SPECIAL ARTICLES
Nupi L a n : Manipur Women's Agitation, 1939
Sanamani Yambem
The N u p i Lan, which started as an agitation by Manipuri women against the economic policies of
the Maharaja and the Marwari monopolists, later on changed its character to become a movement for con-
stitutional and administrative reform in Manipur.
The original demands of the women were confined to the banning of rice exports, but later their
demands also included changes in the Darbar and the administrative set-up.
The importance of the N u p i Lan lies in the fact that it prepared the ground for the leading role
played by the women of Manipur in the emergence of a new Manipur after the end of the Second War.
I e r , but also to the women folk. In
'he agrarian economy of Manipur, rice
Introduction plays a crucial role, and the division
TO apologists of the combined feuda of labour between the farmer who
listic-imperialist rule of the Maharaj; grows it and the women who sell the
— Manipur and his Political Agent hnal product is a traditional one. The
The outbreak of the Nupi Lan or the involvement of women with the pro-
women's Agitation of 1939 in Mani- duction and marketing of rice is an
pur was merely an awkward situatior integrated one, from the time of trans-
which Gimson (Political Agent in plantation upto the selling of the
Manipur, 1933-45), had to face;1 bul final produce. The role of women in
to the people of Manipur it market the economy of the state is indeed
a dividing line between the oppressive crucial, and a boycott of the market
economic and administrative policies by them would mean a virtual hartal
followed by the Maharaja and the Poli- of the whole bazar, severely affecting
tical Agent, and the new Manipuj the economy.
which emerged out of the Nupi Lan However, in contrast to this high
The event also showed that political level of participation of the women
consciousness had grown among the in the economy of the state, their so-
people of Manipur. cial status is not enviable. After the
The Nupi Lan, can perhaps be bcttei Manipuri-Burmese War of 1817, and
understood if we have some idea of the seven years of devastation of the
the position of women in Manipuri Manipuri countryside that followed i t ,
society. Women in Manipur hold a the male population of Manipur was
high and free position, and all internal greatly reduced. This probably led to
trade of the country is managed by the ready social sanction given to the
them. The practice, in Maaipur is to practice of polygamy. The result was
have bazars at convenient spots by that Manipuri women, even while they
the roadside where a group of women positively contributed to the economic
gather either in the morning or in the prosperity of the state, also needed to
evening and sell rice, vegetables, fish look for a husband to gain social secu-
tobacco, salt, o i l , baskets and other rity, Thus the woman of Manipur,
things. In Imphal, the capital of Mani- despite her economic 'independence',
pur, there is a market which is be- cannot be termed as an emancipated,
lieved to have been founded by Kha- satisfied participant in Manipuri so-
gemba about the year 1580.2 In this ciety and economy. The Anglo-Mani-
market, k n o w n as Khwairamband Bazar, puri Wax of 1891, further reduced the
over two thousand women occupy re- male population of Manipur 3 result-
gular stalls while an even larger num- ing in the greater acceptance of the
ber are seated outside. The whole mar- practice of polygamy, and increased
ket has always been managed by the dependence on women for the upkeep
women; this practice is still continu- of the family. The Manipuri women
also continued to cherish the feelings
ing. Apart from the economic activi-
of political independence even after
ties, the market is also an important
Manvpur's 'annexation'. When, in 1904
venue of social and political interac-
(just 13 years after 'annexation') the
tion. It was this aspect of the Khwai-
Political Agent, Maxwell, tried to re-
ramband Bazar which played a crucial
introduce Lalup (a system of forced
role in the outbreak of the Nupi Lan
labour which had been abolished) and
in 1939.
force the people of Imphal to rebuild
Rice provides a means of livelihood
not merely to the producers, the farm- the b u n i t - d o w n house of the Assistant
Political Agent, it was the women of
Imphal that rose up in protest. The
violent agitations and demonstrations
led by the market women had to be
dispersed by the use of force but u l t i -
mately the British had to b u i l d the
houses at their own expense.4 When,
in 1925, the state authorities increas-
ed the water tax, there were widespread
demonstrations against this measure.
The main participants in this agita-
tion were again women. 5 The point to
be noticed here is that these agita-
tions were ail led by the tradeswomen,
similar to those that were to take a
leading role in the women's agitation
of 1939.
II
Politics of Rice
British interest in Manipur at the
early stage of their conquest was
purely strategic, and the taking over
of the administration in their hands
was a sequel to the Anglo-Manipuri
War of 1891. 6 Unlike in Mysore and
Baroda where the relations of these
states w i t h the British Government
were allowed to remain more or less
unchanged, Manipur was considered as
a state which had rebelled against the
British as a whole. 7 Manipur, in B r i -
tish eyes, had forfeited its rights to
exist as a separate state.
Direct British administration con-
tinued upto 1907 when Churachand
was installed as the Maharaja. After
the Kuki rebellion of 1919,8 British
administration began to acquire two
major characteristics;
(a) The Maharaja was made respon-
sible for the administration of
the state and was assisted by
a Darbar, the President of
which was selected by the Gov-
ernor of Assam. The Maharaja,
however, had the power to veto
any resolution of the Darbar.
(b) The Darbar was the highest o r i -
825
 February 2 1 , 1976
ginal and appellate court, both
in civil and criminal matters.
The administration of the h i l l areas and
the British Reserve Area was under
the control of the Political Agent, and
was beyond the jurisdiction of the
Darbar.
The opening up of Manipur by the
British had its own economic implica-
tions.'The valley area of Manipur is a
rice growing area and rice is its main
product. While trade between Manipur
and the outside areas in Assam was
conducted even before 1891, it was
only after 1891 that large scale export
of rice began. It was reported as early
as 1892-93 that rice was being freely
exported to Kohima; 9 and it is record-
ed that in 1894-95 some 8,000 maunds
,of rice were exported to Kohima. 10
Upto the t u r n of the century the
export of rice from Manipur was
restricted to the Kohima area; and
considering the fact that at times of
scarcity in the valley there was no
way of importing foodgratns, this ex-
port of rice was considerably checked
and regulated. Apprehensions were ex-
pressed by Maxwell, the Political
Agent, about the possibilities of rice
scarcity. " I still think that when
thousands of people are on the verge
of starvation and there is no means of
importing food to the valley, the ex-
port of rice, however small, should be
prohibited. Let me express the hope
that the occasion may not arise to fight
out this disputed point." Even so, rice
exports for that year (1898-99) was re-
corded as 36,430 maunds. 11
W i t h the turn of the century we
notice that the rice export policy began
to assume a peculiar character. T i l l the
introduction of motor vehicles, rice was
carried mainly in bullock and hand
carts. But w i t h the introduction of
motor vehicular transportation the rice
export trade was captured by the i m -
migrant Marwari entrepreneurs. As
long as the rice trade was under the
control of the local population there
was little resentment against i t ; but
once the Marwaris and the motor vehi-
cles took over, the whole character of
the export trade changed. The first
major impact of the motor vehicular
traffic on the export of rice was felt
in 1925 when export of rice was per-
mitted for a period of only six months,
and was subsequently stopped from
February 1, 1926, because of the rise
in the price of rice. 1 2 It may be noted
that export of rice had been stopped
earlier, in 1921; but while the earlier
embargo was due to genuine scarcity,
the 1925-26 embargo was due to price
rise consequent upon the increased
326
E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
outflow of rice by motorised transport
The question of rice export from
Manipur to British India is closely
linked with the growth of Marwari
capital in Manipur. The Marwari busi-
ness community began their business
at the beginning of this century and
were settled in the British Reserve
Area beyond the jurisdiction of the
State Police. They gradually captured
the cotton and handloom trade. Pro-
minent Marwaris were Kasturichand
and Sons, Ganeshlal, Guru Dayal and
others. 13 The Marwaris excelled in the
export of rice through the growing
vehicular traffic. They made further
progress when the Maharaja and the
Darbar gave them the monopoly of
the Cart Tax, a levy on rice exported.
In 1933 the Cart Tax contract was
transferred from Sadasakh Mansukha
Roy Saroagi to Mangolchand Meghraj,
The following year, Meghraj made a
profit of Rs 33,215 from the Cart Tax
monopoly after paying Rs 73,000 to the
State.14 A year later the state collect-
ed Rs 91,250, out of the total amount
of Rs 1,24,865 realised by the Cart Tax
monopolist. 16
Rice export came under two catego-
ries — the Cart Tax and the L a i Pass.
The former allowed free movement of
rice, the exporters merely paying the
levy known as the Cart Tax. Under
the latter category rice was exported
under a contract between the Manipur
State and the Government of Assam.
Under the Government contract rice
was exported to the Kohima C i v i l Sta-
tion, the Assam Rifles posted at
Kohima, Sadia and other parts of
Assam. We thus notice that there were
two parallel monopolies for the export
of rice: the Cart Tax, a Marwari mono-
poly, and the Lal Pass, a State mono-
poly.
The area under rice cultivation in
Manipur between 1921 and 1939 i n -
creased by merely 18,838 acres, while
the volume of rice exported increased
by 2,92,174 maunds. Rice export from
Manipur reached an all-time record of
3,72,174 maunds in 1938, the year
before the outbreak of the Nupi Lan,
A situation had thus arisen where any
failure of the harvest in the following
year would result in severe shortages.
The accompanying Table indicates the
nature and trend of rice export from
Manipur.
In 1939, while the world saw the
outbreak of the Second W o r l d War,
Manipur witnessed the uprising of its
women. 16 Excessive rain during July-
August of that year had seriously
damaged standing crops. Further heavy
rains in September-October had an
adverse effect upon the harvesting of
early paddy. Again, in mid-November
hailstorm destroyed most of the stand-
ing crops ready for harvesting, and
the harvest was badly affected.17 This
combined w i t h the large quantity of
rice exported in the previous year,
resulted in severe shortages.
In view of the anticipated bad har-
vest the Darbar in its meeting of Sept-
ember 13, 1939 passed a resolution de-
manding that export of rice be stop-
ped. 18 The urgency of the matter was
perhaps realised by the Darbar, for this
particular resolution was placed in ad-
vance of other resolutions of the day.19
The resolution had to gain the concur-
rence of the Maharaja before it be-
came an order; and the Maharaja while
concurring w i t h the Resolution pointed
out that the ban on export would no
apply to the Government contract we
Assam Rifles in Kohima and Sadiya,
The Darbar which again met on Sept-
ember 23 agreed to the request of the
Political Agent for the export of rice
to the Kohima Civil Station. 21 The
Darbar, however, reserved the right to
stop this export anytime; it also ex-
pressed apprehensions about famine in.
Manipur. Under another resolution
passed on the same day, the Darbar
approved a scheme whereby no rice
could be exported from Manipur, w i t h -
out the permission of the Political
Agent. It also defined 'export' as the
movement of rice along the Manipur-
Dimapur Road to any place beyond
Sekmai.22 The Darbar also refused to
grant permission for the export of
chira and ushana (flattened and par-
boiled rice) apprehending that this
would lead to export of rice after be-
ing converted to chira and ushana)
But the Maharaja, while approving
other resolutions of September 23,
1939, did not give his consent to re-
solution No 4, pertaining to the ex-
port of chira and ushana. He argued
that the quantity of ushana and chira
in stock was small and, if they were
not exported ithin a reasonable
period they would rot, as they were
not consumed by the people of M a n i -
pur and Kohima. 24 Meanwhile the
Darbar also refused an appeal from
the Maharaja for allowing export of
rice to the Dacca Battalion. 23 Applica-
tions from individuals asking for the
re-opening of the rice export were also
refused by the Darbar. 28 In fact, at
this period, the Darbar was consider-
ing the idea of having the rice trade
as a state monopoly. 27 However, when
the Darbar met on November 9, 1939,
there was a dramatic reversal in the
rice export policy. Export of rice was
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
to be resumed from November 24,
1939;28 following the orders of the
Maharaja, it was in fact resumed from
November 2 1 , 1939.29
Thus the rice export was stopped
only for a period of forty days —
from September 14 to November 21,
1939. As the discussions and resolutions
passed by the Darbar indicate, the
Darbar was in favour of state mono-
poly of rice export trade as a measure
to control it, However, there was
strong opposition to it from the
Maharaja. It would perhaps not be
wrong, therefore, to assume that the
decision to re-open rice export trade
by the Darbar on. November 21 was
taken under heavy pressure from the
Maharaja, who in turn was pressurised
by the Cart Tax monopolists and other
merchants. This re-opening of the rice
export was directly responsible for the
outbreak of Nupi Lan on December
13, 1939.
Ill
N u p i Lan
Before the outbreak of Nupi Lan,
the price of rice was Rs 1.12.0 per
maund; this rose to two rupees a
maund just before the December
upsurge. 30 According to some partici-
pants in Nupi Lan, the price of rice
was even higher, The price of paddy
too rose sharply. 31 Conditions were fast
approaching a near famine situation
and the main sufferers were the pea-
sants. Since there was no other source
of income or means of livelihood, the
peasants were forced to sell their
stocks of rice to the Marwaris. There
was also a great scarcity of purchase-
able rice. The women who traded in
rice and paddy were now deprived of
their means of livelihood Meanwhile
all available stocks of rice were being
bought by the foreign traders. (Persons
other than the original inhabitants of
Manipur were categorised as foreigners,
and a separate office to deal w i t h them
was maintained by the State.) Foreign
traders had set up rice mills to m i l l
and export rice. This combined w i t h
the bad harvest hit the poor people
hard. 33
On December 11, just before the out-
break, many small traders arrived as
usual at the Khwairamband Bazar, but
there was not even a Meruk (one mexuk
is almost equal to one seer) of rice for
sale. There were fifty to sixty women
retailers that evening and they were all
disappointed to find that there was no
rice to buy. However, they all prepared
for an agitation the next day. Other
campaigns against the price rise were
on the move. L Kanhai and L Babun
campaigned for a boycott of the cinema
halls because of the famine conditions.
They also met the disappointed women
retailers. They immediately went to the
foreign traders' houses to check any buy-
ing of rice from the local farmers. A
rumour meanwhile bad spread that some
bullock cart drivers were being rounded
up by the women and handed over to
the police, 33
On December 12, thousands of women
began gathering around the Darbar
office petitioning for the immediate stop-
page of the export of rice. A b o u t two
February 21, 1978
thousand women gathered under the
guidance of those women who had been
responsible for the rounding up of bul-
lock-cart drivers who had tried to sell
rice to the Marwaris The Darbar ap-
prehended that there would be famine
in Manipur unless the export of rice
was banned. It asked the Land Settle-
ment Officer and Land Revenue Officer
to give an early report on the size of
the year's harvest.34 The President of
the Darbar was also asked to ascertain
the quantity of rice available in the
market, and the average quantity of
rice being exported. 35 The near famine
condition, and the general apprehen-
sions of the people, could perhaps have
been controlled had the Darbar and
the Maharaja taken immediate preven-
tive measures. However, no such
preventive measures were taken.
While the Darbar was in session, the
women demonstrators who had gather-
ed around the office began shouting
slogans — "Stop the export of rice
immediately'', "Stop the running of
mills", etc. The members of the Darbar
fled through the back-door. But
Sharpe, the President of the Darbar,
was immediately surrounded by the
women and had to face them alone.
He told them that orders for a ban on
the export of rice could not be issued
without the sanction of the Maharaja
who was away at Nawadeep on pilgrim-
age. The women — whose number
had by then swollen to about 4,000
— then went along w i t h Sharpe to the
telegraph office, and confined h i m , the
Civil Surgeon and other officers there, 36
They refused to allow the President of
the Darbar and other officers to leave
the telegraph office u n t i l the receipt of
the necessary orders from the Maharaja,
They also prevented the Commandant
of the 4th Assam Rifles who had arrived
there on hearing about the confinement
of the officers) from rescuing the con-
fined men. At about 2.45 in the after-
noon, when a platoon of the Assam Ri-
fles arrived .the women seemed to weak-
en a little at the sight of guns and bay-
onets. At this moment one of the wo-
men from the crowd repeatedly shouted
"Vande Mataram" and "Manipur Mata
Ki Jai". 37 This raised their morale and
they became more militant and aggres-
sive. The situation became so dangerous
that the sentry on the steps of the office
sounded his bugle, and the troops charg-
ed in to clear the grounds. Amidst a
fusilade of stone, the women were push-
ed back. But although the ground was
cleared the women did not disperse;
they remained on the road outside the
compound. It was not until midnight
327
 ECONOMIC A N D POLITICAL WEEKLY
February 2 1 , 1076
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
that the officers could leave the tele-
graph office, In the event, 21 women
were seriously injured, some receiving
bayonet wounds. 34 This was denied by
the officials; five women were removed
to the Civil Hospital while the others
received first aid in the compound of
the telegraph office.39 The magnitude
and intensity of the women's agitation
can perhaps be judged from the fact that
troops had to be called to disperse them
and maintain law and order. The firm-
ness of conviction and the singleminded.
ness of the women who agitated that
day cannot be underestimated, especial-
ly in view of the fact that this was
achieved w i t h o u t male leadership or
participation.
It w o u l d be proper at this point to
consider whether the agitations of
December 12 were w h o l l y spontaneous.
The women possessed a high degree of
conciousness and it is possible that
they themselves organised the agitation.
Some women even lay down in front
of the lorries loaded w i t h rice and
ready to move c u t It is thus clear
that Manipur women never lacked m i l i -
tancy once they were convinced of their
purpose.
On December 14 the President of
the Darbar received a message from
the Maharaja asking the Political
Agent to stop the export of rice, and
an order banning it was promptly
issued. The women then turned their
attention to the rice mills. They were
able to extract written promises from
the m i l l owners that they w o u l d not
run their mills. However news of a
m i l l owner who had soaked rice and
boiled some paddy to convert it into
par-boiled rice, led to some 10,000
women marching that night to one of
the largest rice mills. It was only after
the removal of electrical connections
to the mills that the women could be
persuaded to go home.
On December 15 the Darbar con-
sidered whether the telegram of the
Maharaja implied a ban on the export
of rice to the Kohima C i v i l Station and
Assam Rifles at Kohima and Sadiya.
This was not clearly indicated in the
Maharaja's telegram. In view of the
agitation a resolution sanctioning
t h i r t y state m i l i t a r y police and fifteen
Dolai Pabas at the disposal of the
Police Member was adopted. The
Darbar's action showed that it was not
always necessary to receive the Maha-
raja's prior approval for the implementa-
tion of an order. The women agitators
therefore had a point when they urged
that the Darbar need not wait for the
Maharaja's sanction for the imposition
of an embargo on rice export
IV
Role of Manipuri M e n
While the women of Manipur were
agitating, what were the men doing?
On the evening of December 12, the
Branch Secretary of the N i k h i l Mani-
puri Mahasabha, L Kanhai Singh, and
T Ibotombi Singh, along w i t h others
requested the elders of the Mahasabha
to discuss the agitation of the women.
The Mahasabha, however, said that it
had nothing to do w i t h i t . On the
contrary, it suggested that an appeal
should be made to the Judicial Mem-
ber of the Darbar. These young mem-
bers of the Mahasabha had therefore
no alternative but to wait for the
arrival of the President of the Maha-
sabha Hijam lrabot Singh, who was
then away at Cachar. On December 13,
a meeting called "by the dissenting
members of the Mahasabha was held at
the Police Bazar, as the Khwairamband
Bazar market was under a hartal. This
was a small gathering which passed off
peacefully.
W i t h the arrival of lrabot Singh at
Imphal on December 16, the N u p i Lan
entered a new phase. The upsurge
which so far had been led solely by
the women, now received male sup-
port. The day after his arrival lrabot
called a meeting of the w o r k i n g com-
mittee of the N i k h i l Manipuri Maha-
sabha to discuss the N u p i Lan: in this
meeting, sharp differences between
lrabot and other members were
revealed. The other members of the
Mahasabha were against the move-
ment, and lrabot opted out of the
Mahasabha. On December 24 he form-
ed a new political organisation called
Manipur Praja Samelini at a meeting
held at the Police Grounds. 40
The tempo of this movement, parti-
cularly among the women, was further
revived on December 29. Seme rice
carters who had been thrown i n t o the
gutters by the women agitators lodged
a complaint w i t h the Political Agent
and named five women as the assail-
ants. The Agency police thereupon
asked the State police to produce the
women for recording their statements.
A large crowd of women objected to
this. They beseiged the Inspector of
the State Police Thana for several hours
for having kicked a Manipuri Brahmin
woman, Chhabi, in front of the
people.41
From December 13 the women had
boycotted the Khwairamband Bazar,
Large public meetings were organised
w i t h lrabot as the principal speaker.
Under his leadership, Manipuri men
also took part in the movement At a
February 2 1 , 1976
meeting held at the Police Bazar on
January 9, 1940, lrabot was arrested
under section 124 of the Indian Penal
Code. He was charged w i t h making
inflammatory speeches. On March 22
the Darbar passed a resolution to keep
lrabot under arrest for three years. He
was to be kept at the Imphal Jail for
some time before being taken to
Cachar Jail, The Darbar passed another
order prohibiting all public gatherings
in the Police Bazar from January 13,
1940. This, however, did not deter the
people from organising meetings at
places other than the Police Bazar.
After the arrest of lrabot, his follow-
ers took up the cause of the women. L
Kanhai led and organised numerous
meetings all over Imphai except the
Police Bazar. A form of Civil Dis-
obedience movement then followed,
and many people began refusing to
pay the feudal dues and taxes like the
Panchanapet (five anna) tax. In May
1910, the members of the Praja Same-
lini built a bamboo bridge at Naharup,
thereby defying the ferry tax order.
Thus the movement initiated by the
women received active support from
their male counterparts.
The boycott of the Khwairamband
Bazar continued and this became a
matter of concern to the authorities
since the economy of the state w o u l d
suffer if women continued the boycott.
The situation did not improve through-
out 1940. This led the Governor of
Assam to demand a full detailed report
on the situation." Gimson in his reply
to J P Mills, pointed out that the boy-
cott of the Bazar began on December
12, 1939, as a spontaneous protest
against what was called the "Bayonet
Charge" and continued as a protest
against foreign merchants. As long as
the leaders of the agitation were
active, the boycott was complete. But
after the arrest of four women leaders
in January 1940, the situation was
near normal- though the Women's
Bazar continued to be empty. In
August, the Political Agent issued an
order that, since the stalls in the
Women's Bazar had been empty for so
long, he would allot them to anyone he
chose. Even this threat d i d net bring
back the women, though it gave rise
to some excitement. However, Gimson
did not make any new allotment as that
would have led to ill-feeling and resent-
ment43
After the order of August 1940, the
women filed a petition signed by K u -
mar! and Rajani of Sagolhand, Maipak-
pi of Thangmeiband, Sanatombi of
Bramhapur, Nainbi of Segalambi and
Ibemcha of Nongmeibung. They point-
329
February 21, 1978
ed out that their main grievances were
(a) the unfitness of the present Darbar
members, (b) the unfitness of the Police
Member, (c) the illegal action cf the
Inspector of Police, (d) the illegal con-
viction of the four women, (e) the
unexpected police assualt on the public
on January 14, 1940, and (f) the illegal
action of Dulap Singh, A m i n , They
assured that as soon as these grievances
ECONOMIC A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
were redressed they would attend the
Bazar.44
The handling of the Women's Boy-
cott, in contrast to the Bayonet Charge,
showed that the authorities had some
appreciation of the militancy of the
women of Manipur. Gimson noted
that "economic distress or political ex-
citement may lead the women of Mani-
pur to take up other forms of agita-
tions, as they had done is the past.' 45
By the time (he boycott was in full
swing, the state authorities had begun
to consider the women as a force to
reckon w i t h . Their handling of the
boycott showed a far greater degree of
caution than the action taken by them
in the telegraph office incident of
December 12, 1939.
The grievances of the women were
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY
not immediately redressed; but the
women certainly made themselves felt.
But the boycott itself came to an end,
w i t h most of the population of Imphal
fleeing for safety as the War approach-
ed Manipur.
V Notes
Conclusions
The Nupi Ian movement of 1939
was based on genuine fears and ap-
prehensions arising out of uncontrolled
export of rice from Manipur, These
fears were further aggravated by the
heavy rains and floods of 1939. The
immediate cause of the movement,
therefore, was the i n i t i a l impact of
the price rise and scarcity conditions on
the women, who were more vocal and
volatile than the male section of the
manipuri society. It was they who
initiated the agitation and sustained
it.
W h i l e a movement for constitutional
reforms in Manipur had been initiated
in 1938, it was the Nupi Lan which
brought the matter to a head and
focussed on the inadequacies in both
the economic and administrative
policies of the Manipur State. While
the original demands of the women
were confined to the banning of rice
export, their later demands also i n -
cluded changes in the Darbar and
administrative set-up. The Nupi Lan,
while postponing consideration of
further reforms, nevertheless emphasis-
ed the need for them. In so far as the
male participation and the role of
Irabot is concerned, it is quite likely
that had Jrabot not appeared at that
particular moment on the scene, the
movement of the women might not
have received the required political
support. It might have remained a
purely women's agitation. But despite
the role of Irabot and the participation
of the males, it was the women who
rose up in protest and who kept the
movement alive. The boycott of the
market for more than one and a half
years certainly convinced the state
authorities that the women of Manipur
could take up any form of agitation
once they were convinced of their pur-
pose.
It would perhaps not be very far
f r o m the t r u t h to conclude that the
Nupi Lan, which started as a rice agita-
t i o n directed against the economic
policies of the Maharaja and the Mar-
wari monopolists, later on changed its
character to become a movement for
constitutional and administrative re-
forms in Manipur. The uniqueness of
the movement, however, lies in the
fact that in the emergence of a new
Manipur after the end of the Second
World War, it was the women of Mani-
pur who were in the vanguard of
change.
1 Evans, Geoffery and Brat, James
Anthony, "Imphal", London, 1962,
p 20.
2 Hudson. T C, "The M e i t e i s ,
London, 1908, p 23,
3 The actual population figures are
not available as the records of the
1891 Census held before the War
were destroyed in the Anglo-
Manipuri War of 1891.
4 Ried, Robert, "History of the
Frontier Areas Bordering Assam'',
Shillong, 1942, p 89.
5 Administrative Report on the
State of Manipur, 1923-24, Imphal,
6 Laldena, "British Policy Towards
Manipur, 1891-1919'', unpublished
M Phil thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru
University, 1973, pp 18, 58.
7 Ried, Robert, op cit, p 7 1 ,
8 See G Bhadra, " K u k i Uprising: Its
Causes and Nature'', paper for
private circulation.
9 Administrative Report for the
State of Manipur, 1892-93. p 6.
10 Administrative Report for the
State of Manipur, 1894-95, p 5,
13 Administrative Report for the
State of Manipur, 1898-99, p 2.
12 Administrative Report for the
State of Manipur, 1925-26, p 5.
13 " N u p i Lan, 1939', The Lamyanba,
V o l 5, No 51, December 1973.
14 Administrative Report for the
State of Manipur, 1933-34, p 7.
J5 Administrative Report for the
State of Manipur, 1934-35, p 6,
16 It was a strong belief among the
Manipuris that the years 1939-
1940 and 1941 would be years of
trouble in Manipur. They further
believed that this was in accord-
ance w i t h the predictions of the
Puranas. The outbreak of the
Women's War in 1939 confirmed
this belief among the local popula-
tion.
17 Administrative Report for the
State of Manipur, 1939-40, p 5.
18 Manipur State Darbar Resolution
No 11, Memo No 10589 of 13-9-
1939.
19 Sharpe, President, Manipur State
Darbar, to Churachand, the Maha-
raja of Manipur, 13-9-1939; here-
inafter referred to as Sharpe to
Churachand or vice versa,
20 Churachand to Sharpe, Memo No
287, p 1, dated 14-9-1939.
21 Manipur State barbar Resolution
No 1 of 23-9-1939.
22 Marapur State Darbar Resolution
No 3 of 23-9-1939.
23 Manipur State Darbar Resolution
No 4 of 23-9-1939; Sharpe to
Churachand Memo No 1120 G of
24-9-1939.
24 Churachand to Sharpe, Memo No
329, PT-1. dated 24-9-1939.
25 Manipur State Darbar Resolution
No 15 of 4-10-1939; and Private
February 2 1 , 1976
Secretary/Churachand to Sharpe,
Memo No 2698-S & J of 28-9-1939.
26 Manipur State Darbar Resolution
No 17 of 16-10-1939.
27 Manipur State Darbar Resolution
No 13 of 1-11-1939, Memo
1416G/1B-1 of 3-11-1939.
28 Manipur State Darbar Resolution
No 1 of November 9, 1939t Memo
No 1433G/1-B1 of November 9,
1939.
29 Memo No 501 PI-1 dated Novem-
ber 21, 1939.
30 Administrative Report for the State
, of Manipur, 1940-41.
31 Ebon, (Manipuri Daily), 12-12-
1973: interview w i t h L Kanhai
Singh, p 2,
32 Administrative Report for the
State of Manipur, 1939-40.
33 Larnyanba, op cit, p 33-4.
34 According to the report submitted
to the Darbar by the Land Settle-
ment Officer and Land Revenue
Officer on the size of the harvest
of the year 1939, there were ap-
proximately 7,400 paris of land un-
der rice cultivation, (one pari be-
ing about 2.5 acres). The area
damaged by Hoods was about 900
paris, and the average yield per
pari was 29 pots (one pot being
about 65 seers). Thus the amount
of paddy available for consump-
tion was about 17.50,000 pots; and
putting the population of the
State at 3,00,000 (1931 Census
figure being 2,84,843). and the per
capita consumption per year at 6
pots, the m i n i m u m requirement
was less than 18,00,000 pots. A n d
considering that fact that already
a large quantity had already been
exported, the Darbar did not rule
out the possibility of rice scarcity
in Manipur before the following
year's harvest, (Manipur State
Darbar Resolution No 12 of Janu-
ary 10, 1940, Memo No 2210G/
IB-I of January 12, 1940.)
35 Manipur State Darbar Resolution
No 1 of December 12, 1939,
Memo No 1973-G/IB-1 of Decem-
ber 15, 19:39.
36 The Hindu, Madras, 18-12-1939.
37 Lamyanba, op cit, p 37.
38 Ibid
39 The Pioneer, Lucknow, 19-12-
1939.
40 ''Manipur Itihasta Nupi Lan''
40 Lannianha, Vol 5, No 52, lanuary
1974.
41 Administrative Report for the
State of Manipur, 1939-40, p 2;
and Petition filed by the women
of Manipur to the Political Agent,
Imphal, dated September 25, 1940.
42 M i l l s , Secretary to the Governor
of Assam to Gimson Political
Agent in Manipur, Confidential,
DO No 710C Shiliong, dated 13-11-
1940, hereinafter referred to as
Mills to Gimson or vice versa.
31 Gimson to M i l l s , Confidential DO
No 5660 GA Imphal dated 21-3-
1941.
44 Petition filed by the women mass
of Manipur to the Political Agent,
dated 25-9-1940.
45 Gimson to Mills, op cit
823