T5 B59 DOS Misc 1 of 2 FDR - Entire Contents - Memos - Cables - 19 Withdrawal Notices

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 51630 FQIA CASE NUMBER: 30768
WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008
BOX: 00025 FOLDER: 0004 TAB: 1 DOC ID: 31199244
COPIES: 1 PAGES: 4
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2]
DOCUMENT DATE: 07/10/2003 DOCUMENT TYPE: Memorandum
FROM: Counterterrorism..
TO: Legat Berlin
SUBJECT:
This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Classified Information
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

NND PROJECT NUMBER: 51630 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768
COPIES: 1 PAGES: 1
DOCUMENT DATE: DOCUMENT TYPE: List
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: List of documents

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 2
DOCUMENT DATE: 05/20/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Teletype
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT:

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 3
RESTRICTED
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT:

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 3
_ACCESS RESTRICTED
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT:

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 4
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT:

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 3
ACCESS RESTRICTED
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT:

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 3
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT:

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 3
j^CESS^RESTRICTED
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT:

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 1
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT:

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 2
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT:

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES:
ACCESS RESTRICTED
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT:

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 3
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT:

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES:
ACCESS RESTOICTCD
DOCUMENT DATE: DOCUMENT TYPE: Report
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Document Forgery

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES:
FROM: Zelikow and Jacobson
TO: Commissioners
SUBJECT: Memorandum and two 2page attachments, PDB Article

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 8
_ACCESS RESTRICTED
FROM: Daniel Marcus
TO: CIA, Litigation Division
SUBJECT: Document Responsive to Item Nos. 1 of CIA Question for the Records No. 1,
Memorandum and Fax cover sheets.

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/ES
UNCLASSIFIED
t
To: The Secretary
From: CA - George C. Lannon
Subject: Press and Congressional Attention on the "Visa Express"
Interview-by-Exception Program in Saudi Arabia
Since the September 11 attacks, the press has been focusing
on visa procedures, most recently the interview-by-exception
program known as "Visa Express" used by our Mission in Saudi
Arabia (Tab 1). The program is almost certain to come under
scrutiny by Congress, which will question how our posts can
continue to waive interviews for visa applicants given the threat
of issuance to terrorists.
"Visa Express" is a variation of a Department-approved
personal-appearance waiver program under which visa applications
are reviewed without interviews unless the consular officer
determines that such an interview is necessary. Interview-by-
exception is a common practice in countries with generally low
refusal rates and a low incidence of fraud. In all cases,
whether or not a personal interview is conducted, all applicant
names are checked against our Consular Lookout and Support System
(CLASS).
Under the "Visa Express" system, all KIV applications in
Saudi Arabia are presented to our consular sections in Riyadh and
Jeddah through ten authorized travel agencies. Our Consulate
General in Dhahran does not process visas. Our Embassy in Saudi
Arabia provided a detailed explanation of the program (Tab 2).
Programs such as "Visa Express" -actually improve post
security, workload management, and customer service. By
eliminating long lines of non-immigrant visa (NIV) applicants and
reducing the resources needed to screen and inspect visitors, the
program enhances security at our posts and allows them to
redirect resources to other security concerns. rsauc
prog.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
2
the attacks
• in
strengthened (Tab 4)
T:
:::
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
3
Drafted: CA/VO/F/P: John Tavenner, X3-1166
Cleared: CA:Georgc Lannon

CA:Wayne Griffith
CA/P: Eloise ShouSe - OK
CA/P: Carolyn Huggins - OK
CA/VOiCatherine^Ba^-ry - ok
CA/VO/F:Linda Donahue - OK
CA/VO/F/P:Tim Smith - OK
MtERooney - ok
D:KBue - in-fo"
P:DGatto -'OK -
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED U7E4681
ACTION CFPP-01
INFO LOG -60 MFA-00 NP-00 AMAD-00 CA-01 CIAE-OC INI- 00

OS-OS : ~.£UR-00 OIGO-00 FBIE-00 UTED-OC FBO-00 TEDE-00
L-00- 'u-rN£A-00 DCP-01 NSAE-00 CAEX-01 PPT-01 IRM-CO
VO-03 ASDS-01 DSCC-00 NFAT-00 SAS-OC
/009W
•13E285 1913552 /38
R 1913452 AUG 01
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5676
AMCONSUL JEDDAH
DIR FSINFATC WASHDC
INFO GCC COLLECTIVE
'JNCLAS RIYADH 002326
DE?T FOR CA/EX, CA/VO, CA/FP?, NEA/EX, NEA/AR?

NFATC FOR M/FSI/SPS/CONS
£.0. 12958: N/A

TAGS: CMGT, CVIS, KFRD, AFSI, ASEC, SA
SUBJECT: U.S. VISA EXPRESS PROGRAM TRANSFORMS NIV SCENE IN
SAUDI ARABIA
1. (U) Summary. Embassy Riyadh, in coordination with

Consulates General in Jeddah and Dhahran, has launched a
new, mandatory service for processing nonimmigrant visas.
Naming the new program "U.S. Visa Express", Embassy Riyadh
established the service to eliminate the long iir.es cf NIV
applicants at the Embassy and Consulate General ir. Jedaan
ar.d to reduce the number of public visitors enterir.g the
posts. The program draws on CA best practices - travel
agencies as NIV reception ager.ts, remote data entry, and
interview by exception. As a result, tne workload on the
Consular Sections' staff has been reduced and made
manageable, customer service to NIV applicants has improved,
and general post security has improved. The program .-.as
transformed the U.S. consular scene throughout Saudi Arabia.
End S ultima r y.
An Outline of the Program
2. (U) Using CA "best practices" as its basis, the U.S.

Visa Express program employs selected travel agencies and
their nationwide networks as NIV application reception
points. These firms review the applications for
completeness, enter the data on diskettes using CA's Remote
Data Service (RDS) software installed at each client
company, receive the MRV and issuance fees, and deliver the Data Si- -cm
applications, diskettes, and fees daily to Embassy Riyadh company, reca
and Consulate General Jeddah for processing. The following applications,
working day, the agencies collect the passports of those a no. Consulate
applicants whose visas were issued without interview, arop vork.in-5 day,
_--pli cants wi-
off new applications, and return the visa-ed passports to
their offices for applicants to collect at their
convenience.
3. (U) Initially, the program, which was started in early

Kay and was officially launched with countrywide media
coverage the first of June, was mandatory only for Saudi
applicants and for qualified non-Saudi resident TCNs.
(Qualified resident TCNs were defined as persons who had
traveled to the U.S. on a multiple er.try NIV within the
previous two years). In late June, however, given the
program's success and the hei.ghter.ed terrorist threat in the
region, tne Embassy expanse;! it overnight to make it
mandatory for all applicants in Saudi Arabia. A consular
officer reviews all applications. The passports of those
applicants whose submissions do not demonstrate clear visa
eligibility are returned to the agencies witn a form letter
indicating that the applicant must come to the Embassy or
Consulate General for interview any work day from 8:00 to
10:00 AM and/or what additional documentation should be
submitted. These applications are adjudicated ir. the NIV
application as pending (INA Section 221g). Applicants who
come fcr interview have already paid the MRV application fee
and have prover. to be manageable in numbers. After an
initial trial of having the TCNs pay the extra issuar.ee fees
to the travel companies, Embassy Riyadh discontinued the
collection of issuance fees from the agencies for resident
TCN applicants on submission of their applications to the
post. Instead, the agencies pay the issuar.ee fees at the -
time of passport collection for resident TCN applicants
issued without interview. Resident TCN applicants issued
after interview pay on their own.
Steps in Setting Up the Progtan
4. (U) Setting up the new NIV service ir. a country the size
of Saudi Arabia, where 9C.966 NIV applications were
processed in FY-2000, and using ter. travel agencies
companies, was a large-scale operation. It required that
one conoff act as project's director and coordinate the
establishment of the program in constant ccnr.unicatior. with
all the other concffs in-country. In addition, the project
manager had to keep the Embassy Front Cffice. tr.e Consuls
General, other agencies, and Section Chiefs informed of our
plan ar.d its implementation schedule. From the initial
stage, when conoff began meeting with various companies to
explore the possibilities and conferring with the Department
to learn what legal options were available until launch
date, establishing the program took place over A period of
seven months. Having gone through the entire process and
knowing the pitfalls, the project director ccr.off believes
-h~ *c--'-s~ possible to establish a Visa Express program in a iruch
._ e/jjoYt'eT'period of time and certainly in nuch less time ir. &~-
t , c=r.
, -..^ <-t g~, (y-y --The: project director conoff begar. by conducting a
'••-'--- /J"s%^p"-'\"b5ibet:t'oir. review of how consular personnel process NIV-
applications at post. At the sane tine, conoffs met with
leading travel agents to discuss the idea of such a visa

service and to learn their suggestions. Some of them were
already talcing in visa applications and submitting them to
Embassy Riyadh, but they were not doing data entry, which
rfeant they would tieed to transform ar.d expand their U.S. NIV
operation. Embassy Riyadh Consul General and ccnoff met
with the Embassy Country Team, post GSO, post Department of
Commerce FCS, and post PAO staff to introduce the concept
and to get feedback from a broad range of in-house sources
months before the program_ was publicly launched. The
Embassy Riyadh Consul General_and the project director
cor.off traveled to the Consulate General in both Jeddah and
Dhahran to introduce the concept to the consular staffs
there.
6. (U! The Embassy Riyadh Consul General and the project

director cor.off made presentations to the representatives of
the travel agencies at meetings conducted at all three
posts. They gave the agencies a three-week deadline for
submitting proposals as to how they would handle the
service. Cor.off analyzed submissions from seme twenty
companies (later another twenty attempted to join en the
bandwagon with even more proposals). She assessed the
proposals according to a set of ten major criteria,
including experience, computer capability, commitment to
advertising, office security, geographic oreadth of branch
networks, and general reputation nationally or regionally.
Based on conoffs evaluation of the various proposals and
the companies' strengths, she and the Consul General
selected ten companies to launch the program over a test
period, with the idea that the nunber might eventually be
cut.
1. (L.'} The Mission then signed a Memorandum of

Understanding (KOU) with the travel agencies that CA ar.d L
had provided to Embassy Riyadh. The MOD includes all tr.e
requirements the Embassy had stipulated in the initial
presentations and had used to evaluate and select the
companies. In addition, it sets a maximum fee which travel
agencies can charge to be the agent for U.S. NIV
applications. This fee is a ceiling but not a floor. Some
participating travel agencies have opted not to charge
customers for U.S. Visa Express service if they purchase
their air tickets and vacation package/hotels through the
travel agency. Following the selection ana the signing, the
project director conoff kept in constant communication by
telephone and e-mail with all the companies to remind them
of their commitments.
8. (U) During the subsequent three weeks, between the MO'J

"signing^ and the official press conference/media launching,
the Embassy and the Consulate General in JedcJah actually^ /
began to operate the new service informally as a way to tes'f
: all _the "systems" before "final launch". . _ During, this
--intense period; conoff organized installation and training-/
programs all over the country for the travel agencies to
learn the RDS software. Fortunately, a CA Orkand refresher
tear, was in Dhahran and post was able to obtain Department
approval for a team raeirber to come to Riyadh to hold
introductory training. Then-"eoRO,f fs and Consular NIV FSNs
went on the road to the travel agencies' offices in Riyadh,
Jeddah, and the Eastern Prov'wvde :cities of Al Khobar and
Danunaro to survey their Visa Express operations and to train
their staffs. At the sane tine, companies were encouraged
to begin their advertising and to begin bringing in visa
applications in order to get the public used to the new
service before the formal June 1 launching.
9. (U) Throughout this period, the project director conoff

also worked with the Embassy Riyadh PAO staff to prepare a
nedia event to launch the prograrr. on June 1. Together, they
nanaged to get some stories placed in rhe local press in
advance. The Embassy Riyadh Consul General formally
launched the Visa Express program with a full-scale media
event with representatives of all the travel companies also
in attendance. Ke emphasized that the new service would be
advantageous to the traveling public as well as the Mission.
For days after the Consul General's press conference, the
Saudi media ran a variety of stories in both the Arabic and
English press.
Comments, Implications, and The Future
10. (0) The Visa Express prograrr directly advances several

MP? goals. The achievement of Mission objectives under
Travel and Migration is enhanced in that we can more
effectively support the travel of those Saudis and resident
TCNs who come to the U.S. for tourist, educational, and
medical services. Effective nonimmigrant visa services also

supports the exports of U.S. goods and services by
facilitating business travel. By completely reorganising
how the Mission provides NIV services to the public, tr.e key
MPP goal of American Citizens is facilitated by freeing
consular officers' tine from NIV services and allowing it to
be reallocated to providing services to Amcits. Finally,
the MPP goal of Diplomatic Readiness is advance by reducing
the number of visitors to the Mission's posts, thus
enhancing security and reducing the local guard force
resources needed to screen and inspect visitors.
11. (U) In the Mission's experience, the Visa Express

program has proven to be a winner all around. The Saudi
public loves the convenience. The Saudi Government, which
was initially hesitant, is now asking the Britisn and French
Embassies in Riyadfi ^£6. implement the exact sair.e system. The
travel agenciesrha*e^?fa5ine^lAp464a.ii-ty?and name recognition
for their ^tEa\?«r-.*e*yig«PSj!Fhe=i&B*iilfar NIV staff says the
new system has vasTt-f-ie'daeed sSress" on "-them,.
---±2: _4V) The U.S-Visa5Expr-e*r*pF<§3*S*n£s the' way of the

future and Embassy Riyadh, whose Consul General serves as
RCO for the A'rabian Peninsula, has already begun encouraging
other Mission's in the region to launch similar programs.
Critical "topics success, however, is that the program must
be made ma^"daicry; otherwise, NIV applicants will refuse to
i., *!**•— cL->
use it at jfji£sf£. Once in place and accepted by the
traveling^puîic,.the Visa Express program will improve
consular Efficiency and enhance Mission security throughout
the region.
BRAYSHAW
NNNS
End Cable Text
.-_-~i. rS- Sf- .,
r-i- * -afi - - -
sn -f.~ '--
<**-
UNCLASSIFIED UTE5868
ACTION NEA-00
INFO LOG- 00 CA-01 INL-00 WHA-00 MEDE-00 EB-00 UTED-00

TEDE-00 10-00 LAB-01 NSAE-00 IRM-00 TEST- 00 VO-03
DRL-02 SAS-00 /007W
^snai A niTsn1* 7 /•» a
R 0311522 OCX 01
FM AMCONSUL JEDDAH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2626
INFO GCC COLLECTIVE
USDOC WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
UNCLAS JEDDAH 000933
CENTCOM FOR POLAD

LONDON FOR SUTPHIN; PARIS FOR O'FRIEL
USDOC FOR 3131/UAFCA/OIO/ANESA/RD/KBRENNAN AND
4502/IEP/AMESA/ONE/DGULUGLMI
RIYADH ALSO FOR DHAHRAN
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A

TAGS: CVIS, SOCI, PHUM, ELAB, SA
SUBJECT: MUSLIMS NEED NOT APPLY: FEAR AND RUMORS LEAD

HEJAZIS TO CANCEL U.S. TRAVEL
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified. Not for Internet

distribution.
Summary
2. (SBU) Many Saudi tourists, businessmen, and students in

the Western Region are canceling plans to travel to the
United States amid rumors that their visas have been
summarily cancelled and fears they will be harassed or
detained at ports of entry. Incidents of anti-Arab and
anti-Muslim attacks in the U.S., while disturbing on their
own merit, have been greatly exaggerated locally. Hejazis,
who like the rest of their countrymen feel particularly
vulnerable being Saudi, Arab and Muslim prefer to stay away
from the U.S. for the time being. End summary.
,Applications Plummet
3. (u) Saudis travel frequently to the United States, where
some own vacation homes and other properties. During the
summer rush, visa issuances here peaked at 4SO a day with
Florida being the number-one destination. The demand for
visas always falls considerably by late August when schools
reopen. However, compared to this time last year, there
has been a dramatic drop in the number of nan-immigrant
visa applicants in Jeddah's consular district following the
September 11 attack.
4. (U) For the last two weeks of September 2000, the

Consulate issued an average of 45 visas a day to host-
country nationals. From September 15 to 30 of 2001, we
have averaged fewer than nine per day. Including third
country nationals, our numbers are two-thirds of last
September. Many more applicants state "business* as their
primary reason for travel rather than •tourism," and there
is a larger than normal proportion of travelers seeking
medical treatment. These numbers support what we hear
locally regarding Hejazi aversions to unnecessary travel
westward.
Truth is Cheap
5. (U) Although the Consulate is conducting business as

usual, we have not been able to convince the local
population that we have not clamped down on visas for
Saudis. The widely-read English-language dailies Saudi
Gazette and Arab News ran erroneous stories on October 1
that the U.S. Mission in Saudi Arabia bad tightened visa
conditions for Saudi citizens following the September 11
attack. This was reported despite the fact that Arab Mews
contacted the Consulate in Jeddah and was informed that
there has been no change in policy.
6. (U) In response to widespread rumors that the State

Department has canceled the U.S. visas of all Saudi
passport holders, the Consular Section continues to take
calls from Saudis who believe their visas are no longer
valid. One ConOff was approached several times by Saudis
at a Chinese National Day celebration asking when the
Consulate would resume issuing visas to Saudis. Me
continue to waive interviews for the vast majority of Saudi
applicants. Nevertheless, the Saudi Gazette reported that
Saudis are now required to undergo a personal interview at
the Embassy or Consulate and must bring reams of supporting
documents.
7. (U) Both Saudi Gazette and Arab News, as well as the

Arabic-language Okaz ran articles October 2 in response to
a press release from Embassy Riyadh stating that there has
been no change in U.S. visa-policy for Saudis. Although
the papers covered the salient points from our press
release, the articles were,not retractions, as there was no
mention of previous editions^'having printed exactly the
opposite. --ust -1 •;
Muslims Need Not Apply?
8. (U) On October 2, an Indian passport holder with a valid

five-year visa issued in Mutnbai came to the Consulate
requesting that his visa be "revalidated." A frequent
traveler to the U.S. currently in Saudi Arabia to perform
"umra" or the so-called minor pilgrimage, he planned to
continue on to visit his sons studying in the U.S. He says
he was told by the Egypt Air Office in Mecca that all
Muslims must now appear at the Embassy or Consulate and
have their visas "revalidated" before they can board a
flight to the United States. While he graciously accepted
the explanation that the United States would never
summarily cancel the visas of an entire religion, he said,
"1 know, but these rumors cntribute greatly to the
misunderstandings about merica in the Muslim world."
9. (U) According to the supervisor of the Egypt Air Office

in Mecca,the airline is following an Egypt Air directive
ssued in Cairo. According to this telex, all paasort
holders from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sr Lanka, Iraq,
Iran, Nigeria, Russia, Somalia, North Korea, China and
Congo/Brazzaville possessing a U.S. visa must have that
visa revalidated at a U.S. mission before boarding an Egypt
Air flight to the United States. The airline employee, who
declined our request to fax the directive to the Consulate,
stated his belief that the new requirement originated with
the USG. Interestingly, contrary to the report of Mr.
Saheb, the telex did not mention "Muslims.*
10. (U) On October 3, the Consulate received a call from

one of the thousands of Saudis with the last name "Al-
Ghamdi," a major Asir-based tribe, one or more members of
which may have taken part in the September 11 attacks. The
caller stated that he had a valid visa and planned to
travel to the U.S. on October 4 or S but was told by an 5AA
representative that no A],-Ghamdie are being allowed to
board U.S.-bound flights.. We have not yet verified this
story wi-th
The Numbers Game

11. !U)-The Saudi Gazette reported a marked decrease in the
number Of visas "granted* to Saudis over the last two
weeks. '-This is absolutely correct, but the implication is
not .---There has been a substantial decrease in the number
of Saudis who are applying for visas to the U.S. but no
change-in the rate of issuance. Since September 11, 104
Saudis have applied for NIVs in Jeddah. Of those, 102 were
issued without interview. The remaining two applicants
were asked to come in for routine reasons and visa were
subsequently issued to them. This is actually a decrease
in the percentage of Saudis interviewed from this time last
year.
Fear of Reprisal
12. (U) Local travel agencies report a 70-80 percent

cancellation rate nationwide of travel from the Kingdom to
Europe and the United States following the terrorist
attacks in the U.S. Discussions with local travel agency
representatives confirm that the fear of reprisal attacks
on Arabs and Muslims is the major reason. Others are not
traveling for fear they will be humiliated, harassed, or
detained by the INS, FBI, or other authorities at the port
of entry.
13. (U) From the early days of this crisis, Saudis and
expat Arabs in Jeddah have been extremely sensitive to the
treatment of Arab visitors and Arab-Americans in the United
States. They are understandably upset by reports of
harassment and violence aimed at persons of Arab and Muslim
origin. Everyday, local papers run stories about violence
against Arabs and Muslims in the United States.
Condemnation of these incidents is widely dismissed, while
the potential risk to U.S.-bound Saudis is exaggerated.
Veteran Travelers Afraid to Enter U.S.
14. (SBU) Saudis who consider themselves practically

American are now afraid to return to their "second home*
due to fears they will be treated like criminals because of
their-religion and nationality. A young Saudi holding a
green card came into the Consulate in search of assurances
-«.- that he would not be arrested at the airport if he traveled
- -ri- to Florida to close on the sale of a new home. Another . .^-..
legal permanent resident, an executive at Saudi Arabian ~ -o
i-une Airlines, planned to retire in the U.S. with his AmCit wife -- legal
-•-->-= and^ctSildreA. He is now extremely worried about how he irss .Mr l
anc- chi1
would be treated by hie long-time neighbors in New Jersey
and has postponed his plans to move back to the States. He
•xpressed concern that he would be treated poorly by
officials at the airport in front of his children.
It's Late September and I Really Should be Back in School
15. (U) Fear of violence and anti-Saudi sentiment has

prompted many prominent Saudi families to withdraw their
children mid-semester from American colleges and
Universities. Saudi and'expat Arab parents alike express
concern for their children'studying in the U.S. The
Lebanese Broadcast Channel (LBC) reported last week that
American University in Beirut, in response to widespread
fear for the safety and well-being of Arab students in
America, announced it was preparing to accept mid-semester
transfer students.
Saudi Arabian Airlines Grounded
16. (U) Despite repeated reports by the local media that

SAA would resume flights to the United States "tomorrow",
as of October 2, the national airline has yet to resume its
U.S. schedule. According to contacts with the airline, SAA
now plans to resume service to the U.S. on October 4. SAA
and other airlines are canceling or cutting back on
scheduled international flights for a variety of reasons.
While the aviation insurance crisis and new FAA safety
requirements are factors, a major reduction in demand
should not be discounted as contributing to the reduction
in flights to Europe and the U.S.
Comment
17. (SBU) In a part of the world where rumors carry great

weight and official statements do not, many Hejazia have
difficulty believing that the Consulate continues to
operate under its pre-September 11 policies. Although the
USG has stated that unlawful acts against innocent Muslims
and Arabs will be prosecuted, the reaction of the Jeddah
streets is that American authorities will turn a blind eye
and American juries will not convict. Arguments pertaining
to civil rights and the rule of law in American do not go
far amidst current tensions. End comment.
- = ~ a l p:raaaer,r resi flAttimore

UTE4267
UNCLASSIFIED UTE4267
ORIGIN CA-01
INFO LOG-00 MFA-00 UP-00 AF-00 AIT-03 AMAD-00 AOP-00

ASX-00 AS-01 A-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 COME-00 CCOE-00
DIM-00 ANHR-00 WHA-00 MEDE-00 EAP-00 EB-00 EUR-00
FBIE-00 UTED-00 FBO-00 VC-00 FSI-00 H-01 TEDE-00
INSE-00 10-00 MMP-00 MOFM-05 M-00 AC- 01 NEA-00
DCP-01 NSAE-00 01S-"03 CAEX-01 PM-00 SCT-00 IRM-00
SSO-00 SS-00 TEST- 00 USIE-00 VO-03 SA-00 FMP-00
SDBU-00 PMB-00 PRM-01 ALM-00 SAS-00 PMA-00 /021R
174004
SOURCE: KODAKC.00403S
DRAFTED BY: CA:EJRAMOTOWSKI -- 10/02/01 X77408
APPROVED BY: CA:MARYAN
CA:GCLANNON CA/VO:CBARRY S/ES-O:ELMARTINE2
29EC88 0418132 /38
P 041806Z OCT 01
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS PRIORITY
SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM
POUCH
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
POUCH FREETOWN
POUCH DUSHANBE
POUCH NDJAMENA
POUCH PESHAWAR
POUCH LAHORE
POUCH JAKARTA
POUCH SURABAYA
UNCLAS STATE 174004
FOR CONSULAR CHIEFS FROM CA A/S MARY A. RYAN
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: CVIS, CMGT
SUBJECT: VISA OPERATIONS
IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS.

SEVERAL POSTS HAVE CABLED THE DEPARTMENT WITH
SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THEY CAN FURTHER INCREASE THE
SECURITY OF THEIR VISA OPERATIONS. WE ARE CONTINUALLY
MAKING THE POINT IN WASHINGTON THAT THE CLASS NAMECHECK
SYSTEM IS A STATE OF THE ART TECHNOLOGY, BUT IN THE END
IT IS ONLY AS GOOD AS THE INFORMATION IT CONTAINS.
WHILE MOST OF THE INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL TERRORISTS
CONTAINED IN CLASS COMES FROM OTHER AGENCIES. CONSULAR
SECTIONS ALSO HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY. ;
2. ALL POSTS SHOULD TAKE A HARD LOOK AT THEIR CURRENT VISA
OPERATIONS AND SEE IF THERE ARE ANY MEASURES THAT COULD
BE TAKEN TO FURTHER STRENGHTHEN THE PROCESS. SOME
QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER IN THE REVIEW: ARE APPLICATION
PROCEDURES, PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT WAIVE PERSONAL
APPEARANCE OF THE APPLICANT, FUNCTIONING AS DESIGNED?
IS THE VISAS VIPER COMMITTEE ENGAGED AND ACTIVE? ARE
ALL CONSULAR OFFICERS AT POST AWARE OF THE DEPARTMENT'S
INSTRUCTIONS ON MAINTAINING VISA RECORDS UNTIL FURTHER
NOTICE, AND ON HOW TO HANDLE VISA AND PASSPORT RECORD
REQUESTS FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES? ARE POST'S

CONTACTS WITH INS PORTS OF" ENTRY AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS UP TO DATE AND PRODUCTIVE?
ARE POST'S CONSULAR SYSTEMS FUNCTIONING WELL. AND IF
NOT, HAS THE CA/EX/CSD HELP DESK BEEN NOTIFIED? HAS
POST CONDUCTED ANY VALIDATION STUDIES? HAVE CONOFFS
DISCUSSED THE IMPACT OF RECENT POLITICAL. ECONOMIC. AND
SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS?
3. THESE SUGGESTIONS ARE NOT MEANT TO BE EXHAUSTIVE. BUT

TO PROVIDE A STARTING POINT FOR CONSULAR MANAGERS TO
TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THEIR VISA OPERATIONS. MANY POSTS
WILL CONCLUDE THAT NO CHANGES ARE NECESSARY. OTHERS
MAY WANT TO MAKE SOME ALTERATIONS BASED ON LOCAL
CONDITIONS AND TRENDS. ANY POSTS CONTEMPLATING A
PROCEDURAL CHANGE SHOULD KEEP THE DEPARTMENT (CA/VC AND
CA/EX) INFORMED. REGARDS.
POWELL
NNNN
End Cabl* T«rt
i i t ^ i " - — " - —'
*E3~. -_*O*- 3V
National Review Article on Visa Express^ ;, ,„
Myths & Facts ;| •'; ;;>
Myth: Most Saudi applicants never come into contact with a US

citizen until stepping off the airplane onto U.S. soil
Fact: Over the past year approximately 45% of visa applicants in Saudi
Arabia have been personally interviewed. Not all applicants are required
to come into the Consulate or Embassy for a personal interview, since
many of the applicants-have no additional information beyond that
contained in the application-and supporting documents to offer a
consular officer. Examples would be: infants, or elderly people with
previous travel to the US, business people working for major American
corporations who travel frequently and have a long history of respecting
US law while in the United States. Waiving an interview for these
applicants allows consular officers to devote their limited time to those
from whom useful information may be elicited by an interview and allows
them to devote more time to screen those who may present a risk to the
United States.
Myth: Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world that enjoys
third party document collection for visa processing.
Fact: Programs making use of travel agencies and other third parties are
good programs that stand up to security scrutiny and are employed in
virtually every embassy throughout the world. Third parties often
distribute visa application forms, collect the completed application along
with supporting documents (including passport], and then send them to
a US embassy or consulate for processing. The third parties, whether
they are travel agents, courier services, or the national postal service.
have no role whatsoever in the visa process beyonctdeiivering the
application materials. They do not vouch for the accuracy of the
information they transmit or for the applicants'eligibility for a visa.
Myth: Consular Affairs is violating its own internal protocol by

?';:
Myth: If a Saudi travel agent is reasonably satisfied that the

traveler has the means to buy a tour package there will be little
further evaluation of the applicant's qualifications.
Fact: Only an American consular officer may assess any applicant's

qualification for a visa. An applicant's economic status has -nothing
whatsoever to do with assessing his security risk to the United States.
The visa applicant is first subjected to a comprehensive name-check to
make sure that he or she is not ineligible for a visa on any one of a
number of statutory grounds for refusal, including security and terrorism
related grounds. Should the consular officer have any reason to question
the applicant's motives, on security or any other grounds, for seeking
entry to the US the applicant would likely be called in for an interview
and his wealth would be irrelevant to any determination made.
Only when the consular officer is satisfied that the applicant is not
ineligible on any of the law's statutory grounds for refusal (which include
security grounds) does the question of his or her ties to their home
country come into play. It isn't simply a matter of money: applicants are
presumed by the law to be "intending immigrants' until they establish to
the satisfaction of the consular officer that they are not. They do so by
demonstrating significant ties (usually of work, family, and property) to
their home country that a consular officer couldn't believe they would
reasonably abandon to remain in the United States. Pumping up a bank
account is a common technique that some would-be illegal immigrants
attempt in order to overcome that legal presumption and our consular
officers are alert to it. '
Myth: Foreign Service Officers'Job performance reviews focus
primarily on politeness and courtesy not on their ability to screen
out terrorists.
Fact: Courtesy to the public, including to visa applicants, is expected of
any officer, but there is no conflict between courtesy and the exercise of
proper judgment. Officers are expected to refuse visa applications as
well as to issue them politely. Good judgment with respect to visa
Myth: Junior Foreign Service officers are typically young, often
unmotivated and almost always under-trained and under-prepared.
Fact: Junior Foreign Service Officers are among the US government's

most talented and best-prepared employees. The average age of a junior
officer is 30 years old with a large number starting second careers. In
addition to the often-formidable academic and work experience they
bring to their assignments, they are trained in basic consular work,
foreign languages, and-area studies. They are supervised by experienced
consular officers who themselves are rated on how well they train and
supervise their staff.
Myth: The Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), our

name-checking system used to alert consular officers to ineligible
applicants, is easily defeated by the applicant slightly varying the
manner in which the name is written or changing the birth date to
hide a match.
. t i . ' . -i;!'..:.; i'
Fact: While no area of human endeavor is impervious to hun}itf};erh>r,
our name-checking system is designed to make it tough for an applicant
to disguise relevant information in our system or for a consular officer to
overlook it. CLASS algorithms provide uniform and consistent
transliterations of names in non-Roman alphabets, and the systems
search parameters display a wide range of potential matches that a
consular officer must review prior to issuing a visa. CLASS provides a
consular officer with information that can be used to follow up directly
with the applicant any inconsistencies that might have been discovered
in the application process.
It is also important to remember here that we have information other

than that available from CLASS and the visa application: a passport, job
letters, and other data are available for the consular officer to cross
check. While it is of course possible for a consular officer to overlook a
name based on the applicant's provision of a false birth date (an example
given by the National Review article) the applicant would need to alter his
passport and perhaps other supporting documents as well. No system is
frsmri nroof. hut CLASS is a maior uoerade to our ability to detect
Drafted: BDecre 7-2140
Openet:
H:DOCS/HouseStaff/NationaJ Review Article on Visa Express
Cleared: CA/P:EHVazquez
CA: GLannon
H: MPolt
M: ERooney
NEA:KSasahara
PA: SMoridani -
P:AGordon
I nit«l Sia^s
See tor Management
U athitifUim. 1>. C. i>t> L'O
S/Z3
UNCLASSIFIED °TAttQ ! IP
To: M -Under Secretary Green , g .-]/ <

» * / ., *
^ ^^^
From: CA - Mary A. Ryan £\•
Subject: Meeting with Frank^Wolf to discuss the Visa repress

Interview-by-Exception Program in Saudi Arabia
Congressman Wolf asked you to discuss Visa Express, Saudi

Arabia's interview-by-exception visa application process, with
him Tuesday afternoon. In a telephone call Monday with VO
Managing Director Catherine Barry, Wolf stressed that Jn the post
9/11 environment, he wants all visa applicants interviewed.
We think that programs such as Visa Express are gcod

examples of risk management. They allow us to concentrate our
assets on problematic cases and move good cases through quickly.
Requiring interviews worldwide would have enormous political
costs. State does not have the staffing, funding or building
space to interview all applicants.
We take the responsibility of securing US borders seriously i

and interview every applicant who merits such scrutiny The only /
sure way to deny a potential terrorist a US visa, however, is to .
have him or her identified to us by intelligence or lav/
enforcement in advance and entered into our visa lookoufcjisiystem.
Absent such prior identification, even the most scrup'&f.bus7 >.'''
interviewer has little likelihood of discovering the applicant's
hidden intent. '••••'
"r ;
UNCLASSIFIED
Drafted: CA/VO/F/P: Laurie Trost, X3-14
Cleared: CA:GCLannon ok
CA/VO:WGGriffith ok
CA/VO/F:MRegan ok
Visa Express Timeline
Visa Express was launched in early May 2001. At first

it was mandatory only for Saudi applicants and for
qualified non-Sskttji;resident Third Country Nationals. In
June 2001, given the heightened terrorist threat in the
region, the program was made mandatory for all applicants
in Saudi Arabia.
Under the VJTBa'Express system, all NIV applications in

Saudi Arabia are presented to our consular sections in
Riyadh and Jeddah through ten authorized travel agenries.
Our Consulate General in Dhahran does not process visas.
Even before the events of September 11, the perrentage

of applicants refused by our posts in Saudi Arabia had been
increasing due to local economic conditions. In FYOD,
almost 15% of all NIV applicants were refused. Post
expects the trend to continue under the Visa Express
program, with FY01 figures likely to show a refusal rate of
over 20%.
Since 9/11, Post has been calling in a far grea :er

percentage of applicants for interview, including virtually
all males between 16 and 45 years of age who are not well
known to Embassy staff. Applicants have also been
subjected to enhanced security measures, including
requirements for additional security advisory bpiniois.
In the aftermath of September, much attention aid

criticism has been focused or. Visa Express by the pr»ss.
The most recent critical article is the National Review
Article. Congress has also scrutinized the process. CODEL
Sensenbrenner visited Riyadh and Kuwait late this wiiter to
examine the visa issuance process. According to Embissy
Riyadh, upon looking into the program the visiting
delegation felt that it did not constitute a security risk.
200120749
United States Department of State
, D.C. 20520
<M
S/ES 1
ll
UNCLASSIFIED
To: The Secretary

ci-<iiy
From: CA - Mary
y A. RyaiAX
Subject: CA Response to the September 11 Attacks
Consular Affairs has been active on several fronts in

response to the terrorist attacks of last week, supporting law
enforcement agencies and responding to the needs of American
citizens. I provide below the highlights of these efforts.
Identifying Visa Records of the Hijackers
We believe we have located the visa records of sixteen of

the nineteen hijackers. Since our memo to you on this subject
(dated September 12}, we have also identified possible records
for the remaining three (Tab 1). Working from incomplete lists
coming from multiple sources, we have made the best matches
possible between visa records and the hijackers and provided
this information to relevant law enforcement agencies.
Volume and Audience of Records Checks
On September 12, we directed all visa-issuing posts to

preserve all existing hard copies of visa records.
The Visa Office is on-call twenty-four hours a day to

handle requests for visa data from the Consolidated Consular
Database. As of September 17, we had performed more than 450
checks of MRV data stored in the database. We have also pulled
up records of all M-l visa cases (for vocational -- including
pilot -- training), and copied that information for transmission
to various task forces. = -••-"..--;•--
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
We have been attempting to impose discipline in the

records-search process by routing all requests through a single
point of contact in DS, as directed by Under Secretary Green.
In addition, the Passport Office has reviewed more than 350

passport files as requested, by law enforcement agencies.
Visa Revocations
The Visa Office has revoked nine visas for individuals

related to the case since September 11.
Communicating with American Citizens
A revised worldwide caution (public announcement) was

issued September 12, reflecting the events of September 11 (Tab
2) . A revised travel warning for Pakistan was issued September
17 in conjunction with the approval of authorized departure for
our posts in that country (Tab 3). Posts have been in almost
daily contact with resident communities via warden messages. We
have also provided around-the-clock service to posts aiding
American citizens stranded outside the United States.
Supporting Victim Assistance Efforts
In addition to staffing the Department Task Force, the

Office of Overseas Citizens Services has remained in close touch
with an interagency group marshaling resources for victim
assistance. Although there is currently no need for direct
State participation, we are prepared to support the Department
of Justice's Office of Victims of Crimes (OVC), which directs a
nationwide call center. We have also offered assistance to the
City of New York as it manages relations with foreign
governments seeking information about their nationals.
Briefing the Hill/Legislation
There has been considerable interest on the Hill about the

visa application process. A briefing for SFRC staffers is
scheduled for September 19. We are also working on draft
legislation in close coordination with H- and others in the
Department, as well as the Justice Department.
Attachments:
Tab 1 - Master List of Visa Records of the Hijackers
Tab 2Us - Worldwide Caution dated 9/12/01
Tab 3'- Travel Warning for Pakistan dated 9/17/01
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Drafted: CA: Amber Baskette, X7-7948
Cleared: CA/OCS:DMAndruch (ok)

CA/P:CHuggins (ok)
CA/VO:WGGriffith (ok)
CA/PPT:GARogers (ok)
CA:GCLannon (ok)
M:ERooney (ok)
D:KBue (info)
P:DGatto .(ok)
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME DOB COB ISSUING POST DATE OF ISSUE VISA TYPE ADJUDICATOR
AA11
Al Omari. Abdul Aziz 28-May-79 Saudi Arabia Jeddah ia-Jun-01 61rB2
Al Shehri. Wail M. 31-Jul-73 Saudi Arabia Jeddah 24-Ocl-OO 81 '82
Al Shehri. Waleed A. B. 3-Mar-76 Saudi Arabia Jeddah 31-May-OO M1 (pilot training)
Al Suqaml. Setam M. A. 28-Jun-76 Saudi Arabia Riyadh 21-Nov-OO B1/B2
Atta, Mohamed Mohamed Elamir 1-Sep-68 Egypt Berlin 17-May-OO B1/B2
AATT
Al HaziKl. Nawal M. S. 9-AU9-76 Saudi Arabia Jeddah 3-Afx-99 B1/B2
Al Hazml. Salem M. 2-Feb-61 Saudi Arabia Jeddah 20-Jun-01 01/B2 , ,
AlmWhar, Kheltd M. A. 1fr-May-75 Saudi Arabia Jeddah 13-Jun-01 B1/B2 • •
Harbour. Hani S H. 30-Aug-72 Saudi Arabia Jeddah 10-Sep-OO 81/B2 !
Moqed. Wajed M. Gh 16-Jun-77 Saudi Arabia Riyadh 20 Nov-00 B1/B2

9/11 Working-level Employee
UA93
Al Hamawi. Ahmad Ibrahim A 11-Ocl-M Saudi Arabia Jeddah 12-Nov-OO B1/82
Al Nami. Ahmed A A. 7-Dec-77 Saudi Arabia Jeddah 2 3- Apr -01 B1/B2
Alghamdi, Saeed A A t 21-Nov 79 Saudi Arabia Jeddah 12-Jun-0» B1/B2
Jarrah. Ziad Samlr 11 -May 75 Lebanon Bertm 25-May-OO B1/B2
UA175 .
Ahmed Mohamed Airier. Fay« • 31Oc«-71 Eflypl Cairo B-Nov-99 J1
Al Ghamdl. Ahmed Saieh S ' 2-Jul 79 Saudi Arabia Jeddah 3-S«p-00 B1/B2
A) Ghamdi. Hazma S. A 15-NOV-80 Saudi Arabia Riyadh UOct-00 81/82
Al Shehrt. Mohand M F . 7 May 79 Saudi Arabia Riyadh 23-Ocl-OO 81/82
0-May ra UAE Dubai 16-JarvOO B1/B2
' (denotes probable, not confirmed)

* (denotes possible, not confirmed)
>
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 7
DOCUMENT DATE: 05/08/1993 DOCUMENT TYPE: Cable
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Visa Lookout System and International Terrorists

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 20
FROM:
TO: Daniel Marcus
SUBJECT: Transmittal memo and index of documents responsive to document requests

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 5
RESTRICTED\_\e item identified below has been withdr
DOCUMENT DATE: 06/16/1995 DOCUMENT TYPE: Cable
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Extradition

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Page: 1
current Handling: n/a -"7 /,~/-
Document Number: 2000STATE009483 Channel: n/a
UNCLASSIFIED PTO8180
\E 0
ORIGIN VO-03
INFO LOG-00 CA-02 CIAE-00 DS-00 FBIE-00 UTED-00 TEDE-00

INSE-00 ADS-00 NSAE-00 PPT-01 ASDS-01 DSCC-00 DRL-02
SAS-00 /009R
009483
SOURCE: KODAKA.015059
DRAFTED BY: INR/IC : EJURBAN -- 01/14/00:647-8963
APPROVED BY: INR/IC : JGARRIZA
CA/VO/L/C: BMALLEN (SUBS)
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
CA/VO/L/C
------------------ 26E3B3 150914Z /22
R 150319Z JAN 00
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
CIA WASHDC 0000
DIRNSA FORT GEORGE G MEADE MD
UNCLAS STATE 009483
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: KVPR, CVIS, PTER, ASEC, PINR
SUBJECT: VISAS VIPER PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE
REF: (A) 98 STATE 108969 (B) FREETOWN 00103
1. PER POST'S REQUEST (REF B) , THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF

REF A, THE DEPARTMENT'S LATEST VISAS VIPER PROCEDURAL
GUIDANCE :
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 STATE 009483 150913Z
TO DCM/PO AND CONSULAR SECTION CHIEF FROM CA A/S RYAN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KVPR, CVIS, PTER, ASEC, CMGT, PINR, PREL, EAIR
SUBJECT: FIGHTING TERRORISM: VISAS VIPER PROCEDURES
REF: 96 STATE 134202

Current Handling: n/a
SUMMARY
1. THE DEPARTMENT HAS REVIEWED THE CURRENT VISAS VIPER

PROGRAM (WP) GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REFTEL, TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION CHANGES THAT HAVE EVOLVED SINCE REFTEL WAS
ISSUED AS WELL AS POSTS' QUERIES AND REQUESTS FOR
CLARIFICATION DURING THE ENSUING PERIOD. WE FOUND THAT FEW
SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENTS WERE NEEDED AND THAT MOST OF THE
REVISIONS MADE HAVE BEEN TO PROVIDE GREATER CLARITY OR
EMPHASIS. THE REVISED VISAS VIPER PROCEDURES WHICH BEGIN
AT PARAGRAPH 5 SUPERSEDE THE GUIDANCE FOUND IN REFTEL.
THEY WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO THE NEXT REVISION OF 9 FAM
40. 32.
2. POSTS ARE ASKED TO ENSURE THAT ALL MISSION SECTIONS AND

AGENCIES ARE MADE AWARE OF THIS REVISED GUIDANCE, TO
EXAMINE THEIR MANAGEMENT OF THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM IN
LIGHT OF IT, AND TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS ARE NEEDED TO
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 STATE 009483 150913Z

RESOLVE ANY INCONSISTENCIES. NO REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT
IS REQUIRED ON THE RESULTS OF THIS INTERNAL REVIEW.
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES
3. POSTS SHOULD NOTE THE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN VISAS VIPER

PROCEDURES:
--THE WP HAS BEEN EXPANDED TO INCLUDE TIPPIX, A PROGRAM

FOR SCANNING TERRORISTS' PHOTOGRAPHS, AND TUSCAN, A PROGRAM
FOR SHARING TERRORISTS' NAMES WITH CANADA (PARAGRAPH 6);
--THE DESIGNATION OF POST WP COORDINATORS IS ENCOURAGED

AND THEIR GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES ARE OUTLINED (PARAGRAPH
ID ;
--THE NAME AND CONTACT NUMBERS OF THE DEPARTMENT'S VISAS

VIPER COORDINATOR ARE PROVIDED (PARAGRAPH 13) ;
--THE TIME FRAME FOR SUBMITTING MANDATORY WP QUARTERLY

REPORTS HAS BEEN EXTENDED FROM 10 DAYS FOLLOWING THE END OF
EACH QUARTER TO 15 DAYS (PARAGRAPH 15) ;
-- THE "KVPR" TAG MUST BE USED ON ALL WP REPORTING

(PARAGRAPHS 15, 32, 34, AND 38);

--WP REPORTING SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO INR/TIPOFF AND

CA/VO/L/C (PARAGRAPHS 15, 32, AND 38);
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 04 STATE 009483 150913Z

--POSTS SHOULD REPORT THE NAMES OF OTHER POSTS ON WHOSE
BEHALF THEY SUBMIT WP QUARTERLY REPORTS (PARAGRAPH 16) ;
--A SUBJECT'S GENDER SHOULD BE SPECIFIED IN CASES WHERE THE

GIVEN NAME CAN BE EITHER MASCULINE OR FEMININE (PARAGRAPH
22) ;
--THE PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE OF PROVIDING YEAR OF BIRTH

INFORMATION ON NATIONALS OF VISA WAIVER COUNTRIES IS
EMPHASIZED (PARAGRAPHS 24 AND 35) ;
--POSTS' VISAS VIPER COMMITTEES HAVE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY

FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE WP CRITERIA HAVE BEEN MET
(PARAGRAPH 27) ;
--THE NEED TO TRANSMIT DS REPORTING ON TERRORISTS THROUGH

THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL IS SPECIFIED (PARAGRAPH 28);
--OTHER POSTS WITH POSSIBLE INTEREST IN THE SUBJECTS OF

VISAS VIPER CABLES SHOULD BE INCLUDED AS INFO ADDRESSEES
(PARAGRAPH 32) ;
--THE BIOGRAPHIC DATA ELEMENTS THAT WILL BE ENTERED INTO

CLASS AND IBIS SHOULD NOT BE CLASSIFIED (PARAGRAPH 33) ;
--THE ROGER CHANNEL SHOULD BE AVOIDED WHEN SUBMITTING VISAS

VIPER TELEGRAMS (PARAGRAPH 33); AND
--ANY PREVIOUS CLASS ENTRIES ON THE SUBJECTS OF WP

REPORTING SHOULD BE FULLY CITED (PARAGRAPH 37).
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 05 STATE 009483 150913Z

4. REVISED PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE FOR THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM
FOLLOWS.
THE "VISAS VIPER" TERRORIST REPORTING PROGRAM:

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
5. THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM ORIGINATED IN RESPONSE TO THE

/ Current Handling: n/a
1993 WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING AND OTHER THREATS AND

INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM INVOLVING FOREIGN NATIONALS. AN
INVESTIGATION INTO THE WTC BOMBING REVEALED DEFICIENCIES IN
THE WAY AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON TERRORISTS WAS BEING
SHARED AT OVERSEAS POSTS AND REPORTED TO THE DEPARTMENT.
SPECIFICALLY FOUND LACKING WAS A MECHANISM FOR ROUTINELY
AND CONSISTENTLY BRINGING SUSPECTED TERRORISTS TO THE
CONSULAR SECTION'S ATTENTION FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENTERING
THEIR NAMES INTO THE DEPARTMENT'S "CONSULAR LOOKOUT AND

SUPPORT SYSTEM" (CLASS) AND THE INS/US CUSTOMS SERVICE'S
"INTERAGENCY BORDER INSPECTION SYSTEM" (IBIS). THE VISAS
VIPER PROGRAM WAS CREATED TO ADDRESS THIS CONCERN. ITS
MISSION IS TO:
(1) UTILIZE THE COOPERATIVE RESOURCES OF ALL ELEMENTS OF

FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL TERRORISTS;
(2) DEVELOP INFORMATION ON SUCH INDIVIDUALS;
(3) PROVIDE A DIRECT CONSULAR CHANNEL FOR REPORTING THIS

INFORMATION; AND
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 06 STATE 009483 150913Z
(4) WATCHLIST THE SUBJECTS IN CLASS AND IBIS TO ENSURE THEY

ARE APPROPRIATELY SCREENED SHOULD THEY LATER APPLY FOR
VISAS OR FOR ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES.
RECENT EXPANSION OF THE WP
6. IN MAY 1997, THE TIPPIX PROGRAM WAS INITIATED TO SCAN

THE PHOTOGRAPHS OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTSS OBTAINED FROM
FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS AND OTHER SOURCES, INTO THE
TIPOFF/VIPER COUNTERTERRORISM DATABASE AND THE IBIS LOOKOUT
SYSTEM. IN APRIL 1998, THE DEPARTMENT BEGAN SHARING NAMES
FROM THE DATABASE WITH THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT UNDER A
PROGRAM CALLED TUSCAN. EACH PROGRAM HAS SIGNIFICANTLY
ENHANCED U.S. BORDER SECURITY.
SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM:

LIMITED TO NON-VISA APPLICANTS
7. THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM IS INTENDED SOLELY FOR

REPORTING ON ALIENS WHO ARE NOT CURRENTLY APPLYING FOR U.S.

VISAS. VISA APPLICANTS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF TERRORIST
ACTIVITY CONTINUE TO BE SUBJECT TO THE VISAS DONKEY OR
VISAS BEAR SECURITY ADVISORY OPINION REQUIREMENT (SEE
PARAGRAPH 9 BELOW).
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 07 STATE 009483 150913Z

LIMITED TO TERRORISTS
8. THE VIPER CHANNEL IS FURTHER LIMITED TO ALIENS WHO ARE

KNOWN OR POTENTIAL TERRORISTS '. IT SHOULD NOT BE USED TO
REPORT ON NARCOTRAFFICKERS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALS, OR
OTHER MALEFACTORS UNLESS THEY ARE ALSO SUSPECTED OF FALLING
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF INA 212(A)(3)(B). (NB: AN ALIEN WHO
IS NOT A CURRENT VISA APPLICANT, BUT WHOM A CONSULAR
OFFICER SUSPECTS OF INVOLVEMENT IN EXCLUSIONARY CRIMINAL OR
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING ACTIVITY, MAY BE ENTERED DIRECTLY
INTO CLASS BY THE CONSULAR POST USING THE APPROPRIATE QUASI
REFUSAL CODE (SEE 9 FAM PART IV APPENDIX D, EXHIBIT I)).
DISTINCTION BETWEEN "VISAS VIPER" AND "VISAS DONKEY/BEAR"
9. THE VISAS VIPER REPORTING PROGRAM COMPLEMENTS THE VISAS

DONKEY AND VISAS BEAR SECURITY ADVISORY OPINION (SAO)
PROCEDURES IN THAT VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS REPORT ON POSSIBLE
TERRORISTS WHO ARE NOT CURRENT VISA APPLICANTS FOR THE
PURPOSE OF WATCHLISTING THEM, WHILE VISAS DONKEY AND VISAS
BEAR CABLES ARE USED TO REQUEST SAO'S ON SUCH INDIVIDUALS
WHEN THEY APPLY FOR VISAS. POSTS MUST USE WHICHEVER
PROCEDURE IS APPROPRIATE TO BRING ALL TERRORISTS ON WHOM
THEY HAVE INFORMATION TO THE DEPARTMENT'S ATTENTION.
WP ADMINISTRATION AT FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 08 STATE 009483 150913Z
10. THE WP IS PRIMARILY ADMINISTERED AT OVERSEAS POSTS

THROUGH A VISAS VIPER COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED AT EACH POST,
CHAIRED BY THE DCM OR PRINCIPAL OFFICER AND COMPOSED OF
REPRESENTATIVES FROM APPROPRIATE POST ENTITIES. ALL

SECTIONS AND AGENCIES INVOLVED IN SECURITY, LAW

ENFORCEMENT, AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES SHOULD
PARTICIPATE, AS SHOULD THOSE HAVING OFFICIAL AND/OR PUBLIC
CONTACTS WHICH MAY PRODUCE TERRORISM-RELATED INFORMATION.
THE VISAS VIPER COMMITTEES MEET AT LEAST QUARTERLY TO SHARE
INFORMATION ON KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS AND TO
DETERMINE WHETHER SUCH INFORMATION MEETS THE CRITERIA FOR
VISAS VIPER REPORTING (SEE PARAGRAPH 17 BELOW). A REPORT
SUMMARIZING THE RESULTS OF THE COMMITTEE MEETING(S) HELD
DURING EACH QUARTER IS REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
INSTRUCTIONS IN PARAGRAPHS 14 THROUGH 16 BELOW. WHILE
VISAS VIPER COMMITTEE MEETINGS ARE THE PRINCIPAL FORUMS FOR
SHARING TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE AT POST, INFORMATION
DEVELOPED ON AN AD HOC BASIS, PARTICULARLY THAT OF AN
URGENT NATURE, MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED FOR EXPEDITIOUS

REPORTING THROUGH THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL.
DESIGNATION OF POST WP COORDINATORS
11. POSTS ARE ENCOURAGED TO DESIGNATE A VISAS VIPER

COORDINATOR, NORMALLY THE CONSULAR SECTION CHIEF OR AN
OFFICER RESPONSIBLE TO HIM OR HER, WHO WOULD SERVE THE
FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS:
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 09 STATE 009483 150913Z
(1) LIAISON WITH OTHER SECTIONS AND AGENCIES (PROVIDE

INFORMATION AND ADVICE ON WP POLICIES AND PROCEDURES,
ENSURE THAT STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS USE THE VISAS VIPER
CHANNEL WHEN REPORTING ON TERRORISTS, AND PROMOTE AWARENESS
AND UTILIZATION OF THE VIPER CHANNEL AMONG OTHER-AGENCY
REPRESENTATIVES);
(2) COORDINATION OF VIPER COMMITTEE MEETINGS (ASSIST THE

DCM/PO IN SCHEDULING THE MANDATORY QUARTERLY MEETINGS AND
ARRANGE APPROPRIATE STATE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER-AGENCY
PARTICIPATION);
(3) OVERSIGHT OF VISAS VIPER REPORTING (PREPARE REQUIRED

QUARTERLY REPORTS ON POST'S WP ACTIVITIES AND MONITOR AD
HOC REPORTING ON INDIVIDUAL TERRORISTS); AND
(4) LIAISON WITH THE DEPARTMENT (MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE

DEPARTMENT'S VISAS VIPER COORDINATOR, SEEK GUIDANCE ON
QUESTIONS REGARDING WP ISSUES, AND RESPOND TO THE

DEPARTMENT'S REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON VIPER CASES).
WP ADMINISTRATION WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT
12. IN THE DEPARTMENT, THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM IS AN

INTEGRAL PART OF "TIPOFF", A PROGRAM ADMINISTERED BY THE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH (INR) THAT COORDINATES
THE DEPARTMENT'S USE OF INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE FOR THE
WATCHLISTING OF TERRORISTS. TIPOFF MAINTAINS A
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 10 STATE 009483 150913Z

COUNTERTERRORISM DATABASE NOW NUMBERING OVER 43,000 NAMES,
OF WHICH MORE THAN 9,000 WERE CONTRIBUTED THROUGH THE VISAS
VIPER CHANNEL. THE TIPOFF/VIPER STAFF, IN CLOSE
COOPERATION WITH THE VISA OFFICE'S COORDINATION DIVISION
(CA/VO/L/C), DEVELOPS VISAS VIPER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES,
CREATES AND UPDATES TIPOFF RECORDS, AND DETERMINES WHETHER
THE NAMES OF INDIVIDUAL SUSPECTED TERRORISTS ARE ENTERED

INTO CLASS AND IBIS AND SHARED WITH THE CANADIAN
GOVERNMENT. IT PROVIDES FEEDBACK AND GUIDANCE TO FOREIGN
SERVICE POSTS ON VISAS VIPER REPORTING AND SERVES AS
LIAISON WITH INTERESTED OFFICES IN THE DEPARTMENT AND WITH
THE HEADQUARTERS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ON MATTERS
RELATING TO THE PROGRAM. ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE
TIPOFF/VIPER STAFF SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO INR/TIPOFF.
DEPARTMENT'S VISAS VIPER COORDINATOR
13. THE DEPARTMENT'S VISAS VIPER COORDINATOR IS ELAYNE J.

URBAN. MS. URBAN IS LOCATED AT INR/TIPOFF, ROOM 6510,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520. SHE CAN BE
REACHED TELEPHONICALLY AT (202)647-8963 AND HER FAX NUMBER
IS (202)647-8030. HER NAME IS ALSO IN THE DEPARTMENT'S E-
MAIL SYSTEM.
QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENT:

MANDATE AND CONTENTS
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 11 STATE 009483 150913Z

14. POSTS ARE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT QUARTERLY REPORTS

OUTLINING THEIR VISAS VIPER PROGRAM ACTIVITIES DURING EACH
PERIOD. SUCH REPORTS SHOULD CONTAIN THE DATE(S) WP
COMMITTEE MEETINGS WERE HELD, THE NUMBER OF VIPER TELEGRAMS
SUBMITTED, AND A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF ANY QUESTIONS OR
COMMENTS THE POST MAY HAVE REGARDING THE PROGRAM'S POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES. REPORTS MUST BE SUBMITTED EVEN IF NO
INFORMATION ON TERRORISTS WAS DEVELOPED DURING THE QUARTER.
THE QUARTERLY REPORT REQUIREMENT WAS INSTITUTED UPON THE
RECOMMENDATION OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL TO IMPROVE THE
PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS IN THE VISAS VIPER
PROGRAM. THE OIG'S CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE WP REFLECTS THE
PROGRAM'S KEY ROLE IN THE DEPARTMENT'S COUNTERTERRORISM
EFFORTS.
QUARTERLY REPORT PROCEDURES
15. WP QUARTERLY REPORTS ARE DUE NO LATER THAN 15 DAYS

FOLLOWING THE END OF EACH QUARTER, I.E., BY THE 15TH OF
JANUARY, APRIL, JULY, AND OCTOBER. THE QUARTER REPORTED
UPON SHOULD BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED IN. THE SUBJECT LINE: E.G.
"VISAS VIPER: FY-98 3RD QUARTER REPORT". THE REPORTS

SHOULD BE SLUGGED FOR INR/TIPOFF AND CA/VO/L/C AND USE THE
FOLLOWING TAGS: KVPR, CVIS, CMGT, PINR, PTER, ASEC.
SUBMITTING QUARTERLY REPORTS FOR OTHER POSTS

UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 12 STATE 009483 150913Z
16. THE DEPARTMENT IS AWARE THAT SOME POSTS ARE CONSULTING

WITH AND SUBMITTING QUARTERLY REPORTS ON BEHALF OF
CONSTITUENT AND/OR NON VISA-ISSUING POSTS WITHIN THEIR HOST
COUNTRIES. IN SUCH CASES, THE REPORTING POSTS SHOULD BE
CERTAIN TO INDICATE IN THEIR QUARTERLY REPORTS THE POSTS
WITH WHICH THEY HAVE CONSULTED ON VISAS VIPER ACTIVITIES
AND ON WHOSE BEHALF THEY ARE REPORTING.
VISAS VIPER REPORTING CRITERIA
17. A VISAS VIPER CABLE MUST BE SUBMITTED IF:

(1) THERE IS REASON TO SUSPECT THAT AN INDIVIDUAL FALLS

WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF INA 212(A)(3)(B); AND
(2) THERE IS SUFFICIENT BIOGRAPHIC DATA TO POSITIVELY

IDENTIFY THE SUBJECT OF THE INFORMATION.
18. THE PRIMARY GOAL OF THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM IS TO

DEVELOP HIGH-QUALITY, USABLE RECORDS ON POSSIBLE
TERRORISTS, NOT MERELY TO COLLECT IMPRESSIVE STATISTICS. A
VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM SHOULD THEREFORE ONLY BE SENT IF BOTH
OF THE ABOVE CRITERIA ARE MET.
REASON TO SUSPECT TERRORIST ACTIVITY
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 13 STATE 009483 150913Z
19. THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN A VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM

MUST BE SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT
THE INDIVIDUAL IS SUBJECT TO INA 212 (A) (3) (B) : I.E., THAT
HE OR SHE:
(1) HAS ENGAGED, IS ENGAGED, OR IS LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN

TERRORIST ACTIVITY AS DEFINED IN THAT SECTION;
(2) HAS INCITED TERRORIST ACTIVITY WITH INTENT TO CAUSE

DEATH OR BODILY HARM; OR
(3) IS A KNOWING MEMBER OR A REPRESENTATIVE OF ONE OF THE

30 TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY OF
STATE (SEE 9 FAM 40.32, NOTE 6.6(C) FOR A LIST OF THESE
DESIGNATED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS).
20. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE "REASONABLE SUSPICION"

CRITERION FOR SUBMITTING VISAS VIPER CABLES REPRESENTS A
LESSER STANDARD THAN THE "REASON TO BELIEVE" STANDARD
REQUIRED TO SUPPORT VISA DENIAL UNDER INA 212 (A) (3) (B) .
THE DEPARTMENT CONSIDERS THE "REASONABLE SUSPICION"
CRITERION TO BE MET IF THE DEROGATORY INFORMATION CURRENTLY
AVAILABLE WOULD WARRANT FURTHER DETAILED INQUIRY INTO THE
SUBJECT'S BACKGROUND SHOULD HE OR SHE APPLY FOR A VISA. AN
INDIVIDUAL'S ASSOCIATION WITH KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS
OR TERRORIST GROUPS ALSO MEETS THE CRITERION IF SUCH
ASSOCIATION SUGGESTS A PROSCRIBED MEMBERSHIP OR PERSONAL
INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTS.

UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 14 STATE 009483 150913Z

IDENTIFICATION OF SUBJECT
21. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO DEVELOP AND REPORT ALL AVAILABLE

IDENTIFYING DATA ON THE SUBJECTS OF VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS.
DEROGATORY INFORMATION ON A SUSPECTED TERRORIST, REGARDLESS
OF ITS GRAVITY, IS OF LITTLE VALUE UNLESS IT CAN BE LINKED
TO THAT INDIVIDUAL SHOULD HE OR SHE APPLY FOR A VISA OR FOR
ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES. INSUFFICIENT BIOGRAPHIC DATA
IN A GIVEN CASE CAN RESULT IN A FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A
SERIOUS THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY. IT CAN ALSO PRODUCE
"FALSE HITS" WHICH COMPLICATE VISA ADJUDICATION, PLACE
CONSULAR OFFICERS AT RISK OF SANCTIONS UNDER THE VISA
LOOKOUT ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIREMENTS, AND CAUSE UNWARRANTED
INCONVENIENCE TO BONA FIDE VISA APPLICANTS. FOR THESE
REASONS, THE DEPARTMENT CAREFULLY WEIGHS THE ADEQUACY OF
BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER TO CREATE
TIPOFF RECORDS AND CLASS/IBIS ENTRIES ON THE SUBJECTS OF
VISAS VIPER REPORTING. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT
EVEN WHEN CLASS AND IBIS ENTRIES ARE NOT MADE BECAUSE OF
INSUFFICIENT BIOGRAPHIC DATA, TIPOFF RECORDS ARE OFTEN
CREATED ON THE SUBJECT IN CASE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS
LATER DEVELOPED.
22. VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS SHOULD IDEALLY PROVIDE FULL

NAMES (INCLUDING ALIASES AND ALTERNATE SPELLINGS) AND DATES
AND PLACES OF BIRTH. SINCE NAMING CONVENTIONS VARY 3Y
COUNTRY AND REGION, THE SUBJECT'S SURNAME(S) MUST BE
CLEARLY IDENTIFIED, EITHER BY LISTING IT/THEM FIRST,

FOLLOWED BY A COMMA AND THE GIVEN NAME(S), OR BY PLACING
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 15 STATE 009483 150913Z

THE SURNAME(S) IN PARENTHESES. IN CASES WHERE THE
SUBJECT'S GIVEN NAME CAN BE EITHER MASCULINE OR FEMININE,
THE SUBJECT'S GENDER SHOULD BE SPECIFIED.
23. IF AN INDIVIDUAL'S EXACT DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH ARE

NOT AVAILABLE, A REASONABLE ESTIMATE OF HIS OR HER AGE AND
THE KNOWN OR PROBABLE COUNTRY OF BIRTH SHOULD BE PROVIDED
IF POSSIBLE. VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS MAY BE SUBMITTED
WITHOUT BIRTH DATA IF THE SUBJECT'S NAME IS NOT A COMMON
ONE, AND IF THE POST IS ABLE TO PROVIDE OTHER IDENTIFYING
INFORMATION. PERSONAL DETAILS SUCH AS PASSPORT DATA,
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS, EDUCATION, PROFESSION,

RESIDENTIAL AND EMPLOYMENT HISTORY, AND THE NAMES OF FAMILY

MEMBERS ARE OFTEN USEFUL IN ESTABLISHING IDENTITY. A
SUBJECT'S AFFILIATION WITH A TERRORIST GROUP, AND HIS OR
HER POSITION THEREIN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE REPORTED AS THIS
INFORMATION IS PARTICULARLY VALUABLE FOR BOTH
IDENTIFICATION AND THREAT ASSESSMENT PURPOSES.
24. PLEASE NOTE THAT A YEAR OF BIRTH, AT A MINIMUM, IS

REQUIRED TO ENTER A SUBJECT'S NAME INTO THE INS/U.S.
CUSTOMS SERVICE'S IBIS LOOKOUT SYSTEM. IT IS ESPECIALLY
IMPORTANT TO KEEP THIS IN MIND WHEN REPORTING ON NATIONALS
OF VISA WAIVER COUNTRIES SINCE THE ONLY SCREENING OF SUCH
INDIVIDUALS IS THROUGH IBIS AT U.S. PORTS-OF-ENTRY.
PRIORITIZING AND EVALUATING TERRORIST INFORMATION:

PRIORITIES FOR TERRORIST REPORTING
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 16 STATE 009483 150913Z

25. WHILE ALL SUSPECTED TERRORISTS MEETING THE VISAS VIPER
CRITERIA MUST BE REPORTED, POSTS SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THE
FOLLOWING PRIORITIES WHEN GATHERING AND EVALUATING
TERRORIST INFORMATION. THESE PRIORITIES, RANKED IN
DESCENDING ORDER OF THREAT, WERE DEVELOPED IN CONSULTATION
WITH OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES:
(1) INDIVIDUALS WHO POSE OR KAY POSE A PRESENT THREAT TO

U.S. INTERESTS IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD;
(2) INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT NOW KNOWN TO POSE A PRESENT

THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS, BUT WHO HAVE DONE SO WITHIN THE
PAST 15 YEARS; AND
(3) INDIVIDUALS WHO POSE A PRESENT THREAT TO NON-U.S.

INTERESTS, OR WHO DID SO WITHIN THE PAST TEN YEARS.
EVALUATION OF TERRORIST INFORMATION
26. THE FOLLOWING ARE AMONG MANY FACTORS THAT MUST BE

CONSIDERED WHEN EVALUATING TERRORIST INFORMATION AND/OR
ASSESSING ITS URGENCY:
(1) THE IMMEDIACY AND SEVERITY OF THE THREAT POSED;

(2) THE RELIABILITY OF THE INFORMATION;
(3) WHETHER THE SUBJECT IS CLEARLY IDENTIFIED; AND
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 17 STATE 009483 150913Z

(4) WHETHER ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COULD BE DEVELOPED
WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME PERIOD TO FURTHER CLARIFY THE
SITUATION OR BETTER IDENTIFY THE SUBJECT.
27. EVALUATING TERRORIST INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF

SUBMITTING VISAS VIPER REPORTING REQUIRES FLEXIBILITY AND
SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENT FOR WHICH THERE ARE NOT ALWAYS CLEAR
GUIDELINES. THE DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT SUCH ASSESSMENTS
ARE BEST MADE BY EACH POST'S VISAS VIPER COMMITTEE, WHICH
HAS FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE HOST COUNTRY'S TERRORIST
THREAT SITUATION. IF THE POST BELIEVES THE REPORTING
CRITERIA OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 17 ABOVE HAVE BEEN MET, A
VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM PROVIDING ALL KNOWN INFORMATION SHOULD
BE SUBMITTED. THE DEPARTMENT ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR
ACTION TAKEN ONCE INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL TERRORISTS IS
REPORTED.
VISAS VIPER REPORTING CHANNEL
28. COUNTERTERRORISM REPORTING IS AN IMPORTANT FOREIGN

POLICY FUNCTION REQUIRING THE COLLABORATIVE EFFORT OF ALL
MEMBERS OF A POST'S COUNTRY TEAM. EXCEPT IN THE RARE
INSTANCES WHERE THERE ARE SPECIAL OPERATIONAL CONCERNS, ALL
STATE DEPARTMENT REPORTING ON TERRORISTS, INCLUDING
DIPLOMATIC SECURITY (DS) REPORTING, MUST BE TRANSMITTED
THROUGH THE.VISAS VIPER CHANNEL. OTHER-AGENCY TERRORIST
REPORTING MAY USE THE VIPER CHANNEL OR BE SENT THROUGH THE
AGENCY'S TRADITIONAL REPORTING CHANNEL. REGARDLESS OF THE
MEANS OF TRANSMISSION CHOSEN, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 18 STATE 009483 150913Z
THAT SUSPECTED TERRORISTS ARE SCREENED FOR POSSIBLE

INCLUSION IN THE CLASS AND IBIS LOOKOUT SYSTEMS.
DEPARTMENTAL REPORTING

29. THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL OFFERS A DIRECT CONSULAR

CONDUIT FOR WATCHLISTING KNOWN AND SUSPECTED TERRORISTS AND
MUST BE USED FOR ALL DEPARTMENTAL REPORTING ON INDIVIDUALS
WHO MEET THE VIPER PROGRAM'S SCOPE AND CRITERIA.
INFORMATION ON TERRORISTS MAY ORIGINATE FROM A VARIETY OF
SOURCES INCLUDING CONSULAR INTERVIEWS, MEDIA REPORTING, AND
THE CONTACTS OF THE SECURITY OFFICER AND OTHER POST
SECTIONS AND AGENCIES. THE FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION
SERVICE (FBIS) , IF AVAILABLE AT POST, IS A VALUABLE
RESOURCE. TERRORIST INFORMATION MAY BE DEVELOPED AND
SHARED THROUGH EITHER THE POST'S INTERAGENCY VISAS VIPER
COMMITTEE OR ON AN AD HOC BASIS. WHILE THE CONSULAR
SECTION HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATING AND MONITORING
VISAS VIPER REPORTING, OTHER DEPARTMENT SECTIONS ARE
RESPONSIBLE FOR SHARING TERRORIST INFORMATION WITH THE
CONSULAR SECTION, AND, IF DRAFTING REPORTS ON TERRORISTS,
FOR ENSURING THAT SUCH REPORTING IS TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE
VISAS VIPER CHANNEL. (FOR GUIDANCE ON PREPARING VISAS VIPER
TELEGRAMS, SEE PARAGRAPHS 31 THROUGH 34 BELOW).
OTHER AGENCY REPORTING
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 19 STATE 009483 150913Z
30. THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL IS INTENDED TO SUPPLEMENT,

RATHER THAN SUPPLANT, PREVIOUSLY EXISTING CHANNELS USED BY
OTHER AGENCIES FOR REPORTING ON FOREIGN TERRORISTS. OTHER
AGENCIES MAY SHARE TERRORIST INFORMATION WITH THE POST'S
VISAS VIPER COMMITTEE FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE DEPARTMENT
THROUGH THE VIPER CHANNEL, OR MAY CHOOSE TO SEND IT
DIRECTLY TO THEIR HEADQUARTERS. DATA TRANSMITTED THROUGH
THE LATTER ROUTE IS USUALLY LATER PASSED TO THE DEPARTMENT
FOR POSSIBLE CLASS AND IBIS ENTRY THROUGH THE TIPOFF
PROGRAM. OTHER-AGENCY DRAFTERS CAN EXPEDITE TIPOFF'S
RECEIPT OF THEIR TERRORIST REPORTING BY INCLUDING THE
PHRASE "RECOMMENDED FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE VISAS VIPER
PROGRAM" IN THE TEXT OF THE OUTGOING MESSAGES. ORIGINATING
AGENCIES MAY PREFER TO USE THEIR OWN REPORTING CHANNELS FOR
A VARIETY OF REASONS, INCLUDING THE PROTECTION OF SOURCES
AND ONGOING OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, ALL POST AGENCIES SHOULD
BE AWARE OF THE AVAILABILITY OF THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL AS
A DIRECT AND MORE EXPEDITIOUS MEANS OF WATCHLISTING

SUSPECTED TERRORISTS IN THE BORDER SECURITY LOOKOUT SYSTEMS
(CLASS AND IBIS) AND SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO USE IT IN
EMERGENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

VISAS VIPER REPORTING PROCEDURES:

REQUIREMENTS
31. THE DEPARTMENT'S OBJECTIVE IS TO FACILITATE VISAS

VIPER REPORTING TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE CONSISTENT WITH
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 20 STATE 009483 150913Z

MEETING THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS:
(1) THAT ALL AVAILABLE IDENTIFYING AND DEROGATORY

INFORMATION BE PROVIDED; AND
(2) THAT THE REPORTS RECEIVE THE DISTRIBUTION NECESSARY FOR

ALERTING INTERESTED AGENCIES AND FOR WATCHLISTING THE
SUBJECTS.
PREPARING VIPER TELEGRAMS
32. VISAS VIPER CABLES SHOULD BE SLUGGED FOR INR/TIPOFF

AND CA/VO/L/C AND MUST BE ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING
AGENCIES: "SECSTATE WASHDC, DIRFBI//INTD/CTS//, INS/HQINT
WASHDC, US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHDC/INTEL". OTHER POSTS
HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT'S PLACE OF NATIONALITY
OR RESIDENCE, OR OVER THE AREA IN WHICH THE SUBJECT, OR THE
SUBJECT'S CnCUP, HAS BEEN ACTIVE SHOULD NORMALLY 3E
INCLUDED AS INFO ADDRESSEES. THE VISAS VIPER CODE
INDICATOR SHOULD APPEAR IN THE CAPTION LINE AND THE FIRST
PARAGRAPH OF THE TELEGRAM, AND THE FOLLOWING TAGS SHOULD BE
USED: KVPR, PTER, CVIS, PINR, ASEC, (COUNTRY TAG). VISAS
VIPER TELEGRAMS SHOULD IDEALLY BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE MODEL FORMAT PROVIDED IN 9 FAM PART IV APPENDIX E,
SECTION 302, ALTHOUGH FLEXIBILITY IS PERMITTED (SEE
PARAGRAPH 34 BELOW). AT POSTS' DISCRETION, MULTIPLE NAMES
MAY BE SUBMITTED IN A SINGLE TELEGRAM. THE CABLE SHOULD
PROVIDE ALL IDENTIFYING DATA AVAILABLE REGARDING THE
SUBJECT(S) AS WELL AS A DETAILED RECITATION OF THE
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 21 STATE 009483 150913Z

DEROGATORY INFORMATION KNOWN TO POST, INCLUDING THE
IDENTIFICATION OF ANY TERRORIST GROUPS WITH WHICH THE
SUBJECT MAY BE AFFILIATED. FINALLY, VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS
SHOULD INCLUDE AN EVALUATION OF THE CREDIBILITY AND
APPLICABILITY OF THE INFORMATION SUBMITTED, A GENERAL

DESCRIPTION OF THE SOURCE, AND AN ASSESSMENT OF THE

SOURCE'S RELIABILITY.
CLASSIFICATION AND HANDLING
33. VISAS VIPER CABLES SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE CLASSIFIED AT

AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL AND ASSIGNED APPROPRIATE TELEGRAPHIC
PRECEDENCE. IN A CLASSIFIED VIPER TELEGRAM, THE PORTION
CONTAINING THE SUBJECT'S NAME, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH,
NATIONALITY, AND PASSPORT NUMBER SHOULD REMAIN UNCLASSIFIED
SINCE THESE DATA ELEMENTS WILL LIKELY BE ENTERED INTO THE
UNCLASSIFIED CLASS AND IBIS LOOKOUT SYSTEMS. ALL OTHER
INFORMATION PROVIDED IS MAINTAINED BY THE DEPARTMENT AND
PROTECTED ACCORDING TO ITS CLASSIFICATION. THE USE OF THE
ROGER CHANNEL SHOULD BE AVOIDED WHEN SENDING VISAS VIPER
CABLES, SINCE TELEGRAMS SO TRANSMITTED REQUIRE SPECIAL
HANDLING THAT DELAYS THEIR PROCESSING.
DUAL PURPOSE REPORTING
34. THE DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES THAT COUNTERTERRORISM

UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 22 STATE 009483 150913Z

REPORTING, PARTICULARLY THAT INITIATED BY OTHER SECTIONS OR
AGENCIES, OFTEN HAS PURPOSES OTHER THAN, OR IN ADDITION TO,
WATCHLISTING THE INDIVIDUAL IN QUESTION. FOR THIS REASON,
AND TO OBVIATE THE NEED FOR DUPLICATE REPORTING, POSTS ARE
NOT REQUIRED TO PRECISELY FOLLOW THE MODEL FORMAT SHOWN IN
9 FAM PART IV APPENDIX E, SECTION 302. AS LONG AS THE
TELEGRAM CONTAINS THE "KVPR" TAG AND THE "VISAS VIPER" CODE
INDICATOR, INCLUDES THE ADDRESSEES LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 32
ABOVE, AND PROVIDES COMPLETE INFORMATION REGARDING THE
SUSPECTED TERRORIST'S IDENTITY AND ACTIVITIES, IT WILL
RECEIVE APPROPRIATE DISTRIBUTION AND BE PROCESSED BY THE
TIPOFF/VIPER STAFF.
WATCHLISTING TERRORISTS
35. THE SUBJECTS OF VISAS VIPER REPORTING WHO MEET THE

PROGRAM'S CRITERIA ARE ENTERED INTO TIPOFF'S
COUNTERTERRORISM DATABASE AND THEIR NAMES ARE INCLUDED IN
CLASS UNDER THE DPT-00 CODE. AS WITH ALL DPT-00 ENTRIES,

THE DEPARTMENT'S SECURITY ADVISORY OPINION IS REQUIRED

SHOULD A SUBJECT LATER APPLY FOR A VISA, AND NO VISA MAY BE
ISSUED UNTIL THE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE SAO REQUEST

IS RECEIVED. THE NAMES OF MOST INDIVIDUALS WHOSE DATES OF
BIRTH ARE KNOWN ARE ALSO ENTERED INTO THE INS/U.S. CUSTOMS
SERVICE'S IBIS LOOKOUT SYSTEM AND ARE SHARED WITH THE
CANADIAN GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE TUSCAN PROGRAM. AS
INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 24 ABOVE, AT LEAST THE SUBJECT'S
YEAR OF BIRTH IS NEEDED TO CREATE AN IBIS ENTRY, MAKING THE
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 23 STATE 009483 150913Z

PROVISION OF THIS INFORMATION PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT WHEN
SUBMITTING VIPER CABLES ON NATIONALS OF VISA WAIVER
COUNTRIES.
CLASS ENTRY BY POSTS IN CERTAIN CASES
36. WHEN A CONSULAR OFFICER AT A POST ON-LINE WITH CLASS

BELIEVES THAT A SUSPECTED TERRORIST SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN
CLASS IMMEDIATELY, THE CONSULAR OFFICER SHOULD ENTER THE
SUBJECT'S NAME DIRECTLY USING THE APPROPRIATE QUASI
212(A) (3) (B) REFUSAL CODE (SEE 9 FAM PART IV APPENDIX D,
EXHIBIT I). CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING SUCH ACTION INCLUDE,
BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, A CREDIBLE IMMINENT THREAT TO
UNITED STATES INTERESTS OR AN IMPENDING APPLICATION FOR A
U.S. VISA BY THE SUBJECT. THE CONSULAR OFFICER MUST THEN
EXPEDITIOUSLY SUBMIT A VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM, IN WHICH THE
POST'S CLASS ENTRY SHOULD BE REPORTED.
CONDUCTING CLASS CHECKS
37. PRIOR TO SUBMITTING A VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM ON A

POTENTIAL TERRORIST, CONSULAR POSTS MUST CONDUCT A CLASS
CHECK TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SUBJECT WAS PREVIOUSLY
INCLUDED AS A DPT-00 ENTRY OR UNDER ANOTHER CODE REQUIRING
A SECURITY ADVISORY OPINION. THE VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM
SHOULD BE SUBMITTED EVEN IF THE CLASS CHECK REVEALS A
PREVIOUS ENTRY SINCE THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO POST IS
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 24 STATE 009483 150913Z

LIKELY TO ADD TO THE SUBJECT'S EXISTING RECORD. THE
RESULTS OF THE CLASS CHECK SHOULD BE REPORTED IN THE VIPER

CABLE. ANY CLASS ENTRIES MUST BE FULLY CITED SO THAT THE

SUBJECT MAY BE ACCURATELY IDENTIFIED AND HIS/HER RECORD
EXPEDITIOUSLY LOCATED.
REMOVING WP CLASS AND IBIS ENTRIES
38. RECOMMENDATIONS TO DELETE CLASS AND IBIS ENTRIES WHICH

WERE BASED UPON VISAS VIPER REPORTING SHOULD BE SUBMITTED
TO THE DEPARTMENT SLUGGED FOR INR/TIPOFF AND CA/VO/L/C.
THE CABLE SHOULD CONTAIN THE "VISAS VIPER" CODE INDICATOR
AND THE "KVPR" TAG. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DELETION REQUEST
MUST BE PROVIDED. CIRCUMSTANCES CREATING THE NEED FOR SUCH
A RECOMMENDATION MIGHT INCLUDE THE SUBJECT'S DEMISE OR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF EVIDENCE THAT THE DEROGATORY INFORMATION
AGAINST THE SUBJECT, PREVIOUSLY BELIEVED CREDIBLE, IS
WITHOUT FOUNDATION.
DEPARTMENT FEEDBACK
39. THE DEPARTMENT WILL REPLY IN A TIMELY MANNER TO ALL

VISAS VIPER COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ROUTINE
QUARTERLY REPORTS. IN INDIVIDUAL CASES, THE DEPARTMENT
WILL INFORM POSTS REGARDING THE WATCHLISTING OF THE
SUBJECT(S) AND WILL ADVISE IF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS
NEEDED. POSTS' INQUIRIES REGARDING VISAS VIPER POLICIES
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 25 STATE 009483 150913Z

AND PROCEDURES WILL ALSO RECEIVE THE DEPARTMENT'S PROMPT
ATTENTION. THE DEPARTMENT WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO
PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE GUIDANCE AND FEEDBACK ON VISAS VIPER
MATTERS AND TO FORM A TRUE PARTNERSHIP WITH FOREIGN SERVICE
POSTS IN FULFILLING THIS CRUCIAL COUNTERTERRORISM
RESPONSIBILITY.
REQUEST FOR POST ACTION
40. THE OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR VISAS VIPER PROGRAM

COORDINATION IS ASKED TO REVIEW POST'S PROCEDURES AND
PRACTICES IN LIGHT OF THESE REVISED INSTRUCTIONS AND MAKE
ANY CHANGES NECESSARY TO BRING THEM INTO ACCORD. NO REPORT
TO THE DEPARTMENT ON THE RESULTS OF THIS REVIEW NEED BE
SUBMITTED. THE WP COORDINATOR SHOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT ALL

SECTIONS AND AGENCIES AT POST ARE MADE AWARE OF THE NEW

GUIDANCE. ANY COMMENTS, SUGGESTIONS, OR QUESTIONS
REGARDING THESE INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO
INR/TIPOFF. THE DEPARTMENT COMMENDS POSTS' CONTRIBUTIONS
TO THIS VITALLY IMPORTANT PROGRAM AND ENCOURAGES EVEN
GREATER FUTURE PARTICIPATION.
TALBOTT
UNCLASSIFIED
« END OF DOCUMENT »

Document Number: 1993CAIRO12494 Channel: n/aN
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 01 CAIRO 12494 01 OF 07 201519Z

ACTION OIG-04
INFO LOG- 00 CA-02 CCO- 00 OASY-00 DIM-01 PIFF-01 IMMC-01

TEDE-00 ADS-00 NEA-01 PSOE-00 SS-00 VO-06 MLDE-00
CORE- 00 /016W
norm? t; 9m R 9 i~\7. /TR
0 201515Z JUL 93 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9418
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 CAIRO 12494
FOR OIG/AUD/CI - GARY PETROVICH, CA, CA/VO, AND

NEA/EGY
E.G. 11652: N/A

TAGS CVIS, AADP, CMGT, EG
SUBJECT: OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN: FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS
REF: PETROVICH FAX TRANSMITTED 7/14/93
1. THE REFERENCED FAX WAS RECEIVED AT POST AT CLOSE

OF BUSINESS, WEDNESDAY, JULY 14. THE FOLLOWING ARE
THE TEXT OF THE FAX AND RESPONSES PREPARED BY CONSUL
GENERAL SWOPE IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONS CONTAINED
IN THAT FAX.
2. GENERAL COMMENT. THE QUESTIONS POSED IN THE

REFERENCED FAX RAISE A NUMBER OF ISSUES OF A POLICY
NATURE WHICH ARE BEST ADDRESSED TO THE DEPARTMENT.
CAIRO STRONGLY SUPPORTS DEPARTMENT EFFORTS TO
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 CAIRO 12494 01 OF 07 201519Z

PREVENT THE ENTRY OF EXCLUDABLES AND OTHER
UNDESIRABLES INTO THE U.S. SINCE 1991, WE HAVE
EXPANDED OUR COORDINATION EFFORTS WITH OTHER
ELEMENTS OF THE MISSION AND NEARLY DOUBLED OUR
OUTGOING CABLE TRAFFIC TO THE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER
POSTS. THE CONSULAR SECTION CONDUCTED (AND
CONTINUES TO CONDUCT) EXTENSIVE REVIEWS OF ALL
CONSULAR INTERNAL MANAGEMENT CONTROLS INCLUDING NAME
CHECKING PROCEDURES. SINCE 1991 POST HAS BEEN IN
COMPLIANCE WITH DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS. YOU MAY
WISH TO REVIEW OUR FY-94 AND FY-95 CONSULAR PACKAGE

Document Number: 1993CAIRO12494 Channel: n/a
SUBMISSIONS (CAIRO MEMORANDA OF MARCH 13, 1992 AND

OF MARCH 15, 1993 WHICH WERE SENT TO OIG AMONG OTHER
WASHINGTON ADDRESSEES). NONETHELESS, OUR INABILITY
TO ACCESS CLASS ON SUNDAYS (A WORKDAY), INCONSISTENT
DATA RETRIEVAL FROM CLASS WHICH APPEARS TO BE
ASSOCIATED WITH THE CLASS CENTRAL SYSTEM SEARCH
SOFTWARE (AND WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED TO WASHINGTON
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 CAIRO 12494 01 OF 07 201519Z

REPEATEDLY DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS) WILL CONTINUE
TO HAMPER OUR ABILITY TO RETRIEVE ENTRIES ALREADY
MADE INTO CLASS. THE DEPARTMENT MUST SOLVE THESE
MAJOR SYSTEMS PROBLEMS IF OVERSEAS POSTS ARE TO HAVE
THE MINIMAL TOOLS NECESSARY TO SCREEN VISA
APPLICANTS.
3. THE REFERENCED FAX, ADDRESSED TO CAIRO CG, HAS

AS IT'S SUBJECT "QUESTIONS REGARDING CAIRO 21875,
12/11/92". INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH READS:
QUOTE
AS DISCUSSED IN OUR PHONE CONVERSATION, THIS IS A
LIST OF QUESTIONS OUR OFFICE HAD ON THE ABOVE CABLE,
WHICH WE FOUND WHILE REVIEWING EMBASSY CAIRO'S
POLTICAL SECTION FILES IN MAY 1993. QUESTIONS HAVE
BEEN RAISED WHETHER THE INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED IN
UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 01 CAIRO 12494 02 OF 07 201522Z

ACTION OIG-04
INFO LOG-00 CA-02 CCO-00 OASY-00 DIM-01 PIFF-01 IMMC-01

CORE-00 /016W
D90B7C 201522Z /38
O 201515Z JUL 93 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO


NEA/EGY
E.O. 11652: N/A

THIS CABLE WOULD MERIT BEING PUT INTO CLASS AS

QUASI-REFUSALS. THE CABLE WAS SENT TO WASHINGTON,
BUT INFORMATIONAL COPIES WERE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE
EMBASSY, INCLUDING THE CONSULAR SECTION. WHAT WE
WOULD LIKE TO LEARN FROM THE EMBASSY'S CONSULAR
SECTION IS THE FOLLOWING:
QUESTION 1. TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, DID THE CONSULAR

SECTION IN FACT RECEIVE A COPY OF THE ABOVE CABLE?
END QUOTE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 CAIRO 12494 02 OF 07 201522Z
RESPONSE:
YOUR TELEPHONE CALL ON 7/13/93 WAS THE FIRST TIME

ANYONE HAD GIVEN THE CONSULAR SECTION THE MESSAGE
REFERENCE NUMBER OF THE CABLE IN QUESTION. NEVER
.DURING THE COURSE OF THE AUDIT TEAM'S VISIT IN EARLY
MAY, 1993, WAS I PROVIDED WITH THIS ESSENTIAL
INFORMATION DESPITE MY REQUEST FOR SUCH INFORMATION.
THE CONSULAR SECTION REGULARLY RECEIVES

INFORMATIONAL COPIES OF A GREAT DEAL OF OUTGOING
NON-CAPTIONED CABLES DRAFTED BY THE POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC SECTIONS. HOWEVER, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
AND CLASSIFIED CABLES CANNOT BE. CIRCULATED, OPENLY ...
WITHIN THE CONSULAR SECTION. THEY MUST REMAIN IN A

SECURE CONTAINER IN A RESTRICTED AREA AVAILABLE FOR
PERUSAL BY CLEARED AMERICAN STAFF AS THEY HAVE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 CAIRO 12494 02 OF 07 201522Z

TIME. THE DISTRIBUTION LINE OF CABLE INDICATES THAT
THE CONSULAR SECTION RECEIVED AN INFORMATIONAL COPY

'Current Handling: n/a
AS IT DOES OF MANY OTHER CABLES. WE DID NOT CLEAR

THE CABLE, NOR WERE WE AWARE OF ITS CONTENTS PRIOR
TO ITS DISPATCH.
QUESTION 2 IN REVIEWING THE CABLE, WHAT 'IS YOUR

JUDGEMENT (SIC), AS CHIEF OF THE CONSULAR SECTION,
ON WHETHER ANY OF THE INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED MERITED
BEING PUT INTO THE CLASS SYSTEM AS QUASI-REFUSALS?
--IF SO, WHICH NAMES?

--WHAT WOULD BE THE BASES (SIC) FOR INCLUDING
SOME NAMES FROM THIS LIST IN THE SYSTEM AND NOT
OTHERS?
RESPONSE:
--BASED SOLELY ON THE INFORMATION IN CAIRO 21875, IT

APPEARS THAT NONE OF THE NAMES MERIT ENTRY INTO
CLASS AS EXCLUDABLES BECAUSE:
A. THE INDIVIDUALS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE

EXCLUDABLE/INELIGIBLE UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY ACT (INA) SECTION 212(A)(2)(A)(I)(I),
CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE BECAUSE:
1. THE VERDICTS WERE SUSPENDED PENDING APPEAL

(CABLE, PARAS 4,7, AND 8) AND 9 FAM 40.21(A)N. 3.7.
2. MANY OF THE DEFENDANTS MENTIONED IN THE

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 04 CAIRO 12494 02 OF 07 201522Z

REFERENCED TELEGRAM, INCLUDING THOSE WHO ARE
SUPPOSEDLY THE MOST "DANGEROUS," WERE TRIED IN
ABSENTIA (CABLE, PARA 9 AND 9 FAM 40.21(A)N 3.4-2
WHICH STATES "A CONVICTION IN ABSENTIA DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE A CONVICTION.")
UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 01 CAIRO 12494 03 OF 07 201523Z

ACTION OIG-04

INFO LOG- 00 CA-02 CCO- 00 OASY-00 DIM- 01 PIFF-01 IMMC-01

CORE- 00 /016W
nomaa/i o n i «;•? 7 V. 1 ~\
O 201515Z JUL 93 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

NEA/EGY
E.O. 11652: N/A

3. NO SPECIFIC CRIMINAL/TERRORIST ACTIONS ARE

MENTIONED IN THE CABLE AS HAVING BEEN COMMITTED BY
THE INDIVIDUALS LISTED IN THE CABLE. WITH THE
EXCEPTION OF THE PLO, A PERSON IS NOT GUILTY OF A
CRIME MERELY BECAUSE THE GROUP OR GROUPS TO WHICH
(S)HE BELONGS COMMIT(S) CRIMINAL ACTS.
B. THE INDIVIDUALS DO NOT APPEAR INELIGIBLE FOR

VISAS UNDER INA 212(A) (3) (A) (III) WHICH STATES "ANY
ACTIVITY A PURPOSE OF WHICH IS THE OPPOSITION TO, OR
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 CAIRO 12494 03 OF 07 201523Z

THE CONTROL OR OVERTHROW OF,(SIC) THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE, VIOLENCE, OR OTHER
UNLAWFUL MEANS." THERE IS NOTHING WHATSOEVER IN THE
REFERENCED CABLE TO INDICATE THAT THESE GROUPS FOCUS
THEIR ACTIVITIES AGAINST AMERICAN INTERESTS.
C. THE INDIVIDUALS DO NOT APPEAR, FROM THE

INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE REFERENCED CABLE, TO BE
INELIGIBLE UNDER INA SECTION 212(A)(3)(B) ENGAGING
IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. 9 FAM 40.32 N 5.1
STIPULATES THAT MERE MEMBERSHIP IN OR AFFILIATION
WITH A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF
THE PLO), DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A GROUND OF
INELIGIBILITY. IN THE "AFGHAN" CASE, THE REFERENCED
CABLE STATES THE INDIVIDUALS WERE CHARGED WITH
"MEMBERSHIP" IN A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (PARA 2).

IN THE "JIHAD/HEZBOLLAH" CASE THEY WERE CHARGED WITH

"ESTABLISHING A GROUP." SINCE THE PASSAGE OF IMMACT
90, NEITHER ESTABLISHING NOR BELONGING TO TERRORIST
GROUPS IS A GROUND OF EXCLUSION.
PUBLIC LAW 102-138 SECTION 128 ENJOINS THE SECRETARY

OF STATE FROM INCLUDING INFORMATION INTO THE
AUTOMATED VISA LOOKOUT SYSTEM ABOUT INDIVIDUALS WHO
ARE NOT ACTUALLY EXCLUDABLE. THE POLITICAL OFFICERS
WITH WHOM WE INTERACT ON THESE ISSUES ARE CONSTANTLY
FRUSTRATED THAT THEIR REPORTING CABLES DO NOT
PROVIDE LEGAL GROUNDS FOR US TO ENTER A NAME INTO
CLASS.
IT WOULD BE IMMENSELY EASIER FOR DRAFTERS OF CABLES

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 CAIRO 12494 03 OF 07 201523Z

SUCH AS 92 CAIRO 21875 IF THE DEPARTMENT WERE DEFINE
SPECIFIC SUBGROUPS OF THE "ISLAMIC GROUPS" AS
ORGANIZATIONS IN WHICH MEMBERSHIP IN AND OF ITSELF
CONSTITUTES PARTICIPATION IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
(SEE 9 FAM 40.32 N 5.2). BUT, IT HAS NOT DONE SO.
QUESTION 3: WHAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WOULD YOU

NEED BEFORE YOU COULD ENTER THE NAMES INTO THE CLASS
SYSTEM?
RESPONSE:
IN ORDER TO ENTER THESE INDIVIDUALS INTO CLASS IN

ANY RETRIEVABLE, MEANINGFUL WAY, THE CONSULAR
SECTION REQUIRES:
A. AN ALLEGATION OF
(1) A SERIOUS CRIME HAVING BEEN COMMITTED BY EACH
INDIVIDUAL (OR THE ADMISSION OF THE ESSENTIAL ACTS
OF SUCH A CRIME), OR
(2) "ANTI AMERICAN" CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (SECTION

212(A) (3) (A) (III)) EVEN OF A NON-SERIOUS NATURE
COMMITTED BY EACH INDIVIDUAL, OR
UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 01 CAIRO 12494 04 OF 07 201524Z

ACTION OIG-04
INFO LOG- 00 CA-02 CCO-00 OASY-00 DIM-01 PIFF-01 IMMC-01

CORE- 00 /016W
normiat? o n i i ^ o 4"7 /1O
0 201515Z JUL 93 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

NEA/EGY
E.O. 11652: N/A

(3) A SPECIFIC TERRORIST ACT, AS DEFINED BY THE

INA, IN WHICH EACH INDIVIDUAL TOOK PART.
B. PROOF THAT IT IS REASONABLE TO BELIEVE THAT THE

ALLEGATION IS TRUE. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE:
(1) A REPORT OF A PERMANENT CONVICTION OF A CRIME

OF MORAL TURPITUDE, OR
(2) A FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PROJECT WHICH STATES

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 CAIRO 12494 04 OF 07 201524Z

CATEGORICALLY THAT WE KNOW A SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL HAS
ENGAGED IN ANTI AMERICAN CRIMINAL ACTS OR SPECIFIC
TERRORIST ACTIONS.
C. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH. THE WAY WE DISTINGUISH

ONE PERSON WITH THE SAME NAME FROM ANOTHER IS WITH
THE DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH. PARTICULARLY IN MUSLIM
ARAB COMMUNITIES WHERE THE SAME 20-30 NAMES ARE USED
OVER AND OVER AGAIN (AS FORENAMES AND AS SURNAMES),
IT IS ESSENTIAL TO KNOW THIS MINIMAL BIT OF
BIOGRAPHIC DATA.

D. ALIASES. THERE IS NO POINT IN ENTERING A NAME

IF THE INDIVIDUAL HAS AN ESTBLISHED AND
COMMONLY-USED ALIAS OR NAME VARIATION WHICH HE WOULD
LIKELY USE ON A PASSPORT OR PASSPORTS TO APPLY FOR A
U.S. VISA.
QUESTION 4. TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, WAS THERE ANY

FOLLOW-UP ACTION TAKEN ON THIS CABLE TOWARDS
COLLECTING THE NECESSARY INFORMATION FOR INPUT INTO
CLASS, EITHER ON YOUR PART OR BY THE POLITICAL
SECTION? IF NOT, WHY NOT?
RESPONSE:
ON MAY 5, 1993, THE POLITICAL SECTION SENT US A LIST

FIFTEEN NAMES OF SUPPOSEDLY "CONVICTED TERRORISTS."
EIGHT OF THESE WERE LISTED IN 92 CAIRO 21875.
HOWEVER, THE MAY 5 LIST FAILED TO REFER TO CAIRO
21875. WE WERE UNAWARE OF THE OVERLAP. THE MAY 5
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 CAIRO 12494 04 OF 07 201524Z

LIST DID NOT CONTAIN ALTERNATE SPELLINGS, DATES AND
PLACES OF BIRTH, NOR ANY SPECIFIC INFORMATION
CONCERNING "TERRORIST" ACTIVITIES COMMITTED BY THOSE
LISTED. WE DID EXPLAIN, AT LENGTH, TO THE THEN POST
TERRORISM/POLITICAL OFFICER THE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS
INVOLVED. DESPITE OUR REQUESTS, TO DATE WE HAVE NOT
RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION. THE POLITICAL COUNSELOR'
INFORMS ME THAT THE POLITICAL SECTION MADE
INQUIRIES, BUT HAD NOT RECEIVED THE NEEDED
INFORMATION.
THIS SPRING WE REDOUBLED OUR EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT

DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES CONCERNING ENTRY OF POSSIBLE
EXCLUDABLES INTO CLASS/NIVCAPS BY ..HOLDINGÂ . .
CLASSIFIED BRIEFING SESSION ON APRIL 297*^993 WHICH
THE DCM CHAIRED. SOME OF OUR EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD
ARE REPORTED IN CAIRO 11344 OF JULY 1, 1993 WHICH
WAS SLUGGED FOR OIG AMONG OTHER DEPARTMENT OFFICES.
UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CAIRO 12494 05 OF 07 201525Z

ACTION OIG-04

CORE- 00 /016W
nonnirc; oni R9R7. /IP
O 201515Z JUL 93 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

NEA/EGY
E.O. 11652: N/A

ONE OF THE POSITIVE RESULTS OF OUR EFFORTS WAS OUR

JUNE 7 MEMO, APPROVED BY THE DCM, WHICH DEFINES A
STANDARD REPORTING FORMAT FOR POTENTIAL NAMES OF
THOSE INELIGIBLE OR EXCLUDABLE UNDER THE INA. THE
MEMO WAS DISTRIBUTED TO THE DCM, POLITICAL, RSO, AND
ORA SECTIONS, THOUGH TO DATE NONE OF THESE SECTIONS
HAS USED IT TO CREATE A REPORT RECOMMENDING THAT A
QUASI-REFUSAL BE MADE.
TO FACILITATE THIS EFFORT, THE POST IS CREATING AN

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 CAIRO 12494 05 OF 07 201525Z

INTER-ACTIVE WANG GLOSSARY WHICH GUIDES THE USER
STEP-BY-STEP THROUGH WRITING A CABLE FOR POSSIBLE
ENTRY INTO CLASS, EXPLAINING AT EACH POINT THE LEVEL
OF DETAIL WHICH IS REQUIRED. WHEN THIS IS
COMPLETED, WE WILL TRAIN OTHER SECTIONS ON ITS USE,
AND SHARE IT WITH THE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER POSTS.
QUESTION 5: HAS THERE BEEN ANY DEVELOPMENTS (SIC)

REGARDING THESE INDIVIDUALS SINCE THE DECEMBER 1992
CABLE, THAT WOULD AFFECT WHETHER THEY SHOULD BE
ADDED TO CLASS OR NOT? IF SO, WE WOULD LIKE TO
OBTAIN RELEVANT CABLE TRAFFIC THAT HAS BEEN
GENERATED REGARDING THESE INDIVIDUALS.

Document Number: 1993CAIR012494 Channel: n/a
RESPONSE:
CONSULAR SECTIONS DO NOT MAINTAIN CASE FILES ON

POSSIBLE TERRORISTS UNLESS THEY APPLY FOR VISAS.
CONSULAR SECTIONS DO NOT HAVE THE LEGAL MANDATE,
ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY, PERSONNEL RESOURCES,
NOR THE SECURE DOCUMENT STORAGE FACILITIES TO DO
SO. CABLE TRAFFIC ON SPECIFIC TERRORIST GROUPS AND
INDIVIDUALS ARE HELD IN S/CT, INR/TNA, DS/DSS/ITA,
COUNTRY DESKS, AND AT COUNTERPART WASHINGTON
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. WE HAVE NOT BEEN INFORMED OF
DEVELOPMENTS ON THE 48 SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS LISTED
IN 92 CAIRO 21875.
NONETHELESS, LEST ANYONE IMAGINE THAT THE CONSULAR

SECTION NOT ENTERING THE NAMES IN QUESTION INTO
CLASS HAS SOMEHOW FACILITATED THE INTERNATIONAL
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 CAIRO 12494 05 OF 07 201525Z

TRAVEL OF TERRORISTS, WE NOTE THAT AT LEAST SEVEN OF
THE INDIVIDUALS LISTED IN 92 CAIRO 21875 WERE

ENTERED AS "00" BY THE DEPARTMENT IN DECEMBER,
1992. SEVERAL OTHERS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN IN THE
SYSTEM EVEN BEFORE THE CABLE WAS SENT. EVIDENTLY,
THE RECIPIENTS OF THE CABLE READ IT, GATHERED
WHATEVER ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE
THROUGH INTER-AGENCY LIAISON, CONSIDERED AND
EVALUATED THE LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE INFORMATION
AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON, AND ENTERED THE NAMES INTO
CLASS. THIS WAS ACHIEVED THE SAME MONTH THE CABLE
WAS RECEIVED, SO IT APPEARS THAT THE DEPARTMENT DID
ITS JOB WELL.
THE FIVE QUESTIONS POSED TO US SEEM TO IMPLY THAT WE

SHOULD BE REDUPLICATING THIS EFFORT, EVEN THOUGH THE
CONSULAR MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK (CHAPTER 6, SECTION 4,
PAGES 117-119) DOES NOT MENTION ANY SUCH REQUIREMENT
IN DESCRIBING THE CONSULAR LOOKOUT AND SUPPORT
SYSTEM (CLASS). CONSULAR SECTIONS DO, REPEAT DO,
HAVE THE MANDATE TO ENTER THE NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS
WHO SEEK VISAS AND TO ENSURE NAME CHECKS ARE
PERFORMED FOR PERSONS TO WHOM A VISA IS
CONTEMPLATED. (UNDER EXISTING DEPARTMENT
GUIDELINES, NAMECHECKS ARE NOT DONE ON PERSONS TO
WHOM VISAS ARE NOT ISSUED.) SEEKING OUT

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS AND ENTERING THEIR NAMES IN

ADVANCE INTO THE WASHINGTON-BASED AUTOMATED VISA
LOOKOUT SYSTEM IS NOT THE ROLE OF CONSULAR SECTIONS
ABROAD. THIS IS WHY THE DEPARTMENT MUST CONTINUE TO
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 04 CAIRO 12494 05 OF 07 201525Z

RELY ON ALL SOURCE REPORTING TO HEADQUARTERS
UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 01 CAIRO 12494 06 OF 07 201526Z

ACTION OIG-04

CORE- 00 /016W
nonri Q om<ÔK7. /TR
0 201515Z JUL 93 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

NEA/EGY
E.G. 11652: N/A

AGENCIES AND THE INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION PROCESS

IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY AND ENTER POSSIBLE
UNDESIRABLES, SUCH AS CRIMINALS AND TERRORISTS INTO
CLASS. CONSULAR SECTIONS ARE NOT STAFFED TO PROVIDE
INTELLIGENCE REPORTING ON PERSONS WHO ARE NOT
SEEKING VISAS.
THIS IS AS IT SHOULD BE. BY ANALOGY, CONSIDER OUR

NATION'S TURBERCULOSIS CRISIS. INCREASING NUMBERS
OF AMERICANS ARE KILLED BY INFECTIOUS TUBERCULOSIS
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 CAIRO 12494 06 OF 07 201526Z

CARRIED TO OUR SHORES FROM ABROAD. CARRIERS OF T.B.
ARE EXCLUDABLE UNDER THE INA. YET THE CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL DO NOT EXPECT CONSULAR OFFICERS TO
GATHER INFORMATION ON KNOWN AND POTENTIAL CARRIERS

OF T.B. IN ADVANCE OF THEIR POSSIBLE APPLICATION FOR
A VISA. CONSIDER, ALSO, VIOLENT CRIMINALS. THEY
ARE ALSO EXCLUDABLE. BUT, THE FBI AND OTHER LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES DO NOT EXPECT CONSULAR OFFICERS
TO GENERATE COMPREHENSIVE LISTS OF EVERYONE WHO HAS
COMMITTED A VIOLENT CRIME IN THE CONSULAR DISTRICT,
JUST IN CASE SOME OF THESE INDIVIDUALS MAY APPLY FOR
VISAS. WE NEITHER HAVE THE RESOURCES NOR THE
MANDATE TO ACCOMPLISH THESE TASKS.
SIMILARLY, WE DOUBT THAT INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

AGENCIES EXPECT US TO ASSESS WHO IS AND WHO IS NOT A
TERRORIST THREAT TO THE U.S. AND TO CREATE A
COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS.
HOWEVER, IF WE RECEIVE A SPECIFIC REQUEST

ACCOMPANIED BY SUFFICIENT INFORMATION (INCLUDING
FULL NAME, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH AND SUPPORTING
DATA), WE ENTER NAMES INTO CLASS. THUS, IF THE
REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER CAN DEMONSTRATE THAT AN
INDIVIDUAL CARRIES TUBERCULOSIS, OR THE RSO GIVES
ANALAGOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING CRIMINAL
INELIGIBILITY, OR OTHER MISSION ELEMENTS
DEMONSTRATED INELIGIBILITY UNDER THE DEFINITION OF
TERRORISM, THE NAMES ARE ENTERED. CONSULAR SECTIONS
ARE NOT STRUCTURED TO INITIATE SUCH ENTRIES OF NAMES
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 CAIRO 12494 06 OF 07 201526Z

OF PERSONS NOT APPLYING FOR VISAS. NOR DO WE HAVE
THE MANDATE OR RESOURCES TO INVESTIGATE INDIVIDUALS
WHEN THE INTIATING/REQUESTING OFFICE CANNOT
SUBSTANTIATE ITS REQUEST.
AS WE DISCUSSED DURING THE OIG VISIT TO CAIRO, ONLY

WASHINGTON MAY MAKE THE ENTRY WHICH REQUIRES ANY ONE
WHO HAS AN APPLICATION FROM THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL
IN QUESTION TO REFER THE CASE TO WASHINGTON. THIS
IS KNOWN AS THE DOUBLE ZERO (OO - DEPARTMENT)

ENTRY. INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE ENTERED INTO THE CLASS

SYSTEM AS DOUBLE-ZERO ENTRIES ARE VETTED THROUGH THE
INTER-AGENCY PROCESS. ONLY BY USING THE
INTER-AGENCY PROCESS, WITH ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE
AND OTHER INFORMATION NOT READILY AVAILABLE TO
POSTS, CAN MEANINGFUL EVALUATION OF DATA OCCUR. IN

FACT, UNCONTROLLED ENTRY OF LARGE NUMBERS OF NAMES
WITHOUT SUFFICIENT SUPPORTING INFORMATION INTO THE
UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 01 CAIRO 12494 07 OF 07 201527Z

ACTION OIG-04

CORE- 00 /016W
._ --nanr1-!A 9CM c:o'T7. /•*«
0 201515Z JUL 93 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
'NEA/EGY
E.O. 11652: N/A
CLASS DATABASE HAS BEEN A SERIOUS PROBLEM AND

PRESUMABLY IS ONE OF THE REASONS THE DEPARTMENT OF'
STATE HAS SEVERELY LIMITED POST'S ABILITY TO MAKE
PERMANENT ENTRIES INTO THE WORLDWIDE CLASS
DATABASE. FOR EXAMPLE, CLASS WILL NOT PHYSICALLY
ALLOW AN OVERSEAS POST TO ENTER AN INDIVIDUAL AS
"90" - POSSIBLE TERRORIST, UNLESS A BIRTHDATE IS
PROVIDED. THE DEPARTMENT DISCOURAGES POSTS FROM
USING THE CODE "45" - INFORMATION HELD AT POST, AS A
CATCH-ALL TO ENTER NAMES OF TERRORISTS, FELONS, ETC.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 CAIRO 12494 07 OF 07 201527Z
WE REMAIN ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF TERRORISTS

APPLYING FOR VISAS EVEN IF THEIR NAMES DO NOT APPEAR
AS A "HIT" IN CLASS. WE KNOW, TOO, THAT TERRORISTS
MAY EASILY ASSUME A NEW ALIAS FOR THE PURPOSE OF
OBTAINING A U.S. VISA. TO COUNTER THIS, WE
FREQUENTLY CONSULT WITH OTHER MISSION ELEMENTS AND
OCCASIONALY SUBMIT SECURITY ADVISORY OPINIONS EVEN
IF THE NAMES DOES NOT APPEAR IN CLASS. FOR EXAMPLE,
WE SUBMITTED SAO'S ON THE BROTHER OF IBRAHIM EL
GABROWNY (SEE CAIRO 9953 OF 6/10/93) AND A SHEIK
SEEKING TO TRAVEL TO NEW JERSEY (CAIRO 11213 OF
6/29/93, STATE 181704 OF 6/16/93, AND CAIRO 7290 OF
4/28/93) (SEE 9 FAM APP A).
A COROLLARY DIFFICULTY WITH ARABIC NAMES WAS

DISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITH MEMBERS OF THE DIG TEAM
DURING THEIR VISIT AS IS DOCUMENTED MOST RECENTLY IN
CAIRO 7475 OF 4/27/93. THIS CABLE ALSO DISCUSSED
THE PROBLEMS AT THIS POST (AND OTHERS IN THE MIDDLE
EAST) STEMMING FROM LACK OF ACCESS TO CLASS ON
SUNDAYS, A NORMAL WORKDAY HERE.
##
HULL
UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
Current Class.- UNCLASSIFIED Page: 14

UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 01 STATE 238926 060455Z

ORIGIN DS-00
INFO LOG- 00 AF-01 ARA-01 A-01 CA-02 CCO- 00 CIAE-00

OASY-00 DODE-00 EAP-01 EUR- 01 OIGO-01 TEDE-00 INR-00
10-19 ADS-00 M-01 NEA-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OIG-04
SCT-03 SSO-00 VO-06 SA-01 ASDS-01 CORE- 00 /046R
DRAFTED BY: DS/I/PII:RBRAND

APPROVED BY: DS:ACEQUAINTON
DS/DSS/I:RREAMS DS/DSS/ITA:SCOX
S/CT:PTHEROS CA:DHOBBS
DS/DSS/OP:DWILLIAMS M:HGEISEL
DS/DSS/L:DWOODEN S/S-O:PPETRIHOS
DFAAB8 060455Z /38
P 060455Z AUG 93
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO SECURITY OFFICER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
USLO MOGADISHU PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE PRIORITY
UNCLAS STATE 238926
FOR RSO'S FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUAINTON
E.G. 12356: N/A

TAGS: ASEC, CMGT, CVIS, PTER
SUBJECT: MORE ON FIGHTING TERRORISM
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 STATE 238926 060455Z
REF: STATE 228336
1. BY NOW YOU SHOULD HAVE SEEN THE REFERENCED MESSAGE

FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY ON FIGHTING TERRORISM. I WANT
TO ENSURE THAT ALL REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICERS ARE
REPRESENTED ON THEIR RESPECTIVE POST COMMITTEE TO REVIEW
CONSULAR LOOKOUT LISTS AND TO ASSIST IN CONSULAR
COUNTERTERRORISM OBJECTIVES.
2. THE BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY'S SPECIFIC STATUTORY

AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS OF ILLEGAL PASSPORT OR

VISA ISSUANCE AND USE, AND THE REWARDS PROGRAM FOR
TERRORISM INFORMATION PROVIDE THE DEPARTMENT WITH VALUABLE
TOOLS IN ITS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.
3. DS INITIATIVES IN INVESTIGATING VISA AND PASSPORT

FRAUD COMMITTED BY SEVERAL OF THE PRINCIPAL SUSPECTS IN
THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING, OUR SUBSEQUENT ;
INVESTIGATION AND ARREST OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN THE
FAILED PLOT TO BOMB THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECENTLY ANNOUNCED REWARDS PROGRAM

CAMPAIGN FOR THE ARREST OF RAMZI YOUSEF AHMAD, REFLECT OUR
IMPORTANT ROLE IN LOCATING AND PROSECUTING INDIVIDUALS WHO
THREATEN THE WELFARE OF THE UNITED STATES. OUR STRONG
PARTICIPATION AT THE DEPARTMENT LEVEL SHOULD BE REFLECTED
AT POST IN THE RSO'S ROLE ON THE LOOKOUT COMMITTEE. THE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 STATE 238926 060455Z

RSO MUST BE AN ACTIVE PLAYER AND ASSIST POST CONSULAR
OFFICIALS IN THIS IMPORTANT ENDEAVOR.
4. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
WHARTON
UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED
Document Number: 1995AMMAN10183
PTQ0505
i
UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0505
PAGE 01 AMMAN 10183 211358Z

ACTION VO-04
INFO LOG-00 CA-02 CIAE-00 OASY-00 DS-00 TEDE-00 INR-00

ADS-00 DSCC-00 /006W
EF02A4 211358Z /38
P 211357Z SEP 95
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3164
INFO FBI WASHDC//INTO/CTS//
USINS WASHDC
USCUSTOMS WASHDC//INTEL//
UNCLAS AMMAN 010183
DEPARTMENT FOR CA/VO/L/C AND INR/TNA
E.G. 12356: N/A

TAGS: CVIS PTER PINR ASEC JO XX (NAJIM, EYAD MAHMOUD ISMAEL)
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR EVALUATION OF SECURITY INFORMATION
REF: 94 STATE 242729
1. VISAS VIPER
2. NAJIM, EYAD MAHMOUD ISMAEL, AKA EYAD ISMAIL, AKA EYAD

ISMOIL
NATIONALITY: JORDANIAN
PLACE OF BIRTH: KUWAIT
DATE OF BIRTH: JUNE 7, 1971
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 AMMAN 10183 211358Z

PASSPORT DATA: JORDANIAN PPT NO. B795447
CURRENT RESIDENCE: U.S. CUSTODY
CLASS HITS: NONE
3. SUBJECT WAS ARRESTED IN JORDAN ON AUGUST 2, 1995, AND

IMMEDIATELY EXTRADITED TO THE U.S. TO FACE CHARGES FOR HIS
INVOLVEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING IN FEBRUARY
1993. THE BOMBERS ARE AN ADHOC GROUP OF DIFFERENT MIDDLE >- "- —
EAST NATIONALITIES FROM DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONS WHO USED -'~ ^V?17
Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED ' Page:-l

Document Number: 1995AMMAN10183 Channel: n/a
THE NAME "FIFTH BATTALION OF THE LIBERATION ARMY" TO CLAIM

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BOMBING.
4. SOURCE: PROSECUTOR'S AFFIDAVIT, U.S. DISTRICT COURT,

SOUTH NEW YORK.
5. POST BELIEVES THE INFORMATION ON EYAD NAJIM IS

SUFFICIENT FOR A FINDING OF VISA INELIGIBILITY. POST IS
BRINGING HIS CASE TO THE DEPARTMENT'S ATTENTION WITH THE
RECOMMENDATION THAT THE SUBJECT BE ENTERED AS A CLASS
HIT. EGAN
UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED .. . Page: 2

T5 B59 DOS Misc 1 of 2 FDR - Entire Contents - Memos - Cables - 19 Withdrawal Notices

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originalbeschreibung:

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

T5 B59 DOS Misc 1 of 2 FDR - Entire Contents - Memos - Cables - 19 Withdrawal Notices

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025 FOLDER: 0004 TAB: 1 DOC ID: 31199244

FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2]

DOCUMENT DATE: 07/10/2003 DOCUMENT TYPE: Memorandum

TO: Legat Berlin

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025 FOLDER: 0004 TAB: 2 DOC ID: 31199245

FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2]

DOCUMENT DATE: DOCUMENT TYPE: List

SUBJECT: List of documents

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025 FOLDER: 0004 TAB: 3 DOC ID: 31199246

FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2]

DOCUMENT DATE: 05/20/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Teletype

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025 FOLDER: 0004 TAB: 4 DOC ID: 31199247

FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2]

DOCUMENT DATE: 05/22/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Teletype

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025 FOLDER: 0004 TAB: 5 DOC ID: 31199248

FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2]

DOCUMENT DATE: 05/25/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Teletype

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025 FOLDER: 0004 TAB: 6 DOC ID: 31199249

FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2]

DOCUMENT DATE: 05/26/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Teletype

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025 FOLDER: 0004 TAB: 7 DOC ID: 31199250

FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2]

DOCUMENT DATE: 05/26/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Teletype

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025 FOLDER: 0004 TAB: 8 DOC ID: 31199252

FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2]

DOCUMENT DATE: 05/27/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Teletype

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025 FOLDER: 0004 TAB: 9 DOC ID: 31199253

FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2]

DOCUMENT DATE: 05/27/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Teletype

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025 FOLDER: 0004 TAB: 10 DOC ID: 31199254

FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2]

DOCUMENT DATE: 01/30/2003 DOCUMENT TYPE: Teletype

---±2: _4V) The U.S-Visa5Expr-erpF<§3Sn£s the' way of the