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 1

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Multilateral Institutions in Asia:

The ASEAN Regional Forum

Carlyle A. Thayer

Seminar Series
October 2000
 i

Table of Contents
Executive Summary i

Introduction 1

The Formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum 5

Strategic Uncertainty 6

Role of Track 2 7

Accommodation in the Asia-Pacific Region 8

Measuring the Effectiveness of the ARF 11

Interest-based Approach 13

Identity-based Approach 14

Measuring ARF Effectiveness 17

Strengthening the ARF 19

Procedural 19

Process 20

Security Challenges 21

The Goals of Regional Order 23

The Goals of Regional Security 24

Non-traditional Security Issues 25

ARF Structure 26

The United States and the ARF 28

Enhancing Regional Cooperation 29

Abbreviations 32
Participants 34

Bibliography 35
 i

MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIA: THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM

Multilateral Institutions in Asia Seminar: Executive Summary

Executive Summary: On July 17, 2000 the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
(APCSS) convened a one-day seminar entitled “Multilateral Institutions in Asia”
which focused on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The purpose of the
seminar was to discuss the future of Asia’s multilateral security institutions, with
a focus on assessing the reasons behind the emergence of regional organizations,
measuring their effectiveness, and examining what, if anything, should be done
to strengthen their roles in the region. The seminar also considered the
implications for U.S. policy.

Emergence of the ARF. The idea of a multilateral forum to conduct a dialogue on

regional security issues in the Asia-Pacific emerged in the early 1990s. Proposals
were advanced by Australia, Canada and Russia among others. ASEAN took the
lead in 1991 by agreeing that its annual post-ministerial conference could discuss
security issues with its dialogue partners. This ASEAN initiative was made
possible due to a confluence of events: the end of the Cold War, U.S.
disengagement (the loss of bases in the Philippines), consensus among ASEAN
think tanks, and the initiatives of individual ASEAN countries such as Singapore
and the Philippines. The result was agreement among ASEAN members in 1993
to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

Leadership of the ARF. The leadership of the new multilateral security dialogue
forum was given to ASEAN. This was because ASEAN was the most acceptable
and least threatening potential leader of the ARF. ASEAN leadership assuaged
Chinese suspicions of multilateral institutions and made Chinese participation in
the ARF possible. It was noted that ASEAN’s leadership role had suffered
subsequently because of a noticeable weakening of ASEAN cohesion due to three
factors: the Asian financial crisis, domestic instability in Indonesia and
enlargement (the inclusion of new members – Cambodia, Laos and Burma).
Nonetheless, participants concluded that ASEAN should remain in the “driver’s
seat” and it was premature to consider “other forms of alternate leadership” of
the ARF. The seminar felt that the sharing of the chairmanship of inter-sessional
working groups between ASEAN and non-ASEAN states remained an effective
mechanism for initiatives by non-ASEAN members.

The ARF as a “security community”. This issue was discussed extensively.

There was agreement that the notion of a security community, especially as
propounded by Karl Deutsch, was inappropriate for the region’s security
architecture at this stage. The evolution of a European security community was
based on the perception of a common threat. This is not the case in Asia-Pacific at
present. The very term “security community” was also considered linguistically
 ii

unacceptable by regional states because of its connotations of Western

institutions and the identification of an adversary. The notion of a “security
community” appears to have been “reversed engineered” to fit the peculiarities
of Asia-Pacific; that is, applied retrospectively to the Asia-Pacific on the basis of
existing European institutions. The bottom line conclusion was that the notion of
a “security community” should not form the theoretical underpinning of U.S.
engagement strategy planning.

Strengthening the ARF. The following suggestions were felt to have merit:

• Increased interaction by defense officials.

• Inclusion of law enforcement and immigration officials in the ARF

process.

• Establishment of a Regional Risk Reduction Center.

• Creation of an ARF Secretariat with an independent research capacity.

• Further dialogue based on case studies of successful intra-regional conflict

resolution and case studies of unsuccessful extra-regional conflict
resolution.

• Greater involvement of the ARF in addressing transnational issues.

• ARF action to control the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

• Revival of efforts to create a Regional Arms Register.

• Strengthening of Confidence Building Measures, especially maritime

CBMs.

• Stepping up the involvement of “track one-and-a-half” activities due to

concern that existing track two activities had become too much of a
“club,” lacked new thinking, and needed reinvigoration and new blood.

• Eventual establishment of an ARF High Council to assist in preventive

diplomacy and conflict resolution.

Suggestions for U.S. Policy. The continued engagement of the United States in
regional affairs was held to be essential to regional peace and security. The
seminar expressed strong concerns about the development of a destabilizing
power vacuum should the U.S. disengage. Participants noted that regional
concerns about U.S. disengagement were less pronounced now than in the early
1990s. A continued U.S. military presence was necessary to deal with
 iii

contingencies arising on the Korean peninsula, between China-Taiwan, and

between India and Pakistan.

The ARF is likely to remain an unmanageable forum for dealing with regional
security issues for the foreseeable future. ASEAN is beset with severe limitations
on its operational capability to lead cooperative actions to address regional
security concerns. The ARF’s focus on confidence building measures and
preventive diplomacy presents an opportunity cost in not dealing effectively
with more pressing security concerns (in North East Asia, for example).

The United States should more fully embrace multilateralism by adopting a “pull
strategy” rather than a “push strategy”. The United States should continue to
assist regional states develop a sense of ownership of multilateral efforts to
address common security concerns. The United States has resources that it can
bring to bear on these issues. The U.S. should consult with select regional states
about the most sensible and efficient way these resources can be used
cooperatively to attain common goals. In this way the onus is placed on the
“customers” to define what they expect and want. The next step would be to
encourage select regional states to reach a consensus about their priorities. The
U.S. should then incorporate these inputs into its engagement strategy. This
multilateral process provides the opportunity for U.S. allies and friends to have
influence on and become proponents of U.S. policy in the region.
 1

Multilateral Institutions in Asia: The ASEAN Regional Forum

Introduction

The Asia-Pacific region lacks any overarching effective security structures

comparable to Europe. The region is beset with pockets of instability and
potential hot spots. The Asia-Pacific also contains both developed and
developing economies and a plurality of sub-regional associations formed to
encourage trade and investment. The Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) is the best example of such a sub-regional grouping. It has been only
relatively recently, however, that ASEAN has enlarged its agenda to deal
explicitly with security issues. In the early 1990s ASEAN took the lead in
establishing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to foster multilateral dialog on
security matters. The ARF is still in its formative period of development. It is also
one of several sub-regional associations in the Asia-Pacific that addresses
security concerns (eg. Five Power Defense Arrangement, Four Party Talks on
Korea, Trilateral Forum on the North Pacific, Northeast Asia Cooperation
Dialog).

In 1993 the Clinton Administration overcame a long-standing U.S. aversion to

multilateral security institutions in Asia-Pacific by endorsing multilateralism and
the ARF. This change in national policy impacted on the Department of Defense
which has had to reconceptualize it strategy of engagement in Asia-Pacific. One
of the key players in implementing U.S. defense policy in Asia-Pacific is the
Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC). The current incumbent,
Admiral Dennis C. Blair, has applied himself conceptually to exploring new
possibilities of multilateralism involving the military. Since taking office in
February 1999 he has articulated his views in a series of public addresses that are
reviewed briefly below. A close examination of these speeches reveals an
evolutionary process in developing new concepts and practical activities for
enhancing regional cooperation. Admiral Blair’s intellectual engagement with
these issues provided a major stimulus to the Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies to explore the question of multilateral institutions in Asia at a specially
convened international seminar held in July 2000.

In 1998, the U.S. Department of Defense issued a security strategy for the Asia-
Pacific that called for “developing security pluralism.”1 According to Admiral
Blair, speaking in May 1999 shortly after assuming the position of Commander-
in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, security pluralism “refers to a network of
bilateral and multilateral relationships adding up to a resilient security

1U.S. Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, The United States Security
Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998. Washington, D.C.: November 1998. pp. 42-44.
 2

framework for the region.”2 He also argued that there were two contending
concepts with respect to regional security, the traditional balance of power
approach and security pluralism. In his view:

[s]ecurity pluralism is an alternative to balancing power. It relies on

diplomacy and negotiation to make steady progress on disputes. A
network of security and military relationships — bilateral and multilateral
— develops to maintain peace and allow economic and cooperative
development by which all nations prosper and benefit… In the Asia-
Pacific Region we need more security pluralism thinking and less balance
of power thinking.3

Admiral Blair also identified five multilateral institutions that contributed to

developing security pluralism: the ASEAN Regional Forum, Four Party Talks on
Korea, Trilateral Forum on the North Pacific, Northeast Asia Cooperation
Dialog and the South Pacific Forum (now the Pacific Islands Forum).

In a subsequent address Admiral Blair developed three additional concepts,

“enriched bilateralism,” “strategic communities” and “security communities.”4
In Admiral Blair’s view the old metaphor describing U.S. security ties as “a hub
and spoke arrangement” needed to be modified in light of likely future security
challenges. In his words:

American security relations in Asia have been referred to as a hub and

spoke arrangement — with America at the center of bilateral ties among
nations who have weak or non-existent military relations with each other.
We now need to enrich those bilateral ties.

No longer is it sufficient to consult only with South Korea on American

policy toward North Korea, we need also to work very closely with Japan,
and consult with China and Russia. Consulting with security partners on
bilateral relations regarding third countries before setting policy and
taking action is becoming more important.

From enriched bilateralism it is a relatively small step toward bringing all

parties working on the issue together for consultation and coordination.

2Admiral Dennis C. Blair, “Collective Responsibilities for Security in the Asia-Pacific Region,”
Remarks at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore, May 22, 1999.
3Ibid.
4Remarks by Admiral Dennis C. Blair, USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, at the

Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, September 8, 1999.
Security communities became the favored expression; see: Dennis C. Blair, “Security
Communities Are the Way Ahead for Asia,” International Herald Tribune, April 21, 2000. In
August 2000, in a further evolution of conceptualization, the expression “enhanced regional
cooperation initiative” was adopted.
 3

The approach that Japan, South Korea and the U.S. used for coordinating
their policies regarding North Korea is a template for building upon
enriched bilateralism. The four-party talks provide similar opportunities
for coordination among China, South Korea and the U.S.

Extending this process transforms the former hub and spokes system into
a network of security relations that build the confidence needed for the
formation of strategic communities (emphasis in original).5

In Admiral Blair’s view the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis and instability in
Indonesia has resulted in a weakening of ASEAN and the ARF. Both
organizations were assessed as “making little headway “ in dealing with the
region’s most pressing security problems. This made it imperative to draw China
into a regional security community. In his words:

[t]he fundamental security challenge in the Asia-Pacific region is to

transform the balance of power approach proposed by those who
advocate a multi-polar global power structure into one that instead aims
to produce strategic communities where the thought of using armed force
to resolve disputes never arises (emphasis in original).6

In a series of major speeches delivered in March and April 2000 Admiral Blair
fleshed out his concept of a security community by specifically borrowing a term
used by political scientist Karl Deutsch in the 1950s to describe Western Europe.7
In an address to the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference he
argued:

The way ahead is the development of security communities. Karl Deutsch

coined the term to describe a community of nations that have dependable
expectations of peaceful change.

The attributes that I ascribe to security communities are that they are
nations who

—genuinely do not plan or intend to fight each other,

—are willing to put collective efforts into resolving regional points of

friction,

5Ibid.
6Ibid.
7Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957. Amitav Acharya has also drawn on the work of Karl Deutsch to define a
“security community,” see: “A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?” Journal of
Strategic Studies, September 1995, 18(3), 180.
 4

—are willing to contribute armed forces and other aid to UN mandated

operations to support diplomatic solutions,8

—are willing to contribute to humanitarian operations, and

—are willing to plan, train and exercise their armed forces together to
build trust, confidence, and capabilities to conduct these kinds of
operations.

The concept of security communities is particularly apt for the Asia-Pacific

region because the member nations need not be treaty alliance signatories.
Communities may be based on a non-military organization9 such as the
ASEAN Regional Forum; or their membership may be based upon
geography or common concerns10 rather than any multilateral security
forum.

The key issue is that the members are committed to policy coordination,
including combined military cooperation, on a particular regional security
issue, or a series of related security issues, to advance peaceful
development over time.11

8As an example of Admiral Blair’s evolutionary approach in conceptualizing security issues

points four and five were combined and reformulated in an address to the Pacific Basin Council.
The text now read: “that are willing to contribute their armed forces and other assistance for
humanitarian operations and peacekeeping operations to support diplomatic solutions.” In this
speech reference to a UN mandate was dropped and contributions to peacekeeping operations was
included. In a subsequent speech Admiral Blair reverted to his original five points. See,
respectively, Remarks by Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command,
at the Pacific Basin Economic Council, March 21, 2000 and Remarks as Prepared for Admiral
Dennis C. Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, University of California San Diego,
Graduate School of International Relations & Pacific Studies, Dean’s Roundtable Breakfast, April
13, 2000.
9In Admiral Blair’s address to the Pacific Basin Council he added ASEAN to his list of non-

military organizations. In a subsequent speech to the University of California San Diego Admiral
Blair dropped ASEAN from this section.
10In a further example of Admiral Blair’s evolutionary approach in conceptualizing security

issues, in his address to the Pacific Basin Council this phrase was changed to read ”[t]hey can
simply be groupings of nations who share a common geographic concern or functional concerns
as they work together.” In a subsequent speech to the University of California San Diego Admiral
Blair reverted to his original five points.
11Remarks by Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, presented at

the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, D.C., March 16, 2000.
 5

Finally, to round out this discussion on the “security communities” concept, it

should be noted that Admiral Blair included an explicit military component
(including military dialog and rudimentary exercises).12

In 1997-98 a number of factors combined to weaken perceptions of ASEAN’s

cohesion: the Indonesian “haze problem,” the Asian financial and economic
crisis, ASEAN enlargement, 13 political instability in Indonesia and to a lesser
extent Malaysia, and the rise of intramural differences between ASEAN
members. In 1999 violence in East Timor resulted in a UN-mandated Australian-
led international intervention force (INTERFET) to secure order. These
developments led to renewed doubts about the ARF’s ability to respond
effectively to regional security challenges. It was in these circumstances, and in
light of Admiral Blair’s call to replace balance of power politics as the mainstay
of regional security, that the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies decided to
convene a one-day international seminar focused on the future of multilateral
institutions in Asia with specific attention to the ASEAN Regional Forum. The
seminar examined four sets of issues:

• the factors which led to the emergence of the ARF as the region’s main
multilateral security forum;

• measures of ARF effectiveness;

• measures which might strengthen the ARF; and

• the implications for U.S. policy.

The following sections examine each of these issues in detail.

The Formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum14

The ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF is primarily a product of shifting power

alignments in Southeast Asia following the end of the Cold War. Three sets of

12Remarks as Prepared for Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command,
University of California San Diego, Graduate School of International Relations & Pacific Studies,
Dean’s Roundtable Breakfast, April 13, 2000.
13For difficulties associated with ASEAN’s enlargement see: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Reinventing

ASEAN: From Constructive Engagement to Flexible Intervention,” Harvard Asia Pacific Review.
Spring 1999, 3(2), 67-70.
14Thissection draws on Maria Consuelo C. Ortuoste, “The Establishment of the ASEAN Regional
Forum,” Paper delivered to Multilateral Institutions in Asia Seminar, Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies, Honolulu, July 14, 2000 and Ortuoste, “Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific:
The ASEAN Regional Forum Experiment,” FSI Quarterly [Manila], January-March 1999, 1(1), 43-
73.
 6

factors converged in the early 1990s that led to the creation of the ARF: strategic
uncertainty, the interaction of regional security think tanks, and accommodation
among states in the Asia-Political region.

Strategic Uncertainty

The post-Cold War security environment was marked by increased strategic

uncertainty as bipolarity gave way to incipient multipolarity. In 1991-92 the
United States withdrew from its military bases in the Philippines. At the same
time China was perceived as a rising military and economic power. In 1992
China became more assertive in the South China Sea after promulgating a law on
its territorial sea and contiguous waters. It granted an oil concession to the
Crestone Corporation in an area Vietnam claimed was on its continental shelf.
China also occupied and began construction on a number of features in the area.

Japan’s role was limited to economic aid through its Official Development
Assistance program. Indeed, Japan was criticized by the United States for its
“check book diplomacy” during the Gulf War. In light of these changes ASEAN
sought to transform the old balance of power system based on unilateral action
with a new balance based on the positive engagement of external powers in
consultation with each other. Finally, there was a new attitude of optimism about
the efficacy of dialog. This attitude has its origins in the Pacific Economic
Cooperation Council (PECC) process.15 As a result there was increased
discussion in the region about how to prevent economic growth from being
undermined by security issues.

In sum, bilateral military alliances and existing regional organizations were

increasingly perceived as inadequate to deal with new security issues. For
example, one participant noted the example of Somalia16 as a “new kind of
conflict” that was a factor in thinking leading to the creation of the ASEAN
Regional Forum. Support for comprehensive security also gained ground and
this led naturally to the search for alternate security mechanisms. In the early
1990s at least nine countries advanced specific proposals, most prominently
Japan, Canada and Australia.

15PECC was formed in September 1980 as a tripartite partnership of representatives from

business and industry, government and the academic world acting in their private capacities
from individual countries in the Asia-Pacific. Its purpose is to encourage cooperation and policy
coordination in trade, investment, finance, human resource development and all major industrial
sectors. Membership now stands at twenty-five. See: www.pecc.net
16In September 1992 500 lightly-armed Pakistani peacekeepers were deployed. In December the

United Nations Security Council adopted a peace-enforcement mandate.

 7

Role of Track 2

Southeast Asian states were caught flat-footed by the end of the Cold War.
During this period of initial hesitancy regional think tanks — the ASEAN-
Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) network — took the
initiative. The ASEAN-ISIS network consisted of five strategic studies institutes
based in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (plus the
Brunei Ministry of Foreign Affairs).17 Because these institutes were not formal
government bodies they became known as track two organizations to distinguish
them from track one which involved sovereign state actors.

Since 1990 ASEAN-ISIS deliberations provided a multilateral framework for

strategic thinking. ASEAN-ISIS engaged in extensive networking, for example,
through the Asia-Pacific Round Table held annually in Kuala Lumpur since 1987,
and the Indonesian workshops on Confidence Building in the South China Sea
inaugurated in 1992. Through these endeavors ASEAN-ISIS developed the habit
of dialog and support for confidence building measures (CBMs). They also
discovered the efficacy of presenting their governments with collective proposals
rather than individual submissions. In brief, in a variety of formal and informal
settings ASEAN-ISIS incrementally added to their governments’ agenda.

In November 1994 ASEAN-ISIS held a formal meeting with senior ASEAN

officials and presented a document containing eight chapters including a
discussion of peacekeeping. The ASEAN-ISIS proposals, along with those from
Australia, Canada and other countries, were then consolidated by Brunei in its
capacity as chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee. They were then reviewed
by ASEAN officials. Next, Singapore diplomat Kishore Mahbubani was
commissioned to draft a mission statement/concept paper based on the common
elements of these proposals. The development of Mahbubani’s paper benefited
from further exchanges among ASEAN officials who sought to define a role for
ASEAN in the emerging multilateral process. The result was a Mission and
Vision Statement that was presented to a meeting of ASEAN senior officials in
Bangkok in May 1994. The final product that emerged was entitled the ARF
Concept Paper.18

In the early 1990s a series of conferences on Security Cooperation in the Asia

Pacific (SCAP) were hosted by ASEAN-ISIS, the Japan Institute for International
Affairs, Pacific Forum/CSIS and the Seoul Forum for International Affairs. Also,
in parallel with the emergence of the ASEAN-ISIS network, non-Southeast Asian

17Center for Strategic & International Studies (Indonesia), ISIS Malaysia; Institute for Strategic

and Development Studies (Philippines), Singapore Institute for International Affairs (since
replaced by the Institute of Defence & Strategic Studies), Institute of Security & International
Studies (Thailand).
18The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper. http://www.aseansec.org/amm/prog_arf.htm
 8

track two institutes were active in the process of developing a track-two

equivalent of the ASEAN Regional Forum. In 1993 ten institutes came together
and founded the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP).19
This new body also included strategic studies think tanks from Australia,
Canada, Japan, South Korea and the United States.20 It should be noted that the
original ASEAN-ISIS was composed of think tanks from five “like minded”
states. ASEAN enlargement to include Vietnam (1995), Laos, Myanmar (1997)
and Cambodia (1999) has resulted in the transformation of ASEAN-ISIS. Four of
the new members are represented by government officials rather than private
individuals.21 Brunei has always been represented by its Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.

Accommodation in the Asia-Pacific Region

Individual governments also played a role in the creation of the ARF. In the
1990s both Canada and Australia advanced proposals supporting a new
multilateral security framework. For example, Canada’s Joe Clark proposed the
creation of a multilateral body to deal with security issues mainly in Northeast
Asia. Australia’s Foreign Minister Gareth Evans proposed a Conference on
Security Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) modeled on the Conference on Security
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).22 ASEAN officials dismissed European
institutions out of hand arguing that the security environment in Asia Pacific
was entirely different from Europe. Japan and South Korea also rejected the
notion that European institutions could be transposed to the Asia-Pacific. The
United States also opposed Evans’ CSCA proposal out of fear it would dilute its
bilateral alliances. The rejection of the European models was accompanied by
efforts by ASEAN scholars and officials to define the uniqueness of the Asia-
Pacific region in terms of its geography, and economic and security linkages.

In 1991 an ASEAN-ISIS meeting held in Jakarta to discuss the forthcoming

ASEAN Summit, considered a proposal to convene an Asia-Pacific political
dialogue. This meeting was attended by the head of Japan’s Policy Planning
Office in the Gaimusho. According to Carolina Hernandez, “ASEAN-ISIS
requested this official to seek the support of Japan for the initiative if it should be

19The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region (CSCAP). CSCAP Pro-Tem
Committee, 1993. 5-8. See also the writings by Des Ball and Paul Evans listed in the bibliography.
20
In addition to the five ASEAN-ISIS members (see note 17 above), the other founding members
included: Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University (Australia);
Joint Center for Asia Pacific Studies, York University (Canada); Japan Institute of International
Affairs; Seoul Forum for International Affairs (South Korea); and Pacific Forum/CSIS (U.S.).
21 Vietnam, for example, is represented by the Institute of International Relations (IIR) which

comes under its Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

22Robyn Lim, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand,” Contemporary Southeast Asia,

August 1998, 20(2),120.

 9

brought up in the 1992 [sic] Kuala Lumpur AMM and subsequently in the
ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) with ASEAN’s dialogue
partners.”23 The Gaimusho official brought the ASEAN-ISIS initiative to the
attention of his Foreign Minister, Taro Nakayama, and recommended that Japan
support the idea of a regional discussion of security issues if the matter was
raised by ASEAN first. In an episode that deserves further historical scrutiny,
Foreign Minister Nakayama, on his own initiative, endorsed the idea of a
regional security dialog in remarks to the 24th ASEAN PMC held in Kuala
Lumpur in July 1991. Nakayama’s proposal for a process of political discussion
envisioned that security dialogue would involve a comprehensive discussion of
security. He suggested that senior ministers meet prior to the ASEAN Post-
Ministerial Conference to discuss security issues.

ASEAN was extremely sensitive about formally discussing security issues at the
PMC. The PMC usually considered economic matters but had recently allowed
discussion of Cambodia on the agenda. Nakayama’s endorsement of regional
security dialog unintentionally preempted the ASEAN-ISIS initiative and did not
go down well with his audience. According to Hernandez, “[h]aving come from
a ranking official of a major regional power about whom lingering suspicions on
foreign policy motives remain in the minds of many of its neighbors, the idea
was met with deafening silence.”24 Nonetheless, this episode demonstrates that
there was growing external support for discussions on regional security by
ASEAN’s dialog partners. The ASEAN-ISIS proposal (Memorandum No. 1) was
formally presented to ASEAN in June 1991 and was endorsed in principle at the
Fourth Summit held in Singapore in January 1992.

By the early 1990s ASEAN’s role in brokering a peace settlement in Cambodia

had been eclipsed by the role of the five permanent members of the UN’s
Security Council (otherwise known as the Perm 5 or P5).25 ASEAN risked
marginalization as a result. The idea of a region-wide security dialogue was
supported by Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines but not Malaysia.
Indonesia was initially reluctant because of its role as chair in the Workshop on
the South China Sea. Indonesia led the workshop process on behalf of ASEAN
and was reluctant to see any diminution of its role in a new body. ASEAN finally
acted collectively as it did not wish to see its primacy in regional security matters
challenged. The first regional security dialogue between ASEAN members and
other regional states took place at the Singapore summit in January 1992. A

23Carolina G. Hernandez, “Philippine Participation in Track Two Activities on Security-Related

Issues: ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP Experiences, 1990-1997,” in FSI Foreign Affairs Quarterly,
January-March 1999, 1(1), 81.
24Ibid., 80.
25Richard H. Solomon, Exiting Indochina: U.S. Leadership of the Cambodia Settlement & Normalization

with Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000.
 10

declaration was issued that stated that the PMC would discuss security issues.
Security issues were raised at the ASEAN annual ministerial meeting and PMC
held in Manila in July. For example, the United States raised the issue of drugs as
a security concern at the ASEAN Six Plus One meeting.

China took a strong stand against hegemony (U.S. leadership). It was initially
opposed to participating in multilateral security organizations because it felt
these would constrain Chinese actions. Later China concluded multilateral
institutions could be useful devices for constraining the United States. Chinese
attitudes slowly changed as it was integrated into the regional security dialogue
process. China attended its first ASEAN PMC as a guest of host country
Malaysia. China’s status was then upgraded to consultative partner and
eventually into full dialog partner status (along with Russia).

The United States was a latecomer in supporting multilateralism in Asia-Pacific.

Generally the U.S. viewed collective security, such as European collective
defense, as being directed against a particular threat. In 1990 Secretary of State
James A. Baker wrote to his Australian counterpart and told him that proposals
for multilateral security forums were “a solution in search of a problem” and that
existing bilateral arrangements were still suitable. According to one seminar
participant, the U.S. administration had a “Asia blind spot” and was unwilling to
give consideration to other than the forward deployment of U.S. forces. It was
the Clinton Administration that first endorsed multilateralism.26 This was
signaled by Winston Lord in his confirmation hearing27 and in a major speech
given in 1993 supporting multilateral structures.

In 1993 the above three strands converged and resulted in the formation of the
ARF as a multilateral security dialog forum. An early draft of what became the
ARF Concept Paper included the expression “co-drivers” in its discussion of ARF
leadership. In other words ASEAN and its dialogue partners would share the
leadership role. Australia was an advocate of this formula but did not
aggressively push its case preferring to take its lead from ASEAN. In the event
ASEAN took the “driver’s seat” and assumed the prime leadership role of the
ARF.

In the 1990s, ASEAN as an organization was widely perceived as a success story.

It promoted high rates of economic growth and had taken the political lead in
opposing Soviet-backed Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia. In the view of
one observer, ASEAN had become a “diplomatic community.” ASEAN

26Lim, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand,” op. cit., 121.
27“Opening Statement at Confirmation Hearings for Ambassador Winston Lord Assistant
Secretary of State-Designate, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,” March 31, 1993.
http://www.gwjapan.com/ftb/pub/policy/congress/senate/newpacfc.txt
 11

leadership of the ARF therefore did not present a high risk to any other ARF
member. ASEAN was a non-military association. Also ASEAN was the only
group that was acceptable to all other prospective members. If Australia or any
other country had taken the lead other states would not have come on board. The
ARF would have been a non-starter if either China or the United States had
initiated the process of setting up a multilateral security forum.

According to one seminar participant, there were three possible approaches to

security: (1) collective self-defense; (2) collective security based on the United
Nations (where no enemy was identified); and multilateral cooperation
arrangements. In the end ASEAN Regional Forum was “the only game in town.”

Finally, ASEAN emerged as the natural leader of the ARF because it had already
developed an acceptable framework for discussions on security issues through
its dialog partner process at its annual ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences.
Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, argued that strategic circumstances in
the Asia-Pacific were different from Europe where the CSCE had been created to
deal with the East-West conflict. Alatas argued for a unique Asian approach to
managing change and maintaining equilibrium among external powers. In 1992
the ASEAN PMC proposed that security issues by discussed at a meeting of
composed of PMC senior officials. The following year an informal dinner
meeting of foreign affairs officials set the stage for the first formal meeting of the
ASEAN Regional Forum on July 25, 1994 in Bangkok.

Measuring the Effectiveness of the ARF28

The ASEAN Regional Forum is now six years old. The ARF initially adopted a
three-phase program of development: confidence building, preventive
diplomacy, and elaboration of approaches to conflict. It was later agreed that
phases one and two (confidence building and preventive diplomacy) could
proceed in tandem. The ARF’s work plan is conducted by a number of inter-
sessional groups and inter-sessional meetings held in the first half of each year.29
Proposals from the ISGs and ISMs are transmitted to ARF senior officials for
consideration and recommendation to ARF ministers. The ARF is presently

28Thissection draws on John Garofano, “Measuring ARF Effectiveness: A Proposal for Research,”
Paper delivered to Multilateral Institutions in Asia Seminar, Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies, Honolulu, July 14, 2000
29Currently the two most active are the Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence-Building

Measures and the Inter-sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief. The Inter-sessional Meeting on
Peacekeeping is moribund. It was at Chinese insistence that a distinction was drawn in
nomenclature between inter-sessional activities (support groups versus meetings). China wanted
to reduce the impression that the ARF had set up institutionalized working groups on a
permanent basis. See: Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, Adelphi Paper 302. London:
Oxford University Press for International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996, p. 42.
 12

bogged down over disagreement about how to define preventive diplomacy.

China, in particular, is concerned that preventive diplomacy may be used as the
thin edge of the wedge to intervene in its internal affairs (Tibet and Muslim
separatism in its western provinces). Critics have dismissed the ARF as a “talk
shop” because of its slow pace.

On the other hand, supporters of the ARF measure its effectiveness by other
means. They note that not only has ASEAN been able to convince China to
participate but that China has gradually moderated its hostility to
multilateralism. For example, concerning territorial disputes in the South China
Sea, China has modified its position from opposing multilateral discussion of this
issue to engaging in a dialog with ASEAN as an organization. Within the ARF,
China has agreed to settle the issue by peaceful means on the basis of
international law and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in
particular. Further, there has been a considerable change in the content of
China’s first two White Papers. The first dealt with arms control issues almost
exclusively while the second dealt with a broader range of security concerns.

Supporters of the ARF also point to its extensive discussion and adoption of
CBMs. At the fifth ASEAN Regional Forum the chairman issued a matrix that
included the publication of defense policy statements and Defense White Papers,
circulation of submissions to the UN Conventional Arms Register (UNCAR), and
participation in the UNCAR, regional security dialogues, high-level defense
contacts, exchange of representative of defense institutes and defense officials,
and disarmament/non-proliferation regimes. An increasing number of ARF
members are voluntarily subscribing to these and other ARF-endorsed CBMs.
One participant noted that at the ISG on Search and Rescue held in Honolulu in
late 1998 the plenary sessions were formal affairs with little observable progress,
but in the technical meetings there was a convergence of views on practical
things to do.

It may be argued that the ARF’s long-term goal is the creation of a security
community defined as a community of states that have shared expectations
about a peaceful future and about pacific solutions to problems that threaten
stability and peace.30 With this as the end state, there are two approaches to the
process by which partially antipathetic states can form a security community: an
interest-based approach and an identity-based approach.

30ASEAN itself has set the goal of becoming a community of peaceful, socially cohesive,
competitive and prosperous Southeast Asia by the year 2020; see ASEAN Vision 2020 issued by
the second informal summit held in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997.
 13

Interest-based Approach

The interest-based approach represents the realist view of inter-state relations.

Inter-state cooperation is based on perceived national interest and the existence
of an external threat. States are forced to deal with each other to overcome
conflicts of interest. States cannot isolate themselves from the system. The
interest-based approach favors the creation of institutions. For example, states
form a regime, such as the CSCE, and devise ways to share information and
develop transparency. In sum, although self-interest permits states to engage in
cooperative activity states’ identities do not change significantly as a result.

The interest-based approach posits that states cooperate if it will bring them
gains in the form of increased security or if non-participation will bring them
relative loses. The “shadow of the future” serves as a powerful motivating force
for states to engage in cooperation in order to avoid the penalties lost through
non-cooperation. But the range of cooperative activities will tend to be narrow
because of the overriding concern of states to limit the relative gains accruing to a
rival. Institutions are supported to the extent that they lower the transaction costs
of arriving at a mutually beneficial agreement.

The interest-based approach suggests that ARF effectiveness can be determined

by measuring the following issue-areas:

Group 1: Perceptual

• Evidence of concern for the “shadow of the future.”

• Evidence that serious conflicts are due to misperception and lack of

information.

• Evidence of new information altering prior perceptions or behavior in serious

cases.

• Evidence of regime-type arrangements effectively lowering the costs of

acquiring new information.

Group 2: Interests

• Evidence of the persistence of traditional, national interests.

• Evidence of regime-constraining effects on traditional behaviors and interests.

 14

Identity-based Approach31

The identity-based approach represents the sociological approach to the study of

inter-state relations. According to Karl Deutsch a dense network of transactions
among states involved in the process of integration leads to a sense of “we
feeling” or community. Sovereignty is slowly pooled over time. In other words,
states give mutual consideration to each other’s needs. Others — outsiders —
perceive individual members as part of a group. In sum, how each nation sees
itself gradually changes over time as a result of political and economic
interaction. Diplomatic meetings, for example, slowly change consciousness as
each participant develops a comfort level in dealing with other members.
Through this process there is a gradual adjustment of interests. The development
of a European security community evolved from the mid-19th century to the
1950s. In other words, more than power politics (realism) is at work.

The identity-based approach provides another means by which to evaluate the

ARF’s effectiveness. According to one participant’s view ARF’s sense of
community is being fashioned by the development of shared interests and norms
(traditional security concerns plus other issues such as maritime issues, piracy
and drug trafficking). The ARF has made modest progress in encouraging
transparency. The use of force has not characterized relations between ARF
members but it is not clear that the existence of ARF has contributed to this
peaceful state of affairs. There has been some, however slight, movement
towards preventive defense. These factors have developed a stronger sense of
“us.” But the ARF has not yet resulted in the development of a Deutschian
security community. The ARF needs to develop a High Council to resolve
disputes among its members. And the ARF needs to more fully integrate defense
officials in the process of identity formation.32

The identity-based approach suggests that ARF effectiveness can be determined

by measuring the following groups of issue-areas:

Group 1: Consciousness

• Density of transactions.

• Extent of transactions.

• Evidence of “we-feeling.”

31Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia. Singapore:
Oxford University Press, 2000.
32In 1997 at the ARF senior officials meeting it was decided to include defense officials in

discussions on CBMs as a step towards preventive diplomacy.

 15

• Evidence of trust.

• Evidence of shared images.

Group 2: Impact on Significant Groups

• Evidence of these issues revealing themselves in key policy making groups or

in public.

Group 3: Outcomes

• Evidence of convergent interests.

• Evidence of spillover when agreement is not reached in one area.

• Overall decrease in tensions.

The identity-based approach was criticized on a number of grounds by seminar

participants. First, there is the problem of defining what geographic region is
being included in the ARF security community. Does the ARF represent a
nascent East Asian identity? If so, what about the states of Eurasia, where do
they fit in? A second consideration is the question of ASEAN identity. How is
ASEAN identity being changed by the recent formation of an East Asian
community (ASEAN plus 3 — China, Japan and South Korea)? Is it possible that
not one but multiple identifies may be formed? It could be argued, the real work
of the ARF will take place at the sub-regional rather than regional level. Finally,
the notion of an East Asian identity cuts across the notion of an Asia-Pacific
community. Some state that initially joined the ARF supported conflict resolution
as one of its goals, but with the passage of time and enlargement of the ARF’s
membership, these states have begun backing away from their earlier
commitment.

Some participants saw a relationship between domestic political systems and a

security community. It was argued that a successful security community was
likely to emerge if all its members were democracies. Here it was noted that a
trend towards democratization was taking place in East Asia as the examples of
Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia illustrate. Others
were skeptical that democratization would lead to increased cooperation.
Domestic opinion might be mobilized and exacerbate security. Nationalism was
on the rise in the face of globalization and the trend towards regionalism.
Further, there was the problem of telescoping history in comparing six years of
ARF development with a much longer period of development in the West. It was
argued in this context that the density of contacts between states was not a
particularly effective measure of effectiveness but interoperability was.
 16

The U.S.-China dialog was cited as an example of divergences of viewpoints.

China interpreted U.S. policy calling for shaping the security environment and
leadership as “bending to one’s will” and “special responsibility for the region,”
respectively. One participant argued that CINCPAC’s approach to regional
security has always been strongly bilateral. ASEAN and the ARF are not treated
equally. U.S. motivations for joining the ARF had more to do with wanting a seat
at the table and not being left out. The U.S. is slowly coming around to
appreciate that bilateral relations cannot solve the main security problems which
confront the U.S. But if the U.S. tried to give the ARF responsibility in this area,
the ARF would decline. This raises the question whether the ARF serves ASEAN
identity.

It was argued above that the ARF’s long-term goal is the creation of a security
community (but not defined in the same way as used by Admiral Blair). The ARF
contains half of the world’s population and five of the great powers. Karl
Deutsch used the term security community loosely. In the view of one seminar
participant Admiral Blair appears to have “reverse-engineered” his concept by
attempting to fit the European experience (which was evolutionary and
developed over a considerable period of time) onto Asia-Pacific. The ARF has
never articulated a vision of its future as an identity-based security community.

Other participants argued that the conflict in Cambodia provided a focus for
ASEAN. But in the post-Cold War era ASEAN has lost its compass. In order to
create a security community both identity and interest based approaches need to
be adopted. China feared multilateral engagement because they lacked the
experience and felt participation would constrain China’s actions. A security
community must be based on an opportunity model not a conflict model. The
enlargement of ASEAN to ten members seemed to be directed at this goal but the
inclusion of four non-performing members mitigated against the early creation
of a security community.

The creation of a security community may involve the voluntary transfer of

national sovereignty to a regional organization. ARF members jealously guard
their national sovereignty and repeatedly stress their adherence to the cardinal
principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Nonetheless, there
has been some discussion in the ARF, in the ASEAN PMC, and bilaterally about
the principle of non-interference and whether or not is should be modified in
special cases. The most serious issues will be those which are essentially internal
but with an external dimension. A prime example is Thailand’s advocacy of
readapting the principle of non-interference is cases like Burma where domestic
problems there spill over the border and affect Thai security.
 17

Measures of Effectiveness

The ARF’s effectiveness must be measured by both the interest-based and

identity-based approaches. There is evidence that both power politics and
“something else” has led to a change in regional identity. Process changes
identity over time and it is also possible to have competing identities. The ARF
has made limited if mixed progress in a number of areas:

• Transparency. Sixteen of the ARF’s twenty-two members (1999) provide data

to the UN Conventional Arms Register and the publication of Defense White
Papers has increased. But little progress has been recorded in establishing a
Regional Register of Conventional Arms.

• Adherence to procedural norms. A recent study by Nischalke33 has found that

ASEAN has a mixed record in adhering to the “ASEAN way” on a number of
security issues. ASEAN generally adhered to a common position on the
conflict in Cambodia, but there were occasions when individual states
adopted deviant positions. ASEAN dealt with the question of expanded
membership on the basis of consensus and ASEAN states reached agreement
on the formation of the ARF through debate and compromise. The ARF has
been inconsistent in setting conditions for membership; both observers and
dialog partners have been admitted.

• Conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea. In response to Chinese

assertiveness in 1992 ASEAN adopted a Declaration of Concern. ASEAN has
been less than unified in dealing with subsequent Chinese encroachment in
the Mischief Reef area off the west coast of the Philippines. Clear differences
have emerged between Malaysia, on the one hand, and Vietnam and the
Philippines, on the other, over defining the geographical area to be covered
by a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. ARF members have raised the
question of conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea at ARF
meetings despite Chinese opposition to holding discussions in a multilateral
setting.

• Non-use of force. ASEAN member states have not resorted to armed force
against each other since the association was founded in 1967. But the reasons
for this are not altogether clear. On balance there is little evidence of a sea-
change in attitudes regarding the utility of force in inter-state relations by
ARF members.

33Tobias Ingo Nischalke, “The ‘ASEAN Way:’ A Real Spirit or a Phantom?” Contemporary
Southeast Asia, April 2000, 22(1), 89-112.
 18

• Arms control. ARF members by and large subscribe to non-proliferation

agreements and the conventions on nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons. Many are signatories to the Ottawa Convention banning anti-
personnel land mines. But ARF member states continue to brook no limitation
on conventional arms procurements. Weapons purchases have resumed as
individual states recover from the Asian financial crisis. Because the ARF has
failed to fully engage defense officials in inter-sessional activities, progress on
achieving informal or even tacit agreement on conventional arms control has
not made any progress.

• Confidence Building Measures. ARF members participate in a wide variety of

CBMs such as security dialogues, exchanges between defense colleges,
disaster relief, voluntary exchanges of information on military exercises, and
circulation of papers to the ISG on CBMs. There are also a number of partially
implemented CBMs: bilateral exchanges of security perceptions, increased
high-level defense exchanges, military exchanges and training, annual
defense policy statements, publication of White Papers, participation in the
UNCAR, signing of global non-proliferation and disarmament regimes and
other activities. Despite the wide ranging nature of CBM activity, the
evidence is not clear that CBMs have had the desired effect. CBMs may give
an illusion of progress.34

• Transition to stage three (conflict resolution). The 1976 ASEAN Treaty of

Amity and Cooperation makes provision for a High Council to resolve
disputes among members. This has not been utilized. In similar vein, the
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) makes
provision for a referral of disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The ARF has agreed that CBMs (phases one) and preventive diplomacy
(phase two) may proceed in tandem. But progress has been halted due to
disagreement over an acceptable definition of preventive diplomacy.

• Institution-building. The ARF can hardly be described as an institution. The

ARF consists of meetings of its inter-sessional groups, senior officials and
ministers. It does not have the capability of peace management or
enforcement. There is presently some reconsideration in ASEAN to
strengthen its institutions in light of its failure to respond effectively to the
haze problem in Indonesia, the Asian financial crisis, and political instability
in East Timor.

• Voluntary transfer of sovereignty. Both Thailand and the Philippines have

advocated making ASEAN’s principle of non-interference more flexible. This

34Fora critique of CBMs see: Marie-France Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures,

Adelphi Paper 307. London: Oxford University Press for IISS, 1996.
 19

would in effect entail a voluntary transfer of sovereignty from the state to

ASEAN as a regional organization. Recently ASEAN approved the concept of
an ASEAN Troika to deal with disputes among its members — but on a
voluntary basis only. Recent discussions in ASEAN about finding a middle
way between strict non-interference and intervention to deal with a major
threat to regional stability may encourage the ARF to give these issues its
consideration. It is unlikely at this stage, however, that the ARF would
authorize the use of force against a member state.

• Settlement of bilateral disputes. There are a number of bilateral disputes

among ASEAN35 and ARF members including border and territorial disputes.
A number of incidents have been recorded where force has been used, such
as artillery duels along the Thai-Burma border, to aggressive action by naval
patrol vessels against private fishing vessels found encroaching in Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZs). For the most part settlement of these disputes has
been on a bilateral basis. Indonesia and Malaysia have taken their territorial
disputes over Ligitan and Sipadan islands to the ICJ. Likewise Malaysia and
Singapore have taken a similar dispute to the ICJ as well. But so far the ARF
has not played a role in conflict resolution nor has there been any attempt to
develop conflict resolution mechanisms to deal with specific cases involving
ARF members.

Strengthening the ARF

The ARF’s strengths and weaknesses must be put into context. The ARF is a
relatively young security body. It is only one part of the regional security
architecture. There are a number of bilateral defense-security links at regional
and sub-regional level which shore up regional order. The ARF has never
considered the U.S. security role and the possibility of a diminished presence
even including the dismantling of military bases in South Korea and Japan. The
ARF faces another major challenge: furthering the economic integration of its
diverse membership.

The ARF has three main limitations: procedural (setting the “rules” for decision-
making), process (determining how decisions are carried out) and security
challenges. These will be discussed each in turn.

Procedural

ASEAN primacy within the ARF must be recognized at the onset. The ARF
would not have gotten off the ground without ASEAN. If ASEAN had not been
placed in the driver’s seat, China would not have joined. ASEAN primacy has

35N. Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN. Pacific Strategic Paper 9. Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999.
 20

meant, however, that regional security issues are viewed primarily for their
impact on ASEAN. But there are major security issues in Northeast Asia that
have not been addressed. The ARF with ASEAN in the chair gives ASEAN too
much of a role on Northeast Asian security issues. This could prove unacceptable
to other participants at the negotiation stage. The ASEAN Chair will also have
difficulty in preventive diplomacy related to Northeast Asia. The Chair can offer
its good offices and facilitate dialogue on emergent disputes, but the states of
Northeast Asia are unlikely to accept a leading role for ASEAN.

Process36

There is no danger, however, of ASEAN losing its pivotal role in the ARF. At
present ASEAN represents ten of the ARF’s twenty-three members. ASEAN
could take a less proprietal role and be less insistent on being the core of the
ARF. Non-ASEAN members influence the ARF through their role as co-chair of
inter-sessional groups and as chair of some ARF-sponsored meetings. The ARF
operates by way of consensus decision-making and at the pace of its most
cautious member. There is evidence that some states have already become
frustrated at the time-consuming and slow pace of decision-making. Other
countries may soon lose their patience as well.

The ARF operates without a formal agenda. It conducts it annual meetings on the
basis of unstructured discussions. These rarely go into depth on any particular
issue. Foreign Ministers are free to raise any issue they like. The quality of the
security dialogue is “once over lightly.” Some countries object if certain issues
are raised (eg. China on the South China Sea).

ASEAN fears institutionalization. The ARF lacks a Secretariat. There is no central

depository for documentation although the ASEAN Secretariat plays a minimal
role. This weakness may place some constraints on the role of the ARF in
preventive diplomacy. For example, in order to carry out the tasks of information
gathering and early warning of conflict, a Secretariat and central depository is
essential.37 A proposal to create a Conflict Reduction Center remains on the table.
Consideration could be given to creating a virtual ARF secretariat.

The ARF attempts to build consensus on norms in a non-formal and non-

legalistic way. Is decision-making is not accompanied by the power to impose
sanctions for non-compliance. One illustration of the ARF’s procedural weakness
concerns membership criteria. The ARF operates on the basis of case by case
decisions which leads to inconsistency. Some states have been admitted directly

36Maria Consuelo C. Ortuoste, “Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: The ASEAN Regional
Forum Experiment,” op. cit., 46-47 and 51.
37Ibid., 47 and 67.
 21

into ARF membership from observer status while others have been admitted
only after being elevated to the status of dialogue partner.

Security Challenges

There is uncertainty about the relations between the major powers and how they
will develop in the future. Five countries are of direct concern: the United States,
China, Japan, India and Russia. Will they develop cooperative or competitive
relations? What can the ARF do?

The ARF needs the support of both the United States and China. A key concern
for the ARF is how to make relations between Washington and Beijing more
collaborative. ARF members have a shared interest in developing a mechanism
to encourage such cooperation. They could take the initiative within the ARF to
develop a policy response to address this issue. However some states might be
extremely sensitive to this.

The nature of conflict is changing and the ARF needs to adjust accordingly. Intra-
state conflict has increased while armed conflict between states has decreased;
but it cannot be ruled out completely (boundary and territorial disputes, force
modernization, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
systems). The ARF could play a contributing role to ameliorating intra-state
conflict.

The ARF could play a complementary role in advancing a peaceful resolution to

conflict on the Korean peninsula. As a useful step, the ARF could play a role in
encouraging North Korea to participate more in the regional community. ARF
members could assist in exposing North Korea in a non-threatening manner to
the views of other regional states.

The ARF has played a minimal role in the resolution of territorial disputes in the
South China Sea. Individual ASEAN states (and others) have raised their
concerns at ARF meetings.

The ARF could play a greater role in increasing defense transparency. It could
increase the participation of defense personnel in ARF activities. But there are
some constraints on the ARF. There are some countries where defense and
foreign affairs officials do not sit and discuss security issues. There are other
domestic constraints. The promotion of military CBMs presents a chicken and
the egg problem. The ARF needs the participation of the military and it needs
military CBMs. The ARF could be strengthened if a role was developed for it in
this area. For example, it was hoped that the ISG on humanitarian issues (peace
operations and search and rescue) would provide such an opportunity. It was
felt by some participants that a meeting of defense department officials would
 22

generate the core of military CBMs. But when the matter was considered at a
Senior Officials Meeting, dominated by foreign ministry personnel, it was
decided that military participation should go no further than an informal lunch
attended by military officials only.

The ARF has addressed the issue of weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems from the very beginning. The ARF spoke out against the testing
of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in May 1998. But in light of Indian
attempts to constrain further progress on this question it appears likely that the
ARF will find it hard to reach a concrete agreement on what further steps to take.

The ARF has played a role in discussing the question of ballistic missile defense
proliferation. Ballistic missile proliferation is on the ARF’s agenda because of
North Korean actions years ago. The ARF has discussed this issue and expressed
its concern but it has not pressed North Korea to limit its activities.

The ARF accepted that it should play a role in preventive diplomacy. Preventive
diplomacy was included in the original ARF Concept Paper as a second phase
activity. But six years has passed and nothing practical has emerged. Some
countries fear that preventive diplomacy will be used to constrain an activity by
a country when its core interests are at stake. There is the fear that a country
might end up being involved in compulsory conflict resolution procedures.
There is also the concern that preventive diplomacy is a mechanism for outside
intervention in a country’s internal affairs. Nevertheless, despite the long-time it
has taken to discuss the concepts and principles of preventive diplomacy in the
Asia-Pacific, preventive diplomacy remains an important part of the ARF’s
agenda. The ARF, through a Secretariat and a Conflict Risk Reduction Center,
could play a role to facilitate, mediate, and provide information in a dispute to
prevent armed conflict.

The ARF needs to redefine what is meant by non-intervention. For example,

there is now increased agreement that the cross border movement of people can
be discussed by the ARF (eg. the movement of Burmese into Thailand). In order
to move forward, the ARF needs to address hard issues such as the sources of
conflict — ethnic and religious tensions and separatist movements. One initiative
the ARF could undertake is to encourage one and a half track or track two
dialogue on the basis of case studies of where these hard issues were successfully
or not so successfully dealt with.

There have been changes in the nature of threats to security. The ARF needs to
address such “soft” security issues as illegal migration, drug trafficking, and
environmental issues. The ARF initially adopted a cautious attitude out of fear
that the consideration of soft security issues would displace concern for the hard
issues. When Indonesia first raised the question of drug smuggling, other ARF
 23

members felt it was a topic best dealt with by the ASEAN PMC. The ARF has
now come around and will consider illegal immigration, piracy, and small arms
trafficking. According to diplomatic observers this new concern for soft security
issues has added value by raising the awareness of ministers. It is expected that
law enforcement and immigration ministers and officials will be drawn into
discussions under the ARF framework.

The ARF will be constrained in moving forward on the above proposals due to
its caution and sensitivities about the comfort level of other ARF members.
Because of this there is scope for track two involvement, especially by CSCAP.
CSCAP can and must think ahead of the ARF. CSCAP could develop proposals
on the principles to govern intervention in internal affairs by spelling out the
under what conditions intervention can take place, who will be involved and
how the intervention will occur.

The Goals of Regional Order

What are the goals of regional order? Three may be identified: survival, peace
and prosperity. Some states are willing to surrender elements of sovereignty in
order to create regional order. States seek to strengthen themselves and improve
their standing in the region. They seek the goal of physical and ideational
survival, as the examples of South Korea and Taiwan demonstrate. The goal of
survival is problematic. With the exception of South Korea and Taiwan, few if
any other states in the Asia-Pacific face imminent and credible threats to their
very existence. It would be difficult to create an organization based on norms
(such as the renunciation of the use of force) alone. It might be possible to
achieve consensus at the level of declaratory policy, but at a deeper level norms
would be contested.

There are competing ideas of regional order in Asia. The ARF and alliances
represent two approaches to international order. All suggestions to strengthen
alliances and multilateral institutions are pathways to some end. So far the
discussion on how to strengthen the ARF has focused on means not ends.

One seminar participant suggested that territorial integrity be listed as separate

goal of regional order because a maximalist view is held in the Asia-Pacific that
survival includes control over the population, territory and by extension
Exclusive Economic Zones. Another participant disagreed and said territorial
integrity should be included under survival. Still another participant suggested
that the number of goals should be expanded to include managing change,
transition of power, sanctity of contracts and international agreements.

Concerning the goal of peace: what is meant by peace — the absence of war or
the renunciation of the use of force? States seek peace but it is unclear on whose
 24

terms and conditions. States also seek the goal of prosperity, which equates to
becoming richer and therefore stronger. But the goal of prosperity raises the
relative versus absolute gains argument. Concerning the three goals, if they are
expanded the question of relative gains arises and states will become concerned.
The Asian financial crisis indicated that relative gains took precedence. There are
tensions between the three goals. The ARF should address core issues through
norm creation and CBMs.

States may seek a higher order goals such as democratization or attaining other
political and social values. So far there has been very little discussion of the goals
of regional order at the level of head of state or government.

The Goals of Regional Security

What are the goals of regional security? Security is a contested concept. There are
competing notions of what represents security. For example should states pursue
a dominant or hegemonic approach to the region? Should states pursue a liberal
agenda and seek the creation of a community of democratic free market states?

Regional order may be based on these goals but the foundation rests on alliances.
For example the United States has a global vision. China reacts to the United
States in a defensive manner. China stresses the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence as the framework for inter-state relations. Japan and ASEAN pursue
a rules based approach in which the weak are protected against the strong. This
represents a non-acceptance of the status quo.

There are different pathways to regional order: balance of power (national),

multi-national (regional) and global based on ad hoc institutions. It cannot be
assumed that the ARF will be the institution for the creation of regional order.
The ARF should not have all burdens of regional security placed on it. The ARF
represents a minimalist, more “touchy feely,” approach to order. It lacks teeth —
the power of enforcement. The Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) could not deal effectively with the problems in Bosnia. So why should
the ARF be expected to deal effectively with circumstances like East Timor or
separatist movements in Indonesia and/or the Philippines?

Despite the weakness of multilateral institutions, Asia has not had a major war.
Did regional institutions create peace, or did peace emerge without institutions?
There is a danger about being over ambitious in our expectation of what
multilateral institutions can do. The ARF could not respond to the crisis in East
Timor. APEC did not react to the Asian economic and financial crisis of 1997-98.
Neither the ARF nor APEC were geared to handle these situations. Take the
example of the Organization of African Unity; after it was formed it intervened,
failed and remained moribund for a long time.
 25

Value can be added to the ARF by enhancing its powers in response to a

particular issue. For example, the United Nations is often unable to act in
response to internal crisis in a nation state unless it invokes Chapter 7 and
declares the situation a threat to peace. The ARF could be strengthened by
making this norm more flexible. The ARF should not go down the Bosnia route.
ARF members should not adhere rigidly to the principle of non-interference. It
has yet to determine how far down the path of interference it is willing to go. In
other words the ARF must engage in the creation of international norms and
their implementation. It must consider whether or not it should intervene in such
situations as the treatment of Muslims in western China or Kashmir.

There are five key actors: the U.S., China, Japan, Russia and India. The U.S. is the
leading player in most conflicts, not the ARF. The ARF needs to be involved in
norm creation and the generation of CBMs. The ARF may well develop into an
umbrella organization with a separate Northeast Asia Forum. The ARF will also
have to widen the footprint of its membership beyond Northeast Asia, Southeast
Asia and Oceania.

Non-traditional Security Issues

The ARF must address how it will respond to non-traditional security issues.
These may cause the ARF to shift its focus from core issues. Should security
issues be lumped together? How far should the ARF go in addressing non-
traditional security issues? There are practical considerations as well. There are
concerns that if the ARF does reach out and consider transnational issue they
will increase the number of meetings. There are also practical restraints arising
from human rights concerns. The ARF may be better served by addressing core
issues.

If ARF expands and considers transnational issues the question of how to

prioritize them arises. This may prove very difficult. There is the view that non-
traditional security issues have been placed on the agenda because of lack of
progress in other areas. Will a consideration of soft issues lay the ground work
for the later consideration of hard security issues? Soft issues will develop habits
of dialog and generate rules and mechanisms that may be transferred to hard
issues.

Non-traditional security issues have already been identified by regional states as

legitimate security issues in their own right. The ARF could assist other states in
realizing that non-traditional security issues are real security issues. For example,
for the last year and a half Thailand has been concerned about the flow of
amphetamine pills across its border from Burma. Thailand has reorganized its
military from a focus on counter-insurgency to dealing with the cross border
drug trade. Thailand is reportedly supporting the insurgents in Burma to restrict
 26

and disrupt the drug trade. This undermines the “ASEAN way.” Australia views
illegal immigration as a security issue. It has expanded its coast watching system
to prevent illegal migration. Drugs and arms trafficking are all tied together and
are international in scope. They cannot be dealt with by any one state. They need
to be addressed by an international consortium. The majority of seminar
participants agreed that non-traditional security issues should be placed on the
ARF agenda but there was no consensus over which issues were to be given
priority.

ARF Structure

Some attention needs to be paid to the ARF’s structure. ASEAN has to share the
running with other players. Already there is concern, expressed by the
permanent secretaries of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, that ASEAN may
be taken over in a larger grouping such as APEC that is dominated by the U.S.
and Japan. A formula must be found in which ASEAN retains influence but
others — the U.S. and Japan — can set the agenda. Otherwise ASEAN faces the
prospect of marginalization.

The ARF performs a valuable service by bringing China and the United States
together. This will reduce misperceptions on both sides in understanding the
other’s intentions.

The ARF must address the question of process and its reliance on unanimity
before taking action. This is not just an ASEAN principle. China, for example,
does not want to go beyond the principle of unanimity.

Should the ARF create a Secretariat? ASEAN opposes the idea; but both ASEAN
and APEC have Secretariats. A Secretariat could serve as the point of contact for
the ARF. An ARF Secretariat should have a research capability but it should not
just rely on CSCAP for inputs. CSCAP has evolved into a club of familiar people.

One way of strengthening the ARF is to limit and reduce our expectations about
what it can accomplish. The ARF’s institutional structures are weak because they
are modeled on ASEAN. The “ASEAN way” does not apply well at all. ASEAN
when it was founded was motivated by a common external threat. Due to the
common weakness of its members they had a shared interest in cooperation.
ASEAN cooperation has evolved slowly.

In contrast the participants in the ARF do not share similar views on cooperation.
They are not bound by weakness. They have widely divergent interests. The ARF
does not have the same sense of regionalism that motivated ASEAN. It is asking
too much of the ARF to evolve as ASEAN has. The ARF can facilitate contacts
among its members but little else.
 27

Despite the Asian financial crisis, ASEAN will continue to play a prominent role
in the ARF. Its ability to do so, however, has been undermined. But the ARF is
one organization that China accepts. ASEAN’s structures are weak and it is
difficult to see how these can be transposed to the ARF that has a wider more
divergent membership.

One can over emphasize the ability of the ARF’s role in ameliorating Sino-
American tensions. The ARF may play a role when the only obstacle is a neutral
venue. It is more likely disputes between the United States and China will be
solved bilaterally. In sum, the ARF’s inherent potential to solve disputes is
limited. The ARF can develop norms of behavior and CBMs but it is not capable
of conflict management.

The ARF’s role in developing CBMs is an important part of its program. The ARF
should begin by playing a small role and then gradually develop preventive
diplomacy and conflict management mechanisms. As an initial step the ARF
could develop a list of experts to assist in facilitation when disputes arise. It is
important not to raise unrealistic expectations and then be disappointed when
they are not realized.

The ARF needs to address three questions: membership, nuclear testing, and
China. Why shouldn’t Pakistan become a member? Pakistan has a limited impact
beyond South Asia. Its main concerns are Kashmir and Karghil. After Pakistan
tested its nuclear weapons, Japan proposed that Pakistan enter a dialogue with
ASEAN and India. The Philippines was to host such a meeting alongside the
ARF as a dialogue mechanism. The Japanese proposal did not include Pakistani
membership in the ARF however.

North Korea has always been seen as part of the ARF’s geographical footprint.
North Korea has transferred missile technology to Pakistan. But the impact is on
South Asia not Northeast Asia. This raises the global nature of proliferation that
should be primarily a UN matter.

The ARF can play a positive role on the nuclear testing issue. When the ARF
takes a strong position on this issue, its member governments are emboldened to
speak strongly on this issue. The ARF can encourage adherence to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and put pressure on states for the
creation of global non-proliferation regimes.

But why should the ARF go out on a limb regarding nuclear testing when its
members have not even signed the protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone Treaty? India’s offer to sign the SEANWFZ protocol was
done to gain recognition of its status as a nuclear weapons state. This was a bit
 28

disingenuous. Formal recognition of India as a nuclear weapons state is not a real

possibility in the short to medium term, as U.S. officials have indicated.

There is a linkage between China, Central Asia, South Asia, Northeast Asia,
Southeast Asia and Oceania on the nuclear question. The dynamics of interaction
indicate that you cannot compartmentalize the sub-regions. The U.S. and Japan
both have interests in Central Asia, for example.

The United States and the ARF

The key security challenges facing the United States are: relations with China, the
Taiwan issue, Korean peninsula, nuclear testing and proliferation in South Asia,
and transnational threats. It is a fact of life that the U.S. is a central actor as far as
all regional security issues are concerned, especially hard security issues.

The feeling of insecurity about a continuing U.S. military commitment to

Southeast Asia is of long standing. It initially arose from Japanese-U.S. economic
tensions in the 1980s. It surfaced again during the Cambodian conflict when the
U.S. declined to arm the anti-Vietnamese Khmer resistance. Feelings of insecurity
about U.S. staying power in the region rose again with the withdrawal of the U.S.
from bases in the Philippines and the ensuing draw down of military assistance
programs (involving arms purchases).

The concern over the staying power of the U.S. was an early 1990s phenomenon.
It is less prevalent today. Now there is more acceptance of the U.S. role especially
in relationship to China, Taiwan, Korea and Northeast Asia generally. The U.S. is
moving from 100,000 forward deployed to “100,000 capability” and a security
community. The U.S. expects others to pick up the slack. Secretary of Defense
William Cohen, for example, in his address to China’s National Defense
University stressed alliances, engagement and multi-national approaches to
security. Secretary Cohen has also raised the question “who would rush to fill the
vacuum if the U.S. left Asia.” In other words, the United States still continues to
see its role as central. The ARF is not viewed in Washington as a viable alternate
security mechanism.

It may be premature to speculate what policies a Gore or Bush Administration

would adopt for the Asia-Pacific. Vice President Al Gore has indicated that U.S.
priorities will focus on Japan, Korea and China. Other than to offer support for
the ARF, Gore has said very little about Southeast Asia. Governor George Bush
has stressed the “fellowship of free nations” as his guiding principle. When he
has addressed Asian security issues his focus has been on China — which will be
“unthreatened but not unchecked” — and not Southeast Asia.
 29

The role of the United Nations and its role has been similarly absent from public
discussion. Governor Bush opposes placing U.S. forces under a UN Command.
Both candidates for president realize that any mention of the role of the United
Nations as central to U.S. security policy is only a losing proposition.

Enhancing Regional Cooperation

The U.S. is the preeminent power in the Asia-Pacific, especially in the maritime
domain. It is in the U.S. interest that very little happens to upset the status quo.
This accounts for why there has been comparatively little new thinking about
how the United States should adjust its policy towards the new multilateral
institutions in Asia, including the ASEAN Regional Forum. U.S. membership in
the ARF is motivated by the desire not to be excluded from any regional body. In
the view of one senior policy analyst, “the United States wants to be part of
everything. The U.S. wants to come to the party.”

There are currently two developments that potentially undercut the U.S. role.
The first is the emergence of the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN plus China, Japan
and South Korea) and the other is the proposal to set up an Asian Monetary
Fund (AMF). Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir initially proposed the East
Asian Economic Caucus in response to the Asia Pacific Economic forum (and
NAFTA) because he feared U.S. and Japanese dominance when APEC was set up
in 1989. Mahathir attempted to set up a “caucus” within APEC but was thwarted
by the strong negative reactions of Indonesia, Australia, the United States and
Japan. Mahathir then proposed an East Asian Economic Group. The Asian
financial crisis of 1997-98 and domestic instability in Indonesia provided the
opportunity to resurface this initiative under a new name. ASEAN Plus Three is
the East Asian Economic Group under a different name.

The formation of ASEAN Plus Three raises the question where do the ASEAN
states put their limited human and financial resources into the ARF or ASEAN
Plus Three? Indonesia lacks the human resources to meet the demands of the
ARF let alone ASEAN at the present time. Although the founding statement of
ASEAN Plus Three touched on political and transnational issues, its focus so far
has been more on economic issues. The bottom line remains that the ASEAN
Plus Three cannot assume a regional security role without the United States.

When the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund was first mooted by Japan it was
opposed by the United States. Tokyo immediately stepped back, but recently
Japan has revived this idea. Will an AMF develop within the context of ASEAN
Plus Three? Japan has made clear, however, that the AMF proposal would
supplement not supplant the IMF where the U.S. has a commanding voice. China
too initially opposed the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund as a Trojan Horse for
Japanese influence. China too is now more receptive and rational about Japanese
 30

proposals that are in China’s interests. In sum, China’s position is to support

initiatives if they serve to keep the U.S. out even if Japan gains. An AMF is
unlikely to play an important role without the participation of the United States.

ASEAN is still uncertain about the long-term role of the United States. Korean
reunification and the rise of anti-base sentiment in Japan and South Korea could
lead to a U.S. military pull out from bases in East Asia. There is a feeling held by
some regional states that the U.S. will not come to the defense of ASEAN
members in the event of a conflict with China.

Seminar participants expressed strong concerns about the development of a

destabilizing power vacuum should the U.S. disengage. The continued
engagement of the United States in regional affairs is essential to peace and
security, especially in dealing with contingencies arising on the Korean
peninsula, between China-Taiwan, and between India and Pakistan.

At a recent informal CSCAP meeting in Singapore held with representatives

from the European Union, the relevancy of the OSCE to the ARF was reviewed.
The CSCAP meeting considered case studies involving sovereignty, intervention
and preventive diplomacy. The United States Institute of Peace presented a
simulation involving the use of good offices by an ASEAN Troika. The OSCE has
attempted to deal with local conflicts, whereas the ARF is not configured to
handle conflicts of this nature. The ARF would do well to study the functions of
the OSCE.

The ARF is likely to remain an unmanageable forum for dealing with regional
security issues for the foreseeable future. ASEAN is beset with severe limitations
on its operational capability to lead cooperative actions to address regional
security concerns. The ARF’s focus on confidence building measures and
preventive diplomacy presents an opportunity cost in not dealing effectively
with more pressing security concerns (in North East Asia, for example). Asia-
Pacific’s security structure will be over-lapping and duplicative. This raises the
question with a multiplicity of regional institutions “who does what?”

Seminar participants agreed that the United States should more sensitive to the
regional security concerns. They also agreed that the U.S. could enhance regional
cooperation by adopting a “pull strategy” rather than a “push strategy” where
multilateral efforts were required. The United States should continue to assist
regional states develop a sense of ownership of multilateral efforts to address
common security concerns.

The United States has resources that it can bring to bear on these issues. The U.S.
should consult with select regional states about the most sensible and efficient
way these resources can be used cooperatively to attain common goals. In this
 31

way the onus is placed on the “customers” to define what they expect and want.
The next step would be to encourage select regional states to reach a consensus
about their priorities. This multilateral process would provide the opportunity
for U.S. allies and friends to have influence on U.S. policy making. The U.S.
should incorporate these inputs into its engagement strategy in order to enhance
regional cooperation.
 32

Abbreviations
AMM Annual Ministerial Meeting

AMF Asian Monetary Fund

APCSS Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

ARF ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations

CBM Confidence Building Measure

CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief Pacific

CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies

CSCA Conference for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific

CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in Asia

CSCE Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

FSI Foreign Service Institute

ICJ International Court of Justice

IDSA Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies

IIR Institute of International Relations

IMF International Monetary Fund

INTERFET Intervention Force East Timor

ISG Inter-Sessional Group

ISIS Institute of Strategic and International Studies

ISM Inter-Sessional Meeting

 33

JIIA Japan Institute of International Affairs

NAFTA North America Free Trade Agreement

OSCE Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe

P5/Perm 5 Permanent Five (members of United Nations Security Council)

PECC Pacific Economic Cooperation Council

PMC Post-Ministerial Conference

SEANWFZ South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

SFIA Seoul Forum for International Affairs

SIIA Singapore Institute of International Affairs

UN United Nations

UNCAR United Nations Conventional Arms Register

USN United States Navy

 34

Participants

Dr. Muthiah Alagappa Professor Shigekatsu Kondo

Senior Fellow, Research Program Director, First Research Department
East-West Center National Institute for Defense Studies

Ms. Christine Bergado Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese

Membership Coordinator Professor
Pacific Telecommunications Council Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Mr. Pete Bostwick Mr. Christopher Johnstone

Senior Regional Analyst Research Fellow
Joint Research Center Pacific Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Dr. Lee H. Endress Mr. Mel C. Labrador

Director, College of Security Studies Analyst, Asia Pacific Area Network
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

Mr. Butch F. Finley Dr. Satu P. Limaye

Associate Professor Director, Research Division
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Dr. John Garofano Dr. Shaun Narine

Research Fellow Visiting Fellow
JFK School of Government East-West Center
Harvard University
Ms. Maria Consuelo Ortuoste
Ms. Rosemary Greaves Chief, Center for International Relations
Head, Strategic Analysis and Strategic Studies
Office of National Assessments Foreign Service Institute of the Philippines

Mr. Jonathan Page Dr. Denny Roy

Research Assistant Research Fellow
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Ambassador Charles B. Salmon Captain Robert G. Speer

State Department Advisor Director of Conference
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

LtGen (Ret) H.C. Stackpole Dr. Carlyle A. Thayer

President Professor
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
 35

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