U.S.

Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D. C. 20535-0001

November 18, 2003

Daniel Marcus, General Counsel

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
RE: Commission's Request for Documents
Dear Mr. Marcus:
In response to the Commissions Request for Documents, please find the
following:

Documents responsive to Document Request 3-If;

Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #3-e -4 Packets;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #3-h -2 Packets;
— Documents responsive to Document Request 13-11.

This is part of the FBI's rolling production and thus may be supplemented in The
future. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 202-324-9613.

Sincerely,

?ert S. Sinl
assistant General Counsel
 SECURITY DIRECTIVE LIST
DOCUMENTS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE
ORIGIN , MISSION AND RESULTS OF THE
SECURITY DIRECTIVE LIST CREATED AND
DISSEMINATED BY THE FBI IN THE IMMEDIATE
AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.

RESPONSIVE
to
REQUEST #13-11
(PACKET #2)

COMMISSION COPY
 •9/11 COMMISSION TASK-FORO,
DOCUMENT DELETION CODES
[As of August 11, 2003]

"A" - SOURCE/INFORMANT INFORMATION - Information, the disclosure of which

would tend to reveal the identity of an informant or source where confidentiality is
expressed or implied.

"B" - FBI TECHNIQUES AND/OR METHODS - Information on sensitive FBI

techniques and/or methods which would impede or impair the effectiveness of that
technique and/or method.

"C" - NON-RELEVANT FBI CASE INFORMATION - Information neither relevant nor

responsive to the Commission's requests.

"D" - FBI PENDING CASE INFORMATION - Information which would impede or

jeopardize a pending investigation of the FBI.

"E" - STATUTORY - Information legally prohibited from release by statute.

"F" - PRIVACY/SECURITY - Information, the disclosure of which would be an

unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy or jeopardize the safety of law
enforcement personnel and/or -tiicir iaiis% :iiejnhers
Material redacted under this code includes (1) social security nuniFerS;
(2) date and place of birth; (3) home address and telephone numbers;
(4) personnel cell phone and pager numbers

"G" - FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION - The identity of a foreign

government and/or foreign service to include the names of foreign law enforcement
employees/officials.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY - ' , ' , '
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION

Aviation Security Directive

Subject: Threat to U.S. Airports - No Fly and Selectee Lists

Number: SD 1542-01-1 OB Date: April 22, 2003

EXPIRATION: Indefinite

This Security Directive (SD) supercedes and cancels SD 1542-01-10A and must be
implemented not later than April 29, 2003. Revised procedures are indicated by bold
text.

INFORMATION: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has received

information indicating that the individuals on the No Fly and Selectee Lists associated
with this SD could pose a threat to civil aviation and national security.
This SD provides procedures that airport operators are to follow to compare individuals
whose names appear on the No Fly and Selectee Lists with direct employees and those
employees to which the airport has issued Security Identification Display Area (SIDA)
identification media, or is OOH Jdering issuing SIDA identification media.

REVISION SUMMARY:

• Revises procedures for comparing names of direct employees and those employees
to which the airport has issued SIDA identification media or is considering issuing
SIDA identification media against the No Fly and Selectee Lists
• Provides guidance and direction to restrict or p> ;h:hit access to the SIDA and other
sterile areas of the airport

ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIRPORT OPERATORS REGULATED UNDER 49 CFR 1542:

The requirements of this SD are applicable to Category X through IV airports that are
required to maintain SIDAs and sterile areas.

I. TSA will provide No Fly and Selectee Lists to the security coordinator of each airport
to which this SD applies. The No Fly and Selectee Lists will be provided via
password protected email or may be obtained from TSA's secure webpage. All future
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW. AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WAPIiiNRTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE VAY
RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR I i? '•'•-•' ""NMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

REQ 13-11 000000004

'" " """"" ' • " - " " • • • • -•-— -=| r SECUR|TY DIRECTIVE 1542-01-10B .--•'
r Page 2 of 3 .- j

updates (removal or ?vU!ition of names) to thp N> - iy 3,1 i Selectee Lists will be
provided in the S3r KI^^T, Air^Ji>. • * v••>: ^s niuat conduct a comparison
between the names on the most recently issued No Fly and Selectee Lists and
its direct employees and any other individual to whom the airport has issued,
or is processing an application for SIDA, sterile area, or other identification
media that is evidence of employment at the airport.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY
RESULT IN CIViL PPM.1*!,!"' OR OTHER ACTION. FOR US. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

REQ 13-11 000000005

 '. --< SECURITY DIRECTIVE 1542-01-108
9/11 Closed by Statute '~ ] Page 3 of 2 '. I

n. Many nun W-.^^n .-.-^-.\\r-jk do'not follow strict patterns in name order. The names
that;
appear on the No Fly and Selectee Lists may be in varying order and spelling. Data
such ad /
issue, will be provided by TSA when available. This data must be used when making
a comparison between names on the No Fly and Selectee Lists and those individuals
to whom the airport has issued, or is processing an application for, SIDA, sterile
area, or other identification media that is evidence of employment at the airport.

HI. NO FLY LIST ACTIONS

A. If during the course of the name comparison, the airport operator determines it
has issued, or is processing an application for SIDA, sterile area, or other
identification media that is evidence of employment at the airport, to an individual
named on the No Fly List, the airport operator must immediately contact:

1, The nearest FBI Office. _

2. The Transportation Security Intelligence (TSI) Watch ad ~]

B. If processing an application for SIDA, sterile area, or other identification media

that is evidence of employment at the airport, the airport operator must not issue
the media. For those individuals already issued SIDA, sterile area, or other
identification media that is evidence of employment at the airport, the airport
operator must suspend the media and prohibit the individual's access, whether
escorted or unescorted, to the SIDA and sterile areas until the status of the
individual is determined by the FBI.

IV. SELECTEE LIST A

A. If during the course of UIH nam.; comparison, the airport operator determines it
has issued, or is processing an application for SIDA, sterile area, or other
identification media that is evidence of employment at the airport to a direct
employee and that employee is named on the Selectee List, the airport operator
must immediately contact:

1. The nearest FBI Office.

2. The Transportation Security Intelligence (TSI) Watch at| |

B. lu relation to identification media:

1. If the employee has applied for SIDA, sterile area, or other identification media
that is evidence of employment at the airport, the airport operator must not
issue the media until the FBI clears the employee. An airport operator may
issue other than SIDA identification media if that employee will be subject to
screening in accordance with the SD 1542-02-03 series prior to entrance into
any sterile area of the airport.

2. Do not permit the employee access to the SIDA if the employee has already
been issued a SIDA identification media unless that employee is accompanied
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEEO TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 4» CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20SSO. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY
RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR US. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETF.RMINm • ;,nER 5 U.S.C. ?52.

REQ 13-11 000000006

 \* SECURITY DIRECTIVE 1542-01-10B ,.,--'
/~% Page 4 of 3
* ~ t

»scc 1 fho has been issued a SIDA media, or the employee is cleared by

AIRPORT OPERATOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT: The Airport Operator must immediately provide

written confirmation to the Federal Security Director (FSD) indicating receipt of this SD.

AIRPORT dissemination: The FSD will disseminate this SD to the Airport Security
Coordinator (ASC) and any law enforcement element having 49 CFR 1542
responsibilities at that airport. No other dissemination may be made without prior
approval of the FSD.
Airport Law Enforcement Agency Network (ALEAN) affected members who currently have a
memorandum of agreement with the TSA will also receive this SD from the TSA. No other
dissemination may be made without prior approval of the Administrator. Unauthorized
dissemination of this document or information contained herein is prohibited by 49 CFR 1520.

APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: With respect to the provisions of this SD, an

airport operator may submit in writing to the FSD, proposed alternative measures and the
basis for submitting the alternative measures, for approval by the Assistant Administrator
for Aviation Operations.
FOR THA ACTION ONI Y: The TSA shall issue this 80 immediately to 49 CFR 1542 airports
Categc: y X thrcuah IV and to the corporate security element of all affected U.S. aircraft
operators.

/s/
J. M. Loy, ADM
Administrator

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY
RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR US. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

REQ 13-11 000000007

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION

Aviation Security Directive

Subject: Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators - Selectee List

Number: SD 1544-01-21C Date: April 22, 2003

EXPIRATION: Indefinite
This Security Directive (SD) supercedes and cancels SD 1544-01-21B and must be
implemented not later than April 29, 2003. Revised procedures are indicated by bold
text.

INFORMATION: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has received

information indicating that individuals on the Selectee List associated with this SD may
warrant additional scrutiny prior to boarding to ensure they do not pose a threat to civil
aviation and national security.

This SD provides procedures that aircraft operators are to follow to verity the identity of
individuals who.=e names appear on the Selectee List. The procedures outlined herein
appiy to passengers carried by the aircraft operator and the frircnft op^ntoc'.*? dii«iet
employees.

REVISION SUMMARY:
• Revises procedures for verifying the identity of individuals whose names appear on
the Selectee List
• Revises procedures to restrict or prohibit access to restricted areas of an airport by
aircraft operator employees whose names appear on the Selectee List

ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIRCRAFT OPERATORS REGULATED UNDER TITLE 49. CODE

OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR). PART 1544: If you are an aircraft operator covered
by
49 CFR 1544, you must implement all the measures set forth in this SD.

I. TSA will provide a Selectee List to the security director or designee of each
aircraft operator required to implement this SD. The Selectee List will be
provided via password protected email or may be obtained from TSA's secure
webpage. All future updates (removal or addition of names) to the Selectee List
will be provided in the same manner. Aircraft operators must conduct a
comparison between the names on the most recently issued Selectee List and
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 2Q590, UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.
>

REQ 13-11 000000008

 I i
_L.
|_ ..P Security Directive 1544-01 -21 C
9/11 Closed by Statute : ) Page2of4

those passengers checking in for flights. ArtditiuiuiJiv. j<rx.ntft operators must

also conduct a comp-iHJ*,Mi *"o ;< v<on n**^ .•;:;;. cm :..*acti updated Selectee List and all
direct aircraft operator employees and those individuals to which the aircraft
operator has issued Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) identification
media, or is considering issuing SIDA identification media.

n. Many non-Western cultures do not follow strict patterns in name order. The
names that appear on the Selectee List may be in varying order and spelling.
Data such asj |
I | will be provided by ISA when available. This data must be used
during the flight check-in process to assist in the determination of an individual's
status as outlined in Section III of this SD.
HI. PASSENGERS
Should an individual whose name appears on the Selectee List present himself or
herself to the aircraft operator for transport, the aircraft operator must complete
the following procedures prior to allowing the passenger and bags on board the
aircraft:
A. Compare all available passenger data|
| (to information on the Selectee List
to determine if there is a match.
B. If the passenger matches both name and one piece of identifying data or there
is an exact name match and no additional identifying data is provided to you
on the Selectee List, the aircraft operator must:
1. Designate the person as a uelcctcft i'cs financed .srrotming procedures.
2. Clear all checked baggage belonging to Hu> jw? senger, if any, in
accordance with the measures in AOSSP Section VIII. E.
3. Ensure the passenger and all their accessible property are subjected to
secondary screening either at the security screening check point or at the
gate in accordance with SD 1544-01-10 series.
4. Immediately contact the following:
a. The nearoy<c FBI Office if within the United States or the United
States legal attache at the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate if
outside the United States.
b. The local Federal Security Director, if within the United States or its
territories, who will alert other air carriers of that airport of the
situation.
c. The appropriate law enforcement officials at the airport if outside
the United States, advising them of the situation
C. Each aircraft operator must develop a system to document passengers
processed in accordance with Section lll.B. above, and the system must be
approved by the aircraft operator's Principal Security Inspector(PSI). The
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 4t CFR PART 15ZO. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WtTHO.UT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1S20, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SfcOtiniTY ADMINISTRATION; WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CML
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER S U.S.C. 552.

REQ 13-11 000000009

 Security Directive 1544-01-21C
Page 3 of 4 '. }

« ne'r *- j; verification check of the information

.j:•..,.•;•;<;.-;-J o^ aiu oei^ctee List. A record must be maintained at each station
of all flights operated with passengers who are designated as selectees in
accordance with this SD, listing the name of each passenger and the
names of the two aircraft operator representatives who completed the
verification. These records must be maintained at the station for a
minimum of seven (7) days if in the United States or 180 days if outside the
United States.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING; THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER $ U-S.C. SS2.

REQ 13-11 000000010

 l /OCUOl—'- I UT-r-y I ~t. I w /Q£.\" "-Jiv-Wi /u*. v-

\ Security Directive 1S44-01-21C

9/11 Closed by Statute ^ ) Page4of4

D. The procedures in Section Ill.C. do not apply to a passenger designated as a

selectee based on the application of the Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System (CAPPS) or manual prescreening criteria.

IV. AIRCRAFT OPERATOR EMPLOYEES

A. Aircraft operators must conduct a comparison against the most current
Selectee List for ail direct aircraft operator employees. If during the course
of the name comparison the aircraft operator determines that an employee
has been issued, or is processing an application for a SIDA, sterile area, or
other identification media that is evidence of employment with the aircraft
operator, and that employee is named on the Selectee List, the aircraft
operator must immediately contact:

1. The nearest FBI Field Office if within the United States, or the United
States legal attache at the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate, if
outside the United States:
2. The Transportation Security Intelligence (TSI) Watch at|
3. The appropriate law enforcement officials at the airport, advising them
of the situation.
B. Upon completion of the steps in I V.A., aircraft operators must take the
following action in relation to ID media;
'.. If lh« employee has applied to the local airport operator for SIDA
identification media, the aircraft operator must advise the airport
operator not to issue the media until the FBI clears the employee. An
aircraft operator may issue sterile area or other identification media
that Is evidence of employment with the aircraft operator if that
employee will be subject to screening in accordance with the SD 1544-
01-10 series prior to entrance into any sterile area of the airport and
equivalent restricted areas at airports outside of the United States, or .._
2. If the employee has already been issued a SIDA identification media,
the aircraft operator must not permit the employee access to the SIDA
or other airport sterile areas unless that employee is accompanied by
an escort who has been issued and is displaying a valid S^OA media or
is cleared by the FBI.

AIRCRAFT OPERATOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT: The aircraft operator shall provide

immediate written confirmation to its assigned PSI indicating that it has received this SD.

AIRCRAFT OPERATOR dissemination required: The aircraft operator shall immediately pass
•the information and directives set forth in this SD to all stations affected, and provide written
confirmation to its assigned PSI, indicating that all stations affected have acknowledged
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 4» CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 4» CFR 1S20, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION, FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE PETERMINEO UNDER 5 U.S.C. SSZ

REQ 13-11 000000011

 Security Directive 1544-01-21C
Page 5 of 4

• •eipt of the information and directives set forth in this SD.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1S20. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVFPNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

REQ 13-11 000000012

j;Watch%20List%20SD-1544-01-21 C%20rfated%204-22-03[1].doc ,, v • Page 6
' "'" ' ' ' ' '"' "" " """ '""""" '" ' "" ""
Security Directive 1544-01-21C
Page 6 of 4

The aircraft operator shall disseminate uJ -(.io,;nation to senior management personnel,

GSC's, and supervisory security personnel at locations within the United States and its
territories. Aircraft operator security personnel at each location should coordinate the
distribution of information in this SD with local airport management and law enforcement
personnel on a strict need-to-know basis. All recipients must limit dissemination within their
respective organizations to personnel with an operational need-to-know. All aircraft operator
personnel implementing this SD must be briefed by the aircraft operator on its content and the
restrictions governing dissemination.

APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: With respect to the provisions of this SD, the
aircraft operator may submit in writing to its Principal Security Inspector (PSI) proposed
alternative measures and the basis for submitting the alternative measures, for approval by
the Assistant Administrator for Aviation Operations. The aircraft operator shall
immediately notify its PSI whenever any procedure in this SD cannot be carried out by the
aircraft operator or its agents, or is not being carried out by a government authority charged
with performing security procedures.

FOR TSA ACTION ONLY: The TSA shall issue this SD immediately to the corporate <?pnirity
element of all affected U.S. aircraft operators and to local airport management and
associated law enforcement officials.

Is/
J. M. Loy, ADM
Administrator

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1S20. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DERNED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20S90. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
PENAL IY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

REQ 13-11 000000013

ii\3tch%20List%20SD-l544-01-20B%2&'2ted%204-22-03n].doc *. V Page 1

U.S. DEPARTMENT Or HOMCUVK)

SECURITY
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION

Aviation Security Directive

Subject: Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators - No Fly List

Number: SD 1544-01-20B Date: April 22, 2003

EXPIRATION: Indefinite
This Security Directive (SD) supercedes and cancels SD 1544-01-20A and must be
implemented not later than April 29, 2003. Revised procedures are indicated by bold
text

INFORMATION: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has received

information indicating that individuals on the No Fly List associated with this SD could
pose a threat to civil aviation and national security.

There have been many instances where the name of a passenger is identical or similar to
an individual on the No Fly List. This SD provides revised guidance and direction
concerning use of the No Fly List and procedures aircraft operators are to follow to
resolve name conflicts. Affirming the incorrect iderrtity of the Individual can cause
unnecessary embarrassment and inability to board a flight Additionally, this SD revises
procedures currently in piaec which prohibit aircraft operator employees whose names
appear on the No Fly List, accost to restricted areas of airports.

REVISION SUMMARY:
• Revises procedures for verifying the identity of individuals whose names appear on
or are similar to names on the No Fly List
• Provides guidance and direction for the use of the No Fly List and procedures aircraft
operators are to follow to quickly resolve conflicts
• Revises procedures to restrict or prohibit access to restricted areas of an airport by
aircraft operator employees whose names appear on the No Fly List

ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIRCRAFT OPERATORS REGULATED UNDER TITLE 49. CODE

OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR). PART 1544: If you are an aircraft operator covered
by
49 CFR 1544, you must implement all the measures set forth in this SD.

I. TSA will provide a No Fly List to the security director or designee of each aircraft
operator required to implement this SD. The No Fly List will be provided via
password protected email or may be obtained from TSA's secure webpage. All
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RFLEAS* MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNI.,.;: j u.J.C. 552.

REQ 13-11 000000014

i'Watch%20List%20SD-1 544-01 -
Security Directive 1544-01 -208
Page 2 of 1

nb_r?o j updates ^removal or addition of names) to the No Fly List will be provided in
the same manner. Aircraft operators must conduct a comparison between the

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHING. \C 2059^ UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBUti AVV.,1 ABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

REQ 13-11 000000015

Watch%20List%20SD-1544-01-20S%2g-J?rted%204-22-03[1].doc
' f " ~ N S e c u r i t y Directive 1544-01-208
9/11 Closed b y Statute : ] Page3°f1

names on the most recently issued No Hy Lisi and tlioue passengers checking in
for flights. Additionally, aircraft operators must also conduct a comparison
between names on each updated No Fly List and all direct aircraft operator
employees and those individuals to which the aircraft operator has issued SIDA
identification media, or is processing an application for SIDA identification media.

II. Many non-Western cultures do not follow strict patterns in name order. The names
that appear on the No Fly List may be in varying order and spelling. Data such as
/ I
will be provided by TSA when available. This data must be used during the flight
check-in process to assist in the determination of an individual's status as
outlined in Section III of this SD.

III. PASSENGERS
A. Check Prior to Arrival: When passenger reservation data is available in
advance of the arrival of a passenger for check-in, the aircraft operator must
conduct a comparison of its flight reservation system to the most current No
Fly List. During this process, if an aircraft operator matches a name and at
least one additional piece of identifying data on its flight reservation system
with the No Fly List, excluding a match of identifying data that appears in the
Remarks Section of the No Fly List, the aircraft operator must immediately
contact the following:
1. The nearest FBI Field Office, if the departing flight is within the
' hji'-r-j States, or the United States legal attache at the nearest U.S.
Embassy or Consulate, if the departing flight is outside the United States,
2. The Transportation Security Intelligence (TSI) Watch at/ ~\
3. The local Federal Security Director, if the departing flight is within the
United States, who will alert other aircraft operators at that airport of the
situation.

B. Clearance at Check-In (Within the United States); Upon arrival of a

passenger for check-in at an airport in the United States, the aircraft
operator must conduct a comparison botv/een the names on the most
recently issued No Fly List and their flight reservation -system. During this
process, if an aircraft operator matches a name and, if provided, at least one
additional piece of identifying data on its flight reservation system with a
name on the No Fly List, excluding a match of identifying data that appears
in the Remarks Section (if the passenger matches data in the Remarks
Section, see HI. B. 4.), the aircraft operator must deny transportation to that
individual, their accessible property, checked baggage, and any other
individual(s) accompanying the passenger and their baggage unless cleared
by the following process:
1. Contact the appropriate local law enforcement officials and ensure the
responding Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) compares all available data
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1620. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. WASHINGTON, DC 205»0. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR 11/3. «UVfctlNME.NT,AGENCIES, PUBUC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER * U AC. SSZ.

REQ 13-11 000000016

Watch%20List%20SD-1544-01 -20B%25Mated%204-22-03[1 j.dbc Page 4 ;
Security Directive 1544-01-20B
Page 4 of 1

to determine if the individual is a match.

9/11 Closed by Statute

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1S20, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. WASHINGTON. DC 20S90. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
P6N«L<Y OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER S U.S.C. *8Z.

REQ 13-11 000000017

iI .Watch%20List%20SD-1544-01
. . . .... ,
-20B%2Qr<3ted%204-22-03[1].doc
..... , . , .gr ^. >...*.. . .-:•
f'""T Security Directive 1544-01-20B

9/11 Closed by Statute

2. If the LEO determines there is no matching data from the No Fly List
other than the individual's name, the aircraft operator may accept the
individual as a passenger for transport.
3. If the LEO determines that an individual matches the name and at least
one additional piece of identifying data (requirement to match additional
data does not apply where only a name is listed) from the No Fly List, the
aircraft operator must immediately contact the following:
a. The nearest FBI Field Office.
b. The Transportation Security Intelligence Watch at| I
c. The local Federal Security Director who will alert other aircraft
operators at that airport of the situation.
4^ Match of identifying data that appears in the Remarks Section of the No
Fly List. TSA may provide identifying data in the Remarks Section of the
No Fly List for an individual who bears a name that is the same as, or
similar to, a name on the No Fly List, but who is permitted to fly. This
identifying data will be used to confirm that the individual is not the
person identified as a threat on the No Fly List.
a. TSA will accept, from individuals only, written requests for relief from the No Fly
List clearance procedures of III. B. 1., 2., and 3.
b. If TSA establishes that an individual requesting relief is not on the
No Fly List, TSA will include in tho R?mar!-;r- Sectioo of the No Fly
List the identifying data tSuiu distinguishes the cicii.od passenger
from the individual who \* prohibited from flying.
c. An aircraft operator must implement a system approved by its
Principal Security Inspector (P3I) that:
(1) Utilizes the data provided in the Remarks Section of the No
Fly List to clear an individual for flights at check-in without
the procedures, listed in 111. B. 1., 2., and 3.
(2) Provides a procedure to verify that an authorized aircraft
operator representative responsible for verification of the No
Fly List applies these clearance procedures.
(3) Maintains at each station a record of every flight that operated
with an individual who was cleared to fly with these clearance
procedures, including listing the name of each individual and
the names of two representatives of the aircraft operator who
completed the verification. These records must be maintained
at the station for a minimum of seven (7) days.
C. Clearance at Check-In (Outside of the United States); Upon arrival of a
passenger for check-in at an airport outside of the United States, the aircraft
operator must conduct a comparison between the names on the most
recently issued No Fly List and their flight reservation system. When an
SENSITIVE SECURfTY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 48 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN «» CFR 1S20, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. WASHINGTON, OC 20SSO. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMWF_L> UNO K "i i I.S.C. 552.

REQ 13-11 000000018

 -> Security Directive 1544-01-20B -*
^ \e 6 of 1 - j
Closed by S t a t u t e ' ' •'
individual rrmtcirjs information on the No Fly List, excluding a match of identifying
data that appears in the Remarks Section (if the passenger mat<;hos <Htn <;,< tfu,

Remarks Section, see III.C.4.), an aircraft operator must deny transportation

to that individual, their accessible property, checked baggage, and any other
individual(s) accompanying the passenger and their baggage unless cleared
by:
1. The United States legal attache at the nearest U. S. Embassy or
Consulate.
2. The Transportation Security Intelligence (TSI) Watch aq |
3. Additionally, the appropriate law enforcement officials at the airport
should be notified.
4. Match of identifying data that appears in the Remarks Section of the No
Fly List. TSA may provide identifying data in the Remarks Section of the
No Fly List for an individual who bears a name that is the same as, or
similar to, a name on the No Fly List, but who is permitted to fly. This
identifying data must be used to confirm that the individual is not the
person identified as a threat on the No Fly List.
a. TSA will accept, from Individuals only, written requests for relief
from the No Fly List clearance procedures of this SD.
b. If TSA establishes that an individual requesting relief is not on the
No Fly List, TSA will include in the Remarks Section of the No Fly
Listfhe identify!n»:,' d;iia Uiat distinguishes the cleared passenger
frouj tao individual who is prohibited from flying.
<... An aircraft operator must implement a system approved by its
Principal Security Inspector (PSI) that:
(1) Utilizes the data provided in the Remarks Section of the No
Fly List to clear an individual for flights at check-in,
alleviating the requirement to process the passenger through
the procedures of III.C.1., 2., and 3.
(2) Provides a procedure to verify that an authorized aircraft
operator representative responsible for verification of the No
Fly List applies these clearance procedures.
(3) Maintains at each station a record of every flight that
operated with an individual who was cleared to fly with these
clearance procedures, including listing the name of each
individual and the names of two representatives of the
aircraft operator who completed the verification. These
records must be maintained at the station for a minimum of
one hundred and eighty (180) days.

IV. AIRCRAFT OPERATOR EMPLOYEES

SENSfTIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1SJO. EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBUC AV*M ABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER S U.S.C. 5C2.
^

REQ 13-11 000000019

 I * Security Directive 1544-01-20B >...*
r~l Page 7 of 1 - \. Aircraft operators must,condnct a comparison be

updated No Fly List and its direci airci-n I «r;i vor s^ipioyees and those
individuals to which the aircraft operator has issued, or is processing an
application for SI DA, sterile area, or other identification media that is
evidence of employment with the aircraft operator.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

REQ 13-11 000000020

 Security DlrecUve 1544-01-20B
Page 8 of 1
9/11 Closed by Statute

B. |f during the course of the name comparison an aircraft operator

determines it has issued, or is processing an application for a SIDA, sterile
area, or other identification media that is evidence of employment with the
aircraft operator, fpr an individual named on the No Fly List, the aircraft
operator must immediately contact the following:
1. The nearest FBI Field Office, if within the United States, or the United
States legal attache at the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate, if outside
the United States.
2. The Transportation Security Intelligence Watch aq I
3. The local Federal Security Director who will alert other aircraft operators
at that airport of the situation.

C. If processing an application for a SIOA, sterile area, or other ID media that is

evidence of employment with the aircraft operator, the aircraft operator must
not issue the media. For those individuals already issued SIDA. sterile area,
or other identification media that is evidence of employment with the aircraft
operator, the aircraft operator must suspend the media and prohibit the
individual's access, whether escorted or unescorted, to the SIDA and sterile
areas until the status of the individual is determined by the FBI.

AIRCRAFT OPERATOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT: Upon receipt of this SD, the aircraft operator
•.;i! )il iKovido immediate written confirmation to its assigned PS!, indicating that they iwra
received this SD.

AIRCRAFT OPERATOR dissemination required: The aircraft operator shall immediately pass
the information and directives set forth in this SD to all stations affected, and provide written
confirmation to its assigned PSI, indicating that all stations affected have acknowledged
receipt of the information and directives set forth in this SD.

The aircraft operators shall disseminate this information to senior management personnel,
GSC's, and supervisory security personnel at locations within the United States and its
territories. Aircraft operator security personnel at each location should coordinate the
information in this SD with local a*i port management and law enforcement personnel on a strict
need-to-know basis. All recipients must limit dissemination within their respective organizations
to personnel with an operational need-to-know. All aircraft operator personnel implementing
this SD must be briefed by the aircraft operator on its content and the restrictions governing
dissemination.

APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: With respect to the provisions of this SD, as

stated in 49 CFR 1544, aircraft operators may submit in writing to their PSI, proposed
alternative measures and the basis for submitting the requests, for approval by the Assistant
Administrator for Aviation Operations. The aircraft operator shall immediately notify its PSI
whenever the aircraft operator or its agents cannot carry out any procedure in this SD, or is
not being carried out by a government authority charged with performing security procedures.
SENSmVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 41 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW. AS DEFINED IN 4t CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, OC S0590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
PFH",LTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 8 U.S.C. SSI

REQ 13-11 000000021

Watch0/o20L.ist%20SD-1544-01 -20B%2Qi3ted%204-22-03[1].doc'
Security Directive 1544-01-20B
Page 9 of 1

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20S90. UNAUTHORIZED ZKLi-ASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

REQ 13-11 000000022

Watch%20List%20SD-1544-01-20B%^lated%204-22-03[1].doc K •, Page 101
• - • '- •••- — - - - ' — •" --" " ' " " ' "' ' ' " ' '"'•' f ,..?'"''•'"" ' Ty;.".v.;;••*•••.", •v.-..-.:,:.lr:';r-~—r^--r.-;v,..-.--".• -•.•-•--• r - f..,.--....„..J

Security Directive 1544-01-20B

Page 10 of 1

FOR ISA ACTION ONLY: The TSA shall issue this SD immediately to the corporate security
element of all affected U.S. aircraft operators and to local airport management and associated
law enforcement officials.

FOR STATE DEPARTMENT: Retransmittal to appropriate foreign posts is authorized. Post

must refer to STATE 162917, 201826Z Sep 01, Subject: FAA Security Directives and
Information Circulars: Definitions and Handling, for specific guidance and dissemination.

fsl
J. M. Loy, ADM
Administrator

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. WASHINGTON, DC 20S90. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC A'/ '.il ABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER S U.S.C. 552.

REQ 13-11 000000023

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

(Rev. 01-31-2003) '- } /, t

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY Date: 06/09/2003

To: All Field Offices Attn: ADIC/SAC

ASAG Counterterrorism
JTTF Supervisors
Airport Liaison Agents
FBIHQ, Manuals Desk
All Legats
Counterterrorism Attn: Section Chief, ITOS I
Section Chief, ITOS II
Section Chief, DTOS
Unit Chiefs

From: Counterterrorism
Special Events Management Unit/
Civil Aviation Security Program
Contact: SSAJi

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: 3UOti-HQ-< :iLA-i203 -K (Pending)

66F-HQ-C1384970
Title: TSA NO FLY AND TSA SELECTEE LIST;
PROCEDURES TO ADD OR REMOVE NAMES
Reference: 265A-NY-280350-WLC Serial 98
265A-NY-280350-WLC Serial 89
265A-NY-280350 Serial 1586
66F-HQ-C13928S2 Serial 8
Enclosure: The following three TSA Avj.,\tion Security Directives,
dated April 22, 2003, are enclosed:
(1) SD-1544-01-21C, "Threat to U.S. Aixorai7t Operators-Selectee
List" ;
(2) SD-1542-01-10B, "Threat to U.S. Airports-No Fly and Selectee
Lists"; and,
(3) SD-1544-01-20B, "Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators-No Fly
List. "

REQ 13-11
000000024
To: All Field O f e s From: Counterterroriv
-A
Re: 300B-HQ-C1184^03-K, 06/09/2003

Synopsis: To advise of procedures established to provide consistent

application of names submitted by the FBI to the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) No Fly and Selectee Lists.

Details: Background:
On October 15, 2001, the FAA issued Security Directives
(SD's) after receiving lists of individuals associated with Al-Qaeda
from both the CIA and the FBI. The SD's contained a list of persons
who were believed to pose a threat to civil aviation security. This
process was refined to a coordinated policy and protocol between the
FBI, CIA, and FAA (now the TSA) to identify persons who may pose a
threat to civil aviation security. Since late 2001, there have been
refinements -to the protocol in which persons are either placed on or
removed from either'list. The TSA maintains the two lists and names
are submitted mostly by the CIA and the FBI, but also from the
Department of Homeland Security/Bureau of Immigration and Customs
.Enforcement, TSA, and on occasion, other agencies.
The TSA No Fly List and TSA Selectee List are not to be
confused with other watch lists, such as:

a.
b.
o.
d.
e.
f.

Definitions of each list

The perspns o<.. the TSA No Flv List are to be prevented from
using U.S. commercial Aviation, since they have been deemed by the
TSA to be a threat to civil aviation security, based upon information
received from various sources. These individuals may not use
commercial aviation as long as their name appears on the TSA No Fly
List.
When a person on this list arrives at an airport and
attempts to fly, the airline is required to alert local law
enforcement. Local law enforcement authorities will be the primary-
response to determine if the person at the airport matches the person
on the list. If there is a positive match, then the local law

REQ 13-11 000000025

 js-TV /~v
To: All Field Of; ):es From: Counterterrori. j
Re: 300B-HQ-C1184203-K, 06/09/2003

enforcement authorities will contact the local FBI Field Office's

Airport Liaison Agent or Joint Terrorism'Task Force. The FBI shall
then respond to the airport to conduct further investigation,
including identity checks, consensual interview, and notification to
FBIHQ. Such responses should be documented at the field division
level.
A detention is generally warranted for individuals with an
outstanding arrest warrant, or if investigation reveals the person is
on an operational terrorist mission.
The persons on the TSA Selectee List are not known to be a
threat to aviation, but an agency has said, they may have a possible
connection to terrorism or a terrorist organization. Passengers
determined to match the name on this list are subject to enhanced
pre-boarding security screening measures, and ultimately, are
permitted to travel on commercial aviation. The .airlines are also
required to notify both local and airport law enforcement and the'
local FBI office. However, as long as individuals are subject to
enhanced screening, additional law enforcement review is not
required.
The backbone to the regulatory process for the civil
aviation industry is Security Directives, issued by the TSA (formerly
Federal Aviation Administration) . Over the past twenty months, the
TSA has issued updated SB's that outline actions for airport
operators and airliner; in regard to names appearxug on either the TSA
No Fly List or TSA 3ei<>c'i:ee Li3t. '
In essence, the SD' d advise airport operators to (1) check
applicants for airport ID card (e.g., SIDA badge) applicants names
against the TSA No Fly List and TSA Selectee List, and (2) outline
procedures for airlines to check passengers names and employees for
name matches from either list. Responses to positive name
identification may require FBI involvement for further identification
and interview after screening by local or airport law enforcement in
questionable cases of identity.
To control all names placed on and removed from both the TS-\o Fly
file (300B-HQ-C1184203-K), has been established for accountability
purposes in the Counterterrorism Division. This file number shall be
appropriately referenced in all documentation.
Procedures to add or remove a person for both lists:
The Counterterrorism Division has developed the following
procedures to add a person to either the TSA No Fly List or TSA
/\. Selectee List. TSA has concurred with the following procedures:

REQ 13-11 000000026

 f ,-?
To: All Field Of5 )es From: Counterterrory,
Re: 300B-HQ-C1184^03-K, 06/09/2003

1. . A substantive terrorism case, such as a 265 and 199 or a

266, must be open on the subject. (Neither a Headquarters
nor Field Office's control file may be used for this
purpose.)
2. Submissions to either the TSA No-Fly List or the TSA
Selectee List must be done via an EC that is uploaded with
unrestricted text. The person's name and identifying
information must also be indexed in UNI. Submissions to
add or remove a person via an e-mail message or telephone
call will be denied.
3. The EC must include all of the following:
a. The substantive file number(s) and the control file number
(300B-HQ-C1184203-K) ;
b. Addressed to the following three ' units in t-h<=»
Counterterrorism Division at Headquarters:

(1) the appropriate FBIHQ operational unit;

(2) Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit, Room 11303; and
(3) Special Events Management Unit/Civil Aviation Security
Program, Room 11795.
c. . The Synous.L-; section of the EC should state:- "Kequ«su i ' < >
.-i.dd for remove] [Name] [DOB], a U.. S. citizen [or USPER o;.-
non-TfSPER] , to [or from] the TSA No Fly List [or TSA
Selectee List]-" Example: Request to add John Q. Citizen,
DOB 03/15/1971, a U.S. citizen, to the TSA No Fly List.

d. The Details section of the EC must specify: (1) which of

the ' two lists (TSA No-Fly or TSA Selectee) the person
should be added or removed, (2) whether the person is an
USPER (citizen) , USPER (non-citizen, such as a Permanent
Resident Alien or lawful non-immigrant visa status), or a
non-USPER, and (3) complete identifying infor.mat-.ion.

e. For all persons -- including npn-citizen USPERs and non-

USPERs - - t h e E C must include a \

a person to either list without these three pieces of

information.
f. For USPERs, and non-USPERs when the information is
attainable, the identifying information shall include all

9/11 Closed by
Statute

REQ 13-11 000000027

9/11 Closed by Statute
>
V— - /••
To: All Field Off }es From: Counterterrori',
Re: • 3003-HQ-C1184203-K, OS/09/2003 •

... other known identifiers, such as.-f

g. The Details section of the EC must describe: (1) the

person's known or suspected connections to terrorism or a
terrorist organization, and (2) the reasons to believe the
person poses a threat to civil aviation security.
h. The Details section of the EC must include a point-of-
contact who is thoroughly familiar with the case, such as
the case agent, co-case agent, and/or supervisor. The POC
should be available at all hours (24/7) in case questions
arise about the person placed on the list. Include direct-
dial work numbers, pager number, and cellular number for"
each POC.
i. The Leads section of the EC must include at least four
leads to the Counterterrorism Division:
(1) the operational unit's Unit Chief to review and
approve;
(2) the operational unit's SSA;
(i) Terrorism Watch and Warning Unit ("Road and clear"),.
and; .' • _
(4) Special Events Management Unit/Civil Aviation Security
Unit ("Read and clear") .
Approval of request
4. Note that only a Unit Chief or higher in the Counterterrorism.
Division at HQ may approve the inclusion (or deletion) of a
person, onto either list. No one In any field office or Legal
Attache has approval authority.

a. Approval to add to the TSA Mo Flv List: If the Unit Chief

(or higher) approves the request to add a person, then
he/she will add the following statement: "The FBI considers
this person to be a threat to civil aviation security."
b. Approval to delete from the TSA No Flv List: If the Unit
Chief (or higher) approves the request to delete a person,
then he/she will ad'd the following statement: "The FBI no
longer believes this person is a threat to civil aviation
security."

REQ 13-11 000000028

 ,,9/ll Law Enforcement Privacy

To: 1 "«s
All Field Offf * /\ J
From: Counterterrori»""N
Re: 300B-HQ-C1184-.3-K, 06/09/2003, V.-/

c. Approval to add_ to the TSA Selectee, List:: If the Unit

Chief (or higher) / approves t;he request to add a person,
then he/she will add the following statement: "The FBI
believes this person may have 'a possible link to terrorism
and may be a threat to civil aviation security."
d. Approval to delete from the.TSA Selectee List: If the Unit
Chief (or highei") approves the request to delete a person,
then he/she will add the following statement: "The FBI no
longer believes this person to \e a threat to civil
aviation security."

If the Unit Chief or higher in the operational unit in the

Counterterrorism Division approves the addition to or removal
from either list, then it is the responsibility of the
operational unit .to coordinate with the TSA's detailees on the-
FBI's National J0int Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) for inclusion
or deletion. / \ . . ...-
The TSA's detailees to the NJTTF are currently j J and
/ ~~7- They will forward the approved request to TSA
from for placement (or removal) on the appropriate list.
Mandatory review of USPERs

6. TI an USPER is added to either list, then th-:s -•jubmittor of the

USPKR is required to review whct-.-hor the. person should remain on
the list. This mandatory review will occur when the case is"
closed and every 120 days after the- date- of the EC that
requested submission of that person to the list. Note that an
USPER can remain on the list even if the Field Office has closed
their investigative or intelligence case, as long as there is
justification to do so. The justification would have to be"
articulated in an EC uploaded to the substantive and control
files, and it must include articulable facts that the person
continues to pose a threat to civil aviation security. Even if"
. the Field Office ha.-; closed the case, it is still required to
conduct a review and document the results every 120 days.

The results of the review -- that is, the reasons to maintain

the person on the list or the reasons to remove the person from
the list -- will be documented in an EC that is uploaded with
unrestricted text. The EC will be sent, as above, to the same
units in the Counterterrorism Division with the same leads,
described above.

If the Field Office, Legat, or operational unit in the-

Counterterrorism Division concludes prior to the closure of the

* J~
 To: All Field Of* fes From: Counterterrori's^ ;
Re: 300B-HQ-C1184203-K, 06/09/2003

9/11 Lav; Enforcement Privacy

case, or prior to the mandatory"120 day review, that the person
no longer poses a threat to civil aviation security, then an EC
should be submitted immediately to request deletion from the
list. """•-..

Distribution of the lists

The most current TSA No Fly List and TSA Selectee. List are e--
mailed to all Airport Liaison Agents, Legats, and Joint. Terrorism
Task Force members as soon as they are received from the TSA by the
Counterrorism Division, Special Events Management Unit/Civil Aviation
Security Program. Dissemination of these lists may occur as much., ai
twice daily. The points-of-contact in that unit are SSA
I
The lists are also posted on the FBI's Intranet, SIOC Operations,
TSA/FBI Support Page, which is located at:
/ I
FBI response to an airport

If an FBI response is warranted, then full database checks and •

I other .appropriate investigation should be conducted and documented.
< The Terrorist .Watch and Warning Unit is available 24/7 at I I
• I I as a resource to check ACS and NCIC.on possible matches.
; I If FBI searches are negative,, but; i.t •.: dcturuiirind the person is
; ; a match, then - Lhe t'.! i.-l.o agent should contact.,- the TSA's 24-hour.
I i command center at I I for background information'.. TSA's.
; ; command center maintains documentation on all persons on both lists
I I provided to them by the FBI and all o'th^r, agencies who contribute to-
/ ; the lists. For. these instances, it is .recommended that responses to
; I positive name matches on the lists bex maintained in the appropriate
- / I airport liaison or. civil aviation security file in the field
; ! division. / ,.• .
For Itegat response purposes, Individuals appearing on the TSA No
/1 Fly. list may not utilize, U.S. commercial aviation. Interview and
;; identification of the individual will rest within the appropriate
local law enforcement jurisdiction, at the request of the FBI. If the
:. individual uses a,foreign-flag air carrier to attempt to enter the
I! U.S. and cannot.be prevented from traveling, the FBI • office at the
;/ arriving city, must be contacted for appropriate action as soon as
II possible. For reference, it is the responsibility of the TSA to
I! include names appearing on the TSA No Fly List to also be entered in
ll TIPOFF and TECS.
In instances in which individuals are prevented from flying and
;• / wish to voice their objection, the TSA, Office of the Ombudsman has

9/11 Law Enforcement. '

Sensitive

REQ 13-11 000000030

 V i #
To: All Field Ofl. Jes From: Counterterrorik,.
Re: 300B-HQ-C11S4203-K, 06/09/2003

been organized to handle such matters. They can be contacted, in

writing, at: Office of the Ombudsman, Transportation Security
Administration, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202.

REQ 13-11 000000031

To: All Field O f j a s From: Counterterrori^
Re: 300B-HQ-C1184V03-K, 06/09/2003

TSA Security Directive 1544-01-20A

[Note that this SD was replaced on April 22, 2003 by TSA SD-1544-01-
2OB, but is included here for background]:

US Department of Transportation
Transportation Security Administration

Civil Aviation Security

Security Directive
Information of Concern to Aviation Security Personnel:
Current Security Procedures Should be Reviewed

Subject: Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators — No Fly List

Number: SD 1544-01 -20 A
Date: April 5, 2002
EXPIRATION: Indefinite

This Security Directive (SD) 1544-01-20A supercedes and cancels the SD 108-01-20 and must be implemented immediately upon
receipt by corporate offices.

INFORMATION: The TSA has received information indicating the individuals on the list associated with this Security Directive
are dangerous and could pose a threat to civil
aviation.

REVISION SUMMARY-
'—Updates I'Cguldtoiycitario"-,
-Provides an additional option for clearing passengers listed on the No Fly Sm.

ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIR CARRIERS REGULATED UNDER TITLE 49. CODE OF FEDERAL RlL(J(Jt ATiONS CCFR"). PART
1544: if you are an aircraft operator covered by 49 CFR Part 1544, you must implement all the measures set forth in this SD.

I. TSA will provide a No Fly List to you. All future updates to the list will be forwarded by the TSA to your corporate security
office under separate cover. It is anticipated that .names may be added or removed from this list. When you receive mt updated
No Fly List, you must immediately conduct a comparison of passengers boarding all flights, as well as screeners and direct air
carrier employees. ,

II. Many non-Western cultures do not follow strict patterns in name IK dor. The names that appear on the No Fly List may be in
varying order and spelling. Data such as Date of Birth, Citizenship, Passport Number, etc, will be provided when available.

III. PASSENGERS
A. Should you find in your flight reservation system an individual whose name appears on the No Fly List, you must immediately
notify:

The nearest field office of the FBI, and at overseas locations the nearest United States Embassy.

B. Should an individual whose name appears on the No Fly List present himself or herself for transport, you must deny
transportation for that individual, their accessible property, checked baggage and any person(s) accompanying that individual
and their baggage until cleared by one of the following processes:

REQ 13-11 000000032

To: All Field Off }es From: Counterterrori i
Re: 300B-HQ-C1184z03-K,\._06/09/2003 "'_

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Info)
ALL RECEIVING OFFICES
Disseminate as appropriate.-

12

REQ 13-11 000000035

 SECURITY DIRECTIVE LIST
DOCUMENTS SUFFICIENT TO ESTBALISH THE
ORIGIN , MISSION AND RESULTS OF THE
SECURITY DIRECTIVE LIST CREATED AND
DISSEMINATED BY THE FBI IN THE IMMEDIATE
AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.

RESPONSIVE
to
REQUEST #13-11

COMMISSION COPY
9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy*

(Rev, 08-28-2000) ' .

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 11/04/2001

To: All Field Offices Attn: ADIC's

SA.C's
CDC 1 s
LEGAT's
All Legats
From: Counter-terrorism
\M 5328
Contact:
Approved By:

Drafted By:
Case ID #: 265A-NY-280350-WLC (Pending)
265A-NY-280350 (Pending)

Title: PENTTBOM
Major Case # 182
OO:NY
Synopsis: Information and guidance to aii offices regarding
FAA Security Directive(SD), SD 108-01-15B and SD 108-01-17.

Reference:
265A-NY-280350-WLC Serial 89
265A-NY-280350 Serial 15786

Details: The FAA issued two SDs, SD 108-01-15E on October 15,

.2001 and SD 108-01-17 on October 26, 2001, after receiving
lists of individuals associated with AL-Qaida/PSNTTBOM from
both the CIA and FBI. SD 108-01-15B contained a list of names
provide by the CIA and SD 108-01-17 contained a list of names
provided by the FBI as noted in the above referenced
communications. The SDs stated that the individuals listed in
the attachment may pose a threat to civil aviation, should be
denied transportation and the carrier should immediately
contact the FBI. The attachment to SD 108-01-15B contained
Name List 4 updated on October 27,2001. The attachment to SD
108-01-17 contained Name List 3.
The FBI and CIA both believed that by providing
names and having them listed on a SD, it would give the FBI
and CIA a useful tool for tracking and/or locating Al-
Qaida/PENTTBOM associates. It however quickly became apparent

REQ 13-11 000000001

To: All Field Off .es From: Counterterrori;
Re: 265A-NY-280350-WLC, 11/04/2001

that without close coordination, this was not an effective and

efficient way to utilize the SD asset. It was determined that
the FBI, CIA and FAA must first establish a policy for
provided names and also establish a protocol when an associate
is identified. In addition the field and HQ must have in-
place the established infrastructure to adequately administer
such a program.
The FBI has reviewed Name List 3 and determined that
there is no conclusive evidence that any of the listed
individuals pose a present threat to Civil Aviation. The FBI
has requested that the FAA recall SD 108-01-17 at this time.
The CIA has not at this time requested that SD 108-
01-15B be recalled. Therefore the field when asked by airline
or airport security must respond and interview individuals who
match the names of those individuals on SD 108-01-15B Name
List 4. The field will fully identify the individual and
determine through an interview if identical to the individual
on Name List 4. The CIA has not provided to the FBI the
criteria use for selecting these individuals however all are
believed to be known members of terrorist organizations. If
identical to a name contained in SD 108-01-15B Name List 4 the
field is requested to check indices and notify the substantive
.FBIHQ unit. If no substantive- unit can be determined contact
the writer until a protocol is established. FBIHQ is aware of
the difficulty the field has had in positively identifying
these individuals and responding to calls by airline and
airport security due to the lack of identifiers. FBIHQ is
also aware of the lack of information regarding why the CIA
has asked the FAA to place these individuals in a SD. These
issues are presently being addressed by FBIHQ.
The FBI, CIA and FAA both believe that the SD is an
effective tool. That when used correctly the SD could provide
the community with a wealth of information from tracking a
target's travel to locating a target. However a protocol must
be established and mechanisms must be in-place to fully
utilize this asset. FBIHQ in coordination with the CIA and
FAA is presently engaged in discussions that will develop the
protocol and establish the mechanisms necessary for utilizing
this asset. The field will be advised by EC when this has
been accomplish. FBIHQ will establish a POC to coordinate
future request from the field for placing names on FAA SDs.

REQ 13-11 000000002

To: All Field Ofi _es From: Counterterrori.
Re: 265A-NY-280350-WLC, 11/04/2001

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1:

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Read and Clear.

REQ 13-11 000000003

 U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D. C. 20535-0001

November 5, 2003

Daniel Marcus, General Counsel

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
RE: Commission's Request for Documents
Dear Mr. Marcus:
In response to the Commission's Request for Documents, please find the
following:

Documents responsive to Document Request 13-9a;

Documents responsive to Document Request 13-9b;
Documents responsive to Document Request 13-9c;

This is part of the FBI's rolling production and thus may be supplemented in the
future. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 202-324-9613.

Robert S. Sinton
Assistant General Counsel