Hallucinogens or lucidogens: the debate is open1

Juan C. Gonzlez, PhD Philosophy Department Morelos State University at Cuernavaca (Mexico) entedemente@gmail.com www.categorizacion.org http://hallucinations.risc.cnrs.fr Abstract: The goal of this essay is to open a philosophical debate aimed at evaluating the thesis that hallucinogens or at least certain types of them far from being substances that induce the user into error or deception in one way or another, are or can be substances that enhance the awareness and cognitive powers of the user, thereby bringing about or increasing his/her lucidity. Thus, we are to assess the extent and conditions under which it can be maintained, if at all, that a hallucinogen is in fact a lucidogen. I- What is at stake in this debate? Within the large class of known psychoactive substances substances that have the power to change our ordinary awareness, including the form and content of our mental states, that bring about shifts in meaningfulness and alterations of global psychological processes and cognitive functions in humans and other animals there is a subclass that has come to be called hallucinogens. Beyond terminological issues regarding the appropriateness of the names given to this subclass, there lies a myriad of issues concerning hallucinogens that deserve our serious consideration. There are, for instance, conceptual issues (which, although linked to the terminological ones, are nevertheless independent from them and certainly more complex). Deciding whether or not these substances should be characterized by reference to hallucinations is one conceptual issue. Another one is deciding whether or not these substances should be considered as drugs. Then there are epistemological issues. For instance, knowing precisely the effects that hallucinogens have on our mental sphere is an enterprise that calls for empirical research but also for phenomenology. Another epistemological issue consists in

establishing the way and extent in which hallucinogens impinge on our cognitive contact with reality. There are also mental-health issues that call for a thorough revision of what hallucinations are in order to ascertain whether they are a pathological sign or whether hallucinogens can be used as healing treatment in a therapeutic or clinical context. As for socio-political and legal issues, let us just say that the Hippie movement did bring many of them into the foreground, although it certainly did not exhaust them. And there are also religious/spiritual issues such as the ontological status of certain substances whose nature and use is sacred in certain cultures and contexts2. Of course, there are several other types of issues such as botanical, anthropological or pharmacological ones, which we dont address here. Many of theses issues are, directly or indirectly, and to a certain degree, at stake in the present debate.

II- On the concept lucidogen In August 1956 Charles Duits underwent an intense experience with peyote (lophophora williamsii, whose active alkaloid is mescaline) which he writes about in Le don du Christ lhomme rouge [1979]. Duits narration is by all accounts an excellent exercise in the phenomenology of hallucinogenic experience 3: it describes the setting in which the experience took place, without losing the focus on his physical and mental impressions; it is rich in details, without being redundant or irrelevant; it provides information demonstrating that, should the reader want to assess Duits capacity for self-criticism, he kept his critical thinking in check; it reveals a mind knowledgeable in philosophy, religion and the arts. In said essay, Duits challenges the popular idea that a substance like peyote is in fact a hallucinogen; more precisely, he challenges the idea that if hallucinogens are substances that induce us into error or deception, then peyote is a hallucinogen4. Whether implicitly or explicitly, Duits repeatedly highlights the virtues of peyote as a consciousness-enhancing plant, providing a more or less systematic rationale for maintaining so. Moreover, he deems our ordinary

perception and awareness as rather poor or misguided capacities adjoined by an equally poor or misguided intellect the insights gained in the peyotic ecstasy making this evident. And he believes the above to the point of asking whether peyote is truly a hallucinogen and not, in fact, a lucidogen5. In order for us to evaluate the relevance of Duits question and the usefulness of its eventual answer, we first have to make clear the meaning of hallucinogen. Given the standard definition of a hallucinogen as a substance that induces hallucinations and that of hallucination as a perception of objects with no realityan unfounded or mistaken impression or notion: delusion 6, our inquiry will naturally lead us to first discuss hallucinations. And based chiefly on the phenomenological descriptions of hallucinogenic experiences that I have found in first-hand testimonies and in the relevant literature, my analysis will yield a negative thesis: the substances called hallucinogens are not always in fact hallucinogens (in the sense that either they do not provoke hallucinations under the standard definition of hallucination, or the hallucinations they provoke are not in fact hallucinations under the standard definition). With these elements in hand, I will sketch an alternative view, a positive thesis, on hallucinogens and hallucinations that pretends to lay the foundations for a yet-to-come robust theory of hallucinogenic and hallucinatory experience. The final part of the essay will explore Duits idea that a hallucinogen is or can be a lucidogen. In this perspective Duits idea is revolutionary, for he is not only denying that a hallucinogen (necessarily) leads into error, delusion or deception, but he is surmising that a hallucinogen is the opposite of what accepted wisdom holds, namely, a substance that heightens (or can heighten) perceptual awareness and cognitive lucidity. From this point of view, hallucination and lucidation are antagonistic terms, corresponding to equally abnormal perceptual states (regardless of their etiology), and perception corresponds to a stable and (statistically) normal state of sensory experience. From this exploration we should be able to assess the extent and conditions under which it can be maintained, if at all, that a hallucinogen is in fact a lucidogen.

III- On hallucinogens and hallucinations: the negative claim Two major traits characterize the standard (extended) view on

hallucinations: a) A hallucination is defined as a sensory perception in the absence of external stimuli [Gregory, 1987]; b) Hallucinatory episodes are phenomenally indiscernible from veridical perceptual episodes; more generally, a hallucinatory experience is taken to be phenomenally indistinguishable from a perceptual experience (of the corresponding parcel of the world). These traits make up the conceptual core of the standard view and shape the commonsensical, long-established view on hallucinations which has nevertheless managed to permeate the outlook on the subject of a great deal of scholars. But in spite of its time-honored standing, it turns out that this view does not withstand epistemological scrutiny. There are several reasons for rejecting the standard view on hallucinations some of them empirical, some others conceptual and phenomenological 7. But perhaps the main or, at any rate, the most obvious reason for rejecting the standard view on hallucinations is that basically all the data on which it has been fabricated and rests are inaccurate . A proper methodology for gathering and exploiting precise data in this area has been strangely missing and is still wanting (see the cases of Grof and Masters and Houston, in [Hayes, 2000], of Metzner and Strassman, in [Pellerin, 1998], and the HRS and APZ questionnaires of Strassman and Dittrich, respectively, as isolated exceptions). True, in the psychedelic domain there were efforts made in the 20th century towards this end (think, for instance, of the research on mescaline that took place in Europe between the World Wars, or the research on LSD in Europe in the 50s or in the United States in the 60s). But, to my knowledge, these efforts were never systematized within an international scientific community and never produced a robust theory of psychedelic or hallucinatory experience: they were rather isolated or intermittent research projects 4

(many of them of military interest) under the sign of the Cold War [Lee & Shlain, 1992]. At any rate, most of the references on hallucinations that we typically find in philosophy (and in several other domains) are vague, second-hand or anecdotal and, above all, tributary of the standard view as I have described it 8. Curiously enough, it is in the literary domain where fiction is everydays business that we find the most realistic accounts, eloquent precision and methodological scrupulousness concerning hallucinations and the experiences provoked by hallucinogens. But it is even more curious that our epistemological queries that directly or indirectly address hallucinations rarely rely, if ever, on those sources. Why wouldnt we, make use of reports by literary-gifted, healthy and lucid subjects that deliberately expose themselves to a hallucinogenic experience (many in the spirit of a controlled psychology experiment), reports which are rich and reliable sources of information on the matter and on the workings of the mind in general? I think that this is a negligence that should be corrected. And in this I am only echoing the many voices that have been heard defending psychedelic research, up until this day, since Timothy Learys initial outcry 9. This unfortunate phenomenon can be explained in good part by the sociopolitical events that took place in the sixties and seventies, mostly in the United States under the banner psychedelic revolution, and by the corresponding assuredly sometimes fair, sometimes unfair governmental repression 10 (repression which, in any case, has spread out to virtually all over the world and still is very much active), causing a taboo and a stigma to take hold around hallucinogens and hallucinogenic experience. But there is a deeper and plain explanation of the phenomenon, proposed by Charles Duits, maintaining that In respect to the sacramental plants, Westerners and their consciousness instinctively adopt a hostile attitude. They see those who use the plants no matter how honorable their intentions are as transgressors, as guilty ones; they even refuse to acknowledge that these plants have been and still are an integral part of the religious life of certain civilizations and Indian people. This refusal, and its symptomatic uneasiness, arise mainlyfrom the image of the relationship between Man and the Universe formed by Westerners . It is because we never call into doubt us, who have nevertheless made doubting be the foundation of our philosophical tradition the 5

correctness of that image that the usage of sacramental plants shocks and scares us. It seems evident to us that any substance that affects the mind term which we in fact use to only designate intelligence is, fatally, a darkening element, a narcotic. Given this, any protest coming from a plant-user will be automatically dismissed. If sacramental plants blur our sight, then we must prohibit them, justifying hence the attitude of authorities. But what if they have a totally different effect? No one considers this possibility. Its consequences are too grave. [Duits, 1994a : 11-12]

So much for the standard view. But before we carry on, I wish to insist on the fact that the standard view on hallucinations and hallucinogenic experience has been conceived, developed and maintained on faulty grounds or, at best, on very thin ice: on imprecise data and by means of a flawed or nonexistent methodology. Should the reader find this claim to be exaggerated or otherwise inaccurate, the burden of proof to set the record straight lies on the readers side.

IV- On hallucinogens and hallucinations: the positive claim In the previous section I claimed that hallucinations at least those begotten by hallucinogens are not what most people, including scholars, have traditionally believed they are. This negative claim rests, as we have seen, on: 1) empirical and conceptual arguments (appearing in previous work) to the effect of showing that perceptual experience 2) the and lack hallucinatory of precise experience data and are phenomenally distinguishable; robust

methodologies for supporting a theory of hallucinatory experience or indeed any positive assertion about the nature of hallucinations; 3) ignorance or neglect regarding the numerous and careful reports on hallucinogenic experiences induced by psychedelics which, by and large, do not comply with the conceptual core of the standard view on hallucinations. This should compel us to thoroughly revise the traditional view on the nature of hallucinations, which in turn should have a decisive impact on our conception of hallucinogens. So in this section I will sketch an alternative view on hallucinations, which has the double purpose of providing a

positive platform for theorizing on the nature of hallucinations and hallucinogens, and laying the grounds for a future theory of hallucinatory experience. The basic ingredient that a proper analysis of hallucinations and hallucinogenic experience should have is an authoritative methodology. This allows to filter-out undesirable information and to retain the useful one by appraising the reliability, relevance and scope of the data available. The methodology should also allow for the optimal exploitation of the data retained (exhibiting it in a format that several disciplines can utilize for cross-examination, for example). It should be mentioned here that more than a century ago, Husserl [1950, 1993] proposed the rudiments of a method for studying consciousness and the structure of mental life that would avoid the mistakes of psychologism 11. He called that method phenomenology, giving to the term its modern meaning as some sort of descriptive psychology or method (as opposed to introspective psychology or methods). Husserlian phenomenology offers thus several useful insights and venues to approach hallucinations. As for the behavioral and sub-personal components of the hallucinatory and the hallucinogenic experiences, the obvious methodological candidates for studying them reside in the behavioral and brain sciences. But there is a larger scientific and multidisciplinary context that could loosely be considered as an outgrowth of Cognitive Science and psychedelic research, which can provide an even better, more complete understanding of the hallucinatory and hallucinogenic experiences. A good example of this type of research context is provided by two international organizations that actively work toward a proper understanding of psychedelic experience, in its broadest sense: MAPS (Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies) and The Heffter Institute 12. The other fundamental ingredient is a proper analysis of hallucinations and hallucinogenic experience based on rich and reliable data about the experiential (first-person) aspect and the empirical, observational and testable ( third-person) aspect. Let us now look at the different senses that hallucination can take. Indeed, there are at least four different senses for the concept hallucination (that do not

necessarily exclude each other): a) Hallucinations as (profane or mystical) visions, ideations or mentations [Shanon, 2002, II] and/or modified mental states, where there can be overlap or coexistence with regular perception and cognition. This sense of hallucination is not only compatible with the fact that perceptual capabilities remain at work simultaneously, intermittently or at least as a background condition during the hallucinatory experience, but relies on it. Therefore, it can be perfectly understandable when someone claims to be simultaneously hallucinating and perceiving the cognitive contact with the world warranting the perceptual experience, and the extra-ordinary content of thought warranting the visionary experience. Change of perceptual and conceptual meaning and a new outlook on the contents of thought are typical of this kind of experience. It could also be that, while phenomenal experience remains more or less intact, insights or revelations start pouring over our consciousness, making us see good-old things under a new light or interpretation or finding a solution for an ongoing problem. b) Hallucinations as endogenous visions that have a dreamlike quality. This sense is helpful when approaching the hallucinations provoked by powerful and rapid-onset hallucinogens, such as Yopo or smoked DMT, 5MeO DMT, or boosted Salvia Divinorum. These substances provoke an intense though transient state that usually compromises all perceptual modalities and many cognitive aptitudes, beliefs, behavior and interactions with the world and, in some cases, even the mental soundness and physical integrity, and therefore the biological viability, of the subject. However, these very visions can also evoke insights, memories and associations that may radically change (for the better) the understanding of the subject, whether in regard to a specific situation or to life in general. c) Hallucinations as hyperperceptions: states whose cognitive scope

reaches beyond the ordinary objects or contents of perceptual consciousness, endowing the subject with an epistemic access to extra-ordinary objects or contents. This sense corresponds to a state of hyperperception. There are many reports, both public and personal, to the effect of showing that some hallucinogens and/or usages of them in fact enhance the agents cognitive capacities and awareness. Huxley [1994], Duits [1994a, 1994b] and Smith [2000] are now classics in this regard. In this perspective, to hallucinate would roughly mean to be conscious of the ordinary objects/contents of perception as the agent interacts with the world but, also, of extra-ordinary objects/contents of perception that are not normally perceived or noticed. This sense includes therefore the regular sense of to perceive but extends it further to refer to an enhanced epistemic capacity. It is hence blatantly contradictory to speak of hallucinations (in the traditional sense) when subjects are in this type of state. Furthermore, this enhancement can refer to different aspects of the cognitive performance. For instance, a Brazilian friend told me that, when he eats mushrooms (of the type psylocibe cubensis) he can take off the glasses he wears all the time, and can see perfectly well without them, whether at a distance or at a short range. d) Hallucinations as perceptual distortions and phenomenal effects manifested in the perceptual field. This sense refers to the distortions and the optical effects that can characterize the visual field (or, mutatis mutandis, other perceptual fields) during a hallucinogenic experience, and that have been studied since the early 20 th century by researchers like Havelock Ellis and Heinrich Klver. Under this reading, the hallucinating subject perceives the ordinary world albeit in a peculiar, distorted fashion, which is to be attributed to the physiological effects of the substance on the cognitive system. Summarizing: we have discerned four different senses for the concept hallucination that do not necessarily exclude each other: a) hallucinations as

(profane or mystical) visions, ideations or mentations, where there can be overlap or coexistence13 with regular perception; b) hallucinations as endogenous visions that have a dreamlike quality; c) hallucinations as hyperperceptions: states whose cognitive scope reaches beyond the ordinary objects or contents of perceptual consciousness, providing it with an epistemic access to extra-ordinary objects or contents; and d) hallucinations as perceptual distortions and phenomenal effects manifested in the perceptual field. Hallucinogenic experiences can warrant one, two, three or all of the senses mentioned above, depending on the case at hand.

V- Conclusions: hallucinogen or lucidogen? In the traditional view, a hallucinogen is a substance that causes hallucinations; these, in turn, are usually conceived as deceiving and undesirable states or episodes. But, upon closer inspection, we have seen that hallucinations hardly are what commonsensical wisdom holds them to be. So we have abandoned the traditional view and conceived an alternative view on hallucinations that, in turn, has allowed us to highlight four different senses for the term none of those senses conforming with the standard view of a hallucination as a false perception or a perception with no object. From this perspective, it follows that a hallucinogen is not what the commonsensical traditional view holds that it is. I now submit that a hallucinogen is a substance that, in accordance with three of the four senses mentioned above, causes (or can cause) visions (ideations or mentations), endogenous visions or hyperperceptions. And following Duits [1979], I also submit that a lucidation (as opposed to a hallucination or a perception) and to lucidate (as opposed to to hallucinate or to perceive) are better though assuredly unusual terms for capturing the idea that a hallucinogenic experience can bring about or add lucidity to the subject by enhancing his awareness and increasing his cognitive powers (whether through visions (ideations or mentations), endogenous visions, or hyperperceptions) so as

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to gain new epistemic access to the world and/or new insights about reality and our own thought and existence. We can finally conclude that at least three senses for hallucination that we have put forth warrant the linguistic and conceptual shift from hallucinogen to lucidogen the latter term referring to those substances that (can) bring about mental, cognitive or existential changes in said senses.

VI- References Devereux, Paul. 1997. The long trip: a prehistory of psychedelia. Penguin/Arkana. New York. Duits, Charles. 1979. Le don du Christ lhomme rouge , in Essai sur lexprience hallucinogne, J.-C- Bailly & J.-P. Guimard (Eds.). Pp. 85-111. 1969 (1979). Pierre Belfond, Paris. Duits, Charles. 1994a (1967). Le pays de lclairement. Le bois dOrion. France. Duits, Charles. 1994b (1974). La conscience dmonique. Le bois dOrion. France. Gonzlez, Juan C., 2004. El argumento de la alucinacin revisitado, Acta Comportamentalia, Vol. 12, pp- 55-73. ISSN 0188-8145. Gonzlez, Juan C., 2005. La conciencia perceptiva y la conciencia alucinada , in A. Escotto & I. Grande-Garca (Eds.), Enfoques sobre el estudio de la conciencia. FES-Zaragoza/Ed. UNAM. Mxico, pp. 325-368. ISBN: 970-32-2498-9 Gonzlez, Juan C. 2009. Ontologie des plantes psychoactives dites de pouvoir et tats modifies de conscience, in S. Baud & N. Midol (Eds.) Pp. 32-43. 2009. La conscience dans tous ses tats. Elsevier Masson. France. Gregory, Richard L. (Ed.). 1987. The Oxford Companion to the Mind. OUP. Oxford. Grob, Charles S. 2002. Hallucinogens, a reader. Penguin Putnam Inc. New York. Hayes, Charles. 2000. Tripping: An Anthology of True-Life Psychadelic Adventures. Penguin Compass. New York. Hirst, R. J. (Ed.) 1970 (1965). Perception and the External World. The MacMillan Company. New York.

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Husserl, Edmund. 1993 (1961). Recherches logiques (2): Recherches pour la phnomnologie et la thorie de la connaissance. Presses Universitaires de France. Paris. Husserl, Edmund. 1950 (1913). Ides directrices pour une phnomnologie. Gallimard. France. Huxley, Aldous. 1990 (1954). The doors of perception & Heaven and Hell. Harper & Row. New York. Leary, Timothy. 1998. The Politics of Ectsasy. Ronin Publishing. Berkeley, California. Lee, Martin A. & Shlain, Bruce. 1992 (1985). Acid dreams. Grove Press. New York. Ott, Jonathan, 1995. The Age of Entheogens & The Angels Dictionary. Natural Products Co., Kennewick, WA. Pellerin, Cheryl. 1998. Trips: How Hallucinogens Work in Your Brain. Stories Press. New York. Seven

Ruck, Carl A. P. et al., 1985. Entegenos, in Wasson, G., Hofmann, A., Ruck, C. (Eds.) 1985 (1978), El camino a Eleusis. Breviarios. Fondo de Cultura Econmica. Mxico. Shanon, Benny. 2002. The Antipodes of the Mind: Charting the Phenomenology of the Aahuasca Experience. OUP. UK. Smith, Huston. 2000. Cleansing the Doors of Perception. Penguin Putnam. New York.

VII- End Notes

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1 2

I wish to thank Alexandre Lehmann for his useful suggestions in this text. For a discussion on the nature and ontological status of sacred plants see [Gonzlez, 2009]. 3 By hallucinogenic experience I understand an experience that results from the intake of a hallucinogen, whether hallucinations occur or not; by hallucinatory experience I understand an experience that is characterized by the hallucinations it presents, whether they are caused by a hallucinogen or not. In some situations both locutions will be, of course, interchangeable. 4 Other people, for several reasons, have long discussed about the appropriateness of the term hallucinogen, most of them agreeing with the idea that another term should be used. Among the main proposals we find: entheogen, phanerothyme, phantastica, pharmacotheon, psychedelic [Ott, 1995 : 96]. See also [Ruck et al, 1985: 231-5]. In any case, I am well-aware of the technical inadequacy of terms like hallucinogenic (which implies delusion and/or falsity, besides suggesting pathology to psychotherapists). [Ott, Ibid.]. 5 A term of his coinage (as far as I know) roughly meaning that gives or enhances lucidity. Elsewhere in the text we find a few other terms of his. In my opinion, Duits had the moral authority for introducing new terms, since he both manifestly had an excellent mastery of the French language and provided justifications for so doing. 6 Merriam Websters Collegiate Dictionary, 10th edition. 7 In [Gonzlez, 2004; 2005] I address seven such reasons. 8 A paradigmatic case in this regard is Lord Brains work on hallucinations. Brain says, for instance, that there are many perceptual experiences in which a hallucination has sensory qualities indistinguishable to the subject from veridical perceptual experiences and which are naturally, and appropriately, described in the same terms, [Hirst, 1970 : 60]. 9 See, for instance, Learys own book [1998], [Grob, 2002] and the MAPS organization: Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies (http://www.maps.org) 10 On this issue see, for instance [Devereux, 1997; Lee & Shlain, 1992] 11 Psychologism was a popular doctrine in the 19 th century that, in a nutshell, advocated that self-observation was the ultimate method for obtaining and evaluating knowledge, including that relating to mathematics and logic. 12 See http://www.maps.org/ and http://www.heffter.org/index.html 13 This overlap or coexistence between perception and visions does not presuppose nor entail their phenomenal or conceptual identification the visionary episodes being distinguishable from the perceptual ones (because of their being of different quality or etiology, for example, or because they belong to two different ontological categories: one visual, one eidetic, for example).