DIETRICH HOFFMANN

4. THE SEARCH FOR THE TERM TERM BILDUNG IN THE GERMAN CLASSIC

THE DEFINITION OF THE EPOCHS

It is essential to consider the concept of Bildung in the German Classic, when presenting the history of its theory. The list of literature published in Germany over the last 150 years on history of pedagogic is long, and it would be time consuming to read them all, but it is safe to say that most of them have a relevant chapter. The reason for this is that it has become common to divide longer periods of time into epochs in order to achieve a clearer overview. If nothing else, this is helpful from an educational point of view for both teaching and learning. However, a disadvantage of this method is that differences can be lost in the overall view or can even be ignored. It is obvious that epochs should be chosen which are well known in cultural history. In Germany Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Friedrich von Schiller belong to the Classics, they are, without a doubt, the Classics par excellence. Additionally, on closer inspection, both had thoughts that contributed to the theory of education, as did others in their circle, all of whom contributed to the pedagogical discussion of the time, e.g. Johann Gottfried Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Friedrich von Schlegel and Christoph Martin Wieland to name just a few. At the same time, this raises a problem with the label as we say today of the German Classic, which gives the wrong impression. Especially since, if based on Goethe and Schiller, this takes into consideration only a short span of time. Their acquaintance and friendship, which is symbolized by the monument in front of the National Theater in Weimar, lasted only a few years. To be specific, at the most it lasted from Goethes return from his Italian travels in 1788 to Schillers death in 1805. The independent view of the world and of art, which was developed at the Weimar court of muses of the Duchess Anna Amalia, maintained its impact beyond those years, so it can at best only be called a period. However, it is questionable whether it is justified to give it as much weight as Herwig Blankertz (1998) who dared to describe the Pedagogic of the German Classics as the theory of Bildung of mankind (p. 95) or as Clemens Menze (1970), who although using a more careful and semantical approach, reached the same conclusion in a handbook article where he equated the German Humanism with its classical German term Bildung to the preclassical idea of Bildung during the Enlightenment period (pp. 136ff.). One cannot avoid the impression, that our literary Classics should without fail also be educational. Since we have become more careful with our enthusiastic labels, most people today use the term Weimar Classic when referring to this specific period. However, this does not change the core of the problem. The epochs, that are traditionally distinct from each other, change rapidly in the course of the 18th and 19th century: Late-Enlightenment, New Humanism, Classic, Idealism, and
Siljander, P., Kivel, A. & Sutinen, A. (Eds.), Theories of Bildung and Growth, 4757. 2012 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.

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Romanticism. Some of the above mentioned individuals can be assigned to two or three epochs, depending on how the chroniclers date the periods and the interpretations of the achievements of the persons in question. This, of course, has repercussions on the interpretation of the idea of Bildung. Those concerned at least agree that Bildung means individuality, but, when looked at in detail, they developed very individual concepts, as I will demonstrate. It should at least be mentioned that the term German Classic, which was probably used to describe the history of German literature for the first time in 1839/40 by Heinrich Laube. The term had already been coined in the 18th century by the New-Humanist Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, who corresponded with Goethe about a National book, which could become, for the Germans, what Homer was for the Greeks (Blankertz, 1982, p. 99). As early as the 15th century during the Humanism of the Renaissance, in the absence of its own idols, Europe turned to Antiquity for help. France turned to the Romans, whereas England and the German-speaking regions orientated themselves towards the Greeks. After latent periods especially during the Enlightenment period of the late 17th and early 18th century this custom was resumed again during the new humanism period. However, after a few decades, contemporaries thought that there were enough exemplary minds and imposing geniuses who could easily take the place of the antique idols. This independence was hindered by the expansion of the school system under the influence of New Humanism. A significant educational program was started with the creation of the high-schools and the profession of the high-school teacher (philologist). The beneficiaries of this program held on to the old languages and the antique repertoire in philosophy and aesthetic, in particular the worship of the Greeks by Johann Joachim Winckelmann, who published his Gedanken ber die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst in 1755. Niethammer organized the Bavarian educational system in the south of the country and Humboldt organized the Prussian one in the north. In contrast, however, the idea of a German consensus in terms of one political ideal for all citizens (the whole middle-class) could not be reached. This striving for advancement expressed itself in the idea that Bildung was the nobility of the mind. This was an allusion to the fact that Goethe received a knighthood in 1782; as did Schiller in 1802 and the two Schlegels in 1815. Exemplary for failure of efforts to form a consensus is the attempt of the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1946), who titled his inaugural lecture: Die dichterische und philosophische Bewegung in Deutschland 1770-1800, in which he reconstructed the movement in Germany of the last third of the last century in a closed and continuous progress ... from Lessing to the death of Schleiermachers and Hegels (p. 7). At this point in time, he did not consider integrating the educational efforts. This was first done by Diltheys pupil Herman Nohl as he expanded the new epoch to 1830 in 1911, and called it the German movement (Nohl, 1911, p. 38; also Nohl, 1925). The motivation for this was not only the intention to create a clearer overview by choosing a different classification of the epochs. Both of them were intent on finding a reason for the fact that the anticipated German national unity was put on a par with the emerging third class or middle-class, by the German folk. For this reason, Nohl argued that the movement died down around 1830, but regained new strength in

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1870 that is shortly before the founding of the Empire. When it comes to the idea of Bildung, one must first eliminate all differences and contradictions with fitting interpretations, not only those that occur consecutively but also the ones that occur parallel to each other. A unity was confirmed that did not exist, not even in the so called Classic. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer named such a union in conjunction with Karl Marx ideology, reasons for justification. This had already been expressed by Dilthey. The movement he expressed was founded in a particular developmental stage of society. Through the breakdown of social culture a whole new pleasure in ones own self individuality and that of others emerged. There was also a tremendous boost of the national self-pride as a result of the amplitude and culture of the middleclass, which produced an intellectual excess: personal Bildung, intellectual distinction became their ideals (Dilthey, 1946, pp. 7ff.). It is undeniable that the above kinds of civil ideologies did exist: in the middle of the 19th century (1845/46) in Die deutsche Ideologie (Marx, 1964, p. 341) Marx described the causes of these wrong ideas which people had of themselves. About 100 years later (1940), the Austrian philosopher Otto Neurath, who had to emigrate to England, reflected on the German climate, in order to understand the intellectual atmosphere, in which the fatal national idea could evolve - an idea which lead, or at least contributed to, the advancement of National Socialism. His proposal of a solely German Climate could not succeed due to a similar Climate in his homeland (Sandner, 2011). The questionable approach of Nohl, whose own idea of Bildung remains worthy of discussion (cf. Menze, 1970, p.154; Nohl, 1961, p. 140f.), is shown in the fact that he conceals the alarming devaluation of the concept of Bildung in the second half of the 19th century with his thesis in which general power or strength of Bildung is presented as general factual Bildung and Bildung is reduced to the sum of knowledge, that one has to know (Menze, 1970, p. 149). In Germany, to this day, Bildung is put on the same level as knowledge and is called general knowledge out of touch with life and reality and means knowing about art and literature, not about the economy, work and society (ibidem, cf. Hoffmann, 2006, particularly pp. 185ff.). What was an important starting point (around 1800) for world change, as recognized by Menze, has since been organized to fit the existing conditions and social structures by the schools and the educational system. The humanistic education, which was dominant even after the middle of the 20th century in Germany, to be more exact in West Germany, had acquired this concept of Bildung in the way portrayed here. What Menze elaborated on in 1970 is still valid today:
Therefore this understanding of Bildung is ideological, because the middle-class has distanced itself so far from the pressing reality of time that they cannot grasp it and so they try to hide this through the random construct of antiquated illusory overall concepts (Ibid. p. 150).

These serve the purpose of securing the privileges which in the mean time no longer belong to one class or position but are still in the permanent possession of groups, milieus, single persons. While these privileges used to secure ascent, they now served the purpose of preventing descent.

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THE TRANSITION FROM ENLIGHTENMENT TO IDEALISM

With this initial criticism of the false opinion of the educational historians, which led them to summarize and harmonize far more complex and complicated processes, the way is now free for a realistic description of the discussion during the time of the Weimar Classic. With the beginning of the Enlightenment in the 17th century for which, in Germany, the lawyer Samuel Baron von Pufendorf was responsible, it became necessary to break free from the theological idea of the uniqueness of the human being as a creation and turn towards philosophy. The words which were put in Gods mouth by the Latin bible (Vulgata) Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostrum Let us form the human in our likeness and equal to us caused the translator to search for a similardefinition of the way and the goal of his own development. They decided to use the words bilden (form) and Bildung (formation) something which from our point of view nowadays is quite incomprehensible. Franz Rauhut quotes in a relevant essay from an article written by Moses Mendelssohn in 1784 The words enlightenment, culture, Bildung are new arrivals in our language. For the time being they belong to the language of books (quoted after Klafki, 1965, p. 18). Bildung was now put to debate and could not be predetermined as an act of creation. Speculations about anthropology arose and two alternatives took shape. The philanthropists (humanitarians) depended, in the tradition of the Enlightenment, on the perfection and moral insight of the human through education; their goals were civil usability and usefulness. Immanuel Kant followed this approach, as he introduced his lectures on education between 1776 and 1787 with the words: The human is the only creature in need of education (Kant, n.d., p. 5). The New-Humanists (unlike the Humanists of the Renaissance) strove for the change and improvement of the human to individuality and wanted the human to collect his powers as a whole through the highest and best proportioned Bildung (Humboldt, quoted from Hermann 1979, p. 157). Both parties fought for the enforcement of their position for decades, as shown by Niethammers publication (in 1808) Der Streit des Philanthropinismus und Humanismus in der Theorie des Erziehungsunterrichts unserer Zeit. This debate was partly begun, argued out and reconciled at the University of Gttingen. The classical philologists Johann Matthias Gesner and Christian Gottlob Heyne worked there and were regarded as pioneers of Humanism (Ttken, 1987, p. 33) and for this reason one should consider Gttingen rather than Weimar when discussing the theory of Bildung in the Classics. Wilhelm von Humboldt was a pupil of Heyne in Gttingen, as was his brother Alexander and the brothers August Wilhelm and Friedrich von Schlegel, who produced their own theory of Bildung in the 1790s (Menze, 1970, p. 141). Heyne was called Praeceptor Germaniae, and he drafted the school regulations for the town school in Gttingen in 1798. He was born into a poor family just like Gesner the life of both men proved that it was no myth to overcome the social class into which one was born through the New-Humanistic influenced development (cf. the presentation of Ttken, 1987, pp. 33ff.). The experience of misery in his childhood and adolescence did shape Heyne; a later poem of
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his begins with the words: To live twice? No, not this (p. 34). The philanthropist Ernst Christian Trapp also studied under Heyne in Gttingen, as did Johann Georg Heinrich Feder (philosopher) and Johann Peter Miller (theologian). They also had a close relationship with the philanthropists (p. 28). One should especially call to mind the historian August Ludwig von Schlzer and the physician Johann Friedrich Blumenbach who also took part in the discussion. They were based at the newly founded (1737) Reform University which enjoyed unprecedented academic freedom. The atmosphere of academic communication at the Georgia Augusta University in Gttingen was in no way inferior to the fertile community at the court of muses in Weimar the two locations are also close to each other which enhanced the effect. Schlzer supported this modernization with the statement: Homo non nascitur sed fit, and the reasons for his human dignity lie beyond him. Inherently, he is nothing, through conjunction he can become everything: this uncertainty constitutes the second part of his nature (Schlzer, 1785, p. 59). The word conjunction, meaning connection, link or unity, is no longer seen as a foreign word in German and is a better word than development to describe clearly what is meant: not everything is already there, but something more is added. His dictum The human is not born, but developed/designed stands in a sharp contrast to Blumenbachs claim that there is a nisus formatives, this means an urge for development and Bildung (cf. Hoffmann, 2008, p.150; Buck, 1984, pp. 136, 155). An idea that might be based on a misunderstanding of the view of the Earl of Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper), which was well known in the middle of the 18th century in Germany, and was adapted especially by Wieland. As described by Ilse Schaarschmidt: Shaftesbury used the term formation of a gentle character for Bildung and wrote about an inward form (quoted from Klafki, 1965, p. 49ff) to describe the goal of designing the human. One should not be deceived: the claim by Schlzer is innovative with regards to the question of Bildung, but he could not provide any valid empirical proof. Evidence could have been provided by Blumenbach from his anatomical studies and the Blumenbach skulls which seduced him to make statements about differences in human types, which could have then and are now regarded as an early stage of scientific racism. Schlzer probably orientated himself toward Johann Amos Comenius, whose motto, a translation from Greek of a thesis by Gregor von Narianz, The art of all arts is to from the human, the most flexible and shimmering of all living beings (quoted from Buck, 1984, p. 70), provided the impulse for similar formulations. He used formare as a translation for the Greek word agein to lead. This view was also accepted by the above mentioned Kant (n.d.) when he said: The human can only become human through education. He is nothing but what he is educated to be (p. 7).
CONTRARY OPINIONS IRRECONCILABLE

When considering the ideas of Bildung in the above mentioned Classics, it becomes obvious that one cannot speak of conformity. Goethe and Schiller,
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especially, had very different opinions on the subject. Hans Weil was wrong when he described Bildung in his 1930 dissertation entitled Die Entstehung des deutschen Bildungsprinzips (The origin of the German principle of Bildung) as an unfolding and explained this using Goethes definition of a moulded form, which develops during the course of life. Today we would speak about: genetically predetermined possibilities. In so doing, he united the views of Blumenbach, Herder and naturally Goethe, but neglected the equally important views of Schlzer, Wieland and Schiller. This is understandable (not only because of the reasons mentioned above but also because he had, as he put it,friendly assistance and correction from Nohl) but at the same time it is unfortunate. Weil was staying with Nohl as he worked on the paper. As a sociologist, he had observed and named two facts, which I have not yet mentioned, but which are essential for understanding the principle of Bildung in the terminology of Weil. It does not develop through general Christian secularisation, but through specific Protestant ideas. The conclusion is that Bildung cannot be developed or thought, but has to be realized through experience and development. Theodor W. Adorno (1963) referred to this (in the early 1960s) saying Bildung is not available because Bildung is that for which there are no customs, it cannot be acquired through courses, not even through studies (p. 42). In the beginning, the right for Bildung was only valid for a relatively small group of intellectual elites, academics, artists and writers, for a part of societyIt was not attainable for the broad classes of society, which were ruled by the traditional German work- and ethical principles (Weil, 21967, p. IX). These classes leaned towards the goals of either the philanthropists or the practitioners, like Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, who referred directly to Kant and who did not have anything in common with the intentions of the bourgeoisie elite. Weil established that the striving to an intellectual elite was a need of the middle-class (cf. Dilthey), to which the intellectual elite, because of their higher social status did not belong. This is what most of his educationally not socially or politically interested readers obviously failed to realise, when they praised his observations. Because they were mostly non-political, those who strove to reach this status were depoliticized (ibid. p. 164f.). This point, which was in clear contrast to the political concept of Schiller, had critical consequences. In his fictional Briefe ber die stethische Erziehung des Menschen (Letters about the aesthetic education of the human) from 1793/94, Schiller, following Kants opinions, outlined the educational requirements for the constitution of a political community (Menze, 1970, p. 142). The Bildung of sociality and more precisely humanity was his intention, and not the Bildung of individuality and classes. In his 24th letter he says:
One can distinguish three different moments or steps in development, which must be experienced by the individual human, and by the whole species, in order to complete the circle of their determinationThe human simply suffers the force of nature in his physical form; he rids himself of this force in the aesthetic state, and he controls it in the moral state (Schiller w/o year, p. 247)

This thought was adopted by Pestalozzi. The freedom for the organisation of a moral state through the human must be searched for and found somewhere
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in the middle between the realm of force (nature) and the realm of laws (society) in the realm of scope to play (p. 267). That Schiller made an error at this point when he wrote about an aesthetic urge for Bildung (ibidem) becomes obvious when we take a look at the context. Schillers opinion was never further away from that of Goethe, and especially Blumenbach, than in his letters. He searches for a name for the tendency towards freedom to play that this does not necessarily lead to Bildung, but only creates the necessary conditions; this is an error easily corrected. This is also shown in the way he uses the terminology development, not in the sense of Goethes entelechy, as an unfolding of the pre-formed, nor in the sense of dveloppement adopted from the French by Johann Gottfried Leibniz, but more in the way used by Shaftsbury: Its the mind, which forms (quoted from Klafki, 1965, p. 46). Schiller struggles with Kant, who stated in his Kritik der Urteilskraft (Criticism of Judgement) that all powers of the human should be developed in a way so that he is capable of meaningful political actions (Menze, 1970, p.143). It was the New-Humanism of Niethammer that lead to the separation of Bildung that was formalized, that is more and more limited to knowledge from the social reality (Blankertz, 1982, p. 94), and legitimatized non-political, private awareness of inner qualities. One interpretation of German history holds this private orientation of the German Bildung society, in part, responsible for the path taken by German politics. It went from Blut und Eisen (blood and iron) through nationalism, imperialism and finally to fascism without the nation of Dichter und Denker (poets and thinkers) the usual term used with allusion to the Classics, offering any resistance worth mentioning (ibidem). The only acceptable bridge between the contrary opinions was made by Herder, who did too much good with his Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (Ideas on the philosophy of the history of mankind) (17841791). In his description of the phylogeny of the human, he tried to combine historiography and anthropology in order to emphasize the ontogenesis: The practical interests of Herder focused not on the human in general but on the real or concrete human representative of his time with regards to his development towards humanity (Schmidt, 1995, p. 11). He specifically chose the Greek term paideia that is used as a synonym for Bildung in the literature. Since a human had the freedom to organise himself (Herder, 1995, p. 117) and was for this reason the first of Gods creations to be freed (p. 119), if not already reasonable is capable of becoming educated to humanity (p. 120). For Herder the specific character of the human lies in the fact that he is born with near to no instinct. Through life-long practice he can be developed to humanity. This is no general and ideal condition, but a real and special one: The natural condition of the human is the state of the society; because he is born into it and educated by it (p. 239). From todays viewpoint it is hard to understand why Herders idea of the second genesis of the human was not met with approval (p. 227), since, with his idea he elegantly avoided the dilemma of deciding between the development towards nature or towards society. Even Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in about 1762, could not solve this problem. The fronts were hardened and the solution remained hidden in a complicated context. Although the author had himself built this bridge in his argumentation, by leaving open whether one should call the development he
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described as culture (Kultur) from working the field or Enlightenment from the metaphor of light (Aufklrung), or in the sense of the New Humanism which was propagated by him Bildung (ibidem). Herder was inevitably overshadowed by Goethe and Schiller, and one could assume that he, as a theologian, could not keep up or unite with the thoughts and actions of the increasingly independent educators and philosophers. But the reason is a very different one. He sought a new approach to the philosophy of history (compare to Schmidt, 1995, p. 21). According to this theory, history does not have an overlaying meaning, and is just a progress that is diverse in itself, it becomes historical individuality (p. 23). This is thought through very logically, because if the development of a single person leads to identity or individuality, then it follows that the development of mankind has to be individual, or rather has to be understood that way (hence the title of the book: History of mankind. This first became acceptable in the 19th century: educationally by Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, philosophically and historically by Leopold von Ranke among others. For this to happen Idealism had to reach its limitations and had to be replaced by Historicism.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVIDING THE CONCEPT INTO THEORY AND PRACTICE

Where the reasons lie for dividing the concept, and neglecting the contributions of Schiller cannot be determined. However, it is clear why the political and social dimensions were not important factors for Goethe: he rejected the French revolution and accepted nothing from the arguments of Rousseau, no matter how they were interpreted, Schiller (because of his early death) could not defend his concept long enough. When one considers the fate of Marquis Posa in the tragedy Don Carlos, the incarnation of the politically aware intellectual, one can suspect a lack of confidence to enforce it on the ruling class. For many people it was too difficult to behave appropriately, even though the aristocracy and the middle-class did seem to be following the same interests, for a short time, during the liberation wars and the Prussian Reform. The argumentation of Gnther Buck is convincing in a way one can follow:
Schiller had founded an idea of Bildung that differed from the prevailing metaphysics of Bildung in the era of Goethe toto coelo, Humboldt accepted it although hesitantly, the German Idealism elaborated on it in different ways Hegel most decisively and the temporary final version is presented in the philosophy of Karl Marx (Buck, 1984, p.156).

German Classic Weimar Classic The era of Goethe: this line is one answer to the question that this theme addresses. The second is that a reduced ideal of Bildung was represented by the German pedagogic, when measured against the possibilities of that time and despite being over-rated by its advocates, did not do justice to the conflicts of a democratization of society. Buck was of the opinion that Schiller and his followers focused on the restoration of the identity of the subject, which was lost through self54

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estrangement: The only worry of the subject is to be a subject (p.160). If one ignores the fact that this frequently expressed thought is not very convincing, history does not present much evidence for its acceptance. He points out the egoism of the human and that the human/he at the earlier [point in] time had already been a subject, not self-estranged but lived for its self. The individual tries to be or become a subject by means of others, but not in or through coexistence with others. Marx phrases in a footnote of the first volume of his Kapital: Only through the relationship to the human Paul, as his equal, does Peter refers to himself as a human (quoted from Adorno/Dierks, 1956, p. 47). It is possible that the rejection of this opinion is the reason why the political or more specifically the social dimension of the idea of Bildung, as discussed in the Classics, was neglecting. If one talks about the task of the Bildung of a social individual being to overcoming his estrangement, and does not wrongfully accuse the nonpolitical subject that it brought itself into this woeful situation, one could use the following argumentation. I will once again quote from Adorno (1966): The identity of the self and self-estrangement accompany each other from the beginning; that is why the term of self-estrangement is hardly romantic (p. 214). Buck writes that Wilhelm von Humboldt hesitantly accepted Schillers idea of Bildung: He was compared to the onedimensional New-Humanistic argumentation of Niethammer a stroke of luck for the politics of Bildung, as he became responsible for the reformation of all institutes of Bildung in Prussia. To strengthen the practice, as a pragmatist, he made many unorthodox but at the same time useful connections to the theory (Menze, 1975). Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel aided him with regard to the lower schools, by arguing that the selfalienation could not only be overcome through play (aesthetic term of Bildung), but also through work (productive term of Bildung) (Buck, 1984, p. 189). In his theory Humboldt, however, followed Goethe by assuming the peculiarities of the individual, which results from shaking off the accidental randomness. At the same time, to understand foreign individualities, one should leave the accidental singularity and enter the generalidentity of humanity (p. 226). One could call this communicative Bildung, but it is useless to think about this, because Humboldt does not get further than programmatic statements, due to the pressures of everyday life, and this is why his texts remain ambiguous (Menze, 1970, p. 140). The egalitarian opinions of Bildung remained in light of the concrete social condition... another abstract programme (Herrlitz et al., 1993, p. 43). The New-Humantistic Bildung reform, as Hans-Georg Herrlitz et al. wrote, could not enforce their concept of a common educational or school system against the resistance from the landholding nobility, which resulted in the development of new, ideologically justified privileges fitting of their higher Bildung. The existing modern authority began to classify the freed society hierarchically (ididem). Neither the newly developed extended higher school system, nor the obsolete lower school system, became institutions, where the classical idea of Bildung was practiced in its unabbreviated form. The fact that Humboldt counts as a successful administrator of the classical principle of Bildung is
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because the school reform, begun by him, met the interests of the powerful social groups in Germany. Weil summarized the genesis of the named principle, interestingly not until 1966 in the foreword to his book:
The theological appeal of Luther to find mercy and fulfilment through the medium of the bible became, in the course of secularization, a demand to find a kind of worldly grace in nature and art, from historical experiences. Through this turning pointBildung developed in contrast to an organised and generally communicable teaching, as well as, in contrast to education in the sense of the Enlightenment. (Weil 21966, p. X)

Through these Verschulung the term Bildung has found in the Classics remained Utopian.
REFERENCES
Adorno, Th. W. (1963). Philosophie und Lehrer. In Th. W. Adorno (Ed.), Eingriffe. Neun Kritische Modelle (p. 29ff.). Frankfurt am Main. Adorno, Th. W. (1966). Negative Dialektik. Frankfurt am Main. Adorno, Th. W. & Dirks, W. (Eds.). (1956). Soziologische Exkurse. Frankfurt am Main. Blankertz, H. (1982). Die Geschichte der Pdagogik. Von der Aufklrung bis zur Gegenwart. Wetzlar. Buck, G. (1984). Rckwege aus der Entfremdung. Studien zur Entwicklung der Deutschen Humanistischen Bildungsphilosophie. Paderborn/Mnchen. Dilthey, W. (1946). Die dichterische und philosophische Bewegung in Deutschland 17701800. In H. Nohl (Ed.), W. Dilthey, Die Philosophie des Lebens. Eine Auswahl aus Seinen Schriften 18671910 (p. 5ff.). Frankfurt am Main. Dilthey, W. (1936). Gesammelte Schriften. Band XII. In E. Weniger (Ed.), Leipzig. Herder, J. G. (1995). Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit. Bodenheim. Herrlitz, H.-G., Hopf, W., & Titze, H. (1993). Deutsche Schulgeschichte von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart. Weinheim. Herrmann, U. (1979). Die Philanthropen. In Klassiker der Pdagogik (p. 135ff.). First Volume. Mnchen. Hoffmann, D. (2006). Kritische Theorie der Bildung. Tuschungen und Selbsttuschungen im Pdagogischen Diskurs. Hamburg. Hoffmann, D. (2008). Stationen des Anthropologischen Diskurses in Gttingen und sein vorlufiges Ende. In D. Hoffmann (Ed.), Anmerkungen zur Gttinger Pdagogik. Unbeachtete Zusammenhnge aus Zeiten des Umbruchs (p. 149ff.). Hamburg. Kant, J. (1803). ber Pdagogik. In K. Vorlnder (Ed.), Leipzig o.J. Klafki, W. (Ed.). (1965). Beitrge zur Geschichte des Bildungsbegriffs. Weinheim. Langewand, A. (1994). Bildung. In D. Lenzen (Ed.), Erziehungswissenschaft. Ein Grundkurs. Reinbek. Marx, K. (1964). Die Frhschriften. In S. Landshut (Ed.), Stuttgart. Menze, C. (1970). Bildung. In J. Speck & G. Wehle (Eds.), Handbuch Pdagogischer Grundbegriffe. Band I (p. 134ff.). Mnchen. Menze, C. (1975). Die Bildungsreform Wilhelm von Humboldts. Hannover. Nohl, H. (1911). Die Deutsche Bewegung und die idealistischen Systeme. In H. Nohl (Ed.), (1949). Pdagogik aus Dreiig Jahren (p. 28ff.). Frankfurt am Main. Nohl, H. (1925). Die Deutsche Bewegung in der Schule. In H. Nohl (Ed.), (1949). Pdagogik aus Dreiig Jahren (p. 39ff.). Frankfurt am Main. Nohl, H. (1961). Die Pdagogische Bewegung in Deutschland und Ihre Theorie. Frankfurt am Main. Sandner, G. (2011). Was das Deutsche Klima aus uns Gemacht Hat (p. 73). In FAZ 26 (2011, March). Schiller, F. v. (year). Werke. Band IX. Die Kritischen und Philosophischen Hauptschriften. In R. Buchwald & K. F. Reinking (Eds.), Hamburg o.J. Schlzer, A. L. v. (1785). Weltgeschichte Nach Ihren Haupt-Theilen im Auszug und ZusammenHang (Vol. I). Gttingen. 56

THE TERM BILDUNG IN THE GERMAN CLASSIC Schmidt, G. (1995). Einleitung. Now. In J. G. Herder (Ed.), Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (p. 11ff.). Bodenheim. Ttken, J. (1987). Die Anfnge der Pdagogik im 18. Jahrhundert. In D. Hoffmann (Ed.), Pdagogik an der Georg-August-Universitt Gttingen (p. 13ff.). Gttingen. Weil, H. (1967). Die Entstehung des Deutschen Bildungsprinzips. Bonn.

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