BOLOS VS. BOLOS, G.R. No.

186400, October 20, 2010 Facts: On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the following disposition: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law. A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006. In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal was likewise denied. On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Issue: a.) Does A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC to marriages before the Family Code took effect? b.)Does the break-up of families consistent with the inviolability of marriage? Ruling: a.) The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads: Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. b.) The 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. This constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break - up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members. REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO , respondent G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008 FACTS: Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding

judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid. HELD: Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio. G.R. No. 186027 December 8, 2010 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-in-Fact, EVELYN M. OGA, Respondent. MENDOZA, J.: This petition for review on certiorari assails the December 9, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN, which affirmed the September 28, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 8 (RTC), in a petition for correction of entries, docketed as Special Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427), filed by respondent Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera) under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Factual and Procedural Antecedents On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth - fromMarilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048).2 Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general, as the case may be, is now authorized to effect the change of first name or nickname and the correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries. "Under said law, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The law now excludes the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied"3 and removes "correction or changing of clerical errors in entries of the civil register

from the ambit of Rule 108." Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of the rules are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.4 The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048."5 Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC). The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427). Section 2 of Rule 108 reads: SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)changes of name. [Underscoring supplied] Upon receipt of the petition for correction of entry, the RTC issued an order, dated June 10, 2005, which reads: Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, notice is hereby given that the hearing of said petition is set on JULY 26, 2005 at 8:30 oclock in the morning, at the Session Hall of Branch 8, this Court, Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Dipolog City, on which date, time and place, anyone appearing to contest the petition shall state in writing his grounds there[for], serving a copy thereof to the petitioner and likewise file copies with this Court on or before the said date of hearing. Let this order be published at the expense of petitioner once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper edited and published in Dipolog City and of general circulation therein, the City of Dapitan and the province of Zamboanga del Norte, and copies hereof be furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General of (sic) 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro Manila, the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog, and posted on the bulletin boards of the City Hall of Dipolog, the Provincial Capitol Building, and of this Court. IT IS SO ORDERED. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines and deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to assist in the case only on the very day of the hearing. This prompted the court to reset the hearing on September 5, 2005. On said day, there being no opposition, counsel for Mercadera moved for leave of court to present evidence ex parte. Without any objection from the City Prosecutor, the trial court designated the branch clerk of court to receive evidence for Mercadera. On September 15, 2005, the testimony of Oga and several photocopies of documents were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove that Mercadera never used the name "Marilyn" in any of her public or private transactions. On September 26, 2005, the RTC issued an order6 admitting Exhibits "A" to "I"7 and their submarkings, as relevant to the resolution of the case. The following facts were gathered from documentary evidence and the oral testimony of Oga, as reported by the lower court: Petitioner Merlyn M. Mercadera was born on August 19, 1970 at Dipolog City. She is the daughter of spouses Tirso U. Mercadera and Norma C. Lacquiao. The fact of her birth was reported to the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City on September 8, 1970. It was recorded on page 68, book no. 9, in the Registry of Births of said civil registry. In the

certification of birth dated May 9, 2005 issued by the same registry, her given name appears as Marilyn and not Merlyn (Exhibit "C"). On September 29, 1979, petitioner was baptized according to the rites and ceremonies of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines. As reflected in her certificate of baptism issued by said church, she was baptized by the name Merlyn L. Mercadera (Exhibit "D"). In her elementary diploma issued by the Paaralang Sentral ng Estaka, Dipolog City; her high school diploma issued by the Zamboanga del Norte School of Arts and Trades, Dipolog City; and college diploma issued by the Silliman University, Dumaguete City, where she earned the degree of Bachelor of Secondary Education, uniformly show her name as Merlyn L. Mercadera (Exhibits "E", "F", and "G"). Presently, she is working in U.P. Mindanao, Buhangin, Davao City. Her certificate of membership issued by the Government Service Insurance System also bears his [sic] complete name as Merlyn Lacquiao Mercadera (Exhibit "H"). When she secured an authenticated copy of her certificate of live birth from the National Statistics Office, she discovered that her given name as registered is Marilyn and not Merlyn; hence, this petition. In its September 28, 2005 Decision,8 the RTC granted Mercaderas petition and directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct her name appearing in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera. Specifically, the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City is hereby directed to correct the given name of petitioner appearing in her certificate of live birth, from Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera. In a four-page decision, the RTC ruled that the documentary evidence presented by Mercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged in her petition. Considering that she had used "Merlyn" as her given name since childhood until she discovered the discrepancy in her Certificate of Live Birth, the RTC was convinced that the correction was justified. The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. It mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of Mercadera of the remedy and procedure under Rule 108. In its Brief9 filed with the CA, the OSG argued that the lower court erred (1) in granting the prayer for change of name in a petition for correction of entries; and (2) in admitting the photocopies of documentary evidence and hearsay testimony of Oga. For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercaderas given name might seem innocuous enough to grant but "it is in truth a material correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights."10 What the lower court actually allowed was a change of Mercaderas given name, which would have been proper had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor. The lower court, "may not substitute one for the other for purposes of expediency."11 Further, because Mercadera failed to invoke a specific ground recognized by the Rules, the lower courts order in effect allowed the change of ones name in the civil registry without basis. The CA was not persuaded. In its December 9, 2008 Decision, 12 the appellate court affirmed the questioned RTC Order in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN. The CA assessed the controversy in this wise: Appellants insistence that the petition should have been filed under Rule 103 and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is off the mark. This Court does not entertain any doubt that the petition before the trial court was one for the correction on an entry in petitioners Certificate of Live Birth and not one in which she sought to change her name. In Co v. Civil Register of

Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, the High Court reiterated the distinction between the phrases "to correct" and "to change." Said the High Court: To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not qualify as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected or distinguished on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may be. Such entries include not only those clerical in nature but also substantial errors. After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein. That appellee sought to correct an entry and not to change her name is patent to the Court from the allegations in her petition, specifically, paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof xxxx Anent the RTCs error in admitting the photocopies of Mercaderas documentary evidence and in vesting probative value to Ogas testimony, the CA cited the well-established rule that "evidence not objected to may be admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment."13 On March 6, 2009, the OSG filed the present petition. On behalf of Mercadera, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed its Comment14 on July 3, 2009. The OSG declined to file a reply claiming that its petition already contained an exhaustive discussion on the following assigned errors:15 I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE CHANGE IN RESPONDENTS NAME UNDER RULE 103. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN CONSIDERING SECONDARY EVIDENCE. Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code.16 This rule provides the procedure for an independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community.17 In petitions for change of name, a person avails of a remedy to alter the "designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known."18 When granted, a persons identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new "label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him."19 Judicial permission for a change of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court decree. The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the order issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. When complied with, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. "It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it."20 Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of ones existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status.21 However, "there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to objection by parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on the public mind."22 Hence, in requests for a

change of name, "what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced x x x mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant x x x."23 Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code.24 Entries in the civil register refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons,"25 also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law.26Before, only mistakes or errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in the entries in the civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and substantial errors affecting the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party are beyond the ambit of the rule. In the abandoned case of Chua Wee v. Republic,27 this Court declared that, x x x if Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the new Civil Code." In the latter case of Wong v. Republic,28 however, Justice Vicente Abad Santos, in a separate concurrence, opined that Article 412, which Rule 108 implements, contemplates all kinds of issues and all types of procedures because "the provision does not say that it applies only to non-controversial issues and that the procedure to be used is summary in nature." In Republic v. Judge De la Cruz,29 the dissenting opinion penned by Justice Pacifico De Castro echoed the same view: It is not accurate to say that Rule 108 would be rendered unconstitutional if it would allow the correction of more than mere harmless clerical error, as it would thereby increase or modify substantive rights which the Constitution expressly forbids because Article 412 of the Civil Code, the substantive law sought to be implemented by Rule 108, allows only the correction of innocuous clerical errors not those affecting the status of persons. As was stressed in the dissent on the aforesaid Wong Case, Article 412 does not limit in its express terms nor by mere implication, the correction authorized by it to that of mere clerical errors. x x x it would be reasonable and justified to rule that Article 412 contemplates of correction of erroneous entry of whatever nature, procedural safeguards having only to be provided for, as was the manifest purpose of Rule 108. x x x proceedings for the correction of erroneous entry should not be considered as establishing one's status in a legal manner conclusively beyond dispute or controversion, x x x the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto x x x shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. Hence, the status as corrected would not have a superior quality for evidentiary purpose. Moreover, the correction should not imply a change of status but a mere rectification of error to make the matter corrected speak for the truth. x x x Finally in Republic v. Valencia,30 the above stated views were adopted by this Court insofar as even substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established, provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. "If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved.

Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x x x."31 "Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution."32 In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108. It appears from these arguments that there is, to some extent, confusion over the scope and application of Rules 103 and Rule 108. Where a "change of name" will necessarily be reflected by the corresponding correction in an entry, as in this case, the functions of both rules are often muddled. While there is no clear-cut rule to categorize petitions under either rule, this Court is of the opinion that a resort to the basic distinctions between the two rules with respect to alterations in a persons registered name can effectively clear the seeming perplexity of the issue. Further, a careful evaluation of circumstances alleged in the petition itself will serve as a constructive guide to determine the propriety of the relief prayed for. The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of ones name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.33 In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 10834 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in ones name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108. This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein."35 A serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a glaring lack of support to the OSGs assumption that Mercadera intended to change her name under Rule 103. All that the petition propounded are swift arguments on the alleged procedural flaws of Mercaderas petition before the RTC. In the same vein, no concrete contention was brought up to convince this Court that the dangers sought to be prevented by the adversarial proceedings prescribed in Rule 103 are attendant in this case. Instead, the RTC found the documents presented by Mercadera to have satisfactorily shown that she had been known as MERLYN ever since, discounting the possibility that confusion, or a modification of substantive rights might arise. Truth be told, not a single oppositor appeared to contest the petition despite full compliance with the publication requirement.

Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."36 From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." It does not take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which the law provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain relief. Thus, the petition was clear in stating: 7. That as such, there is a need to correct her given name as appearing in her Certificate of Live Birth from MARILYN to MERLYN to conform to her true and correct given name that she had been using and had been known within the community x x x. 8. That herein petitioner went to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City and requested them to effect such correction in her Certificate of Live Birth, however, the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City will not effect such correction unless an order is obtained by herein petitioner from this Honorable Court because the Local Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048, hence the filing of this petition. [Emphases supplied] Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes similar to Mercaderas case which recognize the same a harmless error. In Yu v. Republic37 it was held that "to change Sincio to Sencio which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel i in the first name into the vowel e amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error." In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,38 it was held that the change of petitioners name from "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu" to "Emperatriz Labayo" was a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding was appropriate. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto, the correction involved the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." In the latter case, this Court, with the agreement of the Solicitor General, ruled that the error was plainly clerical, such that, "changing the name of the child from Midael C. Mazon to Michael C. Mazon cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)."39 In this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so that what appears as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn" is patently a rectification of a name that is clearly misspelled. The similarity between "Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may well be the object of a mix- up that blemished Mercaderas Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the same. The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could remember. It is worthy to note that the OSGs reliance on Republic vs. Hernandez40 is flawed. In that case, this Court said that "a change in a given name is a substantial matter" and that it "cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding that would in effect render it a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding." While this Court stands true to the ruling in Hernandez, the said pronouncement therein was stated in a different tenor and,

thus, inapplicable to this case. Hernandez was decided against an entirely different factual milieu. There was a petition for adoption that must not have led to a corresponding change in the adoptees given name because "it would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of a corresponding petition for the latter relief at law." In the present case, the issue is the applicability of either Rule 103 or Rule 108 and the relief sought by Mercadera can in fact be granted under the latter. This Court finds no attempt on the part of Mercadera to render the requirements under Rule 103 illusory as in Hernandez. Besides, granting that Rule 103 applies to this case and that compliance with the procedural requirements under Rule 108 falls short of what is mandated, it still cannot be denied that Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding before the lower court. The publication and posting of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and the notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. The fact that no one opposed the petition, including the OSG, did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same and did not make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition and the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were procedurally defective. Indeed, it has become unnecessary to further discuss the reasons why the CA correctly affirmed the findings of the lower court especially in admitting and according probative value to the evidence presented by Mercadera. WHEREFORE, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-18174 April 30, 1963 FELIX LACSON, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELINA T. LOZADA. ET AL., defendants, ANTONIO T. LOZADA, defendant-appellant. Juanito J. Maravilla for plaintiff-appellee. Antonio T. Lozada for and in his own behalf as defendant-appellant. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Antonio T. Lozada and his wife obtained on July 12, 1950 from Felix Lacson a loan in the amount of P4,800.00, payable in one year, with the interest of 12% per annum, secured by a mortgage on a lot situated in Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, which however was not recorded in accordance with law. The spouses Lozada having failed to pay the loan as agreed upon, Lacson impleaded them before the court of first instance of said province to collect the loan. The spouses filed their answer including a counterclaim, to which plaintiff filed a reply. When the case was called for hearing, defendants' counsel informed the court that he was introducing as evidence a deposition of his client Lozada wherein he made an acknowledgment of the loan at which juncture plaintiff made the following manifestation: "that although the account of the defendants is more than P4,500.00, plaintiff is willing to accept P3,800.00 as their debt, as admitted by defendants in the deposition of Atty. Lozada, in order to terminate the case once and for all and in order to avoid unnecessary litigation, considering plaintiff's 81 years of age and infirmity." Whereupon, the court suggested to the parties the advisibility of submitting a stipulation of facts. The parties readily obliged and for with submitted the desired stipulation. And on the basis of this stipulation, the court a

quo rendered judgment ordering defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P3,800.00, without pronouncement as to costs. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t Since the judgment does not contain any provision with regard to defendants' counterclaim, the latter filed a motion for reconsideration, but in view of plaintiff's opposition, it was denied. Hence the present appeal. The stipulation of facts submitted by the parties read as follows: AGREED STIPULATION OF FACTS Come now the defendants and the plaintiff, through their respective undersigned attorneys, and to this Hon. Court respectfully submit the following agreed statement of facts: 1. That the defendants, particularly Atty. Antonio T. Lozada, in his deposition taken before Notary Public Regina G. Ordoez of Manila, dated May 23, 1959, on page 6 thereof, admitted that they are indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P3,800 after deducting the payment of P700 already made by them, which statement appears on page 6 of his deposition, viz: Q. What is the balance of your account with the plaintiff? A. After deducting the payment of P700.00, our account with the plaintiff is only P3,800.00. That the plaintiff although he claims that the account of the defendants due him is P4,800.00 which was later reduced by him (plaintiff) to P4,500.00, is now willing to accept the amount of P3,800 as admitted by the defendants as their indebtedness to the plaintiff in order to terminate this case once and for all and in order to avoid unnecessary and costly litigation, and further considering his 81 years of age, and infirmity. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered strictly in accordance with the agreed stipulation of facts, without special pronouncement as to costs. As may be noted, the above stipulation was submitted in view of the readiness of the defendants to acknowledge their indebtedness as manifested in the deposition made by defendant Antonio T. Lozada, as well as the willingness of the plaintiff to terminate the case once and for all to avoid unnecessary litigation considering his advanced age and his infirmity. Thus, in one of the paragraphs of the stipulation it appears that plaintiff agreed to accept a lesser amount than what in his opinion was owed to him by defendants "in order to terminate this case once and for all and in order to avoid unnecessary and costly litigation, and further considering his 81 years of age and infirmity." In said stipulation it was also prayed that judgment be rendered strictly in accordance therewith. There is nothing stated therein relative to the counterclaim interposed by defendants, nor have the latter made therein any reservation relative thereto. There is, therefore, no basis for appellants' contention that the court a quo erred in denying their motion to have the case reopened so that they may have an opportunity to prove their counterclaim considering that the stipulation of facts was prepared and submitted to the court precisely to put an end to the litigation. Surely, if appellants really wanted to press their counterclaim despite the submission of said stipulation, why is it that they have not made therein a reservation to that effect? The fact is that they agreed to submit that stipulation because of their desire to put an end to the litigation and to obviate the necessity of

submitting further evidence. This is especially to considering the nature of appellants' counterclaim which merely consists in an alleged harassment consequent upon the filing of the present action. But there is no such harassment for under the facts of record the institution of the action was justified. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants. Rodolfo San Luis vs Felicidad Sagalongos-San Luis G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 on November 12, 2010 Bigamy Void Marriage During his lifetime, Felicisimo (Rodolfos dad) contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death of his dad Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code. Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256. ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo is bigamous. HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the

Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. NOLLORA VS REPUBLIC G.R. No. 191425 September 7, 2011 FACTS: While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her husband of two years has another wife. She returned to the Philippines and learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., contracted second marriage with a certain Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001. Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano and Rowena for bigamy. When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for return of her money in the amount of P 50,000. Atilano admitted having contracted 2 marriages, however, he claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back to 1992. He presented Certificate of Conversion and Pledge of Conversion, proving that he allegedly converted as a Muslim in January 1992. And as a Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry wives as allowed under the Islam belief. Accused Rowena alleged that she was a victim of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not know Jesusa and only came to know her when the case was filed. She insisted that she is the one lawfully married to Nollora because she believed him to be single and a Catholic, as he told her so prior to their marriage. After she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert. After learning that Nollora was a Muslim convert, she and he also got married in accordance with the Muslim rites. ISSUE: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous. RULING: Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and as such, the second marriage is considered null and void ab initio under Article 35 of the Family Code. The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is legally married to Jesusa; 2) that their marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; 3)that Atilano admitted the existence of his second marriage to Rowena; and 4) the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Atilano due to his prior marriage. Before the trial and appellate courts, Atilano put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. Granting arguendo that he is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, he cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with Articles 14, 15, 17 up to 20 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws . In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that any marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim solemnized not in accordance with the Muslim law, hence the Family Code of the Philippines shall apply. Nollora's religious affiliation or his claim that his marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, he cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy. His second marriage did not comply with the Article 27 of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines providing: "[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases." Only with the permission of the Shari'a Circuit Court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second, third or fourth wife. The clerk of court shall serve a copy to the wife or wives, and should any of them objects, an Agama Arbitration Council shall be

constituted. If the said council fails to secure the wife's consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall subject to Article 27, decide whether on not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws) Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is "single." Both of his marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one's religion in the marriage is not an essential requirement for marriage, his omissions are sufficient proofs of his liability for bigamy. His false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by these omissions. It is not for him to interpret the Shari'a law, and in apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, he recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has already been violated. MARIA B. CHING, Petitioner, -versusNovember 10, 2006 JOSEPH C. GOYANKO, JR., EVELYN GOYANKO, JERRY GOYANKO, IMELDA GOYANKO, JULIUS GOYANKO, MARY ELLEN GOYANKO AND JESS GOYANKO, Respondents. G.R. No. 165879 .

of sale and of TCT No. 138405 and the issuance of a new one in favor of their father Goyanko. In defense, petitioner claimed that she is the actual owner of the property as it was she who provided its purchase price. To disprove that Goyankos signature in the questioned deed of sale is a forgery, she presented as witness the notary public who testified that Goyanko appeared and signed the document in his presence. By Decision of October 16, 1998,[5] the trial court dismissed the complaint against petitioner, the pertinent portions of which decision read: There is no valid and sufficient ground to declare the sale as null and void, fictitious and simulated. The signature on the questioned Deed of Sale is genuine. The testimony of Atty. Salvador Barrameda who declared in court that Joseph Goyanko, Sr. and Maria Ching together with their witnesses appeared before him for notarization of Deed of Sale in question is more reliable than the conflicting testimonies of the two document examiners. Defendant Maria Ching asserted that the Deed of Sale executed by Joseph Goyanko, Sr. in her favor is valid and genuine. The signature of Joseph Goyanko, Sr. in the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale is genuine as it was duly executed and signed by Joseph Goyanko, Sr. himself. The parcel of lands known as Lot No. 6 which is sought to be recovered in this case could never be considered as the conjugal property of the original Spouses Joseph C. Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz or the exclusive capital property of the husband. The acquisition of the said property by defendant Maria Ching is well-elicited from the aforementioned testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the defendant. Although for a time being the property passed through Joseph Goyanko, Sr. as a buyer yet his ownership was only temporary and transitory for the reason that it was subsequently sold to herein defendant Maria Ching. Maria Ching claimed that it was even her money which was used by Joseph Goyanko, Sr. in the purchase of the land and so it was eventually sold to her. In her testimony, defendant Ching justified her financial capability to buy the land for herself. The transaction undertaken was from the original owner Sulpicia Ventura to Joseph Goyanko, Sr. and then from Joesph Goyanko, Sr. to herein defendant Maria Ching. The land subject of the litigation is already registered in the name of defendant Maria Ching under TCT No. 138405. By virtue of the Deed of Sale executed in favor of Maria Ching, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 138405 was issued in her favor. In recognition of the proverbial virtuality of a Torrens title, it has been repeatedly held that, unless bad faith can be established on the part of the person appearing as owner on the certificate of title, there is no other owner than that in whose favor it has been issued. A Torrens title is not subject to collateral attack. It is a well-known doctrine that a Torrens title, as a rule, is irrevocable and indefeasible, and the duty of the court is to see to it that

CARPIO MORALES, J.: On December 30, 1947, Joseph Goyanko (Goyanko) and Epifania dela Cruz (Epifania) were married.[1] Out of the union were born respondents Joseph, Jr., Evelyn, Jerry, Imelda, Julius, Mary Ellen and Jess, all surnamed Goyanko. Respondents claim that in 1961, their parents acquired a 661 square meter property located at 29 F. Cabahug St., Cebu Citybut that as they (the parents) were Chinese citizens at the time, the property was registered in the name of their aunt, Sulpicia Ventura (Sulpicia). On May 1, 1993, Sulpicia executed a deed of sale [2] over the property in favor of respondents father Goyanko. In turn, Goyanko executed on October 12, 1993 a deed of sale[3] over the property in favor of his common-law-wife-herein petitioner Maria B. Ching. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 138405 was thus issued in petitioners name. After Goyankos death on March 11, 1996, respondents discovered that ownership of the property had already been transferred in the name of petitioner. Respondents thereupon had the purported signature of their father in the deed of sale verified by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory which found the same to be a forgery.[4] Respondents thus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint for recovery of property and damages against petitioner, praying for the nullification of the deed

this title is maintained and respected unless challenged in a direct proceedings [sic].[6] (Citations omitted; underscoring supplied) Before the Court of Appeals where respondents appealed, they argued that the trial court erred: 1. . . . when it dismissed the complaint a quo . . . , in effect, sustaining the sale of the subject property between Joseph, Sr. and the defendant-appellee, despite the proliferation in the records and admissions by both parties that defendant-appellee was the mistress or common-law wife of Joseph, Sr.. . . . when it dismissed the complaint a quo . . . , in effect, sustaining the sale of the subject property between Joseph, Sr. and the defendant-appellee, despite the fact that the marriage of Joseph, Sr. and Epifania was then still subsisting thereby rendering the subject property as conjugal property of Joseph, Sr. and Epifania. . . . in dismissing the complaint a quo . . . , in effect, sustaining the validity of the sale of the subject property between Joseph, Sr. and the defendant-appellee, despite the clear findings of forgery and the non-credible testimony of notary public.[7] in:

contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. We therefore find that the contract of sale in favor of the defendant-appellant Maria Ching was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. The purported sale, having been made by Joseph Sr. in favor of his concubine, undermines the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy vigilantly protects. Furthermore, the law emphatically prohibits spouses from selling property to each other, subject to certain exceptions. And this is so because transfers or conveyances between spouses, if allowed during the marriage would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. The prohibition was designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other and is likewise applicable even to common-law relationships otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.[9] (Underscoring supplied) Hence, the present petition, petitioners arguing that the appellate court gravely erred I. . . . APPLYING THE STATE POLICY ON PROHIBITION AGAINST CONVEYANCES AND TRANSFERS OF PROPERTIES BETWEEN LEGITIMATE AND COMMON LAW SPOUSES ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, THE SAME BEING FOUND BY THE COURT A QUO, AS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF PETITIONER, AND THAT THE SAME WAS NEVER PART OF THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS MOTHER EPIFANIA GOYANKO AND PETITIONERS COMMON LAW HUSBAND, JOSEPH GOYANKO, SR., NOR THE EXCLUSIVE OR CAPITAL PROPERTY OF THE LATTER AT ANYTIME BEFORE THE SAME WAS VALIDLY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER. II. . . . NOT FINDING THAT A JURIDICAL RELATION OF TRUST AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLES 1448 AND 1450 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE CAN VALIDLY EXIST BETWEEN COMMON LAW SPOUSES. III. . . . NOT FINDING THAT A CONVEYANCE OVER A PROPERTY MADE BY A TRUSTEE, WHO BECAME AS SUCH IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, AND WHO HAPPENS TO BE A COMMON LAW HUSBAND OF THE BENEFICIARY, IS NOT A VIOLATION OF A STATE POLICY ON PROHIBITION AGAINST CONVEYANCES AND TRANSFERS OF PROPERTIES BETWEEN LEGITIMATE AND COMMON LAW SPOUSES. IV. . . . ALLOWING RESPONDENTS TO ABANDON THEIR ORIGINAL THEORY OF THEIR CASE DURING APPEAL.[10]

2.

3.

By Decision dated October 21, 2003,[8] the appellate court reversed that of the trial court and declared null and void the questioned deed of sale and TCT No. 138405. Held the appellate court: . . . The subject property having been acquired during the existence of a valid marriage between Joseph Sr. and Epifania dela CruzGoyanko, is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. Moreover, while this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with clear and convincing proof to the contrary, we find no evidence on record to conclude otherwise. The record shows that while Joseph Sr. and his wife Epifania have been estranged for years and that he and defendantappellant Maria Ching, have in fact been living together as common-law husband and wife, there has never been a judicial decree declaring the dissolution of his marriage to Epifania nor their conjugal partnership. It is therefore undeniable that the 661-square meter property located at No. 29 F. Cabahug Street, Cebu City belongs to the conjugal partnership. Even if we were to assume that the subject property was not conjugal, still we cannot sustain the validity of the sale of the property by Joseph, Sr. to defendant-appellant Maria Ching, there being overwhelming evidence on records that they have been living together as common-law husband and wife. On this score, Art. 1352 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1352. Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is

The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which apply to the present case read: ART. 1352. Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. ART. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning: (1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy; (2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious; (3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction; (4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men; (5) Those which contemplate an impossible service; (6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal object of the contract cannot be ascertained; (7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law. These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived. ARTICLE 1490. The husband and wife cannot sell property to each other, except: (1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements; or (2) When there has been a judicial separation of property under Article 191. (Underscoring supplied) The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law relationships. So this Court ruled inCalimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun, etc., et al.:[11] Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. The sale was subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause, object, or purposes is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning. Article 1352 also provides that: Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.

Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union. Those provisions are dictated by public interest and their criterion must be imposed upon the will of the parties. . . . [12] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of his common- lawwife-herein petitioner, it was null and void. Petitioners argument that a trust relationship was created between Goyanko as trustee and her as beneficiary as provided in Articles 1448 and 1450 of the Civil Code which read: ARTICLE 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child. ARTICLE 1450. If the price of a sale of property is loaned or paid by one person for the benefit of another and the conveyance is made to the lender or payor to secure the payment of the debt, a trust arises by operation of law in favor of the person to whom the money is loaned or for whom it is paid. The latter may redeem the property and compel a conveyance thereof to him. does not persuade. For petitioners testimony that it was she who provided the purchase price is uncorroborated. That she may have been considered the breadwinner of the family and that there was proof that she earned a living do not conclusively clinch her claim. As to the change of theory by respondents from forgery of their fathers signature in the deed of sale to sale contrary to public policy, it too does not persuade. Generally, a party in a litigation is not permitted to freely and substantially change the theory of his case so as not to put the other party to undue disadvantage by not accurately and timely apprising him of what he is up against,[13]and to ensure that the latter is given the opportunity during trial to refute all allegations against him by presenting evidence to the contrary. In the present case, petitioner cannot be said to have been put to undue disadvantage and to have been denied the chance to refute all the allegations against

her. For the nullification of the sale is anchored on its illegality per se, it being violative of the above-cited Articles 1352, 1409 and 1490 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. G.R. No. 172471 November 12, 2012 ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner, vs. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA, Respondents. DEL CASTILLO, J.: "An order for x x x support x x x must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence."1 Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 is the March 31, 2005 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79312 which dismissed petitioner Antonio Perlas (Antonio) appeal from the February 26, 2003 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 71 in Civil Case No. 96-3952, ordering him to give monthly support to respondent Randy Perla (Randy). Likewise assailed is the CAs May 5, 2006 Resolution5denying the motion for reconsideration thereto. Factual Antecedents Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and her then minor son, Randy (collectively respondents), filed before the RTC a Complaint6 for support against Antonio. They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and Antonio lived together as common-law spouses for two years. As a result of said cohabitation, Randy was born on November 11, 1983. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he abandoned them and failed to give any support to his son. Respondents thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy. In his Answer with Counterclaim,7 Antonio, who is now married and has a family of his own, denied having fathered Randy. Although he admitted to having known Mirasol, he averred that she never became his common-law wife nor was she treated as such. And since Mirasol had been intimidating and pestering him as early as 1992 with various suits by insisting that Randy is his son, Antonio sought moral and exemplary damages by way of counterclaim from respondents. During trial, Mirasol testified that from 1981 to 1983, she lived in Upper Bicutan, Taguig where Antonio was a neighbor.8 In the first week of January 1981, Antonio courted her9 and eventually became her first boyfriend.10Antonio would then visit her everyday until 1982.11 Upon clarificatory question by the court whether she and Antonio eventually lived together as husband and wife, Mirasol answered that they were just sweethearts.12 When Mirasol became pregnant in 1983, Antonio assured her that he would support her.13 Eventually, however, Antonio started to evade her.14 Mirasol last saw Antonio in 1983 but could not remember the particular month.15 On November 11, 1983, Mirasol gave birth to Randy.16 She presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth17 and Baptismal Certificate18 indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in the said certificates.19 Antonio supplied his name and birthplace after Erlinda Balmori (Erlinda), the "hilot" who assisted in Mirasols delivery of Randy, went to his house to solicit the said information.20Mirasol also claimed that it was Erlinda who supplied the date and place of marriage of the parents so that the latter can file the birth certificate.21 Mirasol likewise confirmed that she is the same "Mirasol Perla" who signed as the informant therein.22

Next to take the witness stand was Randy who at that time was just 15 years old.23 Randy claimed that he knew Antonio to be the husband of her mother and as his father.24 He recounted having met him for the first time in 1994 in the house of his Aunt Lelita, Antonios sister, where he was vacationing.25 During their encounter, Randy called Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand while the latter hugged him.26 When Randy asked him for support, Antonio promised that he would support him.27 Randy further testified that during his one-week stay in his Aunt Lelitas place, the latter treated him as member of the family.28 For her part, Aurora Ducay testified that she knew both Mirasol and Antonio as they were neighbors in Upper Bicutan, Taguig. Presently, Antonio is still her neighbor in the said place.29 According to her, she knew of Mirasols and Antonios relationship because aside from seeing Antonio frequenting the house of Mirasol, she asked Antonio about it.30 She further narrated that the two have a son named Randy31 and that Antonios mother even tried to get the child from Mirasol.32 Testifying as an adverse witness for the respondents, Antonio admitted having sexual intercourse with Mirasol in February and August33 of 1981.34 When shown with Randys Certificate of Live Birth and asked whether he had a hand in the preparation of the same, Antonio answered in the negative.35 Testifying for himself, Antonio denied having courted Mirasol on January 5, 1981 because during that time, he was studying in Iloilo City. He graduated from the Iloilo Maritime Academy in March of 198136 as shown by his diploma.37 It was only in May 1981 or after his graduation that he came to Manila. Further, he denied having any relationship with Mirasol.38 He claimed that he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol only once which happened in the month of September or October of 1981.39 Antonio came to know that he was being imputed as the father of Randy only when Mirasol charged him with abandonment of minor in 1994, which was also the first time he saw Randy.40 Prior to that, neither Mirasol nor her sister, Norma, whom he met a few times told him about the child.41 Anent Randys Certificate of Live Birth, Antonio testified as to several inaccuracies in the entries thereon. According to him, his middle initial is "E" and not "A" as appearing in the said certificate of live birth.42 Also, he is not a protestant and a laborer as indicated in said certificate.43 Antonio likewise alleged that Mirasol only made up the entries with respect to their marriage on October 28, 1981.44 Daisy Balmori Rodriguez (Daisy), for her part, testified that she came to know Mirasol through her mother Erlinda who was the "hilot" when Mirasol gave birth to Randy.45 She narrated that her mother asked Mirasol the details to be entered in the childs Certificate of Live Birth such as the names of the parents, date and place of marriage, and the intended name of the child.46 Her mother also told her that Mirasols son has no acknowledged father.47Daisy likewise claimed that Mirasol later left to her care the then infant Randy until Mirasol took him away without permission when the child was almost five years old.48 Ruling of the Regional Trial Court After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision49 dated February 26, 2003 ordering Antonio to support Randy. The RTC ruled that Mirasol and Randy are entitled to the relief sought since Antonio himself admitted that he had sex with Mirasol. It also noted that when the 15-year old Randy testified, he categorically declared Antonio as his father. The RTC opined that Mirasol would not have gone through the trouble of exposing herself to humiliation, shame and ridicule of public trial if her allegations were untrue. Antonios counterclaim was denied due to the absence of bad faith or ill-motive on the part of Mirasol and Randy. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Randy Perla and against the defendant Antonio Perla, ordering the latter to give a reasonable monthly support of P5,000.00 to Randy Perla for his sustenance and support to be given to him from the time of the filing of this Complaint. Defendants counterclaim is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.50 Antonio filed a Notice of Appeal51 which was given due course by the RTC.52 Ruling of the Court of Appeals In its Decision53 of March 31, 2005, the CA upheld Randys illegitimate filiation based on the certified true copies of his birth certificate and of his baptismal certificate identifying Antonio as his father. According to the appellate court, while these documents do not bear the signature of Antonio, they are proofs that Antonio is the known, imputed and identified father of Randy. The CA also affirmed the trial courts findings on the credibility of the witnesses and its appreciation of facts, as there was nothing to suggest that the RTC erred in such respects. It highlighted Antonios vacillation in his testimony regarding the number of times he had sex with Mirasol and concluded that the same is a clear badge of his lack of candor a good reason to disregard his denials. Thus: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.54 Antonio filed a Motion for Reconsideration55 which was denied by the CA in its Resolution56 of May 5, 2006. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari. Issue The pivotal issue to be resolved in this case is whether the lower courts correctly ordered Antonio to support Randy. Our Ruling There is merit in the petition. A re-examination of the factual findings of the RTC and the CA is proper in this case. "Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on this Court."57 However, this rule admits of certain exceptions such as when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures or when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts.58 As this case falls under these exceptions, the Court is constrained to re-examine the factual findings of the lower courts. Since respondents complaint for support is anchored on Randys alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio, the lower courts should have first made a determination of the same. Respondents Complaint for support is based on Randys alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with sufficient certainty. A review of the Decision of the RTC would show that it is bereft of any discussion regarding Randys filiation. Although the appellate court, for its part, cited the applicable provision on illegitimate filiation, it merely declared the certified true copies of Randys birth certificate and baptismal certificate both identifying Antonio as the father as good proofs of his filiation with Randy and nothing more. This is despite the fact that the said documents do not bear Antonios signature. "Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for x x x

support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence."59 Respondents failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code which provide as follows: Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father. However, said certificate has no probative value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same.60 It is settled that "a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate."61 We also cannot lend credence to Mirasols claim that Antonio supplied certain information through Erlinda. Aside from Antonios denial in having any participation in the preparation of the document as well as the absence of his signature thereon, respondents did not present Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed supplied certain entries in Randys birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained discrepancies in Antonios personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth certificate are manifestations of Antonios non-participation in its preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol who signed as informant thereon which she confirmed on the witness stand. Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate filiation. That during their first encounter in 1994 Randy called Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand while Antonio hugged him and promised to support him; or that his Aunt Lelita treated him as a relative and was good to him during his one-week stay in her place, cannot be considered as indications of Randys open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172(1). "[T]o prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity.1wphi1 Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously."62 Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support him cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. To emphasize, "[t]he fathers conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist."63 Here, except for that singular occasion in which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son.64Neither can Antonios paternity be deduced from how his sister Lelita treated Randy. To this Court, Lelitas actuations could have been done due to charity or some other reasons.

Anent Randys baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a good proof of Antonios paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent to prove paternity.65 And "while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, x x x baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same."66 This Court cannot likewise agree with the RTCs conclusion that Antonio fathered Randy merely on the basis of his admission that he had sexual encounters with Mirasol. Neither does it agree with the CA that the inconsistencies in Antonios testimony with regard to the number of times he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol are good reasons to disregard his denials and uphold the respondents claims. It is well to stress that as plaintiff, Mirasol has the burden of proving her affirmative allegation that Antonio is the father of her son Randy.67 She must rely on the strength of her evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.68 As Randy was born on November 11, 1983, it was incumbent upon Mirasol to prove that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio prior to the usual period of pregnancy or nine months before the birth of Randy. This crucial period therefore is during the early part of the first quarter of 1983. However, nothing from Mirasols testimony indicates that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio during that time. She merely testified that she last met with Antonio in 1983 but could not remember the particular month.69 Plainly, this hardly means anything not only because it was not established that the said meeting took place during that crucial period but also because Mirasol never mentioned that they had sexual contact during their meeting. Antonios admission of sexual intercourse with Mirasol does not likewise by any means strengthen respondents theory that he fathered Randy. When Antonio testified as an adverse witness for the respondents, he stated that he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol in February and August of 1981. Later testifying as witness for his own behalf, he mentioned that he had a one night affair with Mirasol which happened in the month of September or October of 1981. Assuming that he indeed had sexual contact with Mirasol on the dates mentioned, still, none of these sexual congresses could have led to the conception of Randy who was born two years later in 1983. All told, it is clear that respondents failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, the order for Antonio to support Randy has no basis. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 31, 2005 and Resolution dated May 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 79312 are REVERSED and SER ASIDE and the Decision dated February 26, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. 96-3952 is VACATED. A new one is entered DISMISSING the Complaint for Support filed by Mirasol Baring and Randy Perla against Antonio Perla. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondents. x--------------------------------------------------x ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner, - versus SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondent. x--------------------------------------------------x SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Petitioner, G.R. No. 194075 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Respondent. x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x NACHURA, J.: These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN, dismissing the petition for certiorarifiled by petitioner Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos) in G.R. No. 193902, thus, affirming the Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Lanao del Norte, in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed by petitioner Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No. 194075. Before anything else, we disentangle the facts. June 1, 2011 G.R. No. 193908

- versus -

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner, - versus -

G.R. No. 193902

On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982. Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.

A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Sharia Circuit District Court, 1st Circuit, 3rd District, Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1992, as follows: DECREE OF DIVORCE This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman against her husband, the herein respondent, on the ground that the wife, herein complainant, was previously given by her husband the authority to exercise Talaq, as provided for and, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. When this case was called for hearing[,] both parties appeared and herein respondent, Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman[,] interposes no objection to confirm their divorce, which they have freely entered into on December 18, 1983. This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the herein parties is fully convinced that both the complainant and the respondent have been duly converted to the faith of Islam prior to their Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more possibility of reconciliation by and between them, hereby issues this decree of divorce. WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, this petition is hereby granted. Consequently, the marriage between Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman is hereby confirmed dissolved. Issued this 18th day Province, Philippines. of June, 1992, at Isabela, Basilan

Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, on October 18, 1999, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto. As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against Zamoranos, to wit: 1. Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed on March 31, 2003 before the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249. Subsequently, on May 31, 2004, Pacasum amended the petition into one for Declaration of a Void Marriage, alleging, among other things, that: (a) Zamoranos, at the time of her marriage to Pacasum, was already previously married to De Guzman on July 30, 1982; (b) Zamoranos first marriage, solemnized before the RTC, Quezon City, presided over by Judge Laguio, subsisted at the time of the celebration of Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage; (c) Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage was bigamous and voidab initio; and (d) thus, Zamoranos, as the guilty spouse, should forfeit: (i) custody of her minor children to their father, who should have sole and exclusive custody; (ii) her share in the community property in favor of the children; and (iii) her inheritance from Pacasum by testate or intestate succession. 2. Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), filed on October 25, 2004. 3. Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos dismissal from service and disbarment before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Bureau of Finance Revenue Integrity Protection Service, respectively. Parenthetically, the administrative cases were dismissed in due course. However, as of the date of the assailed CA Decision, Pacasums appeal from the CSCs dismissal of the administrative case was still pending resolution. Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in Civil Case No. 6249, Pacasum contracted a second marriage with Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004.[4] Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution dated February 2, 2005, finding prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy. [5] Consequently, on February 22, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-12305.[6] Zamoranos filed a motion for reconsideration of the City Prosecutors February 2, 2005 resolution. As a result, the proceedings before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, were temporarily suspended. On April 29, 2005, the City Prosecutor of Ozamis City, the acting City Prosecutor of Iligan City at the time, issued a resolution granting Zamoranos motion for reconsideration and dismissing the charge of Bigamy against Zamoranos.[7] Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for reconsideration of the April 29, 2005 resolution of the City Prosecutor, which was denied in a resolution dated August 15, 2005. [8] Posthaste, Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the Secretary of Justice, assailing the dismissal of his criminal complaint for Bigamy against Zamoranos.[9]

(signed) HON. KAUDRI L. JAINUL Presiding Judge[3] Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she had previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, on December 28, 1992, in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos first marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon. Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and, in 1998, the two were de factoseparated. The volatile relationship of

In yet another turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on February 7, 2006, issued a resolution granting Pacasums Petition for Review and reversed the February 2, 2005 and April 29, 2005 resolutions of the City Prosecutor.[10] Zamoranos immediately filed an Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in Abeyance Filing of the Instant Case; and (3) to Hold in Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest, respectively dated February 20, 2006 and February 24, 2006, before the Secretary of Justice.[11] Unfortunately for Zamoranos, her twin motions were denied by the Secretary of Justice in a resolution dated May 17, 2006.[12] Zamoranos second motion for reconsideration, as with her previous motions, was likewise denied. On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249, the RTC, Branch 2,Iligan City, rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of thePhilippines: From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the Court finds that the allegation of [Pacasum] to the effect that his marriage with [Zamoranos] on December 28, 1992 is a bigamous marriage due to the alleged subsisting previous marriage between [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman is misplaced. The previous marriage between Jesus de Guzman and [Zamoranos] has long been terminated [and] has gone with the wind. The fact that divorce byTalaq was entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband in accordance with PD 1083, x x x their marriage is dissolved and consequently thereof, [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman can re-marry. Moreover, the second marriage entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband Jesus de Guzman under the Family Code on July 30, 1982 is merely ceremonial, being unnecessary, it does not modify/alter or change the validity of the first marriage entered into by them under PD 1083. Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos], their second marriage on December 28, 1992 under the Family Code does not in any way modify, alter or change the validity of the first marriage on December 20, 1989 entered into by [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos] under PD 1083, as amended. In fact, according to Ghazali, one of the renowned Muslim author and jurist in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence and concurred in by retired Justice Ra[s]ul of the Court of Appeals and also a Professor on Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, in the case of combined marriage[s], the first marriage is to be considered valid and effective as between the parties while the second marriage is merely ceremonial, being a surplusage and unnecessary. Therefore, the divorce by Talaq dissolved the marriage between [Zamoranos] and her first husband[,de Guzman,] being governed by PD 1083, x x x. Article 13, Chapter I, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, provides x x x:

Application The provisions of this title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims[,] or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[,] shall be governed by the Muslim Code and divorce proceedings shall be properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit Court. Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the Muslim code, provides x x x: Jurisdiction The Sharia Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over: xxxx 2. All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have been married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating to: a) b) Marriage; Divorce recognized under this Code;

x x x x The above provision of law clearly shows no concurrent jurisdiction with any civil courts or other courts of law. And any divorce proceeding undertaken before the Shari[a] Court is valid, recognized, binding and sufficient divorce proceedings. Moreover, the instant case is one of the several cases filed by [Pacasum] against [Zamoranos] such as complaints for disbarment, for immorality, for bigamy and misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and in the Civil Service Commission which were all similar or [based on] the same set of facts. A pure and simple harassment. In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the considered view and so hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the above-entitled case for annulment of marriage entered into under PD 1083, x x x. It is the Sharia Circuit Court that has the exclusive original jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the affirmative defenses which are in the nature of motion to dismiss is hereby granted. The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED.[13] On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 6249 by the RTC, Branch 2,Iligan City. On April 3, 2009, the denial by the Supreme Court of Pacasums appeal became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.[14] In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, upon motion of Pacasum, issued an Order reinstating Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy against Zamoranos.[15] Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, had no jurisdiction over her person and over the offense charged. Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the decision of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, in Civil Case No. 6249 categorically declared her and Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the mootness of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 and the inapplicability of the RPC provision on Bigamy to her marriage to Pacasum. In all, Zamoranos claimed that Criminal Case No. 06-12305 ought to be dismissed.[16] On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, denied Zamoranos Motion to Quash the Information. Zamoranos motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied.
[17]

jurisdiction; as opposed to an error of jurisdiction where the acts complained of were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction. xxxx In the present case, [w]e have circumspectly examined [Zamoranos] Motion to Quash Information and the action taken by the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City] in respect thereto, and [w]e found nothing that may constitute as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City]. The Order dated December 21, 2009, which first denied [Zamoranos] [M]otion to [Q]uash Information meticulously explained the factual and legal basis for the denial of the issues raised by [Zamoranos] in said motion. We find the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan Citys] stance in upholding the sufficiency of the Information for bigamy and taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 to be well within the bounds of its jurisdiction. Even assuming arguendo that the denial of petitioners motion to quash is erroneous, such error was, at worst, an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.[18] Interestingly, even Pacasum was not satisfied with the CAs dismissal of Zamoranos petition for certiorari. Hence, these separate appeals by Zamoranos and Pacasum. We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases, filed by her two counsels, docketed as G.R. Nos. 193902 and 193908, respectively, which assail the same CA Decision. However, upon motion of counsel for Zamoranos, to obviate confusion and superfluity, we have allowed Zamoranos to withdraw her petition in G.R. No. 193908 and for her earlier petition in G.R. No. 193902 to remain. Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to ignore the conclusions made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, and affirmed by the CA and this Court, to wit: 1. Zamoranos is a Muslim and was validly married to another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites; 2. Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage ceremony under civil rites before Judge Laguio did not remove their marriage from the ambit of P.D. No. 1083; 3. Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos divorce by talaq to De Guzman severed their marriage ties; 4. Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[, are] governed by the Muslim Code and [the] divorce proceedings properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit Court. 5. Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under Islamic rites; and 6. On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, have no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case for declaration of nullity of marriage entered into under P.D. No. 1083 because it is the Sharia Circuit Court that has original jurisdiction over the subject matter. For his part, Pacasum, although he agrees with the dismissal of Zamoranos petition, raises a quarrel with the aforementioned conclusions of the CA. Pacasum vehemently denies that Zamoranos is a Muslim, who was previously married and divorced

Undaunted, Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and reversal of the December 21, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City. As previously adverted to, the CA dismissed Zamoranos petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a petition for certiorari to assail the denial of a Motion to Quash the Information: A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy. As such, it is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly void. The aim of certiorari is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to a court on the basis alone of an alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. To prosper, a petition forcertiorari must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. Simply put, in a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence, such as an error of judgment which is defined as one in which the court or quasi-judicial body may commit in the exercise of its

under Islamic rites, and who entered into a second marriage with him, likewise under Islamic rites. We impale the foregoing issues into the following: 1. Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos petition for certiorari; and 2. Whether the RTCs, Branch 2, Iligan City and the CAs separate factual findings that Zamoranos is a Muslim are correct. As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[19] The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courtsacts which courts have no power or authority in law to perform.[20] The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of an appeal.[21] Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of amotion to quash an information. The established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.[22] However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in certain situations, certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;[23] (d) to promote public welfare and public policy;[24] and (e) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof.[25] The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in this instance. Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, committed an error of jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos motion to quash. First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2,Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, IliganCity, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts. The

RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the Sharia Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the principle of res judicata. The provision reads: SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: (a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only beprima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate. The requisites for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are: (1) (2) The former judgment or order must be final; It must be a judgment on the merits;

(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.[26] The second and fourth elements of res judicata are not present in this case. Suffice it to state that the judgment rendered by RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, was not a judgment on the merits. The lower court simply dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since it found that the Sharia Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear the dissolution of the marriage of Muslims who wed under Islamic rites. Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties. Apart from that, Zamoranos presented the following evidence:

1. Affidavit of Confirmation[27] executed by the Ustadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto, who solemnized the marriage of Zamoranos and De Guzman under Islamic rites, declaring under oath that: 1. I am an Ustadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as such, authorized to solemnize the marriages among Muslims; 2. On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting that both parties are believers of Islam, I solemnized the marriage of Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman and Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos in accordance with Muslim Personal Laws in Isabela, Basilan;

3.

The Sharias Circuit Council in the Island Province of Basilan was housed at the old Capitol Building, in the City of Isabela, Basilan, Philippines; As the Clerk of Court of the Sharias Circuit Court since 1985, I can recall that in 1992, Mr. Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman, who is a province mate of mine in Basilan, and his former wife, Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos, jointly asked for the confirmation of their Talaq, by the wife; which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083; In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharias Circuit Court were lost by reason of the fire that gutted down the old Capitol Building in the City of Isabela; This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of fact.

4.

5. 3. Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his former wife, Mariam Zamoranos came to see me and asked my assistance to have their marriage and the subsequent Talaq by the wife, which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083; registered [by] the Sharia Circuit Court in the province of Basilan; and, after I was convinced that their divorce was in order, I accompanied them to the [C]lerk of [C]ourt of the Sharia Circuit Court; 4. Satisfied that their marriage and the subsequent divorce were in accordance with Muslim personal laws, the Clerk of Court registered their documents; 5. In June of 1993, the old Capitol building, where the Sharia Circuit Court was housed, was razed to the ground; and, I found out later that all the records, effects and office equipments of the Sharia Circuit Court were totally lost [in] the fire; 6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of fact; and 7. This is issued upon the request of Mr. De Guzman for whatever legal purposes it may serve. 2. Certification[28] issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge Jainul), which confirmed the divorce agreement between Zamoranos and De Guzman. 3. Affidavit[29] executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge Usman), former Clerk of Court of Judge Jainul at the time of the confirmation of Zamoranos and De Guzmans divorce agreement by the latter. Judge Usmans affidavit reads, in pertinent part: 1. 2. I am the presiding Judge of the Sharias Circuit Court in the City of Pagadian; The first time that a Sharias Circuit court was established in the Island Province of Basilan was in 1985, with the Honorable Kaudri L. Jainul, as the Presiding Judge, while I was then the First Clerk of Court of the Basilan Sharias Circuit Court;

6.

From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083. True, the Sharia Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses penalized under the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is correct when it declared that: The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg. 129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia District Courts and ShariaCircuit Courts with limited jurisdiction. Neither court was vested jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal Code. There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court has jurisdiction over this case.[30] Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on Pacasums claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA. The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage before the

Sharia Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman. Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA when her liberty was already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings against her. In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to promote the advancement and effective participation of the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies. Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos. Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides: TITLE II. CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS Article 3. Conflict of provisions. (1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general application, the former shall prevail. (2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws or laws of local application, the latter shall be liberally construed in order to carry out the former. (3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim. In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazalis Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines, the two experts on the subject matter of Muslim personal laws expound thereon: The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general application, this Code shall prevail. For example, there is conflict between the provision on bigamy under the Revised Penal Code which is a law of general application and Article 27 of this Code, on subsequent marriage, the latter shall prevail, in the sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Muslim Code, the provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy will not apply. The second provision refers to a conflict between the provision of this Code which is a special law and another

special law or laws of local application. The latter should be liberally construed to carry out the provision of the Muslim Code.[31] On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. 1083 provides: TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Chapter One APPLICABILITY CLAUSE Article 13. Application. (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. (2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply. Chapter Two MARRIAGE (NIKAH) Section 1. Requisites of Marriage. Section 3. Subsequent Marriages Article 29. By divorcee. (1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has observed an idda of three monthly courses counted from the date of divorce. However, if she is pregnant at the time of the divorce, she may remarry only after delivery. Chapter Three DIVORCE (TALAQ) Section 1. Nature and Form Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by: (a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);

divorce of the parties, if the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.[32] Article 46. Divorce by talaq. (1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in a single repudiation of his wife during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained from carnal relation with her. Any number of repudiations made during one tular shall constitute only one repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the prescribed idda. (2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have the right to take her back (ruju) within the prescribed idda by resumption of cohabitation without need of a new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall become irrevocable (talaq bain sugra). xxxx SO ORDERED. Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq; or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it becomes irrevocable, shall have the following effects: (a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in accordance with this Code; (b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance; (c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article 78 of this Code; (d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole dower in case the talaq has been effected after the consummation of the marriage, or one-half thereof if effected before its consummation; (e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give support in accordance with Article 67; and (f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall be dissolved and liquidated. For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazalis Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines: If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of the Philippines will govern the marriage and G.R. No. 163604 May 6, 2005 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC, respondents. CARPIO-MORALES, J.: In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of September 29, 1999,1 granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioners Report2 and accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead. In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial courts order by filing a Notice of Appeal.3 By Order of November 22, 1999s,4 the trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served "as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case being a special proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal. The Republics Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order of disapproval having been denied by Order of January 13, 2000,5 it filed a Petition for Certiorari6 before the Court of Appeals, it contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal. By Decision of May 5, 2004,7 the Court of Appeals denied the Republics petition on procedural and substantive grounds in this wise: Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry.[33] It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Sharia Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy. WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in G.R. No. 194075 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy is GRANTED.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in form. It failed to attach to its petition a certified true copy of the assailed Order dated January 13, 2000 [denying its Motion for Reconsideration of the November 22, 1999 Order disapproving its Notice of Appeal]. Moreover, the petition questioned the [trial courts] Order dated August 15, 1999, which declared Clemente Jomoc presumptively dead, likewise for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, yet, not even a copy could be found in the records. On this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright in accordance with Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve deeper into the substantive issue of the validity/nullity of the assailed order. The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal to perfect its appeal. Otherwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, the period to appeal is 15 days from notice or decision or final order appealed from and the appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal (Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court). As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, "a civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999). Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action . The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person. On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13, 2000 denying OSGs Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice of Appeal was correctly issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a special proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required for an appeal to be perfected. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in the enumeration, petitioner contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices. By Resolution of December 15, 2004,8 this Court, noting that copy of the September 27, 2004 Resolution9requiring respondent to file her comment on the petition was returned unserved with postmasters notation "Party refused," Resolved to consider that copy deemed served upon her.

The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on Special Proceedings, Part II of the Revised Rules of Court entitled SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, read: RULE 72 SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL RULES Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the following: (a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons; (b) Escheat; (c) Guardianship and custody of children; (d) Trustees; (e) Adoption; (f) Rescission and revocation of adoption; (g) Hospitalization of insane persons; (h) Habeas corpus; (i) Change of name; (j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations; (k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children; (l) Constitution of family home; (m) Declaration of absence and death; (n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. (Underscoring supplied) The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death provides: Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored its grant of the petition for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides: Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouses was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial court in disapproving petitioners Notice of Appeal, provides: Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. (a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing

a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following provision, inter alia: Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all casesprovided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial courts order sufficed. That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows: Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and alllaws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied), seals the case in petitioners favor. Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition before the appellate court. Petitioners failure to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial courts order denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the appellate court should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule. As for petitioners failure to submit copy of the trial courts order granting the petition for declaration of presumptive death, contrary to the appellate courts observation that petitioner was also assailing it, petitioners 8-page petition10 filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely having assailed the order disapproving the Notice of Appeal. WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to it for appropriate action in light of the foregoing discussion. SO ORDERED. QUIAO V. QUIAO G.R. No 176556, [July 04, 2012]

FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities. Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugalpartnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse. Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned. RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation. ISSUES: 1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. Art 129 will govern. 2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights overof the properties in the conjugal partnership NO. 3. Is the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal partnershipof gains the same with the computation of net profits earned in the absolute community? NO.

RATIO: 1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife. Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugalpartnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. 2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the conjugalpartnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife. While one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process.First, he was wellaware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all thecommunity properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial courts ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process. 3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couples

properties. And when the couples marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned. In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the net profits. And since the legal separationshare decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing. On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugalpartnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals. In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugalpartnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty partys favor. Republic vs. CA GR No. 159614, December 9, 2005

FACTS: Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in February 1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents house but was not there and even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-laws house and learned that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. He then sought help from the Barangay Captain. For some time, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also reported the disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife. ISSUE: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead. HELD: The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the Barangay Captain. He even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to corroborate his testimony. He also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of the local police authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in RTC.

thereof by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale. In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property, Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises. Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said documents null and void and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car which was burned, the attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages. The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for damages and attorneys fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition ISSUE: 1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE. 2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY. HELD: the petition is denied. 1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part: ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . .

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO, G.R. No. 153802 March 11, 2005

FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.

Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.[ Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . . In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code

on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter. The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondents consent. 2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . .. (1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . . Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[ The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation. NOTES: In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal,

petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory. Francisco vs. Master Iron Works Construction Corporation GR. No. 151967, February 16, 2005 FACTS: Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and Eduardo Francisco got married on January 1983. The latter was then employed as Vice President in a Private Corporation. Josefina acquired two parcels of land where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina, married to Eduardo. An affidavit of waiver was executed by Eduardo where he declared that prior to his marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the land with her own savings and that he waived whatever claims he had over the property. When Josefina mortgaged the property for a loan, Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. In 1990, Eduardo who was then a General Manager, bought bags of cement from defendant but failed to pay the same. The latter filed a complaint for recovery and trial court rendered judgment against Eduardo. The court then issued a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a notice of levy on execution over the alleged property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the amount due under the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels of land in which she claimed as her paraphernal property. ISSUE: WON the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo. HELD: The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the sole owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it was issued after her marriage. Their case fall under Article 148 and since they got married before the Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner likewise failed that she had any vested right. Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that the wife/husband has actually contributed money, property, or industry to the properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership will not arise. The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA that the property was conjugal was affirmed. FRANCISCO L. GONZALES vs ERMINDA F. GONZALES G.R. No. 159521December 16, 2005 Facts: In March 1977, Francisco Gonzales, petitioner, and Erminda Gonzales, respondent, started living ashusband and wife. After two (2) years, or on February 4, 1979, they got married. From this union, four(4) children were born, namely: Carlo Manuel, Maria Andres, Maria Angelica and Marco Manuel.On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a

complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, MakatiCity, for annulment of marriage with prayer for support pendente lite, docketed as Civil Case No. 32-31111. The complaint alleges that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with theobligations of marriage. He beats her for no justifiable reason, humiliates and embarrasses her, anddenies her love, sexual comfort and loyalty. During the time they lived together, they acquiredproperties. She managed their pizza business and worked hard for its development. She prays for thedeclaration of the nullity of their marriage and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains.On February 12, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision.Not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. He did not contest that part of the decision which declared his marriage to respondent voidab initio.In its Decision dated April 2, 2003, the Appellate Court affirmed the assailed Decision of the trial court.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in an Order dated July 23, 1997.Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the court of Appeals erred in ruling that the properties should be divided equallybetween the parties. Held: Property relation shall be governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the Family Code quoted asfollows:"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively witheach other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wagesand salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them throughtheir work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.Petition DENIED. Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner

GR 165420 June 30 2005 CONCEPCION R. AINZA, substituted by her legal heirs, DR. NATIVIDAD A. TULIAO, CORAZON A. JALECO and LILIA A. OLAYON, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ANTONIO PADUA and EUGENIA PADUA, respondents. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari assails the February 24, 2004 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70239, [1] and its September 28, 2004 resolution, denying reconsideration thereof.[2] In her complaint for partition of real property, annulment of titles with damages, [3] Concepcion Ainza (Concepcion) alleged that respondent-spouses Eugenia (Eugenia) and Antonio Padua (Antonio) owned a 216.40 sq. m. lot with an unfinished residential house located at No. 85-A Durian corner Pajo Sts., Barangay Quirino 2-C, Project 2, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 271935. Sometime in April 1987, she bought one-half of an undivided portion of the property from her daughter, Eugenia and the latters husband, Antonio, for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No Deed of Absolute Sale was executed to evidence the transaction, but cash payment was received by the respondents, and ownership was transferred to Concepcion through physical delivery to her attorney-in-fact and daughter, Natividad Tuliao (Natividad). Concepcion authorized Natividad and the latters husband, Ceferino Tuliao (Ceferino) to occupy the premises, and make improvements on the unfinished building.

Thereafter, Concepcion alleged that without her consent, respondents caused the subdivision of the property into three portions and registered it in their names under TCT Nos. N-155122, N-155123 and N-155124 in violation of the restrictions annotated at the back of the title. On the other hand, Antonio averred that he bought the property in 1980 and introduced improvements thereon. Between 1989 and 1990, he and his wife, Eugenia, allowed Natividad and Ceferino to occupy the premises temporarily. In 1994, they caused the subdivision of the property and three (3) separate titles were issued. Thereafter, Antonio requested Natividad to vacate the premises but the latter refused and claimed that Concepcion owned the property. Antonio thus filed an ejectment suit on April 1, 1999. Concepcion, represented by Natividad, also filed on May 4, 1999 a civil case for partition of real property and annulment of titles with damages. Antonio claimed that his wife, Eugenia, admitted that Concepcion offered to buy one third (1/3) of the property who gave her small amounts over several years which totaled P100,000.00 by 1987 and for which she signed a receipt. On January 9, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85, rendered judgment[4] in favor of Concepcion, the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants and ordering: 1. the subdivision of the subject property between the said plaintiff and defendants in equal shares with one-half of the property, including the portion occupied by the spouses Severino and Natividad Tuliao to be awarded to the plaintiff; 2. the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N-155122, N-155123, N155124 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City; 3. the defendants to pay to the plaintiff P50,000.00 as attorneys fees. SO ORDERED.[5] The trial court upheld the sale between Eugenia and Concepcion. It ruled that the sale was consummated when both contracting parties complied with their respective obligations. Eugenia transferred possession by delivering the property to Concepcion who in turn paid the purchase price. It also declared that the transfer of the property did not violate the Statute of Frauds because a fully executed contract does not fall within its coverage. On appeal by the respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, and declared the sale null and void. Applying Article 124 of the Family Code, the Court of Appeals ruled that since the subject property is conjugal, the written consent of Antonio must be obtained for the sale to be valid. It also ordered the spouses Padua to return the amount of P100,000.00 to petitioners plus interest.[6] The sole issue for resolution in this petition for review is whether there was a valid contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion. A contract of sale is perfected by mere consent, upon a meeting of the minds on the offer and the acceptance thereof based on subject matter, price and terms of payment.[7] In this case, there was a perfected contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion. The records show that Eugenia offered to sell a portion of the property to Concepcion, who accepted the offer and agreed to pay P100,000.00 as consideration. The contract of sale was consummated when both parties fully complied with their respective obligations. Eugenia delivered the property to Concepcion, who in turn, paid Eugenia the price of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), as evidenced by the receipt which reads:

The verbal contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion did not violate the provisions of the Statute of Frauds that a contract for the sale of real property shall be unenforceable unless the contract or some note or memorandum of the sale is in writing and subscribed by the party charged or his agent. [9] When a verbal contract has been completed, executed or partially consummated, as in this case, its enforceability will not be barred by the Statute of Frauds, which applies only to an executory agreement. [10] Thus, where one party has performed his obligation, oral evidence will be admitted to prove the agreement.[11] In the instant case, the oral contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion was evidenced by a receipt signed by Eugenia. Antonio also stated that his wife admitted to him that she sold the property to Concepcion. It is undisputed that the subject property was conjugal and sold by Eugenia in April 1987 or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Article 254 of which repealed Title V, Book I of the Civil Code provisions on the property relations between husband and wife. However, Article 256 thereof limited its retroactive effect only to cases where it would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. In the case at bar, vested rights of Concepcion will be impaired or prejudiced by the application of the Family Code; hence, the provisions of the Civil Code should be applied. In Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon, et al. ,[12] the legal effect of a sale of conjugal properties by the wife without the consent of the husband was clarified, to wit: The legal ground which deserves attention is the legal effect of a sale of lands belonging to the conjugal partnership made by the wife without the consent of the husband. It is useful at this point to re-state some elementary rules: The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 165, Civil Code) Subject to certain exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. (Art. 166, Idem.) And the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent, except in cases provided by law. (Art. 172, Idem.). In the instant case, Gimena, the wife, sold lands belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the husband and the sale is not covered by the phrase except in cases provided by law. The Court of Appeals described the sale as invalid a term which is imprecise when used in relation to contracts because the Civil Code uses specific names in designating defective contracts, namely: rescissible (Arts. 1380 et seq.), voidable (Arts. 1390 et seq.), unenforceable (Arts. 1403, et seq.), and void or inexistent (Arts. 1409 et seq.). The sale made by Gimena is certainly a defective contract but of what category? The answer: it is a voidable contract. According to Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, among the voidable contracts are [T]hose where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract. (Par. 1.) In the instant case Gimena had no capacity to give consent to the contract of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not even to the husband alone but to both spouses. The view that the contract made by Gimena is a voidable contract is supported by the legal provision that contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when such consent is required, are annullable at her instance during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned. (Art. 173, Civil Code). Gimenas contract is not rescissible for in such a contract all the essential elements are untainted but Gimenas consent was tainted. Neither can the contract be classified as unenforceable because it does not fit any of those described in Art. 1403 of the Civil Code. And finally, the contract cannot be void or inexistent because it is not one of those

mentioned in Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. By process of elimination, it must perforce be a voidable contract. The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her husband only during the marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the contract while the marriage subsisted because they merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold. (Emphasis supplied) The consent of both Eugenia and Antonio is necessary for the sale of the conjugal property to be valid. Antonios consent cannot be presumed.[13] Except for the self-serving testimony of petitioner Natividad, there is no evidence that Antonio participated or consented to the sale of the conjugal property. Eugenia alone is incapable of giving consent to the contract. Therefore, in the absence of Antonios consent, the disposition made by Eugenia is voidable.[14] The contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion being an oral contract, the action to annul the same must be commenced within six years from the time the right of action accrued.[15] Eugenia sold the property in April 1987 hence Antonio should have asked the courts to annul the sale on or before April 1993. No action was commenced by Antonio to annul the sale, hence his right to seek its annulment was extinguished by prescription. Even assuming that the ten (10)-year prescriptive period under Art. 173 should apply, Antonio is still barred from instituting an action to annul the sale because since April 1987, more than ten (10) years had already lapsed without any such action being filed. In sum, the sale of the conjugal property by Eugenia without the consent of her husband is voidable. It is binding unless annulled. Antonio failed to exercise his right to ask for the annulment within the prescribed period, hence, he is now barred from questioning the validity of the sale between his wife and Concepcion. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated February 24, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70239 and its resolution dated September 28, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision dated January 9, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. Q-99-37529, is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, petitioner, vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, respondent. [G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005] TINGA, J.: I will not blot out his name out of the book of life. Revelation 3:5 On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.

The RTC established the following facts: Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.
[1]

previous cases[9] decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of name.
[10]

On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. [2] The trial court found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petitionthat is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle namedid not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name.[3] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a resolution dated 20 May 2004.[4] The trial court maintained that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of name would not prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable.[5] Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) [6] arguing that the trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174[7] of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that [W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the best interest of the child. [8] It is argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out that the middle name Carulasan will cause him undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the trial court to have denied the petition for change of name until he had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to

The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition. The OSG filed its Comment[11] positing that the trial court correctly denied the petition for change of name. The OSG argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same. According to the OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name Carulasan is in the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry. [12] The OSG also adds that the petitioner has not shown any compelling reason to justify the change of name or the dropping of the middle name, for that matter. Petitioners allegation that the continued use of the middle name may result in confusion and difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its argument raised before the trial court that the dropping of the childs middle name could only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion since both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use of such middle name is actually proscribed by Singaporean law.[13] We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied. The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.[14] The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. [15] To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.[16] In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.[17] The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name usually deal with requests for change of surname. There are

only a handful of cases involving requests for change of the given name [18] and none on requests for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We have to answer in the negative. A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant at this point. We quote, thus: For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the name is immaterial. The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.[19] This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.[20] The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, [21] while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.[22] Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mothers surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child. Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society. In support, he cites Oshita v. Republic[23] and Calderon v. Republic,[24] which, however, are not apropos both.

In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based on the following considerations: she had elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other siblings who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using their mothers surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War; and there was no showing that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public interest. In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed the petition in her behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mothers husband. The Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant should be granted where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court took into consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people. Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,[25] in arguing that although Article 174 of the Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the father and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use only one family name, even the family name of the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had been using since childhood, in her school records and in her voters registration). The trial court denied her petition but this Court overturned the denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate child, should principally use the surname of her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there was ample justification to grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion. Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name against the standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on his petition. The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners were already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name. Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of the petitions for change of name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable or compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition to the fact of therein petitioners election of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the Court granted the petition since the petitioner had been known since childhood by a name different from her registered name and she had not used her registered name in her school records and voters registration records; thus, denying the petition would only result to confusion. Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to buttress his argument

that he does not have to reach the age of majority to petition for change of name. However, it is manifest inCalderon that the Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave paramount consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner therein. In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name. In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority.[26] As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC VS IYOY (G.R. NO. 152577) Facts: The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36. On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her husbands last name as hers in the invitation. March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her newhusbands last name as evidences. Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince 1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA. Issue: Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity? Held: The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity. Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. JAIME F. VILLALON, - versus MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition [1] for the annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City where it was docketed as JDRC No. 3917 and raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage. G.R. No. 167206 November 18, 2005

CO- OWNERSHIP Buenaventura VS. CA G.R. Nos. 127358 and G.R. Nos. 127449 March 31, 2005 Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondents motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000. The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

Held: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution.

According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void ab initio. On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answer[2] denying petitioners allegations. She asserted that her 18-year marriage to petitioner has been fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more growth in their relationship and that their marital squabbles were normal based on community standards. Petitioners success in his professional life aided him in performing his role as husband, father, and provider. Respondent claimed that petitioners commitment to his paternal and marital responsibilities was beyond reproach. On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed the prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there was collusion between the parties. [3] The report submitted to the trial court stated that there was no such collusion.[4] The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) subsequently entered its appearance in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines [5]and submitted an opposition[6] to the petition on September 23, 1997. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Petitioner testified that he met respondent sometime in the early seventies when he applied for a job at Metrobank, where respondent was employed as a foreign exchange trader. They began dating in 1975 and had a romantic relationship soon thereafter. [7] After going steady for about two years, petitioner and respondent were married at the San Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Manila on April 22, 1978. Petitioner claimed that he married respondent because he believed that it was the right time to raise a family and that she would be a good mother to his children.[8] In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided to separate from respondent. According to him, their marriage reached a point where there was no longer any communication between them and their relationship became devoid of love, affection, support and respect due to his constant urge to see other women. [9] Moreover, their relationship tended to be one-sided since respondent was unresponsive and hardly ever showed her love, needs, wants and emotions.[10]

a child psychologist before talking to his children. [15] He considered himself as a good and loving father and described his relationship with the children as great.[16] Despite the separation, petitioner would regularly visit his children who stayed with him on alternate weekends. He voluntarily gave monthly support to the children and paid for their tuition fees. He also shouldered the childrens medical expenses as well as the maintenance and miscellaneous fees for the conjugal abode.[17] Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex. Dr. Dayan described the said disorder as a pervasive maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and occupational functioning with main symptoms of grand ideation about oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is unique and wanting to always be the one followed, the I personality. A person afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with Casanova Complex exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another.[18] Dr. Dayan submitted a psychological report on both petitioner and respondent based on clinical interviews and psychological tests.[19] Respondent testified that she first learned of her husbands infidelity in 1980. She discovered that he was having an affair with one of her friends who worked as a trader in her husbands company. The affair was cut short when the woman left for the United States to work. Eventually, she and petitioner were able to rebuild their relationship and overcome the crisis.[20] When asked about the womanizing ways of her husband, respondent averred that she did not know whether her husbands acts could be deemed womanizing since there were only two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart. [21] She also theorized that petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled so he could marry her old friend. [22] She stated that she has not closed her doors to petitioner but the latter would have to give up his extra-marital relationship.[23] To controvert the findings of petitioners expert witness, respondent presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, who testified that Dr. Dayans findings were incomplete because a team approach was necessary in evaluating an individuals personality. An evaluation of ones psychological capacity requires the expertise of a psychiatrist and social worker. [24]

Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions before his marriage, he had two girlfriends at the same time. He also saw other women even when he became engaged to and, later on, married respondent.[11] Respondent learned of his affairs but reacted in a subdued manner.[12] Petitioner surmised that it was respondents nature to be silent and withdrawn.[13] In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode and moved into an apartment located five to ten minutes away. Before he left, he and his wife spoke to their three children who, at that time, were 14, 8, and 6 years old, respectively. [14] Petitioner consulted

Upon order of the trial court, the parties submitted their respective memoranda. [25] The OSG likewise filed a certification[26]pursuant to Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals.[27] In due course, the trial court rendered judgment as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon celebrated on April 22, 1978, as null and void ab initio on the ground of

psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code Accordingly, the conjugal assets and liabilities are hereby ordered to be liquidated and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains be effected in accordance with Article 129 of the Family Code. As petitioner manifested that he wishes to maintain the custody arrangement now existing, the custody of the three (3) children Miguel Alberto, Fernando Alfonso, and Ma. Joanna Victoria shall remain with the respondent subject to visitation rights of petitioner as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties. In order to cancel the registration of the Marriage Contract between herein parties appearing in the Book of Marriage of the city of Manila, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila as well as the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO), CRD Legal Department, EDSA, Quezon City. SO ORDERED.[28] Respondent and the OSG seasonably filed an appeal from the decision of the trial court, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74354. On March 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, the dispositive part of which reads: WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 12, 2001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment entered DISMISSING the petitioners petition for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.[29] Contrary to the trial courts findings, the appellate court held that petitioner failed to prove the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of his alleged psychological incapacity. Although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioners psychological incapacity preceded the marriage, she failed to give sufficient basis for such a finding. Dr. Dayan also stated that parental marital instability was the root cause of petitioners psychological incapacity but failed to elaborate thereon or link the two variables. Moreover, petitioners sexual infidelity was made to appear as symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder when, in reality, the same merely resulted from a general dissatisfaction with the marriage.

The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioners personal history. In Santos v. Court of Appeals ,[31] the court held that psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, must be characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability.[32] It should ... [R]efer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated....[33] In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner suffered from Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex even before the marriage and thus had the tendency to cheat on his wife, such conclusion was not sufficiently backed by concrete evidence showing that petitioner indeed had several affairs and finds it difficult to be faithful. Except for petitioners general claim that on certain occasions he had two girlfriends at the same time, no details or explanations were given of such circumstances that would demonstrate petitioners inability to be faithful to respondent either before or at the time of the celebration of their marriage. Similarly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan described the symptoms of one afflicted with Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder as self-centered, characterized by grandiose ideation and lack of empathy in relating to others, and one with Casanova Complex as a serial adulterer, the evidence on record betrays the presence of any of these symptoms.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision which was denied in an order dated October 28, 2004.[30] Thus, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to prove his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition has no merit.

Moreover, we are not convinced that petitioner is a serial or habitual adulterer, as he wants the court to believe. As stated by respondent herself, it cannot be said that two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart could be deemed womanizing, especially considering that these instances involved the same woman. In fact, at the time of respondents testimony, petitioners illicit relationship has been going on for six years. This

is not consistent with the symptoms of a person suffering from Casanova Complex who, according to Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one relationship to another. Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.[34] The evidence on record fails to convince us that petitioners marital indiscretions are symptomatic of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the evidence reveals that petitioner was a good husband most of the time when he was living with respondent, a loving father to his children as well as a good provider. In Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,[35] we held that the cause of the alleged psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Further The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.[36] In the instant case, it appears that petitioner has simply lost his love for respondent and has consequently refused to stay married to her. As revealed by his own testimony, petitioner felt that he was no longer part of respondents life and that the latter did not need or want him.[37] Respondents uncommunicative and withdrawn nature apparently led to petitioners discontentment with the marital relationship. However, as held in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals ,[38] refusal to comply with the essential obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity within the meaning of the law. The policy of the State is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.[39] WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 23, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74354 and its October 28, 2004 Resolution, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code. HELD: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law. EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005 FACTS: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy. Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaa on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandaleras knowledge of Manuels first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latters defense being that his declaration of single in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTCs decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed. Hence, this petition. ISSUES:

Republic vs. Orbecido GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005 FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code. 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law. RULINGS: 1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner. 2. The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable. ELENA P. DYCAICO, G.R. No. 161357 November 30, 2005 , - versus SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, Before the Court is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Elena P. Dycaico which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision [1] dated April 15, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69632. The assailed decision affirmed the Resolution dated February 6, 2002 of the Social Security Commission (SSC), denying the petitioners claim for survivors pension accruing from the death of her husband Bonifacio S. Dycaico, a Social Security System (SSS) member-pensioner. Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is the appellate courts Resolution dated December 15, 2003, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The case arose from the following undisputed facts: Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his selfemployed data record (SSS Form RS-1), he named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and

their eight children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away on June 19, 1997. A few months prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner on January 6, 1997. Shortly after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivors pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground that under Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 or the Social Security Law [2]she could not be considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement. The said proviso reads: Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits. (d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. Applying this proviso, the petitioner was informed that the Records show that the member [referring to Bonifacio] was considered retired on June 5, 1989 and monthly pension was cancelled upon our receipt of a report on his death on June 19, 1997. In your death claim application, submitted marriage contract with the deceased member shows that you were married in 1997 or after his retirement date; hence, you could not be considered his primary beneficiary. In view of this, we regret that there is no other benefit due you. However, if you do not conform with us, you may file a formal petition with our Social Security Commission to determine your benefit eligibility.[3] On July 9, 2001, the petitioner filed with the SSC a petition alleging that the denial of her survivors pension was unjustified. She contended that Bonifacio designated her and their children as primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1 and that it was not indicated therein that only legitimate family members could be made beneficiaries. Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not, likewise, require that the primary beneficiaries be legitimate relatives of the member to be entitled to the survivors pension. The SSS is legally bound to respect Bonifacios designation of them as his beneficiaries. Further, Rep. Act No. 8282 should be interpreted to promote social justice. On February 6, 2002, the SSC promulgated its Resolution affirming the denial of the petitioners claim. The SSC refuted the petitioners contention that primary beneficiaries need not be legitimate family members by citing the definitions of primary beneficiaries and dependents in Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 8282. Under paragraph (k) of the said provision, primary beneficiaries are [t]he dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children Paragraph (e) of the same provision, on the other hand, defines dependents as the following: (1) [t]he legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member; (2) [t]he legitimate,

legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and (3) [t]he parent who is receiving regular support from the member. Based on the foregoing, according to the SSC, it has consistently ruled that entitlement to the survivors pension in ones capacity as primary beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of relationship with and dependency for support upon the deceased SSS member during his lifetime. Under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, the primary beneficiaries who are entitled to survivors pension are those who qualify as such as of the date of retirement of the deceased member. Hence, the petitioner, who was not then the legitimate spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement, could not be considered his primary beneficiary. The SSC further opined that Bonifacios designation of the petitioner as one of his primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1 is void, not only on moral considerations but also for misrepresentation. Accordingly, the petitioner is not entitled to claim the survivors pension under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review of the SSCs February 6, 2002 Resolution. In the assailed Decision, dated April 15, 2003, the appellate court dismissed the petition. Citing the same provisions in Rep. Act No. 8282 as those cited by the SSC, the CA declared that since the petitioner was merely the commonlaw wife of Bonifacio at the time of his retirement in 1989, his designation of the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries in the SSS Form RS-1 in 1980 is void. The CA further observed that Bonifacios children with the petitioner could no longer qualify as primary beneficiaries because they have all reached twenty-one (21) years of age. The decretal portion of the assailed decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed 06 February 2002 Resolution of respondent Commission is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs. The petitioner sought reconsideration of the said decision but in the assailed Resolution dated December 15, 2003, the appellate court denied her motion. Hence, the petitioners recourse to this Court. The petitioner points out that the term primary beneficiaries as used in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not have any qualification. She thus theorizes that regardless of whether the primary beneficiary designated by the member as such is legitimate or not, he or she is entitled to the survivors pension. Reliance by the appellate court and the SSC on the definitions of primary beneficiaries and dependents in Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 8282 is allegedly unwarranted because these definitions cannot modify Section 12-B(d) thereof. The petitioner maintains that when she and Bonifacio got married in January 1997, a few months before he passed away, they merely intended to legalize their relationship and had no intention to commit any fraud. Further, since Rep. Act No. 8282 is a social legislation, it should be construed liberally in favor of claimants like the petitioner. She cites the Courts pronouncement that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its

beneficiaries, and the law, by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor.[5] The SSS, on the other hand, contends that Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 should be read in conjunction with the definition of the terms dependents and primary beneficiaries in Section 8 thereof. Since the petitioner was not as yet the legal spouse of Bonifacio at the time of his retirement in 1989, she is not entitled to claim the survivors pension accruing at the time of his death. The SSS insists that the designation by Bonifacio of the petitioner and their illegitimate children in his SSS Form RS-1 is void. According to the SSS, there is nothing in Rep. Act No. 8282 which provides that should there be no primary or secondary beneficiaries, the benefit accruing from the death of a member should go to his designated common-law spouse and that to rule otherwise would be to condone the designation of common-law spouses as beneficiaries, a clear case of circumventing the SS Law and a violation of public policy and morals. [6] Finally, the SSS is of the opinion that Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is clear and explicit; hence, there is no room for its interpretation, only for application. In the Resolution dated July 19, 2005, the Court required the parties, as well as the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective comments on the issue of whether or not the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. The Court believes that this issue is intertwined with and indispensable to the resolution of the merits of the petition. In compliance therewith, in its comment, the SSC argues that the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not run afoul of the equal protection clause of the Constitution as it merely determines the reckoning date of qualification and entitlement of beneficiaries to the survivorship pension. It asserts that this classification of beneficiaries is based on valid and substantial distinctions that are germane to the legislative purpose of Rep. Act No. 8282. The SSC also impugns the marriage of the petitioner to Bonifacio after his retirement stating that it was contracted as an afterthought to enable her to qualify for the survivorship pension upon the latters death. It further alleges that there is no violation of the due process clause as the petitioner was given her day in court and was able to present her side. The SSS filed its separate comment and therein insists that the petitioner was not the legitimate spouse of the deceased member at the time when the contingency occurred (his retirement) and, therefore, she could not be considered a primary beneficiary within the contemplation of Rep. Act No. 8282. The SSS posits that the statutes intent is to give survivorship pension only to primary beneficiaries at the time of the retirement of the deceased member. Rep. Act No. 8282 itself ordains the persons entitled thereto and cannot be subject of change by the SSS. The Solicitor General agrees with the stance taken by the SSS that the proviso as of the date of his retirement merely marks the period when the primary beneficiary must be so to be entitled to the benefits. It does not violate the equal protection clause because the classification resulting therefrom rests on substantial distinctions. Moreover, the condition

as to the period for entitlement, i.e., as of the date of the members retirement, is relevant as it set the parameters for those availing of the benefits and it applies to all those similarly situated. The Solicitor General is also of the view that the said proviso does not offend the due process clause because claimants are given the opportunity to file their claims and to prove their case before the Commission. For clarity, Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is quoted anew below: Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits. (d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. Under Section 8(k) of the same law, the primary beneficiaries are: 1. 2. The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children.

There was outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving him or her an opportunity to be heard. The proviso was also held to infringe the equal protection clause as it discriminated against dependent spouses who contracted their respective marriages to pensioners within three years before they qualified for their pension. For reasons which shall be discussed shortly, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 similarly violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The proviso infringes the equal protection clause As illustrated by the petitioners case, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries results in the classification of dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries into two groups: (1) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted prior to the latters retirement; and (2) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement. Underlying these two classifications of dependent spouses is that their respective marriages are valid. In other words, both groups are legitimate or legal spouses. The distinction between them lies solely on the date the marriage was contracted. The petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement. As such, she and those similarly situated do not qualify as primary beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 and, therefore, are not entitled to survivors pension under the same provision by reason of the subject proviso. It is noted that the eligibility of dependent children who are biological offsprings of a retired SSS member to be considered as his primary beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is not substantially affected by the proviso as of the date of his retirement. A biological child, whether legitimate, legitimated or illegitimate, is entitled to survivors pension upon the death of a retired SSS member so long as the said child is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he or she is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally. On the other hand, the eligibility of legally adopted children to be considered primary beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is affected by the proviso as of the date of his retirement in the same manner as the dependent spouses. A legally adopted child who satisfies the requirements in Section 8(e)(2)[10] thereof is considered a primary beneficiary of a retired SSS member upon the latters death only if the said child had been legally adopted prior to the members retirement. One who was legally adopted by the SSS member after his or her retirement does not qualify as a primary beneficiary for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. In any case, the issue that now confronts the Court involves a dependent spouse who claims to have been unjustly deprived of her survivors pension under Section 12-B(d)

Further, the dependent spouse and dependent children are qualified under paragraph (e) of the same section as follows: 1. 2. The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support until he or she remarries; and The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.

The SSS denied the petitioners application for survivors pension on the sole ground that she was not the legal spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement; hence, she could not be considered as his primary beneficiary under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. The Court holds that the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries, is unconstitutional for it violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.[7] In an analogous case, Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros ,[8] the Court invalidated the proviso in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146 [9] which stated that the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. In the said case, the Court characterized retirement benefits as property interest of the pensioner as well as his or her surviving spouse. The proviso, which denied a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period, was declared offensive to the due process clause.

of Rep. Act No. 8282. Hence, the subsequent discussion will focus on the resultant classification of the dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries under the said provision. As earlier stated, the petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement. She and those similarly situated are undoubtedly discriminated against as the proviso as of the date of his retirement disqualifies them from being considered primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension. Generally, a statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection clause of the law. [11] With respect to Rep. Act No. 8282, in particular, as a social security law, it is recognized that it is permeated with provisions that draw lines in classifying those who are to receive benefits. Congressional decisions in this regard are entitled to deference as those of the institution charged under our scheme of government with the primary responsibility for making such judgments in light of competing policies and interests.[12] However, as in other statutes, the classification in Rep. Act No. 8282 with respect to entitlement to benefits, to be valid and reasonable, must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.[13] The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not bear out the purpose of Congress in inserting the proviso as of the date of his retirement to qualify the term primary beneficiaries in Section 12-B(d) thereof. To the Courts mind, however, it reflects congressional concern with the possibility of relationships entered after retirement for the purpose of obtaining benefits. In particular, the proviso was apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or those contracted by persons solely to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the anticipated death of the other spouse. This concern is concededly valid. However, classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to survivors pension based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e., provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden."[14] The nexus of the classification to the policy objective is vague and flimsy. Put differently, such classification of dependent spouses is not germane to the aforesaid policy objective. For if it were the intention of Congress to prevent sham marriages or those entered in contemplation of imminent death, then it should have prescribed a definite duration-ofrelationship or durational period of relationship as one of the requirements for entitlement to survivors pension. For example, in the United States, a provision in their social security law which excludes from social security benefits the surviving wife and stepchild of a deceased wage earner who had their respective relationships to the wage earner for less than nine months prior to his death, was declared valid.[15] Thus, nine months is recognized in

the United States as the minimum duration of a marriage to consider it as having been contracted in good faith for the purpose of entitlement to survivorship pension. In contrast, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) in Rep. Act No. 8282 effectively disqualifies from entitlement to survivors pension all those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to retired SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement. The duration of the marriage is not even considered. It is observed that, in certain instances, the retirement age under Rep. Act No. 8282 is sixty (60) years old.[16] A marriage contracted by a retired SSS member after the said age may still last for more than ten years, assuming the member lives up to over seventy (70) years old. In such a case, it cannot be said that the marriage was a sham or was entered into solely for the purpose of enabling one spouse to obtain the financial benefits due upon the death of the other spouse. Nonetheless, the said surviving spouse is not entitled to survivors pension because he or she is not a primary beneficiary as of the date of retirement of the SSS member following Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. Further, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective marriages to the SSS member were contracted prior to or after the latters retirement for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension does not rest on real and substantial distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is too sweeping because the proviso as of the date of his retirement, which effectively disqualifies the dependent spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS member were contracted after the latters retirement as primary beneficiaries, unfairly lumps all these marriages as sham relationships or were contracted solely for the purpose of acquiring benefits accruing upon the death of the other spouse. The proviso thus unduly prejudices the rights of the legal surviving spouse, like the petitioner, and defeats the avowed policy of the law to provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden.[17] The proviso infringes the due process clause As earlier opined, in Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros ,[18] the Court characterized retirement benefits as a property interest of a retiree. We held therein that [i]n a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment.[19] Thus, it was ruled that, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause and [r]etirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. [20] Further, since pursuant to the pertinent law therein, the dependent spouse is entitled to survivorship pension, a widows right to receive pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the husbands contractual compensation.[21] Although the subject matter in the above-cited case involved the retirement benefits under P.D. No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 [22] covering government employees, the pronouncement therein that retirees enjoy a protected property interest in their retirement benefits applies squarely to those in the private sector under Rep. Act No. 8282. This is so because the mandatory contributions of both the employers [23] and the employees[24] to the SSS do not, likewise, make the retirement benefits under Rep. Act

No. 8282 mere gratuity but form part of the latters compensation. Even the retirement benefits of self-employed individuals, like Bonifacio, who have been included in the compulsory coverage of Rep. Act No. 8282[25] are not mere gratuity because they are required to pay both the employer and employee contributions. [26] Further, under Rep. Act No. 8282, the surviving spouse is entitled to survivors pension accruing on the death of the member; hence, the surviving spouses right to receive such benefit following the demise of the wife or husband, as the case may be, is also part of the latters contractual compensation. The proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement of their survivors benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be heard. By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement, the proviso as of the date of his retirement qualifying the term primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension has created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement date of SSS members were entered into for the purpose of securing the benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282. This presumption, moreover, is conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose. The proviso, as it creates this conclusive presumption, is unconstitutional because it presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true. In the United States, this kind of presumption is characterized as an irrebuttable presumption and statutes creating permanent and irrebutable presumptions have long been disfavored under the due process clause. [27] In the petitioners case, for example, she asserted that when she and Bonifacio got married in 1997, it was merely to legalize their relationship and not to commit fraud. This claim is quite believable. After all, they had been living together since 1980 and, in fact, during that time their eldest child was already twenty-four (24) years old. However, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to prove her claim that she was Bonifacios bona fide legal spouse as she was automatically disqualified from being considered as his primary beneficiary. In effect, the petitioner was deprived of the survivors benefits, a property interest, accruing from the death of Bonifacio without any opportunity to be heard. Standards of due process require that the petitioner be allowed to present evidence to prove that her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted in good faith and as his bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivors pension accruing upon his death. [28] Hence, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) which deprives the petitioner and those similarly situated dependent spouses of retired SSS members this opportunity to be heard must be struck down.

Conclusion Even as the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) is nullified, the enumeration of primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension is not substantially affected since the following persons are considered as such under Section 8(k) of Rep. Act No. 8282: (1) The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and (2) The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children. In relation thereto, Section 8(e) thereof qualifies the dependent spouse and dependent children as follows: (1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member; (2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally. Finally, the Court concedes that the petitioner did not raise the issue of the validity of the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. The rule is that the Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case. [29] However, the question of the constitutionality of the proviso is absolutely necessary for the proper resolution of the present case. Accordingly, the Court required the parties to present their arguments on this issue and proceeded to pass upon the same in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and in order to render substantial justice to the petitioner who, presumably in her advanced age by now, deserves to receive forthwith the survivors pension accruing upon the death of her husband. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 15, 2003 and Resolution dated December 15, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69632 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is declared VOID for being contrary to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The Social Security System cannot deny the claim of petitioner Elena P. Dycaico for survivors pension on the basis of this invalid proviso. SO ORDERED. MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO, - versus ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INES, G.R. No. 132537 October 14, 2000 Facts: Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of Mary Josephine C. Gomez and EugeniaSocorro C. Gomez-Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines. Josephine and Socorro demanded for an accounting of the produce of said

rice lands while underthe management of Marietta and for the return of the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) of theproperty. Trial court rendered judgment again st Marietta and ordered her to deliver the owners copy of the TCT and pay damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of execution was issued, by virtueof which, a parcel of land in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Mariettas name was sold at a publicauction wherein Josephine was the highest bidder. Mariettas husband, Hinahon together with their children, filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya on theground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence and is thusexempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the houseand lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the time they occupied it in 1972 Issue: Whether or not the property can be sold. Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of the Family Code, the family homeshall be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other things, debtsincurred prior to the constitution of the family home. While the respondent contends that the houseand lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is notdeemed constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her debts.Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as the family home only upon theeffectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against Marietta was instituted in1986 to for acts committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied property was constituted as the family home in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta falls within theexception provided for in Article 155 of the Family Code: debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home JOSE E. HONRADO, G.R. No. 166333 Petitioner, - versus COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROGELIO M. PIZARRO, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 222; THE CLERK OF COURT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, as Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Promulgated: Quezon City; MR. NERY G. ROY, in his official capacity as Sheriff IV of November 25, 2005 the RTC of Quezon City; and PREMIUM AGRO-VET PRODUCTS, INC., Respondents. CALLEJO, SR., J.: Before this Court is a petition for review of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77488 dated June 30, 2004 dismissing the petition for certiorari for the nullification of the April 14, 2003 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon

City, Branch 222 in Civil Case No. Q-97-32965. Also assailed in this petition is the CA Resolution dated December 2, 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration of the said decision. On December 11, 1997, Premium Agro-Vet Products, Inc. (Premium) filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for sum of money against Jose Honrado, who was doing business under the name and style of J.E. Honrado Enterprises. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-32965. Premium sought to collect the amount of P240,765.00 representing the total price of veterinary products purchased on credit by Honrado from November 18, 1996 until June 30, 1997. For failure of Honrado, as well as his counsel, to appear at the pre-trial conference, he was declared in default. Premium was, thus, allowed to present evidence ex parte. It turned out that the Spouses Jose and Andrerita Honrado had filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba City for the judicial constitution of the parcel of land registered in Honrados name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-143175 located in Calamba, Laguna, and the house thereon, as their family house. The case was docketed as SP Case No. 489-1998-C. In his petition, Honrado declared that his creditors were Atty. Domingo Luciano, P & J Agriculture Trading, Inc., and Mr. Tito Dela Merced, and that the estimated value of the property was not more than P240,000.00. On February 23, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Premium: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant directing the latter to pay plaintiff the following: 1) P240,765.00 representing the total overdue account plus interest of 28% per annum thereon computed from their respective dates of deliveries until the same shall have been paid in full; 25% of the total amount awarded, plus acceptance fee of P50,000.00 and additional P1,500.00 for each day of court appearance, as attorneys fees; and Costs of this suit.

2) 3)

SO ORDERED.[2] Honrado filed a Notice of Appeal. However, on March 20, 2000, the appeal was dismissed for his failure to file his brief as appellant. Entry of judgment was made on April 26, 2000.[3] On October 10, 2000, Premium filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. [4] The RTC granted the motion[5] and a writ of execution was issued on March 29, 2001.[6] The Sheriff levied on the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T143175. The Notice of Levy was annotated at the dorsal portion of the title on April 4, 2001. [7] The Sheriff set the sale of the property at public auction on April 4, 2001. Honrado was served with a copy of the notice of such sale but he opposed the same.

On May 17, 2001, the property was sold to Premium, the highest bidder, for the amount of P650,204.10.[8] On May 23, 2001, the corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued[9] and annotated at the dorsal portion of the title.[10] Honrado failed to redeem the property. In the meantime, the RTC of Calamba City rendered a Decision [11] in SP Case No. 489-1998-C on April 29, 2002, declaring the property a family home. On May 3, 2002, Honrado filed a Motion to Declare Properties Exempt from Execution under Article 155 of the Family Code of the Philippines in Civil Case No. Q-9732965. It was alleged therein that the property is exempt from execution because it is a family home which had been constituted as such before he incurred his indebtedness with Premium. He also alleged that he and his family had no other real property except the land which was levied upon and sold on execution. [12] Premium opposed the motion on the ground that Honrado was already estopped or barred by laches from claiming the exemption, and that said claim has been mooted by the lapse of the redemption period for Honrado to redeem the property. Premium averred that, after the sale at public auction, Honrado and his family even vacated the property. Honrado re-occupied the property only in April or May 2002.[13] It further averred that the law does not automatically exempt a family home from levy or execution and there was no showing that its present value does not exceed the amount allowed by law under Article 157 of the Family Code.[14] On September 18, 2002, the RTC denied said motion on the ground that Honrado is deemed to have waived the exemption considering that he failed to object to the sale of the property on execution on May 17, 2001.[15] Honrado did not assail the said order. On October 14, 2002, Premium filed a Motion for Issuance of Final Deed of Conveyance and Writ of Possession [16] asserting that the one-year redemption period had already lapsed on May 23, 2002, without any redemption being made by Honrado. The latter opposed the said motion claiming that the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, had already rendered a decision declaring the property a family home. Honrado further averred that his family resided in the house before the Family Code became effective and was entitled to the exemption under the Code.[17] On April 14, 2003, the respondent Judge issued an Order [18] granting the motion of Premium and directing Honrado to: (1) execute a final deed of conveyance over the subject parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-143175 of the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna; and (2) surrender of the subject title, TCT No. T-143175. The respondent Judge further ordered that after execution of the deed of conveyance, a writ of possession be issued over the aforesaid property in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant or his successorsin-interest who are in possession of the said premises. Honrado filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the April 14, 2003 Resolution of the RTC. On June 30, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition. [19] The CA declared that there was no proof that the public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to assert his claim for exemption at the time of the levy or within a reasonable time thereafter. It held that once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a writ of execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.[20]

On December 2, 2004, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Honrado.[21] In this petition for review, the petitioner alleges that the CA committed serious errors of law and facts: 5:A IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT ARTICLE 153 OF THE FAMILY CODE FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE; 5:B IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT HONRADOS FAILURE TO ASSERT HIS CLAIM FOR EXEMPTION OF HIS FAMILY HOME FROM EXECUTION AT THE TIME OF THE LEVY OR WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME IS FATAL TO HIS CLAIM; 5:C IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RIGHT TO CLAIM EXEMPTION CANNOT BE WAIVED BECAUSE IT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND/OR PUBLIC POLICY.[22] The petitioner contends that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing his prayer for exemption of his family home from execution. The petitioner avers that the ruling of the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 35 in SP Case No. 489-1998-C, declaring that the property in question is a family home, has already become final; hence, it can no longer be disturbed. The family home cannot be levied upon considering that the debt, which was the basis of the judgment under execution, was incurred between the period from November 18, 1996 and June 30, 1997, or after the Family Code had been in effect. Hence, the family home of the petitioner is exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code.[23] The petitioner further asserts that he and his family had been occupying the property as their family home as early as 1992. Under Article 153 of the Family Code, his house was constituted as a family home in that year. Thus, even if he failed to contest the levy on his property or move for the lifting thereof, the same cannot be deemed a waiver of his right to claim the exemption of his family home. He avers that his right cannot be waived, for it would be contrary to public policy. He claims that the policy of the State, in conferring such exemption, is to allow a particular family to occupy, use and enjoy their family home, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. Moreover, the waiver must be shown by overt acts and it cannot be presumed from the mere failure to assert the claim for exemption within a reasonable time.[24] The private respondent avers that the petitioner is estopped from claiming that the property is exempt from execution and from assailing the levy of the property, the sale thereof at public auction and the September 18, 2002 and April 14, 2003 Orders of the RTC. It points out that the petitioner agreed to the levy and sale of the property at public auction; he even surrendered the key to the house and vacated the property after it was purchased by the private respondent at the public auction. The private respondent averred that the petitioner hoped to get a higher amount than his debt. The petitioner never adverted to his petition in the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, for the constitution of the property as a family home. The petitioner revealed the decision of the RTC in SP Case No. 4891998-C only on November 25, 2002 when he opposed the private respondents motion for a

final deed of conveyance. It was only after the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, rendered its decision that the petitioner re-occupied the property and claimed, for the first time, that the property is a family home and exempt from execution. By then, the period for the petitioner to redeem the property had long lapsed. The petition has no merit. In dismissing Honrados petition, the CA declared that: Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as the family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by Law. A family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. Such provision finds no application in this case. Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption must be claimed by the debtor himself at the time of levy or within a reasonable period thereafter. It is self-evident that petitioner did not assert their claim of exemption within a reasonable time. Any claim for exemption from execution of properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be presented before its sale on execution by the sheriff. Petitioner and his wife failed to disclose in their petition for the judicial constitution of a family home that Premium AgroVet Products, Inc. is one of their creditors considering the fact that the collection case filed against Honrado was filed in 1997 or prior to the institution of said petition in 1998. Petitioner never raised the argument of exemption of his family home before the trial court before and during the auction sale. We find that such actions reveal a dilatory intent to render nugatory the sale on execution and defeat the very purpose of execution to put an end to litigation. Petitioner previously failed to appear in the pre-trial conference, failed to submit his appellants brief and now conveniently raised the issue of exemption almost a year from the auction sale. We find no proof of grave abuse of discretion [on] the part of public respondents. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a Writ of Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. It is well-settled that the sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ issued by a court is purely ministerial. The function of ordering the execution of a judgment, being judicial, devolves upon the judge.[25]

The ruling of the appellate court is correct. The respondent court, tribunal or administrative agency acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the case. There is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.[26] Moreover, in a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only cases of jurisdiction. [27] A writ of certiorari is an equitable remedy and he who comes to court for equity must do so with clean hands. In this case, the RTC acted in accord with case law when it issued the assailed order. The petitioner admits to having been notified of the levy of his property and of its sale at public auction at 9:30 a.m. on May 17, 2001 at the Municipal Hall of Calamba, Laguna. However, he did not bother to object to the levy and the projected sale on the ground that the property and the house thereon was a family home. The petitioner allowed the sale at public auction to proceed and the Sheriff to execute a certificate of sale over the property in favor of the private respondent for P650,204.10. He even vacated the property after the said sale. The petitioner remained silent and failed to seek relief from the Sheriff or the court until May 3, 2002, when he filed his motion to declare the property exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code and Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Even then, there was no showing that, during the hearing of said motion, the petitioner adduced evidence to prove the value of the property and that it is, indeed, a family home. Moreover, the petitioner set the hearing of his motion on May 10, 2002 at 8:30 a.m. The private respondent opposed the motion, but the petitioner did not file any reply thereto. Moreover, the petitioner never informed the Court that the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, had rendered judgment in SP Case No. 489-1998-C earlier on April 29, 2002. It was only on November 25, 2002 that the petitioner revealed to the RTC of Quezon City that there was such a case and a decision had already been rendered. The petitioner has not justified why he concealed such matters for such considerable period of time. While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone:[28] Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter; In the absence of express provision it has variously held that claim (for exemption) must be made at the time of the levy if the debtor is present, that it must be made within a

reasonable time, or promptly, or before the creditor has taken any step involving further costs, or before advertisement of sale, or at any time before sale, or within a reasonable time before the sale, or before the sale has commenced, but as to the last there is contrary authority. In the light of the facts above summarized, it is self-evident that appellants did not assert their claim of exemption within a reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time, for purposes of the law on exemption, does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-year period provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for judgment debtors to redeem the property sold on execution, otherwise it would render nugatory final bills of sale on execution and defeat the very purpose of executionto put an end to litigation. We said before, and We repeat it now, that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. We now rule that claims for exemption from execution of properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be presented before its sale on execution by the sheriff.[29] IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. CHILD CUSTODY PABLO-GUALBERTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. Nos. 154994 and 156254 June 28, 2005 Facts: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she left him. The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations. The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother. Held: Article 213 of the Family Code provided: Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds

compelling reasons to order otherwise, This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, w/c reads: Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such measure. Belen Sagad ANGELES vs Aleli Corazon Angeles MAGLAYA (G.R. No. 153798; Sept 2, 2005; J. Garcia) FACTS: Francisco Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind 4 parcelsof land and a building, among other valuable properties. Respondent Corazon claims that as the sole legitimatechild of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado has all the qualifications and none of the disqualificationsrequired of an administrator. Petitioner Belen claims, as Franciscos second wife and surviving spouse, that sheshould be made administratix of Franciscos estate. She claims that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Further she said that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. She also said that she and Francisco adopted a child.Respondent in turn alleged that per certification of the appropriate offices, the January to December 1938records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genovevawedding took place, were destroyed. She also dismissed the adoption as of little consequence, owing to her having interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC atCaloocan. Respondent testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimatechild. Four other witnesses testified on her behalf, and she also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word Yes appears on the space below the question Legitimate? (Legitimo?). Pictures taken during respondents wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T.Maglaya; a copy of her marriage contract, and her scholastic and government service records, were alsooffered as evidence.RTC ruled in favour of Petitoner, CA ruled in favor of respondent. ISSUE: WoN respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado? HELD: NO . CA erred in giving respondent presumptive legitimacy. A legitimate child is a product of, and,therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage (FC Art 146). However, the presumption of legitimacy under Art 164 may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor

, i.e., that the childs parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Respondent failed to present evidence of Franciscos marriage to Genoveva, thus she cannot be presumed legitimate. Further, the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was only signed by the attending physician making itonly proof of the fact of the birth of a child. The legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself , itcannot be made dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of thenewborn child. None of the evidence respondent presented is enough to prove filiation or recognition. Further, RTC Caloocan in the case respondent filed to nullify the adoption of Francisco and Belen of their child, said that respondent is NOT a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva ; following the rule onconclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondents legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latters marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated between hereinpetitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of the latter.Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased , the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the deceased.

be financed and that she would be provided with a better life. Blinded by his promises and assurances of his love for her, Shirley agreed to an amorous relationship with Benito, Sr. True to his word, Benito, Sr. then provided her with a residential house and lot located in Canaman, Camarines Sur, where they cohabited and resided; he also financed her college education in midwifery. On October 5, 1995, Benedick Arevalo Dy Chiao, Jr., the plaintiff, was born, the product of the amorous relationship, whom Benito, Sr. acknowledged as his son. He also continued to give Shirley and their son financial and moral support. It was also alleged that the Dy Chiao siblings recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of their father. Moreover, when he died intestate, Benito, Sr. left behind residential lands and commercial buildings worth P100,000,000.00, more or less; as such, there was a need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate to preserve his (Benedicks) rights over the same before its partition. It was prayed that upon the filing of the complaint, Benedicks mother be appointed as his guardian ad litem, that an administrator of the estate of the deceased be appointed, and that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in favor of Benedick, as follows: a. declaring the Plaintiff as the illegitimate son of the late Benito Dy Chiao. b. ordering herein Defendants to recognize and acknowledge the Plaintiff as the illegitimate son of the late Benito Dy Chiao. c. ordering the Partition of the Estate of Benito Dy Chiao and distributing the same in favor of the Defendants and herein Plaintiff in a manner provided for by law. d. granting the Plaintiff such other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the law.[4] In an answer to the complaint, Mary Jane, through counsel, for herself, and purportedly in behalf of her brothers, denied the allegations that Shirley and her father had an amorous relationship and that Benedick was the illegitimate son of their father for want of knowledge or information; the allegation that they had recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of their father was, likewise, specifically denied. Finally, she alleged that the plaintiffs action was for a claim against the estate of their father, which should be filed in an action for the settlement of the estate of their deceased parents.[5] On October 28, 1996, Benedick filed a Motion,[6] praying that the court order a mental examination of the Dy Chiao brothers, who were patients at the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Mental Hospital, and for the appointment of their sister as their guardian ad litem in the case. It was, likewise, prayed that the director of the hospital be summoned to appear before the court to inform it of the mental condition of the Dy Chiao brothers. On December 6, 1996, Benedick filed a Motion[7] set for hearing on December 9, 1996, reiterating his plea for the appointment of Mary Jane as guardian ad litem of her brothers. That same day, however, the plaintiff, through counsel, filed a Compromise Agreement dated November 24, 1996, with the following signatories to the agreement: Shirley Arevalo, for the plaintiff and assisted by counsel, Atty. Amador L. Simando; and Mary Jane Dy ChiaoDe Guzman, assisted by counsel, Atty. Adan Marcelo B. Botor, purportedly for and in behalf of her brothers. Appended to the agreement was a photocopy of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated September 20, 1995, notarized and certified by Atty. Edmundo L. Simando, purportedly signed by the Dy Chiao brothers, who were then still confined in the hospital. Mary Jane was therein appointed to be their attorney-in-fact, with the following powers:
[8]

[G.R. No. 141273. May 17, 2005] JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA RIVERO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MARY JANE DY CHIAO*-DE GUZMAN, and BENITO DY CHIAO, JR., represented by his uncle HENRY S. DY CHIAO,respondents.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 44261 annulling the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 19, in Civil Case No. RTC96-3612. The Antecedents On August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint [2] against Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and for the administration and partition of his estate as he had died intestate on July 27, 1995. Since Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley Arevalo, filed the complaint on his behalf. Concepcion, Benito Sr.s wife, was not impleaded as she had died on July 7, 1995. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. RTC 96-3612 and raffled to Branch 19 of the court.[3] Benedick, whose counsel was Atty. Amador L. Simando, made the following allegations in his complaint: During his lifetime, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. was engaged in business, under the business name Benito Commercial in Naga City. He courted Shirley Arevalo (Benedicks mother) in 1991, assuring her of his sincere love, likewise promising that her college education would

1. To represent us in negotiations and be our representative with power to sign Agreements or Contracts of Lease involving property and/or assets belonging to the estate of our late father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. while said estate is not yet settled between (sic) all heirs; as well as to collect rentals and other money due to the estate by reason of said agreements or contracts; 2. To file or cause to be filed the necessary proceedings for the settlement of the estate of our late father, and to ask for letters of administration in her favor as a next of kin or as someone selected by us, next of kin, to be the administrator. On December 13, 1996, the trial court approved the agreement and rendered judgment on the basis thereof, quoted as follows: Before this Court is a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT entered into by and between the parties in this case which is herein below quoted, thus: COMPROMISE AGREEMENT Plaintiff and defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman duly assisted by their respective counsels hereby submit the following Compromise Agreement: 1. That the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman hereby recognizes the plaintiff as the illegitimate son of her deceased father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.; 2. That in full satisfaction and settlement of plaintiffs claim from the estate of the late Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao De Guzman for herself and in behalf of her brothers, who are likewise defendants in this case, hereby agree and bind herself to pay the plaintiff the amount of P6,000,000.00 which shall be taken from the estate of the late Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., which amount shall be payable under the following terms and conditions: a. The amount of P1,500,000.00 shall be payable upon signing of this Compromise Agreement; b. The balance of P4,500,000.00 shall be payable within the period of one year from the date of signing of this Compromise Agreement and for which the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman shall issue twelve (12) checks corresponding to the said balance in the amount of P375,000.00 per check; 3. That the parties hereby waive other claims and counterclaims against each other; 4. That any violation of this Compromise Agreement shall render the same to be immediately executory. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the foregoing Compromise Agreement be approved and a decision be rendered in accordance therewith. Naga City, Philippines, November 24, 1996. (SGD.) BENEDICK AREVALO MARYJANE DY CHIAO-DE GUZMAN Plaintiff Defendant represented by: (SGD.) SHIRLEY AREVALO Natural Guardian & Guardian Ad Litem Assisted by: (SGD.) (SGD.) AMADOR L. SIMANDO ADAN MARCELO BOTOR Counsel for the Plaintiff Counsel for the Defendants

WHEREFORE, finding the foregoing Compromise Agreement to be the law between the parties, not being tainted with infirmities, irregularities, fraud and illegalities, and the same not being contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals and good customs, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered APPROVING the same. Parties are hereby enjoined to faithfully abide by the terms and conditions of the foregoing Compromise Agreement. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.[9] It appears that a copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the Dy Chiao brothers to the Benito Commercial Building, Naga City. On December 17, 1996, Mary Jane, through Atty. Simando, (the counsel for Benedick in Civil Case No. RTC96-3612), filed a petition with the RTC for the settlement of the estate of her father and for her appointment as administrator thereto. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. RTC96-684 and raffled to Branch 20 of the court; it was later transferred to Branch 19. On April 3, 1997, Benedick filed a Motion for Execution,[10] of the Decision dated November 24, 1996, on the allegation that the defendants had failed to comply with their obligations under the compromise agreement. The trial court granted the motion in an Order[11] dated April 7, 1997. Conformably, it issued a Writ of Execution [12] for the enforcement of the said decision. On April 18, 1997, Benedick terminated the services of Atty. Simando since he was Mary Janes counsel in Special Proceedings No. 96-684. On April 28, 1997, the sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Property[13] over five parcels of land titled under Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., including the improvements thereon. The Dy Chiao brothers, represented by their uncle, Henry S. Dy Chiao, then filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order dated May 27, 1997, assailing the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. RTC96-3612, as well as the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto. The petition alleged that the Dy Chiao brothers had no legal capacity to be sued because they were of unsound mind, which impelled their uncle Henry to file a petition for guardianship over their person and property, now pending in the RTC of Naga City, Branch 61, docketed as Special Proceedings No. RTC97-695. They did not authorize their sister Mary Jane to execute any compromise agreement for and in their behalf; yet, in confabulation with Benedicks counsel, she was able to secure a judgment based on a void compromise agreement. It was further alleged that the Dy Chiao brothers were unaware of the complaint against them and that they did not engage the services of the law firm of Botor, Hidalgo & Fernando Associates to represent them as counsel in said cases. As such, the said counsel had no authority to file the answer to the complaint for and in their behalf. It was further pointed out that less than a month before the said compromise agreement was executed by their sister, she filed purportedly in their behalf, on November 22, 1996, a petition for the settlement of the estate of their parents in the RTC of Naga City, with the assistance of Atty. Simando (Benedicks counsel), as well as for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. RTC96-684. [14] There was thus collusion between Mary Jane and Atty. Simando.

The Dy Chiao brothers, likewise, opposed the appointment of their sister as the administrator of their parents estate.[15] The verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the petition was signed by their uncle Henry as their representative. On May 29, 1997, the CA issued a status quo order. However, before the said order was served on Benedick, several lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16931 in the name of Benito, Sr. had already been sold at public auction: Lot No. 3, to Jose Rivero forP6,400,000.00; Lot No. 4 to Jessie Rivero for P7,600,000.00 and Lot No. 5, for P7,000,000.00, to Amalia Rivero. Another property covered by TCT No. 5299 had also been sold to Consuelo Dy for P310,000.00.[16] The buyers at public auction had already remitted the amounts ofP15,319,364.00 and P162,836.00 to the executing sheriffs,[17] who later remitted P5,711,164.00 to Benedick through his mother, Shirley, in satisfaction of the decision,[18] and the remainder given to the Clerk of Court of the RTC. On June 3, 1997, Sheriffs Arthur S. Cledera and Arnel Jose A. Rubio executed a Provisional Certificate of Sale[19] over the property to the buyers at public auction. The Dy Chiao brothers, through their uncle Henry, then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, informing the CA of the recent developments in the case below. In a Resolution[20] dated July 14, 1997, the appellate court granted their plea for a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a P500,000.00 bond, directing as follows: (a) the private respondents and/or the sheriffs of the respondent court to deposit before the Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Naga City, the proceeds of the public auction sale held on June 3, 1997 and to submit to this Court within five (5) days from notice, proof of compliance therewith; (b) Sheriffs Arnel Jose Rubio and Arthur Cledera, through the respondent court, to refrain from issuing any certificate of sale over the properties sold at the public auction sale conducted on the aforementioned date; (c) the respondent court to issue a notice of lis pendens on all the properties affected by [the] public auction sale conducted on June 3, 1997 and cause its registration with the Register of Deeds concerned within five (5) days from notice. The sheriff was, likewise, directed to refrain and/or cease and desist from issuing/effecting any further certificate of sale over the affected properties. [21] On August 15, 1997, the RTC issued an Order[22] directing the Register of Deeds of Naga City to comply with the CA resolution. Meantime, Benson died intestate on June 25, 1997.[23] His brother, Benito, Jr. then filed a Notice of Death and Substitution, and thereafter, a Motion to Admit an Amended Petition to drop Benson as petitioner, and the inclusion of his sister Mary Jane, as party respondent, as well as those who participated in the public auction, namely, Jose Rivero, Jessie Rivero, Amalia Rivero and Consuelo Dy. The CA granted the motion in a Resolution [24] dated January 14, 1998. Thereafter, Atty. Botor, Mary Janes new counsel, filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion to Dismiss,[25] alleging, inter alia, that an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs of the spouses Dy Chiao had already been executed. Benito, Jr., represented by his uncle Henry, opposed the motion,[26] alleging that a dismissal grounded on the extrajudicial settlement alone was improper, since what was being assailed was a decision of a court based on a compromise agreement involving one who is not a party thereto, with third-party

bidders acting in bad faith. In a Resolution[27] dated February 27, 1998, the CA directed Mary Jane to submit her reply to the opposition to the motion to dismiss filed by Henry on behalf of Benito, Jr. In her compliance and comment/manifestation,[28] Mary Jane declared that there appeared to be a sound basis for the nullification of the assailed decision since the illegitimate filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise agreement. She further alleged that the parties thereunder did not recognize the validity of the compromise agreement, as in fact she and the petitioners were exploring the possibility of modifying their extrajudicial settlement.[29] Benedick, represented by his mother Shirley, presented before the appellate court an SPA dated October 31, 1996 executed by Benito, Jr., prepared by Atty. Simando, authorizing Atty. Botor to enter into a compromise agreement in the RTC.[30] On March 31, 1999, the CA rendered judgment in favor of Benito, Jr., granting the petition and nullifying the assailed decision and writ of execution issued by the RTC, including the sale at public auction of the property of the deceased. The appellate court ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Benedicks action for recognition as the illegitimate son of Benito, Sr. and for the partition of his estate. It further held that the filiation of a person could not be the subject of a compromise agreement; hence, the RTC acted without jurisdiction in rendering judgment based thereon. It concluded that the said compromise agreement was procured through extrinsic fraud. The CA ordered the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Naga City to deliver to the trial court within ten days from finality of said judgment, the amount of P15,482,200.00, together with all interests earned therefrom, and to thereafter distribute the aggregate amount to the buyers of the said properties, in proportion to the amounts they had paid. It also ordered Benedick, through his mother Shirley, to turn over to the trial court, within ten days from finality of judgment, the amount of P5,711,164.00 received from Sheriffs Rubio and Cledera, together with all other amounts that she might have been paid pursuant to the compromise agreement. This was, however, without prejudice to the buyers right of recourse against Mary Jane, who was declared subsidiarily liable therefor. The RTC was, likewise, directed to return to the buyers the aggregate amount in the same proportion as above stated; thereafter, the properties would be delivered to the intestate estate of Benito, Sr. for proper disposition by the intestate court.[31] Jose Rivero, Jessie Rivero and Amalia Rivero filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision, on the following grounds: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS INVALID DUE TO EXTRINSIC FRAUD; II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE; III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PUBLIC AUCTION SALE CONDUCTED ON JUNE 2, 1997 WAS VOID; AND IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS JOSE, JESSIE AND AMALIA, ALL SURNAMED RIVERO COULD NOT HAVE LEGALLY BECOME THE OWNERS OF THE PROPERTIES SOLD AT THE PUBLIC AUCTION SALE.[32]

Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration thereof, they filed the present petition for review on certiorari. The Present Petition The petitioners raise the following issues: (1) whether or not Henry Dy Chiao had the authority to file the amended petition for Benito Dy Chiao, Jr.; (2) whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick Arevalo for recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., as well as the action for partition and distribution of the latters estate; and (3) whether the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement is null and void for extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.[33] On the first issue, the petitioners aver that the verification and certification of nonforum shopping contained in the petition with the CA was executed by Henry; hence, it was he and not Benson or Benito, Jr. who filed the petition. Moreover, Henry had no proof of his authority to file the petition for and in behalf of the brothers. The petitioners assert that there was no need for Henry to file the petition with the CA, since the Dy Chiao brothers had the legal capacity to do so, as admitted by their counsel, and Henry himself. Moreover, there was no law mandating Henry to represent his nephews in all actions which may redound to their benefit. The petitioners point out that although Henry sought to remedy the situation by filing an amended petition praying that he be appointed as guardian ad litem for the Dy Chiao brothers, the CA did not take cognizance of the allegations in the petition. The CA was correct in so doing, since the matter of whether one is incompetent should be threshed out in the guardianship proceedings, Special Proceedings No. RTC97-695, and not in the CA via a petition to annul the judgment of the RTC, where Benito, Jr. is also a party respondent. On the other issues, the petitioners maintain that the CA erred in annulling the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement on the ground of extrinsic fraud; the alleged fraud was committed by Mary Jane as an incident to the trial. What the CA should have done was to dismiss the petition, without prejudice to the rights of the Dy Chiao brothers to file an action against their sister. The latter was herself a party to the compromise agreement and also a principal party to the case; hence, was bound by it. As a matter of fact, the petitioners aver, Mary Jane was appointed by her brothers as their attorney-in-fact to negotiate for and execute the compromise agreement in their behalf. The petitioners further assert that the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition filed by Benedick in the RTC, and that the latters recourse was based on paragraph 1, Article 172 of the Family Code, although his putative father, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., was already dead when the complaint was filed. The petitioners thus insist that the public auction sale conducted by the sheriff on the subject properties was valid. In her comment on the petition, Mary Jane avers that the decision of the CA holding that the compromise agreement was vitiated by extrinsic fraud is correct. She claims that she was made to sign the agreement, but was not informed of its intricacies. She insists that she does not have any liability to Benedick in Civil Case No. RTC96-3612, despite her being a signatory to the said agreement.

For his part, respondent Benito, Jr., through his uncle Henry, avers that the latters authority to file the amended petition before the CA in their behalf was never questioned by the petitioners. He asserts that the CA admitted the amended petition containing the prayer that his uncle Henry be appointed as his guardian ad litem. Besides, the CA found that he and his brothers were not of sound and disposing minds; hence, the need for a guardian ad litem in the person of his uncle. He further alleges that the compromise agreement was the product of connivance between his sister and Benedick, and their respective counsels. He further points out that Atty. Simando, Benedicks counsel in the RTC, was likewise the counsel for Mary Jane when she filed her petition for letters of administration in the RTC of Naga City on December 17, 1996. He further insists that the ruling of the CA on the issues of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction of the RTC is in accord with law, and that the decision based on the compromise agreement was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.[34] The Ruling of the Court The petition is denied for lack of merit. On the first issue, we reject the petitioners contention that Henry was the petitioner who filed the amended petition before the CA. As gleaned from said petition, the petitioners were Benito Dy Chiao, Jr. and Benson Dy Chiao, represented by their uncle Henry S. Dy Chiao. Moreover, Henry had the authority to file the amended petition and sign the requisite certification on non-forum shopping when the CA admitted the amended petition and appointed him as guardian ad litem of his nephews. This was in the January 14, 1998 Resolution of the CA, where the following findings were made: x x x We find the opposition to be devoid of merit, firstly because there is an obvious necessity to amend the petition; and secondly, because the representation of an incompetent need not be by a duly appointed judicial guardian. A guardian ad litem may be appointed by the court. In the instant case, the members of this Court who conducted the several hearings herein, are convinced from an observation of the petitioners that they are not of a sound or disposing mind. x x x[35] In resolving whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for the respondent, the appellate court needed only to determine whether the individual for whom a guardian was proposed was so incapable of handling personal and financial affairs as to warrant the need for the appointment of a temporary guardian. It only needed to make a finding that, based on clear and convincing evidence, the respondent is incompetent and that it is more likely than not that his welfare requires the immediate appointment of a temporary guardian. [36] A finding that the person for whom aguardian ad litem is proposed is incapable of managing his own personal and financial affairs by reason of his mental illness is enough.[37] Guardians ad litem are considered officers of the court in a limited sense, and the office of such guardian is to represent the interest of the incompetent or the minor. [38] Whether or not to appoint a guardian ad litem for the petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of the court where the petition was filed, taking into account the best interest of the incompetent or the minor. [39] The court has discretion in appointing a guardian ad litem that will best promote the interest of justice. [40] The appointment of a guardian ad litem is designed to assist the court in its determination of the incompetents best interest.[41] The records will show that no less than Benedick Arevalo sought the appointment of Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman as guardian ad litemfor respondent Benito Dy Chiao, Jr. and his brother, Benson Dy Chiao, before the RTC in Civil Case No. RTC96-3612.

It must be stressed that the appellate court was not proscribed from appointing Henry as guardian ad litem for the respondents, merely because of the pendency of his petition for appointment as guardian over their person and property before Branch 61 of the RTC. Time was of the essence; the RTC had issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of its decision based on the compromise agreement; the plaintiff therein, Benedick Arevalo, was bent on enforcing the same, and had in fact caused the sale of five parcels of land belonging to the estate of Benito, Sr. worth millions of pesos. Indeed, the sheriff was able to sell at public auction prime real property of the estate of the deceased forP20,000,000.00 before the status quo order of the CA reached him. It goes without saying that the finding of the CA on the mental capacity of the respondents is without prejudice to the outcome of the petition in Special Proceedings No. RTC97-695. The petitioners claims that there was no factual basis for the appellate courts finding that the respondents were incompetent cannot prevail. It must be stressed that the CA conducted a hearing before arriving at the conclusion that respondent Benito, Jr. was incompetent. More importantly, such claim involves a factual issue which cannot be raised before this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. On the issue of jurisdiction, case law has it that the jurisdiction of the tribunal over the nature and subject matter of an action is to be determined by the allegations of the complaint, the law in effect when the complaint was filed and the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. If a court is authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only and undertakes to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case to which the statute has no application, the judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory authority to make a particular judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.[42] The CA nullified the decision of the RTC on the ground, inter alia, that the filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise, and that Mary Jane had no authority to execute the compromise agreement for and in behalf of her brothers. The petitioners, for their part, maintain that Mary Janes recognition of Benedick as the illegitimate son of her father was not a compromise, but an affirmation of the allegations in the complaint that the Dy Chiao siblings had, in effect, recognized him as the illegitimate son of their deceased father. The petitioners posit that the admissions in the compromise agreement are likewise binding on the Dy Chiao siblings. The contention of the petitioners is bereft of merit. The Court finds and so holds that the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane is null and void. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.[43] A compromise is a contract whereby parties, making reciprocal concerns, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. [44] Like any other contract, it must comply with the requisite provisions in Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and

(c) cause of the obligation which is established. Like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order.[45] Any compromise agreement which is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights and holds no obligation to any party. It produces no legal effect at all.[46] Considering all these, there can be no other conclusion than that the decision of the RTC on the basis of a compromise agreement where Benedick was recognized as the illegitimate child of Benito, Sr. is null and void. Article 1878 of the New Civil Code provides that an SPA is required for a compromise. Furthermore, the power of attorney should expressly mention the action for which it is drawn; as such, a compromise agreement executed by one in behalf of another, who is not duly authorized to do so by the principal, is void and has no legal effect, and the judgment based on such compromise agreement is null and void.[47] The judgment may thus be impugned and its execution may be enjoined in any proceeding by the party against whom it is sought to be enforced.[48] A compromise must be strictly construed and can include only those expressly or impliedly included therein.[49] As previously stated, the Court is convinced that the compromise agreement signed by Mary Jane and Benedick was a compromise relating to the latters filiation. Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of her deceased father, the consideration for which was the amount of P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, the waiver of other claims from the estate of the deceased, and the waiver by the Dy Chiao siblings of their counterclaims against Benedick. This is readily apparent, considering that the compromise agreement was executed despite the siblings unequivocal allegations in their answer to the complaint filed only two months earlier, that Benedick was merely an impostor: 11. That paragraph 11 is DENIED for the truth of the matter is that they have not recognized any person or impostor who pretends having a filial relation with their deceased father by reason of herein Defendants fathers incapacity to bear children or to engage in any carnal act considering the age and physical state of their father at that time alluded to by the Plaintiff .[50] To stress, the compromise agreement executed by Benedick and Mary Jane is null and void; as such, the decision of the RTC based thereon is also without force and effect. It is, likewise, plain as day that only Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of her deceased father 1. That the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman hereby recognizes the plaintiff as the illegitimate son of her deceased father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.[51] Such recognition, however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the recognition must be made personally by the putative parent and not by any brother, sister or relative.[52] It is conceded that Mary Jane, in her behalf, and purportedly in behalf of her brothers, agreed and bound herself to pay Benedick the amount of P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate of their deceased father. However, a cursory reading of the SPA on record will show that the Dy Chiao brothers did not authorize their sister to recognize Benedick as the illegitimate son of their father. They could not have agreed to payP6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, because they had denied that Benedick was the illegitimate son of their father in their answer to the complaint.

On the assumption that the Dy Chiao brothers had signed the SPA on September 20, 1995, a cursory reading of the compromise agreement will show that they did not specifically empower their sister to enter into a compromise agreement with Benedick in Civil Case No. RTC96-3612. It bears stressing that the SPA was executed as early as September 20, 1995, while the complaint was filed with the RTC almost a year thereafter, or on August 27, 1996. The trial court acted with precipitate and inordinate speed in approving the compromise agreement. The records show that at about the time when it was executed by Mary Jane, her brothers were patients at the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Mental Hospital, and Benedick had accused her of being a spendthrift by reason of her alleged addiction to drugs.[53] On his belief that the Dy Chiao brothers were incompetent, Benedick even filed a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for them, and for the examination of Mary Jane for drug addiction, as follows: WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after hearing, an order be issued, as follows: 1. Appointing a Special Administrator and/or Receiver over the Estate of Benito Dy Chiao [Sr.]; 2. Appointing Guardian Ad Litem over the person of Defendants Benito, Jr. and Benson Dy-Chiao; 3. Ordering defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao to submit a medical examination by a medical expert on drugs to be commissioned by the Honorable Court to determine whether or not said defendant is a drug dependent.[54] Indeed, Benedick filed a Motion on November 14, 1996, for the Dy Chiao siblings to appear before the RTC at 8:30 a.m. of November 18, 1996. He, likewise, prayed that the Director of the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Mental Hospital be directed to bring the clinical records of the brothers, which the trial court granted per its Order dated November 12, 1996.[55] Upon Mary Janes failure to appear for the hearing, Benedick even sought to have her cited in contempt of court. Despite his charge that Mary Jane was a drug addict and a spendthrift, he, nevertheless, prayed in his Motion dated December 5, 1996, that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of Benito, Sr. and the guardian ad litem of her brothers, thus: WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing considerations, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that Maryjane Dy Chiao- De Guzman be appointed as Special Administrator over the Estate of the late Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and as Guardian Ad Litem of defendants Benito, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao.[56] Barely two weeks earlier, or on November 24, 1996, Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman (whom Benedick branded as a spendthrift and a drug addict), executed the compromise agreement, not only in her behalf, but also in behalf of her brothers, who were confined in the hospital and whom Benedick considered as mentally incompetent, and needed a guardian ad litem. The trial court ignored all the foregoing proceedings and approved the compromise agreement without bothering to resolve the issue of whether the Dy Chiao brothers were indeed incompetent, and whether there was a need to appoint a guardian ad litem for them.

What is so worrisome is that the counsel of the Dy Chiao siblings, Atty. Botor, did not even bother to file any pleading in his clients behalf, relative to the motions filed by Benedick. Despite the allegations that the Dy Chiao brothers were in the mental hospital and needed a guardian ad litem, and that Mary Jane was a spendthrift and a drug addict, Atty. Botor still proceeded to sign the compromise agreement as their counsel. More ominously, the said counsel knew that it was he who had been empowered by the Dy Chiao brothers to compromise Civil Case No. RTC96-3612 (based on the SPA dated October 31, 1996); yet, he still allowed Mary Jane to execute the same based on an SPA dated September 20, 1995 notarized by no less than Benedicks counsel, Atty. Amador Simando. The Court is convinced that the compromise agreement was the handiwork of Atty. Simando, because it was he who notarized the SPA dated September 20, 1995 purportedly executed by the Dy Chiao brothers. He later became the counsel of Benedick against the Dy Chiao siblings in Civil Case No. RTC96-3612. He signed the compromise agreement as Benedicks counsel, despite his incessant claim that the brothers were incompetent and needed a guardian ad litem. Barely 11 days after the execution of the compromise agreement, Atty. Simando filed a Petition for the Settlement of the Estate of Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., this time as counsel of Mary Jane. It bears stressing that Mary Jane was the defendant in Civil Case No. RTC96-3612, and that as counsel of Benedick, the plaintiff in the said civil case, Atty. Simando had accused her of being a drug addict and a spendthrift. By then of course, his client (Benedick) had already received P6,000,000.00 from the estate of his alleged putative father. Since the decision of the RTC is null and void, the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto and the subsequent sale at public auction of the properties belonging to the estate of Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. are null and void. Considering our foregoing disquisitions, the Court no longer finds the need to still resolve the other issues that were raised. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. Martinez vs Martinez GR No. 162084, June 28, 2005 FACTS: Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land. The former executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3 lots bequeathed to each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of the estate), and Daniel Jr. In October 1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September 1996 where it appears that the land was sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila and was also issued to them. Rodolfo filed a complaint against his brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila for the annulment of the deed of sale and cancellation of the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him to vacate the property which the latter ignored and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation and settlement but none was reached. It was alleged in the position paper of the spouses that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made but the same proved futile.

ISSUE: WON spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code. HELD: No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the same have failed. Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar. The petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the respondent. Her relationship with the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article 150. It should also be noted that the petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for unlawful detainer in the katarungan Pambarangay in compliance with PD1508 and that after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at resulting in the barangay chairmans issuance of a certificate to file action. ALVAREZ vs. RAMIREZ GR No.143439 October 14, 2005

Jurisprudence is replete with cases of close family ties sadly torn apart by disputes over inheritance. This is one of them and, for sure, will not be the last. In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Nicanor T. Santos assails and seeks to set aside the Decision dated March 24, 1998[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. CV No. 50060 dismissing his appeal from the amended decision dated July 27, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon-Navotas in Civil Case No. 1784-MN, an action for revival of judgment. The facts: Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. SantosGuerrero are brother and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased. Sometime in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a Basic Agreement of Partition covering properties they inherited from their parents. Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero (collectively, the Guerreros), filed suit with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal against petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for recovery of inheritance. Docketed as Civil Case No. 4871 and raffled to Branch VI of the court, the complaint, inter alia, sought to have the aforementioned 1956 Agreement of Partition judicially declared valid. Pending resolution of Civil Case No. 4871, the following events transpired: 1. The Santos heirs executed on May 5, 1959 another document, denominated Deed of Partition (With More Corrections). In it, the properties allotted to the heirs belonging to Group 4, to which Consuelo and Nicanor belonged, were divided into four (4) shares. Share No. 3 was adjudicated to Nicanor who, however, was obligated to pay Consuelo the amount of P31,825.00. 2. Spouses Guerreros filed another complaint against petitioner Nicanor, docketed as Civil Case No. 5858 of CFI-Rizal, for the recovery of her (Consuelos) share under the May 5, 1959 Deed of Partition. Civil Case No. 4871 and Civil Case No. 5858 would subsequently be consolidated before the CFI-Rizal, Branch 11, presided, according to petitioner, by Judge Andres Reyes. On November 27, 1960, Judge Reyes rendered a decision (Exh.5), disposing as follows: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment, ordering the defendant [herein petitioner] to comply with his part of the Deed of Partition and deliver to the plaintiff [respondent Consuelo] the amount of P26,650.00 without prejudice to the right of reimbursement under the same deed. No pronouncement as to costs.

FACTS: Respondent Susan Ramirez was the complaining witness in a criminal case or arson pending before the RTC. The accused was petitioner Maximo Alvarez, stranged husband of Esperanza Alvarez, sister of respondent. On June 21, 1999, Esperanza Alvarez was called to the witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification. Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses. On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999. This prompted respondent to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not Esperanza can testify over the objection of her estranged husband on the ground of marital privilege. HELD: Yes, Esperanza may testify over the objection of her husband. The disqualification of a witness by reason of marriage under Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court has its exceptions as where the marital relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved. The acts of the petitioner stamp out all major aspects of marital life. On the other hand, the State has an interest in punishing the guilty and exonerating the innocent, and must have the right to offer the testimony of Esperanza over the objection of her husband. NICANOR T. SANTOS, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELO T. SANTOS-GUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO, G.R. No. 134787 November 15, 2005

SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket supplied)[2] Subsequently, the Guerreros instituted another complaint against Nicanor with the CFI at Pasig for recovery of sums of money under the May 5, 1959 Deed of Partition. For some reason unclear from the records and which the parties have not explained, the case was also assigned docket number Civil Case No. 5858. It was raffled to Branch VI of the court, presided by Judge Eutropio Migrio.[3] Thereat, Nicanor, as defendant a quo, filed a third party complaint against brothers Ernesto et al. And albeit not touched upon in the basic pleadings, the issue of whether Nicanor was obligated to pay Consuelo the amount of P31,825.00, as stated in the 1959 deed of partition, or the amount of P26,650.00, as decreed in Exhibit 5, was raised in the parties respective memoranda. [4] In fact, during the hearing of this particular case, the Guerreros filed a Manifestation and Motion, stating as follows: 1. That they agree to submit this case . . . on the basis of the total amount of P34, 825.00 due to the plaintiff, Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero, minus P8,175.00 due to Group 8, or a net balance of P26,650.00 in favor of the plaintiff . . . . 2. xxx 3. That they finally agree that the total net balance of P26,650.00 plus the interest thereon and attorneys fees in the amount which this Honorable Court will determine, shall be paid by the defendant-third party plaintiff Nicanor T. Santos and all of the third-party defendants . WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed . . . that judgment be rendered in the above-entitled case in accordance with the foregoing terms and conditions. Eventually, on December 28, 1979, Judge Migrio rendered judgment (Exh. A) ordering Nicanor, as defendant a quo, to pay Consuelo P31,825.00, representing the amount due her under the May 5, 1959 deed of partition, plus damages and attorneys fees.[5] In time, Nicanor went to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), now CA, where his appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 69008-CV. In a Decision dated October 21, 1985, the IAC affirmed the December 28, 1979 CFI decision of Judge Migrio, but reduced the award of moral damages. Nicanors petition for review of the IAC decision would subsequently be denied by this Court per its Resolution dated February 19, 1986 in G.R. No. L-73121.[6] Following the issuance by the Court of an Entry of Judgment on April 1, 1986, [7] the records were subsequently remanded to the trial court. For some reason, however, the Guerreros did not pursue execution of the judgment. A little over six (6) years later, or on June 3, 1992, to be precise, the Guerreros filed a complaint for revival of the December 28, 1979 decision of Judge Migrio (Exh. A), docketed as Civil Case No. 1784-MN of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of MalabonNavotas. Petitioner Nicanor, as defendant, countered with a motion to dismiss on several

grounds, among which were: (a) that the complaint for revival of judgment is barred under the res judicata rule; and (b) that the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards an amicable settlement have been made. After due proceedings, the RTC of Malabon-Navotas dismissed the complaint for revival of judgment. However, on motion for reconsideration and following a new trial, the trial court reversed itself and, accordingly, rendered on July 27, 1995 an amended decision, the fallo of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reviving the Decision dated December 28, 1979 in Civil Case No. 5858 and correspondingly, [petitioner] is hereby ordered to pay [private respondents] as follows. a) THIRTY ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE PESOS (P31,825.00) representing the amount due from him to her under their deed of partition of May 5, 1959; b) TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) by way of unrealized profits; c) FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) by way of moral damages; and d) FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) by way of attorneys fees, all which sums shall be with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) from October 30, 1959 when the complaint was filed, up to and including July 28, 1974 and at the rate of twelve percent (12%) from July 29, 1974 until fully paid. SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket added) Therefrom, Nicanor went on appeal to the CA whereat his recourse was docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 50060 . On March 24, 1998, the appellate court rendered the herein assailed Decision dismissing the appeal.[8] A Resolution of July 24, 1998 denying Nicanors motion for reconsideration followed.[9] Hence, this instant petition for review,[10] petitioner ascribing to the Court of Appeals the commission of the following serious errors, viz: 1. In holding that Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court has no application, and if there is, the subsequent act of herein petitioner already achieved that purpose; In disregarding the fact that the decision issued by Judge Eutropio Migrio is null and void for being barred by res judicata and therefore cannot be revived; and In not ruling that the action based on the decision issued by Judge Andres Reyes is already barred by prescription.

2.

3.

The petition has no merit. A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.[11] Thus, the provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition precedent for the maintenance of an action between members of the same family. As it were, a complaint in ordinary civil actions involving members of the same family must contain an allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made pursuant to Article 222[12] of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family Code. [13] Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.[14] Admittedly, the complaint filed in this case contains no such allegation. But a complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by the introduction of evidence effectively supplying the necessary averments of a defective complaint.[15] Petitioner cannot plausibly look to Article 222 of the Civil Code to effectively dismiss, as presently urged, Civil Case No. 1784 MN. It cannot be over-emphasized in this regard that the rationale of said provision is to obviate hatred and passion in the family likely to be spawned by litigation between and among the members thereof. Civil Case No. 1784 MN, however, being merely an action for revival of judgment of a dormant decision rendered in an original action, can hardly be the kind of suit contemplated in Article 222 of the Code. What the appellate court said in the decision subject of review on the inapplicability under the premises of Article 222 of the Code is well-taken: xxx The rule should have been invoked by [petitioner] in the original action [Civil Case 5858 subject of appeal in CA-G.R No. 69008CV) where the actual controversy is still at issue and not in the present case where the actual controversy between the parties had already been decided by the Court and what remains to be done is the enforcement of the decision. [At p. 8; Words in bracket added] Certainly not lost on the Court is an incident during the pre-trial of Civil Case No. 1784 MN which very well addressed, as aptly noted by the appellate court, the ideal sought to be achieved by said Article 222. We refer to petitioners act, via a proposal, of extending a conciliatory hand to his elder sister in a failed bid to arrive at an amicable settlement. An excerpt of petitioners written proposal: We are fast approaching the cross-road of our journey. I am now 75 years and [respondent Consuelo] is passed (sic) 78. It is unfortunate that for the past 30 years we had been quarrelling about this partition and I feel embarrassed . . . . I appeal to the conscience and understanding of the [respondent] and by way of compromise settlement, I offer to pay [her] the amount of P5,000.00 in lieu of my original obligation of P3,536.11 . . . . Your HONOR, I am very sorry. Allow me to apologize . . . for bringing our family problem to this courtroom which should had been settled among us privately. (At pp. 8-9 of CAs Decision; Words in bracket added)

This bring us to the inter-related second and third assignments of error both of which question, in the light of Exhibit 5 (the joint decision dated November 27, 1960 of Judge Reyes.[16]), the validity of Exhibit A, the December 28, 1979 decision (of Judge Migrio), the revival of which is challenged in this case. Petitioner contends that the Judgment dated 28 December 1979 rendered by Judge Migrio which is the basis of the present case is null and void for being barred by res judicata. Said decision, petitioner adds, had already been the subject of a prior Decision rendered by Judge Andres Reyes on 27 November 1960. We are not persuaded. Res judicata, according to Black, refers to the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.[17] It embraces two concepts: a) the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action; this is designated as bar by former judgment; and, b) precludes the relitigation of a particular fact or issues in another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. This is the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.[18] Contrary to petitioners understanding of the doctrine, res judicata, assuming its applicability on a given situation, is not a nullifying factor, such that the final judgment in the former action works to nullify the proceedings in the subsequent action where the doctrine is invoked. In context, res judicata is a rule of preclusion to the end that facts or issues settled by final judgment should not be tried anew.[19] Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Courts listsres judicata as among the grounds for a motion to dismiss or as a defense to defeat a claim, but the same must be pleaded at the earliest opportunity, either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Else, the defense or objection on that ground is deemed waived.[20] The Court distinctly notes that Exhibit A (Migrio decision), described as a nullity owing to the operation of res judicata, was, as affirmed first by the IAC, then by this Court, per its Resolution of February No. L-73121.[21] The implication of these affirmatory actions on the issue nullity of Exhibit A need no further belaboring. which petitioner earlier narrated, 19, 1986 in G.R. of the validity or

The Court observes likewise petitioners seeming lack of spirit, if not reasons, to support his position on the issue of res judicata and the consequent effects thereof on the final outcome of this case. Consider: Save for copies of the impugned CA decision and resolution, the basic petition for review was filed with this Court without annexes to support petitioners narration of facts whence he drew his conclusions. Worse still, petitioner did not even take serious effort to explain why he believed the doctrine of res judicata should be applied. All he virtually does is to state that xxx after Judge Reyes decided Civil Case No. 5858, all the issues therein were already put to rest [and] [T]he subsequent re-opening of the same by Judge Migrio was without any legal basis and renders [the latters] decision null and void. In net effect, petitioner has not demonstrated, but assumed the existence of the requisites of res judicata and peremptorily pronounced the nullificatory effect thereof on Exhibit A. Needless to state, simplistic conclusions and gratuitous assumptions drawn from unestablished facts are unacceptable norms for an intelligent judgment.

The third assigned error is also undeserving of consideration predicated, as it were, on the erroneous proposition that the decision sought to be revived is Exhibit 5 issued, to repeat, on November 27, 1960, notExhibit A, which petitioner tags as a void decision despite its having been affirmed by the IAC and this Court. As did the RTC of MalabonNavotas, the Court of Appeals found Exhibit 5 and Exhibit A to have resolved two (2) separate complaints, each based on different causes of actions or claims. This factual determination, needless to state, deserves great respect. Surely, petitioners declaration, without more, that Exhibit 5 and Exhibit Aresolved one and the same cause of action involving the same parties cannot be the kind of evidence sufficient to overturn such factual finding. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the impugned decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. PLATON AND LIBRADA CERUILA G.R. No. 140305, December 9,2005 - versus ROSILYN DELANTAR, represented by her guardian, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT, Petitioners-spouses Platon Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila (Ceruilas) filed an action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofManila, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 97-818932, for the annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Rosilyn), the child-victim in the rape case involving Romeo Jaloslos.
[1]

certificate of Rosilyn be canceled and declared null and void for the reasons that said birth certificate was made an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and therefore invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein, as follows: a. b. c. The name of her mother which should not be petitioner Librada A. Telin; The signature of informant referring to Librada T. Delantar being a forgery; The name of Simplicio Delantar as the biological father, considering that, as already mentioned, he is merely the foster father and coguardian in fact of Maria Rosilyn and the name of the natural father in (sic) unknown; The date of marriage of the supposed parents, since the parents reflected in said certificate were (sic) actually full blood brother and sister and therefore marriage between the two is virtually impossible; The status of Maria Rosilyn as a legitimate child as the same (sic) is actually not legitimate; The date of actual birth of Marial (sic) Rosilyn, since the known father merely made it appear that she was born at the time the informations for the birth certificate were supplied by him to the civil registrar or (sic) proper recording; The name of the physician who allegedly attended at the time of birth of Maria Rosilyn, being a fictitious Dr. Santos. [6]

d.

e.

The RTC granted the Ceruilas petition in its decision

[2]

dated April 11, 1997

which was nullified, however, by the Court of Appeals (CA)

on June 10, 1999.[3] The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. [4] Hence the present petition. The antecedents are as follows: Sometime in 1996, Rosilyn complained against her father, Simplicio Delantar (Simplicio) for child abuse, particularly prostitution. Simplicio was incarcerated at the Pasay City Jail starting August 22, 1996 which prompted the filing of a petition for involuntary commitment of Rosilyn in favor of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), as the whereabouts of the mother, Librada Ceruila, was unknown. The petition was granted by the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 119 on November 9, 1996and Simplicios motion to vacate said judgment was denied by said court on January 20, 1997.
[5]

f.

g.

On February 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for hearing on March 19, 1997 and directed the publication of said order once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. The Order also stated that any person who is interested in the petition may interpose his/her comment or opposition thereto on or before the scheduled hearing. [7] Summons was sent to the Civil Register of Manila. [8] However, no representative appeared during the scheduled hearing.[9]

On February 3, 1997, the Ceruilas filed a petition before the RTC of Manila, entitled IN THE MATTER OF CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF MARIA ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR, praying that the birth

On April 11, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision granting the petition of the Ceruilas as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered 1. DECLARING the certificate of live birth of the Minor Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar as registered under the Local Civil Registry No. 85-27325 of the office of the City Civil Registrar of Manila as null and void ab initio: and 2. ORDERING the City Civil Registrar of Manila and the National Statistics Office, Manila, to expunge from their respective marriage registers the entry of the birth of said minor and such other documents pertaining thereto, if any. Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Manila and the National Statistics Office for record purposes. SO ORDERED.[10] The RTC explained in its Decision thus During the initial trial, the petition was read aloud in open court to find out if there is any opposition thereto. There being none, the petitioners counsel, Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga, then established the jurisdictional requirements (Exhibits A to E).[11] Thereafter, petitioner husband Platon Ceruila was placed on the stand as the lone witness for the petitioner and after he completed his testimony, Atty. Paderanga formally offered his evidence and rested his case. The evidence on record reveals the following: On May 11, 1985, a child was born at the Dr. Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The name of the child was entered in her birth certificate as Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Exhibit I). In the said birth certificate the name of the childs mother appear as Librada A. Telin (Entry No. 6) while that of her father as Simplicio R. Delantar (Entry No. 9). The birth certificate likewise shows that the parents of the child, Simplicio R. Delantar and Librada A. Telin, were married on February 14, 1977 in Manila (Entry No. 12). Likewise, in Entry No. 21 of the same document, it is made to appear that the mother of the child was 27 years old when the child was born

and that she was attended in her delivery thereof by Dr. Santos (Entry No. 13). The birth certificate was signed by one Librada T. delos Santos as the informant and mother of the child with her given address as 2165 P. Burgos St., Pasay City (Entry No. 14). This is the very certificate of live birth that is being seriously impugned by the herein petitioners. In support of their petition, the petitioners submitted the baptismal certificates of Simplicio Delantar (Exhibit J) and Librada Delantar (Exhibit K) to prove that they are full blood brother and sister and could not have been possible for them to have sired Rosilyn (sic). In the said baptismal certificates, the names of the parents of Simplicio and Librada are similarly entered as Juan Delantar and Carila Telen (Exhibit J-1 and K1). The Court is inclined to concur with the observation of the petitioner that it is highly unlikely that the alleged parents of Rosilyn would commit an incestuous act and proclaim to the whole world that they are the parents of the herein minor. The court has also observed that in the baptismal certificate of Librada Delantar, it is entered therein that she was born on January 8, 1940 in Tubod, Manglanilla, Cebu (Exhibit K-2). Such being the case, then Librada must have been 45 years of age at the time of the birth of Rosilyn in stark contrast to her age appearing in Entry No. 27 (sic) of the birth certificate of the latter which shows that Librada was 27 years old at the time of her delivery. The presentation of the baptismal certificate of Librada Delantar as secondary evidence of her birth certificate was resorted to after the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Minglanilla, Cebu gave a certification to the effect that the records of birth on file with the office for the period January, 1940 to April, 1945 were all destroyed by WORLD WAR II (Exhibit L ). And going for the jugular, so to speak, the signature of the person named Librada T. delos Santos in the birth certificate (Exhibit I) purporting to be that of the petitioner wife and the signature of the latter appearing in the verification of the petitioner (sic) (Exhibit A-6) are so strikingly dissimilar that they could not have but proceeded from two different hands. For it does not require the trained eye of an expert calligrapher to discern such discrepancy in the writing style. In fine, there being an abundance of evidence to support the petitioners claim that the birth certificate is indeed a falsified document, the Court is left with no other alternative but

to grant the relief prayed for in the petition. To let the birth certificate reamin (sic) as it is would adversely affect the rights and interests of the herein petitioners.[12] On July 15, 1997, Rosilyn, represented by her legal guardian, the DSWD, filed, with the CA, a petition for the annulment of judgment in the petition for cancellation of entry of her birth certificate. [13] She claimed that she and her guardian were not notified of the petition and the subsequent judgment and learned about the same only from the news on May 16, 1997.[14] She argued that the RTC decision was issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process; that the Judge did not have authority to declare her to be illegitimate; and that mere correction of entries, not cancellation of the entire certificate, is the appropriate remedy.[15] Rosilyn further argued that: granting, without admitting that Librada is not her mother, still it was erroneous to cancel or annul her entire birth certificate; Librada is not an interested party concerning the issue of whether Simplicio is the father, the date of actual birth, and the name of the physician who attended to the birth;[16] Libradas allegations are also contradicted by (a) the Records Based on Cord Dressing Room Book dated April 13-May 29, 1985, issued by Emelita H. Avinante, Head of the Medical Records Section and Admitting Unit of the Fabella Hospital, which is attached to the petition for annulment as Annex E and which states that Maria Rosilyn Delantar was born on May 11, 1985 at the Fabella Hospital and that her parents are Librada Telin and Simplicio Delantar;[17] and (b) the admission of Simplicio in his Motion to Vacate Judgment
[18]

SO ORDERED.[21] The CA reasoned that: As shown in the caption of the petition in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893 entitled In the Matter of Cancellation and Annulment of the Birth Certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar, herein petitioner Rosilyn Delantar represented by her legal guardian, DSWD, was not made a party-respondent therein,contrary to the mandatory provision of Section 3 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court In the said Special Proceeding No. 97-81893, petitioners therein, Platon Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila, sought not only a cancellation or correction of an entry in the birth certificate of Rosilyn Telin Delantar but in effect sought to annul, cancel or expunge from the Civil Register the subject birth certificate. With more reasons, therefore, that all parties, particularly Rosilyn Telin Delantar, or thru her legal guardian, the DSWD, whose birth certificate was sought to be annulled or cancelled from the Civil Register must not only be notified but must be made a party in the said petition Petitioner and her guardian are undoubtedly persons who have interest which would be affected by the petition for the obvious reason that it is the entry of her birth which is being sought to be annulled and cancelled. In a similar case, the Supreme Court ruled that corrections of substantial entries in the certificate other than mere clerical errors, should be passed upon in an appropriate adversary proceedings with all the persons interested are made parties therein Republic vs. Valencia (141 SCRA 462; 468-469; 470-474). The proceedings undertaken in said Special Proceedings No. 97-81893 is indeed wanting of the required notice to all the parties having claim or interest which would be affected thereby, and of the adversarial proceedings, as disclosed in the decision dated April 11, 1997 With the foregoing disquisitions, We find that the decision dated April 11, 1997 null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner Rosilyn Delantar

in Sp. Proc. No. 96-419

[19]

regarding the custody of Rosilyn, which is

attached to the petition to annul as Annex F, where he stated that he, as the rightful parent of Rosilyn, should not be deprived of his parental authority. [20] On June 10, 1999, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING NULL and VOID the decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court dated April 11, 1997 in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893. With costs against private respondents

and the DSWD as her legal guardian and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the said decision. Also, the said decision dated April 11, 1997 is considered null and void for lack of due process there being no adversarial proceedings (was) conducted by the public respondent Regional Trial Court. And, even if the same judgment had already become final and executory, and had in fact been executed, as in the instant case, still the execution thereof produces no legal effects. [22] The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. [23] Hence, the present petition raising the following issues: I WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA BRANCH 38 DATED APRIL 11, 1997 IN SPEC. PROCEEDING NO. 97-81893 ENTITLED: IN THE MATTER OF CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF MARIA ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR II WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED ITS PEREMPTORY POWER TO DECLARE THE SUBJECT BIRTH CERTIFICATE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
[24]

ordinary civil action, the cases relied upon by the CA which are applicable only to special proceedings should not be applied herein; the civil registrar, which is an indispensable party, was duly served summons by mail; respondent, meanwhile, is not an indispensable party and granting that she is, she was deemed duly impleaded as her name was clearly stated in the caption of the case; respondents location could not be determined as she was reported to have ran away from the custody of Simplicio, thus the publication of the petition and the order of the RTC setting the case for hearing once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation should be considered substantial notice and the requirements of due process deemed substantially complied with; there was no adversarial proceeding in court because the parties were declared in general default thus, just like an ordinary civil case, the court should receive evidence ex parte.[27] As to the second issue, petitioners claim that: the CA should have exercised its peremptory power to declare the birth certificate of Rosilyn as null and void ab initio following the doctrine that where an instrument is void ab initio for being contrary to law, no amount of technicalities could correct its inherent nullity; otherwise, there will be multiplicity of actions as the parties will have to file cases anew to annul respondents birth certificate. [28] They then pray that the CA decision dated June 10, 1999 be reversed and that the RTC judgment dated April 11, 1997 be reinstated.[29] Anent the first issue, the Solicitor General, for the respondent, contends that: since the petitioners chose to file a petition under Rule 108 they cannot in the present action turn around and claim that their case is not a special proceeding; in any case, due process was not complied with rendering the proceedings a quo annullable; petitioners sought to establish Librada Ceruilas status, i.e., whether or not she is the mother of respondent, thus, the action falls within the ambit of Sec. 3(c), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court;[30]petitioners did not allege that they are bringing the suit to enforce or protect their right or to prevent or redress a wrong, for their case to be categorized as an ordinary civil action; Art. 5 of the Civil Code which is being invoked by petitioners is a general provision, while entries of record of birth in the civil register are governed by Republic Act No. 3753 (Civil Registry Law) as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 651; since the law provides for a remedy when an entry in a record found in

As to the first issue, petitioners argue that: since the falsification of the entries in the birth certificate of Rosilyn renders the same void ab initio, the case should be liberally construed as an ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of falsified documents based on Article 5 of the Civil Code [25] and Section 15, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
[26]

and not as a special proceeding; petitioners were

only constrained to utilize the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on the Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry since Article 5 of the Civil Code provides no procedure for the nullification of void documents which happens to be a birth certificate in this case; since the present case involves an

the civil registry is erroneous or falsified, petitioners cannot, by their mere allegation, transport their case from the realm of the rules on special proceedings for the correction of entry to that of an ordinary civil case for annulment of a falsified document; in Republic vs. Valencia,[31] it was held that the parties who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are the civil registrar and all persons who have or who are claiming interests who would be affected thereby; respondent, being a person whose interests would be adversely affected by the petition, is an indispensable party to the case; publication cannot be substituted for notice; respondent cannot be declared in default since she was not properly notified.[32] Anent the second issue, respondent contends that the CA has no authority to rule on the merits of the case since in a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, its authority is limited to ruling on whether or not the petitioner was denied due process of law; that if the CA were to rule on the merits of the case, it would have deprived respondent of due process; and that in any case, respondents record of birth is not void as Librada was only able to prove that she is not the mother of respondent.[33] Preliminarily, this Court notes that while the petition states that it is one for review on certiorari, it claimed at the same time that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction , which is properly a ground for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and not for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Considering however the substance of the issues raised herein, we shall treat the present petition, as it claims, to be a petition for review on certiorari.
[34]

properly considered as a special proceeding pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 1 and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court Did the Ceruilas comply with the requirements of Rule 108? We answer in the negative. Sec. 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that: SEC. 3. Parties. --- When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. Indeed, not only the civil registrar but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register must be made parties thereto.[35] As enunciated in Republic vs. Benemerito,[36] unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules. [37] Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the cancellation of Rosilyns birth certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and date of birth are at stake. Petitioners claim that even though Rosilyn was never made a party to the proceeding, it is enough that her name was included in the caption of the petition. Such reasoning is without merit. As we pronounced in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic[38] where the mother sought changes in the entries of her two childrens birth certificates: since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken, which is summary in nature, is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any,as their hereditary rights would

Is the petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn an ordinary civil action or a special proceeding? Considering that the petition, based on its allegations, does not question the fact of birth of Rosilyn, all matters assailing the truthfulness of any entry in the birth certificate properly, including the date of birth, fall under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court which governs cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry. Thus, the petition filed by the Ceruilas, alleging material entries in the certificate as having been falsified, is

be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented . . ..[39] (Emphasis supplied) In the present case, only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served summons, who, however, did not participate in the proceedings. This alone is clearly not sufficient to comply with the requirements laid down by the rules. Petitioners further claim that the lack of summons on Rosilyn was cured by the publication of the order of the trial court setting the case for hearing for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. We do not agree. Summons must still be served, not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process. [40] This is but proper, to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect her interest if she so chooses. Indeed, there were instances when we ruled that even though an interested party was not impleaded in the petition, such defect was cured by compliance with Sec. 4, Rule 108 on publication. In said cases, however, earnest efforts were made by the petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties.[41] Such is not the case at bar. Rosilyn was never made a party at all to the proceedings seeking the cancellation of her birth certificate. petitioners make any effort to summon the Solicitor General. It does not take much to deduce the real motive of petitioners in seeking the cancellation of Rosilyns birth certificate and in not making her, her guardian, the DSWD, and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, parties to the petition. Rosilyn was involved in the rape case against Romeo Jalosjos, where her father, as appearing in the birth certificate, was said to have pimped her into prostitution. In the criminal case, the defense contended that the birth certificate of Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial court to prove Rosilyns age and thus find basis for statutory rape, as said birth certificate has been cancelled by the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, in the special proceeding antecedent to this petition. Court, in G.R. Nos. 132875-76
[42]

There is also no merit in the contention of petitioners that because of the false entries in the birth certificate of Rosilyn, the same is void ab initio, hence should be nullified under Art. 5 of the Civil Code, or should be nullified by the CA in exercise of its peremptory power to declare null and void the said certificate. The function of a petition for annulment of judgment, under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, is not to replace the trial courts decision sought to be annulled. The action under Sections 1, 2 and 7 of said Rule, to wit: Section. 1. Coverage. --- This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. --- The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. Sec. 7. Effect of judgment. --- A judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. However, where the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the court may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. is merely for the annulment of the RTC Decision on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, nothing more. The Rules do not allow the CA to resolve the merits of the petition for the amendment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn or to substitute its own findings thereon. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Neither did

Their efforts in this regard,

however, were thwarted when the CA overturned Branch 38s decision, and the considered other evidence as proof of Rosilyns age at the time of the commission of the crime.