EN BANC [G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008] ABAKADA GURO PART !"#T $%OR&ER!

AA#'#( ) O%%"CER#*&E&BER# #A&#ON #. A!CANTARA, ED +"NCENT #. A!BANO, RO&EO R. ROB"#O, RENE B. GORO#PE AND ED,"N R. #ANDO+A!, PET"T"ONER#, +#. -ON. CE#AR +. PUR"#"&A, "N -"# CAPAC"T A# #ECRETAR O% %"NANCE, -ON. GU"!!ER&O !. PARA NO, 'R., "N -"# CAPAC"T A# CO&&"##"ONER O% T-E BUREAU O% "NTERNA! RE+ENUE, AND -ON. A!BERTO D. !"NA, "N -"# CAPAC"T A# CO&&"##"ONER O% BUREAU O% CU#TO&#, RE#PONDENT#. DEC"#"ON CORONA, '.. This petition for prohibition[1] seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 933 [!] (Attrition Act of !"" )# RA 933 $as enacted to optimi%e the revenue&generation capabilit' and collection of the (ureau of )nternal Revenue (()R) and the (ureau of *ustoms ((+*)# The la$ intends to encourage ()R and (+* officials and emplo'ees to e,ceed their revenue targets b' providing a s'stem of re$ards and sanctions through the creation of a Re$ards and )ncentives -und (-und) and a Revenue .erformance /valuation (oard ((oard)#[3] )t covers all officials and emplo'ees of the ()R and the (+* $ith at least si, months of service0 regardless of emplo'ment status# [1] The -und is sourced from the collection of the ()R and the (+* in e,cess of their revenue targets for the 'ear0 as determined b' the 2evelopment (udget and *oordinating *ommittee (2(**)# An' incentive or re$ard is taken from the fund and allocated to the ()R and the (+* in proportion to their contribution in the e,cess collection of the targeted amount of ta, revenue# [ ] The (oards in the ()R and the (+* are composed of the 3ecretar' of the 2epartment of -inance (2+-) or his4her 5ndersecretar'0 the 3ecretar' of the 2epartment of (udget and 6anagement (2(6) or his4her 5ndersecretar'0 the 2irector 7eneral of the 8ational /conomic 2evelopment Authorit' (8/2A) or his4her 2eput' 2irector 7eneral0 the *ommissioners of the ()R and the (+* or their 2eput' *ommissioners0 t$o representatives from the rank&and&file emplo'ees and a representative from the officials nominated b' their recogni%ed organi%ation# [9] /ach (oard has the dut' to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation0 distribution and release of the -und: (!) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and emplo'ees $hose revenue collection falls short of the target: (3) terminate personnel in accordance $ith the criteria adopted b' the (oard: (1) prescribe a s'stem for performance evaluation: ( ) perform

other functions0 including the issuance of rules and regulations and (9) submit an annual report to *ongress#[;] The 2+-0 2(60 8/2A0 ()R0 (+* and the *ivil 3ervice *ommission (*3*) $ere tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 933 0 [<] to be approved b' a =oint *ongressional +versight *ommittee created for such purpose# [9] .etitioners0 invoking their right as ta,pa'ers filed this petition challenging the constitutionalit' of RA 933 0 a ta, reform legislation# The' contend that0 b' establishing a s'stem of re$ards and incentives0 the la$ >transform[s] the officials and emplo'ees of the ()R and the (+* into mercenaries and bount' hunters> as the' $ill do their best onl' in consideration of such re$ards# Thus0 the s'stem of re$ards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionall' mandated dut' of these officials and emplo'ees to serve the people $ith utmost responsibilit'0 integrit'0 lo'alt' and efficienc'# .etitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the s'stem of re$ards and incentives onl' to officials and emplo'ees of the ()R and the (+* violates the constitutional guarantee of e?ual protection# There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to $h' such a s'stem should not appl' to officials and emplo'ees of all other government agencies# )n addition0 petitioners assert that the la$ undul' delegates the po$er to fi, revenue targets to the .resident as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter# @hile 3ection ;(b) and (c) of RA 933 provides that ()R and (+* officials ma' be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target b' at least ;# A0 the la$ does not0 ho$ever0 fi, the revenue targets to be achieved# )nstead0 the fi,ing of revenue targets has been delegated to the .resident $ithout sufficient standards# )t $ill therefore be eas' for the .resident to fi, an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss ()R or (+* personnel# -inall'0 petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of po$ers# @hile the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the la$0 the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the la$# )n their comment0 respondents0 through the +ffice of the 3olicitor 7eneral0 ?uestion the petition for being premature as there is no actual case or controvers' 'et# .etitioners have not asserted an' right or claim that $ill necessitate the e,ercise of this *ourtBs Curisdiction# 8evertheless0 respondents ackno$ledge that public polic' re?uires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case# The' assert that the allegation that the re$ard s'stem $ill breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the la$# 3een in conCunction $ith the declared obCective of RA 933 0 the la$ validl' classifies the ()R and the (+* because the functions the' perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities# 6oreover0 the la$ provides a sufficient standard that $ill guide the e,ecutive in the implementation of its provisions# Dastl'0 the

creation of the congressional oversight committee under the la$ enhances0 rather than violates0 separation of po$ers# )t ensures the fulfillment of the legislative polic' and serves as a check to an' over&accumulation of po$er on the part of the e,ecutive and the implementing agencies# After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties0 the *ourt finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionalit' in favor of RA 933 0 e,cept as shall hereafter be discussed# ACTUA! CA#E AND R"PENE## An actual case or controvers' involves a conflict of legal rights0 an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of Cudicial adCudication#[1"] A closel' related re?uirement is ripeness0 that is0 the ?uestion must be ripe for adCudication# And a constitutional ?uestion is ripe for adCudication $hen the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it# [11] Thus0 to be ripe for Cudicial adCudication0 the petitioner must sho$ a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an inCur' to himself that can be redressed b' a favorable decision of the *ourt# [1!] )n this case0 aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a Cudicial controvers' b' the mere enactment of the la$ even $ithout an' further overt act0 [13] petitioners fail either to assert an' specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate an' direct adverse effect of the la$ on them# The' are unable to sho$ a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an inCur' to themselves# +n this account0 their petition is procedurall' infirm# This not$ithstanding0 public interest re?uires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised b' petitioners# The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of constitutionalit' in favor of the la$# And $here an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the *onstitution0 it becomes not onl' the right but in fact the dut' of the Cudiciar' to settle the dispute#[11] ACCOUNTAB"!"T O% PUB!"C O%%"CER# 3ection 10 Article 11 of the *onstitution statesE 3ec# 1# .ublic office is a public trust# .ublic officers and emplo'ees must at all times be accountable to the people0 serve them $ith utmost responsibilit'0 integrit'0 lo'alt'0 and efficienc'0 act $ith patriotism0 and Custice0 and lead modest lives# .ublic office is a public trust# )t must be discharged b' its holder not for his o$n personal gain but for the benefit of the public for $hom he holds it in trust# (' demanding accountabilit' and service $ith responsibilit'0 integrit'0 lo'alt'0 efficienc'0 patriotism and Custice0 all government officials and emplo'ees have the dut' to be responsive to the needs of the people the' are called upon to serve# .ublic officers enCo' the presumption of regularit' in the performance of their duties# This presumption necessaril' obtains in favor of ()R and (+* officials and emplo'ees# RA 933 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it b' providing a s'stem of re$ards and sanctions for the purpose

of encouraging the officials and emplo'ees of the ()R and the (+* to e,ceed their revenue targets and optimi%e their revenue&generation capabilit' and collection# [1 ] The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrar' is re?uired to rebut it# )t cannot be overturned b' mere conCecture or denied in advance (as petitioners $ould have the *ourt do) speciall' in this case $here it is an underl'ing principle to advance a declared public polic'# .etitionersB claim that the implementation of RA 933 $ill turn ()R and (+* officials and emplo'ees into >bount' hunters and mercenaries> is not onl' $ithout an' factual and legal basis: it is also purel' speculative# A la$ enacted b' *ongress enCo's the strong presumption of constitutionalit'# To Custif' its nullification0 there must be a clear and une?uivocal breach of the *onstitution0 not a doubtful and e?uivocal one#[19] To invalidate RA 933 based on petitionersB baseless supposition is an affront to the $isdom not onl' of the legislature that passed it but also of the e,ecutive $hich approved it# .ublic service is its o$n re$ard# 8evertheless0 public officers ma' b' la$ be re$arded for e,emplar' and e,ceptional performance# A s'stem of incentives for e,ceeding the set e,pectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public accountabilit'# )n fact0 it recogni%es and reinforces dedication to dut'0 industr'0 efficienc' and lo'alt' to public service of deserving government personnel# )n United States v. Matthews0[1;] the 5#3# 3upreme *ourt validated a la$ $hich a$ards to officers of the customs as $ell as other parties an amount not e,ceeding one&half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the la$s against smuggling# *iting Dorsheimer v. United States0[1<] the 5#3# 3upreme *ourt saidE The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and re$ard their %eal and industr' in detecting fraudulent attempts to evade pa'ment of duties and ta,es# )n the same vein0 emplo'ees of the ()R and the (+* ma' b' la$ be entitled to a re$ard $hen0 as a conse?uence of their %eal in the enforcement of ta, and customs la$s0 the' e,ceed their revenue targets# )n addition0 RA 933 establishes safeguards to ensure that the re$ard $ill not be claimed if it $ill be either the fruit of >bount' hunting or mercenar' activit'> or the product of the irregular performance of official duties# +ne of these precautionar' measures is embodied in 3ection < of the la$E 3/*# <# Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the B ! and the BO". #$% The officials0 e,aminers0 and emplo'ees of the [()R] and the [(+*] $ho violate this Act or $ho are guilt' of negligence0 abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to e,ercise e,traordinar' diligence in the performance of their duties shall be held liable for an' loss or inCur' suffered b' an' business establishment or ta,pa'er as a result of such violation0 negligence0 abuse0 malfeasance0 misfeasance or failure to e,ercise e,traordinar' diligence# E/UA! PROTECT"ON

/?ualit' guaranteed under the e?ual protection clause is e?ualit' under the same conditions and among persons similarl' situated: it is e?ualit' among e?uals0 not similarit' of treatment of persons $ho are classified based on substantial differences in relation to the obCect to be accomplished# [19] @hen things or persons are different in fact or circumstance0 the' ma' be treated in la$ differentl'# )n &ictoriano v. Eli'alde !ope (or)ers* Union0[!"] this *ourt declaredE The guarant' of e?ual protection of the la$s is not a guarant' of e?ualit' in the application of the la$s upon all citi%ens of the [3]tate# )t is not0 therefore0 a re?uirement0 in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against ine?ualit'0 that ever' man0 $oman and child should be affected alike b' a statute# /?ualit' of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merel' as such0 but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them# )t guarantees e?ualit'0 not identit' of rights# T01 Co2st3tut3o2 4o1s 2ot 516u351 t07t t032gs 80390 751 43::1512t 32 :79t ;1 t517t14 32 <78 7s t0oug0 t01= 8151 t01 s7>1. T01 16u7< ?5ot19t3o2 9<7us1 4o1s 2ot :o5;34 43s953>327t3o2 7s to t032gs t07t 751 43::1512t# "t 4o1s 2ot ?5o03;3t <1g3s<7t3o2 80390 3s <3>3t14 13t015 32 t01 o;@19t to 80390 3t 3s 43519t14 or b' the territor' $ithin $hich it is to operate# The e?ual protection of the la$s clause of the *onstitution allo$s classification# *lassification in la$0 as in the other departments of kno$ledge or practice0 is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because the' agree $ith one another in certain particulars# A la$ is not invalid because of simple ine?ualit'# The ver' idea of classification is that of ine?ualit'0 so that it goes $ithout sa'ing that the mere fact of ine?ualit' in no manner determines the matter of constitutionalit'# A<< t07t 3s 516u3514 o: 7 A7<34 9<7ss3:397t3o2 3s t07t 3t ;1 517so27;<1, 80390 >172s t07t t01 9<7ss3:397t3o2 s0ou<4 ;1 ;7s14 o2 su;st72t37< 43st329t3o2s 80390 >7B1 :o5 517< 43::151291s, t07t 3t >ust ;1 g15>721 to t01 ?u5?os1 o: t01 <78C t07t 3t >ust 2ot ;1 <3>3t14 to 1D3st32g 9o243t3o2s o2<=C 724 t07t 3t >ust 7??<= 16u7<<= to 1790 >1>;15 o: t01 9<7ss # This *ourt has held that t01 st724754 3s s7t3s:314 3: t01 9<7ss3:397t3o2 o5 43st329t3o2 3s ;7s14 o2 7 517so27;<1 :ou247t3o2 o5 57t3o27< ;7s3s 724 3s 2ot ?7<?7;<= 75;3t575=# )n the e,ercise of its po$er to make classifications for the purpose of enacting la$s over matters $ithin its Curisdiction0 the state is recogni%ed as enCo'ing a $ide range of discretion# )t is not necessar' that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation# 8either is it necessar' that the classification be made $ith mathematical nicet'# Fence0 legislative classification ma' in man' cases properl' rest on narro$ distinctions0 for the e?ual protection guarant' does not preclude the legislature from recogni%ing degrees of evil or harm0 and legislation is addressed to evils as the' ma' appear# [!1] (emphasis supplied) The e?ual protection clause recogni%es a valid classification0 that is0 a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrar'# [!!] @ith respect to RA 933 0 its e,pressed public polic' is the optimi%ation of the revenue&generation capabilit' and collection of the ()R and the (+*#[!3] 3ince the subCect of the la$ is the revenue& generation capabilit' and collection of the ()R and the (+*0 the incentives and4or sanctions provided in the la$ should logicall' pertain to the said agencies# 6oreover0 the la$ concerns onl' the ()R and the (+* because the' have the common distinct primar' function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of ta,es0 customs duties0 fees and charges#

The ()R performs the follo$ing functionsE 3ec# 1<# +he B,rea, of nternal !even,e# & The (ureau of )nternal Revenue0 $hich shall be headed b' and subCect to the supervision and control of the *ommissioner of )nternal Revenue0 $ho shall be appointed b' the .resident upon the recommendation of the 3ecretar' [of the 2+-]0 shall have the follo$ing functionsE (1) Ass1ss 724 9o<<19t 7<< t7D1s, :11s 724 9075g1s 724 799ou2t :o5 7<< 51A12u1s 9o<<19t14: (!) /,ercise dul' delegated police po$ers for the proper performance of its functions and duties: (3) .revent and prosecute ta, evasions and all other illegal economic activities: (1) /,ercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units: and ( ) .erform such other functions as ma' be provided b' la$#[!1] ,,, ,,, ,,, (emphasis supplied) +n the other hand0 the (+* has the follo$ing functionsE 3ec# !3# +he B,rea, of ",stoms#GHI The (ureau of *ustoms $hich shall be headed and subCect to the management and control of the *ommissioner of *ustoms0 $ho shall be appointed b' the .resident upon the recommendation of the 3ecretar'[of the 2+-] and hereinafter referred to as *ommissioner0 shall have the follo$ing functionsE (1) (!) (3) (1) Co<<19t 9usto> 4ut31s, t7D1s 724 t01 9o551s?o2432g :11s, 9075g1s 724 ?127<t31s: A99ou2t :o5 7<< 9usto>s 51A12u1s 9o<<19t14: /,ercise police authorit' for the enforcement of tariff and customs la$s: .revent and suppress smuggling0 pilferage and all other economic frauds $ithin all ports of entr': 3upervise and control e,ports0 imports0 foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of entr': Administer all legal re?uirements that are appropriate: .revent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its Curisdiction: /,ercise supervision and control over its constituent units: .erform such other functions as ma' be provided b' la$#[! ]

( )

(9) (;)

(<) (9)

,,, ,,, ,,, (emphasis supplied) (oth the ()R and the (+* are bureaus under the 2+-# The' principall' perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through $hich the 3tate e,ercises one of its great inherent functions & ta,ation# )ndubitabl'0 such substantial distinction is germane and intimatel' related to the purpose of the la$# Fence0 the classification and treatment accorded to the ()R and the (+* under RA 933 full' satisf' the demands of e?ual protection# UNDUE DE!EGAT"ON T$o tests determine the validit' of delegation of legislative po$erE (1) the completeness test and (!) the sufficient standard test# A la$ is complete $hen it sets forth therein the polic' to be e,ecuted0 carried out or implemented b' the delegate# [!9] )t la's do$n a sufficient standard $hen it provides ade?uate guidelines or limitations in the la$ to map out the boundaries of the delegateBs authorit' and prevent the delegation from running riot# [!;] To be sufficient0 the standard must specif' the limits of the delegateBs authorit'0 announce the legislative polic' and identif' the conditions under $hich it is to be implemented#[!<] RA 933 ade?uatel' states the polic' and standards to guide the .resident in fi,ing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carr'ing out the provisions of the la$# 3ection ! spells out the polic' of the la$E 3/*# !# Declaration of -olicy# & )t is the polic' of the 3tate to optimi%e the revenue&generation capabilit' and collection of the (ureau of )nternal Revenue (()R) and the (ureau of *ustoms ((+*) b' providing for a s'stem of re$ards and sanctions through the creation of a Re$ards and )ncentives -und and a Revenue .erformance /valuation (oard in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and emplo'ees to e,ceed their revenue targets# 3ection 1 >canali%ed $ithin banks that keep it from overflo$ing> [!9] the delegated po$er to the .resident to fi, revenue targetsE 3/*# 1# !ewards and ncentives .,nd# & A Re$ards and )ncentives -und0 hereinafter referred to as the -und0 is hereb' created0 to be sourced from the collection of the ()R and the (+* in e,cess of t0135 51s?19t3A1 51A12u1 t75g1ts o: t01 =175, 7s 41t15>3214 ;= t01 D1A1<o?>12t Bu4g1t 724 Coo54327t32g Co>>3tt11 $DBCC(0 in the follo$ing percentagesE /,cess of *ollection of the /,cess the Revenue Targets 3"A or belo$ 6ore than 3"A .ercent (A) of the /,cess *ollection to Accrue to the -und &1 A & 1 A of the first 3"A plus !"A of the remaining e,cess

The -und shall be deemed automaticall' appropriated the 'ear immediatel' follo$ing the 'ear $hen the revenue collection target $as e,ceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal 'ear#

R1A12u1 t75g1ts s07<< 51:15 to t01 o53g327< 1st3>7t14 51A12u1 9o<<19t3o2 1D?19t14 o: t01 B"R 724 t01 BOC :o5 7 g3A12 :3s97< =175 7s st7t14 32 t01 Bu4g1t o: ED?1243tu51s 724 #ou591s o: %3272932g $BE#%( su;>3tt14 ;= t01 P51s3412t to Co2g51ss. The ()R and the (+* shall submit to the 2(** the distribution of the agenciesB revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the ()R0 and the collection districts in the case of the (+*# ,,, ,,, ,,, (emphasis supplied) Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection e,pected respectivel' of the ()R and the (+* for a given fiscal 'ear as approved b' the 2(** and stated in the (/3- submitted b' the .resident to *ongress#[3"] Thus0 the determination of revenue targets does not rest solel' on the .resident as it also undergoes the scrutin' of the 2(**# +n the other hand0 3ection ; specifies the limits of the (oardBs authorit' and identifies the conditions under $hich officials and emplo'ees $hose revenue collection falls short of the target b' at least ;# A ma' be removed from the serviceE 3/*# ;# -owers and .,nctions of the Board. / The (oard in the agenc' shall have the follo$ing po$ers and functionsE ,,, ,,, ,,,

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for 51>oA32g :5o> s15A391 o::3937<s 724 1>?<o=11s 80os1 51A12u1 9o<<19t3o2 :7<<s s0o5t o: t01 t75g1t ;= 7t <17st s1A12 724 7 07<: ?15912t $7.5E(, 83t0 4u1 9o2s34157t3o2 o: 7<< 51<1A72t :79to5s 7::19t32g t01 <1A1< o: 9o<<19t3o2 as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act0 su;@19t to 93A3< s15A391 <78s, 5u<1s 724 51gu<7t3o2s 724 9o>?<37291 83t0 su;st72t3A1 724 ?5o914u57< 4u1 ?5o91ss E .rovided0 That the follo$ing e,emptions shall appl'E @here the district or area of responsibilit' is ne$l'&created0 not e,ceeding t$o 'ears in operation0 as has no historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation: and @here the revenue or customs official or emplo'ee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period under consideration unless the transfer $as due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential nonperformance of revenue targetsE .rovided0 ho$ever0 That $hen the district or area of responsibilit' covered b' revenue or customs officials or emplo'ees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about b' natural calamities or force ma0e,re or economic causes as ma' be determined b' the (oard0 termination shall be considered onl' after careful and proper revie$ b' the (oard# (c) To terminate personnel in accordance $ith the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraphE .rovided0 That such decision shall be immediatel' e,ecutor'E .rovided0 further0 That t01 7??<397t3o2 o: t01 953t1537 :o5 t01 s1?757t3o2 o: 72 o::3937< o5 1>?<o=11 :5o> s15A391 u2415 t03s A9t s07<< ;1 83t0out ?51@u4391 to t01 7??<397t3o2 o: ot015 51<1A72t <78s o2 799ou2t7;3<3t= o: ?u;<39 o::3915s 724 1>?<o=11s, su90 7s t01 Co41 o: Co24u9t 724 Et0397< #t724754s o: Pu;<39 O::3915s 724 E>?<o=11s 724 t01 A2t3FG57:t 724 Co55u?t P579t391s A9t :

,,, ,,, ,,, (emphasis supplied) *learl'0 RA 933 in no $a' violates the securit' of tenure of officials and emplo'ees of the ()R and the (+*# The guarantee of securit' of tenure onl' means that an emplo'ee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided b' la$ and onl' after due process is accorded the emplo'ee#[31] )n the case of RA 933 0 it la's do$n a reasonable 'ardstick for removal ($hen the revenue collection falls short of the target b' at least ;# A) $ith due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection# This standard is analogous to inefficienc' and incompetence in the performance of official duties0 a ground for disciplinar' action under civil service la$s# [3!] The action for removal is also subCect to civil service la$s0 rules and regulations and compliance $ith substantive and procedural due process# At an' rate0 this *ourt has recogni%ed the follo$ing as sufficient standardsE >public interest0> >Custice and e?uit'0> >public convenience and $elfare> and >simplicit'0 econom' and $elfare#> [33] )n this case0 the declared polic' of optimi%ation of the revenue&generation capabilit' and collection of the ()R and the (+* is infused $ith public interest# #EPARAT"ON O% PO,ER# 3ection 1! of RA 933 providesE 3/*# 1!# 1oint "on2ressional Oversi2ht "ommittee# GHI There is hereb' created a =oint *ongressional +versight *ommittee composed of seven 6embers from the 3enate and seven 6embers from the Fouse of Representatives# The 6embers from the 3enate shall be appointed b' the 3enate .resident0 $ith at least t$o senators representing the minorit'# The 6embers from the Fouse of Representatives shall be appointed b' the 3peaker $ith at least t$o members representing the minorit'# After the +versight *ommittee $ill have approved the implementing rules and regulations ()RR) it shall thereafter become f,nct,s officio and therefore cease to e,ist# The =oint *ongressional +versight *ommittee in RA 933 $as created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations ()RR) formulated b' the 2+-0 2(60 8/2A0 ()R0 (+* and *3*# +n 6a' !!0 !""90 it approved the said )RR# -rom then on0 it became f,nct,s officio and ceased to e,ist# Fence0 the issue of its alleged encroachment on the e,ecutive function of implementing and enforcing the la$ ma' be considered moot and academic# This not$ithstanding0 this might be as good a time as an' for the *ourt to confront the issue of the constitutionalit' of the =oint *ongressional +versight *ommittee created under RA 933 (or other similar la$s for that matter)# The scholarl' discourse of 6r# =ustice (no$ *hief =ustice) .uno on the concept of congressional oversight in Macalintal v. "ommission on Elections[31] is illuminatingE "oncept and bases of con2ressional oversi2ht (roadl' defined0 t01 ?o815 o: oA15s3g0t 1>;5791s 7<< 79t3A3t31s u2415t7B12 ;= Co2g51ss to 1207291 3ts u2415st72432g o: 724 32:<u1291 oA15 t01 implementation o: <1g3s<7t3o2 3t 07s 1279t14. C<175<=, oA15s3g0t 9o29152s post-enactment >17su51s u2415t7B12 ;= Co2g51ss. $7( to >o23to5

;u517u957t39 9o>?<37291 83t0 ?5og57> o;@19t3A1s, $;( to 41t15>321 801t015 7g12931s 751 ?5o?15<= 74>323st1514, $9( to 1<3>327t1 1D19ut3A1 87st1 724 43s0o21st=, $4( to ?51A12t 1D19ut3A1 usu5?7t3o2 o: <1g3s<7t3A1 7ut0o53t=, 724 $4( to 7ss1ss 1D19ut3A1 9o2:o5>3t= 83t0 t01 9o2g51ss3o27< ?1591?t3o2 o: ?u;<39 32t151st. The po$er of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative po$er itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic s'stem of government# , , , ,, , ,,, +ver the 'ears0 *ongress has invoked its oversight po$er $ith increased fre?uenc' to check the perceived >e,ponential accumulation of po$er> b' the e,ecutive branch# (' the beginning of the !" th centur'0 *ongress has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authorit' to the e,ecutive branch and the administrative agencies# *ongress0 thus0 uses its oversight po$er to make sure that the administrative agencies perform their functions $ithin the authorit' delegated to them# , , , , , , ,,, "ate2ories of con2ressional oversi2ht f,nctions The acts done b' *ongress purportedl' in the e,ercise of its oversight po$ers ma' be divided into three categories0 namel'E scr,tiny0 investi2ation and s,pervision# a. Scr,tiny *ongressional scr,tiny implies a lesser intensit' and continuit' of attention to administrative operations# )ts primar' purpose is to determine econom' and efficienc' of the operation of government activities# )n the e,ercise of legislative scrutin'0 *ongress ma' re?uest information and report from the other branches of government# )t can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agenc' involved# ,,, ,,, ,,,

b. "on2ressional investi2ation @hile congressional scrutin' is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readil' available0 con2ressional investi2ation involves a more intense di22in2 of facts # The po$er of *ongress to conduct investigation is recogni%ed b' the 19<; *onstitution under section !10 Article J)0 ,,, ,,, ,,, c. Le2islative s,pervision The third and most encompassin2 form b' $hich *ongress e,ercises its oversight po$er is thru legislative supervision# >3upervision> connotes a continuing and informed a$areness on the part of a congressional committee regarding exec,tive operations in a given administrative area# @hile both

congressional scrutin' and investigation involve in?uir' into past exec,tive branch actions in order to influence future e,ecutive branch performance0 con2ressional s,pervision allows "on2ress to scr,tini'e the exercise of dele2ated law/ma)in2 a,thority, and permits "on2ress to retain part of that dele2ated a,thority# "on2ress exercises s,pervision over the exec,tive a2encies thro,2h its veto power. t typically ,tili'es veto provisions when 2rantin2 the -resident or an exec,tive a2ency the power to prom,l2ate re2,lations with the force of law. +hese provisions re3,ire the -resident or an a2ency to present the proposed re2,lations to "on2ress, which retains a 4ri2ht4 to approve or disapprove any re2,lation before it ta)es effect. 3uch legislative veto provisions usuall' provide that a proposed regulation $ill become a la$ after the e,piration of a certain period of time0 onl' if *ongress does not affirmativel' disapprove of the regulation in the meantime# Dess fre?uentl'0 the statute provides that a proposed regulation $ill become la$ if *ongress affirmativel' approves it# S,pporters of le2islative veto stress that it is necessar' to maintain the balance of po$er bet$een the legislative and the e,ecutive branches of government as it offers la$makers a $a' to delegate vast po$er to the e,ecutive branch or to independent agencies $hile retaining the option to cancel particular e,ercise of such po$er $ithout having to pass ne$ legislation or to repeal e,isting la$# The' contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountabilit' as it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies# +ne proponent thus e,plainsE )t is too late to debate the merits of this delegation polic'E the polic' is too deepl' embedded in our la$ and practice# )t suffices to sa' that the comple,ities of modern government have often led *ongress&$hether b' actual or perceived necessit'& to legislate b' declaring broad polic' goals and general statutor' standards0 leaving the choice of polic' options to the discretion of an e,ecutive officer# *ongress articulates legislative aims0 but leaves their implementation to the Cudgment of parties $ho ma' or ma' not have participated in or agreed $ith the development of those aims# *onse?uentl'0 absent safeguards0 in man' instances the reverse of our constitutional scheme could be effectedE *ongress proposes0 the /,ecutive disposes# +ne safeguard0 of course0 is the legislative po$er to enact ne$ legislation or to change e,isting la$# (ut $ithout some means of overseeing post enactment activities of the e,ecutive branch0 *ongress $ould be unable to determine $hether its policies have been implemented in accordance $ith legislative intent and thus $hether legislative intervention is appropriate# )ts opponents0 ho$ever0 critici'e the le2islative veto as u24u1 1295o790>12t u?o2 t01 1D19ut3A1 ?515og7t3A1s# The' urge that 72= ?ostF1279t>12t >17su51s u2415t7B12 ;= t01 <1g3s<7t3A1 ;57290 s0ou<4 ;1 <3>3t14 to s95ut32= 724 32A1st3g7t3o2C 72= >17su51 ;1=o24 t07t 8ou<4 u2415>321 t01 s1?757t3o2 o: ?o815s gu7572t114 ;= t01 Co2st3tut3o2 # The' contend that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the .residentBs veto authorit' and intrusion into the po$ers vested in the e,ecutive or Cudicial branches of government# .roponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of po$ers as it prevents the e,ecutive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too much po$er# The' submit that reporting re?uirements and congressional committee investigations allo$ *ongress to scrutini%e onl' the e,ercise of delegated la$&making authorit'# The' do not allo$ *ongress to revie$ e,ecutive proposals before the' take effect and the' do not afford the opportunit' for ongoing and binding e,pressions of congressional intent# )n contrast0 legislative veto

permits *ongress to participate prospectivel' in the approval or disapproval of > s,bordinate law> or those enacted b' the e,ecutive branch pursuant to a delegation of authorit' b' *ongress# The' further argue that legislative veto >is a necessar' response b' *ongress to the accretion of polic' control b' forces outside its chambers#> )n an era of delegated authorit'0 the' point out that legislative veto >is the most efficient means *ongress has 'et devised to retain control over the evolution and implementation of its polic' as declared b' statute#> )n mmi2ration and 5at,rali'ation Service v. "hadha 0 t01 U.#. #u?51>1 Cou5t 51so<A14 t01 A7<343t= o: <1g3s<7t3A1 A1to ?5oA3s3o2s# The case arose from the order of the immigration Cudge suspending the deportation of *hadha pursuant to KL !11(c)(1) of the )mmigration and 8ationalit' Act# The 5nited 3tates Fouse of Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to KL !11(c)(!) authori%ing either Fouse of *ongress0 b' resolution0 to invalidate the decision of the e,ecutive branch to allo$ a particular deportable alien to remain in the 5nited 3tates# The immigration Cudge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement the Fouse order and the alien $as ordered deported# The (oard of )mmigration Appeals dismissed the alienBs appeal0 holding that it had no po$er to declare unconstitutional an act of *ongress# The 5nited 3tates *ourt of Appeals for 8inth *ircuit held that the Fouse $as $ithout constitutional authorit' to order the alienBs deportation and that KL !11(c)(!) violated the constitutional doctrine on separation of po$ers# +n appeal0 the 5#3# 3upreme *ourt declared KL !11(c)(!) unconstitutional# But t01 Cou5t s0314 787= :5o> t01 3ssu1 o: s1?757t3o2 o: ?o815s and instead held that the provision violates the presentment clause and bicameralism# )t held that the one&house veto $as essentiall' legislative in purpose and effect# As such0 it is subCect to the procedures set out in Article ) of the *onstitution re?uiring the passage b' a maCorit' of both Fouses and presentment to the .resident# , , , ,, , ,,, T$o $eeks after the "hadha decision0 the *ourt upheld0 in memorandum decision0 t$o lo$er court decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the 8atural 7as .olic' Act of 19;< and the -ederal Trade *ommission )mprovement Act of 19<"# -ollo$ing this precedence0 lo$er courts invalidated statutes containing legislative veto provisions although some of these provisions re?uired the approval of both Fouses of *ongress and thus met the bicameralism re?uirement of Article )# )ndeed0 some of these veto provisions $ere not even e,ercised# [3 ] (emphasis supplied) )n Macalintal0 given the concept and configuration of the po$er of congressional oversight and considering the nature and po$ers of a constitutional bod' like the *ommission on /lections0 the *ourt struck do$n the provision in RA 91<9 (The +verseas Absentee Joting Act of !""3) creating a =oint *ongressional *ommittee# The committee $as tasked not onl' to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said la$ but also to revie$0 revise0 amend and approve the )RR promulgated b' the *ommission on /lections# The *ourt held that these functions infringed on the constitutional independence of the *ommission on /lections#[39] @ith this backdrop0 it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se0 meaning0 it neither necessaril' constitutes an encroachment on the e,ecutive po$er to implement la$s nor undermines the constitutional separation of po$ers# Rather0 it is integral to the checks and balances

inherent in a democratic s'stem of government# )t ma' in fact even enhance the separation of po$ers as it prevents the over&accumulation of po$er in the e,ecutive branch# Fo$ever0 to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment >be'ond the legislative sphere0> the *onstitution imposes t$o basic and related constraints on *ongress# [3;] )t ma' not vest itself0 an' of its committees or its members $ith either e,ecutive or Cudicial po$er# [3<] And0 $hen it e,ercises its legislative po$er0 it must follo$ the >single0 finel' $rought and e,haustivel' considered0 procedures> specified under the *onstitution0[39] including the procedure for enactment of la$s and presentment# Thus0 an' post&enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutin' and investigation# )n particular0 congressional oversight must be confined to the follo$ingE (1) scrutin' based primaril' on *ongressB po$er of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection $ith it0 its po$er to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard b' either of its Fouses on an' matter pertaining to their departments and its po$er of confirmation[1"] and

(!)

investigation monitoring[11]

and of the implementation of la$s pursuant to the po$er of *ongress to conduct in?uiries in aid of legislation#[1!]

An' action or step be'ond that $ill undermine the separation of po$ers guaranteed b' the *onstitution# Degislative vetoes fall in this class# Degislative veto is a statutor' provision re?uiring the .resident or an administrative agenc' to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a la$ to *ongress $hich0 b' itself or through a committee formed b' it0 retains a >right> or >po$er> to approve or disapprove such regulations before the' take effect# As such0 a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an in$ard&turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutin' and investigation) to an agenc' to $hich *ongress has b' la$ initiall' delegated broad po$ers#[13] )t radicall' changes the design or structure of the *onstitutionBs diagram of po$er as it entrusts to *ongress a direct role in enforcing0 appl'ing or implementing its o$n la$s# [11]

*ongress has t$o options $hen enacting legislation to define national polic' $ithin the broad hori%ons of its legislative competence# [1 ] )t can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the e,ecutive branch the responsibilit' for making necessar' managerial decisions in conformit' $ith those standards#[19] )n the latter case0 the la$ must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions $hen it leaves the hands of the legislature# [1;] Thus0 $hat is left for the e,ecutive branch or the concerned administrative agenc' $hen it formulates rules and regulations implementing the la$ is to fill up details (supplementar' rule&making) or ascertain facts necessar' to bring the la$ into actual operation (contingent rule&making)# [1<] Administrative regulations enacted b' administrative agencies to implement and interpret the la$ $hich the' are entrusted to enforce have the force of la$ and are entitled to respect# [19] 3uch rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute [ "] and are Cust as binding as if the' have been $ritten in the statute itself# As such0 the' have the force and effect of la$ and enCo' the presumption of constitutionalit' and legalit' until the' are set aside $ith finalit' in an appropriate case b' a competent court#[ 1] *ongress0 in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer0 ma' not pass upon their legalit' b' subCecting them to its stamp of approval $ithout disturbing the calculated balance of po$ers established b' the *onstitution# )n e,ercising discretion to approve or disapprove the )RR based on a determination of $hether or not the' conformed $ith the provisions of RA 933 0 *ongress arrogated Cudicial po$er unto itself0 a po$er e,clusivel' vested in this *ourt b' the *onstitution# CON#"DERED OP"N"ON O% &R. 'U#T"CE DANTE O. T"NGA 6oreover0 the re?uirement that the implementing rules of a la$ be subCected to approval b' *ongress as a condition for their effectivit' violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment#[ !] 3ection 10 Article J) of the *onstitution statesE 3ection 1# T01 <1g3s<7t3A1 ?o815 s07<< ;1 A1st14 32 t01 Co2g51ss o: t01 P03<3??321s 80390 s07<< 9o2s3st o: 7 #127t1 724 7 -ous1 o: R1?51s12t7t3A1s 0 e,cept to the e,tent reserved to the people b' the provision on initiative and referendum# (emphasis supplied) Degislative po$er (or the po$er to propose0 enact0 amend and repeal la$s) [ 3] is vested in *ongress $hich consists of t$o chambers0 the 3enate and the Fouse of Representatives# A valid e,ercise of legislative po$er re?uires the act of both chambers# *orrollaril'0 it can be e,ercised neither solel' b' one of the t$o chambers nor b' a committee of either or both chambers# Thus0 assuming the validit' of a legislative veto0 both a single&chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid# Additionall'0 3ection !;(1)0 Article J) of the *onstitution providesE 3ection !;# (1) EA15= ;3<< ?7ss14 ;= t01 Co2g51ss s07<<, ;1:o51 3t ;19o>1s 7 <78, ;1 ?51s12t14 to t01 P51s3412t# )f he approves the same0 he shall sign it0 other$ise0 he shall veto it and return the same $ith his obCections to the Fouse $here it originated0 $hich shall enter the obCections at large in its =ournal and proceed to reconsider it# )f0 after such reconsideration0 t$o&thirds of all the 6embers of such Fouse shall agree to pass the bill0 it shall be sent0 together $ith the obCections0 to the other Fouse

b' $hich it shall like$ise be reconsidered0 and if approved b' t$o&thirds of all the 6embers of that Fouse0 it shall become a la$# )n all such cases0 the votes of each Fouse shall be determined b' yeas or nays0 and the names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in its =ournal# The .resident shall communicate his veto of an' bill to the Fouse $here it originated $ithin thirt' da's after the date of receipt thereof: other$ise0 it shall become a la$ as if he had signed it# (emphasis supplied) /ver' bill passed b' *ongress must be presented to the .resident for approval or veto# )n the absence of presentment to the .resident0 no bill passed b' *ongress can become a la$# )n this sense0 la$& making under the *onstitution is a Coint act of the Degislature and of the /,ecutive# Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act $ith the force of la$0 it cannot take effect $ithout such presentment even if approved b' both chambers of *ongress# )n sum0 t$o steps are re?uired before a bill becomes a la$# -irst0 it must be approved b' both Fouses of *ongress#[ 1] 3econd0 it must be presented to and approved b' the .resident# [ ] As summari%ed b' =ustice )sagani *ru%[ 9] and -r# =oa?uin 7# (ernas0 3#=#[ ;]0 the follo$ing is the procedure for the approval of billsE A bill is introduced b' an' member of the Fouse of Representatives or the 3enate e,cept for some measures that must originate onl' in the former chamber# The first reading involves onl' a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral b' the 3enate .resident or the 3peaker to the proper committee for stud'# The bill ma' be >killed> in the committee or it ma' be recommended for approval0 $ith or $ithout amendments0 sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon# )f there are other bills of the same nature or purpose0 the' ma' all be consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a committee bill# +nce reported out0 the bill shall be calendared for second reading# )t is at this stage that the bill is read in its entiret'0 scrutini%ed0 debated upon and amended $hen desired# The second reading is the most important stage in the passage of a bill# The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are distributed at least three da's before the third reading# +n the third reading0 the members merel' register their votes and e,plain them if the' are allo$ed b' the rules# 8o further debate is allo$ed# +nce the bill passes third reading0 it is sent to the other chamber0 $here it $ill also undergo the three readings# )f there are differences bet$een the versions approved b' the t$o chambers0 a conference committee[ <] representing both Fouses $ill draft a compromise measure that if ratified b' the 3enate and the Fouse of Representatives $ill then be submitted to the .resident for his consideration# The bill is enrolled $hen printed as finall' approved b' the *ongress0 thereafter authenticated $ith the signatures of the 3enate .resident0 the 3peaker0 and the 3ecretaries of their respective chambers### [ 9]

+he -resident*s role in law/ma)in2# The final step is submission to the .resident for approval# +nce approved0 it takes effect as la$ after the re?uired publication#[9"] @here *ongress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the la$ it has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said la$0 the la$ must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions $hen it leaves the hands of the legislature# And it ma' be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature $hen it becomes effective because it is onl' upon effectivit' of the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled b' the language of the statute# 3ubCect to the indispensable re?uisite of publication under the due process clause0 [91] the determination as to $hen a la$ takes effect is $holl' the prerogative of *ongress# [9!] As such0 it is onl' upon its effectivit' that a la$ ma' be e,ecuted and the e,ecutive branch ac?uires the duties and po$ers to e,ecute the said la$# (efore that point0 the role of the e,ecutive branch0 particularl' of the .resident0 is limited to approving or vetoing the la$#[93] -rom the moment the la$ becomes effective0 an' provision of la$ that empo$ers *ongress or an' of its members to pla' an' role in the implementation or enforcement of the la$ violates the principle of separation of po$ers and is thus unconstitutional# 5nder this principle0 a provision that re?uires *ongress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a la$ after it has alread' taken effect shall be unconstitutional0 as is a provision that allo$s *ongress or its members to overturn an' directive or ruling made b' the members of the e,ecutive branch charged $ith the implementation of the la$# -ollo$ing this rationale0 3ection 1! of RA 933 should be struck do$n as unconstitutional# @hile there ma' be similar provisions of other la$s that ma' be invalidated for failure to pass this standard0 the *ourt refrains from invalidating them $holesale but $ill do so at the proper time $hen an appropriate case assailing those provisions is brought before us# [91] The ne,t ?uestion to be resolved isE $hat is the effect of the unconstitutionalit' of 3ection 1! of RA 933 on the other provisions of the la$M @ill it render the entire la$ unconstitutionalM 8o# 3ection 13 of RA 933 providesE 3/*# 13# Separability "la,se# & )f an' provision of this Act is declared invalid b' a competent court0 the remainder of this Act or an' provision not affected b' such declaration of invalidit' shall remain in force and effect# )n +atad v. Secretary of the Department of Ener2y0[9 ] the *ourt laid do$n the follo$ing rulesE The 2eneral r,le is that $here part of a statute is void as repugnant to the *onstitution0 $hile another part is valid0 the valid portion0 if separable from the invalid0 ma' stand and be enforced# The presence of a separabilit' clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separabilit'0 rather than complete nullit' of the statute# To Custif' this result0 the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature $ould have enacted it b' itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionall' enact the other# /nough must remain to make a complete0 intelligible and valid statute0 $hich carries out the legislative intent# , , ,

The exception to the 2eneral r,le is that $hen the parts of a statute are so mutuall' dependent and connected0 as conditions0 considerations0 inducements0 or compensations for each other0 as to $arrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a $hole0 the nullit' of one part $ill vitiate the rest# )n making the parts of the statute dependent0 conditional0 or connected $ith one another0 the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a $hole and $ould not have enacted it if one part is void0 in $hich case if some parts are unconstitutional0 all the other provisions thus dependent0 conditional0 or connected must fall $ith them# The separabilit' clause of RA 933 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach an' invalid provision from the other provisions so that the latter ma' continue in force and effect# The valid portions can stand independentl' of the invalid section# @ithout 3ection 1!0 the remaining provisions still constitute a complete0 intelligible and valid la$ $hich carries out the legislative intent to optimi%e the revenue&generation capabilit' and collection of the ()R and the (+* b' providing for a s'stem of re$ards and sanctions through the Re$ards and )ncentives -und and a Revenue .erformance /valuation (oard# To be effective0 administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or implement e,isting la$ pursuant to a valid delegation# The )RR of RA 933 $ere published on 6a' 3"0 !""9 in t$o ne$spapers of general circulation [99] and became effective 1 da's thereafter#[9;] 5ntil and unless the contrar' is sho$n0 the )RR are presumed valid and effective even $ithout the approval of the =oint *ongressional +versight *ommittee# ,-ERE%ORE0 the petition is hereb' PART"A!! GRANTED. 3ection 1! of RA 933 creating a =oint *ongressional +versight *ommittee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the la$ is declared UNCON#T"TUT"ONA! and therefore NU!! and +O"D. The constitutionalit' of the remaining provisions of RA 933 is UP-E!D# .ursuant to 3ection 13 of RA 933 0 the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect# #O ORDERED# -,no, ". 1., 6,is,mbin2, 7nares/Santia2o, 8,stria/Martine', "arpio Morales, 8'c,na, 5a'ario, &elasco, 1r., 5ach,ra, !eyes, Leonardo/De "astro, and Brion, 11.0 concur# "arpio, 1.0 3ee separate concurring opinion# +in2a, 1.0 .lease see concurring opinion# "hico/

N Advocates and Adherents of 3ocial =ustice for 3chool Teachers and Allied @orkers# [1] 5nder Rule 9 of the Rules of *ourt# [!] An Act to )mprove Revenue *ollection .erformance of the (ureau of )nternal Revenue (()R) and the (ureau of *ustoms ((+*) Through the *reation of a Re$ards and )ncentives -und and of a Revenue .erformance /valuation (oard and for +ther .urposes# [3] 3ection !0 RA 933 # [1] 3ection 30 id# [ ] 3ection 10 id# [9] 3ection 90 id# [;] 3ection ;0 id# [<] 3ection 110 id# [9] 3ection 1!0 id# [1"] *ru%0 )sagani0 .F)D)..)8/ *+83T)T5T)+8AD DA@0 199 edition0 p# !3# [11] (ernas0 =oa?uin0 TF/ 19<; *+83T)T5T)+8 +- TF/ R/.5(D)* +- TF/ .F)D)..)8/3E A *+66/8TARO0 1999 edition0 pp# <1<&<19# [1!] "r,' v. Secretary of Environment and 5at,ral !eso,rces 0 1"" .hil# 9"1 (!""")# (Jitug0 =#0 separate opinion) [13] See La B,2al/B*Laan +ribal 8ssociation, nc. v. !amos 0 7#R# 8o# 1!;<<!0 "1 2ecember !""10 11 3*RA 1# [11] +a9:ada v. 8n2ara0 33< .hil# 19 (199;)# [1 ] 3ection !0 id# [19] "entral Ban) Employees 8ssociation, nc. v. Ban2)o Sentral n2 -ilipinas 0 7#R# 8o# 11<!"<0 1 2ecember !""10 119 3*RA !99# [1;] 1;3 5#3# 3<1 (1<99)# [1<] ;1 5#3# 199 (1<9<)# [19] (DA*PB3 DA@ 2)*T)+8ARO0 3./*)AD 2/ D5Q/ th /dition0 @est0 p# 1<1# [!"] 1 < .hil# 9" (19;1)# [!1] )d# *itations omitted#

[!!] 8mbros v. "ommission on 8,dit0 7#R# 8o# 1 9;""0 3" =une !"" 0 19! 3*RA ;!# [!3] 3ection !0 RA 933 # [!1] 3ection 1<0 *hapter 10 Title ))0 (ook )J0 Administrative *ode of 19<;# [! ] 3ection !30 id# [!9] -elae' v. 8,ditor ;eneral0 1!! .hil# 99 (199 )# [!;] Eastern Shippin2 Lines, nc. v. -OE8, 7#R# 8o# D&;99330 1< +ctober 19<<0 199 3*RA 33# [!<] *ru%0 )sagani0 .F)D)..)8/ .+D)T)*AD DA@0 1991 edition0 p# 9;# [!9] -anama !efinin2 "o. v. !yan0 !93 5#3# 3<< (193 )0 (*ardo%o0 =#0 dissenting)# [3"] 3ection 0 Rule ))0 )mplementing Rules and Regulations of RA 933 # [31] De ;,'man, 1r. v. "ommission on Elections0 391 .hil# ;" (!""")# [3!] See 3ection 19(b)(<)0 *hapter 90 Title )0 3ubtitle A0 (ook J0 Administrative *ode of 19<;# [33] E3,i/8sia -lacement, nc. v. Department of .orei2n 8ffairs 0 7#R# 8o# 1 !!110 19 3eptember !""90 "! 3*RA !9 # [31] 1 3 .hil# <9 (!""3)# 6r# =ustice (no$ *hief =ustice) .unoBs separate opinion $as adopted as part of the ponencia in this case insofar as it related to the creation of and the po$ers given to the =oint *ongressional +versight *ommittee# [3 ] )d# (italics in the original) [39] )d# [3;] Metropolitan (ashin2ton 8irports 8,thority v. "iti'ens for the 8batement of 8ircraft 5oise 0 "1 5#3# ! ! (1991)# [3<] )d# [39] )d# [1"] See 6r# =ustice (no$ *hief =ustice) .unoBs separate opinion in Macalintal# [11] E.2#0 b' re?uiring the regular submission of reports# [1!] See 6r# =ustice (no$ *hief =ustice) .unoBs separate opinion in Macalintal. [13] See Tribe0 Da$rence0 ) American *onstitutional Da$ 131 (!""")# [11] )d#

[1 ] )d# at 111# [19] Metropolitan (ashin2ton 8irports 8,thority v. "iti'ens for the 8batement of 8irport 5oise 0 s,pra# [1;] Ed, v. Ericta0 119 .hil# 199 (19;")# [1<] (ernas0 =oa?uin0 TF/ 19<; *+83T)T5T)+8 +- TF/ R/.5(D)* +- TF/ .F)D)..)8/3E A *+66/8TARO0 !""3 edition0 p# 991 citing (ayman v. So,thward0 1" @heat 1 (1< !) and +he Bri2 8,rora0 ; *r# 3<! (1<13))# [19] Eslao v. "ommission on 8,dit0 7#R# 8o# 1"<31"0 "1 3eptember 19910 !39 3*RA 191: Sierra Madre +r,st v. Secretary of 82ric,lt,re and 5at,ral !eso,rces 0 !"9 .hil# 31" (19<3)# [ "] -eople v. Maceren0 199 .hil# 13; (19;;)# [ 1] 3ee Eslao v. "ommission on 8,dit0 s,pra# [ !] )t is also for these reasons that the 5nited 3tates 3upreme *ourt struck do$n legislative vetoes as unconstitutional in mmi2ration and 5at,rali'ation Service v. "hadha (19! 5#3# 919 [19<3])# [ 3] 8achura0 Antonio (#0 +5TD)8/ R/J)/@/R )8 .+D)T)*AD DA@0 !""9 edition0 p# !39# [ 1] 3ection !90 Article J) of the *onstitution providesE 3ection !9# (1) /ver' bill passed b' the *ongress shall embrace onl' one subCect $hich shall be e,pressed in the title thereof# (!) 8o bill passed b' either Fouse shall become a la$ unless it has passed three readings on separate da's0 and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its 6embers three da's before its passage0 e,cept $hen the .resident certifies to the necessit' of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamit' or emergenc'# 5pon the last reading of a bill0 no amendment thereto shall be allo$ed0 and the vote thereon shall be taken immediatel' thereafter0 and the yeas and nays entered in the =ournal# [ ] See (ernas0 s,pra note 1<0 p# ;9!#

[ 9] .F)D)..)8/ .+D)T)*AD DA@0 !""! edition0 *entral Da$book .ublishing *o#0 )nc#0 pp# 1 !& 1 3# [ ;] TF/ .F)D)..)8/ *+83T)T5T)+8 -+R DA2)/30 7/8TD/6/8 A82 +TF/R30 !""; edition0 Re, (ookstore0 )nc#0 pp# 11<&119# [ <] The conference committee consists of members nominated b' both Fouses# The task of the conference committee0 ho$ever0 is not strictl' limited to reconciling differences# =urisprudence also allo$s the committee to insert ne$ provision[s] not found in either original provided these are germane to the subCect of the bill# 8e,t0 the reconciled version must be presented to both Fouses for ratification# ()d#) [ 9] S,pra note 9#

[9"] S,pra note ;# [91] 3ee 3ection 10 Article ))) of the *onstitution# )n +a9:ada v. +,vera (!3" .hil# !<)0 the *ourt also cited 3ection 90 Article ))) $hich recogni%es >the right of the people to information on matters of public concern#> [9!] As much is recogni%ed in Article ! of the *ivil *ode $hich states that >Da$s shall take effect after fifteen da's follo$ing the completion of their publication either in the +fficial 7a%ette0 or in a ne$spaper of general circulation in the .hilippines0 unless it is other$ise provided#> +a9:ada recogni%ed that >unless it is other$ise provided> referred to the date of effectivit'# 3impl' put0 a la$ $hich is silent as to its effectivit' date takes effect fifteen da's follo$ing publication0 though there is no impediment for *ongress to provide for a different effectivit' date# [93] )t has been suggested b' 6r# =ustice Antonio T# *arpio that 3ection 1! of RA 933 is like$ise unconstitutional because it violates the principle of separation of po$ers0 particularl' $ith respect to the e,ecutive and the legislative branches# )mplicit in this claim is the proposition that the abilit' of the .resident to promulgate implementing rules to legislation is inherent in the e,ecutive branch# There has long been a trend to$ards the delegation of po$ers0 especiall' of legislative po$ers0 even if not e,pressl' permitted b' the *onstitution# ()# *ortes0 Administrative Da$0 at 1!&13#) 2elegation of legislative po$ers is permissible unless the delegation amounts to a surrender or abdication of po$ers# ()d#) Recent instances of delegated legislative po$ers upheld b' the *ourt include the po$er of the 2epartments of =ustice and Fealth to promulgate rules and regulations on lethal inCection (Eche2aray v. Secretary of 1,stice 0 3 < .hil# 11" [199<]): the po$er of the 3ecretar' of Fealth to phase out blood banks (Beltran v. Secretary of <ealth0 7#R# 8o# 13391"0 1339910 R 13911;0 ! 8ovember !"" 0 1;9 3*RA 19<): and the po$er of the 2epartments of -inance and Dabor to promulgate )mplementing Rules to the 6igrant @orkers and +verseas -ilipinos Act# ( E3,i/8sia -lacement v.D.80 7#R# 8o# 1 !!110 19 3eptember !""90 "! 3*RA !9 #) The delegation to the e,ecutive branch of the po$er to formulate and enact implementing rules falls $ithin the class of permissible delegation of legislative po$ers# 6ost recentl'0 in Exec,tive Secretary v. So,thwin2 <eavy nd,stries (7#R# 8os# 1911;10 1911;! R19<;110 !" -ebruar' !""90 1<! 3*RA 9;3)0 $e characteri%ed such delegation as >confer[ring] upon the .resident ?uasi&legislative po$er $hich ma' be defined as the 7ut0o53t= 41<1g7t14 ;= t01 <78F>7B32g ;o4= to t01 74>323st57t3A1 ;o4= to 74o?t 5u<1s 724 51gu<7t3o2s intended to carr' out the provisions of the la$ and implement legislative polic'#> ()d#0 at 9<90 citing *ru%0 .hilippine Administrative Da$0 !""3 /dition0 at !1#) Da$ book authors are like$ise virtuall' unanimous that the po$er of the e,ecutive branch to promulgate implementing rules arises from legislative delegation# =ustice 8achura defines the nature of the rule& making po$er of administrative bodies in the e,ecutive branch as > t01 1D1593s1 o: 41<1g7t14 <1g3s<7t3A1 ?o8150 involving no discretion as to $hat the la$ shall be0 but merel' the authorit' to fi, the details in the e,ecution or enforcement of a polic' set out in the la$ itself#> (A#/# 8achura0 +utline Revie$er in .olitical Da$ [!""" ed#]0 at !;!#) Fe further e,plains that rules and regulations that >fi, the details in the e,ecution and enforcement of a polic' set out in the la$> are called >supplementar' or detailed legislation># ()d#0 at !;3#) +ther commentators such as -r# (ernas ((ernas0 supra note 1<0 at 911)0 2e Deon and 2e Deon (F# 2e Deon R F# 2e Deon0 =r#0 Administrative Da$E Te,t and *ases (199< ed)0 at ;9&<": citing 1 Am# =ur# !d <91) and *arlos *ru% (*# *ru%0 .hilippine Administrative Da$ (199< ed)0 at 19&!"0 !!0 !3) have similar vie$s# The *ongress ma' delegate the po$er to craft implementing rules to the .resident in his capacit' as the head of the e,ecutive branch0 $hich is tasked under the *onstitution to e,ecute the la$# )n effecting this delegation0 and as $ith an' other delegation of legislative po$ers0 *ongress ma' impose conditions or limitations $hich the e,ecutive branch is bound to observe# A usual e,ample is the designation b' *ongress of $hich particular members of the e,ecutive branch should participate

in the drafting of the implementing rules# This set&up does not offend the separation of po$ers bet$een the branches as it is sanctioned b' the delegation principle# Apart from $hatever rule&making po$er that *ongress ma' delegate to the .resident0 the latter has inherent ordinance po$ers covering the e,ecutive branch as part of the po$er of e,ecutive control (>The .resident shall have control of all the e,ecutive departments0 bureaus and offices###> 3ection 1;0 Article J))0 *onstitution#)# (' its nature0 this ordinance po$er does not re?uire or entail delegation from *ongress# 3uch facult' must be distinguished from the authorit' to issue implementing rules to legislation $hich does not inhere in the presidenc' but instead0 as e,plained earlier0 is delegated b' *ongress# The marked distinction bet$een the .residentBs po$er to issue intrabranch orders and instructions or internal rules for the e,ecutive branch0 on one hand0 and the .residentBs authorit' b' virtue of legislative delegation to issue implementing rules to legislation0 on the other0 is embodied in the rules on publication0 as e,plained in +a9:ada v. +,vera (7#R# 8o# D&9391 0 !9 2ecember 19<90 119 3*RA 119)# The *ourt held therein that internal regulations applicable to members of the e,ecutive branch0 >that is0 regulating onl' the personnel of the administrative agenc' and not the public0 need not be published# 8either is publication re?uired of the so&called letters of instructions issued b' administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be follo$ed b' their subordinates in the performance of their duties#> ( d., at 1 1) The dispensation $ith publication in such instances is rooted in the ver' nature of the issuances0 i.e.0 the' are not binding on the public# The' neither create rights nor impose obligations $hich are enforceable in court# 3ince the' are issued pursuant to the po$er of e,ecutive control0 and are directed onl' at members of the e,ecutive branch0 there is no constitutional need for their publication# Fo$ever0 $hen the presidential issuance does create rights and obligations affecting the public at large0 as implementing rules certainl' do0 then publication is mandator'# )n e,plaining $h' this is so0 the *ourt $ent as far as to note that such rules and regulations are designed >to enforce or implement e,isting la$ ?u5su72t to 7 A7<34 41<1g7t3o2.G ()d#0 at ! 1#) T01 Cou5t 8ou<4 2ot 07A1 s?oB12 o: GA7<34 41<1g7t3o2G 3: 324114 t01 ?o815 to 3ssu1 su90 5u<1s 87s 3201512t 32 t01 ?51s34129=. 6oreover0 the creation of legal rights and obligations is legislative in character0 and the .resident in $hom legislative po$er does not reside cannot confer legal rights or impose obligations on the people absent the proper empo$ering statute# Thus0 an' presidential issuance $hich purports to bear such legal effect on the public0 such as implementing rules to legislation0 can onl' emanate from a legislative delegation to the .resident# The prevalent practice in the +ffice of the .resident is to issue orders or instructions to officials of the e,ecutive branch regarding the enforcement or carr'ing out of the la$# This practice is valid conformabl' $ith the .residentBs po$er of e,ecutive control# The facult' to issue such orders or instructions is distinct from the po$er to promulgate implementing rules to legislation# The latter originates from a different legal foundation & the delegation of legislative po$er to the .resident# =ustice *arpio cites an unconventional interpretation of the ordinance po$er of the .resident0 particularl' the po$er to issue e,ecutive orders0 as set forth in the Administrative *ode of 19<;# Oet0 b' practice0 implementing rules are never contained in e,ecutive orders# The' are0 instead0 contained in a segregate promulgation0 usuall' entitled >)mplementing Rules and Regulations0> $hich derives not from the Administrative *ode0 but rather from the specific grants in the legislation itself sought to be implemented# Fis position does not find te,tual support in the Administrative *ode itself# 3ection !0 *hapter !0 Title 10 (ook ))) of the *ode0 $hich defines >/,ecutive orders> as >[a]cts of the .resident providing for rules of a general or permanent character 32 t01 3>?<1>12t7t3o2 o5 1D19ut3o2 o: 9o2st3tut3o27< o5 st7tuto5= ?o815s># /,ecutive orders are not the vehicles for rules of a general or permanent character

in the 3>?<1>12t7t3o2 o5 1D19ut3o2 o: <78s# The' are the vehicle for rules of a general or permanent character in the 3>?<1>12t7t3o2 o5 1D19ut3o2 o: t01 9o2st3tut3o27< o5 st7tuto5= ?o815s o: t01 P51s3412t himself# 3ince b' definition0 the statutor' po$ers of the .resident consist of a specific delegation b' *ongress0 it necessaril' follo$s that the facult' to issue e,ecutive orders to implement such delegated authorit' emanates not from an' inherent e,ecutive po$er but from the authorit' delegated b' *ongress# )t is not correct0 as =ustice *arpio posits0 that $ithout implementing rules0 legislation cannot be faithfull' e,ecuted b' the e,ecutive branch# 6an' of our ke' la$s0 including the *ivil *ode0 the Revised .enal *ode0 the *orporation *ode0 the Dand Registration Act and the .ropert' Registration 2ecree0 do not have )mplementing Rules# )t has never been suggested that the enforcement of these la$s is unavailing0 or that the absence of implementing rules to these la$s indicates insufficient statutor' details that should preclude their enforcement# (3ee DBM v.=olonwel +radin20 7#R# 8os# 1; 9"<0 1; 919 R 1; 9 90 < =une !"";0 !1 3*RA 910 9"3#) )n reCecting the theor' that the po$er to craft implementing rules is e,ecutive in character and reaffirming instead that such po$er arises from a legislative grant0 the *ourt asserts that *ongress retains the po$er to impose statutor' conditions in the drafting of implementing rules0 provided that such conditions do not take on the character of a legislative veto# *ongress can designate $hich officers or entities should participate in the drafting of implementing rules# )t ma' impose statutor' restraints on the participants in the drafting of implementing rules0 and the .resident is obliged to observe such restraints on the e,ecutive officials0 even if he thinks the' are unnecessar' or foolhard'# The unconstitutional nature of the legislative veto does not ho$ever bar *ongress from imposing conditions $hich the .resident must compl' $ith in the e,ecution of the la$# After all0 the .resident has the constitutional dut' to faithfull' e,ecute the la$s# [91] This stance is called for b' Cudicial restraint as $ell as the presumption of constitutionalit' accorded to la$s enacted b' *ongress0 a co&e?ual branch# )t is also finds support in -elae' v. 8,ditor ;eneral (1!! .hil# 99 [199 ])# [9 ] 319 .hil# 3!1 (199;)# /mphasis in the original# [99] )n particular0 the .hilippine 3tar and the 6anila 3tandard# [9;] 3ection 390 )RR of RA 933 #

CONCURR"NG OP"N"ON

Tinga0 1.E ) Coin =ustice *oronaBs lucid opinion GHI one of the more legall' significant decisions of this *ourt of recent 'ears because it concludes for the first time that legislative vetoes are impermissible in this Curisdiction# ) full' concur $ith the maCorit'Bs reasoning for declaring legislative veto as invalid# Oet even as the ponencia aligns $ith most of m' vie$s0 ) $rite separatel' to full' e,plain m' vie$point#

The controvers' rests on the so&called >legislative veto>0 defined b' Tribe as >measures allo$ing [*ongress]0 or one of its Fouses or committees0 to revie$ and revoke the actions of federal agencies and e,ecutive departments#>[1] +ur *onstitution specificall' neither prohibits nor allo$s legislative vetoes0 unlike presidential vetoes0 $hich are formall' authori%ed under 3ection !;0 Article J)# 5ntil toda'0 *ourt has like$ise declined so far to pass Cudgment on the constitutionalit' of a legislative veto#[!] The *ourt is unanimous that a legislative veto0 such as that contained in 3ection 1! of Rep# Act 8o# 933 is unconstitutional# 3uch a ruling $ould be of momentous conse?uence0 not onl' because the issue has never been settled before0 but also because man' of our statutes incorporate a similarl' $orded provision that empo$ers members of *ongress to approve the )mplementing Rules of various particular la$s# 6oreover0 the invalidation of legislative vetoes $ill send a definite signal to *ongress that its current understanding of the e,tent of legislative po$ers is a$r'# *oncededl'0 our ruling $ill greatl' affect the $orkings of the legislative branch of government# )t $ould thus be intellectuall' honest to also consider the ?uestion from the perspective of that branch $hich is the branch most affected b' that ruling# +f course0 the perspective of the e,ecutive should be reckoned $ith as $ell since it has traditionall' inveighed against legislative vetoes# 3till0 if $e are to consider the congressional perspective of the ?uestion0 there $ill emerge important nuances to the ?uestion that should dissuade against an' simplistic anal'sis of the issue# . ) have previousl' intimated that the .resident0 in chartering the e,tent of his plenar' po$ers0 ma' be accorded a degree of fle,ibilit' for so long as he is not bound b' an' specific constitutional proscription# That same degree of deference should be e,tended to *ongress as $ell# Thus0 ) $ish to in?uire into $hether there is a constitutionall' Custifiable means to affirm legislative vetoes# The emergence of the legislative veto in the 5nited 3tates coincided $ith the decline of the non& delegation doctrine0 $hich barred *ongress from delegating its la$&making po$ers else$here# [3] 6odern Curisprudence has authori%ed the delegation of la$making po$ers to administrative agencies0 and there are resulting concerns that there is no constitutional assurance that the agencies are responsive to the peopleBs $ill#[1] -rom that frame$ork0 the legislative veto can be seen as a means of limiting agenc' rule&making authorit' b' lodging final control over the implementing rules to *ongress# >(ut instead of controlling agenc' polic' in advance b' la'ing out a roadmap in the statute creating the agenc'0 *ongress no$ proposes to control polic' as it develops in notice&and&comment rulemaking0 after the agenc'Bs e,pert staff and interested members of the public have had an opportunit' to assist in its formation#> [ ] )t is a negative check b' *ongress on policies proposed b' the agencies0 and not a means for making polic' directl'# [9]

-rom the perspective of *ongress0 the legislative veto affords ma,imum consideration to the plenar' po$er of legislation0 as it bolsters assurances that the legislative polic' embodied in the statute $ill be faithfull' e,ecuted upon its implementation# The faithful e,ecution of the la$s of the land is a constitutional obligation imposed on the .resident [;]0 'et as a matter of practice0 there could be a difference of opinion bet$een the e,ecutive and legislative branches as to the meaning of the la$# The clash ma' be especiall' telling if the .resident and *ongress are politicall' hostile $ith each other0 and it bears notice that the legislative veto in the 5nited 3tates became especiall' popular beginning in the earl' 19;"s0 $hen the ties bet$een the 2emocratic&controlled *ongress and the Republican .resident Richard 8i,on $ere especiall' fra'ed# [<] 6ore recentl'0 the current 5#3# .resident (ush has had a penchant of attaching >signing statements> to legislation he has approved0 such statements indicating his o$n understanding of the bill he is signing into la$# The legislative veto0 as a practical matter0 allo$s *ongress to prevent a countervailing attempt b' the e,ecutive branch to implement a la$ in a manner contrar' to the legislative intent# There is nothing obno,ious about the polic' considerations behind the legislative veto# 3ince the courts0 in case of conflict0 $ill uphold legislative intent over the e,ecutive interpretation of a la$0 the legislative veto could ensure the same Cudiciall'&confirmed result $ithout need of elevating the clash before the courts# The e,ercise of the legislative veto could also allo$ both branches to operate $ithin the gra'er areas of their respective constitutional functions $ithout having to resort to the Cudicial resolution of their potentiall' competing claims# As the future 5#3# 3upreme *ourt =ustice 3tephen (re'er once $roteE The [legislative] veto sometimes offers a compromise of important substantive conflicts embedded deepl' in the *onstitution# Fo$ are $e to reconcile the *onstitutionBs grant to *ongress of the po$er to declare $ar $ith its grant to the .resident of authorit' over the Armed -orces as their *ommander in *hiefM The @ar .o$ers Act approaches the problem0 in part0 b' declaring that the .resident cannot maintain an armed conflict for longer than ninet' da's if both Fouses of *ongress enact a resolution of disapproval# 3imilar vetoes are embedded in la$s authori%ing the .resident to e,ercise various economic po$ers during times of >national emergenc'># To take another e,ample0 ho$ are $e to reconcile article )Bs grant to *ongress of the po$er to appropriate mone' $ith article ))Bs grant to the .resident of the po$er to supervise its e,penditureM 6ust the .resident spend all that *ongress appropriatesM *ongress has addressed this conflict0 authori%ing the .resident to defer certain e,penditures subCect to a legislative veto#[9] There are practical demerits imputed as $ell to the legislative veto0 such as the dela' in the implementation of the la$ that ma' ensue $ith re?uiring congressional approval of the implementing rules#[1"] Oet the ?uestion must ultimatel' rest not on the convenience or $isdom of the legislative veto device0 but on $hether it is constitutionall' permissible# )n 19<30 the 5nited 3tates 3upreme *ourt struck a decisive blo$ against the legislative veto in 5S v. "hadha[11]0 a ruling $hich essentiall' held the practice as unconstitutional# )t appears that the foremost consideration of the maCorit' opinion in "hadha $ere the issues of bicameralism and presentment0 as discussed b' the *hief =ustice in his 3eparate +pinion in Macalintal v. "OMELE"[1!]# The t$in issues of presentment and bicameralism $ould especiall' come to fore $ith

respect to the =oint *ongressional +versight *ommittee under Rep# Act 8o# 933 0 composed as it is b' seven 6embers from the 3enate and seven 6embers from the Fouse of Representatives# [13] "hadha emphasi%ed that the bills passed b' the 5#3# *ongress must be presented for approval to the .resident of the 5nited 3tates in order that the' ma' become la$# [11] 3ection !;(1)0 Article J) of our *onstitution imposes a similar presentment re?uirement# "hadha also noted that a bill must be concurred in b' a maCorit' of both Fouses of *ongress# 5nder our *onstitution0 *ongress consists of a Fouse of Representatives and a 3enate0 and the underl'ing uncontroverted implication is that both Fouses must concur to the bill before it can become la$# Assuming that the approval of the )mplementing Rules to Rep# Act 8o# 933 b' seven 6embers from each Fouse of *ongress is a legislative act0 such act fails either the presentment or bicameralism re?uirement# 3uch approval is neither presented to the .resident of the .hilippines for consent0 nor concurred in b' a maCorit' of either Fouse of *ongress# Oet $ith respect to the implications of "hadha on the principle of separation of po$ers0 there are critical informed comments against that decision# "hadha involved the statutor' authorit' of either Fouse of *ongress to disapprove the decision of the e,ecutive branch to allo$ a deportable alien to remain in the 5nited 3tates# The maCorit' had characteri%ed such disapproval as a legislative act0 since it >had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights0 duties and relations of persons># [1 ] Oet that emphasis >on the labels of legislative0 e,ecutive and Cudicial> $as critici%ed as >provid[ing] the rhetorical ammunition for a variet' of cases seeking Cudicial reassessment of the constitutionalit' not onl' of the great number of statutes that have incorporated some kind of legislative veto mechanism0 but of regulator' statutes in general that sought to delegate legislative0 e,ecutive and Cudicial po$er0 and various combinations thereof0 to the unelected officials that run the various federal agencies#> [19] -isher presents a veritable laundr' list of criticisms of the "hadha reasoning0 replete $ith accusations that the anal'sis emplo'ed on separation of po$ers detracted from the intent of the -ramers0 resulting in giving the >e,ecutive branch a one&sided advantage in an accommodation that $as meant to be a careful balancing of e,ecutive and legislative interests># [1;] Fe further observedE The *ourtBs misreading of histor' and congressional procedures has produced some strange results# )ts theor' of government is too much at odds $ith the practices developed over a period of decades b' the political branches# 8either administrators nor congressmen $ant the static model proferred b' the *ourt# The conditions that spa$ned the legislative veto a half centur' ago have not disappeared# /,ecutive officials still $ant substantial latitude in administering delegated authorit': legislators still insist on maintaining control $ithout having to pass another la$# The e,ecutive and legislative branches $ill0 therefore develop substitutes to serve as the functional e?uivalent of the legislative veto# -orms $ill change but not po$er relationships and the need for 3,id pro 3,o#[1<] And Tribe himself finds fla$ in the "hadha anal'sis of $hat constituted a legislative actE And $h'0 precisel'0 did the veto of the suspension of *hadhaBs deportation have to be deemed legislativeM )t $as >essentiall' legislative0> according to the *ourt0 because it >had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights0 duties and relations of persons ### outside the legislative branch># @ithout *ongressB e,ercise of the legislative veto in his case0 *hadha $ould have remained in America: $ithout the veto provision in the immigration statute0 the change in *hadhaBs legal status

could have been $rought onl' be legislation re?uiring his deportation# The difficult' $ith this anal'sis is that the same observations appl' $ith e?ual validit' to nearl' all e,ercises of delegated authorit'0 $hether b' a Fouse of *ongress or b' an e,ecutive department or an administrative agenc'# (oth through rule&making and through case&b'&case adCudication0 e,ercises of delegated authorit' change legal rights and privileges no less than do full&fledged la$s# There $as perhaps less need than the *ourt perceived to s?uee%e the legislative veto into one of the three pigeonholes envisioned b' the -ramers# /ven if *ongressB action had been deemed >e,ecutive> in nature0 it presumabl' $ould have been unconstitutional0 since *ongress ma' make0 but not e,ecute the la$s# And if the legislative veto had been deemed >Cudicial0> it $ould still have violated the separation of po$ers0 as =ustice .o$ell recogni%ed in his concurring opinion# [19] The maCorit' in "hadha did not address the realit' that the 5#3# *ongress had relied on the legislative veto device for over five decades [!"]0 or for that matter0 the valid concerns over the e,ecutive usurpation of legislative prerogatives that led to the invention of the veto as a countervailing measure# =ustice ('ron @hite relied e,tensivel' on these concerns in his dissenting opinion in "hadha# 8onetheless0 the invalidation of the legislative veto in "hadha has caused serious discussion as to alternative constitutional means through $hich *ongress could still ensure that its legislative intentions $ould not be countermanded b' the e,ecutive branch# +n one e,treme0 a Republican congressman0 8ick 3mith of 6ichigan0 filed a bill re?uiring that significant ne$ regulations adopted b' administrative agencies be approved b' a Coint resolution of *ongress before the' $ould become effective#[!1] Dess constitutionall' controversial perhaps $ere the suggestions of =ustice (re'er in remarks he made after "hadha $as decided# Fe e,plained that >*ongress un?uestionabl' retains a host of traditional $eapons in its legislative and political arsenal that can accomplish some of the vetoBs obCectives#>[!!] These include the po$er to provide that legislation delegating authorit' to the e,ecutive e,pires ever' so often# To continue to e,ercise that authorit'0 the e,ecutive $ould have to seek congressional approval0 at $hich point past agenc' behavior that *ongress disliked $ould become the subCect of serious debate# 6oreover0 *ongress might tailor its statutes more specificall'0 limiting e,ecutive po$er# -urther0 *ongress can re?uire the .resident0 before taking action0 to consult $ith congressional representatives $hose vie$s $ould carr' significant political $eight# Additionall'0 *ongress can dela' implementation of an e,ecutive action (as it does $hen the 3upreme *ourt promulgates rules of civil procedure) until *ongress has had time to consider it an to enact legislation preventing the action from taking effect# -inall'0 each 'ear *ongress considers the agenc'Bs budget# )f a significant group of legislators strongl' opposes a particular agenc' decision0 it might $ell succeed in including a sentence in the appropriations bill den'ing the agenc' funds to enforce that decision# [!3] ) raise these points because even $ith the invalidation of the legislative veto0 *ongress need not simpl' 'ield to the e,ecutive branch# The invalidation of the legislative veto can be mistakenl' perceived as signal b' the e,ecutive branch that it can0 in the guise of rule&making po$er0 adopt measures not authori%ed or even forbidden in the enabling legislation# )f that happens0 undue $eight $ill be shifted to the e,ecutive branch0 much like $hat had happened $hen former .resident 6arcos e,ercised both e,ecutive and legislative po$ers# +ne might correctl' argue that the Cudicial branch

ma' still e,ercise corrective relief against such unauthori%ed e,ercise b' the e,ecutive [!1]0 'et the relief ma' not come for 'ears to come0 considering the inherentl' deliberative Cudicial process# ) do believe that there is a constitutionall' sound mechanism through $hich *ongress ma' validl' influence the approval of a la$Bs )mplementing Rules# 3ection 1! of Rep# Act 8o# 933 ma' not be such a means0 but ) maintain that it $ould be highl' useful for the *ourt to e,plain ho$ this can be accomplished# )n this light0 ) submit the follo$ing proposed frame$ork for invalidating the legislative veto $hile recogni%ing the pre&eminent congressional prerogative in defining the manner ho$ legislation is to be implemented# . @e can consider that in the enactment and implementation of a la$0 there is a legislative phase and an e,ecutive phase# The legislative phase encompasses the period from the initiation of a bill in *ongress until it becomes effective as a la$# +n the other hand0 the e,ecutive phase begins the moment the la$ is effective and falls $ithin the capacit' of the e,ecutive branch to enforce# 8otabl'0 as such0 it is onl' upon the effectivit' of the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled b' the language of the statute# 8o$0 subCect to the indispensable re?uisite of publication under the due process clause0[! ] the determination as to $hen a la$ takes effect is $holl' the prerogative of *ongress#[!9] As such0 it is onl' upon effectivit' that the la$ ma' be e,ecuted0 and the e,ecutive branch ac?uires the duties and po$ers to e,ecute that la$# (efore that point0 the role of the e,ecutive branch0 particularl' the .resident0 is limited to signing or vetoing the la$# All other po$ers of government that attach to the proposed la$ are e,ercised e,clusivel' b' *ongress and are hence0 legislative in character# )n fact0 the 5nited 3tates 3upreme *ourt0 speaking through =ustice (lack0 has gone as far as to hold that the *onstitution >limits [the .residentBs] functions in the la$making process to the recommending of la$s he thinks $ise and the vetoing of la$s he thinks bad#>[!;] )t is viable to hold that an' provision of la$ that empo$ers *ongress or an' of its members to pla' an' role in the implementation or enforcement of the la$ after the e,ecution phase has begun violates the principle of separation of po$ers and is thus unconstitutional# 5nder this principle0 a provision that re?uires *ongress or its members to approve the )mplementing Rules after the la$ has alread' taken effect is unconstitutional0 as is a provision that allo$s *ongress or its members to overturn an' directive or ruling made b' those members of the e,ecutive branch charged $ith the implementation of the la$# This time or phase demarcation not onl' affords a convenient 'ardstick b' $hich to assess the constitutionalit' of a legislated role for *ongress vis&S &vis a la$0 it also he$s to the proper allocation of governmental po$ers# Again0 the e,ercise of e,ecutive po$ers relative to a statute can onl' emanate after the effectivit' of the la$0 since before that point0 said la$ cannot be e,ecuted or enforced# 5ntil a la$ becomes effective0 there are no e,ecutive functions attached to the la$#

+f course0 follo$ing this rationale0 3ection 1! of Rep# Act 8o# 933 $ill have to be invalidated# To cite one outstanding e,ample of $hat else $ould be invalidated as a result is the =oint *ongressional .o$er *ommission established in the /.)RA (Rep# Act 8o# 9139)0 $here the *ommission composed of several members of *ongress e,ercises a continuing role in overseeing the implementation of the /.)RA#[!<] The functions of the =oint *ongressional .o$er *ommission are e,ercised in the e,ecution phase0 and thus be'ond the pale of legislative po$er# There are man' other provisions in our la$s0 such as those similar to 3ection 1! of Rep# Act 8o# 933 0 that $ill similarl' not pass muster after this ruling0 and the *ourt $ill have to reckon $ith the real problem as to $hether this decision effectivel' nullifies those provisions as $ell# 8onetheless0 the *ourt need not invalidate those provisions in other la$s 'et and a$ait the appropriate cases to do so0 similar to the approach previousl' taken on the invalidation of municipalities created b' the .resident in -elae' v. 8,ditor ;eneral#[!9] &. ) seriousl' disagree $ith =ustice *arpioBs assertion that the po$er to formulate or adopt implementing rules inheres in the e,ecutive function# That po$er is a legislative function traditionall' delegated b' *ongress to the e,ecutive branch# The ponencia satisfactoril' asserts this point through its -ootnote 8o# 930 and ) need not belabor it# +ne option for congressional control over e,ecutive action is to be ver' specific and limiting in the delegation of po$er to agencies0 so that their rulemaking po$er $ill in turn be limited# [3"] The po$er to make rules and regulation is that kind of legislative po$er $hich ma' be delegated# [31] )n practice0 the 5nited 3tates *ongress has engaged fre?uentl' in broad delegations that in effect re?uire agencies to make specific sub&rules GHT i#e#0 to e,ercise legislative po$er# [3!] This practice has dra$n some criticism that po$er is no$ concentrated in the e,ecutive branch and that it is thus necessar' to restore *ongress to its original status of preeminence# [33] The gro$th of an enormous national bureaucrac'0 operating for the most part $ithin the e,ecutive branch0 ma' have fundamentall' altered the original constitutional frame$ork and re?uires some sort of response if the original constitutional concerns are to be satisfied#[31] 3ection 1! of Rep# Act 8o# 933 0 or an' other provision of la$ granting components of the e,ecutive branch the po$er to formulate implementing rules0 is a delegation of legislative po$er belonging to *ongress to the e,ecutive branch# *ongress itself has the po$er to formulate those particular rules and incorporate them in the la$ itself# @hat ) believe *ongress is precluded from doing is to e,ercise such po$er after the la$ has taken effect0 in other $ords0 after the e,ecution phase has begun# 5nless such a limitation $ere laid do$n0 there $ould ensue undue encroachment b' *ongress in the e,ercise of legislative po$er# This delegable rule&making po$er ma' be classified into t$o t'pesE (1) rules intended to regulate the internal management of the agencies themselves: and (!) rules supplementing a statute and intended to affect persons and entities outside the government made subCect to agenc' regulation# [3 ] /ither case0 the po$er of the e,ecutive branch to promulgate such rules springs from legislative delegation#

)n the .hilippines0 the po$er of e,ecutive officials to enact rules to regulate the internal management of e,ecutive departments $as specificall' allocated to them b' a statute0 the Administrative *ode of 19<;0 promulgated b' .resident A?uino in the e,ercise of her then e,tant legislative po$ers# @ith respect to supplementar' rules to particular legislation0 the po$er of e,ecutive officials to formulate such rules derives from the legislation itself# (ut in no case does such po$er emanate actuall' from inherent e,ecutive po$er# The rule need not be hard and fast# @e ma' as $ell pa' heed to (lackstoneBs practical observation that the >manner0 time and circumstances of putting la$s in e,ecution must fre?uentl' be left to the discretion of the e,ecutive magistrates># [39] (ut b' and large0 an' problem left b' the absence of clear and e,plicit statutor' language is avoided in turn b' the statutor' delegation of legislative po$er to e,ecutive officials to vest them sufficient discretion to fill in the details# [3;] @e thus cannot detract from the fundamental principle that rule&making po$er is legislative in character and e,ercised b' e,ecutive officials onl' upon a statutor' delegation of legislative po$er# As -isher summari%es the peculiar d'namicE P51s3412ts 751 o;<3g7t14 u2415 t01 Co2st3tut3o2 to t7B1 9751 t07t t01 <78s ;1 G:73t0:u<<= 1D19ut14.G T01 o:t12 9o2:<39t32g 724 7>;3guous ?7ss7g1s 83t032 7 <78 >ust ;1 32t15?51t14 ;= 1D19ut3A1 o::3937<s to 9o2st5u9t t01 ?u5?os1 724 32t12t o: Co2g51ss # As important as intent is the e,tent to $hich a la$ is carried out# .resident Taft once remarked0 >Det an'one make the la$s of the countr'0 if ) can construe them#> To carr' out the la$s0 administrators issue rules and regulations of their o$n# The courts long ago appreciated this need# Rules and regulations >must be received as the acts of the e,ecutive0 and as such0 be binding upon all $ithin the sphere of his legal and constitutional authorit'# *urrent la$ authori%es the head of an e,ecutive department or militar' department to prescribe regulations >for the government of his department0 the conduct of its emplo'ees0 the distribution and performance of its business0 and the custod'0 use0 and preservation of its records0 papers0 and propert'# These duties0 primaril' of a >housekeeping> nature0 relate onl' distantl' to the citi%enr'# 6an' regulations0 ho$ever0 bear directl' on the public# "t 3s 0151 t07t 74>323st57t3A1 <1g3s<7t3o2 >ust ;1 51st539t14 32 3ts s9o?1 724 7??<397t3o2. R1gu<7t3o2s 751 2ot su??os14 to ;1 7 su;st3tut1 :o5 t01 g12157< ?o<39=>7B32g t07t Co2g51ss 1279ts 32 t01 :o5> o: 7 ?u;<39 <78. A<t0oug0 74>323st57t3A1 51gu<7t3o2s 751 12t3t<14 to 51s?19t, t01 7ut0o53t= to ?51s953;1 5u<1s 724 51gu<7t3o2s 3s 2ot 72 3241?12412t sou591 o: ?o815 to >7B1 <78s. Ag129= 5u<1>7B32g >ust 51st o2 7ut0o53t= g572t14 43519t<= o5 3243519t<= ;= Co2g51ss.[3<] The *ourtBs rightful reCection of =ustice *arpioBs premise that the po$er of the .resident of promulgate )mplementing Rules and Regulations is inherentl' e,ecutive provides a necessar' clarification that is critical to the understanding of the *ourtBs ruling toda'# Fad =ustice *arpioBs position been adopted b' the *ourt0 the result $ould have been a presidenc' much stronger than the *onstitution envisioned# Acceding to the .resident the po$er to craft )mplementing Rules to legislation even if *ongress specificall' $ithholds such po$er to the *hief /,ecutive $ould have upset the finel' measured schematic of balanced po$ers0 to the benefit of the .resident# -ortunatel'0

$ith the disavo$al of that theor'0 greater consideration is accorded to legislative prerogatives $ithout compromising the important functions of the presidenc'# &. Thusl'0 there is nothing inherentl' unconstitutional in congressional participation in the formulation of implementing rules of legislation since that po$er is legislative in character# Oet there still are multiple roadblocks impeding a constitutionall' valid e,ercise of that prerogative b' *ongress# The matters of bicameralism and presentment0 as e,pounded in "hadha0 are hurdles $hich ) submit should bind the .hilippine *ongress as it e,ercises its legislative functions# 3ection 1! of Rep# Act 8o# 933 can be struck do$n on that ground alone#[39] 6oreover0 imposing a rule barring a legislative role in the implementation of a la$ after the statuteBs effectivit' $ill sufficientl' preserve the integrit' of our s'stem of separation of po$ers# At the same time0 the concerns of *ongress that ma' have animated the rise of the legislative veto should not be disrespected b' simpl' raising formalistic barriers against them# )n practice0 the legislative veto is an effective check against abuses b' the e,ecutive branch# The end ma' not Custif' unconstitutional means0 'et $e should leave ample room for *ongress to be able to address such concerns $ithin broad constitutional parameters# There are a m'riad of creative $a's b' $hich *ongress ma' influence the formulation of )mplementing Rules $ithout offending the *onstitution# )f there are especiall' problematic areas in the la$ itself $hich *ongress is not minded to leave an' room for interpretative discretion b' e,ecutive officials0 then the provision involved can be crafted $ith such specificit' to preclude alternative interpretations# At the same time0 commonl'0 legislators and their staffs ma' lack the e,pertise to draft specific language# [1"] 3peaking from m' o$n legislative e,perience0 it is in the drafting of the )mplementing Rules0 rather than in the statute itself0 that the particular e,pertise of the agenc' officials and e,perts tasked $ith the implementation of the la$ become especiall' vital# Also0 *ongress can dictate $hich particular e,ecutive officials $ill draft the implementing rules0 prescribe legal or factual standards that must be taken into account b' such drafters0 or other$ise impose re?uirements or limitations $hich such drafters are bound to compl' $ith# Again0 because the po$er to draft implementing rules is delegated legislative po$er0 its e,ercise must be $ithin the confines of the authorit' charted b' *ongress# And because e,ecutive functions cannot commence until after the effectivit' of the la$0 *ongress ma' ver' $ell adopt creative but constitutional measures that suspend the effectivit' of the la$ until implementing rules to its liking are crafted# There is nothing unconstitutional $ith suspending the effectivit' of la$s pending the occurrence of a stipulated condition# >[)]t is not al$a's essential that a legislative act should be a completed statute $hich must in an' event take effect as a la$0 at the time it leaves the hands of the legislative department# A statute ma' be conditional0 and its taking effect ma' be made to depend upon some subse?uent event#>[11]

The re?uirements of bicameralism and especiall' presentment ma' pose insurmountable hurdles to a provision that plainl' suspends the effectivit' of a la$ pending approval b' *ongress or some of its members of the implementing rules# [1!] At the same time0 it should be recogni%ed that *ongress does have the prerogative to participate in the drafting of the rules0 and if it finds a means to do so before the e,ecution phase has begun0 $ithout offending bicameralism or presentment0 such means ma' be upheld#

[1] D# Tribe0 )# American *onstitutional Da$ 11! (3rd ed#0 !"""#) 0 at 11!# [!] 3ee0 e#g#0 -< L"O5S8 v. Enri3,e'0 7#R# 8os# 1131" 0 1131;10 113;990 113<<<0 19 August 19910 !31 3*RA "9# 8either $as the ?uestion considered b' the maCorit' opinion in Macalintal v. "OMELE"0 1 3 .hil# <9 (!""3)# [3] 3ee#0 e#g#0 -anama !efinin2 "o. v. !yan0 !93 5#3# 3<< (193 )# 3ee also F# (ruff R /# 7ellhorn0 >*ongressional *ontrol of Administrative RegulationE A 3tud' of Degislative Jetoes>0 9" Farv# D# Rev# 13990 13;!&13;3 (19;;)# [1] (ruff R 7ellhorn0 supra note 30 at 13;3# [ ] )bid# [9] )bid# [;] 3ee 3ec# 1;0 Article J))0 *onstitution# [<] >+ne surve' found five such [legislative veto clauses] enacted bet$een 193! and 19390 nineteen in the 191"Bs0 thirt' four in the 19 "Bs0 fort'&nine in the 199"Bs0 and eight'&nine enacted bet$een 19;" and 19; #> 3# (re'er0 The Degislative Jeto After *hadha0 ;! 7eo# D#=# ;< 0 ;<9 (19<1) [9] (re'er0 supra note <0 at ;<9# [1"] (ruff R 7ellhorn0 supra note 30 at 13;9# [11] 19! 5#3# 919 (19<3)# [1!] 1 3 .hil# <9 (!""3)# >[T]he *ourt [in "hadha] shied a$a' from the issue of separation of po$ers and instead held that the provision violates the presentment clause and bicameralism# )t held that the one&house veto $as essentiall' legislative in purpose and effect# As such0 it is subCect to the procedures set out in Article ) of the *onstitution re?uiring the passage b' a maCorit' of both Fouses and presentment to the .resident#,,,> )d#0 at ;93 (=# .uno0 3eparate +pinion) [13] 3ee 3ection 1!0 Rep# Act 8o# 933 # [11] >The records of the *onstitutional *onvention reveal that the re?uirement that all legislation be presented to the .resident before becoming la$ $as uniforml' accepted b' the -ramers# .resentment to the .resident and the .residential veto $ere considered so imperative that the draftsmen took

special pains to assure that these re?uirements could not be circumvented#> 5S v. "hadha0 supra note 110 at 919&91;# [1 ] )d#0 at 9 !# [19] A# Aman R @# 6a'ton0 Administrative Da$ (!nd ed#0 !""1)0 at 91# [1;] D# -isher# *onstitutional *onflicts (et$een *ongress and the .resident# (1th ed#0 199;)0 at 1 3# [1<] )d#0 at 1 #

[19] Tribe0 supra note 10 at 111# *itations omitted# [!"] 3ee note <# [!1] 8# 3mith0 >Restoration of *ongressional Authorit' and Responsibilit' +ver the Regulator' .rocess# 33 Farv# =# on Degis# 3!3 (1999)# [!!] 3# (re'er0 supra note <0 at ;9!# [!3] )bid# [!1] 3ee0 e#g#0 1ohn <ay -eople*s 8lternative "oalition v. Lim, 19" .hil# 3" (!""3)# [! ] 3ee 3ection10 Article )))0 *onstitution# )n +a9:ada v. +,vera0 !3" .hil# !< (19<9)0 the *ourt also cited 3ection 9 of the (ill of Rights0 $hich recogni%ed >the right of the people to information on matters of public concern>0 as a constitutional basis for mandating publication of la$s# [!9] As much is recogni%ed in Article ! of the *ivil *ode0 $hich states that >Da$s shall take effect after fifteen da's follo$ing the completion of their publication either in the +fficial 7a%ette0 or in a ne$spaper of general circulation in the .hilippines0 unless it is other$ise provided#> The *ourt in +a9:ada recogni%ed that >unless it is other$ise provided> referred to the date of effectivit'# 3impl' put0 a la$ $hich is silent as to its effectivit' date takes effect fifteen da's follo$ing publication0 though there is no impediment for *ongress to provide for a different effectivit' date# [!;] 7o,n2stown "o. v. Sawyer0 313 5#3# ;90 <; (19 !) [!<] 3ee 3ection 9!0 Rep# Act 8o# 91390 $hich providesE #19t3o2 62. 'o32t Co2g51ss3o27< Po815 Co>>3ss3o2. 5pon the effectivit' of this Act0 a congressional commission0 hereinafter referred to as the >.o$er *ommission>0 is hereb' constituted# The .o$er *ommission shall be composed of fourteen (11) members $ith the chairmen of the *ommittee on /nerg' of the 3enate and the Fouse of Representatives and si, (9) additional members from each Fouse0 to be designated b' the 3enate .resident and the 3peaker of the Fouse of Representatives0 respectivel'# The minorit' shall be entitled to pro rata representation but shall have at least one (1) representative in the .o$er *ommission#

The *ommission shall0 in aid of legislation0 perform the follo$ing functions0 among othersE 3et the guidelines and overall frame$ork to monitor and ensure the proper implementation of this Act: /ndorse the initial privati%ation plan $ithin one (1) month from submission of such plan to the .o$er *ommission b' .3AD6 *orp# for approval b' the .resident of the .hilippines: To ensure transparenc'0 re?uire the submission of reports from government agencies concerned on the conduct of public bidding procedures regarding privati%ation of 8.* generation and transmission assets: Revie$ and evaluate the performance of the industr' participants in relation to the obCectives and timelines set forth in this Act: Approve the budget for the programs of the .o$er *ommission and all disbursements therefrom0 including compensation of all personnel: 3ubmit periodic reports to the .resident of the .hilippines and *ongress: 2etermine inherent $eaknesses in the la$ and recommend necessar' remedial legislation or e,ecutive measures: and .erform such other duties and functions as ma' be necessar' to attain its obCectives# )n furtherance hereof0 the .o$er *ommission is hereb' empo$ered to re?uire the 2+/0 /R*0 8/A0 TRA83*+0 generation companies0 distribution utilities0 suppliers and other electric po$er industr' participants to submit reports and all pertinent data and information relating to the performance of their respective functions in the industr'# An' person $ho $illfull' and deliberatel' refuses $ithout Cust cause to e,tend the support and assistance re?uired b' the .o$er *ommission to effectivel' attain its obCectives shall0 upon conviction0 be punished b' imprisonment of not less than one (1) 'ear but not more than si, (9) 'ears or a fine of not less than -ift' thousand pesos (. "0"""#"") but not more than -ive hundred thousand pesos (. ""0"""#"") or both at the discretion of the court# The .o$er *ommission shall adopt its internal rules of procedures: conduct hearings and receive testimonies0 reports and technical advice: invite or summon b' subpoena ad testificandum an' public official0 private citi%en or an' other person to testif' before it0 or re?uire an' person b' subpoena duces tecum to produce before it such records0 reports0 documents or other materials as it ma' re?uire: and generall' re?uire all the po$ers necessar' to attain the purposes for $hich it is created# The .o$er *ommission shall be assisted b' a secretariat to be composed of personnel $ho ma' be seconded from the 3enate and the Fouse of Representatives and ma' retain consultants# The secretariat shall be headed b' an e,ecutive director $ho has sufficient background and competence on the policies and issues relating to electricit' industr' reforms as provided in this Act# To carr' out its po$ers and functions0 the initial sum of t$ent'& five million pesos (.! 0"""0"""#"") shall be charged against the current appropriations of the 3enate# Thereafter0 such amount necessar' for its continued operation shall be included in the annual 7eneral Appropriations Act# The .o$er *ommission shall e,ist for period of ten (1") 'ears from the effectivit' of this Act and ma' be e,tended b' a Coint concurrent resolution# [!9] 1!! .hil# 99 (199 )#

[3"] P# 3ullivan R 7# 7unther0 *onstitutional Da$ (11th ed#0 !""1)0 at 3 1# [31] State ex .rel. (is. nspection B,rea, v. (hitman0 199 @is# 1!;0 !!" 8#@# 9!9 (19!<) [3!] 3ullivan R 7unther0 supra note 3"0 at 3 1# [33] 7# 3tone0 D# 3eidman0 *# 3unstein0 and 6# Tushnet0 *onstitutional Da$ (1th ed#0 !""1)0 at 331# [31] )bid# [3 ] )bid# [39] @# (lackstone0 *ommentaries0 (ook 10 !;"# [3;] >The nature of government often re?uires *ongress to pass general legislation and leave to other branches the responsibilit' to fill in the details># -isher0 supra note 1;0 at 9"0 citing (ayman v. So,thard0 1" @heat# 10 19 (1<! )# [3<] )d#0 at 1"9&1";# *itations omitted# [39] The t$in issues of presentment and bicameralism $ould especiall' come to fore $ith respect to the =oint *ongressional +versight *ommittee under Rep# Act 8o# 933 0 composed as it is b' seven 6embers from the 3enate and seven 6embers from the Fouse of Representatives# "hadha emphasi%ed that the bills passed b' the 5#3# *ongress must be presented for approval to the .resident of the 5nited 3tates in order that the' ma' become la$# [39] 3ection !;(1)0 Article J) of our *onstitution imposes a similar presentment re?uirement# "hadha also noted that a bill must be concurred in b' a maCorit' of both Fouses of *ongress# 5nder our *onstitution0 *ongress consists of a Fouse of Representatives and a 3enate0 and the underl'ing uncontroverted implication is that both Fouses must concur to the bill before it can become la$# Assuming that the approval of the )mplementing Rules to Rep# Act 8o# 933 b' seven 6embers from each Fouse of *ongress is a legislative act0 such act fails either the presentment or bicameralism re?uirement# 3uch approval is neither presented to the .resident of the .hilippines for consent0 nor concurred in b' a maCorit' of either Fouse of *ongress# [1"] -isher0 supra note 1;0 at 91# [11] 1 *oole' on *onstitutional Dimitations0 cited in Ex parte Mode0 ;; Te,# *rim# 13!0 1110 1<" 3#@# ;"<0 Am# Ann# *as# 191</ (191 )# [1!] +f course0 the problem of presentment $ould be avoided if the implementing rules $ould also be submitted for approval to the .resident0 but this roundabout manner should be discouraged0 since it could be avoided simpl' b' having those rules previousl' incorporated in the la$ earlier presented to the .resident#