Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
A JOURNAL
loF
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Volume 29 Number 1
Fall 2001
Eric Buzzetti
The Rhetoric
of
Xenophon
and
in
35
Mark S. Cladis
Rousseau
and
the
Redemptive
Way
and
Discussion: Locke
Natural Law:
Opposing
Views
of
The Internal
Coherency
the Law of
Locke's
Concerning
75
Nature
of a
Michael P. Zuckert
Reply
to
Schmitt,
and
Colonialism, Edited
Translated
by
91
Alexandre Kojeve
and
Erik de Vries
Correspondence
Carl Schmitt
115
Alexandre Kojeve
Colonialism from
Perspective
European
Interpretation
Editor-in-Chief Executive Editor
General Editors Hilail Gildin, Dept. Leonard
of
Grey
Charles E. Butterworth Seth G. Benardete (d. 2001) Hilail Gildin - Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) Howard B. White (d. 1974) Ernest L. Fortin Christopher Bruell Joseph Cropsey John Hallowell (d. 1992) Harry V. Jaffa David Lowenthal Muhsin Mahdi Harvey C. Mansfield Michael Oakeshott Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) (d. 1990) Ellis Sandoz Leo Strauss (d. 1973) Kenneth W. Thompson
Consulting
Editors
International Editors
Editors
Terence E. Marshall
Heinrich Meier
Fred Baumann Maurice Auerbach Bonnette Patrick Coby Amy Thomas S. Engeman Elizabeth C de Baca Eastman Edward J. Erler Maureen Feder-Marcus Pamela K. Jensen Will Morrisey Ken Masugi Leslie G. Rubin Susan Orr Charles T. Rubin Martin D. Yaffe Susan Meld Shell Bradford P. Wilson Michael P. Zuckert Catherine H. Zuckert
Wayne Ambler
Lucia B. Prochnow Subscription rates per volume (3 issues): individuals $29 libraries and all other institutions $48
students (four- year
limit) $18
Single
U.S.: Canada $4.50 extra; $5.40 extra by surface mail (8 weeks or longer) or $1 1.00 by air. Payments: in U.S. dollars and payable by a financial institution located within the U.S.A. (or the U.S. Postal Service). Postage
elsewhere
in
Political Philosophy
as
Well
as
Those
Theology, Literature,
and
Jurisprudence.
follow The Chicago Manual of Style, 13th or later editions Instead of endnotes, the journal uses the (or "author-date") system of notation, described in these manuals, illustrated in cur rent numbers of the journal, and discussed in a sheet available from the Assistant to the Editor (see below). Words from languages not rooted in Latin should be trans literated to English. To ensure impartial judgment, contributors should omit mention
contributors should
or manuals
based
on them.
"reference-list"
desired,
Please
zip
code
in
full, E-mail
list.
Composition
by Bytheway Publishing
Services
Printed
by
the
Sheridan Press
Inquiries:
(Ms.) Joan Walsh, Assistant to the Editor interpretation, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y 11367-1597, U.S.A. (718)997-5542 Fax (718) 997-5565
interpretation
E Mail:
journal@qc.edu
Interpretation
A JOURNAL
Fall 2001
loF
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Volume 29
Number 1
Eric Buzzetti
The Rhetoric
of
Xenophon
and
the
of
and
Mountain
35
Village: The
Way
and
Family, Work,
Community,
Love
on
Discussion: Locke
Two Samuel Zinaich, Jr.
Natural Law:
Opposing
Views
of
The Internal
Coherency
Locke's Moral
the
55
Concerning
Michael P. Zuckert
of a
Natural Law
75
Reply
to Zinaich
Translated
by
Erik de Vries 91
Correspondence
Carl Schmitt
Alexandre Kojeve
Colonialism from
European Perspective
1 15
Copyright 2001
interpretation, All
rights reserved.
ISSN 0020-9635
Interpretation
Editor-in-Chief
Executive Editor General Editors
of
Grey
Charles E. Butterworth Seth G. Benardete (d. 2001) Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) Hilail Gildin Howard B. White (d. 1974) Christopher Bruell John Hallowell (d.
Consulting
Editors
David Lowenthal Michael Oakeshott Amaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) (d. 1973) Strauss Leo Ellis Sandoz (d. 1990) Kenneth W. Thompson International Editors Editors Terence E. Marshall Heinrich Meier
Cropsey Ernest L. Fortin 1992) Harry V. Jaffa Muhsin Mahdi Harvey C. Mansfield
Joseph
Fred Baumann Maurice Auerbach Wayne Ambler Amy Bonnette Patrick Coby Thomas S. Engeman Elizabeth C de Baca Eastman Edward J. Erler Maureen Feder-Marcus Will Morrisey Pamela K. Jensen Ken Masugi Leslie G. Rubin Charles T. Rubin Susan Orr Martin D. Yaffe Bradford P. Wilson Susan Meld Shell Catherine H. Zuckert Michael P. Zuckert
Manuscript Editor
Subscriptions
(3 issues):
individuals $29
libraries
students
institutions $48
(four-year
limit) $18
Single
Postage
or
elsewhere
$5.40
or
longer)
$1 1
by surface by air.
(8
weeks
Payments: in U.S. dollars and payable by a financial institution located within the U.S.A. (or the U.S. Postal Service).
in
Political Philosophy
as
Well
as
Those
Theology, Literature,
and
Jurisprudence.
based
on them.
follow The Chicago Manual of Style, 13th or later Instead of endnotes, the journal uses the
and
editions
"reference-list"
described in these manuals, illustrated in cur discussed in a sheet available from the Assistant to the Editor (see below). Words from languages not rooted in Latin should be trans literated to English. To ensure impartial judgment, contributors should omit mention (or "author-date")
system of notation,
rent numbers of
the
journal,
in full, E-mail address, Please send four clear copies, which will not be returned, entire text and reference list.
desired,
zip
code
Composition
by Bytheway Publishing
Services
Printed
by
the
Sheridan Press
Inquiries:
(Ms.) Joan Walsh, Assistant to the Editor interpretation, Queens College, Flushing, N.Y. 11367-1597, U.S.A. (718)997-5542 Fax (718) 997-5565
interpretation
E Mail:
joumal@qc.edu
called to the
following
tion
changes
in format:
adopted
the
"reference-list,"
"author-date,"
or
system of nota
instead
of endnotes.
This
system
is
now
in
by
cited or
mentioned, headed
"References,"
with
full
publi
information, is
year of
in the
manner of a
bibliography. Quotations
discussion in
list:
followed
by
the author's
parentheses
last name,
relevant page
number, all in
at the end of
the sentence.
Thus,
Kojeve, Alexandre. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Translated by J. H. Nichols, Jr. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969. Text: (Kojeve, 1969, p. 27)
Citations to
year are
more
published
in the
same
distinguished
by
adding
the
letters
"a,"
"b,"
27)"
p.
in the text,
in the list,
"Kojeve, Alexandre. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Translated by J. H. Nichols, Jr. New York: Basic Books, Inc.,
1969b."
Discursive
would
formerly
source
be
placed
in
notes
is to become
part of
only the
be
in
the text
in
parentheses.
Discursive
notes
matter that
placed
is to be
in
parentheses
formerly
would
placed
in
Where all authors, works, or parts of works are adequately identified in the text, further identification by year and page in the text is not needed; an entry in the reference list is also unnecessary. Thus, "In sec. [or aph.] 188 of Beyond Good
and
Evil, Nietzsche
or
134M9)."
It is
not
Only
location
of matter
formerly
in
notes will
Additional discussion
ments
of
this system of
notation with
may be found in The Chicago Manual of Style, 13th ed., sec. 15.4, pp. 400 ff.; 14th ed., sec. 16.1, pp. 640 ff., and in K. L. Turabian, A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations, 4th ed., sec. 12.6, pp. 181
ff.; 5th
FOUR
ed., sec.
8.3,
pp.
112 ff.
that all manuscripts that text and
submitted use
The journal
copies
requests
be sent,
and
reference
The Rhetoric
of
of
Xenophon
and the
Treatment
Eric Buzzetti
Concordia University, Montreal
The
political
resurgence of
philosophy of Xenophon has been the object of a significant interest in political theory in the last decade, but this renewal has
to
Xenophon'
extended
as the
of Socrates to
Recollections of Socrates) Oeconomicus, Symposium and the Jury. The biting judgment expressed half a century
Russell
"[a]
thing
that he can
dominant scholarly
view of
their merits
phon's portrayal
(1945, p. 83). Even the recent attempts to rehabilitate Xenoof Socrates, while rightly challenging this dominant view, have
in showing that (or how) it is
erroneous.
not
been
altogether successful
More
often
by
Framing
(1998)
is
of Socrates: The
a case
Literary
pretation
of
Memorabilia
of the
in
point.
book-length interpretation
twenty-five years; as such,
students of philosophy. what
Memorabilia to
an audience
appear
in English in
it deserves
Indeed, they
will
is in many ways a valuable addition to the literature on the Memorabilia. It contains insightful remarks about the text and well-aimed critiques of various
dogmas
that the
of
the view
Memorabilia lacks formal unity and organization, as that Xenophon was a vain self-promoter. Moreover, Professor length the
rhetorical
Gray
discusses
a
at
character or
neglected
intention
of the
Memorabilia,
dimension
of the work
frequently
by
other scholars.
Gray
dimension, rightly in my
want to
view,
as the
key
is
to a
proper
interpretation
monograph
however,
that despite
against
vindicate although
por-
Gray
sets out to
disclose the
Xenophon's
The
author wishes
to thank
Nadon
and
interpretation, Fall
Interpretation
trayal of
Socrates,
words,
she
fails to
bring
its
out
its theoretical
richness
precisely because
rhetoric.
in
other
contention that
sor
of
Gray's book to introduce my treatment of the Memorabilia. The main part the article contends that when Xenophon's rhetoric is adequately taken into
contrasted with
the Education of
Cyrus,
justice? The overarching aim of the study is to articulate Xenophon's treatment of justice to encourage a revision of the prevailing view that Xeno phon is a conventional thinker and a dull moralizer.
Professor Gray's
tion"
Framing
of Socrates is intended
as
"a
literary
interpreta
of the
Memorabilia,
aim
one which
work, but
show
is to
detailed commentary on way for such a that Xenophon, no less than the other Socrat"does
not offer a prepares
commentary"
the
ics,
and
especially
Plato, "creates
that "[t]he
a coherent
image
Socrates"
of
(p. 6).
Gray
in its
un
key
certainly begins
presentation of
it
Socrates"
derstood best
as a
"literary
experiment"
in
which
newest and
while
he
also
(pp.
8, 184ff). As
genre"
new
in
which
he
used
"the
rhetoric"
processes of
to build on "audience
expectations"
(pp. 8, 176-77).
Xenophon
employed certain
forms
few
and
of
rhetoric,
Gray
executed a
impiety
be
young
thus needed a
public
defense that
would
(i.e., generally unsympathetic) 26ff., 91, 177, 192, 194). Faced with this situation, Xenophon
to the average
audience member
(pp.
wrote an
apology
and per
in
which
he
Socrates'
life
and
thought,
haps
pects
exaggerated
their
importance,
while
he downplayed
or silenced those as or
potentially
subversive of the
at which
traditional] level
product of
[Xenophon]
and other
is]
not a of the
his intellectual
failings, but
helps
limits
audience and
literature
offered"
(p.
"speculative
philosophy"
science"
does
not stem
edge of
from
a personal
gentleman
had
no
addressee
in the
Memorabilia]
normally In
instructional
helpfulness
of wisdom
literature
could not
include
speculative
philosophy."
and
Treatment of Justice
of the
word,
work"
(p. 183).
Gray's
enigmatic
emphasis on
Xenophon's
work,
and
rhetoric
helps
make intelligible
many
of the
features
of the
I believe that it is
fundamentally
sound and
fruitful. Yet
assumption.
cratic
that it is ultimately
premised on a
hypothetical
genuine
So
perhaps a man
(pp.
4; 22, 25,
own
95)
by
in the
mouth of
his better?
argues that when
Gray's Xenophon
fication,"
rates'
is
stated
indirectly. She
Memorabilia, he
employed the
literary
out
technique of "ampli
which
involves "progressive
teachings"
originalities"
restatement at ever
of
Soc
beliefs,
practices and
in
order to
bring
"Socrates'
more notorious
Socrates'
exam
ple,
age
lifelong
concern
is
stated
attempts
in the opening chapter of the work (1.1.16). to define these concepts are then presented in subsequent
on the previous ones
chapters
in
of
Socrates
associ
the Platonic
Socrates"
Xeno
dull
and
conventionally
by demonstrating
parts of
that
his Socrates
develops
in the later
the Memorabilia. In
deed, Gray
last book is
demonstration
reaches
fourth
and
Socrates
"a higher
plane of philosophic
activity"
by
to
and
Gray
compelled to
rather
"traditional Socrates
than original
.
.
instruction, leading
banality"; "Xenophon's
only slightly
strange
remains
in
traditional"
179, 186). In
Socrates
reader
.
offers
in the
antepenultimate on words":
"strike
a modem
play they radically unsatisfactory (p. 182). What justifies Gray's insistence, then, that "the Memorabilia [is] a work of
as mere
philosophic
rhetoric"
as a work of
(p. 83)?
Gray's
simplicity
cover
in capturing the gracefulness and charming Her paraphrases and extensive quotations un
and
interesting
a
subtleties
in the text
help
prepare
the
way for
on the
to offer
"a
Memorabilia"
is
less
insufficient
is
often
notice of
Xenophon's
apologetic
rhetoric
(p. 8). As
a result,
Gray
blind to the
unconventional side of
Interpretation
rhetoric conceals.
Two
to illustrate this
In
various passages of
her analysis,
Gray
discusses Xenophon's
turning"
alleged refu
(protrepein) human be
was in was
lead"
(proagein)
a
them to
virtue
(1.4.1). Socrates
accused, in effect, of
inspiring
desire for
present"
Gray rightly notes that Xenophon does not deny this invites his readers "to consider the evidence he will but merely directly which ostensibly exonerates Socrates (pp. 64-65). Since the phi
was accused of
losopher
failing
bodily
pleasures
(enkrateia), among
exhortations
other virtues
a cur
sory reading
that
Socrates'
is tempted to
"is
Gray's
to be
assertion
a perfect
being deficient,
(p. 178). Indeed Socrates emphatically self-control, suggesting for example that it is "a foundation
proagic"
of
soul"
and
that a human
being
far
must
be
"first in his
(1.5.4). He
even goes so
as to recount the
famous
Heracles"
to lead
his incontinent
companion
Aristippus to
an
companion's
sake,
exhortation
to self-control to Heracles
Virtue,
he
was
more
personified as an attractive
woman,
once addressed
only
an adolescent
A
tes'
careful
reading,
however,
Gray's
contention.
For one, it
would
Socra be to say the least very odd that Xenophon should have competence to (rather than merely "turn") to self-control with an exhortation to Aristippus, the man who went on to found the Cyrenaic school
"lead"
"proven"
hedonistic philosophy ! That school of thought, according to Diogenes Laertius, placed great importance on the bodily pleasures (1966, p. 219 and passim).
of
More
remarkable
still,
we recall
that
Heracles
was notorious
in the
ancient world
for his immense voracity and lack of self-control regarding food, drink and sex: Virtue's exhortation to him as an adolescent, which Socrates recounts in great detail to
"educate"
Aristippus,
proved
then to be
Heracles'
Galinsky
[1972].
the
According
Galinsky,
"The
Herakles
plays was
ished
ence
perhaps as
for
good
early as around the turn of food and drink rather than his labors
Herakles"
of the comic
central reference to
Epicharmus
at
II. 1.20.). In
other
words, it is
surprising
that
Xenophon fails to
comment
favorably
on the effectiveness of
Socrates'
from exonerating him, they seem to vindicate a significant part of his charge (cf. 1.5.6 and II. 1.34 with, e.g., IV.3.18 and IV.4.25). Nor are we
prised
sur
pref-
that
Socrates'
final
exhortation
to self-control in the
Memorabilia is
Xenophon's Rhetoric
aced
and
Treatment of Justice
by
what
is in
effect a
telling
admission:
"when
[Socrates]
conversed, he
turned
self-control"
(protrepein, rather than proagein) his companions most of all toward (IV. 5.1, my emphasis). To sum up: A study like Professor Gray's
to light the unobtrusive
should
bring
features
limited
of the
Memorabilia that
help
cor
rect or reveal
surface.
But
by failing
to observe
unconven of
many
tional
of these
and
features, Gray
humor
provides
help
in uncovering the
instructive truth
subtle
Socrates'
about
life
wit.
and
Xenophon's
and
lighthearted
Gray's discussion
my Socrates
criticism.
of the
Socratic
of
illustration
of
the
Memorabilia,
his young companion Euthydemus (IV.2-7). It has been rightly observed, however, that Euthydemus was a very unpromising Socratic (Strauss, 1972; Bruell, 1994; cf, however, Morrison, 1994). He will
approached and trained various arguments and suggestions even though many inadequate. Xenophon makes clear toward the beginning of Indeed, clearly his discussion that Euthydemus was unfit to receive an education of a higher
are
rarely
object to
Socrates'
sort.
(Xenophon
says that
Socrates
would explain to
sim
he thought
pursue while
little
possible"
as
mus
to question
[IV. 2. 40, my emphasis]. Socrates did not cause Euthyde himself in any fundamental way.) Why, then, did he suggest
Was Xenophon
merely ascribing his own attraction to dullness to a more discerning man? The truth, I believe, is otherwise. Xenophon wished to disclose certain
key
features
getic
of a
Socratic
of the
education
but
without
a
intention
Memorabilia. As
limitations helped
provided) in
a more
traditional or conventional
beings] in
the same
various
(IV. 1.3). He especially distinguished between those who resisted his arguments and those, like Euthydemus, who simply listened and gave
their
uncritical assent:
If
clear to
say
...
he
would
[Socrates] about something without having anything [In bring the entire argument back to its hypothesis.
. .
contradictors themselves.
But
when
he
went
most agreed
something in argument by himself, he proceeded (IV.6.13 15) upon, holding this to be safety in argument.
through
That is,
whenever
Socrates
his
back, by mutually
agreed
steps, to the
premise(s) underlying it: he argued dialectically. In this way, "the truth became
Interpretation
themselves."
But
whenever
he
"conversed"
safe,
and
he
attained
like Euthydemus, his primary goal was to make his argu it by defending conventional or publicly respectable
upon"
"what he
opinions
We
might
kind
interlocutor's beliefs
opinions, especially
as
(Bartlett, 1996,
p.
4).
was
According
to
Xenophon,
these were
of subjects that
Socrates
constantly investigating (1.1.16). Be that as it may, Xenophon makes Socrates would not expose a youth like Euthydemus to his "more
originalities,"
clear that
notorious
and
Xenophon's
skillful
rhetoric
but to the
accuracy
of
his depiction
to
as well.
Gray
her
never seems
realize
contention that
Xenophon
emphasized or exaggerated
traditional character of
nevertheless
of amplified sensi
bilities
capacities,"
and
"a potentially
for
leadership"
(pp. 152,
37;
cause of
error
is, I believe,
pp.
clear:
She fails
to observe that the passage quoted above distinguishes two types of interlocutors
and that affects
Euthydemus
Socrates
must
her interpretation in
Above all,
Gray
led to
ask
whether
would approach
his more promising pupils in the same manner Would he take up with them the questions he
questions
up
with
differently
or more
deeply?
What
would
"stirring"
treatments be?
Nor does
Gray
of
consider
how Xenophon's
help
answer
"The
place
her two-hundred-page study to barely the Memorabilia in Xenophon's wider [p. 194].) For
one page of
corpus"
devotes
book 4
of the
Memorabilia
he defends in that
law"
context
"the
with a
fellow
the sophist
Hippias
of
remains rather
lel
passage
unenlightening if read alone. But when read together with from the Education of Cyrus, fruitful paths of reflection are
up (cf. Memorabilia IV.4.12-18 with Education of Cyrus 1.3.16-17). And it is reasonable to surmise that Socrates would have guided his better pupils, Xeno
phon
richer paths.
In
other
words,
Gray
work
insufficiently
to which the
Memorabilia be
individual
uni
apprecia-
longs to
larger
constellation of
writings,
is bound up with the place that it occupies verse. It is one of the aims of the present study to
within the
show
Xenophonic
a
how
better
Xenophon's Rhetoric
tion of this connectedness can
Socrates'
and
Treatment of Justice
help bring
justice.
presentation of
view of
I.
SOCRATES'
VIEW OF JUSTICE
Even in his
stant
own
lifetime, Socrates
was
famous
as a philosopher
for his
con
investigation
of the
the Memorabilia as a whole bears eloquent testimony: To mention point, the work
only
one
literally
begins
and ends
chapter of the
questions that
Socrates
"always"
was
of the
which
the question,
What is just? figures prominently [1.1.16]. And in the final chapter, Socrates claims that he has "spent his whole [diabioun] doing "nothing
other
than
the
thoroughly examining
and was
what the
just
are, while
doing
just
Yet Socrates
[IV. 8.4; consider also IV.4.5-6].) refraining from the perhaps equally famous for never finishing or completing his
unjust"
examination of as to what
justice; he
seemed to
have
spent
his
whole
life
a
being
at a
loss
contemporaries.
him
of
deliberate
of
concealment.
by
the sophist
Hippias
it
came
to to
justice,
render
with
"asking
and
an
account
to
anyone
do
not want
judgment
anything"
about critique of
(IV.4.9;
rates
cf. also
Thrasymachus'
Soc
in Plato's Republic 336b8-d4). While it may be debatable whether Socra tes deliberately concealed his views about justice, it is surely not difficult to see why these views could have been thought to be elusive. For in the Memorabilia
alone,
no
of
justice
are
offered or
suggested:
(1)
and
justice is
(sophia:
III.9.5); (2)
justice is
"helping
one's
law"
friends
harming
ful":
enemies"
one's
(3)
justice is "the
IV.4.12ff; IV. 6. 6); (4) justice is "to know what is lawful (IV. 6.6, in fine); (5) justice is "to harm no one, not human concerning (IV. 8. 11). even a little, but to benefit human beings to the greatest
to nomimon,
beings"
extent"
That Socrates
spent
his
whole
suggest that
he
never arrived at an
account of
it that he
fully
satisfactory.
But it
does
not
not suggest
that he was
only
searched
as
to
what
a teacher of
or sought to
instruct
never promised
to be a
(It is true that, according to Xenophon, Socrates teacher of justice [or of "virtue": Memorabilia 1.2.3, sec.
that he did not teach justice in actual fact. On the
not mean
he himself knew
of the things
it is
fitting
for
a man who
10
to
Interpretation
know,"
while
making
clear that
Socrates
"justice"
counted
among these
would
gen
tlemanly
topics of
cf.
IV.2.22-23]. It
not promise
seem, then,
to teach justice
students
[or
that
justice
virtue].) The question thus naturally is? What were his mature views
arises:
on this
topic,
provisional as
they may
educa
place
Socratic
answer these
questions, I
consider
in the first
Persian
in
question
occur
in the first
part
of the
description
Persia,
an austere regime
Cyrus
tain
owed
he later transformed.
regime educated
They
more
that
its
children
to
provides a useful
foil in light
Socrates'
of which
view education
Socratic
to
beginning
public schools
Education of Cyrus (1992), Xenophon explains (didaskaleia) had been established in the republic of Persia
of the
other subjects
(1.2.6-7).
day sitting
elders,
such things.
of their pupils,
ished,
also
stealing, of violence, deception, calumny and other found guilty of these and similar injustices were pun had made unjust accusations. Moreover, these teachers
judged the
accusation that
is the
greatest source of
beings, but
saw
which
is
seldom pressed
in
court:
ungratefulness.
Whenever they
have been
supposed
him
to
For they
but had failed to be, they punished that ungrateful human beings were most likely
grateful
neglect
fatherland
and their
friends. And
shame-
lessness,
which seemed to
lead
most of all
Xenophon
The
gone
adds to
his description
of the
Persian
education to
justice
a report
Cyrus
once
had
with
for the
Cyrus'
conversation
was as
his mother, Mandane (1.3.16-18). follows. Cyrus and his mother had
then the despotic
of about
ruler of
to visit
maternal
grandfather,
Astyages,
neighboring Media,
at a time when
Cyrus
was still a
boy
twelve (1.3.1).
came
for
expressed
Media
with
But his
mother objected:
"And justice, my
teachers are over
child,"
will you
at
leam it here,
"Because,"
when your
there?"
And Cyrus
you
"But this,
it?"
know
precisely."
"And how do
know
Xenophon's Rhetoric
and
Treatment of Justice
11
judge
"my teacher, having judged that I already knew justice precisely, had appointed me of others. Only once was I beaten because I had not judged correctly. The case was something like this. A large boy wearing a small coat had stripped a small boy wearing a large coat of the coat he was wearing and, having dressed him with
his
own
coat.
Now
when
I judged between
of
me
for this, saying that whenever I was appointed to as I had, but when I had to decide to whom the
which possession was
just,
due to making or buying. [my teacher] said, 'the legal is just, but the illegal is (to men nomimon dikaion einai, to de anomon biaiori) he bid the judge
forceful,'
'Since,'
always to
at
tally his
verdict with
the
law."
"Thus
you
any
rate
I already know
precisely.
And if I
me
should need
anything in
addition,"
[Cyrus]
The
himself."
(1.3.16-17)
children was, as this
law."
view of
sought to
inculcate in its
quite simple
The Persian
aimed at
justice
inculcating
supported
nurture
habits
of
education children
to law-abidingness. It
by
punishments as well as
by
praise and
in turn
by
through its
punishment of ungratefulness.
shame would
each other as
insure that the young Persians would abstain from injustice toward they grew older, and become instead mutually friendly and helpful.
education to
justice
was meant
to foster
concord and
among
the
Persians. It
represented
education whose complete goal was the who are good or enemies
rected
making of good citizens: human beings helpful to their friends (or fellow citizens) and harmful to their
education
to justice was di
from
emphatically
political goal.
For
present
purposes,
that it reminds us of
chapter of the
however, the most notable feature of this Socrates, who also argues that "justice is the
education
law"
is
in
one
Memorabilia (IV.4).
There, Socrates
sophist
[not]
serious
by
pointing out that law-abidingness is in fact very profitable to both cities and individuals (IV.4. 15-18). He even goes so far as to suggest that "the gods too
. .
are satisfied
legal"
and
(sec. 25). It
would
To be sure, it is
not
entirely say
justice publicly held in Persia. he had in mind was the Persian have been thinking
of the
law;
Socrates did
at
not
so explicitly, and
example.
he
could
laws in force
suggest that
Athens, for
he had
no specific
In fact, many of his remarks to Hippias law in mind but that he equated justice with any
law,
positive or
unwritten, whatever
its
content
p.
334 ff).
On the
other
hand, his
main argument
12
Interpretation
is
a model
to
imitate,
and the
laws
by
the
Persia
were
of the
consti
enjoyed
temperance,
or
the ex
book
learning
music;
they
with
hunting
and
training for
war while
commercial
activity:
(or to
what
extent) Socrates
Persia's
view of
justice,
coats.
carefully the
This
clarify the
perspective
story from
of
Socrates
equated
justice and
legality
his seeming embrace of Persia. Even prior to his judgment of the two
boys,
Persia, "justice is
clear that
the
law."
by
his Persian
makes
Moreover, Xenophon
case:
Cyrus
justice in
question
these
the
boy
fitting
goes
rights.
We
fitting
or the good.
at
Why
that he
do this?
appear
Judging
from his
speech to
not
his mother,
reason would
to be this: he holds
justice,
which
happen to
in this
particular case.
He believes
on the one
but
"justice is something
to the extent
respective
(Strauss, 1953,
gives each would seem
pp.
1).
Moreover,
to their
that
Cyrus
boy
fitting
legal
rights, it
mind
his
or
by
his
the
fitting
by
as
the
law,
when the
law turns
out
to be harmful. And
typically
approve of
is
not
merely idiosyncratic:
we
Yet lest
we
something fitting or good. forget, Cyrus is punished for his decision. Whereas Cyrus judges
simply the legal but the fitting or the good, his teacher main the just is always the legal, even when the legal proves to be unfitting
Cyrus' disregard of clearly the case here. The teacher objects to insists on its absolute sanctity and applicability. But why insist on Cyrus'
bad,
as was
is wrong with judgment in this case? After all, both boys were clearly benefited by the decision. Indeed the common good between them could not have been better served. Why, then, did that decision deserve to be
punished?
Here
ment.
Cyrus'
judg
em-
What
the consequence be of
applying the
principle of
justice
Xenophon's Rhetoric
bedded in that judgment,
but to
all
not
and
Treatment of Justice
13
only
property
things
enjoyed
in Persia? The
of
answer
could
is be
Cyrus'
principle
justice
justly belong
right
well or profitably,
irrespective
of their
legal
tion of such
a principle would
that,
while
every
parent
there had a
schools of justice,
only those
who could
financially
they
were
in
school
actually sent them there. The This decision was of course of successfully of the Persian
gone
others crucial
significance,
the
had
not
through the
education
public
education)
to share
in the
public
honors
and positions
of rule
later
on
economic
of
its
children.
scarcity existing in Persia permitted the regime to educate only some Since the decision whether to educate a child was made privately
by his
in the The
by some public authority, the "distribution of inevitably came to mirror the preexisting distribution
this result
education
of wealth.
problematic nature of
becomes
least
more capable of
benefit
ing
from Persia's
but to
public
education than
at
least
some
of the
children of the
not
wealthy. coats
Accordingly,
but talented
were we to
Cyrus'
apply
have been
principle of
justice
only to
wealthy
well, we
might
have to
conclude that
the poor
educated
instead
of the
but unpromising
of
Cyrus'
ones.
(Consider, for
Cyrus, II.3.7-16; VIII.3; see judgment, if applied to the enjoyment of every type of good and word, privilege in Persia, would have had revolutionary implications for that regime
because
it would
have
meant
political
hegemony
of the
families. To
come
back to
Cyrus'
teacher, then,
and
sanctity
desire to itself
applicability of the law was the result of a status quo in Persia, a regime which presented but
was
in truth
we
closer
to an
oligarchy.
have been his may wonder, view of this controversy between the young Cyrus and his Persian teacher? With whom would he have sided? At first, we might be tempted to conclude that he
But let
to Socrates.
What,
would
would
have
as we saw,
Socrates
suggests
passages
(IV.4. 12;
see also
Xenophon's
other
Socratic
For
instance, in the opening chapter of the Oikonomikos, Xenophon recounts a con versation between Socrates and his young, funloving friend Critoboulos where Critoboulos is gradually led to the very view that underlies the judgment of
young Cyrus: property
irrespective
of
justly
belongs to those
to it
it
well or profitably,
their legal
right
(1.1-15;
6.4). And
14
Interpretation
seen to guide
his
pupil
conclusion
friend's sword,
or
justly be taken away from those who cannot use It would seem, then, that if Socrates imitates the Persian
law, he
also
doubts the
at
property
rights.
fitting
legality. And
judging
i.e.,
that
from that perspective, he sees that the laws ownership that is not profitable to its legal
Are
we
ownership,
Cyrus'
principle of
justice,
fitting
why did he
continue
to insist in various
principle
"justice is the
without
in any way? Didn't he see that many laws are unjust? And if he did, why didn't he advocate that such laws be repealed or improved (but cf. Memorabilia 1.2.9)? In all these respects, it seems, Socrates
apparently qualifying this
remains closer
to
Cyrus'
perspective
from
which these
difficulties
might
be solved,
to our
we
Persian
teacher of
justice
and reconsider
his
position more
closely.
Perhaps
dismissed him too quickly a moment ago without appreciat wisdom in his insistence on the absolute sanctity and applica
element which might
help
Socrates'
explain
attitude.
ask,
would
so as to give
wealthy Persians destroyed. be The Persian has to go. What will necessarily oligarchy replace it? Given the economic scarcity existing in Persia, the regime can only educate the best of its children, whether they be born to the wealthy or the poor.
community him? We have already seen that, should mented in the field of education, the political
would
of that
what
justice be imple
hegemony
of the
Cyrus'
principle
implementation
own
is
the
identity
must go
or social class of
his
of
can everyone
in
we
But
further. Such
a system
headed
by
knowledgeable
a
or wise
who would
and
be in
talents
fitting
for the
do not,
and
then to imple
ment
ultimately have
every
fitting fashion,
tation of
unhindered
by
Cyrus'
principle of
"rule
law"
of
be
replaced
by
Only
in
to hold
Persia,
could there
in this way, only if wisdom were be any hope for the re-
Xenophon's Rhetoric
gime
and
Treatment of Justice
In the end,
and
15
to
to be made just or
"fitting"
go one
of
citizens
of various
countries would
obvious obstacles
any
property
be
eliminated.
see that such a political system probably could never, into being. It is hard to believe that any one human being never, or group of human beings could ever come to know what is good or fitting for member of the entire human or even for an entire community. And every race,
we or should come even
From here,
begin to
if
such
knowledge
were somehow
available, it is
assent rule
that hu
manity (or that community) would ever because of their small number, could not
to the
of the
wise, who,
To
get a sense of
a rich as a
Persian
would
farmer. And
even
likely react to the decision that his child must be if humanity (or the community) did assent to the
obvious that
the wise, it
is far from
want
would entail
spending
one's existence
fulfilling
arbitrating their disputes, all of which would be necessary to give to each what is fitting. But this sounds like an unrewarding and perhaps even a wretched
existence,
not
likely
choose
they
were to rule at
which
least,
unlikely.
In fact, it
human
cal
Cyrus'
being deceiving
existing laws would result in an unscrupulous his fellow citizens into granting him absolute or tyranni
p.
political and
implementation
even
of
grave political
not a realistic
is
fraught
with
wisdom
in the Persian
304-5
attempt
to go beyond the
pp.
of the
fitting
a
or the good.
(David
Hume, [1975],
"Cyrus, young
and
unexperienced,
considered and
before him,
signed the
size.
and reflected on
limited fitness
convenience, when he as
long
His
governor
boy, and the short coat to the other of smaller instructed him better, while he pointed out more enlarged
and
views and
consequences,
informed his
pupil of
in
see
society."
For
discussion
of
law,
293e7ff.)
Could it be that
Socrates'
equation of
justice
with
legality is
best
understood
as a manifestation of
possibilities of
his wisdom,
of
his
awareness of the
limits
view
fitting
be
attempt to
do
is fraught
with grave
dangers, it
and
be better to
return
to the ordinary
view
"justice is the
law"
to
16
Interpretation
view
in
(as
opposed
to a
spirit of senti
or naivete, or even, as
that
Socrates
would
defended the
equation of
justice
legality
defend the lesser of two evils? Socrates certainly doubted the simple adequacy of the equation in question. Xenophon makes that fact very clear in the Memora
bilia,
to the
albeit with
his
usual restraint.
"law-makers"
Critias
and
Charicles that he is
prepared
to obey the
"law"
prohibiting
"law"
conversation with
goes on to
disobey
that
precisely
it is
"something
"laws"
appar
were not
really
when
and
view
[Memora
bilia 1.2.33-34,
law,"
cf.
Socrates
he
asserted that
proved
"justice is the
the sophist
Hippias
his addressee,
at
to be a
very bad
one
[cf.IV 4.12-25]. He
was no
better
Euthydemus. Thus in
suspect that what
law,"
Socrates
conversing I suggested in my introduction, we must to Hippias, including the claim that "justice is
to make "the
truth"
than
Socrates'
onetime student
"visible."
the
was not
primarily
meant
In short,
we
have here
whose
another example of
Xenophon choosing
an addressee
limitations
help
cast
the philosopher in a
more
traditional
light.) Besides,
can we could
really believe that a man who spent his whole life investigating justice have thought that all laws are equally just? That a law imposed by force
on a political
That
bad
or
law to
which the
as a good or wise
implausible.
At this point, it is necessary to
admit that the complete
implementation
of
principle of
impossible
or
dangerous, for
implementation
a
impossible
or
less
oligarchic
Persia
would
be
least
some steps
away from
case
oligarchy.
for example, In
and
it is certainly
words,
possible
Socrates'
other
insistence that
the just
at
is in every
from
questionable
Cyrus'
insis
view
tence,
at
least in the
case of
unjust
shared or
advocate
improving
at
least
very distribution
laws,
and
of property?
(Memorabilia
1.2.1, 1.2.14,
to
wasn't
it his
duty
as a good citizen to
try
improve
frugal
and
self-controlled as he
To
address
penetrate
more
deeply into
our subject
Xenophon's Rhetoric
matter.
and
Treatment of Justice
Socrates
17
I have
ciple of justice
not
judgment
of
I have
correctly.
If
the
judgment in
question seemed so
unquestionably just, it was, I would argue, because both of the boys received a coat that was fitting for their respective needs. Each one was benefited to the
greatest possible extent.
ple
most adequate
formulation
Cyrus'
of
princi
good."
is
not
that "justice
principle
is the
fitting,"
but
rather
This is the
that
shares with
Socrates,
by
particular. reconsidering Euthydemus to agree, for example, that it is just to steal a friend's sword he is dispirited and might harm himself, Socrates was clearly describing a
the
Memorabilia in
by
a common good
[or
community
two
of
inter
same
is
examples
no such
community
coat,
exists?
What if
one
had
with a
coat
big
be
and a
given to the
fitting"
with no coat
in that
case
even then?
Now it is true
could use
that,
the
on
better
arrangement:
can.
the
big boy
big
coat more
for
each
boy
of
his inadequate
reflect
The importance
Yet this would not be better boy deriving at least some benefit from this difficulty becomes clear once we is
that,
at
the political
level,
of
We
recall that
any rate, may exist only under rare in Persia, because of economic scarcity, only some be publicly educated. Now it may be true that, on the
educate
be better for
each
individual. Even
at
wealthy
tion.
parents, will
derive
least
some
By taking
would
What insist
on
such a case?
Would he
way,
distributing
out
in the best
possible
pointing
that this is all that we can do? Perhaps he would argue that those
be
sacrificed
have
an obligation to
be just,
or to serve the
good,
wouldn't this
good
be to
beg
they have no just basis for complaint. But the fundamental question, since there is no common
of sacrifices
in this
easel
What kinds
as a
matter
of obligation,
on the
according to Socrates?
To be sure, this
question
bears
directly
to
rule.
issue
justice,
since,
as we saw,
while perfect
justice
requires
likely
to
want
They
do
not want
fitting,"
be
what about
their
obligation
unrewarding and even a wretched existence. But to rule? That is, even if all other difficulties had
18
Interpretation
would
justice impose
And
what
to serve the
if
better life
(cf.
directly
address
this
far-reaching
not might
question
in the Memora
whether
bilia,
at
least
not
in any
obvious way.
We do
know,
therefore,
so.
he
addressed
it,
or the manner
in
which
he
have done
from venturing some heuristic suggestion. his analysis of justice to focus on certain powerful and enduring opinions which human beings, or at least just human beings, hold about it, and especially on
vents us
justice,
whatever else
at
it is, is
above all
Cyrus'
It is this insistence,
as we
the root of
something judgment
we
of the two
must add
boys,
judgment. But
scope.
it were,
comprehensive
in its
For it
must
would seem to
justice,
only for the the just but also the the just action for doer of it, for man himself. beneficiary of Thus we ordinarily speak and think of justice as a "common and a genu
be something
for
everyone
involved,
which
is to say,
not
good,"
ine
good of the
just
man
himself,
think
along
with
(cf,
say
again, the
and
we
for
us to
be just,
least in the
p.
long
18).
Finally,
that
say
least
will
hope,
be
made
good,
we
believe, by
our
gods?
just
actions prove
believe that
an
place:
we
did
our
divine for
just
deserved. We may even come to look to the in the next life. But, Socrates might have argued, by
insisting
and
that true
of
justice
must as a
be
good
"for
involved,"
everyone
or
we
by thinking
grant
justice
"common
or at
good,"
don't
implicitly
that a
would
be just,
least
not
unjust, if he
attended
to his good in
Don't
be,
so to
speak,
silent
in
such
a case?
Or to
put
it otherwise,
amount
belief in,
or insistence
on, the
complete goodness of
justice
to a recognition
obligated
that, precisely
on grounds
of justice,
of the
community
the question with
if
better
happier life
we
To repeat, In fact,
do
not
know
whether
confronted
which
he
might
have done
too
so.
not
reasonably
object that we
far,
evidence
only in ascribing certain concerns and arguments to Socrates, with scanty textual (but cf. Memorabilia III. 9.4), but also in our disregard of what is arguably the
most conspicuous
feature
of the
Memorabilia
as a whole:
Socrates
Xenophon's Rhetoric
is
presented
and
Treatment of Justice
19
in it
as a most
just
man
little, but benefited his associates to emphasis). That is, the overarching premise
even a
precisely because he "harmed no one, not the greatest (IV. 8. 11, my the of Memorabilia's apology is
extent" others"
justice lies in
"serving
and
(cf. 1.3.1,
truth
in question, how
can the
foregoing
analysis
be
especially Hellenika VII. 3. 12)? What is more, the analysis flawed in another respect. For while it is surely significant,
sized, that we speak and think
and of
would appear to as we
be
have
empha
justice
as a common good,
don't
demands
draw
a
say be devoted to
we also
that very common good? Don't just behavior and selfish pursuit
distinction, in
words, between
we
of self-interest?
By
what right
did
seemingly
sec
would
Thus I
in the concluding
treating
education
back to
he is
not animated
by
what
I have
called
I have
with the
suggested
equates the
just
legal, he may be
by
the political
hegemony
of the
to which,
not
Cyrus,
1.2.5). Yet
while there
obscures an
considerable
we
can
no
longer disregard.
Cyrus'
teacher seems to
not
simply
this
disingenuous
reverence?
he insists
on
source of
It is adumbrated, I believe, toward the end of his instruction to Cy pupil that while "the legal is just, the illegal is
Cyrus'
teacher equates
illegality
with
force; he
law to the
at
rule of
force. His
reverence
for
the
Persian law
seems to
be based,
least in
some
significant
measure, on his
escape
force,
or that
human beings
his
reverential
based, is
not some
kind
of
least in
set
law"
part
because
we see
in them
We,
"rule
"law"
"force"
too,
of
and
in
nobility
force."
of the
with the
would
badness
"rule
of
What
of such an opposition
provided
(and therewith
of
the attitude of
reported
mind
by
a conversation
in the Memorabilia
did
not
this
conversation
directly
of the
icles,
the
famous leader
Athenian
democracy,
and
Alcibiades, later
20
Interpretation
for his
in
mind
political activities
mous
during
the
we
must
keep
took
that
Alcibiades,
Pericles'
twenty
taken
and still
"[a]
companion of
conversation
when
it
place
(1.2.39). (Xenophon
"is
said"
to have
place
[legetai: Memorabilia
Pericles,"
1.2.40].)
said, "would
you
(41) "Tell
law
is?"
me,
[Alcibiades]
be
able
to teach
me what
means,"
"By "By
all
said
Pericles.
then,"
said
Alcibiades, "for
when
I hear
not
certain ones
what
someone who
does
know
law is
praise."
(42)
law
is,"
"But
said
do
not
desire anything
all things are
to know
what
Pericles. "For
has ap
proved and
written, pointing
lad,"
should
do
good
things
not
or
bad
things?"
he said, "and is
the
bad."
(43)
should
"What if it is
not
the multitude, but the assembled few who write what one
oligarchy?
do,
as
is the
What is
this?"
"Everything,"
he said, "is
part of
deliberation,
"So
should even
if
city
writes
for
they
do
this too is
what
writes,"
"Even
law."
called
Pericles?"
(44) "But
it
what
is force is
and
he
said.
"Is but
is
not
by
persuasion
by
the use of
force
"In my opinion,
"And
at
said
Pericles. do
without persuad
ing
them
this is
lawlessness?"
"In my
opinion,"
said
what
ty
being
law."
the few write, without persuading the many but overpowering say that it is force or shall we not say said Pericles, "that one compels someone to do "Everything, in my without persuading him, whether he writes it or not, is force rather than
(45) "And
what
them,
it?"
shall we
opinion,"
law."
"And
ers
it
overpow
those
having
wealth,
would
be force
rather
than
law?"
(46)
"Alcibiades,"
said
Pericles, "we
For
at
things of
cisely the
ing."
now practic
could
have been
your companion at
that
time,
Pericles,
cleverest."
(Memorabilia
12.41-46)
At the
outset of
this
charming
and
sway
of the
revealing exchange, Pericles is under the we already saw in the Persian teacher,
and
that there is
between law
force, between
Xenophon's Rhetoric
and the rule observation of
and
Treatment of Justice
21
force. For that reason, he is easily unsettled that the first (revised) account of law "everything
part of
by
.
.
Alcibiades'
is
called
law
that the
do"
deliberation, overpowering fails to give any expression to this opposition (sec. 43). first account has brought it about that law has become indistinguishable from force; it has come to light as nothing higher or nobler than an act of public coercion.
writes that one should
Pericles'
But Pericles is unwilling to accept this consequence, and he is accordingly dis satisfied with his first account (sec. 44). Alcibiades encourages this dissatisfac
tion
by offering
to
what seems to
Pericles'
expression
be
of the
difficulty,
opposition
rooted
in the
rule
opposition
between
persua
law is
based
on persuasion
(or
on on
force (or
lawlessness)
is
rule
based
Pericles
seizes on that
part of
the conversa
tion, he is accordingly led to claim that a law is only a law if it is fully consen sual, if it involves no compulsion at all but only persuasion: "everything in my opinion that one compels someone to do without persuading him, whether
.
he
writes
it
or not,
is force
rather
than
law"
as
points
say
all of the
"laws"
of
Athens
really laws.
They
e.g.,
exercise against
the rich
(see,
are acts of force, the force that the poor Oikonomikos, 2.5-6; Symposium 4.30-32,
sec.
45). Thus
Pericles'
while
first
account of
law
could not
do justice to his
second account
is
an opposition
between law
of
and
force, his
democratic Athens, in the making of some of which he presumably participated, are indeed laws. We conclude that the opposition between the rule of law and the rule of force
not
is
as
clear as
assume.
In fact, the
Pericles (and, before him, the Persian teacher) seemed to simple opposition between them has come to light as untena
law is
always created and main
by
force.
Every
manmade
law derives
some of
its
power
from force
point
is
dispense entirely
even the tyrant
with persuasion,
must rule
by
force:
by
persuasion at
least his army of bodyguards. (Admittedly, the tyrant might be able to rule even his bodyguards by force, or at least by fear, by playing them against each other.) There might appear to be, then, no difference in kind, but only a difference in
degree, between
the "rule of
the "rule of
law"
and
those under
force."
Yet this
it is
more
are
qualitatively
much
better
and
decent than
others: even
Alcibiades
does Socrates
in
Memorabilia (see
see e.g.
first
question to and
Per
as a
icles
42;
as
for Socrates,
Memorabilia 1.2.32
III. 1-7
whole). more
Nor
should we
more consensual
forms
of rule
tend to be
stable
than,
more on
force.
22
Interpretation
other
words,
while
it is something
significant
of an oversim
politically
put
(cf. Memorabilia
best
force. To
the same
conclusion
differently:
every
by
"regime"
fundamental, what Xenophon calls in (see, e.g., Memorabilia IV.6.12). Yet the
different
put it, parts of
is itself,
in essence,
their
an arrangement of the as
by
Pericles
"everything
is
called one
of the city,
upon
deliberation,
writes that
should
emphasis).
Putting
a
the conversation
teaches that the simple opposition between law and force is untenable because
law is itself
tally by
meant
preexisting factual arrangement defined fundamen begin to understand how Xenophon's report of force. (From here,
produced
by
we
Socrates'
interview
prepare
with
Critias
and
to
the reader
for his
and
by
Critias
and
Char
icles,
or, as
art of
Thirty
in
public.
they had
Thirty Tyrants, after he had allegedly criticized the rule of the They proceeded to forbid him to "converse with the written in the laws, they commanded him to stop "teaching an
[sees. 33, 31]. The story in
question makes
young"
speeches"
abundantly
clear
Thirty
conversing with the young was an act of pure force [see sees. 35, 37]. Yet both Xenophon and Socrates go out of their way to call the prohibition in question a while Xenophon calls Critias and Charicles
against
"law,"
"law-makers"
first,
one
character
conversation with merely ironic. Yet once we reflect on Pericles, we begin to understand the seriousness behind them. Alcibiades offers,
izations
as
so to
speak,
a systematization of the
lesson intimated
by
the
"law-makers"
Crit
ias
final step in our analysis, we might even ask Charicles.) whether the reported conversation leaves any room for the existence of any For we generally believe, with Pericles, that law is both different from,
and
To
go one
"laws."
and
higher
or nobler
than, force. To
exist, but
has
shown
distinction is untenable,
"laws"
say that it
presents us with an
alternative: either
they
force,
or, if we insist
there are no
laws. It is
which
doubtful, in
which,
as
other
being
"law"
or concept
combines all
such,
be
given.
came
It is
law
and
young Alcibiades
to these
insights
about
law-making
Socrates,
and
an association
which,
as we
have mentioned,
going
In fact,
a
Alcibiades'
whole manner of
questioning
Pericles,
Xenophon's Rhetoric
What is
moment
and
Treatment of Justice
contrast,
return
now
23
for
a
? question,
to
was that of a
Socratic.
By
Professor Gray,
not
rupt nature of
correct to
character was
suspicious, but
that
she should
at
least
considered whether
he did
not see
something
Pericles failed
argu
Gray
does
not seem
put an
instructive
in the
notorious
ment.
hubris,
a
be easily dismissed because of his then intimated that his hero was the source of that argu
In
word,
falls
victim to
Xenophon's
apologetic
politicians
rhetoric.
(More
specifically,
Gray
argues that
in Plato's Meno
not
98ff. been
who
have
correct
belief but
reasoned
democracy
sets
is justifiable but is
unable
to
opinion
which
Alcibiades
of the
in train. The
pupil
lacks the
answer
ironic
style of question
and
his
guardian to elicit a
definition
a
which will
be easily
Partial
in
of the tradi
corrupt pupil
tional
form
which
is
a measure of
Xenophon's
control of
has
technical victory over the symbol of political wisdom, as Critias and Char icles had their limited political victory over Socrates as the true symbol of wis 1.2.31-38]" dom in the earlier conversation [at [p. 116]. I would agree with
a
Gray
that
democracy
is justifiable, but
she should
have
explained
why Alcibi
ades'
victory over Pericles is merely "technical.") We conclude that unlike Pericles, and unlike
simple opposition
Cyrus'
between "rule
law"
of
unlike
them, he
fully
force
"the
at the root of
law"
justice
with
was not
What I have
said so
far
aimed
perspective
from
which
Socrates
equated
justice
of a
with the
brought
out
Socratic
justice. In
what respect,
education
counterpart?
begin from
Education of Cyrus.
of about twenty-six or
came
When Cyrus
after the
already
headed
a man
twenty-seven,
and
death
of
his
grandfather
Astyages, Media
the
to be threatened
new ruler of
by
large military
Astyages'
alliance
by
king
of
Assyria. The
Media,
son
Cyaxares,
Cyrus
As Cyrus
responded
to the threat
allies,
sent
and
it
was
by
in
relief.
rode out of
Persia together,
24
Interpretation
a
they had
which,
part of
long
duties
of a general, a subject
crucial
Cyrus'
given
situation,
was
obviously
of
Cambyses'
should
only
gain
attack
his
enemies
if he is going to
asks, how
immediately
At
would someone
from his
enemies?
first,
appears reluctant
to
question: swearing by Zeus, he says that Cyrus is no longer low (phaulos) or simple (haploos) matters. "But know about him questioning "that whoever intends to do this must be a plotter, a con he continues,
answer
this delicate
well,"
cealer,
deceiver, a cheat, a thief, a robber, and in every way greedy to get the (sec. 27). Cyrus is naturally taken aback by (pleonektes) of his the suggestion: "By Heracles, what kind of man do you suggest, father, that I (sec. 27). Indeed, Cambyses seems to be urging his son to transgress all the precepts of Persian justice (cf. 1.2.6). Yet, the father insists, he is only
a
better
enemies"
become!"
suggesting that Cyrus become a most just and law-abiding man. "Why Cyrus reasonably replies, "were we taught the opposite of these things when
adolescents?"
then,"
we
explains
justice in
question remain
in force
with regard
citizens.
But, he
harming
many
ways of
responds that
he,
at
least,
such
things, Cambyses
how to
was taught
use
him that along with the the bow and the javelin, and human being, Cyrus I
even appeared
hunts, how
thing
was
as
to deceive
retorts.
beaten
whenever
to
anyone"
we allow you
human
we taught you
at a target
not so
not of
of
but in
greedy in getting the better (pleonektein) that you would harm your friends, animals, be untrained even in these things should war
not so
arise"
(sec. 29).
Cyrus If
remains
dissatisfied
with
his father's
how to harm human beings is useful, they knowing should have been taught both these things regarding human beings. "It is said,
good and a
how to do
teacher
ancestors,"
children
Cambyses
replies,
lie
and
lie,
not
deceive
and
deceive,
calumniate,
(pleonektein)"
all these
do to
one's
friends,
to one's ene
He
it
would
be just to deceive
even one's
friends,
or to
steal
from them, if it
And
as
he taught these
Xenophon's Rhetoric
things,
and
Treatment of Justice
25
the children necessarily began to practice them toward one another. The Cambyses result, explains, was that some of these children, who were naturally gifted for deception and for greed (pleonektein), and perhaps also not without a
natural
love
of gain
(philokerdein),
love
did
not refrain
(pleonektein)
led to
a other and
teaching
justice
liberation
each
their fellow
Persians.) For that reason, Cambyses explains, an unwrit established at the time, and is still in force today, that the children
"simply"
be taught justice
(haplos), i.e., by
deceive,"
lie,"
"never Those
"never
and so
on), just as
it is taught to house
so
slaves.
who
transgress these
that,
once
they have
habits, they
will
be
gentler citizens.
now
But
have
reached
it is thought
(dokein)
to be safe
has,
enemies.
Indeed, Cambyses
concludes, it is thought
(dokein)
brought up to respect each other would toward their fellow citizens (sec. 34). I
mentioned earlier that the good citizens
not allow
Persian
education to
justice
ing
(1.2.5). To be
in the first
to be
gentle or
friendly
young Persians
were accord
ingly
never
taught
from
they
should never
lie,
never
deceive,
steal,
and so on.
Obedience to these
by
and But good citizenship also ability to defend one's country in time of war: the good citizen is not only friendly to his fellow citizens, he is also harsh with his enemies. He must possess the virtues associated with war (see Memorabilia III. 1.6). In particular,
would
become
means the
he
must
be trained in the
arts of
deception,
which
youths
by
the
organizing frequent
hunting
expeditions
difficulty
(Education of Cyrus 1.2.10-1 1). But is to prevent the Persians, once they have
against each other.
Admittedly,
as
this diffi
or, at
least,
out so
would not
be
so serious,
for
each
story
seen
of the two
beautifully,
the
legal
prescriptions can
in Persia
The
same
fundamental dilemma
prospect of war
be
in Persia's
the original
a partial
of that
teaching; it
compels
liberation
of the
Persians'
acquisitiveness,
outward
inasmuch,
is,
as that
acquisitiveness
is directed
country.
Persia is
forced
justice
to teach, reticently and with infinite care, what the ancestral teacher of
also taught
his
students:
that justice is
apparent
helping
one's
friends
and
harming
of
one's enemies.
But
as was
already
runs
in the
case of that a
teacher's students,
"complex"
this
teaching
the risk of
producing
complete
liberation
26
It
runs
the
which the
weakening the authority of the stern and simple precepts of justice under Persians lived in their youth. For Persia's foreign policy provides a justification for the be
pursuit of self-interest
if
kind
of
by
individuals:
indeed, how
it is If
collective greed?
legitimately blamed,
powers on
Persia herself
teaches that
just to deal
greed
with
foreign
least
self-interest?
is just,
as
or at
not
Be that
it may, it is
once
Persians had
attained
adulthood, and
especially they had learned the arts of deception, the only real bulwark their preventing becoming harsh even with fellow Persians was their acquired habits of law-abidingness and the respect (or shame) they felt toward each other. As
Cambyses'
general reticence
bulwark
dokein
was always
at sec.
Cambyses'
double
use of
adumbrates the
way.
less than
of the education to
following
tion to moderation
[sophrosune],
to obedience to the
[peithesthai tois
archousi]
and to continence
[engkrateia]
in
addition
to their education to justice, he says in every instance that the children's educa
[sumballesthai] by
[1.2.8]. Xenophon
facilitated
elders'
by
justice. This is
to
deny
that the
children
imitated their
in this
case as well:
they, too,
of all manners of
The
us of a
mention
injustices [see Education of Cyrus 1.2.8, cf. sec. 6].) of the ancestral teacher of justice by Cambyses should
remind
Socrates. Indeed the summary description of that teacher's teaching bears striking resemblance to the brief dialectical examination of justice which Soc
rates
is
seen
Euthydemus in
the
last book
of the
Memorabilia (cf. Education of Cyrus 1.6.31-32 with Memorabilia IV.2.14-18). There, too, the conclusion is reached that to lie to, or to deceive one's enemies is just, while to do so to one's friends is unjust; and that deceiving even one's friends
or stealing from them can be just, provided it is done for their own good. (The enemy described by Socrates at Memorabilia IV.2.15 is also an unjust enemy, however. He later drops this important qualification, but without any
explanation.
not ask
for
one
says
deception
must
[1.6.31].)
In
other
Persian
unwritten
a
teaching in
justice
and goal?
law regarding the teaching of justice prohibited its Socratic manner. But how precisely did the Socratic education to
with
"simple"
compare
its Persian
counterpart?
What
was
its
specific character
The Persian
was aimed at
education
to
education,
of
which
is to say that it
his
natural
talents or abilities
(although
as we
wealthy
Xenophon's Rhetoric
in in
actual
nature.
and
Treatment of Justice
27
fact).
It
By
only to a
limited
in?
number of youths
natures"
and, ultimately,
only to those
judged the
Socrates
regarded as
"good
According
to
Xenophon, Socrates
good natures
from three
qualities:
to; they
remembered what
they learned quickly what they they learned; and they desired all
nobly (kalos) (to holon
. .
learning
and
through which
one can
manage a
eu
house
of
hold
and a
chresthai)
human beings
human
matters
is,
intellectual quickness, a good memory, and sort. The young Euthydemus, for example,
sion to emphasize
shows
whose
but
is probably representative,
his
acquaintance with
Rather, he desires
Athens'
to
over
As for his
of a somewhat perverted
initially
to
know to be politically
he lacks the
spontaneous
confirm that
he is
not
such a
so-called
kingly
art or
kingly
virtue, "that
virtue
manage
households,
makes
a
themselves"
as well as
(IV.2.1 1;
cf.
rV.1.2). It is this
particular
desire for
knowledge that
otherwise poor
intellect, in
one respect a
typical addressee of
pointers
education.
gives us some
regarding the character and goal of such Given that the three qualities constitutive of a
we might
all,
broadly
did
not
be tempted to
little importance in
Socrates'
view: a youth
promising.
to be
just,
or concerned with
justice,
to be
But this
conclusion
is
off
the
not
mark.
We
recall
desires to learn
And to
whatever
of
is
condu or
cive,
merely to the
profitable
or effective
management
households
noble
management as
well.
manage
fashion
it be
managed with
with
this,
Euthydemus
it
clear
told
"kingly
at
virtue,"
exercising it
justice. (As he
it,
"it is
not possible
to be
a good
citizen without
[sec.
11].) The
Indeed,
noble
rally issues, in
affairs,
or
other
words, in
a concern
to act
the
kingly
public
virtue natu
in
and private
to be just
oneself.
to go one step
further,
Socrates'
treatment
28
of
Interpretation
Euthydemus Socrates
suggests that the concern to
approached
be just
was
when
mus, a good
nature
be
good at
this without
being
just. But
where will
this
concern
lead him if he is
not
made
"elenchus,"
that he does
know
what
justice is
other
demands, inasmuch
remove
as
his
will want to
become
a pupil of
Socrates,
quite natu
rally, eager to
first time,
IV.2.40).
postpone
aware
(see
Euthydemus'
refutation at
discovery
his
of justice.
of
his ignorance
to
pursuit of
he
possesses an adequate
knowledge
Only
when
accomplished will
he think himself ready to turn to political affairs, confident that he can now be Euthydemus' To put the same point otherwise, (or become) a "good
citizen."
example suggests
counter
for
political
presented
itself
as a means, a mere
pp.
104-5).
But
were these
two types
in their
content?
Here,
education
primarily
on corporal punishments to
tice. Socrates on the other hand made no use of such methods but educated
entirely
by
conversation or speech
"cognitive"
content of the
Persian
We
lim
of
its Socratic
counterpart.
recall that
in Persia, the
children
justice
by
the Persian
justice
"simply"
as
as possible.
In
fact,
good
of a certain
ignorance,
as a
or
apparently depended on the conscious fostering innocence, in its children. (Cyrus himself provides a
conversation with
seems genuinely military general he will have to deceive his enemies or to from them! This innocence is all the more remarkable given the otherwise
illustration
of this.
In his
his
father,
he
sophisticated understanding of the Persian way of life, and its limitations, that Cyrus had demonstrated in his speech to the Peers [see Education of Cyrus 1.5].)
By contrast, dialectically
Socrates
sought to remove
his
pupils'
ignorance
by bringing
out
justice,
of what
justice is
or
demands. He
begin from
a pupil's
preexisting
lying
or
deceiving
is absolutely unjust,
and
gradually bring out the inadequacies and even the contradictions in those opin ions (cf. Memorabilia IV.2.14 ff.). In this way, Socrates' addressee might be led to abandon his former views, or at least to begin a search for a adequate
truly
account of
justice,
each of
do justice,
so to
speak, to the
element a
nut-
of truth
in
his contradictory
opinions.
To
put
this
difference in
Xenophon's Rhetoric
shell:
and
Treatment of Justice
opinions about
29
Persia
was satisfied to
justice,
whereas
knowledge
of
it. (This
is
not
to suggest,
however,
that
a
Socratic
kind
of
sophisticated replacement
education was a
for
Persian
education.
On the contrary,
Persian
necessary prerequisite for undergoing a Socratic training. Thus in the opening of his first conversation with Socrates, Euthydemus is seen to hold the view that lying or deceiving is absolutely unjust [IV.2.14]. Opinions like these would provide the needed material from which the Socratic investigation of justice could begin its work of clarification. The investigation
"Persian"
would sense
bring
out,
if he is
guided
among other things, that a human being is just in the ordinary in his actions not (or not merely) by his knowledge of
a nonrational or suprarational or the
element,
intention"
"good
will"
attitude
Memorabilia
1.2.52.)
Socratic educations,
perplexing difference between the Persian given that both were meant to prepare for however,
most respective
The
and
a political
life, is
a
their
education to
finite
number of years.
young
adulthood,
around
their twenty-sixth or twenty-seventh birthday. In its final stage, the young Per sians would be taught that it is just and lawful to be greedy in getting the better
of the country's enemies.
(We
Cyrus'
recall
conversation with
would turn
his
father.)
After
learning
tion
this, the
now adult
Persians
affairs,
educa
political
as
following
other
the conversa
was
in
question.
a
education to
justice, in
words,
truly
instrumental to
of political activity.
By
justice,
into
while
it
came
apparently turned
a
an end
in itself
after a while.
It
proved
to be a
lifelong
task,
not completed
in any finite
period
of time.
No indications
are
in the
Memorabilia,
at
Euthydemus
ever turned
becoming
political
a pupil of
Socrates.
Besides, Socrates
to speak his
involvement
and spent so
6.15, IV.4.5-6; Symposium 4.1). It is true that some of his students, most notably Alcibiades and Critias, did become politicians after leaving his side. But according to the Memorabilia,
life
investigating
their
behavior
was
bound up
Socrates
and what
he
stood
for (1.2.12-48).
Are
we
to
conclude
its
addressees
for
good
what
justice is? Is
this the
Socrates'
troubling
significance of
lifelong
Or
investiga it be,
tion of justice
and
his
concomitant
abstention
from
politics?
could
and that
his
to,
life?
Could it be, in
other
it came
30
Interpretation
life, led in
meaning
given at
Let
me
try
to spell
so
out
in
suggestion should
pupil
be
understood.
To do
it is
Socrates'
useful
Euthy
virtue,"
demus. We
saw earlier
ing
to be
a good
citizen, or to
Socrates
called the
"kingly
will enable
This virtue,
as
he believes,
him to
perform
in
all of
its
needs:
devotion to the
discussion
common good
serving his city well service lies in to others or in citizenship a more to Euthydemus. (For extensive according
citizen, see IV. 6. 14.) But we
must now add
it,
to be "noble
and
(IV.2.23). He does
he thinks
a good man
is
or
does,
however,
that
although
he indicates that
Or
a good man
good citizen:
would be more accurate to say in is, essence, the same thing as a lies in service to others or in devotion to asks
it
in his
he
(When Socrates
Euthydemus
what
he
wishes
poets and
sophists, the
wishes to acquire
kingly
vir
or,
as
he
puts
it,
to be "a good
Socrates has
that
convicted was
him
he thought he [.
.
[IV.2.1 1, my emphasis]. Yet after ignorance regarding justice, Euthydemus says "pursuing in my philosophizing a philosophy through
of educated to the
citizen"
which
.]
would
be
highest degree in in
Euthydemus'
what
befits
a man
goodness"
[IV.2.23, my
Is
emphasis].
good citizen
is
man"
and good
view.) But is
Euthy
in
holding
thing
this view?
a good man
the same
thing
as a good
as a serviceable man?
Xenophon, for
one, seems to
Hellenika, for
benefactors
he
men,"
as good
"definition"
and
he indicates
by
the context
views the
in
(VII.3.12). And
indeed, how
a good
couldn't it
be
crude
human
being simply
observation could
deeper
significance as well,
even or
fellow
everyday benefactors,
There
with
Euthydemus'
precisely
they
devoted to the
common good.
are reasons to
suspect, in
words, that
Xenophon
was
dissatisfied
simple equation,
Xenophon's Rhetoric
an equation which
and
Treatment of Justice
and, in Euthydemus
31
at
is
not
common as
least, apparently
one of
still unconscious.
Moreover, insofar
Xenophon
a
"service to
others"
is
the most
basic
we surmise a
that this
dissatisfaction
life
having
human
be
investigated in
Socratic
to the
being is
(in the
attracted
political
yearns to
good
sense of
presuppose
his
continuing justice
the quotation
from
the
understanding of human goodness. But Hellenika intimates that the Socratic investigation of into
contact with
might not
have
it,
and who
its results, to
continue
desire,
or at
least to
desire in the
same
for
which
once
lowering
life,
and also
indirectly
life,
life, to judge at least from Socrates and his pupils (cf, e.g., Symposium 1.4). Admittedly, important difficulties would have to be solved before these con
jectures
can
become satisfactory
suggestions.
For one,
the
we would need
to spell
as
out more
fully
why
the philosophic
apparently is,
life is
it
more
obviously perhaps, the fact that philosophy did not entirely supplant politics or political ambition in Xenophon's own life suggests that there exists a viable
"middle
stand clude
successfully blends these two kinds of lives: they need not as irreconcilable alternatives. But be that as it may, we may safely con from the foregoing this much: the Socratic education to justice would
that
addressees a
way"
heightened
goodness.
awareness of
their hitherto un
human
And
since to
become
aware of
almost
inevitably,
to
realize
be,
at
least,
for,
it achieved,
that it
is
we could
was
(cf. Memorabilia
IV.2.24-30).
Professor
Gray
emphasizes
in
various parts of
her
monograph that
Xeno
phon's portrait of
Socrates is
above
that of a serviceable
human
being
(pp. 10ff;
notes that
teaching
in
therefore he stressed
ing
or relatives
was
the sign of a
acknowledges
to reduce
Socrates'
surely
his usefulness.
Gray
that
Xenophon's
portrait
is
frequently "useful,
banal
and thera-
32
Interpretation
but
she
peutic,"
insists
that
"Xenophon
levels"
also operates at
higher
(p. 13).
of
Gray
In
does
it
as satisfactory?
Gray
in
itself to
rhetorical
usefulness,
to
i.e.,
that
he
Memorabilia to
wise
audience
accustomed
rather
man
was
expected
to be
helpful
than
harmful"
Gray
does
not pursue
evidence
its
correctness.
Indeed,
reading:
Gray
ultimately
up
defending
lay, in Xenophon's
eyes, in his
superior use
fulness to
others and
especially to young
men such as
Glaucon, Plato's
older
brother (p. 194). To be sure, this reading of the Memorabilia is not indefensible insofar as Xenophon's Socrates does put forward in his own name, and on more
than one occasion, at least a version of the equation of goodness with service
ability (or with usefulness: see Memorabilia III. 8. 5-7; cf. Symposium 5.3-8). But what is the specific character of this version? Gray correctly senses that
Socrates'
"utilitarianism,"
as we might call
it,
was not
was a
"distinct
values"
advance"
on yet she
tradition,
might
tional
Gray
a significant
recovery
of
Xenophon's Socratic
wisdom
she sought
tion adequately.
REFERENCES
Bartlett,
Robert
C,
ed.
Cornell
University
and
Press.
"Thucydides."
History
In
edited
by
Leo Strauss
by
Leo Strauss
and
Joseph
University History of Political Philosophy, 3d. ed., Cropsey. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Socrates."
Pp.
90-117.
1994. "Xenophon
and
His
In
Memorabilia,
translated
by Amy
L.
Bonnette. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pp. vii-xxii. Galinsky, G. Karl. 1972 Herakles Themes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
and
Literary
Tech
Oxford: Oxford
Gray, Vivienne.
phon's
Press.
Literary Interpretation
ed.
of Xeno
Hume, David.
ford
Enquiry Concerning
the
Oxford: Ox
University University
Press.
1966. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Vol. 1. Press.
et
Laertius, Diogenes.
vard
Lucciom, Jean.
1953. Xenophon
le
socratisme.
Xenophon's Rhetoric
Marchant, E. C.
MA: Harvard
1923.
and
Treatment of Justice
33
University
as
Paul A. Vander Waerdt. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, Pp. 181-208. 1995. "Xenophon's Socrates on the Just and the Ancient Philosophy
by
Lawful."
15:329-47.
Nadon, Christopher.
mon
and
the Com
the Context of
Xenophon's Political
In
Movement,
ed.
University
Russell, Bertrand. 1945. A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon & Schuster. Strauss, Leo. 1953. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1972.
Xenophon'
University
Press.
University
University
Xenophon.
of
Moral Philosopher.
by
H. G. Dakyns. London: J. M.
by Amy
L. Bonnette.
versity Press.
Rousseau
The
and
Way
of
Love
Mark S. Cladis
Vassar College
and
desires
of the
individual
of
life
are at the
heart,
or the
knot,
Rousseau's thought
that issue
life. He
conflicting
claims
from the
vo
life:
and
to self,
friends, family,
and
cation,
civic
life,
could
found
ways to
mitigate
the tension
between them.
wish
maintain commitment
say that Rousseau provided a solution to how society can to both the pluralism that individualism requires and the
commonality that the common good requires. Still, he did illuminate this mod ern drama of the contingent yet inevitable storms that bluster as we attempt to find
public and private
meaning
public
and contentment.
Few
writers
have
portrayed
more
private
life,
or the weight
of alienation
in
barren
life; few
writers
have depicted
more
movingly
life,
or the sense of
belonging
lively
public
life.
Rousseau imagined
Next, he detailed
our
imagined
are at
redemptive ways of
life that,
Garden,
posed
least satisfying
and not
too psychologically
The
He
different,
path, as
The
public
found in On
the
Government of Poland,
within a
recommends
that
individuals
snugly
highly
nationalistic,
educative
community; the
recommends
Solitary Walker,
that ex
that individuals
Solitaires
cultivate a
extricate themselves
from
acerbate the
for
the complete
loss
of the private
life,
loss
of the public.
Both
are effective,
if the
goal is to live undividedly; both are inadequate, if the goal is to live a full, flourishing human existence. The Flourishing City, as depicted in the Social
Contract, is Rousseau's
There is
the
another
middle
way, his
attempt
to
bring
option,
however,
way
of
friendship, love,
INTERPRETATION,
36
Interpretation
between the
"private,"
path runs
and
hence it
can
be
"Moderate,"
because it does
the
Solitaire;
because
at
its
household,
an
inclu
a
sive
common
good.
fantasy
and
attempts
precarious
balance between
or
the
New Eloise,
us
for this
its warm,
nating
supportive
seasons of
families, strong friendships, agreeable work, and its alter solitude, family, and outdoor public festivities. "Friendship,
are the themes Rousseau himself identified in Julie (Les con love, and QZuvres in completes, 1959 [henceforth, O. c], i, 545; J. M. Cohen, fessions, 504. Translations in this essay are my own. For conve p. trans., Confessions,
virtue"
English translation,
when
available.) In fact almost all of Rousseau's favorite subjects and ideals appear, and mostly in Julie's character. Julie, like Rousseau, places common sense
above
sincerity
her
above
frivolity
and
luxury,
Also, Julie,
unlike
atheist
husband, Wolmar, is
God
religious a service
and worships
by
to
(see Julie, O. c,
name of
the name of
Julie's household,
was never
the
by
the Solitaires.
Rather, it
was the
Mountain Vil
by simple, good natured, hardworking, indepen daily the necessity and beauty of nature. Clarens is
of
than a home. It
also a
is
way
life.
Clarens is
geography.
or
outlined
what
he
helpful works, Moral Sensitivity, or The Wise (for Rousseau's description of "Moral sensitive, ou le
see
sage,"
Confessions,
show
pp.
380-81; O.
c,
i, 408-9). In
this
only
from
but
It is
no coincidence
in the Swiss
mountains.
The mountains,
and the
hardy
way
of
landscape
air,"
with
stalwart,
to
"salutary
and
beneficial
mountain
according
are
morality"
p.
aspects of
Clarens
not, of course,
due to geography
alone.
mountain manners.
The Alpine geography works together with Clarens's Like Emile's tutor or the Social Contract's Great Legislator,
Rousseau
the mountain manners at
and
the
37
Clarens
and amour-propre: that anxious and anomie self-love and pride, so on public opinion.
confronts
At the
same
the self with natural necessity and curbs excessive, dangerous sociabil these
ity.
Together,
form
context
individual is
guished nor
nature.
inflated, but is
placed
in
harmony
itself,
or
neighbors, work,
After Rousseau,
place
others such as
Thomas Mann
Martin Heidegger
would
race
but
wise
in towering mountains inhabited by a folk. This elevated, bucolic landscape and tranquil,
healing
hardy way
life
support a modest
community life. It
resembles
Gemeinschaft
(cooperative community) more than Gesellschaft (competitive society), to use Tonnies' Ferdinand terms; or country life more than city life, to use Rousseau's
vocabulary.
In the
warmer
open air.
In the
colder
other,
"circles":
families
who
wine.
Politics
pp.
and the
d'Alembert,
99-113; Lettre
M.
d'Alembert,
193-214. These
circles are
among the few secondary groups of which Rousseau Although they inhabit a space between the public and
"decent"
private,
Rousseau
they
were
"dangerous"
and not
public"
because
[Lettre
M. d'Alem
modest
Arts,
p.
social
ties,
affectionate,
of
entirely voluntary
and
easily
un
This is
is
not the
land
devoted
family
Nor
this the land of urbanites who celebrate novelty more than tradi
tion, diversity more than affinity, dynamic street life more than habitual family life. The way of Clarens exemplifies the simplicity of rural life, the beauty and ruggedness of mountains, and the character of those immersed in both moun
tain manners and unmannered mountains.
The Garden-Fall-Restoration
narrative can
illuminate Julie
and
Rousseau's
the gentle,
depiction In her
of
the
public
and
private
with
innocent
by
natural
virtue,
albeit
she must
of the
garden,
by
and
its
her is
and
consummated and
by
Baron
d'Etange. He forbids Julie to marry St. Preux, a man without a title. As Julie and St. Preux's relationship becomes increasingly concealed, their private lives hidden from
public
view,
they
resort
38
Julie
an
Interpretation
notes
to St.
Preux,
their
and
relationship
"purity."
was
"easy
and
marked
by
"elegant
simplicity"
Now,
after
lies,
and
social
artifice, "that
happy
first
each
no
effect of so cruel a
other"
to
understand
(O. c,
83). Cast
out
of their garden,
they
can
longer openly
hopes
and
fears.
They
now
suffer
tremendously, equally unhappy whether together or separated. How does this gentle tale, that begins in such innocence, turn bitter
cruel? alone:
and
Although Julie
and
St. Preux
are exceptional
humans, they
a
are
incomplete is
ob
they
need
love,
and
each other
structed
by
title, his
be
enough
youth, Julie
never saw
the serpent, amour-propre, in her garden. She didn't know her garden
a world where concern
belonged to
for
love.
Many
"in
her father's
social prejudices
are offered.
family friend)
says to
of
Vain in ink
on old
worthy But he has nobility even so, do not doubt it, not written parchment but engraved on the foundation of his heart in indelible
a
her.
characters.
In
word, if you
your
prefer reason
titles, it is him
Julie,
has
a
pp.
His
attachment to
status runs
and more
important,
duty
by
her filial
for St. Preux, then, is thwarted ultimately to her father and her duty to uphold public appearances,
properly.
Lord Bomston,
drive
will you
his
wealth
lightly,
only
characterizes
Julie's fall
will
he
writes to
her, "the
tyranny
[with
of an
intractable father
after the
into the
obliged
recognize
fall.
You
your
be
to contract an alliance
heart. Public
approval will
be
pp.
refuted
inces
conscience"
Julie,
168). Julie's
is
characterized as a world
in
which private
love
and public
duty
are
in
conflict, causing
deep
will
among its inhabitants. As she writes to I support, my lover or my father? Sacrificing myself to
strife within and
.
cannot evade
culpable"
I take, I must die crime, committing (O. c, ii, 201; Julie, p. 169). Like Antigone, Julie and duty, between private happiness and public appearance.
a
Eventually,
riage
in part,
by
Julie's
mar
Wolmar. Wolmar
enables the
to
become
a virtuous yet no
longer innocent
As for St.
and
woman who
duty
Preux, Wolmar
by
engineering his
return to
Clarens
his
reconciliation with
Rousseau
and
the
the
39
that
Julie; he becomes
friendship.
virtuous
trusted
friend
of
family
derives
much
joy from
for
Living duty above romantic love, while cultivating a seasoned, spousal love Wolmar and a friendship love for St. Preux. Every aspect of the household,
with
men under the same
her two
place
we will a
reconcile
private
harmoniously. Still,
and
lingering
icy
between Julie's
her
to Wolmar.
Only
upon
erased completely.
After
duty diving
into
contracts and
not a
from
virtue
pneumonia.
By
this
death, in
her
duty,
is
is entirely
vindicated and
complete.
be
by performing his duty, for, after Julie's death, he is to remain at Clarens and tutor Julie's children. The circle of his Garden-Fall-Restoration can
saved
be
closed: as
his
garden and
fall began
with
instructing Julie,
At the
his
reclamation
is
to be
made complete
children.
close of
will return to
Clarens. He
home to
in the
second
Discourse
and
in
Rousseau's
as
other works.
As
long
as we
dwell in
a private
universe,
we
innocents, doing little good or harm. When we enter the social however, our innocence is sacrificed for the possibility of achieving
virtue, but
also
For this transition to be relatively successful, existence must be preserved. On the extreme public
vice.
serpent, amour-propre,
was
to the
private
group.
When
all
is public,
as
one
deflected away from the self and redirected is not divided between public duty and
one
love. Moreover,
of a
in the Garden,
socialized
is
confronted with
extreme
necessity, the
path,
intractability
contrast,
one.
highly
society.
On the
private
in
where
When
all
within
oneself, the
not suffer
opposite
saves
Garden,
is
one
is
principally
by
amour
healthy
and one
the necessity of
nature.
In
way
of
Clarens is
neither
strictly
natural,
Its
create a
and private.
At
Clarens,
one enjoys
bring
as well as a modest
of amour-propre. unstable.
sociability
Yet,
For
as we
way
of
Clarens is
eventu
ally love and duty, the private and public, is as fleeting as it is precarious.
Wolmar
natural
alone
will come
into
conflict.
Clarens, then,
such
is
not
the
way
of
of
Clarens includes
40
tude,
Interpretation
natural
beauty,
and
and the
necessary discipline
and
hardship
of
living
in the
Alps. Nature
artifice, working
harmoniously
of
together,
create
this Second
nature
Garden, Clarens. (For a helpful account Julie, see David Gauthier, 1979.)
how
in
household,
tion of the
arrival of
plete
a physical embodiment of a
public
and private.
Preux'
way of life that permits the reconcilia The household transformation begins with the letter to Lord Bomston
contains the most com
pp.
Wolmar. (St.
of the
description
changes; see O. c,
301-4,
although
now
much
is
abridged and
orderly
peaceful, "and
show,
gathered and
destiny!"
In the
absence of
injuri
other,
ous social
nature,
"it is
no
longer
house
made
to be seen but to
ornate
Inordinately
"nothing
"The
large
into
useful
apartments;
simple,
cheerful, and
there smacks of
place of
dairy
room.
for
the cooking;
they
are
had
the
the
together that
converted pleases
Vineyards
by fruit,
all, "everywhere
useful
they have
has
almost always
farmyard,"
become
the
agreeable."
for the agreeable, and yet the St. Preux mentions the delightful
"noises
of the
crowing
of the
cocks, the
lowing
harnessing
fields,
the
new
of the
horses. He
simple,
pleasant meals
taken in the
the shared
labor in cultivation, and many other rural aspects that make Clarens "more lively, more animated, more gay than it had been in
. . .
its
dreary
dignity."
a place
"of joy
a
being"
and well
Julie,
pp.
why
anyone would
traveller,
of
now
finds
way
life that is
happy.
more
Clarens, however, is
social atmosphere
house
and
yard; it is
frank
say.
in
which people
say
what
they
they
There is
strolling,
no need or
Whether eating,
The
transparency
is
absent
in
is
Rousseau
re-established at
and
the
41
Clarens. And
is
tween
removed.
This is
not to
"indiscreetly
not
affairs"
302).
Everything
need
all.
But that
is
of
revealed or concealed
is
based
on
advancing
forms
Clarens,
such as
it is, is
an acknowledge
privacy
At
as a
fundamental
aspect of what
is appropriately
guarded and
protected, or
cretion.
Clarens, then,
distinction is
based
on
baneful
not
injury.
harmonious way
of
not
tion, but
by
agreeable"
life
at
strictly
domains. Public
at
intertwined,
while one one
is
doing
and
chores, as
opposed
Sociability
dresses
behaves to
As
one
works,
one enjoys
interaction
with
family,
neighbors,
and
Useful
luxury,
desires
are
more
only to
personal
but
social
well-being.
Labor
concern
more
rests
at the
heart
of
work was
an
in international
and as
markets
abiding became
of
fluid,
dominated
other goals,
the
division
labor
increased,
work.
workers
increasingly
they
and satisfaction
in their
Their jobs
were more
specialized, curtailed,
for
whom or what
worked.
challenges these
single sentence:
gether
sums up the Clarens alternative in a unhappy "One sees nothing in this household which does not join to the agreeable and the useful, but the useful occupations are not confined
trends. St.
Preux
profit"
to
(O. c,
p.
304). At
Clarens,
the
very
re
idea
of work
is
redefined.
Not
reduced
sought
to
natural vocation
in
I
ond and
am
crafting
the
an
image
of
Clarens from
material
Garden, however, is
in
nature.
not
Discourse
Confessions, among
Less
well
Rousseau,
regard
we
know,
often cele a
brated
connection,
he
maintained,
between
the
activ
ities
of
farm life,
meaningful work
in
brought both
strength
42
Interpretation
joy. In the Confessions he
recounted
of character and of
how,
death, he
quit
his doctor's
instead immersed
gardens,
himself in life
grape
on the
farm,
c. are
with
vegetable
all,
honey
Confessions,
est chapters
220; O.
i, 231). Rousseau's
various
of the
happi
in his life
invariably
rooted
in farm life,
they
often read
Julie. In his happiest recollections, he is in the country, not in solitude, but with some company, involved in useful yet not overly burden
like
chapters out of
some activities.
Why
purpose?
are
tranquility
and
Why
Clarens? As in the
Garden, Rousseau's
state of
nature, Clarens
is free
one
of
not
is
hurtful artificiality and unjust social conventions. As in the Garden, free of necessity, but encounters a necessity rooted in the rhythm of
household activities,
rather
nature and
obsessive social
artifice, competition,
As in the Garden,
one experi
ences an
intimate
Yet,
not as
human
company.
With
amour-propre
curbed,
one can
mans, both. As St. Preux notes, without pomp and pretense, with everything
arranged so as
to
destiny!"
If here St.
rooted
is Rousseau's, and I think it is, then Rousseau Clarens in human nature. Rousseau usually had a generous sense of the
s voice of
Preux'
malleability
human nature,
and
he
often warned
Europeans
against sanction
ing
by attributing many of us, Clarens must seem nothing but parochial. Rousseau, however, felt he was on firm ground when he identified Clarens with nature, including human
nature.
Clarens
seemed to
have it
all:
beauty,
useful of
work,
domesticity, friend
artificiality.
injurious
social
It
Marriage
fantasy of the good life. family are part of that life. Rousseau's
with
celebrations of
domes
ticity
he
over
are not
noted
Therese,
the woman he
for
twenty
what
walks
before marrying her. Reflecting on their simple meals and together, Rousseau wrote, "friendship, confidence, intimacy, sweetness of delicious
after
are!"
soul,
with
seasonings
political
they
of
reunion
Therese
banishment had
briefly
and
separated
intimacy!"
them, he
(O. c,
ex
claimed, "Oh
and
hearts, habits,
i, 354
sound
and
more
friendship
than marriage.
Friendship
principally
and
companionship,
that he
rejected
however, defined
noted
Intimacy
and
companionship,
station,
characterize the
Rousseauean
marriage and
family.
Rousseau
When Rousseau
wrote
and
the
43
Julie,
he had already
isola
feel
alone even
social
engagement alienated
insipid
social existence
emptiness.
offering the warmth, joy, and purpose of a closely knit, family. Clarens anticipated the modem family, that center of one's
social
by
life. Julie,
as
companion and
friend.
They
are
also coworkers.
Julie
Wolmar
address
together
to
the
household,
an
unlike the
households
of
today, is
work
not a narrow
inclusive
space that
brings together
and pleasure,
we
aesthetics,
confined
public and
Julie,
and
much to
discuss together,
to
pursue
together.
ston and
Clarens is the way of marriage and family, but also of friendship. Lord Bom St. Preux, St. Preux and Julie, Julie and Wolmar, St. Preux and Claire, Claire
and
Julie: there
are
many friendships
generous
at
Clarens. These
of
provide
portions
support,
and
family
no
by
both love
duty,
flows
the union of
as
friends imposes
as one's own
naturally
self-love,
a part of
de
soi.
"Self-love [amour de
law
except
soi], like
friendship
which
is but
it, has
no other
the senti
inspires it;
delight"
one
duty, but
does everything for his friend as for himself, not ("Letter to Mme Correspondance, 1967,
D'Houdetot,"
often
dreamed
would
of a
society
where pp.
of
friends,
of a
society "where
alone
duty
nor
interest
enter,
pleasure
and
friendship friendship
These
law"
(O. c, iv,
and
683; Emile,
slavish
348-49). Friends
acknowledge
equality do
deni
into
patronage on one
dependency
he
on the other.
condi
tions of
friendship
not
lessen but
of
depth. Rousseau,
each
for example, described the "tears walked the eighteen miles to see his
p.
would
shed
time
he
good
551; O.
The
c,
based
on
independence.
world of
and
fantasy, but it is
Its
family
wealth,
of
friendships
of
friendships
Rousseau's
In
spouses and
friends
were
deemed
Clarens
challenges
this
utility
the
private
life for
are
Family
and
friends, in
pub
Rousseau's view,
and status.
to
offer
The
realms of
intimacy
Clarens
oppose the
cold, calculating,
lic
world of
Hobbesian
Parisian
social climbing.
Once in
fected
in
44
Interpretation
friendships. In the
even private
Confessions, Rousseau
a public
claimed that
his friend
knew
he became
figure: "I I
was
was
So
long
p.
as
I lived
loved
by
But
as soon as
I had
no
friends"
(O.
c,
i, 362;
Confessions,
friends
lizing
can make one an object of utility or envy among equality and independence necessary for friendships. Uti the Garden-Fall-Restoration narrative, Rousseau would often describe and erode the
graced
338). Fame
by
strong,
private
friendships,
own,
and
something
ration,
or someone
from
however,
chief
seldom occurred.
Clarens, in its
fictional,
Rousseau's
much
compensation,
use of
he dwelt in
a private
imaginary restoration. For some this fantasy and it thereby eased his
an
too
This
salve,
however,
Rousseau's
public
service of
ingly
envisioning Clarens as an alternative and challenge to a world increas engaged in the manipulative pursuit of wealth, status, and power.
AT CLARENS
friendships
at
Clarens,
most notewor
friend, La Boetie,
blend
.
could
be
said as
Julie
and
Claire: "our
pletely that they efface the seam that joined them 139). In fact, Julie and Claire's friendship resembles in
(Montaigne, 1958,
was
p.
most ways
Montaigne's
inspired
description
of the
wonders
if Rousseau
his
by
claim
that women
not have the capacity for the sacred bond of friendship (see Montaigne, The Complete Essays, p. 138). Julie is perhaps the most effective eighteenth-century
refutation of virtues of
Montaigne's
friendship.
Julie
and
Claire
hopes
and
fears,
their
joy
and
suffering.
They
support,
encourage
each other
to do their
they delight in
or
Often
they
their
male
friends,
Wolmar's
reserve.
Rousseau's
portrait of
this
strong
friendship
between two
perplexity of assessing Rousseau's depiction of women in Julie and elsewhere. On the one hand, Julie exemplifies Rousseau's ideal human: self-possessed, yet
engaged
public
in the company
of others.
Julie "knows
and
follows
rules other
than
opinion,
[her]
principal
p.
honor
being
what
[her]
conscience
delivers
[her]"
73). It is
Julie, therefore,
society On
the other
and not
her father,
spite of
who sees
a patriarchal
intelligence
and character.
hand, in
her
indepen-
Rousseau
and
the
45
dence, Julie
band. Julie is
to
yields to patriarchal
father,
a companion at
to
Wolmar,
God
but
she
is
also a
helper,
so
much as
Eve
was
Adam,
Adam,
least
as
that tale is
traditionally
was a
understood.
helper to Israel,
see
Eve
was a
helper
to
that is, as
leader
75.) Although
are
all matters
out that
household. It turns
Phyllis Trible, 1979, p. are discussed together, Wolmar is the head of the in the Second Garden, at Clarens, social conventions
and not a
subordinate;
in place,
conventions that
would
Rousseau
us
supports.
Men's authority
remains su
preme.
in Unlike Emile's Sophie, Julie is a strong, independent woman, and she is not consigned to live out her life in a narrow domestic cage. At Clarens, women's lives are not radically relegated to the private, because the very distinc
such conventions are rooted
nature.
Rousseau
have
believe that
tion between
public
and private
is
not
strict.
Julie,
unlike
Sophie,
need not
City.
as a
The
City
and
need not
function
mighty, defensive fortress. Julie, then, is not Sophie. Still, neither is she a woman liberated from patriarchy. She speaks her mind openly; she challenges
existing prejudices;
ties.
she
is
working
s
woman with
Ultimately, however,
dominance for
she yields
to her
men.
bearing
remains
Wolmar'
unimposing
patriarchy.
case, Clarens
and rights
of women.
By
portraying
notion
based
on
friendship
and
and
By displaying
admirable
interior life
of
Julie
And
docile
and
and unimaginative.
trust, Clarens
right
contributed
to an
intimacy, fondness,
birth to the
in democratic
significance
societies.
With the
the
of a
exposure such
privacy that allows people to share without fear intimacies as letters, emotions, and beliefs. The privacy
us a
of public
portrayed
what
it is to be human.
This in
realm of
striking
contrast
to what we experience
while
our contractual
litigious
public
existence.
At
Clarens, however,
privacy is found, the harsh contrast between public and private is not. The public life is as supportive of human flourishing as is the private, in part because the distinction between the two is The
public
softened.
streets of
life surrounding Clarens is not the interesting, diverse, crowded London or New York. Nor is it the Spartan arena where citizens gather
past
to
remember
victories
and cultivate
an
intense
patriotism.
Public life
at
Clarens is
more
fair, it is
seasonal:
it
arrives with
46
Interpretation
This is
not
warm weather.
to
say
that
during
is
no public
life. There
people events
are
taverns,
informally
and
public
is easy
outdoors,
a
under the
bright sun, At
fully
illuminated.
old,
Group dancing
female,
is
favorite
and
male and
employee and
such
intergenerational,
for
all
public
tertainers,
with
no stage
to stare
at.
themselves,
song,
dance,
games,
and music.
truly
life
natural
public
life.
natural public existence of
The
that
public
of
Paris,
is, City
life. In
Paris,
and
that "vast
world,"
"alone in the
crowd"
p.
Clarens, hiddenness
at all emerge
identify
Their
all
sentiments
do
not
not at
discourse does
appearance
diversity"
. .
of
Paris
entertainment of
spirit"
Paris requires,
or compensates
p.
frivolous
he
(O. c,
for Rousseau
yet
when
suggests
that an
amusing,
In his Letter
retical
to
M. d'Alembert, Rousseau
account,
and
justification,
and
of the public
life
at
Clarens. Rousseau
Its
is the
nature
function
of entertainment.
In
lives, life,
providing for city dwellers, because, like television, it providing This form
are an
The theater is
favorite
entertainment
an otherwise
chaotic, empty,
lonely
existence.
of recreation,
in Rousseau's view,
provides some
highly
limited. His
main critique of
city
recreation
to
re-create
is, it fails
to enable
community recreating
engage
meaningfully
their lives
prejudicial.
We may be tempted to dismiss Rousseau's antiurban sensibilities as quaint or I know I have. In this essay, I have used "the City" as a Rousseauean
metaphor
for
an
impersonal, banal
public existence
intense,
self-indulgent private
life. For
increasingly requires an Rousseau, however, the City was more disliked big cities, especially Paris, but also
prejudice,
that
London, among
our eyes of
others.
This
narrow
however,
should not
diminish in
plights
his achievement, namely, his success in naming one of the great modernity: moral and social isolation. At the heart of his critique
of the
Rousseau
theater we
and the
47
find his
they
is there that
Rousseau wrote, "but really it is isolated. It is there that they go to forget their friends,
"
.
others,"
(Lettre
who
M. d'Alembert,
p.
66; Politics
and
the
Arts,
pp.
16-17). Like
Marx,
sympathetically
acknowledged
that religion
brings
comfort
thereby distracts
ing
edged
they
ease
one's
need
for
"It
is discontent
natural
is
the weight of
idleness, it is forgetting
necessary."
simple,
tastes, that
If
we experience
the need to
occupy
p.
constantly
the
with the
stage,
games,
we might
(Lettre
M.
d'Alembert,
limited to
66; Politics
Arts,
p.
are not
urban existence.
of geographic
All
regardless
Clarens
a
was
Rousseau's
attempt
of
life in
nourish,
not
entertainment
is
antisocial
(one
sits alone,
watching
stage)
and
is
on appearances
entertainment at
Clarens is
the role of
communal, and in
"But,"
place
actors,
everyone assumes
entertainer.
tainments?"
will
be the
objects of needed.
these enter
middle
is
"In the
flowers;
people, and you will have a fete. Better still: let the spectators give entertain
ment
to themselves; make them actors themselves; make it so that each sees (Lettre a M. loves himself in the others, thus all being the better 126). this p. In Politics and the pp. Arts, community enter 233-34; d'Alembert, tainment, participants are moved not by scripted lines, but by the spontaneous
united"
and
from
palpable
of self
(amour de soi) is
of others.
in private,
yet
it is
also
life is
season, a
rhythm of
Clarens. So is
solitude.
After identi
vocation as
"this
oscillation
between labor
recrea
and
St.
her fa
304).
her
Elysium"
Julie,
p.
Julie's Elysium is
locked door
with
secluded,
hidden,
to the
private
public.
would
Upon entering the Elysium, whose It is a have been impossible to find without Julie's assistance, St. Preux
closed
key."
was struck
by
the dense
foliage,
the abundance of
flowers,
ning brook,
trated this
"I thought I
saw the
the
mortal who
had
ever pene or at
we are
least
48
it
Interpretation
The Elysium knows nothing of the symmetry or artifici formal, eighteenth-century French gardens. It appears to St. Preux as ality "uncultivated and beautifully wild. When Julie intimates that the Elysium
would seem that way. of
wild,"
is entirely of human
Julie is
dered"
under
work,"
patient yet
he insists that "it only cost Julie firm with St. Preux: "It is true that
neglect."
nature
thing, but
my direction, and there is nothing here which I have not or (O. c, ii, 71-72; Julie, p. 305). the state of nature that If this is Nature's Garden, it is not the original one
under second
Discourse. That
a work of
p.
Julie's
Elysium, in
no
contrast, is
art, or
"desert
artificiel,"
as
St. Preux
would
474). Rousseau
again seems
to
original garden.
Gardens
and
places of
of redemption
require
human effort,
imagination.
flower
or a
only nature, not Julie, can give birth to a bird; natural, also, insofar as Julie chooses not to import "exotic
as
fruits,"
plants or
but
"natural to the
country."
Still,
it is Julie
grapes,
wild
It is Julie
reside
in her
private sanctuary.
the rest of
Clarens, is
is
having
said on a
of
few
occasions that
nature,
majority
human
rather
woe.
In Julie, however,
societies to worse
Rousseau did
societies, in
better
they
encourage or
ing. Like Julie's garden, Clarens itself may look entirely natural, as if it emerged organically from its mountain soil. In fact, however, every aspect of Clarens is
shaped
by
and
imagination, in
This
cooperation entails a
of
life that
limits
as
human
hardship, suffering,
sive and
and
death,
with
burdens
as exces
competition,
luxury
living
without
meaning
or purpose.
its attending discrepancy between rich and poor, Clarens is a society, assembled by hu
mans, in
Solitude
elaborate
and
beauty belong
of
and solitude
Rousseau's lengthy,
and neces
description
importance
sity
of
exclaims that
privacy in Julie's
an
well-run
household
St. Preux
world,"
garden
he is transported
"entirely
at
least for
hour
or so
(O. c,
p.
respite
in the
garden, his time for contemplation and refreshment, he returns to the world to
resume
his
work and
life. Use
is
one of
Julie's
greatest gifts to
some
effort,
and much
her friends
solitude
place
of restoration.
as
Julie
that in the
rhythm of
life,
does
"The
re-
Rousseau
pose
and
Village
49
from
labors
labors is
304).
less necessary to
man than
the labor
itself"
Julie,
p.
nents of
Solitude, love, family, friendship, community, work: these are the compo Clarens, Rousseau's fantasy and moral measuring rod. Clarens is also a possible home for Emile, Rousseau's favorite, imaginary pupil. Emile does not belong in Rousseau's Poland, for Emile was not trained to place citizenship
above all else.
He did
his heart
and mind
in the image Of
of
not
belong
in the Solitaire's
all
He
the places
in Rousseau's
made
geography, Emile is
best
suited
taigne,
mayor of
community and civic participation. Like Mon Bordeaux, Emile fulfills his civic duty, but that duty can never Neither Citizen
nor
Soli
taire, Emile
walks
Julie's
Given his
affectionate per
Emile,
not
Wolmar, is
the
REDEMPTION AT CLARENS
The
public propre
redemptive
logic
of
Clarens
all
is
similar to that of
Rousseau's
extreme
amour-
In
is kept to
to
a minimum.
On the
path,
private amour-propre
is
redirected
public soi
extreme private
maneuvers em
path, amour
de
(gentle self-love)
Both
public and private ploy Rousseau's strategy for reducing friction between the Whether one embraces conflict. by dodging those situations that put the two in
At Clarens,
amour-propre
is forestalled
by
good marriages,
agreeable
strong friendships,
private
retreats,
public cele
brations, demanding,
we
Here,
moun severe and
have
a multitude of miraculous
manage
balancing
in place,
acts. at
Its
Alpine geography
to
keep
all
least
provisionally.
The
tain manners provide moral sustenance while checking false needs. The Alpine geography brings natural necessity into the daily life at Clarens,
it
a
discourages dangerous,
place where
excessive
sociability.
Together,
these
form Clarens:
the self is
harmony
with
itself,
community
Read Rousseau's description, in his Letter to M. d'Alembert, he once visited in his youth:
50
Interpretation
An
entire mountain covered with arranged such
homes,
land
on which
it
depends,
offer to the
numerous
inhabitants of
society.
the sweetness of
These
happy farmers,
labor
all at ease
free
of poll
and assigned
cultivate
bounty
is
theirs,
and
handmade
goods.
employ the leisure that this cultivation leaves them to In the winter especially, a time when the deep
...
thousands of
snows
hinder
easy communication,
wood, which
each
family
stays warm at
home in
pretty
and neat
home
of
they
themselves
built, occupying
themselves with
to their
numerous enjoyable
labors that
chase
well-being.
Never did
a professional
carpenter,
locksmith,
try;
all
(Lettre
M. d'Alembert,
pp.
133-34; Poli
Arts,
pp.
60-61)
goes on
books,
their
living
rooms that
look
more
or a
"laboratory
in
physics
experimental mountain
their
in drawing,
doubt
served as a model
a
and
carries the
Second Garden,
phasis on
self-sufficiency
dependency,
travels with
amour-propre.
With the
specialization of
labor
comes
the multipli
come
from these
competition,
injustice,
and oppressive or
dependency. When
are
we stand
in
protected
from, humiliation,
envy, contempt,
sphere of
injustice.
mountain
place
Dependency
community.
Rousseau's
a safe
by
definition
for
To this belief he clung in spite of his own disappointing domestic experience with his father and later with Madame de Warens.
intimacy
and trust.
to
Clarens, and perhaps even the mountain community that Rousseau described D'Alembert, is nothing less than an elaborate, fictional portrayal of Rous
social assimilation.
seau's vision of
fatalistic
private paths.
reach.
Its location, high in the Swiss mountains, makes it difficult to This geography is not incidental. Few can achieve it. Many wouldn't There is
no theater.
want to.
There
There is little
a place even
pluralism.
There is little
anonymity.
And
even
if
you
desire to live in
like Clarens,
cruel.
scarce,
be oppressive,
"Misfits"
"imbeciles"
in
a small
community
are sometimes
"eccentrics"
"geniuses"
or
are perhaps
City they
and
derision
scorn.
When I say
like Clarens
are
scarce, I mean,
empirically speaking,
there
Rousseau
are
and
the
51
like it. This is mostly because its pivotal, delicate components are subject to breakdown. Clarens can easily cease to be Clarens. The marriage could have turned sour, with both partners caught up in amour-propre, compet
places
few
ing
The
with each other to attract other suitors or somehow gain the upper
hand.
friendships, too,
The
or public and
could
have become
competitive and
by
envy.
have become
occasions to scheme
personal
revenge
conquest.
The
work could
have turned
oppressive
for the
employees
obsessive
for
the employers,
if Clarens
strove
to
accumulate
Finally,
for
the climate could have turned mild, and the roads and thus providing
more occasions
heating
systems
improved,
for
social
interaction,
more opportunities
amour-propre
populated
When I say Clarens is a fantasy, I mean Rousseau imaginatively created and it out of deep longing and angry protest. It was a protest against
of
division
labor,
and alienation
encouraging anomie, acquisitiveness, a fierce from self, work, and community. Clarens, then,
developing
destructive,
gate
self-centered
as an emotional surro
for intimacy, friendship, and community. For some, the way of Clarens is the most promising path to redemption. It reinstates many features of Nature's Garden simplicity, natural necessity,
curbed amour-propre
while also
introducing
a set of
human
goods and
joys
Yet Garden intimacy, family, friendship, missing from its redemption, like that of the preceding paths, is provisional and incomplete. Clarens culminates in death and sorrow. Julie's romantic passion for St. Preux
that
and community.
is
never
fully
extinguished.
There is
to
still a tear
in her heart
in her
caused
by
her love
her
and
a
her
duty
more
Wolmar. We
might
be tempted to
past.
attribute
dividedness to
caught
a
merely
Yet Julie
seems
quandary
fundamental
and
inevitable. As
alone,
long
between One
to arise. Even at
until
Clarens, love
chaos,
household is
ness,
deception,
As
long
tures,
path, there is
no sure
way to
protect
from ourselves, from diverse loves that can personal and public duties, from loves that
are sheltered
can
lead to bitter
grief.
Only
Solitaires
from
such
lead
a still
life,
nature morte.
Julie
ends
in death
and
swallowed
Claire
confesses,
"I
am
alone
in the
everyone."
midst of
The only
voice she
52
Interpretation
of the
hears is that
dead,
the ghost of
are you
where
p.
are you?
What
her best friend, Julie: "Claire, oh my (O. c, ii, doing far from your
friend?"
409).
Only
.
in death, it
would
seem,
can
Claire
again achieve
the
not
entirely
long."
her
it
awaits
it
for
Freedom from
death. The
the pain
loneliness, longing,
offer
and
dividedness only
comes at
redemption
Clarens has to
is
not complete.
Moreover,
its
redemptive powers
Julie;
of
too much at
frail. Clarens probably cannot survive the death of Clarens hangs together precariously. Clarens, it turns out, is
are a
fleeting
moment
in time that
reminds us
be if
solitude
and
sociability, independence
public and private.
dependence, love
duty, desires
and pow
ers,
If human is there
flourishing
public and
private,
a path
in Clarens? At the
"Moderate,"
called
because it does
Solitaire;
"private,"
because
at
its
household,
Clarens has
no political
community or an inclusive common good. life. Perhaps it would not be Emile 's ideal home. At
with
or
Clarens, we encounter stellar individuals friendship, and good work. But could Julie
citizens?
immense
capacities
for love,
St. Preux
ever or
become
committed
self-
family-sufficiency
that attempts to
be incorporated in include
to
a city-state
a path
enjoyment of
intimacy
justice,
to
a common
good, devotion
of common
family
and to global
acceptance of
diversity
and
love
compromise,
insouciance
If
our
society
were marked
exclusively
by intermediate
to integrate
democ
It
could not
the
society. In spite of my for like Clarens, and my attempt to achieve it in my life longing something and community, I fear anything resembling a national Clarens. The threat of coercion, implicit or explicit, that haunts Clarens 's integration and of of own
heart
tolerate, for example, the very tension the shared moral life of liberal, democratic
harmony
public appeal
and private
should
worry
us more than
its
pleasures
and satisfactions
to
us.
Any
all-encompassing,
give us pause.
Still,
the
way
of
Clarens has
much to offer
local
attempts to achieve
lively,
and
just, and
flourishing
communities.
It
European
Rousseau
and the
53
American industrial revolutions, the work sphere and the domestic sphere have become increasingly segregated. This development coincided with sequestering women and children to the private, domestic sphere. New research suggests that in many rural, preindustrial communities, fluid, as the domestic and work spheres
women's and men's roles were more
were
Today, many
and children
are
seeking
ways to
bring
employment of
into the
home
into
employment.
Rousseau,
home,
course, is
hardly
for
battling
helpful
more
women.
offer a
in
integrated.
should not
if
local community
home, but
roles? rights.
also to
keep,
say,
women's vocations
Clarens has
Democracies
robust,
prohibit
than that.
They
need cul
laws
and practices.
Rousseau
understood
only from law, but from common, shared traditions and commitments, from something like a because it intimates common, secular faith. I employ the concept of
freedom,
equality,
and
individual
"faith"
notions
a shared
history
and
future,
and also
because faith is
beliefs,
and practices
There is nothing neutral or value free about the virtue, of a liberal democracy. There is nothing neutral about
supporting individual rights, or supporting a culture, a way of life, that incul cates the character and habits of citizens engaged in democratic practices.
Rousseau has
much
about
the
importance
not reside
of the
language
in Clarens, but
Rousseau
rather
in the
Flourishing City
Ultimately,
Rousseau's
be oneself, variety
a
ability to be
self-possessed
(as he
once put
it, "to
a
in the
middle of
society")
enjoy
of social commitments,
not the
including
of
civic ones.
Clarens, then,
represents a
component, but
fullness,
human flourishing.
Endeavoring
to fashion the
democratic
republic
in
life is
public
life is inclusive, lively, and just is a worthy challenge. It was Rousseau's challenge. We will often fail. No perfect harmony will be achieved. Still, the
endeavor
challenge of
democracy
in the
twenty-first
REFERENCES
Gauthier, David.
"The Politics of
Redemption."
University
of Ottawa
Quarterly 49
En-
(1979): 331-33.
the Social:
Visiting
54
Interpretation
gland and
and
the
Limits
of the
Public/Private
Dichotomy,"
in Public
and
Private Thought
Practice. Edited
by
Jeff Weintraub
and
University
of
Montaigne, Michel Eyquem. The Complete Essays. Translated by Donald Frame. Stan ford: Stanford University Press, 1958. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Confessions. Translated by J. M. Cohen. New York: Penguin Books, 1953.
CEuvres
Lettre
completes.
Edited
by
Bernard Gagnebin
and
Pleiade, 1959-69,
a
vols.
i-iv.
M. d'Alembert. Paris:
complete
Garnier-Flammarion, 1967.
by
R. A. Leigh.
Julie,
or
the
versity Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968. Emile. Translated by Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Politics
and
the Arts:
Letter
to
M. D'Alembert. Translated
Reread."
by
Allan Bloom.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989. Trible, Phyllis. "Eve and Adam: Genesis 2-3
Carol Christ
and
by
Row, 1979.
Discussion: Locke
on
Natural Law
The Internal
in the
University
they
In this essay I defend the internal coherency of John Locke's moral views as appear in Questions Concerning the Law of Nature (Locke 1990). John
about the called the
law
in ten different
have been
Questions
Concerning
Law of Nature (Locke, 1958) the Law of Nature (Locke, 1990). This work by
the
Essays
Locke
published
it in 1954.
For the
Horwitz, Clay
and
Clay
edition, hereaf
While
not much
the examination of the correctness of either tion. M. A. Stewart has discussed the
limitations
Horwitz,
et
al., edition
(1992,
1956
pp.
145-65).
Many
scholars take
Locke to be
partial
an advocate of a version
of natural and
Two worthy
examples of the
are the
late Robert Horwitz (Horwitz, 1992) and Michael Zuckert (Zuckert, 1994). I will proceed by considering the views of Robert Horwitz as they are found
in
his commentary
on the
Questions. He
Locke
contradicts
him
times; as Horwitz explains, however, Locke contradicts himself in tentionally. The reason is that the style of writing Locke used reflected his
self several attempt to articulate
something
law
of nature.
argue
that Horwitz
is mistaken
in which
argues
basically
the same
more
thing
as
Horwitz;
unlike
detailed
and
forceful. (This
should not
sophical
had time
Horowitz. As I
commentary.
It
was published
posthumously
by
his friends
editor's note
in Horwitz, 1992,
p.
251.) For
example, while
interpretation,
29, No. 1
56
In
Interpretation
each case
argue that
Zuckert is
mistaken as well.
As
with
Horwitz,
in
all of
my believes the
comments against
Zuckert
scrutiny
of texts
which
he
(1992,
in
p.
claims that
Locke
on
argues
for
a
he denies
each argument.
Horwitz
is just the
style of
writing that he
thereby
in
used:
Initially
is
wise
he strongly
gives
it
an authoritative
cast, but
then he gradually
raises
doubts
about
it,
or even
flatly
the
of a
contradicts
for the
reader to regard
every
assertion
Questions
as provisional
in
char
acter,
rather
than
as a pronouncement
by
Locke
definitive doctrine. (P
253)
which
The text
of
his commentary,
one of
however,
reflects
only I
one example
in
he
for
the existence of
briefly
describe Locke's
objection.
found in
the
first
Horwitz's
Locke
law
of nature exists
explanation
for the
nounces upon
himself
a verdict when
he has
For
is
one who
guilty
he himself is
cite
Locke's Questions
by
of
the
folio In
number as printed
in both the
von
and the
Horwitz,
et al.
editions).
other
words, according to
even
Locke,
judgment
his
own
conscience,
censure of the
legal
or
moral community.
The
in
questions seven
(fols.
62-81)
and ten
briefly
explains:
For example, he
contradicts
here his
law
of nature.
Near
the
a
beginning
when
of the
asserted
that "men's
consciences"
prove
"that
very law
of nature exists;
that
is, from
one who
is guilty
wins acquittal
he himself is
judge.'"
(1992,
283)
a
To determine
the passages
whether this
is really
contradiction, I
in
allegedly
Locke's
view
of the conscience
in the first
question.
Discussion: Locke
Horwitz
men pass
authority.
on
Natural Law
the earlier
view
57
that
claims
that
on
Locke
contradicts
in
question seven
judgment
themselves in the
argues
absence of
(p.
283)
that
any kind of civil or religious Locke denies this claim in from Locke indicates, reflection of the dominant
because,
as the
following
passage
more than a
For
men
not
of nature, since
guided
by
the then
dominant
opinion
[and]
have
per
formed
in conformity
of
reason, vicious
nor
and
impious. And
the
none of
lashes
conscience,
that internal
goad of
heart,
usually
(Fol.
guilty
of a crime,
because they
consid
praise
it was,
not
only
permissible
but
even
something
worthy.
17)
Locke I do is the
interpretation.
But is this
what
means?
not
think this
correct
To
why I think it is wrong, I must first expound upon the context of Here Locke has been arguing against consensus as a means of knowledge of the law of nature. He distinguishes two kinds, positive and natural
explain
this
passage.
consensus.
Positive
consensus
is
an agreement which
argues that at
issues from
either a tacit
or expressed compact
"Neither
of these
kinds
of
law
all, since
compact,
and
issue from
whatsoev
no principle of nature
ral consensus
is "an
agreement
to which men
of
are
brought
by
kind
of natural
instinct
without the
if this
about
precept
intervention
compact"
reasons that
of the
law
of nature would
be brought
actions,
by
kind
instinct,
either
in the
consensus of conduct or
opinions, or
principles.
He denies
instincts.
argument under
The
natural
passage above
is discussed in the
this
the
instinct in the
consensus of opinions.
Specifically, Locke is
discussing
men.
why
no consensus of opinions
concerning
among
He
argues
first
that one
there is no such
has only to consult the histories of the world to see that consensus. In fact, as Locke writes: "should we survey, one by
vices,
of virtues and
[virtues]
not
which no one
doubts
constitute
the
law
of nature which
itself, it
men's
will soon
opinions
become
evident
cerning
do
vary
and are
by
public
practice"
approval and
(fol. 69).
Next, he
from
place
argues that
"were the
consensus of mankind
to be
considered
the
rule of morals, there would either exist no law of nature, or this law would
place"
vary
a
to
(fols. 69
and
that this
is
some
acknowledge"
thing
that
"no
one
will
about
70)
because
each
culture,
i.e.,
58
Interpretation
the law of
nature.
Its
members
witz's
(and understanding these reasons is the key to understanding why Horinterpretation is mistaken). First, they believe this because "they have
been
guided
by
[and]
have
another
in conformity
to others, and
though
not without
is,
even
they
think that
they
obeying
guided
instead
by
Second,
of
they believe this to be correct because "they have felt none conscience, nor that internal goad of the heart, which usually
crime"
lashes
wounds and
tor
guilty
of
each
view
law
of nature
is
correct
for his
his
own
view of
the law of
nature.
He does
by
feeling
guilt when
he
by
I
own
After making
explicit
my
alternative
interpretation
of this passage,
see noth
ing
that contradicts the earlier view that men pass judgment on themselves
in
the absence of
any civil authority or religious authority. For example, this claim judge themselves even when there is no dominant religious or
place.
This
claim
does
they judge
themselves
passage
according to the specific laws of nature, only that they judge themselves. The in the seventh question says that individuals often defend their own
views of the
law
of nature
by appealing
what
they
are
doing
is
confirmed
by
even of
if
it
views of
In fact, as Locke makes clear, they do so mistaken. This claim is, then, not a denial
conscience
Locke's
was
earlier
is
doing
under
what
blame.
a
The
stand:
other passage
question.
It is
difficult
passage
to
[T]hat
men
have
concerning
duty
is
perhaps
the
only thing
have the
conduct would
clearly enough as they diverge in some different directions. Not only are a few to be discovered here and there, not only men of private condition but even en
express
tire nations,
among
be
observed no sense of
law,
no rectitude of of these
who
and
many
of wrong pay no heed to at least some of the precepts of the law of nature; for whom it is not only customary but praiseworthy to commit and
any
conscience
sanction crimes which are proper objects of the greatest who think
detestation
to other peoples
permitted
soundly
and who
live according to
nature.
among
strained
from
by
Among
others there
Discussion: Locke
exists no shame
on
Natural Law
59
in debauchery, in
91;
emphasis
is mine)
Here Horwitz
points
out that
Locke
contradicts
himself
by
pointing
out that
without any conscience about wrong and any fetters of conscience. This passage shows, according to Horwitz, that conscience is nothing more than a reflection of the dominant
do bad things
by
opinion
(1992,
p.
283).
Does the
view? means
I think the
bear any evidence of contradicting Locke's earlier for two reasons. First, regardless of what Locke in this passage, he states that from these considerations, "it seems neces
above quotation
answer
is
no
sary to
people
is
no
Law
of
Nature
bound
by
Nature is is
not
universal"
above quotation
Locke's
all, but
only
an objection
that he is considering.
Unfortu
fully
except
to assert
flatly, in
head-to-head law
of
fashion,
is
above the
nature;
everyone
has
other
duties
depending
upon
his
or
her relationship
decisive,
Law
of
Nature is
tion of this
tion. (Fol.
law;
93)
us suppose that the passage
at all that contradicts
Second, let
in
question
is Locke's
in the
view.
Does
his
earlier view?
do
not pass
judgment
on themselves
what
doctrine. In
passage
fact,
he
says
in this
passage
any is
of
in the
seventh question:
often the proper objects of the greatest detestation to other people. regardless science of what
someone's what conscience approves
Therefore,
con
or
disapproves, his
contradicts
is
still
are
doing
points
it
was
designed to do.
There
self.
apparently
out
in
which
Locke allegedly
him
pp.
Zuckert
of these
in his
excellent
book (1994,
118-215). I
to consider Zuckert's
views.
why there is not a coherent natural law view in the Ques show that tions, Zuckert argues along two different lines. First, he attempts to
In
order
to
show
60
Interpretation
nature penned
by
Locke
inconsistent
with
Locke's definition
law. (Locke
of these
Questions.) Second,
he
uses
argues that
Locke denies
a premise
in
to
justify
To
the existence of the law of nature. The contradictions occur in the text
question.
Zuckert'
clear
first line
of argumentation,
will
Locke's
view of
reconstruct
Locke's
arguments
I discuss the
elements
To
convince
us
is, in fact,
case
out
(without argumentation)
a
he takes to be the
is
a
law (fols. 11
and
12). An
on
edict
law just in
it is
(1)
the
declaration
of
a superior will
effective or
(Later
law.); (2) it
prescribes what
is to be done
what
is to be avoided;
(3)
it is
binding
upon men,
i.e.,
law that
doing
(Also in
folio 86, Locke describes the third condition as that which binds terminatively.); and (4) it is sufficiently promulgated. Locke makes clear that the law of nature
satisfies the
four
law:
From these
law
are
considerations
of nature]: of
it is readily apparent that all the conditions necessary to For 1, it is the declaration of a superior will,
law
seems to consist.
and what
in
which the
formal definition
law: it
prescribes what
is to be done
in itself
is to be
avoided.
upon men,
for it
contains
[and]
of rea
although, in
ever,
fact, it is
not promulgated
in the
it is
sufficiently known to
(Fol.
men
since
know it
by
the
light
son alone.
12)
Immediately
law
of this
after this
discussion, Locke
writes:
considerations
following
rehearses
kind
exists"
for
in the first
arguments.
argues that a
everywhere"
law
of nature exists
because "there
prem
law,
which obtains
ways.
famous
"some
argument
the human
function is
life
or
sort of
perception,"
of sense
reason"
"some
sort of
life
of action of the
[part
of the
Aristotle argues,
however,
the
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a34-1098a4). As function is neither the life of nutrition and growth
Discussion: Locke
nor some
on
Natural Law
61
sort of
cludes that
the
itself
having
life of sense perception (1097b 34-1098a4). Aristotle con human function is the "soul's activity according to reason [as reason] or requires reason [as obeying (1098a7-8). Locke
reason]"
derives
an additional
conclusion
immediately
"consequently (fol. by
actions
man must
reason"
necessarily perform those actions which are dictated 13). Locke evidently means that if man must perform those
which
are
according
everywhere.
Next, Locke
follows. He
since
force"
advances
another argument
upshot
is
as
Aristotle
same
(fol. 13), he
law
of
law,
everywhere"
which obtains
(fol. 13).
objec
Later, Locke
first
argument.
The first
is
nowhere to
be found:
law
of nature,
claiming
of the
part of mankind
lives
as
if there recog
guiding
principle
to
life
at all, nor
any law
kind that
all men
(Fol.
15)
that this objection is unsound because it is
obtains everywhere
Locke
argues
possible
to have a law
of conduct
people.
which
but be
which
is
not recognized
by
many
or
could
neglected
because
of
idleness,
because The
of the
bad habits,
or
because
of mental
defects.
no agreement about what the edicts
part
is
law
of nature
are,
even as
of
mankind.
Locke's reply is
follows:
that,
itself does
not
fully
not
agree
what the
law
of nature
is,
what
its
certain and
known
edicts
are, it does
in truth
no
law
(Fol.
17)
does believe in the
Moreover, Locke argues that the sounder same natural laws, but differs in how they
part of mankind
are
Having
of the
stated
Locke's
view of
law
and
his first
s
for
the existence
short.
law
of nature,
now
turn to
Zuckert'
first
objection.
The point, in
is
as
follows:
The first
argument appeals
effect
Locke,
tated
concludes
is activity according to from which Aristotle, or that "man must necessarily perform those actions which are dic
man
reason"
by
on the
preceding
page
explicitly
rejected
62
Interpretation
the idea of law of the "law of
nature as
"dictate
reason,"
of
and therefore
it does
as
not appear
that
nature"
Locke
attributes p.
the law
Locke
seems to accept.
(Zuckert, 1994,
193)
his
own view of the
Zuckert
nature: reason
appears
to be
right as
Locke
writes about
law
of
"Less accurately, it
seems
does
not so much a
lay
down is
it discovers
and
investigates
law
which
ordained
by
higher
has been im
planted
in
hearts"
our
(fol. 12).
to
Zuckert'
respond
s objection
is to
point out
reason,"
as the editors of
and
page
101,
note
9 (and
even
Zuckert
law
on page
of nature:
his book), Locke is referring to "Natural law is a dictate of right reason, 190
of
Grotius'
view of
the
which
indicates the
turpitude or moral
necessity in
either
a given act
by
reason
of
its
agreement or as a
disagreement
itself
and which
indi
cates,
is
forbidden
or commanded
by
nature."
God,
the author of
It is
since
entirely clear that Locke means the same in folio 13 Locke's use of the phrase, "dictate
not
by
thing
as
Aristotle's phrase,
"according
is
to
reason."
If this
must mean
that man
must perform
consistent
with man's
function,
authority
is
right.
consistent with
Locke's
view of
nature
the law of
or man's
nature
because it is
law that is
function. Zuckert
also
finds fault
with
Locke's
second argument
(reproduced in the
first
He
points out
argument
does
not
law
of nature.
This
statement
is
so
because it does
by
of
appears to
be
reason under
faculty
law
of the
p.
intellect
by
which
it
articulates and
no
deduces
argu
(Zuckert, 1994,
of the
194). This
argument
is in
definition
of nature,
however. The
reason
law
the
of
Instead, Locke
have
argues that
many
explanations can
given
for
fact
not
This
use of conscience
does
imply
way concerning actions. It only implies that they judge themselves. Locke reasons that the existence of the law of nature is not only one of these explanations, but it is also the best explanation. In
describing
Locke's
argument
of nature
in the
law
of
law
of nature
of the
identical.
Discussion: Locke
The third
there
or
argument
on
Natural Law
63
by
of nature exists
because
function for man, i.e., a function that leads to human happiness flourishing. To justify his argument, he brings forward the following points.
a proper
is
Locke
argues that
observes a
fixed law,
which
is
suited
for
animals
down for it
not as much as a
thing it is and what its function will be. If this essence can be described in causal terms, it is a subset of the causal laws (which include for example the
law
of
specific.
The
essence
requires,
things,
each
individual
its
own
life,
to
its
own
kind,
and
to
protect
its
offspring.
essence acts as a
kind
of
animals
do
not
to act otherwise.
Although
man
is
not without
laws that he
man
less,
also
laws
is
subject
to that
not required
to observe.
According
to
Locke,
"has
his
nature"
reason
mines the
of
thing he
will
be
and
laws for
man to
observe these
Locke, however, points out that while the animals must fixed laws, the laws for man, which arise in virtue of the kind of
his nature,
are not
follow.
thing he is
To
way
of
living.
the term
this
distinction,
is typically
notion of
contrasted
'fixed.'
The term
'fixed'
brings
with
with
it the
determinacy.
notion.
The term
'prescribed,'
however, brings
a set of
it
a quite
different
This
laws
or rules that
instructs,
recommends, or
such a
kind
of
life. This
is designed in
that
if
he follows the
prescription
way lead to
human happiness.
Zuckert
clause of what
again argues that own
"Locke's third
of the natural
phrase
argument
law"
his
definition
Zuckert
means
by
of
the
"final
clause"
above, the
fundamental line
of
of thought can
be
summarized
in this
way.
Locke's definition
argument
because,
while
his definition
argument
emphasizes
of the
law
of nature, the
third
of nature
in fixed
or
Zuckert, then,
He
and of quotes
the
is this:
Hippocrates in
support of
this
notion of
in
great
which
a
destiny
law: "Each thing in both small (fol. 18). His definition hath set
down"
the law of
to
of
the law
64
Interpretation
Locke has in
ture
mind
action"
of na
is prescriptive,
determinative. (P.
194)
in the consistency
Zuckert'
important
problem
of
Locke's
There is
way
consistency problem, however. The funda In the third argument Locke contrasts two differ Of this
law Locke
kinds
laws.
applies
only to
natural
fixed law
nature"
a measure suited
(quoting
Aquinas
tic
and
Hippocrates), however,
largely
fixed
and
determinis
in
nature:
destiny
for it
"each thing in both small and in great fulfilleth the task which hath set down, and each individual thing departs from the law set down
breadth"
(fol. 18).
Immediately
after,
however,
and one
this is the crucial point, Locke points out a different kind of natural
which alone
law,
only applies to humans: "Since this is the case, it does not seem that man is free of laws, while all others things are bound by them, but he has a his
nature"
second
kind
of
natural
same
law
of nature
of
law
he
attempts to
defend
five
arguments
in the first
law
of
question. nature
Therefore,
in
is inconsistent
two
arguments
Zuckert
writes:
"Properly
adumbrated,
could
indeed be
consistent with
Locke's definition,
although
they
neither
imply
it,
nor
it
them"
[p.
194].)
in
each argument which
now
Locke denies
of the
he
uses to
justify
the
existence
law
of nature.
The
of the other
questions that
Zuckert
argues that
premise of
argument
for the
existence of the
law
of nature.
can
be described in
this way.
cause
According
and
to
Zuckert, Locke
principles
law
of nature exists
be
"there
exist certain
agree
recognizes
which as
men
Zuckert correctly
among men no common consensus concerning right both statements clearly contradict one another, Zuckert's argument appears to be correct.
Zuckert's
approach to the
assessment of the
first
not
argument
argue
is
mistaken on two
counts, however.
human
race recognizes
agreement."
On the
con-
Discussion: Locke
trary, as I have made clear above, Locke argues that because "there exists some law, which obtains
nately, there seems to be
ment one
a problem
on
Natural Law
65
law
of nature exists
everywhere"
I describe it in entirely different terms. How can this issue be resolved conclusively? The issue appears to be based on two different inter pretations. I can resolve the issue by explaining the second reason why Zuckert's
way,
and
approach
is
mistaken.
To
sum
mistake
is
as
follows: He
quotes a passage of
Locke's
B (fol. 13, 11. 18-19) that is part of a large portion of text that Locke himself deleted (fol. 13, 1. 18-fol. 15, 1. 15). The editors of the Questions briefly discuss the deletion. Even though they include this passage in
manuscript
they are careful to point out that it was deleted (see n. 15 on p. Locke's Questions, 1990). W von Leyden also points out that these pages were deleted. Instead of printing them with the main text, he reprints them at the back of his own translation (see von Leyden 's Note B to his translation of
105
of
Locke's Essays
p. 282). Of course, the reason why Locke deleted this early passage seems obvious. He understood that the two passages could not fit together. In the end, the deletion probably represents an
on
the
evolution
in Locke's
own
thinking
as
he
wrote
the Questions.
Zuckert takes up Locke's second argument. It is the same problem that Hor witz discusses as well. Since I have already examined the problem at length and found
no
discussion, I
argument and
direct the
first
part of
this essay.
is
as
Locke's third
argument
him to
a position
later
contradicts
points
as
Locke's
theory, it is known
inclinations
p.
or
(1994,
way in which the natural law 201). One line later he writes, "According to
as the
Question VI,
of
natural
inclinations
mankind'
(fol.
61)"
(p. 201).
The
following
points
may be
noticed at once.
One is this.
According by
to Zuck
a view
argument
logically
implies
or
logically
commits mean
him to
the phrase,
While I may be mistaken about this, we may speculate that the phrase may have at least three meanings. First, the phrase may mean simply that Locke's third argument reminds us of another position, a position that is
"points
to."
logically connected. Second, Zuckert may mean that Locke's third argument logically implies or even, thirdly, his argument logically entails another view.
not
Zuckert
dust
cannot mean
the first
because he
Locke
shakes the
maintain
this without
to"
saying,
his third
argument
"points
is
logi-
66
cally
Interpretation
connected
a claim which
he denies later,
valid method
(modus tollens),
by a deny the
and
logically
something stronger, that the argument Zuckert does not have to maintain such a
a
strong position, however. He merely needs to maintain tion. The meaning is that Locke's argument at folio 18
to
another
basic logical
connec
logically
commits
him
natural
inclination
law
of a
epistemic
foundation
knowledge
of the
of nature.
61, however, he
explicitly denies the epistemic role the natural inclinations may play. Next, Zuckert attributes the roots of Locke's third argument to Thomas Aqui
nas.
It is from this
source that
discus
sion of natural
inclinations. In the
inclinations
inclinations
play three
make the
roles.
disposition to
in
ture,
a well-formed woman
finds
herself, among
offspring.
tion or propensity to
own
form
or enter and
societies, to know
God,
her
species, to
preserve
herself
her
The
result of
having
these
of moral
accountability,
to
pursue
voluntary. consequence of
The
dispositions
the
correspond
to the precepts of
the law
For example,
we read
following
God,
in
Aquinas: "Thus
man
has
a natural
about
and
to live in society;
and
in this respect,
inclination be
longs to the
law"
natural
Finally,
sometimes
in this literature
inclinations become
is
the epistemic
by
which the
Thomistic
natural
law
to
humanity"
(1994,
p.
we see
the
role
"[Sjince, however,
are
has
the nature of
all those
things to
reason
has
and
a natural
inclination
naturally
pursuit,
apprehended and
by
as
being
good,
consequently
as objects of
avoidance"
and objects of
II, Q. 94,
Art. 2). I
not
the
faculty
to
recognize
has
within
herself
only
inclinations
one gives
her
reason to pursue,
but
also the
ability to know
by
means of reason
inclinations
consequence, the
am now
in
a position to consider
Zuckert's
attack on
Locke's third
argu
ment.
There
First, Zuckert's
attack
is
premise of
Locke's
an
he takes to be
On the contrary, it is an attack on a premise that implication of Locke's third argument. As I pointed out above,
Discussion: Locke
the premise of the third argument
a
on
Natural Law
67
is that there is
or
a proper
Questions
to see
if I
am
flourishing. One has only to consult correct. The end result is that Zuckert's
the moment.
pose
Nevertheless, let us ignore this problem for that Zuckert has, nonetheless, discovered
contradict one another.
of argumentation.
Instead, let
in
us
sup
two statements
Questions that
support
Such
indirectly
is
correct
his line
Nevertheless, Zuckert's
argument
phrase
what
I take
foundation
of the
"points to") that the natural inclina knowledge of the law of nature. The
we should
for
us now
is
yes
only if
is
true.
tion,
or there
Locke
kept separate)
epistemology (normally two topics that are may be collapsed together. The first reason is obvious; the second one may not be so obvious, however. The underlying line of thought, in brief, seems to rest partly upon the view that Locke's third argument contains
are or
within
it
not
only
his
metaphysical commitment
to the
existence of the
law
but these
same elements
may
also
be
used to
draw
Both
reason
no evidence
in the
text at
the epistemic
no
foundation
of the
of the
law
of nature.
In fact, there is
discussion
of the natural
more
argument at all.
Additionally,
and perhaps
may argue that such a discussion is irrelevant because, as discussed above, the focus of Locke's third argument is on his elaboration of his premise, namely, that there exists a proper function for humans to follow.
importantly,
Additionally,
all that
even though
Locke
makes reference to
Aquinas, it is
not clear at
he
wants us
to
understand that
his
epistemic method of
Aquinas.
The
second reason
understands
meta
physics and
evidence of this epistemology are to be kept separate. Part of the organizes the Questions. The first question he which in way
is is
largely
a
dedicated to showing why the law of nature exists. Such an endeavor metaphysical enterprise, because metaphysics is dedicated to the question does
not exist.
work
Locke moves to consider a different but equally important question. How is the law of nature known? This is an epistemic discussion because epistemology
studies the questions of what can and what cannot
four, five,
question
Locke's
answer
does
68
us
Interpretation
by
tradition?
It does
not"
sixth question
does
not
contain
from
the natural
inclination
of the mankind?
61].)
is
as
The
result of
no
textual
as
evidence
inclinations
the
of
epistemic
the law
of
nature,
and since
metaphysics and
epistemology
separate and
distinct,
at
ments
in folio 18
or statements
derivable
folio 18 that
Locke's
The
remarks about
I
best
now consider
Zuckert's
objections
to Locke's fourth
and
fifth
arguments.
existence
fourth
law
of nature exists
because its
is the
explanation
existence of societies.
But
what
Apparently
to this
conclusion:
It
seems
positing
some causal
the existence of
relationship between the existence of the law of nature and societies. The law of nature, then, creates societies in some sense. Locke
means can
Perhaps Since
selves
what
be
a
made a
little
clearer
have both
disposition to live
with others
implanted in them
by
God
law
prescribes in ensure
virtue of this
disposition, they
the
act of covenant
keeping. He
one of the
foundations
on
which
human society
seems
to
rest
(fols. 18
and
understand that
keeping
promises
is important
to
legal
keep
were
partly
upon
"These removed,
all
community among
men
[foundations]
Zuckert's
Locke's
themselves"
collapse central
(fol. 19).
line
of attack on the
and
argument
in folios 18
19
with
viability of consensus in the seventh question (fol. 62). For example, in the fourth argument, Locke argues that the law of nature exists because its existence
best
explains
why human
societies
form. Zuckert
adds:
"the law
of nature as
human beings
are sociable
in
nature"
(1994,
p.
204). In the
seventh
question,
however, Locke
consider consensus
in
positive or natural
law
of nature at all.
By
conse
'positive
Locke
as as
among people that "issues from compact, either tacit, when some common human necessity or advantage draws men to it, such the free movement of ambassadors, a free market, and other things of this
means consensus
kind;
or
expressed,
as the establishment of
na
tions, the
embargo against
kind"
buying
(fol. 63).
goods,
and
many
other
consensus'
Locke
means
"an
ol natural
instinct
without the
Discussion: Locke
intervention
it is based
ever"
on
Natural Law
69
compact"
of
any
on a
because
"entirely
because there is
or no
no con of
sensus
actions,
consensus of
opinions,
consensus
principle
nations
as
promising
of
he
makes
view of
the
futility
seeking
reliance
in the
consensus of mankind
in folio 63
contradicts
his
his
premise
Unfortunately, Zuckert's
contradiction?
ment
is
why human societies form. Why does this look like a Locke's fourth
argu
The
reason
is that Zuckert
are
assumes that
humans
sociable
in
seems to
be
this?
This is
because Locke
argues that
in
of nature,
humans have
a sociable nature.
Notice the
Apparently,
no matter
it is from this
societies.
humans
his
Later, he
seems to undermine
by
arguing that
how
we
is
always
the same. We
now
will
make
some comments
about
Zuckert's
First, let
us
in the
Zuckert has correctly described Locke's fourth argument and his seventh question. Has Locke contradicted himself? No, because in
point; in the seventh ques
me attempt
fourth argument, Locke is making a metaphysical tion, however, he is making an epistemic point. Let
the
point.
to clarify this
Let
law
or
Also let
law
to,
in
sense,
explains
sociable nature.
Finally,
suppose that a
in
virtue of a sociable
inclined to
agree to
live together in
community
is the
In sum, let
fourth in
argument.
But
what
relevance?
In short,
all these
because they
purport
to
describe
or mirror
Let
us
turn
now
Again,
what
argue?
He
at
of nature exists
by looking
the kinds of agreements humans make, whether those agreements are positive
But why is this true? Locke gives us several reasons. On the one hand, Locke argues that one cannot find any universal convergence about the agreements humans make (see fols. 63-78). On the other hand, Locke in
origin or natural. argues that
agreement
"even if there
were to exist
among
some opinion or
another, this
nature"
of
something that is
challenge
not
the
law
of nature
out
Having
follows.
spelled
Zuckert's understanding
Locke, my
is
as
70
Interpretation
contradiction?
Where's the
The
answer
is
simple enough.
There is
no contradic
purpose
in his fourth
argument and
his
arguments
in
of reasoning.
My
fourth
second comment
argument.
While he
is that I think Zuckert partly misunderstands Locke's understands the basic thrust of the argument, namely,
for
the creation of
suggest
human societies, he
attributes
argument.
What I
is
by missing it were, in Locke's argument, i.e., the sociability of human nature. He thinks that accounts for why societies form in the first place, for without the
views prem
Locke's
pointing to a
ise,
as
sociability
of
would
humans
agree not
community?
Such
detail
seems
plausible; it is
Locke's
in
the
fourth for
point
is
much narrower.
He merely
"since
argues
that the
law
of nature exists
because its
existence appears
societies exist.
Of course, he does
how
write:
this law
themselves"
among
to
make
we are supposed
Zuckert
My
law
third and
final
comment
is that
while
role of the
in the fourth argument, it is nothing at all like Zuckert's interpretation. This is what Locke says. First, society cannot exist
of nature and agreements
without of the
"the
keeping
agreements"
of contracts and
existence
law
of nature ensures
that, in
they
make.
sense, humans take seriously contracts Locke thinks this is true because "there would
some
be
to
no reason
by
an agreement
fulfill
promises came
from
will of
about
(fol. 20)
But
notice
carefully
what
Locke
It's
not a
why
people make
story
about
why
people are
keep
Now
a promise. what
do the
no
is
that there
question
is
contradiction
between
the
fourth
argument
the seventh
not tie
role of consensus
in
any
sense
justification fourth
law
of nature.
If I
am correct,
Locke's
text
later
on.
Locke's fifth
be
no virtue or
of
Nature there
would
vice, no
praise
for probity
or punishment
for
wickedness"
(fol.
20).
tion
Here, he
law
of nature exists
explana
for
praiseworthy
most normal
for
untoward actions.
means that
of
individuals have
wrong because
the
Discussion: Locke
existence of some of
on
Natural Law
71
the precepts of the law of nature within their minds. It is because of this sense of right and partly wrong that individuals create moral systems for themselves and society in general in order to give to themselves some indication of moral order. Without the existence of the law of nature and
the
duty
is. This
be
subject
only to
what either
interest
be "the
absolutely free judge of his own Zuckert's challenge to the fifth argument is as follows:
supreme and
As stated, Locke clearly and decisively rejects this argument. As we have already seen, he traces human practices of identifying virtue and vice praising and punish ing them respectively to forces quite other than the law of nature. (1994, p. 206)
In
support of
with a passage
found in the
fourth
question:
Indeed,
these opinions
concerning
on their
what
is
firmly
kind
which are
infused into
little
guard, when we
are still of a
form
are
selves.
They
judgment concerning them or notice how they insinuate them instilled by our parents or teachers and by others with whom we
a
as
sociate, who,
mation of a
since
they believe
proper
for
life,
are
themselves, possibly because they have been themselves taught instill those opinions they think
yet
necessary to a happy and blessed life into the young. (Folios 42 and 43)
inexperienced
minds of
the very
In addition, Locke
find
beliefs,
there is a
our
inscribed in
Zuckert's
strong tendency in humans to think that "these hearts by god and (fols. 43-44).
nature"
objection appears to
be
on the
Locke both
law
of nature exists
for
this
However, Locke
explanations
seems to
deny
instead
better
in terms
of our par
we should reject
Zuckert's line
he
of attack writes
because,
way.
again,
what
in the fifth
in the fourth
question are
not related.
point
This truth in
can
be illustrated in the
following
in the fifth
argument?
He
is
explained
the law
of nature.
argues
exactly
when
does
this statement
Apparently
some
this.
an
Locke
that the
presence of
the law of
nature causes
(in
sense)
individual to
condemn
herself
72
Interpretation
an action she
she commits
believes is wrong
crucial point,
and to praise
herself
when she
Locke's
existence or
of the
law
of nature
does
not contribute
of what an
individual may happen to believe is praiseworthy tributes to our feelings of guilt or admiration.
The
question of the origin of our
or condemnatory.
It only
con
beliefs
still remains.
Locke's
answer would
may be too cursory for such an en deavor. This shortcoming is understandable, because such a discussion is outside of the purpose of his book. It is sufficient for our purposes to indicate some of
take too
long
to discuss and,
in
the end,
indicates, many of our opinions come from Elsewhere Locke discusses the role that tradition plays
of our moral
in the formation
of
many
second question).
silent.
Ill
Zuckert
law
and
Horwitz
argue that
Locke does
view of morality.
As I
evidence
scholars
bring
forward
passages exist.
contradictions
In
fact,
and
as
far
as
can
tell,
a
there
does
not appear to
contradiction.
qualifies as
true
logical
attacks on the
last
Let
us suppose aim
for the
that
are
Horwitz
Locke's
trying
to achieve
maintains
secretly trying to do or, at least, attempting to hide, in some sense, is revealed in the very last question, the eleventh: "Does the private interest of each individual constitute the foundation of the law of nature? It does
was
not"
Locke
what
Locke
was
attempting to do
was akin
to a
project
from
(Horwitz, 1992,
p.
is
basically
the same
(1994,
pp.
213-15). Such
a vision of the
tions
a
is
correct
only if two
last
is
in the Leviathan. As I have shown, the convinced, is also mistaken, but that is a
REFERENCES
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. In The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas. 2 vols. Edited by Anton C. Pegis. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997.
Discussion: Locke
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated
on
Natural Law
73
by
lishing Company,
1983.
1985.
Colman, John. John Locke's Moral Philosophy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
and the
Law
Nature."
of
Political
Theory 4,
no.
4 (1976):
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Edited by Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1995. Horwitz, Robert. "John Locke's Questions Concerning the Law of Nature: A Commen Edited by Michael Zuckert. Interpretation 19, no. 3 (Spring 1992): 251-306.
tary."
Lenz, John W. "Discussion: Locke's Essays on the Law of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27, no. 1 (1956): 105-13. Locke, John. Essays on the Law of Nature. Edited and translated by W. von Leyden. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958. Questions Concerning the Law of Nature. Edited by Robert Horwitz, Jenny Strauss Clay, and Diskin Clay and translated by Diskin Clay. Ithaca: Cornell Univer sity Press, 1990. The Locke Newsletter 23 (1992): 145-65. Stewart, M. A. "Critical Von Leyden, W. "John Locke and Natural Philosophy 31, no. 1 16 (1956): 23-35.
Notice." Law."
Nature."
on
the
and translated
by
W.
von
Press, 1958.
77!e Philosophical Review 67,
no.
Yolton, John.
477-98.
Nature."
4 (1958):
Zinaich, Jr., S.
Relativism."
and
of a
Natural Law
Theory
Reply
to
Zinaich
Michael P. Zuckert
University
of Notre Dame
Almost
fifty
years ago
Leo Strauss
the
a
stunned the
Locke-speaking
world
by
that
far from
was
being
in fact
easygoing
anti-Hobbesian
nearly orthodox but surreptitious follower of the Malmesbury. In order to support that substantive claim Strauss
practiced an art of philosophic rhetoric
whereby he partly his philosophy by emphasizing his connections to such traditional and orthodox thinkers as Richard Hooker and obscuring his agreements with such untraditional and unorthodox thinkers as Thomas Hobbes
concealed the
that
Locke had
true
foundation
of
and
reaction
were
pelled
genuinely intrigued by the new Locke Strauss revealed; others were re by the violence his picture did to their received views of Locke and the
uncover this new
methodology deployed to
virtue of
reaction
had the
fomenting
Strauss
lively debate,
both
on the substance of
Locke's philosophy
and on the
At
some point,
however,
opinion.
There
impressed
lesser degree.
by Among
I. There
Strauss
as no
longer to be worthy
review when
slurring book
Order
autonomous
except perhaps
for the
of
occasional
appeared.
Locke
Locke
or
by
of
"schools"
Locke
Strauss-influenced
continu
scholars continued to
pay
at
least
some attention
ing
that
to
attend
far,
more or
mostly to each other. The anti-Strauss partisans did not even go less ignoring Strauss himself and those whose work bore the
now
marks of
his influence.
written a very powerful attack against two of the Locke. Robert Horwitz is no longer alive to de
me
readings of
fend himself,
so
it has fallen to
critique.
philo
merits
Zinaich's
truly
disagreement
discussion that
ought never
to have been
and
Zuckert
and
Zinaich is in toto
quite
interpretation.
Fall
76
Interpretation
but the threshold issue
and
complex
can
be
As Zinaich
presents
it,
Horwitz
Zuckert
maintain that
Locke's Questions
attentive reader
contain
many inconsisten
lead the
from
a surface endorsement
a critique of
by
Locke
law philosophy to
very different and untraditional view orthodoxy instead. Zinaich maintains that Horwitz and Zuckert have not successfully made out the first component of their position, that is, the claim that the Questions is
that
riddled with
inconsistencies
and contradictions.
He
consistently endorses just the traditional Horwitz and Zuckert see Locke rejecting.
Professor Zinaich
nization
is
both
systematic and
thorough,
and
will
follow his
orga
here. He begins
claims
Horwitz's
essay:
(1) Although
in Locke's
gener
Horwitz
contradictions"
Questions, he only
ously
explains the
reference
identify
Zinaich
disparity
in
between Horwitz's
his
performance
by
could
finish his
commentary.
(2) Horwitz is
example
believing
presenting.
I find it
Professor Zinaich
should put
his very
weakest argument
first,
for he is
he
organized gether
form,
to
in I
tions.
of
confess
I have
but, in
Horwitz's
comments on
Question I, I labelled
see
four
contradictions
identified
by
Horwitz,
human
law."
although not
in
all cases
as such.
claims that
Locke first
"
appeals to an
"alleged 'universal
argument
race'
"foundation"
as a
points
for "the
for the
Horwitz
out,
exists"
ment
science"
(p. 253).
"alternative"
as an
also
however, that Locke later "finds that no such agree (2) Horwitz also says that Locke at first appeals to "con foundation for the existence of natural law, but later
this appeal to conscience (pp.
"rejects
outright"
natural
law
with the
"right
reason,"
but later
implying
that
any
natural
law he
still
accepts cannot
be
(pp. 253-54).
(4) Horwitz,
social
discussing
"suggests that
law"
life
ral
here
Locke
also
men and
therefore
is,
at
best, known
can a
an observation
for how
Locke
on
Natural Law
11
voluntary law nearly completely unknown serve the function Locke attributes to it? (5) Horwitz adds in his comments on Question II that Locke's insistence on men's general ignorance of the natural law "flatly contradicts the opening sentence of this where he spoke of 'that law of nature to which very Question,
men
with such
a
unanimous consent,
of which
more
inasmuch
have
as
they
could
hardly
law
'most
mortals
knowledge' "
no
of
many
cases, I do
not propose
to continue
to
demon
Horwitz
can
by
no means
be
said
contradiction
in Locke's Questions.
considerable space to
point
phenomena of conscience
for the
men
"who
or
law
by
which
they
directed
bound"
That shows, says Locke, there is a law under which they themselves, a law natural not positive. Locke quotes the poet Juvenal
science.
ness:
judge"
"no one who is guilty wins acquittal when he himself is (fol. 17). Juvenal's saying is especially useful to Locke at this point in his argument, for the Roman poet makes the kind of connection Locke is seeking between the inner judgment of conscience and law: "for without some law there can be no
judgment."
case
(where
conscience
judges those
innate"
who recognize
no other
law)
by
by
Locke in the
context of the
latter'
s exposition of the
conduct of men.
lack
law
of consensus on
any
wrong in the
Locke there
"men's
conscience confesses
to that inner
think
deny"; "those very persons who act wrongly, yet (fols. 67-68; Horwitz, p. 282). That is to say, the judgments men
prove
make against
they
know
even when
a
they fail to
different
conform their
behavior to those
standards.
Zinaich has
themselves"
view of
Locke's
Conscience
law
of nature
by
in the
is to
praise and
blame, but
law
of nature. and Zinaich, then, is the narrow one of whether later in Questions (e.g, Question TV), that the judgments or even
Locke's view,
expressed
of conscience are
in
among
presented
law
as an
conscience.
yes, Zinaich
Horwitz judges yes, because he believes the argument in Question I to or requires a more or less invariant conscience. Zinaich says no,
argument
in Question I is perfectly
compatible
with
78
Interpretation
character.
conscience of a variable
For the
sake
of concision,
let
us
refer to
these two
different
notions of conscience as
and
Cv
respectively.
Zinaich's I is
not
argument about
depends
on an
talking
is is
how the
content of
existence
shown or
inferred. Zinaich
instrument for
(according
to
Locke)
not a reliable
knowing
law,
of conscience
do vary
significantly.
But Cv is
nonetheless
basis (or
so
infer the
all
ral.
existence of
Locke is arguing, according to Zinaich) on which to fact that men judge themselves at
indicates they know of some law above them which is not positive but natu Zinaich also very helpfully characterizes Locke's argument in Question I as
"inference to the best
posited
explanation."
an
existence of a natural
law is
by
Locke infers
as the
best
explanation
for
the
facts
of conscience.
It is is
an argument that
unseen natural
law
as the
best
explanation
for
what
conscientious
judgment Locke
be
restated
observes.
The difference be
Horwitz
and
Zinaich
can
Horwitz:
(1) C,
(but
not
Cv) is
basis
infer the
existence of
the law
of nature.
from
con
(3) Therefore, he must be invoking C[ in Question I. (4) But later in Questions Locke insists that Cv is the case, not C,. (5) Therefore, Locke later contradicts the argument he made in Question
Zinaich:
I.
(1) Cv is a basis for inferring the existence of the law of nature. (2) Locke infers the existence of the law of nature in Question I. (3) Later on Locke makes clear that Cv is the case, not Q. (4) But this is compatible with the argument in Question I, and
Locke has
not contradicted
therefore
himself.
and of
Horwitz then
comes
down to step
(1)
in their
must
arguments.
Which
point
we
attempt
to establish.
In
order to
do so, there is
case
further
is
point we must
keep
in
mind.
rendered
by
conscience,
Locke is very
content,
tion
one and
invariant in
to and
binding
that
fact in hand,
argument is correct.
Zinaich,
I said, has
helpfully
Locke
called attention
on
Natural Law
79
Locke's
not
argument
is
of the
explanation"
himself
present
for
that
matter
does Locke
anything
more
than the
following highly
suggestive
comment:
For that
law of
the
himself is
. .
evidence
nature.
of nature
recognize
did
not exist
how does it
no other
that
conscience of
the commands of
law
passes
judgment
crime?
on their
very life
them of
(Fols.
17-18)
arguments to show that
I have four
(1) Q
for the
but
not
Cv
explana
can serve as an
existence of the
law
of nature.
refers an
(2) In Question I
proved as
Locke
"innate,"
but
not
from Cv.
when
Cv
and
denies
Q he
presents makes
for
conscience
than the
-law
of nature.
That is, he
law
of nature,
in his opinion, is
of
not
the "best
explanation"
for Cv.
(4)
His
appeal to the
nor
Neither Horwitz
authority Zinaich is
Juvenal implies Q.
explicit
in presenting his
construction
of
Locke's
argument
in Question I,
have in
mind.
so
venture the
following
as a reconstruction
Horwitz:
(law
of
imply
equally invariant
and univer
L.N.,
Q.
somehow
known
to
is the
cause
(2) Cv does
function
not
imply L.N.,
because
an
invariant
and universal
L.N. does
not
as a causal explanation
for Cv,
Zinaich:
why?
is
not the
Therefore, Zinaich
be
mistaken
ing
I
the
to
Cv in Question I.
in passing that the
of the
argument
must note
I have just
presented
does
not prove
nonexistence
law
of nature.
The
transcendent natural
compatible with
law I discuss in
argument
my
chapter
Cv. The
80
Interpretation
as
Locke
understands
it, is
not a valid
to infer the
existence of must
the law of
nature.
The
latter'
s existence,
which
if
that
is to be established,
what
be
established
in
different way,
is
exactly
proved
Locke
presents
in his Question V,
proclaims
as
explained
in Natural Rights.
nature
"innate."
To
call
it innate
allegedly means it
a claim
is
"inborn,"
and
known
of the
directly
Q
and a
to the human
mind.
This is
about
knowledge
law
of nature, not
only
law
about
its
existence.
Again, it is
of nature.
of nature that
of the
it is
But
reasonable
to describe
as the
deliverances
of nature.
innate law
the
Cv is
not evidence of an
innate law
variable.
If it is innate,
be
of nature
in this
argument
for Question I is
it
as
not one
allegiance
is
Not only the Locke of the much later this very description of Essay Concerning Human Understanding, but the younger Locke of Questions already denies the innateness IV, fol. 37). Since
natural
"innate."
of
knowledge
of the
law
of nature
(see Question
conscience as
law
of
only works as a warrant for inferring the existence of a its best explanation if the judgments of conscience show a high
then the facts of
great
degree
calls
invariance,
outlined
attention
to are quite
devastating
natural
law
in Question I. Locke
the
variability
these have
of conscientious
judgment when,
sents a quite
different "best
explanation"
for
the
now
not
trace the
judgments
of con
law, but
rather
Judgments
of conscience,
Locke
shows us,
do
existence of natural
the
force
within us of
call
"the law
opinion."
of
which
Human beings
dominant
in the society in
nature.
so much so that
they
standards of moral
judgment they learn in the nursery with the promptings of It is that confusion Locke means to expose in his apparently vacillating between
conscience and the
law
of nature
(see
espe
evidence
in Question I
as
testimony
quotation
in
mind
Q. Consider the
"guilty,"
is guilty
wins
acquittal when
he himself is
judge"
Juvenal,
Locke, following
him,
have
says
no
without qualification.
we read
point) if
The saying would make no sense (or it in Zinaich's way. Zinaich takes a statement, which,
true or
force of right and wrong in it into the completely uninteresting tautology that no one believes himself guilty believes himself innocent.
meant to make a claim about the
false, is
Locke
on
Natural Law
81
of
Natural Rights
of the
Questions in
Locke's
chapter
claim that
arguments
purporting to establish the existence of a law of nature in Question I cannot be arguments he accepts, because they depend on conceptions of the nature of the
law
of nature out
of the
law
of nature
Locke himself
lays
Questions
proceeds.
Zinaich is
replies
quite
far
as
consider
to my
very
briefly
maintained
in my book. There was indeed much overlap between my chapter and Horwitz's essay (and Strauss's earlier essay), but my thesis was somewhat different from
Horwitz's. I treat the
there
arguments
in Question I
as arguments that
"persuade"
that
is
law
of nature,
arguments persuade
Locke carefully does not say that these him. Given the fact that we can relatively readily identify
notice that
but
different
precedent
thinkers (some
the
five
arguments
explicitly cited by Locke) who forwarded Locke summarizes, I surmised that Locke
of that convince the partisans of natural similar catalogue of
presenting the
such a
arguments
exists.
he knew
law that
thing
Pufendorf, in his
arguments, is
with others
while
very
(at
least)
inconsistent
Locke,
less
it, presents them in such a way that inconsistencies relatively apparent. My hypothesis, then, was that Locke pre sented in Question I a series of arguments raised and held to be persuasive by
earlier suade
thinkers, but that he does not there endorse them as arguments that him. The rest of the Questions represents an attempt by Locke to
evaluate
per
sort
through and
these arguments.
My
point, therefore, is
not
that Locke is
contradicting himself, but that he is recon not by himself but by his sidering and ultimately rejecting the positions taken predecessors. I do agree with Horwitz, however, that Locke is less than perfectly
throwing dust in
our eyes or
directly
is his
project
in Questions,
and
he does
attribute
execute
it in
way
that
do:
to
him
an endorse
ment of
the arguments
in Question I
and therewith of a
very
eclectic or confused
theory
of natural
law.
natural
law
and
his
cautious or
gingerly
manner of
treating it
reflect a most
important intellectual
and political
development
of
the
restoration.
As I
argued
nation
culminating in universally
a regime
seen
culminating in the Cromwellian "repub to have failed by 1660. The civil conflict, civil had
all
war,
and
Cromwellian
dictatorship
found their
source
in the disruptions
attempts
produced
by
the Protestant
Reformation,
and the
conflicting
to find a
82
Interpretation
(or the) proper political embodiment of the Reformation. Given the ambiguities of Protestant political theology and the differences among the sects, the quest for the holy grail of a true Protestant politics had led to disaster. Locke was just
one of
many thinkers
grounding for
biblical
political
life. The
exploration
of natural
law,
guiding
set of
be independent
of specific
revelatory
he
or
dominant intellectual
share
response
to this situation.
seems to
As Locke
forward to
in this
widespread project,
mind:
somewhat
adequate
(1)
As
to examine
in
place of
in
Locke
was predisposed,
it seems, to take
a critical stance
Descartes'
toward the
novel
tradition, for he had already been much influenced by philosophic system, an influence that led him to be critical of the
invoked in
attempt
premises
scholastic natural
that, in Aristotle.
phy
a
(2) To
to find
in
some
basis for
political
life. Locke
appears to
have
of
to the agenda of
moving politics off the biblical-theological basis (with its repeated disasters) and onto more
accessible various
century
"neutral"
grounds, in
principle more
had
guided such
Robert Filmer,
Phillip Hunton,
and
John Milton.
on
as
of Christianity and An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke's commitment to this agenda. His agenda involved not merely
ment to some one particular version of natural
law, but
a commitment
to that
philosophy
and practice.
goal of
finding
agenda
philosophically
adequate
theory
of natural
doctrines,
half
of
his
the
flaws
of the natural
as an
law
theology based
point
on one or another
to just
Questions in fact
was.
Thus Profes
Zinaich,
philosophy largely has to do with making argu Locke's political philosophic activity. I Locke
never published the
guess,
by
Questions
because he did
believe he had
set
quite succeeded
himself here.
Ill
In
order
to prevent my reply
propose
from my
being
original
essay, I
to limit
response
mostly to his
critique of the
first
Locke
line
of argument
on
Natural Law
of
83
he identified in my
relevant to
chapters.
The line
above
discussion
Horwitz
on conscience claimed
is
my
own second
of
argument, for
I, too, had
argument
that Locke
subsequently
regarding defense of
law.
My
defense
of
thus also a
the
key
claims
I had
raised
suade"
I argued, it may be recalled, that three of there is a natural law could not be the
appeal to conceptions of natural
replied
Locke,
he
endorses.
by insisting
reasons
in those three
invoked
arguments
is
consistent with
Locke's
own
definition.
I identified two
notion of natural and
for
doubting
with
that Locke's
own.
first
argument
law identical
his
Professor Zinaich
entered a
long
subtly argued objection to one of these reasons, but completely ignored the other. Since either one alone suffices to make my point, I could save space by merely restating the second point: according to Locke's definition, the "law of
nature can
will"
be
so
described (as
law) because it is
"the
proper
(fol. 11). But Aristotle, Locke's authority in his first argument, speaks of a matter to be discerned by reference to the natural function of
man,"
constitution of man.
of the argument
he
Neither Aristotle himself explicitly nor the general structure makes requires or involves any reference to a divine will (or
These Aristotelian
principles of
to any will
are not
for that
as
matter).
"proper
functioning"
laws
Locke
understands
law; law
lack
requires an authoritative
lawgiver
and obligation.
Aristotle's
speaks
principles
an authority, a
lawgiver,
and obliga
tion.
Thus Aristotle
in
is
a place cited
not of
by
"well-performed,"
authority for the notion that there are natural standards of human action, but not for the notion that those standards have the character of law, a distinction Locke's own definition of the law of first
argument
Locke
cites
perhaps an
nature
argument
is therefore
One
no author
ity
out as
at all
for the
natural
law Locke
purports
to be
establishing.
could with
any defined
contradiction accept
the Aristotelian
law
by
My
must
"From
some
Aristotle?)
perform
by
reason
(fol. 13).
reason,'
'dictate
of
and therefore
rejected
'law
nature'
of
accept"
Locke
attributes
(Natural Rights,
of
193). Zinaich
and that
counters
reason"
is
equivocal
it
by insisting that the phrase "dictate is being used differently in Locke's first
earlier rejected.
argument than
"Locke's
same
use
Zinaich instead
says that
reason'
by
(in fol.
13)
reason,'"
thing
as
'according
to
Locke had
quoted
84
Interpretation
Zinaich's instincts here
are
good;
one ought
is,
be
as
intelligible
and
internally
and
consistent as possible.
But
one should
interpret it
I believe both
here
speak
Locke's
specific against
formulation
the
substance
of
the
thought
ea
strongly
reason
Zinaich's dictat
put
reading.
First, Locke
says
"ut
homnu
necessario
ratio":
"so that
more
men must
to
it slightly
literally
do. The
word
Locke
from
dictate
of
reason) is
constructed.
dictatum rationis, Given the fact Locke has just made much of
rejecting the
use of the
understanding
unlikely.
of natural
as
dictatum
rationis on
very
same word on
folio 13 to
mean
claims) is
rationis
highly
Locke's
view
objection
lay
down is
and
of nature as
it discusses
investigates
law
which
ordained
by
higher
power
(fol. 12).
"Reason,"
of this
interpreter"
(ibid). Zinaich in
no more
reason
construal
does
not
fit
with as
"quae dictat
ratio"
means
the same
Aristotle's
reason"
"according
to
does
not
help, for
rationis
the
latter is
almost as not
faculty
gives
First,
reason
needed
to
make
a precept
into
law;
and
second, Locke
discursive,
son
purely possibly be
rea
as
reason"
authority to
in the
sense
to reason substantive
principles
that allow it to be
if
not
fully
can
be
either.
reason can
To say that reason can discover laws is not the same dictate or give laws. Aristotle's notion of human function
say
("activity
according to reason") clearly has a more substantive and prescriptive character than Locke is willing to grant to reason, as is visible in his treatment of knowl
edge of the ends of action
in book 6
on
of the
of phronesis.
"dictating"
both
grounds
to reason as
to nature rather than the divine will) the alleged natural law
argument
is inconsistent
with the
definition
of natural
presents
in his
is
one
good, or
natural activity for human beings, but without much more (or something less in the case of "dictates of reason") this argument, even if sound, falls well short of establishing the existence of a law of nature.
a
Locke
Locke's
from
second argument
on
Natural Law
85
is
somewhat
argument
of
conscience
Zinaich
witz's
claims about
I have already discussed in the context "contradictions." Locke's The issue now is not
and
Hor
whether
Locke later
argument
contradicts what
conscience
he
says
from
implies
a natural
whether the
natural
law.
of
My
because Lockean
natural
deliverance
response
discursive reason, and conscience does not qualify as this. Zinaich's familiar. "Locke is not using the existence of men's conscience as
the
is
a means to
knowledge
of the
law
nature."
of
He
reiterates
his
earlier point:
The
exis
is "the best
It is
explanation"
of conscience.
my
and
previous rejoinders:
not
the
best
explanation on
Locke's
own
account,
of the with
law
of nature
from
the
of
fact
of conscience
as
knowledge
of the
law
nature,
Locke indicates
by declaring
the law
of nature as
(fol. 18). allegedly implied by conscience to be In Natural Rights I argued that Locke's third argument for the existence
"innate"
of
implies
defines it
as
do
the two
Zinaich
again makes a
pointed out
that
very smart reply, but one not true Locke's law of nature is prescriptive (it
issues
of nature
implied in
argument
Locke, he maintains, speaks of the law of nature in a double sense. Some beings (e.g., nonhuman animals) are governed by a fixed or determinative law, a law
which operates
causally
rather
than
by
address
to their
faculty
for free
action.
Human beings, however, are governed by a law of nature that is prescriptive. In so arguing Zinaich attributes to Locke a doctrine that is fairly standard in the
antecedent natural
most
Zinaich's
subtle
distinctions
with
Locke's
discussion. Unlike
Thomas Aquinas, Locke does not distinguish the operation of the law in rational animals from its operation in other beings. Zinaich, it is true, claims one impor
tant
us
piece of
Man, Zinaich
his
tells
nature.
To
prescribe
attention
all other
things, but
that
prescribes
(praescribere) for
man.
This
be
a more powerful
argument than
it is if Locke had
not spoken
in the
law
binds
fixed law
For
what prescribes
to each
law"
thing
(fol. 18
added).
Locke is
not
deploying
Zinaich's distinction
between prescribing binding, for the fixed or bound things are also said to have their law prescribed. We thus have no reason to suppose Locke means to
and
supplies
for him.
86
Interpretation
Zinaich's
construal of
by
an admirable
desire
to
make
He loses
said
as opposed to what
he
might
have
if he
Zi
law
naich's
interpretation
truly noteworthy
aspect of
is his insistence
on
in the
things,
"each
gives
for
speaking it applies to
notion of
of the natural
nonhuman
Hippocrates'
of
passes over
deterministic
thing."
the law
in favor
of arguments and
illustrations he does
real point
be Locke's
natural order
(a
causal
order)
with another
(a
moral order).
Locke
seems eager
by
many
of a
law. This is
of course not to
say there is
no natural
law; it
is merely inadequate
I have
admire
now
followed Zinaich
careful
about
halfway
reading
he provides, I
am
not convinced
discrediting
not
the
intend
a word
his arguments, but before closing I must say his treatment of the first part of my "second line of in his essay where he calls me that Locke had deleted from his
out
argumentation."
This is the
make
place
my
not
point
I did
pay
by
Zinaich
for calling my attention to this error; nonetheless, the point of my argument in Natural Rights is unchanged and unshaken by this textual correction.
I have two
mentation:
general responses to
Zinaich's
my
argu
(1)
part of
I claimed he was making in the text he left in his manuscript; (2) Zinaich has grossly oversimplified my arguments about Locke's first argument for the existence of the law of nature. Had he followed
nonetheless made the same point out
my
argument
in full, he
would
have
seen that
show
bring
out
uses to refute
Locke to have
refuted
In
order to
all
this
between Zinaich
and me.
less abstract, let me begin by stating the issue I had pointed out that Locke begins his arguments for
by invoking
I then
"consensus"
among
mankind
"on
conduct."
certain principles of
showed that
concluded that
Locke
believe that
standards
implied the
existence of natural
law,
since
he denies the
premise of
Locke
that argument.
consensus
on
Natural Law
to the
87
Zinaich
maintains that
could
find Locke
committed
moral
only by relying on the deleted passages. Zinaich believes that all Locke is actually claiming in his text is that "there exists some law, which obtains Zinaich has Locke appealing to the universal fact of the existence of some law everywhere, not to an agreement on the same law. The
everywhere."
lack
of consensus
Locke later
concedes
is, in
other
point
Locke is making according to Zinaich's reading. As should be evident, here a variant on the earlier disagreement about conscience.
have
We
also
product of
"some."
The
bare text
of the sentence
Zinaich
quotes can
bear
either meaning.
explicated
it in terms
of the
deleted passage,
which
definitely
sensus"
meaning.
Even
without this
this disputed sentence shows that Locke intends that sentence to denote the
consensus
reading
and not
Zinaich's
substitute
tence is
presented
by
Locke
to have
7. Locke's Latin
version goes
like
this (in translation): "it is rightly inferred that there exists some law of nature,
law
everywhere"
which obtains
means or
this, however,
rather
as a
Latin
version of the
quotes
misquotes,
Questions inform
material
In the
editors'
En
allegedly taken from Aristotle reads: "Dividing law into civil and natural, he [Aristotle] says, 'this natural law (fol. 13). (The italicized parts is that law which has everywhere the same
glish version,
Locke's
Greek
force'
'"
in Greek in Locke's
manuscript:
to
de
dynamin.)
is
law
that
which
has
everywhere
the same
Locke has Aristotle saying in effect that force (dynamis), and this is the
same
is the law
of nature.
force everywhere,
and
clear the
Greek
bear the reading Zinaich gives it: If different laws prevail in one cannot say there is a law with the same force everywhere. different places, further What Locke says immediately following the passage from
sentence will not
"Aristotle"
"consensus"
confirms the
reading
of the
first
part of
Locke's first
argument:
At this
exists at
for
all,
the
lives
as
if there
recog
at
nor
kind
"consensus"
This
objection
clearly is
addressed
to the
passage,
for it
contested at all.
This
to
wish
make about
Zinaich's treatment
my
rendition of
argument on
88
Interpretation
In reply to this The law of nature is not known
the
"objection"
Locke in
effect
everywhere.
Locke
ends
not
up his
presentation of
first in
identical)
to the one
Professor Zinaich
as
a
claims
he
affirms at the
outset of
Argument I.
"Indeed, just
that there exist no laws since various interpretations of those laws are to be
discovered among those expert in the laws, so too in Ethics, it hardly follows that there exists no law of nature, since in one place one thing is considered to (fol. 17). something else What Professor Zinaich does not bring out in his critique, however, is the fact that I had already traced the development of Locke's first argument to this be
a
law
of nature,
in
"
another
"consensus"
claim was merely tentative, stage of that argument, from which Locke retreated, dialectical step by dialectical step, until he concluded with the above quoted passage. Zinaich, in a word, failed to mention how I had shown Locke
first,
and
it turns
out
revising his
reader with
own argument as
he
went along.
the impression
last
his
critique
omitting important parts of the argument under examination. He also omitted the last stage of my presentation on Locke's first argument. Let me merely quote the last part of my treatment of Locke's argument. I begin
by ignoring
by
restating the
position reviewed
just
above:
what
natural
law to be is
"concerning
(fol. only in its interpretation; for all recognize that vice and virtue exist by 17). The nearly universal variation in what people take the content of the law to be is less important than the universal agreement that nature is the source of moral dis
differences
of
"interpretation"
of a
universally
but the
rec
content
is
in
law's
existence even
is.
Yet
this
fallback
Locke, for
is
not
again
be among those arguments that per he denies in his own name the premise upon
themes we have already
it is built. In Question IV he
.
The
problem
one conceded
in Question
a
I,
that "in
thing, in
another
dictate
of nature
among Locke
of
some
is
vicious
More
significant
in
among differ
ent
law
nature"
of
is that "others
nature
[recognize]
who
none."
know
of peo
in fact, is
"live ignorant
at all of what
virtuous"
right and
any law, as if they needed (fol. 42; cf. fol. 9). Human
of
beings do
ral
the second-order
immanence
the
natural
law. (Natu
Rights,
199)
Locke
Locke's argument, then, is both
than
much more
on
Natural Law
far
89
dialectical
and
more radical
Zinaich
an
allows.
at times
overly
selective
critique,
provides
excellent vehicle
Zinaich's essay can in taking seriously the issues and arguing so strenuously for his different inter pretation. It is invigorating to have such an adversary.
and tact.
for reappreciating Locke's philosophic acumen serve that function so well because he is exemplary
REFERENCES
Horwitz, Robert.
tary."
Concerning
the
no.
Edited
by
Law of Nature. Edited by Robert Horwitz, Jenny by Diskin Clay. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
and
the
Discussion
and
European
and
Edited
Carleton
Translated
by
Erik De Vries
University
purposes. First, it provides some background con cerning the little-known, and perhaps surprising, friendship between Alexandre Kojeve and Carl Schmitt. Second, it outlines the importance of their correspon dence and, especially, the lecture Kojeve gave at Schmitt's invitation in 1957, for an understanding of Koj eve's thought as less systematic and more ambigu ous
English-speaking
particularly during his lifetime, published nothing as overtly political as Schmitt did, these documents add more to our understanding of Koj eve's thought than
to that of Schmitt.
friendship
and
Carl Schmitt
improbable. When they began corresponding in 1955, Schmitt was some of an academic pariah; in 1933, the legal scholar had joined the Nazi Party, thing publicly declared his anti-Semitism, was later interrogated (but not charged) at
Nuremberg,
the
and retired on
from his
Hegel's
in 1946. After
Kojeve joined 71). After the
pp.
p.
war's end,
worked until
up in the French ministry of economic affairs, where he his death in 1968. Schmitt's anti-Semitism was sufficient to divide
other scholars with whom and
including
did
not
can
probably
also count
Editorial
longer
in these
articles
authors
can
no
make changes
in their
work and
because the
articles
have been
by
a third person.
Translator'
s note
I gratefully acknowledge the kind assistance of Kirsten Nellen in translating the most difficult of Kojeve's unusual German passages, and of Piet Tommissen and George Schwab, who provided corrections to the translation. I would also like to thank Charlotte Masemann both for her translation
of
Latin
phrases and
her
advice
Any
remaining
errors
are mine.
interpretation,
29, No. I
92
Interpretation
his
resume
friendly
correspondence with
Schmitt
after the
to
letter in 1933 (Meier, 1995, p. xvii). How Kojeve was able to look past such
is unclear, but
we
Schmitt's
in 1943,
anti-Semitism
do know that he
Schmitt
a considerable
phenomenologie presented
du Droit,
completed
in his Concept of the Political, relied largely on Schmitt's argument, that the friend-enemy distinction is the primary political division (Kojeve, 1981, p. 144). For Schmitt, establishing this distinction as primary was meant to pre serve the possibility of a serious political theory by overcoming liberalism's
tendency, particularly when combined with democracy, to obscure and neutral ize the political, that is, the possibility of battle to the death against an enemy (Schmitt, 1996, p. 23). Kojeve's use of the friend-enemy distinction in the Es
quisse echoes
his
earlier
on the anthropogenetic
battle for
Phenomenology
for purely
meaning
must
be
nonbiological
In both instances, the human capacity to risk life reasons engenders a historical and political world with
not reducible
(Kojeve,
Europe
1973,
p.
143).
when
By 1955,
Kojeve
and
western
had been astonishingly transformed by the Marshall Plan and the creation of the European Economic Community. If Kojeve's "universal and homogeneous
state"
had
not yet
concept of
If
be
the
human
if
forever be foreclosed in
and
the
distinction
of
friend
enemy
What
remains
is
law,
entertainment,
If
appear, I do
not
not
lead to
world peace
(Schmitt, 1996,
53-54)
With
IV
politics"
of
May
both
2, 1955, below), in
been
replaced
Europe
after
clear to
by
had
or
also not
Schmitt's
"administrative
peared
state"
p.
instead
"empires"
Both
1957
at
Kojeve
gave
in Dusseldorf in both
men on the
Schmitt's invitation
twilight world
shed some
light
on the thought of
nature of the
they
were observing.
Discussion:
93
im Volkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europeaum (1974, first published in 1950) and Land and Sea (1954b), Schmitt argued that the exhaustion of exploitable
lands
the
nineteenth-century colonialism had historical distinction between land and sea obsolete; colonial
had
given
by seafaring
empires under
rendered
"taking"
(Neh-
men)
way to
global
and
"grazing"
speech, his
response
to Land
of the
Sea, lays
out
for the
new
European
colo
Empire's domination
nialism"
Mediterranean basin
so much as a
with a
of
policy
of
"giving
his
which resembles
plan
nothing Kojeve
advocated
in Dusseldorf
French
government's
Economiques Exterieures (D.R.E.E.). An unpublished, posthumous report of Kojeve's administrative career describes both his advocacy of a unified Euro
pean economic
policy
and the
dismantling
grounds
of trade
for this
"giving
are
inhabit
clients,"
colonies
in Africa
Kojeve tells his audience, are "bad, or even dangerous, This last admission illustrates Kojeve's ambiguity concerning history's
pacity to determine or attenuate political action. Until at least
ca
1939, Kojeve
read
Hegel through
tion;
both
the
lens
of the master-slave
to the
sake of recogni
and, therefore,
obsolete.
ing
of
global
a period
in
which
he
obsolete
the postwar
severed the
master's
history; if
former
Man's capacity to risk life after history's end receives two distinct interpreta tions in Kojeve's postwar works. The first interpretation appears in the wellknown
addition to the second edition
"Japanized"
of the
of the
suicide"
in
"re-animalization"
(Kojeve, 1968,
end
p.
437)
Kojeve had
posited as
the
only
possible outcome of
history's
in the first
edition.
According
is
animalization
to this
interpretation,
posthistorical man's
If
is determined,
satisfied
as
Kojeve
in the
Introduction, by his
and
willingness to
be
by
homogeneous
the
state provides of
him,
latter
option
lies in
pilot
impossibility
Kojeve
uses as an example
The kamikaze
in
our time
by
the
suicide
bomber,
and, perhaps,
future,
(or
risks
a radical
wing
protesters:
the value
for
which
perishes
perishing) is
and will
"formal"
is, any
success
is temporary,
be forgotten
94
Interpretation
Posthistorical
men
cannot negate
overcome.
state
below)
and
will not
"dangerous
There is, in contrast, nothing formal or gratuitous about the risk from the in Kojeve's Dusseldorf lecture. In 1950, Kojeve had written
by
the posthistorical
brand
of recognition
p.
instead
"sick"
up"
classified as a world of
and are
simply "locked
(Strauss, 2000,
difference between the merely sick and the dangerous, however. His recognition of this difference suggests that the later Kojeve re
255). There is
mained open
to (if
not convinced
position:
that the
is
rooted
in
nature rather
than in
A
history
the text
history's
end.
note on
The
original
letters
and
lecture from
which this
translation
is
taken are in
German, in
which all
Consequently,
writings
frequently, but
Master
and
capitalization
not appear
in his French
(with
such terms as
do
in this translation.
The
correspondence and
Kojeve's Dusseldorf
speech
directly from
was
Piet Tommissen's meticulously annotated edition (Tommissen, 1998). While Kojeve to publish the lecture himself, a French translation has since been published in two
forbidden
parts
(Kojeve,
from it.
from the
original
German
here, but
enclosed
typographical
in the Tommissen
edition and
All
Round
and square of
brack
ets are
Schmitt's
is
and
Kojeve's; curly
uncertainty
ones
({ })
in two types
instance:
where there
some
(owing
to difficulties in reading
Kojeve's
handwriting)
and
in
cases where
I have
provided
Thank
you
very
much
for
kindly
sending
it
your
essay.1
made aware of
and read
Politik."
Rereading
an
it
To say every
so
thing
essential
in 10
pages
is
extraordinary
Of course I have something to say about it, but it is impossible to do letter. On the whole, however, I am fully in agreement.
in
With
like this:
respect
to your "last
questions"
in short, I
would answer
something
1) "in
itself"
there is
related attempts
since
Napoleon)
no
longer any
"taking"
(all
95
2) 3)
"for
us"
knowledge")
there
but "for
itself"
(for instance
is
vision."
The
goal
is
unfortunately!
in his
will
etc.
hemisphere
"distribute"
attains
more
it first
will
The
Americans'
"Point
and
IV"2
USSR
China,
But in the
"worldly
there
is
more
to distribute. Thus a
concrete prognosis
Faithfullv,
(s)
1.
Schmitt, 1953.
2. President
Harry
new
Truman's Point IV
program
1949,
as
"a bold
progress available
for
the
was introduced in his inaugural speech on January 20, for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial improvement and growth of underdeveloped namely, in Western
areas,"
Europe. It
marked an
important
advance over
European
Recovery
Program
not
(the Marshall
on
Plan),
which
focused
on economic
technology
transfer.
Plettenberg (Westphalia)
9/5 55
you the
the first information accompanying document (summer 1948). Your letter of the 2nd of
May,
which
conveyed
Otherwise I
would
Leon Bloy's
categories,2
if
Everything
on
215
of your
Introduction
la lecture de Hegel/ I do
conveyed
Hegelian "take
"atheist,"
God"
[Gott-Nahme]
is
Hegel
as
and we
Judgement."4
Bruno Bauer's amusing "Trumpet of the last yours on page 215 would have to change all present
phers right
philosophy,
who, in the
to the
your
course of
labor,
firm
"Philosophy"
however, today
share
opinion
that
"taking"
has
Napoleon,
remains
and
that
there
is only
he
production
.
(grazing
{geweidet}). There
{ausgeweidet}
cause
creates
The earthly God, who now only gives and no from Nothingness, creates Nothingness first of
he creates, i.e. takes.
thing, from
which
May I,
you
at the same
time,
essay
which will
hardly
for
other reasons
(it has to do
Festschrift3
with a
96
Interpretation
in which, however,
a remark
birthday)
modem
is reported, for
which
I recognize,
on the
earth,
Faithfully,
(s)
1. At
although
Iring Fetcher's
suggestion,
Roman Schnur,
Kojeve had already been aware of Schmitt's work, according to evidence gathered by Tommissen (1998, pp. 57-63). Kojeve's 1943 Esquisse dune phenomenologie du droit uses the
friend-enemy
translated
presented
in his 1933
edition of
Die
2.
by George Schwab as The Concept of the Political (Schmitt, 1996). Leon Bloy (1846-1917) was a passionate convert to Catholicism and a
page
It is
unclear
to
which categories
3. This
pp.
476-77
of the Hoff-
Hegel's Phdnomenologie des Geistes; 678 (p. 412) in the Miller translation (Hegel, 1977). In this passage, Kojeve starkly presents his view of Hegel as atheist: "Briefly, Man
meister edition of
himself thoroughly and completely as Spirit cannot satisfy himself except And this is why Schicksal, the Destiny of all Theology, of all Reli
atheism.
...
gion,
is, in
it
the
final analysis,
does
in the
mode of
"stellt sich
vor'
In theism, Man becomes conscious of himself. But he Vor-stellung [re-pre-sentation]. That is, he projects himself outside himself, [re-pre-sents himself), and, no longer recognizing himself in this projection, he
presence of a transcendent God. And it is thus that Hegel could say that only difference between his Science and Christian Theology consists in the fact that the latter is a Vorstellung, while his Science is a Begriff, a developed concept. In fact, it is enough to over
come the
Vorstellung, it is
enough to
enough to of
jected, it is
atheistic
say
grasp [be-greifen], to know or to understand what was Man everything the Christian says of his God in order to have the is at the foundation Hegel's
Science."
pro-
by
Pans, 16/V/55
Dear Mr. Schmitt, Thank The
you
very
much
for
your
letter,
the
accompanying card,
comes
and
the Jiinger
essay, which
I have just
"Hegel
read.
France"1
"Icon"
vient en
{"Hegel
to
France"}
certainly
. .
very
priceless
and appears to
be
quite a
"serious"! I
few
K."
would
not
is really have
"subsumed"
you under
Bloy: I knew
of your writings.
That I dislike
{"K.'s
existentialist com
extremely2
certainly goes without saying. But unfortunately it is gen France. in The only truth about it is that I sought (and now am erally customary again seeking) to reach a "mise a {"update"} of Hegel. If
mentary"}
jour"
"existentialist"
"modem,"
or even
"a la
mode"
{"fashionable"}
then I am in
page
on my In my course I spoke of Hegel's anthropo-theism, but I also emphasized that it has to do not only with a mortal but really with a dying (and perhaps already dead) God.
You are,
of
215,
as you cited.
97
understood that!
Besides them, I have only heard it from an and forgotten the name of the
us."3
as the rest of
Real
Anglo-Saxon
irony
and
"Ver{?}zenheit."4
But it
used to
For nobody (besides me) understood be completely different. Heinrich Heine, e.g.,
going for help, I say whose buildings are
asks
knew it very well. In the Pariser Tagebuchern5 (page forgotten!) it goes some like this: "Since I am no longer a it is also well for me. thing Hegelian, Now if somebody comes to me, complains about life, and to him: / am no longer God! Turn to a suitable institution,
usually
bells."
Yes,
people
of years as
it
pertained
to
have
"existentialism"!!] is
even after
top.
Just to
it is
so
difficult that
over the
a
very
few
understand
it. And
At the time
of
my
course
always
inwardly
"Stalin"
read
instead
nology.
"Napoleon"
of
and nevertheless
=
your
termi
=
Stalin
"the Alexander
empire].
of our
"industrialized
Napoleon"
World
(=
Country)
enlarged and
ble"
was completely right and that history was already historical Napoleon. For, in the end, Hitler was only a "new improved of Napoleon ["La Republique une et indivisi
edition"
{'The
indivisible
Republic"}
"Ein Land,
ein
Volk,
Fiihrer"
ein
{"One country,
time
middle)6:
had done it
as well as
Hitler, it
unfortunately Hitler did it 150 years too brought nothing essentially new. And the first one was just an intermission. What did Napoleon want? To ["aufheben"} the state as such, in
"sublate"
certainly have been enough. But latel Thus the second world war
favor
"society."
of
able
to attain it through a
"total"
victory in the
"total"
(Through this
"total"
ing
completion"
[state
(and
could
thing (cer
tainly
And Marx
also meant
freedom [to do
what?!)."
could
still
States in the
word,
governments
anything
other than
administrations
and politics
The Americans do
not
have
never
known
are
what
war,
(the
"boys"
die
as
soldiers, but
killed
as police
[But
you
know
pour
Dantzig"10?!) Africa,
for
vie"
Asia?
correctly say,
attain the
history
is
unique and
these countries
of
No,
as you
famous "niveau de
{"standard
living"}
"American way
98
of
Interpretation
life""
and
"armament"
there
opportunity to
success!
The disarmament
conference
is certainly is well
no on
When I [foreign
was no
political
entered
=
"state"
foreign "policy") I thought (only after several yearsl) that there longer any State at all. Parliament and government (i.e. the formerly
trade
structures)
maintained
decide,
tion"
determine
or
do anything
mutual
"neutraliza
carry
out
its
work
unencumbered,
i.e.
guage).
[could] Certainly
no
rather
(= organize the
"grazing,"
policy."
Domestic politics,
however,
longer
nothing; for
they
are,
by
and
everybody wants, of course, the same thing, namely large, if not satisfied [befriedigt] at least contented
elite
[zufrieden]
only if
[and the
most
dissatisfied
is
a revolutionary, so-called
i.e.
political power
Externally, everything
street"},
who can no
to
be "as it
used to":
even to the
"homme de la
{"man
of the
longer take
it
seriously.
When I had
ply
and
a
seen
USSR is
sim
bit
"modern"
more
Here,
Parliament
without
having
not
changed.
install
a new government
government, but
a new administration.
Government Thus
end a
Parliament is
=
"fascism"
(tyranny). Thus it
clear that
not
was
at
Stalin. It became
(=
it doesn't
work. what
Russian
"Parliament"
desperately
"king"
sought, but
=
found. But to
Parliament
is
Regius
State)?! Or,
otherwise:
to
of
Parliament
exists to
when everybody remains quiet anyway and "parliamentary" be dealt with in a way (or
no
danger
a
"king"
by
without
"Parliament").
"anticommunist"
What do
such
Russians
as
may be
want?
The
the
same as the
"communist"
peacefully."
Only
vs.
former think is
not a
that the
political
latter
Malenkov12). But
that
problem, and
is necessary,
nor a
state at all,
but just
an administration. on
a
So
ment
"World
prognosis"
one.
"Appeasement"13
Disarma
{Abriistung} politics (for otherwise {?} unemployment in the {pun}!) "Point of raw materials and industrial products (= "graz USA14) "rational without "destruction") in the West equalization of income within each
IV" division" ing"
("without indignation
to make a calembour
country
And
and after
between
countries
("underdeveloped
"non-Hegelian"
10-20 years,
even a
Discussion:
not only want the same thing (in fact, "alignment" Then will be easy.
since
thing}.
All (with
of
this as
commentary
on my:
"whimsical"
production, which
"education"
"no longer any taking, but only depends on working time, which is
of not
grazing"
func
tion of
[Bildung],
Sea"16
being
Your "Land
I
agree with
and
remains.
"brilliant"
everything (of what is certainly know it yourself) except for the but is no longer. And this you say yourself, p.
you
in it, I
will
question of time.
156.17
it something like this: longer any but only "inland [One needs the anachronism of Mussolini's Italian foolishness in the 20th century to believe that the Mediterranean is still a political phenome
one could express no
Superficially,
economically, there is
"Roman"
"ocean,"
water"
non:
and
has been
"sublated"
in
be "pulled And
out of the
air,"
fend"
only want and are able to "de themselves, there is no longer any history and thus no Please forgive the long and confused letter. But I also wanted to put my
where all
. .
anymore anyway.
"timely
considerations"
before
"competent"
judge.
Faithfully,
(s)
1. Tommissen identifies Kojeve's 2.
subject
here
as
Dufrenne, 1948.
Reading
dusserst where
Tommissen's
3. In English.
4. Illegible in the original, according to Tommissen's edition. 5. I was unable to find any work by Heine by this title, although Kojeve may be referring to collection of Heine's Paris articles, since published as Pariser Berichte 1840-1848 (Heine, 1979).
view
Tommissen's
is that the
quote
is
not
Heine's;
In
letter from
April 15, 1849, Heine writes, "In manchen Momenten, besonders wenn die Krampfe in der Wirbelsaule allzu qualvoll rumoren, durchzuckt mich der Zweifel ob der Mensch wirklich ein zweybeinigter
Gott ist,
wie mir
den
selige
Professor Hegel
mehr
vor
funfundzwanzig
p.
Jahren in Berlin
versichert
hatte
...
gottlicher
Bipede
(Heine, 1982,
112). ("In
certain moments,
especially
years ago
croire que
par
really is in Berlin 1 am
...
agonizingly through my spine, the doubt crosses my Hegel assured me twenty-five Hegel m'avait fait biped.") From Nov. 3, 1851: ". divinite, je me croyais si grand que, quand je passais
.
no
longer
si
divine
ma
j'etais
un
Dieu! J'etais
ou
fier de
la
porte
Saint-Martin
c'etait une made me
craignant
''
de
me
heurter
146).
contre
l'arc
belle epoque,
depuis longtemps
my Saint
(Heine, 1972,
p.
divinity, I believed myself so great that, when I passed through the door of Saint Martin or Denis, I involuntarily lowered my it was a belle epoque, which is long gone. head for fear of hitting myself on the arch ") gener 6. This error, according to Schmitt, is to respond to the contemporary "call of
(".
. .
Hegel
believe I
was a god!
was so proud of
history,"
ated
by
the dialectic between land and sea, with "the old answer": "While
and
people
believe themselves
to be historical
once."
stay
7. Kojeve's meaning throughout is ambiguous, since Politik means both tics"; Aussenpolitik is translated here in its common English usage as "foreign
and
"poli
policy,"
whereas
100
Interpretation
no real
Innenpolitik, having
mestic
meaning if translated
appears
as
"domestic
policy,"
is translated below
as
"do
politics."
The
"Police"
word
in brackets
immediately
after the
German
word
Polizei here.
9. In English.
10. "Mourir based L'Oeuvre
orator
Dantzig?"
pour
was the
headline
of an article
in the
May 4, 1939,
by Marcel
in the
Vichy
government as
founder Polish
of the
Deat
to
argued
corridor
French
am
indebted
pp.
See
also
146-48.
was chosen
by Stalin
to
replace
him
as
Communist Party
ten days.
1953,
which
Malenkov
did, for
Nikita
Krushchev (1894-1971),
split the
two
posts.
They
agreed, and
secretary of the party, persuaded Politburo members to Krushchev became party secretary, while Malenkov took the
significantly less power. On February S, 1955, Krushchev Malenkov, installing Nikolai Bulganin (1895-1975) as prime minister. At the time Kojeve wrote this letter, Krushchev had taken a staunch anti-Western position, and would thus have ap peared an unrepentant Stalinist (and hence "communist"). Malenkov, on the other hand, had advo
post of prime
minister,
a position with
ousted
cated
foreign policy
of reconciliation
with the
West
and a shift
in domestic
economic
policy
away from
heavy industry towards consumer goods (thus playing, in Kojeve's terminology, the "anticommunist"). In fact, Krushchev proved to be anything but a loyal Stalinist, as evidenced by his 1956 "secret denouncing Stalin's practice of political persecution; moreover, his concil iatory foreign policy came to resemble Malenkov's almost immediately after the latter's ouster
speech"
(Marantz, 1975).
13. In English.
14.
Partially
edition.
referring to Schmitt's
eponymous
book Land
und
Schmitt's essay in the Jiinger Festschrift (Schmitt, 1955). 17. Here Schmitt discusses the radical separation of the technological {die Technik) from the normative standards of criticism and from "dialectical-historical
thought."
26/5/55
received
your
letter
11/51
of
on
journey
in
southern
Germany: I
will
answer
it from
Plettenberg
IV"
after
my
return
confirma
I certainly understand "K. remains hu That "Point is our constitution is confirmed to me here every single day; I flee from the overcrowding of the streets back into my shelter.
tion of
receipt and
man."2
At the
same time
would
like to
und
2nd
edition of
my
Meer"3; forgive
me
for
presupposed
to submit to
daughter
essay4
and
is hence
forgivable.
Many
ceived
thanks
your
for the
abundance of your
re
in
last letter!
Yours, (s)
-101
Kojeve's letter
rests
human"
of
16/5.
(in English).
Mohler, 1955.
Paris,
Dear Mr. Schmitt, many thanks for
Meer."
28/V 55
your
letter
and the
friendly
transmission
of your
"Land
und
read
important
clearly
I
and simply! am
I already told
you that
completely in
And
concerning
"elements."
now
see
the future are also less different than one could believe on the basis of the
Jiinger
few
essay.
Your
answer to
my letter interests
know
me extraordinarily:
today
there are
very
(and thus
"history")
with
are, or
rather,
Yesterday
and
day
in bureaucratic discussions
was a good
Englishmen
as much of
Americans
"Land-Sea"
"Convertibility"': that
illustration,
the
contrast as of
l'Histoire"
{"lessons
one2
of
history"}!
Really
danger
{?}
the philosophy
{?}2
of anachronism
Most respectfully,
Faithfully, (s)
1.
"Convertibility"
agreement reached at at
ber
states
were
"convertible"
fixed for
rates
convertible
to gold. In practice, this only happened at the end of 1958. France was never an enthusi
placed
the onus
keeping
fixed
on
members
(a fault
which
led to the
overvalued
2.
during the period 1968-71). See Bordo, Partially illegible,. according to Tommissen's
1994.
edition.
Plettenberg
7/6/55
"state,"
that
is true; this
mortal
be
modem administration-apparatus of
"government"
the "care of
is
not
in Hegel's sense,
not
know if
you
were
able
to
both sides)
102
Interpretation
which played
arts'
comedy
tion and
itself
out
in Gottingen because
the "Gottingen
and
Seven"
a parody-reprise of
1837);
no
longer
death penalty;
grant
hence
also no
longer
capable of
making
history. Nonetheless, I
that
however,
of the view
for the
next3
now major
homines
{greater men}
Grossraum4;
how
and
Grossraum, i.e.
row's
a planning-space suited
technology [Technik]. I do
Earth,
no matter
small even
it may have become, to be a planning leave open if it ever can become one.
sense of a contrast to and
"small-space"
unit
not
by
long
not
shot;
have, for me, the KleinI { Raum} (which {say} only in passing
does
"Grossraum"
the sense
enables meaningful
an opposition
and
is hence
{which
unity of the world, i.e. against the assumption that the cycle of time is already over. That is what I do not believe. Le cercle n'est pas encore parcouru {The circle has not yet been travelled}. The contemporary world-dual
ism (of
end of
to-date"
east and
west, or land and sea) is not the final dash for unity, i.e. the
which
the
road
to
new "upnew
no-
mos5
of
homines {great men} leads. I am thus looking for the the Earth, a geo-nomy; this does not arise from the dictate of
lord
of
the world,
arises
into
a
whose
hands
few Nobel
prize-winners maneuvered
powers."
power; it
from
tremendous,
reciprocal
"match
of
I am writing that in all directness in answer to the questions of both your letters (of 16/5 and 28/5), because I cannot withhold my answer from you. I
know how misleading every such discussion is today, but it I were not to speak to you bluntly. I fear (and see) that the
ended.
would
"taking"
Recently
asserted
(in
a radio
Earth. I
it
I am eagerly looking forward to your Hegel book. It ought to appear in German. It is outrageous that the German public takes no notice of the Introduc
tion a la lecture de Hegel. But you will experience the truth of Goethe's expres
"I already know the dear Germans: first they are silent; then they carp; then (sic: twice in August 1816, namely in Riemer and in Zelter) a they nice 5-stage law. I have, therefore, advised a German publisher (Eugen Diedersion:
eliminate"7
ichs)
and
German
edition. your
I personally
no
longer
get
involved in
is
Introduction
able
was too
strong,
still too
strong, for
to remain silent.
Faithfully, (s)
(1921-1981),
1955
member of the of
was
ap
was
parliament
of the Georg-
August
University
of
Gottingen publicly
Schluter
103
allegations, but
Nazi defender. Premier Heinrich Hellwege (1908-1991) appointed a committee to investigate the Schluter resigned four days later, long before the committee reported. See Marten,
2. In 1837, Emst August
members
at
1987.
(1771-1851), King of Hanover, rescinded the 1833 constitution. Seven of Gottingen, including the brothers Jacob (1785-1863) and Wilhelm (1786-1859) Grimm, protested and were subsequently dismissed.
faculty
3.
4.
the
University
where
Reading
ndchste
here
Tommissen's
"Grossraum."
including
in
which
appeared
Bendersky
pp.
provides an account of
(Bendersky, 1983,
"law"
is crudely translatable as meaning of the term. For Schmitt, nomos is a founding See Schmitt, 1974, pp. 36-48.
6. Schmitt's "Gesprach iiber den Neuen
Raum"
5. Although
"norm,"
or order
directly
division
was
broadcast
on
Hessische Rundfunk
as
on
April
12, 1955. It
und
broadcast,
den
Zugang
Machthaber; Gesprach
cites
uber
1994). The
passage passage
Schmitt
here
appears on p.
ich schon: erst schweigen sie, actually reads, "Denn die lieben Deutschen dann makeln sie, dann beseitigen, dann bestehlen, und verschweigen ("For I know the dear Germans: first they are silent, then they carp, then eliminate, then steal and conceal.") The passage
appears
7. The
identicalh in
letter
of
August
1833, 1841,
p. p.
298)
and
in Riemer's
own report of a
9, 1816, from Goethe to Carl Friedrich Zelter (Riemer, dinner speech by Goethe on August 29, 1816 (Riemer,
719).
Paris, 11/VII55
Dear Mr. Schmitt,
please
forgive
on
me
travelling
Morocco).
business,
for only today answering your last letter (of 7/VI). I was then much work in the office (Sicily, Brussels, Tunisia,
"state."
It
not,
pleases me
I do
however,
as
understand
how
coming
political-
"conflict."
military But
not
is
a symbol of
the future.
I have
a philosopher, and a
play
the
prophet.
"dualism"
And
is there
and
nowadays rather
really, then, a
of
East
and
in "Land
Sea"
of the compass.
is
significant
that war
fleets
am
belong
to the
past.
Be that
as
it may, I
you very be ready, wrote to my pub my book. Kohlhammer Publishing appeared to lisher, but since then I hear nothing more of it, not even from the translator, Mr.
Thank
much
looking forward to your future works. very for your intervention in the matter of the translation
much
of
Fetscher.2
On
the other
hand, I
received
Taubes3)
a New York letter today from America who writes to me that his Hegel lectures "a la a
students there
very
much.
Faithfully,
(s)
104
Interpretation
(1890-1986), foreign minister from 1939-1949 all his life; he was openly hostile to Krushchev
after attempting, with and and
1953-1956, in fact
was expelled
remained an ardent
Stalinist
others,
Of Molotov's cowboy hat, alas, I could find no trace. Hegel: eine Vergegenvartigung seines Denkens. Komentar Phdnomenologie des Geistes (Kojeve, 1958).
to
remove
Krushchev
first
secretary.
2. The translation
appeared as
zur
struggled
was a with
Judaist
scholar and
lifelong
admirer of
while
Schmitt. Taubes
he
corresponded with
Schmitt, only
Free
him in
University
I
of
where
from
come
to us
directly from
Peking). His
answer:
'to
Plettenberg.'
was
astonished,
For
talking
For I had
denied
myself a visit
to Carl
Schmitt,
uninhibitedness
in
associating
with
Carl
Schmitt"
(Taubes, 1987,
24;
see also
Mohler, 1995,
pp.
Paris, 1/VIII 55
Dear Mr. Schmitt,
thank you very much
the
for
your
friendly
as
letter
were
25/VII1
of
and
ballads,
which were as
funny
they
sharp-witted,
of
(who is
he,
anyway?).2
Lines
such as
"Hylisch
are
verdreckt"3
chthonisch und
Morgenstern.4
{"Hylic,
chthonic and
filthy"}
as
impossible
as
Both
are waged
precisely
by
states,
which no
longer
exist!
Revolutions, like wars, belong, in my opinion and in your terminology, not division, but to taking. And you will certainly agree, if I add, with Hegel, that taking is only political insofar as it takes place on the grounds of prestige
to
and
for
prestigious ends.
On the
vice
other
hand, Athens certainly did not have much to except for i.e. precisely prestige.
"hegemony,"
versa)
It
pleases
you
(for
which
I apologize,
however). It difference
of opinion
certainly between
recently in an automobile accident and am sitting with a broken arm in Paris, instead of being in Yugoslavia as I had anticipated. Thus it will please
was
me
very much to see your daughter. I am writing to her in this context. Mr. Fetscher writes me to say that you have recently spoken about many thanks!
me to
Faithfully, (s)
1. This letter is
missing.
2. "Erich
Strauss"
is Schmitt's
poetic pseudonym.
105
p.
fortunately
also appear
in Mohler, 1995,
192.
Morgenstern (1871-1914),
Plettenberg
14/XII 55 Dear Mr. Kojeve, for months since August
express
write to
you, just to
my
gratitude to you
for
having kindly
entertained
in Paris,
frequently
which
distracted
the opportunity.
last months,
and
only today do I
has
find
question which
long
occupied me and
would
like to
worked
That it is in this capacity that I eagerly Hegel book and, at the same time, in a German edition, is under It would also interest me whether the translation by Dr. Fetscher is pro
well and
through your
"Introduction."
ceeding
if it
Now my
ness,"
modest question:
it
enemy in Hegel,
and
"enemy"
in the
"unhappy
conscious
Pretre1
Hoffmeister, p. 581 of your Introduction (Le Moine, Le {The Monk, The Priest}; what do the asterisks *** there mean??2). It has
with the expression: the
168 in
to do
enemy in his
most characteristic
form.3
[eigensten]
enemy?
(a few
[eigentumlichen])
Who is this
is it
seek there?
page
89/90 in
quoted:
in form.
who was at
no
German6
said to me recently:
problem.
Wisdom
of
I do
not
know if
be
a special
delight for
to send
It is generally as with the question of the possibility of a the system of Hegelian philosophy the question whether there
emy"
"dictatorship"
in
can
be
an
"en
in Hegel
and
at all.
For:
either
he is only
animal
or
invalid
be
insubstantial. Of the
which
necessary passing stage of negation, functions, it means (p. 168) that they for
itself."
would
"something
is invalid in
and
would
be sincerely
grateful
for
line
on this
theme,
while
am not
impa
(s)
106
Interpretation
the
Recently
book
by
appeared about
Hegel's
it to
Nuremberg (and social-democratic) editor, Beyer, time in Bamberg as an editor; biographical, under the
a
Logik"7
(Hegel
as
"coward"). If it interests
you, I
will send
you.
these are Kojeve's own titles for these paragraphs, which appear in Monk, The 225 and 226, respectively, of Miller's translation of the Phenomenology (Hegel, 1977). 2. The passage cited (Kojeve, 1958, p. 583) is not part of Kojeve's Introduction proper, but an appendix to it, showing his schema of the structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. The aster
1. "The
Priest,"
isks
are part of Kojeve's numbering system. 3. See Hegel. 1977, 223 and 225; Miller translates both terms 4. Schmitt, 1950.
"characteristic."
as
poet. His most famous work, Das Nordlicht (1910), a poem lines, was much revised during his lifetime. Schmitt's fascination with Nordlicht went back to 1912; in 1916 he published a commentary on the poem (Schmitt, 1991). 6. According to Tommissen, this is Hans-Joachim Arndt, later professor of political science in
of
30,000
met
note
3 to Kojeve's letter
of
description
in Taubes (1987),
7. Beyer, 1955.
Paris, 4/1 56
Dear Mr. Schmitt,
thank you very much for your
reply:
letter
of
14/XII
and please
forgive
the
late
I was,
until
recently,
in
Tunis because
it is
about you
Morocco.
Before I
answer your
letter, I
would
like to
wish
Perhaps
have the opportunity to meet personally? Of the publication of the German edition of my old book I know
we will not
nothing:
written me
overcome.
.
in
long
time.
I do
not
even
know if
all
precise about a a
not know anything book is concerned, it is still always project. I have certainly written about a thousand pages, but all of this is only Anyway, for six months I have no longer worked on "preparatory
book is
also to
appear
in America, but I do
as the
far
exercise."
it:
no time.
Still, I
know
think about it
gradually becom
read
ing
clearer.
not
I do
your
"Ex
salus"
captivitate
and would
like to
it, like
that
flows from
your pen.
about
Hegel's time in
Bamberg
would also
here
somewhere.
Now,
The
"enemy
in his
characteristic
form"
more
precisely
107
Christian devil,
or man
in the "animal
"invalid"
functions."
us"
because
man negates
is only
slave
just
an animal
religious
"unhappy
reality One The
consciousness"
(i.e.
man,
more
before death
and
life in the
struggle
honor)
thus
struggle, "for
itself"
is
not
"invalid"
"diabolical."
can real
say
the following:
body
and
enemy is the enemy to the death: he can kill and be killed, is thus If one is prepared to kill him (i.e. if one is thus, if one likes,
"form."
prepared
life),
then the
enemy is
one
"invalid"
[nichtig]
and can
(at least
"slave"
enemy) be destroyed.
"diabolical"
If, however,
not
is
afraid of
he becomes
and
"master"
is his
as one
does
world").
"Whether there
and
be
an
enemy in Hegel
at
you ask.
As
always:
Yes
No. insofar
as. and as
Yes,
tory.
World
history
is the
long as there is a struggle for recognition, i.e. his history of enmity between peoples (which does not
"fight"
exist at all
No,
of the
among insofar as
animals: animals
for something,
not out
of
enmity).
and as soon as
history
(= struggle
"sublated"
"Logic,"
in Absolute Knowledge. Thus enmity is, after all, only a i.e. of human speech. The fulfilled reason of the wise
also speaks
man
(of
Absolute
Knowledge)
of
S.)
about
the
but the
nor to enemies.
mutual
recognize
[former]
enemy,
so that the
enmity is
in
a sublimated
(sublated) form.
oneself, if in about
will still
Hegel takes
far. Now
(Hegel)
about
enmity
be
under
"state,"
stood.
"war,"
Already today
"history"
mean.
only Most
few
are
"enemy,"
understand what
"against"
the words
in this
it
means.
But if
all this
longer
understand what
that
meant.
Then there
will also
be
Hegelian
"wisdom."
And
as
long
"about"
in Hegel's something
sense.
.
For then
one speaks
only
or
and
only
with
my best wishes,
Faithfully,
(s)
108
Interpretation
Plettenberg
1 1/5/56 Dear Mr. Kojeve,
"Hegelian"
I certainly
of
understand
your
language
and
there
is, for
me, no
greater satisfaction
explanations about
Hamlet in
your
letter
5/5
'
am
eternally
for it,
as well as
for
of your
Introduction,
a
a passage which
I have
long
known
But I
is only
take
lecture,
which
had
a particular
Hekuba"2
sion of the
historical
present of
I did
not want
to
up the
at the
general problem
of the tragic
state.
in
Excursus 2
want
to speak of the
the passage on p.
65, lines
to the
6-12
or
of
Hekuba"! The
hero-tragedy
the addition
in Lasson3), 359
an
Right 93
93 (hero-W:
the time of
of the
etc.
Shakespeare is thus
still
barbaric.
an obvi
Nonetheless, is Hamlet
ous way:
split
in
Part I
ballad
a street
death
of
Polonius) is
without
a revenge
play, Part
ghost appear.
What
no
mean?
trace, is simply
mentioned.
The tragic thing does not lie in the play, but outside it, in It is splendid that you say: James 1 only died a natural
"coincidentally"
death. Correct.
I do
express
not want
to write more
healthy
a
my best wishes for your distresses me very much. I had attempted, for several weeks, to organize lecture for you at the Rhein-Ruhr Club in Dusseldorf. This club not to be
the heavy-industrial
and
today, but to thank you for your letter and to health. The notification that you are not feeling
has mainly
industry
independent
which,
e.g.
Schmid5
(my
namesake,
a social
democrat)
you
and others
have
to
use.
a
asked me
to ask you
if
would
be
prepared
deliver
oped
perhaps about
regions6
consider
it
or
is it
pointless
(not purely philosophical) theme. Would you really to pursue this idea: please write me that in all
me
For
it
would
be
you
a particular
joy
to
procure a platform
Germany
for
in this way,
and
for
me
personally,
getting
have
discussion
with you.
lively
your
wish
discussion;
and
there
is,
moreover, the
Germany
to
introduce
Hegel
or
interpretation to the
at
mediocrity
of the modern
university business,
would perhaps stir
least to
make an attempt at
up
109
than
lecture in
the aegis of
"cultural
exchange"
university city, which today stand together and have become hotbeds of conformity
it
suits you
without
ideas.
So
if I
pursue
the
Dussel
dorf plan,
or winter?
Yours sincerely,
(s)
Hamlet is
at
"play,"
jeu {game},
street
ballad,
.
both intrusion
points
[Einbruch-Stellen]
This letter is
missing.
2.
the passage at
93, Hegel
ethical
considers
hero-law
as possible
existing
and
institutions. Schmitt
was
between
Verfassung (constitution)
institutions, and thus differentiated Verfassungsgesetz (constitutional law), and the corresponding
Gewalt
the power which cre
pp.
Gewalt
and verfassungsgesetzgebende
laws,
respectively.
75
ff.
and
sentence at
218
we see
in the tragedy
of the ancients,
members of
another"
beyond."
(Hegel, 1967, p. 140). Section 359 appears under the heading "The Germanic is, in Hegel's descriptions, divided into two realms, one mundane, and the other "a world Before the advent of the state (360), both are externally barbaric (pp. 222-23).
of
4. Heinrich
Briining (1885-1970)
1930 to 1932,
to
when
was
leader
of the
Catholic Center
von
Party,
and
Chancellor
of
Germany from
he
was replaced
by
Franz
Papen (1879-1969). He
escaped
appointment at
Harvard
Germany,
where
he taught
political science at
professor
of
law
and
science, translator of
German,
and, from
1949-1972,
sitting
member of
the
Social Democratic
Party
in
Germany.
regions"
6. "Underdeveloped
appears
here in English.
Paris, 21/5 56
Dear Professor,
thank
you
very
much
for
your club.
friendly
In
letter
of
11/V,
be
as
well
as
for the
invitation of lecture there. Because I am, however, ill for the moment, I cannot, unfortu could foresee something for January nately, promise anything firm. Perhaps one
principle
the Dusseldorf
would
pleased
to give a
or
February
The
1957?
seems to me
"Hegelian"
theme: "underdeveloped
to be very
good.
On
this
occasion
known:
what was
the
proletariat
developed"2
in the 20th,
with
my in the 19th century has become the "under as theory and everything that follows from that,
interpretation
of
Marx
practice.
110-
Interpretation
On the tragedy problem in Hegel: 1. I believe that Hegel himself did not
Yet I believe that my interpretation is 2. If I understand Hegel correctly,
geois
as
see the
"tragedy
of the
intellectuals."
"orthodox."
a citizen
is de facto,
also always a
prehistory):
bour
either state
(the
"master"
real
[Herr]
"mythical"
"aristocrat"
"bourgeois"
or as actual
or poor).
"struggle for recognition) in the puts an end to the tragedy: precisely because there is no "actual state (more precisely: because the "real can however only be deathreplaces the
masters"
"authority"
master"
worthy
people
criminals).
agree with
this. Yet
are
(or
can
be)
in the
state
"bourgeois,"
on the
simple grounds
that
they
These
(and monks??) who live (or at least would mune") Republique des Lettres. And in this 3. Your interpretation
with
"intellectuals"
of tragedy (as "history") is, in my opinion, certainly Hegelian (somewhat "Marxist") interpretation. Roughly thus: there is also an actual "struggle for in the state. Not only between individuals, but between (to speak with Marx). Thus there compatible
the
recognition"
"classes"
are also
"tragic historical
are not
situations."
Only Hegel
and
Marx
these
"situations"
(i.e.
more
always a
revolutionary
Faithfully, (s)
1. In English. 2. In English.
Vanves, 30/XI 56
Dear Professor,
lately
you
plan a
lecture for
could
me
in Dusseldorf. In the
meantime, as
acceptance.
know, I
was
ill. Thus I
Now it
appears
meet you on
be
lecture in Dusseldorf? It
particularly
if I
and
faithfully,
(s)
-111
about your
letter
of
30/XI; first
of all
because
of the news
you
healthy
again,
and
secondly
at the prospect
getting to know
on the
am available to you
a
during
at the
all of
evening
can also
of
January
21st I have
lecture
come, at
Plettenberg
is
industry
refuge
reach
winter: the
with
Machiavelli's
ex
tend to the
beauty
if
we meet
in
larger
city.
communicated with
I have
it is
uncertain whether a
middle of
January
be successfully organized. Time is a little bit tight, because the winter program has already been established. Still, I want to do my best. I will keep
you posted about
it. If I
can
be
useful to you
in any
other
way for
your
journey
to
a genuine pleasure.
Plettenberg (Westphalia)
23/12 56
Canal,
or
French
colonial
policy, or
something if the
of
the lecture
not enough
in the
middle of
time,
listeners
will come
a current aspect.
would
be eternally
the
am
happy
larger sending
Naturally, in
great
city
such as
Dusseldorf,
I
you
important listeners is in
demand;
previous
hence
our concern.
you as an example an
invitation to the
lecture. Could
immediately
in
send the
information
about yourself
(a few bio
the
printed with
invitations?
give you
my best
wishes
year and
in
January
in Dusseldorf!
Ever faithfully,
(s)
112
Interpretation
Vanves 24/XII 56
Dear Professor,
your
letter,
which
I have just
received.
Enclosed
some
bio
certainly be deleted. We previously considered the theme of "Underdeveloped does one say that in German, by the way?). It seems to me to be very Such as: The title could, nonetheless, be somewhat "spiced
graphical notes: some of these can
up."
Countries"1
(how
current.
The
(?)
countries
[or (?)]
so-called
"colonial
"princi
ism"
[and the
"Euro-African"
idea].
careful and
Still, I
ples"
must, as a
deal
with
rather
Personally, I
But I
Club
is interested in it.
In any case I thank you very much for your efforts in the matter. I will be extraordinarily happy to get to know you personally and to
with you.
speak
With best
wishes
Faithfully,
(s)
PS: I
assume that the
Club
Or
ments?
1. In
English; reading
"Underdeveloped"
where
Tommissen's
edition reads
"Unterdeveloped
"
Vanves, 23/1 57
Dear Professor, I would like to thank
you most
sincerely,
once
again,
for
the extremely
friendly
in Dusseldorf.
after all
I hope that
agreeable and
will
decide
beautiful.
power1
I
tion.
read
in the train
as
always, with
great satisfac
am
in full
On this
As far
refrain
occasion
would
like to
ask you to
convey to
your
daughter
the most
cordial greetings.
as the publication of
my lecture is concerned, I
must
unfortunately
from
doing
so
for
now: at
the
RR-Club
At the
same
time I am
writing to Mr.
apologize.
-113
friendly
greetings,
Faithfully, (s)
1.
also note
6 to Schmitt's letter
of
7/6/55
2. Then
counsel
Rhein-Ruhr-Club, Justus Koch (1891-1962) had for Paul Komer, Goring's permanent deputy, in the "Ministries
(Trials of War Criminals, 1997,
p.
president of the
defense
Case"
Nuremberg
Military Tribunals
10).
Plettenberg
Dear Mr. Kojeve,
many thanks for
that you
your
31/1 57
letter
to
of
23/1 ! For
me
it the
most
trip
the personal
I took from it myself, I must above all state that your name has now become effective for at least 20 young, intelligent Germans. That seems to me to be a
good result.
Besides, I hope
in
Germany
at
under
better
a
that this
Dusseldorf
experiment
did not,
least, have
articles
deterrent
effect.
I
it
can
hardly
open a
daily
newspaper without
immediately finding
German
public.
in
lecture.
Perhaps, however,
today
with a
impres
Schacht1
sion of the
difficulties
one encounters
Dr.
wrote me a
80th birthday. I
often makes
longer letter; he just travelled to Munich, where he celebrated his am sorry that he was not there, for despite his advanced age he very
interesting
whom
comments
of
the
Flick
companies,2
met
the
following Friday,
was
sorry
not
to have
de Menthon
incident.3
I already said to you, that the young people who heard you were important. From my "Gesprach iiber die Macht und den Zugang zum
you
Machthaber"
will
have
understood
the hidden
fills
me
participates
in
power.
A friend in
and
is
friend
lost,4
it
goes
in the "Education I
would also
cannot
Adams,"5
of
Henry
add:
published
of
Carl
Schmitt"6
like to be
A foe in
power
foe
doubled.7
is
regrettable,
also understandable.
personal
meeting
and my life. The reading of your because of it, a discussion of immediate liveliness.
of your
letters becomes,
I remain,
ever
with
best
greetings and
wishes,
sincerely faithfully,
(s)
114
Interpretation
Song
of the
old man
humanity is
the mosel is
now
laity
remains without
hidden
remains
the
dear
god
pot8
becomes
melting
laity
takes veronal
Alexandre Kojeve
to commemorate the
over
discussion
in Dusseldorf
Palatinate
C.S.
wine
and politician.
President
of the
Reichsbank (Imperial
resigned as
Bank)
1923-1930
and
1933-1939,
feud
with
member of
Hitler's
cabinet
1935-1943. He
finance
but
re
minister
in 1937
after a
Hermann
Goring (1893-1945)
1943. While he
espoused the
Nuremberg Laws,
Schacht
opposed
the invasion of
Poland,
was
in
and conspired
attempt against
Hitler in
July
1944. He Schacht
for these
activities
Military
Tribunal
was tried
by
International
1954).
ultimately
cleared
2. Konrad Kaletsch
(1898-1978)
and
was a
high-ranking
executive of the
companies
begin
five
other
Flick
executives were
three
Nuremberg
was
Jewish
labor. Kaletsch
found
(including
was.
Flick
president
Friedrich
Flick)
were con
(Jung, 1992).
incident
at
3. I
the
Nuremberg
appears
trials
provisional government
lost"
from 1943-1945.
is
friend
here in English.
107.
doubled"
power
pot"
is
foe
appears
here in English.
8.
"Melting
appears
here in English.
poem.
Although
it
laity does
Veronal. I have
with
so-
recently
called
experienced
something completely
decide
on a
remarkable
in this field
it
"politicians."
Perhaps
you will
trip
to Paris after
all:
would make me
very
happy !
With
respectful
greetings,
Faithfully,
(s)
-115
Thank
which
you
very
much
for the
friendly
transmission
of
Tyrannei der
Werte,1
I,
as
always,
interest
and satisfaction.
I hope that
we will soon
With
respectful
greetings,
Faithfully, (s)
1.
Schmitt, 1979.
Colonialism from
European Perspective
Alexandre Kojeve
Ladies
and
Gentlemen!
the
Before I begin my lecture, I would like to thank sincerely for the friendly invitation.
And then I
a
Rhein-Ruhr-Club
most
would also
like to
apologize
for my
poor
joy
to give a lecture in
Hegel's language. But my German leaves therefore I must ask for a good deal of indulgence.
would
be
like to
repeat what
said to you.
Namely,
former
is my
own
citizen
student at
would also
like to
remark
that in
my lecture I very consciously and deliber is in any way political or could appear to
all the concepts
I discuss,
deal
Thus I
from
political-economic
[national- okonomi-
schen]
The
this
"capitalism"
word
was coined
and
Karl Marx
gave
concept a
very
precise,
specifically
economic meaning.
Marx
understood
by
"capitalism"
by
the
"capitalist"
economy is
an
industrialized
economy.
Second:
means of production
belong, in
"leading,"
laboring
(with the
help
of these
means) majority
of the population,
physically but to a
so-
"guiding"
politically
as well as
economically
system
minority
or elite of
called capitalists.
Third: this
is
set
up
so that the
116-
Interpretation
"proletariat,"
so-called
ress of
industrialization,
progress of
derives absolutely no advantage from the technical prog of production. or, if you like, of the
"rationalization"
The
tivity"
as
industrial technology increased the labor yield, the "produc it is called today. It thus creates a surplus value from labor. This
was
"surplus
tained
value"
not,
however,
by
the
capitalist minority.
paid out to the working mass, but was re Thus the working majority of the population
living,
which
was, moreover,
a minimum
for
income.
income"
I say deliberately: "increase in and not in standard of living. For just as there is a minimum for subsistence, there is also a maximum for living
[Lebensmaximum]
And this
living
optimum which
is
not surpassed.
optimum had already been attained by the before industrialization. Marx called it very good, moreover,
"leading"
minority
long
in his
scientific works.
a very tiny Almost everything was
part of
"invested"
i.e. the
"perfection"
[?]
or rational
ization
However,
up
And
while
"capitalism"
so that the
working majority absolutely did not profit from this progress. they did not become poorer in absolute terms (which was completely
impossible anyway), they did become so relatively: the difference between {their income and} the combined income of the elite became ever greater. From
this Marxist
theory
of capital
formation
and surplus
Marxists
It
of the
The
so-called
"social
Revolution"
historical
necessity.
formation founded
"social
destroys the
social
equilibrium; the
Now, it
erred.
tion."
can
be ascertained,
without
further ado,
that the
Marxist
soothsayers
For precisely in the really capitalist countries, there was no "social revolu [And today not a single serious person seriously asserts that there is still
such a revolution
no
in these countries.]
to
longer
possible
deny
these
could assert
facts seriously today, it is that Marx erred in his predic false. [And
foundations
is
not
cause
actually very often.] But, in my opinion, such an interpretation false in itself, but also dangerous. For Marx erred, in fact, not be only he was theoretically wrong, but rather right.
about?
For how did this error, certainly generally recognized today, actually come It was not that there was no revolution in the West, although the capital-
-117
It
because
of
this that
liked to
assert
ing
like the
capitalism
he described its
existed.
in the last century) absolutely noth In fact, Marx erred, first of all,
what
capitalism was
exactly
he
said
it was,
and
secondly,
capitalism resolved
and
economic
defects
or, if one
likes, "contra
but in
discovered
described
by
a
"revolutionary"
and
Marxists really
erred
in only
one
way.
They
assumed
that
shortsighted,2
as naive and
economists and
as unwise and
blind,
who
believed
Marxist theory in books of varying thickness. Now, had it really been so, Marx would certainly not have erred in this way. But it was, in fact, not this way. The capitalists published the books, sometimes even (as young students) read them, but they did exactly the
"anti-Marxist"
themselves to have
"refuted"
rebuilt capital
ism in
Marxist
way.
To
said
put
it briefly, the
exactly the
same
thing
as
Marx
saw and
[although
independently
progress,
him,
capi
talism can
neither
nor even
not
value"
produced
capitalist
minority
working
majority.
In
other
words, the
highly
industrialized
working masses. And they behaved accordingly. In brief, the capitalists did exactly what they ought to have done according to Marxist theory in order to make the "social impossible, i.e. unnec
living)
revolution"
essary.
This
"Marxist"
reconstruction
of the
original
capitalism
was
accom
plished more or
less
anonymously.
But,
ideologue
was the
here,
were,
Henry
only great, in
order to
Marxist
of the
century.
[All
"Romantics"
more or
less,
apply them to noncapitalist relations, i.e. precisely to tems Marx did not have in view.]
Nevertheless,
after
Ford
fully
consciously did
had
already done before him, more or less unconsciously, along theorists who developed Fordist ideas under the name "Full
a
intellectual in
Employment,"3
they
were so
successful
with
in this that it became really difficult to understand that it had to do Fordist ideas, which were properly Marxist and therefore, as soon as they
actually
refuted pseudo-Marxist theories. capitalism
were realized,
Be
that as
described
and criticized
by
Marx, i.e.
investment
capital
by
artifi-
118-
Interpretation
the income of the
working class to the minimum for subsistence, except for Soviet Russia. Where in any industrialized country if not it is, moreover, called [, but demonstrates the same sociopolitical (police-related on the one hand, and revolutionary on the
daily limiting
no
longer
exists
"socialism"
"communism"
other)
European
capitalism of the
19th
century.
In full
confor
mity with Marxist theory. For, from this theory's perspective, it does not matter whether the surplus value is invested by private individuals or state bureaucrats.
It is only important that the capital -forming surplus value is calculated the working masses are kept close to the minimum for subsistence.]
such that
II
Now, ladies
are
and
gentlemen, what
I have
will
said
is absolutely
not new.
[These
am
plainly truisms
about
"colonialism."
today.] And
more
speaking but
you
ask yourselves
not entitled
why I
"capitalism"'
Now, I have
ful
and
spoken about
Marx
if
as well as
its
peace
democratic
"political,"
overcoming, because, in my
so
opin
ion,
has
not
been
totally
and
finally
less
on
overcome as
appears at
first
glance.
Indeed,
not
only because it
under the
continues to exist
more
in Soviet
so-called
satellites)
or
correct name
but
also
because it
unfortunately
today.
also
lives
in the
West,
where
it is
"colonialism"
also called
Marx himself, however, had only western Europe in mind. And in his time fully justified. It is less justified, however, that even today many him have
the same world view as an ancient
of
political economist might
Roman
North America
are also
{"earthly
globe"}.
In reality, however, after the 2nd World War in any case, the so-called "Western is absolutely no longer just European or Euro-American. It is also, and perhaps even predominantly, at least in the long term, African and
world"
Asian.
Now,
when this
World is looked
at as a
whole, i.e.
as
difficult to
Marxist definition
"necessarily."
of capitalism
not
only
we see
but
also
Indeed,
longs to
important
means of production
be
a Euro- American
minority
income from
Asian majority does not become poorer, to be sure, in an absolute sense (which is certainly physically impossible), but does become relatively more impover ished. At the same time, it is absolutely not true that this is a matter of two
-119
systems.
For there is
a vigorous economic
interaction be
tween Euro- America and Afro- Asia. But the system is constructed such that the
becomes
richer
every
year through
it,
while
never raises
no
itself
for
subsistence.
industrialized country
for Russia
today is
there a
tion who
"capitalist"
in the Marxist sense, i.e. really poor classes of the popula can only just subsist and have no real affluence. [In the so-called countries everybody is, more or less, equally rich and not poor; for
relative, to be sure
then one
affluence.] But if
whole,
however,
immediately
precisely in the true Marxist sense of this word. And because it has to do with an economic unit, i.e. an economic system, one can thus certainly say that there is
also a
"surplus
value"
in the Marxist
sense of the
term,
which
in its totality
pro
countries
which this
"surplus
value"
is
is, from
the
sur
perspective,
countries.
And thus
one
can, although
calmly
and
Western
economic system
is
also
completely
in the
Marxist but
Nonetheless,
value
important difference,
not
also in the economic respect, exists between the system where the surplus
is
extracted
masses within
this surplus value is taken in other countries. And this difference can be
defined is
classic, European
ex
by
private persons.
By
socialism
(I
do
socialism,
system
which
actually
exists
today in
in
by
Soviet
as
socialism will
be
is, just
in capitalism,
raised within
is invested
by
the state.
"colonialism"
Finally,
as not
the word
not
will
indicate
value,
raised
in capitalism, is
inside but
invested
by
it is
These definitions
immediately indicate,
one understands
then, that
real
capitalism
does
not
is
still related to
this van
ished
take a
capitalism. position
Thus
on colonialism which
is
to that which
Marx took up
On the
one
hand, they
difference}
minority is constantly that this this from infer system, because of hand, they
120
Interpretation
collapse.
they
are
the only ones to make these observations and to draw these conclusions
whereas the
from them,
be just
as
blind
Now,
at
were
certainly be
correct
in their I said,
prediction
concerning
that
capitalism.
reason that
my lecture,
Marx's
[For
did
not
re
vealed
in the
this contradiction, in
"economy"
in a reconstructing its way. And] From this historical fact one can logically draw only one conclusion: namely that, in order to prevent the collapse of colonialism, this
a peaceful,
"Fordist"
democratic way,
at
that,
while
colonialism will
have to be
reconstructed
in
a rational
way,
which
is
analogous
to the
way in
before,
Ford
reconstructed
Ill
The
situation
is
quite peculiar
old capital
ism,
the
"Marxist"
contradiction was
capitalists themselves.
Employment4
actually
and
and
by
"Fordist"
Only
after this
overcome
in
practice
new scientific
theory
of so-called
Full
states, in
accordance with
the
already-
existing
economic
adjusted
however,
the situation is perfectly reversed. There are already many good theo the problem
(as, for
example, in the
United (such
Nations);
of the
whole
statements5
and programs
as, for example) President Truman's famous "Point IV"6). But the
practitioners
economy take a reserved, even sceptical position and behave business has nothing to do with them, because it has to do with a
as
if the
so-called
political problem.
of the
Now it is certainly a political problem and perhaps even the political problem 20th century. But, as has been mentioned, I would like to disregard that And that
all the more
completely.
so,
even, perhaps,
above all
an economic problem.
For,
to
put
bad clients,
a
and
if the majority of a firm's clients bad firm in any case, not a sound
order to avoid
the
firm, in
And
be
surprised
must goes
language,
"law
[?]."
of
But it
remains true
today
nonetheless.]
-121
Thus
one must
question today:
how
can colonialism
be
eco
"Fordist"
way, so to
speak?
On the face
of
it,
there
three conceivable methods, and all three have already been suggested.
First,
one can
famous "terms
trade."7
of
That is, in
good
German,
pay
more
veloped countries
for goods, i.e. mainly raw materials, produced by the underde than has been the case until now. The purpose is to stabilize
only allows the exporting countries to live, and not only to live securely, but also to live continu ally better, just as the importing countries continually live better. In other words:
modern colonialism could
understand not
do the
same
thing
as old capitalism
did,
namely, to
that it
is
not
to pay as little as
possible
only politically, but also economically advantageous for labor, but as much as possible. That was the
agreements."8
"Commodity
Well, they
were
much discussed, anyway, and in many languages, too [: five months at the Havana conference of '47, four months in the GATT in Geneva in '54]. And all countries were
finally
was
it
in
the underdeveloped
produced
absolutely
half
as much
less than
oil
in Texas. Or
raw materials
for almost nothing at all, while industrial prices would change rela little. And so on. So, as has been mentioned, all countries were in agreement tively But: one country was against it and, what is more, on "principled Geneva. in
would go
grounds."
But that
was enough.
speaks about
it
for the
USA.
mo
more.9
ment
any from
Secondly,
value
collect
the surplus
anything
colonial, as
before, but
not
invest it
countries
in the already industrialized and rich countries, but in the underdeveloped, poor in which the surplus value is being extracted anyway. And this could
something of the kind. This has also already been much discussed: for years, and "internation way, as it [Although not exactly as I have just done, but in a underde the the aid of come to were to industrialized countries meant that the investment international were to be financed by an in that veloped be done
by
to it:
SUNFED,10
or
"noble"
ally."
ones,
they
was
finally
.
(I
mean after
exception
in
agreement
to
find,
so
altogether,
$250
But
underdeveloped
countries.
not
been
found
And it is
still
being
spoken about
very
small
Thirdly,
That is,
the one
directly,
as all
a given
industrialized country
the right)
(indeed,
hand,
industrialized
do nowadays, but
more
(thus the
left)
surplus
value, or even
than
1 22
Interpretation
one
that, in
be sure,
Now, if
such a
country really
invests the
no
entire surplus
value, or even
more
longer
speak of colonialism
no
in the
For then
one
longer taking anything, and is even giving something. facto, And when the country in question spends far more than is collected by it, then it must even really be called anticolonialist.
is certainly, de
As far
as
France
I know, this third method is applied by only two countries today, and by England. As far as France is concerned, no matter
calculates the extracted colonial surplus value to
markup for French goods, preferential tariffs, etc., nonetheless it emerges that, since the war, France invests five to six times more in its colonies and
former
And
colonies while
that about
than these colonies and ex-colonies supply in surplus value. I know the corresponding English figures less precisely, I do know the same is true for England.
To
summarize the
contemporary
of
situation
one can
thus
"principled"
colonialism
countries are
is in Washington;
except
industrialized
de facto
colonial
France
and
IV
I certainly do
been it
said should
was a
not need
to
bring
just
be taken
{with
a grain of salt}.
joke "Socratic
moreover, can be
meant
more or
less
one
successful).
In
other words:
seriously way What is meant seriously is that the real problem is not political, but economic colonialism. For in
longer
exists at all.
and
is, in
"pedagogical."
or another,
no
Only
even
"regime."
colonial
And
very few countries today are still if, because of these, local difficulties
a
truly
exist or could
whole
Western longer
world will
This
colonialism
is
no
a world problem.
nomic colonialism
is
What is
also
seriously
is that
not
only is it
possible
to conduct colo
countries
nialism without
less11
having
fact,
all
industrialized
more or
alone
derive
advantage
colonialist, in the
progress
every year, while the backward countries remain exactly as poor as before, and therefore become relatively poorer every year. What is seriously meant, finally, is that the problem cannot really be solved
123
colo
long
Modern
just
as
urgently
at
who emerged
spontaneously
who produced
a mass
market, which
they
created themselves
only
when
they increased
out
the wages, i.e. the production costs, for economic reasons, with
the state would
expecting that
of
only
create
this mass
market
for theoretical
or political reasons.
All
this seems to
me
Western Earth.
one of the wittiest and most
I just read, in
division
to be
brilliant
essays that
roots:
I have
ever
And that
But the
ancient
perhaps
This
root of the
and economic
maybe
law
modern
Western
Greeks:
Christian
power?
were a small
heathen people,
One thing I know for certain. Namely, that what has just been said is abso implicitly in lutely no criticism of Professor Carl Schmitt. For his
"division"
my "giving": if everything has already been taken, one can naturally I only wanted to point divide only if some give away what the others perhaps sounds out that, from the etymological perspective, the verb "to
cludes
give"
receive.12
verb
"to
take"
even
if it
means
practically the
same
thing! Thus
and not
that
they
are
taken
a much man
the
all,
larger meaning than is normally believed. In is distinguished from animal by language. And
it is
not
perspective
going
at all well
for
our
West
little
domestic
after
masses as
"socialism"
it
was national
giving capitalism, which gives the domestic masses as has no name. At least, not insofar as it is giving. For And insofar as it is taking, even if only from abroad, it is called want to latest I thing, who does not know this name nowadays? But the very backward countries more than it takes say giving colonialism, which gives the be anonymous. It to sure, only a newborn child [thus small is, from them, is still accordance with the and weak, but is it not also unusually beautiful?]. But, in
ized). But
our modem,
still much as possible,
"colonialism."
modern
Christian custom,
a
be baptized
and named
[And
smart, custom.]
the nomos of the modern
an
But
named or unnamed
Western
world
is, for
me, undoubtedly
what
I have called, in
And because this
improvised
and
"living
colonialism
is
"law,"
124
Interpretation
will,
sooner or
countries
later,
submit
to it: particularly,
to which
however,
those coun
"colonies"
they
give
form
of
taking
normally
would
be time to
ask oneself:
in
what
amount, in
made
legally-required disbursements to be
in
framework
So first
of
giving
How
colonialism?
would
question
before I finish.
of all:
much should one pay? a position on
difficult
question and
would not
like to take
United
Nations'
countries could
cent of
be
solved
if
all the
developed
countries
invested
about or
per
in the backward
that 3
countries.
If
that
is true
not, I
would
do
not
know. [I do
know, however,
In
per cent
western
Europe, too,
its
lot.]
independently
about
France
of
national revenue
ruined
in its
.
.
colonies con
Moreover,
without
being
purely
by
that
[But I
of an economic
kind. At least
so,
extrapolate
colonialism"
"giving
in the Western
$10 billion. That is certainly a burden, indeed French example shows that this burden is, by far, not
about
heavy
unbearable.
Secondly: How
speak about
Now, I have
[I
would
neither
Agreements.13
Commodity
only like to
sincerely
understanding
the grounds
for
the American
But I
could also
Thus I personally tend, of course, to see a so-called prejudice in that. be wrong.] I must, however, confess that I think our American in
one
friends
are right
Commodity
be
Agreements14
alone
Direct
contributions would
have to be
given
added
in
any
case.
in this direct
manner.
even, if
one
likes, contradictory
consisted,
until
[which
certainly absolutely
asserted].
Cola type,
as
is
sometimes
maliciously
not given
English direct
contributions are
exclusively
on-the-spot
which
only
away, but
are even
sold more
125
[And I
would
like to remark,
Anglo-French
methods
method
is
analogous to that
which
is to be favored. For,
on the
easier to give
we are
away
surplus consumer
dealing
give
with
investments in
than noth
perhaps
better,
anyway, to
something
ing
at all.
But
on the other
hand, it
must not
tion of the
until
backward
countries
has become
realized
that,
being
I
in
a spectacular a
Western world, by
is hard to better!
see
which
mean
in China. From
which
long
is closer, it
one
outside the
[Moreover,
of the
backward
countries
buying
be necessary for mass necessary power of the domestic masses {; it} is an eco
as would
Thus I
must confess
favor
the English-
French
method of on-the-spot
investment to
giving
on the
one give?
hand,
Even
the
international
means of aid
reasons
not
I believe that,
preferable
the other
aid.
hand,
on
purely
economic grounds.
Namely
today,
actually
of
But these
regions
from
the
the perspective
recently became politically and economically reestablished. There we see, in contrast to the 200 million relatively industrialized Russians, about 700 million underdevel
oped
of
giving colonialism, not equal. Let us, to begin with, take the regions, which lie outside the Mongolian empire, first founded by Ghengis Kahn,
Western world,
and which
Asians. I
e.: each
ple on
his
shoulders
have to carry 3.5 peo for many decades. That is a heavy, very heavy burden. But unbearable burden [provided, however, that the Russians
would
course of police-supported consumer asceticism].
Russian
"underdeveloped"
continue to
follow the
Let
each
us then
look
at the
sterling
zone.
much worse.
For here
on
Englishman
shoulders.
"underdeveloped"
Asians
his
British
"austerity,"15
which
and which
than Soviet
socialism,
police
[polizeiliche]
colonialism
foundation. Thus it be
not
giving
must
American.
If, however,
North
and at a per capita
India,
Indonesia
and
Indo-China,
to the total
burden
on
if only partially, in this way one arrives the Americains which is proportionately larger than is
even
126
the
Interpretation
on the
burden
Russians
national
Chinese. Because however, in the very long product is becoming much higher than the Russian
of the
one, it
will thus
without
be
possible
for America to
attain of
decidedly
life"16
better
results
than
Russia
[,
which, moreover, is
"austerity,"
not a path of
not
very old, history. For this region was once called the Imperium Romanum and economically preserved itself astonishingly viably and robustly. Indeed, modern historians have established that this economic re
this region also has an old,
gion would
have
preserved
itself, i.e.
reestablished
conquest of
the
itself, even despite the bar Mediterranean, which was the con
converted
necting link of one single economic world, had not between two worlds, so that for centuries it longer
but became
almost
it into
border
traffic,
time
served commercial
exclusively
meanwhile
a theater of
military
games. more at
But
people
have
become
more no
serious,
adult;
all.
and the
is certainly
not
far
and
off where
they
will
longer play
Thus
one can
confidently say that the economic conditions of the Medi terranean region's economic unity have been restored. And here one must say that, from the perspective of giving colonialism, this economic region is a region
certainly calmly
which
by
God. For
each
inhabitant
of the
industrialized
coun
tries
north of the
Mediterranean only
or even
needs
ant of
in
order to
attain the
same,
better,
results as
anywhere else
in the
whole world.
And half
a man per
no
burden
at
is,
so to which
ballast,
does
not make
is
well
Thus
giving
one
is
in the
newspapers resources
that
colonialism
in the Mediterranean
resources could
must get
its financial
much
from
far
away.
For these
in fact be found
For the
they
"small"
or even
Europe, in
contrast to the
Europe"
there are
least two
are
or
three countries which must notice that the high rate at which
wealthier
they
becoming
countries
would
like to become
they
etc.
use
perfectly
adequate means
for
that: more
All
of this
is,
perhaps not
be forgotten
that, in fact,
by only a little in a [wie Gott in Frankreich] already lives "like God in members of the economic Mediterranean region will not become
more serious
than this is
done, if giving
colonial-
127
clients
Mediterranean
bad
or even
remain,
as
before,
clients;
"danger
ous"
clients.]
I
that
an
must
I have
stop here! I have already spoken a lot, as well as long. And I notice not even begun my actual lecture. For what was just said was only
must summarize reads:
introduction to it.
Thus I The title
Colonialism from
perspective.
I
at
should thus
have
explained
perspective:
least in my
opinion.
it, in my
opinion, look
in
reality?
it be?
My
answer
First: it
should not
taking but
be
colonialism.
[And it
would
good to
giving (if you like: a dividing, find a fitting name for it.]
or
sharing)
Secondly: it
on the spot.
away
readymade
Thirdly:
(and
as
perhaps
really European giving colonialism it should cover the entire area only the area) which lies around the Mediterranean and which has
historically
proven
itself to be
a viable economic
region; an
area which
is, how
in my view, adequately
by
French giving
of this
That
time
so
my theme. For the actual execution and I'm very sorry for that!
I have,
far, only
And that
is,
always somewhat
confess
disappointing. So I
for
that.
are truths.
showing itself,
to
avoid
later,
And I absolutely
wanted
friendly
invitation
of the
1. Text in 2.
square
brackets
was omitted
Reading kurzsichtig
Employment"
in Commentaire (Kojeve, 1980 and 1999). where Tommissen's edition reads durzsichtig.
here in English.
3. In English.
4. "Full
appears
edition
5. In Tommissen's French
translation
illegible,
but they
appear
in Kojeve's
own
(Kojeve, 1999,
560).
6. In English.
7. In English. 8. In English. 9. Several commodity agreements were subsequently successfully but all called New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s,
constructed
under
the
so-
except
for the
rubber com
1996). agreement failed, mainly due to lack of political support (Gilbert, modity proposed by developing Development was Economic Fund for United Nations Special 10. The alternative to the World Bank, controlled by wealthy states, particularly the nations in 1952 as an
128
Interpretation
committee was
United States. A UN
formed
formation
of
SUNFED,
$250
fund, in
with
states pressed
hard, but
ultimately
tion
run
prevailed offered
in 1959
its
(IDA) by the World Bank (Nossiter, 1987, pp. 34-37; United Nations, 11. Reading weniger where Tommissen's edition reads eniger.
12. Schmitt takes up this
point
was
1953).
in
1959
essay:
"In
a world made
by
people
for
people
and
taking"
sometimes
unfortunately
(Schmitt, 1995,
p.
583).
13.
Agreements"
14.
"Commodity "Commodity
here in English.
here in English.
Agreements"
appears
15. In English.
16. In English.
17. "Last but
least"
not
appears
here in English.
REFERENCES
Adams, Henry. The Education of Henry Adams. London: Penguin, 1995. Auffret, Dominique. Alexandre Kojeve: La philosophie, Vetat, la fin de I 'histoire. Paris:
Bernard Grasset, 1990. Bauer, Bruno. Die Posaune des jungsten Gerichts iiber Hegel den Atheisten
christen. und Anti-
Wigand,
1841.
ein
The Trumpet of the Last Judgement against Hegel the Atheist and Antichrist: Ultimatum. Translated by Lawrence Stepelevich. Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press,
Reich.
1989.
Bendersky, Joseph W. Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the University Press, 1983. Beyer, Wilhelm Raimund. Zwischen Phdnomenologie
der Bamberger Zeitung. Frankfurt
am
und
Logik; Hegel
Redakteur
Main: G. Schulte-Bulmke, 1955. Breakdown of the Bretton Woods International Monetary Fund, 1994.
et al.
France
and
the
Washington, Monetary Cointet, Jean-Paul. Marcel Deat: Du socialisme au national-socialisme. Paris: Librairie Academique Perrin, 1998. Daubler, Theodor. Das Nordlicht. Munich and Leipzig: G. Muller, 1910. Esprit 16 (Sept. 1948): 396-408. Dufrenne, Mikel. "Actualite de Fischer, Albert. Hjalmar Schacht und Deutschlands "Judenfrage. Cologne, Weimar and Vienna: Bohlau, 1995. Gilbert, Christopher L. "International Commodity Agreements: An Obituary World Development 24, no. 1 (Jan. 1996): 1-19. Hegel, G. W. F. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. 2d ed. Edited by G. Lasson. Leipzig F. Meiner, 1921.
Hegel."
"
System.
DC: International
Notice."
Hegel's
Philosophy
by
by
Press, 1967.
The
Phenomenology
129
Briefe 1850-1856,
ed.
Heinrich Heine: Sdkularausga.be. Werke, Briefwechsel, Liebenszeugnisse. Vol. 10, Pariser Berichte 1840-1848. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1979. Heinrich Heine: Gestdndnisse, Memoiren und Kleinere autobiographische Schriften, vol. 15, ed. Gerd Heinemann. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1982. Jung, Susanne. Die Rechtsprobleme der Niimberger Prozesse dargestellt am Verfahren
gegen
Kojeve,
gart:
Alexandre.
Friedrich Flick. Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1992. Hegel; eine Vergegenwartigung seines Denkens. Komentar des Geistes. Translated
1958.
zur Phd-
nomenologie
by Iring
Fetscher
and
Kohlhammer,
Introduction "The Idea
a
la lecture de Hegel. 2d
the
ed.
of
Death in
no.
Philosophy
Hegel."
of
Car-
pino.
Interpretation 3, "Ford
est
Dieu, Marx
est son
Esquisse d'une
"Du
phenomenologie
colonialisme au
Mannes, Astrid Luise. Heinrich Bruning: Leben, Wirken, Schicksal. Munich: Olzog Ver lag, 1999. Marantz, Paul. "Internal Politics and Soviet Foreign Policy: A Case Study. Western Political Quarterly 28, no. 1 (March 1975): 130-46.
"
niedersachsische
Ministersturz: Protest
und
Widerstand der
Georg-August-Universitat
Gottingen
gegen
Ruprecht, 1987.
Meier, Heinrich.
by
J.
Harvey
Mohler,
Lomax. Chicago
London:
University
of
Chicago
Press,
1995.
Briefwechsel
zum
60.
Geburtstag. Frankfurt
Bernard. The Global Struggle for More. New York: Harper & Row, 1987. Peterson, Edward. Hjalmar Schacht: For and Against Hitler. Boston: Christopher Pub
lishing House, 1954. Jahren Riemer, Friedrich Wilhelm, ed. Briefwechsel zwischen Goethe und Zelter in den 1796 bis 1832, vol. 2. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1833. Mittheilungen iiber Goethe, vol. 2. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1841. Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1933. Schmitt, Carl. Die Begriff des Politischen. Hamburg: Ex captivitate salus: Erfahrungen der Zeit 1945/47. Cologne: Greven, 1950, and
Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1950.
"Nehmen/Teilen/Weiden
stellen."
tschaftsordnung
vora
Gemeinschaft
Politik 1,
no.
und
den
Zugang
zum
Machthaber. Pfullingen:
Neske,
Land und Meer. 2d ed. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1954b. "Die Geschichtliche Struktur des Heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes von Ost
Bemerkungen zu Ernst Jungers Schrift: 'Der
und
West:
Gordische
Knoten.' "
In Freundschftliche
130
Interpretation
zum
60. Geburtstag,
edited
by
Armin
Mohler,
pp.
137-67. Frankfurt
oder
Hamlet
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1955. Hekuba; der Einbruch der Zeit in das Spiel. Dusseldorf: E.
Dieder-
ichs, 1956.
"Nomos-Nahme-Name."
Przywara,
1959.
edited
by Siegfried Behn,
ed.
im
und
Lutz Verlag,
Verfassungslehre, 4th
Der Nomos der Erde lin: Duncker & Legalitdt
Ber
Humblot, 1974.
und
Humblot, 1980. die Elemente, den Geist und die Aktualitat des Werks. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991. Gesprach iiber die Macht und den Zugang zum Machthaber; Gesprach iiber den Neuen Raum. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994. In Carl Schmitt: Staat, Grossraum, Nomos, edited by Gunter Maschke, pp. 573-91. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995.
Theodor Ddublers
"Nordlicht"
drei Studien
uber
"Nomos-Nahme-Name."
_.
_.
don:
University
by
and
Lon
Sepp
edited
by Sepp
Verlagshaus, 1979.
United States: The Case
of
Bill Scheuer
zum
70. Geb
urtstag by Bruchsal: San Casciano Verlag, 1993. In Schmittiana VI, Sombart, Nicolaus. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1998.
edited
Volker Beismann
and
edited
by
Piet Tommissen,
pp.
ed.
Victor Gourevitch
and
and
University
of
Chicago
Press, 2000.
Taubes, Jacob. Ad Carl Schmitt: Gegenstrebige Fugung. Berlin: Merve Verlag, 1987. Tommissen, Piet. Schmittiana VI. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1998.
Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Tribunals No. 10, vol. 12. Buffalo: William S. Hein & Co., 1997. United Nations Department
of
under
on a
Nations, 1953.
Now back in
from NORTHWESTERN
print
Philosophy
"Very
ambitious
.
Edited
by
no
ordinary
anthology.
work
Charles M. Sherover
of many
The Human
disciplines to
explore the
meaning
reminds
of time,
as
Prof.McKeon
Experience
Time
of
us
to in
side
The Development
of the
International
of
Philosophical
Quarterly
Its Philosophic
Meaning
"A
long
needed
book,
which will
be widely
It is
unique
in its
scope and
in
[Sherover's]
his
remarks
are
lucid, exhibiting
and
rare
balance
flexibility as
both
J^fiw
of the
authors,
allowed
by
Charles M. Sherover
Review
Metaphysics
$29.95paper
Available
in bookstores
everywhere.
To
order
by
phone,
call
1-800-621-2736.
http://nupress.northwestern.edu
in Six Volumes
Edited
ISBN
by Heinrich Meier
3-476-01222-0
The publication
the
of the
third
volume concludes
Strauss's known
writings
(many of which
are published
emigration 1938.
here
to the
in
In addition,
four
intellectual
career
is
presented.
Both the
writings and
in the
rious
original
languages. This
critical edition
study
of
Volume
1:
Leo Strauss
Gesammelte Schriften Bandl Die Religionskritik Spinozas und zugehorige Schriften
Zwcite Auflaee
und zugehorige
2001.
xx,
(subscription
39,90).
ISBN 3-476-01856-3
Contains the
Spinozas
Religionskritik
derBibel-Wissen-
schaft Spinozas
(1930), Cohens Analyse (1924), Zur Bibelwissenschaft Spinozas und seiner Vorlaufer (1926), Das Testament
Spinozas (1932). The second, revised, and
edition
enlarged
by
on
includes three previously unknown early essays Strauss from the years 1925-1929, among others
Freud's
The
Future
of an
Illusions
Volume
1997.
2:
Friihe Schriften
44,9o(subscription price:
xxxiv,
635
dust jacket,
39,90)
ISBN 3-476-01212-3
Contains the
more
critical editions of
29
essays
1921
to 1937,
Quelques
than a quarter of which are published here for the first time:
(1936), (1937), Das Erkenntnisproblem in der philosophischen Lehre Fr. H. Jacobis (1921), Der Konspektivismus (1929), Religi6se Lage der Gegenwart (1932), Eine Erinnerungan Lessing (1937), and more. The marginalia from Strauss's
remarques sur
On
la
science politique
de MaTmonide
and
et
de Farabi
Political Teaching
Volume 3:
Hobbes'
politische
-
Wissenschaft
Leo Strauss
Gesammelte Schriften
Band 3
Hobbes'
Briefe
49,90
with
dust jacket,
(subscription
Wissenschaft Briefe
politische
und zugehorige
Schriften
Hobbes'
Wissenschaft
(1935)
variants of
from 1936, as well as the book-length manuscript Die Religionskritik des Hobbes (1933/1934), published here for the first time. In addition,
Gerhard Kriiger, Karl Lowith,
the
original 320
letters,
and
Gershom Scholem, in
and
languages (German
publication of of
two
key essays,
Reason
and
Revelation and
numerous
Living
Issues
German translations.
Volume 5:
Ober Tyrannis
Contains the German translation along with the correspondence between Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojeve (1932-1965) published here for the first time
original
languages (German
and
English).
volume contains a
by the
editor of
the
Gesammelte
Schriften
which
introduces the
text as
reader
to the
circumstances
surrounding the
composition
of each
well as
its
Each
15%
volume
may be
to
Choosing the
three
Subscribers
receive
following
at no extra charge:
von
Leo Strauss
und
66 pp.,
9,90.
ISBN
3-476-01504-1.
result of a
long and
intensive involvement
with
Strauss's
appendix contains
the
most comprehensive
bibliography yet
presented of
Strauss's
writings.
mm VERLAG
J.B. METZLER
P.O.Box
10 32 41
D-70028 Stuttgart
7 ") 21 94-249
www.metzlerverlag.de
ttffaradi jara
'
andthe
foundation
Muhsin S. Mahdi
Art*
*
:!
%(jaraU
and tfk foundation of
'Islamic
yoliticdyiJHosofby
M(4#|p S,
In
this work,
more than
four decades
work of
founder of Islamic political philosophy. Mahdi, who also brought to light writings of Alfarabi Alfarabi, that had long been presumed lost or were not even known, presents this great thinker as his contemporaries would
seen
have
and
him:
new
understanding
of revealed religion
its
Beginning with a survey of Islamic philosophy and a discussion of its historical background, Mahdi considers the
interrelated
Alfarabi s
spheres of philosophy, political
thought, theology,
and
jurisprudence
of the time.
He
then turns to
concept of
"the
virtuous
in-depth
analysis of the
trilogy
Philosophy ofPlato
and Aristotle.
"This is
Middle Ages,
extraordinary scholar. In Mahdi's presentation, Alfarabi becomes one of the whose original ideas on philosophy and religion, on theology and jurispru
discussions."
dence,
are relevant
to
contemporary
Joel L. Kraemer
Cloth $34.00
J33
The
1427 East 60th
Street, Chicago,
INTERPRETATION
A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY Queens College, Flushing, NY 11367-1597 U.S.A. (718, 997-5542 Subscription
rates per volume
other
institutions $48
students {four-year
limit) $18
Postage
U.S.: Canada $4.50 extra; elsewhere $5.40 extra by surface longer) or $1 1 by air. Payments: in U.S. dollars and payable by a financial institution located within the U.S. or the U.S. Postal Service.
outside
mail
(8
weeks or
.00
Please
print or type
BILLED)
wish
to subscribe to INTERPRETATION.
name
address____
P biff me
Q
payment enclosed
student
ZIP/postcode
air mart
country (if
outside
U.S.)
to INTERPRETATION for
.
name
address
,
student
ZIP/posteode
;___,
@;;air
gjfcjjl
Q
country (if
outside
U .S.)
_
me
from: name
address
payment.nc)osed
ZIP/postcode
that our
ical philosophy
library subscribe to INTERPRETATION, a journal of polit [ISSN 0020-9635], at the institutional rate of $48 per year (three
signature
; i
,
issues).
name.
date
position
11
c
CO
=P
5'
CTQ
Z
00 00
=3
k
re
1
*
"-1
Z
o o
ro
T3
n> C3
re
C/i
UJ
ON
o
ON
UJ
-J
n 5
3
oT (JO
5*
bo
>
(_>l
en
X
-a O
<
i
c
o
o -o o
3
2
o
4^
>
~
era
o
-~J
"O
Bd
o
00
OJ L*J
CL