Why and how should civil servants be subjected to political control?

The issue of how should civil servants be subjected to political control can be traced to the fundamental questions of how the role and powers of the state should be distributed in a polity. The concept of a civil service/bureaucracy subjected to the control of the government of the day is essentially a twentieth-century phenomenon, and its characteristics were set out in 1920 by the German sociologist Max Weber. Weber postulated that there should be clear separation between politics and administration and therefore distinct roles for political leaders (normally elected) and state officials/civil servants (normally appointed) (Minogue, 1998:3). And since, no longer can civil servants be dismissed as mere administrators or policy implementers, but rather they are key figures in the policy process, and even some times run their countries, thus the organization and control of civil servants/bureaucratic power is therefore one of the most pressing problems in modern politics, and one that no political system has found easy to solve (Heywood, 2007). Moreover, the Civil service which the civil servant belongs to is a permanent service and members of it would not normally expect to take up or quit office on a change of Government. Civil servants must therefore be in a position to serve all Governments of whatever complexion with equal loyalty and to obtain the confidence of Ministers irrespective of their political party. The duality of this relationship between civil servants and politicians is explained further by Appiah (1996) as he no tes that once politicians bring politics into government, politics is embedded in the state. As such a governments authority will always be political and politics and administration will always be related (Appiah, 1996:210). This emphasizes the special relationship between the civil servant and the government of the day which places responsibilities vis--vis the Government on the Civil servant which ordinary members of the community do not share (ibid). Adu (1969) describes this special relationship as follows:
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As a servant of the state, the civil servants first loyalty is to the state. Since the Government is charged, by popular choice, with the control and administration of the affairs of the state, the civil servants loyalty is to the Government of the day, and he should appropriately feel a positive and consistent responsibility to prosecute the interests of the Government as his employer (Adu, 1969:24). It has been said, therefore, that the civil servants inability to implement the governments policies faithfully and efficiently, not only impedes these policies but it might seriously undermine the governments position and stability. Perhaps, this explains why politicians have always aimed to a larger extent to control their civil servants, to make sure that civil servants have a positive attitude towards the ideology and policies of the ruling government. Adu (1969) also cautions that these special responsibilities of the Civil Servant to the government should be matched also by the special responsibility of the government to its Civil Servants. By nature of their work, Civil Servants are often subject to public criticism in newspapers, in Parliament and on political platformsThe Civil Servant is, however, debarred from replying publicly to public criticisms since he has no voice but that of his Minister. The Minister is in honour bound, therefore, to defend his Civil Servants from criticism or attack in respect of acts which they carry out in their official capacities Adu (1969:30). Not only are political control and accountability mechanisms key factors for the effective and efficient implementation of the public policies, they are also about getting the basics rightthey are the foundations upon which public administrations rest and which enable them to conduct their core functions of policymaking, budget allocation and delivery of goods and services. Now, the question is how civil servants should be subjected to political control?
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This can only be done if civil servants, particularly those in the higher ranks, exercise special restraint in political matters. Control is overtly established through a system of political appointment. Thus, in order to clarify the civil servants whose political control and loyalty were central to the quest for a representative bureaucracy, the Civil Service in Ghana, for example divided civil servants according to posts into four categories, A, B, C, D. Category A posts included the very top echelon of the bureaucracy- Permanent secretaries (Chief Directors). Category A civil servants hold their posts subject to complet e confidence of the Ministers whom they advise and to whom they are responsible for organizing the execution of government business. If that confidence should be destroyed or if there should be disharmony between such an officer and his Minister, it would clearly be in the over-riding interests of the state that the Government should be able to divest itself of the services of such an officer without having recourse to the normal disciplinary procedures (Appiah, 1996:212). However, this effectively blurs the distinctions between politics and administration, and between politicians and public officials. For example in Ghana, Ayee (1994) notes that the Chief Director (CD), unlike the position of the Permanent Secretary (PS), is appointed by the President in consultation with the Civil Service Council (CSC) and the Public Service Commission (PSC). Like the PS, the CD is a public officer who is appointed from outside the civil service, but is specified in his letter of appointment. This is to ensure that the person appointed has the expertise to handle the onerous functions given that the person appointed has the onerous functions given to him. Moreover, the CD as noted above is generally the chief adviser to the minister on all policies and other matters related to his sector. Specifically, he is expected in relation to the ministry to: (a) provide leadership and guidance for determining policies and objectives within the sector and the implementation of the policies and objectives;
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(b) coordinate work programmes and provide rules, guidance and procedures to facilitate the achievement of targets set by the ministry; (c) ensure the effective organization and development of training programmes consistent with sectoral policies and programmes; (d) establish systems for effective inter-ministerial and sectoral collaboration and cooperation to avoid duplication and to achieve harmonization of programmes; (e) develop systems of effective work-flow and feedback on the activities within the sector; and (f) initiate plans and programmes to achieve and accelerate the decentralization of his sector where required (Republic of Ghana, 1993:11, quoted in Ayee, 1994:20). The Category B posts include Heads of Department and equivalent posts. In Ghana, under the Chief Director (CD) in the ministry are Directors, who like the CD, are appointed by the president in consultation with the Civil Service Council (CSC) and Public Service Commission (PSC). Unlike the CD, however, the Directors hold office as professionals who can be relied upon and also encourage those who want to pursue a career in the civil service to do so without facing competition from outside (ibid). Hence, ministerial accountability, responsibility, answerableness and control in which each Minister is responsible to the Cabinet and ultimately to Parliament for every act done- or omitted to be done-by every civil servant (including daily-paid employees) in his Ministry and Departments under his control constituted the central organizing principle in political control (Appiah, 1996:213). Other important control and accountability mechanisms key to keeping the civil servants subjected to politicians include:

Expenditure controls through budgeting and financial management including procurement;

Administrative controls through personnel and performance management systems Democratic accountability to the legislature and for greater civil society engagement, both to improve policy and to strengthen accountability (Stevens and Teggemann, 2004:72).

Finally, in general the Public Service Commission (PSC) controls the entire Civil Service system of a country. This politically independent body however places bureaucratic autonomy beyond political control. The control of the civil service by the PSC include: the authority for all appointments, promotions, discipline, organization and direction of effort (Appiah, 1996:210). It is also instructive to note that, in sum the question of Why and how civil servants should be subjected to political control? is a mutual one, whilst civil servants are expected to be responsible in the internal organization of the bureaucracy, the minister is externally responsible to the larger representative system. Likewise accountability and answerableness have an internal bureaucratic dimension hierarchically controlled by the minister and an external dimension controlled by parliament and society (Appiah, 1996:211). And unless politicians, civil servants and others connected to the operations of the civil service show the commitment to work in harmony and to cooperate with one another, the civil service will fail in its crucial role of the achievement of good governance, socio-economic development and the welfare of citizens. Thus, governments in both the developed and developing countries institute from time to time, civil service reforms with the aim of enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of their civil services to enable them play their proper role.

References: Ayee, J.R.A. (1994), Civil Service Reform in Ghana: An Analysis of the 1993 Civil Service Law, the Journal of Management Studies, Third Series, Vol.11. Adu, A.L (1969), The Civil Service in Commonwealth Africa: Development and Transition, London: George Allen and Unwin. Appiah, F. (1996), The Search for a Bureaucracy with a Ghanaian Face: Bureaucratic Reorganization and the Politics of Institutionalization of a Political Regime in PostColonial Ghana, 1957-1993, Department of Administration and Organization Theory, University of Bergen, Norway (PhD Dissertation). Heywood, A (2007), Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, UK. Stevens, M and Teggemann, S (2004), Comparative Experience with Public Sector Reforms in Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia, in Brian Levy and Sahr Kpundeh Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons, WBI Development Studies, US. Minogue, M (1998), The Internationalization of New Public Management, in Willy McCourt and Martin Minogue The International of Public Management: Rein venting the Third State, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK.