Galman v.

Pamaran 138 SCRA 295 Facts: PD 1886 was promulgated created an ad hoc Fact Finding Board aka Agrava Board in order to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing of the Killing of Sen Aquino at MIA. It conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the board.Respondents contend that their individual testimonies before said board should not be admitted in evidence and prayed that the it be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. However, it was denied by the Sandiganbayan contending that their testimonies could not be excluded because the immunity was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board Whether or not the testimonies given by the 8 respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board is admissible in evidence Whether or not the right against self-incrimination extends to testimonies given before the Agrava board and not to an investigating officer Ruling: NO. In the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and extent of his participation therein. This notwithstanding, Presidential Decree No. 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so. The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet when they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them Ruling: YES. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. If in a mere forfeiture case where only property rights were involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied to a person facing investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the statements to be given by him, hang on the balance. The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to the herein private respondents notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case. Such infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered People v. Hatton 210 SCRA 1 Facts: Hatton was charged with murder for the death of Faustino Algarme. On August 29, 1986, Algarme was with 3 friends; on their way to their destination, 2 men approached them. One tapped Algarme with his left hand and stabbed him with his right hand. At that moment Ongue gazed at the man who tried to pull back his knife but failed to do so. Thereby ran toward the corner of a house owned by Hatton. Hatton was pointed by Ongue as their suspect. The court rendered a decision finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Then, Hatton argued that he was presented in a line-up of sorts he was not represented by a counsel, which allegedly violates his constitutional right to counsel during custodial investigation Issue: Whether or not the post-indictment line up subjected to the accussed is valid Ruling: No, There is every reason to doubt the regularity of the identification by Ongue of the accused-appellant. It is clear that he did not positively identify the accused-appellant. At the time of the incident he made a very fleeting glance on the person who stabbed the victim. At that moment, he had the impression that the assailant was a mestizo. During the proceedings in the police station where he was supposed to identify the assailant, he identified the accused-appellant as allegedly the person who stabbed the deceased, not because he was certain that the accused-appellant was really the assailant but because he was the only mestizo in the station and because he was pointed to the policemen as their suspect. The fact is that the accused-appellant was not identified in a police line-up. He was pointed to by the police as their suspect. He being the only mestizo in the station, Ongue pointed to him as "the man." From all indications, the identification of accused-appellant by Ongue was suggested by the police and this is objectionable.Accused-appellant is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt Estacio v. Sandiganbayan 183 SCRA 12 Facts: At Central Bank Clearing House were accused Valentino (who became a state witness), a bookkeeper deatailed at the Clearing Office and Estacio, a janitor-messenger who were waiting for the demand envelope containing the checks deposited by accused Villasanta. As soon as the demand envelope arrived, Estacio got the same and brought it inside the comfort room at the 4th floor of Central Bank. Accused Estacio then waited for Valentino and Villasanta. When they both arrived, the former took the envelope and pulled out the checks in question and thereafter gave the same to Villasanta. Valentino got hold of the attached bank clearing statement of Solid Bank, Lucena Branch. The amount of "P628,564.00" under the column "Amount Received" opposite the words "Traders Royal Bank", was thereafter crossed out to make it appear that the same was not received while the total amount of "P992,723.99" appearing in the clearing statement was likewise crossed out and replaced by the figures "P344,238.29" After having been taken into custody, the extra-judicial statement of petitioner was taken with the following questions and answers: Q1. We are informing you that you are under investigation in connection with the complaint of the Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation and the Central Bank for alleged Estate Falsification committed at the Central Bank of the Philippines. But before we ask you any question, you must understand your legal rights. You have the right to remain silent. You have the right not to give any statement if you do not wish to. Anything you say may be used as evidence against you in any proceeding. You are entitled to the assistance of counsel of your own choice. If you cannot afford a lawyer and you want one, a lawyer will be appointed for you before we ask you any question. Now, after having been informed of your rights, are you still willing to give a free and voluntary statement and swear to tell the truth in this investigation? Answer: Yes, sir. Q2.: Are you willing to sign a waiver of your rights? Answer: Yes, sir. Issue: Whether or not the extra-judicial statements of the accused are inadmissible in evidence as he was not properly informed of his constitutional rights, and there was no valid waiver on his part of such rights prior to the taking of those statements Ruling: While it is true that petitioner's waiver of his right to remain silent and to assistance by counsel was not made in the presence of counsel, the defect was cured and the requirement laid down was substantially complied with when Estacio's lawyer, one Atty. Madarietta, arrived at the closing stage of the interrogation, read the statement and talked to Estacio before the latter signed it. As respondent court aptly ruled, if the accused had not voluntarily waived his constitutional rights prior to the investigation or had wanted to change his mind by availing of his right to remain silent after his counsel arrived and read the statement before the accused signed it, he could easily have refused to sign the same and

demand possession of the unsigned statement. The repudiation by petitioner of his confession on the ground that it was extracted through force and intimidation is negated by the fact that the confession contained details which only petitioner could have known. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY People v. Pamon 217 SCRA 501 Fortunato Pamon was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest for a murder of a certain Robert Te which was charged against him in the RTC of Tangub City. Pamon, in the presence of Atty. Rubencio Ligorio of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), executed a Confession marked as Exhibit "A". He admitted that he shot and killed Robert Te. Furthermore, he implicated John Doe, alias "Dodo", Gerson Dulang, and Inocencio Feras. This extrajudicial confession was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Vicente Aseniero and reaffirmed his Confession during the preliminary investigation of the case. Thereafter, an information for murder was filed against Fortunato Pamon, as principal by direct participation, Inocencio Feras and Gerson Dulang as principals by inducemet, and John Doe, alias "Dodo" as accomplice. When Inocencio Feras died during the course of the trial, the information was amended by dropping Feras' name and substituting the name of Gerson Dulang, who professed ignorance of the crime. After trial, the trial court convicted Fortunato Pamon, Gerson Dulang and John Doe alias "Dodo" Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Gerson Gulang solely by virtue of Pamons confession Although the court sustained the trial court's conviction of Fortunato Pamon, it constrained to disagree with the conviction of Gerson Dulang. Well settled is the rule that the guilt of an accused must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to meet this quantum of proof with respect to Gerson Dulang. Apart from the extrajudicial Confession of Fortunato Pamon, there is no other evidence linking Gerson Dulang to the crime. Moreover, We also want to point out that Fortunato Pamon had no personal knowledge of Gerson Dulang's participation. He only heard from alias "Dodo" that Gerson Dulang hired him to kill Robert Te. 28 Thus, the confession of Fortunato Pamon vis-a-vis Gerson Dulang was, as the appellant called it, double hearsay. Main Point: An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. This is so because the co-accused has no opportunity to cross-examine the confessant and thus, as against him, the confession is hearsay People v. Sabban 260 SCRA 630 Eduardo Sabban was arrested in Cagayan and brought to the Quezon City Jail for the crime of robbery with homicide. During investigation, he confessed to his having taken part in the killing of Nancy Maxey and Nora Mercado. He executed, with the assistance of counsel, a Sworn Statement detailing how the victims were killed and the participation of the other assailants in the commission of the crime. Sabban was convicted of the crime and later appealed. The main line of defense, it thus appears, is an alleged violation of the constitutional right of appellant to be assisted by a counsel of his own choice in the execution, during custodial investigation, of his sworn statement admitting his participation in the crime. Atty. Justino San Juan, was the counsel in question who happens to be the Executive Director of the I.B.P. (at the time) and who, in the absence of the free legal aid lawyers, is also commissioned to act as counsel of the free legal aid. Sabban claimed and swore that when he was brought to the office of the IBP there was already a prepared statement which he was forced to sign and that before signing that statement, he told Atty. San Juan that he could not sign it because the contents of that statement is not true ISSUE:Whether or not there was credence to the defense claims of Sabban that his confession was obtained in violation of his constitutional right A confession to be admissible must be: (1) express and categorical; (2) given voluntarily, and intelligently where the accused realizes the legal significance of his act; (3) with assistance of competent and independent counsel; (4) in writing, and in the language known to and understood by the confessant; and (5) signed, or if the confessant does not know how to read and write, thumbmarked by him. The court found that Atty. San Juan, while serving as rebuttal witness, apprised the accused of his constitutional rights and ensured that he read or recited to accused his constitutional rights and whether he understands the tenor thereof, particularly, that he is entitled to hire a counsel of his own choosing and that whatever statement that maybe given by him freely maybe used in his favor or against him later in Court and that he may refuse to answer questions which may tend to be incriminating and among others. Atty. San Juan also asked the Sabban, since he does not have a lawyer at that time, if he would be willing to give out his statement with him as his counsel for purposes of that extra judicial confession. The court found that Sabban replied Yes to all of the above. As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. As an officer of the court, he has in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his sworn duties and responsibilities. Absent any showing that Atty. San Juan was remiss in his duty, the confession of the accused-appellant is valid and binding upon him and is thus admissible in evidence. A lawyer is an officer of the court, and he has in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his sworn duties and responsibilities People v. Camat 256 SCRA 52 Amboy Camat and Willie Del Rosario were accused of roberry with homicide on a certain Nelson Sinoy and Gonzalo Penalver. Camat divested Penalver of a black leather clutch bag containing an electric tester valued at P150 and stabbed the victim. Del Rosario on the other hand stabbed Sinoy which caused the latters death, Penalver survived with serious injuries. Both accused admitted to Pat. Odeo Carino their involvement in the crime upon invitation in the police station. At their arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After due hearing, the lower court rendered judgment 2 on June 19, 1987 finding both appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide. Appellants assigning in their brief a single error submitting that the court gravely erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide. In support of their lone assignment of error, appellants insist that the trial court cannot rely on the extrajudicial confession of appellant Camat as a basis for their conviction because such confession was obtained during custodial investigation in violation of their constitutional rights WON the trial court erred in relying on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused as basis for their conviction because such confession was obtained in custodial investigation in violation of their constitutional rights Yes. Absent any showing that appellants were duly advised of the mandatory guarantees under the Bill of rights, their confessions made before Pat. Carino are inadmissible against them, and cannot be used in support of their conviction. However, SC still affirmed their guilt.

People v. Alicando 251 SCRA 293 People v. Malimit 264 SCRA 167 Manuel v. NC Construction 282 SCRA 326 People v. Andan 269 SCRA 95 People v. Gomez 270 SCRA 432 People v. Dela Cruz 279 SCRA 245 People v. Binamira 277 SCRA 232 Accused Binamira was arrested for having allegedly killed and robbed a certain Jessie Flores. He was tried in the RTC of Makati and was convicted of robbery with homicide. Not satisfied with the decision, he appealed and assailed the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession he made as well as his right to counsel preferably of his own choice. First, the confession was allegedly taken during investi gation when he was brought to the police station, and that he was only provided a counsel (Atty. Parcon) the following day who signed the said confession without having informed him (accused) the consequences of his extrajudicial confession. Second, his right to counsel preferably of his own choice was not exercised freely as it was not made clear to him that he has the right to choose whether or not he can accept Atty. Parcon as counsel. ISSUE: Were the accuseds rights under custodial investigations violated YES. SC declared that the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible as evidence as the prosecution failed to rebut the evidence that the a ccuseds counsel was only present during the signing of the confession and not during the investigation . Moreover, the extrajudicial confession itself shows that, in the course of the custodial investigation, Binamira was not fully apprised of his constitutional rights. While he was perfunctorily informed of his right to be represented by counsel, it was not explained to him that he may choose that counsel. More important, he was not given the chance to actually retain such counsel of his choice. Furthermore, he was supposedly informed of these rights th rough two kilometric sentences punctuated by similarly two terse answers of Opo initialed by him. It was not demonstrated that appellant understood his constitutional rights; and the Pahiwatig itself, which is obviously of martial law vintage, shows that the investigating officers did not exert sufficient effort to explain such rights. Verily, the right of a person under custodial investigation to be informed of his rights contemplates an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the accused has been informed of his right People v. Santos 283 SCRA 443 Mercy Santos was arrested for having kidnapped a 7-year old and detained her for 5 days. She was positively identified by a witness and the 7year old girl herself. Hence, by virtue of the witness and an extrajudicial confession of the accused she was convicted in the RTC for kidnapping and serious illegal detention. She appealed and assailed the validity of her extrajudicial confession and the credibility of the witnesses. ISSUE: What were alleged violations in the observance of the rights of the accused under custodial investigation The extrajudicial confession was declared inadmissible. SC found out that accuseds counsel made terse and perfunctory statements which do not evince a clear and sufficient effort to inform and explain to appellant her constitutional rights, much less satisfy the constitutional prerequisites. The right of a person under custodial investigation to be informed of his rights entails an effective communication that results in an understanding thereof. Any effort falling short of this standard is a denial of this right. trial court erred in admitting appellants ext rajudicial confession without showing that Atty. Gordon Uy was indeed the competent and independent counsel of appellants own choosing. SC noted appellants insistent and persistent disavowals of knowing said Atty. Uy, much less of retaining him as her counsel of choice. The prosecution failed to present Uy as a witness to show his role in the taking of the alleged confession. They also failed to show that appellant was, at that time, assisted by competent and independent counsel preferably of her own choice. However the conviction was sustained in view of the credibility of the witnesses People v. Suarez 267 SCRA 119 Accused Suarez, together with Reyes and Lara conspired to kill Estrellita Guzman. Reyes and Lara were later apprehended and so they gave their own sworn statements with regards to the planning until execution of their crime. RTC then by way of the extrajudicial confessions and circumstantial evidences, convicted Reyes, Lara, and Suarez to the crime of robbery with homicide. Accused appealed assailing the admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions contending that their extrajudicial confessions were obtained through force and intimidation and without the benefit of an effective counsel ISSUE: W/N there was violation of their rights under custodial investigation No, after thorough review of the case SC found out that the extrajudicial confessions of accused Reyes and appellant Lara were freely and voluntarily given and that their retraction and claims of violence and coercion were merely belated contrivances and efforts at exculpation. Their claim that they were forced to sign their respective statements was sufficiently refuted by the witnesses for the prosecution who were present on the day and time the duo gave and signed their sworn statements. Even though the police investigators are the ones who can present a counsel if the accused cannot afford to provide his own, still the accused has the discretion whether or not to accept that counsel. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. While the lawyers of the accused were provided by the NBI, the accused never signified their desire to have a lawyer of their own choice. It is untenable claim that the lawyer who assisted him in his waiver came in only after he had executed his waiver. His own statements show that he waived his rights in the presence and with the advice of Atty. Rodolfo Dahiroc People v. Calvo 269 SCRA 676 People v. Espanola 271 SCRA 689 People v. Teehankee, Jr. 249 SCRA 54 People v. Meneses 288 SCRA 95 Roman Meneses was charged and found guilty of the murder of Cesar Victoria. The victim was stabbed to death with a fan knife (balisong) while sleeping by his seven-year old son, Christopher in a rented makeshift room in Tondo. The case however was appealed and Meneses was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. During the appeal, plaintiff pointed out that appellant had verbally admitted having committed the crime at the time of his arrest and later during the conduct of the investigation. The appellant however during the trial denied having made such verbal admissions of guilt WON an admission of guilt by the accused obtained under custodial investigation is admissible NO, the verbal admissions would not be admissible in evidence against him because the constitutional preconditions for its admission were not complied with. The mere assertion by a police office that after an accused was informed of his constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel he readily admitted his guilt, does not make the supposed confession admissible against the purported confessant. In this case, the admissions of guilt were made WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF COUNSEL. People v. Dumantay 307 SCRA 1 Bernardino Domantay (alias Junior Otot) was charged and found guilty with the crime of homicide with rape and was sentenced to death and

damages. Sometime in 1996, the body of six year old Jennifer Domantay was found in a bamboo grove in Pangasinan with 38 stab wounds. Bernardino was picked up and taken to the police station for questioning. Before police commenced questioning, Bernardino was apprised of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, in English, which was later translated into Pangasinense. Bernardino also agreed to answer the questions of the investigator even in the absence of counsel and admitted killing the victim. His confession was also not reduced to writing While detained in the municipal jail, Celso Manuel, a radio reported interviewed Bernardino where he also confessed to the killing of Jennifer WON the accused was already held under custodial investigation. WON the extrajudicial confession to the police is admissible. WON the extrajudicial confession to the radio reporter is admissible YES. Custodial investigation occurs "when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect." In the case, he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the crime. He was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution applied to him. NOTE: R.A. No. 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee of Sec 12 to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning. NO. For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. In the case, although he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. Thus, the waiver is invalid and his confession is inadmissible YES. Confessions to newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. Further, extrajudicial confession is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, namely, the fact of death of Jennifer Domantay as provided by Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan 302 SCRA 102 Arnold Pasicolan, a public officer at the Makati Central Post Office, in conspiracy with Lito Marcelo and Ronnie Romero, private individuals, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with grave abuse of confidence, and with intent of gain and without the consent of the owners thereof, took, stole and carried away from the Post Office one bag containing assorted mail matters some of them containing U.S. Dollar Bills in the aggregate amount of $500, or its peso equivalent in the amount of P11,000.00. All three were arrested by the NBI and were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the letters in order to identify the letters as the very same letters confiscated from them. They were eventually found guilty of qualified theft. But a petition for certiorari was filed contending that Honorable Court erred in admitting as evidence of petitioner's guilt the letters signed by the accused during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel, in utter disregard of his constitutional right WON the accused were deprived of their constitutional rights while under custodial investigation. WON the letters can be considered valid evidence in court YES. Petitioners did not have a competent and independent counsel during the time the petitioner and his co-accused signed the envelopes following their arrest. Hence, they were at the time under custodial investigation, defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way. Under the Constitution, among the rights of a person under custodial investigation is the right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and if the person cannot afford the services of counsel, that he must be provided with one. YES. Despite the letters/envelopes being excluded as evidence under Sec 12, Article 3, the letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of the crime validly seized during a lawful arrest People v. Mahinay 302 SCRA 455 People v. Morada 307 SCRA 362 People v. Bariquit 341 SCRA 600 People v. Dano 339 SCRA 515 Acused was convicted of murder. An extrajudicial confession was made. Defense interposed self-defense Extrajudicial statement is inadmissible because of violation of constitutional rights during custodial investigation. A suspects confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel without a valid waver of such assistance regardless of the absence of coercion, or the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if appellants confession were gospel truth. However, his statements made to the barangay captain, who is neither police officer nor a law enforcement agent is admissible. When an accused invokes selfdefense, the onus probandi to show that the killing was justified shifts to him. Even if the prosecutions evidence was weak, it could not be readily dismissed after the accused had openly admitted his responsibility for the killing Santos v. Sandiganbayan 374 SCRA 386 F: This is a case of Estafa. One of the Petitioners (Valentino) made an extrajudicial confession with waiver of his rights to counsel. He, in his statement, also stated that the other petitioners were part of the group that conspired on the act I: WON the confession is admissible with regards to the co-accussed H: If a confession be free and voluntary the deliberate act of the accused with a full comprehension of its significance, there is no impediment to its admission as evidence, and it then becomes evidence of a high order; since it is supported by the presumption a very strong one that no person of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, especially if it be a serious crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. In these cases, the NBI investigator would not have known the members of the syndicate and the sophisticated manner by which the crimes in question were perpetrated if Valentino and Estacio, who were directly involved therein, did not reveal these. With respect to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of Valentino and petitioner Estacio against their co-accused, once again, this Court declares that although an extrajudicial confession is admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused People v. Sevilla 339 SCRA 515 The accused raped his 14 yr. old daughter. He started making sexual advances when she was 6 and finally had sexual intercourse with her 8 yrs. later. Appellant questions the credibility of the victims testimony since it took 8 yrs. before she complained of his acts Held: Guilty. The Court is not persuaded by accused-appellants submission. As held by this Court in People v. Miranda, there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one has just been confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience as heinous as the crime of rape

and not every victim to a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably with the expectation of mankind. The fact that Myra did not complain to her mother or her aunts about the sexual abuses committed by her father against her for eight long years, is of no moment. Myra, who was of a very tender age when the horrible events in her life began to unfold, could have, in all probability, been confused and bewildered by her experience that for more than half of her young life, she was shocked into utter insensibility. Furthermore, a rape victims testimony is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a close relative of having raped her, as in the case of a daughter against her father People v. Figueroa 335 SCRA 249 After a buy-bust operation gone wrong, the accused, Robert Figueroa( known as Obet) was brought to the station for questioning. During the interrogation, Obet volunteered to the police that the source of his drugs was a certain Betty whom the police later caught. In the course of the trial, Betty was acquitted. He also appealed for his acquittal on the basis of the failure of the State to show by convincing evidence that shortly prior to or during custodial investigation, he was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and to be informed of such rights. He asserts that he did not waive those rights. Thus, whatever admissions were allegedly extracted from him are inadmissible in evidence Issue: Were the statements given by the accused admissible as evidence against him No. It is always incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at the trial that prior to in-custody questioning, the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. The presumption of regularity of official acts does not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. Hence, in the absence of proof that the arresting officers complied with these constitutional safeguards, extrajudicial statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, made during custodial investigation are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of a case. In other words, confessions and admissions in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution are inadmissible in evidence against the declarant and more so against third persons. This is so even if such statements are gospel truth and voluntarily given. Such statements are useless except as evidence against the very police authorities who violated the suspect's rights. SORIANO admitted that the custodial investigation of OBET was conducted without the presence of a lawyer, and there is no proof that OBET waived said right and the right to remain silent. No waiver in writing and in the presence of a counsel was presented. Thus, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution any admission obtained from OBET in the course of his custodial investigation was inadmissible against him and cannot be used as a justification for the search without a warrant. People v. Salvatierra 276 SCRA 55 Charlie Fernandez was stabbed and later he died. the event was witnessed by Milagros Martinez. In a separate event, the police received a complaint that Salvatierra was causing a commotion. He was brought to the station, and when the officers had knowledge that he was a suspect to the death of Charlie, he was investigated, interrogated and detained. Later, he was brought out of his cell where a man and two women viewed him. The latter was the witness Milagros, against him who pointed to him as the k iller of Charlie in the police line-up. Two days later, he was made to sign a document the contents of which he was not allowed to read. When he insisted on reading the document, his head was hit with a key and he was forced to sign it. The document was the booking and information sheet Accused was found guilty. Thus, his appeal stating that during custodial investigation and the police line-up he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel. Citing cases where defendants were acquitted on the basis of inadmissibility of extrajudicial confessions Issue/s: Can accused be acquitted on the basis of the alleged inadmissibility of his confession during the custodial investigation? Was the right of the accused violated when he signed the booking and information sheet without assistance of counsel No. In this case, other pieces evidence by the which the culpability of the appellant may be founded were present, not only the extrajudicial confessions of the accused during custodial investigation. Appellant cannot successfully assert that the case should be dismissed because during custodial investigation and the police line-up he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel. To bolster his assertion, appellant quotes People v. Campos and People v. Vasquez, where the Court in effect held that during custodial investigation, an accused should be assisted by counsel. Those cases, however, should be distinguished from the case at bar because in the former, the extrajudicial confessions of the accused during custodial investigation were the only bases for conviction, unlike in this case where there are other pieces of evidence by the which the culpability of the appellant may be founded. No. Appellant may not validly claim that dismissal of the case against him should be a matter of course because he signed the booking and information sheet without the assistance of counsel. Granting that affixing the signature of an accused is covered by the constitutional mandate requiring assistance of counsel to an accused during custodial investigation, this piece of evidence may be disregarded without the least diluting the prosecution's case against appellant. The booking and information sheet is not the only incriminatory evidence against appellant Right to be Informed of Custodial Rights People v. Samolde GR 128551, July 31, 2000 Accused-appellant Ramil Samolde was charged, together with Armando Andres, with the crime of murder. However, when arraigned both accused pleaded not guilty. Accused-appellant Samolde claimed that he was beaten up by the police. He testified that during his detention, he was not allowed to be seen, lest visitors notice his swollen face. As regards his counsel, accused-appellant stated that, contrary to what was stated in his extrajudicial confession, his lawyer did not really assist him. He was not informed of his constitutional rights when he executed his extrajudicial confession, and he did so only after he had been subjected to some brutality by the police Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant admissible in evidence No. The extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is not admissible in evidence, he was not informed of his constitutional rights before his statement was taken. Clearly, accused-appellant was not properly apprised of his constitutional rights. Under Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution, a suspect in custodial investigation must be given the following warnings: (1) He must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be wa rned that anything he says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. As the above quoted portion of the extrajudicial confession shows, accused-appellant was given no more than a perfunctory recitation of his rights, signifying nothing more than a feigned compliance with the constitutional requirements. This manner of giving warnings has been held to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. For this reason, we hold accusedappellants extrajudicial confession is invalid People v. Canoy GR 122510-11, March 17, 2000 Duay and Gabuyan, agents of Metrodiscom Anti-Narcotics Unit (MANU), were found dead. Emma Bangot, a waitress, testified that Emma saw GABUYAN collared by Pat. Romarate, who was with Heralco and Gregorio. DUAY approached Romarate, identifying himself as a MANU agent. Romarate ignored him and handcuffed both DUAY and GABUYAN. The two were then dragged into the groups vehicle. Emma immediately reported what she saw to the office of the MANU. Later on, Jeremias Baguhin, a member of the Philippine National Police, declared that he learned that the perpetrators in the killing of DUAY and GABUYAN wanted to surrender. HERACLEO and GREGORIO told Jeremias they had knowledge of the death of DUAY and GABUYAN in the

hands of Romarate, and that they wanted to surrender because their conscience was bothering them. Jeremias brought them to the Anti-Crime Office for investigation. Romarate was apprehended, but he denied having killed DUAY and GABUYAN. During confrontation, HERACLEO and GREGORIO pointed to Romarate as the alleged mastermind. After they were apprised of their constitutional rights, HERACLEO and GREGORIO told him they did not need the assistance of a lawyer and they were willing to give a statement. Nevertheless, Rodel called Atty. Rideway Tanjili to assist them in signing a sworn statement waiving their rights to counsel and to remain silent. Atty. Tanjili substantially corroborated this point. HERACLEO and GREGORIO executed an extra-judicial confession in the presence of Fiscal Garcia, wherein they narrated their participation in the commission of the crime. GREGORIO alleged that during investigation, he was not informed of his rights to counsel and to remain silent. He denied having admitted before the National Police Commission that he had any participation in the killing of the victims Issue: Was there a violation of the constitutional right of information GREGORIO maintains that the oral admission and extra-judicial confession he gave before the police authorities cannot be used as evidence against him because his waiver of his rights to remain silent and to counsel during custodial interrogation cannot be characterized as one made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. It is not enough for the interrogator to merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of such provision in practical terms -- e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do -- and in a language the subject fairly understands. The right to be informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the subjects understanding of what is conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is sought to b e attained, the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation. We are convinced that the foregoing constitutional rights of GREGORIO were violated in these cases. Since the waiver of GREGORIO was intrinsically flawed and, therefore, null and void, the alleged extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. Additional Info: Nonetheless, the nullity of the waiver and the expurgation of the extrajudicial confession do not absolve GREGORIO from any criminal responsibility. The evidence on record satisfies us with moral certainty that he and his co-accused conspired together to kill DUAY and GABUYAN and that GREGORIO was not a mere witness to the acts of the others; he himself materially contributed to the pursuit of the conspiracy. GREGORIO cannot benefit from the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. He surrendered to the authorities to clear his name in connection with the alleged unlawful death of his fellow conspirator Corsonado. It was never his intention to submit himself to the authorities and assume responsibility for the crimes with which he was indicted, that is, for the untimely demise of DUAY and GABUYAN. An accused may be credited the mitigating circumstance of a surrender provided that the surrender must be spontaneous, i.e., the accused unconditionally submits himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his criminal culpability or he wants to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. None of these elements is present in this case. Decision Affirmed People v. Obrero GR 122142, May 17, 2000 Accused, a delivery boy, was claimed conspiring and confederating with an anonymous person, mutually helping one another to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to take, rob and carry away cash belonging to Antonio Cabrera against his will. On the occasion and by reason of the robbery, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attacked, assaulted and used personal violence upon two housemaids of the household. Only accused-appellant had been apprehended and pleaded not guilty. In the course of the investigation, an extrajudicial confession was presented as evidence claiming that accused-appellant confessed willingly. It claimed that the constitutional rights such as the right to remain silent, the right to counsel and such was explained to Obrero. Obrero denied participation in the commission of the crime and claimed that he was arrested without a warrant in Pangasinan. He claimed that, after being informed of the charges against him, he was beaten up and detained for a week and made to execute an extrajudicial confession. He denied having known or seen Atty. De los Reyes before and stated that he did not understand the contents of the extrajudicial confession which he signed because he does not know how to read Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of a constitutional right to be informed Accused-appellant claims that his confession was obtained by force and threat and his allegation that the fact that he was made to sign the confession five times is proof that he refused to sign it. What renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact that accusedappellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel. There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused-appellant without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions of this Court, has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. Especially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that accused-appellant was specifically asked these questions considering that he only finished the fourth grade of the elementary school. Due to the procedural irregularities committed during custodial investigation and the trial of the case, Obrero is acquitted. People v. Figueroa GR 134056, July 6, 2000 Palencia, an NBI Special Investigator testified that he was in the office of Soriano, an NBI Intelligence Agent II, when they received a call from their informant, a woman, who reported that a certain Robert Figuera (OBET) was allegedly engaged in large-scale drug trafficking in Makati City. PALENCIA and SORIANO forthwith instructed their informant to establish contact with OBET for a buy-bust operation. The informant was given money, dusted with fluorescent powder. When the operation commenced, Obet sensed the presence of Palencia and fire at their direction, ran towards his house and detained his mistress and her two children until Mayor Reyes arrived, to which Obet surrendered. He was detained at the NBI Headquarter where Palencia and Soriano methodically interrogated Obet about the source of the shabu. Obet eventually volunteered that a certain Betty was the source. Palencia and Soriano brought Obet to Betty as a follow-up operation. At Bettys, Palencia and Soriano tried to convince Betty to surrender the shabu. Betty persistently denied. Obet entered the premises and pointed out a pail containing liquid shabu. Palencia and Soriano seized the items and was tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The trial court pronounces Betty NOT GUILTY for failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence that she, in conspiracy with OBET, manufactured shabu without the requisite authority and that the items were taken without warrant. However, accused Robert Figueroa is found GUILTY ISSUE: Whether or not the there was a violation of Constitutional Rights by Palencia and Soriano for not informing Obet about his rights to remain silent and right to counsel

Obet claims that he was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and to be informed of such rights. He asserts that he did not waive those rights. Thus, whatever admissions were allegedly extracted from him are inadmissible in evidence. This court rules that the evidence for the prosecution miserably failed to prove OBET's guilt of the offense charged. It was established that OBET fired two shots toward the direction of PALENCIA and SORIANO and held hostage his mistress and her two children. Yet he was not placed under custodial investigation for such crimes as grave threats, coercion, illegal possession of firearms, or crimes other than that with which he was charged. On the contrary, OBET was held in custody and investigated or interrogated about the source of the shabu, none of which was found during the buy-bust operation. In short he was held in custody as a consequence of the failed buy-bust operation and as a follow-up to link him to the source and establish a conspiracy in the illegal trade of shabu. Obet cannot be investigated for anything in relation to shabu while under custody without informing him of his rights to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Any waiver of such rights should be in writing and made in the presence of a counsel pursuant to Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution. Also, even if the articles thus seized actually belonged to him, they cannot be constitutionally and legally used against him to establish his criminal liability therefor, since the seizure was the fruit of an invalid custodial investigation. Acquitted People v. Liwanag 363 SCRA 62 Admissibility as Evidence People v. Continente 339 SCRA 1 The trial court convicted the accused of murder. Among the evidence the trial court relied upon were the confession of the accused. The accused argued that their confession were inadmissible in evidence, since they were not informed of their constitutional right. ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence is admissible The written warning contained an explanation that the investigation dealt with the participation of the accused who chose not to give any statement to the investigator and a warning that any statement obtained from the accused might be used against them in court. They contained an advice that the accused might engage the service of a lawyer of their own choice and that if they could not afford the service of a lawyer, they would be provided with one for free. Despite the manifestation of the accused that they intended to give their statements, the investigator requested two lawyers to act as counsel for the accused. The lawyers conferred with the accused before their investigation. The accused were informed of their constitutional rights in the presence of their counsel. The confession are admissible in evidence People v.Labtan 320 SCRA 140 Several information for robbery with homicide and highway robbery were filed against accused Feliciano et al. Only accused Feliciano pleaded not guilty to the two charges. Orlando Labtan had escaped detention while Jonelto Labtan has eluded arrest. The prosecutions case was mainly anchored on the three-page sworn statement executed by Feliciano, which was obtained during the questioning at the CDO City Police Station, without the presence of counsel. ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial confession of the accused in admissible No. Since it was executed in the absence of a competent and vigilant counsel during the questioning at the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station, confession is inadmissible as evidence, as it was obtained in violation of Art3 Sec12 (1) The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. During the questioning at the Police Station, although Feliciano was assigned a counsel de officio, said counsel was nowhere during said questioning People v. Gamer 326 SCRA 660 XIII. Section 13 Waiver of the Right People v. Judge Donato & Rodolfo Salas 198 SCRA 130 People v. Mapalao 197 SCRA 79 Excessive Bail De La Camara v. Enage - 41 SCRA 3 Petitioner Ricardo de la Camara, Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, was arrested and detained for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen (14) and the wounding of twelve (12) other laborers of the Tirador Logging, Co. A case for multiple murder and another for multiple frustrated murder were filed before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. A petition for bailed was filed and was eventually granted. However, the bail was pegged at P 1,195,200.00 representing the sum of P 840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder and the remainder for multiple frustrated murder. Then Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos had reacted to the exorbitant sum and had suggested that P 40,000.00 bond would be reasonable. However, the judge remained firm with the bail amount WON the bail bond imposed by the Respondent Judge is excessive Yes. The amount of P 1,195,200.00 is just too much. The purpose of the bail is for the person accused by a crime, to not contemplate on making himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his case. In addition, the Constitution commands the prohibition against excessive bail. If there is no prohibition, the right to bail is rendered meaningless. It would be paradoxical to say to the accused that he has a right to bail but the same cant be availed of because of the exorbitant amount Chu v. Dolalos 260 SCRA 309 Complainant Alfredo Y. Chu, Mayor of Kabasalan, Zamboanga del Sur filed a letter-complaint against respondent Ana Maria Dolalas, Municipal Circuit Trail Judge of Kabasalan-Siay-Payao, Zamboanga del Sur alleging grave abuse of discretion for requiring P 50,000.00 bail for all of the accused in Criminal Case 6255. This is apart from the allegation of habitual tardiness on the part of the respondent Judger and her personnel. Respondent alleged that this is in retaliation of the verbal encounter they had when the Mayor barged into the respondents c hamber and angrily protested the excessive bail imposed. The Respondent tried to appease the Mayor by explaining but to no avail. The case was brought to the Regional Trail Court which dismissed the case for being baseless and untenable. However, the Office of the Court Administrator had found respondent judge guilty for acting with grave abuse of discretion in imposing the bail. Thus, the case at bar WON the bail bond imposed is excessive Yes, the bail imposed by Judge Dolalas is excessive. Section 6, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provided the Judges the guidelines in fixing the reasonable amount for bail: 1) financial ability of the accused to give bail; 2) nature and circumstances of the offense; 3) penalty of the offense charged; 4) character and reputation of the accused; 5) age and health of the accused; 6) the weight of the evidence against the accused; 7) probability of the accused appearing for trial; 8) forfeiture of other bonds; 9) the fact that the accused was fugitive from justice when arrested; and, 10) the pendency of other cases which the accused is under bond.

Furthermore, Ministry Circular No 8 issued by then Minister of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza is likewise applicable wherein the bond is fixed at P 1,000.00 per every year of imprisonment based on the maximum penalty imposable on the crime. Thus, for the crime of Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation Against Persons, the maximum bail should have been only P 10,000.00 Right to Bail of Military Personnel Commendador v. Gen. De Villa 200 SCRA 80 The accused in the case are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989. In one of the cases, specifically in GR No 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for a bail before the General Court Martial but was denied. The issue was raised before the Regional Trail Court of Quezon City which granted the provisional liberty to Ligot. However, Generals Renato S. De Villa and Alexander Aguirre refused to release him pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken before the Court WON the members of the military are entitled to bail No. Traditionally, the right to bail has not traditionally been recognized and is not available in the Military, as an exception to the rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Instead, the right to speedy trail is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist as what is suggested in the Aura case. The unique structure of the military is the justification as to why the military men are not covered by the constitutional coverage of the right to bail Right to Bail People v. Gako 348 SCRA 334 Jinggoy Estrada v. Sandiganbayan GR 148965, Feb. 26, 2002 Sule v. Biteng AM MTJ-95-1018, 243 SCRA 524 Facts: Petitioner Miguel Paderanga was belatedly charged as co-conspirator inthe crime of multiple murder for the killing of members of the Bucag familyin Gingoog City of which, petitioner was the mayor at the time. The trial of the case was all set to start with the issuance of an arrestwarrant for petitioners apprehension, but before it could be served on him,petitioner, through his counsel filed a motion for admiss ion to bail with thetrial court. Petitioner furnished copies of the motion to State ProsecutorGingoyon , to the Regional State prosecutor and the private prosecutor. Thetrial proceeded to hear the application for bail, but only assistant prosecutorappeared for the prosecution and four of pe titioners counsel.Petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College GeneralHospital due to acute costochondritis, his counsel ma nifested that theywere submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapterof the IBP and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he isconsidered being in custody of the law. The prosecution neither supportednor opposed the said application for bail. The trial court admitted petitionerto bail. The following day, petitioner managed to personally appear beforethe clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount fixed. Hewas thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also appeared personally and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case.20 days after the resolution of the trial court, Prosecutor Gingoyon filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that he received a copy of the petitionfor admission to bail only a day after the hearing. The trial court denied themotion for reconsideration, and so Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matterthe respondent Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals annulled the decisionof the trial court in granting bail to petitioner on the ground that they weretainted with grave abuse of discretion. Responednt court observed that atthe time of petitioners application for bail, he was not yet in the custody of the law, apparently because he filed his motion for admission to bail beforehe w as actually arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. Respondent court also noted that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the fact that nobail was recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons held that the grant of bail was doubly improvident Issue:A.Whether or not petitioner was in the custody of the law when it applied for bail before the arrest warrant was served on him. B. Whether or not bail was granted with grave abuse of discretion considering that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable byreclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt was strong Ruling:A. Yes. Factual ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. B. Yes. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that beforeconviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged withoffenses punishable byreclusion perpetuawhen the evidence of guilt isstrong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, nowprovides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regionaltrial court of an offense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua or lifeimprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail,which may be waived considering its personal nature and which, to repeat,arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs from thepresumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not beinflicted incarceration at the outset since after trial he would be entitled toacquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trialcourt of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as amatter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instances wherethe accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong.Under said general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, thecourt having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant thesame after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On theother hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion onthe part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatoryin nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of thecourt, is required with the participation of both the defense and a dulynotified representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether ornot the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant.Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that theevidence meets the required quantum Asst. Prov. Prosecutor Chin v. Judge Gustilo 247 SCRA 175 Facts: This is a case filed against Judge Tito G. Gustilo for "gross misconduct, gross and grave abuse of discretion, malfeasance in office and maladministration of justice." The complainant, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo City Antonio P. Chin, was injured during an altercation with a security guard. He complains that respondent judge granted bail to the security guard without notice to the prosecution and fixed the amount of the bond at P8,000.00 only, without taking into consideration that the firearm used was unlicensed. The respondent judge argues that notice to the fiscal is required only when the charge is for a capital offense. Here the police blotter indicated that Girao's liability, if any, would be for frustrated homicide only. He also claims that the police blotter did not indicate that the gun used by Girao was unlicensed and since it was a service revolver, the presumption was that it was licensed. He emphasizes that as no charge had been filed against Girao, there was no need for him to set a hearing on the motion for bail Issue: Whether Respondent was in error in granting bail of 8,000 only

Held: Yes. The prosecutor must be heard even in cases where bail is a matter of right because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account a number of factors, such as the applicant's character and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds, or whether he is a fugitive from justice. (Rule 114, 6) Had the prosecutor been heard on the bail application, he could possibly have informed the court that the gun used was unlicensed if this was the case People v. Nitcha 240 SCRA 283 Facts: On October 1990, upon commotion in a sari-sari store involving the appelants brother. Nitcha fired his gun in the direction of the Sibayans, the bullet hitting May at the back of her head and existing through the middle of her forehead. Appellant then aimed his gun at Joselito but missed. Appellant was convicted with principal liability of Reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant argues next that procedural infirmities attended the trial below such as (a) the hearsay character of the testimony of the People's third witness which was heard in the absence of accused-appellant and his counsel; (b) the denial of due process on account of the perceived bias of the trial judge; (c) the illegality of accused-appellant's arrest and detention; and (d) the absence of preliminary investigation. Despite all these claim the appellant was able to post a bail bond Issue: Whether appellant can be granted bail despite posting a bail bond Held: No. The clear implication therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable byreclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction. apart from the fact that he entered a plea of not guilty, is tantamount to foregoing the right to question the assumed irregularity; Bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua (absolute); Bail is a matter of discretion when the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua; If accused ins convicted by the crime (reclusion perpetua), bail is neither a matter of right nor a matter of discretion. Bail must not be granted US v. Purganan Sept. 24, 2002 Facts: (This case is a sequel to GR. 139465 Sec. Of Justice Vs. Lantion) Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty. Issue: Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings Held: No! Extradition is different from ordinary criminal proceedings. He should apply for bail in the court where he is tried. Exceptions: (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein. Parada v. Veneracion 269 SCRA 371 Facts: Parada was accused of Estafa. He notified the court through his attorney of his change of address but the notifications were still sent to his old one so Veneracion (judge) held the trial in absentia. A warrant of arrest was issued with no bail. His non-appearance also was construed as waiver to present evidence. He was convicted and he now files a complaint against judge for gross ignorance of the law when he did not follow the legal requirements of a valid trial in absentia which led to his conviction and premature incarceration, that the order of his arrest with no recommendation for bail was erroneous, and that respondent Judge abused his authority. Issue: Did the judge erred in ordering an arrest with no BAIL? Held: Yes. The warrant of arrest with no recommendation for bail that was issued by the Judge is a violation of Paradas constitutional right to bail. The rule is clear that unless charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong, all persons detained, arrested or otherwise under the custody of the law are entitled to bail Obosa v. CA 266 SCRA 281 Facts: Obosa was charged with two counts of murder for the ambush and slaying of former Secretary of Interior and Local Governments Jaime Ferrer and his driver Jesus Calderon. However, he was only convicted of two counts of homicide by the trial court. Obosa applied for bail with the trial court. While this is pending, he appealed the case to the CA, which found strong evidence of guilt. Meanwhile, the trial court approved Obosas bail bond, prompting the prosecution to request the CA to cancel the bail bond approved by the trial court. Hence, this petition Issue: Whether or not Obosa is entitled to right to bail pending appeal as a matter of right Held: The Court denied the petition of Obosa to resolve the 2 resolutions of the responding court relating to his bail. While it is true that the lower court granted him bail because he was convicted only for 2 counts of homicide and not murder or the capital offense, the fact is, once an appeal is made in the CA, and CA found strong evidence of guilt, it throws the whole case open for review and reverts him back to his original situation as a person charged with the capital offense of murder. Moslares v. CA 291 SCRA 440 XIV. Section 14 Military Tribunal Olaguer v. Military 150 SCRA 144 Tan v. Barrios 190 SCRA 685 Presumption of Innocence U.S. v. Luling 324 Phil 725 Accused F. Luling, is a wharf watchman employed in the customs service in the Philippines, received P100, in order that he might secure through customs brokers, certain rolls of paper in which a large quantity of opium was hidden to Rufino Elorzd or Rufino Elord. The act of accepting any money or valuable thing in relation to his customs duties, is prohibited by section 316 of Act No. 355 of the United States Philippine Commission, for which he was found guilty. In the SC, the accused alleges that section 316 is unconstitutional in that the state is without right or authority to enact a law, for which the commission of a certain act shall constitute prima facie proof of guilt, in which case the burden of proving innocence is shifted to the Accused Issue: Whether section 316 of Act No. 355 of the United States Philippine Commission is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the accused to prove his innocence Held: NO. No rule has been better established in criminal law than that every man is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In a criminal prosecution, therefore, the burden is upon the state to prove every fact and circumstance constituting the crime charged, for the purpose of

showing the guilt of the accused. While that is the rule, it has been frequently decided, in case of statutory crimes, that no constitutional provision is violated by a statute providing that proof by the state of some material fact or facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are committed without unlawful intention People v. Mingoa 92 Phil 856 Facts: The defendant Aquino Mingoa was short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer, and unable to produce the missing fund upon demand by the provincial auditor. He placed the money in a large envelope which he took with him to show and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore when he returned. But he did not testify in court and presented no evidence in his favor. He was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds (Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code), and having been found guilty as charged and sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that court certified the case here on the ground that it involved a constitutional question Whether the legal provision violates the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved Held: NO. The contention that this legal provision violates the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be sustained. The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. The ultimate fact presumed is that the officer has malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he has received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two. Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity. Further still, the question of the constitutionality of the statute not having been raised in the court below, it may not be considered for the first time on appea Dumlao v. COMELEC 95 SCRA 392 Facts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in the coming elections of January 1980. Petitioner Romeo B. Igot, is a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. Petitioners assail the validity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 Sec. 4. which provides that, any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity: Provided, that a judgment of conviction of the above crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact Issue: Whether Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 Sec 4 is violative of the Constitutional presumption of innocence Held: YES. But only a partial declaration of nullity of the objectionable portion (second portion) is mandated. As it is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which can stand by itself. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code Pamintuan v. People 234 SCRA 63 1. Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways was robbed. 2. The robbery was reported to the police. 3. Some of the lost items were in Chinatown area as tipped by an informer. 4. His wife was able to recognize the stolen jewelry displayed at the stall being tended by Norma Dizon-Pamintuan. 5. Norma was accused for violating anti-fencing law. 6. Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. 6. Norma was arrested, tried and convicted of violating the Anti-Fencing Law. 7. Norma assailed that section 5 of the anti fencing law violates the presumption of innocence provided in the constitution. Whether or not section 5 of the anti-fencing law is unconstitutional No, the supreme court held that section 5 is constitutional. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of Robbery or Theft. This presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence protected in the fundamental law. Marquez v. COMELEC 234 SCRA 538 Facts: 1. Eduardo Rodriguez and Bienvenido Marquez were both candidates for Governor in the Province of Quezon in 1995 elections. 2. Rodriguez won. 3. Rodriguez, however, has a criminal charge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. 4. Marquez files a disqualification case against Rodriguez on the grounds that Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice, and 5. Section 40 (e) of the local government code states that The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position... (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Issue: Whether or not fugitive from justice with regards to disqualification cases violates the presumption of innocence Held: No. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. It includes those who after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. The COMELEC is directed to proceed and settle the case in conformity of the given clarification with the term fugitive from justice. Hizon v. CA 265 SCRA 517 Right to be Heard Maliwat v. CA 256 SCRA 718

FACTS: Petitioner Maliwat is charged with the crime of falsification of public documents through a decision of Judge Diaz of the lower court. The prosecution alleged that Maliwat had accessed to two blank transfer certificates of title. He allegedly filled them up and forged the signature of then Register of Deeds of Cavite Atty. Cuevas, making it appear that he is owner of two real properties owned by Green Valley Corporation. He then went to the Registry of Deeds to request for the purported original copies of the duplicate certificates. Atty. Santiago saw the duplicate titles held by Maliwat and became suspicious of their authenticity because the signatures of Atty. Cuevas appearing in the aforementioned certificates are different from the signature he recognizes. He then called for the assistance of the NBI instead of denying Maliwat then and there. Maliwat never returned back to the office until Santiago went on a leave of absence and Atty. Gutierez took over. Not knowing about the case of Maliwant, Atty. Gutierez issued the original certificates of title as requested on the ground that there was no patent irregularity in the documents presented per his notice and that the Registry of Deeds has been burned twice so the original documents that now cannot be found may have been burned with it. Upon learning of this turn of events, Atty. Santiago contacted the NBI for the investigation. Case was filed to cancel the issued documents. One of the witnesses presented by the prosecution is the then Register of Deeds Judge Diaz who made a testimony that no such original titles exists under his possession. Maliwat denied all the allegations against him and averred that he bought the lands through a valid sale as evidenced by a Contract of Absolute Sale he entered with a certain Benigno Aseo. A charge for falsification of public documents was then filed against Maliwat, the case falling under the court of Judge Diaz, who was appointed as judge from his previous position as Register of Deeds. The trial court rendered a decision against Maliwat. Maliwat now contends that his right to be heard is violated because Judge Diaz is not impartial or free from bias in rendering the assailed decision ISSUE: WON the right to be heard was violated RULING: NO, it was not violated. Being called in the witness stand as a register of deeds is not a flaw sufficient enough to question the impartiality of Judge Diaz because he merely certified to the fact that he doesnt have the original titles alleged by Maliwat in his poss ession. If ever, Judge Diaz was even too lenient to Maliwat considering the number of times the trial was rescheduled as requested by petitioner Right to Counsel People v. Holgado 86 Phil. 752 FACTS: Defendant Holgado is charged and convicted for the case of slight illegal detention when he, a private individual, took into custody a certain Artemia Fabreag for eight hours. Without the aid of counsel, he pleaded guilty but alleged that the act of illegal detention was ordered by a certain Mr. Ocampo. The court never looked into this Mr. Ocampo nor questioned the lack of counsel of the accused ISSUE: WON the right to be heard to counsel was violated RULING: YES, it was violated. Every accused has the right to be informed of his constitutional rights, including the right to counsel. In case he has no means to provide himself a lawyer, the court should provide him with one. In the case at bar, the court made an irreversible error in not even questioning the lack of counsel of the defendant Holgado. They merely looked at the fiscals report as basis. They did not ev en looked into the Mr. Ocampo alleged by defendant. Considering the gravity of the offense and the importance of such qualified confession, the court committed a major error in disregarding the right to counsel of the accused and the necessary investigations over the n amed Mr. Ocampo United v. Ash 413 US 300 FACTS: Respondent Ash together with his companions was charged for the crime of robbery. A number of informants identified him as part of the robbery group who robbed a certain bank through a post indictment photographic lineup. Ash contends that such identification which constitutes majority of the prosecutions evidence is inadmissible because there was no counsel that accompanied him during such identifi cation. He argues that a counsel should be made available at such an important stage in the case ISSUE: WON the right to counsel was violated RULING: NO, it was not violated. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution which includes the right to counsel of an accused does not contemplate the presence of a lawyer in a post indictment photographic lineup. In fact, even the accused may not be present during such procedure; hence, the possible undue influence over the accused which is the purpose why right to counsel was established, is not present