1 Dylan Henrich Political Science 4320 Midterm 2 Essay: China Like most communist states, China is dominated by a single

political party. Although there are formal constitutional institutions, power in China is effectively centralized into the Chinese Community Party (CCP). The National Peoples Congress, established in 1982 as the highest organ of state power exercises very little real power. Instead, control of the state lies within the CCPs Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), a group of seven men headed by CCP Secretary-General Xi Jinping. The PSC divides political control of the country among each member, although decisions are made by the entire committee. In this way, individual power is limited. Forging agreements is difficult, as members of the PSC owe their positions to varying interest groups, constituencies, and former high-level party members who still exercise considerable influence in the political system. The second most powerful actor within China is the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), which is not an official military of the state, but rather the armed forces of the CCP. Currently headed by Secretary-General Xi Jinping, the CCP exercises absolute control over the PLA, ensuring the partys permanent status as the sole national governing authority. By extension, the PLA is highly politicized. It has formal recognition in the CCP through the partys Central Military Commission, and the CCP in turn enforces political indoctrination as a core pillar of the PLA. What should be the most powerful organ in China per its constitution, the National Peoples Congress (NPC), is nothing more than a rubber stamp for the policies delivered by the PSC. While it has the constitutional authority to elect members of the PSC and exercise

2 considerable power, the CCP has effectively removed its incentive to do so by manipulating how members of the NPC are elected. NPC members are nominated by the CCP, which typically nominates more deputies than there are seats available. State-level congresses and the PLA then elect NPC members from those nominees. Unsurprisingly, nominees tend already to be CCP, PLA, or state-level officials, who not only owe their allegiance to the CCP, but also have conflicts of interest in maintaining the CCPs political authority. To solidify their control of the NPC, a member of the PSC serves as the chair of the NPC leadership body. Centralized political control does not mean that all decisions are made from the top down or that certain individuals have the power to act unilaterally. There has not been a supreme leader in China since the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997. Institutional constraints at nearly every level of government prevent any individual from exercising unilateral power. While Xi Jinping may have the two most important portfolios in the PSC (military and foreign affairs), he still must convince the other six members of the PSC in order to enact his preferred decisions. That is not to say the Secretary-General does not exercise considerable influence over political and military decisions, but there are veto points other PSC members can use to rein in a Secretary-General acting unilaterally or attempting to change the status quo too much. Moreover, Chinas massive bureaucracy has its own constraints. Stove-piping is a major problem, as China has no formal body that encourages horizontal communication between different bureaucratic bodies. Additionally, there is a common tendency of different agencies to compete for limited budget resources, to claim authority over the same jurisdiction, and to jockey for the favor of party leadership. These two characteristics of Chinese bureaucracy limit it from being the kind of all-encompassing, totalitarian system so commonly associated with communist states.

3 Those internal constraints institutional checks on unilateral power, and bureaucratic stove-piping and competition combine with external factors to constrain Xi Jinpings foreign policymaking. Chinese leaders must contend with Chinas position in the international political and economic order. The question of Chinas interests as its military and economic power rise is under question, mostly because Chinese political leaders themselves are facing a crisis of competing visions. Recent studies indicate that foreign policy decision-making in China has become more pluralistic, though it is still very likely that top leaders maintain the most influence over foreign policy. Domestically, leaders are constrained by respect for their predecessors they tend not to engage in dramatic shifts in foreign policy while their predecessors are still alive and exerting influence in the political system. True to that, Xi Jinping has not strayed far for Hu Jintaos example. Based on operational code analysis, both leaders tend to hold cooperative and optimistic worldviews. New assertiveness probably is not the result of domestic political change, but rather Hu Jintao shifted foreign policy to a slightly more assertive stance following actions by external actors, namely the United States. Absent a hostile or otherwise uncooperative external environment, Xi Jinping would likely prefer to cooperate in the international system. Domestic constraints prevent him from going too far one way or the other, so it is reasonable to assume a content China would like to maintain the status quo. How important Xi Jinpings perception of the external environment as destabilizing the status quo is, as the PSC member charged with military and foreign affairs, is a difficult question to answer. However, when faced with a less status quo-friendly environment, it is likely that Chinese leadership will act more aggressively.