DOES THE APPLICATION OF VIRTUALLY MERGED IMAGES

INFLUENCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPUTER-BASED TRAINING IN

X-RAY SCREENING?

Marcia Mendes Adrian Schwaninger, Prof. Dr. Stefan Michel, Dr.

University of Applied Sciences
Northwestern Switzerland (FHNW)
School of Applied Psychology (APS)
Institute Humans in Complex
Systems (MikS)
Riggenbachstrasse 16, 4600 Olten
Switzerland
marcia.mendes@fhnw.ch
University of Applied Sciences
Northwestern Switzerland (FHNW)
School of Applied Psychology (APS)
Institute Humans in Complex
Systems (MikS)
Riggenbachstrasse 16, 4600 Olten
Switzerland
adrian.schwaninger@fhnw.ch
University of Applied Sciences
Northwestern Switzerland (FHNW)
School of Applied Psychology (APS)
Institute Humans in Complex
Systems (MikS)
Riggenbachstrasse 16, 4600 Olten
Switzerland
stefan.michel@fhnw.ch

and and and

Center for Adaptive Security Center for Adaptive Security Center for Adaptive Security
Research and Applications (CASRA) Research and Applications (CASRA) Research and Applications (CASRA)
Thurgauerstrasse 39 Thurgauerstrasse 39 Thurgauerstrasse 39
8050 Zurich, Switzerland 8050 Zurich, Switzerland 8050 Zurich, Switzerland

Abstract – The necessity of computer based training for
airport security screening officers to achieve and maintain a
high level of x-ray image interpretation competency is well-
known. During such training, x-ray images of passenger bags,
similar to how they appear at the security checkpoint, are
presented to the screening officers on a screen and have to be
judged regarding their contents.
Certain computer based training systems, such as X-Ray
Tutor (XRT), apply a special algorithm that automatically
merges images of fictional threat items (FTIs) into x-ray images
of passenger bags. The advantage of virtual image merging is
that a) a huge variety of different bag images containing
different threats can be created, and b) the difficulty of threats
(e.g. viewpoint, superposition and bag complexity) can be
adapted to individual performance and learning progress.
However, merging images virtually can lead to artifacts
appearing on the resulting pictures. Therefore, the question
arises if the training with merged images actually reflects the
reality or if the resulting artifacts on the images actually make it
easier to detect threat items during training. If this would be the
case, the actual effectiveness of such a CBT would have to be
questioned.
The aim of this study was to investigate whether threat items
that are virtually merged into bags (as they appear during
training), are detected more easily than threat items physically
embedded in bags and x-rayed as a whole (like at the security
checkpoint). A test was conducted with screeners at different
international airports. 256 images of passenger bags were
presented to screeners, 128 of them contained threat items.
Half of these threat images were created through virtual
merging, while for the other half of the images threat items had
been placed physically into the bags. Half of the used threat
items were familiar to the screeners from training (XRT-library),
whereas the other half of the items were new. The same study
was replicated one year later.
In both studies, the screeners achieved high detection
performance scores in the test. However, only very small
differences in detection performance for the virtually merged
threat items and the physically embedded threat items were
found. In fact, detection performance was even slightly higher
for the physically embedded threat items.
In summary, results imply that when well elaborated merging
algorithms are used, small artifacts appearing on the test
images influence neither the effectiveness of CBT nor the
detection of real threat items in real x-ray images negatively.
Index Terms — Airport security, computer-based training, x-
ray screening, detection performance, virtual merging.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recurring terrorists’ attempts and attacks have led to aviation
security becoming a highly relevant and ongoing topic that
concerns and affects the whole world. In recent years, large
amounts of money have been invested into the development of
security technology employed at airports. X-ray machines are
highly sophisticated and produce high quality images of
passenger bags, however, they are not yet able to identify and
detect prohibited items automatically and reliably based on
shape information. Therefore, identification of prohibited items
in passenger bags still requires human operators (i.e. screening
officers). Thus, the most advanced technology becomes
worthless if the personnel operating these machines is not
selected and trained appropriately. Advanced training of airport
security screening officers is an indispensible prerequisite for
achieving and maintaining high standards at security
checkpoints. Within the EU, for example, recurrent training
consisting of image recognition training and testing – in the
form of classroom and/or computer-based training – has now
become obligatory for all persons operating x-ray equipment at
airports ([1]).

1
 According to [2], performance of an x-ray screener is
dependent on knowledge-based and image-based factors. In
order to detect items reliably, an x-ray screener needs to know
which objects are prohibited and what they look like in x-ray
images. Many prohibited items are rarely seen in everyday life
or look very different from reality when displayed as an x-ray
image (e.g., improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or electric
shock devices). Knowledge as such can be acquired with the
help of class room, computer-based (CBT) and on-the-job
training (knowledge-based factors). Image-based factors refer
to the difficulty of an x-ray image. [2] have identified three
image-based factors relevant in x-ray screening: viewpoint
(based on the viewpoint of threat items in a bag), superposition
of a threat item by other objects and the complexity of a bag
(number and types of objects in a bag) ([3]; [4]; [5]).
Regarding these knowledge-based and image-based factors,
research has shown that recurrent CBT with individually
adaptive training systems, such as X-Ray Tutor (XRT), is a
powerful tool to enhance x-ray image interpretation competency
of screening officers (e.g., [6]; [7]; [8]; [9]).
XRT is a CBT system deployed at many airports all over the
world. It is based on findings about how the human brain
processes visual information, taking the above mentioned three
relevant image-based factors influencing detection into account.
XRT is individually adaptive, meaning training sessions are
created based on each trainee’s individual performance and
learning progress. With improving performance the image
difficulty increases step by step regarding the rotations of threat
items, the degree of superposition by other objects and the bag
complexity (for more information on X-Ray Tutor see [3]; [4];
[10]).
During training with XRT, images of passenger bags are
presented to the screening officers, whereupon they visually
have to inspect them and search them for threat items.
Subsequently, the trainees have to make a decision whether a
bag can be regarded as harmless or not ([11]). XRT holds a
very large multiple views library currently containing up to
13’055 x-ray images of fictional threat items (FTIs).
XRT applies a special merging algorithm, where the FTIs are
virtually combined with x-ray images of harmless passenger
bags. The advantage of virtual merging is that a) a huge variety
of different bag images containing different threats can be
created, and b) the difficulty of threats (e.g. viewpoint,
superposition and bag complexity) can be easily adapted to
individual performance. Plane rotated versions and mirror
reversals can be created and merged into images of passenger
bags.
In order to blend an FTI into a bag, the merging algorithm
computes each pixel value of the FTI with each pixel value of
the bag, resulting in new pixel values that are displayed on the
screen and referred to as combined threat images (CTIs). This
process is illustrated in figure 1.
A similar process is applied for threat image projection (TIP)
(e.g. [12]) for cabin baggage screening (CBS). TIP is a software
function of state of the art x-ray machines where images of FTIs
are randomly integrated into the screened images of passing
through carry-on baggage. TIP is mainly applied to maintain
motivation and alertness. Furthermore, it is an interesting
source for quality control, risk analysis and assessment of
individual screener performance ([13]). A special merging
algorithm is required for TIP, so that the threat image is
seamlessly inserted and correctly positioned into the incoming
2
bag image (for more information on TIP see [12]).
a) b) c)
Fig. 1: Illustration of a) an x-ray image of a real passenger bag,
b) a fictional threat item (FTI), and c) the resulting combined
threat image (CTI).
In order to better distinguish between the different materials
when analyzing x-ray images, colors are nowadays applied.
The colors in x-ray images are derived by dual energy
technology (high and low energy beams) (e.g. [14]). This
technology enables a differentiation between materials
according to their atomic number. Different materials have
different degrees of attenuation for high- and low-energy x-rays.
By comparing the attenuation ratio of low-energy x-rays to high
energy x-rays a discrimination of materials can be achieved
([15]; [16]). Image processing algorithms transform this
information into the company specific image format using the
RGB color model to distinguish between the different materials.
Usually, orange is assigned to organic material, green to
inorganic material and blue to metallic material ([16]).
Due to these colorings, the application of merging algorithms
in CBT or TIP systems can sometimes lead to small artifacts
appearing on the resulting pictures. Figure 2 demonstrates a
comparison of four different images. The first three have been
created by applying virtual merging and belong to different XRT
merging algorithm-versions. The fourth image displays an exact
duplicate of these images (regarding the contents), but has
been created manually with the threat item physically
embedded in the passenger bag and x-rayed as such.
X-Ray Tutor X-Ray Tutor X-Ray Tutor Original X-ray
2.0 2.3 2.4 image
Fig. 2: Evaluation of the merging algorithm.
Looking at these examples it is very difficult to identify
artifacts resulting from the merging algorithm. However, minor
dissimilarities between the images can be recognized. Mostly
organic materials (orange colors) appear slightly different,
whereas for the inorganic and metallic materials (displayed in
green and blue colors) discrepancies can hardly be found.
As mentioned above, the effectiveness of CBT for increasing
the x-ray image interpretation competency of security screening
officers has been proven in several studies (e.g., [6]; [8]; [17]).
Nevertheless, CBT can only be accounted as a powerful tool
for increasing threat detection performance in x-ray screening if
a given improvement can also be transferred to the detection of
real threat items physically imbedded in passenger bags (as
they would occur in reality at the security checkpoint). Thus, the
question arises whether the training with merged images
actually reflects the reality and whether potential artifacts on the
images make it easier to detect threat items during training. If
this would be the case, an increase in detection performance
during training and computer-based assessment tests would be
achieved. However, a screeners’ competency to detect
physically imbedded threat items in passenger bags (at the
security checkpoint) would not be trained or improved optimally.
The actual effectiveness of such a CBT would then have to be
questioned.
The aim of this study was to investigate whether artifacts that
occur on merged images using the most recent XRT merging
algorithm have an impact on the perceptual plausibility and the
detection of prohibited items in passenger bags, i.e. if threat
items that are virtually merged into bags are detected more
easily than threat items physically imbedded in passenger bags
and x-rayed as a whole. A test was created and conducted
with screening officers from different international airports to
compare these two conditions. The test included 256 test
images, with 128 images containing threats. Half of these 128
threat images were created through virtual merging. The other
half was created by manually placing threat items physically in
the passenger bags and x-raying these as such. The threat
images were identical for both conditions, in order to be able to
compare directly.
II. METHOD AND PROCEDURE
A. Participants
The study (same experimental design) was replicated after
one year. Altogether, four different international European
airports (Airports 1, 2, 3 and 4) participated in the two studies.
In the first study, Airports 1, 2, and 3 were involved (n = 923
professional screening officers for cabin baggage screening
(CBS)). The second study involved Airports 1 and 4 (n = 1019
CBS screening officers). Airport 1 participated in both studies.
Regarding CBT, the screening officers at the four airports
had very different experiences. When applying CBT for x-ray
image interpretation training, it is usually recommended to
conduct recurrent training of 20 minutes per week. At Airport 1,
the screeners had already been training with XRT CBS 2.0
Standard Edition (SE) 1 for several months prior to Study 1.
Almost all screeners had achieved level 12 (highest difficulty
level in XRT). In the first study n = 752 screeners and in the
second study n = 970 screeners participated from this airport.
At Airport 2, XRT CBS 2.0 Professional Edition (PE) had been
used for several months. Screening officers from this airport
had the most experience with CBT. 116 screeners at airport 2
participated in the first study. Airport 3 provided 55 screeners to
participate in Study 1. These screeners had not trained with
XRT at all, but had undergone a different type of schooling and
classroom training (160h/screener). Screeners from Airport 4
1 XRT Standard Edition (SE) contained 100 different threat
items, while XRT Professional Edition (PE) contained 400
different threat items.
3
had also been training with XRT 2.0 PE, however, these
screeners had very little experience with this CBT yet. 49
screeners from this airport participated in Study 2.
B. Materials
1) The Modified X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-
Ray CAT): In order to measure whether threat items on virtually
merged images are detected more easily than threat items that
are physically embedded in passenger bags, a special test had
to be constructed. The construction of this test was based on
the structure of the X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-
Ray CAT). This test is a reliable and valid instrument to
measure x-ray image interpretation competency of airport
security screening officers and is being applied for screener
certification in many different countries (for more information
see [18]).
Same as the X-Ray CAT, this modified test version consisted
of 256 images. Half of these images were non-threat images
(not containing a threat item) while the other half were threat
images (containing a threat item). The images were based on
64 different color x-ray images of passenger bags. Each bag
image was used four times, twice containing a prohibited item
and twice without any prohibited item. The same threat images
were also presented twice: once the image was created by
physically embedding the threat item into the passenger bag,
the other time the image was created by virtually inserting the
fictional threat item (FTI) into the image of the passenger bag.
Thus, the test contained two identical sets of threat images.
The prohibited items used can be assigned to four different
categories, as defined in Doc 30 of the European Civil Aviation
Conference (ECAC): guns, IEDs (improvised explosive
devices), knives and others (e.g., self-defense gas spray,
chemicals, grenades, etc.). For each category, 16 exemplars of
threat items were used, which again could be subdivided into
two different sets.
The test took about 30-40 minutes to complete. Each image
was shown on the screen for a maximum of 15 seconds, while
the screening officers had to make a decision whether a bag
was OK (containing no prohibited item) or NOT OK (containing
a prohibited item). The images were represented in random
order.
2) Computer-Based Training with X-Ray Tutor (XRT): In this
study, the X-Ray Tutor (XRT) Version 2 algorithm was
evaluated. XRT is a computer-based training program created
to enhance x-ray image interpretation competency of screening
officers. It is developed based on scientific research ([10]).
During training, x-ray images of passenger bags are presented
to the screening officers, whereupon they have to visually
inspect them with regard to threat items and then make a
decision whether a bag is harmless or not. In this training
system, a special merging algorithm is applied, which
automatically combines the fictional threat items with the x-ray
images of passenger bags (similar to how TIP at the security
checkpoints works). In XRT, most items can be depicted from
up to 72 different views. In order to achieve a high learning
progress, it is important that during training a large variety of
representative threat items depicted from different viewpoints
are presented to the screening officers ([10]). A big advantage
of XRT and its merging algorithm is that it is individually
adaptive, meaning it automatically adapts to the performance of
each individual with regard to coping with image difficulty. At
first, easy items depicted from easy views are shown.
Depending on the individual learning progress, the difficulty of
the threat items and images (regarding the above mentioned
image-based factors) increases. These parameters are
calculated by an individually adaptive algorithm using objective
measures of view difficulty, superposition and bag complexity
([19]; [20]).
After having judged an image (OK or NOT OK), feedback
appears on the screen immediately, informing the screener
whether the response was correct or not. If the bag did contain
a threat item, detailed information about this item and its
location in the bag is displayed ([10]). The effectiveness of
individually adaptive CBT compared to conventional (not
adaptive) CBT has been investigated in previous studies (e.g.,
[9]).
C. A' as a Measure for Detection Performance
When measuring detection performance it is important to use
a valid measure, i.e. one that considers the hit rate2 as well as
the false alarm rate3. Only considering the hit rate would not be
valid, as any candidate could achieve the highest hit rate by
judging all bags as NOT OK. In our analyses we applied A’
([21]) as a measure for sensitivity. A’ is a non-parametric
measure, meaning that its computation does not require any a
priori assumptions about the underlying signal and noise
distributions. A' is a kind of average between minimum and
maximum performance and can be calculated by the following
formula ([22]):
1 (𝐻 − 𝐹)(1 + 𝐻 − 𝐹)
A′ = +
2 4𝐻(1 − 𝐹)
H is the hit rate and F the false alarm rate. If performance is
below chance, i.e. when H<F, the equation must be modified
([23]):
1 (𝐹 − 𝐻)(1 + 𝐹 − 𝐻)
A′ = +
2 4𝐹(1 − 𝐻)
Even though the computation of A' requires no a priori
assumption about underlying distributions, it does not mean
that this measure is an accurate reflection of its theoretical
origin (i.e., that A' reflects the area under a reasonable ROC
curve) or that it is a distribution-free measure and fully
independent of response bias (see [24]). However, due to its
easy computation and interpretation, A' is often applied as a
measure for detection performance in research and application.
In this paper, actual performance values are not reported due
to security reasons. For all relevant analysis effect sizes are
reported and interpreted based on Cohen ([25]).
2 The hit rate counts how often a person has correctly judged
a bag as NOT OK in proportion to all bags containing threat
items.
3 The false alarm rate counts how often a person has
wrongly judged a bag as NOT OK in proportion to all bags
containing no threat item.
4
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this study, it was investigated whether threat items virtually
merged into x-ray images of passenger bags (as in XRT), are
detected more easily than threat items physically embedded in
passenger bags and x-rayed as a whole (like at the security
checkpoint). The XRT Version 2 image merging algorithm was
evaluated. A test was created to measure and compare
detection performance scores of screening officers for both
conditions. Furthermore, more detailed analyses were
conducted focusing on each threat category, and, reaction
times were compared.
A. Comparison of detection performance for real vs. virtual
threat items
To compare detection performance scores for the real vs.
virtual threat items t tests were conducted. Very small, yet
significant differences between the two conditions in Study 1
(t(922) = 4.79, p < .001, d = .06 ) and Study 2 (t(1018) = 11.80,
p < .001, d = .18 ) were revealed. As figure 3 displays, the real
threat items were detected slightly better than the virtually
merged ones. Yet, the very small effect sizes imply that hardly
any differences were observed.
Fig. 3: Mean detection performance scores (A’) and standard
deviations for both conditions (real vs. virtual) and both
studies.
Figure 4 demonstrates the results for each airport (with means
and standard deviations4 of detection performance) of both
studies. Pairwise t tests were conducted to compare detection
performance scores for both conditions at each airport
separately (see table 1). In Study 1, Airports 1 and 3 received
better scores for the real items while the opposite was observed
for Airport 2. In Study 2, both airports achieved better scores for
the real items. The effect was slightly greater for Airport 4 (see
table 1). However, the generally small effect sizes for all
airports indicate that the level of difficulty for detecting the real
and virtual threat items can be regarded as similar.
4 The standard deviation represents the range of dispersion
around the mean data and indicates the range of individual
differences between the tested airport security screeners.
 easily on the real images than on the virtually merged images.
All in all, except for the category “others” in Study 1, the real
threat items were detected better than the virtually inserted
ones. No effect was found for the factor study, thus, the results
achieved in both studies were very similar.

Fig. 4: Mean detection performance scores (A’) and standard

deviations for both conditions (real vs. virtual) and each
airport of both studies.

TABLE I
RESULTS OF THE T TESTS COMPARING DETECTION
PERFORMANCE FOR BOTH CONDITIONS (REAL VS. VIRTUAL). Fig. 5: Mean detection performance scores (A’) and standard
Study 1 deviations for both conditions (real vs. virtual) and each
t(751) t(115) t(54) p d category (guns, IEDs, knives and others) for both studies.
Airport 1 5.25 <.001 0.17
Airport 2 -4.24 <.001 -0.26 B. Reaction Times for Real vs. Virtual Threat Items
Airport 3 6.40 <.001 0.20
Study 2 Additionally to measuring detection performance scores for
t(969) t(48) p d both conditions, reaction time (RT) was recorded. The reaction
Airport 1 10.46 <.001 .16 time refers to how long it takes for a screener to come to a
Airport 4 7.62 <.001 .48 decision after image onset on the screen. Figure 6 displays the
RTs for all hits (correctly judged images as NOT OK). As can
More detailed analyses were conducted for Studies 1 and 2 be seen, for all airports, except airport 2, RTs were shorter for
by looking at each threat category separately. Figure 5 shows the real threat items. Yet, as the separate pairwise t tests
the means and standard deviations of detection performance conducted to compare RTs for both conditions reveal, effect
broken up by category for Studies 1 and 2. The results of the sizes were very small. Thus, differences between both
repeated measures ANOVA using A’ scores with the within- conditions can be considered as almost negligible (table 2).
participant factors condition (real vs. virtual) and category
(guns, IEDs, knives and others) and the between-participant
factor study (Study 1 and Study 2) revealed a medium effect for
2
condition F(1, 1940) = 154.27, p < .001, η = .07 and a large
2
effect for category F(2.12, 4083.58) = 2264.13, p < .001, η =
.54. No significant effect was found for the factor study F(1,
2
1940) = 1.73, p = .189, η = .00. Interactions were significant
with small effects for the two-way interactions condition and
2
category F(2.57, 4982.31) = 55.09, p < .001, η = .03, condition
2
and study F(1, 1940) = 28.04, p < .001, η = .01, and category
2
and study F(2.12, 1940) = 33.32, p < .001, η = .02. The three-
way interaction of condition, category and study also revealed a
2
small effect F(2.57, 1940) = 9.49, p < .001, η = .01.
As the results of the ANOVA indicate, slight differences in
detection performance between the two conditions could be
Fig. 6: Reaction times (sec) and standard deviations of hits
observed, however, the differences between the different
(correctly answered as NOT OK) for both conditions (real vs.
categories were more remarkable. As can be seen in figure 5,
virtual) and each airport of both studies.
highest scores were achieved for the categories guns and
knives, whereas the IEDs seemed to be more difficult to detect.
Still, as figure 6 shows, large differences in RTs between the
As figure 5 also indicates, the largest difference in detection
individual airport security screeners (large standard deviations)
performance for the real and virtual threat items could be
and between the different airports (e.g. Airport 1 and 4 in Study
observed for the category IEDs in both studies. An explanation
2) could be observed. A repeated measures ANOVA using RT
for this could be that many of the IEDs used in the test were
scores with the within-participant factor condition (real vs.
IEDs build with organic materials (orange coloring). The orange
virtual) and the between-participant factor airport (1a, 2, 3, 1b,
coloring of the organic material appeared slightly stronger on
4) revealed a very small effect for condition F(1, 1936) = 4.51, p
the screen for the real images than in the virtually merged ones 2
< .05, η = .002, but a medium effect for airport F(5, 1936) =
(see figure 2). Therefore, IEDs were probably detected more

5
 2
49.88, p < .001, η = .11. The two-way interaction of condition
and airport also showed a small effect F(5, 1936) = 19.03, p <
2
.001, η = .05. The differences between the individual screeners
and between the airports probably resulted due to the
differences in the amount of training. Previous studies
evaluating the effectiveness of CBT with XRT showed that RTs
can be reduced significantly by recurrent training (e.g., [8]). In
these two studies, Airports 3 and 4 revealed the longest RTs.
Both these airports had either no or only very little experience
with XRT.
TABLE II
RESULTS OF THE T TESTS COMPARING DETECTION
PERFORMANCE FOR BOTH CONDITIONS (REAL VS. VIRTUAL)
Study 1
t(751) t(115) t(54) p d
Airport 1 -4.04 <.001 -0.03
Airport 2 2.16 <.05 0.03
Airport 3 -5.76 <.001 -0.11
Study 2
t(969) t(48) p d
Airport 1 -12.60 <.001 -0.06
Airport 4 -6.41 <.001 -0.15
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The necessity of image recognition training for airport
security screeners to achieve and maintain high levels of
competency is well-known. CBT systems that apply merging
algorithms to virtually insert fictional threat items into images of
passenger bags have been proven to be effective training tools
(e.g., [8], [10]). To achieve high learning progresses in image
recognition, it is important that large varieties of threat items
depicted from different viewpoints are seen by the screening
officers. This, of course, can be best achieved by using a
training system that applies virtual merging. However, merging
the pixel values of the bags and FTIs could possibly lead to
small artifacts appearing on the picture composition, which
could then make it easier to detect threat items in virtually
merged images. Consequently, this would have a negative
influence on the actual effectiveness of this kind of CBT.
The aim of this study was to evaluate the application of the
merging algorithm used in XRT Version 2. It was investigated
whether threat items that are virtually merged into bags are
detected easier than threat items which are physically
embedded in bags and x-rayed as such. Detection performance
was measured by using a specially created image interpretation
test. The study was replicated after one year.
All in all, high detection performance scores were achieved
by the screening officers in both studies. Regarding the two
conditions, results of the analyses revealed only very small
effect sizes, implying that the differences in detection
performance for both conditions were almost negligible. Hence,
the difficulty of detecting real or virtual threat items could be
considered as almost similar. In general, the real threat items
were detected slightly better than the virtually merged ones.
Taking a look at the different airports individually showed that
only at one airport the virtual items were detected better (Airport
2).
The results of the more detailed analyses focusing on the
different types of threat categories revealed a medium effect for
6
the factor condition, indicating some differences in the difficulty
of detecting the real and virtual threat items. Yet again, the
physically embedded threat items were detected better than the
virtually merged ones. Large differences were found between
the different categories for both conditions. Detection
performance scores in general were highest for guns and
knives, and lowest for IEDs. No significant effect was found for
the factor study, implying that the results of the replication study
confirmed the results collected in the original study.
Additionally to measuring detection performance scores,
reaction times were recorded. Hits (correctly judged images as
NOT OK) were analyzed for each airport separately. Again, in
every case only very small differences between the two
conditions could be observed. Yet, large differences between
individuals (large standard deviations) and differences between
the airports were found. These differences were probably a
result of different amounts of training. While some screeners
enjoy conducting several training sessions per week, others
only conduct a few per month. Previous studies on the
effectiveness of CBT with XRT, however, showed that RTs can
be reduced significantly by recurrent training (e.g., [8]). In these
two studies, both airports with the least experiences with XRT
(Airports 3 and 4) also revealed the longest RTs.
All in all, results of this study show that the usage of virtually
merged images for image interpretation training purposes of
screening officers does not influence the training effectiveness
of a CBT such as XRT negatively. Only very small differences
in detection performance for the virtually merged threat items
and the physically embedded threat items were found. In fact,
those threat items physically embedded in the passenger bags
were detected slightly better than the virtually merged ones.
The results therefore confirm that when well elaborated
merging algorithms are used, small artifacts appearing on the
test images influence neither the effectiveness of CBT nor the
detection of real threat items in real x-ray images negatively.
Furthermore, the experimental design applied in this study
proved to be a useful method to investigate whether the
learning process for x-ray image interpretation is affected
negatively by the usage of merging algorithms in CBT.
V. REFERENCES
[1] European Commission, “Commission regulation (EU) No
185/2010 of March 2010 laying down detailed measures
for the implementation of the common basic standards on
aviation security,” Official Journal of the European Union,
2010.
[2] A. Schwaninger, D. Hardmeier, and F. Hofer, “Aviation
security screeners visual abilities and visual knowledge
measurement,” IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems,
20(6), 29-35, 2005.
[3] A. Schwaninger, “Evaluation and selection of airport
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7
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VI. VITA
Marcia Mendes works as a research scientist at the
University of Applied Sciences Northwestern Switzerland
(FHNW) and the Center for Adaptive Security Research and
Applications (www.casra.ch) in Zurich. She is a member of
the security research team led by Prof. Dr. Adrian
Schwaninger and involved in several national and
international projects in aviation security. Marcia finished her
studies in psychology (work and organizational psychology,
health psychology, clinical psychology and public health) at
the University of Bremen (Germany) in 2009. Currently, she
is writing her doctoral thesis in the field of aviation security.
Prof. Dr. Adrian Schwaninger lectures at the University of
Zurich since 1999 and at the University of Applied Sciences
Northwestern Switzerland since 2008. He is the head of the
Center for Adaptive Security Research and Applications
(www.casra.ch) in Zurich and the head of the Institute
Humans in complex Systems (MikS) at the School of Applied
Psychology, University of Applied Sciences Northwestern
Switzerland (www.fhnw.ch/miks). His areas of expertise are
aviation security, human factors, scientifically based software
development, applied cognitive psychology, and human-
machine interaction. Adrian is a member of the ECAC
Training Task Force, the ECAC Technical Task Force, the
ICAO Working Group on Training, and he leads the ECAC
Technical Task Force TIP Study Group. Adrian is recognized
as a leading authority on aviation security. He has more than
70 publications and more than 150 invited presentations. In
1999 he has received the Young Researcher Award in
Psychology. In 2003 he has received the ASI International
Award of Excellence in Aviation Security: Enhancement of
Human Factors.

Dr. Stefan Michel is currently working as a scientific

researcher and project manager at the University of Applied
Sciences Northwestern Switzerland (FHNW) and the Center
for Adaptive Security Research and Applications
(www.casra.ch) in Zurich. He manages different national and
international projects in aviation security which provide clients
with cost effective methods to achieve security performance
improvements and operational effectiveness. Stefan has a
strong background in psychology with experience in aviation
security enhancing the interaction between people,
processes, and technology. Previously, he worked at the
University of Zurich (Switzerland) and the Max Planck
Institute for Biological Cybernetics in Tübingen (Germany) as
a research scientist and received the doctoral degree in
2008.