A Synagogue Employing a Lady in a Rabbinic Capacity

Be-chasdei Ha-Kadosh Barukh Hu, Yishtabach Shemo

Shalom C. Spira
1 Sivan, 5775

INTRODUCTION
I have been asked the halakhic question of whether a synagogue may employ a lady in a
rabbinic capacity. Before offering any substantive comment, it seems to this student that an
insightful philosophical approach to this topic has already been articulated by R. Aryeh Leib
Baron, the late rosh yeshivah of Merkaz ha-Talmud in Montreal, Canada. Specifically, as testified
by R. Barons disciple Dr. Paul Cohen, a lady once asked R. Baron why she could not be
ordained as a rabbi. R. Baron answered you are overqualified.1 It would seem to this writer that
the meaning of R. Barons response is as follows: The Torah recognizes that the righteous ladies
of Israel are spiritual leaders who represent the true heroes of Jewish history and Jewish destiny.2
Included within this recognition is the teaching of the gemara in Niddah 45b that ladies are
endowed with superior understanding.3 Thus, there is no need to ordain ladies as rabbis per se,
for every Jewish lady is already ordained from Heaven.4
1

This testimony was first provided by Dr. Cohen approximately thirteen or fourteen years ago, when R. Baron was
still alive. At my request, the testimony was reconfirmed by Dr. Cohen as accurate in a conversation between
himself and myself on May 18, 2013 (after R. Baron had already ascended to the Heavenly Academy).
2

See the many sources to this effect on pp. 102-105 of this students essay The Quest for an Effective Synagogue
Partition Plan, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/168693341/Synagogue-Partition>.
3

Indeed, the same message may be attributed to the gemara in Kiddushin 49b which states Ten volumetric units of
conversation descended into the world/universe; nine were taken by ladies, and the rest by the balance of the
world/universe. Since the faculty of speech represents the power of the soul [-see R. J. David Bleich, Bioethical
Dilemmas II (Targum Press, 2006), p. 16, and accompanying endnote 37 in that treatise], it emerges that the power
of the soul of ladies outshines that of the balance of the world/universe by a ratio of nine to one.
In the opinion of this student, the foregoing is not contradicted by the gemara in Yoma 66b, where Rabbi
Eliezer expounds upon Exodus 35:25 to mean that ein chokhmah la-ishah ela bi-flakh (a ladys wisdom is manifest
through textile creativity). As R. Ben-Zion Meir Chai Uziel, Mishpetei Uziel, Choshen Mishpat no. 6, sec. 1, s.v. al
ha-rishonah cogently observes, it is impossible to interpret Rabbi Eliezers remarks as an insult, because [in addition
to the obvious biblical interdiction against verbal insult bespoken by Bava Metzia 58b], the gemara actually begins
by submitting shaalah ishah chakhamah et Rabbi Eliezer, leaving no doubt that the lady with whom Rabbi
Eliezer was speaking was actually endowed with wisdom. Rather, it seems to this student that ein chokhmah laishah ela bi-flakh should be interpreted as a praise to the righteous ladies of Israel, viz. that unlike the gentlemen
who foolishly squandered their wisdom on constructing a false golden calf, by contradistinction the righteous ladies
appropriately dedicated their wisdom to the mitzvah mission of building the Mishkan, a mitzvah mission which
required extraordinary textile creativity. [Hence, in context, Rabbi Eliezer was telling a lady who consulted him
about the differential punishments that were imposed upon the worshippers of the golden calf that she need not
worry that such punishments would ever have any relevance to her or to her fellow ladies in the House of Jacob.]
4

When this interpretation was suggested to Dr. Cohen in our more recent conversation (referenced supra, note 1), he
agreed that it potentially captures the true meaning of R. Barons words.
See also Rashi to Ketubot 36b, s.v. u-marot le-iman, who writes that mothers are poskot to their
daughters when training their daughters in the laws the latter need to know prior to marriage. [Rashi, in context,

Having been informed by the illuminating philosophy of R. Baron, we can now turn to
the substantive halakhic question at hand. Since a number of erudite responsa have already been
published on the topic, these materials will first be reviewed.

A.

SURVEY OF PUBLISHED RESPONSA

Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 7:4 disqualifies a lady from serving as a judge on a
Beth Din. However, Birkei Yosef (seif katan 12) authorizes a sagacious lady to serve as a
halakhic decisor in a non-judicial capacity.
As a matter of practical interest, the matter remained largely dormant until it was revived
by an obiter dictum of R. Aharon Feldman in his article entitled Halakhic Feminism or Feminist
Halakha? (Tradition 33:2, Winter 1999). On p. 65 of that article, R. Feldman comments that
Another [essay in the book that I am reviewing5] is only obliquely halakhic, presenting sources
refers to deciding whether the daughter is a betulah, so as to determine the value of money that should be inscribed
in the daughters ketubah.] This Rashi would seem to bespeak R. Barons message, viz. that ladies are ordained from
Heaven to transmit from mother-to-daughter the Oral Torah heritage that has been traditionally transmitted from
mother to daughter since the Revelation at Mount Sinai.
5

Referring to Chanah Henkin, Women and the Issuing of Halakhic Rulings, published in Jewish Legal Writings
by Women (Micah D. Halpern and Chana Safrai, eds.), Jerusalem: Urim Publications, 1998, pp. 278-287.
Mrs. Henkin relies on the aforementioned Birkei Yosef, as well as its citation by Pitchei Teshuvah (seif
katan 5), to authorize ladies to render halakhic decisions. Mrs. Henkin proceeds to write: This position, I want to
stress, is non-controversial. Nowhere within the Rishonim or the Acharonim is there an opinion that the Halakha
prohibits in principle the issuing of a halakhic ruling by a woman. Mrs. Henkin also notes that the midrash
(Bamidbar Rabbah 10:17) quotes Samsons father Manoah as describing ladies as not being bnot horaah
(persons capable of rendering halakhic decisions), but she dismisses that reference because (a) Manoah was
referring to testimony rather than halakhic decision-making; (b) Manoah was an ignoramus and (c) if Manoah was
referring to halakhic decision-making, then Manoahs evaluation is not corroborated by any other rabbinic source.
This student would respectfully challenge Mrs. Henkins three arguments negating the Manoah episode as a
proof on the question of ordaining ladies. Regarding (a), ladies are actually accepted as witnesses on matters of
ritual permission and prohibition, as indicated by Tosafot to Pesachim 4b, s.v. heimnuhu rabbanan bi-de-rabbanan.
Perhaps, then, Manoah in remarking that ladies are not bnot horaah was referring to halakhic decisionmaking regarding the details of Nezirut Shimshon [which he had now heard from his wife was to be conferred upon
their future son]. Regarding (b), while it is true that the gemara in Eruvin 18b initially posits a hypothesis that
Manoah was an ignoramus, the gemara proceeds to reject that hypothesis. And regarding (c), Mrs. Henkins
supposition that there is no other rabbinic source which excludes ladies from rendering halakhic decisions will be
respectfully challenged in Section B of the present essay.
Now, it is true that the midrash immediately proceeds to comment that the angel [to whom Manoah had
remarked that ladies are not bnot horaah] told Manoah to listen to his wife, with the express intent of honouring
Manoahs wife and of endearing Manoahs wife to Manoah. Clearly, this repost of the angel to Manoah serves to
repudiate Manoahs original remarks. Nevertheless, one might counter-argue based on R. Ovadiah Yosef, Shut
Yabia Omer I, Orach Chaim no. 41, who demonstrates that we cannot accept halakhic rulings from angels. If so, the
angels repudiation of Manoah may be halakhically meaningless. [And even though Manoah himself consulted with
the angel for guidance, this is because at that time Manoah did not yet realize that his interlocutor was an angel,
as Scripture testifies in Judges 13:16, 21. Rather, Manoah thought he was speaking with a prophet. And although a
prophet (other than Mosheh Rabbeinu) is forbidden to render a halakhic decision by way of prophecy, a prophet who
is also a rabbinic sage may render halakhic decisions in a non-prophetic manner. Thus, perhaps Manoah thought that
this prophet was a rabbinic sage, with whom he was now consulting for halakhic guidance.] Ergo, the halakhah
should follow Manoah (to exclude ladies from the rabbinate) and not the angel (to include ladies within the
rabbinate)!

which indicate that women who have attained the proper expertise in Jewish law have the
authority to offer rulings a view to which there is no reason for anyone to take exception,
provided the expertise is genuine. This obiter dictum of R. Feldman is quite significant because
paradoxical to the entire traditionalist approach that R. Feldman champions in his article the
obiter dictum potentially concedes that women can indeed be ordained as rabbis.
Accordingly, it did not take long for R. Nathaniel Helfgot to notice this paradox, and he
sent a letter to the editor (Tradition 34:1, Spring 2000) asking that if such is the Halakhah, then
Orthodox rabbinical seminaries should be established for ladies. This prompted R. Feldman to
respond to R. Helfgot (ibid.) by greatly limiting his willingness (virtually to the point of nonexistence) of countenancing ordination of women. R. Feldmans stringent approach was
subsequently criticized by R. Joel Wolowelsky, Rabbis, Rebbetzins, and Halakhic Advisors
(Tradition 36:4, Winter 2002), which prompted R. Feldman to respond with a letter to the editor
(Tradition 37:2, Summer 2003), which further prompted R. Wolowelsky to counter-respond
(ibid.).
R. Feldmans thesis is that pursuant to the prohibition against a father teaching his
daughter Oral Torah, as codified in Rambam (Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:13) and Shulchan Arukh
(Yoreh Deah 246:6) most ladies lack the ability to analyze Torah she-be-al Peh and hence lack
the ability to serve as rabbis. The exceptions to this rule are so few and far between that it would
be inappropriate to establish a semikhah program for ladies. [Rather, R. Feldman presumably
holds that a lady can only serve as a halakhic decisor when a universal consensus has developed
among the Sages of Israel that this particular lady is an extraordinary exception to the rule.] R.
Wolowelskys essential rejoinder is that this is not what Rambam and Shulchan Arukh mean.
Rather, Rambam and Shulchan Arukh prohibit a father from coercing his daughter to study Torah
she-be-al Peh in a social milieu where such coercion would be pedagogically harmful to the
daughter. But when a lady desires of her own independent volition to study Torah she-be-al Peh,
and she demonstrates her proficiency to the same level that gentlemen must demonstrate to earn
semikhah, then it is certainly appropriate to ordain the woman. Since no student (man or woman)
is ever coerced to enter a semikhah program nowadays, but instead students enter as a result of
their own personal interest and as a consequence of demonstrating their own personal talent, R.
Wolowelsky believes that R. Feldmans objection is moot.6 R. Wolowelsky substantiates his
On the countervailing side, perhaps the fact that the midrash approvingly records the angels repudiation of
Manoah means that the Sages who recorded the midrash agreed with the angels evaluation, not because of the
angels statement per se (which is halakhically inadmissible as evidence according to Yabia Omer) but because the
angels declaration corresponds with an oral tradition that the Sages (who recorded the midrash) independently
received, viz. an oral tradition to include ladies within the rabbinate. The matter requires further analysis, and so this
student will not draw any definitive conclusion from the midrash.
In any event, Mrs. Henkin deserves congratulations for cogently bringing to light this midrash and its
interface with the question of whether ladies can be ordained.
6

In a lecture delivered in 2004 to Yeshiva Universitys Azrieli Graduate School of Jewish Education and
Administration (at which this student was privileged to be attending as a summer student), R. Jeffrey R. Woolf
added a consideration that apparently vindicates R. Wolowelsky. Namely, R. Woolf points to Rambam, Hilkhot
Yesodei ha-Torah 4:13, who writes that every lady as well as every gentlemen is capable of comprehending the Oral
Torah as it applies to practical Halakhah (-represented by the disputes of Abaye and Rava). Thus, surmises R. Woolf,
Rambams alternate remarks (in Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:13) prohibiting a father from teaching his daughter Oral
Torah must only have been intended in the sense that a father may not coerce his daughter to study Oral Torah, since
the Sages of the Talmud understood this to be pedagogically harmful.

rejoinder by citing Encyclopedia Talmudit and Shut Binyan Av I, no. 65 (of R. Eliyahu Bakshi
Doron), who based on the aforementioned Birkei Yosef authorize a woman to serve as a
halakhic decisor. R. Wolowelsky argues that in our era, where women have achieved prominence
in all the professions, there is no reason to hinder them from entering the rabbinate.
Subsequently, in 2004, R. Efraim Greenblatt (author of Shut Rivevot Efraim) was
invited by R. Joshua H. Shmidman, rosh yeshivah of Noam ha-Torah (Montreal, Canada) to
deliver an examination to his students. R. Greenblatt asked his deputy R. Yuval Noff to serve as
his representative in delivering the examination, and also to present the Montreal students with a
list of exhortations how a rabbi must behave.7 Later that year, the entire list was published jointly
by R. Greenblatt and R. Noff in their co-authored book Rivevot ve-Yovlot, Vol. 1 (Memphis,
Tennessee, 2004), pp. 441-458, including an exhortation which seems to prohibit a synagogue
from employing a woman as a rabbi.8
Although, in context, R. Woolf articulates his thesis only to the extent of allowing a lady to study Talmud
[when she is motivated by her own volunteer effort], R. Daniel Sperber (in a 2009 responsum, cited infra, note 9)
adapts R. Woolfs thesis as a basis to even authorize a lady to render halakhic decisions, affirming precisely what R.
Wolowelsky had originally argued.
[Cf. R. Yitzchak Zilberstein, Chashukei Chemed al Mesekhet Megillah (5767), p. 202, who quotes his
brother-in-law R. Chaim Kanievsky as positing that it is only we (i.e. the gentlemen) who are prohibited from
teaching a lady to study Oral Torah, but the lady who volunteers on her own to study Oral Torah may do so.]
Actually, one might argue that a balancing of the two conflicting statements of Rambam (Hilkhot Yesodei
ha-Torah 4:13 vs. Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:13) is already contained explicitly in Shulchan Arukh Yoreh Deah 246:6,
since immediately after Shulchan Arukh codifies the prohibition against a father teaching his daughter Oral Torah,
Rema adds that a lady is obligated to study practical Halakhah. Accordingly, the entire debate between R. Feldman
vs. R. Wolowelsky can be recapitulated as follows. All agree that a lady is obligated to study practical Halakhah. All
agree that a father is forbidden to coerce his daughter to study the academic realms of Oral Torah. The ultimate
debate between R. Feldman and R. Wolowelsky is whether a lady who volunteers to study the academic realms of
Oral Torah can then be trusted to apply those teachings to the rendering of practical halakhic decisions.
7

This student was privileged to be among those present.

On p. 458, Rivevot ve-Yovlot calls upon the students of R. Shmidman to sanctify the Name of Heaven by rectifying
the following problematic types of communities: those without a synagogue partition, those without a day school,
those without a mikveh, those without a mesader kiddushin, those without domestic peace, those without a mohel,
those without a Sabbath-observant baal korei, those where the rabbi is a lady [-emphasis added by this student
(Shalom C. Spira)], those where the baal korei is a lady, those where Shabbat candles are not lit by ladies, those
where congregants do not attend synagogue on a weekly basis, those where gentlemen do not don tefillin on a daily
basis.
Although no particular source is cited in that context to substantiate this prohibition (of a lady serving as
rabbi), the same cryptic remark (excluding ladies from the rabbinate) appears in an earlier and unrelated chapter in
Rivevot ve-Yovlot, pp. 415-423. In the earlier chapter, Rivevot ve-Yovlot addresses why Rema to Shulchan Arukh
Yoreh Deah 1:1 records a custom for a lady not to serve as a ritual slaughterer. Rivevot ve-Yovlot suggests that ritual
slaughter requires shimush talmidei chakhamim (prolonged interaction with Torah scholars, through which one
learns how to apply the Oral Torah in practical situations) on the part of the apprentice, and that based on the
comments of Rashi to Sotah 21b, s.v. ke-ilu and Sotah 22a, s.v. ve-lo shimesh talmidei chakhamim such
apprenticeship is not typically compatible with the female personality. Rivevot ve-Yovlot proceeds to add that the
philosophical reason behind the biblical exclusion of ladies from writing a Torah scroll is that whoever is not
obligated in the matter cannot discharge the obligation of the public (mishnah in Rosh ha-Shanah 29a). Since ladies
are not obligated in the mitzvah de-oraita of Torah study (see infra, note 11), the Torah excludes ladies from serving
as the secretaries for the official vehicle of Torah study, claims Rivevot ve-Yovlot. Finally, Rivevot ve-Yovlot
concludes the entire discussion with the cryptic remark (p. 423) that ladies should not serve as rabbis, seemingly
indicating that one [or perhaps both] of the above two considerations (viz. incompatibility of shimush talmidei
chakhamim with the female personality and/or lack of mitzvah de-oraita for ladies to learn Torah) explains the

Subsequently, in 2009, several significant analyses were published on the subject of

ordaining ladies as rabbis. On the one hand, the Hebrew Institute of Riverdale (in Bronx, New
York) celebrated the ordination of a sagacious lady, at which event the newly composed responsa
of R. Yoel Bin-Nun, R. Daniel Sperber and R. Joshua Maroof were distributed, all arguing based
on the aforementioned Birkei Yosef [and its citation in Pitchei Teshuvah] that such ordination is
authorized by Torah law.9 On the other hand, that same year R. Menasheh Klein published Shut
Mishneh Halakhot XVII, which contains a responsum (no. 92) devoted to womens prayer
groups, that as an obiter dictum critiques the idea of employing women as rabbis on the
grounds that such employment will render the womens husbands less available to study Torah,
which is undesirable because it represents a skewed allocation of scarce resources.10 Namely,
since the husband (and not the wife) is obligated to study Torah [as per the gemara in Kiddushin
29b11], and since obligatory fulfillment of a mitzvah is greater than voluntary fulfillment of a
mitzvah (as per the gemara in Bava Kamma 87a), it is the husbands learning which should be
prioritized.12 Also that year, R. Gil Student published Posts Along the Way (Yashar Books),
exclusion of ladies from the rabbinate. If it is the former reason, then Rivevot ve-Yovlot is following the approach of
R. Feldman presented supra, note 6, which is challenged by R. Wolowelsky. If it is the latter reason, then Rivevot
ve-Yovlot appears to be hinting to the Nov. 27, 2010 approach of R. Mordechai Willig, which will be presented infra,
note 31.
9

The package of responsa is available at

<http://www.jofa.org/sites/default/files/uploaded_documents/responsa_on_ordination_of_women.pdf>.
10

This is because, claims R. Klein, the spiritual leadership functions traditionally assumed by the matriarch of the
home in raising a family (e.g. preparing meals) will de facto be shifted to the husband, hindering the husband from
being able to study Torah.
11

Although, as explained supra, note 6, a lady is indeed obligated to study practical Halakhah, the gentlemans
obligation to study Torah is more encompassing, including practical Halakhah as well as the academic realms of
Torah. This is because a Jewish gentleman is commanded by the Torah to study Torah; this mitzvah encompasses all
dimensions of Torah study. By contradistinction, a Jewish lady is exempted by the Torah from studying Torah (as per
the gemara in Kiddushin 29b), yet [in addition to her prerogative to praiseworthily volunteer to fulfill the mitzvah
de-oraita of studying Torah, much the same way as she may praiseworthily volunteer to fulfill the mitzvot of shofar,
sukkah and lulav,] she is commanded by the rabbis to study Torah in those dimensions of Torah study that will
practically enable her to fulfill the mitzvot according to Halakhah. E.g. she needs to be proficient in the practical
laws of Shabbat in order for her to successfully observe Shabbat, etc.
Somewhat complicating the above differential prescription of Torah study obligation is the occasion of
Hakhel, where ladies as well as gentlemen are obligated as a mitzvah de-oraita to attend the public reading of the
Torah. Even so, the mitzvah of Hakhel applies on Sukkot once in seven years, and even then only when the Temple
exists. By contradistinction, every day of every year, whether or not the Temple exists, gentlemen are obligated as a
mitzvah de-oraita to study Torah. [On the other hand, Hakhel is indeed cited by the poskim in the context of the
rabbinic prohibition against a father coercing his daughter to study Oral Torah (referenced supra, note 6). Namely,
the reason the Sages did not impose such a parallel rabbinic prohibition against a father coercing his daughter to
study Written Torah is because they did not want to contradict that which the Torah specifically obligated at Hakhel
(during the Temple era) once in seven years. That consideration, however, does not detract from the cogency of R.
Kleins argument. Although there is no rabbinic prohibition against coercing ones daughter to study Written Torah
(-and this is inspired by Hakhel), it remains the case that there is no mitzvah de-oraita obligating a lady to study
Written Torah on a daily basis, either. (And all the more so there is no mitzvah de-oraita obligating a lady to study
Oral Torah on a daily basis.)] And see the exchange between R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and R. Ovadiah Yosef,
published in the latters Shut Yabia Omer IX, Orach Chaim no. 11, which confirms this analysis (in the context of
ladies reciting birkot ha-Torah).

containing a list of reasons (pp. 95-105) auguring against ordaining ladies,13 but which
paradoxically also professes (op. cit., p. 100):

I see no reason why a woman cannot rule on halachic matters to those who ask
her, even if others will ignore her rulings Certifying an advanced melamedes
[scholarly lady who teaches] is entirely uncontroversial. Regarding a posekes
[scholarly lady who renders halakhic decisions], though, the question remains
whether this is a confirmation of the non-Orthodox and, therefore, should be
delayed to a generation that does not have the same recent past as ours.14

Subsequently, in 2010, the Agudath Israel of America and Rabbinical Council of America
(RCA) both issued statements indicating that an Orthodox synagogue cannot employ a lady as a
rabbi, even in a non-judicial capacity. Without citing any specific textual source, the Agudath
Israel of America invokes mesorah, while the RCA similarly invokes commitment to sacred
continuity.15
12

Although first published in 2009, this responsum of R. Klein was actually originally composed in 1986, and is
addressed to R. Dov Frimer, one of the co-authors of the article Womens Prayer Groups published in Tradition
32:2 (Winter 1998). The 1998 article references the (then as-of-yet unpublished) manuscript of R. Klein in endnote
64. [It should be emphasized that the question of womens prayer groups and the question of woman rabbis represent
two distinct halakhic subjects (although there may be some overlapping concepts to both questions). The issue of
woman rabbis is being raised by R. Klein purely as an obiter dictum.]
13

These reasons include the problems of granting ladies serarah (a position of authority, which according to
Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:5 is denied to ladies), deviation from the minhag that contemporary semikhah is
patterned to follow the original semikhah granted to members of Mosheh Rabbeinus Sanhedrin (and hence cannot
be granted to ladies, pursuant to Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 7:4), communal unity considerations, and the
prohibition against confirming the heterodox.
Regarding this last item, R. Hershel Schachter, Preserving our Mesorah in Changing Times (Jewish
Action, Winter 5771), reports that R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik derived the halakhic obligation to avoid emulating
heterodox practices from Tosafot to Chullin 41a. [Actually, the reference would appear to be Rashi to Chullin 41a,
s.v. aval oseh guma.] R. Student, The Adoption of Heterodox Practices [Posts Along the Way, pp. 109-127], cites
earlier decisors, beginning with R. Moshe Sofer in his Teshuvot Chatam Sofer, Vol. 1 no. 27, who rule the same way.
An even earlier authority ruled likewise: R. Ezekiel Landau in his Teshuvot Noda bi-Yehudah, Mahadura Kamma,
Choshen Mishpat no. 16 (final paragraph).
14

In the present writers opinion, while R. Students contribution to this topic is valuable, his specific assertion that
I see no reason why a woman cannot rule on halachic matters to those who ask her, even if others will ignore her
rulings is problematic. If a ladys halakhic ruling is legitimate, then it represents an element of the Oral Torah,
which every Jew is obligated to honour and respect. No Jew has the right to ignore any element of the Oral Torah,
and thus no Jew has the right to ignore any halakhic ruling. Either we must decide that ladies are authorized to
render halakhic decisions, or we must decide that ladies are entrusted with a different type of mitzvah mission role
by the Holy One, blessed be He. There cannot be an intermediate position of authorization for ladies to rule but with
the caveat that some Jews enjoy the right to ignore the ladys rulings.
In fairness to R. Student (who is a tzaddik gammur), his entertained notion [that it is possible for some to
voluntarily ignore the rulings of a female rabbi] is supported by the words of R. Isaac Herzog. See infra, note 48.
Even so, it seems to this writer that R. Herzog himself never substantiates this notion, and so the question is merely
shifted from R. Student to R. Herzog.

Subsequently, Hakirah (Vol. 11, Spring 2011) published competing analyses from R.
Hershel Schachter on the one hand,16 and R. Michael J. Broyde and R. Shlomo M. Brody on the
other,17 regarding ordination of ladies as rabbis. R. Schachter prohibits ladies ordination because
he regards the rabbinate as serarah (occupying a position of authority, which Rambam, Hilkhot
Melakhim 1:5 denies to ladies); because the minhag is to pattern contemporary semikhah based
on the judicial semikhah that Mosheh Rabbeinu gave to members of his Sanhedrin (-and judicial
semikhah can only be given to gentlemen, as per Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 7:4); and
because of the prohibition against emulating the heterodox. R. Broyde and Brody challenge all of
R. Schachters premises, and are inclined to tentatively authorize ordination of ladies in
principle.18 However, due to public policy/communal unity/practical rabbinics meta-issues, R.
15

The full text of the statements of both organizations have been collated into one document available at
<http://www.hakirah.org/vol%2011%20rca%20agudah.pdf>
16

R. Schachters article is available at <http://www.hakirah.org/Vol%2011%20Schachter.pdf>

17

R. Broyde and R. Brodys jointly written article is available at <http://www.hakirah.org/Vol

%2011%20Broyde.pdf>
18

One semantic error in R. Broyde and R. Brodys (otherwise outstanding and tour de force) article which requires
correction is the following opening sentence: In the second half of the twentieth century, the halakhic community
has confronted several new intellectual challenges [sic] to the structure of Jewish law. This sentence is absolutely
mistaken, since a fundamental principle of Orthodox Judaism is that the structure of Jewish law was revealed by the
Omniscient Creator to Mosheh Rabbeinu at Mount Sinai. Thus, there can never be any intellectual challenges [sic]
to the structure of Jewish law, since the Holy One, blessed be He, Who is the Master of all intellectual achievement,
is the Architect of Jewish law.
Still, it is contextually clear that this semantic error in R. Broyde and R. Brodys article represents an
inadvertent oversight on the part of the distinguished authors, and it is the humble privilege of this student to
presently honour the distinguished authors (who are tzaddikim gemurim) by rectifying the inadvertent oversight with
the publication of the present footnote. [Cf. Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh Deah III, no 88, where R. Moshe Feinstein
similarly writes that the greatest honour one can grant the Chazon Ish is to rectify the (exceedingly seldom) mistakes
that he rendered.] Certainly, the general message that R. Broyde and R. Brody convey in the opening section of their
article, viz. what they poetically term unity without uniformity; diversity without divisiveness, appears well
supported by the sentiments expressed by R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Orach Chaim IV, no. 25.
It seems to this student that another correction from which R. Broyde and R. Brodys (otherwise
outstanding and tour de force) article would benefit relates to the obiter dictum on p. 38, which states
Parenthetically, we expect the number of gerim with semikhah will greatly increase in the coming generations, as
many children will undergo Orthodox conversion because their mother originally did not receive a halakhic
conversion. This obiter dictum presupposes that there will be many kosher conversions in the coming generations.
Yet, it seems to this student that such there should be no automatic guarantee that future applicants to conversion
will ever be accepted. After all, we do not accepts converts in the messianic era (Yevamot 24b), and since
(pursuant to the gemara in Eruvin 43a-b) Jewish law recognizes the realistic possibility that the messianic era could
arrive on any weekday, one cannot presuppose that there will be any significant number of kosher conversions
performed in the future. Moreover, as R. Broyde himself demonstrates in his excellent article devoted to the laws of
conversion at <http://www.judaismconversion.org/Something_Old,_Something_New.html>, a certain benchmark
standard of accepting the yoke of commandments is required for a conversion to be valid. There is no guarantee that
any particular Noahide will ever sincerely undertake to meet that benchmark standard (-and, for that matter,
Noahides are not required to convert to Judaism altogether; rather, the Torah summons Noahides to be righteous by
observing the Noahide Code). Only a Beth Din acting on a case-by-case basis can determine whether a Noahide
applying for conversion has met the benchmark standard of accepting the yoke of commandments. Given this
reality, it seems to this student that no Beth Din should attempt to guarantee in advance how many valid conversions
(if any) will occur in the future. It is precisely for this reason that R. Menasheh Klein, Shut Mishneh Halakhot
XVII, no.18, reports that Chazon Ish opposed the creation of batei din whose sole function is to process conversions.
Chazon Ish reportedly feared that the very existence of such batei din would prejudice in advance the conclusion

Broyde and R. Brody further argue that the time is not yet right for woman rabbis. Thus, while R.
Broyde and R. Brody refute R. Schachter in theory, they concur with him in practice for the time
being.19
Subsequently, Hakirah (Vol. 12, Fall 2011, pp. 18-19) featured an exchange between R.
Nathaniel Helfgot and the editors. Writing in his capacity as a board member of the International
Rabbinic Fellowship, R. Helfgot reports that his organization has issued a highly nuanced
position on the question of ordaining ladies as rabbis.20 The editors while thanking R. Helfgot
for the information respond that such nuance is surprising, since it contradicts every major
posek of our time.
Subsequently, in 2013, the RCA reiterated its opposition to ordination of ladies, [this time
apparently emulating the phraseology of the Agudath Israel of America] by characterizing such
ordination as a violation of our mesorah (tradition). that contradicts the norms of our
community.21 R. Avraham Gordimer claimed that the RCA approach represents the uniform
consensus of top poskim throughout the world.22 R. Mordechai Bulua further argued that
employing a lady as a synagogue rabbi would potentially create problems vis--vis the obligation
of a synagogue partition.23 On the other hand, R. Avraham Weiss responded to the RCA by
that a certain number of applicants to conversion will be accepted.{To that effect, this student finds a parallelism in
R. Moshe David Tendlers annual hilkhot gerut lectures at RIETS, where R. Tendler announces that he declines to
serve on any Beth Din performing a conversion (except for the case of conversion of an adopted baby), given the
complexity of the task in our era of ascertaining that a Noahide is willing to sincerely accept the yoke of
commandments. Similarly, R. J. David Bleich, in his lecture recorded at
<http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/733609/Rabbi_Dr_J_David_Bleich/Tikun_Olam:_A_Jew's_Responsib
lity_to_Society>, has announced that he declines to serve on any Beth Din performing a conversion [-and, in his
case, even in the case of an adopted baby. The only distinction between R. Tendler and R. Bleich concerns
conversion of an adopted baby, and this is because there is a debate between them whether the validity of an infant
conversion depends on the mitzvah-observance of the adopting parents. See R. Bleichs Be-Netivot ha-Halakhah II
(KTAV Publishing, 1998), pp. 185-187; idem. III (KTAV Publishing, 2000), p. 223; and idem. IV (HaDaF
Typesetting, 2010), p. 193.]}
19

Interestingly, it is not clear from R. Broyde and R. Brodys article whether they were actually aware at the time of
its composition that they would be responding to R. Schachter. The fact that they never mention R. Schachter by
name as their interlocutor seems to indicate that they were not. In any event, the issue would be further revisited in
Hakirah Vol. 12 (Fall 2012), by which time R. Broyde and R. Brody were obviously aware of their interlocutor.
Namely, pp. 15-18 of the latter volume features a debate between R. Abraham Kelman vs. R. Broyde and R. Brody,
where R. Broyde and R. Brody maintain their position. [And see further in the main text for recapitulation of another
related exchange in Hakirah Vol. 12]
20

Parenthetically, although not directly referenced by R. Helfgot, it seems to this student that his approach is
consistent with his earlier letter published in Tradition 34:1 (Spring 2000), discussed in the third paragraph of the
present section of this essay.
21

<http://www.rabbis.org/news/article.cfm?id=105753>

22

<http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/795123/Rabbi_Avraham_Gordimer/Ordaining_Women_and_the_Role
_of_Mesorah>
23

Canadian Jewish News, May 30, 2013 (Montreal edition), p. 12. R. Bulua invokes Iggerot Mosheh, Orach Chaim
IV, no. 70, sec. 5, where R. Moshe Feinstein is consulted whether a synagogue rabbi may authorize a lady to enter
the gentlemens sanctuary during prayers in order to read an English translation of the liturgy for the pedagogical

submitting that the mesorah factor is counterbalanced by the consideration that makom hinichu
li avotai le-hitgader bo (viz. there is room for innovation within the parameters of the Oral
Torah, as per the gemara in Chullin 7a). R. Weiss affirms that pursuant to R. Bakshi Dorons
[earlier mentioned] responsum authorizing ordination of ladies, it is entirely appropriate to
establish an Orthodox rabbinical seminary to ordain ladies.24 Similarly, R. David Wolkenfeld
remonstrated that ordination of ladies, while novel, represents a legitimate form of novelty
analogous to the Chassidut that Baal Shem Tov introduced, to the delivery of Torah lectures in
the vernacular and/or to the practice of many Orthodox Jewish gentlemen to groom themselves
presentably with a (kosher) electric shaver.25

B. ANALYSIS OF BIRKEI YOSEF

We have seen in Section A that Birkei Yosef [as well as its citation by Pitchei Teshuvah]
is invoked by many writers26 as a proof to authorize ladies to render (in a non-judicial capacity)
halakhic decisions. Birkei Yosef arrives at this conclusion on the basis of two considerations:

benefit of the congregants. R. Feinstein responds that it is obvious that it is forbidden, and it is astonishing that an
Orthodox rabbi would do so. Behold, you write that the Gaon R. Jacob Isaac Ruderman told you that it is
forbidden, and it is obvious and clear that it is forbidden
Actually, as discussed in this students The Quest for an Effective Synagogue Partition Plan (referenced
supra, note 2; see, especially, section B of that treatise), there are contradictory opinions among the poskim (and
even among the writings of R. Feinstein himself) whether indeed this is the halakhah. Nevertheless, it seems to this
student that (as concluded in the final paragraph of Section E of the treatise), considerations of safek de-oraita lechumra require stringency. [See also footnote 62 there (in Section E of that treatise), where it is explained that,
notwithstanding the foregoing, a lady who is a healthcare professional (such as a physician, nurse or paramedic)
may respond to a lifesaving medical emergency in the gentlemens section in the middle of prayer services, and the
prayer services may even continue while she does so.]
Of course, R. Buluas synagogue partition argument is technically separate from the issue of ordaining
ladies as rabbis. In theory, if R. Buluas objection represented the only cogent objection to ordination of ladies, it
could be resolved by simply insisting that a lady rabbi always remain in the ladies section of the synagogue during
services. For that matter, even R. Wolowelskys Winter 2002 contribution (referenced earlier in this section of the
essay), which indeed advocates rabbinic ordination of ladies, has cautioned that the lady must not enter the
gentlemens section during prayer services.
24

<http://www.yctorah.org/content/view/823/17/>

25

<http://morethodoxy.org/2013/06/25/orthodox-women-rabbis-a-response-to-the-blogosphere-and-a-hope-for-thefuture/>
26

In chronological order: Encyclopedia Talmudit, R. Bakshi Doron, Mrs. Henkin, R. Wolowelsky, R. Bin-Nun, R.
Sperber and R. Maroof. [It is also evidently the basis for R. Broyde and R. Brodys joint analysis cited supra, note
17, as well as R. Weiss analysis cited supra, note 24, since they invoke R. Bakshi Doron.] Moreover, even R.
Aharon Feldman [who discourages/opposes ordination of ladies, as one may infer from his responses to Mrs. Henkin
and R. Wolowelsky, as well as his signature on the Agudath Israel 2010 statement] never explicitly challenges the
invocation of Birkei Yosef.

(i)

The mishnah in Niddah 49b declares that anyone who is qualified to judge is also
qualified to serve as a witness. Tosafot (Yevamot 45b, Gittin 88b, Bava Kamma
15a, Shevuot 29b, and Niddah 50a) question that this rule seems inconsistent
with the fact that Deborah the Prophetess served as the chief judge of the Jewish
People (as apparently described by Judges 4:4), even though ladies are biblically
disqualified to serve as witnesses [pursuant to the gemara in Shevuot 30a].
Tosafot offer four answers to this question throughout their comments on the
Talmud. One of the four answers is that Deborah did not serve as a judge
altogether, but would rather teach the laws to the gentleman judges of Israel. It is
the gentlemen who would then sit in judgement on actual cases. Thus, Deborah
avoided the halakhic disqualification of ladies as judges by her serving behind
the scenes as the master teacher of the gentleman judges.27 Birkei Yosef infers
from this that a lady can serve as a halakhic decisor in a non-judicial capacity.

(ii)

Sefer ha-Chinukh, mitzvah 83, rules that ladies are disqualified to serve as judges.
Yet, in mitzvah 152, Chinukh rules that the biblical prohibition against a sage
rendering a halakhic decision while intoxicated applies to sagacious ladies as well
as to sagacious gentlemen, since sagacious ladies can also render halakhic
decisions. Thus, infers Birkei Yosef, although a lady cannot render a halakhic
decision in a judicial capacity (as per Chinukh, mitzvah 83), she evidently can
render a halakhic decision in a non-judicial capacity, and it is to this that Chinukh
(mitzvah 152) refers.

Yet, it seems to this student that this Birkei Yosef is disputed, as one can infer from the
continuation of Pitchei Teshuvah. Namely, after citing Birkei Yosef, Pitchei Teshivah proceeds
to record the contradictory opinion of Shaarei Teshuvah to Shulchan Arukh Orach Chaim 461,
seif katan 17. In context, Shaarei Teshuvah writes that a lady may not issue a halakhic decision
as to whether a particular piece of matzah has become nefuchah (volumetrically inflated, and
hence prohibited for consumption on Pesach). Pitchei Teshuvah apparently understands this to
represent a general rejection of Birkei Yosefs authorization of a lady to render halakhic
decisions.28
27

The other three answers of Tosafot are:

(1) Ladies are in fact qualified to serve as judges. The mishnah in Niddah 49b is only describing the Halakhah
insofar as it applies to gentlemen.
(2) Although ladies are disqualified to serve as judges, Deborah the Prophetess served as an ad hoc judge by
prophetic decree. [The ad hoc instructions that a bona fide prophet receives (horaat shaah) override all
commandments of the Torah (except for the interdiction against idolatry), as per the gemara in Sanhedrin
90a.]
(3) Although ladies are disqualified to serve as judges, litigants can accept upon themselves in advance as a
binding dispute resolution arbitration agreement a disqualified judge. Thus, Judges 4:4 means to
communicate that Jewish litigants routinely selected Deborah the Prophetess as their arbitrator.
[Answer (1) listed by the present footnote is rejected by Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 7:4, which
disqualifies ladies as judges. For further discussion of all four answers of Tosafot, see R. Yosef Ben-Arza,
Yosef Daat commentary to Niddah 49b.]

28

R. Moshe Mendel Sklars, Chayei Mosheh al Shulchan Arukh Yoreh Deah, Vol. 1 (Bnei Brak, 5755), p. 97,
footnote 32, correctly recognizes the opposition of Shaarei Teshuvah to Birkei Yosef. [Indeed, this student is
indebted to R. Sklars for highlighting the debate between Birkei Yosef and Shaarei Teshuvah in the first place.]

10

Surprisingly, Encyclopedia Talmudit misconstrues the meaning of Pitchei Teshuvah,

erroneously claiming that Pitchei Teshuvah simply endorses Birkei Yosef, when in fact Pitchei
Teshuvah cites the conflicting opinions of Birkei Yosef and Shaarei Teshuvah without deciding
between them.29 As for Binyan Av I, no. 65, he overlooks Pitchei Teshuvah altogether. [In all
fairness to Binyan Av, though, the author appears to have rectified this omission in a more recent
responsum. Namely, in Shut Binyan Av V, no. 17 (published in 5769), R. Bakshi Doron
discourages the establishment of womens prayer groups in Beth Jacob schools, because he
argues when the students graduate from the Beth Jacob school system, they will develop
inappropriate aspirations to change the order of creation, and seek a position in Keriat haTorah, in participation in the community, in singing and in dancing, and the like. Arguably, R.
Bakshi Doron, with his participation in the community comment, appears to have now
reconsidered his previous recommendation that ladies be ordained as rabbis.30]
Curiously, in the main text on the page which refers to the footnote, R. Sklars writes a lady is disqualified to judge,
but is permitted to render a halakhic decision. Yet, in the opinion of this student, this appears to be an
oversimplification in the main text on R. Sklars part, since his footnote recognizes that Birkei Yosefs ruling is
opposed by Shaarei Teshuvah.
In his books appendix (entitled Hosafot u-Miluim), R. Sklars supplements the material on p. 97 by
pointing to the introduction to Drishah [written by Drishahs son], which records Drishahs wife two novel insights
regarding lighting Yom Tov candles. R. Sklars also points to Shakh to Yoreh Deah 326, seif katan 4, which records
Shakhs mothers practice in how to separate challah. However, to this student, those two references represent a non
sequitur regarding the question addressed by the present essay as to whether a lady can actually render a halakhic
decision. In both the case of Drishahs wife and Shakhs mother, other people [being gentlemen who were ordained
as rabbis] evaluated the insights of the lady in question, and through methods of Oral Torah, those gentlemen
concluded that the insight of the lady was correct in each particular instance. This is not the same as declaring that a
lady is authorized to render a halakhic ruling. To wit: the gemara in Berakhot 32b records the interpretation of a
Noahide government minister as to the meaning of Deuteronomy 4:9. That interpretation is then codified as
normative by Rambam, Hilkhot Rotzeach 11:4. [R. Bleich, Bioethical Dilemmas II, p. 115, emphasizes that there is
apparently no other source for Rambams ruling than the Noahide government ministers interpretation.] Yet, it is
universally agreed that a Noahide, no matter how learned he is in Torah study, is disqualified to render a halakhic
decision. Mutatis mutandis, the fact that the insights of Drishahs wife and Shakhs mother are cited by poskim does
not prove that ladies themselves can render a halakhic decision. Rather, the question of whether a lady is entitled to
render a halakhic decision is ultimately subject to debate between Birkei Yosef and Shaarei Teshuvah.
29

And see R. Yehudah Herzl Henkin, Teshuvot Bnei Vanim II, no. 7 (final gloss), who lists a series of mistakes
found in the Encyclopedia Talmudit, and then proceeds to comment: Therefore it is a mitzvah to publicize that one
should not rely on anthologies or summaries for halakhah le-maaseh, until one investigates the source of the
matter.
Paradoxically, R. Henkin himself duplicates this mistake in his subsequently published Teshuvot Bnei
Vanim III, no. 12 (p. 44), where he cites Birkei Yosef without dissent. [In all fairness to R. Henkin, though, the
context of this latter responsum is not for purposes of ordaining ladies, but for the more traditional purpose of
teaching Torah to ladies.]
Of course, this does not detract from Encyclopedia Talmudit or Bnei Vanim, whose authors are tzaddikim
gemurim, and whose scholarly accomplishments represent a great treasure, even if there are some rare errors that
must be corrected. [Cf. Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh Deah III, no 88, where R. Moshe Feinstein similarly writes that the
greatest honour one can grant the Chazon Ish is to rectify the (exceedingly seldom) mistakes that he rendered.]
30

Although, as already observed supra, note 12, the questions of womens prayer groups and of woman rabbis
represent two distinct halakhic topics, R. Bakshi Doron appears to have tangentially linked them in the latest
responsum with his participation in the community comment. Obviously, the best manner to verify whether this
interpretation of R. Bakshi Dorons latest responsum is accurate would be to forward him a copy of the present
essay.

11

Shaarei Teshuvah himself never mentions Birkei Yosef, nor does he explain why he
prohibits a lady from rendering a halakhic decision. However, in a 2010 lecture, R. Mordechai
Willig [while himself oblivious to both Birkei Yosef as well as Shaarei Teshuvah], suggests a
source from the Rishonim why a lady might not be authorized to render a halakhic decision.31
Namely, R. Moshe Isserles, in his Darkei Mosheh commentary on Tur Yoreh Deah 127, seif
katan 2, cites three Rishonim [Ran, Semag and Issur ve-Heter] as positing that a lady cannot be
trusted to rectify a doubtfully prohibited foodstuff where there are reasons to be lenient, since a
ladys knowledge is light.32 The position of these three Rishonim is canonized as halakhah by
R. Isserles in his Rema gloss to Shulchan Arukh Yoreh Deah 127:3.
R. Willig explains that when these three Rishonim speak of a ladys knowledge being
light, it means that the lady is not obligated in the mitzvah of Torah study, as per the gemara in
Kiddushin 29b.33 It is true that a lady may volunteer to fulfill the mitzvah of Torah study, and that
she is praised for doing so, but the reward she will receive for her learning is not as great as that
of a gentleman, since obligatory fulfillment of a mitzvah is greater than voluntary fulfillment of a
mitzvah (as per the gemara in Bava Kamma 87a).34 Therefore, these three Rishonim believe that
the ladies Torah knowledge is light [presumably meaning that it is not as accompanied by the
same level of Providence as that which accompanies a gentlemans learning], which results in the
consequence that Halakhah does not entrust a lady with the responsibility of rectifying a
prohibition which requires weighing lenient considerations against stringent considerations.
Ergo, argues R. Willig, these same three Rishonim hold that Halakhah does not entrust a lady
with the responsibility of rendering a halakhic decision, since by definition every halakhic
decision requires weighing lenient considerations against stringent considerations.35
It seems to this student that the approach of R. Willig can be appreciated in light of three
sources which speak of halakhic decision making as the product of Providence that assists the
rabbi who renders the decision. [Thus, R. Willig believes that only one who is obligated in Torah
study (viz. a gentleman), and who therefore receives the full measure of reward for studying
Torah, can be entrusted to receive the full level of Providence necessary to render a halakhic
decision.] Firstly, Shiltei ha-Gibborim [commentary to Mordekhai, Tractate Shabbat36], writes as
follows:

31

Lecture of Nov. 27, 2010, recorded at

<http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/753159/Rabbi_Mordechai_I_Willig/Women_in_Halacha_#3:_Tefilah
> , first 23 minutes of lecture.
32

The source for the statement that a ladys knowledge is light is the gemara in Shabbat 33b and Kiddushin 80b.

33

See supra, note 11, and accompanying text.

34

Indeed, this principle of inequality in ladies and gentlemens respective reward for learning Torah is canonized by
Rambam (Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:13) and Shulchan Arukh (Yoreh Deah 246:6).
35

R. Willig acknowledges that his analysis is inspired by Dr. Avraham Weinroth, Feminism ve-Yahadut (Yedioth
Acharonoth Books and Chemed Books, 2001), p. 54.
36

Beginning of ch. 2, p. 140 of Mordekhai to Shabbat in standard Vilna Shas, last two lines of page.

12

 For you will illuminate my candle, and Ha-Shem will brighten my darkness
[Psalms 18:29] -- This refers to the study of Torah. When a person is occupied
with the study of Torah for its own sake, the Holy One, blessed be He brightens
his [i.e. the persons] darkness, that he should not come to the hands of sin and
that he should not render a decision in Torah against Halakhah. And therefore
Scripture says Ve-hagita bo [Joshua 1:8], a language of nogah [brightness].
When the Holy One, blessed be He, sees that the heart of a person is for the sake
of Heaven, even though there is not in his [i.e. the persons] heart the ability to
know the depth of Halakhah, the Holy One, blessed be He, brightens his [i.e. the
persons] words that there should not emerge from his mouth a decision against
Halakhah.

Secondly, R. Moshe Sofer, Shut Chatam Sofer, Even ha-Ezer II, s.v. le-zeh ani omer,
writes: And it emerges that the words of our master R. Joseph Karo in his two books [Kessef
Mishneh and Beit Yosef] are accurate in its place, and if perhaps the rabbi Beit Yosef did not
intend for this [consciously], nevertheless [the Creator] caused to come to him, to sweeten the
language of his writing quill, such that that righteous man be saved from that mistake. For such
are the ways of the Giver of the Torah, may His Name be blessed, with all those who are
occupied with His Torah for its own sake, to hide under the language of their quill, [granting
them] salvation from our mistakes.
Thirdly, R. Yissachar Dov Babad, Otzar Yad ha-Chaim no. 487, writes: That which they
say in the name of the Noda bi-Yehudah, that when they ask a [halakhic] question which actually
occurred, on this there is Heavenly Providence [for the rabbi] to render in accordance with
Halakhah, but if they ask to test [the rabbi] on a [hypothetical] question like this, there is no
Heavenly Providence and it is possible [for the rabbi] to err. [Indeed,] I have found such [as
corroboration to the oral teaching imputed to Noda bi-Yehudah] in the Yerushalmi, Sanhedrin ch.
3, [regarding what] Rabbi Chiya the son of Rav asked in the presence of Rabbi Yochanan.37
Indeed, in a 2013 lecture, R. Hershel Schachter suggests that this same message (viz. the
message of Shiltei ha-Gibborim, Chatam Sofer and Otzar Yad ha-Chaim that halakhic decision
making is the product of Providence that assists the rabbi in reaching the conclusion) is
communicated by an aggadic passage in the gemara, Sanhedrin 93b, which declares
And Ha-Shem is with him [I Samuel 16:18]; this means that the halakhah follows him in every
case.38
The analysis of R. Willig, then, would presumably explain Shaarei Teshuvahs position
that halakhic decision making is limited to gentlemen.39
37

R. Sklars (op. cit., p. 213) observes that the reference in Yerushalmi Sanhedrin ch. 3 is to the end of halakhah 9.

38

Lecture on May 12, 2013, recorded at <http://www.torahweb.org/audioFrameset.html#audio=rsch_051213> , at

40 minutes into the lecture.
39

To that effect, the analysis of R. Willig addresses R. Wolowelskys valuable argument (presented in Section A
above) that just as ladies have mastered all the secular professions, so too should ladies master the rabbinate. R.
Willigs analysis claims that there is a key distinction between the secular professions and the rabbinate. The secular

13

On the other hand, how would Shaarei Teshuvah respond to Birkei Yosefs two proofs?
Regarding proof (i), one can simply answer [on behalf of Shaarei Teshuvah] that the
solution of Tosafot that Deborah the Prophetess taught the gentlemen the laws (and hence that a
lady is qualified to render halakhic decisions, as Birkei Yosef infers), is only one of four solutions
that Tosafot present. Not all of the other three solutions in Tosafot necessarily agree with this
concept.40 Thus, the dispute between Birkei Yosef and Shaarei Teshuvah may ultimately be
reflected in the disagreement among the four solutions of Tosafot.
Proof (ii), however, is stronger, since it is clear that Chinukh unequivocally authorizes a
lady to render a halakhic decision. Sha arei Teshuvah would presumably have to answer that he
subscribes to the three Rishonim referenced by Darkei Mosheh (viz. Ran, Semag and Issur veHeter) who apparently dispute Chinukh, and who hold that a lady may not render a halakhic
decision.
Another source on this topic is Minchat Chinukh (mitzvah no. 78, final paragraph), who
independently rules that a lady is authorized to render a halakhic decision in a non-judicial
capacity.41 Minchat Chinukh claims that the proof toward this conclusion is Deborah. Evidently,
professions are exclusively dependent on personal competence. Since ladies are as personally competent as
gentlemen and in fact are far superior to gentlemen in personal competence (as per the gemara in Niddah 45b that
ladies are endowed from Heaven with superior understanding) society has chosen wisely to admit ladies to all the
secular professions, and we can celebrate the achievements of ladies in all these fields. The rabbinate, by
contradistinction, depends on halakhic decision making, which according to Ran, Semag and Issur ve-Heter
requires Heavenly assistance that is granted to those who are specifically obligated in the mitzvah de-oraita of Torah
study. For reasons shrouded in Heavenly mystery, Heaven has decided that only gentlemen are obligated in the
mitzvah de-oraita of Torah study. [As R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Orach Chaim IV, no. 49 astutely
observes, no amount of human political effort can change the reality of womens exemption from the mitzvah deoraita of Torah study, because no human being has the capacity to contradict the decree of the Holy One, blessed be
He.]
40

To be sure, as described supra, note 27, one of the alternate three solutions of Tosafot actually validates ladies as
judges. [If so, ladies can certainly render halakhic decisions even on non-judicial occasions]. However, this solution
is rejected by Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 7:4, and so need not be considered for practical purposes.
[Additionally, as noted by R. Yona Reiss, lecture of March 19, 2013, recorded at
<http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/791993/Rabbi_Yona_Reiss/Women's_Leadership_Roles_in_the_Mode
rn_Age:_A_Halakhic_and_Hashkafic_Analysis>, at 26:00 into the recording, Sifrei to Deuteronomy 1:13 rejects the
possibility of a lady serving as a judge.] On the other hand, the other two solutions of Tosafot described supra, note
27 (viz. Deborah judged by ad hoc prophetic decree, or Deborah was voluntarily accepted as an arbitrator) may
theoretically hold that a lady cannot deliver a halakhic decision (even in a non-judicial context), precisely as
Shaarei Teshuvah holds. Thus, one cannot claim that all four solutions of Tosafot contradict Shaarei Teshuvah.
[Namely, even if Deborah was voluntarily accepted as an arbitrator, this does not mean she rendered any halakhic
decision. As R. Mordechai Willig, in his lecture of March 12, 2011, recorded at
<http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/761209/Rabbi_Mordechai_I_Willig/Women_in_Halacha_#16:_Wome
n_in_Positions_of_Authority_&_Future_Challenges_>, comments (first four minutes of lecture), a Noahide can also
be invited to serve as an arbitrator. {N.B. This permission for two Jewish litigants to voluntarily accept themselves
in advance an arbitrator who happens to be a Noahide must not be confused with the prohibition against Jews
proceeding to a Noahide arbitrator who functions under a system of secular law. See R. J. David Bleich,
Contemporary Halakhic Problems V (Targum Press, 2005), pp. 21-25.} Yet, all agree that a Noahide, no matter how
learned in Torah, is not authorized to render a halakhic decision. Thus, the fact that Deborah served as an arbitrator
does not necessarily prove that a lady is authorized to render halakhic decisions.]
41

This source is cited by Mrs. Henkin, R. Henkin, as well as the joint composition of R. Broyde and R. Brody.

14

without citing Birkei Yosef by name, Minchat Chinukh follows Birkei Yosefs understanding of
Deborah, but we have already seen [even if never mentioned by Minchat Chinukh] that it is also
possible to alternately explain Deborah in harmony with Rema and Shaarei Teshuvah. Leaving
that aside, it is also logical to surmise that Minchat Chinukh being, of course, a commentary on
Chinukh was persuaded by Chinukhs unequivocal ruling (mitzvah 152) that a lady may render
a halakhic decision.
A further source on this topic is R. Yisrael Yehoshua Trunk, Yeshuot Yisrael commentary
to Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat no. 7, Chukat ha-Mishpat, seif katan 1. R. Trunk is
bothered how the talmudic Sages named Shemayah and Avtalyon who were converts could
serve on the Sanhedrin, when a convert is disqualified for such a role. R. Trunk answers that just
as Tosafot [in the same answer emphasized by both Birkei Yosef and Minchat Chinukh] explain
that Deborah taught the gentlemen judges how to rule, so too could Shemayah and Avtalyon have
done the same. Evidently, while R. Trunk never indicates so explicitly, the fact that he regards
this particular answer of Tosafot to be normative [as distinct from the other answers of Tosafot
regarding Deborah] implicitly demonstrates that he would authorize a lady to render halakhic
decisions. Nevertheless, it seems to this student that there are other answers to the Shemayah and
Avtalyon question [paralleling the already established fact that there are other answers in Tosafot
to the Deborah question], such that R. Trunks implicit conclusion does not necessarily refute
Rema and Shaarei Teshuvah.42
Yet another source on the topic is the responsum of R. Isaac Herzog. R. Herzogs
responsum whose ruling is correctly cited by R. Bin-Nun and R. Sperber in their respective
responsa,43 and which is subsequently correctly identified by locational reference by R. Broyde
and R. Brodys joint composition44 is found in Techukah le-Yisrael al pi ha-Torah (Jerusalem,
1989), pp. 109-110, posthumously published by Dr. Itamar Warhaftig.45 In context, R. Herzog
42

See R. Yitzchok Mitnick, Avodah Berurah al Mesekhet Horayot (Brooklyn, 5771), pp. 181-182, for other answers
to the Shemayah and Avtalyon question. It is also interesting to note that R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik accepts R.
Trunks approach, except that he divorces it from the Tosafot regarding Deborah. Namely, in his June 19, 1975
lecture to the RIETS alumni on the laws of gerut, R. Soloveitchik states [quoting his father R. Moshe Soloveitchik]
that Shemayah and Avtalyon being the leading Sages of their era participated in the abstract deliberations of the
Sanhedrin, where their extraordinary scholarship was decisive in discovering authoritative halakhic conclusions.
However, Shemayah and Avtalyon subsequently recused themselves from voting on cases that can only be
adjudicated by a Sanhedrin [-since, being converts, Shemayah and Avtalyon were technically disqualified for the
Sanhedrin.] Thus far, R. Soloveitchiks analysis is entirely congruent with R. Trunks. Yet, when asked during his
lecture how this relates to Deborah, R. Soloveitchik simply answers that Deborah was a political administrator. R.
Soloveitchik never relates explicitly to Tosafot during his lecture, but his characterization of Deborah as a political
administrator appears to correspond best to answer (3) of Tosafot catalogued supra, note 27, viz. that Deborah
served as an arbitrator. Ergo, there is no proof according to R. Soloveitchik that a lady can render halakhic decisions.
[See supra, note 40.]
43

Referenced supra, note 9.

44

Referenced supra, note 17.

45

As explained by Dr. Warhaftig in the introduction to the work, Techukah le-Yisrael al pi ha-Torah consists of a
series of rulings personally written by R. Herzog (but the majority of which was not published during his lifetime)
regarding how the State of Israel should function in consonance with Halakhah. On p. 27 of the introduction, Dr.
Warhaftig professes that I am not convinced whether the material was ready from his [i.e. R. Herzogs] side for
final publication, yet in any event almost all the material in my possession was transcribed with a typewriter and

15

responds to the claim of those who would deny ladies the right to participate in elections (as
voters and/or as candidates to be elected) on the grounds that a ladys knowledge is light.46 R.
Herzog rejects this claim because, inter alia, we hold that ladies are qualified to render halakhic
decisions, as per Pitchei Teshuvah to Choshen Mishpat no. 7, seif katan 5. R. Herzog therefore
continues that when the gemara states that a ladys knowledge is light, it refers only to a ladys
ability to maintain confidentiality under circumstances of duress. R. Herzog insists that in no
way can this disqualify a lady from participating in elections.47 Remarkably, this responsum
proves that R. Herzog interprets Pitchei Teshuvah to mean that the halakhah follows Birkei
Yosef (i.e. authorizing ordination of ladies), precisely following Encyclopedia Talmudits
interpretation of Pitchei Teshuvah presented earlier. 48 Accordingly, with all due reverence
passed a proofreading by the Rabbi himself, such that I have no doubt that the words indeed reflect his view. Thus,
thirty years after R. Herzogs ascent to the Heavenly Academy, these rulings were finally published.
46

As observed supra, note 32, the source for the dictum that a ladys knowledge is light is the gemara in Shabbat
33b and Kiddushin 80b.
47

R. Herzog does add the bracketed caveat that since cabinet members of government do need to be capable of
maintaining confidentiality even under duress, he would recommend against appointing ladies to cabinet. But this is
irrelevant for most elected positions in the legislature, which entail no cabinet responsibilities, and hence which
should be open to ladies.
48

Interestingly, even R. Herzog himself adds the caveat that he would personally not want to see ladies serve as
halakhic decisors, despite his ruling that in principle (based on Pitchei Teshuvah) ladies are authorized to be so
ordained. In R. Herzogs words (p. 110):
And it almost goes without saying that my intention is not chas ve-chalilah that they should
appoint ladies as halakhic decisors in communities, because for an appointment of this nature the
aforementioned poskim of blessed memory did not intend. [Now, the reason my intention is not
that ladies be appointed as halakhic decisors of communities is] not because they [the ladies] are
intrinsically disqualified according to the law on account of all positions of authority should only
be taken by gentlemen [Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:5], for this is not a position of authority.
Rather, [the reason my intention is not that ladies be appointed as halakhic decisors of
communities is that] because in general I have already said that religious Judaism must oppose
election of ladies [on account of non-halakhic public policy considerations] except that if [this
public policy consideration] will not win, Heaven forbid for [the observant community] to
separate from leadership of the community on this account. Whereas the appointment of halakhic
decisors is a matter controlled by religious councils, and there would be no possibility of
appointment of ladies to such a position except by virtue of coercion by the government, and this
for sure it is forbidden to give. And if in one case out of a thousand the government will seek to
coerce upon us the appointment of a lady to such a position, it is forbidden for us to recognize her
and it is upon us to prohibit her decisions, and ipso facto the matter will be cancelled. And the
essence of the fact that this will lead to force us [to take action to prohibit her decisions] already
disqualifies her for a sacred task like this. But I think that just as the matter [of appointing ladies
as halakhic decisors of communities] never was, so too it will never be, and it is not necessary to
elaborate on this point.
In other words, R. Herzog subscribes to the position of R. Broyde and R. Brody (referenced supra, note 17)
that ladies can be ordained according to the letter of the law, but public policy considerations augur in favour of
avoiding such ordination. The difference between R. Herzogs public policy considerations vs. R. Broyde and R.
Brodys public policy considerations is one of degree, based on the perceived sociological realities of the time. [Viz.
in R. Herzogs time, it was unthinkable for a lady to ever serve as a halakhic decisor at any time in the foreseeable

16

manifest before R. Herzog, the same objection that applied to Encyclopedia Talmudits
interpretation of Pitchei Teshuvah will apply to R. Herzogs interpretation of Pitchei
Teshuvah.49
In summary, then, we appear to have discovered a dispute among both Rishonim and
Acharonim whether a lady may render a halakhic decision (in a non-judicial capacity). Among
the Rishonim: Chinukh holds of the affirmative, as do two out of four solutions of Tosafot. [The
other two solutions of Tosafot are inconclusive.] On the other hand, Ran, Semag and Issur veHeter hold in the negative. Among Acharonim: Birkei Yosef, Minchat Chinukh, Yeshuot Yisrael
and R. Herzog hold in the affirmative, whereas Rema and Shaarei Teshuvah hold in the
negative, while Pitchei Teshuvah is undecided.50
future. A half-century later, there is indeed a foreseeable possibility (in the evaluation of R. Broyde and R. Brody)
for a lady to serve as a halakhic decisor, provided that certain logistical challenges are successfully navigated within
the next few years, as described by the concluding section of R. Broyde and R. Brodys article.] Remarkably, R.
Herzog speaks of enforcing his public policy considerations by prohibiting the decisions of a lady who renders
halakhic decisions. This idea [which would be subsequently recapitulated a half-century later by R. Student (see
supra, note 14)] seems problematic to the present writer, and is never substantiated by R. Herzog. [Cf. Iggerot
Mosheh, Yoreh Deah III, no 88, where R. Moshe Feinstein writes that the greatest honour one can grant the Chazon
Ish is to rectify the (exceedingly seldom) mistakes that he rendered.] Still, leaving aside public policy questions and
enforcement tactics, the fundamental ruling of R. Herzog is that ladies are indeed authorized to render halakhic
decisions in principle.
49

Parenthetically, the challenge that is being raised to R. Herzog in the main text of this essay (viz. that he
overlooked the full meaning of Pitchei Teshuvahs comment) does not negate the cogency of R. Herzogs
conclusion that ladies may participate in elections according to the letter of Halakhah. Even according to the poskim
(overlooked by R. Herzog, such as Shaarei Teshuvah cited by Pitchei Teshuvah) who deny a lady the capacity to
render halakhic decisions, the dictum that a ladys knowledge is light refers only to the fact that there is a
Scriptural decree exempting them from Torah study, as explained earlier in the main text of this section. In no way
does this consideration preclude the possibility of ladies participation in elections (as voters and/or as candidates for
the legislature, the latter applying at least for non-cabinet positions). Indeed, from the gemara in Niddah 45b that
ladies are endowed from Heaven with superior understanding, it would emerge that ladies are more qualified to
participate in elections than are gentlemen! Thus, even if R. Herzog (following the example of Encyclopedia
Talmudit) overlooked the balance of Pitchei Teshuvahs remarks regarding the ability of ladies to render halakhic
decisions, the essential thesis of R. Herzog remains true insofar as ladies participation in elections is concerned.
50

Additionally, R. Maroof (in his responsum referenced supra, note 9) writes that R. Ben-Zion Meir Chai Uziel
both in his Shut Mishpetei Uziel and his Shut Piskei Uziel authorizes ladies to render halakhic decisions. With
all due respect manifest before R. Maroof, it seems to this student that no such authorization appears in R. Uziels
responsa. It is true that Mishpetei Uziel, Choshen Mishpat, no. 5 authorizes a lady to serve as a voluntarily accepted
arbitrator , and that Mishpetei Uziel, Choshen Mishpat no. 6 authorizes a lady to vote in democratic elections. But at
no time does Mishpetei Uziel ever authorize a lady to render a halakhic decision. [As explained supra, note 40, a
Noahide can also serve as an arbitrator, even though all agree that a Noahide is not authorized to render a halakhic
decision. Mutatis mutandis, the fact that Mishpetei Uziel authorizes a lady to serve as an arbitrator does not prove
that he authorizes a lady to render a halakhic decision. In fairness to R. Maroof, the information supra, note 40, is
based on R. Willigs 2011 lecture, which was only delivered after R. Maroof had already written his 2009 responsum
(referenced supra, note 9).] Similarly, it is true that Piskei Uziel no. 44 authorizes ladies to represent community
interests and to meet with gentlemen in a serious professional atmosphere to manage the needs of the public. But at
no time does Piskei Uziel ever authorize a lady to render a halakhic decision.
[Moreover, although there is no clear indication to this effect, it seems to this student that there might be
grounds to suggest that R. Uziel specifically agrees with the analysis of R. Willig (in his 2010 lecture, referenced
supra, note 31) to limit halakhic decision-making to gentlemen. This emerges from Mishpetei Uziel, Choshen
Mishpat no. 6, sec. 1, s.v. al ha-rishonah, where R. Uziel endeavours to justify ladies participation in elections by
invoking the gemara in Niddah 45b that ladies are endowed from Heaven with superior understanding. R. Uziel

17

C. THE PRECEDENT OF BERURIA

In his responsum,51 R. Sperber adds an impressive precedent to the discussion, one that
Birkei Yosef never cited but which seems to vindicate Birkei Yosef: Beruria, who was herself an
outstanding Torah scholar [as per the gemara in Berakhot 10a, Eruvin 53b-54a, and Pesachim
62b] and who herself rendered halakhic decisions [as recorded twice in the Tosefta of Tractate
Kelim (first gate, 4:9; and middle gate, 1:3).]
Nevertheless, it seems to this student that with all due reverence manifest before R.
Sperber the Beruria precedent is not necessarily as conclusive as it may originally appear. In
both Tosefta cases, Berurias ruling is cited by others [being gentlemen] who evaluated the
insights of the lady in question, and through methods of Oral Torah those gentlemen
concluded that the insight of the lady was correct in each particular instance. This is not
necessarily the same as declaring that a lady is authorized to render a halakhic ruling. To wit: the
gemara in Berakhot 32b records the interpretation of a Noahide government minister as to the
meaning of Deuteronomy 4:9. That interpretation is then codified as normative by Rambam,
Hilkhot Rotzeach 11:4.52 Yet, it is universally agreed that a Noahide, no matter how learned he is
in Torah study, is disqualified to render a halakhic decision. Mutatis mutandis, the fact that
Berurias halakhic insights appear in the Tosefta does not necessarily prove that ladies
themselves can render a halakhic decision.
Moreover, some understand Rashi to Avodah Zarah 18b (s.v. ve-ikka de-amrei mishum
maaseh de-Veruriah) as reporting that Beruria eventually took her own life to atone for a series
of events that were catalyzed by her questioning the principle that a ladys knowledge is light,
viz. the very same principle upon which Rema (as analyzed in Section B of this essay)
disqualifies a lady from rendering a halakhic decision. If that is the case, then quite the
contrary the precedent of Beruria could be argued to actually support the opinion of Rema that
a lady should not render halakhic decisions.53 On the other hand, the Rashi regarding Berurias
argues that society will benefit from the input of ladies during the vote, since they can be trusted to vote with
superior understanding. Yet, R. Uziel concedes that he is faced with a (seemingly) variant talmudic dictum (Shabbat
33b, Kiddushin 80b) which states that ladies knowledge is light. R. Uziel responds to this consideration by
cryptically writing that it has entirely different meaning (yesh lo muvan acher le-gamrei), but R. Uziel does not
explain further. Arguably, R. Uziels cryptic remark could be interpreted to mean that Shabbat 33b and Kiddushin
80b should be interpreted to yield the conclusion bespoken by Ran, Semag and Issur ve-Heter (as elucidated by R.
Willig), viz. that because ladies are exempt from the mitzvah de-oraita of Torah study, therefore the responsibility of
rendering halakhic decisions is not entrusted to ladies.]
51

Cited supra, note 9.

52

R. Bleich, Bioethical Dilemmas II, p. 115, emphasizes that there is apparently no other source for Rambams
ruling than the Noahide government ministers interpretation. [This consideration has already been advanced supra,
note 28, as a deflection to R. Sklars.]
53

See R. Eliezer Yehudah Waldenberg, Shut Tzitz Eliezer IX, no. 3; and R. Menasheh Klein, Shut Mishneh
Halakhot IX, no. 238, who draw this conclusion regarding ladies Torah learning. [A fortiori, those authorities would
not allow a lady to render a halakhic decision.]

18

alleged suicide is controversial; some insist that Rashis comment should be understood in purely
allegorical/metaphysical terms, while others insist that the comment could never have actually
been written by Rashi, but rather appears in our Rashi manuscripts due to a copyists error.
Certainly, all poskim agree that no one should ever attempt to duplicate Berurias alleged suicide,
whether that alleged suicide was historical, allegorical or contrafactual.54 In any event, it seems
to this student that even according to the school of thought that one should allegorize/disregard
the comment of Rashi, the precedent of Beruria does not necessarily prove that a lady may
render a halakhic decision, due to the consideration raised in the previous paragraph.

D. LADIES CITED AS ACTUAL HALAKHIC SOURCES BY RISHONIM

R. Sperber further champions the ruling of Birkei Yosef (viz. that a lady is authorized to
render a halakhic decision) based on multiple instances of ladies cited as actual halakhic sources
by Rishonim.
Firstly, Tosafot to Shabbat 111a-b, s.v. hai, report that Ri heard from the mouth of ladies
that Rabbeinu Tam permitted [a woman taking care of a soiled baby] to wash her hands [on the
Sabbath] and to wipe her [wet] hands on the [soiled] garment in order for her to be allowed to
pray. [Tosafot proceed to record that Ri disagrees with this ruling attributed to Rabbeinu Tam.]
Secondly, Or Zarua II, no. 256, in elucidating the laws of Pesach, cites a lady/ladies
twice: (a) He quotes (p. 117, right hand column) his mother-in-law as quoting her late husband
(viz. Or Zaruas father-in-law) to prohibit kneading thick dough in a utensil for the purpose of
baking matzah, despite the fact that such thick dough was acceptable in the Temple [where
chametz is generally prohibited year-round.] The mother-in-law (quoting her late husband)
explains that we cannot take the liberty to duplicate outside the Temple the special kneading54

For a survey of opinions on the episode of Beruria, see R. Eitam Henkin, Taalumat Maaseh de-Veruriah;
Akdamut no. XX1 (Elul 5768); R. Aryeh Zev Eleff, Shirat Miriam (New York, 5769), pp. 164-193; and R. Yitzchak
Mitnick, Avodah Berurah al Mesekhet Avodah Zarah I (Brooklyn, 5770), pp. 405-406.
In the opinion of this student, a satisfactory manner in which to explain Berurias suicide (if one holds that
the comment attributed to Rashi is indeed authentic, a matter whose adjudication is beyond the scope of the present
essay) would be in much the same way as one would explain the episode of Berurias father Rabbi Chanina ben
Teradyon [described on the immediately previous page in the Talmud, viz. Avodah Zarah 18a]. Namely, the episode
of Beruria was a horaat shaah; viz. a one-time event pre-programmed from Heaven for the ultimate benefit of all
protagonists. [See Iggerot Mosheh, Choshen Mishpat II, no. 73, sec. 3 who describes the R. Chanina ben Teradyon
episode as a horaat shaah.] Since the gemara in Berakhot 5a reports that the entirety of the Bible and Talmud was
revealed to Mosheh Rabbeinu at Mount Sinai, it emerges that all events described by the Bible and Talmud,
including the episodes of Rabbi Chanina ben Teradyon and Beruria, were pre-programmed from Heaven, and thus
can be explained as a horaat shaah. And see the gemara in Avodah Zarah 4b which explicitly states that the
episodes of the golden calf and of (le-havdil) King David were pre-programmed from Heaven. Somewhat similarly,
see R. Moshe Sofer, Torah Mosheh (third edition) to Deut. 34:5, who explains that all events recorded in the Sefer
Torah were pre-programmed from Heaven even prior to Creation. Mutatis mutandis, the same philosophy could be
applied to all episodes recorded in the Talmud. [And see R. Chaim Yosef David Azulai, Marit ha-Ayin commentary
to Avodah Zarah 18b, who cites a mystical tradition that Beruria was a transmigrated soul of Bathsheba, and that the
disciple of Rabbi Meir (-the other protagonist in the episode recorded by our manuscript of Rashi) was a
transmigrated soul of Uriah. If so, this students invocation of the gemara in Avodah Zarah 4b would appear
particularly apt. (Interestingly, Marit ha-Ayin is, of course, the same author as Birkei Yosef.)]

19

technique which was employed in the Temple itself. (b) He cites (p. 119, right hand column) the
practice of ladies to mark which matzah emerged from the oven earlier, so that it will enjoy the
honour of being on top at the Seder (relative to a matzah which emerged from the oven later),
just as the boxes used to take half-shekel coins from the Temple treasury were analogously
marked, as per the mishnah in Shekalim 3:2. [Or Zarua proceeds to disapprove of this matzahmarking practice, arguing that the middle matzah and the lower matzah enjoy equal importance
as the upper matzah, pursuant to the gemara in Megillah 21b.]
Thirdly, Shut Or Zarua (by R. Chaim, son of the aforementioned Or Zarua), no. 101
quotes his mother-in-law to the effect that Rabbeinu Abba Mari (our teacher, my father and
master55) would wash his hands and recite the blessings of netilat yadayim as well as Asher
Yatzar after he arose in the middle of the night to visit the washroom. Subsequently, the same
Shut Or Zarua (by R. Chaim son of the aforementioned Or Zarua), no. 146 transcribes a letter
written by his teacher R. Isaac ben Elijah. In this letter, R. Isaac investigates whether the
stringency of Rabbi Zeira (recorded by the gemara in Niddah 66a, viz. for a Jewish lady to
automatically require herself to observe seven clean days upon experiencing even a mustard-size
drop of menstrual blood) also encompasses a requirement to observe seven clean days during the
dam tohar period (described by Leviticus 12:4-5). After offering his own survey of the pertinent
literature on the topic, R. Isaac reports my wife says that her great father at the end of his days
warned the members of his household to observe [the stringency of Rabbi Zeira during the
dam tohar period] in privacy, because in France they grab mitzvot and [le-havdil] insanity to be
stringent about poultry and milk whether one should prohibit it in benefit...56
Fourthly, Teshuvot Maimoniyot, Maakhalot Asurot, no. 5 cites a lady/ladies five times,
all on the theme of milk and meat: (a) He quotes the widow of his uncle Rabbeinu Yehudah to
the effect that her late husband would not protest when members of the household would bake a
meat-filled pie/quiche (pashtidah) in an oven that had previously been employed to bake a dairyfilled pie/quiche (fladon) as long as the oven was energized in the interim to the same level that
bakers normally fire-up an oven. (b) Teshuvot Maimoniyot further reports that such is also the
practice of the household of his grandfather Rabbeinu Meir, as well as the household of Marat57
Miriam the granddaughter of Rabbeinu Shlomo. (c) On the other hand, continues Teshuvot
55

Although, prima facie, this would literally refer to the father of R. Chaim (i.e. it would refer to the author of Or
Zarua, the father of Shut Or Zarua), the present student assumes that it would be unnecessary for R. Chaim to
have consulted his mother-in-law with respect to the practices of his own father, and therefore the source of
information is actually R. Chaims father-in-law. [I.e. the mother-in-law is quoting her late husband.] R. Chaim
simply refers to his late father-in-law as my father as a sign of endearment.
56

Although the flow of ideas in this sentence is not entirely clear to the present student, it appears that the following
is its intended meaning. The wife of R. Isaac ben Elijah quoted her father to the effect that whereas his own
household should elect as a matter of piety to observe Rabbi Zeiras stringency even during the dam tohar period,
nevertheless he felt that publicizing this stringency (which exceeds the letter of the law) in the milieu of the Jewish
community of France (where her father lived) would be spiritually deleterious to the community, because the
community already experienced a sort of obsessive compulsive disorder in the pursuit of unnecessary stringencies,
as evident by the communitys concern that perhaps poultry cooked with milk is prohibited in benefit. [In fact,
poultry cooked with milk while prohibited in consumption on a rabbinic level is permissible in benefit.] [N.B.
The accepted halakhah by Rema in Shulchan Arukh Yoreh Deah 194:1 is that the stringency of Rabbi Zeira applies
even during the dam tohar period, and that this principle must indeed be publicized to the world at large. However,
in the time of R. Isaac ben Elijah, the authoritative decision of Rema had obviously not yet been canonized.]
57

A titile of honour meaning The Mistress or Her Majesty.

20

Maimoniyot, [a different lady named] Marat Miriam the wife of my uncle Rabbeinu Tam is
stringent to require kosherizing the oven with a torch (libbun) that reddens the oven. Teshuvot
Maimoniyot confesses that he does not know whether this latest Miriam is doing so based on the
ruling of his uncle Rabbeinu Tams ruling [-Rabbeinu Tam being her current husband], or based
on the practice of her first husband Rabbeinu Avraham who was accustomed to stringencies
(writes Teshuvot Maimoniyot) and/or whether this practice is only an ab initio stringency but
would not be applied post facto. (d) In any event, Teshuvot Maimoniyot continues that ladies are
accustomed in every place to lend pashtidah and fladon to one another without inquiring whether
the oven was kosherized with libbun in the interim, so long as the oven was energized in the
interim to the normal level that bakers fire-up an oven. (e) Teshuvot Maimoniyot concludes that if
he would know that Rabbeinu Tam was stringent [-which Teshuvot Maimoniyot entertains as a
doubtful possibility in (c) above,] then he would defer to Rabbeinu Tam, but so long as Rabbeinu
Tams position is unknown, we rely on our own logic58 and on the testimony of the daughters of
the giants of the generation.
Fifthly, Raaviah no. 841 writes that he heard from his aunt Eishet Rabbeinu (the wife
of our teacher) testifying in the name of her husband that he would not allow mourners who
buried a departed relative on Erev Rosh ha-Shanah to fast on that day [despite the fact that a
bona fide custom exists to fast on Erev Rosh ha-Shanah]. Raaviah proceeds to independently
suggest that the reason his uncle (as quoted by the uncles wife) ruled so is because fasting on
Erev Rosh ha-Shanah is not required according to the letter of the law, such that the paramount
mitzvah to be observed is to put the mourners emotional distress at ease by feeding the mourners
with a seudat havraah, rather than allowing the mourners to fast.59
Nevertheless, it seems to this student that with all due reverence manifest before R.
Sperber these precedents from the Rishonim are not necessarily as conclusive as they may
originally appear. In the case of Tosafot, Or Zarua (a), Shut Or Zarua, Teshuvot Maimoniyot
(a), (b), (c) [and possibly (e)], as well as Raaviah, the lady being featured is quoting a third party
(who is a gentleman), and Tosafot/Or Zarua/Shut Or Zarua/Teshuvot Maimoniyot/Raaviah is
now evaluating whether the ladys quotation is normative. Of course, Or Zarua (b) and Teshuvot
Maimoniyot (d) [and possibly (e)] represent more formidable cases, since the practice of ladies
[without quoting any gentlemen] is being cited. Still, even these more formidable cases do not
necessarily represent an absolute proof that ladies can render halakhic decisions, seeing as the
same rejoinder that was offered to the Beruria precedent (Section C above) can be offered here,
as well. Viz., the practice of the ladies is being cited by a gentleman (viz. Or Zarua/Teshuvot
Maimoniyot), who using methods of the Oral Torah is now evaluating the validity of the
ladies insight.
E. THE EPISODE OF SHEVA BEN BIKHRI

58

I.e. in the portion of this responsum that precedes the citation of scholarly ladies, Teshuvot Maimoniyot presents
his own reasoning why baking pashtidah and fladon successively in the same oven should be permitted without an
intervening libbun.
59

In the Harry Fischel edition of Raaviah (Jerusalem, 5724), this passage is found in Vol. 3, p. 561.

21

Mrs. Chanah Henkin cogently identifies the episode of Sheva ben Bikhri as another
source of relevance to the question of ordaining ladies.60 II Samuel 20:16-22 records how a
sagacious lady (ishah chakhamah) saved the lives of her townspeople by convincing them to
deliver Sheva ben Bikhri to King Davids army.61 The Jerusalem Talmud, Terumot 8:10,
understands the ladys counsel to be in accordance with Halakhah, and features a debate between
Resh Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan how to interpret this episode. In analyzing the debate of the
Jerusalem Talmud, R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh Deah II, no. 60, sec. 4, describes
the counsel of the sagacious lady as a horaah, a genuine halakhic decision. Thus, R. Feinstein
appears to understand the episode of Sheva ben Bikhri as establishing that a lady may render a
halakhic decision.
While Mrs. Henkins proof is indeed legitimate (and accordingly supports Birkei Yosef,
Minchat Chinukh, Yeshuot Yisrael and R. Herzog), it seems to this student (in defense of Rema
and Shaarei Teshuvah) that the Sheva ben Bikhri episode could be alternately interpreted. It is
not necessarily the case that the sagacious lady rendered an actual halakhic decision, but rather it
could be that her counsel implemented an already established halakhah that she received from
her own teachers. To be sure, II Samuel 20:16 describes this lady as an ishah chakhamah, viz.
that she merited the praise of Proverbs 31:26 that her mouth is open with wisdom, and the Torah
of kindness is upon her tongue. But this does not necessarily mean that she rendered any
halakhic decision. It could be that she is called an ishah chakhamah because all the other
townspeople forgot the relevant halakhah for this situation, and she was the only one who was
able to remind them.62
Yet, R. Feinstein himself does insist that the terminology ishah chakhamah in II
Samuel 20:16 absolutely means that she did render a halakhic decision regarding Sheva ben
Bikhri. Ergo, according to this responsum of R. Feinstein, a lady can serve as a rabbi. On the
other hand, in Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh Deah II, no. 71, R. Feinstein explains that there is a safek
whether a lady can render a horaah regarding the colour of niddah blood, and that this safek is
adjudicated to the side of stringency (i.e. she cannot). Ergo, according to this alternate responsum
of R. Feinstein, a lady cannot serve as a rabbi.
Accordingly, it seems to this student that the episode of Sheva ben Bikhri as it stands on
its own without R. Feinsteins elucidation does not necessarily prove that a lady can render a
60

Referenced supra, note 5.

61

According to a midrash cited by Rashi to II Samuel 20:16, the lady was Serach bat Asher. Radak (ad. loc.)
questions this midrash, but the midrash is upheld by Kli Yakar (ad. loc.)
62

Such an alternate interpretation to the Sheva ben Bikhri episode, while obviously incompatible with this
responsum of R. Feinstein(*), appears to this student to be compatible with the independent approaches to the Sheva
ben Bikhri episode suggested by R. Meir Shapiro, Shut Or ha-Meir no. 39 and by R. J. David Bleich, Be-Netivot
ha-Halakhah I (KTAV Publishing, 1996), pp. 106-117.
[(*)=Interestingly, although not related to the question of whether the ishah chakhamah rendered a halakhic
decision, in an earlier segment of the same published responsum (sec. 2, final paragraph), R. Feinstein adds that
several years after originally composing his responsum, he found a different approach expressed by R. Chaim
Soloveitchik. R. Feinstein remarks that both what R. Soloveitchik writes and what he (R. Feinstein) writes are true,
because there are many faces to the Torah.]

22

halakhic decision, and although R. Feinstein does elucidate it as such (viz. that it proves that a
lady can render a halakhic decision), this is apparently contradicted by a different responsum of
R. Feinstein in the same volume of Iggerot Mosheh.

F. THE MEMOIRS OF R. YOSEF YITZCHAK SCHNEERSOHN

A new source of potential relevance to ladies ordination is an episode recorded by R.

Yosef Yitzchak Schneersohn, sixth mentor of the Lubavitch movement.63 R. Schneersohn himself
ascended to the Heavenly Academy in 1950. Some fifteen years later, volume 2 of his Sefer haZikhronot (memoirs of stories that R. Schneersohn had inherited from his ancestors) was
posthumously published in Yiddish, based on R. Schneersohns handwritten manuscripts. The
book would subsequently be translated into English by Nissan Mindel, and is available today as a
revised edition (Kehot Publication Society, 2004). On pp. 252-254 of that volume, the story of
Rachel Batlan (paternal grandmother of R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi) is related, as follows.
Rachel was raised by her father R. Baruch Batlan to be a great Torah scholar. One
Shabbat, father, daughter and several others (including the daughters groom) were walking
through the street; all were wearing gloves in reliance upon the neighbourhood eruv, and one was
also carrying holy books, certainly in reliance upon the neighbourhood eruv.64 The party was
suddenly apprised that the eruv was inoperative. R. Batlan revealed to the party that his daughter
knows the halakhah, and he called upon her to render a ruling how they should proceed.
Obligingly, she did so. R. Schneersohn (author of these memoirs) proceeds to relate that for some
time afterward, Rachels groom was displeased with this event, until his father-in-law (R. Batlan)
mollified him.
Presumably, the fact that R. Schneersohn records this episode in his memoirs means that
R. Schneersohn approves of the notion of a lady rendering a halakhic decision, positioning him
as an ally to Birkei Yosef, Minchat Chinukh, Yeshuot Yisrael and R. Herzog. However, R.
Schneersohn never relates to the countervailing evidence presented in Section B, viz. that Rema
and Shaarei Teshuvah prohibit a lady from rendering a halakhic decision. Thus, it is unclear to
this student how much weight can be assigned to this episode that is transcribed by R.
Schneersohn.
The present student would hypothesize that there is also another way in which to interpret
the Rachel Batlan episode. In recording the anecdote, R. Schneersohn never invoke the sources
that support the idea of a lady rendering a halakhic decision. Granted that R. Schneersohn could
not have been aware of R. Herzogs responsum [which was only published after R.
Schneersohns ascent to the Heavenly Academy,] but R. Schneersohn certainly should have been
63

I am grateful to Reb Chaim Katz for bringing this valuable source to my attention.

64

Shulchan Arukh Orach Chaim 301:37 records a dispute among the Rishonim whether a Jew may wear gloves
outside an eruv on Shabbat, if the gloves are not linked to ones coat sleeves. Shulchan Arukh proceeds to
recommend stringency. On the other hand, all Rishonim [and Shulchan Arukh] obviously agree that a Jew cannot
carry holy books outside an eruv on Shabbat.

23

aware of Birkei Yosef, Minchat Chinukh and Yeshuot Yisrael that preceded him. His silence in
citing any of these sources raises the possibility that perhaps there is an alternate message to his
rendition of the Rachel Batlan story.
Namely, R. Jacob Emden tentatively expresses the possibility that an individual be
allowed to sacrifice his life in order to save his child.65 Similarly, R. Zvi Hirsch Meisels
considers the possibility that a persons child be regarded as the equivalent of a person himself in
the application of the hatzalah vs. mesirah dichotomy for lifeboat ethics.66 Those opinions are
philosophically justified by R. J. David Bleich through the truism that a child can be regarded as
the alter ego of his/her parent, as per the principle in place of your fathers shall be your
children (Psalms 45:17) that is elaborated by the gemara in Bava Batra 159a, by R. Shlomo
Kluger in his Imrei Shefer, Parashat Kedoshim, sec. 14 and by R. Elchanan Wasserman in his
Kovetz Shiurim II, no. 12.67 Although the doubts entertained by R. Emden and R. Meiselesh lead
to the normative practical conclusion that a person dare not sacrifice his life even for his child,
and that a child dare not be regarded as the triage equivalent of oneself regarding hatzalah vs.
mesirah, nevertheless, the theoretical possibility to the contrary may be the motivating factor
behind R. Schneersohns transcription of the Rachel Batlan episode. Viz., R. Baruch Batlan may
have regarded his daughter as an extension of himself, and thus when he asked his daughter to
render a halakhic decision what he really meant to say was I am capable of rendering the
halakhic decision myself, but since I have learned much Torah with my daughter, and since I
regard my daughter as an extension of myself, it would give me pride to hear my daughter
announce the halakhic decision. Let her render the verdict, and if she errs, I can immediately
refresh her memory and correct her. [Fortunately, as recounted in the story, the daughter did not
err, and so there was no need for R. Batlan to refresh her memory.]
In the final analysis, it seems to this student that the most straightforward and likely way
in which to interpret R. Schneersohns recording of the Rachel Batlan episode is that he indeed
rules like Birkei Yosef, Minchat Chinukh and Yeshuot Yisrael. Even so, R. Schneersohn never
presents any evidence to refute Rema and Shaarei Teshuvah. On the other hand, there is also a
small/remote possibility that R. Schneersohn is not adjudicating the question of a lady rendering
a halakhic decision per se, but rather he is applying the principle of in place of your fathers
shall be your children, as hypothesized in the foregoing two paragraphs.

G. THE OBLIGATION FOR A SYNAGOGUE TO HIRE CLERGY

65

Sefer Birat Migdal Oz, Even Bochen, Pinah Aleph, sec. 85. Somewhat similarly, in his Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot IV,
no. 323, R. Moshe Sternbuch tentatively articulates the possibility that perhaps a terminally ill but pregnant cancer
patient enjoys the option to voluntarily refrain from undergoing life-prolonging chemotherapy in order to allow her
fetus to survive until parturition, if she so chooses. The ladys wish to give birth to a living child may trump her own
self-survival pikuach nefesh obligation. [R. Sternbuch concludes that the matter requires further clarification.]
66

Teshuvot Mekadshei Ha-Shem I, shaar machamadim, ch. 3. For an exposition of R. Meisels thesis, see Shalom
C. Spira and Mark A. Wainberg, HIV Vaccine Triage: Halakhic Considerations, Jewish Law Annual XX (2013),
footnote 68.
67

Be-Netivot ha-Halakhah I, pp. 125-126; and Tradition 41:2 (Winter 2008), pp. 28-30.

24

Shulchan Arukh Orach Chaim 53:24, based on the responsa of Rosh, rules that if a
synagogue has insufficient resources to appoint both a rabbi and a cantor as clergy, then if the
rabbi is great in Torah learning and expert in halakhic decision making, he takes precedence,
whereas otherwise the cantor takes precedence. Mishnah Berurah, seif katan 71 and 72 (as well
as Biur Halakhah, s.v. sheliach tzibbur) explains that this serves to highlight the fundamental
obligation that every community has to appoint a rabbi who is expert in decision making. Even
though, absent a cantor, the congregation will not be able to pray properly [in a society where
siddurim are not widely available, such that only the cantor has access to a siddur and/or knows
the prayer liturgy by heart, which describes the sociological reality in the time of Rosh],
nevertheless it is more important for the congregation to be guided by a competent halakhic
decisor than to properly pray, because the proper fulfillment of many mitzvot (apart from prayer)
depends upon the guidance of an expert rabbinic decisor. It is only where no competent halakhic
decisor is available that the synagogue should hire a cantor, such that at least the synagogue will
be able to fulfill the mitzvah of prayer properly.
Biur Halakhah adds that, in his era,68 in communities where the congregants know how
to pray, hiring a rabbi who is expert in decision-making must all the more so be prioritized.
Transposing Biur Halakhahs ruling to our era [where siddurim and/or ability to pray by heart
are almost universally available], R. Ovadiah Yosef, Shut Yabia Omer VII, Yoreh Deah no. 18,
and R. Simchah Rabinowitz, Piskei Teshuvot commentary on Mishnah Berurah (ad. loc.) rule
that there is certainly an absolute obligation which devolves upon every synagogue to appoint an
expert rabbinic decisor as clergy.69
Accordingly, the question of whether a lady may render halakhic decisions will impact on
whether a synagogue may fulfill its obligation to hire clergy by hiring her. We have seen (Section
B) that the question of whether a lady may render a halakhic decision is subject to a debate
among both Rishonim and Acharonim. We have also seen (Section E) that R. Moshe Feinstein
has contradicted himself on this question, presumably reflecting the inherent nebulosity of the
subject. We have further seen (Section F) that R. Yosef Yitzchak Schneersohn most probably
rules in favour of the Rishonim and Acharonim who authorize a lady to render a halakhic
decision, but even he does not present any evidence to refute the countervailing school of
Rishonim and Acharonim. [And, as mentioned is Section F, there is also an alternate way to
interpret R. Schneersohn, albeit one whose possibility is small/remote in nature.]
68

As distinct from the era of the Rosh, because by the time of Biur Halakhah, availability of siddurim became
commonplace, as did education to pray by heart.
69

One of the many sources cited by Yabia Omer in this context (viz. Shut Kapei Aharon Azriel II, Yoreh Deah no.
6) invokes the biblical obligation to appoint judges over every Jewish community. In the opinion of this student, this
citation by Yabia Omer does not contradict the thesis presented by this student elsewhere [viz. A Combination of
Two Halakhically Kosher Prenuptial Agreements to Benefit the Jewish Wife, available at
<http://www.scribd.com/doc/176990434/Prenuptial-Agreements> , footnote 103 and accompanying text] that a bride
and groom cannot force themselves in advance by way of a prenuptial contract (under present conditions in the
Diaspora) to materialize before a particular Beth Din. [The basis of that thesis is that, under the current conditions in
the Diaspora, a Jew enjoys the freedom to withdraw from one community (with one Beth Din) and join another
community (with a different Beth Din) at any time. See that treatise for the implications this creates in the context of
an agunah, and for a proposed solution.] Rather, what the responsum of Yabi a Omer should be interpreted as
indicating is that although a Jew enjoys the freedom to move from one synagogue community to another, any given
synagogue community must prioritize appointing a qualified halakhic decisor.

25

In the opinion of this student, since the rendering of a halakhic decision represents a
mitzvah de-oraita,70 and since the gemara in Avodah Zarah 7a establishes that an unresolved
debate among the poskim regarding a mitzvah de-oraita must be treated stringently (out of
doubt),71 it is prohibited (as a matter of safek de-oraita) for a lady to render a halakhic decision,
and it follows that a synagogue cannot hire her as clergy.72
To recapitulate the conclusion in other words, it appears to this student that insofar as
the synagogue is concerned clergy is defined as encompassing those roles identified by
Shulchan Arukh Orach Chaim 53:24. In truth, the entire Jewish People is clergy, pursuant to
Exodus 19:6, and moreover that verse was directed to the ladies of the Jewish People even
before the gentlemen.73 Thus, the ladies of the House of Jacob represent the ultimate clergy. Yet,
every synagogue community discriminates among its membership by imposing the burden of
clergy (as the semantic term is conventionally employed) upon specified individuals for
purposes of meeting the particular requirements of Shulchan Arukh Orach Chaim 53:24. Because
of the unresolved doubt expressed in Sections B and E of this essay, the duties of Shulchan
Arukh Orach Chaim 53:24 can only be fulfilled by gentlemen as a matter of practice, and
therefore it would appear to this student that an Orthodox synagogue cannot appoint a lady to its
clergy.74
As R. Menasheh Klein (op. cit.) writes, the difference of roles prescribed by the Torah for
ladies and for gentlemen does not reflect discrimination, but rather reflects unique mitzvah
missions provided to each spiritual soldier in the legion of the King of kings, the Holy One,
blessed be He. [In the case of rendering halakhic decisions, we have discovered that there is a
70

See R. Bleich, Be-Netivot ha-Halakhah III, pp. 52-57, who demonstrates that the rendering of a halakhic decision
represents a mitzvah de-oraita, derived from either Leviticus 10:11 or Deuteronomy 32:7.
71

The gemaras principle is codified as normative by Rambam, Hilkhot Mamrim 1:5 and Rema in Shulchan Arukh,
Yoreh Deah 25:2. For further treatment of this principle, see Section E of this students The Quest for an Effective
Synagogue Partition, referenced supra, note 2.
72

While it may understandably take time for a synagogue (with a vacancy in its rabbinic position) to find the proper
candidate to fill the role, to deliberately appoint a lady to that role when there is a genuine doubt as to whether a
lady can actually serve as a halakhic decisor according to Torah law should presumably be forbidden as a refusal
to comply with Shulchan Arukh Orach Chaim 53:24.
73

This point is emphasized by R. Zalman Sorotzkin, Shut Moznayim la-Mishpat no. 42; as well as Iggerot Mosheh,
cited supra, note 39.
74

Of course, on Rosh ha-Shanah one further clergy member is needed, viz. a musician who sounds the shofar,
pursuant to Shulchan Arukh Orach Chaim 595:1 that it is more important to sound the shofar correctly on Rosh haShanah than to recite the mussaf for Rosh ha-Shanah. Yet, even this member of clergy must be a gentleman, since
only a male musician can discharge the shofar obligation of fellow males on Rosh ha-Shanah, as per Shulchan
Arukh Orach Chaim 589:1, 3. On the other hand, Shulchan Arukh Orach Chaim 589:6 does authorize a lady to blow
shofar on Rosh ha-Shanah for herself [in order for her to voluntarily fulfill the mitzvah] as well as for fellow ladies.
Thus, a synagogue which organizes a womens-only shofar blowing on Rosh ha-Shanah could indeed appoint a
female musician for that purpose. [N.B. R. Klein (referenced supra, note 12) is opposed to womens-only shofar
blowing, under the rubric of his general opposition to womens prayer groups. However, other poskim disagree with
R. Klein, as one may infer from the article co-authored by R. Kleins interlocutor R. Frimer (also referenced supra,
note 12). A resolution of that debate is beyond the scope of the present essay.]

26

genuine doubt whether or not ladies are eligible for that role, and it seems to this student that the
Halakhah requires stringency due to this genuine doubt.]

H. A SUGGESTED PATH FORWARD75

A number of righteous ladies have graduated Yeshivat Maharat as of the date of the
composition of the present essay. Although it seems to this student (as explained in Section F)
that they cannot actually serve in a rabbinic role and that they therefore cannot actually serve as
synagogue clergy, it further seems to this student that the professional training that these ladies
have received eminently qualifies them to serve as yoatzot halakhah. As distinct from a rabbi
who renders halakhic decisions, a yoetzet halakhah provides counsel to her fellow ladies
(without her ever rendering any halakhic decision), following in the footsteps of our Matriarch
Sarah who as described by Rashi to Genesis 12:5 taught Torah to other ladies.
Indeed, as noted in Section E, even those Rishonim and Acharonim who exclude ladies
from the rabbinate (and who have been granted a veto by Section G of this essay, due to the
principle that safek de-oraita le-chumra) must admit that the ishah chakhamah described by II
Samuel 20:16-22 saved the lives of her townspeople by reminding them of a halakhah that they
had forgotten. Ergo, the ishah chakhamah was a yoetzet halakhah par excellence, and serves
as an appropriate example for todays yoatzot halakhah.76
75

This section is patterned after the identically entitled closing section of R. Broyde and R. Brodys article. This
student is grateful to those authors for blazing the trail that enabled the composition of the present proposal.
76

Actually, based on the precedent of II Samuel 20:16-22, one could argue that a yoetzet halakhah be appointed to
even counsel the gentlemen of the congregation. However, this student hesitates to advocate such an approach (-not
only because it is inconsistent with the paradigm of Sarah our Matriarch whose teaching was specifically directed to
ladies [-see also the gemara in Yevamot 77a which praises her for doing so], but also) because R. Moshe Feinstein,
Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh Deah III, no. 73, rules that a lady can only be a teacher to Jewish school boys (whether for
sacred studies or for academic studies) in a time of great duress (sheat ha-dechak gadol). Presumably, the reason
of R. Feinsteins limitation to sheat ha-dechak gadol is so as to follow the mitzvah de-Oraita of Deut. 23:10 for a
gentleman to look away from a married lady in any situation where there is no functional benefit for the gentleman
to see the lady (e.g. to rescue her from drowning, as per the Gemara, Sotah 21b, to serve as witnesses for an act of
kiddushin, etc. etc.), analyzed in a previous responsum of R. Feinstein, viz. Iggerot Mosheh, Orach Chaim I, no. 40.
In that earlier responsum, R. Feinstein writes that even for so important a purpose as answering a halakhic question
presented by a married lady, a rabbi is obligated to try to look away in the other direction. In other words, where
there is no functional benefit to seeing the lady, the mitzvah de-Oraita of Deut. 23:10 becomes relevant. [Obviously,
everything depends on the social circumstances of the situation; there will be situations where it is essential for the
rabbi to see the lady while speaking to her in order to effectively adjudicate the halakhic question. The rabbi must
judge each case as it arises.]
If this student may take the liberty to suggest an elaboration on R. Feinsteins words, schools indeed
experience all sorts of she at ha-dechak gadol on a regular basis, seeing as it is the healthy nature of school children
to flee school in the first place (as per Tosafot to Shabbat 116a). Thus, a Jewish school administrator may realize that
the best hope for educating the boys under his/her tutelage is to hire a creative and innovative lady Torah scholar
(ishah chakhamah) who can accomplish the pedagogical duty more effectively than a gentleman. [And see Iggerot
Mosheh, Orach Chaim IV, no. 49, where R. Feinstein writes that ladies are far superior to gentlemen (a concept
highlighted supra, notes 2-4, 73) as is especially manifest in (though obviously not limited to) the ladies spiritual
aptitude to care for children. Ergo, it is understandable how a Jewish high school would experience a sheat ha-

27

R. Ovadiah Yosef, Shut Yechaveh Daat III, no. 72, rules that it is a mitzvah for the
ladies who attend a Beth Jacob school to honour a lady Torah scholar who teaches them, by
rising in her presence and by refraining from calling her directly by her first name.77 These
considerations could certainly be transposed to a yoetzet halakhah, who while her being
unable to render halakhic decisions would be honoured by the members of the congregation
whom she counsels, both by their rising in her presence and by their addressing her by a title.78
Therefore, in the opinion of this student, a synagogue is forbidden to include a lady as a
member of its clergy, but on the other hand it is acceptable for a synagogue to appoint a lady
as a yoetzet halakhah who following the paradigm of a Beth Jacob teacher who does not
render any halakhic decisions will counsel the ladies of the congregation.79
dechak gadol in its need to care for its students by means of an employing an ishah chakhamah to teach the high
school boys.] Under such circumstances, the high school boys are allowed to look at the married lady who serves as
their teacher.
On the other hand, transposing this sheat ha-dechak gadol claim to the synagogue where congregants
attend by their own consent is highly questionable. [The episode of II Samuel 20:16-22 was truly a sheat hadechak gadol, viz. an exceptional set of circumstances, where it was appropriate for the lady to offer counsel to the
entire townspeople, to literally save their lives. Such extraordinary scenarios do not arise in the contemporary
synagogue with any degree of frequency.] Accordingly, it seems advisable to this student that a yoetzet halakhah
specifically counsel ladies.
Cf. Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh Deah II, no. 109, where R. Feinstein addresses a meeting of a society where
gentlemen and ladies arrive to discuss, debate and decide in secular matters of the society. Presumably, the
reference is to a corporate executive meeting hall. R. Feinstein avers that it is not known why in this country we are
lenient with simplicity to allow such mixed events to occur, but since the leniency is already established, the
practice can continue even when words of Torah are discussed at the meeting, and only when the assembled group
seeks to pray minchah or maariv must the ladies and gentlemen separate. [R. Feinstein directs the ladies to leave to
another room, but obviously although not mentioned by R. Feinstein equally acceptable would be to construct a
synagogue partition between the ladies and gentlemen within the same corporate executive meeting hall.] Perhaps R.
Feinstein considered such an arrangement to be a sheat ha-dechak gadol, and regarded it as such because peoples
livelihood depends on such mixed events. The same cannot be said for the yoetzet halakhah position (which is a
purely spiritual position created by the synagogue community, unrelated to the livelihood of the members of the
community), such that is appears advisable to this student that a yoetzet halakhah specifically counsel to ladies.
Cf. the posthumously published Iggerot Mosheh, Orach Chaim V, no. 12, sec. 3, where a responsum
attributed to R. Feinstein rules that a lady can give a Torah lecture to gentlemen be-akrai bilvad, viz. exclusively on
an ad hoc basis. This latest responsum is certainly consistent with the sheat ha-dechak gadol insistence of the
aforementioned responsa published personally by R. Feinstein.
See also Sifrei to Deuteronomy 22:16, which states that from here [we learn] that there is no permission
for the lady to speak [before a Beth Din] in the place of the gentleman. In other words, while we do certainly find
in Numbers ch. 27 that the daughters of Tzelofchad spoke before Mosheh Rabbeinu and the entire community (and
are indeed praised for the sagacity they demonstrated in their disquisition, as correctly observed by Mrs. Henkin,
referenced supra, note 5), in that situation there was no one else who could accomplish the task to plead on their
behalf, and so the daughters of Tzelofchad acted correctly. To borrow R. Feinsteins terminology, we might say that
the case of the daughters of Tzelofchad represents a sheat ha-dechak gadol. By contradistinction, Sifrei to
Deuteronomy 22:16 informs us that when a gentleman is equally available to do the speaking (such that there is no
sheat ha-dechak gadol), he should do so. In the opinion of this student, this Sifrei confirms the sentiment that a
yoetzet halakhah would be best advised to specifically counsel the ladies of the congregation. [Counselling to the
gentlemen of the congregation can be equally accomplished by the synagogue rabbi, and so he should do so. On the
other hand, all actual halakhic decision-making, whether it pertains to the ladies or the gentlemen of the
congregation, must be answered by the rabbi, as per Section G of this essay.]

28

Acknowledgement: I am indebted to Mrs. Linda Bogante, Mrs. Michelle Echenberg, Dr. Arna Fisher, Ms. Beverly
Shaffer, R. Henoch Singer and Dr. Mark Wainberg for the insightful guidance they provided during the composition
of this essay. Any errors are solely the responsibility of this student.

This approach can also be inferred from a lecture that R. Joshua H. Shmidman delivered at his Yeshivat
Noam ha-Torah on the subject of Shulchan Arukh Yoreh Deah 87:3, where Rema requires that almonds be floating
in almond milk in order to permit consuming it with meat (for otherwise the unsophisticated observer will
mistakenly think that the Jew is consuming bovine milk with meat). At that juncture, R. Shmidman presented the
analysis of R. Yitzchak Yosef, Yalkut Yosef, Issur ve-Heter III (Jerusalem, 5759), pp. 273-274, investigating whether
almonds floating in human milk will permit consumption of human milk with meat. [Shulchan Arukh Yoreh Deah
87:4 prohibits consuming human milk with meat, again on fear that the unsophisticated observer will mistakenly
think that the Jew is consuming bovine milk with meat.] R. Shmidman ruled stringently (like Yalkut Yosef),
explaining that it is unthinkable that an intellectually dishonest visual indicator (viz. almonds floating in human
milk) could resolve the problematic situation. A student then asked R. Shmidman whether posting a picture of a lady
next to the human milk (which serves as an honest and truthful visual indicator) would be acceptable to resolve the
problem. R. Shmidman responded in the negative, based on Deut. 23:10.
See also R. Moshe Sofer, Chiddushei Chatam Sofer to Shabbat 21b, s.v. ve-ha-mehadrin, where a similar
message emerges regarding ladies being best advised to discharge their obligation to light Chanukah candles through
the gentlemen of the house, rather than have the ladies exit into the public domain (when lighting at the entrance of
the home). R. Sofer acknowledges that if there is no alternative, the lady can and must exit into the public domain
where she will be a celebrity as she lights the Chanukah candles. But, ceteris paribus, it is preferable for a lady to
avoid being forced into such a role. On one occasion, when personally consulted by this student regarding Chanukah
candle-lighting, R. Shmidman answered that he concurs with this Chatam Sofer.
On the other hand, throughout his career at Congregation Tifereth Beth David Jerusalem in Montreal (prior
to his becoming rosh yeshivah of Noam ha-Torah), R. Shmidman invited a scientist acknowledged for her efforts
to prevent the incidence of Tay-Sachs disease to introduce with a Devar Torah the various scholars-in-residence
who would periodically visit. (These events occurred outside of prayer times, such that it was logistically possible
for her to address the congregation. See supra, note 23.) Clearly, R. Shmidman envisaged the risk of children
acquiring Tay-Sachs disease to represent a sheat ha-dechak gadol, which therefore required the congregation to
hear the Torah gems of wisdom of this scientist. [While representing a distinct quadrant of Halakhah with its own
governing parameters, instructive in this regard (in the sense that af al pi she-ein raayah la-davar, zekher la-davar
{to borrow the expression from the mishnah in Shabbat 86a}) are the remarks of Arukh ha-Shulchan, Orach Chaim
38, 6 that Michal, daughter of King Saul, was exceptionally allowed to don tefillin because she was renowned to be
a tzaddeket gemurah.(*)]
See also the lecture of R. Reiss, cited supra, note 40, where he encourages the existence of a yoetzet
halakhah position with the specific purpose of counselling the ladies of the congregation. [Parenthetically, R. Reiss
reliance upon the Maayan Ganim book (as a halakhic source to encourage the yoetzet halakhah position) is
challenged by Dan Rabinowitz, Rayna Batya and Other Learned Women: A Reevaluation of Rabbi Barukh Halevi
Epsteins Sources, Tradition 35:1 (Spring 2001). Still, even granted that caveat to R. Reiss lecture, the balance of
R. Reiss presentation remains cogent.]
[(*) = Interestingly, taking this argument to its logical conclusion, a tzaddeket gemurah nowadays would be
authorized to don tefillin. Yet, in analyzing the question of a lady donning tefillin, neither R. Moshe Feinstein
(Iggerot Mosheh, Orach Chaim IV, no. 49) nor R. Yehudah Herzl Henkin (Shut Bnei Vanim II, no. 3) draw this
conclusion. (Actually, rather surprisingly, neither of them even mention Arukh ha-Shulchan {-though this does not
detract from the greatness of the respective responsa of R. Feinstein and R. Henkin}.) Nevertheless, it seems to this

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student that Arukh ha-Shulchans formulation can be transposed from the context of tefillin to the context of R.
Shmidmans invitation to the tzaddeket gemurah to lecture before the entire synagogue, whereupon the formulation
becomes effective.
The distinction between tefillin and public lecturing might be explained in one of several ways: (a) The
ability of a lady to don tefillin is not actually the litmus test of her tzaddeket gemurah status. Rather, the ability of
lady to don tefillin reflects communal norms of who is considered by the public to be capable of maintaining
cleanliness while donning tefillin. In biblical times, communal norms were such that a tzaddeket gemurah was so
considered. Today, communal norms are such that a tzaddeket gemurah is specifically encouraged to manifest her
righteousness by her refraining from donning tefillin. (b) Arukh ha-Shulchans formulation is imprecise, and
Michals donning of tefillin was not predicated on her being a tzaddeket gemurah (although parenthetically no
one is disputing that Michal should be granted that distinguished accolade). Rather, Michal did so because she
believed that donning tefillin is an obligation that applies 24/7, a position that some talmudic sages espoused but
which ultimately is rejected by Shulchan Arukh. (c) Arukh ha-Shulchans formulation is imprecise, and Michals
donning of tefillin was not predicated on her being a tzaddeket gemurah (although parenthetically no one is
disputing that Michal should be granted that distinguished accolade). Rather, the Pesikta (cited by Tosafot to Eruvin
96a, s.v. Mikhal bat Kushi haitah manechet tefillin) reports that Michal was ultimately asked by the Sages to refrain
from donning tefillin. Presumably, Michal complied when she received this request, such that there is no precedent
altogether for a tzaddeket gemurah to don tefillin.]
77

Admittedly, with all due reverence manifest before R. Yosef, there is an error in his responsum. He reports that
Minchat Chinukh (mitzvah 257) requires a Jew to stand in the presence of a lady Torah scholar. Alas, Minchat
Chinukh writes precisely the opposite. Nevertheless, R. Yosefs conclusion appears to be well taken, viz. that there is
a sufficiently formidable school of thought among the poskim to create a safek de-oraita that obligates us to rise in
the presence of a lady Torah scholar. Presumably, this is true even if Minchat Chinukh must now be reckoned as an
opponent of R. Yosefs position.
Indeed, R. Yosef appears to have subsequently rectified this misrepresentation of Minchat Chinukh, because
in Shut Yabia Omer IX, Orach Chaim no. 100, sec. 31, R. Yosef explicitly acknowledges that Minchat Chinukh
does not require a Jew to stand in the presence of a lady Torah scholar. [Remarkably, R. Yosef never mentions that
this represents a reversal of his earlier erroneous portrayal of Minchat Chinukh.] Even so (or in any event), Yabia
Omer concludes that he stands (no pun intended) by his original ruling in Yechaveh Daat III, no. 72 that one must
stand in the presence of a lady Torah scholar.
78

Presumably, the preferred titled would be Morah, simply because that is what is already the custom in the
system of Beth Jacob schools that is universally accepted throughout Orthodox Jewry. The only innovation of the
yoetzet halakhah concept is to create a full-time Beth Jacob teacher position whose job is to educate all the ladies
of the community, no matter what their age. Indeed, R. Yosef Blau, lecture of May 2, 2010, recorded at
<http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/746659/Rabbi_Yosef_Blau/Halakhic_Responses_to_the_Changing_R
ole_of_Women_in_Society>, beginning 51:20 into the recording, remarks that the Beth Jacob system has evolved
from its origins of being an elementary/secondary school system to a more lifelong system of ladies Torah learning.
The yoetzet halakhah position simply formalizes R. Blaus observation by providing the lady members of a
synagogue community with a permanent Beth Jacob teacher to whom they can always turn. Similarly, R. Yissachar
Frand, in a lecture of Jan. 9, 2014, recorded at <http://www.yadyechiel.org>, 35:35 into the recording, states that the
lesson to be derived from the career of Deborah the Prophetess is that the Beit Yaakov movement one can say

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saved Klal Yisrael. [If so, ladies who follow Deborahs scholarly example today should presumably be given the
title of a Beth Jacob teacher.]
Although not raised as a possibility by Yechaveh Daat, perhaps one can argue that the title Maharat, as
coined by Yeshivat Maharat, is acceptable (for a Beth Jacob teacher and/or for a synagogue community yoetzet
halakhah), provided that it be understood that the lady is not a member of synagogue clergy and that she cannot
render halakhic decisions, as per Section F of this essay. To that effect, perhaps one can also argue that the title
Rabbah (currently held by the righteous Dean of Yeshivat Maharat) is acceptable, provided that it be understood
that the lady is not a member of synagogue clergy, and that she cannot render halakhic decisions, as per Section F of
this essay. [Interestingly, the expression Ha-Ishah Rabbah has long been employed in Orthodox Judaism, viz. as
the crowning title of the tenth chapter of Tractate Yevamot. Also of interest is that Maharat sounds quite similar to
Marat, which as observed supra, note 57 was indeed employed by Teshuvot Maimoniyot as a title of honour
for learned ladies. Not quite of the same nature, but nevertheless worthy of mention, is an advertisement in the
Canadian Jewish News, Oct. 24, 2013 (Montreal edition), p. 40, inviting readers to attend a lecture entitled Mahawhat? Maharat! This advertisement points to the potential pedagogical value the honourific Maharat possesses in
galvanizing ladies together to learn Torah in a Beth Jacob setting, thereby providing the ladies with spiritual
enrichment.] On the other hand, R. Student (referenced supra, note 13) and R. Schachter (referenced supra, note 16)
claim that there is a danger that use of such titles as Maharat and Rabbah may be interpreted to be emulating
the heterodox. {Cf. R. Steven Pruzansky, Shared Roles, Aug. 23, 2013 at <http://www.rabbipruzansky.com>, who
argues that ladies and gentlemen do not have to be the same or do the same things (or even bear the same titles). In
fact, it is far better that in [the Holy One, blessed be He]s orchestra, like [le-havdil] in mans, each person plays a
different instrument and plays it well, but together, to forge the great harmony that [the Holy One, blessed be He]
has established for us as our most sublime goal in life. [N.B. It seems to this student that R. Pruzansky (who is a
tzaddik gammur) might have been more effective in communicating his argument had he written like in
humankinds instead of like in mans, so as to be semantically inclusive of ladies.]} Accordingly, this student
would prefer not to provide any opinion on the matter of which title to employ, leaving it for the poskim to
adjudicate.
79

As R. Saul J. Berman, The Status of Women in Halakhic Judaism, Tradition 14:2 (Fall 1973), p. 22, comments,
the creative religious energies of Jewish women remain a major source of untapped strength for the Jewish
community as a whole, and those energies must be freed. This student believes that appointing a yoetzet halakhah
to counsel the ladies of a synagogue congregation following the paradigm of a Beth Jacob teacher who does not
render any halakhic decision will go a long way toward meeting the important challenge identified by R. Berman.
A synagogue that has already appointed a lady to the clergy [and has now discovered through this essay
that a change is required] can remedy the problem by reformulating the ladys position to that of a non-clergy
yoetzet halakhah. As for whether the lady may retain the Rabbah/Maharat title, see supra, note 78. [This student
hastens to emphasize that there is no retroactive blame being placed by this essay on those synagogues that
appointed a Rabbah/Maharat to the clergy before the composition of this essay. The members of those
congregations are certainly tzaddikim gemurim, to whose eternal credit redounds the fact that they have caused the
present expansion of Torah study. See Rashi to Numbers 27:5. With the publication of the present essay, it is
certainly to be hoped that the appropriate change will be orchestrated by those synagogues (viz. that in each case, the
lady will be transferred [and indeed elevated] to a non-clergy yoetzet halakhah capacity). This can be compared to
the disciples of Rabbi Eliezer described by the gemara in Shabbat 130a who routinely desecrated the Sabbath for the
preparatory steps of a same-day circumcision and were rewarded for doing so, even though the halakhah was

31

ultimately determined in accordance with Rabbi Akiva who forbids such preparatory steps. For an analysis of the
process by which the sovereign ruling of a decisor (such as that of Rabbi Eliezer) is transformed from practical to
academic, see The Quest for an Effective Synagogue Partition (referenced supra, note 2) footnote 63 and
accompanying text in that treatise.]

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