MANEUVER WARFARE--APPLICKI'ION TO NAVAL BA711.

E AND TACTICS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U S . Army Command and General Staffcollege in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degrec MAS'I'ER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

KORERT P. GONZALES: LCDR: (!SN B.S., Villanova University, Villanova, Pennsylvania, 1986

Fort Ixavenworth, Kansas 1997

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. TlTLE AND SUBTITLE Maneuver Warfare-Applicationto Naval Banle and Tactics

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I Z REPORT DATE

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6Junel997

~MaswrsthesislAu

. AUTHORISI LCDR Roben P. Gonzales, USN

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USA CSGC Arn:ATZL-SWLCD Fort Leavenwonh, KS 66027-6SW

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3. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

This study explores maneuver warfare theory, naval ractics and if maneuver warfare influencesor can be applied t o naval mics and battle. The concepts of amition warfare and maneuver warfare are investigated. The study is presented from a aval penpective. To support this perspective, aspats of war at sea and war on land are discussed. This comparison of sea ower helps develop the idea of naval maneuver warfare. Foundationsof naval tactics are outlined and the uniquinessof nava anle is also explored. Thmughhistorical and tactical examples, and discussions this study shows maneuver warfare theory and concepts apply to aval Wtics and battle. Furthermore, maneuver warfare is addressed with respect to military culture, the developingconcep f precision culture and other warfare theories includingamition warfare theory. Maneuver warfare strengths and milartions are discussed.
The U.S. Navy has recently embraced maneuver warfare theory, perhaps too quickly. Quite a heavy maneuver emphasis as developed lhat does not fully appreciare other warfare theories. This study presents a balanced discussion and conuibutes ) h e current debate tha~ is shaping U.S. Navy Doctrine.

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t. SUBJECT TERMS

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115. NUMBER OF PAGES

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93
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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

U S . Navy Namc of Candidate: 1-CDR Kobcrt P. Gonn~lcs,

Thesis Title: Maneuver Warfarc--Application to Naval Rattle and Tactics

Approved by:

% ~ L f l eUS/ , ,Thesis Committee Chairman "" LC~~ Scott R A. Hastings, M.&M.M.A.s.. E.M.B.A.

, Member
LTC ~dwarc&.Brennan, M.B.A.

, Member. Consulting Faculty

LTC Robert G. ~ a n ~ n hPh.D. n,

Acceptcd this 6th day of June 1997 by:

, Director, Graduate Degree Programs

Philip J. Brookes, PI1.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the 1J.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any othcr governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT MANEUVER WARFARE--AI'I'I.ICATION ' 1 ' 0 NAVAL HA'I'T1.E AND TACTICS by LCDR Kohert 1'. Gonzales. I.!SN, 93 pages. This study explores maneuver wartire theor!, naval tactics and if maneuvcr warfare inlluences or can be applied to naval tactics and battle. The concepts of attrition warfare and maneuver warfare are investigated. The study is presented from a naval perspective. To support this perspective, aspects of war at sea and war on land are discussed. This comparison of sea power helps develop the idca of nmrd maneuver warfare. Foundations of naval tactics are outlined and the uniqueness of naval hattle is also explored. Through historical and tactical cxarnples, and discussions this study shows maneuver warfare theory and concepts apply to naval tactics and battle. Furthermore, maneuver warfare is addressed with respect to military culture and other warfare theories including attrition warfare theory. Mancuvcr warfare strengths and limitations are discussed. The U.S. Navy has recently embraced maneuvcr warfare theory, pcrhaps too quickly. Quitc a hcavy maneuvcr cn1ph;lsis has devcloped that docs not fully appreciate other warfare theories. This study presents a balanced discussion and contributes to the current debate that is shaping US.Navy doctrinc.

ACKNOW1,EDCiM BN'I'S

In memory o f the Airmen. Marincs, Sailors and Soldiers that lost their livcs in Iron

Rottom Sound during thc Solomon Island Campaign o f World War 11.

TAD1.E OF CONI'ENTS

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APPROVAL PAGE .................................................................................................................. ABSTRAC I ..................... . . . .................................................................................................
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ACKNOWLEDGMENI'S ........................................................................................................... iv

IJST O F ILLUSTRATIONS ...................................................................................................... vii

CI IAPTER

I . INTRODUCTION ..................... . ............................................................................

Topic

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Rackground

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Scope ........................................................................................................................ Significance ................................................................................................................ Levels of Warfare ....................................................................................................... Levels of War.. Defined ................................................................................................
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Developing Maneuver Warfarc ............................

Melee and Autiraktik ................................................................................................ Definlt~on of Maneuver Warfarc ............................................................................

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2. I. ITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................ 27

3 . RESEARCI I DESIGN ............................................................................................. 4 . WAR A T SEA AND NAVAL. 'IAC'I'ICS

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Introduction ................... . . ......................................................................................

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Military Culturc ........................................................................................................... 38 I'ocus and Execution of thc Art oTWiirlighting ...........................................................
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Sea Powers' Bond to the land ...................................................................................... 41 War on Land Vcrsus War at Sea .......................

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Foundations of Naval Tactics .................................................................................

5 . APPLICA'I'ION OF NAVAL MANI3JVER WARFARE .......................................... 53 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 53 I'echnology ................................................................................................................... 53 Firepower ....................................................................................................................

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Scouting and Anti-Scouting .......................................................................................... 61 Mobility and Movcnwnt .............................................................................................. 70 Leadership .................................................................................................................. 5 . CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................... Future Research Questions ........................................................................................... 73 77

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BIBLlOGRAI'IIY ...................................................................................................................... 89 INITIAL DISTRIDI!TION LIST ........................

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LIST O F FIGURES

Figure

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I . Notiooal Level of War ................... . . ......................................................................... 10

2 . Doubling ........................................................................................................................
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LIST O F TABLES

'l'ahle 1 . Land Battle Versus Sea Rattle .........................................................................................

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2 . Key Principles and Characteristics of Naval Tactics .....................................................

3 . Attrition CulLure Versus Mancuvcr Culture .................... . . .........................................

51 81

4 . Maneuver Culture Versus Precision Culture ................................................................. 83

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODIJCTION

"Naval maneuver wi~rfarc applies to campaigns, not to battles. . . The aim of naval tactics. . . was, and still is, attrition."' These words were writtcn recently by Captain Wayne Hughes, lJSN (Retired), naval historian. theorist, and member of the Naval War College Review Advisory Board. l lis words provide the genesis for this thesis: an exploration of maneuvcr

a n he applied to warfare theory, naval tactics, and whether maneuver warfare influences or c
naval tactics and battle.

Bloodshed, destruction, and material loss, typical of naval battles, clearly dcmonstratcs an attrition nature. Contact with the enemy demands attrition, usually on both sides. This given must not be ignored. The military leaders. ship designers and those on the deck plates must be prepared to strike hard and counter a tenacious foe. Yet, can the 1J.S. Navy tight smarter? While

accepting the attrition nature of naval battle, can the battle group commander or ship's
commanding oflicer apply maneuver warfare concepts to naval tactics and battle to avoid and minimize attrition? Since the end of the Cold War and the demise (at least marginalization) of America's nemesis, the Soviet Navy, the U.S. Navy has been aggressively redefining doctrine. As new doctrine has developed and emerges. the U.S. Navy has been quick to embracc maneuver warfare theory. Perhaps, like a sailor. fresh off thc bow in an cxotic liberty port, destined for a binge. the U.S. Navy has become intoxicated with maneuvcr warfare. Major General Edward Atkeson,
1

1J.S. A m y , has come to this conclusion and believes thc U S . Navy is under the spcll o f the "maneuvcr ~ a r f a r e siren song."2 In part. this over exuberance i s due l o the I1.S. Navy's relatively rcccnt adoption o f naval maneuver warfare theory. Naval mancuver warfarc theory i s so fresh that littlc has been writtcn about it insidc naval circlcs. The US.Navy's principal rclcvant warfarc publications, Naval Doctrinc Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfarc, and Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-20. Surface Shin Tactics, offer littlc beyond a gcneral definition o f maneuver warfarc and a powcrful assertion tliat maneuver warfare isthc prcferred and most

effective rncthod o f warfarc.'

U.S. Navy mancuver warfare thcory is still maturing. Thc U S . Navy's warfighting guide which firmly adopted maneuver warfarc, NDP I, Naval Warfare, was prornulgatcd in the spring o f 1994. 'l'he process o f doctrinal changc takes time to work through all Icvels. As ncw conccpts come online therc is both resistance and a learning curve to contcnd with. Thc 1j.S. Navy is working through these issues. Hughes accurately points out, that the I1.S. Navy has yet to put the "flesh" on the "skeleton" o f naval doctrinc.' This thesis w i l l address mancuver warfare's impact on and application to naval bnttlc and tactics. A t the same timc. it i s hoped it w i l l contribute to tlic current dcbatc that is shaping U.S. Navy doctrine.

Hackaround Warfarc theories and conccpts can hc traced back to thc origins o f man. The first cave man that brandished a club to posture and drive away another was practicing thc philosophy o f Sun Tzu. Sun 'l'zu, whosc writings datc to 400 13.C.. is onc o f the earlicst recorded warf:?re

theorists. Sun 'l'zu taught, "To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acmc o f skill. T o subdue thc cnemy without fighting is thc supreme exccll~nce."~ This i s a basic belief o f maneuver thcorists. The cave man untlerstood this: he knew hc could not afford a

broken honc that might result liom a tight, cven a victorious fight. Convcrsely, the cavc man soon discovcrcd another advantage of thc club: it enablcs one to dispatch or wear down the enemy morc efficiently (attrition warfarc). At times, no amount of posturing. rational or common scnse can avoid thc fight. Witncss the Gulf War of 1990-91. Would a rational enemy have permitted the United States and Coalition forces timc to move Fort Ilood, Fort Bragg, Camp Pendleton, n~ultiple aircratl wings and hrigadcs, numerous ships, and supplies into striking range without any resistance. Would a rational cncmy have suffcrcd through weeks ofacrial bomhardmcnt only to capitulate one hundred hours after hcing assaulted by ground troops. If enough is at stake or if onc is foolish enough, the enemy will fight in despcration. 'Sbc cave man helps illustrate the halancc hctwcen mancuvcr warfare and attrition warfare theory. It has been historically common to transition between the two theories. One is not thc "good" typc of warfare and the other "had." Attrition bvarfare and maneuver warfarc arc two distinct styles of warfare. Sometimes only one stylc can be applied or is applicable, other timcs a choice must be made betwccn the two. Dcpcnding on ihc

circumstances or irthe enemy commander has the initiative. hc may decidc which warfare style
is employed. Furthermore, warfitre is not limited to attrition warhre and maneuver warfare. For example, a third common warfarc style is gucrilla warhre. G'uerre de course (commerce raiding) is sometimes considcrcd its naval counterpart.
Sun I'zu has been followcd by many grcat theorists and practitioners of wartiire.

(ienghis Khan, Alexander thc Great, Napoleon, Clnusewitz, Malian, Patton. William DePuy, to highlight only a few, haw contributed to thc understanding of warfare theory and tactics. Technology has providcd further impctus. The longbow, gunpowder, steel, steam engines, mass production, airplanes, and computers haw shaped hattlc space and warfare.

A contemporary understanding of naval narfare is mainly due to theorists like Alfred 'l'haycr M;~lian, Julian. Corhctt and Ilaoul Castex. Hcrnard Rrodie affirms this in A Lavman's Ciuidc to Naval Stratew. He writes, "The underlying value of the teachings of men like Malian, Corben and Castex is still largely intact."' M~nhan and Corbcn preceded Castex. 'l'hcy discuss some aspects and foundation of mancuver theory, but ncvcr dclined the concept or singled it out. In his work Stratceic 'l'hcories. Castex was the first to define naval mmeuvcr warfare and dcvclop a naval understanding ofthc concept. I lowever, James 'l'ritten, author of "'Maneuver' or
12.kmoeuvi-e W a r h e for the C1.S. Navy?" who is lavish i n his praise and admiration for Castex,

warns that Castex's concepts arc not ideally suited to the U S . Navy. Castex, hc notes, was "providing a doctrinc for a second-ranking navy [France in the 1930~1 and not one that would ever hope to challcngc a first-rate fleet."' Mancuvcr warfare theory moved into thc forerront of American military thinking with the development of a "ncw opcralional view and tactics of battle tagged AirLand Battle." and thc in 1982.8 This firmly publication of U.S. Army Ficltl Manual (FM) 100-5, O~erations established mancuvcr warhrc in American military doctrine and lexicon. Thc U.S. Marine Corps aggressively embraced maneuver warhre in 1989 with the publication of Fleet Marine Forcc

and (FMFM) I, Warfinhting. These publications and subsequent writings have

precipitated a lively dcbatc and a critical analysis of all aspects of land and amphibious warfare. Furthcnnore, Desert Storm helpcd to validate aspects of both services' doctrine. While developing maneuver warfare doctrinc, cach service and academia have produccd a rich litany of hooks, articles, and writing on land and amphibious mancuvcr warfare. By the mid-1990s the U.S. Navy would bccome a full participant in the debate. In 1994, the I J S . Navy promulgated its vision of naval wartighting with the publication of NDP 1, Naval Wartire. 'I'hc impclus for change was the collapse of thc Soviet Union and end

ofthe cold war. Since the start of the cold war. in tlie late 1940s, through the latc 1980s. the U.S. was actively containing com~nunism and tixed on dctcrring war with thc United Sovict Socialist Republic (1JSSIt). The U.S. Navy conducted prcscnce operations to the shore lincs and backyard orthe USSR. Operations were conducted in the North Sea and Baltic Sca, under thc ice cap, and into the Sovict underbelly, the Black Sea. I n thc East, the 1J.S. Navy operated in the North Pacific and Sca of Japan. Embarrassed by their maritime unpreparcdness in the carly sixties, thc Soviets developed a fleet approaching par with the 1J.S. by tlie late seventies and early eighties.
To countcr this "permanent foc," doctrine and tactics were dcvcloped. This doctrine servcd one

purposc--to defeat the Sovict Navy. Some Inlay call this short sighted; however, i n tlie context of the timc it was survival.

I will never forget. whilc s c ~ i n on g a dcstroycr. being overflown by Soviet Badgers

whilc steaming in the Sca ofOkhotsk during my first deployment in 1987; and despite a foggy and moonless night in thc Sca of Japan, being denied permission to turn on thc ship's alternate navigation radar \\,lien its primary radar failed. l'hc alternate radar was the SPQ-9 radar, which was also tlie gunfire control radar. It was fcarcd bringing up thc SPQ-9 navigation and gunfire control radar might alarm Soviet destroyers that wcrc operating close by. The U.S. Navy was corisumed in forward presence operations against a capable, improving adversary. 'l'hc threat began to cnsc in the late eighties and early nineties with reforms in the Sovict Union. In 1091; following thc collapse of thc Soviet Union, t l ~ c U.S. Navy found itself without pccr or permanent adversary--for tlic ncar future. 'l'hc "comforting certainties of the Cold War"' werc ovcr. In hand. tlic U S . Navy's doctrinc and tactics would soon be provcn out of datc. Thc end oftlie cold war found tlie 1J.S.Navy adrift (figuratively, not literally). 'fhc U S . Navy did not have to look fir to prompt change. The Gulf War of 1990-91 demonstrated that the collapse of the Sovict Union did not change America's geographic position

or need for permanent maritime superiority. I t also demonstrated that doctrine, tactics, command and control. weapons, and concept o f operations were not suitcd to this "Ncw World Ordcr." According to' Admiral William Owens, the Gulf War was the US.Navy's "midwife to cl~ange."'~ In Hinh Seas: The Naval Passaee to an ilnchnrted World, Owens discusses national strategy to fight in the deep hluc ocean, bottle up the Soviet Navy and protect the Navy's sea lancs o f communication (SLOC). Fighting was going to take place over long distances, at maximum rangc. The command and control systcrn was designed to opcrate in a defensive mode and counter a doctrinal adversary. Owens recognizes that thc maritime stratcgy and battlc group tactics wcrc products o f the tirncs. I-lowever, they proved "illsuited to the G u l f War" and likely scenarios for tlic future--the IJ.S. Navy had to adapt and changc,"" With the lessons o f tlic Gulf War o f 1900-91 and the collapse o f the Soviet Navy, the U S . Navy quickly and deliberately institutcd change. T o stimulate and guidc change, the Lkpartment o f the Navy produced a white paper, litled " chartcd a new coursc for the naval servicc.

. . . From the Sea,"

in 1992, which

". . . From the Sca" steered the naval service away

from the hlue watcr navy, open ocean maritime strategy dictatcd by the cold war. Recognizing tlic new challenges and changing world, it focused efforts toward development o f naval cxpcditionary forccs (NEF) and further integrating the Navy-Marine Corps tcam. Also, thc service was to prcparc forjoint and multinational operations in the littoral.'2 Creation o f tlic Naval Doctrinc Command followcd in the spring o f 1993. Tasked with articulating naval doctrine, i n 1994, the Navy Doctrinc Command promulgated N D P 1, Naval Warfare. I n its own words, N D P I:Naval Warfarc, is a "capstone document for Naval Warfare that translates tlic vision and strategy o f ". . . From the Sea" into doctrinal rcality."" Thcse changes wcrc indeed far reacliing--and continuc today. In 1996 ". . . From the Sca" was updated and slightly modified and a new white paper. "Fonvard . . . From the Sea,"

was introduced. As a result of thcsc white papcrs, the entirc 1I.S. Navy's focus chnngcd. 1)octrine. co~iccpts.procedures, battle group makeup and command and control structure wcre updatcd or moditied. In conjunction with these movements, NDP 1, Naval Warfare, cmbraces maneuver warrare as "the prcfcrable and rnorc effective--albeit more difficult to master--fighting

The scopc of this thesis is limited to thc study of naval maneuvcr warfare thcory and practice and if it applics to naval battle and tactics. In the process, this work will explorc kcy dcfinitions, foundations of naval tactics and differences hemccn land warfarc and naval warfare. Naval mancuver warfarc's influence on thc operational and strategic levels of warfare will also appear within this study.

Siclnificance "'l'his ship is built to fight . . . you'd bctter know how."" With thcsc words as a 51), Admiral Arleigh Burke challenge to thc commissioning crew of USS Arlcigh Burke (DL)(; commissioned his namesake. I h c most capablc guided missilc destroyer in the world. ARLEICiH BUIZKE is the lend ship of the 1J.S. Navy's newcst class of warships. Thesc are tough words. Admiral h r k c intcnded these words for the entirc U.S. Navy. A war licro and brilliant tactician, he kncbv the importance of knowing your profession and craft. His crafi kept him alive and enabled him to achieve cxcmplary succcss against thc Japanese during World War 11 as a destroyer squadron comrnandcr. In the spirit of Arlcigli Burke's challenge, this tlicsis will explore aspects of l!.S. Navy's craft and naval warfighting. This tlicsis will look at newly developed naval doctrine and cxplore thc works of naval thcorists. Spccificnlly. this tlicsis will dircctly look at mancuver warfare.

naval tactics, and whether maneuver warfarc influences can be applied to naval tactics and battle. Additionally, this thesis w i l l highlight, to somc degree, the following significant issues:

I. Many maneuver wnrhre practitioners, cspccially o r naval maneuver warfare, believe

maneuver warfare is & movcmcnt or mobility. This thesis w i l l addrcss this misunderstanding o f maneuver warfare and demonstrate that maneuver warfare is more than glorilietl movement or mobility. A n art and philosophy, maneuver warfare may include lnovement and mobility but. should not bc limited to the non-linear battlefield. Mancuvcr warfare also seeks othcr avenues to exploit thc initiative and defeat the enemy's w i l l to fight.

2. Exploiting mancuvcr warfare on the battlefield i s an earned right. The tactics, tempo,
and tcclmology--among othcr things--that the commander brings to a light promotes maneuver warfire. Yet. freedom o f maneuver cannot he imposcd on the cncniy; it must be wrestcd from the enemy comrnandcr. Dcspitc his best efforts, a maneuver practitioner may have to rely in part on attrition tactics or actions.

3. Attrition warfarc cannot always he avoided. Contact, soldier versus soldier, ship
vcrsus ship. plane versus plane, even with ovcrwlielnling odds or technological advantage, may lead to attrition. Even in tlic best circun~stances,conlact exposes forces to a linear hattletield or two-dimensional aspcct o f warfare. 'l'ypically, somconc w i l l experience attrition, most likely on hoth sides.

4. "Mancuvcr warfare is good while attrition warfarc is bad" is a frequently declared

generalization. This conclusion is flawed. The relationship and dynamic are more complex. Yet. much o f what is written relegates attrition warfare to a losing option. As stated above, leaders must understand that attrition warfare at times may he the only option. While maneuver warfarc offers many advantages, an indirect approach may not initially exist in tactics or battles.

5. Land warfare and sca warfare arc distinct disciplincs. While sonlc concepts ovcrlap.
thcir uniqueness must be recogniZcd. Understanding these distinctions enablcs commanders to

effectively apply land power and sca power.

6. Warfare thcory i s typically cast from a land warfare perspective. Yct, land warfare
and sca warfare are uniqoc. When applying \ \ d a r e thcory to naval warfare its uniqueness must he addrcsscd. Ignoring thcsc differenccs may lead to a misapplication d w a r f a r c thcory.

Lcvcls of Warfiwc

Today there arc three generally recognized lcvcls o r war: stratcgic. operational, and tactical. I x v e l s o f war are a tool or model to link a nation's policy to m i l i t a y strategy to tactical actions. This model has cvolved over thc ycars. Clauscwitz spoke o f strategy and tactic^.'^ Jomini introduced concepts, such as grand tactics and elementary tactics." The current niodcl i s rclatively recent and cxpands on many ofthese idcas. The term "opcrational level o f war" or "opcrational art" bccatnc popular in U.S. military Icxicon in the latc 1970s. Adoptcd first by tlic Army. i t was later incorporated into joint doctrine. By thc late 1990s i t bcgan to appcar in naval writings and is now fully incorporated in naval warfare publications (NWPs) and naval doctrine publications (NDPs). I t has long hccn recognized that military powcr and military action are instruments o f a nation's power andan extension o f policy. Both Clausewitz and Jomini concluded that military action is a means o f achieving a nation's ob.jectivcs. Influenced by the works o f Clausewitz and Jomini. the great naval theorist Alfrcd 'fhayer Mahan echoed this conclusion and declared i n 1879, "War i s simply a violent political movemer~t."'~ Figure I dcpicts the notional levels o f a war rnodcl and helps show how this modcl links national policy to tactical actions.

War Campaigns Major operations Battle Engagements

STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL TACTICAL

NCA Theater, JTF, Fleet Commander, Task Force, Task Group, CVBG Task Group. Task Element, CVBG, SAG, SAU, Ship, Submarine

Figure I . Notional Level of War Chart

Figure 1 is only a notional depiction ofthc rnodcl. In reality this model does not hold to strict boundarics or relationships. For example, tactical actions may have dircct impact on
strategic concerns and national policy. Thc Doolittle Raid serves to illustrate this point. In April

1942. sixteen B-25 mcdium bombers. Icd by James Doolittlc, were launchcd from the USS Horrrer (CV-X), against Tokyo and three othcr cities i n Japan. They condoctcd a relativcly minor tactical action--especially in the scopc of the military actions that irnmcdiately followed the raid. (Thc Battle of Coral Sca (3 May 1942) would follow two weeks latcr. and Midway shortly aftcr that.) Iksidcs being tactically small, operationally it significantly hampcrcd Admiral Chester Nirnitiz's actions in the Pacilic. With limited assets at his disposal, this raid dangcrously disoerseh his four availeblc carriers. IJSS Surtrroga (CV-3). Nitnil2 fifth carricr in the Pacific during this pcriod, had bccn crippled by a .lapnnese suhniarinc torpedo and would he unavailable until aftcr the Battle of Midway. With USS En~erprisc? (CV- 6) escorting Hornet, Nimitz only had two carricrs available for othcr operations. As a direct result ofthe raid, only IJSS Yorkto~rn (CV-5) and IlSS Lexinglon (CV-2) would he in thc South Pacific for the Battle of thc Coral Sca. Yet, this tactically insigniticant raid and operational mistake was a top national and strategic priority for thc Unitcd States. 'l'hc strategic, political considerations were considered paramounc

it made the Amcrican people feel good and was perceived vcry positively in the press and

considered a victory." 'l'hc Doolittle Raid clcarly illustrates the modcl. It also demonstrates a misapplication of military power. The Doolittlc Kaid was not tied to Admiral Nimitz's principal strategic mililary objectives of hold thc IJacific. Europe tirst and operate as a raider or spoiler o n the strategic defensive. Where aircralt carricrs could have been rnorc effectively positioned in the South Pacific, they wcrc scattered over the I'acific.'" The U.S. would address this early mistake at

Midway. At Midwxy, the I1.S. would align its national military strategy and tactical actions. Admiral Nimitz would he able to concentrate his carricrs for the lirst time and deal a devastating hlow to Japan. The level of war model is not limited to general war. It applies to any exccution of the military instrument of power in peacetime. Peacetime opcrations skew the model even morc. USS Vincennes'(CG-49) minor skirmish \\.it11 Iranian gun hoats and the accidental shooting down of an Iranian civilian air lincr was a tactical action. Yct, its ramilications w r e felt in the halls of the White Housc and Pentagon.

Tilt hostage rescue attempt, Desert One and sending

aircraft carricr battle groups (C:VRGs) into the Taiwan Straits are two morc cxamplcs that blur the distinction bctwccn strategic: operational. and tactical levels of war. Yet, the model still applies. 1)ecisions made by the National Command Authority (NCA) influence action down to thc tactical level and tactical actions stretch hack to the NCA. I:ailurc rcsulls when actions are not properly linked. Succcssf~~l cxecution of national goals and objectives demand that this relationship bc understood and propcrly cxccuted.

I.cvcls o f War--Defined Acknowledging his dcbt to Clausewit7, Malian stated in 1x97: "It is not until this political determination [national objectives and goals] has been reachcd that the data for cvcn starting military problems are in hand; for here, as always. the military arm waits upon and is subservient to the political interests and civil powcr o f the state."" I t is at the strategic lcvel

where military mcans are developed t o mcct Mahan's political dctcrmination; the exccution of the military instrumcnt o f power is tied dircctly to achieving national goals and ohjectivcs at the strategic level. I).pically. stratcgic policy is initiatcd by thc N C A assisted by tlic National Sccurity Council (NSC). Furthermore, at the stratcgic lcvcl, theater strategy and operational goals arc dcveloped. Theater strategies and operational goals link thc strategic level to thc operational level o f war. Operational icvcl or operational art links t l ~ c strategic and tactical lcvcls o f war. Commanders in Chief (CINCs) and Fleet Cornmandcrs conduct operational art. 'fhc K C A provides theater stratcgy and operational goals to thc CINC. The CINC or tlcct commander

translates these into campaign plans and direct tactical action. This intertiiediate-lc\,cl
opcrational art and campaign planning is instrumental to ensurc tactical actions come together and support stratcgic plans. 'lhc tactical level o f war deals with individual engagements and battlcs. Tactics is the art o f lighting. Ship-to-ship or ship-to-submarine encounters and air strikes are tactical execution.

CVBCi and Amphibious llcady Group (ARC;) actions arc typically tactical execution. Tactics
link hack to opcrational art by supporting opcrational goals.

Attrition Warfare "As the Allies prcsscd thcir offensive. Germany's losscs cxcceded its war industry's capacity to kccp pace, at the same time, the allics wcrc ablc to replace their damaged merchant fleet and even cxpand it by adding replacements numbcring hvicc the losses suffcrcd."'* With

tl~esc words. NDP 1, Naval Warfare, adeptly captured the essence o f the Battlc o f the Atlantic during World War 11. A daunting Gcrman submarine forcc, which expanded in the carly war years and was difficult to find and destroy, menaced Allicd SLOCs. These sea lanes wcre critical to Allied survival and could not be abandoned or bypasscd. These, the Allics had to mass assets and rcsources to counter the German tlircat and keep the sea lanes opcn. Thus, the Battle o f thc Atlantic is an example o f thc classic attrition tight. Thc Battle ol'tlie Atlantic displays thc chief characteristics o f attrition warfare: strength versus strength, systematic destruction o f t l i c enemy, and engagement and battle focus. Attrition warfare sccks to dcstroy thc mass and physical force o f tlic cncmy. I t i s very costly and force ratios arc cxtrclncly importani. Critical to n succcssf111attrition fight is destroying tllc cnemy faster than hc can recover. Employment o f rcscrvcs and rcsources in greater nurnbcrs or raster than the enemy w i l l swing tlic battlc or war. Attrition warfare is oftcn called linear warfarc wlicre neither side has freedom o f mancuvcr. I n addition to the 13attlc o f thc Atlantic, tllerc arc numerous othcr cxamplcs o f attrition warfarc. I n many ways, attrition warfarc has bccn the dominant influence on the American way o f a Attrition warfare complements America's strengths: economic might, industrialization. and

vast rcsources. Significant aspects o f attrition warfare can be clearly sccn in the C i v i l War, World War I,World War 1 1 , and Victnam. I n each case, the 0 . S . liarncssed its economic power, industrial engine, and resources to bring niacliines, personnel, fircpowcr, mass, and technology to bcar. Wearing down the enemy. strcngtli versus strength, and dcstroying the encmy faster

than he could destroy Arncrican or Allied fbrccs charactcrizcd these conflicts. 'l'hc cold war was anotlicr attrition fight. The West's massivc force and nuclear arscnal were built up t o dctcr thc Soviets from bccoming an aggressor. The posturing was mass versus mass. During the cold war America idcntilied the Soviet military--army, navy, air force and

nuclear arsenal-as n source o f strength arid sl~ccesslidly countered i t with overwhelming

superiority o f the IJ.S. and NATO. Attrition warfarc i s bcst suited when thc cncmies strength is his niilitary. I t may be the only option if friendly power cannot influence or get at his othcr sources o f strcngth. Vietnam offers an cxamplc o f where America's culture o f attrition warfare was ti liability. I n Victnam the 0.S. military faccd anothcr type ofwarfare--disti~ict liom maneuver warfare and attrition warfare--guerilla warfarc. I n On Strateuv: A Critical Analvsis o f the Victnam War, Colonel Ilarry Sumnicrs rccalls an April 1975 conversation i n which he remarked, " 'You know you never defeated us on the hattletield' to which his Vietnamesc counterpart rcplicd. 'That may be so, hut also irrclcvant.'
"l'

The Viet Cong and North

Victnamcsc strength was not limited to thcir forces in the tield. Where military mass is not thc enemy's strength, attrition \barfare i s poorly suited. Morcover, attrition warfarc does not target or exploit other enemy strengths or wcakncsscs other than military mass. On the othcr hand, maneuver warfarc sccks to exploit an enemy's will, cohesion, and mass.

I)cvclooinu Maneuver Warfarc A r l and philosophy are the most coninion descriptive ternis encountered researching ihe concept and dcfinition o f maneuver warfarc. A t lcast one. and. tiequently both terms nppcar i n most definitions o f maneuver warfarc. Sincc i t is not an exact or hard scicnce, maneuver warfare does not have a rigid list o f theorems or foniiulas. As a result i t is often d i f i c u l t to explain,

understand, and apply. I n the Mancuvcr Warhre Handbook. William Lind bluntly states, "'l'here

is no formula you can Icarn. Wlien someone says. 'Cut all thc bull about theory; just tell me what to do,' you can't. You can talk about how to think, and ahout somc useful technique^."^' L i n d effectively capturcs thc main point: maneuvcr warfarc i s very much a conceptual approach to warfare and painstaking t o grasp. Though it i s not an exact science, likc all philosophies. there are core hclicfs that hold true. Thc corc idcas o f maneuver warfare w i l l hc cxplaincd below. I n addition, mancuver warfarc w i l l bc dividcd into two themes. Looking at mancuver warfare as t\vo thcnics helps explain maneuver warfare thcory dcvclopmcnt and defuse some confusion surrounding maneuver warfarc. Before exploring the corc idcas o f mancuver warfare. consideration o f how maneuver warfare measures succcss illuminates its conceptual and morc complcx nature. I n the attrition light success is measured by tanks dcstroycd or ships sunk or aircraft sl~ot down. Attrition warfmc is focused on force ratios and mass vcrsus mass. Success is easicr to mcasure. B y comparison, for the maneuverists. thcsc nicasures o f success frequently hold little value. Thc ~iianeuvcrist must conccntratc o n the effect his actions and initiative have o n the enemy w i l l to continue. Often. the only measurc o f succcss for tlie friendly commander i s mission accomplishmcnt. As discussed earlier, tlie origins o f maneuvcr uarfarc philosophy date hack to grcnt Chinese military thinkcrs that prcdatc Christ by hundreds o f ycars. Aspccls o f mrtneuvcr tlicory were also displaycd by tlic ancient Greeks, Komans, and Phoenicians. Maneuver warfarc theory has continucd to mature over the years. I n 'fhc Art o f Maneuver, Robert Lconard details the contributions of Sun 'l'zu, Cicnghis Khan. Napoleon, 1,iddel Hart, and others in the evolution o f maneuvcr warfarc ~ h c o r y . ' ~ The genesis for mancuvcr warfare theory was thc realization that thc w i l l and cohesion o f t l ~ c n c ~ i i y can be broken without destruction o f his mass. Ile can bc broken

cven if he has a numerical advantage or his notional strength is prcatcr. O n land, outtlanking an opponent to hit his vulnerable rear, massing forces at a point. and breaking his line are

manifestations ofthis idea. Ihring the age of sail, crossing the "T" or the tactic of doubling.
whcrc a column of ships would split to cnvelop an enemy column on both sides (figure 2)i"cts to this idea. Here is t l ~ c chicfdirference between maneuver warfare and attrition warfare. Attrition w a r h e defeats an cncmy by destro>ing his mass. Mancuver warfare dcfeats the cncmy's will and cohesion by sccking a vulnerability and destroying mental, moral, or mass. (Again, maneuver warfarc is not an alternativc to attrition warfare. If no vulnerabilities or weaknesses exist, than mass versus mass--attrition--may be the only a n s w r . ) Two themes emerge wl~ilc studying mancuvcr warfare. Both themes have at their corc defeating the enemy's will and cohesion, avoiding strcngth vcrsus strength and exploiting

weaknesses and vulnerabilities. These thcmcs did not develop one aftcr the other or separately;
they dcvclopcd together. The first theme is simplcr and easier to understand. It is dependent on movement in relation to thc cnclny. The second theme is morc complex as it looks bcyond movcmcnt. This theme looks for a vulnerability that permits weakening the enemy's sources of strcngth and cohesion. 'l'hcsc themes are not niutually cxclusive. and aspects of both may appear in battle. Howcvcr, thcy simplify explaining maneuver warrare. The first theme can bc labclcd the basic theme or movcmcnt theme. The route to an cncmy's cohesion is through his mass, not brute ibrcc (mass against mass) but cxploiling ~novement.Movcincnl in relation to the cncrny increases friendly combat power. The cncmy's cohesion is broken, largely, by pitting strength against weakness. Mancuver or movemcnt is uscd to increase friendly tighting power relativc to the enemy's.

The aim of doubling was t o achieve o n e of these positions:

Both fleets were moving, a t about t h e s a m e speed when well handled, s o it was difficult t o attain t h e positions without splitting a fleet temporarily and risking the enemy's closing on o n e half o r the other and counterconcentrating. Admiral Nelson successfully doubled on the French a t the Battle of the Nile because they were a t anchor and other circumstances were fortuitous:
Brltish underway
v b b

4 4 4 French a t anchor

b b b

Figure 2. Doubling. Sourcc: Wayne Ilughcs. Flcct Tactics. Thcon. and Practicc (Annapolis. MD Naval Institute Prcss, 10x6). 45.

During the Battle of the Nile. August 1798. Admiral Lord Horatio Nclson displayed the hasic thcmc of mancuvcr warfarc theory. Falling. unexpectedly, on the French at Aboukir Hay. outside the mouth of the Nile Rivcr. he achieved a trcmcndous victory. Exploiting surprise, tcmpo and movcmcnt. thc English dccinlatcd and humiliated a superior French forcc. Abandoning a rigid linc formalion from the outset, he intended to double on the Frcnch. As the British column approached the French van, he split some of his ships to the landward side of the French. This caught the French completely off guard and Admiral Nclson was able to douhle on thc anchored Frcnch ships. As thc Royal Navy column worked the French line it was always two or morc ships against onc. " Admiral Nclson exploited movement and mobility to incrcase his combat powcr i n rclntion to thc Frcnch. It is from this basic thcmc that mancuver warfare gets its name. The hasic tltcmc is dependent on movement and mobility. However, rnaneuvcr warfarc is more than movement and . . . . , .. . . . , mobility; Thc cxpandcd thcmc will illustraie this point. I t is in the basit thcme where much of

the confusion about maneuver warfare sets in. I t is generated by its own namc: mancuvcr warfare. Many cannot get bcyond maneuver ~ a r f a r e being about movement or mobility.'"llic expanded theme below helps show maneuver warfare i s more than moverncnt or mobility. The second theme can be considered the expanded theme. The key hcrc is that there are other ways t o break an enemy's cohesion besides increasing thc combat powcr relative to his. I n the basic theme, primarily through movement. friendly combat power is incrcascd. 'Shis increase in combat powcr allows conccntration against sclcctcd portions o f his mass. I n the basic theme mass still plays a key rolc. Thc cxpandcd theme looks at decreasing the enemy's combat powcr. This is accomplished by balancing an enemy's strengths against his weakncsscs and
\

ulncrabilitics. Strengths arc not attacked. Nor arc all \wakncsscs attacked. Only those

weakncsscs and vulncrabiliticr: that directly reduce an enemy's strengths are attacked. I n this way thc cncmy's intcmal strcngth and cohcsion are broken. American actions in tlic Solomons between July 1942 and August 1943 in defense o f (iuadacanal are illustrative. American local air superiority during daylight forced the Japanese to opcratc at night. Thc campaign ccntcrcd on support for forccs ashorc and control of Hcndcrson Field. A t night tlic lmpcrial Navy would attempt to resupply land forces and sllcll

Ilenderson Field. The American Navy attempted to deny the Japanese lines o f communication.
Deprived ofaircrall due to darkness: these were ship-to-ship clashes. 'l'he source o f Japancse strength was the Long Lance torpedo. They employed it with devastating effectivcncss. Mounted on cruisers and destroyers, it outclassed the American torpedo in rangc and payload. The Amcricans were slow to apprcciatc its capabilities and initially rought the Japanese with brute strength and attrition, attempting to counter t l ~ c Long Lance with gunfire and torpedoes. These tactics resulted in spectacular failures. I.atc in tlic campaign, American tacticians grasped the key to success: the Japancse did not posscss radar and could not match Amcrican scouling

and antiscouting. B y developing tactics that cxploitcd this weakness, the Long Lance was marginalized. Essentially the Americans kept their guns silcnt until after they had closed with the cncmy. fired thcir torpedoes, and hit their mark. The Japancse were surprised and unable to employ thcir torpedo effectively.

Melee and Aufrue.sruk~ik Common to both the basic and expandcd theme and a core belief o f n~ancuvcr warpare theory is the idea o f Melee and Aujirupruklik. These are, respectively, the British Royal Navy and the German Army. These terms emhody the conccpts o f retaining initiative at all levels ol' comm;tnd, mission orientated comhat. arid freedom ol' action for subordinates. Properly hnrnessing the concept ensures unity o f effort without micromanagement or overreaching control by superiors. Commanders emphasize "end state dcsircd" not "how to" and ensure junior leaders know the commander's intent and those o f liis superiors. Those closest to the action are

empowered to take decisive action. Since each level is executing the commander's clcarly stated
intcnt, all parts o f the force are working together. Rapid action results. "Captains arc to look to thcir particular Line as their rally-point. But, in case Signals can neither be seen or pcrfectly understood, no Captain can do very wrong if Iic places his Ship alongside that o f an Enemy."" This famous quotc fiom Admiral Lord Iloratio Nelson's 1803

hattlc nicmorandum was wriuen on his tlagship. t l M S Vicrory, prior to the Battle o f Trafalgar. This splendid quotc is rcprcscntative o f l l i e Meleeist spirit. 4 s Royal Navy tradition and experience developed in the late 1600s. two camps or schools o f thooght slowly emerged. The lirst school is sometimes referred to as the "Formalisl." 'l'his school relied heavily on doctrine and lighting instructions. During the 1704 Batlle o f Malga an Anglo-1)utch fleet achieved viclory with a well disciplined hattlc line. This school held that this was the key to victory.'"

Thc sccond school was the Melee school or "Meleeist." For the Meleeist doctrine was a crutch or shield to hidc bchind. Thcy fclt circumstanccs and opportunity should dictate action.

Commanders rcquired a firm grasp o f the basics, maneuver and tactics, but must be allowed
freedom o f action. "Thc mancuvcr-oricntated Melee doctrinc attracted some dashing English commanders who did not want to bc bound by rulc and had the skills to master the frccdom o f maneuver warfare."" The most noted Royal Navy Meleeist is Admiral Nelson. I l e was a charismatic leader and highly skilled tactician. A Mclccist, Admiral Nclson did not rely on doctrine, formal signals, and tight control during hattlc. He relied on personal contact with his commanders. Routinely and, specifically. prior to battle, he held meetings and dinners with his commanding officers. At these prebattle mectings. Admiral Nclson assembled his "Band o f Brothers" and "personally co~nrnunicatcd his perception o f the alternative courses the battle might take and the basic actions that wcrc cxpected o f each."'2 Admiral Nelson personally narncd his unconvcntional lcadcrship style "The Nelson Touch." Cieorgc M. Hall in 'l'hc Fifth Star: Hieh Command in an Era o f Global War highlights the Nelson touch in a discussion o f facets of leadership. The Nclson touch. he states, "describes a commander who predisposes his rcsourccs to favor a striking victory (the mechanics ofwar) and thcn inspircs his subordinates to act as if they were an cxtcnsion o f hinlsclf whilc still exercising their own initiative to deal with circumstanccs as need bc (leadcrship).""

Auf/raptakrik or "mission tactics" i s very similar to thc conccpt o f Mclcc and The
Nelson Touch. Alrfrrcrg.~faklik has been a guiding principle o f the German Army throughout thc 20th Century. The concept i s formally dctincd and can bc found in numerous works on warfare theory. I t is more gcncrally rccognizcd than Mclce. Like Melee it is a rather simple concept. I t involves empowering a subordinate by telling him the result or "end state" one wishes him to

obtain. I t is up to the subordinate to determine "how" and gct it done. Ordcrs specify output, not input. I n ordcr l o be effective this must hold truc at cvcry Icvcl, from general to fire tcam and individual soldier a ~ l d from admiral to commanding officers to tactical action ot'ticcrs to weapons console opcrators. '1'0 complctc the empowerment, every lcvcl must know the commander's intent and end state desired two lcvcls up." I n 1913, Vice-Admiral Sir David Dcatty, commander o f t h e Royal Navy's Grand Fleet battlc cruiscrs in thc North Sea stated, ";~lthough time aficr timc I liavc impressed . . . the ricccssity o f always using.

. . initiative and discretion--that m y ordcrs arc expressions o f

intentions and thcy arc nor to bc obcyed too literally. The Man on the Spot i s thc only one who
can judge certain situations."" I l l i s dcmonstratcs that tllc spirit o f Admiral Nelson and thc Nclson touch still influenced the Royal Navy. Yet, it is notcworthy that this statement is found in Admiral Bcatty's critique o f his failure to decisively engage an isolatcd German Imperial Navy cruiscr forcc at Scarborough: "We were within an ace o f bringing about the complete destruction o f t h e Enemy Cruiser Force--and failed." Wliilc Admiral Bcatty was an adherent to Mclcc and the Nelson Touch, he demonstrates how difficult it is to cxccute. 'l'lic main cause o f t h e Royal Navy's h i l u r c at Scarborough was one o f Admiral Rcatty's

subordinates. Commodore William Goodenough, cornniandcr o f Admiral Beatty's light cruiser

screen. Cornmodorc tioodcnoogh broke contact with enemy light cruisers wllcn Admiral Beatty ordcrcd a change in disposition o f his screening forccs. Admiral Bcauy was unaware that Conimodorc Cioodcnough was in contact with three enemy light cruisers. If Commodore Cioodcnough had instcad "kccp in touch with [remained engaged] and rcportcd the presence o f thc Encmy Cruisers," Admiral Deatty would liavc turncd l o support his light cruiser screening force and cut down: with ovcnvhclrning superiority, a German lmpcrial Navy light cruiser and hatlle cruiser force. As i t was: by thc timc Atlmir:d Beatty \\.as informed o f the engagement and

numher of enemy cruiscrs he had movcd thc forcc too far to the wcst and, despite giving chase. was unable to overtake the enemy.

I n his report Admiral Ucatty focuses on one of the principal solutions for achieving
Ar!firc~g.stcrktik;~nd the Nelson Touch. "If I had only had the L.C. Squad'n [Light Cruiscr lie Squadron] i n peace 1 would haw guaranteed those mistakes w'd [would] not have o~currcd,"~' states. Training and contact between juniors and superiors is critical. Commanders must clcarly outline expectations and intent. How-tos nlust be avoided. and juniors allomcd frcedom of action. The principles of Melee and Aujirug.staktik must be taught at every lcvcl and by every cornmandcr. Howcvcr, Admiral Hcatty docs not discuss a second key point. Many commanders fear they will lose control. 'l'liis is not a by-product of these concepts. Clcarly, Nelson, Patton, and Kommel and other students of Melee and Atrj,ragstaktik did not lose control. Ilence, the key for commandcrs is they must execute control through the crctions ofsuhordinrrtes vice execution ofconlrol through their own ucrcrions. Control is executed hy outlining expectutions, inlenr uncl crrdstute vicc micronrrmsrcr~ing rrnd telling hoiv-lo. This is not easy; it is hard. I t requires dynamic leadership: building trust. and hard work. While Mclcc, the Nelson touch, and Aufrrtrgstsrcrktikarc corc bcliefs for maneuver warfarc, tlicsc concepts arc not limited to maneuver warfare. This concept can be applied--and should he applied--to all types and levels of warfarc. NDI' I rccognizcs this important distinction. NDP 1 adopts thc term "commander's inteli't" to describe Melee. the Nclson touch, and Alrfiragslaktik. '1'11~concept is highlighted in NDP 1's delinition of maneuver warfarc: "cmphasizcs the nccd to give the commander freedom ofaction"" However, cornrnandcr's intent is not ticd cxclt~sivcly to maneuver warfare. I t is described in detail later in the publication's discussion of "The Conduct or War." NDI' Iconcept of Commander's Intent is true to Melee. the Nelson Touch and A~frrrrpruktik. NDI' I , states, cornmandcr's intcnt "rcflecls his vision

and conveys his thinking through mission-type orders, in which subordinates are encouraged to exercise initiative and are givcn thc frccdonl to act independently."'x

llctinition of Maneuver Warfare While there are core heliefs for mancuvcr warfare theory, like any philosophy it is suh,ject to intcrprctation. Some interpretations are highly sclcctivc, others overarcliing. Thc delinition provided bclow is found in NDP 1. This definition was sclccted for several rcasons. I:irst, it is a standard delinition presenting generally acccptcd concepts of maneuver warfare. I t is not highly sclcctivc or ovcrarching. Secondly, it is cstablishcd I1.S. Navy doctrine. This is a statement hy the U S .Navy of how it wants lo fight. Furthermore, it promulgates a common languagc for articulating and critically analyzing naval doctrinc. Naval forces also have used the prcfcrablc and more effective--albeit rnorc difficult to master--tighting stylc known as maneuver warfare. Closely associated with the writings of Sun f z u and used hy tlic grcat practitioners ofexpeditionary, naval: and land warfare, mancuvcr warfare is aphiIo.w~phy.rather than a formula-an approach, rather than rccipc. l i k e attrition warfarc, it has long served common doctrine for naval forccs. It emphasizes c~f ocrion to den1 with spccific situations. Maneuver the nced to give rhe commcmdf;rfri~edon~ Wartirc is further characterized by adaptability and is not limitcd to a particular cnvironmcnt. Tliough enhanced hy a variety of tcchnologics, it is not dependent upon any of them. Maneuver warfarc cmphasizcs the irrcliri,cr cpproach--not mcrcly in terms of mobility and spatial rnovcmcnt, but also in terms oftime and our ability to take action before thc enemy can countcr us. Maneuver warfare requires us to projcct combat power. lJnlikc attrition warfare, howcvcr, this powcr is focused o n key enemy wcakncss and vulnerahilitics that allow us to strike the source of his powcr--the key to his existence andstrcngth as a military thrcat [author's italic~j.'~

'fhc NDP 1's definition oTmaneuver warfare puts forth five main points that address the core conccpts of mm~cuvcr warrare (italicized above): ( I ) philosophy. (2) commander must rctain lieedom of action, (3) adaptability, (4) indirect approach, and (5) focw power on key wcakncsscs and vulnerabilities. These central thcmcs, critical to understanding U.S. Navy rnancuwr warfare theory and practice, warrant rurther explanation.

The first point squarely accepts maneuver warfare theory as a philosophy. NDP 1 is true to thc definition throughout t l ~ c publication. It ncver attempts to codify maneuver warfare or provide rigid routines. Tlic publication lays out broad ideas a ~ concepts. ~ d The second point, the idea that the commander must retain freedom of action is true to the idea of Melee and Aufrtagstaktik. Discussed in the preceding section, these ideas center on mission ordcrs and initiative-keeping it and allowing juniors to exercise it. 'flic third point pronounces that mancuvcr wrfarc is vcry adaptablc. This is quite true; rnancuvcr warfarc can bc applied to a variety of situations. However, here it is as important to undcrstantl what tlic dcfinition says as wliat it docs riot say. Yes, maneuver warfarc is adaptablc to mmny situations. I lowcvcr. it is not adaptablc to ull situations. This thcsis will illuminate this point several times. The foul-th point embodies the second theme or expanded theme of maneuver warfare carlicr in this chnptcr. Mancuvcr warfarc looks for indircct ways, bcyond mass and movcmcnt. to dcstroy an cncmy's cohesion. Thc tifth point rccognizcs how this indircct approach is achicvcd, primarily, through exploiting the balance between strcngths. weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

'Wayne P. Iloghcs, "Comments Section." 1J.S. Naval lnstitutc Procectlincs, 122 (March 1996): 17. 'Edward H. Atkcson, "Maneuvering Past Maneuver Warfare," I!.S. Naval lnstitutc I'roccedinas. 122 (January 1996): 33-35. 'I!.S. Navy, NDP I, Naval Warfarc (Washington, DC: U S . Govcrnmcnt Printing Office, 28 Marc11 1904), 33.

'Sun 'l'zu, 'l'he Art of War, trans. Samuel U. Griftith @ew York, NY: Oxford llnivcrsity I'ress, 1963). 1 12. "Uernard Brodie: A Lawnan's Guide to Naval Strate= (London, 1J.K.: Oxford University Prcss, 1943): x.

'James Tritten, 'Mancuvcr' or ilf(~nocuvre Warfsre For the U.S. Navv?" Technical Report (Norfolk, VA: Naval Doctrine Command, July 1995). 7. XJohnI.. Konijue, American Armv Doctrine for [he Post-Cold War (Fort Monroe, VA: U S . Army Training and Doctrine Command. 1997). 16. YR.A.II.Applcgatc and J. Moore. "Warfare--an Option of Difficulties, An Examination oT1:orms of War and the Impact of Military Culture," RUSl Journal (Autumn 1990): 13. 'UWilliamA. Owens, I linh Seas: The Naval Passaac to an Uncharted World (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995). 5. "Owens, 4. "James Tritten; Naval Doctrinc ...From the Sea Technical Report (Norfolk. \'A: Naval Doctrinc Command. Dccenibcr 1994), 3.

"NWSA 1404 Navy Wirc Scrvicc, ''4DM Arleigh "3 I-knot" Rurkc Ilics" (Navy Public Affairs Library, 2 January 1996), available from l~ttp:/lw\r~w.cliinl'o.navy.~nil/nav.palib!people/ cno/burkobit.txt: intcrnct. '"Carl von Clausewilz. On(Princeton, NJ: I'rinccton U~liversily Press, 1976), 75-79. "Antoinc-Hcnri .lomini, Thc Art of War (Philadelphia, PA: 1862 and rcprinled Westport, CT: 1966). 12. "Alfred Thayer Mahall, 1:rom Sail to Stcam: Recollections of Naval Lifc (London and New York, 1907). 283. "Frank Uhlig. How Navies Fiaht. 'l'lic IJ.S. Navv and its Allies (Annapolis. MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994). 205-207.

"Alfred 'l'haycr Malian. Interest of America in Sca Powcr. Present and Future (Boston, MA: 1897): 180. "NDP I . 32 "Joseph A. Cintluso. "Set and Dritt: Warfare Theory," Naval War Collcnc Review, XLlX (Autumn 1996): 115. 2'William S. Lind. Maneuver Warfarc llantlbook (Boulder, CO: Westvicw Press, 1985), 7.

m.(Novato, C A : Prcsidio I'rcss,

'Sllobert Leonard, The Art o r Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theorv and A i r l m d 1991): 2 i .

'"Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theow and Practice (Annapolis, M D : U.S. Naval Institute Press, 11)86), 45. "Hughes, Fleet Tactics. 20.

?qJ. J. Tritten, Maneuver or Manouvre Warfare for the U.S. Navv? (Norfolk, V A : Naval Doctrinc Comn~and Technical Rcpon, July 1995). O f note, to fully capture naval maneuvcr warfare's uniqucncss, Jamcs l'rittcn proposed in "Maneuver or Manoeuvre Warfare for thc U S . Navy," that thc U.S. Navy adopt thc English and French spelling o f maneuver: manoeuvrc. Trittcn fclt this would highlight that maneuver warhre is more than movement and distinguish its uniqucncss from land mancuvcr warfare. Also, this spelling would recognize Admiral Kaul Castcx's contribulion to naval mancuvcr warfare theory. Naval Doctrine Command rejected his proposal and optcd for thc common spclling for N D P I,Naval Warfare; and U.S. Navy doctrine. (Recognizing that one o f the chief purposes and advantages o f doctrine is establishing a common vocabulary, h i s thesis w i l l defer to doctrine vice academia.)
'"Bernard 1). Claxton, John M. Gurtclicff, and Jcffcry J. I'ollcs, 'l'rafalrar and Jutland: A
Studv in the Princinle o r War (Montgomery, AL: Maxwell Air Force Base, Air Comand and Staff Collcgc, 1985), 77.
I". J. 'l'ritten: Doctrinc and Flcct Tactics i n thc Koval Navy (Norfolk. VA: Naval Doctrine Command Technical k p o r t . November 1994), 4.

"lhid.. IS. ';George M. Ilall, The (Westport, : I'racgcr I'ublishers. 1994). 16 1. (Novato, CA: I'rcsidio

"Richard D. Ilooker, Jr., Maneuver Warfare An Antholo=, Press. 1993). l I.

"Arthur J. hlardcr, From the D~w~dnou.-ht to Scam Flow. Volume 11. The War Years: To the Eve ofJutland (London: Oxford [Jniversity Press, 1965), 143. "'Mardcr. 143. W D P 1.33. ''h'DP 1, 38.

'"1)P

1,33.

CHAI'TEK TWO I.ITEKATUKE REVIEW

Introduction Many books, articles and professional works have been devoted to the study, history and application of maneuver warfare. I-lowever. most of these works approach nianeuvcr warfare from an airlland battle or amphibious warfarc perspective. Naval Doctrinc I'ublication (NDP)I , Naval Warfarc brought the concept of naval maneuvcr warfare to the forefront. and exposed the limited writing available on thc subject. Sincc its publication in 1994, the professional community has rcspondcd wit11 numcrous works addressing naval maneuver warfare. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedin~s and Naval Doctrine Command have precipitated a lively debate on the topic, including puhlishing articles and works on the suhjcct. Many of these works arc discussed in the following paragraphs. Also discussed helow are the most noteworthy works that contributed to this thesis. A full hihliography is provided at the end of the thesis.

Books
Admiral Kaoul Castex's classic study of naval warfarc, Stratwic 'Sheorics, lirst published in the 1930s has ncvcr bccn fully translated into English. Tlic Naval Institute Press's English translation offers a large portion of the work. A French Navy admiral, Castex builds on the concepts and ideas of the great naval theorists. Furthermore: he ofl'ers the tirst major work that specilically addresses naval maneuver warpare. This work is an indispensable companion to Alfrcd 'l'haycr Mahan and Julian Corbctt.

27

Admiral Chscppc Fioravanzo's Naval Tactical Thounht, providcs a concisc, lively study of the history of naval strategy and tactics from the age of oar to the nuclear age. An Italian Navy admiral, his insights into thc failurcs ofthe Italian Navy in the Mediterranean and U.S. success in the Pacific are refreshing. Colin S. Gray's and Kohert W. Harnctt's work Seanower arid Stratefly is an anthology. 'l'hc book's tcmpcrament truly reflects the Cold War. Reading the hook returns a chill that has been too quickly forgotten since the demise of the Soviet Union. The tirst chaptcr "Scapower and Landpowcr." writtcn by Colin S. Gray, prcscnts a broad picturc of the differences between scapowcr and landpowcr. l'hc book docs not address how advancing technology will change or blur the distinction between seapower, landpower and airpower. Most ofthe hook dcals with seapower's contribution to strategy. Gcneral John K.Galvin's work Mancovcr Warfarc: An Antholony invitcs some of

America's lincst minds to cxplorc thc idca ofmancuvcr bascd warfarc. Thc book presents
radical and opposing views on maneuver warfare. David A. (irossman's contribution, "Defeating thc Enemy's Will: l'hc Psychological Foundations of Mancuvcr Warfare" is superb and

applicable to all warfare thcorics. Thc book is land warfare focused and does not address naval
warfarc or naval mancuvcr warl'arc. It is an cxccllent sourcc for background inrormation and analysis of maneuver warfare theory. Captain Wayne I lughes' comprehensive study Fleet Tactics Theorv and Practice is the most recent book available on naval tactics. As the title suggests, the book concentrates on tactics. The hook lays a foundation with a historical review and some extensive analysis of World War 11 naval battlcs and tactics. Hughcs' dcvclops a list of tactical constants and applies them to the present (publishcd 1986). Outside some vague references, Capt. I lughes does not address or definc naval maneuver warlgrc.

Thc first half o f Robert Leonard's scholarly study, The Art ofManeu\er: i s dedicated to tlic evolution and theory o f maneuver warfare. This book provides excellent introductio~~ material and background into maneuver warfare theory. Again, it is strictly land orientated. Basil Liddell Hart's concise, masterful history o f World War I, 'i'hc Kcal War 1914-1918, contains an excellent study ofthe Battle o f Jutland and the difference between naval and land warfare (pages 27 1-295). William S. Lind's mark Maneuver Warli~re I-landbook is an early contribution to thc maneuvcr warfare debate within the American military. I'ublislicd in 1985, hc clearly develops and cxplains tlic thcory o f rnaneuvcr warfare. He dcvotcs considcrablc spacc to cxplaining and applying thc Boyd dccision making modcl, (tlic OODA Loop: Obsewc, Oricnt, Decide. Act) to maneuver warfare. While he lills out his delinition o f maneuver warfare with other kcy points, they are overshadowed by his emphasis o f the OODA Loop. I l i s discussions apply directly to ground comhat, and naval maneuver warfare is not addressed Alfred Tliayer Malian's most recognized works are The Influence o f Sea Power on I-listow. 1660-1783 and The lntluence o f Sea I'ower unon the French Revolution and 1'1noirc. 1793- 1812. Masterful works. tlicy oftcn ovcrshudow much o f his later writings. Two later works. lntcrcst o f Amcrica in Sca Powcr and 1:rom Sail to Stcam: Rccollcctions ofNaval Life. are more theoretical and project into the futurc. Also, they bcnefit from additional ycars ol'study and research. Arthur J. Mardcr's dctinitivc naval history o f World War I ,From tlic Dreadnounht to Scana Flow fills scvcn volu~iics.'llic work is outstanding; very detailed and authoritative. Volumc 11. 'l'hc War Years: '1'0 the Eve o f Jutland providcd additional dctnil on the struggle between the Royal Navy and Imperial Navy in thc North Sca. 'l'his volumc supported many o f Admiral llauol Castcx's conclusions in Stratenic Theories. (Castex uses the North Sca during

World War 1 as a casc s t u d for his maneuver thcorics.) The outstanding work is cxtremely uscfd when conducting rescarch on naval warfare during World War I. Samocl Eliot Morison, a llarvard history professor: was commissioncd a Lieutenant Commander in early 1942 with thc assignment to writc a naval history o f World War I 1 from the inside looking out. The product o f his endeavor was a scvcn volume work titled, Historv o f llnitcd States Naval Ouerations in World War 11. Volume I. Battle ol'the Atlantic and Volume II. The Strucldc for Ciuadalcanal provided excellent background information. Admiral William A. Owens" informstivc book Hinh Sea: The 'aval I'assarrc to an

IJnchartcd World is truc to thc title. Published in 1994; hc sets thc stage with a discussion o f the Cold War and the intlucncc o f the Gulf War on the U.S. Navy and naval doctrine. Admiral Owcns' outlines the new dynamics and chaIIcngcs facing today's navy. Also, thc book proposes solutions and recommends a coursc for thc future. Vice Chairman o f thc Joint Chiefs o f Staff in 11ie early nineties, he offers a highly qualified and unique perspective. Peter Parct's anthology Makers o f Modern Strater?\ from Machiavclli to the Nuclear Aclc provides a diversity o f themes and broad pcrspcctive. The chapter on Alfred fhaycr blahan.

"Alfred Thayer Mahan: Tlic Naval Historian, " by Philip A Crowl, was particdarly helpfi~l. C h w l concisely captures Mahan's essence and contribution to naval warfare.
. Tl~c U.S. Navv and Its Allies, i s ccntcrcd around I'rank Uhlig's work, Ilow Navies Fielit:

the U.S. Navy.

It combines

a historical rccortl within critical analysis. This book is an excellcnt

source for background and as an overview o f U S . Navy operations, does not dircctly discuss warfarc theories.

Service M a r i ~ ~ a and l s Publications Field Manual (FM) 100-5 O~crations,Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1 Warfiehting, Naval Doctrinc Publication (NIP I) , Naval Warfarc, and Naval Warfarc Publication-(NWP) 3-20, Surhcc Warfare Tactics give simplc, broad definitions o f maneuver warfare, attrition warfare and conccpts and principles o f war. 'l'hcir definitions o f mancuvcr and attrition warfare are compatihlc. Disturbingly, their definitions: conccpts and principles do not always mesh. NI)P 1. Naval Warfare i s superb. Well writtcn and w r y concise it captures thc cssence o f naval warfighting in short order. Most o f the work is applicable to all warfare, not only naval

warhrc. The section "The Conduct o f War," presents ideas very clearly." N D P I is an excellent primer ibr study o f naval warfare and warfarc in general. I t avoids jargon and its message is cffcctivcly complemented by short historical vigncttcs. Naval Warfare Publication (NWI') -3-20, Surface Warfire Tactics is classified CONFIL)ENl'IAL. Definitions and principles o f war portions ofthe publication arc UNCLASSIFIED.
is a dcfinitivc resource for IJ.S. Military Joint Pub 3-0: Ihctrinc for Joint O~erations

doctrine. terms and dcfinitions. Again, i t does not always agrcc with other service publications. Ilowever, it has the advantage o f bcing the linsl say when it comcs to how the IJ.S. Military conducts business.

/\rticles
Major K.A.D. Applcfntc's and J. R. Moore's informative article, "Warfare--an Option o f I~iftic~~ltic offers s , ' concise definitions o f forms o f warfarc. They do not restrict thcrnselves to

gcncrally accepted categories and proposc somc interesting arguments. l'hcir discussion o f

evolution o f military culture and conclusions are unique and refreshing.

General Edwin Atkinson's articlc, "Maneuvering Past Maneuver Warfare," is vcry t h o ~ g h provoking. t He questions thc U.S. Navy's emhrace o f maneuver warfare theory. Hc fcels that the U S . Navy's exuberance w i l l be tempered with reality, a better understanding o f the true delinition o f maneuver warfarc and an appreciation o f i t s limitations. Gcncral William E. DePuy's article, "Infantry Combat," is an edited version o f a speech hc gave to the U.S. Army Infantry Ofticcr Advance Course in October 1989. The speech is centered around thc i~nportancc o f freedom o f mancuvcr. He w r y clearly discusses how frecdom o f mancuver is critically important and an earned right that mus1 he wrestlcd from the cncmy. The speech also provides kecn insight into US. military culture through oul this century. Captain Wayne Hugl~es. IJSN, gives n powerful defense o f attrition warfare in the "Commcntary and Discussion" section o f l'roceedings. This short letter is a rcsponse to General Atkinsods articlc discussed above. In this lettcr Captain Hughcs s~~pports General Atkinson's assertions and clcarly illustrates that attrition warfare cannot always be avoided.

Unouhlished Dissertations. 'l'hcsis and I'a~crs Dr. James i'ritten has bccn w r y prolilic and produced many outstanding works on naval warfare and naval rnancuvcr warfxe. Many o f his works havc bccn developed for Naval Doctrine Command. His inside seat and naval maneuver warfarc perspective have heen particularly helpful. "Manouevre Warfarc a1 Sca" provides excellent background and depth into the conccpt o f naval maneuver warfare. "Is Naval Warfare IJnique" and "Doctrine and Fleet Tactics in thc Royal Navy" also provided n wcalth o f information.

Timothy 1:isher and Matthcw Kohler explore naval mancuvcr warfarc from an operational and strategic view. Thcir rcspcctive works, "Maneuver: Where Docs it Fit in Operational Art" and "Maneuver by the U.S. Navy in thc 20th Century Blue-Water Operations: Selected Historical Examples" provided background information and bibliographic sourccs. Contributing to thc dcvcloping concept of naval maneuver warfarc, they highlight how mancuvcr warfarc concepts and theory k ~ l d into the strategic and opcrational level of naval warfarc.

C H A l Y f E K THREE KESEAKCH DESIGN

The first step in the construction o f a ship is laying thc kccl. Onen accompanied by pomp and circumstancc i t i s tlic birth o f a ship. Rising from tlie keel are framcs. Along with the kccl, tlic frames form the skclcton o f the ship. Decks, platforms, superstructure and equipment rely on the kccl and frames for strength and support. This skclcton dictates the shape, beam, s i x , ctc, o f tlic ship. A ship's kccl and franc arc influcnccd by many factors including thc typc o f material. Mine sweeper's, for example, in tlie past were limited to all wood construction. Wood introduced certain limitations. Today mine sweepers use glass reinforccd plastic (GRP) nlong with wood. 'l'his cliangc o f matcrial has influenced a wliole new generation o f minc sweepers. Similarly: the newest destroyers are constructed with high gradc (HY 80) steel. Again. this matcrial influcnccs tlic final design and outcome o f a destroyer. lnflucnccs arc no1 limited to matcrial, another factor which influenced frames was the shift from rivets to welding when working with steel. Numerous othcr cxamplcs o f influerices on keel and kame design and outcome are available. Considcr naval tactics as a ship. Foundations o f naval tactics make up the kccl and frame o f this ship. If maneuver warfire tlieory influcnccs thc foundations o f naval tactics, our keel and frames, then maneuver warfare w i l l influcncc our ship dcsign and naval tactics in battle. 'l'his analogy is tlic hnsis for m y rcscnrch design or method. B y exploring thc foundations o f naval tactics. and seeing if maneuver warfare affects tlicsc foundations, this work w i l l dctcrminc

if maneuvcr warfarc tlieory influcnccs naval tactics and battle. 1:wthcrmorc. this model w i l l

34

illuminate where maneuver warfarc concepts inlluence naval tactics and to what extent. Converscly. it may also show where maneuver warfarc thcory docs not influence naval tactics and battle. Chapter One, Introduction. establislics tlic key delinitions in support of tlic research qucstion and research design. It also builds ncccssary background. The literature and resources which contributcd to this thcsi5 arc rcviewed in Chapter Two, 1.itcraturc Rcview. Only the most significant sourccs are highlighted. All sourccs, of coursc, arc listed in the bihliography. Chapter Four, War at Sea and Naval I'actics, will look at land warfare. air iizrfare and naval warfarc. Military culture, the focus ofeach service and differences between war at sea and war on land will be explored. This will provide insight into tlic realities oTU.S. Army, U S . Navy, U S . Marine Corps, and I!.% Air Force culturc and highlight the uniqueness of naval warfarc. Oftcn ignored by warfare theory, it is important to undcrstand these differences. Naval warfarc is very distinct and cannot be studied from a strictly land warlare point of vicw. Tlic sccontl lialfof Chapter Four will be dcvotcd to thc construction of the keel and framcs or foundations of naval tactics. Predominately. the foundations of naval tactics will bc developcd from Hughcs' Flcet Tactics: Fioranzo's Naval 'Tactical Tliounht and NWP 3-20 Surface S h i Tactics. ~ A consensus will bc dcvcloped from these works. Cliaptcr Five, Application of Naval Mancuvcr Warfarc. will explore if mancuvcr warfare thcory influences some of these foundations. This analysis will determine if niancuvcr warfare theory influcnccs naval tactics. where and to what cxtcnt. In cxploririg the foundations of tactics, this thcsis will look for historical examples that support this work's analysis. In somc cases, a discussion of contcmporary naval doctrine and tactics may best illuminate how rnancuver warfarc tlicory inlluences the principlc.

My linal chaptcr, Chapter Six. Conclusions and Kecornmcndations, will statc the
conclusions and discoveries that crncrge from an analysis ofthe research evidence. IXrcct conclusions and interpretations will be provided. Also. some indirect conclusions: building on research evidence, will be explored. Furthermore, rccornrnendations for application of the research and further research questions will be included in this chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR W A R AT SEA A N D N A V A L TACTICS

Introduction "Perhaps one explanation . . . \\.as that the admirals cxcrciscd thcir command i n the forefront o f the battle and generals from headquarters far in the rcar. were as ready to risk their owti livcs as thcir mcn's,

. . . [while]

some generals

. . . othcrs undoubtly gained moral couragc

through physical rcnioteness.'" Liddell Hart expressed this thought in his concise, masterfi~l study o f World War I,The Kcnl War 1914-1918. Hc was looking for solutions, reasons for the g u l f he observed betwccn thc conduct o f war hy the generals and the admirals. Major sea battles were few during thc war. Yct, on land, World War I saw great carnage and waste. The conduct o f the gcncrals was marred by foolish initiatives and unsound offensives. Admirals and generals

displayed a fimdamental difference in the execution d t h c war. Admirals would not initiate
bnttlc unlcss tlicy had reasonably determined an initial advantage. On the other hand, generals were typically ready to takc thc offcnsivc rcgardlcss o f tlic di~advantagcs.~ The diffcrcncc i n thc execution o f t h e war by thc admirals and gcncrals can bc largely attributed to diffcrcnccs in military culture among thc scrviccs, thc uniquc naturc o f sca. air and land warfare and thc practice and approach to the art o f warfighting by each service. These observations are not limited to World War I. Military culture, the unique nature o f sea, land, and air warfare, and the practice and approach to thc art o f warfighting significantly impact thc interpretation and practice o f warfighting theory. Appreciating these issues is important to understanding why and how each service tights. With respect to mancuvcr warfare,

37

it is critical. Mancuver warlbre theory is typically cast with rcspect to land warlare. Its lcxicon

retlects land warfarc. Naval maneuver warfare. while based on thc samc core ideas, is significantly different than land maneuver warhre. Thc first half of this chapter will address thcsc issucs. military culture. each service's focus and the differences between war at sca and war on land will be investigated. This study is necessary to set the stage for dcvcloping the foundations of naval tactics and exploring if lnancuver warfare influences naval tactics. I'articularly, sincc warfare theories are typically

discussed from a land perspective it is important to dcvclop a sca perspective.

Militarv Culture Thc scopc of this thesis precludes a detailed investigation of diffcrcnces in military culture. However: it is important to apprcciatc that thcrc arc truc, justilied differences in military culture. Aspects of military culture directly influcncc hob\ "thc military" thinks and its mark can bc seen on doctrine. Some military culture is hound in tradition and custom and, perhaps, parochial and out oflouch. Most is a result of the uniqucrlcss and diffcrcnt missions and roles of each scrvicc. A fcw cxamplcs will serve to illustrate military culture. Execution of leadership is diffcrcnt in each service. It is not a result of tradition or custom but, hard fact. retlecting the diffcrcnt rolcs and missions of each service. In thc U.S. Air Forcc, the officers. the best and brightest, go off to light in combat. Today's 1J.S. Air Forcc tightcrs and hombcrs arc manned exclusively hy oflicers. Thc ofticcrs go into battle, not the airmen. crcw chick or maintcnancc men. The enlisted bury the officers. Also, inotivating airmen has a different scnsc of urgcncy. Airmen are not motivated to go into hattlc but, support in the rear. In the Army, hattlc is thc purvicw, primarily, ofjunior officers and cnlistcd soldiers. Senior and mid-gradc ofliccrs are frequently hehind the main cngagcment area. 1.eadership now

dcmands motivating junior oflicers and soldiers to light, defend and; at times, charge into the enemy. Modern technology and an extensive logistics tail, at times, blur tlie distinction bctwccn front lincs and thc rcar. 'fhc rlatltrc o f lcadcrship at sea is once again different. Everyone on the ship sliarcs thc samc fatc. 'fhc admiral, tlic captain, tlie quartermaster, the cook and tlie engineman are exposed equally to the hattle. I n a battlc group thcrc i s no rcar; a hit on a ship docs not distinguish who's who. Clcarly, tlicsc diffcrcnt circumstmccs influence leadership stylcs and dcsircd traits i n cach scrvicc. The driving factor is not tradition or parochialism; these arc hard rcalitics that arc a dircct result o f thc naturc and uniqucncss o f cach form o f warfare. Command orfers another window into military culture. I n the U.S. Army, ofticers take command as junior ofticers. Opportunity for command continues as they progrcss through thc ranks. Yet, at each level they are mder close supervision and scrutiny o f superiors and pcers. Almost instant fccdback and dircction is available from superiors. Frequently, superiors are only
a tent away or a short vehicle ride. Command in the [J.S. Navy is very different. l l i e r c arc vcry

fcw junior officcr commands. Outside thcsc minor cxccptions, command falls on scnior leaders. With command at sea the Captain dominates tlie scene. I-le is directly responsible for everything that occurs on the ship a soveign piece of1J.S. territory. I-lis oversight by superiors is w r y indirect compared to the IJ.S. Army. I k n today it is common to go days or wccks and in some cascs monllis without facc-to-face contact with superiors. Modern radio and satellite communications liavc rcduccd thc isolation o f battlc group commanders and ship commanding officers. Yet, physical separation and tlie limits o f these systems ensure that thc CO rctains control in routinc mattcrs. I;~~rtllcrmorc, during high tcmpo operations or crisis these systems quickly become saturated and only the most r i t i c a l communications are permittcd. Command at sca cntails lots o f independence. The U.S. A i r Force also offers limited command opportunity Ibr junior officers. I'urthermore, U.S. A i r I'orcc com~nandcrs arc typically in close proximity

and in dircct contact with superiors. As a rcsult, U.S. Army, U S . Navy and U.S. Air Forcc ofticcrs have different approaches to command. Again, these are not artilicial differences; thcy arc hard rcalitics. Ixadcrship and command arc only two cxamplcs. The naturc of opcrations--fixed,

objective oricntatcd for thc U.S. Army, prcscncc, mobilc orientated For thc U S . Air Forcc and
1J.S. Navy; thc nature ofthe rear; and the comhat arms or fighters vs non-combat arms or support pcrsonncl in cach scrvicc are other examples. All these issues, and, many more. impact thc way scrviccs think and act. Military culture is rcal, unavoidable (to a large extent) and must bc understood or at least acknowleged. I t offers a valuable window into the actions and thought process of each service. Focus and Exccution of Art of Wartixhting Liddell Ilart's observation of gcncrals in thc rcar and admirals in the van and thc thick of battlc Icads somc to hypotlicsis that gcncrals would focus o n strategy, while admirals would focus on tactics. Liddcll Hart concludes. "Actually, the reverse occurred." He continues and explains: "the paradox would seem to lie in (lie different expericncc of peace training, wherein the soldier serves in small garrisons and exercises in crampcd arcas. whilc thc sailor traverses the wide oceans and learns navigation as the staple orhis craft. For him, geography precedes gunnery."' This is more evident today than in 1914. The company frontage of an infantry or tank company has increased dramatically since World War I. Where once the Army could

place a division in a training arca, today thc largest 1I.S. Army training area is barely large cnough for a brigade (plus) sizcd unit. By comparison, the vast occan scrvcs as a training area that swallows up a battlc group. Evcry six months. on cach coast, thc US. Navy conducts a Joint Training Excrcisc (.l'l'X). 'l'hcse exerciscs involvc at lcast two carricr battlc groups (CVBGs) and
an amphibious ready group (ARG), plus an assortment of other ships and aircraft. On the west

coast, thcy may stretch from Mexico's Baja Peninsula to the Straits o f Juan dc Fuca and the Canadian horder. In Militarv Stratew, Rear Admiral J. C. Wylic cxpounds on this idea: Whcrc thc sailor or airman thinks in tcrms o f an cntire world, the soldicr at work thinks in terms oftheaters, in terms ofcampaigns, in terms ofbattles. And the three concepts are not too markedly different from each other. Where the sailor and the airman are almost forced, by the nature o f the sea and the air, to think in terms o f a total world or, at the least: to look outside the physical limits o f their inimcdiatc concerns, the soldicr is almost hcrnmcd in by his terrainJ I.I.S. Navy, U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force ofticers approach their art o f wartighting ditlicrcntly. I x k o f mobility and geographic considerations keep soldiers looking at thcir fcct. They tend to think in terms of~ucrics orpc.rhmps operurionol url. Due to their inherent mobility and vast geographic footprint. sailor and airman think big. Srrorqic or/ is thcir focus. Gray sums up, "...tlicy [sailors and soldiers] wagc different, if complementary, forms o f war and, as ofien as not their practitioners h a w diffcrcnt pcrspcctivcs on the conduct o f \var."'

Sea Powers' Bond to the Land

"Everything, and wc mcan cvcrything is sccondary to the infantryman."& While these

words arc proclaimed by many gcncrals and military historians, the author hcrc is an Italian Navy officer, Admiral Ciiuscppc Fioravanzo. Hc exclaimed these words in his lively work,

Ilistorv ofNaval Tactical Thounht. His thoughts arc shadowcd hy an American naval historian and theorist: Captain Waync Ilughcs. I-lc slatcs, very succinctly~ "Thc scat o f purposc is on thc land."' In his chapter "The Sca Vcrsus thc Land," Admiral Kaoul Castcx, o f thc Frcnch Navy. rcjoins, "Sca powcr i s valuablc only to the extent that it contributes to victory onland. . . . "' 'These words arc also echoed by Corbctt." A l l thcsc thcorists tic sca warfarc to land warfarc,

specifically to objcctivcs ashore. Great naval theorists are not jumping ship and running to thc

I1.S. Army's camp. They recognize n natural prccmincncc. Namely, as long as man lives on
land, the ibcus and purpose o f war at sea w i l l be land. The roots o f how sea power supports land power is evident in a basic comparison o f sea power and land powcr. I n his discussions on seapower and landpower, Colin Gray cautions that thc diffcrencc b e t w c n land warfare and sea warfarc can be exaggerated. Howcver, he still allows,
'I.

. . it is true to claim that armics most often havc occupation (or possession) goals,

while navies have use or denial-use goal^."^" 'l'lie basic goal of sea warfare and land warfarc is different. Through the conquest o f territory, armies apply pressure directly on tlle enemy to achieve unconditional surrender or conditional peace. Besides being an avenue to victory, conquest or occupation o f land (unlike oceans) has an " . . . absolute value in its own right."" Ownership or occupation gives tlle right to administer laws and regulations over populations. With ownership people are controlled and opponents can be neutralized or destroyed.12 Invasion; conquest and occupation (or at times, a credible threat o f invasion) produce absolute value. As discussed below, occans havc an indirect value in relation to land: they do not havc valuc i n and o f thcmsclvcs. Gray notcs that the German occupation o f 13elgium and Northern France throughout thc First World War had the consequence o f compelling the Allies to ". . . assume the tactical offensive in h a t region, virlually rcg;~rdlcssof broader strategic considcrations."" Similar parallels can be drawn with tlie Iraqi occupation o f Kuwait in 1990. "In contrast to the land. the sca is a mcdium for movcmcnt. I t cannot be occupied and lixtilied. Navies cannot 'dig in' at sea, or s e i ~ e and hold ocean areas that have great intrinsic value."" War at sea is fought over sea lincs o f communication ( S I L K S ) and immediate access

to land. The goal is to use the sea to one's own advantage. While, at tlie same time, denying the use o f thc sea to the enemy. Sea warfare and control o f thc oceans do not directly produce absolute value. Control o f an ocean or sea lane o f communication (SI.OC) is only valuable to

thc cxlcnl i t inlluences land operations. This indirect relationship i s horn o f man living on land and using the sea as a medium. Sea warfarc or sea power is a means to an objective ashore. Sea warfare ultiniatcly only suppofls land warfiirc. 'l'his does not nican sca power i s not instrurncntal. Whcn the war's objectives are a conditional pcacc or limited ob.jectives. sea powcr may bc thc means to that end. Naval and A i r Force air strikes against Libya in the 1980's forccd her to change her behavior. Kcflagging Kuwaiti tankers and limited strikes against Iran's Navy in thc late 1980's also achieved conditional objectives. lraq illustratcs this point from a different angle. I t highlights the limitation o f sea power (or air power) alone. Kuwait was liberated by reoccupation. She has remaincd free due to the expulsion o f Iraqi troops and her continued selrdeterniination. Iraq. on tlic othcr hand, continues to be a rogue state. Bricfoccupation o f Southern lraq forccd a conditional peace. A continucd sca and air blockade has not ensured victory or prcvented her

reemergence as a regional power. Sca powcr (and air power) can h r c e conditional pcace, it does
not dircctly produce absolute value. Sea power can bc critical to winning wars. Indeed it was critical and absolutely necessary in the Napoleonic Wars, thc Kaiser's War and Hitler's War. 'l'hesc wars clearly illustrate how war at sea intlucnccs victory. Mastery o f t h e sea was necessary to achieve victory. I-lowever, sca powcr could not do it alone. I n each case. coalitions and projection o f power ashore was thc linal tlclerniining factor. Wliilc hcing a grcat 5ca power is instrumental to victory, it docs not cnsurc or s c i ~ c victory. The generation ofabsolutc value by projecting powcr on land (or the creditable threat o f projccting powcr on land) was required to acl~icv'c unconditional surrender and victory. The fact that sea battlcs arc not fought for their own sake is shown by a study o f history. Throughout history thc most coninion naval battlcs arc amphibious operationsilandings,

supporting operations ashore, and the protection o f sea lancs o f communication. Fleet battle is rare. Evcn more striking, all the grcat decisiw sca battles bctwccn fleets arc connected with events on land--not as an aside, usually in an immediate, direct obvious way.'* Admiral Nelson's two greatest battles. thc Battles o f the N i l c and Trafalgar, both were directly tied to land. The Battle o f the N i l c was precipitated by Napoleon's invasion o f Egypt. I n a bold, audacious m o w Admiral Nelson fcll on the Frcnch tleet in a secure anchorage and destroyed it in a spectacular night engagcmenr that truly demonstrated his acumcn. This battle irreparably cut Napolcon's sea lanes o f communication and he was forced l o abandon Egypt and thousands o f troops. Thc Battle o f Trahlgar, similarly, prescrvcd the Royal Navy's mastery o f the seas and prevented an in\,asion o f England. A l l tlic great naval clashes o f World War I 1 are tied to land. The Battle o f Coral Sca-Japancse drive to Port Morcsby; the Battle of Midwy--Japancsc invasion attempt on Midway Island; the Battlc o f t h e Philippine Sca--U. S. landing on Saipan; the Battle o f Lcyte Gulf--US. landings on Lcyte; and thc Battle o f thc Atlantic--SI.OCs to England are all rcpresentstivc cxamples. Each one is ticd directly to results or opcrations o n land. Clcarly there i s a relationship between sca power and land power. They are not mutually exclusive. Nor is one bctter than thc other. T o bc a great powcr, a nation must possess and appreciate thc uniqueness, strenglhs and we;~knesscso f each discipline. Currently, absolute valuc can only be gcncrated by armies and land power. Therc is no substitute Tor a foot soldicr and occupying real estatc. One day, in the distant future, satellites may be ablc to see through buildings and deep into the ground. They w i l l bc able to track and h p " individuals at will. In addition, le\itating orbs, the sizc o f soccer balls, w i l l travel frccly among populations. Controlled by operators far away they w i l l monitor and watch a society.

'Ihcsc orbs w i l l fight or pimish populations. Societies w i l l be monitorcd and controlled by lcaps

in tcchnology. When tcchnology advances to this stage, armies may no longcr be required to occupy land and towns or trend among conqtrcrcd peoples. Sca power: air powcr, space power and land p o w r will blend (a process already taking place). Ilowc\,cr, regardless of thc instrument. land will be thc focus of all power.

War on Land Versus War at Sea Thc differences outlincd in the proceeding section arc gcncrally a strategic outlook. Tlicsc broad stratcgic differences arc important. 'There are also important differences at the tactical level or on thc battlefield. Many historians and tacticians tacklc this question. I lowevcr. in IFlcet Tactics: ' k o r v and Practicc, Captain Waync Hughes providcs a comprehensive, concise list which cuts to the chase. This splendid list is repeated below as Table I . Hughes compares T.N. Dupuy's, "'l'imeless Vcritics of Combat" and develops naval counterparts for ca~ll.'~ Hughes' comparison highlights key differences between war on land and war at sea. Many are very notcworthy. I t is significant that rcscrves, indispensable to wartire on land, hold little meaning at sea. Ships arc riot held in rcscrvc during naval battle. Also: indispcnsable to land warfare is terrain. Terrain gives dccisivc tactical advantage. There is no high ground at sea While seizurc of a strait or forward operating basc or airfield arc valuable contributions to sea dcnial. they arc cxamples ofthc importance of land. Another important distinction is the idea of flank or rear. Thesc do not exist at sca. During the age ofoar and sail a slight comparison could he made. Battle today is no longer delined by mccting the enemy. Sea battle today is out of sight and over the horizon (OTII). Flanks and rears do not cxist at sea in a land scnse. This list and comparison are vcry instructive. It docs display one failing. While the tnblc recognizes friction, it lcavcs out any mcntion of fog or luck as a hedrock principle. This is

Table I . Land Battle Versus Sea 13atllc

I. Offensive action is es~cntial to posilivc cornhat results.

Ihis 1s true o f sea h d t k I)efensive is usually wrakcr

2. 1)cSensive strength is greater than olli'nsive strength

3. IkScnsive posture is neccssw when successlul oSfcnse is impossible

4. I:lank or rear attack is more likely l o socceed than ihmlal attack.
5 , Initiative permits application ot' preponderant cornhat poacr

s inhermtly risk Ikfenhivc posture i prone and suhject to incommensurate losses.

Attack from an uneyxcted quarler is aiIv;mtageous, hut the concept of mueluprnent has no parallel with land tactics. 'l'he power o f initiative is especially valuable at sea. l)rfrnsi\e power is solely l o gain mctic;~llime fbr an efl'rcti\.c attack or counlcratmck. Ihis is true o f sea b;ittlc. given the whereu ithal. At sra. Selling aside rehrrvcs is a misl;dc. When the appropriate qualificallons are cons~drrcd.it is posihle l o say that superior i t is lorcc nil1al\va)s win at sea IInwev~r, hetlrr to say that when two compctilive Sorccs meet in naval comhat. the onr that attacks eNecti~cly lirst will win. 'Ihis is tmc ofsea battle. fhis ic true olscn baule. W l d s this is ollen true, there are many cx;rrnples o f nawll cngagenlcnts in which the results come more s\vittl) than expected. I'crhaps there i\ Icss frictmi at sca than on land. This is true Ofsea hattle.

6. I\ defender's chance o f succcss arc direclly proporlionale l o Sortification strength.

7. An attacker atllinp to pay the price cam aI\va)s pmc!ralc the strongest dckosc.

X Successli~l dchx requires depth and reservr\.

9 Superior con~hal poucr always uins. ifone takes into accounl the \.aluc o f surprise. relative comhat elTectivcness, and the advan:ages of dcknsi\.e posaurc as elemcnl\ of clrength.
10. Surpr~se whsmtiiill) a~hances a m h a t power. I I.1:irepoacr LIII~. disrupts. supproses. and causes dispersion. 12. ('omhat activitie\ arc slowr, less p r o l h ~ l iand ~ ~ less , efficient than anricip;ucd [liom peacetime t e ~ plans. , and rxcrcises]. 13. Combat is too coniplcx l o he described in a cimplr a~phoricm.

Source: Wayne 1:. Ilughes: Jr.. Flcct Tactics: Thcorv and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Instilutc I'ress, 1986). 143.

particularly surprising for point ninc. Point ninc, for hoth land and sca battle. csscntially says; if everything goes right. the supcrior combat power wins. Dul'uy cavcats his statcmcnt \\.it11 "if one takes into account" and lists cvcrything that must he done right. Hughes caveats his with the operative word "efkctivcly." I n the rcview o f histor).., one call always find something that "was not takcn into account" or was "inef'ectivc." It is best to acknowledge up front: luck and fog are

a reality o f warfare. A n outstanding naval hattle that highlights the play o f luck and fog (and
bravery) is Midway. I t should he notcd that numbcr 13 lets both 1)uPuy and Hughes o f r t h c hook. Anothcr point that is not addressed here is logistics. Armies and navies view logistics during hattle (and campaigns) dilkrcntly. Armics tend to bc tied directly to the logistics train, even during hattlc. Tactical units in contact have a limited duration without constant resupply. I.'uel and ammunition endurancc is measurcd in hours. Navies fight as is, resupplying only whcn the environment is rclatively benign. At sea food endurancc is niensurcd in weeks. Fucl endurancc is measurcd in days or weeks (ycars for nuclcar po\\ercd ships and submarines). Ships and submarines can operate independently for days. Modern ammunition is the most limiting factor during hi~ttlc.To a large cxterit ammunition is rncasured as a "one shot deal." Most rnissilcs can only bc loaded in port. Tomahawks and Ilarpoon missiles, for examplc, are

generally only loaded in port or alongside a tender.

For thosc missiles, bombs and shells that can

be loaded at sea: i t is a time-consuming process that. again. req~rircs a hellign environment. Naval hattlc is not tied to logistics. What a ship or submarine brings to thc battle is all that is availahlc until the battle is ovcr. I n part this lcads to I-luhges' central theme of naval battle, "Attack effeclivcly tirst."" or losc it. Only a linitc amount o f ammunition is available. Usc it effectivcly,

A final distinction o f war at sea i s summed up by Admiral Fioravano. I n Naval Tactical tic states, "The impo.rsibility of there heinx tm enguxcment jf one side docs nor want if (that is, battles at sea arc hy rnulualconsml). . . . battlc cannot take place if the detc?rminationto

commit oneselffilly is lucking [author's italic^]."'^ Typically, fleets can choose when and where
thcy want to fight. Flccts are relatively frec to maneuvcr and wait until they perceive the tactical advantage. Admiral Fioravano attributes this to the lack o f terrain at sea, "The inrpos.tibi/i~y of as can bc done in land warfarc, wherc terrain givcs decisive prel~urinxforhuttle in urfvc~nce.

strategic-tactical indication [author's italics]."'When a navy s i d s i t is not forfeiting the high

ground. Wlicrc sea battlc has hccn forced, it is directly tied to land campaigns. Thc Battle o f Midway is an example. Admiral Chcstcr Nimitz could not afford ro cede Midway to the Japanese. I l c was compelled to dispatch his available forces to prevent the Japanese from seizing tlie islands. Midway--land--was too valuable. However, oncc Admiral Frank Jack Flctcher and Admiral Raymond Spruance had decimated tlie Japanese carrier force and Midway was safe. thc tide shifted. Tlic Japanesc tleet was no longer a threat to Midway. Uut, as night fell and the aircran carriers could not provide air covcr, the cruisers covcring tlie American force were no match for Admiral lsoroku Yamamoto's hattlcships and cruisers. Admiral Flctcher and Admiral Spruancc did not risk a night tight. They ceded blue watcr to the Japanese and ~naintained a safe distance from the Japanese flcct. Admiral Yamamoto could not force a g f ih t and could not capitali7.e on his battleship and cruiser advantage. A more contemporary cxamplc o f the inability to force naval battle at sca occurred during tlie two and half month Anglo-Argentine War over Falkland (or Malvinns) Island. Thc war began 2 April 1982 when Argentina invaded and capturcd Falkland Island. One m o n t l ~ later.
a British b;~lrlcforce arrived and "soughr to draw thc Argentine fleet and air force into battle."'O

llcar Admiral John F. Wood\vard. Commander o f the British Force, attempted to lure the

Argentine's into battle hy conducting air raids and naval bombardment of tlie islands and posturing for a countcr invasion. Yct, dcspite closing to within 180 nm of each other, the battlc could not be forced. Rcar Admiral Gualtcr Allara, Commander of the Argcntinc Fleet chose not to light. He was hampcred by poor wcathcr and insufficient wind to launch bomb laden carrier aircraft." The battle cot~ld not he forced.

In contrast, thc British invasion of Falkland Island reinforces how land forces naval
battle. A numbcr of issues dictatcd the British not postpone a landing. They includcd approaching winter, conccrn popular honicfront support would wane and the constraints of supporting troops at sea so far from l3ritain. On 18 May amphibious landings were conducted in Falklands Sound. Naval forces were committed in tlie Sound to protect amphibious ships and landing craft. Sincc Royal Navy aircraft carriers could only provide limited air covcr, Koyal Navy ships were very vulnerable to Argcntinc air attacks. Five ships wcrc lost protecting and supporting thc invasion." Falklarld Island dictatcd and forced naval battle.

Constants and generally acccptcd foundations of naval tactics cmcrge wliile researching naval warfarc. Most of thc differences encountered are a mattcr of terminology. emphasis and aspect. Whilc a principle or concept may not make an author's top ten list, it is givcn consideration and crcdit in due coursc. The execution of w r fii re and tactics is an art. Art is a ctinscious use of skill: art is creative imagination. Art requircs thinking. Execution of art is in the hand ofrhc cxccutioner. Naval officers and warriors should not dcrnand rigid mdxims and dogma. Shc execution of warfare and tactics requires pcrsonal interpretation of generally acccpted ideas and core principles of warfare. Thc true skill is not laying the canvas, arranging the paint or selecting the brush. True skill is painting the picture. which may require lcaving

some paint on the floor andlor expanding the canvas. Whilc: each author had an individual twist, a foundation did emcrgc. The primary sourccs tor developing a foundation of naval tactics wcrc Captain I lughes'.

p NWP , 3-20.6. Surlncc Shin Tactics: and Admiral Ciuiseppe

Fioranvano's. Naval Tactical Thouaht. Figure lprovides thcir key principlcs or charactcristics of naval tactics and hattlc. In the contcxt of each work differences are slight. For example, Hughes and i:ioranvano both single out technology. I-lughes states, "'So know tactics, know tcchnology."'' Fioravimro's multiformity of action includes, "[taking into consideration] one's
. weapon characteristics and capacity to withstand a~tack."~" Whilc technology did not makc

..

NWP 3-20.6's list, it docs dedicatc considerahlc space to discussing the importance of sensor cmploymcnt. weapon employment and knowing systcrn capabilities and limitations.'* Across the hoard, each publication addresses t o n significant extent all the points in Table 4-2. However, it is clear, thcir critical considerations differ. Whcn reviewcd from a conmon vantage point a consensus or foundation emergcs from the works cited in table 2. Listcd below is that conscnsus. This list includcs only the points that directly apply to naval battle and tactics. Some themcs presented in table 2 arc more appropriate Ibr a11 operational or stratcgic discussion and havc been left out. Remaining are foundations of naval tactics: ( 1 ) leadership. (2) scouting and anti-scouting. (3) lircpower, (4) survivability, (5) command and control, (6) mobility and movement, (7) tcchnology, and (8) fog of war. In the ncxt chaplcr some of t h e li)undations will hc cxamincd to see ifthcy can be influcnced by naval maneuver warfare conccpts and thcory.

Table 2. Kcy Principlcs and Characteristics of Naval Tactics

N W P 3-20.6
Five C:ornerstones:

Naval Tactical Thowht Characteristics of Naval

:-

- Men Matter Most

Doctrine is the Glue of Tactics - To Know Tactics. Know Technology - Thc Seat of Purpose is I.and - Attack Effectively First The Great Constants: - Mancuver - Firepower - Counterforce - Scouling - C2 and C2CM

Tactical I'rocedorcs: - Planning - Search - Engagement - Support Tactical Emdovmcnt: - I.ogislics - Intelligcncc - Communications - C2 - Formation - Maneuvcr - Achieve Tactical I'osition - Conccntrate Fire Power

1. Uncerlainty as to position of adversary. (security, reconnaissance) 2. The impossibility of thcrc being engagcment ifone side does not want it. 3. The impossibility of preparing for battle in advance. 4. The multiformity o r action (mobility, offensive power, weapon characteristics, survivability) 5. Instability o r situations. 6. Rapidity ofaction. 7. Fogginess of battlc area.

'B. 11. liddell Ilart, The Real War 1914-1918 (New York: I.ittle Brown and Co., 1964);

272.

'J. C. \Vylie, Militarv Strateay(Wcstport, CT: Greenwood Prcss. 1980). 49.

'Colin S. Gray and Rogcr W. Barnclt. S c a n o w e r y ( A n n a p o l i s . MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989). 10.

"Ciiuseppe Fioravanzo, Naval Tactical 'fhoueht (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Prcss, 1979), 27. 'Waync 1'. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theorv and I'racticc (Annapolis. MI): Naval lnstitutc I'rcss, 1986). 33. RKao~ Castex, l Strate~ic Thcorics (Annapolis, MI): Naval Institute Press, 1994), 394. Y"Becausemen live on thc land and not at sca. the outcomes of great wars among nations have always resulted, exccpt in w r y rare cases, either from what one army managed to do to the territory or national life of the enemy or from fcar of thc possibilities which a fleet could give to the army against the same territory or national lifc." Corhctt, I'rincinles quoted in Castex, 394395.

"lhid "J. J. Trittcn, "Is Naval Warfare Unique?" Technical Rcport (Norfolk, VA: Naval Doctrine Command, July 1995). 9. "Gray. 1 1 . "lhid.

"lhid. loFrank Uhlig, How Navies Finht. The I!.S. Navv and Its Allics (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994). 367. "Uhlig, 368. "Larry 1-1. Addington, 'l'he I'atterns of War Since the Einhteenth Centurv (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University I'rcss. 1994), 3 13.

"Fioravanzo. 182. "NWP 3-20; 6.

CHAIsI'EK FIVE APPLICATION OF NAVAL MANEUVER WARFARE

Introdoction The analysis presented in this chapter shows that maneuver warfare theory and concepts do influence selected foundations of naval tactics. l'hc foundations of naval tactics examined arc technology, firepower, scoutinglanti-scouting, ~nobilitylmovement,and leadership. Through the historical examples and tactical discussions detailed below maneuver warfare's influence on technology, firepower, scoutinglanti-scouting and rnohilitylmovcmcnt is apparent. A brief discussion of leadership highlights its unique position with respect to maneuver warfire. Foundations fog, survivability and command and control have not been investigated.

Technoloey The Battle ol' the Atlantic during bolh World Wars was an example of the classic attrition light. The Germans attempted to cut Great Britain's vital resupply and raw material link to the New World. The principle weapon in their quest to cut the SLOCs was the U-boat. The Allies' primary solution was mass and overwhelming firepower. I.osses were replaced and enormous resources were dedicated to the eSSort. NDI' 1 (which uses the Battle of the Atlantic during World War I 1 as a primary example of attrition warfare) rccounts, "for each German LJboat, there were 25 1J.S. and British warships and 100 aircraft in pursuit. For evcry German submariner at sea, there wcrc 100 American and British antisubmariners."' This classic attrition

strugglc pittcd mass vcrsus mass and strcngth versus strcngth. The Allies overwhelming industrial power, rcsourccs and mass arc largely credited with winning the Battle ofthe Atlantic. This text book example of an attrition campaign also presents an example of how technology offered a maneuver solution to the battle. Exploiting this technological edge, a small group ofships ncgatcd the submarinc thrcat and crosscd thc Atlantic unimpcdcd. Exercising the acrnc of maneuver skill, these ships knocked submarines out of the tight without tighting. 'l'hc short rangc and speed of German World War I1 torpedoes limited their cffcctivcncss as a victim's speed increased. When high speed was combined with frequent course changes or zigzagging, U-boat commanders could not dcvclop a firing solution. Thc target was beyond their limited capabilities. Ilowever, few ships could obtain speeds fast enough to capitalize on the iJ-boats' shortcomings. Even fcwcr ships had tlic cndurancc to maintain this spccd for long periods. I:urthcrmorc, in ordcr to maintain tlic integrity of a convoy, the convoy's spccd was limited to that of tlic slowcst ship. Thc typical convoy could only mustcr 11-13 knots,

". . . a

speed too meager to give effective anti-submarine protection."' 'fhcsc convoys could not exploit spccd. nor could tllcir escorts. They required heavy anti-submarine warfare (ASW) scrcens. Ilowcvcr, a small group of ships posscsscd a tcclinological edgc and was ablc to usc spccd as protection and defense. They were the great ocean liners. Designed for the Atlantic passcngcr tradc, thcy wcrc big and built for spccd and cndurancc. Quick voyagcs across tlic Atlantic, bcfore thc war; translated into largc profits and prcstigc. This spccd and endurance were put to the test beginning in August of 1942. The French S.S. Pu.sreur, Cunrrtlian Emprc.w
o f .koflund, British Queen Mur);, Queen Elizuhefh and Aqrrifuniu wcrc prcsscd into service as

troop carriers. Aftcr Pcarl Harbor thc Amcrican cruisc lincr S.S. hiuriposujoincd thc fight. The largest could transport 15,000 troops. Their speed precluded escorts from keeping up and they sailed alone, unescorted. exccpt in coastal waters and approaches. Between August 1942 and

Junc 1943 these great lincrs made 30 castbound voyages. Thc Naval Historian, Samucl E. hlorrison sums up the cruise liners' success: " 'Mary' and 'Liuie' [Queen Mary and Quccn I7limbethl were able to steam an average of26.5 knots for the entire voyage and to make a British port in less thcn live days from Ncw York; tlic othcrs too wcre fast enough to baftle IJboats, whose anxiety to catch thcm may be gauged by liequcnt German claims that they had been ~ u n k . "'~lirougliout ~ the war not a man was lost crossing tlie Atlantic in these majestic ships. Clearly, the Battle of the Atlantic would have taken a different shape if every convoy could have exceeded 20 knots as thcy crosscd tlic Atlantic. Howcvcr, this was beyond tlie

technological and industrial base of the Allies and only a few ships were availablc. Yct, this
simplc cxamplc docs demonstrate at the tactical level how technology influences tactics and how use of maneuver warfarc affcctcd what was csscntially an attrition clash, thc Rattle oftlie Atlantic.

Firepower
'l'hc Solomon Island Campaign hclps illustrate the cxpanded thcmc of mancuvcr warfare in Chapter I. Here a more thorough study of this bloody struggle and how mancuvcr warfare applied at the tactical level and negated Japanese firepower will be conducted. A principlc sourcc of strcngth of thc Japancsc Navy during the Solonion Island Campaign was firepower, specifically tlie Long Lance torpedo. The use of this weapon was or could not bc solved with morc lircpowcr; instcad a niancuvcr solution had to be developed. The U.S. countered this source of strength by exploiting Japancse Imperial Navy weaknesses in screening. Technology coupled with innovative tactics by IJ.S. naval forces exploited this Japancsc wcakncss and

marginalized tlicir fircpowcr advantage, negating their source o f strength, the Long l.ance torpcdo. "Solomon Island has liad the distinction o f bcing thc sccnc o f numerous pitched battles and the occasion for six major naval engagements within . . . [tlie first four monllis]. I n addition, there were some half a hundred ship-to-ship and air-sea Fights . . . in this supcrabundance o f heavy slugging"' Samuel Eliot Morison caplures the extent o f the strugglc i n his multi-volume history o f tile U S . Navy's light during World War 11. l'hc Solomon Island Campaign was a slugfest, initially over control o f Guadacanal lsland and subsequently, allied advances through the remainder o f tlic Solomon Lslands and New Guinea. A i r fields and air covcr dicmed the hasic terms o f the Solomon C:ampaignvsnaval cngagcmcnts. The vast majority would bc at night. Once Henderson Field on Guadacanal was sccurcd by the Marines, tlie allies erijoycd local air superiority during daylight hours. Without adcquatc air covcr from Rahaul, the Japanese air base over SOOnm to thc north, thc Japanese could not venture into the Slot--a strip o f sca bounded by the Solomon Islands. Even a f c r establishing an air base on Bukn lsland, 170nm closer, on tlie approaches to tlic Slot, tlic Japanese could not operate deep insidc thc Slot during day light liours--overhead time for Zeros was too short. Conversely, U S . forces could not chase Japancsc ships too far north in the slot. As da\\n approaclicd tlicy liad to he well south o f .Iapancsc air bases at 1tabaul and on Uuka Island.' Captain Waync Hughes caplures tlie scene, "But when tlie sun set air power lost its grip, and surfacc combatants Inel and fought oncc more."' Thc Japancsc Imperial Navy and tlie 0 . S . I'leet clashed ovcr bcachhcads and convoys. By day Allied forces would resupply its bcachhcads and troops ashore. Ry night the Japancsc ships, nicknamed llie "Tokyo Express," steamed into thc slot to rcsupply their troops and occasionally bombard Ilenderson Field on Ciuadacanal.' Thc Allies were determined to stop the

Tokyo Express and sortied rcpcatedly into the Slot. This precipikted numerous engagements. Soon. the Slot carned the nickname "Ironbottom Sound" and Morison ch;~llenges, "You ma> scarch the seven seas in vain for an ocean graveyard with the bones o f so many ships and

sailor^"^
The Japanese Navy's sourccs o f strength during the Solomon Island Campaign were adept night tactics and fire power, namely, thc Long Lance torpedo. This \\,ark w i l l focus niainly on firepower and the l.ong Lancc torpedo. I-lowever, a bricf discussion o f the Japancsc tactical advantagc is noteworthy. The Japancsc provcd well trained and adcpt as night tightcrs. I n part, this was because they trained cxtcnsively in night tactics and squadrons maintaincd cohesion. The Americans wcrc unprepared to fight at night. They had emphasi~ed daylight tactics prior to the outbreak o f World War 11. Also, l!.S. task groups \vcrc hastily organized and poorly trained during thc initial months o f the campaign.' For Morison this was evident at the Rattle o f 'fassafaronga. which was a 11.S. failurc. 1le concludes, "It must bc rcmembered that the Unitcd States forcc. . . had never before steamed together, even in daylight. and that is was strictly a 'scratch team;' whilc Tanaka's [Japanese] forcc had been well trained and long practiced under the same commandeer.""' American tactical dcvclopment would prove a bumpy ride. but improvc with experience and asccnt o r commanders likc Arlcigh Burke and Frederick Mooscburger. "No one in authority in the South Pacific seemed to undcrstand what the Japancsc had, although, since the beginning o f the Tokyo F.xpress runs down the Slot the Japancsc had scored

victor); u/rer viclur); by using torpcdocc."" Thc Long Lance torpedo was a dcvastaling weapon
and gave the Japanese Navy a distinct fire power advantagc. Tlic torpedo was twice as powerful as its American countcrparts. I t had a range o f 22,000 yards at 49 knots; 44,000 yards at 36 knots." On 4 July 1943 a group o f 1J.S. dcstroyers, conducting naval gunfire bombardments, spookcd some Japanese destroyer transports that were attempting to resupply Central Solomon

Island. The Japanese destroyers wcrc alcncd by the American muzzle flashes. The 1J.S. dcstroyers caught a brief glimpse o f the Japanese destroyers on radar at 25nm as they tled. Exercising a tactic that would prove devastatingly erfective, the Japanese destroyers immediately fired Long Lance torpedoes at the rnlrzzlc flashes before executing radical maneuvers and flceing. When a torpedo slammed into one o f the destroyers. USS STRONG, it was believed i t was a submarine torpedo, not. ". . . a dcstroycr torpedo fired from a distance impossible for an American destroyer to duplicate."" Morison, Hoyt and Hughcs detail spectacular 1j.S. failures in the period August 1942 through July 1943, during the Solomon Island Campaign. A t one point, only four months into the Solomon Island Campaign, Morison feels it necessary to issue a caution i n his book. After

splendidly detailing thc A~nerican failurc during the Battle o f Tassahronga, 30 November 1942,
he warns. "So. readerif this tale has seemed repetitious with shock and gore, exploding magazines, huming and sinking ships and plummeting planes--that is simply how i t was."" The 1J.S. task force commanders were extremely brave and daring. 'l'hcy wcrc following sound prc-war tactics. Frequently cruisers were matched against destroyers. I-lere the range and fire power advantage o f the cruisers' bigger guns should havc taken thc day. This lirepower solution came up short. the cruisers also fcll victim to the Long Lance, \vhicIi matched their gun range. I n a number o f the engagements the Americans were able to cross the "'I'," a clcar fire power multiplier. Again, U.S. task forccs fcll victim to the silent Long Lance. I'art o f thc solution \vould result from more experience and better tactics. This was largely hampered by the "scratch teams" mentioned earlier. The key to the solution was exploiting a wcakncss and vulnerability that rcduccd thc Japanesc sourcc o f slrenglli. The American's screening and scouting advantage provided by radar proved to be that key. This should have been recognized much earlier; II.S. commanders knew early on thcy had a radar

advantage.I5 An account of the sinking of the Japanese destroyer MUKASAMI': brings home the point: "Her captain still did not know what he faced. He had seen the enemy only as a few pinpoints of light and he didn't know what sort of ships he faced or how many. He never got a chance to find out: bccause the radar shifted to his ship . . . the cruisers began to fire on him. in three minutes he was dead in the water."'"n

.. .

short ordcr thc A4urr1.~urnc, was sunk. Radar gave

the Americans a distinct scouting advantage. During the black nights ofthe South Pacific, the Americans knew where the enemy was first. Yet, without tactics to supporl this advantage and exploit the .lapanese weakness, it was lost and Japanese firepower continued to rule the night.

.I. he means to exploit thc Japanese vulnerabilities came with ascendancy of Commander
a Mooseburger, Admiral Mcrrill and Captain Rurke. After a year of fighting i n the Solon~ons "new brccd" of "American captains had come to age."" These rncn benefited from improved unit cohesion and combat experience. Commander Mooseburger would initiate the final successcs ofthc Solomon Campaign with thc Rattle of Vella Golf on 6-7 August 1943. (Three morc banks remained after Vella Gulf. Two would he successes for tlie Americans, one a set back.) The credit for the battlc plan goes to Captain Arleigh U ~ r k e . '1-lughes ~ sums up: T h c
I!.S. Navy had found the tactics to match its radar advantage and neutralize the enemy's torpedo

advantage. Good sensors and scouting could overcome better tirepower. . . . Hit and move was tlie answer. not crossing thc '1': units had to be nimble rather than fixed in sturdy. steady, cohesive--and suicidal--column."'" Accepting NIW 1's definition of maneuver warfare and the expanded theme of mancuvcr warfare, this is clearly a maneuver solution t o n tactical problem. The setback would he the very next fight, the Battle of Vella Lavella on 6-7 October 1943. Captain Frank Walker, in his first tight. with a scratch force ofthree destroyers faced six Japanese destroyers. His i'ailure actually validated Captain Burkc's and Commander Mooseburgcr's ncw tactics. Captain Walker's ships fircd fourteen torpedoes. at scvcn thousand

yards, using radar on an unsuspecting enemy. I'licn lie violated tlic main spirit of the new tactics.

I le did not maintain surprisc and the radar advantage. Commander Moosehurgcr, and latcr
Admiral Mcrrill and Captain 13urke, held their gunfire until aftcr their torpedocs hit their mark. Then thcy would conduct a radical maneuvcr to avoid any counter lire. This night, Captain Walker reniaincd broadside to the cncmy and opcncd lire with his guns as his torpcdoes were running. Tlic alcrt Japanese dcstroycrs, maneuvcrcd and fired counter-fire torpcdoes. Only one Japanesc dcstroyer \vas hit and sunk. I-lowevcr, two I!.S. destroycrs were torpcdoed, and thc third collided into onc of the victims: three I!.S. dcstroycrs were out of action.'" Captain Walker sacrificed his advanlaye \\,hen hc opcned tire heforc his torpedocs struck home. These rnistakcs \\ore no1 madc again in tlie last hvo battles of tlic Solomon Campaign. 'l'hc Battles o f Emprcss Augusta bay and Cape St. Georgc were victories. Capkin Burke fought at both hattlcs. Ile fought undcr tactical command of Admiral Mcrrill in the first engagement: for the second hc was in tactical command--the Ijattlc of Cape St. Georgc. Fought on 'l'hankspiving night 1943. the Rattle of Cape St. Georgc pushed the Japancsc Imperial Navy out of the Slot for good. Captain Ourkc's five dcstroycrs encountered tivc cnerny destroycrs, split into two groups. Having the radar advantage, thc U.S. destroyers fircd fifteen torpcdoes at thc tirst group of two Japancsc dcstroyers. Thc U.S. destroyers rcmaincd undetcctcd until tlicir torpcdoes hit the cnclny destroyers. Both Japanese destroycrs were hit and dcad in the water. Captain Burke left two destroycrs to linish thcse ofrand giivc cliase to tlie sccond group oftliree he sank one more and avoidcd a large salvo of Japanesc dcstroyers. During a two-hour cl~ase, cncmy torpedocs. tlc broke offthc chase as dawn approached; lie was dangerously far north and closing on the Japancsc air base at Kabaul. Iloyt summarires. "The Rurke force got off scot-free in what was to that point the clcancst and most cffcctive multi-ship action of tlic war. Not a man was Iiu~t.not a scratch administered to an Alncrican ship, and three Japancsc destroyers had g n ~ e

dow11."'~ Captain Burke had displayed a Nelson 'l'ouch. He tossed out old procedures and failed Vactics and dcveloped tactics bvhich exploited a weakness that reduced the enemy's combat power in relation to his. I-le was a charismatic leader and avoided detailcd instruction prcfcrring to,

". .

. [gather his] captains to discuss a variety o f tactical problems."" Captain Burke provided a
mancuver solution to a tactical tirepower and attrition problem.

Scouline and Anti-Scouting German Imperial Navy stratcgy and tactics developed on thc North Sea during World War Imanifcstcd many core idcas o f naval mancuvcr warfare theory. Raoul Castcx and Julian Corbctt support many o f thcir theories and draw conclusions directly from thcse operations. The North Sea struggle between Great Britain and Germany was the foremost naval campaign studied in the 1020s and 1930s. Castex's study o f German and British experiencc i n North Sca is particularly illuminating and concisc." The Germans applicd their rnaneuvcr concepts to

scouting and anti-scouting: they sought an "indirect approach" and to focus on "kcy enemy weaknesscs and vulnerabiliti~s.~'~' Maneuver warfare theory influcnccd their approach to scouting and tactics. Racknround--Imperial Navv OlTensive in thc North Sea. 1914-1016. "Thc High Seas Fleet ought not to be engaged." was the principal order from the Kaiscr Wilhelrn II in the Summcr o f 1914.'' Thc Kaiser, along with the majority o f thc German Naval Staff. ssuffcrcd from a malaise or inferiority complex. I n the Pace o f thc Koyal Navy, thcy forsook any thought o f an offensivc. Yct, some o f thc officers o f the High Scas Fleet (Gcrman Imperial Navy fleet. stationed in thc North Sea) would challenge naval circlcs and attempt to scize the initiative by

exploiting technology and developing innovalive scouting and anti-scouting tactics. 'I'hcse
officers \vould introduce aspects o f mancuver wnrfarc.

The lmpcrial Navy cntcred World War 1 cntrcnched in Admiral Alfrcd von Tripitz' famous "Kisk Theory." I n 1900 this theory was codified by thc Reichstag as the Second Navy Law. Thc Sccond Navy Law referced to Grcat Britain and the Royal Navy as "a great naval powcr," "a suhstantially superior sea powcr," "an encmy who is more powerful at sea," and most tcllingly, "the greatest naval power."" The hill inferred the Imperial Navy w i l l always he an

inferior forcc and stated i l s purpose was through dc@t to "so substantially weaken thc enemy that. in spite o f a victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world w u l d no longer bc secured by an adequate f l ~ c t . " ~Admiral ' von Tripitz was a proponent o f this atlritionist view and felt Circat Britain would never risk an engagement with thc Imperial Navy, since it would leavc the Royal Navy at the mcrcy o f Russia and France. B y 1914 the theory was woefully out o f date; it did not account for British shipbuilding capability or the changing allimce structure. The principal result of thc "Risk Thcory" was to initiatc a naval arms race, increase tensions between Gcrniany and England, and draw France and England closcr togethcr.

Ilowevcr, i t also institutionalixd in the imperial Navy a sense o f inl'criority and pessimism.
suffocated tnoralc and innovation. This malaise reachcd all the way to the Kaiscr. A strong
proponent o f the navy, hc nevertheless felt the lmpcrial Navy was impotent against the larger,

morc powerful Koyal Navy. His initial operating orders to tlic Cicrman Naval Staff and High Seas Fleet, as hostilities bcgan, stressed preserving tlic fleet and waiting for tlic Royal Navy to move. M i n c laying operations and suhmarinc w r f a r e would be conducted lo equalizc the fleets. The Kaiser's strategy, approved b y the German Naval Staff, o f preserving the Imperial Navy would cnsurc control of'thc Baltic Sea and neutrality o f the Scandinavian States. Also, he felt preserving tlic navy would hc inslrumental in peace ncgotiations. Considered in hand with tlic general feeling o f impotence. his preservation orders arc clear.

Admiral Friedreich von lnger~olil would bc onc of the first officers to challenge these orders and tlic general sense of impotcncc. 1le would attempt to seize the initiative through

innovative plans and lactics. I'crliaps--surprisi~igly--the seed for their thought was contained in
thc Sccond Navy Law of 1900: "... it is not absolutely necessary that tlie Gcrman Battle Flect should be as strong as that of'thc greatest naval powcr because a great naval power will not, as a
rule, he in a position to conccntratc all its striking forccs against us."2XThis clearly

acknowlcdgcd that a superior force is vulnerable if dispersed or unable to "concentrate" or mass its forces. While others may liavc seen aspects o f mancuvcr warfare theory here. it was lost on the principal author ofthe law. Admiral Tripitz. At the outbrcak of the war he stated. " . . . Admiral von

we, the navy, can do very little, and that makes our situation very

Tripitz was resigned to defeat and his early prediction oCa battle of attrition in which destruction ofthe High Scas Flcct would be the only outcome.'" Admiral von lngenolil was the Comniandcr of the Imperial Navy High Scas Fleet when war was dcclarcd. C:onstrained by the Kaiscr's orders, lie achieved limited success equalizing naval forces through mining and submarine unrfare during the Summer of 1914. Early successes of mining and submarine operations. which included sinking four British armorcd cruiscrs and one of England's newest battleships, began to w n c as the Royal Navy improved
procedures and became adcpt at rcpclling mine laying opcrations. Equalization was further

hampered hy the adoption by the British of a distant blockade. lnstcad of blockading tlie German coastline. tlie Royal Navy blockaded the acccsscs to tlie Nortli Sea. 1:urtliermore. with
no threat from thc Imperial Navy, the Royal Navy retained tlic initiative and sortied on its own

terms into the North Sea. In August of 1914 a Grand Flcct (title ofthe Koyal Navy's North Sea flcet) task force surprised the Imperial Navy with a thrust deep into tlie North Sea. l'hrec cruiscrs and a destroyer werc quickly lost. Admiral von lngenolil believed the restriction on

protecting light forccs with battlcsliips and battlc cruisers o f tlic High Seas Flect doomed any
chancc o f success. I n this changing situation, Admiral von lngenohl proposed Battle Cruiser raids supported hy the High Seas Fleet. Convinced that cqualizntion could not he achieved by mine operations and submarines alonc, he petitioned thc Naval Staff for use o f tlic High Seas Flcct's capital ships (battlcsliips and battlc cruisers). He proposed equalizing forces,

". . . by taking the initiative

onesclf and sorting with united forccs, to obtain success against parts o f the British Flect. . . . "" This request to rcgain the initiative is an early crystallization o f maneuver warfare theory and innovative tactics. Thc Naval Staff rcjccted Admiral von ingenohl's proposal. However, events would forcc a shin. I n Octobcr, 1914, Admiral vo11 ingenohl dcclarcd he could no longer conduit mine laying operatio~is.British counter-mine operations were too effective. llnless Gcrman mine operations wcrc supported by hcavy forces, Admiral von lngenohl fclt he could not continue. This was a blow to tlic stratcgy o f achieving parity through minor actions. Modifying his earlier proposal, lic proposed the High Seas Flect support mine operations?' Thc Kaiser and the Naval Starrapproved his plans. Minc laying operations graduated to raids against thc British Coast. Although they inflicted minimal damage, they did causc some public panic. I n response, the Royal Navy dispcrscd some ships along the coast. (This was an onintcnded benefit.) I:stablishing a coastal dcfense force contrihured to an already disperscd force. Royal Navy commitments included: channel blockade, forccs dctached to protect England from a channel invasion. Scottish Straits blockade and now protecting the coast from raids. Continuing the blockade was critical. I-lowevcr, an invasion scarc was a small thrcat" and coastal raids wcre

relatively insignificant. More importantly. the bcst way to eliminate both trouhlcs was to
concentrate on dcstroying thc High Scas Fleet. IXspersion iniproved the situation for thc

Germans. Throughout this period (1914- 1916), the Royal Navy had difficulty unifying forccs

efficiently--;I maneuvcr success for tlic Imperial Navy.

On I 6 December 1914, Admiral von lngenohl misscd his chance to commit his "unified force" against "part" o f the Grand Fleet. Admiral von lngcnohl was steaming the High Sea Fleet in support o f a cruiscr raid against the English coast. I n responsc to the German raid, the Grand Flect sortied. Intelligcncc informed thc British ofthc impending cruiser raid. Howcver, thcy believed tlic bulk of the High Sca Fleet was in port. Poorly dispersed, a Grand Fleet Rattle Cruiscr Squadron and Ilcstroyer Squadron became sandwiched betweell a much largcr Imperial Navy forcc: thc advance guard o f tlie Iligli Scas Fleet and the main force o f thc High Seas Fleet. The remainder o f the Grand I'lcct was well to thc norlli. However, when tlie engagement began, Admiral von lngenohl broke ofr. believing hc had encountcrcd the entire Grand Fleet, missing just thc chance he sought. Compounding his crror. when thc High Seas Ncct broke the engagement and headed home. Admiral von lngcnohl left the cruiscr raid isolatcd and unsupported. Only a sudden lurn in thc \\eather and chance signal crror among Koyal Navy ships saved the German force." "'Hcrc at last . . . wcrc the conditions for which the Germans had been striving since tlic outbreak o f tlie war. A fcw miles away on tlie port bow o f the I l i g h Sea Flcet, isolated, . . . was the most poncrful

. . . battle squadron o f the Grand I+xt,

the destruction o f which would . . .

[have placed tlic flcctsj on precisely cvcn footing."" 'l'liis i s how a Royal Navy Staff monograph summed up the encounter. Admiral von lngcnohl's offensive initiative and mancuvcr tactics worked and did draw out and isolatc part o f tlie Grand Fleet. Though the opportunity was lost, i t validatcd his ideas. As
it

bccame apparent that Admiral von lngcnolil had crca~cd and blundered

this opportunity, hc won numerous converts \vho also criticized his actions in battlc. When a

month later he would leave somc o f his cruisers unsupported and lose a cruiser, Admiral von Ingenohl was relieved. 1915 was a year o f waiting and inactivity under Admiral I-lugo von I'oll, Admiral von Ingcnohl's replacement. While critical o f Admiral von lngcnohl's actions on 16 Decembcr, Admiral von Pohl was a convert to his mancuver ideas. But, he was unable to take the risk. (The risk o f sailing sorting an inferior force (High Seas Fleet) against a superior forcc (Grand Flcct), in an attempt to cngagc a slice. was indccd da~lgerous.) Thc High Seas Fleet remained in port for the entirc ycar. I n January 1916, Admiral von I'ohl bccamc ill and was rcplaced by Vice Admiral Rcinhard Schcer. Introduction ofZennelins and Submarines as Scoots. Admiral Schcer was energctic and dynamic. He was a true convert to the ncw tactics and mancuvcr idea. He would argue, "l'hc prescnt disparity o f forces forbids us from seeking out decisive battle. . . . Our conduct o f operations ought thcrcfore to ensure that a dccisive battle not hc imposed upon us by the enemy.

. . . Ihc many ways wc havc ofattacking the cncrny givc us the advantagc, cven given our
f inferior forces. o
~ I ~ I V ~ ~ . Y

..

being crggre.csors."~' Admiral Schecr was bcnt on pursuing a bolder

offensive. Again. likc his predecessors. his primary goal was to achieve equalization before a "stand-up, give-and-take tight to the finish \vith thc British Fleet."" Admiral Scheer would organizc three major tactical ofrensive operations: 24-25 A p r i l (Lowefest Raid). 30 May-IJune (Jutland). and 19 Aug 1916. . I hcsc were coordinatcd operations specifically designed to hanlc portions of the Grand Fleet i n order to cnsure an unfair tight--in

fiver o f thc l l i g h Sea Fleet--and cqualize forces. I n the process o f each opcration he would
dcvclop innovative tactics. Chief among thcsc was using suhmnrincs and Zeppelins i n a

reconnaissance and security role.

Admiral Schccr recognized if Admiral von Ingenohl had known he was facing only part of thc Grand I:lcct, hc would havc surely presscd his attack on 16 Decemhcr 1914. A lack of cffectivr scouting was a failing of botli tlccts. Admiral Scheer's new scouting tactics would fix an Imperial Navy weakness and target a Royal Navy vulncrability. 'lhcy would initially evolve around the Zeppelin. The Royal Navy soon dcvcloped a rcspecl For thc Zeppelin. "If we saw them sailing about overlicad," stated Admiral Sir William Milburnc James. ofthc Royal Navy. "we could do nothing but swear at them."'8 Prior to thcir first employment in a dircct fleet scouting rolc Admiral o f thc 1:lcct 1st Earl Jellicoc, Commander in Chief of tlic Grand Flcct, observed, ". . . I think the Zcpps raids are purc rcvenge. and also Tor reconnaissance of the soutl~ern part ofNorth Sca." He continued, "l~liosc \vho opposed tlic building of Zcppelins i n this country 3 ycars ago have a heavy rcsponsibility now."" Admiral Scheer had clcarly identified a wcekness of the IZoyal Navy. His challenge now was to propcrly employ this advantage and execute his mancuvcr idea.

O n 25 April 1916 Admiral Schccr conductcd a similar opcration lo Admiral von

Ingenohl's raid of 16 December 1914. There were two principal diffcrcnces. First Admiral von Ingenohl opcraled in support of the cruiscrs and on a "chance" mecting wit11 thc portions of the Grand Flcct. In contrast. Admiral Schccr planned this operation from the onsct to engagc a portion of tlic Grand Flcct. The other major differcncc was Admiral Sclieer's cmployment of Zcppelins as scouls. For the i.owestofI operation, Admiral Schccr cmployed ninc Zeppelins. Three wcre in direct support and positioned from tlic outset to provide intelligcncc on the Grand Fleet. Six othcrs were assigncd scouting stations aner thcy finished thcir bombardments over England. Admiral Scheer achicved his objectives with thc Lowestoft raid. Oncc again he faced a

dispersed, disorgani~ed Grand Fleet. Marder sums up, "'l'he condition o f the [plan] had been met: he had drawn an important detachment o f t h e Cirand Fleet into waters lhvorablc for action.

. .""" The outcome?

Royal Navy history accurately states, "He [Admiral Scheer and Imperial

Navy Fleet] did not wait evcn to glimpse thc masts o f Admiral Beatty's light cruisers on the horizon, much less thc appemnce o f Admiral Beatty or the Co~nmander-in-CIiicf. . . . [Admiral Schccr conducted] a speedy retreat into the Bight."" I n part this was due to crroneous rcports

l i o m thc Zeppelins. Also, incxplicably, Admiral Schccr detached thcm early! When they could liavc been o f thc bcsl value. they wcrc on the way home. The Lowestoft raid proved another Imperial Navy missed opportunity and hilure.
,

Thc same day Admiral Scheer returncd from the failed Lowestoft raid. the German Naval Staff informcd him suhmarincs would have to conduct attacks in accordance with

international law. Namely, ships had to be warned bcfore lired on and survivors rcscued. (This
abandonment o f unrestricted submarine warfarc was to appeasc the United Statcs.) Thesc were ~macceptable conditions for continuing thc submarine campaign and Admiral Scheer recalled all the boats. "I-lcnceforth, the suhmarine would collaborate with thc l l i g h Seas Flcet in the North Sea, aiding in both security and battle, and i t s contribution to Manoeuvre would be a genuine innovation.""' Admiral Schecr wasted little timc exploiting the frcslily released U-boats. He planned,

"A bombardment ofSunderl;nld

. . . [which] \vould cause Ueatty [and the British battle cruisers]

to race out o f the Forth to engage llipper. 'lhc later would lcad the British force . . . to the German battle fleet. . . . [Which] would polish o f f Beatty heforc Jellicoe [and the Grand Fleet] could arrive on the scene."" For this operation Admiral Schccr planned to dcploy the U-boats as a screen and guard ibrce outsidc major British naval hascs. The iJ-boats would report and attack as able. I n addition, once again Zeppelins had a major role. Marder states. "This plan depcnded

on cxtensivc airship reconnaissance.

. . to cnwre .lellicoc was not engaged in a swecp down thc

North Sca when thc plan was launchctl."" 'I'hc plan originally scheduled for 17 May 1916, was delayed until 29 May duc to engineering and rcpair problems among Admiral Scheer's larger ships. Ry 29 May repairs were cornplcte and the suh~narines were on station. Howcver. strong winds prevented the Zeppclins from taking off. Scheer delayed one more day. Due to the limitcd endurancc of his submarines, he could delay no niorc. On 30 May thc strong winds prevailed and prccluded the usc of Zeppelins. Admiral Schccr modilied his plan and sailcd anyway, without the Zeppclins. a key element of his original plan and his main source of scoutins. Admiral Scheer sailed thc High Seas Flcct into the Battlc of Jutland. Forsaking thc .
Zeppelins would prove his undoing. Unknown to Admiral Schccr, alerted by signal intelligence,

Admiral Jcllicoe and thc Grand Fleet wcrc underway conducting a sweep down the North Sea. Whcn Admiral Schccr rcccived spot rcports of British warships liom his submarines, hc believed lic was up againsl small groups of British ships."' On paper the Uattlc of Jutland can be considered a Gcrnian victory. albcit small: 253 ships involved. Grand Fleet 14 lost (1 10.980 tons), High Seas Fleet I6 lost (62,233 tons)."' It was a lost opportunity for thc Grand Flcct. Ilnclcar signals and misunderstandings critically hampcrcd the Grand Flcet.4' Whilc a tactical victory for the I-ligh Scas I:lcet, the Battlc of Jutland was a strategic dcfcat for the Gcrman Imperial Navy. An Anicrican newspaper summed up: "'l'he German Flcct has nssaultcd its jailer; hut it is still in jail."4RThe Battle of Jutland hrokc thc morale of thc I-ligli Seas Flcet. Already suffering from an inferiority complex and having spent thc majority of thc war in port, Jutland rcinforced tlicir sccond rate status and inferiority. The High Scas Fleet would attcmpt one morc major sortic after the Rattlc ofJutland on
19 August 1916. Framed after Admiral Schccr's previous sortics into the North Sea. it was his

first opportonity to use both U-boats and Zeppelins. 'flic sortie was inconclusive and an engagement did not result. Evcn bcrore this sortic: Admiral Schecr bcgan to lohby for a return t o unrestricted submarine warfare. 13y returning the submarines to the Atlantic. lic was depriving himself o f a vital scrcen and resigning to spend the remainder o f the war in port.4" Admiral von Ingcnolil and Admiral Scheer ofthe German Imperial Navy cxercised mancuvcr warfare conccpts and tactics. Admiral Scheer did not l i m i t himself t o n strategic mancuvcr approach. Idcntifyiny an indirect approach to scouting. he used subrnarincs and Zeppelins to scout and screen his forccs in a hid to isolntc and destroy portions o f the Rritisli Grand Flcct. Rcpeated failure can largely he attributcd to poor execution and coordination and thc underlying sense o f Gcrman Navy inferiority. These tactics cxcrcised maneuver concepts, strengthened tlic lmpcrial Navy's hand and targeted Koyal Navy vu1ner;lbilities.

Mobilitv and Movement "The fimdamcntal tactical position is no longer delined by the geon~c,/ric relationship o f the opposing formations. but by an operu/iowcrl elcmcnt: the early detection o f lhe enemy [aulliors italics]."'" From the Age o f Oars l o World War I1 tactics were driven hy geometric

relationships, mobility and movcmcnt. Ramming, positioning windward or leeward, doubling, crossing the "'I-", ctc. dictated tactical advantage and held prccmincnce. Today operational f x t o r s hold tactical advantage and prccmincnce. Battle spacc, security, scouting, screening, etc. hold the day. 'l'his change 1x1s largely bccn driven by technology. Yet, to this day, in undersea warfare mobility, movcmcnt. speed and relativc position are still vital.

Anti-submarine wcapon and hull mountcd sonar ranges arc bcst measured in yards vice
~nilcs.When a surfacc ship i s starching for or prosecuting a submarine, even when using a towed array sonar. geometric relationships arc paramount. Anti-submarine helicopters and

airplanes have pushcd out search and attack ranges and eased the geometric relationships. Subniarine anti-ship and anti-submarine weapons have longer ranges then thcir shipboard cousins. Also, their sonars liavc grcatcr ranges. Howcvcr, thcy are still affected by mobility and movcmcnt constraints. Speed is'their crutch. As suhmarine spccd increases, submarine noise

increases and their sonar sensitivity is rcduced. This i s particularly acute ror nuclear submarines.
I)icscl submarine speed is further hampered by the limited capahilitics o f underwater nonnuclear propulsion systcms. lixploiting mobility and movemcnt offcrs a maneuver solution to a formidable antisubmarine warfare problem: diesel submarines in the littoral. Diesel submarines arc very quiet and difficult to lind in the noisier (comparcd to blue water) undersea environment in the littoral. 'They pose a significant threat. Diesel submarines have some weaknesses. They are slow (both underwater and surfaccd). must surface periodically to rccliarge batteries and liave limited

endurance.
I n 1993. Admiral William Owens proposcd a solution lo the littoral dicscl submarine problcm that is quite simple: lind out whcrc they are and don't go there. Specifically he said, "It may be enough to know whcrc thc other submarines arc. As long as they are not interfering with our primary mission: all wc nccd to know is wherc thcy arc and how to avoid thcni. Then they posc no threat to us and we can get on to more important things."" This concept is not ncw.

During the World War I1 ljattlc o f tlic Atlantic, exploiting Ultra sccrets and cryptanalysls, the Allies routcd convoys around German CI-boat and W o l f Pack locations. (As the war progressed, and assets could bc dcvotcd to olTensive sub~narinc operations, hunter/killcr groups were scnt to thcsc o f f limits ocean areas)': This tactic o f avoiding submarine waters i s wcll suitcd to a renewed conflict on the Korcan peninsula. North Korca poses a signiticant submarine threat. Tlicy possess a large dicscl

suhmarinc forcc. Many are very old and only marginally capable or obsolete. However, they havc over 20 boats which arc a Chinese version o f the Soviet's KOMEO class submarine. The oldcst o f these ROMEO boats is 23 years old. Thc bulk o f t l i e ROMEOShave been built i n North Korea with the latest commissioned in 1994.5' The ROMEO boat i s quite capablc and North Korean suhmarincrs have demonstrated some proficiency in undersea operations. As the Falklands War. bctween Great Rritair~ and Argentina, dcmonslrated, even a fcw suhmarincs can bc a signiticant drain on resources.'" North Korean submarincs are vulnerable to being simply "avoided." They arc vcry much
a coastal forcc and have limited bluc water capability. Funhermore, due to America's and South

Korca's quick dominance o f tlic air, the North Korcan submarine support infrastructure would soon collapse. Command and control Facilities should bc targctcd early on. I'ort and shore support facilities would follo\v soon aftcr. I n view of North Korca's poor equipment readiness and limited endurance, many o f her submarincs would be non-mission capahlc quickly. Hcncc, a campaign o f heavily dcfcnding key ports and convoy routes, while avoiding invested areas is advantagco~~s to the U.S. Furtliermorc, pulling North Korcan boats out o f the littoral to blue water also promotcs U S . Navy

strength^.'^

A qucstion may come up, "How does the 1J.S. Navy measure success if i t is not sinking submarines?" As mentioned in Chapter I,this is frequently looked at as a rnaneuverist problcm. The answer is simplc: by mission accomplishment. If the mission is resupply South Korea and if thc North Korean or Chincsc submarines can hc avoided and supply ships are reaching South Korcan ports unmolested, mission accomplished. Succcss is measured hy the number o f ships that safely reach port. Even tliougli thc U.S. Navy complctcly dominates the North Korean Navy i t may not he necessary to run in and sink cvcry North Korean submarine. This would be an attrition solution.

\vhich the U S . Navy would win. Yet, an indirect approach may be less costly, rctairl the initiative and achieve the samc mission results. As dctailcd above a maneuver solution is available.

maneuver Despite rnancuvcr warfare's emphasis on initiative, Melee and Aufiragstak~ik, warfiire cannot seize these concepts as its own. Initiative. Melcc and Aufirugstukfik arc not the sole domain o f maneuver warf;lrc. These ideas cross a11 theories o f warfare. Maneuver warfare proponents and theorists deserve a lot o f credit for pronouncing these critically important concepts. H o w v c r . no one thcory can call these conccpts their own. Maneuver warfare influences leadership by emphasizing thc imporlance o f leadership and promoting sound leadership theories. The appropriate relationship is warfare thcory is the tool ofthe leader. 'l'he lcader must select the right thcory o f combinations o f theories to apply. Given circumstances demand different applications o f thcory. 1,cadcrship impacts theory, not the other way around.

'NDP I, Naval Warfarc (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 28 March 1994). 40. 'Samuel Eliot Morison, Histow o f IJnitcd Stales Naval Owrations in World War 1 1 , Volumc V. The Slriwnle Tor Guadalcanal (Hoston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1984), 331. 'Ibid., 329 'Ibid., 3 V'rank Uhlig, I l o w Navies Fight. The U.S. Navvand its Allies (Annapolis, M D : Naval Institute Press. 1994). 2 17. W a y n e 1'. Hughes, Jr.. Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, M D : Naval Institute Press, 1986), 1 18. 'Ibid,

XMorison.4. 9Hughcs. 123 and Morison, 3 15. 'OMorison. 3 15. "Edwin 1'. Hoyt, The Cilorv of the Solomon (New York: Stein and Day Publisher, 1983). 135.

"Morison, 3 15. "Hughes. 1 I9 and I-loyt, 42-43.

"Hughcs, 124. "According to 1L13. I'ottcr. Moosehurger used Arlcigh Burke's battle plan." E. H. Potter, ed. Sea Powcr: A Naval I-liston, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, l%?l), 313.

"NDP 1; 40. "Raoul Castcx. Stratccic Theories: trans. Eugenia C. Keisling (Annapolis. MI): Naval Institute Press, 1994). 127-183.

"Robert K. Massic. Drendnourht (Ncw York: Random tlouse, 1991). 181. "lbid. %id. '"Castex. 133.

'"Arthur J. Marder; From the Dreadnourht to Scana Flow, Volume 11. Thc War Years: To the Eve of Jutland (1.ondon: Oxford University Press, 1965). 43. Marder paints a slightly different picture of Von 'l'ripitz. Quoting Van Tripit2 post-war memoirs hc credits Von 'l'ripitz with promoting a "...policy of'continual activity' and 'minor succcsscs"' to force the Grand Fleet (Royal Navy) to seek out the High Seas Fleet. "Castex, 140.

"Mardcr, 60-64.

"Marder, 420

"'lhid.. 425

"Mardcr, 444-5.

"Castex, 168-9. '",arry H. Addington. 'The Patterns of War Sincc the Eiehteenlh Crnturv (Indianapolis, ID: Indiana Univcrsity Press. 1994), 152. "Bernard 1). Claxton, John M. Gunchcff, and Jeffcry J. Pollcs, Tralilcar and Jutland: A Studv in the Princinle of War (Montgomery, Al.: Maxwell Air Force Base, Air Command and Staff Collegc. 1985), 39-43,66.

5"Giuseppe Fioravanzo, Naval Tactical 'l'houcht (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979). 209.

"Joscph Lodmell, "It Only Takes Onc." Proceedines 122 (Annapolis, Institutc, December 1996), 33. "Uhlig, 158-61, 185. 'Todmell, 30. "Uhlig, 369-370 and l.odmell, 30. 55120dmell, 33.

M I ) : US.Naval

CI-IAPTER SIX CONCL.USIONS

Mancuvcr warfare theory and design can be applied to naval tactics and battle; naval baalc is not the solcly in the domain ofattrition warfare. Mancuvcr warfare goes beyond mass and attacks an enemy's will and cohesion. This is accomplished primarily by cithcr using movement and mobility to increase your combat powcr in rclntion to the encmy's, or by
'

identifying the enemy's sourccs of strcngth, his weaknesses and attacking his vulncrabilities. In Chapter One these themes were developed as the basic and cxpandcd themes of maneuver warfare. Despite leaps in technology, such as over-the-horizon targeting and weapons, the basic theme of maneuver warfarc still applics to today's naval tactics--although typically ovcr a broader area. Friendly comhurpower cun he increu.d in relation to the enemy hy mohility and movement. This is apparent in surface clashcs as wcll as undcrsca battle. movement and mobility, at the tactical level, may isolatc pan of an enemy force away from adequatc suppon or pcrbaps the cover of shore based protection--missiles or aircraft. Regarding submarine warfarc, tlic hnsic theme is even more potent. Anti-submarine warrarc is still a "close" tight. Effective reconnaissance and

screening will idcntify the threat and enable high value units to be vectored

out of danger. Avoiding dispcrsion and concentrating tire powcr, facilitatcd by movement and mobility, arc also kcy clements of naval tactics. 'I'hcsc arc only a fcw examples. Aspects of t11c basic theme, movement and mobility and increasing your combat power in rclation to the enemy, occur throughout naval tactics.
77

In today's tactical environment the expanded theme of maneuver warfarc offcrs thc most potential. Technology has bccn a significant inipctus i n promoting this theme. The expanded theme, Ihe search for an indirect approach and seeking to reduce the enemy's combat powcr is indispensable. As with the idea of Melee and Auftrap~akik, this concept is not limitcd to maneuver warfare. Identifying an enemy's strengths, vulnerabilities and wcakncsscs can be applied throughout the spectrum of warfare theory. It is this maneuver concept--determining strcngths and starching for weaknesses and \,olncrabilitics--that tclls a mmcu\*cristwhen he must resort to attrition warfare or even guerilla warfire. Specifically, the expanded theme can he applied to naval tactics. At the tactical lcvcl the naval commander can evaluate enemy sources of strength, vulnerabilities and wcakncsscs. This is precisely what Captain Arleigh Burke did in the South Pacilic. I-leexploited an enemy's weaknesses and vulnerabilitics, reduced their combat power. and defeated him. Enemy combat po)vc!r con he rcxhrcc!d I J determining ~ his smmglhs mnd exploiting his weuknc..s.sc~.s and vrrlneruhilities. Maneuver warfare is another tool the naval commander brings to the tight. It applics to all levels of naval warfare. strategic and operational.' as well as the tactical level. While the attrition nature of contact with the enemy is unavoidable. maneuver warfare cannot bc overlooked. I t allows the commander to tight smarter. Warfare is very much an art. 'fhc successful commander must know his tools, and he prepared to exploit each to the fullest. Maneuver warfare is a powerfill tool that can contribute to the strategic, operational and tactical light. This thcsis has idcntificd scvcral important thcmcs. Frcqucntly, tlirougl~out the work maneuver warfare's relationship to other thcorics has bccn addrcsscd. The following recurring thcmcs appcarcd: ( I ) mancuvcr warfarc may not be the only answer or solution, (2) mancuvcr

warfare docs not always apply. (3) maneuvcr bvarfnre is an earned right, and (4) the relationship between maneuvcr and attrition i s more complcx than good versus had. I t is critical to understand these very important themes. I n many ways they help dctine the limits o f maneuver warfarc. Attrition warfarc is thc most basic form o f warfare. Slugging it out--mass against mass-is the base form o f combat. When facing a much wcakcr opponent it is very cffcctive. Overwhelming force typically carries the day. As odds even or when facing a stronger opponent, the limitations bccomc apparent. As stated earlier, mancuver warfare goes beyond mass and attacks an enemy's w i l l and cohesion. What if friendly forces cannot exploit movement o f mobility to increase their combat powcr? What if friendly forces havc no mcans ofgetting at an enemy's sources o f strength, o f

exploiting the enemy's weakncsscs and vulnerabilities'? Maneuvcr warfarc denlands freedom o f
maneuver or an ability to gct at the enemy's vulncrabilitics and sources of strength. When two evenly matchcd opponents square off, thesc conditions may not exist. Even wlicn forces are not evenly matclicd, as in the Atlantic during World Wars I and 1 1 : mass versus mass may he the only avenue t o victory. The apprcciation o f t h e limits o f each typc ofwarfare facilitates the conclusion that one
rype is not good while the other is bud. Clearly, each warfarc tlicory has strengths and

weaknesses. Mancuvcr warhre can he declared a "bcttcr" Sorm d w a r f a r e or cvcn more cfticicnt. NDP 1 draws that specitic conclusion: "Naval ibrces

. . . 11avc used the preferable and

more cffective--albeit more difficult to mastcr--fighting style known as mancuvcr warfare."' Yet. this docs not makc maneuver warlire good whilc othcr theories, specifically attrition warfarc. are bad.

Gcncral William Dcl'11y illuminates thc relationship bctwccn nlancuvcr warfare and attrition warfare. I-lc rclatcs his cxpcricnces i n World War I1 in a speech presented to the U S . Army infantry Oficer Advance Course in October 1989. He captures how the Allies brokc out ofNormandy. and for a month and a halrand enjoyed freedom of maneuver. Ilowever, ". . . they ran out of gas (Iitcrally), thc Cicrmans rallicd, and thc war rcturncd to the attrition mode."' hc pauscs to balancc attrition warfare against mancuvcr warfarc, Here

". . . [attrition vs. maneuver

warfare] is not an intellectual choice. The same generals who so brilliantly dashed across Francc wcrc suddcnly forccd back into conducting attrition warfare. Nobody doubts that General George Patton prcfcrrcd mancuvcr warfarc, but mancuvcr warfarc is not a doctrinal choice; it is an earned hcncfit."' . Perhaps, the most important aspcct hcrc is that mancuvcr warfare is an earned right. A

commander cannot simply choose maneuver. He must impose his will on the cncmy and wrestle the right of freedom of maneuver from the enemy commander. Chapter four briefly explored each service's military culture. Simihr to service cultures, military forces have a collcctivc culturc. This collective military culture defines a nation's ~nilitary.Military culturc is a product of a nation's histon., success and failures, sizc, geography and the nation's culture, among other stimuli. Military culture is based on hard realities and tradition. It is difficult to always distinguish where hard rcalitics and traditions diverge. Typically, thcy dcvclop hand in hand. Hard rcalitics andlor traditions includc: maritime vice continental nation, large populations vice small, wcstcrn vicc castcrn intlucnccs. land locked vice ocean access: industrialized vice agrarian, neighboring bullies vice isolatcd, history of victory or failurc, ctc. All thcsc issucs and many morc fccd a nation's military culture.

The dominant U.S. military culture liom the Civil War through Vietnam was an attrition oriented culture. Today a maneuver oriented culture is most prevalent. 'l'ablc 6-1 summarizes and compares these two cultures. It is very important to recognize that maneuver warfarc and attrition warfare are common to both cultures. In many ways, tlic transition from an attrition culture to a maneuver culture has been a developing relationship bctwccn attrition warfarc and mancuver warfare thcory. Thc primary diffcrcncc bctwccn thc two culturcs is a matter of emphasis--attrition warfare based, while maneuver culture is mancuvcr warfarc based. Both culture is a~trition warfarc thcorics havc influcnccd America at war. Examples of maneuver warfare can bc found in tlic Spanish-American War. World War 11 and Korean War, though America's dominant culture during these conflicts was attrition based.' Similarly, attrition and maneuver aspccts arc present in the Gulf War of 1990-91, which was fought under a professed maneuver culturc.

Tablc 3. Attrition Culture Versus Maneuver Culture Past Attrition Culture - Attrition warfare based - Accepts maneuver warfare - Cnpitalixs on U.S. strengtl~s strength, - Economic power important

Today Maneuver Culture - Maneuver warfarc bascd - Recognizes attrition warfare - Conccpt of ccntcr of gravity, source of
weaknesses and vulnerabilities critically

11 1

- Rccognizcd limits of technology - Mass and lircpowcr cnipliasis

- Large country - Industrialized

- Suits advances in technology - lmpctus includes: - Approaching parity with IJSSK in '80's - Dil'liculties of limited wars - Post Cold-War downsizing - Failure in Vietnam

I n the past the general trend was attrition, dcspitc brilliant theorists and practitioners o f mancuvcr warfarc. A n attrition culture suited the U.S. well. The U.S. capitalized on its

strengths with an attrition culturc: strong national will, cconomic powerhouse, industrialized giant, large population, firepower oriented forces, etc. Also, within thc limits o f past technology, it was difticuk to fully exploit maneuver theory. Maneuver warfare still played an important role and frequently was exploited at all levels o f war--tactical, operational and strategic. I-lowever, mass vs. mass and attrition best characterized past conllicts. Maneuver oriented culturc movcd to the forefront toward the end o f the Cold War. 'The Cold War itself was part o f the impetus to change. As thc USSR approached parity or superiority with U.S. and N A T O forces, changes in doctrine and tactics were necessary to counter thc Sovict threat. Also, technolog> was a significant driving factor. Advances i n

technology cxpandcd battlespace dramatically and new wcakncsscs and vulncrabilitics bcgan to
appear and could bc targctcd. Another impetus to change was losing the Vietnam War and a resulting search for answers. I n turn. thc cnd o f thc Cold War and the rise in importance o f 1.imitcd Wars and Military Operations Other 'l'han War (MOOTW) demandcd ncw solutions and also supported a shift to maneuver culture. The old attrition culturc was not suitcd to and could not stand up to this changing environment. C:onccpts central to maneuver warfare--indirect approach, sourccs ofstrcngth. weaknesses and vulnerabilities--were adoptcd and promotcd by thc military. U.S. military culture shilied to
; I maneuver

bascd idca.

As U S . military culturc has evolved, t i d s and passing trends h a w challcngcd military culture and been an impctus to change. Shortly after World War 11 an atomic culturc challcngcd the attrition culture. The atomic culturc forsook conventional warrare. Proponents declared the mighty A-bomb and strategic bombing wcrc all thc United States needed. The atomic culture won many convcrts and influenced military development, acquisition and doctrine. As a direct

result the [Jnited States was unprepared for the Korean War." The atomic culture did not recognize conventional wartire and was shortsighted and a failure. Maneuver culture faces a new challcngcr: precision culture. Table 4 compercs maneuvcr culture with a devcloping school of thought--precision culture. I'recision culture is based on maneuver warfare with heavy emphasis on tcclinology, mass and firepower. The chief

Table 4. Maneuver Culture Versus Precision Culture Present Maneuver Culture - Maneuver warfare hased - Accepts attrition warfare - Concept of center of gravity, source of strength, approach, weaknesses and vulnerabilities critically important - Suits advances in technology lmpct~~ includes: s - Failure in Vietnam - Approaching parity \vitli IJSSR in '80's - Post Cold-War downsizing - Difficulties of limited wars Challenger Precision Culture - Maneuver warfare based - Does not fully recognize attrition, accepts mass and tirepower does not accept protracted attrition - Ileavy emphasis on technology, mass and firepower - Key limiting casualties and damage Impetus includes: - Gulf War success - Western values - l'echnological advances - Perceived weak public will

difrerences are assumptions. Precision culturc assumes technology is the prime answer and America will only stomach short battles with limited casualties and damage. Attrition warfare is only partially accepted. Precision culture supports attrition warrare patterns of niass vs. mass and heavy lirepower, yet only for a short duration. Long allrition conflicts are discounted. I:urthermore, precision culture also reflects western values i.e. the sanctity of human life and the idea that war is bad and must always be avoided.

'I'he precision culture's heavy reliance on technology suits America's military tcchnology advantage over thc rcst o f thc world. Thc Econoniist magazine recently published an article on the current lechnology and information revolution affecting military affairs. The article

concluded, "Amcrica is likely to maintain its huge lead, at least until or unless a richer China or a
revived Russia pushes itself into competition. . . . Eithcr way, the military [technology and information] revolulion w i l l grcatly cxpand Amcrican po\ver in the years ahead."' The dangcr is relying too heavily on technology and not recognizing its limitations. Similar to thc limitations o f atomic wcapons. tcchnology has limitations. While technology allows America to dominate the battlefield, it cannot solvc cvcry prohlcm. For cxample, when a communications node is a soldier on a donkey, intclligcncc satellites and ground stations cannot intercept communications and elcctronic jammcrs cannot jam it or shut it down. When facing low tech armies or insorgcnccs. high technology may not have answers or solutions.

Proponents o f t h c precision culture feel that America w i l l not support a long. costly
attrition struggle. They point to the bombing o f the 1J.S. Marinc barracks in Hcirut, Lcbanon or the U.S. Army Rangers debacle in Somalia. High casualties, they contend h r c e d America out. The lessons from Beirut and Somalia arc morc-comnlcx. Amcrican national w i l l did not crodc solely because o f t h c loss o f lifc. National w i l l crodcd because [J.S. military involvement could not effectively be tied to Amcrican national intcrcsts. Amcricans could not answer "why are m y sons and daughters in harm's way?" I n 1987 thirty-scvcn sailors were killed in the Arabian Gulf, when their frigate, USS
Stark, was struck hy an Exocet missile fired by a carclcss Iraqi pilot? Elcvcn months latcr

another liigate patrolling in thc Arabian Gulf. USS Sumriel 11. Noberts, \vas struck by a minc and severely damaged. In 1996 scvcntccn airmcn wcrc killcd whcn a terrorist dctonatcd a bomb outside an American military complex in Saudi Arabia. While these incidents precipitated an

evaluation o f America's continued presence in the Middle East, America did not pull out. Thc American people could answer the question "why are m y sons and daughters in harm's way i n thc Arabian Ciult?" American presence was tied directly to vital national interests. America's national w i l l remains strong where 1J.S. vital national interests are at stake. I n addition to ovcr lificcn ycars o f activc and highly visible presence i n the Arabian Gulf,0 America has dcmonstratcd hcr strong national w i l l in other struggles. Examples include, thc Cold War and the continued presence o f American troops--in harm's way--in South Korca. Both these struggles stretch back more than a generation. The Cold War endcd in 1991, while the Korean conflict continues. Again, vital national interests were (and still are i n Korea) at stake. American national w i l l can stoniach the long haul, again, when vital national intcrcsts arc involved. This counters thc argument, often presented by supports o f prccisio~i culturc, that I)cscrt Storm has conditioned the American public to cxpcct a short, limited casualty war. Dcscrt Storm was a quick and startling success; undeniably, future success and failures w i l l be measured in the shadow o f 1)csert Storm. However, when justifiable. the American public w i l l support the long haul and an attrition struggle. This leads to the most serious fallacy o f thc precision culture. The precision culture does not accept thc long attrition struggle. I'recision culture holds that wars must he short, with limited casualtics and damage. These are very admirable goals. Hut similar to the quest for frccdom o f maneuver, the enemy has a say. A tenacious, determined foe may continue to fight rcgardless o f our technological advantagc in smart wcapons and precision munitions. Furthcrmorc, this determined foe may transition l o an unconventional war. Thc shortcomings o f a precision culture are vcry scrious. Many o f its assumptions are faulty. Dcspitc America's huge military advantage, protccting and prcscwing vital national intcrcsts may require a protracted attrition struggle.

Undcrstanding maneuver warfare theory and attrition warfire theory is indispensable to cxccuting the profcssion of arms. Thcsc thcorics apply to all lcvcls of naval warfarc, including thc tactical level. They also illuminate broader issues such as military culture.

1:11turc Kcscarch Ouestions Can we always choosc our fight and avoid thc attrition battle? This question desenres fi~rther research and effects all the services, The I J S . Army, I J S . Marinc Corps and now the

[J.S. Navy havc all graspcd maneuver warfire as their t:dvored style of warhre. I t is implied and
frequently stated that the U S . military will cxccutc mancuvcr warfarc. Howwcr, is it that simplc? Is cxccution of maneuver warfare always the purview of the friendly commander? Does the enemy have a say on whcthcr wc conduct maneuver warfare and how successful it will bc'? Exploring thc Battle of the Atlantic and General George Patton's drive across Europe would illuminate this subject. The Battle of thc Atlantic is thc classic attrition tight. Would we have fought it diffcrcntly with a maneuver approach to warfi~re?Gcncral Patton was clcarly a advocatc of mancuvcr warfare. Yet, he spent months locked in an attrition fight or lincar battlc tield during World War 11. Why was hc unahlc to impose maneuver o n the enemy? Does maneuver narfare represent a transitional form, an clcvatcd s t a y of warfarc apart from attrition warfare? Is attrition warfare a subsct of mancuvcr warfarc'? Whcrc docs prccision culture fit'? What is the impact of scrvicc (USAF. USMC, USN and USA) culture on joint opcrations and jointness'? As dcmonstratcd in Chapter 4, many aspects of service culture are a result of hard realities. Tradition and parochialism can bc dcalt with: howcvcr, thc hard realities of military culturc cannot be avoided. Flow do they influence joint opcrations and jointncss'? Are they
understood and properly addressed in today's environmenl?

Is technology diminishing the distinction between landpower. seapowcr. spaccpower and airpower? What will be thc future implications? How do the diffcrcnces today affect joint opcrations? And whcrc do the new tcrms and concepts information warfarc or information operations fit in? A mancuvcr study ofthc Solomon Campaign may prove very enlightcning. Hughes, Ixanord and Fisher all concludc that maneuver warfare is hest suited for operational art or the operational level of war. Yct: at the operational lcvcl, the Solomon campaign was clearly an attrition battle. Perhaps, thcrc were maneuver solutions yet, preliminary research suggests they cluded Admiral Gormly and Admiral Halsey. I lowevcr, at the tactical lcvcl maneuver warfare actions are clearly present. I lughcs concludes (without addressing mancuver warfare) that, in part, the Solomon Campaign was won when, "Thc U S . Navy found thc tactics to match its radar advantage and ncutralize the enemy's torpedo advantage." He continues, "Good sensors and scouting could overcome better lirepowcr.""' Accepting the expanded dcfinition of maneuver warrare. this is clearly a tactical maneuver warfarc solution. Thc Solonion Campaign would prove 21 vcry interesting mancuver study at tlic tactical and operational level. What bcttcr salute to the gallant nien that gave their lives in that bloody campaign but, to learn from their sacrifice.

'Timothy A. Fisher, "Maneuver: Where Docs it 1:it in Operational Art." (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1996) arid Matthew J. Kolcr, "Maneuver by thc U.S. Navy in the 20th Ccntury L3lue-Water Operations: Selected Historical Examples." (Masters Thesis. IJSACGSC. Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1996).
'US. Navy, NDI' I, Naval Warfarc (Washington, D C : U S . Government Printing Office, 28 March 1994), 33.

'DePuy. William E. "Infantry Cornhat." Army Infmitry School, March-April 1990), 0.

80, no. 3 (Fort Benning, GA: U.S.

'An cxarnple o f maneuver warfare during the Spanish-American War is not dispersing thc fleet to defend a poorly defended US. coast linc and ports. It was feared Spain might send her fleet to attack the U.S. coastlinc and ports. Many politicians and leaders called for a cruiser in cvcry port. Instead, under Captain Alfred 'fhaycr Mahan's direction on the War Roard, the . U S . posturcd to send ; Ipowerful lleet to Spanish waters. Spain, whose own ports were poorly derended, abandoncd any idea o f threatening 1J.S. ports. Admiral Dcwy's action in thc Pacific, quickly destroying thc Spanish Pacitic fleet in Manila was a rnancuvcr strokc. Hc dcstroycd thc lleet herorc it finishcd war preparations and \vliile i t was vulncrablc in Manila Uay. World War IIexamples include bypassing islands in the pacitic and General Patton's drive across Europe. Inchon is an examplc o f maneuver wartiare during the Korean War.

Teter Paret. 1 jl'rinceton. NJ: Princeton Llnivcrsity Press, I986), 735-778. '"The Futurc o f Warfare: Select Enemy, Deletc,"
I8.

(1.ondon: 8 March 1997).

BFrank Uhlig, How Navies Firht. 'l'lic US. Navv and its Allies (Annapolis, M D : Naval Institute Press, 1994), 382. "America has maintaincd a military presence in the Arabian Ciulf sincc tlic 1940s. I-lowcvcr, it was not until the fall o f the Shah o f Iran that this presence became highly visible and ;~ctive. The announcement o f the Carter Doctrinc, the Iran-Iraqi war. the Quasi-war with Iran ;uid thc G u l f War have ensured American intcrcst rcrnains high. "Wayne Huglics: Jr.. 1:leet Tactics: Theorv and Practicc (Annapolis. MI): Naval Institute Press, 1986). 127.

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