The metaphysics of time in the prose of Jorge Luis Borges This article discusses one of the key philosophical

elements in Jorge Luis Borges stories and essays the distortion of time. The analysis of the question of time in Borges prose will be based on the investigation into the influences that diverse schools and philosophical figures had in the works of the writer, highlighting Buddhism, Idealism and the theories of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Isaac Newton and David Hume. The purpose is to situate Borges thought on time among these philosophical traditions and to highlight certain contradictions within his ideas, seen in the context of the metaphysics of time. Keywords: Jorge Luis Borges, fantastic time, circular time, atemporality

1. An introduction to the enigma of time The metaphysics of time is a branch of philosophy of time, which studies the concept of time from manifold perspectives, for instance - the perspective of the topology, the ontology, the direction and the flow of time, among others. The necessity for this subdivision into different disciplines within the metaphysics of time can be grasped better if we compare the study of time to a detective investigation. If we were detectives trying to find the truth behind a certain mystery, we would start our investigation by trying to answer the questions that the mystery poses. The same pattern is applied by the philosophers in the great investigation of the mystery of time. Each of the mentioned disciplines in the study of time harbors a whole lot of questions on the nature of time. For instance, the topology of time revolves around the philosophical question of the finiteness of time, the fundamental one being is time finite or infinite? Consequently, if time is finite, does it have a beginning and will it have an end or does it rather have a circular structure? Other questions raised by philosophers belong to the branch of ontology: is time a substance, a real thing that exists independently of its inhabitants or is it a mere system of relations among those inhabitants? Finally, if our philosopher-detective would wish to question the direction or the flow of time from a metaphysical perspective, he or she could ask: Are the past and the future as real as the present? And - is the flow of time a real feature of the world or is it an illusion? (Van Inwagen, 2007) But how exactly is the metaphysics of time related to the works of the Argentine writer? It happens so that not only is the notion of time one of the central topics in Borges prose, but his understanding of the concept of time has been formed under the influence of diverse philosophical schools as well. As a consequence, Borges himself often engages in philosophical discourse. He describes time as a jarring, urgent problem, perhaps the most vital problem of metaphysics (a history of eternity 123, non-fictions) and believes that the fundamental mysteries of mankind [are] the origin of the Library [the Universe] and of time (the library of babel, 115, fictions). The authors fascination with time imbues his numerous fantastic stories and essays. His fiction and philosophy-inspired essays propound thorough analysis and vivid portrayal of some of the most important problems of the metaphysics of time, such as the above mentioned problems of the topology, the ontology, the direction and the flow of time.

2. Borges and the philosophy of time

Borges prose reveals his extensive philosophical knowledge. The authors passion for philosophy is asserted not only in his philosophical essays, but also in the plots of his stories, which abound in philosophical ideas. Regarding the philosophy of time, Borges frequently discusses oriental philosophy (chiefly Buddhism), Platonism, Spinozas and Leibnizs rationalism, Berkeleys subjective idealism and Humes empiricism. Apart from this, Borges oftentimes canvasses the ideas of Kant, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, as well as the scientific theories of George Cantor and Albert Einstein. On the one hand, the majority of authors reflections on the nature of time stem from Buddhist philosophy. Borges interest in Buddhism began early in his writing career: in 1936 he published a book of essays dedicated to the question of time, under the title A History of the Eternity (Oviedo, 2002: 288). As indicated by the very title of the book, what appeals to Borges in Buddhist philosophy above all is the notion of infinite time, in other words - eternity. On the other hand, a considerable part of Borges thought on time derives from: 1) George Berkeleys subjective idealism, a philosophical approach which oppugns the reality of the matter; and 2) from empiricism of David Hume, who adopts Berkeleys arguments so as to infer the inexistence of the spirit. Borges decides to make a step forward and, drawing on Berkeleys and Humes arguments, attempts to refute the reality of time. These diverse philosophical concepts that have influenced Borges work share certain similarities, but obviously enough, they present many contrasting elements: Buddhist philosophy argues for the infinite time, while Berkeleys and Humes arguments lead Borges to conclude that not only time is not infinite, but rather it is not real at all. It is an illusion! Could it be credible, then, that Borges was an avid follower of two disparate theories of time? If we strive to solve this puzzle, we have to expose and analyze the philosophical resources Borges incorporated in his prose and his own perspective on the fundamental questions of the metaphysics of time. 3. The topology of time in Borges prose: the eternal cycles The topology of time is a branch of metaphysics which addresses the problem of the finiteness of time; in other words, it offers diverse hypothesis in regard to the beginning and the end of time (Arsenijevi, 2003: 59). According to the standard topology, time is defined as an infinite one-dimensional linear continuum, or put in simple words it has a structure of a line

(Arsenijevi, 2003: 63). Nevertheless, there are other, non-standard topologies of time. One of them is the topology of a line segment, according to which time has a beginning and an end; there is also the topology of a ray, which argues that time has a beginning or an end; the topology of a circle, according to which time is infinite and circular, without having a beginning or an end; and the topology of a branched line, according to which time is a multidimensional non-linear continuum. (Arsenijevi, 2003: 60). For the sake of our argument, it is important to determine which of these topologies Borges advocated. The answer is: none of them. Despite the fact that Borges originally based his philosophical discourse on the topology of a circle, he ended up altering it significantly. Borges became acquainted with various philosophical theories that deal with the topological problem of time, especially with the ones that delineate time as an infinite circular continuum, such as the Greek, the Nietzschean and the Buddhist philosophy. Moreover, the Argentinean writer was so interested in the concept of circular time that he dedicated two essays to this particular topic The Doctrine of Cycles (1984) and The Circular Time (1984a). However, he did not consider that any kind of circular time could be possible. Specifically, he couldnt make sense of the philosophical theories that argue for identical cycles of time, in which events happen over and over again in an identical manner. As a result, Borges dismissed Platos idea that at the end of each Platonic year, the same individuals will be born again and will live out the same destinies (The Circular Time, 1. strana). In addition to this, the author attempted to refute the eternal return of the Nietzschean man as well. He begins with exposing Nietzsches doctrine of eternal return. Namely, Nietzsche claims that the number of all the atoms that compose the world is immense but finite, and as such only capable of a finite [] number of permutations. [As a consequence], the universe has to repeat itself. Once again you will be born from a belly, once again your skeleton will grow, once again this same page will reach your identical hands [] (The doctrine of Cycles 135) Borges then proceeds to refute Nietzschean eternal return with scientific arguments, by drawing on Cantors infinite sets theory and the second law of thermodynamics, also known as entropy. Borges concludes that if [according to Cantor] the universe consists of an infinite number of terms, it is rigorously capable of an infinite number of combinations and the need for a Recurrence is done away with. (Doctrine of Cycles, 137) Moreover, Borges claims, entropy shows us that light [in the universe] is gradually lost in the form of heat [] At some point, [the universe] will no longer be

anything but heat: an equilibrium of immobile, evenly distributed heat. Then [the universe] will have died. [] This inoffensive or insipid-seeming proof annuls the "circular labyrinth" of the Eternal Return. (The doctrine of Cycles, 122). These were, in brief, the arguments Borges drew on in order to rebut those philosophical ideas that argue for the eternal return of the universe and its elements. Be that as it may, although opposed to the cyclical repetition of identical histories, Borges (The circular time, 394?) believed that it was possible to accept the cyclical topology of time in one particular case: if we speak not of identical temporal cycles, but of similar ones. A multitude of authors and theories had impact on Borges preference of the topology of similar cycles, among them Heraclitus, Marcus Aurelius, Spengler and Schopenhauer (Borges, 1984a: 394-395 the circular time). Nonetheless, it appears that oriental philosophies had the most profound influence on the writer. Namely, together with Alicia Jurado, Borges wrote a book dedicated to the Buddhist religion, under the name Qu es el budismo. Among other important Buddhist ideas, Borges in this book oftentimes discusses one of the crucial concepts in Buddhist philosophy the reincarnation. Buddhism, says Borges, preaches that each person is trapped in the wheel of Samsara, an infinite circle of birth and dying, where each rebirth or reincarnation - of a person depends on the good or the bad things they have done in their past lives (Borges y Jurado, 2013). The conclusion drawn from the theory of reincarnation is that people live in similar cycles, not identical ones, since each individual is reborn in a new form of existence, different from the past one. In regard to his inclination towards Buddhist topology of time, Borges (El inmortal, 191) posits: In my view, the Wheel conceived by certain religions in Hindustan is much more plausible; on that Wheel, which has neither end nor beginning, each life is the effect of the previous life and engenderer of the next, yet no one life determines the whole. Now we can finally answer with certainty which topology Borges advocates. As we have seen, he argues for similar cosmic cycles. However, these cyclical repetitions do not presuppose finiteness of time. On the contrary, the cycles repeat in different times and therefore time remains open. (Arsenijevi, 2003: 64). This kind of topology of time could be represented diagrammatically:

Imagen 1 (Borke, 2003): the fractal structure of circular infinity Image 1 depicts the topology of an open circular time comprised of circles forming a fractal line. By travelling across one cycle, the traveller wont reach the point of departure; on the contrary, he or she will enter a new cycle. In short, the travellers route would resemble the form of a number eight (8). Since the travellers route is an open fractal structure, he or she could continue travelling infinitely in similar circles. 3.1. Labyrinths and mirrors in Borges stories as symbols of an infinite circular time Borges work is famous for its recurrent themes of labyrinths and mirrors. Of course, as it is usually the case in literary theory and criticism, both themes have been the objects of a wide variety of interpretations. For example, the theme of labyrinths in Borges stories can be interpreted as a Buddhist symbol emphasizing the importance of the road taken rather than the destination (Stojakovi, 1989: 137) and as the symbol of chaos (Weber, 1968: 133). Nonetheless, since a labyrinth is, in its essence, a network of different paths, it can also be considered a symbol of Borges topology of an open circular time: circular, because the travel through a maze is repetitive one searches for the right part over and over again; and open in the sense that the road taken is never identical, on the contrary, there is a multitude of paths one can choose. However, finding ones way through a labyrinth can sometimes result impossible and one can

stay trapped in a maze forever. According to this, labyrinths in Borges prose sometimes also stand for closed circular time, which Borges, as we have already seen, considers repugnant. This interpretation coincides with Webers (1968: 133) claim that Borges labyrinth is a microcosm of an infinite circle. The symbolism of mirrors in Borges stories is twofold as well. On the one hand, being objects that multiply reflected images, they accentuate the concept of infinity. On the other hand, the multiplication of the image of a reflected individual transmits an image of a false plurality. This false projection, according to Borges (Tlon Ukbar 68) indicates that there is something monstrous about mirrors. [] Mirrors [] are abominable, for they multiply the number of mankind. This abominality and monstrosity is frequently presented through the mirrors that stand opposed to one another. They personify the horror of a monstrous, plural and false eternity, which Borges associates with Christian ideology. The themes of labyrinths and mirrors oftentimes appear in Borges collections of stories Fictions and El Aleph, one of the prime examples being the short story The Library of Babel. The labyrinth and the mirror in The Library of Babel allude to the possibility that the universe could have an infinite and open labyrinth-like structure: The universe (which others call the Library) is composed of an indefinite, perhaps infinite number of hexagonal galleries. [] One of the hexagon's free sides opens onto a narrow sort of vestibule, which in turn opens onto another gallery, identical to the first-identical in fact to all. [] In the vestibule there is a mirror, which faithfully duplicates appearances [and] burnished surfaces are a figuration and promise of the infinite. [] The Library is unlimited but periodic. (Library of Babel 112, 118) Another example of symbolism of mirrors and labyrinths is the story Death and the Compass. The house in the Villa Triste-Le-Roy in Death and the Compass is another infinitely circular labyrinth. However, contrary to the labyrinth-like universe in The Library of Babel, this labyrinth - house is closed and terrifying. Moreover, the horror of finiteness is reiterated by the facing mirrors alluding to the imaginary infinity: Lonnrot explored the house. Through foyers that opened onto dining rooms and on through galleries, he would emerge into identical courtyard, often the same courtyard. He climbed dusty stairs to circular antechambers; he would recede infinitely in the facing mirrored walls; he wearied of opening or half opening windows that revealed to him, outside, the same desolate garden from differing heights and differing angles. (Death and the Compass 154) Having had this dreadful experience of being imprisoned,

Lnnrot confirms what has already been insinuated in the story: I sensed that the world was a labyrinth, impossible to escape (154). Another story that introduces the themes of labyrinths and mirrors, seen in the context of topology of an infinite circular time, is The Immortal. The Immortal describes the narrators endeavours to reach the city of the immortals, which appears to be a circular labyrinth. Again, the immortality of the people hints at infiniteness of time they live in: I descended the ladder and made my way through a chaos of squalid galleries to a vast, indistinct circular chamber. Nine doors opened into that cellar-like place; eight led to a maze that returned, deceitfully, to the same chamber; the ninth led through another maze to a second circular chamber identical to the first. (The Immortal 187). In continuation, the symbol of a mirror is introduced, underlining the themes of immortality and infinity. The idea that mirrors symbolize immortality and infinity is affirmed by the words of the narrator himself: There is nothing that is not as though lost between indefatigable mirrors. Nothing can occur but once, nothing is preciously in peril of being lost. (The Immortal, 192). There are other stories that exemplify the theme of labyrinths, such as The Garden of Forking Paths, The Theme of the Traitor and the Hero y The Two Kings and the Two Labyrinths. In these stories labyrinths once again epitomize the universe of an open, infinite and circular time. The Garden of Forking Paths tells the story of Tsui Pn, a man obsessed with time, who wants to write a novel with a temporal structure resembling an infinite labyrinth. But what kind of temporal structure could possibly resemble an infinite labyrinth? The narrator reveals us, at this point the unsurprising answer [] I had wondered how a book could be infinite. The only way I could surmise was that it be a cyclical, or circular, volume, a volume whose last page would be identical to the first, so that onemight go on indefinitely. (The Garden of Forking Paths, 125). Labyrinth symbolizing circular time emerges as a motif in the story The Theme of the Traitor and the Hero. Here, Borges (The Theme of the Traitor and the Hero, 144) gives a singular name to the parallelisms in history, for instance the similarities in the circumstances of deaths of great historical figures Cesar and Lincoln. He calls these parallelisms circular labyrinths. Another story worth mentioning, where labyrinth figures as a symbol for circularity, is The Two Kings and the Two Labyrinths, for in this story, the second labyrinth is, ironically, a

desert; a vast, open, pathless desert, where a person, without being able to rely on any kind of signposts, ends up spinning in circles. Our investigation of the topology of time in Borges works is focused on the symbolism of labyrinths and mirrors; therefore, we will not analyze any further those stories that, although speaking of circular time, dismiss the motifs of labyrinths and mirrors. However, it is important to highlight that the notion of an infinite circular time permeates many other Borges stories, such as The Circular Ruins, Story of the Warrior and the Captive Maiden and The Writing of the God. 4.1. The ontology of time in Borges prose The ontology of time studies the mode of the existence of time. The two principal ontological suppositions in regard to the question of time are: 1) Time is absolute: Newton argues that the existence and the characteristics of time are not dependent on the physical world. According to Newton, time would continue to exist even if the physical sphere was destroyed. 2) Time is relative: Leibniz postulates that the structure of time depends on the physical aspect of the universe. Therefore, according to Leibniz, it is necessary that a change in time should exist so that the existence of time could be declared. (Arsenijevi, 2003: 77-79). Apart from these two ontologies of time, Arsenijevi (2003, 87) acknowledges a third ontological supposition, which he calls Leibnitz attenuated postulate. Leibnitz attenuated postulate could be illustrated in the following way: despite the fact that the existence of the physical world is necessary so as to declare the existence of space and time, the possibility that void space and time could exist must not be excluded. According to Arsenijevi (2003: 93), void time would be the time that exists beyond the physical world and could exist, as a consequence, before or after the birth of the physical world. Of course, the idea of void time existing beyond the physical sphere is not an invention of Arsenijevi. The same idea under a different name surfaces in other Platonic and Christian philosophy. Platonic and Christian parallels to void time are the eternal worlds preceding and following the mortal life. Exposing the theory of void time and highlighting its Platonic and Christian parallels of the eternal worlds is crucial for the understanding of Borges perspective on this particular topic, which he discloses in the essay A History of Eternity.

Borges begins his discussion on void time by pointing to the Platonic world of forms. In brief, according to Plato, the world of forms consists of the entities called forms or ideas, which are eternal and invariable and paradigmatic of the structure and character of the world. (Kraut, 2004) Interestingly enough, Borges disapproves of the Platonic world of forms, particularly of the immobility and invariability of the platonic eternity. Borges characterizes it as the motionless and terrible museum of the Platonic archetypes (History of Eternity 126) which to him seems icily remote (History of Eternity 129). Unsurprisingly, Borges is averse to the Christian variant of eternal world as well, denominating it a monster (History of Eternity 131). But what could have possibly led Borges to consider Christian eternity monstrous? To begin with, according to Christianity, the creation of the Holy Trinity (the Father engendering the Son and the Holly Spirit issuing from the two) did not occur in time, but it consumes past, present and future once and for all (History of Eternity 130). This singularity of times is nothing more than the Christian version of the eternity. However, if we want to admit Leibnizs conclusion that a change creates time, how can it be possible that the Christian generation (Father Son Holy Spirit), which obviously constitutes a kind of change, occurred outside of Leibnizs relative time, that is to say, how is it possible that it took place in void time, i. e. eternity? Obviously, a contradiction exists between the concept of the Holy Trinity, which connotes plurality and the concept of eternity, which hints at singularity. This contradiction could have inspired Borges to denominate the Christian eternity a monster. Another element of this monstrosity could be the problem of causality in the Christian creation. Namely, Christianity argues that the physical world, which is temporal and changing, originates from the eternal and atemporal world of the Holy Trinity. This, however, is not consistent with the concept of the temporal causality (Arsenijevi, 2003: 86). How could it be possible that a change derive from something unchanging? How could it be possible that immobility generate mobility? At this point, we can safely conclude that Borges rejects Leibniz debilitated postulate, the concept of the void time that antecedes the existence of the world. Now, let us take one step back and return to the basic theories of the ontology of time. Since weve established that Borges repudiates Leibniz debilitated postulate, could we determine whether he accepts either of the

10

two basic ontologies of time? Does Borges reflection on time coincide with Newtons or Leibnizs ontology of time? The truth is that Borges does not discuss openly either of the two ontologies. However, his essay Doctrine of the Cycles reveals that his understanding of time coincides with Newtons ontology of absolute time, even though he might very well not be aware of it. Namely, according to the writers opinion time is infinite to our intuition, so is space [ because] we go back to the first second and note that it requires a predecessor, and that that predecessor requires one as well, and so on infinitely (Doctrine of the Cycles 121). This phrase is essentially Borges affirmation of the existence of an infinite and absolute time that existed before the physical world, that exists with the physical world and that will exist after the physical world. 5. The flow of time in Borges work: atemporality or presentism? The flow is presumably the first thing that comes to our minds when we think about time. The fact that time flows appears to be its fundamental characteristic, or even its differentia specifica in regard to other one-dimensional and multidimensional entities (Arsenijevi, 2003: 151). I do not pretend to know what sort of thing time is-or even if it is a "thing"-but I feel that the passage of time and time itself are a single mystery and not two Borges (Time and J. W. Dunne, 219) asserts, thus revealing that he himself equates time with the course (or the flow) of time. Consequently, Borges attempts to refute time, exposed in the essay The new refutation of time, come down to the refutation of the flow of time. Refutation of the flow of time resembles McTaggarts theory of atemporality, which argues for the inexistence of times, respectively the past, the present and the future time. (Arsenijevi, 2003: 154-155). As a result, to say that Borges argues for the refutation of time is to say that Borges argues for atemporality. His supporting of the theory of atemporality is grounded in philosophical readings, the most significant influences being three philosophical concepts: George Berkeleys subjective idealism, David Humes empiricism and Leibnizs ontological principle of identitas indiscernibilium (The New Refutation of Time, 317, 318). Subjective idealism argues that the matter does not exist at all times, but rather it exists only when someone perceives it. Accordingly, the main exponent of this theory, George Berkeley, claims that we do not perceive material objects; what we perceive is the set of ideas

11

proceeding from our mind (Honderich, 2005: 92). His theory has inspired Borges to write Tln, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, a story about a fictitious idealist world. Berkeleys negation of matter had influenced the theory of David Hume, the second important figure who shaped Borges thought. Hume used logical reasoning to infer that if we were to accept Berkeleys negation of matter, we would have to acknowledge the negation of the spirit as well. To negate spirit means to negate that a person has an impression of an I identical and continuous in a course of time. Hume concludes that, negated the existence of the spirit, a person is reduced to a collection of different mental perceptions, succeeding one another with inconceivable speed, in perpetual flow and movement. (Honderich, 2005: 405-406). In brief, Berkeleys and Humes arguments indicate, respectively, that matter and spirit exist not in reality, but only in the mind of an individual. Borges (The new refutation of time, 321) exposes in his essays Berkeleys and Humes arguments against the existence of the matter and spirit and concludes: If we deny matter and spirit, which are continuities, and if we also deny space, I do not know what right we have to the continuity that is time. In other words, if matter and spirit are an illusion, time is also an illusion. If we negate the flow of time, it is logical to negate the absolute flow (the continuous existence) of any other thing that could exist in time. Hence, the continuous existence of absolute individual identity is also refuted, or put in different words - the consistence of personal identity is negated. Borges takes the idea about the inconsistence of the human identity from two sources: from Humes empiricism, which propugnates the inexistence of an I identical and continuous in a course of time (Honderich, 2005: 405-406) and from the teachings of oriental religions that argue the same thing: Se cuenta que un brahmn expuso la doctrina a un soldado de Alejandro de Macedonia; el soldado lo dej hablar y luego lo derrib de un puetazo. Ante las protestas del brahmn, el converso le dijo: Ni fui yo quien golpe, ni eres t el golpeado (Borges y Jurado, 2013). Borges introduces the idea of inconsistent personal identity in the story Funes, his memory. Funes is a man who remembers each and every instance of his life, because of which a l it irritated him that the "dog" of three-fourteen in the afternoon, seen in profile, should be indicated by the same noun as the dog of three-fifteen, seen frontally (Funes, his memory 136). Funes is molested by this because he realizes that the dogs identity is inconsistent, the absolute

12

and singular identity is an illusion, and therefore giving the same name to two (or more) identities of a dog must be a mistake. As we have seen so far, to negate the flow of time is to negate the continuous existence of anything that occurs in time. And to negate the continuous existence of events is to reject the simultaneity and the succession of these events as well. To put it simply, if time doesnt flow, then the events that take place in time cannot happen before or after one another. Therefore, the simultaneity and the succession of events can also be considered our illusions. Borges affirms (A new refutation of time, 322): I deny, in a large number of instances, the existence of succession. I deny, in a large number of instances, simultaneity as well. However, as the phrase indicates, Borges admits a certain number of cases where simultaneity could exist. He states that the simultaneity of two events in time could exist only if, during the interval of time that encompasses both events, the individuals that take part in each of them know that the other event is taking place. This leads him to conclude that The lover who thinks, "While I was so happy, thinking about the faithfulness of my beloved, she was busy deceiving me;' is deceiving himself. If every state in which we live is absolute, that happiness was not concurrent with that betrayal (A new refutation of time, 762). In order to negate the succession of events, Borges reaches for another source Leibnizs ontological principle of identitas indiscernibilium, which can be defined as follows: for two things to be considered different it is not enough that they differ only according to the spatial or temporal criteria, it is indispensable that they possess other differential characteristics (Arsenijevi, 2003: 80). Taking this principle into account, Borges (A new refutation of time 322-323) gives an example of those events that differ only in taking place at different times; that is, the difference between the events does not exist. If a difference between events doesnt exist, then they are the one same event: I never pass the Recoleta cemetery without remembering that my father, my grandparents, and my great-grandparents are buried there, as I shall be; then I remember that I have remembered the same thing many times before. These recurrent thoughts lead Borges (A new Refutation of Time 323) to postulate the existence of identical repetitions of sentiments, perceptions and thoughts in human life and formulate a hypothesis: Are not these identical moments the same moment? Is not one single repeated terminal point enough to disrupt and confound the series in time? In other words, Borges claims that succession is not a real feature of the world, but our illusion. Two events cannot succeed one another in time, simply

13

because, according to Leibniz principle of identitas indiscernibilium, they are not two different events. They are one same event, one sensation or one perception, repeated. Nevertheless, even though all of the exposed arguments indicate that Borges acknowledges atemporality, some of his phrases allude to the acceptance of presentism. According to the theory of presentism, only the events that occur in the present moment are real (Arsenijevi, 2003: 158). Many phrases that support Borges belief in presentism can be found throughout his essay The new refutation of time. For instance, he states that future events [] will not happen to us, who are the diminutive present (A New Refutation of time, 331) and cites Schopenhauer: No man has ever lived in the past, and none will live in the future; the present alone is the form of all life (A new Refutation of time, 331). Borges flirtation with presentism casts doubt that the writer grasps the difference between the two theories: atemporality, according to which the times (the past, the present and the future) dont exist and presentism, which underlines that (only) the present time exists. 6. Borges fantastic stories and the reversal of the direction of time Fantastic universes embodying perturbed laws of physics appear as a common theme in Borges prose. These fantastic universes are divested of the temporal division into the past, the present and the future time. Instead, the past and the future appear to be as real as the present and there is no longer a precise division between what is subjective and what is objective. (Bossart, 2003: 99). The Other is a story that can be considered an illustration of a universe of fantastic time. It narrates a fantastic encounter between two persons living in different epochs. Namely, Borges Senior (in further text S), who is living in the year of 1969, meets a younger self; he meets Borges Junior (J) from the year of 1918. The bizarre encounter between these two people takes place on a bench that existed in two times and two places (The Other, 417). J thinks he is dreaming, but S wants to prove him that the encounter is real by giving him a dollar bill inscribed with the year of 1974, a year obviously posterior to the year of the encounter the year of 1969. There are three possible interpretations of this universe of fantastic time: 1) The direction of time is changeable: the time-arrow is not always directed from the past towards the future. Time-travel is possible and this is exactly what one of the story

14

characters did. Borges (History of Eternity 124) reiterates in his essay that [time] is commonly held to flow from past to future, but the opposite notion [] is no less logical . 2) The story is about parallel worlds, i.e. about multiverses of quantum mechanics. (Bossart, 2003: 103). According to the theory of multiverses, in addition to the world we are aware of directly, there are many other similar worlds which exist in parallel at the same space and time. (Vaidman, 2002). As a result, the story characters could be living in different parallel worlds, which, for whatever reason, coincide in reality. 3) The story narrates a dream or subjective time. If this is the case, then J could be dreaming of S and vice-versa, S could be dreaming of J. It is impossible to determine the one true interpretation out of these three, especially since it seems that Borges purposefully plays with readers minds and bemuses them. For instance, aiming to solve the mystery of the fantastic encounter, S comes up with a conclusion that the encounter is actually a dream dreamt by J. According to S, this must be the case because J dreamt the impossible date on that dollar bill (The Other, 417), that is - the year of 1974 which represents future to S as well. However, this version appears to be the least feasible one. If the whole encounter is in reality only a dream that J dreams, how is it possible that S knows someone is dreaming of him? Doesnt the year 1974 on the dollar bill implicate that S also could have had an encounter with someone from the future, who could have given him the dollar bill? The motif of a mysterious object from the future (or from a dream) appears in two other stories by Borges: Utopa de un hombre que est cansado and La flor de Coleridge. The mysterious objects from the future that bedazzle the characters in these stories are, respectively, a painting and a flower. Since establishing a clear interpretation appears to be impossible, the final

conclusion is left with the readers. These three interpretations can be helpful in reading other Borges stories which abandon the linear direction of time, that is, the irreversible course of the past going towards the future. In some cases it results easier to opt for one interpretation than for another, while in other cases finding the truth behind the story seems unattainable. For example, The Garden of Forking Paths renders transparent that the character of Tsui Pn believed in an infinite series of times, a growing, dizzying web of divergent, convergent, and parallel times (Garden of Forking Paths 127), owing to which he aims to write a book of multiverses. Nevertheless, the story The Secret Miracle raises a difficult task. Namely, the story is about a writer Jaromir Hladik, sentenced to

15

death before a firing squad, who asks of God to give him another year to finish his book. Unexpectedly, God grants him his wish: God had performed for him a secret miracle: the German bullet would kill him, at the determined hour, but in Hladik's mind a year would pass between the order to fire and the discharge of the rifles (The Secret Miracle, 161-162 ). By using the syntagm in Hladiks mind, the narrator implicates his own version of the story. The syntagm refers to the possibility that Jaromir Hladik experiences subjective time prior to his execution. However, there is another, equally plausible interpretation: Jaromir Hladik could be living in two parallel worlds: in one of them he finishes his book and in the other one he dies (Bossart, 2003: 103). The story The Other Death also deals with the question of time from a fantastic perspective. Namely, the protagonist Pedro Damin dies as a coward, but later succeeds in annulling his past and dies heroically. Again, were up against diverse interpretational possibilities: Damian could have time-travelled and died like a hero or he could have merely dreamt or fantasized about dying heroically.

7. Conclusions Jorge Luis Borges profound interest in the question of time permeates, as we have exposed, both his essays and his short stories. Under the influence of Buddhism, the topology of Borgesian time becomes an infinite circle, represented in his stories through the symbols of mirrors and labyrinths. In regard to the ontology of time, Borges decidedly rejects the platonic and Christian eternity and endorses Newtonian absolute time. Moreover, owing to the influence of subjective idealism and Leibnizs identitas indiscernibilium, the flow of time in Borges prose comes to be unreal and imaginary. However, although Borges metaphysics of time appears to be well embedded and brilliantly exposed, the author sometimes falls in contradiction. For instance, Borges belief in the theory of atemporality, which he sometimes confuses with presentism, is not in accordance with his topology of time. It is not possible to believe that time does not flow and, at the same time, to affirm that history develops in similar circles, because circular history has to develop in a time that flows circularly. As we have seen, this circular topology leads to the ontology of absolute time. Nevertheless, the ontology of absolute time is again confronted with atemporality. Contrary to the ontology of absolute time, which argues that time would continue to exist even if the physical sphere was destroyed, atemporality argues that time is an illusion, that it doesnt exist at all! This division between the circular, ontologically absolute time and

16

atemporality can only be explained if we consider a passage from last page of the essay The New Refutation of Time. The ending phrases of the text say:
Negar la sucesin temporal, negar el yo, negar el universo astronmico, son desesperaciones aparentes y consuelos secretos. Nuestro destino [] no es espantoso por irreal; es espantoso porque es irreversible y de hierro. El tiempo es la sustancia de que estoy hecho. El tiempo es un ro que me arrebata, pero yo soy el ro; es un tigre que me destroza, pero yo soy el tigre; es un fuego que me consume, pero yo soy el fuego. El mundo, desgraciadamente, es real; yo, desgraciadamente, soy Borges. (Borges, 1984d: 771)

This paragraph leads to conclude that Borges attraction to atemporality derives not from the authors true approval of subjective idealism and Humes empiricism, but from the wide imaginative possibilities the theory of atemporality offers (Oviedo, 2002: 288). In his final phrases, Borges indicates that his refutation of time was nothing more than a game and as, as a consequence, he comes out as an existentialist; an existentialist made of flesh and bone, devoured by time in an ephemeral world. Bibliography ARSENIJEVI, M. (2003): Vreme i vremena. Dereta, Beograd. BORGES, J. L. (1982): El inmortal, en J. L. Borges El Aleph. Emec, Buenos Aires. pp. 7-21. BORGES, J. L. (1989): El otro, en J. L. Borges El libro de arena, Emec, Buenos Aires. pp. 11-16. BORGES, J. L. (2001): El jardn de los senderos que se bifurcan, en J. L. Borges Ficciones, El Mundo, Barcelona. pp. 43-48. BORGES, J. L. (2001a): El milagro secreto, en J. L. Borges Ficciones, El Mundo, Barcelona. pp. 70-73. BORGES, J. L. (2001b): Funes el memorioso, en J. L. Borges Ficciones, El Mundo, Barcelona. pp. 51-55. BORGES, J. L. (2001c): La biblioteca de Babel, en J. L. Borges Ficciones, El Mundo, Barcelona. pp. 38-42. BORGES, J. L. (2001d): La muerte y la brjula, en J. L. Borges Ficciones, El Mundo, Barcelona. pp. 63-69.

17

BORGES, J. L. (2001e): Tema del traidor y del hroe, en J. L. Borges Ficciones, El Mundo, Barcelona. pp. 60-62. BORGES, J. L. (2001f): Tln, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, en J. L. Borges Ficciones, El Mundo, Barcelona. pp. 7-15. BORGES, J. L. (1984): Doctrina de los ciclos, en J. L. Borges Historia de la eternidad, Emec, Buenos Aires. pp. 385-392. BORGES, J. L. (1984a): El tiempo circular, en J. L. Borges Historia de la eternidad, Emec, Buenos Aires. pp. 393-396. BORGES, J. L. (1984b): Historia de la eternidad, en J. L. Borges Historia de la eternidad, Emec, Buenos Aires. pp. 353-367. BORGES, J. L. (1984c): El tiempo y J. W. Dunne, en J. L. Borges Otras Inquisiciones, Emec, Buenos Aires. pp. 646-649. BORGES, J. L. (1984d): Nueva refutacin del tiempo, en J. L. Borges Otras Inquisiciones, Emec, Buenos Aires. pp. 757-771. BORGES, J. L. & Jurado, A. (2013): Qu es el budismo [e-book], s.l., disponible en <http://www.worcel.com/archivos/6/Borges%20&%20JuradoQue%20Es%20El%20Budismo.pdf> [Acceso el 20 de febrero de 2013]. BORKE, Paul. (2003): Circular Infinity [imagen online], disponible en

<http://paulbourke.net/fractals/circles/> [Acceso 20 de febrero de 2013]. BOSSART, W. H. (2003): Borges and Philosophy: Self, Time and Metaphysics, Peter Lang, New York. HONDERICH, T. (ed.) (2005): The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford. KRAUT, R. (2004): Plato, en E. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, disponible en: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/plato/> [Acceso el 20 de febrero de 2013]. OVIEDO, J. M. (2002): Historia de la literatura hispanoamericana: De Borges al presente. Vol. 4. Alianza editorial, Madrid, pp. 287-292.

18

STOJAKOVI, S. M. (1989): ovek iz ulice sa ruiastim duanom i ljudi u aravima boje afrana, en Borhes, H. L. ta je budizam (trad. S. M. Stojakovi), A- Delo, Beograd. pp. 127147. VAN INWAGEN, P. (2007): Metaphysics en E. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, disponible en <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/metaphysics/> [Acceso el 20 de febrero de 2013]. VAIDMAN, L. (2002): Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics en E. N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, disponible en

<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/qm-manyworlds/> [Acceso el 20 de febrero de 2013]. WEBER, F. W. (1968): Borges's Stories: Fiction and Philosophy. Hispanic Review 36(2), pp. 124-141, JSTOR, disponible en <http://www.jstor.org/stable/472042 > [Acceso el 20 de febrero de 2013].

19