wars with new ,ut often old enemies.

Samuel Huntinton: Clash of Civilizations

From Chapter 1: The New Era in World Politics ntroduction: Fla!s and Cultural dentit" #n $anuar" %& 1''(& a meetin! of )ussian and *merican scholars too+ place in the auditorium of a !overnment ,uildin! in -oscow. Two wee+s earlier the Soviet /nion had ceased to e0ist and the )ussian Federation had ,ecome an independent countr". *s a result& the statue of 1enin which previousl" !raced the sta!e of the auditorium had disappeared and instead the fla! of the )ussian Federation was now displa"ed on the front wall. The onl" pro,lem& one *merican o,served& was that the fla! had ,een hun! upside down. *fter this was pointed out to the )ussian hosts& the" 2uic+l" and 2uietl" corrected the error durin! the first intermission. The "ears after the Cold War witnessed the ,e!innin!s of dramatic chan!es in peoples3 identities and the s"m,ols of those identities. 4lo,al politics ,e!an to ,e reconfi!ured alon! cultural lines. /pside5down fla!s were a si!n of the transition& ,ut more and more the fla!s are fl"in! hi!h and true& and )ussians and other peoples are mo,ilizin! and marchin! ,ehind these and other s"m,ols of their new cultural identities. #n *pril 16& 1''7& two thousand people rallied in Sara8evo wavin! the fla!s of Saudi *ra,ia and Tur+e". 9" fl"in! those ,anners& instead of /.N.& N*T#& or *merican fla!s& these Sara8evans identified themselves with their fellow -uslims and told the world who were their real and not5so5real friends. #n #cto,er 1:& 1''7& in 1os *n!eles ;<&<<< people marched ,eneath =a sea of -e0ican fla!s= protestin! Proposition 16;& a referendum measure which would den" man" state ,enefits to ille!al immi!rants and their children. Wh" are the" =wal+in! down the street with a -e0ican fla! and demandin! that this countr" !ive them a free education>= o,servers as+ed. =The" should ,e wavin! the *merican fla!.= Two wee+s later more protectors did march down the street carr"in! an *merican fla!5upside down. These fla! displa"s ensured victor" for Proposition 16;& which was approved ," ?' percent of California voters. n the post5Cold War world fla!s count and so do other s"m,ols of cultural identit"& includin! crosses& crescents& and even head coverin!s& ,ecause culture counts& and cultural identit" is what is most meanin!ful to most people. People are discoverin! new ,ut often old identities and marchin! under new ,ut often old fla!s which lead to

#ne !rim Weltanschauun! for this new era was well e0pressed ," the @enetian nationalist dema!o!ue in -ichael Ai,din3s novel& Aead 1a!oon: =There can ,e no true friends without true enemies. /nless we hate what we are not& we cannot love what we are. These are the old truths we are painfull" rediscoverin! after a centur" and more of sentimental cant. Those who den" them den" their famil"& their herita!e& their culture& their ,irthri!ht& their ver" selvesB The" will not li!htl" ,e for!iven.= The unfortunate truth in these old truths cannot ,e i!nored ," statesmen and scholars. For peoples see+in! identit" and reinventin! ethnicit"& enemies are essential& and the potentiall" most dan!erous enmities occur across the fault lines ,etween the world3s ma8or civilizations. The central theme of this ,oo+ is that culture and cultural identities& which at the ,roadest level are civilization identities& are shapin! the patterns of cohesion& disinte!ration& and conflict in the post5Cold War world. The five parts of this ,oo+ ela,orate corollaries to this main proposition. Part : For the first time in histor" !lo,al politics is ,oth multipolar and multicivilizationalC modernization is distinct from Westernization and is producin! neither a universal civilization in an" meanin!ful sense nor the Westernization of non5Western societies. Part : The ,alance of power amon! civilizations is shiftin!: the West is declinin! in relative influenceC *sian civilizations are e0pandin! their economic& militar"& and political stren!thC slam is e0plodin! demo!raphicall" with desta,ilizin! conse2uences for -uslim countries and their nei!h,orsC and non5Western civilizations !enerall" are reaffirmin! the value of their own cultures. Part : * civilization5,ased world order is emer!in!: societies sharin! cultural affinities cooperate with each otherC efforts to shift societies from one civilization to another are unsuccessfulC and countries !roup themselves around the lead or core states of their civilization. Part @: The West3s universalist pretensions increasin!l" ,rin! it into conflict with other civilizations& most seriousl" with slam and ChinaC at the local level fault line wars& lar!el" ,etween -uslims and non5-uslims& !enerate =+in5countr" rall"in!&= the threat of ,roader escalation& and hence efforts ," core states to halt these wars. Part @: The survival of the West depends on *mericans reaffirmin! their Western identit" and Westerners acceptin! their civilization as uni2ue not universal and unitin! to renew and preserve it a!ainst challen!es from non5Western societies. *voidance of a !lo,al war of civilizations depends on world leaders acceptin! and cooperatin! to maintain the multicivilizational character of !lo,al politics.

* -ultipolar& -ulticivilizational World n the post5Cold War world& for the first time in histor"& !lo,al politics has ,ecome multipolar and multicivilizational. Aurin! most of human e0istence& contacts ,etween civilizations were intermittent or none0istent. Then& with the ,e!innin! of the modern era& a,out *.A. 1?<<& !lo,al politics assumed two dimensions. For over four hundred "ears& the nation states of the WestD9ritain& France& Spain& *ustria& Prussia& 4erman"& the /nited States& and othersDconstituted a multipolar international s"stem within Western civilization interacted& competed& and fou!ht wars with each other. *t the same time& Western nations also e0panded& con2uered& colonized& or decisivel" influenced ever" other civilization E-ap 1.1F. Aurin! the Cold War !lo,al politics ,ecame ,ipolar and the world was divided into three parts. * !roup of mostl" wealth" and democratic societies& led ," the /nited States& was en!a!ed in a pervasive ideolo!ical& political& economic& and& at times& militar" competition with a !roup of somewhat poorer communist societies associated with and led ," the Soviet /nion. -uch of this conflict occurred in the Third World outside these two camps& composed of countries which often were poor& lac+ed political sta,ilit"& were recentl" independent& and claimed to ,e nonali!ned E-ap 1.(F. n the late 1'6<s the communist world collapsed& and the Cold War international s"stem ,ecame histor". n the post5Cold War world& the most important distinctions amon! peoples are not ideolo!ical& political& or economic. The" are cultural. Peoples and nations are attemptin! to answer the most ,asic 2uestion humans can face: Who are we> *nd the" are answerin! that 2uestion in the traditional wa" human ,ein!s have answered it& ," reference to the thin!s that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestr"& reli!ion& lan!ua!e& histor"& values& customs& and institutions. The" identif" with cultural !roups: tri,es& ethnic !roups& reli!ious communities& nations& and& at the ,roadest level& civilizations. People use politics not 8ust to advance their interests ,ut also to define their identit". We +now who we are onl" when we +now who we are not and often onl" when we +now whom we are a!ainst. Nation states remain the principal actors in world affairs. Their ,ehavior is shaped in the past ," the pursuit of power and wealth& ,ut it is also shaped ," cultural preferences& commonalities& and differences. The most important !roupin!s of states are no lon!er the three ,locs of the Cold War ,ut rather the world3s seven or ei!ht ma8or civilizations E-ap 1.%F. Non5Western societies& particularl" in East *sia& are developin! their economic wealth and creatin! the ,asis for enhanced militar" power and political influence. *s their power and self5confidence increase& non5Western societies increasin!l" assert their own cultural values and re8ect those =imposed= on them ," the West. The =international s"stem of the twent"5first centur"&= Henr" Gissin!er has noted& =. . . will contain at least si0 ma8or powersDthe /nited States&

Europe& China& $apan& )ussia& and pro,a,l" ndiaDas well as a multiplicit" of mediumsized and smaller countries.= Gissin!er3s si0 ma8or powers ,elon! to five ver" different civilizations& and in addition there are important slamic states whose strate!ic locations& lar!e populations& andHor oil resources ma+e them influential in world affairs. n this new world& local politics is the politics of ethnicit"C !lo,al politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalr" of the superpowers is replaced ," the clash of civilizations. n this new world the most pervasive& important& and dan!erous conflicts will not ,e ,etween social classes& rich and poor& or other economicall" defined !roups& ,ut ,etween peoples ,elon!in! to different cultural entities. Tri,al wars and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilizations. @iolence ,etween states and !roups from different civilizations& however& carries with it the potential for escalation as other states and !roups from these civilizations rall" to the support of their =+in countries.= The ,lood" clash of clans in Somalia poses no threat of ,roader conflict. The ,lood" clash of tri,es in )wanda has conse2uences for /!anda& Iaire& and 9urundi ,ut not much further. The ,lood" clashes of civilizations in 9osnia& the Caucasus& Central *sia& or Gashmir could ,ecome ,i!!er wars. n the Ju!oslav conflicts& )ussia provided diplomatic support to the Ser,s& and Saudi *ra,ia& Tur+e"& ran& and 1i,"a provided funds and arms to the 9osnians& not for reasons of ideolo!" or power politics or economic interest ,ut ,ecause of cultural +inship. =Cultural conflicts&= @aclav Havel has o,served& =are increasin! and are more dan!erous toda" than at an" time in histor"&= and $ac2ues Aelors a!reed that =future conflicts will ,e spar+ed ," cultural factors rather than economics or ideolo!".= *nd the most dan!erous cultural conflicts are those alon! the fault lines ,etween civilizations. n the post5Cold War world& culture is ,oth a divisive and a unif"in! force. People separated ," ideolo!" ,ut united ," culture come to!ether& as the two 4erman"s did and as the two Goreas and the several Chinas are ,e!innin! to. Societies united ," ideolo!" or historical circumstance ,ut divided ," civilization either come apart& as did the Soviet /nion& Ju!oslavia& and 9osnia& or are su,8ected to intense strain& as is the case with /+raine& Ni!eria& Sudan& ndia& Sri 1an+a& and man" others. Countries with cultural affinities cooperate economicall" and politicall". nternational or!anizations ,ased on states with cultural commonalit"& such as the European /nion& are far more successful than those that attempt to transcend cultures. For fort"5five "ears the ron Curtain was the central dividin! line in Europe. That line has moved several hundred miles east. t is now the line separatin! the peoples of Western Christianit"& on the one hand& from -uslim and #rthodo0 peoples on the other. The philosophical assumptions& underl"in! values& social relations& customs& and overall outloo+s on life differ si!nificantl" amon! civilizations. The revitalization of reli!ion throu!hout much of the world is reinforcin! these cultural differences. Cultures can chan!e& and the nature of their impact on politics and economics can

var" from one period to another. Jet the ma8or differences in political and economic development amon! civilizations are clearl" rooted in their different cultures. East *sian economic success has its source in East *sian culture& as do the difficulties East *sian societies have had in achievin! sta,le democratic political s"stems. slamic culture e0plains in lar!e part the failure of democrac" to emer!e in much of the -uslim world. Aevelopments in the postcommunist societies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet /nion are shaped ," their civilizational identities. Those with Western Christian herita!es are ma+in! pro!ress toward economic development and democratic politicsC the prospects for economic and political development in the #rthodo0 countries are uncertainC the prospects in the -uslim repu,lics are ,lea+. The West is and will remain for "ears to come the most powerful civilization. Jet its power relative to that of other civilizations is declinin!. *s the West attempts to assert its values and to protect its interests& non5Western societies confront a choice. Some attempt to emulate the West and to 8oin or to =,andwa!on= with the West. #ther Confucian and slamic societies attempt to e0pand their own economic and militar" power to resist and to =,alance= a!ainst the West. * central a0is of post5Cold War world politics is thus the interaction of Western power and culture with the power and culture of non5Western civilizations. n sum& the post5Cold War world is a world of seven or ei!ht ma8or civilizations. Cultural commonalities and differences shape the interests& anta!onisms& and associations of states. The most important countries in the world come overwhelmin!l" from different civilizations. The local conflicts most li+el" to escalate into ,roader wars are those ,etween !roups and states from different civilizations. The predominant patterns of political and economic development differ from civilization to civilization. The +e" issues on the international a!enda involve differences amon! civilizations. Power is shiftin! from the lon! predominant West to non5Western civilizations. 4lo,al politics has ,ecome multipolar and multicivilizational. Cop"ri!ht K 1'': ," Samuel P. Huntin!ton Cop"ri!ht K 1''?51''; 9 T/ Productions *ll ri!hts reserved. Ao not duplicate or redistri,ute in an" form. We respect "our privac".