1

Ottoman military organization (up to 1800)

BOR A GOSTON GA

The Ottoman Turks, who emerged in western Asia Minor in the late thirteenth century, built one of the longest-lived empires in history, a multi-ethnic state that influenced the lives of millions in Europe and Asia for six centuries until the empires demise in World War I. In addition to its pragmatic policies and flexible governance, the Ottoman military played a crucial role in the expansion of Ottoman realms. The Ottomans were among the first to create a standing military force, the Janissary corps, which was established as early as the late fourteenth century. Until the late seventeenth century, the army and logistical system proved superior to those of their European and Asian rivals. However, economic and social upheavals in the empire in the seventeenth century, together with the growing military threat of the Ottomans foes, Austria and especially Russia from the mid-eighteenth century onward, resulted in major changes in the Ottoman military forces and their financing.

THE EARLY OTTOMAN MILITARY In the early years of the Ottoman state, the bulk of the Ottoman army consisted of the rulers military entourage, the cavalry troops of Turkoman tribes that had joined forces with the Ottomans, and those peasants who had been called up as soldiers for military campaigns. The members of the military entourage, known as kul (slave) ker (companion, client, retainer), and no were the forerunners of the sultans salaried troops. The Turkoman cavalrymen received a share of military spoils and were granted the right to settle on conquered lands.

In return, they had to provide men-atarms in proportion to the amount of benefice in their possession. Later they became the fief-based provincial cavalry, or timarholding sipahis, whose remuneration was secured through military fiefs (timar). The bulk of the early Ottoman forces under Osman (?1324?), the founder of the dynasty, consisted of mounted archers and excelled in raids and ambushes rather than formal battles and sieges. However, by the reign of Orhan (13241362) and Murad I (13621389), the Ottoman military had been transformed from the rulers raiding forces into a disciplined army, and was capable of conducting campaigns and sieges. In the fourteenth century, young volunteer peasants were recruited for the infantry sellem yaya (footman) and cavalry mu (exemptee) corps. Paid by the ruler during campaigns, they returned to their villages after campaigns and were exempted from certain taxes in lieu of their military service. Under Murad I the salaried palace horsemen, known as sipahis, gradually replaced sellems, whereas the azab infantry the mu archers and the more famous Janissaries took the yayas place in the army. As a con sellems became sequence, the yayas and mu auxiliary forces, transporting weapons and ammunition and building and repairing roads and bridges during campaigns. The azabs were a kind of peasant militia composed originally of unmarried young men fit for war, who were levied from the taxpaying subjects. In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, some twenty to thirty reaya households were responsible for equipping and sending one fighting azab soldier to campaigns. Armed with bows and swords, infantry azabs were expendable conscripts who fought in the first rows of the Ottoman battle formation, in front of the cannons and Janissaries. While their number was significant in the fifteenth century (20,000 at the conquest of

The Encyclopedia of War, First Edition. Edited by Gordon Martel. 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2012 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

2 Constantinople in 1453, and 40,000 in the 1473 campaign against the Akkoyunlu Turkoman Confederation in eastern Anatolia), the Janissaries gradually overtook their role, relegating them to garrison service. Azabs also served as archers and later musketeers on ships; they guarded the coastline and ports and worked in the imperial naval arsenal and the many shipyards throughout the empire. Paid from the imperial treasury, the number of marine azabs decreased from 2,279 in the midsixteenth century to 239 in 1694. and in addition to their military training they served as a cheap workforce for public building projects or worked in the sultans gardens, the imperial dockyards in Istanbul and Gallipoli, or in the imperial cannon foundry. After several years of such service they became Janissaries or joined the corps of gunners, gun carriage drivers, bombardiers, and armorers. The levies occurred haphazardly in the fifteenth century, and more regularly in the sixteenth century, when the frequent wars often decimated the ranks of the Janissaries. By the end of that century, however, the ranks of the Janissaries were filled with sons of Janissaries and thus the child levy became unnecessary. With the broadening of the pool of recruitment, the initial guard was soon transformed into the rulers elite household infantry, numbering about 2,000 men by the Battle of Kosovo (1389), 5,000 men in the mid-fifteenth century, and about 10,000 men by the end of Mehmed IIs reign in 1481. The Janissaries remained about 10,00012,000 strong until the end of the sixteenth century. The bulk of the Ottoman army, however, remained cavalry. Until the beginning of the sixteenth century the freelance light cavalry aknc raiders remained militarily significant. In 1475, Mehmed II mobilized 6,000 such raiders, whereas Suleiman I (r. 15201566) brought 20,000 of them to his 1521 campaign against Hungary. Along with the standing infantry forces, the sultans also paid six cavalry units whose number doubled between 1527 and 1567, from 5,088 men to 11,251. An even larger cavalry force was maintained through the timar military fiefs. In return for the right to collect revenues from his assigned villages, the Ottoman provincial cavalryman had to provide for his arms (short sword, bows), armor (helmet and chain mail), and horse, and to report for military service along with

THE STANDING ARMY Established in the 1370s, the Janissaries, or new troops (Turkish yeni ceri), served initially as the sultans elite guard and comprised only a few hundred men. At first the sultan used prisoners of war to create his own independent military guard. Later, in the 1380s, the child levy or collection (devshirme) was introduced to recruit new soldiers. Under this system, Christian boys between 8 and 20 years old, and preferably between 12 and 14 years of age, were periodically taken at varying rates, usually one boy from forty households. A group of 100200 boys, called the flock, was collected and a detailed register was compiled, containing each boys name and physical description. The flock then traveled on foot to the capital. Those who did not escape or perish during the long journey were inspected on arrival, circumcised, and converted to Islam. The smartest were singled out for education in the empires elite Palace School. The rest were hired out to Turkish farmers for seven to eight years, learning the rudiments of the Turkish language and Islamic customs. After these years the boys joined the ranks of Janissary novices. They lived in their own barracks under strict military discipline,

3 his armed retainers when called upon by the sultan. The number of armed retainers that the provincial cavalryman had to keep, arm, and bring with him on campaigns increased proportionately with the income from his fief; the more income he had, the more soldiers he was obliged to provide. In order to keep track of the number of fiefholding cavalrymen and their obligations, the Ottomans introduced various survey registers, perhaps as early as the reign of Bayezid I. During campaigns, muster rolls were checked against these registers in order to determine whether all the cavalrymen reported for military duty and brought the required number of retainers and equipment. If the cavalryman did not report for service or failed to bring with him the required number of retainers, he lost his military fief, which was then assigned to someone else. The timar fiefs and the related bureaucratic surveillance system provided the Ottoman sultans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries with a standing provincial cavalry army of 50,00080,000 strong, while relieving the central Ottoman bureaucracy of the burden of revenue-raising and paying military salaries. The system also proved instrumental in administering the provinces, maintaining law and order, and protecting the taxpaying subjects from abuses on the part of their landlords. Provincial and district governors, also remunerated through these military fiefs, served as military commanders of the cavalry forces of their respective provinces and districts, as well as heads of the provincial administration, which was charged, among other duties, with collecting taxes and maintaining law and order. The frequent rotation of governors and their surveillance by Muslim judges, sent by the central government, prevented the emergence of independent local strong men in the provinces and proved an efficient way to maintain and mobilize large forces until the end of the sixteenth century. For major sultan-led campaigns, Mehmed II, Selim I (r. 15121520), and Suleiman I could and did mobilize 70,000 80,000 men or more, including the standing units, the provincial cavalry paid through military fiefs and vassals, thus greatly outnumbering their opponents. Based on Ottoman treasury accounts, the paper numbers of the Ottoman salaried troops are summarized in Table 1. As we shall see later, the paper figures in Table 1 are often inflated, especially from the late seventeenth century onward, and the size of deployable and deployed central troops was considerably smaller. However, they reflected one important trend, the increase of salaried troops, which took place in the Ottoman military as a response to the new challenges that the Ottomans faced when fighting against their Habsburg and Romanov enemies.

WEAPONRY, ARMS INDUSTRY, AND LOGISTICS The bulk of the Ottoman army (infantry azabs, cavalry timariots, and akncs) used swords and bows. The Ottomans adopted firearms in the latter part of the fourteenth century, and established a separate artillery corps as part of the sultans standing army in the early fifteenth century, well before their European opponents. Initially, the Janissaries were equipped with their formidable recurved bow, saber, shield, and light coat of mail, while other units used crossbows, javelins, and war-axes. Under Murad II (r. 14211444, 1446 1451), they began to use matchlock arque fek in Ottoman sources. The buses, called tu fact that fortress inventories of the mid feks alongside canfifteenth century listed tu nons (top) suggests that by this time the fek had evolved into hand-held firearms tu of the arquebus type. By the mid-sixteenth

4
Table 1 The paper number of central salaried troops Date 15141515 15271528 15671568 1574 1609 1652 1654 16601661 16611662 16651666 16661667 16691670 16941695 16961697 16981699 17001701 17011702 17021703 17041705 17101711 1712 17231724 17271728 17281729 17291730 17611762 17751776 Janissary 10,156 7,886 12,798 13,599 37,627 55,151 51,047 55,151 54,222 20,467 47,233 39,470 78,798 69,620 67,729 42,119 39,925 40,139 52,642 43,562 36,383 24,403 24,733 24,803 98,723 49,708 61,239 Artillery 1,171 2,163 2,671 2,034 7,966 7,246 6,905 7,246 6,497 ? ? 8,014 21,824 14,726 15,470 11,485 10,893 10,010 11,851 5,510 Cavalry 5,316 5,088 11,044 6,047 14,869 20,479 19,844 ? 15,248 ? ? 14,070 13,395 15,217 13,447 13,043 12,999 12,976 17,133 15,625 Total 16,643 15,137 26,513 21,680 60,462 82,876 77,796 ? 75,967 ? ? 61,554 114,017 99,563 96,646 66,647 63,817 63,125 81,626 64,697

goston (2010): 116, 128129. zvar (2006), vol. 1: 237238; A Source: Genc and O

century most Janissaries carried firearms. Murad III (r. 15741595) equipped his Janissaries with the more advanced matchlock musket, although flintlock muskets with the Spanish miquelet-lock were also manufactured in the empire from the late sixteenth century. The Janissaries were firing their weapons row-by-row from the early sixteenth century, but it seems that they started to use volley fire of the West European type only in the 1590s. The Ottomans also established cannon foundries and gunpowder works throughout their empire. Major foundries operated along the Adriatic (Avlonya and Prevesa),

r), the in Hungary (Buda and Temesva Balkans (Rudnik, Semendire, Iskenderiye, Novaberda, Pravis te, and Belgrade), Anatolia (Diyarbekir, Erzurum, Birecik, Mardin, and Van), Iraq (Baghdad and Basra), and Egypt (Cairo). The center of cannon casting, however, was the Imperial Cannon Foundry in Istanbul, which was established by Mehmed II after the capture of the city. It was one of the first arsenals in late medieval Europe that was built, operated, and financed by a central government, at a time when most of Europes monarchs acquired their cannons from smaller artisan workshops. The Istanbul foundry could easily

5 multiply its capacity before and during major wars, casting several hundreds of cannon before the campaign season. In addition to the Istanbul gunpowder works, the Ottomans produced gunpowder in their provincial centers, including Cairo, Baghdad, Aleppo, and Yemen in the cs, Arab provinces; Buda, Esztergom, Pe r, Belgrade, Salonica, and Gallipoli Temesva in the European provinces; as well as Izmir, Bor, Erzurum, Diyarbekir, Oltu, and Van in Asia Minor. These works met the demand of the army, navy, and garrisons well into the eighteenth century. However, in the 1770s diminishing production forced Istanbul to import substantial quantities of powder from Europe. At the end of the eighteenth century, the new Azadl gunpowder works in Istanbul, modernized with French assistance, were again able to manufacture sufficient quantities of gunpowder of a much better quality. Despite allegations to the contrary in the literature, the Ottomans managed to keep pace with Europe regarding weapons technology. More importantly, their military-industrial complex in the capital, supplemented by smaller provincial cannon foundries and gunpowder workshops, enabled the Ottomans to establish longlasting firepower superiority in eastern and central Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. While factors such as numerical superiority, cavalry charge, and better logistics and tactics were important in the Ottoman victories at Chaldiran (1514), Marj-i Dabiq (1516), Raydaniyya (1517), cs (1526) against the Safavids, and Moha Mamluks, and Hungarians respectively, Ottoman firepower superiority played a crucial role in all these field battles. In siege warfare, Ottoman firepower superiority remained the Ottomans strength throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Ottomans also had a well-oiled financial and bureaucratic apparatus, as well as advanced provisioning, supply, and logistical systems. The Ottoman treasury closed most years with surplus up until the 1590s. They had a sophisticated road network, partly inherited from Roman and Byzantine times, and elaborate and well-functioning courier and relay systems, the stations of which were also used as grain-storage depots. Roads, mountain passes, and bridges were repaired before the campaigns, and substantial quantities of wheat, barley, flour, and biscuit were stored in the depots along the campaign routes. The mobilization, storage, and distribution of food supplies to the fighting army remained the strength of the Ottomans until about the mid eighteenth century, positively affecting discipline and moral. Owing to their supply and logistical system, Ottoman soldiers were usually better fed than their opponents. However, during the Russo-Ottoman Wars of 17681774, the Ottoman supply system seems to have collapsed, contributing to the Ottomans disastrous defeat. Ottoman firepower superiority, combined with numerical and logistical superiority, proved to be crucial in mounting a continuous pressure on Europe. Attempts to match Ottoman firepower prompted a series of European countermeasures. These included modernization of fortress systems (the introduction of the star fort or trace italienne into central and eastern Europe); changing the cavalryinfantry ratio; improving the training and tactics of field armies; increasing the quality and production output of armaments industries; and modernizing state administration and finances. While all these were part of a larger phenomenon, often referred to as the European military revolution, and were undoubtedly fostered by the frequency of interstate violence within Europe, in eastern and central Europe it was Ottoman military superiority that constituted the greatest challenge and required adequate countermeasures.

6 THE NAVY Under Mehmed II and Bayezid II (r. 14811512), the Ottomans acquired the common naval technology of the Mediterranean, adopting the oared galley as their principal vessel. The usual Ottoman galley carried a single mast with a lateen sail and had 2426 banks of oars on both sides, with three oarsmen to a bench, all pulling separate oars until the mid sixteenth century. From the 1560s, following their Mediterranean rivals, the Ottomans too adopted the al scaloccio system, by which all oarsmen on the same bench pulled a single oar. This arrangement helped to increase the number of oarsmen. Ottoman galleys usually carried a center-line cannon and two smaller flanking culverins. However, impressed by the Venetian galeasses, which played an important role in the Christians victory at the Battle of Lepanto, the Ottomans were quick to imitate these large and heavily armed galleys that could fire broadsides, as opposed to the traditional galleys, which had guns only on the prow. During the rebuilding of their fleet, destroyed at Lepanto, the Ottoman shipyards in Sinop and Istanbul constructed some four or five galeasses. These vessels could carry as many as 24 guns and fire them from the stern, bow, and sides. Although the Ottomans allies in the Barbary states started to use warships of the Atlantic type from the early seventeenth century and the Algerine war vessels carried as many as 30 to 50 guns and 250350 men by the last third of the century, the Ottomans were slow to adapt to the shipbuilding revolution. Recognizing the superiority of the Venetian sailing galleons during their attack on Crete in 1645, the Ottomans tried to imitate the Venetians. However, due to the inexperience of their crew, several of these new galleons were either captured or destroyed by the Venetians in the mid1650s. In 1662, Istanbul temporarily suspended the building of galleons and returned to the production of galleys. It was only after 1682 that the galleons became standard warships in the Ottoman navy. Of the ten galleons built in 1682, four carried 60 bronze guns, and six 80 guns. From the beginning of the eighteenth century some of the three-decker and larger galleons carried as many as 112 and 130 guns. In 17351740 the Ottoman navy consisted of 33 ships, of which 27 were three- and twodecker ships of the line and six smaller vessels of the fifth rank. The next phase of the modernization of the Ottoman navy took place under Selim III, as part of the sultans military reforms. The size of the Ottoman navy was already impressive under Mehmed II, who employed 380 galleys in his naval expeditions against the Genoese-administered Crimean port town of Caffa in 1475. During the 1499 1503 OttomanVenetian War, Bayezid II considerably strengthened the navy, ordering the construction of no fewer than 250 galleys in late 1500 alone. The reorganization of the Ottoman navy under Bayezid II transformed the originally land-based empire into a formidable naval power. The navy was instrumental in halting Portuguese expansion in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and in the Ottoman conquest of Mamluk Egypt in 15161517. Appointing the famed corsair Hayreddin Barbarossa grand admiral of the Ottoman navy (1533) and co-opting the corsairs of the Barbary states of Algiers and Tunis was a smart and economically efficient way to further strengthen the Ottoman navy and to project Ottoman military and political power as far as Algiers and Tunis. The Mediterranean fleet under the command of the grand admiral was the core of the Ottoman navy. Operating independently of this main fleet were smaller squadrons under the command of the captain of Kavala, who patrolled the northern Aegean;

7 the district governors of Lesbos and Rhodes, the latter commanding the sea routes between Egypt and Istanbul; the admiral of Egypt, who controlled both the Egyptian fleet based in Alexandria and the Suez fleet; and the captain of Yemen, who guarded the entry to the Red Sea. In addition, smaller flotillas operated on the Danube, Tigris, and Euphrates. The fighting power of such flotillas was impressive. On the Shatt al-Arab in 16981699, there were 60 frigates with 70 soldiers aboard each ship, which meant a fighting force of 4,200 troops. Gelibolu, the first naval arsenal, remained an important shipyard for the construction and repair of Ottoman ships. Nevertheless, by the beginning of the sixteenth century the Istanbul Naval Arsenal on the shore of the Golden Horn, inherited from the Genoese of Galata and expanded under Selim I, had become the principal center of Ottoman shipbuilding and maintenance. In the 1550s, 250 ships could be constructed and/or repaired there at a time. In addition to Gelibolu and Istanbul, there were shipyards at Izmit on the Sea of Marmara, at Sinop and Samsun on the Black Sea, at Suez in the Red Sea, and at Birecik and Basra on the Euphrates and the Shatt al-Arab, respectively. If one includes the smaller shipyards, the number of sixteenth-century Ottoman shipbuilding sites is close to 70. Hungarian wars of 15931606, the Ottomans faced increased firepower from the musketbearing Habsburg infantry, whose ratio to the cavalry in certain units reached 75 percent. The Ottomans strove to counterbalance this in two ways: by substantially increasing the number of musket-bearing Janissaries (see Table 1), and by recruiting musketeers from the subject population. The latter were disbanded after the campaign seasons in order to ease the burden on the treasury. These disbanded soldiers often turned into bandits and contributed to the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century uprisings. The swelling of the ranks of the Janissaries also had several negative consequences. The child levy system lapsed, and with it the old methods of training and drill also weakened, resulting in deteriorating discipline and skills. Prebends were turned into crown lands so that the treasury could pay the growing number of salaried troops. However, with the decline of the timar system, Istanbul lost its control over the provinces and its ability to maintain law and order through their provincial cavalry commanded by the sultans governors and other officers. These functions were increasingly fulfilled by semi-independent local strongmen, who were then appointed as governors, for the state needed their private armies against Austria and Russia. For instance, traditional timariot cavalry forces comprised less than 12 percent of the 86,884 troops mobilized for the 16971698 Hungarian campaign. At the same time, the household troops of governors and non-timariot provincial troops together accounted for more than 32 percent of the mobilized army. It was only with the help of such private and provincial troops that the Ottomans could still mobilize an army whose infantry-tocavalry ratio (57:43) was comparable to that of Istanbuls Habsburg and Romanov rivals.

IMPERIAL OVERSTRETCH, MILITARY TRANSFORMATION, AND REFORM By the late sixteenth century the Ottoman army reached the limits of its operational capabilities. Power relations on all fronts were more balanced, wars lasted longer, and they required commitments in fighting men, weaponry, supplies, and money at scales previously unseen. Moreover, during the

8 Since the state still lacked the funds to pay its swelling troops, the Janissaries were allowed to engage in trade and craftsmanship. It is hardly surprising, thus, that in the mid seventeenth century some 30 percent of the Janissaries were pensioners or guards, not fit for active military service. Some 30 to 60 percent of the Janissaries performed garrison duties. Thus only a fraction of the Janissaries (17 to 30 percent at the turn of the seventeenth century) participated in campaigns. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Ottomans European opponents had established their own standing armies that were comparable in size to that of the Ottomans. While revenues of the European fiscal-military states increased sharply in the seventeenth and especially in the eighteenth centuries, the Ottoman central governments share of the redistribution of revenues shrank from 58 percent in the 1520s to 24 percent in the 1660s, and the Ottoman states revenues increased by only 10 percent in the eighteenth century. Whereas in the middle of the century the revenues of Russia and the Ottoman Empire measured in tons of silver were still comparable, by 1796 St. Petersburgs revenues were almost ten times greater than those of Istanbul. In addition to such fiscal imbalance of power between the two empires, Russia also had a conscription system, which resulted in much larger armies. European troops in general were of higher quality, enjoyed an efficient supply system, better command, and professional military bureaucracy. The eighteenth century thus witnessed experimentation with other forms of recruitments and military systems ranging from militias to state-contracted formations, leading to the New Order (Nizam-i Cedid) Army of Sultan Selim III (r. 17891807). Launched in the aftermath of the RussoOttoman War of 17871792, the military and associated financial and administrative reforms of Selim III resulted in a new, disciplined, European-style army equipped with up-to-date weaponry and dressed in modern uniforms. Financed from an independent treasury, the new army was 23,000 strong by 1807, when opposition mounted by an alliance of the Janissaries and the religious establishment forced Selim III to disband it and abdicate. SEE ALSO: Austro-Ottoman War (17361739); Janissaries; Lepanto, Battle of (1571); Military Revolution, the (15601660); Muscovy, military rise of (14601730); Ottoman conquests; Ottoman military organization (18001918); Peter I of Russia (the Great) (16721725); Russo-Turkish Wars (pre-1878); Selim I (the Grim) (14651520); Suleiman I (the Magnificent) (14941566).

REFERENCES
goston, G. (2010) Empires and Warfare in EastA Central Europe, 15501750: The Ottoman Habsburg Rivalry and Military Transformation. In Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim (Eds.), European Warfare, 13501750. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 110134. zvar, E. (Eds.) (2006) Osmanl Genc , M. and O stanbul: tc Maliyesi: Kurumlar ve Bu eler, 2 vols. I Osmanl Bankas Ars iv ve Aras trma Merkezi.

FURTHER READING
goston, G. (2005) Guns for the Sultan: Military A Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire. New York: Cambridge University Press. Aksan, V. H. (2007) Ottoman Wars 1700 1870: An Empire Besieged. Harlow: Longman/ Pearson. rekc Bo i, G. (2006) A Contribution to the Military Revolution Debate: The Janissaries Use of Volley Fire during the Long OttomanHabsburg War

9
of 15931606 and the Problem of Origins, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 59 (4): 407438. . (2005) Ku rekli ve Yelkenli Osmanl Bostan, I sku stanbul: Bilge. dar, I Gemileri. U Heywood, C. (2002) Writing Ottoman History: Documents and Interpretations. Aldershot: Ashgate. Heywood, C. (2006) Whats in a Name? Some Algerine Fleet Lists (16861714) from British Libraries and Archives, Maghreb Review, 31 (12): 103128. Imber, C. (1996) The Navy of Suleyman the Magnificent. In C. Imber, Studies in Ottoman History and Law. Istanbul: Isis Press, pp. 169. Imber, C. (2009) The Ottoman Empire, 13001650: The Structure of Power, 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. nalck, H. (1980) Military and Fiscal TransformaI tion in the Ottoman Empire, Archivum Ottomanicum, 6: 283337. ldy-Nagy, G. (1976) The Conscription of Ka sellem and Yaya Corps in 1540. In the Mu ldy-Nagy (Ed.), Hungaro-Turcica: Studies G. Ka meth. Budapest: Lora nd in Honour of Julius Ne tvo s University, pp. 275281. Eo ldy-Nagy, G. (1977) The First Centuries of the Ka Ottoman Military Organization, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 31 (2): 147162. Murphey, R. (1999) Ottoman Warfare, 15001700. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Panzac, D. (1997) Armed Peace in the Mediterranean 17361739: A Comparative Survey of the Navies, Mariners Mirror, 84 (1): 4155. Shaw, S. J. (1971) Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III, 17891807. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Uyar, M. and Erickson, E. J. (2009) A Military rk. History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatu Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International/ ABC-CLIO. Vryonis, S. (1965) Isidore Glabas and the Turkish Devshirme, Speculum, 31 (3): 433443. Zorlu, T. (2008) Innovation and Empire in Turkey: Sultan Selim III and the Modernisation of the Ottoman Navy. London: Tauris Academic Studies.