Contention 1 Proliferation

Iran is quickly moving toward proliferation They have the uranium and technical capacity to build a nuclear bomb
Director, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Orde Kittrie Professor of Law, Sandra Day OConnor College of Law, Arizona State University Leonard Spector Deputy Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies Michael Yaffe Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the changing Middle East, The Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy january 2013, Washington, D.C. isisonline.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/FinalReport.pdf 2. Irans Nuclear Program Is Moving Ahead In spite of the progressive strengthening of economic sanctions, Irans stockpile of enriched uranium has continued to grow. For example, while the February 2009 IAEA report determined that Iran had

Albright Et Al 2013, David Albright President, Institute for Science and International Security Mark Dubowitz Executive

produced 1010 kg of U-235 enriched at 3.5 percent,32 by the time of the November 16, 2012 IAEA report, Iran had produced a gross total of 7,611 kg of U-235 enriched at 3.5 percent.33 This amount of 5 percent enriched U-235 is sufficient for six or seven nuclear weapons if further enriched, according to an analysis by the Institute for Science and International
Security (ISIS).34 In addition, Iran has produced, as of November 2012, 232.8 kg of U-235 enriched to nearly 20 percent.35 This amount far exceeds the amount needed for the Tehran Research Reactor, the purported use for this material.36 In August, Iran transferred 96.3 kg of this stockpile to its Esfahan facility for conversion to uranium oxide for fuel plates for its research reactor.37 While

the uranium oxide could be converted back to uranium hexafluoride suitable for further enrichment to bomb grade, it would take Iran several months to do so, which would mean that this material would not be useful during a dash to produce weapon grade uranium for a first nuclear weapon. However, this uranium oxide could be converted back for a second or subsequent nuclear weapon, and Iran continues to produce more uranium hexafluoride enriched to nearly 20 percent. While Irans conversion of this material into oxide has temporarily reduced the nuclear crisis, it does not comprehensively address either the concerns over Irans growing stocks of enriched uranium or the broader questions about its nuclear program. Iran also is continuing to increase its number of centrifuges. As of

November 16, 2012, the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant contained 10,414 IR-1 centrifuges, with 9,156 of those centrifuges enriching.38 The Fordow Fuel Enrichment plant, which is deeply fortified underground in a mountainous region, was brought partially online in 2011 and began enriching uranium to near 20 percent. According to the November 2012 IAEA report, Iran had installed all 2,784 of the centrifuges it planned at the site for the production of nuclear fuel. Of the total number of installed centrifuges, the inspectors reported that 696 centrifuges in four cascades were enriching uranium to the near 20 percent level. Another 696 centrifuges were fully connected in four cascades and ready to enrich uranium. The remaining 1,392 centrifuges, in a total of

eight cascades, lacked critical piping and electronics necessary to operate. No date was given as to when any of these last eight cascades would be operational.39 At the same time Irans stockpile of enriched uranium and number of centrifuges continue to grow, Iran persists in refusing to respond constructively to outstanding issues that the IAEA has identified with regard to possible military dimensions of Irans nuclear program. For example, according to the November 2012 IAEA report, Iran is blocking access to the Parchin military site, which is suspected of having housed a containment vessel and support facilities for high explosive tests related to the development of nuclear weapons. Iran also is engaged in extensive activities to sanitize the Parchin complex. This lack of access and changes at Parchin are hampering effective verification of suspected military nuclear activities.40 How close is Iran to reaching critical capability? Given the progress that

Tehran has already made with its nuclear plansstill-hidden centrifuge manufacturing plants, enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow, a likely, now
sanitized weaponization facility at Parchin, and an extensive ballistic-missile programthe regime faces a short, relatively inexpensive dash to the nuclear finish line should it choose to take this step.

According to a 2011 report by The Washington Post, IAEA officials have concluded that Iran has

sufficient technical know-how to design and produce a functioning nuclear implosion device .41 Such a device would be usable in
an underground nuclear explosion or for crude delivery (e.g., transportation by truck, ship, or aircraft). Iran would need more time to make a reliable warhead for a ballistic missile.

A 2012 report by the Institute for Science and International Security states that, should Iran choose to do so, it could pursue one of several strategies that would allow it to develop a nuclear weapon. The probability of Irans pursuing such a strategy is judged to be medium in
2013.42

Iran will reach critical capacity by 2014 Now is key to stop proliferation Albright Et Al 2013, David Albright President, Institute for Science and International Security Mark Dubowitz Executive
Director, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Orde Kittrie Professor of Law, Sandra Day OConnor College of Law, Arizona State University Leonard Spector Deputy Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies Michael Yaffe Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the changing Middle East, The Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy January 2013, Washington, D.C. isisonline.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/FinalReport.pdf

Based on the current trajectory of Irans nuclear program, we estimate that Iran could reach this critical capability in mid-

2014 . Depending on the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of various potential developments, Iran could in fact reach this critical capability either
before or after mid-2014. Developments that could expedite the date include Irans increasing its enrichment from 20 percent to a level of 60 percent, a significant increase in the number or efficiency of Irans centrifuges, the existence of a secret Iranian enrichment facility, or various
potential developments relating to Irans plutonium production capacity (e.g., reprocessing capabilities). Developments that could delay the date include another Stuxnet-type computer attack on Irans nuclear program or other unexpected Iranian difficulties with its centrifuge program. In light of these factors,

caution

dictates that the U nited S tates assume, and plan on the basis , that Iran is likely to reach critical capability in mid-2014. Given
these uncertainties and recognizing Prime Minister Netanyahus more accelerated timeline, we believe that the intensification of sanctions we recommend needs to begin as rapidly as possible.

Iran proliferation causes a cascade of proliferation throughout the Middle East and will collapse the NPT and cause nuclear war Albright Et Al 2013, David Albright President, Institute for Science and International Security Mark Dubowitz Executive
Director, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Orde Kittrie Professor of Law, Sandra Day OConnor College of Law, Arizona State University Leonard Spector Deputy Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies Michael Yaffe Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the changing Middle East, The Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy january 2013, Washington, D.C. isisonline.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/FinalReport.pdf

iii. Iranian nuclear arsenal could spur further proliferation in Middle East The third major danger of Iran acquiring a nuclear arsenal is that several of its neighbors in the Middle East could feel compelled to acquire their own nuclear weapons in response. Saudi Arabias King Abdullah has explicitly warned the United States that if Iran obtains nuclear weapons, his nation will seek to do so as well. If they get nuclear weapons, we will get nuclear weapons, Abdullah told Dennis Ross, then a U.S government

official, during a meeting between the two in April 2009.219 It might take Saudi Arabia only a relatively short time to acquire nuclear weapons, as there are persistent reports that Saudi Arabia financed Pakistans nuclear program on condition
Eastern states could follow.221 A cascade of proliferation in the Middle East could lead to the worldwide collapse of

Pakistan be prepared to transfer bombs to Saudi Arabia (or the capability to make them) if and when the Saudis request them.220 Other Middle

the already tottering NPT regime . In addition, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East tinderbox, with its border
disputes, religious fanaticism, ethnic hatreds, unstable governments, terrorist groups, and tendency for conflicts to spiral out of control, seems likely to result in a devastating nuclear wa r. While a proliferation cascade may not be the inevitable response to an Iranian
investing in nuclear technologies, enhancing their conventional military capabilities, and, possibly, acquiring nuclear arsenals of their own. All of these nuclear arsenal, Iran should expect that its neighbors will react by adopting a number of measures to shore up their security, including obtaining security assurances,

measures will cause instability and escalate tensions in an already tense region.

NPT prevents rapid, opaque proliferation in the Middle East

Lewis, senior vice-president of the US-based Science Applications International Corporation, The NPT: Assessing the Past, Building the Future, Nonproliferation Review, July 16th, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr_16-2_dunn.pdf Metric: Did widespread NPT adherence help reverse the perception that runaway proliferation was unavoidable? In the early 1960s, there was a growing fear that widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons was possibly unavoidable. President John F. Kennedy warned in 1963 that a world with many dozens of nuclear weapon states might emerge. This

Dunn 2009,

fear of runaway proliferation gave urgency to the negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty, not least because of

the belief that growing worldwide use of nuclear power would place access to nuclear weapons material in the hands of many countries.21 Such warnings of

runaway proliferation, however, could well have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Fearful of a world of nuclear powers, many countries might

have sought nuclear weapons lest they be left behind. Responding to such fears, the United States took actions to enhance the nuclear security of its European nonnuclear allies. In parallel, the United States, the Soviet Union, and many other countries joined together to create what became the nonproliferation regime. The

NPT was and remains a key part of that regime. Steadily growing membership in the NPT after its opening for signature in 1968*including critical countries in Europe and Asia*provided a valuable symbol that demonstrated to many countries that runaway proliferation was not the wave of the future. So did the
prospect of an international system of nuclear safeguards*run by a then-new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)*to prevent diversion of nuclear weapon materials from peaceful nuclear uses. In effect, partly because of more traditional security mechanisms and partly due to the growing NPT

membership, early fears of a world of runaway global proliferation became a self-denying prophecy. Today, fears have again emerged that runaway proliferation could develop. It is often argued that the spread of nuclear weapons is at a tipping point, that

there is a danger of cascading proliferation, and that we could be entering a new nuclear age.22 In this context, however, widespread adherence to the NPT alone will not suffice to counter fears of nuclear weapon proliferation. Rather, the NPTs

contribution to countering fears of runaway proliferation will depend heavily on whether there is a widespread perception that countries are complying fully with their NPT obligations. Article II Net Assessment. The direct impact of Article II in

preventing proliferation is mixed. Negotiation of the NPT with its no manufacture, no acquisition obligation forced a number of countries to decide whether or not to pursue nuclear weapons. Faced with that decision, important countries chose to renounce nuclear weapons. In deciding, states were motivated by a mix of considerations, and the NPT helped crystallize their decisions. By contrast, some prominent NPT parties have stayed in the NPT while pursuing nuclear weapons: North Korea, Iraq, and Libya*and quite possibly Iran. The indirect impact of Article II may be more compelling. The no acquisition, no manufacture obligation provides a nonproliferation leverage point for rallying outsiders, for engaging in dialogue with countries rethinking their nonproliferation commitment, and for taking action after NPT breakout. Successful negotiation of the NPT and Article II contributed significantly to reversing earlier fears of runaway

worldwide proliferation. Today, adherence to Article II still provides a potentially valuable means to counter renewed fears of such a world*assuming there is compliance with NPT obligations.

Contention 2 Iranian Politics

Scenario A) Moderation Moderates are gaining political control in Iran now. The election of Iranian moderate president Rouhani provides the opportune environment to strengthen diplomatic relations. Luers Et Al 5-30-2013, William Luers, William Luers is Director of The Iran Project and Adjunct Professor at SIPA, Columbia University. He was US Ambassador to Venezuela and Czechoslovakia. (August 2013), Thomas R. Pickering was formerly US Under Secretary of State and Ambassador to Russia, Israel, India, Jordan, El Salvador, Nigeria, and the UN. (August 2013), Jim Walsh is on the faculty of the MIT Security Studies Program and Political Science Department. He was previously Executive Director of the Managing the Atom Project at Harvards John F. Kennedy School of Government. (August 2013), Thomas R. Pickering, and Jim Walsh, For a New Approach to Iran, www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/aug/15/new-approach-iran/?pagination=false
Given the more than three decades of mutual mistrust between the US and Iran, the relationship cannot be quickly transformed. Yet there

are at least t wo factors that offer the possibility for shifting the attitudes and behavior of both countries: Irans recent elections and changing circumstances in the Middle East . The election of Hassan
Rouhani as president of Iran offers an opening for some change in USIran relations. First, it means not having to deal with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Holocaust denier. That by itself opens more political space for

negotiation . The president-elect is a knowledgeable former nuclear negotiator and has a good relationship with Supreme Leader Khamenei, the ultimate arbiter on Irans nuclear program and relations with the United States. The elections demonstrated the moderate disposition of Iran s public when permitted to make a choice even from among the candidates offered to them by the government. Over 70 percent of the voting population cast a ballot and over 50 percent of those voted for Rouhani. The turnout, including many young people, certainly reflected broad support from the reformists including many who participated in the Green Movement, which opposed the disputed 2009 elections. The reformist vote also showed strength in local elections. The Supreme Leader and Irans powerful Revolutionary Guard stayed largely apart from the elections. The strength of support for Rouhani has brought both relief and optimism from a population whose standard of living has been declining in a weak economy.

Hardliner control ensures state sponsored terrorism

and Defense Policy Center at the Rand Corporation, Coping with a Nuclearising Iran, Survival, Vol 53, No 6

Dobbins 2012, James, former Assistant Secretary of State and now directs the International Security

The anti-American and anti-Israeli elements of Iranian policy have historical and ideological roots, but they
populations. Iran

are also geopolitically instrumental, offering the regime a means of going over the heads of hostile Arab governments to directly influence their

has no modern history of military aggression and only limited capabilities to threaten its neighbours militarily. It is not, however, the Iranian military that its neighbours fear most, but rather the Islamic Republics appeal to their populations as the ideological bastion of anti-American, anti-Israeli and

pro-Shia sentiment, as the patron of Arab rejectionist forces, and as a source of funding, advice and arms for insurgent and extremist groups . Irans odd combination of theocracy and elected institutions has produced generally cautious and pragmatic behaviour at the state-to-state level, combined with the use of subversion, terrorism, propaganda, ideology and religion to undermine neighbouring regimes it regards as adversaries. Conservative and reformist governments have sometimes sought to emphasise the overt and more positive strain of Iranian policy, but the security establishment and the religious leadership have never been willing to entirely abandon the darker tools of statecraft. Controversy in Iran over

the results of the 2009 presidential election have strengthened this more fundamentalist faction, consolidating the power of the Revolutionary Guard and the position of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the final arbiter of Iranian policy. As long as these forces remain dominant, there is little prospect of overcoming the many differences that divide the United States and Iran, least of all Irans nuclear programme.

Nuclear terrorism is an existential threatit escalates to nuclear war with Russia and China Ayson 2010, 7-7-2010, Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld
But these two nuclear worldsa

non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1

problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the nuclear material came from.41 Alternatively, if

debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the

the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved
in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The

reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States

as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response . As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their

sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the Chechen insurgents long-standing interest in all things nuclear.42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

Scenario B) Liberal Credibility The Credibility of U.S. democratic liberal institution building is essential to prevent extinction Specifically warming
G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, A World of Our Making, Democracy Journal, Issue 21, Summer, http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=all

Ikenberry 2011,

Grand Strategy as Liberal Order Building American dominance of the global system will eventually yield to the rise of other powerful states. The unipolar moment will pass. In facing this circumstance, American grand strategy should be informed by answers to this question: What sort of international order would we like to see in place in 2020 or 2030 when America is less powerful? Grand strategy is a set of coordinated and sustained policies designed to address the long-term threats and opportunities that lie beyond the countrys shores. Given the great shifts in the global system and the crisis of liberal hegemonic order, how should the United States pursue grand strategy in the coming years? The answer is that the United States should work with others to rebuild and renew the institutional foundations of the liberal international order and along the way re-establish its own authority as a global leader. The United States is going to need to invest in alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions, special relationships, great-power concerts, cooperative security pacts, and democratic security communities . That is, the United States w ill need to return to the great tasks of liberal order building. It is useful to distinguish between two types of grand strategy: positional and milieu oriented. With a positional grand strategy, a great power seeks to diminish the power or threat embodied in a specific challenger state or group of states. Examples are Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, the Soviet bloc, and perhapsin the futureGreater China. With a milieu-oriented grand strategy, a great power does not target a specific state but seeks to structure its general international environment in ways that are congenial with its long-term security . This might entail building the infrastructure of international cooperation, promoting trade and democracy in various regions of the world, and establishing partnerships that might be useful for various contingencies. My point is that under conditions of unipolarity, in a world
of diffuse threats, and with pervasive uncertainty over what the specific security challenges will be in the future, this milieu-based approach to grand strategy is necessary. The United States does not face the sort of singular geopolitical threat that it did with the

fascist and communist powers of the last century. Indeed, compared with the dark days of the 1930s or the Cold

War, America lives in an extraordinarily benign security environment. Rather than a single overriding threat, the United States and other countries face a host of diffuse and evolving threats. Global warming, nuclear proliferation, jihadist terrorism, energy security, health pandemicsthese and other dangers loom on the horizon. Any of these threats could endanger Americans lives and way of life either directly or indirectly by destabilizing the global system upon which American security and prosperity depends. What is more, these threats are interconnectedand it is their interactive effects that represent the most acute danger. And if several of these threats materialize at the same time and interact to generate greater violence and instability, then the global order itself, as well as the foundations of American national security, would be put at risk. What unites these threats and challenges is that they are all manifestations of rising security interdependence. More and more of what goes on in other countries matters for the health and providing opportunities for weak states or nonstate groups to threaten others at a greater distance. When states are in a situation of security interdependence, they cannot go it alone. They must negotiate and cooperate with other states and seek mutual restraints and protections. The United States can-not hide or protect itself from threats under conditions of rising security interdependence. It must get out in the world and work with other states to build frameworks of cooperation and leverage capacities for action against this unusually diverse, diffuse, and unpredictable array of threats and challenges. This is why a milieu-based grand strategy is attractive. The objective is to shape the international environment to maximize your capacities to protect the nation from threats. To engage in liberal order building is to invest in international cooperative frameworksthat is, rules, institutions, partnerships, networks, standby capacities, social knowledge, etc.in which the United States operates. To build international order is to increase the global stock of social capitalwhich is the term Pierre Bourdieu, Robert Putnam, organized around liberal order building, what are the specific objectives and what is the policy agenda? There are five such objectives. First, the United States needs to lead in the building of an enhanced protective infrastructure that helps prevent the emergence of threats and limits the damage if they do materialize. Many of the threats mentioned above are manifest as socioeconomic backwardness and failure that cause regional and international instability and conflict. These are the sorts of threats that are likely to arise with the coming of global warming and epidemic disease. What is needed here is institutional cooperation to strengthen the capacity of governments and the international com-munity to prevent epidemics or food shortages or mass migrations that create global upheavaland mitigate the effects of these upheavals if they occur. The international system already has a great deal of this protective infrastructureinstitutions and networks that pro-mote cooperation over public health, refugees, and emergency aid. But as the scale and scope of potential problems grow in the twenty-first century, investments in these preventive and management capacities will also need to grow. Early warning systems, protocols for emergency operations, standby capacities, etc.these safeguards are the stuff of a protective global infrastructure. Second, the United States should recommit to and rebuild its security alliances . The idea is to update the old bargains that lie behind these security pacts. In NATO, but also in the East Asia bilateral partner-ships, the United
and other social scientists have used to define the actual and potential resources and capacities within a political community, manifest in and through its networks of social relations, that are available for solving collective problems. If American grand strategy is to be

safety of the United States and the rest of the world. Many of the new dangerssuch as health pandemics and transnational terrorist violencestem from the weakness of states rather than their strength. At the same time, technologies of violence are evolving,

States agrees to provide security protection to the other states and brings its partners into the process of decision-making over the use of force. In return, these partners agree to work with the United Statesproviding manpower, logistics, and other types of supportin wider theaters of action. The United States gives up some autonomy in strategic decision-making, although it is more an informal restraint than a legally binding one, and in exchange it gets cooperation and political support. Third,

the United States should reform and create

encompassing global institutions that foster and legitimate collective action . The first move here should be to reform the
United Nations, starting with the expansion of the permanent membership on the Security Council. Several plans have been proposed. All of them entail adding new memberssuch as Germany, Japan, India, Brazil, South Africa, and othersand reforming the voting procedures. Almost all of the candidates for permanent membership are mature or rising democracies. The goal, of course, is to make them stakeholders in the United Nations and thereby strengthen the primacy of the UN as a vehicle for global collective action. There really is no substitute for the legitimacy that the United Nations can offer to emergency actionshumanitarian interventions, economic sanctions, uses of force against terrorists, and so forth. Public support in advanced democracies grows rapidly when their governments can stand behind a UN-sanctioned

the United States should accommodate and institution-ally engage China . China will most likely be a dominant state, and the United States will need to yield to it in various ways. The United States should respond to the rise of China by strengthening the rules and institutions of the liberal international orderdeepening their roots, integrating rising capitalist democracies, sharing authority and functional roles. The United States should also
action. Fourth,

intensify cooperation with Europe and renew joint commitments to alliances and multilateral global governance. The more that China faces not just the United States but the entire world of capitalist democracies, the better. This is not to argue that China must face a grand counterbalancing alliance against it. Rather, it should face a complex and highly integrated global systemone that is so encompassing and deeply entrenched that it essentially has no choice but to join it and seek to prosper within it. The United States should also be

seeking to construct a regional security order in East Asia that can provide a framework for managing the coming shifts. The idea is not to block Chinas entry into the regional order but to help shape its terms, looking for opportunities to strike strategic

bargains at various moments along the shifting power trajectories and encroaching geopolitical spheres. The big bargain that the United States will want to strike is this: to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijings acceptance and accommodation of Washingtons core strategic interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia. In striking this strategic bargain, the United States will also want to try to build multilateral institutional arrangements in East Asia that will

the United States should reclaim a liberal internationalist public philosophy . When American officials after World War II championed the building of a rule-based postwar order, they articulated a distinctive internationalist vision of order that has faded in recent decades. It was a vision that entailed a synthesis of liberal and realist ideas about economic and national security, and the sources of stable and peaceful order.
tie China to the wider region. Fifth, These ideasdrawn from the experiences with the New Deal and the previous decades of war and depressionled American leaders to associate the national interest with the building of a managed and institutionalized global system.

What is needed today is a

the restraint and the

renewed public philosophy of liberal internationalism a shift away from neoliberal-ismthat can inform American
elites as they make trade-offs between sovereignty and institutional cooperation. Under this philosophy,

commitment of American power went hand in hand . Global rules and institutions advanced Americas national interest rather than threatened it. The alternative public philosophies that have circulated in recent years philosophies that champion American unilateralism and disentanglement from global rules and institutionsdid not meet with great success. So an opening exists for Americas postwar vision of internationalism to be updated and rearticulated today. The United States should embrace the tenets of this liberal public philosophy: Lead with rules rather than dominate with power ; provide public
goods and connect their provision to cooperative and accommodative policies of others; build and renew international rules and institutions that work to reinforce the capacities of states to govern and achieve security and economic success; keep the other liberal democracies close; and let the global system itself do the deep work of liberal modernization. As it navigates this brave new world, the United States

will find itself needing to share power and rely in part on others to ensure its security. It will not be able to depend on
authority and respect in recent years.

unipolar power or airtight borders. It will need, above all else, authority and respect as a global leader. The United States has lost some of that

In committing itself to a grand strategy of liberal order building, it can

begin the process of gaining it back.

Warming causes Extinction Cummins 2010, Ronnie Cummins and Will Allen, Organic Consumers Association, "Climate Catastrophe: Surviving the 21st Century," 2--14--10, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/02/146
The hour is late. Leading

climate scientists such as James Hansen are literally shouting at the top of their lungs that the world needs to reduce emissions by 20-40% as soon as possible, and 80-90% by the year 2050, if we are to avoid climate chaos, crop failures, endless wars, melting of the polar icecaps, and a disastrous rise in ocean levels. Either we radically reduce CO2 and carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e, which includes all GHGs, not just CO2) pollutants

(currently at 390 parts per million and rising 2 ppm per year) to 350 ppm, including agriculture-derived methane and nitrous oxide pollution, or

else survival for the present and future generations is in jeopardy. As scientists warned at Copenhagen, business as
usual and a corresponding 7-8.6 degree Fahrenheit rise in global temperatures means that the carrying capacity of the Earth in 2100 will be reduced to one billion people. Under this hellish scenario,

billions will die of thirst, cold, heat, disease, war, and starvation.

Emerging diseases cause extinction

Zimmerman and Zimmerman 1996, Barry and David, both have M.S. degrees from Long Island University, Killer Germs, p 132) edited for gendered language
world. Lush tropical Then came AIDSand Ebola and Lassa fever and Marburg and dengue fever. They came, for the most part, from the steamy jungles of the

exotic viruses sit, freeze-dried, at Yale Universityimports from the rain forests. They await the outbreak of diseases that can be ascribed to them. Many are carried by insects and are termed arboviruses (arthropod borne). Others, of even greater concern, are airborne and can simply be breathed in.

rain forests are ablaze with deadly viruses. And changing lifestyles as well as changing environmental conditions are flushing them out. Air travel, deforestation, global warming are forcing never-before-encountered viruses to suddenly cross the path of humanity. The resultemerging viruses. Today some five thousand vials of Some, no doubt, could threaten humanitys very existence. Joshua Lederberg, 1958 winner of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine and foremost authority on emerging viruses, warned in a December will be more surprises, because our fertile imagination does not begin to match all the tricks that nature can survival of humanity is not preordainedThe single biggest threat to [hu]mans continued dominance on the planet is the virus (A Dancing Matrix, by Robin Marantz Hening.
play According to Lederberg, The

speciesThere

1990 article in Discover magazine: It is still not comprehended widely that AIDS is a natural, almost predictable phenomenon. It is not going to be a unique event. Pandemics are not acts of God, but are built into the ecological relations between viruses, animal species and human

Removing the threat of force strengthens Iranian democracy and the credibility of U.S. democracy promotion. Iran democratization strengthens moderates, prevents terrorist support, and cements U.S.-Iran relations. The alternative is Middle East destabilization. Simakovsky 2013 , Mark Simakovsky Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Trevor Monroe Editor, Reassessing Regime Change: U.S. National Security Strategy towards Iran, The Journal of IPS International Policy Solutions, UCSD Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5375.pdf
Political and Security Tools To avert Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and to create the conditions necessary for Iran to operate as a stabilizing force in the region, the United States must attempt to alleviate Irans sense of insecurity . As long as Iran complies with its obligations under the NonProliferation
Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Association requirements,

t he U.S. should make a commitment to refrain

from threats of force against the country.

Additionally, the U.S should support the creation of a high-level security forum

that includes states in the region. Bringing Iran into regional security arrangements and

strongly consider trading leading members of the MEK (Mujahideen-e Khalq)27 in Iraq for al-Qaida prisoners currently being held in Iran. Although Iran has showed interest in this prisoner swap, it has been stymied by the desire of some in the administration to keep the MEK intact as a valid source of leverage over Iran in any future intervention.

ending the menacing threats of regime change could slowly allay the significance Tehran places on acquiring nuclear weapons. Finally, the U.S. should Irans active civil society, media and fledgling

democratic system could enhance U.S. efforts to promote democratic development in the region . Engaging Iran and supporting its entrance into regional and international organizations, such as the WTO, will solidify the countrys political economy. Bringing Iran more openly into international institutions will intensify internal pressure for change among the conservative theocracy . However, U.S. policymakers vision of rapid democratic change in the Middle East should be tempered by the political realities in Iran. Due to Irans active nuclear program, U.S. interests in reducing Irans support to terrorist groups and the struggle for human rights liberty in Iran should be considered in a longterm strategic framework. Just as the Shanghai Communiqu between China and the

U.S. in 1972 placed contentious issues between the two countries and democratic development in China on the backburner, U.S.

United States must vigorously support European initiatives to decrease Irans offensive weapons capability through negotiation. Creating a step-by-step process of rewards for compliance would be helpful. For example, each step, such as supporting stability in Iraq and Afghanistan or refraining from supporting terrorist group, will be rewarded by concessions. This can be accomplished through the following policy levers: 1) Supplement the European Trade and Cooperation Agreement with an American agreement that lists certain graduated concessions that will keep the Iranians at the bargaining table. 2) Support Iranian membership into the WTO, allowing selective participation of U.S. energy firms inside Iran, and review the gradual lifting of sanctions on Iran. 3) Offer the Iranians access to civilian sources of nuclear fuel and technology in exchange for increased inspections and a final end to its nuclear weapons program. 4) Improve the current Trans-Atlantic Strategy by leveraging U.S./European economic concessions and sanctions. By employing carrots and sticks in a coordinated fashion the Iranians will see

engagement of Iran should proceed with the acceptance that democratic development in Iran is a longterm process that cannot be started without engaging the legitimate government of the country. The

Conclusion The lack of good will between the United States and Iran continues to plague negotiations on the future of Irans nuclear program. Selective engagement may not be the perfect solution, but it may provide the incentives and warming of relations that could create a breakthrough in negotiations. Planning for selective engagement, however, should be matched by preparatory steps towards pressuring Iran to comply. Policymakers have to be prepared for
the potential benefits and costs of their ultimate decision on the utility of nuclear weapons. the increasing possibility that Iran will restart uranium enrichment in the near future. If this occurs, a united approach towards punishing Iran through the UN Security Council must be undertaken.

If U .S. policymakers continue to threaten Iran and view the nuclear issue as an isolated security concern that is disconnected from the larger economic, political, and security challenges facing Iran, then it is likely that difficult and dangerous years lie ahead for MidEast security. An effective policy course should instead rely on political dialogue that discusses mutual interests of security, energy transit routes, the location of U.S. forces in the region, and the IsraeliPalestinian crisis. Again, the new strategic landscape of the region involves the presence of the U.S. military in Irans neighborhood. By placing the nuclear issue in a long-term strategic framework that seeks to address Irans sense of insecurity, one can hope to establish a long-range vision that puts U.S.- Iranian relations back on the path of pragmatic interaction. Without this interaction, chances are the Middle East will never be a region of peace and prosperity.

Contention 3 SOP
Statutory restriction on executive war-making toward Iran solves separation of powers. The constitution gives congress war-making authority
President Ronald Reagan, he is the author and editor of several books, including The Politics of Plunder: Misgovernment in Washington, Attack Iran? Ask Congress to Declare War, The American Spector, It is time to end the era of executive war-making, spectator.org/archives/2012/01/04/attack-iran-askcongress-to-de Declarations of war have gone out of fashion. The last one was 70 years ago, in response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, less formal authorizations of force are common. While not quite the same, Congress still voted on war with Iraq. And President George W. Bush did not deny that he was fighting a war. In contrast, President Obama channeled George Orwell in claiming the absence of hostilities in Libya as U.S. drones, missiles, and planes destroyed military materiel and killed military personnel. It was

Bandow 2012, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to

an exquisite rhetorical performance. But also illegal and unconstitutional. This election the American people should insist that whoever is elected actually follow the Constitution. The Founders were prepared to fight for their independence, but they feared the costs of war. They particularly worried about the consequences of investing the executive with the limitless power to engage in war, like the British king. Wrote James Madison, sometimes called the father of the Constitution: Of all the enemies of true liberty, war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, and debts, and taxes are the known instrument for bringing the many under the domination of the few. These sentiments animated the debates at the Constitutional Convention. Enthusiasts for expansive, unaccountable executive power were few. That reluctance included giving the president authority to take the new nation into war. The

Constitution created barriers to executive war-making. Contrary to conventional wisdom in todays White House, the Founders gave Congress several important war-making powers, including raising an army, approving military expenditures, ratifying treaties, setting rules of war, and issuing letters of marquee. Moreover, the legislative branch was to decide whether

there would be a war for the president to fight. According to Article 1, Sec. 8 (11), Congress shall have the power to declare war. James Madison explained: the fundamental doctrine of the Constitution that the power to declare war is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature. The convention delegates were not fools. Especially at a time when communication and transportation were slow, they recognized that the chief executive might have to respond to foreign attack. For that reason the Framers changed make to declare. However, that did not mean that Congress could only declare as in take note of the fact that the president had, say, invaded another nation. The objective was simple. They did not trust the executive to make this important decision alone. For instance, John Jay contended that dubious motives often led kings to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people. George Mason declared: the president is not safely to be entrusted with the power to start wars. Thus, Mason favored clogging rather than facilitating war. Similar was James Wilson, who said the Constitution will

Founders

not hurry us into war. Rather, he explained, the provision is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is in the legislature at large. Pierce Butler, an advocate of executive power at the convention, made a similar point when campaigning for the
Constitutions ratification in South Carolina. Butler assured his skeptical brethren that the document did not give the president authority to start wars as throwing into his hands the influence of a monarch, having an opportunity of involving his country in a war whenever he wished to promote her destruction. Similar was the understanding of influential leaders not directly involved in drafting the document. Thomas Jefferson was ambassador to France at the time, but he wrote approvingly of the proposed Constitutions effectual check to the dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose. Abraham Lincoln, no opponent of expansive executive power, lauded the Founders for recognizing war to be the most oppressive of all Kingly oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man

should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us. Of course, the Constitution named the president

referred to the commander-in-chief as the first general and admiral of the armed services. He emphasized that the presidents authority was in substance much inferior to that of the British monarch, and would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the land and naval forces while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war. Over

commander-in-chief of the military (but not the country). With that position comes important authority, primarily to conduct wars authorized by Congress. Alexander Hamilton was an advocate of quasi-monarchy, but he only the years presidents often engaged in military action without congressional authority. Military maneuvers, attempts at

War did a president claim the authority to unilaterally undertake large-scale combat, especially against a nation which had not assaulted or even threatened America. And he did not have the excuse of necessity, such as preempting a threatened Soviet nuclear attack. Truman could have called Congress together and made his pitch for war, while readying U.S. forces to use if he received legislative sanction. Vietnam created a new precedent congressional authorization short of a war declaration, in this case the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Congress took a similar approach to the Persian Gulf War, attack on Afghanistan, and invasion of Iraq. My Cato Institute colleague John Samples categorizes these as conflicts which involved (and were expected to involve) troops in combat and thus, casualties. More common, however, are wars many frankly aggressive against nations which had done nothing against the U.S. or even an American ally which presidents conducted without even a nod in Congress direction. Samples points to military action or threatened action in the Balkans, Somalia, Haiti, Iraq, and Libya. In frustration over the fact that two presidents fought the Vietnam War for years with limited congressional authorization, Congress

intimidation, limited retaliation, and even isolated acts of war have been common, but remain qualitatively different than initiating full-scale hostilities. Not until President Harry Truman took America into the Korean

the War Powers Resolution in an attempt to add statutory constraints to executive power. But unsurprisingly, most presidents have as little respect for the law as for the Constitution. Particularly shocking was President Obamas claim that the war in Libya was not a war. He claimed unilateral authority to intervene in a civil war in North Africa while citing the War Powers Resolution. Even here he was on thin ground. The WPR authorizes introduction of troops pursuant a national emergency created by attack on the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces. Muammar Gaddafi had done none of these. (The bombing of PanAm flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, might have qualified 23 years before.) However, the WPR is unambiguous about requiring either withdrawal or congressional authorization after 60 days. When that deadline hit the president ignored
the advice from his chief legal officials and simply announced that the U.S. was not involved in hostilities. Sounding a lot like the former president who quibbled over the definition of is, President

passed

Obama explained Americas role was non-kinetic, more limited, and in support. One anonymous administration official declared that the kinetic pieces of that are intermittent.
Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates appeared to be bemused by this argument, observing that Gaddafi probably thought differently. Thankfully most of these wars turned out to impose only modest direct costs on the U.S., though sometimes the unintended geopolitical consequences were serious. Of greater concern, however, was the legal breach. Observed Columbia law professor John Bassett Moore:

There can hardly be room for doubt that the Framers of the Constitution when they vested in

Biden, when serving in the Senate, advocated impeachment of President W. Bush if the latter bombed Iran without legislative authority. Biden explained that the Constitution denied the president unfettered power to start wars and granted Congress the power to initiate all hostilities, even limited wars. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, when running for president in 2008, announced: I do not believe that the president can take military action including any kind of strategic bombing against Iran without congressional authorization. Of course, that was then, this is now. The Republican contenders have said nothing about the issue. Almost all are claiming that they would be tough and vigorous commanders-in-chief. But none have said if they would follow the clear legal and constitutional restraints on the commander-in-chief. The question should be asked of every candidate for president. The fact that prior chief executives may have violated the law by deploying the military is no answer. Most of those instances offer little precedent for anything, usually having been limited actions, often carried out for arguably defensive purposes or under colorable legal authority, and sometimes even initiated without Washingtons authorization. None justify attacking another sovereign nation half the world away which has not attacked or even threatened to attack the U.S. Following the law does not make a president a pushover. For instance, President (and former General) Dwight Eisenhower announced that I am not going to order any troops into anything that can be interpreted as war, until Congress directs it. He explained: When it comes to the matter of war, there is only one place that I would go, and that is to the Congress of the United States. Eisenhowers respect for the Constitution reflected that of another general turned president, George Washington: The Constitution vests the power of declaring war with Congress; therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken until after they shall have deliberated upon the subject, and authorized such a measure. Americans

Congress the power to declare war, never imagined that they were leaving it to the executive to use the military and naval forces of the United States all over the world for the purpose of actually coercing other nations, occupying their territory, and killing their soldiers and citizens, all according to his own notions of the fitness of things, as long as he refrained from calling his action war or persisted in calling it peace. Now the issue of Iran looms. There are many good reasons to fear a nuclear Iran, but also many good reasons to fear the consequences of launching a preventive military strike against Iran. If the president, whoever it is, wants to do the latter, he or she should indeed, under the Constitution, must go to Congress. The question came up in the 2008 campaign, and then candidate Obama answered: The president does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation. Vice President Joseph

have suffered for years under lawless government, with Congresses and presidents routinely acting without constitutional authorization whenever they desired. That should come to an end. After all, when he first ran for president, Barack Obama declared: No more ignoring the law when its inconvenient. Republicans, who talk the most about restoring the Constitution, have an equal responsibility to

reestablish the rule of law. Hopefully there will be no cause for war with Iran. But if the

president believes war is necessary, he or she has a constitutional obligation to go to Congress. It is time to end the era of executive warmaking.

Separation of Powers is essential to Hegemony Democratic institutions produce credibility better Ikenberry 2001, John G. Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International
Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also Co-Director of Princetons Center for International Security Studies. Ikenberry is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, Korea. In 20132014 Ikenberry will be the 72nd Eastman Visiting Professor at Balliol College, Oxford. The National Interest, Getting Hegemon Right, www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/readingssm/Ikenberry_Hegemony.pdf
First, America's mature

political institutions organized around the rule of law have made it a relatively predictable and cooperative hegemon. The pluralistic and regularized way in which U.S. foreign and security policy is made reduces surprises and allows other states to build longterm, mutually beneficial relations. The governmental separation of powers creates a shared decision-making system that opens up the process and reduces the ability of any one leader to make abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states. An active press and competitive party system also provide a service to outside states by generating information
about U.S. policy and determining its seriousness of purpose. The messiness of a democracy can, indeed, frustrate American diplomats and confuse foreign observers. But

over the long term, democratic institutions produce more consistent

policies that

and credible policies

do not reflect the capricious and idiosyncratic whims of an autocrat.

Think of the United States as a giant corporation that seeks foreign investors. It is more likely to attract investors if it can demonstrate that it operates according to accepted accounting and fiduciary principles. The rule

entitled Agents of Influence, detailing the supposedly scandalous ways in which Japanese ministries and corporations were manipulating the American political process. High-priced lobbyists were advancing Tokyo's commercial interests within the hallowed halls of the American capital and undermining the pursuit of the U.S. national interest. Today Washington is even more inundated by foreign diplomats and revolving door lobbyists working to ensure that the interests of America's partners are not overlooked. Looked at from the perspective of the

of law and the institutions of policymaking in a democracy are the political equivalent of corporate transparency and accountability. Sharp shifts in policy must ultimately be vetted within the policy process and pass muster by an array of investigatory and decision-making bodies. Because it is a constitutional, rule based democracy, outside states are more willing to work with the United States or, to return to the corporate metaphor, to invest in ongoing partnerships. This open and decentralized political process works in a second way to reduce foreign worries about American power. It creates what might be called "voice opportunities"-that is, opportunities for political access and, with it, the means for foreign governments and groups to influence the way Washington's power is exercised. In 1990 the political analyst Pat Choate wrote a bestseller

stable functioning of America's hegemonic order, Choate was actually describing one of the brilliant aspects of the United States as a global power. By providing other states opportunities to play the game in Washington, they are drawn into active, ongoing partnerships that serve the long-term strategic interests of the United States.

U.S. withdrawal would leave behind a power vacuum, spurring terrorism, economic turmoil and multiple nuclear wars. Ferguson 2004, Niall, July/August , A World Without Power, Foreign Policy, Issue 143

So what is left? Waning

empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of
course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous-roughly 20 times more--so

friction

between the world's disparate "tribes" is

bound to be more frequent . Technology

has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The

reversal of globalization--which a new Dark Age would produce--would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression . As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous region s, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of aids and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines
would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the

heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on
the imperial frontier--its

critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of

power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder

Contention 4 Diplomacy
Plan: The United States federal government should increase statutory restrictions on the war powers authority of the President in the area of introducing Armed Forces into hostilities with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The plan nullifies the authority to attack Iran, established broadly by statutes in 2001 and 2002
the United Nations in Iraq from 1991 to 1998, 27 December 2007. Stop The Iran War Before It Starts, http://www.countercurrents.org/iran-ritter270107.htm If hearings show no case for war with Iran, then Congress must act to insure that the U nited S tates cannot move toward conflict with that nation on the strength of executive dictate alone. As things currently

Ritter 2007, Scott Ritter, a former Marine intelligence officer, served as a chief weapons inspector for

stand, the Bush Administration, emboldened with a vision of the unitary executive unprecedented in our nation's history, believes it has all of the legal authority it requires when it comes to engaging Iran militarily. The silence of Congress following the President's decision to dispatch a second carrier battle group to the Persian Gulf has been deafening. The fact that a third carrier battle group (the USS Ronald Reagan) will probably join these two in the near future has also gone unnoticed by most, if not all, in Congress. The

President and his advisers believe that they are acting in accordance with the authorities given to the executive by the US Constitution, and by legislative authority as well, as provided for in both the A uthorization for U se of M ilitary F orce resolution of September 14, 2001 (after the attacks of September 11, where Congress not only authorized the President to use military force against the perpetrators of the terror attacks but also against those nations deemed to be harboring people or organizations involved in the attacks), and the A uthorization of M ilitary F orce A gainst Iraq resolution of October 2002 (where Congress concurred that any presidential action would be "consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001"). The National Security Strategy of the United States, most recently promulgated in March 2006, lists Iran as the number-one threat to the United States, not only in terms of its yet-to-be-proven nuclear weapons program but also from its status, as declared by the Bush White House, as the world's leading state sponsor of terror. The Bush Administration has repeatedly linked Iran with the perpetrators of the 9/11 terror attacks and has accused Iran of harboring people and organizations involved in that attack. If left unchallenged by Congress, the Bush Administration firmly believes it has all of the authority required to initiate military action against Iran without Congressional approval. This is not an idle statement on my part. One needs only to read the words of President Bush
during his recent State of the Union address: Osama bin Laden declared: "Death is better than living on this earth with the unbelievers among us." These men are not given to idle words, and they are just one camp in the Islamist radical movement. In recent times, it has also become clear that we face an escalating danger from Shia extremists who are just as hostile to America, and are also determined to dominate the Middle East. Many are known to take direction from the regime in Iran, which is funding and arming terrorists like Hezbollah, a group second only to Al Qaeda in the American lives it has taken. The Shia and Sunni extremists are different faces of the same totalitarian threat. But whatever slogans they chant, when they slaughter the innocent, they have the same wicked purposes: They want to kill Americans, kill democracy in the Middle East and gain the weapons to kill on an even more horrific scale. In the sixth year since our nation was attacked, I wish I could report to you that the dangers have ended. They have not. And so it remains the policy of this government to use every lawful and proper tool of intelligence, diplomacy, law enforcement and military action to do our duty, to find these enemies and to protect the American people. [Author's emphasis] What is unrealized in this passage is the loud applause given by members of Congress to the President's words. Democrats in Congress have the opportunity to nip this looming disaster in the bud. The fact that most of the Democratic members of Congress who enjoy tenure voted in favor of the resolutions giving the

President such sweeping authority

is moot. Democrats are all capable of pleading that they were acting under the influence of a

Republican-controlled body and unable to adequately ascertain through effective oversight the genuine state of affairs. This is no longer the case. The Democrats in Congress are in firm control of their own destiny, and with it the destiny of America. A war with Iran will pale in comparison with the current conflict in Iraq. And if there is a war with Iran, this Congress will be held fully accountable. Democrats

notion of a unitary executive will scoff at the concept of a Congressional declaration of war. They hold that the power to make war is not an enumerated power per se. While statutory authorization (i.e., a formal declaration of war) is enumerated in the Constitution, the reality (as reflected by the current War Powers Act) is that the powers of bringing America to a state of war are not so much separated as they are linked and sequenced, with Congress exercising its control over budgetary appropriations and the President through command.

should seek immediate legislative injunctions to nullify the War Powers' authority granted to the President in September 2001 and October 2002 when it comes to Iran. Congress should pass a joint resolution requiring the President to fully consult with Congress about any national security threat that may be posed to the United States from Iran and demand that no military action be initiated by the United States against Iran without a full, constitutionally mandated declaration of war. Those who embrace the

Removing the presidents threat of force strengthens the diplomatic track toward Iran The threat of force only damages diplomacy Luers Et All 2013, William Luers, Director of the Iran Project; Iris Beiri, The iran Project Coordinator, and Priscilla Lewis, editor for the Iran Project, Thomas R. Pickering, Jim Walsh of MIR and Stephen Hentz of Rockefeller Brother Fund, The Iran Project is a Non-Government Organization that seeks to Improve Official Contacts between the United States and Iranian Governments, Founded in 2002 b the United Nations Association of the USA, The Iran Project, strategic Options for Iran: Balancing Pressure with Dipomacy, pg 41-42, http://www.scribd.com/doc/136389836/Strategic-Options-for-Iran-BalancingPressure-with-Diplomacy#fullscreen
IV.

Strengthening The Diplomatic Track : Practical Considerations and Strategic Options Virtually every

American administration since 1979 has tries to find a way to work with Iran, only to be faced with the same core questions. Whether, when, and how to start talks with Irans inaccessibleand often resistantleaders? Once talks have begun what, if anything, to offer Iran in order to get what the United States wants, including on nuclear issues? How to bridge the growing cultural and psychological divide and the deep-seated distrust that makes even indirect negotiations so unconformable, it not disagreeable, for both parties? As summarized in Part VI of this paper (the Primer on Prior Initiatives to Improve U.S.-Iran Relations), the

long frustrating history of presidential efforts to reverse the downward spiral of relations with Iran demonstrates the profound mutual distrust and misunderstanding that shape the words and actions of both governments. Iranians with whom we have spoken tell us that similar questions arise when Iran contemplate working with the United States. Of course, the tensions between the United States and Iran are not just the results of bad attitudes and difficult processes. The enmity between the United States and Iran reflects real differences, threats, conflicts, and offenses, which we have discusses in earlier sections of this paper and in our two previous reports. These problems, if not resolved or managed more effectively, could lead to armed conflict with Iran or even a war in the Middle East and beyond. We focus
countriesas well as some problems in the regionwill require such an approach. The

here on strategies for working directly with Iran because our analysis suggests that the effective management of the problems between the two

goal would be to build a practical relationship that could over time help the United States achieve its principal objective without resort to force . Reaching this foal would necessarily be a gradual process, with one step back for every two steps forward. As we have noted, strengthening the diplomatic track of U.S. policy towards Iran does not
the President decides to try to work with Iran, he will

mean abandoning the pressure track, including maintaining the option of using military force should the Iranians move quickly to build a bomb. Nor does It mean reducing the use if surveillance and intelligence gathering to detect any changed in the status if Irans nuclear program. But if

have to take into account the political and strategic difficulty of managing those policy tracks and their respective goals benefits, and costs. The challenge would include: Retaining the credibility of threatened military action. Whether Iranian leadership has taken seriously President

Obamas stated willingness to take military action to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, it has been called into question by critics. Their doubts would increase if the President decided to negotiate directly with Iran and put serious offer on the table. Yet the more the president threatens the use of force , the more difficult it will be for Irans defiant leadership to consider any offer, and more the President will be under pressure to use military force.

Failure to engage Iran in diplomacy motivates Irans nuclear policy and makes war inevitable Current US policy is the driving force behind Iran proliferation efforts Parsi 2006, Trita the co-founder and current president of the National Iranian American Council, a non-profit educational organization) May 8 2006 The United States Double vision in Iran, Open Democracy, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-iran_war/double-vision_3518.jsp
For the last five years, the George W Bush administration has often been accused of lacking an Iran policy. While all eyes were on Iraq, Washington did little to seriously address the challenge posed by Iran. More recently, however, these years of negligence by adopting not one, but

Washington has

overcompensated for

two foreign policies on Iran: non-proliferation of nuclear materials, and regime change. The problem is that these policies tend to undermine each other in the short term and risk embroiling the United States in yet another war in the middle east. As desirable as the goals of non-proliferation and regime change may be per se, they are contradictory in nature and will likely leave Washington achieving neither. The regime-change policy brings with it two elements that undermine the non-proliferation goal and tend to increase the risk of a military conflict with Tehran rather than bringing closer Iran's peaceful democratisation. First, it compels Washington to refuse direct negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear programme. This is against the advice of United Nations secretary-general Kofi Annan, International Atomic Energy Agency secretary-general Mohamed ElBaradei and European Union officials, who have all stated that a peaceful resolution is unlikely to be achieved unless the two principal actors in this equation Iran and the US negotiate directly. Second, financial aid to exiled Iranian dissident groups (which may or may not include the terrorist-listed Mujahedin-e Khalq) as proposed in Condoleezza Rice's request to Congress for
$85 million for democracy-promotion in Iran erodes the little trust that is left between Iran and Washington and further undermines prospects for a peaceful conclusion to their nuclear dispute. Washington's calculation may have been to increase the pressure on Iran from all directions, but it fails to appreciate the driving force behind Iran's nuclear ambition. Indeed, the current impasse over Iran's nuclear programme has been intertwined with the inequality of power between the two states. For many years, Iran has had to consider the real possibility of an American attack, and those fears rather than Persian nationalism or Iranian pride have been a key motivating factor behind Iran's quest for a nuclear option. According to former CIA officials who participated in the preparation of national-intelligence estimates on Iran in the 1990s and since 2000, US intelligence experts have consistently concluded that Iran's fears of a US attack are a major contributing factor to its pursuit of the nuclear option. The Bush administration has unfortunately not taken those intelligence estimates into consideration.

America's

no-diplomacy policy has already toughened Tehran's stance . The Bush administration's unwillingness to negotiate with the Mohammad Khatami government (1997-2005) after Iran's cooperation with America in Afghanistan has strengthened the hand of those in Tehran who argue that no Iranian policy change will be sufficient to satisfy Washington, and that Iran consequently has no choice but to prepare for what the Iranians see as a likely American military assault. As Washington intensifies the pressure on Iran, and refuses to actively participate in the nuclear negotiations and starts channelling funds to dissidents, the Iranian perception of the threat from Washington will undoubtedly increase and prompt Tehran to cling onto whatever deterrences against the US it possesses or can develop. This, in turn,
will be seen as a casus belli by hardliners in Washington. Clearly, this does not bode well for America's non-proliferation objective, but neither does it advance the goal of democratisation as it increases the risk for a military showdown with Iran that undoubtedly will have profoundly negative effects on Iran's prospects for democracy. To resolve this dilemma, granted that war is not the ultimate objective, the duality of Washington's Iran policy must be made more refined. As ideologically unattractive as multilateral talks with Iran may appear to the Bush White House, it must be recognised that the no-diplomacy

policy has only aggravated the situation and made the chance of attaining Washington's policy objectives less likely. During this period, Iran has aggressively pursued nuclear technology
and decreased Washington's manoeuvreability. Indeed, if Washington had joined European Union states (Britain, France and Germany, the

"EU3") in its negotiations with Iran from October 2003, Iran would likely not be enriching uranium today.

If the no-diplomacy policy

is further pursued, Tehran will be gifted more time to present Washington with a nuclear fait accompli , which will leave the US in a much weaker position to change the dynamics of the nuclear stand-off and to promote democracy in Iran. Opponents of multilateral talks have failed to present a compelling case for their position
instead, they tend to present the very problem sought to be resolved as an argument for not pursuing the most obvious solution. Invoking Iran's aggressive rhetoric, its nuclear programme, theocratic nature or influence in Iraq as arguments not to join multilateral talks is selfdefeating, as America's experience with Iran over the last few years has shown. Since

other policy options have proven unsuccessful and since the stated preference is not to start a war, multilateral talks should be pursued precisely because that is the most likely way to resolve Washington's problems with Iran's rhetoric, its nuclear programme, its influence in Iraq and its lack of democracy. Joining multilateral talks with Iran should neither be seen as a reward
nor a concession. It is simply an appropriate policy modification put in place in order to successfully obtain the objectives of non-proliferation and democratisation in Iran. If

talks are not pursued, Washington risks trapping itself in a situation in which military action will be its only remaining option. That does not mean that war is inevitable, however. Diplomacy can still be given a chance. But forsaking diplomacy is increasingly tantamount to choosing war.

The threat of Force against Iran hurts the U.S. credibility of overall diplomacy Parasiliti 2010, Survival Global Politics and Strategy, Andrew Parasiliti (2010): After Sanctions, Deter and Engage Iran, Survival, 52:5, 13-20, www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/andrewparasiliti4ea012bdc7887.pdf
Although Washington is deepening defence and intelligence coordination with its Gulf allies with regard to Iran, comparable diplomatic steps toward Iran or a NATO-style military alliance among Gulf countries will be difficult to obtain. There would probably be little overt

support for a US or Israeli military strike against Iran, especially in the Middle East. Even those countries which might privately endorse military action would likely stay quiet to avoid a popular anti-American or anti-Israeli backlash, or to avoid Irans wrath. The use of force against Iran would represent a failure of US and international

diplomacy . While any military action in a deterrence scenario would be targeted solely at Irans nuclear facilities and related targets, the use of force would likely have unforeseeable negative consequences in the region. The

effect of a military attack inside Iran is also unknown and could prove unpopular among Iranians. Iran should nevertheless be aware of potential consequences, beyond sanctions, should it continue to defy UN security resolutions and decide to pursue a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy: sanctions and endgame While a credible military deterrent is a last resort to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon, the

first resort remains diplomacy backed by sanctions. Sanctions can serve as prelude, or context, to further diplomacy with Iran. In

diplomatic terms, sanctions buy both space and time for further engagement. While many of the proponents of sanctions do not believe that sanctions alone can force Iran to comply with UN resolutions regarding its nuclear programmes, the argument is that they will deprive Iran of revenues, materials and technologies it could otherwise use in those programmes. Sanctions also convey to the Islamic Republic, and to the Iranian people, the high economic and diplomatic costs of continued non-compliance with the IAEA and UN Security Council resolutions. It is Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010), Iran is required to cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues without delay comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement ratify promptly the Downloaded by [109.2.201.93] at 05:48 18 October 2011

worth reviewing the objectives of sanctions on Iran; that is, exactly what Tehran must do to have sanctions lifted. According to UN

Diplomacy solves all global problems Its essential to overall leadership and prevents cyber-terror, disease and warming

Nye 2012, Joseph S, University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard and former dean of Harvards
Kennedy School of Government, Diversifying American Power, Sept, http://www.internationalrelations.com/2012/09/09/joseph-s-nye-jr-diversifying-american-power/, CMR

The bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside of government control, and it includes non-state actors as diverse as bankers electronically transferring sums larger than most national budgets at one extreme, and terrorists transferring weapons or hackers threatening cyber-security at the other. It also includes new challenges like pandemics and climate change. On this bottom board, power is widely dispersed, and it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multipolarity, hegemony. The soft power to attract and organize cooperation will be essential for dealing with transnational issues. The problem for American power in the 21st century is that there are more and more things outside the control of even the most powerful state. Although the United States does well on military measures, there is increasingly more going on in the world that those measures fail to capture. For example, international financial stability is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but the United States needs the cooperation of others to ensure it. Global climate change too will affect the quality of life, but the United States cannot manage the problem alone. And in a world where borders are becoming more porous than ever to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, America must help build international coalitions and build institutions to address shared threats and challenges. In this sense, power becomes a positive sum game. It is not enough to think in terms
of power over others. One must also think in terms of power to accomplish goals. On many transnational issues, empowering others can help us to accomplish our own goals. In this world, networks and connectedness become an important source of relevant power. The problem of American power is less one of decline, than realizing that even

help of others.

the largest country cannot achieve its aims without the

Cyber-attack causes world war 3

Threat of Cyberwar, NPR, 31811, http://www.npr.org/2011/03/18/134651428/foreign-policywhere-fukushima-meets-cyber-wars, accessed 9-17-11
The Japanese nuclear crisis, though still unfolding, may, in a way, already be yesterday's news. For a peek at tomorrow's, review the testimony of General Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command. Testifying before Congress this week and seeking support to

Rothopf 2011, Garten Rothkopf, visiting scholar, CEIP, When Fukushima Meets Stuxnet: The Growing

pump up his agency budget, the general argued that all future conflicts would involve cyber warfare tactics and that the U.S. was ill-equipped to defend itself against them. Alexander said, "We are finding that we do not have the capacity to do everything we need to accomplish. To put it bluntly, we are very thin, and a crisis would quickly stress our cyber forces. ... This is not a hypothetical danger." The way to look at this story is to link in your mind the Stuxnet revelations about the reportedly U.S. and Israeli-led cyber attacks on the Iranian nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz and the calamities at the Fukushima power facilities over the past week. While seemingly unconnected, the stories together speak to the before and after of what cyber conflict may look like. Enemies will be able to target one another's critical infrastructure as was done by the U.S. and Israeli team (likely working with British and German assistance) targeting the Iranian program and burrowing into their operating systems, they

Japan. (Although one power company executive yesterday joked to me that many plants in the U.S. would be safe because the technology they use is so old that software hardly plays any role in it at all. This hints at a bit of a blessing and a curse in the fractured U.S. power system: it's decentralized which makes it hard to target overall but security is left to many power companies that lack the sophistication or resources to anticipate, prepare for or manage the growing threats.) Importantly, not only does the apparent success of the Stuxnet worm demonstrate that such approaches are now in play but it may just be the tip of the iceberg. I remember over a decade ago speaking to one of the top U.S. cyber defenders who noted that even during the late 90s banks were losing millions and millions every year to cyber theft -- only they didn't want to report it because they felt it would spook customers. (Yes.) Recently, we have seen significant market glitches worldwide that could easily have been caused by interventions rather than just malfunctions. A couple years back I participated in a scenario at Davos in which just such a manipulation of market data was simulated and the conclusion was it wouldn't take much to undermine confidence in the markets and perhaps even force traders to

will seek to produce malfunctions that bring economies to their knees, put societies in the dark, or undercut national defenses. Those infrastructures might well be nuclear power systems and the results could be akin to what we are seeing in

move to paper trading or other venues until it was restored. It wouldn't even have to be a real cyber intrusion -- just the perception that one might have happened. What

makes the nuclear threat so unsettling to many is that it is invisible. It shares this with the cyber threat. But the cyber attacks have other dimensions that suggest that General
Alexander is not just trying to beef up his agency's bank accounts with his description of how future warfare will always involve a cyber component. Not only are they invisible but it is hard to detect who has launched them, so hard, in fact, that one

can imagine future tense international relationships in which opposing sides were constantly, quietly, engaging in an undeclared but damaging "non-war," something cooler than a Cold War because it is stripped of rhetoric and cloaked in deniability, but which might be much more damaging.

While there is still ongoing debate about the exact definition of cyber warfare there is a growing consensus that the threats posed by both state-sponsored and non-state actors to power grids, telecom systems, water supplies, transport systems and computer networks are reaching critical levels. This is the deeply unsettling situation effectively framed by General Alexander in his testimony and rather than having been obscured by this week's news it should only have been amplified by it.

Dialogue allows for cooperation on a wide range of issues and denuclearization

staff in the Clinton administration, and Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, January 11 2008 Forging ties with Iran The Boston Globe, http://www.cfr.org/iran/forging-tiesiran/p15247?breadcrumb=/region/404/iran

Brzezinski 2008, Mark an international lawyer in Washington, served on the National Security Council

The recent tension in the Persian Gulf between Iranian vessels and the US Navy, coming on the heels of the disclosures of the National Intelligence Estimate, highlights the failure of the Bush administration to craft a coherent Iran policy.

While the intelligence estimate contradicted persistent White House claims of imminent Iranian nuclear danger and undermined the case for war, the aggressive behavior of the Revolutionary Guard underscores the continued challenge of Iran. Both developments reinforce caution and firmness as the right way to proceed. The intelligence estimate undercuts the Bush administrations attempt to craft (let alone broaden) an international coalition to impose sanctions against Tehran. There is widespread feeling overseas that the consequences of the judgment that Tehran has suspended its nuclear weapons program should be positive, not punitive. To

clerical state today is an unexceptional opportunistic power seeking to exert preponderance in its immediate neighborhood. Gone are the heady revolutionary days when Iran viewed projection of influence as necessitating the subversion of the incumbent Arab regimes. In the past year, Irans representatives, particularly the peripatetic Ali Larijani, have made overtures to both Saudi Arabia and Egypt, calling for collective mediation of the regions conflicts. From Iraqs raging sectarian strife to Lebanons internal convulsions, Iran may well recognize that the best means of stabilizing the Middle East and safeguarding its own interests is through better relations with its longstanding rivals. The question then becomes can Irans pragmatic streak be harnessed to accommodate a new relationship with the United States. Any diplomatic approach to Iran will find a confident theocracy seemingly determined to achieve advanced nuclear capability. Russias recent delivery of uranium shows Irans ability to interact with outside powers to achieve this objective. To compound the difficulty, Irans foremost leader, Ali Khamenei, has his own long-held suspicions of the United States, continuously decrying America as a source of cultural contamination and imperial encroachment. Yet, Khamenei has conceded the importance of national interests and recently stated: We never said that these relations will be suspended indefinitely. . . . Certainly I would be the first to approve of resuming ties with the US the day it is to the benefit of the nation.

be sure, the Islamic Republic still has nuclear ambitions, and its expanded uranium enrichment capacity is certainly worrisome. Nonetheless, dialogue and diplomacy are still the best means of mitigating the Iranian challenge. And despite President Mahmoud Ahmadinejads odious rhetoric and the reckless behavior of Iranian speedboats, there is reason to believe that Tehran may be open to such an approach. While some have depicted Iran as a rash, militant state imbued with messianic fervor, the

The challenge for US diplomacy therefore is to alter Irans calculus, diminishing its inordinate sense of paranoia while building on its desire for regional stability. The starting point of any cautious and firm approach (as opposed to precipitous reaction) is an appreciation that after the intelligence estimate , there is little domestic or international consensus for the use of force.

Moreover, given the dramatic changes that the Middle East

has undergone in the last few years, and the removal of the traditional Iraqi barrier to projection of Irans influence, it is hard to see how Tehran can be isolated. At a time when Iranian officials are welcomed in Arab capitals, and as trade between Iran and its neighbors soars, a regional accord on isolating Iran simply does not exist. Bushs statements after the intelligence estimates release emphasized that nothing has changed, that Iran remains a threat. He intends to use his first extended tour of the Middle East to rally support for international pressure against Iran. But the new

intelligence estimate requires a revision of tactics toward Iran. That Iran ceased work on its it provides an opportunity to start negotiations with Tehran without any preconditions. Moreover, it allows both parties to come to the negotiating table with a constructive tone. If
nuclear program several years ago is positive, as

is not imminent, the US long-range goal for negotiations with Iran ought to be to create a context in which Iran sees it as in its own self-interest to become more closely associated with the West and the international order. The US approach should reflect the mixed nature of shared as well as conflicting interests with Iran. The stabilization of Iraq, Persian Gulf security, nuclear counterproliferation, among others, should be cast as shared interests. The possibility of growing interaction economically should also be welcomed. At the same time, the United States should be clear that support of terrorism in the region directly threatens the security interests of Iran. There

either or both parties come to the table making veiled threats or hurling insults, or even dismissing each others security concerns, the negotiations naturally will be derailed from the outset. Now that a nuclear threat

should not be exaggerated expectations placed on such an approachit will not produce an immediate panacea. But at a minimum, the pursuit of a calm, strategic policy toward Iran may ensure that a future, more sober, postAhmadinejad leadership recognizes that an Iran linked more closely to the West and the international community will be more prosperous and secure.

Diplomacy reverses containment and prevents proliferation and Iranian supported terrorism Negotiating credibility is essential. Sofaer 7-30-2013, Abraham D. Sofaer, who served as legal adviser to the US Department of State
from 1985 to 1990, was appointed the first George P. Shultz Distinguished Scholar and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution in 1994. During his service as legal adviser, he was responsible for US/Iran negotiations at the Iran/US Tribunal in The Hague, Taking on Iran: Strength, Diplomacy, and the Iranian Threat by Hoover fellow Abraham D. Sofaer, http://www.hoover.org/news/press-releases/152926

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE STANFORDHoover Institution Press today released Taking on Iran: Strength, Diplomacy, and the Iranian Threat by Abraham D. Sofaer. In this book Sofaer charges that the

United States, under both Republican and Democratic presidents, has failed to deal effectively with the threat posed to international peace and security by Iran. Iranian misconduct, he
and NATO forces today in Afghanistan. In recounting those incidents, Sofaer points out that

writes, has led to the deaths of some one thousand US soldiers, starting with the marine barracks bombing in Lebanon through the killing of US

the United States has done little or nothing to deter Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) aggression. Given this background, says Sofaer, it is not surprising that the United States has failed to convince Iran to give up acquiring the capacities and fuel needed to develop and deliver nuclear weapons. A nuclear-armed Iran would increase instability in the Middle East, further embolden the IRGC, and lead to nuclear arms proliferation, all with potentially catastrophic results. On the other hand, attacking Irans nuclear facilities is also a highly undesirable outcome. An attack for the purpose of preventing Iran from continuing its nuclear and missile programs woulddespite the UN Security Council resolutions ordering Iran to stop both programsbe widely regarded as illegal and illegitimate, would likely alienate the Iranian population, and may succeed only in delaying Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons. It is crucially important , therefore, that Iran be convinced to give up its illegal programs , thereby sparing the United States
or its allies the task

of choosing

between the two undesirable options of attacking Irans nuclear program or attempting to contain a nuclear-armed Iran. But the United States currently lacks both the credibility and the negotiating policies necessary to secure that outcome. In Taking on Iran, Sofaer presents a viable approach the United States could use to deal with Irans nuclear program without either resorting to preventive attacks or accepting a nuclear-armed Iran. As former secretary of state George P. Shultz writes in the Foreword to
Sofaers book: In this book, Abe Sofaer presents an alternative to preventive attack or containment that should have been implemented long ago. The lawful use of defensive strength against the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps could, in addition to deterring aggression, provide important diplomatic leverage. Strength is the key to getting Iran to negotiate in earnest, and the United States should apply diplomatic practices in negotiating with Iran similar to those it used successfully in negotiating with the Soviet Union. Sofaer details thirty years of

United States in Washington, DC. He also delineates thirty years of weakness in failing to respond to IRGC aggression by both Republican and Democratic administrations. Drawing from the US experience in dealing with the Soviet Union during the Reagan and first Bush

IRGC aggression against the United States, through its surrogate Hezbollah, by supplying arms and support to groups with which the United States is in armed conflict, such as the Sadrists in Iraq and Taliban elements in Afghanistan, and directly in the form of assassinations in foreign countries, including the recent effort to kill the Saudi ambassador to the

administrations, Sofaer shows how combining strength and effective diplomacy is likely the only way to convince the Iranian government to international community. Responding forcefully but proportionately to IRGC aggression

end its support for IRGC aggression and to achieve, through meaningful negotiations, a peaceful outcome to its current face-off with the

will enhance US credibility and increase the likelihood that Iran will commit to a negotiating process based on sovereign respect, avoidance of disabling preconditions , mutually beneficial outcomes, a broad agenda, and the use of forums that seek results, not platforms for
mutual recriminations. Taking on Iran makes no claim that the policy of strength and effective diplomacy will be certain to succeed in defusing the Iranian threat. No such assurance is possible in dealing with the worlds most complex confrontations. But experience has demonstrated that a policy of strength and

effective diplomacy is the path most likely to lead Iran to alter its nuclear policy

without the risk of starting a war that would likely fail to achieve the changes in Iranian behavior necessary to ensure a peaceful and stable outcome to the present crisis.

The plan spurs future diplomacy This ensures no more proliferation Al-Ahram 2013, Al-Ahram Weekly, Negotiating with Iran, August 22, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/2171/19/Negotiating-with-Iran.aspx
The sanctions have shaken the Iranian economy, and Iran is looking for a solution out of the deadlock that it can justify to domestic public opinion. After years of the government exaggerating the nuclear project, cloaking it in nationalist rhetoric, public expectations have risen to a level where Irans rulers can no longer simply shift their policy in response to foreign pressures. Iran has also come to the conclusion that negotiations with the western powers are useless without the United Statess approval , and it should not come as a surprise if Iran makes an effort to meet with its American counterparts soon after the countrys
elections in June.

Khamenei

admitted on 21 March that he was not optimistic about talks with the US, but he added that he was not But

against them either. It

appears that he is willing to take a chance and sit with the Americans face to face.

he also sees himself as being too senior to personally lead the negotiations, so it is likely that Irans next president, to be elected in June, will take the lead. Clearly, Iran

does not wish to be perceived as an irrational state like North Korea, and returning to the international community is a goal of the leadership. But more than just a lifting of the sanctions, Iran also needs to feel welcome in the international community and to feel convinced that the latter is not aiming for regime change.
In the light of this, it may appear strange that Iran cast a negative vote on the UN treaty to control arms sales earlier this month, with the global effort to regulate the sale of conventional weapons being opposed by Iran, Syria and North Korea. Irans opposition stunned many nations, particularly those from the 120-member Non-Aligned Movement of which Iran is currently serving as president. The part of the treaty that likely did not suit Iran, Syria and North Korea was that concerning arms sales to countries that face sanctions, with the UN treaty aiming not only to regulate the international trade in conventional weapons but also to increase transparency. The Syrian government recently lost its seat in the Arab League to the rebels who have now been fighting the regime in Damascus since 2011, and the UN treaty, if agreed, would likely have curbed weapons sales to the government. North Korea has already declared a state of emergency and has threatened to use nuclear warheads in a stand-off with the US. Iran is in neither situation at the moment, but with

tense relations with its neighbours and struggling to solve its problems with the international community over its controversial nuclear programme, it sees the UN treaty as limiting its scope for manoeuvre were the country to face a confrontation. The treaty could be used to push for further sanctions on countries like Iran if a new round of resolutions passes at the UN, and it could also be used to target Irans nuclear programme. Such matters are sure to have been in the back of the minds of Irans rulers when they decided to vote against the UN treaty, and they help observers to understand their resistance to uncritical cooperation with the I nternational A tomic E nergy A gency or with the
P5+1 group.

Iran needs a security guarantee , and this cannot be gained unless

The plan would work best prevents proliferation and encourages peaceful integration into the multilateral system Dobbins 2012, James, former Assistant Secretary of State and now directs the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the Rand Corporation, Coping with a Nuclearising Iran, Survival, Vol 53, No 6
By contrast,

a policy of pure containment would employ defensive alliances, sanctions and noncommunication to isolate and penalise Iran. Such an approach can achieve the objective of restraining Irans external behaviour, but it works against the goal of reforming its domestic politics and increases popular as well as regime support for the acquisition of nuclear weapons . Pre-emption goes beyond mere containment to include an offensive threat or the use of military force to forestall some unwanted development, in Irans case the acquisition of a nuclear-weapons capability. Such an approach could slow Irans nuclear programme, but it would strengthen both external sympathy and internal support for the regime, as well as probably accelerating its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Containing Irans regional influence would therefore become more difficult in the aftermath of a military strike. Deterrence, by contrast, would employ the threat of retaliation to dissuade Iran from employing nuclear weapons to influence, coerce or damage others. Such a policy is a necessary companion to containment should Iran cross the nuclear threshold. If deterrence is not accompanied by a greater level of engagement, however, the risk of uncontrolled escalation is high.
it sits down with the US, however painful that may be.