A Lecture by Prof Mohsen Kadivar, Duke University Venue: Wawasan Open University, Georgetown, Penang Date: 23 August, 10AM

12PM The animosity between Shia and Sunni is not new, however today it displays some characteristics that are different from the historical sectarianism. Today we see the heightened tension between Shia and Sunni primarily due to the Arab Spring that has led to the collapse of authoritarian rule. There is a new struggle for political and economic power and over which interpretation of Islam will influence societies and new leadership. The Shias have long been a reminder to Sunni Muslims of the unresolved dispute within Islam since the death of the Prophet more than 1400 years ago. The differences have crystallized around the question of the rightful succession to the Prophet as head of the early religious and political community: should the new leader be chosen from among Muhammads closest companions or from his direct bloodline? The Shia telling of this story as encapsulated in the death of Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet by the Umayyads in a battle near Karbala in 680CE has created the narrative most Shias have lived ever since. It is a narrative of defeat, martyrdom and dispossession that is deeply embedded in the core of Shias identity. Lately we have seen the gradual rise in sectarian tension and this had to do more with politics and competition for influence and power, notably between Iran and the Arab countries Saudi in particular. In addition to the inter-state rivalry, the socially and economically disadvantaged position of Shias in Sunni majority countries has contributed to the sense of alienation and their quest for emancipation and legitimacy. And on a broader scale, the latest intensification of sectarian tension throughout the Muslim world reflects the Western strategy of instrumentalizing sectarian differences to forge a regional alliance against West greatest foe Iran. However it must be stressed that there is nothing inevitable or fated about the Sunni-Shia conflict. Their differences are not any worse than those that had existed within the Christian family which now have all but disappeared as a result of overall prosperity, democracy, and sustained efforts at intra-faith dialogue and reconciliation. agama yang Terpisah: Antara Mitos dan Realiti dalam Dunia Islam

Syarahan oleh Prof Mohsen Kadivar, Universiti Duke Universiti Terbuka Wawasan Georgetown, Pulau Pinang 23 Ogos, 10 am - 12 pm

Permusuhan antara Shia dan Sunni bukan baru, bagaimanapun hari ini ia menampilkan beberapa karakteristik yang berbeza dari pergulatan sekte dalam sejarah. Hari ini kita melihat perbenturan yang meningkat antara Shia dan Sunni terutamanya kerana Musim Semi Arab yang telah membawa kepada ranapnya pemerintahan otokratik. Di sana terdapat perjuangan yang baru untuk merebut kuasa politik dan ekonomi dan di mana interpretasi tentang Islam akan mempengaruhi masyarakat dan kepimpinan yang baru. Shia telah lama menjadi peringatan kepada Muslim Sunni tentang pertikaian yang tak berakhir dalam Islam sejak kewafatan Nabi (saw) lebih dari 1400 tahun yang lalu. Perbedaannya terealisasi seputar persoalan hak penggantian terhadap Nabi (saw) sebagai peneraju umat agama dan politik yang awal: haruskah pemimpin yang baru dipilih dari kalangan sahabat Nabi (saw) yang terdekat atau dari darah keturunannya yang langsung? Penceritaan Shia tentang kisah ini sebagaimana diliputi dalam kematian Hussein, cucu Nabi (saw) oleh Umayyad dalam perang dekat Karbala pada 680 AD telah menciptakan naratif yang kebanyakan Shia telah menjalaninya sejak itu. Ia adalah naratif kekalahan, syahid dan perampasan yang sangat tertanam dalam inti keperibadian Shia. Akhir-akhir ini kita telah melihat kian bangkitnya persengketaan antara sekte dan ini lebih bersabit dengan politik dan persaingan terhadap pengaruh dan kuasa, khususnya antara Iran dan negara-negara Arab - Saudi terutamanya. Selain dari persaingan antara-negara, kedudukan sosial dan ekonomi Shia yang lemah dalam majoriti negara-negara Sunni telah menyumbang kepada rasa tersisih dan pencarian mereka kepada kebebasan dan hak kekuasaan. Dan dalam skala yang lebih luas, penguatan terkini dari ketegangan sekte di seluruh dunia Islam mencerminkan strategi Barat untuk menggunakan perbezaan sekte untuk membina jaringan serantau ke atas musuh terbesar Barat - Iran.

Bagaimanapun ia harus ditekankan bahawa tidak ada yang mutlak atau ditakdir tentang konflik Sunni-Shia. Perbezaan mereka tidak lebih buruk dari yang telah wujud dalam keluarga Kristian yang kini telah seluruhnya padam hasil dari kesejahtaraan yang umum, demokrasi, dan usaha yang berlanjutan terhadap dialog antara-agama dan perdamaian.They argued that with reason alone one could know how to act morally; and ipso facto there was no necessity to combine religion and statecraft. History has it that the Muktazilites were pitted against the Asharites and it was the victory of the Asharites that has led Muslim societies to see religion and politics as two sides of the same coin.Things turned to worse when secularism in the Muslim world was always presented as an ideology in direct opposition to Islam and to equate secularism with Europeanization. And if Muslims now were to accept secularism, both secularism and religion have to be reformulated. Extra religious concerns such as democracy, human rights and pluralism should take precedence over intra-religious concerns such as the role of religious scholars and notions of religious truths. The rights of God should be left to the individual and his conscience; the state should concern itself only with the rights of the people. So that secularism will emerge not at the expense of religion but as a method for reinterpreting and revisiting religion itself.Jzkk Nabil. Saya amat menghargainya. AFMusa

2013/8/4 nabil amir <nabiller2002@yahoo.co.uk> slm dr, disertakan terjemahan utk syarahan di wawasan university

Agama yang Terpisah: Antara Mitos dan Realiti dalam Dunia Islam

Syarahan oleh Prof Mohsen Kadivar, Universiti Duke Universiti Terbuka Wawasan Georgetown, Pulau Pinang 23 Ogos, 10 am - 12 pm

Permusuhan antara Shia dan Sunni bukan baru, bagaimanapun hari ini ia menampilkan beberapa karakteristik yang berbeza dari pergulatan sekte dalam sejarah. Hari ini kita melihat perbenturan yang meningkat antara Shia dan Sunni terutamanya kerana Musim Semi Arab yang telah membawa kepada ranapnya pemerintahan otokratik. Di sana terdapat perjuangan yang baru untuk merebut kuasa politik dan ekonomi dan di mana interpretasi tentang Islam akan mempengaruhi masyarakat dan kepimpinan yang baru. Shia telah lama menjadi peringatan kepada Muslim Sunni tentang pertikaian yang tak berakhir dalam Islam sejak kewafatan Nabi (saw) lebih dari 1400 tahun yang lalu. Perbedaannya terealisasi seputar persoalan hak penggantian terhadap Nabi (saw) sebagai peneraju umat agama dan politik yang awal: haruskah pemimpin yang baru dipilih dari kalangan sahabat Nabi (saw) yang terdekat atau dari darah keturunannya yang langsung? Penceritaan Shia tentang kisah ini sebagaimana diliputi dalam kematian Hussein, cucu Nabi (saw) oleh Umayyad dalam perang dekat Karbala pada 680 AD telah menciptakan naratif yang kebanyakan Shia telah menjalaninya sejak itu. Ia adalah naratif kekalahan, syahid dan perampasan yang sangat tertanam dalam inti keperibadian Shia. Akhir-akhir ini kita telah melihat kian bangkitnya persengketaan antara sekte dan ini lebih bersabit dengan politik dan persaingan terhadap pengaruh dan kuasa, khususnya antara Iran dan negara-negara Arab - Saudi terutamanya. Selain dari persaingan antara-negara, kedudukan sosial dan ekonomi Shia yang lemah dalam majoriti negara-negara Sunni telah menyumbang kepada rasa tersisih dan pencarian mereka kepada kebebasan dan hak kekuasaan. Dan dalam skala yang lebih luas, penguatan terkini dari ketegangan sekte di seluruh dunia Islam mencerminkan strategi Barat untuk menggunakan perbezaan sekte untuk membina jaringan serantau ke atas musuh terbesar Barat - Iran. Bagaimanapun ia harus ditekankan bahawa tidak ada yang mutlak atau ditakdir tentang konflik Sunni-Shia. Perbezaan mereka tidak lebih buruk dari yang telah wujud dalam keluarga Kristian yang kini telah seluruhnya padam hasil dari kesejahtaraan yang umum, demokrasi, dan usaha yang berlanjutan terhadap dialog antara-agama dan perdamaian.

Subject: Terjemah Salam Nabil, Tolong terjemah write-up yang saya tulis njie. Nak publish di al-Ahkam.

Regards, AFMusa The movement to separate religion from politics began early in Islamic history. Known as the Muktazilites literally the Separatists these thinkers were against strict legalistic faith based solely on the notion of divine law or Shariah and work to transform Islam into a more humanistic religion.Secularism has always been thought to be antithetical to Islam. However if one was to look back at history, secularism has played an integral part in shaping classical Islamic thought. The idea has been frequently discussed and debated, in various disguises, by many Muslim scholars and thinkers.Saturday, August 24, 2013 from 9:00 AM to 7:00 PM (MYT)Colloquium on Reappraising Islam and Secularism Kolokium Mengapresiasi Ulang Islam dan Sekularisme Colloquium on Reappraising Islam and Secularism

Islamic Renaissance Front Sabtu, 24 Ogos, 2013 9:00 am - 7:00 pm Saturday, August 24, 2013 from 9:00 AM to 7:00 PM (MYT)
Sekularisme sering dianggap sebagai bercanggah dengan Islam. Bagaimanapun jika seseorang melihat semula sejarah, sekularisme telah memainkan bahagian yang integral dalam membentuk pemikiran Islam klasik. Idea tersebut sering dibincang dan diperdebat, dalam penyamaran yang beragam, oleh ramai ulama dan pemikir Islam Secularism has always been thought to be antithetical to Islam. However if one was to look back at history, secularism has played an integral part in shaping classical Islamic thought. The idea has been frequently discussed and debated, in various disguises, by many Muslim scholars and thinkers. Gerakan untuk memisahkan agama dari politik bermula awal dalam sejarah Islam. Dikenal sebagai Muktazila - secara harfiyah kaum separatis - pemikir-pemikir ini menentang kepercayaan hukum yang beku hanya berdasarkan faham undang-undang Tuhan atau Syariah dan berusaha untuk mentransfomasi Islam ke dalam agama yang lebih manusiawi. The movement to separate religion from politics began early in Islamic history. Known as the Muktazilites literally the Separatists these thinkers were against strict legalistic faith based solely on the notion of divine law or Shariah and work to transform Islam into a more humanistic religion. Mereka berhujah bahawa dengan akal sahaja seseorang dapat mengetahui bagaimana bertindak secara moral; dan oleh itu tiada keperluan untuk menggabungkan agama dan tata pemerintahan. Sejarah mencatatnya bahawa Muktazilah beradu dengan Ashari dan bahwa kemenangan Ashari yang telah membawa masyarakat Muslim melihat agama dan politik sebagai dua sisi dari mata wang yang sama.

They argued that with reason alone one could know how to act morally; and ipso facto there was no necessity to combine religion and statecraft. History has it that the Muktazilites were pitted against the Asharites and it was the victory of the Asharites that has led Muslim societies to see religion and politics as two sides of the same coin. Perkara bertukar menjadi buruk apabila sekularisme di dunia Islam sering diutarakan sebagai suatu ideologi yang langsung bertentangan dengan Islam dan untuk menyamakan sekularisme dengan pengEropahan. Dan jika kaum Muslim sekarang mahu menerima sekularisme, kedua-dua sekularisme dan agama harus direformulasi semula. Perhatian agama yang lebih seperti demokrasi, hak-hak asasi dan pluralisme harus mengambil keutamaan ke atas perhatian tentang urusan intra-religius seperti peranan pemikir ulama dan faham tentang kebenaran agama. Things turned to worse when secularism in the Muslim world was always presented as an ideology in direct opposition to Islam and to equate secularism with Europeanization. And if Muslims now were to accept secularism, both secularism and religion have to be reformulated. Extra religious concerns such as democracy, human rights and pluralism should take precedence over intra-religious concerns such as the role of religious scholars and notions of religious truths. The rights of God should be left to the individual and his conscience; the state should concern itself only with the rights of the people. So that secularism will emerge not at the expense of religion but as a method for reinterpreting and revisiting religion itself. Hak Tuhan harus dibiarkan kepada individu dan dhamirnya; negara harus mempedulikan dirinya hanya pada hak-hak rakyat. Supaya sekularisme akan tampil tidak dengan mengorbankan agama tetapi sebagai metode untuk menginterpretasi ulang dan menilai agama semula. Mohsen Kadivar From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Mohsen Kadivar Mohsen Kadivar.jpg Born Era June 7, 1959 (age 54) 21st-century philosophy

Region Eastern philosophy Influenced by Hussein-Ali Montazeri Mohsen Kadivar ( , born June 7, 1959) is an Iranian philosopher, University lecturer, cleric and activist. A political dissident, Kadivar has been a vocal critic of the doctrine of clerical rule, also known as Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), and a strong advocate

of democratic and liberal reforms in Iran. Kadivar has served time in prison in Iran for his political activism and beliefs. Mohsen Kadivar's sister Jamileh Kadivar and brother-in-law Ata'ollah Mohajerani, are two leading figures in the Iranian reform movement. Contents 1 Family, education and career 2 Dissent 3 Research works and contributions 3.1 The Theories of State in the Shiite Jurisprudence 3.2 Government by Mandate 3.3 Government by Appointment 4 See also 5 References 6 External links Family, education and career[edit source]

Born in Fasa to a politically active family,[1] Mohsen Kadivar completed his primary and secondary education in Shiraz before being admitted into electronics engineering at Shiraz University in 1977. He became politically active as a student and was arrested by the shah's police in May 1978 for his political activities. In 1980 he switched his focus to religious education and began attending Shiraz Seminary. He moved to Qom in 1981 to pursue his studies in fiqh and philosophy. In Qom, he was taught by prominent teachers like Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri. Kadivar graduated with a degree in ijtihad in 1997. Then he went on to get his PhD in Islamic philosophy and theology from Tarbiat Modares University in Tehran in 1999. Kadivar started his career as a teacher teaching fiqh and Islamic philosophy at Qom Seminary. Later he began teaching Islamic philosophy and theology at Imam Sadegh University, Mofid University, and Shahid Beheshti University. He started a decade of teaching at the department of philosophy at Tarbiat Modarres University. In 2007 political pressures forced Kadivar to leave his teaching appointment for a position at the Research Center of Iranian Institute of Philosophy. He is a faculty member of the Department of Islamic Philosophy at the Iranian Institute of

Philosophy and is currently a visiting professor of religious studies at Duke University after spending the 2008-2009 academic year at the University of Virginia. Kadivar married in 1981 and has four children. Dissent[edit source]

Kadivar is a prominent critic of the Islamic Republic system in Iran, and wrote a detailed criticism of the Ayatollah's Khomeini's theory of Islamic government as rule by Shia clerics, Government by Mandate (see below). As punishment for his criticism, Kadivar was sentenced to eighteen months in prison after being convicted by the Special Clerical Court in 1999, on charges of having spread false information about Iran's "sacred system of the Islamic Republic" and of helping enemies of the Islamic revolution,[2] or as another observer put it, "for commenting on the contradiction between the revolution's aims to serve the people and the subsequent concentration of power in the hands of clerics."[3] He spent virtually all of his imprisonment in solitary confinement[4] and was released from Evin Prison, on July 17, 2000. Kadivar was unrepentant on his release[4] and is currently active within the various reform movements of Iran. In a 2004 interview, Kadivar told a journalist, "Every member of society and every member of government is subject to the law. No one can be above it. Everyone has the same rights, yet the root of the faqih is inequality. He assumes he is above it. ... It is time for the supreme leader to be subject to the constitution too. After all, the Supreme Leader doesn't come from God!"[4] On the issue of clerics in government, he has said: "Our job as religious people is not politics. ... They are taking Iran backward, not toward the future."[4] Research works and contributions[edit source]

Kadivar is a prolific author and has published twelve books. He has also been writing extensively in various Iranian journals and has over 100 articles to his name. Four of Kadivar's books focus on political theology. Of these, three comprise a trilogy - The Theories of State in the Shiite Jurisprudence, Government by Mandate, Government by Appointment. The Theories of State in the Shiite Jurisprudence[edit source]

The first volume of this trilogy, The Theories of State in the Shiite Jurisprudence (Nazarrieh haye Doulat dar Figh'h e Shi'eh), which has been translated to Arabic, encompasses a broad typology of religious opinions on the desired or permissible types of government in Shiite theology. Every single instance in this typology is either proposed or endorsed by the highest authorities in Shiite jurisprudence.[1] According to Kadivar, "Velayat e Motlaghe ye Faghih" reflects a spectrum of authoritative options for Islamic society. There are not one, but "no less than nine distinct possible forms of government all proposed and supported by most revered religious scholars and texts." A. Theories of State based on Immediate Divine Legitimacy Four theocratic types, in chronological order: 1. "Appointed Mandate of Jurisconsult" in Religious Matters (Shari'at) along with the Monarchic Mandate of Muslim Potentates in Secular Matters (Saltanat E Mashrou'eh) Advocates: Mohammad Bagher Majlesi, Mirza ye Ghomi, Seyed e Kashfi, Sheikh Fadl ollah Nouri, Ayatollah Abdolkarim Haeri Yazdi. 2. "General Appointed Mandate of Jurisconsults" (Velayat E Entesabi Ye Ammeh) Advocates: Molla Ahmad Naraghi, Sheikh Mohammad Hassan Najafi (Saheb Javaher) Ayatollahs Borujerdi,Golpayegani, Khomeini, (before the revolution) 3. "General Appointed Mandate of the Council of the 'Sources of Imitation' " (Velayat E Entesabi Ye Ammeh Ye Shora Ye Marje'eh Taghlid) Advocates: Ayatollahs: Abdollah Javadi Amoli, Beheshti, Taheri Khorram Abadi 4. "Absolute Appointed Mandate of Jurisconsult" (Velayat e Entesabi ye Motlaghe ye Faghihan) Advocate: Ayatollah Khomeini (after revolution) B. Theories of State Based on Divine-popular Legitimacy Five democratic types, in chronological order: 5. "Constitutional State" (with the permission and supervision of Jurisprudents) (Dowlat e Mashrouteh) Advocates: Sheikh Esma'il Mahallati, Ayatollahs: Mazandarani, Tehrani, Tabataba'i, Khorasani, Na'ini 6. "Popular Stewardship along with Clerical Oversight" (Khelafat e Mardom ba Nezarat e Marjaiat) Advocate: Ayatollah Mohammad Bagher Sadr 7. "Elective Limited Mandate of Jurisprudents" (Velayat e Entekhabi ye Moghayyadeh ye Faghih) Advocate: Ayatollahs Motahhari, Montazeri 8. "Islamic elective State" (Dowlat e Entekhabi ye Eslami) Advocate: Ayatollah Mohammad Bagher Sadr

9. "Collective Government by Proxy" (Vekalat e Malekan e Shakhsi ye Mosha)" Advocate: Ayatollah Mehdi Ha'eri Yazdi Government by Mandate[edit source] Having laid out a spectrum of authoritative options for Islamic society, in his second volume, Government by Mandate (Hokumat e Vela'i), Kadivar criticises Ayatollah Khomeini's theology, the most absolutist thesis among the varieties of "Velayat e Motlaghe ye Faghih" and the one enshrined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.[1] Kadivar considers this 432-page opus the heart of his trilogy and the most scholarly book he has written. The work unfolds in two phases: the first, lays bare the presuppositions of the concept of Velayat, which concerns the meaning of the term, its interpretation in mysticism (Irfan), philosophy (Kalam), jurisprudence (Figh'h), The Qur'an, and Tradition (Sonnat). In every instance, Kadivar discounts political implications of the term. He traces the first indication of the thesis to the writings of eighteenth and nineteenth century jurists namely, Mohaghegh e Karaki, Shahid Thani, and Ahmad Naraghi. Kadivar, thus determines the age of the concept as less than two centuries, a mere blinking of an eye compared to the history of Shiite jurisprudence.[1] But he reserves his most devastating attacks for the second part of the book that is devoted to the critical analysis of the proofs and confirmations of the principle of government by divine mandate. Here Kadivar proceeds in four sections; following the sources of adjudication in Shiite theology he sets up and knocks down the arguments for the Velayat e Faghih adduced from Quran, Tradition, (Sonnat) consensus of the Ulama, (Ijma') and reason (Aghl), He thus concludes: "The principle of Velayat e Faqih is neither intuitively obvious, nor rationally necessary. It is neither a requirement of religion (Din) nor a necessity for denomination (Mazhab). It is neither a part of Shiite general principles (Osoul), nor a component of detailed observances (Forou') It is, by near consensus of Shiite Ulama, nothing more than a jurisprudential minor hypothesis." Government by Appointment[edit source] The third volume of Kadivar's trilogy is entitled: Government by Appointment (Hokoumat e Entesabi). It deals with practical consequences, disappointments, and disenchantments that the Government based on divine mandate has brought about[1] See also[edit source]

Mahmoud Taleghani Abdolkarim Soroush

Intellectual Movements in Iran Religious Intellectualism in Iran References[edit source]

^ a b c d e Mohsen Kadivar: Wielder of the 'Two-edged Sword' ^ Human Rights Watch, 2000, Hellman/Hammett Grants ^ Christopher de Bellaigue, The Struggle for Iran, New York Review of Books, 2007, p. 10 ^ a b c d Wright, Robin, Dreams and Shadows : the Future of the Middle East, Penguin Press, 2008, p. 296 External links[edit source]

Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Mohsen Kadivar Mohsen Kadivar's website The Critical Cleric Human Rights and Religious Intellectualism (interview): Part 1, Part 2 In Iran, democracy wrestles with clerical authority A Critical view on Kadivar's theory on history of extremists in early Shi'ite A Critical view on Kadivar's theory on authenticity of Shi'ite traditions in Kulaini's Kafi Interview with Mohsen Kadivar: "People Have Started Believing in Their Own Strength" A Religion Divided: Between Myth and Reality in the Muslim World A Lecture by Prof Mohsen Kadivar, Duke University Wawasan Open University Georgetown, Penang 23 August, 10AM 12PM The animosity between Shia and Sunni is not new, however today it displays some characteristics that are different from the historical sectarianism. Today we see the heightened tension between Shia and Sunni primarily due to the Arab Spring that has led to the collapse of authoritarian rule. There is a new struggle for political and economic power and over

which interpretation of Islam will influence societies and new leadership.The Shias have long been a reminder to Sunni Muslims of the unresolved dispute within Islam since the death of the Prophet more than 1400 years ago. The differences have crystallized around the question of the rightful succession to the Prophet as head of the early religious and political community: should the new leader be chosen from among Muhammads closest companions or from his direct bloodline?The Shia telling of this story as encapsulated in the death of Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet by the Umayyads in a battle near Karbala in 680CE has created the narrative most Shias have lived ever since. It is a narrative of defeat, martyrdom and dispossession that is deeply embedded in the core of Shias identity.Lately we have seen the gradual rise in sectarian tension and this had to do more with politics and competition for influence and power, notably between Iran and the Arab countries - Saudi in particular. In addition to the inter-state rivalry, the socially and economically disadvantaged position of Shias in Sunni majority countries has contributed to the sense of alienation and their quest for emancipation and legitimacy.And on a broder scale, the latest intensification of sectarian tension throughout the Muslim world reflects the Western strategy of instrumentalizing sectarian differences to forge a regional alliance against West greatest foe - Iran. However it must be stressed that there is nothing inevitable or fated about the Sunni-Shia conflict. Their differences are not any worse than those that had existed within the Christian family which now have all but disappeared as a result of overall prosperity, democracy, and sustained efforts at intra-faith dialogue and reconciliation.s and Sis,

This is to inform you that IRF will be holding a Colloquium on Reappraising Islam and Democracy on Saturday, 24th of August, which is basically two weeks after Raya. It will only be a one-day event at Renaissance Hotel, KL. I have confirmed al the lecturers namely Dr Mohsen Kadivar, an eminent scholar and visiting professor at Duke University, US; Dr Farish Noor, a well-known political scientist at NTU and Dr Azmi Sharom, a Law professor at Universiti Malaya.

For those who are unfamiliar with Dr Kadivar, he is a reformist and a political dissident and well-known as a vocal critic of the doctrine of Guardianship of the Jurist in Iran. He is also a strong advocate democracy and had serve time in prison for his political activism.

I would like you to get your friends who might be interested especially from the alumni of the first colloquium. There is a possibility that we could accomodate 100 participants this time and it would be more convenient since it will be in KL and for only one day.

I need you to get back to me as soon as possible with the names of your friends and colleagues preferably complete with their email addresses and mobile numbers. This is to facilitate me in dealing with Renaissance Hotel. The tentative program is as below:

Venue: Studio R, The Renaissance Hotel, KL Saturday 24 August

0930AM -1000AM: Registration 1000AM -1200PM: Forum 1 1200PM -1230PM: Tea-break 1230PM -0130PM: Workshop 0130PM - 0230PM: Lunch 0230PM - 0430PM: Forum 2 0430PM - 0530PM: Workshop 0530PM - 0600PM: Tea-break 0600PM - 0700PM: Resolution

Please take note that Dr Kadivar will arrive in KL probably on the 20 or 21 August after the Symposium on Contested Visions at the University of Sydney. I shall be meeting him over there where I shall be presenting a paper as well and Dr Kadivar is scheduled to deliver a keynote speech. I have arranged for him to deliver talks at a few academic centres in KL before our colloquium on Saturday. He'll be leaving back to the Sates that Saturday night itself. And the final schedule of his talk will be disseminated soon InsyaALlah.

Until then, I hope to hear your responses.

Regards,The Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding

Invites you to a conference:

Rethinking Shariah:

Who Speaks for

Islam?

Identifying the Key Voices and

Their Resonance in the

Muslim World ___________________________________

Thursday, October 7 9:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m.

**ICC Auditorium** Georgetown University As a religious and legal system, Islam influences the lives of Muslims and non-Muslims alike around the world. Yet in the fourteen centuries since Muhammads life, there has never been one single Muslim voice that can unequivocally define what Islam is or what Islamic law decrees. Instead, Muslim scholars have engaged in a process of debate, consensus building and consensus breaking that has spanned centuries and continues today. With modernity came the emergence of the nation state, the establishment of secular legal systems and the primacy of Western thought--all of which brought serious challenges to the authority of the traditional Muslim ulama. They are now but one voice among many in the global Muslim discourse over what Islamic law is and should be. On issues ranging from extremist violence to womens rights, both Muslims and non-Muslims interested in the effects of Islamic law on issues of state and society are faced with the question of who speaks for Islamic law today. We will address many of these questions at a conference organized by Georgetown Universitys Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.

Conference Program: __________________________________________________

9:00-9:15am -- Welcome and Opening 9:15-10:45am -- Panel 1

Who defines and interprets Islamic Law: What are the roles of the ulama and non-ulama or lay intellectuals? Today, traditionally trained Muslim scholars influence understandings of the Shariah as state agents or muftis (like the Egyptian Ali Gomaa or the Bosnian Mustafa Ceric) and as independent voices (scholars like Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Muhammad Ramadan al-Buti). At the same time, non-ulama or lay intellectuals have also emerged as major interpreters of Islam. What is the substantive impact of such reformers? To what extent are their opinions and rulings authoritative or competing expressions of Islamic law amongst various Muslim audiences?

Panelists: Intisar Rabb, Boston College Sherman Jackson, University of Michigan Jonathan Brown, Georgetown University Respondent: Mohsen Kadivar, Duke University 10:45-11:00am -- Coffee Break

11:00am-12:30pm -- Panel 2

The Courts Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Iran are a few of the Muslim countries that have legal organs using Shariah language and methods to shape their substantive law. From Egypts High Administrative Courts ruling on female circumcision to the Indonesian high Shariah court rulings on polygamy, a body of Islamically justified law is being produced as state law in the Muslim world. Are we at or nearing the point where Muslim countries are creating a body of positive law broad enough to be drawn on as representations of the Shariah?

Panelists: Clark Lombardi, University of Washington Ihsan Yilmaz, Fatih University - Turkey

Respondent: Amira Sonbol, Georgetown University - Qatar

12:30-1:30pm -- Lunch Break

1:30-3:00pm -- Panel 3

What is the future role of Islamic law in the Muslim world and in the West among Muslimminority communities? Recent events and fears about Islamization or the imposition of the Shariah in the West have highlighted tensions and uncertainties surrounding how Muslims in the West understand Islamic law and who they look to as authorities. Who speaks for Islamic law amongst and for Muslim minorities?

Panelists: Andrew March, Yale University Mohammad Fadel, University of Toronto Mathias Rohe, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg - Germany

Respondents: John Esposito, Georgetown University Lama Abu-Odeh, Georgetown University AFMusa