VY.

Graduate School of Business STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Research Paper No. 187

DIVIDEND, INVESTMENT AND FINANCING DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON FRENCH FIRNS

John G. NcDonald* Bertrand Jacquillat Maurice Nussenbaum

February 1974 (Revised July 1974)

Graduate School of Business, Stanford University; Centre dEnseignement Sup~rieur des Affaires (CESA), Paris; and CESA, respectively. The authors wish to thank Edmond Malinvaud, Robert Litzenberger, and a referee for helpful comments and Patrice RactMadoux for computational assistance. Initial research supptrt through aFulbrightFlays: grant to J. G. McDonald and subsequent support by the Commissariat Gen~ra1au Plan of the French Government are gratefully acknowledged.

t.

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the dividend, investment and financing decisions of French firms. A basic premise of the study is that domestic economy. While the increased perspective in business finance can be gained through better understanding of the financial behavior of companies outside ~ literature of finance and economics includes many significant empirical studies based on dividend, investment and financing data on American firm~, the body of evidence on continental European firms is still relatively small, owing in large part to the difficulties encountered in gathering meaningful financial data on individual firms) In order to examine for the first time the relationship of dividend and investment decisions in France, using wellknown models of financial behavior, we were able to obtain annual data on a sample of French companies over a sevenyear period. Our intent is to add to the understanding of the robustness of these models by demonstrating their empirical validity in Europe and to report several differences from previous empirical findings for American firms. In the tradition of Irving Fisher

1 11],

the schedule of investment opportuAt an optimal level

nities available to the firm is often assumed to be given.

of investment in the firm, Miller and Modigliani [25] demonstrated that a firm in a perfect capital market can finance externally, through issuance of new equity, any desired level of dividends. In behavioral terms, the investment decision in An alternative view under assumptions In the this context may be viewed as primary and the dividend decision as secondary in the investmentdividendf inancing triad. of imperfect capital markets is that dividend, investment, and external financing decisions are mutually determined and strongly interdependent in the firm. latter spirit, Dhrymes and Kurz [8] studied a large crosssection of American firms in 195160 in single equation and simultaneous equation models, and they reported substantial interdependence between investment and dividend decisions; their findings led them to caution against the use of singleequation models of investment and dividend behavior. Higgins [14] recently questioned the findings of Dhrymes

and Kurz with some new evidence on American companies in 196165, concluding that dividends were a function of profit and investment but that investment did not depend on dividends

results consistent with the MillerModigliani theorem.

1Some findings on aggregate investment time series in France were recently reported by ThollonPomerol and Malinvaud [18].

In the present study, models of dividends, investment and external financing are estimated with crosssection data on 75 French firms in each of seven years, 196268. The findings indicate that dividends of French firms are well explained The reby profit and lagged dividends in the dividend model of John Lintner [21].

sults of the investment model do not differ substantially from previous findings for American firms, except that estimated coefficients of the dividend variable are significantly positive; interpretation of this finding of apparent dependence must be made with caution, however, as the results are not necessarily inconsistent with the MillerModigliani theorem.2 In the model of external financing, level of investment is the most significant determinant of level of financing in French firms, confirming existing evidence on American companies. The three equations are also estimated for each of the seven years in a simultaneous equations model using two stage least squares; however, the results do not differ substantially from the ordinary least squares estimates, in contrast to the findings of Dhrymes and Kurz on American companies. II. Models of Dividends, Irvestment and Financing

Our three dependent variables have received considerable attention in the theoretical literature: dividends, investment and external financing. Specification of each of the three equations in the present paper includes theoreticallydetermined exogenous variables and the remaining two of the three variables of primary interest in this study. We will describe the explanatory variables in the models and cite their antecedents in the literature, without attempting to reiterate the entire theoretical justification of each variable in the interests of brevity. Dividend Model. In his wellknown model of dividend behavior, Lintner [21] suggested that the change in dividend is a function of a firms target or desired dividend and its past dividends. Each firms dividend or change in dividend can As a behavioral

be expressed as a function of profit P and lagged dividend Dti.

model, the Lintner dividend relationship is usually estimated with timeseries data. The empirical validity of Lintners model has been demonstrated by many investigators using timeseries data for the United States and several other countries, including both aggregate data and observations on individual firms.3 We estimate a 2Dividends in the investment model estimated in this study may serve as a surrogate measure for lagged capital stock or as a measure of economic earnings in the absence of uniform accounting principles for reporting profit, as discussed later in the paper. 3See, for example, Lintner [21] and Brittain [3] for results using aggregate data and Fama and Babiak [10] for results using timeseries data on individual American firms. Recent results using timeseries dividend data on firms in France and Belgium include those of Galesne [12] and Cobbaut [6]. Mueller [26] estimated a dividend model using crQsssectiqn data on firms in the United States.

dividend model with a crosssection specification, in which current dividends are a function of profit and lagged dividends, as well as investment I and financing F. The model to be estimated is as follows:

~~

I +a F+u, +a3~ 4~

(1)

where the as are coefficients to be estimated, u is an error term, and all variables other than D~1 are assumed to bear subscripts I and t, designating firm in year t. All of the variables are deflated by firm size, as measured by sales S. Investment Model. The extensive empirical literature on investment decisions has dealt primarily with timeseries data on aggregate series and on individual firms, but also with crosssection data on firmsin.the1J~iitedStates and In France.4 Variables used in explaining investment behavior may be classified~ in four theoretical categories: acceleratorcapacity variables;5 profit or profitrate variables;6 liquidity variables;7 and financial risk variables.8 The following investment model includes measures of these four determinants of investment: capital Wk, and longterm debt LTD.9 for plant and equipment. firm size S. I dS P Wk
LTD :D F

change in

sales from the previous to the current year dS, profit after tax P, net working Investment I represents gross annual outlays

As in the dividend model, all variables are deflated by

(2)

4Fora review of the literature on econometric models of investment using aggregate data for the United States, see Jorgenson, Hunter and Nadiri [17]. Recent empirical studies of investment in France include ThollonPommerol and Malinvaud [28], DesplatRedier [7], Echard and Henin [9], and Brefort [2]. 5Acceleratorcapacity arguments are summarized in papers by Clark [5], Tinbergen [27], Chenery [4], Lintner [22] and Jorgenson and Siebert [16]. The present investigation is limited to a oneyear accelerator, and our conclusions on this variable will be restricted in this respect. 6Prof it and investment are discussed by Klein [17], Jorgenson [15], Grunfeld [13], and Jorgenson and Siebert [16]. 7See Anderson [1] and Lintner [22] for a discussion of liquidity as a potential determinant of investment. An alternative specification might include a 1agged~liquidIty variable e.g., working capital at the end of the previous year. However, In this sample of French firms, the mean rank correlation of firms by Wk/S for two succeeding years was high (approximately 0.9), so that the use of current or lagged Wk/S in this case would lead to similar crosssection results. 8The relationship between financial leverage and investment is discussed by Lintner [22], Meyer and Kuh [23], Kuh [19], and Meyer and Glauber [23]. 9Lintner [21] demonstrated that empirical results for American firms were not sensitive to the measure of leverage used in the investment equation.

where the bs are coefficients to be estimated and u is an error term.

Dividends

D and financing F are included in the model, but the interpretation of the dividend variable must be made with some care; under the perfect market assumptions of Miller and Modigliani [25], we would not expect dividends to be a determinant of investment. However, dividends may be regarded in this model as a proxy for other First, dividends may serve as Se-

explanatory variables in the theory of investment.

a proxy for the lagged capital stock variable in Chenerys accelerator model.

cond, dividends in France may be a proxy for a firms economic earnings, so that this variable serves as a better profitability measure than reported earnings in the investment model. French firms enjoyed substantial latitude in the computation of reported earnings, and some observers of French firms have suggested that large corporations may work backward from their perception of economic earnings and the desired dividend level to a noisier figure of earnings reported in income state 10 ments. Financing Model. Given the desired level of investment and dividends, the In this view, required amount of external financing F may be viewed as a residual,.

the budget constraint or flowbalance equation for each firm is as follows: F I + D (P + Depr) + (Wk

where I + D represents the outflow for gross investment plus dividends, P + Depr represents profit plus depreciation or internally generated funds, and Wk

~tl We

is increase in net working capital, current assets minus current liabilities.

hypothesize that investment is the primary determinant of the level of new financing F; however, we specify the following equation and estimate it with crosssection data to provide some evidence as to the relative importance of these variables as determinants of level of external financing. firm size 5: + 1+ c~ c1 ~ P+ Depr+ c3 ~ c4
~

Each variable is again deflated by

~.+
2

~
5
~-

c6

LTD
~

+ u,

(3)

10The hypothesis that reported earnings of French firms are a function of cash dividends desired by management, rather than the other way around, is exemplified in a recent quote by Kremper [20] from a French auditor (Commissaire aux Comptes): The allowance for depreciation is determined at such a level that you can show enough profit to declare the dividend that the Board of Directors wants to propose for distribution to shareholders (based on economic earnings). We caution that to ascertain the empirical validity of this statement would require analysis of timeseries data on firms, e.g., by measurement of the information impact of earnings and dividend announcements on common stock prices as done by Watts [31] for American firms.

where the cs are coefficients to be estimated and u is an error term.

External

financing F is measured by net longterm borrowing, the change in longterm debt 11 on the balance sheet. Longterm debt is included as a determinant of external financing for two reasons. First, longterm debt is a proxy for interest payments in this period, so that, ceteris varibus~. greater longterm debt LTD means larger required financing F; in France reported profit, linked to declared dividends as suggested above, may not fully reflect interfirm differences in interest payments. Second, the French plan de stabilisation of 1963 provided institutional constraints, which limited firms allowed borrowing by way of guidelines linked to previous borrowing.12 III. Sample and Data The sample comprises 75 French firms in 9 manufacturing and distribution industries.13 Firms in the sample had sales between $12 million and $280 million in 1962, with a median of $35 million and mean of $95 million.14 The 75 firms were chosen by stratified random sample from a population of the largest 400 companies in these 9 industries, ranked by sales in 1962 and subject to two constraints related to consolidation of financial data. Very few French firms published consoliAccordingly, Empirical Results

dated income statements and balance sheets in the 196268 period.

firms which had unconsolidated subsidiaries were excluded from the original population, so that we might be assured that reported profits of sample firms comprised the cleanest data available in France for this period. 15 In addition, intercompany investments and their income were generally not consolidated by French firms in 196268; to reduce this source of error in reported profits, we excluded from the population firms whose financial statements showed other fixed assets measure of external financing ignores new issues of common stock, which comprised on the order of five per cent of new longterm external financing by French firms during this period. Under French banking practice,a substantial part of shortterm debt, the d~couvert,may be relatively permanent; however, short-term debt is excluded in our measure of external financing. 12lnclusion of longterm debt also facilitates comparison with results of Dhrymes and Kurz [8] for firms in the United States. 13The sample comprises 75 firms in the following French industries: transportation vehicles and equipment (8); department stores (8); food products (7); chemicals and petroleum (7); electrical equipment (9); machine tools (9); construction materials and equipment (10); textiles, glass, and paper (9); steel and nonferrous metals (8). 14Figures in dollars are based on a conversion rate of 4.2 francs to the dollar. 15The largest French firm without important subsidiaries in this period ranked 25th in sales. Hence, the 24 largest companies in France as of 1962 are not represented in our 75firm sample. Firms included in the sample ranked from 25th to 400th in sales in France

(autres valeurs immobilis~es) in excess of 25 per cent of the book value of shareholders equity. Financial data in convenient machinereadable form, comparable to the Compustat tapes on American firms, were not available on French firms. As a result, we found it necessary to collect and codify data on the 75 firms in the sample for each of
the years 196268, using published annual reports of the individual companies and
the

financial summaries of DAFSA in Paris.

B1egression Results Ordinary leastsquares results for the dividend, investment and financing models are shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3. stability of the relationships. Dividend Model. Table 1 provIdes positive evidence as to the validity of the Lintner dividend model in France, as the estimated coefficients of profit and lagged dividends are significant at the one per cent level in all years. insignificant in all seven years in the dividend model. Investment is Where Dhrymes and Kurz 18] The models were estimated using cross section data for each of the seven years 196268 to provide an indication of the

found significantly positive coefficients for investment in American firms, they interpreted the finding as a weakness of singleequation estimation. hypothesis that a tradeoff existed between investment and dividends. Higgins [14] External found negative coefficients of investment in his dividend model, supporting the financing is insignificant in six of seven years in the present study; we note that at a given level of profit, lagged dividend, and Investment, we did not observe some French firms paying high dividends and using external financing and others paying low dividends and using no external financing, so that, ceteris paribus, a positive dividendfinancing relationship was not observed in French firms)6 In our seven crosssection estimates for French firms in 196268, the mean coefficient of determination in the Lintner dividend model is 0.94, reflecting the highly significant lagged dividend variable. Investment Model. Table 2. Regression results for the investment model are shown in The mean coefficient of determination (0.49) is slightly higher than

that found by Dhrymes and Kurz [8] for crosssection regressions on American firms (0.42). The oneyear change in sales variable (which Meyer and Glauber [23] suggest may be interpreted as a proxy for capacity~ utilization) did not have a significant coefficient except in 1968 when its sign is negative, but the interpretation of the dividend variable below is also germane to the evaluation of accelerator variables 6For American firms Van Home and McDonald 130] did observe the combinations of high cash dividends with substantial external financing and loworzero dividends with little external financing in the electronics and electric utility industries.

7 in this investment model. The coefficient of profit was positive in four of seven years, including the only two years when it was significant)7 The liquidity variable was uniformly negative; the line of causality appeared to run opposite to the usual liquidityInvestment hypothesis, suggesting perhaps that firms with a higher level of investment ex p~sthad lower liquidity at year end. and five. The leverage variable in the investment equation was positive in every year, with tratios between one To summarize the line of argument, if the firms marginal cost of capital is a decreasing function of leverage under assumptions of taxdeductible interest and zero bankruptcy costs, higher levels of investment will be associated with higher leverage; the results reported In Table 2 support this hypothesis)8 The coefficient of dividends In the investment model was positive in all years and significant in five of seven years. Findings of this apparent dividend effect

on investment are not necessarily inconsistent with the theorem of Miller and Nodigliani; the significant dividend coefficient is consistent with the hypothesis that dividends are a proxy for lagged capital stock in a Chenery accelerator model, or that dividends serve as a proxy for true economic earnings of French firms, as discussed above. In either case, the reader is cautioned that the specification of the investment model is not thoroughly satisfactory, In that it does not permit us to discriminate among the potential effects of dividends, lagged capital stock and economic earnings on investment in French firms. the findings for this model. Financing MOdel. Table 3. Results for the model of external financing are shown in The most significant determinant of external financing is the level of That Is, we conclude that we cannot reject the hypothesis that investment is independent of dividends based on

investment, for which the estimated coefficients are positive in all years and significant in six of seven periods.9 Dividends and profit, though predominantly 17 The profit variable in the investment equation of Dhrymes and Kurz [8, Table 8] had a coefficient, estimated by ordinary leastsquares, which was negative in seven of ten years 195160 and never significant. 18Lintner [21, pp. 223231] discussed uncertainty and the distinction between long run and shortrun equilibrium on the investmentleverage question. Using aggregate timeseries data, Lintner found that debt ratio of manufacturing corporations 191n the United States was negatively related to investment. The significant role of investment in external financing appears to be similar in France and the United States, in light of our findings and those of Dhrymes and Kurz [8]. The finding that investment is a positive determinant of new debt f1 nancing is also consistent with the results of Van Home and Stewart [28], using aggregate timeseries data on corporate bond issues and expected capital expenditures in the United States.
,

negative, are insignificant.

Depreciation has the expected negative sign, but is The leverage variable is positive as The

generally insignificant, as is liquidity Wk.

expected in six of seven years and is significant in three of those years.

mean coefficient of determination in the financing model is 0.35 for French firms in 196268, as compared with 0.22 for American firms in Dhrymes and Kurzs results for l95l_60.20 Partition of the Sample To investigate further the stability of the relationships, the sample was partitioned into two groups.Groups I and II designate financially aggressive and defensive firms; firms with net external financing F greater than or equal to zero were classified in the former category, and firms with negative values of F were classified in the latter category in each year, l962_68.21 cussed briefly but are not reported in detail. The regression results for equations (1), (2) and (3) usIng data on Groups I and II in 196268 are disEstimation of the dividend model provided results for the two groups essentially the same as those shown in Table 1. Estimation of the investment model for the two categories revealed that the dividend variable is more significant for Group I than for Group II, with dividends significantly positive in only two of seven years for the latter group. Adjusted R2 in the investment model was uniformly higher for Group I than Group II, indicating that the findings in Table 1 are to be interpreted cautiously for firms in the latter category, particularly in l966_68.22 Estimation of the financing model produced the greatest difference in results for the two groups, as one would expect, recognizing that the values of the dependent variable in equation (3) were all positive or zero in Group I and negative in Group II. 1.23 The findings for Group I were typical of those shown in Table 3. The regression results for Group II varied more from year to year than those of Group The investment variable was generally insignificant, but depreciation was

significantly negative in four of seven years, indicating that the net repayment 20 See Dhrymes and Kurz [8, Table 9]. 21The number of firms in the sample of 75 for which the variable F was greater than or equal to zero was 35 in 1962, 42 in 1963, 38 in 1964, 37 in 1965, 40 in 1966, 32 in 1967, and 35 in 1968. 22Estimation of the investment equation produced the following values of R2, adjusted for degrees of freedom, for Group I and Group II: 1962, 0.43 and 0.48; 1963, 0.68 and 0.38; 1964, 0.44 and 0.34; 1965, 0.63 and 0.53; 1966, 0.54 and 0.13; 1967, 0.53 and 0.09; 1968, 0.60 and 0.05. 23 2 The range of estimates of R , adjusted for degrees of freedom, of the financing model in 196268 was 0.30 to 0.69 for Group I and zero to 0.77 for Group II.

of loans (negative F) was directly related to internallygenerated funds of Group 24 II firms. Longterm debt was significantly negative in 1965 and 1966, as firms with higher leverage in Group II made relatively greater repayments of debt; the longterm debt variable was positive in all years for Group I. In sum, the regression results for the total sample in Table 1 hold for dividend decisions in both financially aggressive and defensive companies, whereas the investment and financing results in Tables 2 and 3 are representative only of aggressive Group I firms in this classification. Simultaneous Equations Model The model in equations (1), (2) and (3) was estimated in each of the years 25 196268 using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. In the case of American firms Dhrymes and Kurz [8] found significant reversals of the signs of the investment coefficients in their dividend model (from positive to negative) and the dividend coefficients in their Investment model (from positive to negative) in moving from ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation to 2SLS. determined. Their findings led them to conclude that investment and dividend decisions in American firms were jointly No such differences in signs of the OLS and 2SLS coefficients were found for this sample of French firms, so that the 2SLS results are not reported. In the 2SLS results the profit and lagged dividend variables of the Lintner dlvi dend model were again highly significant, while investment and financing were insignificant in this dividend equation. For the investment and external financing equations, 2SLS results revealed no important changes in the estimated coefficients, relative to the OLS findings reported in Tables 2 and 3, except that the tratios of the 2SLS coefficients were uniformly lower. Generally, the findings for French firms are in opposition to those of Dhrymes and Kurz in this regard, as the specification of a simultaneous equations model produces neiiher different nor superior results. IV. Conclusion

Models of dividend, investment and external financing decisions were estimated In each of the years 196268, using crosssection data on 75 French firms. Dividend decisions of French firms are welldescribed by the Lintner model; investment and financing variables are insignificant in the dividend equation in both OLS 24The LTD variable in Group II results had tratios of 5.0 in 1965 and 9.8 in 1966. 25With the 2SLS procedure the reducedform equations of (1), (2) and (3) were estimated by ordinary least squares in the first stage. The resulting estimates of dividends, investment and financing were used in place of the original variables D, I and F on the righthand side of each equation in the second stage.

10

and 2SLS results.

The investment model estimates show profit, depreciation

and

financial leverage to be more significant than the oneyear accelerator or liquidity variables; the dividend variable in the investment model is consistently positive, however, the results are not inconsistent with the MillerModlgliani theorem in light of the Interpretation of dividends as a proxy for a lagged capital stock variable or a proxy for economic earnings under French accounting practices. negative, is primarily a function of the firms level of Investment. External financing, particularly for aggressive firms for which net borrowing is nonThe coeffi dents of determination in the dividend, Investment and financing equations are generally at least as high as those found in previous studies of American firms. We conclude that.the hypothesis of Miller and Modigliani that dividend and investment decisions are independent cannot be rejected based on our findings with French data and that the position of Dhryines and Kurz in advocacy of a simultaneous equations framework in the estimation of dividend, investment and financing decisions is not supported by our empirical evidence on French firms. To the extent that dividend and investment decisions are found to be independent in France, we are led to question the finding of Dhrymes and Kurz that these decisions are strongly interrelated in the much larger capital market in the United States.

TABLE 1 Regression Results for the Dividend Model: French Firms. 1962-68 Dependent Variable: D/S

Constant 1962 .0011 (l.91)*

- .0015 (1.72)

P/s .0679 (3.73) .2487 (9.86) 1684 (5.77) 1093 (4.07) .1591 (4.71) .1379 (4.67) .0467 (2.65)

Dt

/S

I/s .0129 (1.71) .0225 (1.81)

- .0075
-

2 R Adj. F/s .0034 (.31)

-

.8662 (30.06) .6920 (17.62)

.967

1963

.0004 (.03)

.949

1964

- .0006

.S335
(17.40) .7877 (19.53) .6682 .( 11. 56) .8024 (15.26) .8848 (23.00)

(.84) 1965 .0011 (1.89) .0017 (1.80) .0205 (.35)

- .0026

(.72)
- .0082 (1 .04)

.0156 (1.15) .0184 (1.19)

- .0068

.953

.953

1966

.0032 (.23) .0049 (.87) .0083 (1.01)

.867

(.45) .0026 (.17)

- .0205 (2.75)

1967

.944

1968

.955

(.04)

Numbers in parentheses are t-values (absolute values). t = 2.00 and t = 2.66.

05

Critical values of t-ratio are t .10

1.67,

01

TABLE 2 Regression Results for Investment Nodel: Dependent Variable: French Firms, 1962-68 I/S

Constant 1962 .0395

dS/S
- .0414 (1.17)

P/S .3358 (1.11)

-

Wk/S
- .0754 (2.29)

LTD/S .1729 (2.17) .1125 (1.96) .1984 (4.04) .2489 (5.12) .1224 (2.94) .0667 (1.06) .0513 (1.20~

n/s
1.3150 (2.33) 1.7776 (3.20) .7437 (1.21) .8792 (1.34) 1.8020 (3.31) 4.089 (3.56) 2.728 (4.89) .5761 (3.30) .5498 (4.12) .5308 (4.13) .5650 (2.93) .3849 (3.19) .7162 (2.02) .3461 (2.69)

R Adj. .497

(4.l3)*
1963 .0336 (3.56) .0335 (3.53) .0222 (2.32) 0.3930 (4.85) .0444 (2.93) .0434 (4.55)

.0708 (1.38) -.0046 (.10) -.0036 (.06) -.0534 (1.28)

- .1028 (1.25)

.1314 (.39)

-.0701 (2.35) -.0628 (1.85)

- .0896 (2.54)

.640

1964

.515 (1.29) 1.1390 (2.83) .2483 (.82) 1.567 (2.12)

- .4703 (1.61)

.532
I-.

1965

.515

1966

-.1014 (3.39)
-

.536

1967

.0060 (.11)

.282

1968

-.0811 (2.22)

- .0604 (1.86)

.411

Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios (absolute values).

TABLE 3 Regression Results for External Financing ~1odel: French Firms, 1962-68 Dependent Variable: F/S

Constant 1962
- .0139 (2.21)~

I/S 2.511 (3.63) .3909 (4.54) .3793 (4.12) .2151 (3.18) .3336 (3.14) .0926 (2.03) .2579 (1.76)

D/S
- .4635 (1.28)

P/S .0239 (.13) .0900 (.35) .4501 (1.34) -.3548 (1.44) .2791 (.99)
-

Depr/S
- .1312 (2.48)

Wk/S .0425 (2.06) .0071 (.28) .0498 (1.76)

-

LTD/S .2178 (4.76) .1839 (4.23) .0500 (1.08) .Q712 (2.19)

-

2 R Adj. .530

1963

.0185 (2.53)
.0177 (2.40)

.2442 (.53) 1.3040 (2.49) .2206 (.55) -.4779 (.8611)

-

-.0315 (.53) .0331 (.51) -.0740 (1.49) -.0341 (.58)

- .1078 (1.63)

.636

1964

.363

$ I..,

1965

.0045 (.80) -.0201 (2.60) .1044 (0.19) .47 (.41)

.0050 (.23) .0211 (.71) .0047 (.24)

.168

1966

.1473 (3.87) .0307 (1.32) .0335 (.67)

.465

1967

.0986 (.21)

.1875 (.68) .1889 (.62)

.158

1968

-1.303 1.77)

.0675 (.48)

.0659 (1.75)

.144

Numbers in parentheses are i-ratios (absolute values).

14

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