------- VAnRAM & RAVI

be done by providing for It under Article

1

The Constitution of a NJC would
21
8). Simultaneously, changes would <I Of
the Constitution (and also Articles
1
) Act
196
8. The creation of such a Councu aJao
have to made In the Judges (lnqu ry e laws. Any change In the proce \Viq
require changes In three places In re ulre that Article 124 of the Constltuu
0
88
Of
appointment to the Supreme Court
1 1
6 nell A similar amendment will hav n be
amended to provide for a National Judie a have the authority to overs e to be
made to Article 217. Also, since the Counc s e to Article 217 (Clause 4 ee and
discipline judges, further changes will need to be mad ).
100
VAJIRAM_ & RAVl _______ _
CHAPiER- 6
INSiliUilONAL
FRAMEWORK FOR EiH\CS
The major sub-heads covered
outlined below- under the topic Institutional tor E.th\cs' are
1 . Existing Institutions/A
gencles
2. Evaluation Of The A
ntiCorruptlon Machinery In India
3. The Lok Pal
4. The Lokayukta
5. Ombudsman At The Local Level
6. Strengthening Investigation And Prosecution
A brief description of the above h b .
as een la1d in the forthcoming paragraphs.
EXISTING INSTITUTIONS/ AGENCIES
Union Government
The Administrative Vigilance Division of the Department o1 Personnel&. iraining \s tne
nodal agency for dealing with VIgilance and Anti-corruption. Its tasl<.s, Inter alia, are to
and provide necessary directions to the Government's programme of
ma1nte.nance of discipline and eradication ot corruption trom the pub\\c seNices. ihe
other mstltutlons and agencies at the Union \eve\ are - ti) ihe Central Vigilance
Commission (CVC); (li) Vigilance units In the Ministries/Departments ot Government o1
India, Central public enterprises and other autonomous organ\sat\onsi and the
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).
Central VIgilance Commission
In pursuance of the recommendations made by the Committee on Prevention ot
Corruption, popularly known as the Santhanam Committee, the Central V1gi\ance
Commission was set up by the Government of India by a Resolution dated '\' .2. \ l\
was accorded statutory status, consequent upon the judgement of \he Hon'b\e Supreme
Court in Vineet Narain v. Union of India, through the Centra\ VIgilance Commission Ac\
2003. The CVC advises the Union Government on all matters perta1n\ng \o \M
maintenance of integrity in administration. It exercises superintendence over \he
of the Central Bureau of Investigation, and also over the v\g\\ance adm n\atfdOn ot
various Ministries and other organizations ot the Union Government
..
-------VAJJRAI\1 & RAVI -------
VIgilance Units In the Government of India
. th Union Government have a Chief Vigilance Officer
All Mrmstries/Departments rn e . . d
v
1
e Division of the organrzatron concerne assrstrng and
who heads the rgHt of Office in all matters pertaining to vigilance. He also
advrsrng the Secretary or ea v .
1
c
provides a link between his organisation and the Central rgr ance on the
one hand and his organisation and the Central Bureau of en the other.
Vigilance functions performed by the CVO include collectl.ng about corrupt
pract,ces of the employees of his organisation; venfr.able .allegations
reported to him; processing investigation reports tor further consrderatron . the
disciplinary authority concerned; and referring matters to the Central Vrgrlance
Commission tor advice wherever necessary.
The Central Bureau of Investigation
The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is the principal investigative agency of the
Union Government in anti-corruption matters. It derives its powers from the Delhi Special
Police Establishment Act, 1946 (DSPE Act) to investigate certain specified offences or
classes of offences pertaining to corruption and other kinds of malpractices involving
pubhc servants.
The Special Police Establishment, which forms a division of the Central Bureau of
lnvestigalion, has three units, viz. (i) Anti-corruption Division, (ii) Economic Offences
Wing, and (m) Special Crimes Division. The Anti-corruption Division investigates all
cases registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as also cases of offences
under any other sections of the IPC or other law if committed along with offences of
bribery and corruption. The Anti-corruption Division investigates cases pertaining to
senous irregularities allegedly committed by public servants. It also investigates cases
agamst public servants of State Governments, if the case is entrusted to the CBI. The
Special Crimes Division investigates all cases of economic offences and conventional
crimes; such as offences relating to internal security, espionage, sabotC!.Qe. narcotics and
psychotropic substances, antiquities, murders, dacoities/robberies, c'heating, criminal
breach of trust, forgeries, dowry deaths, suspicious deaths and other offences under IPC
and other laws notified under Section 3 of the DSPE Act.
VIGILANCE SYSTEMS IN STATE GOVERNMENTS
At, the level of state governments, similar vigilance and anti-corruption organisations
exrst, although the nature and staffing of these organisations vary between and across
state governments. While some states have Vigilance Commissions and anti-corruption
bureaus, others Lokayuktas. Andhra Pradesh has an Anti Corruption Bureau a
V.grlance Commtsston and a Loka kf T '
v
1
Co . . yu a. amll Nadu and West Bengal have State
g ance mmtsstons to oversee the vigilanc f t'
m Tamtl Nadu is a servin Secreta e unc Ions. Vigilance Commissioner
he brings out an Annual in functions as a Secretary though
capacrty as V1gt1ance Commrssioner. Maharashtra
102
VAJl RA.M & RAVI ------
has a combination of an Om'-"d
lied th
uu sman and Vi .
bodY ca e Lokayukta With a r a tgtlance Commissioner a multi-member
and a retrred civil servant as v rce Judge of the higher judiciary' as the Chairman
f A . rce Th . .
States o ssam, Brhar, Gujarat J ere are Vtgtlance Commissioners rn the
't th c ' ammu & Kashm M
Tern ones, e hie! Secretary h' rr, eghataya and Sikkim. In the Union
States have adopted the pattern

as the Vigilance Commissioner. Some

organizations with dual e Unron. Government and set up internal vigilance
departmental head with subord'. "t of to the Vigilance Commissioner and the
rna e unrts ff'
districts reporting to the higher formatio rn Heads of Departments and the
ns and the Vtgtlance Commissioner.
EVALUATION OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION MACHINERY IN INDIA
The working of many of these anti-corru . .
to analyse the functioning of th r p!Jon .bodtes leaves much to be desired. In order
enforcement, the details of ca e and the agencies involved in their
decades, based on the tned and convicted in the past three
Bureau were studied. annua stattstrcs published by the National Crime Re<:ords
From an analysis of the available statistics th f II . b .
drawn: e o OWing road conclusiOns may be
1.
2.
3.
4.
conviction rate in cases by CBI is low compared to the cases registered.
wh1ch nevertheless is double that of the State Anti Corruption organisations. U
one were to assume that no cases are filed from now onwards it would take
about nine-ten years to clear the backlog in the states.
There has been rapid increase in the number of cases registered and
investigated by the State Anti-Corruption organisations after 1988.
The number of cases pending for investigation before the State Anti Corruption
organisations has been increasing.
The number of cases disposed of in trials each year is much less than the
number of cases filed, indicating that the backlog of cases In \nal courts is
increasing.
THE LOK PAL
The first Administrative Reforms Commission had recommended the establishment 01
the institution of Lok Pal. The Lok Pal Bill has been introduced several times but due to
various reasons it has not been enacted into law. The Lok Pal Is supposed to be
watchdog over the integrity of Ministers and the Members of Parliament. The lnd
Pal was intended to be similar to the institution of Ombudsman exist ng
Scandinavian countries.
103
-------VAJIRAM & RAVI ------......
r ed as a bulwark of democratic governme
The Institution of Pal Bill provides for constitution of the
against the tyranny of ottlcalddomt nqulre into cases of corruption against PUbll
Pal as an Independent bo Y o e
1

1
c
. h . m for filing complaints and conduct ng mqu nes etc.
functlonanes, with a mec ams
The Lok Pal Bill should become law with the least possible delay. As recommended In
the Bill, the Lokpal should deal with allegations of corruption against Ministers and
Members of Parliament.
Allegations of corruption against government officials are dealt with departmentally and
also by the Central Bureau of Investigation under the Central Vigilance Commission. In
some cases of corruption there may be collusion between the Ministers and the officers.
Therefore there should be an organic link between the Lok Pal and the Central Vigilance
Commissioner. The reason for this is that an overarching approach to fighting corruption
in high places is necessary. Corruption at the political level is at times with the
connivance of officials. Some cases of corruption involving officers may also point
towards political patronage and involvement. Thus the linkage between the CVC and the
Lok Pal would enable sharing of information and prompt action against all persons
Involved. It may a/so be provided that all cases of corruption Involving Ministers or
Members of Parliament which also have elements of connivance or collusion by officials,
should be enquired into by the Lok Pal only. While the Central Vigilance Commission
should enjoy full functional autonomy, it should nevertheless work under the overall
guidance and superintendence of the Lok Pal.
The Lok Pal should be a three-member body. This would bring in the expertise and
msight of more than one person which would be essential for transparency and
objectivity. Moreover, the multi-member characteristic would render it more immune to
any extraneous influence. The Second ARC is of the view that of the three members, the
Chalfrnan should be from the judiciary (a serving or retired Supreme Court Judge), the
member should be an eminent jurist and the third should be the Central
Vtgllance Commissioner (ex-officio).
One issue which has been debated for long is Whether the office of Prime Minister
sho.u/d brought under the jurisdiction of the Lok Pal. Those who believe that the Prime
Mtmster s conduct should be scrutinized by the Lok Pal rightly argue that all public
serv_anrs should be acco_untable. In a democracy, the citizen is the sovereign, and every
publtc. servant holds offtce to serve the citizens, spending tax money and exercising
under the laws made on citizens' behalf or under the Constitution, which we,
e people, gave. unto ourselves. Therefore, no functionary, however high should be
exempt from scruttny by the Lok Pal. '
In constttutional according to the Westminster model, the Prime Minister is the
among equals rn a Council of Ministers exercising collective responsibility.
;:;retore, whatever rules apply to other Ministers, should apply to the Prime MinistGr as
104
VAJIRAM & RAVI ______ _
However, there are deeper iss
Minister's office was merely th ue; that need to be examined carefully. While the Prime
Minister became the leader of Jrst am?ng equals in conception, over time the Prime
collective responsibility once d branch of government. 'The Cabinet accepts
customarily within the Council

are made. That is why all policy debates are

free to express their reservation

away from public gaze, and Ministers are not
the Prime Minister to lead d s or differences of opinion In public. It Is the function of
decision making and exe to coordinate among the Ministers In framing of policies,
unchallenged authority

of th?se and decisions. The Prime Minister's

r ose in governm t eadership are cnttcal to ensure cohesion and sense of
pui The Prime M' ' to make our Constitutional scheme function in letter and
sp n . lnlster IS accountable to the Parliament and on his survival depends
the survtval of the govern""ent If th p . . . ' ' .
. "' e nme Mmtster's conduct Is open to formal scrutiny
by then the government's viability Is eroded and
Parliaments sJpremacy 1s m jeopardy.
In our scheme of things, the Prime Minister is appointed on the basis of
the President s.]udgment of his commanding majority support in Parliament. All Ministers
are then appomted only on the advice of the Prime Minister. The President cannot
ordinarily dismiss the Prime Minister as long as he enjoys the majority support in the
House of the People. But other Ministers are removed by the President at any time on
the advice of the Prime Minister. No reasons are required to be given by the Prime
Minister for removal of such Ministers. Integrity and competence of the Ministers are not
sufficient conditions to continue in office. They must enjoy the confidence of the Prime
Minister in order to hold office as Ministers. This scheme has been deliberately
introduced In our Constitution to preserve the authority of the Prime Mimster, and to
ensure cohesion and coordination in the functioning of government. Any enquiry Into a
Prime Minister's official conduct by any authority other than the Parliament would
severely undermine the Prime Minister's capacity to lead the government. Such
weakening of Prime Minister's authority would surely lead to serious !.allure
governance and lack of harmony and coordination, and would severely undermme public
interest.
Those who argue that the Prime Minister is like any other Member of .Parliament or any
other Minister are technically correct. In reality, in all countnes tol\owmg the
Parliamentary executive model drawing the Cabinet from the leg1slature. the Pnme
Minister becomes the leader of the country and government. The authonty of the Pnme
Minister, as long as he enjoys Parliamentary support, has synonymous With the
nation's dignity and prestige. A Prime Minister facing formal enqUITy by a Lok Pa\
th t such an enquiry gives the opportumty to ue

IS, once there IS a formal enquiry ly eroded and the government wiM be
b h P
. M'nister's authonty IS severe .._ .......
e, t e nme I . f the Prime Minister cannot undo the damiQI """...,
paralysed. Subsequent me Minister. If the Prime Minister is ndHd QU*Y
to the country or to the office of t e n
105
-------VA.JJRAM & RAVl -------..
h ld be the judge of the matter, and the Lok
of serious Indiscretions, Parliament s ou. tree No lengthy enquiry
Sabha should remove the Prime Mlmster from
0 1
. or
h me of things and a mere pass1ng
1
impeachment Is therefore contemplated 1n our sc e ' o
no-confidence motion without assigning reasons is sufficient to change government. In
the directly elected executive model of government, the Parliament remove the
President who is the chief executive, and therefore a complex process of Impeachment,
and an enquiry by Special Prosecutors to precede such an impeachment have become
necessary.
It could be argued that since any Minister could be removed on Prime Minister's advice,
or Parliament as well, the Lok Pal neeid not have jurisdiction on a Minister's conduct
also. But Parliament does not really sit in judgment over a Minister's conduct. It is the
Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers as a whole whose fate is determined by
Parliament's will. And the Prime Minister does not have the time or energy to personally
investigate the conduct of a Minister. The government's investigative agencies are
controlled or influenced by the Ministers, and therefore it is difficult for the Prime Minister
to get objective assessment of the Ministers' official conduct. Therefore, an Independent,
RECOMMENDATIONS
a. The Constitution to provide lor a national Ombudsman to be called the Rashtriya
lokayukta. role and JUnsdlcton of the Rashtriya lokayukla should be defined in the Constitution
while the composition, mode of appointment and other details can be decided by Parliament through
leg1siallon
b The jurisdiction of lokayukta should extend to all Ministers of the Union (except the Prime
Mmrster), all state Chref Mm1sters, all persons holding public office equivalent in rank to a Union Minister
and Members of Parham.ent. In case the enquiry against a public functionary establishes the involvement
of any other publrc along with the public functionary, the Aashtriya Lokayukta would have the
power to enqurre agarnst such public servant(s) also.
c The Pnme Minister should be kept out of the jurisdiction of the Rashtriya Lokayukta
gh The Rashtriya Lokayuk!q should consist of a serving or retired Judge of the Supreme Court as the
an ernment JUnst as Member and the Central Vigilance Commissioner as the ex-officio
the Rashtriya Lokayukta should be selected from a panel of sitting Judges of the

The same Committee may select the M b (I
Chairperson and Member of the Rashtriem er .e. an eminent JUnst) of the Aashtriya Lokayukta. The
years and they should not hold an should be appointed for only one term of three
being that they can become the o; thereaf.ter, the only exception
I err serv1ces are so requrred.
(f) The Aashtriya Lokayukta should also be entrusted with th
tor rBJ&ng the standards of ethics in public life. e task of undertaking a national campaign
of high would be of great value in enforcing high standards of
ca con uct among Mrnrsters. A similar reasoning applies to Members of Parliament,
106
VAJIRAM & RAVI ______ _
since Parliament's time and ene
conduct of a Member. rgy cannot be consumed by detailed enquiry into the
aut the final decision of removi
of a Minister m
1
b ng the must vest in Parliament, and that of
re onsible
10
the nation . e on. advtce of the Prime Minister. Parliament 1S
for his dec . or ts dectstons, and the Prime Minister is responsible to the
Par
1
1
b trans! d
1
sons. These responsibilities of Parliament and Prime Minister
canna e erre o any unelected body.
Finally, the Prim.e Minister is yet another Member of Parliament in constitutional
theory, pohttcal evolutton transformed him into the leader of the nation. Theoretically,
each member of the legislature is elected by his/her constituents in our model of
government. .au.t the past century, elections even in parliamentary system have
become .plebtscttary 1.n nature. Most often. the Prime Minister's personality, vision, and
leadership are the ISsues, which determine the electoral outcomes. Similarly, the
opposition focuses its energies and hopes on its leader. The electoral contest is
transformed into a test of acceptability of the leaders. The constituency contests have
thus become increasingly dependent on the larger question of whose governmental
leadership people trust or seek at that point of time. Given this overwhelming political
reality, it would be unwise to subject the Prime Minister's office to a prolonged public
enquiry by any unelected functionary. Ultimately, the Parliament is the best forum we
can trust to enforce integrity in the office of the Prime Minister.
The same principles and arguments also hold good in respect of the Chief Minister of a
state. Therefore, it would be unwise to include the Chief Minister in the Lokayukta's
junsdiction. Several states have excluded the Chief Minister from the Lokayukta's ambit
though in a few states, the Chief Minister is included. But, if the Chief Mimster is brought
under the jurisdiction of a federal institution of high standing, then the risks are mitigated.
once the Lok Pal or equivalent institution is in place, all Chief Ministers should be
brought under Lok Pal's purview. Such a provision would makmg Lok Pal a
Constitutional authority and defining his jurisdiction in the ConstitutiOn wh1lo leav
1
ng the
details of appointment and composition to be fixed by parliament through leg1sla\10n
In order to enable the Lok Pal to enh:::-nce its ef1ectiveness and to the trust the
public has in the institution, it is essential for the Lok Pal to establish tor
effective interaction with the public in general and the private and the society
in particular Such association would also help better understanding of the
build checks and balances in its functioning, and prev.ent abuse of aut or, rcA6
. . th to the Lok Pal's not1ce The expenence o
investigating agencies by bnnglng em h hown that the education and
in Hong Kong which h.as strategy it It IS to be ellcctiVc
awareness raising funct1on IS crucial to any a h ICACP of New south Wales Austm a
, CEC s apore's CPIB and t e '
Botswana s D mg C f N South Wales 1s noted 1or holdlflg p b c
have similar mandates. In the the successful expenence of th
hearings to expose corruption. In b the public 1n general nd tho pnv
countries with ant1corrupt1on efforts Y
107
VAJIRAM & RA.Vl
h econd ARC recommended that SUch
sector and the civil society 10
1
e s
activiHes should be taken up by the Lok a
1
cannot be over-emphas
duct In high p aces ISed
The role of the Lok Pal In ethical con d that the Lok Pal be given a Constitutlonai
The Commission would like to recommen ' d status and Constitutional safeguards
status. This would provide the Is expected to be a watchdog against
appropriate for such an important mstltut
0
'
wrong doings by high public authorities.
rovlde an element of a continuum In the fight
Another minor !ssue Is the name Itself. To P from the top to the grass roots, it may be
against corruptton from the Union to the States, kt and name the proposed Lok p
1
useful to provide a connect with the State Lokayu as a
as the 'Rashtriya Lokayukta'.
THE LOKAYUKT A
In the wake of the recommendations of the first Administrative Reforms Commission,
many State Governments enacted legislation to constitute .the to
allegatrons or grievances arising out of the conduct of public servants mcludmg pohttcal
executives, legislators, officers of the State Government, local bodies, public enterprises
and other Instrumentalities of Government including cooperative societies and
umversttles. By v1rtue of such legislation, a member of the public can tile specific
allegattons with the Lokayukta against any public servant tor enquiry. It is also open to
the lokayukta to initiate suo-motu inquiry into the conduct of public servants. The
lokayukta 1s generally a retired Judge of the High Court or the Supreme Court and
normally appotnted for a five-year term on the basis of a Joint decision involving the Chief
Mtnlster, the Chief Justice, the Speaker of the House and leader of the Opposition.
However, in many states the Lokayukta does not have an independent investigating
authority at its disposal and Is therefore dependent on Government agencies to carry
forward its investigations. The Maharashtra and Orissa Lokayuktas assume more the
character of a grievance redressal organization rather than an Ombudsman for cases of
corruption.
Over .seventeen states presently have Lokayuktas but there is no uniformity in the
prov1s1ons of the enactments, with fundamental differences regarding their functions.
Whtle rn all states the Lokayuktas deal with issues of corruption, in some, they also deal
With other In a few states, a wide range of functionaries including Chief
MiniSters. and office bearers of cooperatives have been brought within
the s purvrew; m others, the coverage is quite restrictive. In some States,
powers are vested in them with an Investigation machinery attached. Some
also prov1de for powers of search and seizure in the course of investigation. The
expenditure

the is, in some States, charged on the consolidated fund of

the State provldlng reqUtsrte financial independence for the institution. Some Lokayuktas
have powers to pun,sh tor contempt.
108
-------VAJIRAM & RAVl ______ _
Be that as It may, the experience In
rather unfortunate as the followln regard to wooong of the LoK<\yuktas has been
fl st State to establish thl
1
. g examples Will show. Though Maharashtra was the
rhen the incumbent nstltutlon early as in 1972, Its public credibility was lost
w Orissa lnstlt t d ued to for several months after he was as\<.ed to step

1
bol' ed and then abohshed the institution. In Haryana, the tnstitutlon of
Lok . a .was a ts e overnight through an Ordinance as the serving High Court Judge
functtontng as the Lok Pal had protection against summary dismissal. The Punjab
Government also repealed the Act through an Ordinance as a fallout of a matter In which
the Lok .Pal had received eight complaints against former Ministers in the previous
ministry 10 The Rajasthan Lokayukta was forthright in recommending to the
Government In tts annual report in 1996 that there was no use of continuing the
institution as the institution had not proved to be effective. Even though the Madhya
Pradesh Lokayukta had indicted two Ministers in a land deal and certain other Mintsters
were also held responsible for wrong doing, no action whatsoever was tal<.en against any
of them. Here too, in its annual report for 1997-98, the Lokayukta had advised the
Government that unless adequate powers were given to it there was no need tor
RECOMMENDATIONS
a. The Constitution should be amended to incorporate a provision making it obligatory on the
part of State Governments to establish the institution of Lokayukta and stipulate the general
principles about Its structure, power and functions.
b. The Lokayukta should be a multi-member body consisting of a iudiclal Member 1n the Chair \
an eminent jurist or eminent administrator with impeccable credentials as Member and the
head of the State Vigilance Commission as ex-officio Member.
The Chairperson of the Lokayukta should be selected from a panel of retired Supreme Court
Judges or retired Chief Justices of High Court, by a Committee consisting of the Chtef
Chief Justice of the High Court and the Leader of the Opposition in the Leg1slative Assembly.
The same Committee should select the seCQnd Member from among emt'1ent
jurists/administrators. There is no need to have an Up-Lokayukta.
c. The jurisdiction of the Lokayukta would extend to only cases involving corruption. They
should not look into general public grievances.
d. The Lokayukta should deal with cases of corruption against Ministers and MLAs.
e. Each State should .a State
against State Government offtetals. The Commtss on .ou
functions similar to that of the Central Vigilance Commlsston.
f. The Anti Corruption Bureaus should be brought under the control of the State V\gtlance
Commission.
. bers of the Lokayukta should be appointed strictly tor one tern\
g. The Chairperson and Medm bl'c office under government thereatter.
only and they should not hoi any pu
1
_,
. hine tor investigation. In llally, It may tak.e"' t
h. The Lokayukta should have tts own but period oi1Ne t sho d t e
on deputation from the State ' rl
to recruit its own cadre, and tratn them prope y.
1
ed to Rashtriya Lokayl.ikta or Lok 1
t. All cases ol corruption otlnquiry.
should not be referred to any
109
------ YAJIRAM & RAYI -----.......
. nution. In Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, the annual reports
01
lh
continuance of ms not been laid on the table of the legislature as required be
Vigilance mission. Y
the order conshlutmg the Com
k kta which has been a very active institution, is headed by a retir
The Kamataka Lo ayu Court and has jurisdiction over all public servants including
Judge of .the With the Anti Corruption Bureau of the State forming Part 8
1
Chief M1mster an lnl . . . . o
. . . . h nfettered power to enqwre or tnvesttgate mto cases of misconduct
the mshtutton, It as u . H h h h
and deals both with allegations and gnevances. thowlevker, tkot ugb the Act
. h bmission of property returns to e o ayu a y t e Ch1ef Mtn
1
ster
prov1des for I e su . h t f d
. . d llleg'sfators few have subm1tted t ese re urns so ar an no actton has M1ntsters an a
been taken against those wtlo have not done so.
In this context, the Lokayuktas' Conference had proposed a for a
uniform institution of Lokayukta in every state: on a Central with
C 11 1 onal back up. In the Draft Bill, maladm1nrstrat1on has been def1ned to make it
ons 1 u 1 d f' f bl'
more broad based to facilitate r'nvestigation and the e o pu 1c functionary
coming within the ambit of the institution has been widened. Vanous powers have been
proposed to strengthen the Lokayukta. Most importantly: it been the
proceedings before the Lokayukta should be treated as JUdiCial it
with Jurisdiction, powers and authority to punish for contempt of 1tself as a High Court.
The proposals include the conferment of constitutional status on P" with High Court
Judges.
The entire structure of the anti-corruption machinery in the States needs reconsideration.
An all-out effort to combat corruption would require that this problem be dealt with
appropriately at all levels. On the one hand, curbing corruption at the cutting edge level
would require a machinery having wide reach which could investigate a large number of
cases of corruption effectively. On the other, curbing corruption at the highest level
would require a mechanism with adequate powers, expertise and status which could
investigate cases against high public functionaries like Ministers. If the Lokayukta is to
be effective, it would neither be appropriate nor feasible to make this institution
investigate petty cases against junior functionaries as its primary effort. Therefore, it is
necessary to have the equivalent of the Central Vigilance Commission at the state level
to deal with cases of corruption among public servants. The Lokayukta could then deal
with corruption at the highest level covering senior-most public functionaries. However,
often the thread of corruption runs through several levels, indicating connivance of
Ministers and public officials.
It s therefore necessary to have a link between the Lokayukta and the State Vigilance
Commissoner. The Central Vigilance Commissioner should be made a Member of the
Lok Pal. The Second ARC has also recommended a multi-member Lok Pal, so that it is
better r ulated against outside influence and also because a decision of a multi-
member Commission would be more objective as it would have inputs from the different
members. A sim1lar approach at the state level would be appropriate. The multi-member
Lokayukta should have a retired Supreme Court Judge or a retired Chief Justice of the
110
- ------ VAJlR.AM & RAVI -------
High Court in the Chair the Stat v . .
t or an eminent ad'm . e lgllance Commissioner as a member and an emment
juns 'sin the Chief . of impeccable credentials as a member. A collegium
should the Leader ol the Opposition and the Chief Justice ol the
H1gh . .appoint the Chairman and Members of the Lokayukta. The State
V'gilance Comm1ss1ons should . 1
. exerc1se supenntendence over the funct1onmg of the
Bureaus. It should tender independent and impartial advice to the
disciplinary and in disciplinary cases, involving the vigilance angle at
different stages

mvest1gation, inquiry, appeal , review etc; and exercise a general

check and superv1s1on over vigilance and anti-
corruption work in Departments of the State
Government and other organizations Within the
control of the State Government.
To insulate the institution of Lokayukta from the
vagaries of political expediency, of the kind
witnessed in the past, it would be necessary to
give the Lokayukta, as in the case of the Lok
Pal, a Constitutional status. It would be
necessary to amend the Constitution to provide
for the institution of Lokayukta in all states. This
would also provide the opportunity to vest this
authority with certain uniform powers,
responsibilities and functions across all states.
To this effect the Second ARC believes that the
Lokayukta can be a state level equivalent of the
Rashtriya Lokayukta witt! a similar constitution.
OMBUDSMAN AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
RECOMMENDATIONS
a. A local bodies Ombudsman should
be constituted lor a group of districts
to investigate cases against the
functionaries ol the local bodies. The
State Panchayat Raj Acts and the
Urban Local Bodies Act should be
amended to indude this provision.
b. The local bodies Ombudsman
should be empowered to investigate
cases ol corruption or
maladministration by the functionaries
of the local sell governments. and
submit reports to the competent
authorities tor taking action. The
competent authorities should normally
take action as recommended. In case
they do not agree with the
recommendations. they should giVe
their reasons in writing and the
reasons should be made public.
The 73rd and the 74th amendments to the Constitution have hrmly estabchlished
h' d f 1 the government h:erar Y on
decentralization of powers and functions to the '. lr . ler o I I ted to bring government
I . a measure of democratisation ca cu a
a statutory ootlng as . t bTty of the local administration. However.
closer to the people and Increase the without proper safeguards can
concern has been expressed e multaneously accompanied by the creatiOn of
increase corruption, if the process IS not Sl . 'I ble at the level of the Umon
. . h ms otherw1se ava1 a
suitable accountability mec ams Th' gives greater scope lor corruption.
Government and state governments. IS Ia n\s ol
. sman may be established to hear comp
A system of Local Bodies Ombud ed mbers as well as ollicials). Such Ombudsma
corruption against local bodies .me -n. Local Bodies Ombudsman should ha
.
1
roup of d1stncts. ,.,e In
may be constituted or a g . of corruption against publiC tunct10nanes
powers to enquire rnto allegations t ke action against the elected mem n;
bodies. They should be to the State Panchayat RBI Acl
are found guilty of misconduct. or .
111
VAJIRAM & RAVI ------.....
d d to prescribe the details. The

ld have to be amen e t 1 th l k
Municipalities Acts wou dl Ombudsman's should ves n e o ayukta Of
superintendence over the Local eo, es powers over the Local Bodies Ombudsman.
h ld be given revls onary
the state, who s ou d Ombudsman under the Kerala Panchayau Raj
The Government of Kerala has appolnt,e estlgatlons In respect of any action involving
A t 1999 It conducts nv d 1 t tl t
(Amendment) c ,
1
'ties In the discharge of a mm s ra ve unctions
corruption, maladministration or ',"egu an elected representative, of or an Official
by local self government lnstllut ons,t Institution and tor the disposal of any complaint
working In any self wilh the provisions of the Kerala Panchayat Raj
relatmg to such action In accor ance
Act, 1994 (Act No.13 of 1994 ). .
C t't ronal role now envisaged for decentrahsed local I the wake of the larger ons I u I . h
n . ld b ood initiative to have a separate v1gllance overs1g t agency
'' wou. e and maladministration against elected executives
to Investigate allegations o . 'd 1 Th t
f th three tiers of these local bodies and their pal personne . e otal
and members o e 11 'bfe fo th t
number of such elected personnel is so large that It IS Vlrtua y lmpossl r e s ate
Lokayuktas to exercise effective vigilance over these bodies.
Th Ombudsman should be appointed under the respective Panchayat Raj/Urban Local
Acts in all States!UTs., for a group of districts. The .
should be empowered to investigate cases of corruption or by
tunctlonanes of local self government Institutions. It is often argued that of
Local Ombudsman would lead to duplication of efforts since the Lokayukta IS already
there. The Lokayukta should investigate cases only against Ministers or
public functionaries and legislators. Therefore, there would be no clash of JUnsd1ct1on
between the Local Ombudsman and the Lokayukta. However, in order to provide proper
gwdance to the Local Ombudsman, they should be placed under the overall guidance
and superintendence of the Lokayukta.
STRENGTHENING INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION
Prosecution is often a weak link in the chain of anti-corruption law enforcement and there
are instances where prosecutors have facilitated the discharge of a delinquent officer. It
is, therefore, crucial that cases of corruption are handfed by efficient prosecutors whose
integrity and professional competence is above board. The Supreme Court did mandate
a key safeguard in corruption cases, by decreeing that a panel of lawyers, answerable to
a body similar to that of the Director of Prosecutions In the United Kingdom should be
created to review the prosecution of corruption cases. As the Supreme Court observed,
th1s panel of "competent lawyers of experience and impeccable reputation shall be
prepared on the advice of the Attorney General." According to the Supreme Court, each
case of prosecution by the CBI will have to be reviewed by a lawyer from the panel, and
responsibility for unsuccessful prosecution should be fixed. It would be desirable that the
lol'-ayukras/State Vigilance Commissions are empowered to supervise the prosecution
112
-------VAJIRAM & RAVI ______ _
of corruption related cases Thi
osecutors on the one hand. s provide the much needed overstght of the
pr and QU1dance to the prosecutors on the other.
corruption prevention
and enforcement in an
increasingly electroniC RECOMMENDATIONS
environment both in a. The State Vigilance Commissions/Lokayuktas may be empowered
government institutions to SUpervise the prosecution of corruption related cases.
and outside, requires b. The investigative agencies should acquire multi-disciplinary
T should be thoroughly conversant with the working of vanous
specl IC measures to Offices/ departments. They should draw officials from d1fferent wmgs
equip the investigating of government.
agencies with electronic c. MOdern techniques of investigation should also be deployed
investigating tools and electronic surveillance, video and audio recording of surpnse
capability to undertake inspections, traps, searches and seizures.
such investigation. d. A reasonable time limit tor investigation of different types of cases
systematic training of should be fixed lor the investigative agencies.
officers in this area more e. There should be sustained step-up in the number of cases
particularly at the state detected and investigated. The priorities need to be reoriented by
level is essential. In view focussing on 'big' cases of corruption.
of the complexities f. The prosecution of corruption cases should be conducted by a
panel of lawyers prepared by the Attorney General or the Advocate
involved in investigating General in consultation with Rashtriya Lokayukta or Lokayukta as
modem-day corruption, the case may be.
the investigating g. The anti-corruption agencies should conduct surveys
agencies should be of departments with particular reference to highly corruption prone
ones in order to gather intelligence and to target otftcers of
equipped with econom1c,
accounting and audit, questionable integrity.
h The economic offences unit of states need to be strengthened to
.. technical, and effectively investigate cases and there should be better coordination
sc1ent1f1c knowledge, amongst existing agencies.
skills and tools of . . . . ed of torens1c
investigation. More specifically they reqUire knowl ge
accounting, audit in different fields like the of
It would be advisable to have officials in the mvestlgatlve agencies drawn rom
wings of government.
. . d mutual assistance among various enforcement
Inter-agency mformatlon exchange an o t te of Enforcement Economic
. . 'es such as the ora .
investtgattve agenc1 . t d' ect and indirect taxes as well as the
Intelligence Agencies including those relating nearthing serious cases ol frauds
State investigating agencies can a of Ftnance has set up an
and economic offences. In recogmtton o 'U d the present system, there \s an
elaborate nodal agency for this b n Unton Finance Mtn stcr With
Economic Intelligence Council e:.igative and mtelligence agcnces at
representatives from key MinistrieEs an Intelligence Commttees (REICs) w
I E. ht en Regional conoml 1 coord
national leve . 1g e . in
2003
to, inter alia. ensure operattona
set up in 1996 and reacttvated
113
-------VAJJRAM & RAVf
. ..........
. nd eeonomic intelligence agenc1es as well as si .
between vanous enforcement a ed
1
the Ministry of Finance to m . lll
1
1q,
S I I
Th re is perhaps ne or Onl!or
tate eve agenc1es. e ff rve nodal agencies tor check the
work of the REICs so that they become more e ec
1
lng Ira
d
. . . f econom
1
c and related offences. It has been also noticed LI(J
an corrupt1on ansmg rom . 1h
the cases filed relate mostly to those based on or press reports, be; at
reactive action on the part of the agencl_es. Few cases emanate out 01
department's own efforts. Streamlined vertical corruption runs through levels
the official hierarchy in corruption prone departments, and does not receive the atte .
t f t' t
0110
n
it deserves. This calls tor strengthenmg sources o rn orma ron o specrf1cally 1
. A f t' arget
officers involved in the chain of hierarchical corrupt1on. n r-corrup ron agencies sh
conduct systematic surveys of departments with particular reference to highly corru

prone ones in order to gather intelligence and to observe officers at the higher level:"?n
1 With
questronab e reputatrons.
114
VAJlRAM & RAVI ______ _
CHAPTER-
7
MENACE OF CORRUPTION
The major sub-heads covered d
un er the topic 'M
1. Menace 01 c . enace of Corruption' are outlined below-
orruptlon In Public Life
2. India As A 'Soft Society'
3. Directives Of Supreme Court
4. Administrative Reform C . .
s ommiSSion On Corruption In India
A brief description of the above has b
1

een aid '" the forthcoming paragraphs.
MENACE OF CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC LIFE
Corruption is an abuse of public r . . . .
scope for corruption increa or poSition In pubhc for private gam. The
the division of power be::s w en. on public administrators is fragile and
. . . . . een pohllcal, executive and bureaucracy is ambiguous.
Poht1cal corruption wh1ch IS sometimes inseparable ' b
. . . . .rom ureaucrallc corruption tends to
be more Widespread m authontanan regimes where the public opinion and the Press are
to denounce The paradox of India, however, is that in spite of a
press and pubhc op1mon, the level of corruption is exceptionally high. This may
be to the utter insensitivity, lack of shame and the absence of any sense of
pubhc morality among the bribe-takers. Indeed, they wear their badge of corruption and
shamelessness with equal elan and brazenness.
The increase of opportunities in State intervention in economic and social lite has vastly
increased the opportunity for political and bureaucratic corruption, more particularly since
politics has also become professionalized. We have professional politictans wno are
politicians on a full time basis, even when out of office. Corruption today poses a danger
not only to the quality of governance but is threatening the very foundations of our
society and the State. Corruption in defence purchases, in other purchases and
contracts tend to undermine the very security of the State. Some of the power contracts
are casting such financial burden upon some of the States that the very financial viab1l1ty
of those States has fallen into doubt. There seems to be a nexus between terrorism,
drugs, smuggling, and politictans, a fact which was emphas1zed in the Vohra Comm1ttee
Report.
Corruption has flourished because one does not see adequately successful examples of
effectively prosecuted cases of corruption. Cases, poorly founded upon. haH-hearted nd
incomplete investigation, followed by a tardy and delayed tnal confluence a morally 11-
deserved but a legally inevitable acquittal. The acceptance of corrupt on u an
inexorable reality has led to silent reconciliatiOn and res1gnation to such wrongs
115
------- VAJJRAI\1 & RAVJ ______ ...._
th social consciousness of our citizens - that
There needs to be a vital stimulatiOn m
8
al sphere 11 Is true that the present proce
5
1
t
neither has a place in the personal nor sot Cis In which it should have never entered or .
5
f rhd ng the State from vanous sec or 1n
o f rl ng efficiently may reduce the chances of corruption to
whiCh 11 IS nor capable o pe orml th has to be
some extent bur even 1f we migrate to a tree market .. ere . regulation
f d' !'net from restrictions upon the industnal activity. The reqUirements Ol
o economy as IS I h ses and so on
governance would yet call for entering into contracts, pure a
INDIA AS A 'SOFT SOCIETY'
The Scandinavian economist-sociologist, Gunnar Myrdal, had described the Indian
society as a 'soft society'. He also clarified what the expression 'soft society' means.
According to him, a soft society is:
(a) one which does not have the political will to enact the laws necessary for its
progress and development and/or does not possess the political will to
implement the laws, even when made, and
(b) where there is no discipline. In tact, he has stressed the second aspect
more than the first.
According to him, it there is no discipline in the society, no real or meaningful
development or progress is possible. It is the lack of discipline in the society - which
expression includes the administration and structures of governance at all levels - that is
to corruption. Corrupt1on and indiscipline feed upon each other. One way of
mshllmg the d1sc1pline among the society may be to reduce the chances of corruption
and to deal with it sternly and mercilessly wherever it is found. For this purpose, the
rnadequacies in the criminal judicial
system have to be redressed.
Corruption is also anti-poor. Take,
tor example, the Public Distribution
System (PDS) and the welfare
schemes for the poor including
Scheduled Castes (SCs) and
Scheduled Tribes (STs). It is well-
known that a substantial portion of
grain. sugar and kerosene oil meant
for PDS goes 1nto black-market and
that hardly 16% of the funds meant
for STs and SCs reach them - all
the rest is m1sappropriated by some
of the members of the political and


\
Oaylo-day\
T ronsactional.
PnonUsabOnal
__....._ ./....# Politicians, senior.
.,.. "-._./ !b""-. bul'llauerats dipping
/ into public funds.
National security risks
from corrupt security
forc&s.
Polocy neglect by and
burtaucl'1ts itS a mull of focus on
money'.
OffiCial class and uns.crupulous dealers and businessmen. The famous economist Late
As
Mehbub-U/-Haq succinctly and poignantly set out the ill-effects of corruption in a South
1an country l1ke ours.
116
VAJlRAM & RAVl ______ _
He said: "Corruption happens
campaigns m Italy and the It has been at the centre oi elee\ton
Indonesia, and resulted in legis\ r tngdom, to the iall oi governments m Japan and
corruption exists in nch, actiOn tn Russia and the United States. But, ii
worried about it? The answe Y successiul countries, why should South Asta be
characteristics that make it iar IS South Asian corruption has lour key
world. ore damagmg than corruption in any other parts oi the
First, corruption in South Asia occurs
d
istorts fundamental decs up-stream, not down-stream. Corruption at the top
1
IOns about developm t .. 1 d I
dust rial countries thes . . en pnonttes, po tctes, an pro1ects. n
1
n n merit even core dec.tstons are taken through transparent competition and
o P Y corruption may occur down-stream.
second, corruption money in So th A
. . . u sta has wtngs, not wheels. Most oi the corrupt
gains made 1n the reg1on are immed t 1
. . . 1a e Y smuggled out to safe havens abroad. Whereas
there IS some capttal fhght in other countries as well, a greater proportion goes into
investme.n\. In words, it is more likely that corruption money in the North Asia ts
used to fmance bustness than to fill foreign accounts.
Third, corruption in South Asia often leads to promotion, not prison. The b1g fish- unless
they belong to the opposition- rarely fry. In contrast, industrialised countries often have
a process of accountability where even top leaders are investigated and prosecuted. For
instance, former Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi was forced to live m exile in Tunisia
to escape extradition on corruption charges in Rome. The most lrustrating aspect ol
corruption in South Asia is that the corrupt are often too powertul to go through such an
honest process of accountability.
Fourth, corruption in South Asia occurs with 515 million people in poverty not with per
capita incomes above twenty thousand dollars. While corrupt1on in rich rapidly growmg
countries may be tolerable, though reprehensible, in poverty stricken South Asia it is
political dynamite when the majority of the population cannot, but to massive human
deprivation and even more extreme income meet their basic needs wt'11le a lew make
fortunes through corruption. Thus corruption in South Asia does not lead to s1mply
Cabinet portfolio shifts or newspaper headlines inequalities. Combating corruption in :he
region is not just about punishing corrupt politicians and bureaucrats but .about savmg
human lives. There are two dimensions of corruption. One is the expl01tat1ve corruptiOn
where the public servant exploits the helpless poor Citizen. The other ts collustve
corruption where the citizen corrupts the public servant by a bnbe b:cause he gets
financially better benefits. Collusive corruption depends on black money
DIRECTIVES OF SUPREME COURT
It rna be recalled that the Supreme Court had given certain duecttons m \1 e c
. Y U f lnd'ta (AIR
19
98 sc 889) for conlernng statuto!) \
Vmeet Nara1n vs. mon o 1 1
the Central Vigilance Commtsslon and to insulate the Central Burcnu o v
117
YAJI AA.M & R;\Yl -._

111 1
control and pressures. In the
te from po
1
ca d f L
and the Enforcement Olrectora h pprovalthe recommen attons o ord Nor
decision, the &Jpreme court United Kingdom. The following
Committee on Standards In Public mended by the court:
I application were com
public lifo of genera Th eneral principles of conduct which underp
Principles of public life. e this The seven principles of selflessnes
10
public lifo need to be restated .. "!e and readership are set out. s,
Integrity, objectivity, accountabtltty, op
d t
. All public bodies should draw up codes of COnduct
Codes of con uc
Incorporating these principles.
l ndepondent scrutiny: Internal systems for maintaining standards should be
supported by Independent scrutiny.
. M eds to be done to promote and reinforce standards
01
Education. ore ne d . . . I d' .
conduct in public bodies, in particular through guidance an tratntng, tnc u mg tnduction
tramlng:
The Seven Prlnctples of Public Life are stated in the Report by Lord Nolan, thus -
(i) Selflessness: Holders of public office should take decisions solely in terms
of the public Interest. They should not do so in order to gain financial or other
material benefits for themselves, their family, or their friends.
(il) l ntegrl!y Holders of public office should not place themselves under any
financtal or other obligation to outside individuals or organizations that might
mfluence them in the performance of their official duties.
(Ill) ObJectivity: In carrying out public business, including making public
appomtments, awarding contracts, or recommending individuals for rewards
and benefi ts, holders of public office should make choices on meri t.
(rv) Accountability: Holders of public office are accountable for their decisions
and actions to the public and must submit themselves to whatever scrutiny is
appropriate to their office.
(v) Openness: Holders of public office should be as open as possible about all
the decisions and actions that they take. They should give reasons for their
decisions and restrict Information only when the wider public interest clearly
demands.
(vi) Honesty: Holders of public office have a duty to declare any private interests
relatmg to thetr public duties and to take steps to resolve any conflicts arising
m a way that protects the public interest.
(vi:) leadership: Holders of public office should promote and support these
princ,ples by leadershrp and example ...
118
VAJIRAM & RAYl -------
These prinCiples of pubhc life are
01
. . .
expected to bear them in mind While application 10 every democracy and one is
office. II ts tnte that the holders of the conduct of every holder of a public
exercised 1n pubhc interest alone IC offices are entrusted with certain powers to be
people. Any deviation from the p ' therefore, the office is held by them In trust lor the
trust and must be severely dealt .rectitude by any of them amounts to a breach ot
conduct amounts to an often WI tnstead of being pushed under the carpet. It the
against whom a prima facie
1
t must be promptly investigated and the offender
the majesty of law Is upheld

made out should be prosecuted expeditiously so that

to enforce the rule of law and t e rule
01
law vindicated. It is the duty of the judiciary
erelore, to guard against erosion of the rule of law."
ADMINI STRATIVE REFORMS C
OMMISSION ON CORRUPTION IN INDIA
The Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) h
1
'd
mmendations th . . . . as a down a number of
reco on e preva11tng chaotic cond1tion. The following list deals with them:
1 . Official Conduct Causing Damage to Public Interest
2. Collusive Bribery
3. Sanction for Prosecution
4. Speeding up Trials
5. Corruption Involving the Private Sector
6. Confiscation of Properties
7. Prohibition of 'Benami' Transactions
8. Protection to Whistleblowers
9. Serious Economic Offences
10. Immunity Enioyed by Legislators
11 . Constitutional Protection to Civil Servants
12. Improving Institutional Arrangements to Reduce Corruption
13. Strengthening Investigation and Prosecution
14. Promoting Competition
15. Simplifying Transactions
16. Ustng Information Technology
17. Integrity Pacts
18. Reducing Discretion
19. Supervisron
119
-------VAJIRAM & RAVI ------.. % .....
20. Ensuring Accessibility and Responsiveness
21. Risk Management tor Prevenlive Vigilance
22. Proactive Vigilance on Corruption
23.Audit
24. Proactive Vigilance on Corruption
25. Intelligence Gathering
26. Vigilance Network
27. Social Infrastructure
28. Protecting the Honest Civil Servant
A brief description of the above has been laid down below.
1. Official conduct causing damage to public interest
However, experience of the past decades shows that such an indirect definition
01
corrupt practices is paradoxically restrictive and a whole range of official conduct
detrimental to public interest, is not covered by strong penal provisions. In particular'
there are four types of official conduct which cause immense damage to public interest'
which do not explicitly constitute violation of criminal law. '
The first and possibly the most important of these is gross perversion of the Constitution
and institutions, including, wilful violation of the oath of office. Constitutional
functronanes have sometimes been found to indulge in such constitutional perversion out
of partisan considerations or personal pique. In most
such case_s. there may be neither illegal consideration SUGGESTED STEPS
nor pecumary advantage, nor any form of gratification WHICH MUST BE TAKEN
involved.
In some of those cases, the Supreme Court held
holding high office guilty of gross
mrsconduct amounting to perversion of the Constitution.
In cases, except public opinion, political pressure
and drctates of the conscience of the individual there
are no legal provisions to punish the perpetrators.'
The second class of offences is abuse of authority
or_ harming someone, without any
pecumary consrderatron or gratification. In such case
often . partisan interests, nepotism and person:;
role, though no corruption is involved
m the restnctrve, 'legal' sense of the term
the damage done by such wilful acts
den al ol ones due by criminal neglect have profound
120
The following should be
classified as offences under
the Prevention of Corruption
Act:
Gross perversion of the
Constitution and
democratic institutions
amounting to wilful
violation of oath of 1
office. !
Abuse of authority
unduly favouring or
harming someone.

Obstruction of justice .

Squandering public
money.
VAJlRAM. & RAVI ______ _
consequences to society and und .
rule of law. emllne the very framework of ethical governance and
Third, obstruction or perversion
1
. .
agencies and prosecution
1
s a como JUStice by unduly influencing law enforcement
cases. partisan considerations n occurrence in our country. Again in most such
gratification, may be the and and not pecuniary gain or
confidence in the system and e resultant fa1lure of justice undermines public
s anarchy and violence.
Finally, squandering public mone .
more common. In all such y, ostentatious official life-styles, has become
O
r loss to any citizen there IS neither private pecuniary gain nor specific gain
. re IS a so no misapprop . r . I d T .
t large suffers and b th . . na IOn lnvo ve . he pubhc exchequer
a .
0
pubhc mterest and citizens' trust in government are
undermmed.
It is believed that all these tour types of wilful abuse ot office are on the
In our country at all levels and need to be firmly curbed it we are to protect
and our democratic system. Otherwise, public servants - elected or
appomted - Will _be seen _not as custodians ot public interest and sentinels of democracy
but. as for personal aggrandizement and pursuing private agendas
wh1le occupymg pubhc office.
There is therefore need for classifying the following as offences under the Prevention of
Corruption Act:




2.
Gross perversion of the Constitution and democratic institutions amounting to
wilful violation of oath of office
Abuse of authority unduly favouring or harming someone
Obstruction of justice
Squandering public money
Collusive bribery
In any corrupt transaction, there are two parties- the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker The
offence of bribery can be classified into two categories. In one category the bnbe gwer ts
a victim of extortion, he Is compelled to pay for a simple service. because if he does not
submit to the extortionary demands of the public servant, he ends up losing much more
than the bribe. The delays, harassment, uncertainty, lost opportunity, loss ot wor\1. and
wages _ all resulting from non-compliance with for a bribe - are .so great \hat
the citizen is sucked into a vicious cycle of corrupt1on for day-to-day survwal Ses\dcs
there is another category of cases where the bn1>egiver and bnbe-taker together 1\eece
society and the bribe-giver is as guilty as or even guiltier than the bnbetaker The
cases execution of substandard works. distortion ol competitiOn, robbtng th P
exchequer, commissions in public procurement, evasion by coUu \On cau
direct harm to people by spurious drugs and v1olation ot safety norm The
categories of corruption are also termed as 'co ere ve' and co\1
121
------- VAJI RAM & RAVJ lti::ail
. economy cases of coercive corruption are
0
respoctively. W1th the rapidly growrng the magnitude of 'serious ec n the
mcrease. and, at umes, these often assu onol'llic
offences'
Act lays down various offences and Pe
Cha ter 111 of the Prevent1on of Corruption . .
P
1
nee of illegal gratificatiOn by a public servant for doing .
sect1on 7 makes accep a
1 1
defned as t any
official act an offence. Though giving bribe is .not e Y
1
. an . fence, the
b b
. 'It of the offence of 'abetment and 1s liable tor tho same pun1shrnent
n egiVer 1s gw Y . .
1
f as
the bribe-taker. Section 24 of the Act, however. provides lmmun ty rom prosecution to a
bnbe-giver if he/she gives a statement in a court ?f law. that he/ she bribe
However, the Prevention of Corruption Act does not differentiate between coercive anci
'collusive corruption.
System1c refonns are very effective in combating coercive corruption. Besides, ev
though the general conviction rate in cases of corruption is low, it is observed that
rate of convictiOn in cases of coercive corruption is more than in collusive corruption. Th:
reason for this is, the bribe-giver is also the victim and because of the immunity provided
to him under Section 24 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, he often comes forward t
depose against the bribe-taker. Besides, the 'trap cases' by the vigilance machinery
qu,te effectiVe in such cases. The same is not true for 'collusive' corruption. Getting
conv1ct10n m these cases IS extremely difficull as both, the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker
collude and are beneficiaries of the transaction. The negative impact of collusive
corruphon 1s much more adverse and the government and often the society, at large, are
the sufferers.
'Collusive corruplion needs to be dealt with by
effective legal measures so that both the bribe-
g ver and the bribe-taker do not escape
puntshment. A/so, the punishment tor collusive
corruption should be made more stringent. In
cases of collus1ve corruption, the 'burden of
proof should be shifted to the accused.
Sect1on 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act
needs to be amended to provide tor
SpeCial offence of 'collusive bribery'. An offence
could be classified as 'collusive bribery if the
outcome or intended outcome of the transaction
leads to a toss to the state, public or public

SUGGESTED STEPS WHICH
MUST BE TAKEN
a. Section 7 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act needs to be amended
to provide for a special offence of
'collusive bribery'. An offence could
be classified as 'collusive bribery' if
the outcome or intended outcome of
the transaction leads to a loss to the
state, public or public interest.
b. In all such cases if it is
established that the interest of the
state or public has suffered because
of an act of a public servant, then
the court shall presume that the
public servant and the beneficiary of
the dec1sion committed an offence of
'collusive bribery'.
teresr. In all such cases if If s established that
the merest of the state or public has suffered
because of an act of a public servant, then the
COUtt shal/ presume that the public servant and
the of the decision committed an
o/tfnee of 'CXJI/usrve The punishment for
c. The punishment for all such cases
of collusive bribery should be double
that ot other cases ot bribery. The
law may be suitably amended in this
regard.
122
----- -- VAJIR.AM & RAVI _______ _
all such casos should be increased t
10 o years.
3. Sanction for prosecution
Section 19. ot the Preventton of Corrupt A .
. 10n ct prov1des
that prev1ous sanct1on of the compet nt h . .
e aut onty 1s
necessary a court takes cognizance of the
oftences det1ned Sections
7
,
10
,
11
,
13
and
15
of
the Act. The objective ot this provision is to prevent
harassment to honest public servants through malicious
or vexatious complaints. However, many a times there is
substantial delay in obtaining sanction for prosecution
from government, with the result that corrupt officials are
often . not brought to book. The procedure for granting
sanctton, where government is the competent authority,
needs to be streamlined so that there is no delay in
processing such cases.
SUGGESTED STEPS
WHICH MUST BETAKEN
a. Prior sanction should not
be necessary lor prosecuting
a public servant who has
been trapped red-handed or
in cases ol possessing
assets disproportionate to
the known sources of
income.
b. The Prevention
Corruption Act should
amended to ensure that \
sanctioning authorities are
not summoned and instead
the documents can be
obtained and produced
1
before the courts by the
appropriate authority. \
It is recommended that at the level of the Union
c. The Presiding Officer of a
Government, the sanction tor prosecution should be House of Legislature should
processed by an Empowered Committee consisting oi be deSignated as the
the Central Vigilance Commissioner and the sanctioning authority lor MPs
Departmental Secretary to Government. In case of a
\
and MLAs respectwely.
difference of opinion between the two it could be d. The requirement of pcior
. . ' sanction lor prosecuuon now
resolved by plactng the subject before the full Central applicable to servmg public
Vigilance Commission. In case, sanction is sought servants should also apply to
against a Secretary to Government the Empowered retired public servants
. .' d acts performed while tn
Committee would compnse the Cabtnet Secretary an
service.
the Central Vigilance
Commissioner.
4. Speeding up
trials
In order to ensure speedy
trial of corruption cases,
the Prevention of
Corruption Act made the
following provis1ons:
(a} All cases
under the Act
are to be tried
only by a
Special
SUGGESTED STEPS WHICH MUST BETAKEN
a. A legal provision needs to be introduced fixing a time limit
tor various stages ot trial. This could be done by amendments
to the CrPC.
b. Steps have to be taken to that judges declared as
Special Judges under the of the Prevention o1
Corruption Act give primary attention to disposal ol cases
under tha Act. Only it there is madequate worl<. under \he
should the Special Judges be entrusted with o cr
responsibilities.
c It has to be ensured that the pcoceedlngs ol try ng
under the PreventiOn ol Corruption Act l\fC h on
day-to-day basis. and no deviation Is permitted.
d The Supreme Court and the High Courts ma t
to preclude unwarranted ed}oummonll
avotdable delays.
123
------- VAJIRAM & RAVI -----.... ...._.
Judge.
ed. s of the court should be held on a day-to-day basis. (b) The proce mg
h II Slay
the proceedings under the Act on !he grounds
1
'c) No court s a . h . . o an..
,, 1 gularity in the sanction granted, unless 1n t e opmron ot the r error or rre eolJ
11
it has led to failure of justice.
. 'th the trial of cases under the Act, has been disappointing in spt
The ere considered as path-breaking at the lime. Although the Jud'e or
the prOVISIOnS W I w . 9es
.
1 0
cases under the Prevention of Corruptron Act have been declared tryrng corrup 1 n . . as
Special Judges, they have been saddled w1th numerous other non-corruptron cases With
the result that trials in corruption cases get delayed.
5. Corruption Involving the private sector
According to the Bribe Payers Index of Transparency International, businesses fro
India, China and Russia, who are at the bottom of had the .greatest
to pay bribes. This raises the issue of how corruption rn pnvate bod1es should be dealt
with. Corruption in the private sector does not come under the purview of the Prevention
of Corruption Act.
However, if the private sector (or any person engaged by them) is involved in bribing any
public authority then he/she is liable to be punished for the offence of abetment ot
bribery under the Prevention of Corruption Act. A large number of public services, Which
were traditionally done by government agencies, are being entrusted to non-government
agencies. In such cases, persons engaged by the private agency replace the rote ot
erstwhrle public servants. It is therefore necessary to bring such agencies within the fold
of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Also, a large number of Non-Governmental Organizations receive substantial aid from
government. As these agencies spend public money it would be desirable that persons
engaged by such organizations be deemed to be public servants for the purpose of the
Prevention of Corruption Act.
In India, the Companies Act, 1956 provides the statuto'}' framework which governs the
mtemal processes ol a Company. The Company is a juridical person whose internal
processes are determined by the Companies Act and its Articles ol Association. In case
ol non-compliance, the penal provisions are invoked against the Company and its
Officers
1
n default. The Companies Act, 1956 contains penal provisions against criminal
offences by companies and their directors and officers. Though the offence of corruption
or bnbel}' IS not specified under the Compames Act, 1956, instances of wrong doing by
Compan,es and their officers are addressed through the mechanisms ot Accounts and
Audff. ISectoon 211), Inspection under Section 209A, Technical Scrutiny of Balance Sheel
(Section 234), Investigation under Section 2351237 or Section 247, special audit under
;ectiOn
23
3A, r:terence to Company law Board (CLBJ under Section 3888 etc.
esldes, Compames are reqwred to have audit committees ol the Board of Managemenl
to look mto va,ous aspects related to tmanc1a1 propriety It IS felt that corruption in the
124
-------VAJIRAM & RAVI ------- private sector should be addressed
bY effective enforcement of
'Regulations on Corporate
Governance'.
Moreover, corruption within the
private sector should be tackled
through the effective enforcement of
existing laws and regulations.
Bringing the activities of the entire
private sector within the fold of the
Prevention of Corruption Act is
neither desirable nor practical.
SUGGESTED STEPS WHICH MUST BETAKEN
a. The Prevention of Corruption Act should be
SUitably amended to indude in its purview private
sector PfOViders of public utility services.
b. Non-Governmental agencies, which receive
SUbstantial funding, should be covered under the
Prevention of Corruption Act. Norms should be .laid
down that any instiMion or body that has rece1ved
more than 50% of its annual operating costs, or a
sum equal to or greater than Rs 1 crore during any
of the preceding 3 years should be deemed. to
have obtained substantial funding' for that penod
and purpose of such funding.
6. Confiscation of properties
Prosecution and subsequent conviction of corrupt public servants not been
commensurate with the extent of corruption. The level of proof and the
procedural hurdles have ensured that a large number of corrupt are
convicted. Even worse, they often flaunt their ill-gotten wealth w1th 1mpumty. It
necessary that apart from criminal prosecution, the corrupt public servant should also be
denied the ownership of his/her ill gotten wealth.
The Prevention of Corruption Act provides for confiscation ot assets of public in
excess of their known sources of income. However, the provision has
because such forfeiture is possible only on conviction for the relevant olfence;. the
resent, for attachment and forfeiture of illegally acquired of public servan s
of the Criminal Law. Amendment Ordinance, 1944 are mvoked.
tt h nt of the property illegally
Under this Ordinance, there is a provision for mtenm a on an application by an
acquired. The Special Judge is empowered to do so ase . . I case the attached
authorized person. Depending upon the outcome of the cnmlna '
property is either forfeited or released.
. . . . is that the procedure for attachment can
Another shortcoming in the exlstmg proviSions f th offence In actual situations, thiS
start only after the court has taken cognizance hot. e to hide adjust his,her ill gotten
may be too late as t e ace . . . . th State or the Union Governmen as
h used may get enoug lme t h
wealth Moreover under the exlstmg proviSions, e
t thorize the 'filing of a request seeking attachment. SUGGESTED STEP
0 au . WHICH MUST BET AKEH This could also be time consummg.
of a public servant a The Corrupt Pubt c
For confiscation of the property . ets the SeNants of
convicted for possession of disproportlohnate Property) sm
. h b rden of proof to t e pu
1
by the Law
law should sh1ft t e u
1
n in such cases, should sttould be enacted withOUt
who is convicted. The presump
10
found in the further delay.
be that the disproportionate t were acquired by him
possession of the public servan
125
0
-------VAJIRAM & RAVI -----... ........_
t s and a proof of preponderance of probability should be sutr
though corrup mean rc;elll
for confiscation of property.
7. Prohibition of 'benaml' transactions
The Law Commission, in its 57th and 130th Reports . enactment Of
legrslatron prohibrting Ben am/. and acqumng propertres Ben ami. A Ia:
entrtled The Benami Transactrons (Prohrbrtron) Act, 1988 was passed rn 1988. The A
Precludes the person who acqurred the property in the name of another person f C1
h.b. B ' t t. rom
claimmg
11
as his own. section 3 the Act pro 1 rts enamr ransa.c rons while Section
4
prohibits the acquirer from recoverrng the property from the Benamrdar.
Section 5 of the Act permits acquisition of property held benami. It states
"(1) All properties held benami shall be subject to by such authority, in such
manner and after following such procedure as may be prescnbed.
(2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that no amount shall be payable fo
the acquisition of any property under sub-section (1 )". r
Unfortunately, in the last few years, Rules have not been prescribed by the government
for the purposes of sub-section (1) of Section 5, with the result that the government ;
not m a position to confiscate properties acquired by the real owner in the name ot h.s
b .
enamtdars. The wealth amassed by corrupt
public servants is often kept in 'Benami' accounts SUGGESTED STEP WHICH MUST
or invested in properties in others' names. Strict BE TAKEN
enforcement of the Benami Transactions a. Steps should be taken for
(Prohibitron) Act, 1988, could unearth such immediate implementation ot the I
properties and make property accumulation Benami Transactions (Prohibition)
d.ff 1 , Act, 1988.
1 1cu t ,or corrupt officers and also work as a "'---------------1
deterrent tor others.
B. Protection to whistleblowers
pla.y a crucial role in providing information about corruption. Public
. h ants who work rn a department/agency know the antecedents and activities of others

1
eJr organization. They are, however, often unwilling to share the information for fear
do ref pnsa/. There is a very close connection between the public servant's willingness to
1sc ose corruption in his organ
2
f d h
d t't If
1
a ron an t e protection given to him and his/her
en 'y. adequate statutory protection is granted, there is every likelihood that the
overnment would be able to get substantia/ information about corruption.
The term "whistleblowing" itself 1
1
States, m the ts a re attve Y addition to our lexicon. In the United
man who "blew the e:, after the and tribulations of Daniel E//sberg, the
only been protected by b .so Pentagon papers", whistleb/owing has not
lhe cit zens. Furthermore t,; ts a so as an ethical duty on the part of
Congress passed the ar collapse of and WorldCom, the US
Y ct of
200
2, grantmg sweeping protection to
126
VAJIRAM & RAVI ------- whistleblowers in publicly traded .
whistleblower can now be imprison P<lnses. Anyone retaliating against a corporate
. e or up to 10 years.
Laws provsdsng such protection exst.
The UK Pubhc Interest Dssclosure
10
the UK, the USA, Australia and New Zealand.
Australia, the Protected _ ct,
1998
the Public Interest Disclosure Act, 1994 of
Disclosure Act, 2000 of SUGGEST
New Zealand, and the ED STEPS WHICH MUST BETAKEN
Whistle blowers a. Legislation should be enacted immediately to provide
Protection Act 1984 of ihroetelcliocn to on the following lines proposed by
aw omm1sson:
USA are legislations Wh
. . . sstleblowers exposing false claims fraud or corruption
provrdsng protection to should .be protected by ensuring and anonymity,
whistleblowers. All these protection from victimization in career, and other administrative
laws generally provide measures to prevent bodily harm and harassment.
tor preserving the The . legislation should cover corporate wl11stleblowers
anonymity of the unearthsng fraud or serious damage to public interest by willful
. 1 acts of omission or commission.
wh1stleb ower and
safeguarding him/her A_cts of harassment or victimization of or retaliation against, a
. . . . . wl11stleblower should be criminal offences with substantial
agarnst vsctrmrzatron penalty and sentence.
within the organization.
9. Serious economic offences
Economic Offences, called frauds in common parlance the term itself has been defined
in the Indian Contract Act have become a matter of concern because of an 1ncreasmg
trend both in terms of size and complexity. This worrying trend has its roots m the rapd
pace at which the Indian economy is growing and the tinancsal sector is diversifymg.
The impact of some of these crimes is widespread and can cause much damage to the
economy seriously affecting the public at large and sometimes even becoming a threat
to national security. These economic offences include tax evasion, counterfeiting,
distorting share markets, falsification of accounts, frauds in the system,
smuggling, money laundering, insider trading and even bribery. In a world of
financial activity, with new instruments for such activity and new technology to fac11ltate
it, the present laws are not adequate to combat new economic crimes.
There are a large number of laws governing economic offences. These include the.
Indian Penal Code (IPC); the Banking Regulation Act, 1949; the Compame.s. Act. 1956,
the Customs Act, 1962; the Income Tax Act, 1961; the Essenttal Act, the
Conservation of Foreign Exchange and the Prevention of Smuggling ActiVItlesh

Foreign Exchange Management Act, the Prevention of Food AdulteratiOn Act, t e n tan
Patents Act etc.
. t ations are carried out by the police. Some states
In a large of these Wings to guide such lnvestigat1ons. In r spect
have also established re taken up by designated agent es und \ e
of some Central Laws, a
1
takes up cases by way of relerral by oth
law. The Central Bureau of Investigation

-------VAJJRAM & RAVI
authorities or on directions by
the government or the courts. It
is generally felt that the
punishment provided under the
existing laws is not enough of a
doterrent; as a resuft these
offences have become a high
gam low risk activity.
SUGGESTED STEPS WHICH MUST BETAKEN
a. A new law on 'Serious Economic Offences should be
enacted.
b. A serious Economic Offence may be defined as :
i. One which lnvolvos a sum exceeding Rs. 1 0 crores; or
li. Is likely to give rise to widespread public concern; or
111. Its Investigation and prosecution .are li.kely to require
highly specialized knowledGe of the frnancral market or
01
the behaviour of banks or other financial institutions; or
iv. involves significant international dimensions; or
v. in the Investigation of which there is requirement
01
legal, financial, investment and investigative skills to be
brought together; or
vi. which appear to be complex to the Union
Government, regulators, banks, or any financial
institution.
Of late, economic offences
have been drawing more
attention because these are
being used to fund criminal and
even terrorist activities. In
1993, the N.N. Vohra
Committee had revealed the
powerful nexus between those
who violated the economic
laws, politicians and
government functionaries,
which resulted in protection of
large-scale economic crimes.
c. A Serious Frauds Office (SFO) should be set up
(under the new law), to investigate and prosecute such
offences. It should be attached to the Cabinet
Secretariat. This office shall have to investigate
and prosecute all such casef n Special Courts
constituted for this purpose. The SFO should be staffed
by experts from diverse disciplines such as the financial
sector, capital and futures market, commodity markets,
accountancy, direct and indirect taxation, forensic audit,
investigation, criminal and company law and information
technology. The SFO should have all powers of
investigation as stated in the recommendation of the
Mitra Committee. The existing SFIO should be
subsumed in this.
A Serious Frauds Investigation
Office (SF/0) was set up in
2003 as a specialised multi-
disciplinary organisation to deal
with cases of serious corporate
frauds. It has experts from the
financial sector, capital market,
banks, accountancy, forensic
audit, taxation, law, information
technology, company law,
customs and investigation.
SFIO Charter includes
forwarding of its investigation
reports on violations of the
provisions of other Acts to the
concerned agencies tor
PI'08eaJtionl appropriat e action.
d. A Serious Frauds Monitoring Committee should be
constituted to oversee the investigation and prosecution
of such offences. This Committee, to be headed by the
Cabinet Secretary, should have the Chief Vigilance
Commissioner, Home Secretary, Finance Secretary,
Secretary Banking/ Financial Sector, a Deputy Governor
RBI, Secretary, Department of Company Affairs, Law
Secretary, Chairman SEBI etc as members.
e. In case of involvement of any public functionary in a
serious fraud, the SFO shall send a report to the
Rashtriya Lokayukta and shall follow the directions given
by the Rashtriya Lokayukta.
However, the current provisions
In the Banking Regulation Act,
1948; SEBI Act, 1992 and the
f. In all cases of serious frauds the Court shall presume
the existence of mens rea of the accused, and the
burden of proof regarding its non-existence, shall lie on
the accused.
Act, 1956 are not
128
VAJIRAM & RAVI------
strong enough to prevent large scale f
The present regulatory bodies like Practices nor are they deterrent enough.
not adequately empowered to address' . .
1
and Department of Company Alfairs are
There is, therefore, need for a separat involved in such scams and lrauds
serious financial fraud cases and reco e Institution for investigation and prosecution oi
. . very of assets involved therein
fhere rs need to defrne 'Serious E .
deterrent punishment for it The ex ctonomrc Offence' under a statute and prescribe
I d . rs rng SFIO tho h ..
offences on Y un. er the Companies Act Th ug a pos1trve step, can investigate
serious Economrc Offences' would . e complex and multi-disciplinary nature ot
d
requrre the constit r
investigate an prosecute the cases u d u ron of an empowered body to
. n er all such offences.
ThiS would requrre the establishment
1
Frauds Office (SFO) which would ne
0
a. new and adequately empowered Serious
Frauds Office thus constituted subsume the existing SFIO. The Serious
Frauds Monitoring Committee cha deb under the and supervision ot a Serious
from the financial sector capital Y the Cabrnet Secretary with representatives
d
rect and indirect toe commodity markets, accountancy,
r r nsrc aud1t cnmmal and com 1 d
information technology. The SFO h ' pany aw, mvest1gat1on an
. s ould be empowered to take up cases suo motu or
upon reference by the Unron or the State Governments.
10. Immunity enjoyed by legislators
The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution recommended that
1 05(2) may amended to clariiy that the immunity enjoyed by Members oi
privileges should not cover corrupt acts committed by
them tn connection wtth thetr duties in the House or otherwise. Such a recommendation
was made because corrupt acts include accepting money or other valuable
considerations to speak and/or vote in a particular manner and, for such acts. they
should be liable for action under the ordinary law of the land.
Right to equality and equal protection of
law is a fundamental right and the
Constitution enshrines this principle of
equality. The Ruling creates an
anomalous situation wherein the
Members of Parliament are immune from
prosecution for their corrupt acts if they
are related to voting or speaking in the
Parliament. This runs contrary to norms
SUGGESTED STEPS WHICH MUST
TAKEN
a. While endorsing the suggestion ol the
National Commission to Rev1ew the Woril.ing
of the Constitution, recommends that SUitable
amendments be effected to Article 1 05(2) ol
the Constitution to provide that the immun1ty
enjoyed by Members of Parliament does not
cover corrupt acts committed by them 10
connectton with therr dut1es in the House or
otherwise.
1
b. Similar amendments may bo mad
Article 194(2) of the Const1tutron In r
members of the state legtslaturcs
of justice and fair-play. Members of
Parliament, being the lawmakers have to
maintain the highest standards of
integrity and probity. It is, therefore,
necessary to amend the Constitution to l
remove this anomaly.
129
.. --------- VAJIRAM & RAVI-----... ......_
1
to civil servants
11. Constitutional protect on . . . . .
. . taction in terms of specrfrc provrsrons rn Part
Civil servants in India .enJOY umque of their conditions of service. Xlv
of the Constitution, whrch authorize
1
. .
. t to the provisions of the Constrtutron, acts
Article 309 st!pulates that the recruitment and conditions of service of Pers Of
appropriate legrslature n:'ay a
9
ts In connection with the affairs of the Union or
0
"
8
appointed to public servrces an pos Of a
State. f' d
. g the Union or a State hold of rce urrng the pleas
Under Article 310 - persons servrn llre
of the President or the Governor of the State as the case may be.
. f th's pleasure is however circumscribed by the provisions of Article
311
The exercrse o r ' k .
. d follows "Dismissal removal or reductron rn ran of person
The Artrcle rea s as . s
employed in civil capacities under the Unron or a State-
(a) No person who is a member of a civil the Union or an
rvice or a civil service of a State or holds a crvrl post under the Unron or a
se b d' t
State shall be dismissed or removed by an authonty su or rna e to that by
which he was appointed.
(b) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in
rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges
against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of
those charges: Provided that where, it is proposed after such inquiry, to
impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the
basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be
necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on
the penalty proposed:
Provided further that this clause shall not apply -
(i) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the
ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge;
or
(ii) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to
reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by
that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such
inquiry; or
{iii) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied
that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold
such inquiry.
(c) It, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is
practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the
130
VAJIRAM
decision thereon of th & RAVI
person or to red . e authority em . .
uce h1m in rank sh
11
po:-vered to d1sm1ss or remove such
The procedure laid down in A
1
a be
intended to, first, assure rt cle
3
11, subject to th .
are covered by the Arr a, measure of security of te provisos, or exceptions, therein, is
. ICe and, se . enure to government servants, who
dism.ls.sal or removal of a provtde certain safeguards against arbitrary
provrstons are enforceable in a nt servant or reduction to a lower rank Th
d court of law d . ese
311 or ers passed by the discipr an where there is an infringement of Article
Articles 310 and 311, apply to all
9
rnary authority are ab-initio void. The provisions of
. overnment servants.
Removmg Article
311
summing up, it could be said that
guarantees that this Article does Constitution appears to contain the kind of
enactment to apply the 'doctrine lee of India Act-1919 was the first
application was "subject to rules" thasure tn Section 96B thereof. Its
under that Act applied the exta t
1
e courts exammmg challenges to penalties
n ru es to determme whethe th h
In other words when this d t . . r ese were ng tly 1mposed.
provide against oc nne ftrst in India, it was deemed sufficient to
d' .
1
any unjust exercrse of 'pleasure'. With the provisions of
Ju rcra now in our Constitution, the protection available to Government
employees IS even outside Article 311. This is borne out by the tact
that ample rehef ts avatlable to employees invoking judicial intervention in cases
involving compulsory retirements even though Article 311 does not extend to such
cases.
It is believed that the rights of a civil servant under
the Constitution should be subordinate to the
overall requirement of public interest and the
contractual right of the State. It cannot be an
argument that a corrupt civil servant's rights are
more important than the need to ensure an honest,
efficient and corruption-free administration.
Ultimately, the public servant, an agent of the
State, cannot be superior to the State and it is his
fundamental duty to serve the State with integrity,
devotion, honesty, impartiality, objectivity.
transparency and accountability.
SUGGESTED STEPS WHICH \
MUST BETAKEN
I
a. Article 311 of the Constitution \
should be repealed.
b. Simultaneously, Article 310 of \
the Constitution should also be
repealed.
c. Suitable legislation to provide for
all necessary terms and conditions
of services should be provided
under Article 309. to protect the
bona fide actions of public
servants taken in pubhc interest;
this should be made applicable to
the States.
It is true that the government as an employer is
expected to act in a fair manner and it has to be a d. Necessary. prstotec
8
!
00
traryto public
. h It servants agam lUI action
model worthy of emulatton by ot \ should be provided. through such
has also to be ensured that honest and \ legislation under Art1de 309
public servants are not subjected to the whtms and ted t dspense with the serv\
fancies of their superiors. No government can be expec 'tho t 'a proper enqulry
of a government servant in an arbitrary manner or WI ou
131
VAJIRAM & RAVI
- . te sector. Strlclly, there should be
I s not possible even In thtJ pn.tdas may be provided through leglslatno
arbitrary ramova ' . d legal safeguar IOn
need for retaining Article 310, an
under Article 309. . If the whole gamut of "conditions or servic
conrmuum. h' n n 1 d e
Articles 309 310 and 311 form a tl e part of Article 309, t IS ca I c u e matters
IS codified required by substa.n vosition of penalties. Moreover, as noted above
such as disciplinary proceedmgs
1
mp rt of the basic structure or the constitutio '
d an Integral pa b ., bl n,
with rule of taw accepte as . Article
311
will continue to e ava1 a e to satisry
reasonable protection now artrr.buted to
the requirements of 'rule of law
. d a fairly common percept1on that explict
th considerations an . . . 1
Taking into account ese .
1 1
. n itself gives an 1mpress1on of Inordinate
.. t' n" in the Consll u 10
articulation of protoc to .
1 311
need not continue to be a part of the
'protection', thus, on Artie e rehensive legislation under Article 309 could
Constitution. Instead appropnate and t and service even with regard to dismissal
f d all aspects of recrwtmen ' . . ,
be rame to . t legislation by the respecttve legislatures may
removal or reductton In rank. Appropna 9 . .
also be ensured through a revised Constitutional proviSIOn.
12. Institutional framework to tight corruption
The Administrative Vigilance Division of the .of Personnel is the
nodal agency for dealing with Vigilance and Ant1corrupt1on. Its mter-a!Ja, are to
oversee and provide necessary directions to the Governments . of
maintenance of discipline and eradication of corruption from. the public The
other institutions and agencies at the Union level are - (1) The Central V1g1lance
Commission (CVC): (ii) Vigilance units in the Ministries/ Departments of Government of
India, Central public enterprises and other autonomous organisations; and (iii) the
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).
Central Vigilance Commission
In pursuance of the recommendations made by the Committee on Prevention of
Corruption, popularly known as the Santhanam Committee, the Central Vigilance
Commission was set up by the Government of India by a Resolution dated 11 .2.1964. It
was accorded statutory status, consequent upon the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Vmeet Narain v. Union of India, through the Central Vigilance Commission Act,
2003. The CVC advises the Union Government on all matters pertaining to the
maintenance of integrity in administration. It exercises superintendence over the working
of the Central Bureau of Investigation, and also over the vigilance administration of
various Mintstnes and other organizations of the Union Government.
Vigilance Units In The Government Of India
All MinisrriestOepartments in the Union Government have a Chief Vigilance Officer
who heads the V1gilance Division of the organization concerned, assisting and
adv1smg Secretary or Head of Office in all matters pertaining to vigilance. He also
tOVIdes a Jmk between his organisation and the Central Vigilance Commission on the
132
VAJIRAM & RAVI ------- one hand and his organisation and th
Vigilance functions performed b e Central Bureau of Investigation on the other.
ractices of the employees r cvo collecting intelligence about corrupt
to him; processin in his . investigating verifiable allegations
d' ciplinary authority co g reports for further consideration of the
CIS mmission for advice whncemed, and referring matters to the Central Vigilance
o erever necessary.
The Central Bureau Of Investigation
Central of (CBI) is the principal investigative agency of the
Un1on In anti-corruption matters. It derives its powers from the Delhi Special
Police Establishment Act, 1946 (DSPE Act) to investigate certain specified offences or
classes of offences pertaining to corruption and other kinds of malpractices involving
public servants. The Special Police Establishment, which forms a division of the Central
Bureau of Investigation, has three units, viz.
(i) Anti-corruption Division,
(ii) Economic Offences Wing, and
(iii) Special Crimes Division.
The Anti-corruption Division investigates all cases registered under the Prevention at
Corruption Act, 1988 as also cases of offences under any other sections of .the \PC. or
other law if committed along with offences of bribery and corruption. The Ant1-corrupt1on
Division investigates cases pertaining to serious irregularities allegedly committed by
public servants. It also investigates cases against ot Governments,
if the case is entrusted to the CBI. The Special Cnmes D1V1s1on all ol
economic offences and conventional crimes; such as offences relatmg to
security, espionage, sabotage, narcotics and psychotropic
murders dacoities/robberies cheating, criminal breach of trust, torgenes, dowry de.
3

tT ed nder Section suspicious deaths and other offences under IPC and other laws no 1 I u
of the DSPE Act.
Vigilance systems in state governments .
. ., . ilance and anti-corruption orgamsatlons
At the level of state governments, Simi ar Vlg ansations vary between and across
exist, although the nature and staffing of Commissions and anti-corruption
state governments. While some states havep lgdl a h has an Anti CorruptiOn Bureau. a
L k yuktas Andhra ra es S
bureaus, others have o a . 'I N du and West Bengal have tate
. . nd a Lokayukta Taml a . .
Vigilance CommiSSIOn a . .. , f nctions The Vigilance CommiSSioner
Vigilance Commissions to oversee the Vlgl ance and as a Secretary though
in Tamil Nadu is a serving Secretary to Vigilance CommiSSioner. Maharashtra
1 R port in his capacl Y a " moor
he brings out an Annua e d a Vigilance Commissioner. a mu I m
has a combination of an of the htghcr ludiciary as the Ch um
body called the Lokayukta With. a . man Some States have adopted th p \ n t
and a retired civil servant as VIce. t air I orgamzations with du l re pon
the Union Government and set up In erna 133
VAJIRAM & RAVJ -------..
IIIli d h departmental head with subordinate
. C missioner an t e . th .
of reporting to the VIgilance om d the districts reporting to e higher
units in offrces of Heads of an
formations and the Vigilance CommiSSioner.
t reduce corruption
Improving Institutional arrangements o
.
1
eak political wltl, inadequate laws and
Accordmg to Transparency , t w qual emphasis on prevention measures
excessive reliance on enforcement ":'
1
ou e 'es Having regard to the importance of
contribute to the failure United Nations Convention against
the preventive role of anti State party shall ensure the existence
Corruption mandates'". prevent corruption. Each State party shall grant
of a body or bod1es as appropna. e . accordance with the fundamental
th b d'es the necessary mdependence, 1n

0 1
.
1 1 1
to enable the body or bodies to carry out its or their
prmc1ples of 1ts ega sys em, ater'al e
functions effectively and free from any undue influence. The m 1 . r
d I
. ed staff as well as the training that such staff may to carry out the"
an spec1a 1z t f d 1
h ld b ded " In so tar as the convention has come 1n o orce an ndra
funct1ons, s ou e prov1 . . . . . .
is a signatory to it, it becomes incumbent on the country to implement th1s decrsron 1n rts
true spirit.
Unfortunately, anti-corruption agencies, both of the Uni.on and
are hobbled by weak investigative powers and overlappmg A .mult1phc1ty of
anti-corruption institutions with overlapping functions has undermmed the1r coherence.
The CVC, departmental vigilance units and CBI at the /eve/ of the Union Government,
and a combination of Lokayuktas, State Vigilance Commissions and Anti-Corruption
Bureaus with widely varying functions, have not succeeded in providing unified focus to
the task of Implementation of multi-pronged strategic initiatives to prevent, monitor and
punish corruption, establish the necessary deterrence and cleanse the systems. A fresh
look at the institutions for this purpose is necessary.
The Lok Pal
The first Administrative Reforms Commission had recommended the establishment of
the institution of Lok Pal. The Lok Pal Bill has been introduced several times but due to
various reasons it has not been enacted into law. The Lok Pal is supposed to be a
watchdog over the integrity of Ministers and the Members of Parli ament. The Indian Lok
Pal was intended to be similar to the institution of Ombudsman existing in the
Scandmavan countries. The institution of Ombudsman has emerged 'as a bulwark of
democrat1c government against the tyranny of officialdom'. The Lok Pal Bill provides for
constitutiOn of the Lok Pal as an independent body to enquire into cases of corruption
agamst public functionaries, with a mechanism for filing complaints and conducting
inquiries etc.
The Loka yukta
In the wake of the recommendations of the first Administrative Reforms Commission,
many State Governments enacted legislation to constitute tho Lokayukta to investigate
134
-------VAJlRAM & RAVI -------
uegations or grievances arising out of th
8
.)(ecutives, legislators, Officers of the St e COnduct of public servants Including political
end other instrumentalities of Go ate Gover:nment, local bodies, public enterprises
8
iversities. By virtue of such mcluding cooperative societies and
with the Lokayukta IOn, a n:ember ot the tile specific
8
Lokayukta to initiate suo-motu. . any pubhc servant tor enqUiry. It 1s also open to
the
1
nqu
1
ry into the conduct of public servants.
The Lokayukta is generally a retired J d
11 a ointed for a five- u ge of the High Court or the Supreme Court and
Chief Justice on the basis of a joint decision involving the Chief
Mrnrs . e peaker of the House and leader ot the Opposition.
However, In. states the Lokayukta does not have an independent investigating
authority. at. Its and is therefore dependent on Government agencies to carry
forward ItS mves.trgatlons. The Maharashtra and Orissa Lokayuktas assume more the
character of a gnevance redressal organization rather than an Ombudsman lor cases ot
corruption.
various states
presently have
Lokayuktas but there
is no uniformity in the
provisions of the
enactments, with
fundamental
differences regarding
their functions. While
in all states the
Lokayuktas deal with
issues of corruption, in
some, they also deal
with other grievances.
In a few states, a wide
range of functionaries
including Chief
Ministers, Vice
Chancellors and office
bearers of
cooperatives have
been brought within
the Lokayukta's
purview; in others, the
coverage is quite
SUGGESTED STEPS WHICH MUST BETAKEN
a. The State Vigilance Commissions/Lokayul<.tas may be
empowered to supervise the prosecution ot corruption related
cases.
b. The investigative agencies should acquire multi-disciplinary
skills and should be thoroughly conversant with the wooong of
various offices/ departments. They should draw othcials from
different wings of government.
c. Modern techniques ot investigation should also be deployed
like electronic surveilance, video and audio recording of surpose
inspections, traps, searches and seizures.
d. A reasonable time limit for investigation of dit1erent types of
cases should be fixed lor the investigative agencies.
e. There should be sustained step-up m the number cases
1
detected and investigated. The priorities need to be reonented b'i
focussing on 'big' cases of corruption.
t The prosecution of corruption cases should be conducted by a
panel of lawyers prepared by the Attorney . General or the
Advocate General in consultation with Rashtnya Lokayul\ta or
Lokayukta as the case may be.
g The anti-corruption agencies should conduct
s of de artments with particular reference to 1\1 Y
ones order to gather intelligenco and to target
officers of questionable mtegnty.
h. The economic offences unit of states need to ::0
to effectively investtgate cases and there s ou
coordination amongst existing agenctes.
L
restrictive. In some ed . them with an in\'estigat1on
States, investigative powers are vest
1
n search and seizure n th
attached. Some also provide for powers of
135
-------- VA.JJRAM & RAVI
n the Lokayukta Is, in some States, charged on lh
Investigation. The expenditure o rovidlng requisite financial Independence for the
consolidated fund of the State p wars to punish for contempt. e
institution. Some Lokayuktas have po
The Noed Of The Hour
. n machinery in the States needs reconsideratio
The entire structure of the antl-corrupllo ld require that this problem be dealt wl'l
An all-out effort to combat corruption curbing corruption at the cutting edge
appropriately at all levels. On han 'h hich could Investigate a large nurnbe el
would require a machinery havmg wrde reac w r 01
cases of corruption effectively.
On the other curbing corruption at the highest level would require a with
adequate expertise and status which could investigate cases agarnst hrgh PUblic
functionaries like Ministers.
If the Lokayukta is to be effective, it would neither be nor. feasi.ble to make
this institution investigate petty cases against junior as rts effort.
Therefore It is necessary to have the equivalent of the Centra/ Vrgrlance Commrssion at
the state ievel to deal with cases of corruption among public seNants. The Lokayukta
could then deal with corruption at the highest level covering senior-most PUblic
functionaries. However, often the thread of corruption runs through several levels,
rndrcating connivance of Ministers and public officials.
It rs therefore necessary to have a link between the lokayukta and the State Vigilance
Commissioner. It has been recommended that the Central Vigilance Commissioner be
made a Member of the lok Pal. Further a multi-member lok Pal should also be created,
so that rt 1s better insulated against outside influence and also because a decision of a
multi-member Commission would be more objective as it would have inputs from the
different members. A similar approach at the state level would be appropriate. The mum.
member Lokayukta should have a retired Supreme Court Judge or a retired Chief Justice
of the Hrgh Court in the Chair, the State Vigilance Commissioner as a member and an
eminent JUrist or an eminent administrator of impeccable credentials as a member. A
collegium comprising the Chief Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Chief
Justice of the High Court should appoint the Chairman and Members of the Lokayukta.
The State Vigilance Commissions should exercise superintendence over the functioning
of the Anti-Corruption Bureaus. It should tender independent and impartial advice to the
disciplinary and other authorities in disciplinary cases, involving the vigilance angle at
different stages i.e. investigation, inquiry, appeal, review etc; and exercise a general
check and supervision over vigilance and anti-corruption work in Departments of the
State Government and other organizations within the control of the State Government.
To msutate the institution of Lokayukta from the vagaries of political expediency, of the
'kmd witnessed in the past, it would be necessary to give the Lokayukta, as in the case of
the Pat, a Constitutional status. It would be necessary to amend the Constitution to
proVJde for the mstitution of Lokayukta in all states. This would also provide the
136
VAJlR.AM & RJ\VI ------- opportunity to vest this authority With .
nctlons across all states. To this elf .c?rtam. uni1orm powers, responsibilities and
fu 1 equivalent of the Rashtriy L k ect It IS believed that the lokayukta can be a state
I eve a
0
ayukta W1th a similar constitution.
1 3. Strengthening Investigation and .
P osecution is often a weak link in th ch .
prosecution
r h e am of anti-corruption law enforcement and there
are instances w prosecutors have facilitated the discharge of a delinquent officer. It
is, therefore, crucial .that cases of corruption are handled by efficient prosecutors whose
integrity and professional competence is above board.
The Supreme Court did mandate a key safeguard in corruption cases, by decreeing that
a panel of lawyers, answerable to a body similar to that of the Director of Prosecutions in
the United Kingdom should be created to review the prosecution of corruption cases. As
the Supreme observed, this panel of "competent lawyers of experience and
impeccable reputatron shall be prepared on the advice of the Attorney General."
According to the Supreme Court, each case of prosecution by the CBI will have to be
reviewed by a lawyer from the panel, and responsibility tor unsuccessful prosecution
should be fixed. It would be desirable that the Lokayul<tas/State Vigilance Commissions
are empowered to supervise the prosecution of corruption related cases. This would
provide the much needed oversight of the prosecutors on the one hand, and guidance to
the prosecutors on the other.
The Need of the Hour
corruption prevention and enforcement in an increasingly electronic environment both in
government institutions and outside, requires specific measures to equ1p the
investigating agencies with electronic investigating tools and to undertake such
investigation. Systematic training of officers in this area more part1cular\y at the state
level is essential.
In view of the complexities involved in
investigating agencies should be equipped with and au 1\.
technical, and scientific knowledge, skills tools of
they require specialised knowledge of forensic accountmg, au d' .'n ble to have oftlclals
engineering depending on the nature of the case. would be a VISa
in the investigative agencies drawn from different wmgs of government.
. . d utual assistance among various enforcement
Inter-agency tnformatlon exchange an m o torate of Enforcement Econom c
. . es such as the 1rec \h
and investigative . . relatin to direct and mdirec\ taxes as we\\ as e
Intelligence Agencies lncludmg those g I . nearthing serious cases at 1rnuds
. ces can play a key roe m u
State investigating agen
1

1
th's fact Ministry of Finance h, s set up n
and economic offences. In recogmtlon o I
elaborate nodal agency for this purpose.
. an Economic Intelligence Council cha r
Under the present there IS t r s from key MIJllS\nes ond In\' \
Union Finance Minister with represen a IVa
137
VAJIRAM & RAVI

1 1
Eighteen Regional Economic lntelllgenc
I
t the national ave . . 2003 . e
intelligenco agenc es a
1 1996
and reactivated 1n to, Inter alia
Committoos (REICs) set ;:n enforcement and economic
ensure operational coordmatton betw
1
Ies Tho AEICs are required to meet on
agenc1es as well as Staten::: of Finance to the work

monthly basis. There IS perhaps ff r
0
nodal agencies tor check1ng fraud and
the REICs so thai they become more e ec IV
corruption arising from economic and related offences.
It has been also noticed that the cases filed relate mostly to ba.sed on co.mplaints
or press reports, being reactive action on the part of the Few
I t f the departme
nt's own efforts Streamlined vert1cal corruption runs
cases amana e ou o .
through sovoral/ovols of the official hierarchy in corruptiOn prone departments, and does
not receive tho attention it deserves.
This calls for strengthening sources of information to specifically ta:get officers involved
in the chain of hierarchical corruption. Anti-corruption agenc1es should conduct
systematic surveys of departments with particular reference to highly corruption prone
ones in order to gather intelligence and to observe officers at the higher levels with
questionable reputations.
SYSTEMIC REFORMS
"A fallacy promoted by some in the field of anti-corruption and at times also by the
intemat1onal commumty is that one "fights corruption by fighting corruption" through yet
another anti-corruption campaign, the creation of more "commissions" and ethics
agenc1es, and the incessant drafting of new laws, decrees, and codes of conduct.
Overall, such initiatives appear to have little impact, and are often politically expedient
ways of reactmg to pressures to do something about corruption, substituting for the need
for fundamental and systemic governance reforms".
IMPORTANCE OF SYSTEMIC REFORMS
A holistic approach for combating corruption would require an optimum mix of punitive
and preventive measures. Punitive measures act as a deterrent whereas preventi ve
measures reduce opportunities for corruption by making systems transparent, increasing
accountability, reducing discretion, rationalising procedures etc. Better preventive
measures act as 'Systemic Reforms' as they seek to improve systems and processes.
Some of the initiatives taken in recent years in this direction are listed below:
Railway Passenger Bookings (Indian Railways): The computerization of rail way
bookings, including 'on-line' booking and e-ticketing has eliminated the
decongested booking offices and brought considerable transparency to the
Ra1tway reservations process.
Common Entrance Test (Karnataka): This seeks to ensure merit-based selection to
professtonal colleges m a timely and transparent manner.
138
VAJlRAM & RAVI ____ ... __
Teachers
Scheme SUGGESTED STEPS WHICH MUST BETAKEN
t(arnataka): This a. The Constit .
( nique effort provided Pfovlsion maki utlton be amended to incorporate a
u to establi t Obligatory on the part of State Governments
tor a fool-proof principle of LoKayuk\a and stipulate the general
objective and a s uttts structure, power and functions.
transparent system for lol<ayukta be a multi-member body consisting of a
app
ointing teachers. JUd
1
al Member tn the Chair, an eminent iurlst or eminent
a mtnlstralor with Impeccable credentials as Member and the
Registration & head of lhe State Commission as ex-olliclo Member.
The Chairperson of the Lokayukta should be selected from a
Stamps of retired Supreme Court Judges or retired Chief Justices
(Maharashtra): of Court, by a Committee consisting of the Chief Minister,
,ntention was devJstng Justice of the High Court and the Leader of the Opposition
tn the Legislative Assembly. The same Committee should select
more transparent the second Member from among eminent iurists/administrators.
property There is no need to have an Up-Lokayukta.
tables, computenzatton c. The jurisdiction ol the Lokayukta would extend to only case.s
of records, setting time involving corruption. They should not look into general public
limits for returning a grievances.
registered document, d. The Lokayukta should deal with cases ol corruption agamst
use of digital cameras Ministers and MLAs.
tor photos and finger- e. Each.State should constitute a State V1gilance Commission to
Th look into cases of corruption against State Government oHicia\s.
printing, etc. e The Commission should have three Members and have
expedient of 'valuation functions similar to that ot the Central Vigilance CommisSion. \
tables' has virtually f. The Anti Corruption Bureaus should be brought under the
done away with control of the State Vigilance Commission.
arbitrary assessment of g The Chairperson and Members of the Lokayukta should be
stamp duty C\nd appointed strictly tor one term only and they should not hold any
achieved the multiple public office under government thereafter.
objectives of minimizing h The Lokayul<ta should have its own 1or
corruption, ruling out Initially, it may take ?flicers. on
t State Government, but over a penod.of hve years,'
harassment o steps to recruit its own cadre, and tram them properly.
purchasers of . h ld be referred to Rashtriya
immoveable property should not be referred to any
and augmenting tax Commission of lnqutry.
collection.
0
. . . ed a s stem for the payment ot property tax an
Unit Area Scheme (Delhi): ThiS provld Y t d normative basiS ot calculation.
registration of property involving self assessmen an . . I Ia nts and th u
. sure on-line registration o comp
e-Cops (Punjab): ThiS seeks to en. t scertain the outcome and the htghel
systematic follow-up enabling complatnanths o a the manner the cutting edge' l ve\
eal time' watc over
police echelons to keep r
functionaries act on complaints. \ 'FR\ENOS stand\og tor
d sh (E- Seva). and Kera a ' . l"'
e-Governance in Andhra Pra e k tor Distribution ot Serv\ces) "
t
Effective Networ
Fast, Reliable, lnstan ' 139
-------VA.JIRAM & RAVI
. . b simptrfylng transactions
proVIde Improved serVIce deliVery/ y t chnology for payment of utility bills or se
. . of informaton e d f h .
atizens mvolv1ng use
1
tf Mention may also be ma e o t e rnifiativ 4
different servtces on a smgle fp a of farmers selling their produce. e l
Choupals' m Madhya Pradesh or t e
SDP (Rural service Delivery Points) In Andhra Prade
Rural Kiosks, known as A E S through Internet to facilitate payment of
This ensures the off f :Vaetc reducing public inconvenience and re1e,.ft111
mformation, downloadmg o orm . . -111g
employees to more 'substantiVe' publiC dulles.
Such 'best practices' drive home the point that given a pragmatic approach to Probteltl
I leadersh,p and planmng impressive results can be achieved .
so vmg, proper ' . kl h 111
enhancmg the quality of services and reducing corruption. But 100 ng at t e magnitude
of existing corruption such initiatives are tar too few. The of that
generally shrouds government operation and programmes IS .a fertJie ground for
corruptiOn. The weakness of accountability mechanisms opportunities for
corruption. Bureaucratic complexity and procedures make 11 dlffJcu/1 for the ordinary
at,zen to naVIgate the system. What is required is large scale reform of both SYstems
and procedures.
The range of activities undertaken by government is so vast that any meaningful
system1c reform would require an in-depth study of each of these functions. However
cer.an ge,..r:raJ pnrcip!es would apply to all functions of government at all levels, vlhieh
are dea ' forward
14. Promoting competition
'AoSi PLb IC services n India are provided by government in a monopolistic setting. Such
a s .. ua'IOfl by ts very nature
s conduo ve :o arbitrarness,
ard comp,acef'Ce tlith a high
proDab "Y o* a section of
f .. f1C''Onar es taking
acuantage of the
regemony' for
corruptfof'!. lntroouction of an
e emer of competition ir the
pc,.-vis O" of Pub. c services is
l.'i(JS a very USeful tool
Wrb C0'1Llption. T 110
.51-Jc.cessft. rratf.tes ca, be
SUGGESTED STEPS WHICH MUST BETAKEN
a Each Ministry/Department may undertake an immediate
exercise to identify areas where the existing 'monopol y ot
functions can be tempered with competition. A similar
e,(ercise ma; be done at the level of State Governments and
local bodies. This exercise may be carried out in a time
bound manner, sa; in one ;ear, and a road map laid down
to 'monopoly' of functions. The approach should be
to mtroduce competition along with a mechanism tor
regJiatiofl to ensure performance as per prescribed
standards so that public interest is not compromised.
cr._e;j m tr s 0,... first
e grad "a: de-
ml')r. ':lfXJ sa ;or. vf tr,e
b. Son'le CemraJ 1 Sponsored schemes could be
restrudured so as to provde incentives to states that taY.e
steps to promote competihon in 5rvice delivery.
c. J. new ra1,ona1 pol:oez on subjects ha 11ng large publ1c
"'_e.rlace land amendments to e1istrng policies on such
shou d rrtar ab.; addre$S the issue of engendermg
competrto'1.
te -O'Jrr. .ser..tQr; ';f:t;fjr.d, tne
UNfn[} rr e ct Pflvate players r direct marketing services to farmers outside
140
..... ------ VA.JI IV\\1 & RAVI -------
vernmcnt controlled mar>Or-. in Mdh
ttle go 1 1n a large ot , er / "" 1a PrMer.h. Ctt.-altJ q, ,,,rr O".IJ(\'
0
opo Y ''="' and Ja
rno . role 1n rcduc1ng corruptic.n To ' i:S t> '111\'1 to r.ar: r. I
a maJor d c.ng compethon qo ; a larg<:: ettr.:rl \tlt;ret,_.rt;, ''a O"'.i...
and lotro u rruption olsr.whern ThC>g<;tl" er. Ho l<::r der<.lgulan""J w Of e area rr -:s I
,crease co lh en , e c.ar iiA:II \)( :..Ub-lf\Oo/.S
I (ivate agencieS, v I rcplac.u tho (J<>verr.mefl1 If\ tcr I crk1t.S fA
P re corrupt. It IS therefor"'
ven mo . . ' "' nr;cc;:_:;ar 1 that dem<.(l(ipo ar .d
IS accompanied b/ a regulatiOn to enwre p<".;r
cribed standards so that public intere-.t
15
protected
pres
15
. Simplifying transactions
ih8 causal relaliOnship between incidence af\d ot corruption and tM o:.rrp e1
nature of work methods needs no elaboration. An ordinar1 citizen uno ha-; to fYiJ 1 a
.11
10 ttte government could be condemned to maving multiple Ji';.t<;, to
es. There is high probabihty of such a citizen up grea-:. nq tte pa "':.. Gt
to avoid harassment. Similar\/, hierarchie-;. no on 'I comp'.t!1
0 1
: methods but also cause diffusion ot f . ".k
. . . f ... I . ard
dJstnbutJon o 1101r aso, for tnzta!lce, to cauze Olercrou-:1"g
ter . t' t ,. . ... a"'"
sequent mo\Jva 10n o JUmp queues vf pa:f!f9 zpeoo rooreJ or e'l'p G.f r-,, ...
The practice of laymg donn methodolo9'=s throviJh mar ...a\s ras ta o/' "
se Properly deployed, and regular\:J upgrruled, can M a g'eat
of demystifying admintstrati"'e procedures and prorno'1!'9 accou!vao I ,. e
sou of Information Technolog; and Pigr
1
to llltormaon such doCL.ments can 00 a
source for 'stmplifying transactiors' inasmucn as attord a o1
clarity to the literate service user.
1 the maladies of admif'::ra,'()n tn lrda s tne

c' every
one 0 . ...... .. to corr lnene :et
on making process. Apart from dela)'S, '.l'IS con r ...,...
dec1st
1
d . , , s aMeo r. the ope a
b se of authority is noticed, another layer o a mtnts ra ' r ados o
a .u would act as a cheer. More often than I'O', eacl' add u \.e et IS tS o
and corruption without solvll"g 'he orig:Oal pc-oblem. A c.ass c exarnp es\a\e
. h h sence of largP-scale btac)( money
when confronted Wit t e pre ed t"'e ll"come to
a 'Competent Authonty' nas. corsltttut eomP'!tent A.u had
I t
actions abo 1e a certa1f' va ue. rues
clear all sa e rans . . found to be urderva'ued. Very lew Pfope
power to acquire properties. which were counterpcoducti'le as ccea!.CC a
were acquired but the arrangement ot geumg a clearance 1rom e
further incentive lor undervaluation to avo t ol etper\mentaoon e PfOV\SiOn
'Competent Authonty . After more than two de
been deleted from the e oen: e
I II reqUifements or one-stop &eMC
A single Window clearance o a as st simp hes procedures and reduce
which can cut down on corruption MCe centres lS Andhra Prad
the most successful eJ(amples of one-stop se13 state and loCal govern
h
of some
model. E-Seva offers t e
5
nd mne pnvate sector oc
three central government orgamsatons a 141
VAJIRAM & RAVI ----............
-------that E--Seva ! SUGGESTED STEPS WHICH
roof. Tho sondces ont of nood to bring slmpi.Ucatlon ot
offers lnc/udo lhO paym. of a Iss/ago of admlnlslratlvo rclonns. Le""
bile SO<Vicc bills, provt_s!on tho soctoral roqulromonts, lho ,!""o
pu d dca/h cerltftcales, ' s I such rofotms must be, adopt; o,.;
btrlfl an tax tram and fNtnctp/es o w approach, minimizing hiera.''".
paymont of propany . ;e mobile "Stnglo , ..

ltmo //mils for disposal etc. "'"' bus reservations. pnva . tiers, st pu
hono bill payments, recetpl of I b Tho oxtSIIng OopanmentBI Manu?'' "?d c..,.
p rt nnJicallons and also, hould be thoroughly reviewed and Simplified With !
passpo a"" s . . on the Head of the Depan.,e
tronsler of shares. A user such documents and
conductod by tho Admlmstratwe on-line and hard
Stall College a/India Indicates that av,"' manuals must be In vety

h
C
lod benefits are being sa e. and phrases /Ike "/ell to the dtscretion ol" .,
I o oxpe tenns, ., bt decision may be lak ' '
realized by E-Sava and should be
corruption has been reduce :ul: and regulations governing Issue
01
substantially. permissions, licenses etc.
Mos/ of the procedures dealing A system of rewards and Incentives lo,
with permissions, licenses and ;;;,.plincation and streamlining of may be
l
' ntroduced in each government organiZation.
registration were laid down years
ago. These procedures are quite d The principle of 'positive silence' should generally
complex and require .;. used though this principle cannot be used in all
cases. Wherever permissions!/' .mses etc are to be
documentation, which a common issued, there should be a time limit processing ot
citizen finds difficult to complete. It the same alter which penn1sston, tl not already
is, therefore, necessary to have a given, should be deemed to have been granteo.
review of all such procedures so However, the rules should provide that lor eacn
such case the official responsible for the delay must
that unnecessary procedural
be proceeded against.
requirements are eliminated.
The relationship of the government with its constituents, citizens and businesses, and
also between its own organs can be transformed through the use of the tools of modern
technology such as Information and Communication Technology (ICT). The digital
revolution has the potential to transform and redefine processes and systems of
governance. The most visible impact has been in access to information and data, in
building management information systems and in the field of electronic service delivery.
E-Govemance is the logical next step in the use of ICT in systems of governance in
order to ensure wider participation and deeper involvement of citizens, institutions, civil
society groups and the private sector in the decision making process of governance. It is
proposed to examine this promising area of reforms in a subsequent Report and will,
therefore, confine itself only to some broad aspects here in the context of reducing
corruption.
16. Using information technology
So"'e of the recent inftiatives clearly demonstrate what such applications may achieve.
The Gyandoot project in Madhya Pradesh is one such example. It seeks to provide
mtormalion about prevailing agricultural produce prices at auction centres and easier
142
-------.. & 'RAVI _ _ ____ _
sses tor obta1ning cop1es of Ia d .
proce on ol e-govomance B n <ec<>tds. "ll>ete have been seveta\ successes'"
There ate vety 1;,_, Ul\he g,.aleS\ challenge has been then tepllcab\lrty
up-sca/1 g . xamp\es ol egovetnance e.amp\es Wi\h a nattonwode
Impact (tho rat/way '
080
"'
0110
n
9
YS\em is one Ollhem). The laCk ot good inh.,tructu<e
and tho tnadcquete capabthty ol the Petsonnel have ptoveo lobe malo< bottlenecl<s in
the spread
01
e-g?vernance. Much Qteate, attention needs to be paid to lamiliatize
Qepat1menlal OlltCtals W."h lhe televanl Ptecesses Ond lhek capablt.,es. Apart hom
mpaning on-lhe-tob hatntng, Depanmenlal ollicials involved wilh planning and lamentations ot sucn - 1
may be sent lo SUGGESTED STEPS WHICH MUST BETAKEN
str ' I dl I
ganizations, mc u ng some a. Each Ministry/Department/Organisation o
the private seclor, where Qovemment sho,ld dtaw "P a lot ""' ot IT to
improve gove.rnance. In any government process, use ol
these are already lntormanon TeChnology should bo made only altet the
malnstreamed. The NalionaJ existing procedutes have been thoro,gh\y te-
l formatics Centre (NIC) has engineered.
a useful role in b. The Mln\stty otlnletmatlon and Technology n .. ds to fac
ilitating e-Governance. NIC identity certain governmental processes and take
ay take concrete steps to scale.
up a project of their computerization on a nat1onwlde
b
m .
11
d up skills and domain let
u .
1
c. Fot compuJerizaJion lo be successtu\, compu \
expertise among Its knowledge of departmental olficers needs .to
so that specific orgamzattona upgtaded. Similarty, the NIC needs 1o be !tamed
needs are more fully departmenl -''" activities, so that they \
derstoo
d by technology appreciate each other's view pomt and also each
un M . t f technology providers understand the anatomy
0
providers. The In IS 'Y.
0
-------------- formation Technology 1tself
assess new areas for computerization across the country.
17. Integrity pacts
One mechanism that can help in SUGGESTED STEP WHICH MUST BET liKEN .
t
. g transparency and h mechanism ol 'integnty
1
promo 1n . . a. Encou.agemenl ot 1 . . st ot Ftnance
creating confidence n . pubhc pacts' should be done. e 'iesentatives from
contracting is the use of mtegnty conslilule a Task Fotce w.l ;opidenlify lhe ot '
Pa
cts'. The term refers to an Minislties of Law and to provide fo1 a
h ublic transactions such pac act ihe Task Force
agreement between t e p . protocol for enlenng tnlo such a P d. whelhet any
agency involved in procunng in particular,. like !he
s and -services and the amendment in the Prevenlion of Corruption
tor a public contract to the Indian agteements en<orceatle.
I . d have not Act IS reqUir - .
effect that the bid ers . llln lot
paid and shall not pay in question. For its part, the
gratification to secure the a level playing field and lair play tn and scru\Jny by
bids commitS to pacts is that they often to mprove(t
An important feature o S ch pacts have contnbu
independent, outside observers. u
143
VAJlRAlYf & RAVI" _______ __
. er in which major deals in Government
. f'dence m the mann I t
transparency and publrc con I I ded Many national lega sys ems now give
. rons are cone u
and public sector orgamza I .
id rable weightage to such pacts. .
cons e M U with Transparency InternatiOnal India and
ONGC is the first PSU to have signed ; has been made in the revised Defence
the eve on April 17,
2
0
6
A adoption of an "Integrity Pact" in all defence
Procurement Procedure Manual, 2 th Rs 300 crores. Government organizations in
d
ements of more an . .
contracts an procur wn much interest in adopting this healthy pract1ce. The
t,e country have so tar not sho t of uncertainty about the place of such pacts in
. a 'd to be also on accoun .
reluctance IS s ' . h . must be encouraged and rntegrated into
our legal framework. This mec amsm 'ble
government transactions in as many sectors as possr .
18
. Reducing discretion
. .
1
- re greater in a system with excessive discretion in the
Opportumtles tor corrup 10n a h t T
h d t the official machinery particularly at lower levels. Sue o_ppor unr res can be
by reducing discretion and maximizing transparency r_n the s_ystem and
. d strict accountability tor actions. The most successful antr-corruptron reforms
mtro .... ucrngthat seek to reduce discretionary benefits, which are controlled by public
are u,ose _ ------,
of'icials. , SUGGESTED STEPS WHICH MUST BE TAKEN
Tf!ere are a large number of
governmental activities where
a scre:10r can be totally eliminated.
AJ suer ac::vities could be
au:omaed and supported by IT.
of a:rJ1s and Deaths'
anc recn. .. of teacrers based
O'i mafo.s secured in qualifying
exams are examples of this. Where
rr s r.ot poss ble to e!rm:nate
o sere on, hen tfle exercrse of
(XYIIfYS should be bound by well-
det ... ec gwde nes to mimmize
d:sr.,(efiOO. checks and
srtOuld be built over
exf:fase of d scre!of1.
J 9. Supervision
a. All government offices having rnterfa?e
should undertake a review of thelf actrvrlles and hst
out those which rnvolve use of discretion. In all such
activities, attempt should be made to el minate
discretion. Where it is not possible to do so. well-
defined regulat1ons should attempt to 'bound' the
discretion. Mmistries and Departments should be
asked to coordinate thrs task rn thetr
organizations/offices and complete rt within one
year.
b. Decision-making on rmportant matters should be
asSigned to a committee rather than indivrduals.
Care has to be exercised, however, that thrs pract1ce
is not resorted to when prompt decisions are
required.
c. Stale Governments should tako steps on srmilar
lrnes. especially rn local bodies and authontros,
'Nhich have maximum publrc contact
IN'IVO.l '"ments and 'heir agerc1es a hierarchical structure. In such a structure,
rtant tasfi..s of each funct,onary ls to supervrse the work of tha off1cial
ext repcrtrng to hun/her As mentioned m earlier paras, there have to be
and balances aga1r.s: !he discretiOn vested in publrc funcllonanes.
U'.rt.JCs one en mect1am,m. Tt1e very fact ttlat no many casoa aro
144
. YAJlRAM & RAVl
nitlated agamst corrupt Officials b IIIII
1
ision function 1s n t k- Y the depart
superv
0
v.::mg given th . ment 1tseH ts an indcator that th
e attentton it d
C
ontrolling corruption in an office e;oerves
d I h or an organ .
of the hea o t e Office. Moreov tz.atton should pnmanly be the responsibl W
hierarchrcal structure, each level sho:id : government othces agenctes have a
minimize the scope of corruption lor th esponsble tor tak.ng preventive steps to
that with the constitution of indepe de levels it. It has generally been observed
officers feel that it is not their responns_be'nl_t agenCies to combat corrupt.on. departmanta.\
N
I . ' 11\y to CUrb cor .
or turn a e son s eye to the problem
1
ruptton m thetr othcesJsubord nates
corruption machinery with thr:: to be emphasized that \he external ami-
substitute for anti-corruption measures tak sources _and reach can. m no way, be 11
e
asures could be random ins t en by m leadersh1p posttions. These
m pee rons surpnse t
1
d
1
...1. t
' t'zens/ clients, putting procedur . . VISt s, con 1 entta leedba.,;r. rom
cr ' y clients etc es m place whrch make it drtlicult \o seek t>r be, usc o
deCO
It is, suggested that reporting otlicers while evaluat1ng the pertormar.oo \l'le r
subordrnates should - - ---- ----
clearly comment on \ SUGGESTED STEPS WHICH MUST BET
the efforts made by Th .
a. e role of otftcers needs to be re-emph ssed t
the latter to check bears re1tera\ion that supervisory oltcers are pr mar y rcsponSt
corruption. There lor curbing corruption among their suboratnates, ano ay 00\0
should be a column in take all preven\Jve measures lor this purpose.
the self-assessment b: Each superv!S()(Y officer should ca!elully ana,y:c \he att:. cs
P
ortion of the Annual hrs her orgamz.atiol1iof11ce, tdent.ty the aciVI cs w
vulnerable to corruption ano lhen bu \d uo S\ll\a.ble
Performance Report vlg1lance measures. All m<llcr mstances ot \oss caused \
wheretn each goverrvnent or to the publtc, 'r:Jy oftlCla\s by \helr acts o1 om
supervrsory officer commtsslon should be enquued nto and responsz x
crnng ollicer W1th1n a tome-frame.
should mdrcate the
measures
he/she c. In the Annual Penoonance Report o1 Q en cHltef
took to
be a column where the olltcCf should nd.'eat c
check took to control com:pt1cn In hts o1t oe nd
corruption in h1s1her Tho reporting ot11cer snoulo then 9 ve .. '
0
u1cc and amongst thrs.
hts: her subordinates.
and what were the
outcomes ol such
measures. 1he
Reporttng othcor
should lhcn grvo
hisJhcr comments on
thts solfcvoluat on It
has ba ,n ob f\1 d
that confld n\1 I
report at ott c1 I r no\
\4
VAJIRAM & RAVI

01
commenting objectively on the
d t play sate' by n om t h'
officers. Reporting officers ten o ertain unethical practices have e o IS/her
integrity of a public servant even accountability of Olllcors about the
nottce. This IS mainly because olourless entries such as nothrng adverso has
wny they evaluate tho" subordrnates. C . however need to make superVISIOn more
co'me to notice' are quite common There IS, sure reporting officers evaluate and
proactive rn roofing out corruption. In to It should be mandated that in
record accurately about the integrity of h's of any officer and such
. h . en a 'clean c It In I A
case a reporting officer as glv the Prevention of Corruptron ct and the
an Officer Is charged with any offence under the year under report, then the reporting
corrupt act took placo wholly or durr.ng n the 'integrity certificate'.
officer should explain why that officer was give
et another useful tool to detect wrong
Surprrse mspection.s by superv!sory a::urd be more rigorous in offices having
domg in public Such collection points, parking lots, pollution
dealings w1th the publiC, check posts,
0
d t checking centres quarries, mines
' h b'l e'ghts and measures an me er ,
c eck mo 1 e vans. w
1
. r f d'
1
'bution centres during calamities
works in progress pay and accounts off1ces, re re rs n . . . . ,
' k ted and verification of genurneness of benefrc1anes
etc. On-site mspectron of wor s execu .
is another variant of such surprise inspection. Surpnse checks. could extend to
establishment sections and cash branches more particularly of taxation departments
venfy prompt accounting of cash received, depositing cheques and d.rafts 1n
government account, accuracy of preparation of pay bills, of recovenes from
salaries of government employees in government account, etc 1n to
mtsappropnation of funds. Surprise verification of cash in possess1on of offr?ers
havrng public dealings has had a salutary effect in discouragrng acceptance of
while in the office. This is a measure, which should be extended through all offrces,
making tt mandatory for senior officers to periodically undertake this function.
Reviews/checks could be conducted internally for information relating to price paid for a
wide range of purchases made by different field local bodies and
parastatals tor stationery, computer accessories and office equipment, consumables and
department specific purchases like lighting and sanitation requirements, drugs and
pharmaceuttcals, hospital requirements; clothing requirements of hospitals, uniformed
servtces, education institutions and hostels; books and other educational accessories
and construction materials. These checks should not be limited to comparison of price of
art1cles purchased in one office at a single point of time with market prices, but should
extend to a period of say one or two years with the market price prevailing. Such
comparison should extend to the price paid by different offices of the same department
durmg the same penod and also the prices paid by different departments for the same
product Similar comparative analysis could also be useful in departments which obtain
periOdical returns from citizens, such as various tax departments.
146
YAJ IRAM&RA_yl
ruption can take place when a b.
cor r en Pa pu he servant d
benefit the c IZ . . an illegal assessmen oes something illega\ in order to
mple. Corruption, as tn the case of. t order to favour a tax assessee is an
eJ(a h C . speed mone
right I 1ng orrupt1on may ----Y:......:....' even while dotng
place through deliberate SUGGESTED STEPS WH - -
ta . nee on the part of th . ICH MUST BETAKEN. . \
11eghge e a. pr d
brc servant. Allowing an illegal so that an se ers should converge their actvtes
pu
1
s h rvces are dehvered at a common po.nt
Onsignment through a checkpost \ uc common service points could also be
c I I th' Th . outsourced I .
san examp eo tS. e creatton the task of
0
may then be given
an institutionalized system to agencies. pursumg ctltzens requests With concerned
event corruption, alter a careful b T .
pr . of instanc . Whtch are prone to corruption, should be
analysts . es of spht. up mto dfferent activities that can be entrusted
rruption, IS an essential first to dtfferent persons.
co If t' I I
steP to e ec IVe Y tackle c. Public interactiOn should be limited to designate<\
orruption. This should be the ?lhcers .. A 'single Window front office' lor proviSIOn ot 1
c . ary responsibility of all and services to the citizens with a lile \
pnm . trackmg system should be set up in all government
supervisory offtcers. departments.
20. Ensuring accessibility and responsiveness
Departments of government have to be accessible to members ot the public and
responsive to their needs and aspirations and also responsible tor prompt redressal ot
their grievances. To ensure this, it is necessary that the tacililtes, concessions and rights
which are available to them in each department should be made public and the detatls
about authorities who are competent to grant them together with the procedure tor
securing the same and getting their grievances redressed should be put 1n the public
domain. There is need to define service standards. Every department should be required
to take steps to understand the problems ot its customers, define the standards wh1ch
the department would maintain in the provision of its services and spec1ty the
which customers should fulfil to qualify for the same. Appeal procedures ava1\able m
case the customers want further redressal should also be It is essential to
ensure timely disposal of applications. In order to do th1s, time hmtts need to be
prescribed for disposal of different categories of applications.
various small measures, too numerous to detail here, possible to improve\
t rans arency in government offices. Help desks at the cuttmg edge level, promtnens
of names of officials, automatic call and simplifiedt' compt
th ght direct1on Concentra ton o "
of service delivery are steps m e n 'd d These tasks should be as tm ns
corruption prone in a a:: by dillerent people. Pub\.c
possible, broken up . acttvttles f office and some designated olllccrs Thts c"
interaction should tdo for providing inform::\tion.
be supported by a srnglc wtn ow
ts to the ublic should be so destgncd as to nsur
Accessibility of government servan . t p ction between the cttt!ens nnd ot
regular, time bound and courteous tn eran government departments Shou\d b T
functionaries. To this end, business
VAJIRAM & RAVI
IIi egregated and take place In a time bo
ff' e functions are s f lJnu
angrneored so that o. IC 'first in first out', with tho sc.ope or
manner based on the prmcrple of "sin le window for provisron of sorvrces to Clti:zens /'
while tho front office should be a g I)
full publiC view. . SUGGESTED STEPS WHICH MUST
21. Monitoring complamts TAKEN I
to complaints is an important tool a. All offices having large public intenaee
Recourse f tizen to get his/her should have an complaint
m the hands o a Cl ften these system. If possible, thrs task or complaint
grievance redressed. Very .
0
tracking should be outsourced.
I . not handled w1th due care.
comp arnts are . . . v a b There should be an external, periodic
Most public off1ces rn lndta ha e of 'audit' of complaints in offices
complaint monitoring system, but more having large public interlace.
often than not, the system not c Apart from enquiring into each complaint
as the complaint ends wtth the offtcral fixing responsibility for the lapses, if
against whom the charges are alleged. It any, the complaint .be used to
usually takes several months for a analyse the system1c defrcrencres so that
complainant to get a response from the remedial measures are taken.
government (if at all there is a response).
22. Reforming the civil services
The admmtstrative system should be transformed so that at every level of the civil
serv1ce, there is a clear assignment of duties and responsibilities with structured anct
interlocking accountability in which the government servant can be held accountable for
the manner in whrch he/ she performs his/her duty. Such assignment should be specitrc
and categorical and include in concrete terms the supervisory and oversight
responsibilities of the controlling officers. This should go all the way up the line so that
the mterlockrng accountability forces every level of government servants to function
efficiently.
There also has to be an in-built system of rewards and punishments, with criteria being
laid down which can eliminate arbitrariness and subjectivity in granting rewards or
awarding punishments. At present, there is no incentive to work diligently and efficiently
and no adverse consequences of shirking work, indulging in corruption or failing to
achieve an acceptable level of efficiency. At present, not only is there no performance
audit but even the old system of awareness of an officer's strengths, weaknesses and
reputat1on seems to have become a thing of the past. It is high time that a robust system
of performance audit to periodically monitor and objectively evaluate the performance of
otf;cers ts mtroduced for every level of the civil service.
Risk Management For Preventive Vigilance
The fiSk of corruption m government depends on the nature of the office and its activity
and the character of the person holdmg that office. An office having more discretion and
more publ c tnlerace ts more vulnerable to corruption than an office in which there are
no discretonary powers. This 1mpties that it may be possible to classify various positions
148
U & RAVI
ernment as 'high risk of eori\Jpr , .
ill To illustrate, the Post of a medium risk of cori\Jption' and 'low risk of
corrukPost could be classified as a 011icer or an inspector at a border
llec . t . 'I . nsk POSttio , h
c enqutry coun er IS a ow nsk POsitio . n w ereas the position of an olticia\ atan n.
I
rly indtvtdual g. overnmen\ serva t
rnr a ' . . n s vary i th .
St who tndulge 1n outnght extortion t n etr level of mtegrity ranging from
tllose o those Who ' . .
gement system to prevent corruption h are absolutely upnght. A rtsk
personnel' should hold 'high risk

?uld to minimize risk by ensuring that

'loW rif, a risK profiling is done for .s band VIce versa. lhis would work elhctent\y
onlY ent policy should then ensure dept
10
s and also of government servants. The
placem oyment ot 'low risk staff to 'high risk jobs'.
. k profiling of government officials poses a chan .
RIS f performance evaluation d. m the sense that the presen
system M eover categ . . a reporting officer !rom giving anything
adverse or onzmg an ofllctal as
'high' risk b.ased on an adve.rse rating by one SUGGESTED STEPS WHICH
1
orting off1cer may not be fa1r (unless a glaring MUS! BE 1 AKEN
rep h t .
sconduct as come o not1ce). It would,
be better if risk profiling of officers is
by a committee of 'eminent persons' after
he officer has completed ten years of service,
t . f
nd then once 1n every tve years. The
a mmittee should use the following inputs in
co I .
coming to a cone us1on:
a. The performance evaluation of the
b.
reported officer.
A self-assessment given by the
reported officer focusing on the
efforts he/she has made to prevent
corruption in his/her career.
a. Risk pro1iling of jobs needs to ;,
done in a more systematic and
institutionlised manner m ai\
government organtzations.
b. Risk profiling of o!l\cers should oe
done by a committee of 'emmenl
persons' after the olficer has
completed ten years of seNice, and
then once in every five years. lhe
committee should use the \
inputs in coming to a conclusu3'""
i. The performance evaluation of tt'!)
reported offlcer.
ii. A sell-assessment given by the
reported officer focusing on the
eflorts he/she has made to preve:1t
corruption in his/her career.
c. Reports from the vigilance iii. Reports from the vigalance
organization. organization.
d A peer evaluation to be conducted iv. A peer evaluation to be
conducted confidentially by the
confidentially by the committee committee through an evaluat1on
through an evaluation form. form.
One method to assess the of a is T t st the candidate nas to
the integrity test. It is like an ordmary paper-pencl eal.,ty test These tests are used n
1 s'milar to a person
answer various questtons. It ts. a so.
1
s cted corrupt persons. lntegnty tests. \ ke 1'
some developed countries to ldenttfy su pe I and are thus not a foolproot
d n lead to wrong cone us, ........
tests, are imperfect, an ca Th fore taking disc1phnary act10n on
method to evaluate integrity of a person. ere '
149
VAJJRAM & RAYI ......
in by a court. but these can be used as one
01

such a test would not stand the scrut Y ''&
inputs wh1/e nsk profiling an officer.
23. Audit t th
f rmation which has come o e" knowJed
The audit authorities do

misconduct is involved, to the
in respect of senous lfregulantles m ailable to the anti-corruption bodies h-
corruption bodies The avthe Parliament or the State Legislatur only
wh h d1 rt of the GAG 1s la1d e ore e as
en t e au 1 repo . .
1
t (which is detected in audt
the case may be By the time a senous lfregu an Y d . t d 1 and
reported to the tor response as an audit query an mcorpora e as a Part
01
the annual audit report laid before the house), comes to the knowledQe of. the anti-
corruption bodies. a lot of time is lost. Such delays not on!y alert the cufpnts in the
organization but also give them enough time to cover tracks and. destr?y the
evidence and material records thus making it extremely for 1.nvest1Qating
agencies to successfully complete their investigations. In v1ew of th1s, 1t would be
desirable to make a standing arrangement with CAG and the AG to report such
mstances as soon as they are unearthed in audit.
A second innovation in this regard would be to equip the agency concerned in the
mechanics of forens1c audit so that aspects crucial for criminal investigation could be
taken oue care of.
It would be m the fitness of things if the anti-corruption bodies are equipped to undertake
Si..Cf' forens1c audit of government departments where major irregularities come to their
r;oce. The rdf!a is to have an in-house forensic team in these offices. Similar capability
d be r .11/t ,n the local fund audit department. To start with, a forensic audit training
coursP could be conducted to develop expertise in this regard. The entire process of
a .. must come into public gaze through publication of pending audit obseNations
ai,'1ua '!y.
24.
Proactive vigilance on corruption
Prevent1ve v1gilance attempts to eliminate or reduce the
scope for corruption in the long run. The current approach
to proact ve vigilance is based on the recommendations of
he Samnanam Committee in 1964. The main emphasis in
SUGGESTED STEP
WHICH MUST BE TAKEN
a. Taking proactive
vigilance measures should
primarily be the
responsibility of the head
of the office . roac:ve vigilance has been on identifying suspected
rrupt elements and then devising mechanisms to weed
m out or to ensure that they do not occupy sensitive positions. In this regard, the
owmg ma'n loots have been evolved:-
(1) List of Officers of Doubtful Integrity
a lst of OffcersiExecutives maintained in the organization/departments which
the names of at/ of/1cers against whom disciplinary action on some vigilance
pe d ng or vlho IS undergoing punishment on a vigilance related matter.
J50
VAJlRAM & RAVl _______ _
(2) Agreed List of Suspect 0f1icers
lhis is a list of Officers/Executives . P ..
f indulging in corruption. The r n . SUsJBanks on whom there is a strong susp1c1on 0
rganizations and the Central B st s prepared by the Chief Vigilance 01\icers of 0
h ureau of Investigation. ihese ollicers are \<.ept under watc
(3) List of Undesirable Contact men
The Central Bureau of lnvestigat
. . i . ton Prepares a list of middlemen, touts etc. dealing With
.organ and shares the information with senior officers in \he concerned
organtzattons on need to know basis'.
(4) Annual Property Returns
This is another tool to identify suspected corrupt elements /practices.
(5) Vigilance Clearance
Vigilance clearance is obtained from the CVC for Board level appointments in and
pSBs. Besides, the Government of India has established procedures for getting vtgt\ance
clearance before appointing an officer.
The above listed measures are, by and large, at the initiative of the vigilance machinery.
such measures should also be initiated by the departments/ organizations themselves.
as the inputs available with them about their officials and the tasks they
much more than with an external machinery. Following are some measures which ca
be taken by the departments/organization: .
bTr statements o1 pub\lc (a) Timely submission and of assets and \Ia: 1 1 1es
servants should be ensured.
(b) These should be put in the public domain.
hould be prepared in a\\
(c) Annual lists of public servants of doubtlul s . Th list shollld
. . h th r corruption agencies. e
departments in consultation w1t e an I-
1
d to be iacking in
tf s who have been oun
contain names of those o. . i For ex.ample:-
integrity In the course of an mqulry or after an mqu ry. . t
n a charge of lack of mtegnW or or
(i) those convicted in a Court of o but on whom penalty otner than
an offence involving moral is imposed:
dismissal , removal or compu so ' I k ol in\egnW or on
It departmentally ,or ac
(ii) those awarded a major 'J 1 duty in protecting the nter \ a
charges of gross derehctlon o
Government: \ '
. ceedings for a penalty or '
(iii) those against whom is in progress: and
lack of integrity or mora u chn t \
ted but acqu1tted on \e
(iv) those who were prosecu
, 51
-------VAJIRAM & f{AVI --------
.
(d) rhOro should be
8
mandatory annual rov1ow of ofllcors who have attained
tho aoo of 50155 yoars or completed 25 years of sorv1co, based on An
Roports, other rocords. and gonoral reputation 1n ardor to roliro
doubtful mtognty compulsorily ThiS would prosuppos( that making reati
. She
ontno'> rolatrng to 1ntognty m the annual porlormanco reports should be m
mandatory unlike tho present prac!lco of being vague and silent on
aspact Officers should be reqwred to bo graded based on levels of
(o) Govommont servants, who d1splay exemplary capac1ty to identify m .
and scandals and bring corrupt elements to book and
major loopholos wh1ch cause substantial loss to publ1c exchequer,

rewarded. Such officers should be protected from e
(f) Thoro should bo public shaming of known corrupt officers.
25. Intelligence gathering
.Gathering illlolligenco nbout tholr own personnel is a practice followed by
mvestlgnltve ngoncios. There could be several ways secunty and
of gathormg intelligonco about public servants. These
mcludo keeping surveillance over suspected public SUGGESTED STEP WHICH Mus
servants. studying thetr life-styles, studymg the BE TAKEN T
(decisions they havo made, analysis of complaints a. Supervisory officers should
eedback from citizens and peer group. ' assess. the integrity of his/her
subordrnates based on h's/h
Incentive money f
0
h dl'
1
er
. r m secret funds
1
s used at times to an rng of cases, complaints and
gather such mformation. Although all s h from different sources
may n t I uc measures This could th .
. o a ways be desirable or practical a . . en become an
supervisory bff h Important rnput for risk profiling of
h. lh . rcer s ould assess the integrity of otfrcers.
IS er subordmates based on his/her handlin
icases, co.mplaints and feedback from different
mportant rnput for nsk profiling of officers. rces. This could then become an
26
Vigilance network
There .are a large number of disc. r
pending with various and also criminal cases relating to
ese are rarely reviewed by supe . . reason for this large pendency is that
would be destrable to rvrsory Officers. It
such cases updated create a national database of SUGGESTED STEPS WHICH
publtc doma Th' regularly, which should be in the MUST BE TAKEN
m. ts apart fro
monltonng of all su h m providing a tool for A nat!onal database containi ng
levels would gene by authorities at different J e detarls of all corruption cases
such 'cases Th. rae publtc opinion for quick action in at all levels should be created.
information o.n pre's,. database should have b. database should be in the
1mmary en publrc d
with all enqurr,ng . qumes, regular inquiries . . omain. Identified
agen authontres should b d
a th ctes and all d.
1
. e rna e
u oatses, investigatiOn . - tsctp mary responsrble for updating the
' prosecutton trial, punishments database regularly.
152
....... ------ YAJin ... _..- J.'\.1\.M & RA:
penallie. s, recovery ot assets :Vl
anv d . . , and apPe I
disciplinary an cnmmal case a, review and ..
bOth rtments and other organlzaton s ltnking the entire g reviSion processes covering
dBPa s to Which the ovemment machinery and all
k
h ld executwe po
00
twor s ou cover cases ot bo wer ol the State extends
fhO .
1
C . th elect d
prevenuon o orrup\lon Act a d e and paid pub\
rne Involving public p ' n other White col\ IC cases under
servants roperty or resource ar economic o1lences by public
penal code. In addition, the internet should s public conduct under the Indian
and all other related intormatlon mtormaUon on ali annual proper\)'
useful to Incorporate In the network all intorm conthct ot interest It would be
uspect officers, contractors, suppliers t a\lon on otlicers ot doubttul integritv
s 1 t t t ' e c blacklisted b .,.
information re a 109 .o outs, liaison men etc. Part . . Y government tor corruption,
t
the general pubhc, part to all the de
01
this mlormation would be accessible
o . d' Th C pan.ments and th . .
corruption bo 1es. e entral Vigilance Comm : e entire mlormation to anti-
such a networked database. ISSIOn may take the lead in establishing
soCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
under the category of Social Infrastructure the !olio .
1 11 wmg a s under-
1 . Citizens' Initiatives
2. False Claims Act
3. Role of Media
4. Social Audit
5. Building Societal Consensus
A brief description of the above five is given under.
1. Citizens' Initiatives
The citizens' voice can be effectively used to expose, denounce and restrain corruption.
This calls for the engagement of civil society and the media in educating citizens about
the evils of corruption, raising their awareness levels and securing their participation by
giving them a 'voice' . This introduces a new dimension to the concept of accountability of
government to the people otherwise than through the traditional horizontal mechanisms
of legislative and legal accountability of the executive and internal vertical accountability.
<
Civil society here refers to formal as well as informal entities and inc\udes the private
sector, the media, NGOs, professional associations and informal groups ot people from
different walks of life.
The Independent Commission Against Corruption {ICAC) of Hong has.
exemplary results over the last quarter century by the ab1hty ot CIVIl
to question corruption. The credit tor raising the consciousness ot the commun\ty an
153
-------- Vi\.JIIV\ M & HAVI ------..........
11 , goos torgoly ro tho vlgoroua public oducnr
llono Kong nbour fighting corrup
0
1()
11
cnmpnlgna cnrrlod out by thO ICAC.
col "lrnloglo:. to combnt corruption, but
113
1 htJ ICAC /Jti"' uo;od In tho public Attitude to
omph.tsls hns bi'OI1 on b q "uonchod boforo tho ICAC stArted functioning. At
1

Corwptmn In I long Kong wns on I I bfo and any effort to right It as lutrlo 8 hat
tuno poopto rognrdod corruption ns novt " Ul lhll
wo/1 public rolntlon campaigns conducted tho. ICAC. shattered lhat
concoplion Tho ICAC hns, In facl, transformed a pass1vo socml onwonmont, Which
condonod corruption :md holpod sustain /1111 tho process.
II is notod for Its unique outreach progmmmo compri sing roloasos, PUblic
nnnouncornonts, /ntorv/ows. documontorios, posters, leaflets, moo11ngs and work Witt,
sclloofs nnd tmlvOtsltlos to convoy anti corruption mossogo to tho public. It also
sponsors sporting, cultural and ontortainment .events that_ aro almod at youth Which
omphasizo nn/1-corrvption thomos. A feature of 1ts working tncludos collaborative efforts
with mnjor Cllllmbors of Commerce to promote tho Hong Kong Ethics Development
Contro to furthor ethics /n corporate governance. It also instructs, advises and assists
any porson, on roquost, on ways in which corrupt pracllcos may bo eliminated and
advisos /lOtlds of govornmonr departments or of public bodies of changes in practices or
procoduros compatible with tho offoctlvc discharge of tholr dutlos.
In India, thoro havo been many outstanding cases of civil society engagement. In fact,
civtl society tnitlativos to Improve governance in India have grown in scale and content
from tho oarly 1990s. There havo been efforts in different parts of country to challenge
current paradtgms, test alternative approaches and share the learning from these
expenencos. Somo successful civil society engagements are:
(i) Public Interest litigation by Common Cause Delhi and Consumer Education
and Research Centre, Ahmedabad, the Association for Democratic Reforms
of Ahmedabad;
{it) Report Card Survoy of Public Affairs Centre, Bangalore;
{iii) Jan Sunwai by Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan, Rajasthan and Parivartan,
Delhi;
(iv) Campaign for Electoral Reforms and Citizens' Charters by Lok Satta,
Hydcrabad;
(v) Capacity Building for Advocacy by National Centre for Advocacy Studies,
Pune;
(VIJ Campatgn for Effective Municipal Decentralization by CIVIC, Bangalore;
(vu) Public discussion on municipal and State budgets by Disha and PROOF of
Bangalore and participatory municipal budgeting by Janaagraha, Bangalore;
(vui) Campa1gn for Citizen Charters by PRAJA of Mumbai;
154
........------ VA.Jl RAM & RAV1 -------
(ix) voter Awareness Campa n
Centro, Sangalore and by Catalyst Trust, Chennai, Public /\\lairs
atta, liyderabad; and
(x) National Campaign tor p
00 1
.
on Right to lntormat
1
on. pes Right to lntormation/Parivartan, New Oelh1
ample of JUSt two ot those ornan t'
rnc ex and th . "' za IOns would tndicate the e.<cellent wor\1. being
bY these o er c1v11 society .
done (MKSS) in Ra asthan organisations. The Mazdoor Ktsan
sangathan . .
1
a well-lc.nown NGO started uncovering corrup\ton tn
local public works to employment roils, vouchers. beneticiary lists, and
,...pletion and utilisatiOn certifiCates and then hanainn them over to the concerned
CO" f . b\' .,
villagers for scru
1
ny In pu. IC hearings _called Jan Sunwai. Instances ol large-scale
rruption wore unearthed
10
these pubhc hearings regarding talse muster rolls, talse
and vouchers, and false completion and utilisation certificates. As a result ot these
bl bliC hearings facilitated by MKSS, the government in Rajasthan was tinally persuaded
pu ntroduco serious reforms such as the creation of a ward sabha that was given the
to to conduct social audit of government programmes, approve proposals tor. public
po ks and certify proper execution ol works. Parivartan, an NGO based in Delh1, used
wor Right to Information law to expose corruption in the Public Distribution System by
ting on access to stock registers maintained by lair price shops, and expose that
1
nsse quantities of rice, wheat and oil intended lor the public had been diverted to the
larg
open market.
h t d
o these initiatives signify? Civil society groups have put pressure on :rnng
W a . h
1
provided momtonng
rnments to reform corrupt pract1ces. They ave a so . tmg
govehanisms to track corruption by educating members of the public and,
mec Th h h lped generate demand ,or r
them in anticorruption efforts. e_y ave e 0 th hole these civil society
. n and introducing systemic reforms. n e w , o ser.te the
are path breaking initiatives that have

I people and
f the C
ommon man and have 1nvo\ved a grea
needs o
mobilizing them. the criticality ol educating
f
.
1
oc ety groups underscore e
The successful initiatives o CIVI s . I . . \ion \hough such im\latives. .
le and raising their awareness In hghtmg corrup .. onment whereby the Cltlz.ens
peop nt can create an enw res to
from the society' the . 't !torts to root out corruption. Some measu
groups can effectively partiCipate m I s e
facilitate this could be: ment programmes:
to oversee govern
(i) inviting civil societieS .
. . t'ng service standards,
(ii) establishing and dlssemma I . .
. laints mechamsms,
(iii) establishing credible comp . t. on institutions. judiciary nd \aw
. in antlcorrup I I \s,
ng public confidence s to improve trust eve
(iv) assossl d . designing programme
onforcemont an In
. ss to information;
(
v) enforcmg acce
155
VAJIRAM & RAVl
of corruption and to Instil moral commitment
(vi) educating society on the events
to integrity: . d.
. nment activitieS where au 1ences gather
(vii) using public hearings audit and residents provide their own
to hear details of public work sc
perception; . .
. t ector sponsored public educat1on and
(viii)imtlating government or pnvha ed.s newspapers and the television;
awareness campaigns throug ra IO,
nd ublic hearings at the national and local
(ix) holding integrity. problems and suggest changes involving
levels at regular mterva s
all participants;
(x) surveying and assessing public service delivery periodically;
(xi) surveying corruption perceptions in general or specific sectors of government
functioning;
(xii) incorporating corruption as a subject in the education curriculum; and
(xiii)selting up websites on corruption - containing facilitating
dialogue and feedback from citizens, associating former public servants in
lobbying against corruption.
Citizens' Charters make a'dministration both
accountable and citrzen-friend/y. A few years
back, almost every government department and
orgamsatton launched its Citizens' Charter. The
Charter is an undertaking a public service
orgamzat1on gives to the citizens, to provide a
hrgh level of servrce while meeting the standards
contained in the declaration.
Over time m a large number of offices Citizens'
Charters have fallen into disuse. The promises
made in the charters have become pious
declarations with no mechanism to enforce them.
The Citizens' Charter should contain specific
Action Needed
a. Citizens' Charters should be
made effective by stipulating the
service levels and also the remedy
if these service levels are not met.
b. Citizens may be involved in the
assessment and maintenance of
ethics in important government
institutions and offices:
c. Reward schemes should be
introduced to lncentivise citizens'
initiatives.
d. School awareness programmes
should be introduced, highlighting
the importance of ethics and how
corruption can be combated.
prov1srons and set out specific obligations for the
pabl:c serv1ces, the time within which the
department would be obliged to provide a
or to respond to a query or complaint. In order to
make tnese charters effective tools for holding public servants accountable, the charters
should dearly spell out the remedy/penalty/compensation in case there is a default in
the standards spelt out in the charter. It would be better to have a few promises
which can be kept rather than a long list of lofty declarations which are impractical.
156
..... --- ---VAJl RAM & RAVI
ctizens may be involved in the asse llilliilliiiifl
offices and institutions with

maintenance ot ethics in major

g eat the state, diStnct and subdistr" t
1
9
PUbhc contacts. This assessment could be
doncept1on of citizens who have beelc The assessment may be made I rom the
per . n m touch wth .
tess1onal agenc1es. A mechan
1
sm n d
1
such otllces, with the help ot
a data base of all visitors is to be put m in government oltices so
th e persons and get their feedback.
9
d. The professional agency should contact
tnes. en a rating. ased on these teedbacks, the public ot1ice could
be QIV
licy of incent1vismg citizens' parr .
A po Claims Law is one way of. be actively pursued. Enacting a
false f . lncentlvlsmg CitiZens' participation A reward system tor
reporting
0
. could also help in bringing to cases of corruption.
prompt on complaints apart from redressing the grievance also motivates
others to brtng their gnevances to the notice of authorities.
school a':'areness ?rogrammes can be very effective in bringing about attitudinal
changes 1n the society. Such programmes are ideally taken up in high schools and
should educate students about the role of citizens in a democracy, the role ot civil
society, harmful effects of corruption, principles of collective assertion in tight against
corruption, some exposure to functioning of public institutions etc.
An allied aspect relates to the question of government using positive inducements or
rewards to disclose information on corruption. There are reward schemes in taxation
departments where complainants are rewarded a percentage of the income unearthed
based on the information. Such cases of rewards should also be otiered where
information is furnished about corrupt practices. Innovative mcent\ves need to be
introduced so that people are motivated to expose the wrong doings of corrupt public
officials. Change will come when the incentives to throw out a corrupt become
stronger than the incentives to retain such a system. The need of the hour ts to have
zero tolerance towards corruption.
2. False Claims Act
The existing provisions in the Indian Penal Code and other enactments are not
. .
1
. t to approach courts tor recovery o
to enable interested citizens and ctvt socte Y h Untted States.
the roceeds of corruption and provide for a share tn proceeds. In t e n court in
the Claims Act makes it possible for interested to approach a Y
any judicial district for recovery of the proceeds of corruption.
. . rson who has knowledge about a traud
Under the Federal False Clatms, any pe .
1
t on behalt ot the Fcdem\
r entity may file a aw sui
committed by another person . ' . rt
1
\aw the person comm\t\ ng the
Government. And if the fraud a ol recovery. The Lnw
fraud is penalized and the p\atnttff ts re t \ traud in Federal contracts. \\ w
was enacted during the Civil War52 to con ro dments to thO False C\a\ms Act m U
amended in 1986 and gtvon more teeth. government alone cannot wm th w
in 1986 were earned out as the Congress tor pnvate clttzens to com tol'W3 d
hl t
create 1ncenttves
agamst frauds and soug
0
1
57


VAJJRAM & RAVl
t re of the law is the protection it Ofle
n'ticant tea u rs
ment's efforts. A srg
1
mended the enactment of a law
1
supplement govern d ARC has recom hasise th f o
to whistle blowers. The Secon would be appropriate to emp e act here
provide protection to It laims made to a government offrce, rn a case
that "Insider Information" rogardrng the passing of that law.
of collusion would be more forthcomrng wr follows:
f the US False Claims Law are as
Tho central features o bli procurement should ott
d or services rn pu c . . er to
The provrder of goo s . If any other customer rs provrded a rnor
Fedora/ Government the best pnce. -- e
favourable price for the same quality,
the contractor is liable to make good Action Needed
tho difference in price. a. Legislation on the lines of the us

The citizens are empowered to file a
civil suit in the Federal Courts on
behalf of the United States. The US
Government is notified of such an
event and the Government may
implead itself as a litigant in such
cases.
The Court will determine the loss
sustained by the public. Such loss
includes actual monetary loss and
non-monetary loss to society in the
form of poor quality of goods and
services, pollution and other social
costs. In respect of social cause, the
court computes it in money terms.
The court is empowered to impose a
penalty of three times the loss
sustained or computed.
The citizen filing the civil suit will get
15 to 35% of the penalty levied as the
compensation for his efforts,
False Claims Act should be enacted
providing for citizens and society
groups to seek legal relref against
fraudulent claims against the
government. This law should have
the following elements:
;. Any citizen should be able to bring
a suit against any person or agency
tor a false claim against the
government.
ii. It the false claim is established in
a court of law, then the person/
agency responsible shall be liable for
penalty equal to five times the loss
sustained by the exchequer or
society.
iii. The loss sustained could be
monetary or non-monetary as in the
form of pollution or other social
costs. In case of non-monetary loss,
the court would have the authority to
compute the loss in monetary terms.
iv. The person who brought the suit
shall be suitably compensated out of
the damages recovered.
depending upon his involvement in the case. This provides strong incentive
to citizens and civil society organizations to unearth false claims and
corruption and to file civil suits.
The whole procedure is governed by rules of civil litigation and the standard
of proof needs to meet civil court norms, and does not require proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
There is neoo for legislation on the fines of the US False Claims Act, which will make it
possible for interested citizens and civil society groups to seek legal relief tor the
158
Ifill""" & VAJlRA.M & 'RAvt
rY of the proceeds of corrupr
recove corruption where the fraudon and claim a share
aut moro important, such a !has been committed. a would help in
servan pubhc organrzallons aw would help in co\lus,on with a public
private . mg a culture of fair play ""
3.
Rol e of Mcdra
rnedia has a crucial role in the
p. tree
1
prevention
h
rnedia can In orm and educate th . ' moMonng and control ot co t.
sue . e PUbhc 0 rrup IOn.
overnrnent, and civil soc,ety or ant expose corruption In
g duct while pohclng rtself against corrupt'o g zatlons and help monitor codes ol
con 1 n.
vestigative reporting by media or reporting of .
lfl a significant source of . _ Instances of corruption as they occur can
bB t'
.
1
rrnation on corrup ron .
lfl 0 f .
DailY reporting o 1nstances of
rruption as they occur is
co f I 'b .
other type o con n ut1on.
action should be
by the authorities to
rnrnediately respond to such
to appraise the
correct facts, to take steps to
bring the culprits to book and
Action Needed \
a. It is necessary to \
proper screening and practices requiring
media and tak'
0
. a\ allegat1onslcomplamts by the
' tng acbon to put them in the public domain.
b. The electron d' \
and a self IC Ia should evolve a Code ol Conduct
Code of C riulating mechanism in order to adhere to a
1
on uct as a safeguard against malahde action.
c. Government. agencies can help the med1a '" the tight
I agamst corruption by disclosing details about corruption
cases regularly.
to keep the press and the public informed from time to time of the progress of such
action. It has been the common experience that very often there is no systematic
arrangement to take note of these allegations and to follow them up.
The collation of reports appearing in different sections of the media and their follow up
should be an integral part of complaints monitoring mechanism in all public offices.
It has been observed that sometimes under pressure of competition, the media does no\
verify allegations and information before putting them in the public domain. Occasionally,
such allegations/complaints are motivated. It is necessary to evolve norms and practices
that all allegations/complaints would be duly screened, and the person against whom
such allegations are made is given a fair chance to put forth his version.
4. Social Audit
Social audit through client or beneficiary groups or civil society groups is yet another wav
of eliciting information on and prevention of wrong doing in procurement of products and
services for government, in the distribution of welfare
payments, in the checking of attendance of teachers Action Needed
and students in schools and hostels, staff in the a. Operational gu,deh!'lcs t ell
developmental schemes and cuzen
hospitals and a host of other similar citizen service- centnc programmes should de
oriented activities of government. This will be a useful tor a socal aud1t mecharusm
supplement to surprise inspections on the part of the
159
VAJIRAM & RAVI ----.............
. . for social audit should be made a Part
. Prov1s1ons Of
departmental chemes.
oporatronal guidelmes of all s
Building Societal Consensus .
5. b .1d a broad consensus on the 1mp
0
rt
. . ecessary to w I h ance
In fighting corruption. It IS n d that end it is essenlla I at the Political 01
r n tree Towar s ' P&llJ
making society corrup IO - nsibilities in governance, pursue anti-corl\l _e
which have crucial roles and respo Plion
agendas. . h
ous elections dunng t e t1me span till 2o
13
It is heartening to for against corruption as a major theme fl1oSJ
ma1or political parties had mclu e
1
the;
1
elect1on manifestos.
Protecting the honest civil servant
Tho raison d't}tre of vigilance activity is not to to th_e level Of
managerial efficiency and effectiveness in the organization .. form Part
of government functioning. Every loss caused to the organlzat.lon, Bither rn Pecuniary or
non pecuniary terms, need not necessarily the subj ect matter of a vigilanee
inquiry. One possible test for determining the bona-fides could be whether a person Of
common prudence working within the ambit of the prescri?.ed regulations and
instructions, would have taken the decision in the prevarlrng Circumstances in !he
commercial/operational interests of the organization.
Even more than in government, managerial decision-making in public sector
undertakings and day-to-day commercial decisions in public sector banks offers
considerable scope for genuine mistakes being committed which could possibly raise
questions about the bona-fides of the decision-maker. The Central Vigilance
Comm1ss1on has recogmzed this possibility of genuine commercial decisions going
wrong Without any motive whatsoever bemg attached to such decisions. In view of the
co.mmercial shift in the role and functions of commercial banks, appropriate attention is
bemg paid to this aspect while deciding on the involvement of a vigilance angle in the
complamtsldtsctplmary cases relating to the banking sector.
For that purpose, each bank has set up an internal advisory committee of three seni01
Officers, to the complaints received in the bank and also the cases arising oul
of mspectJons and audit etc, to determine involvement of vigilance angl e or otherwise in
those transactions The
11
' '
. comm1 ee records reasons for arriving at such a conclusion and
sends II to the eva The eva h'l t k' ..
advice of . w
1
e a mg a dec1s1on in each case, considers the
t tt the comm,tlee. Such records are maintained by Jhe CVO and made available
o an o Jeer, or a team of officers of the Cent I v .,
it visits the bank for the . . ra .
1
9
1
ance Commission for scrutiny when
nvolvement of the vig I purpose VIgilance audtt. All decisions of the commi ttee on the
difference of o . . I ance ang e, are expected to be taken unanimously. In case of
Pinion among the members, the majority view may be stated.
The CVO refers its recommendations t th d' . .
opinKJn between the disciplmary e rscrpltnary authority. In of difference of
ty and the CVO, the matter rs referred to the
160
.......------VAJIRMt & RAVI ______ _
al Vigi lance Commission for advice . . .
involv1ng a vigilance angle reports of audit and
inSP .
510
n for advice even if the co reqwed to be referred to the Vigilance
officer involved is of the bank decide.s to close the
case. or Whtch the V1gtlance Commission's advtce IS requ1red.
are genuine apprehens1ons about th ,
I here 1 th e system s ability to protect an honest public
servant. Fortunate y, ere are sufficient safeguards in the law and procedure to ensure
t"on of an honest c1v11 servant
protec
1
. , . . . agamst baseless, mala-fide, mahctous and
motivated complatnts. The Single POtnt directive Which is now a statutory provision as a
result of
amendments made .to the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, requires prior
ermission of the Unron Government for initiating investigation against an officer of the
p nk of a Joint Secretary and above in the Government of India and its equtvalent in the
Public Undertakings. Sanction for prosecution of a public is required
1
om the Government or the appropriate authority under Section 19 of the Prevention of
Act, 1988 and Section 197 of the Indian Penal Code as applicable in so far as
such offences relate to and form part of official conduct. Investigation within the
rganization itself is subject to prior approval of the Superintendent of Police concerned
the case of CBI. A case under the Prevention of Corruption Act can only be registered
the sp9cial Police Establishment ot the CBt or the anti-conuption agency ol a state
and not by the civil police. Only a special judge is competent to take cogmzance of an
offence of corruption.
8 rtue of the procedural instructions, eve has to recommend sanction of prosecution
y in respect of civil servants coming within its jurisdtction. In States
Commissions are in it is the Vigilance Comm1sston who exam,nes
and recommends sanction for prosecution.
B th the 'single point directive' and the requirement of prior sanction tor
been called to serious question as obstructive ot the Th:
. . . d an unnecessaty interference m the JUdiCial pr :
mvestlgatlng an . had annulled the then executive d1fectton ol
Supreme Court, In the Jam ermission for commencing mvesttgatlans In
the Union Government requmng Its pnor p ll'f this that the Union
. . S t and above. It was to nu 1 Y
cases involvmg Jomt ecre anes . t . the Delhi Special Pohce Establishment
Government brought i n a statutory requlremen f m d honest civil servants and scntor
Act. The ground for this inclusion was to. sa engaged In pohcy advice and
public sector executives including from natlona doubt that honest pub\ic serv nts
. . t' ely While there 1s no s
commercial dec1s1ons respec IV t'
1
to assure c
1
t
1
zens that such prov1s on
t qually essen 1a \
do require to be protected,
1
IS e f r prosecut
1
on are not used s too n
. r atiOn and sanctton o Th C n l
for prior permission for 1nves
1
9 and rotect corrupt public servants. o e
the hands of Government to favour ph msm for screening cases ot pub c
Vigilance Commiss1on has mstttuted a IS one ot cxerc1s1ng du d '"' n
executives wi thin its junsdicl!On. The ques
101
161
VA.JlUAM & RAVI ........,.
. d aggod through investigative
ant from bemg r I h 8
protect an honest civil serv f estigo and enormous angu s .
nt and toss o pr
mvolving harassme rr
5
and managers that anll-corrupt
. among o Jeer d h h 'Oil
Thoro IS a general perceptiOn . trative and business risks an t at t ey lend to
tlgenc,es do not fully appreciate admm's has gone awry or where a loss is caused i
. here the deCISIOn f d fO /t . ll
mlsmtcrprot tho motives w ron is not without oun a I n. ts essential
a commorctal transaction. Such a percep
1
stab/ish that their actions are designed
1

. t. rng agencies to e h'
1
,.,
lhereforo for the mves 1ga
1
. This depends on the et tea standards and
teet honest officers. . . AI/
such a way as to pto I manning ant-conup/ton agenctes. egauon,
protosstonaf of lhe pemo;ne/es against whom the olflcet has initlat ..
can bo mado by diShonest su":;' '""stood In the way of dishonest intentions of the
dtScipllnery proceedtngs may /he tole of aggtleved"' outsiders who lalfed
10
corrupt subordinate. More smtster cou e
have their wrongful way.
It is generalfy assumed by the investigating agencies that (1) a be
for tllere to be corruptiOn, an 1 d' 'd
. . d (
2
)
1 1
s easier to involve everyone tn the cham of dec,s
1011
makmg and allege conspiracy
than to take pains to find out the tn tvt ua/s Who are
actually involved. It is often overlooked that a corruption .can even the
dectsions are correct and that it also takes place at specifiC pomts _and outstde the
system. This enltenched approach to Invest/gallon has led to convtclton rates being
dismally low. honest functionaries getting demoralized and dtshonest ones often gomg
scot free.
The crucial questton ts one of ensuring a balance between equality before law and
protec/ton of an honest civil servant who has his reputation to safeguard, unlike a corrupt
one. Such a balance could be achieved by an impartial agency which would screen
cases of pnor permission tor investigation and sanction prosecution of public servants
mvolved In corruption. Central Vigilance Commission should be empowered to give such
permtsston.
There ts need lor a special investigation unit reporting to the proposed lok Pal
(Rashtriya Lokayukta) to investigate allegations of corruption against investigating
agencies. This unit should be multi-disciplinary and should also investigate cases of
allegations ol hatassment against the investigating agency. Similar units should also
exist in States under the State Lokayuktas.
Suggested action
{a) Every allegauo, of corruption received through complaints or from sources
cultivated by II e investigating agency against a public setVant must be
exammed in depth at the initial stage itse/1 before initiating any enquiry,
Every such allegatton must be analyzed to assess whether the allegation is
Specific, whether it is credible and whether it is verifiable. Only when an
a//egabon meets the requirements of these criteria, should it be
rocommended for verification, and the vertfication must be taken up after
obtammg approval of the competent authority. The levels of competent
162
......... ---- - & 'RAVI
.. .. ................ .. authorities l or authorizing Verifi ..
corrupt1on agencies for rnust be fixed in the anti
evels of suspect officers
(b) In matters relat1ng to allegations
1
.
taken up straightaway on the ba
0
. COrf\Jpt
1
on,_open enquiries should not be
verification/ secret enquiries are aSIS rof information. When
of such verifications is mainta pdp oved, It should be ensured that secrecy
lne and the verif t' h
manner that neither the sus . 10ns are done 1n sue a
about it. Such secrecy is !>ect nor anYbody else comes to know
. essent,al not only to t t th tat' I
innocent and honest officials b pro ec. e repu 1on o
. nal investi ation S ut also to ensure the effectweness of an open
cnmt 9 . uch secrecy of verification 1 enquiry will ensure that in
case the are found to be incorrect, the matter can be closed
without any_one come to know of it. The Inquiry 1 Verification Officers
should be tn a POSitiOn to PPeciate the sensitivities involved in handling
allegations of corruption.
(c) The evaluation of the results of verification/enquiries should be done in a
competent and just manner. Much injustice can occur due to faulty
evaluation of the facts and the evidence collected in support of such facts.
Personnel handling this task should not only be competent and honest but
also impartial and imbued with a sense of justice.
(d) Whenever an Inquiry Officer requires to consult an expert to understand
technical /complex issues, he can do so, but the essential reqwement of
proper application of mind has to take place at every stage to ensure that no
injustice is caused to the honest and the innocent
(e) Capacity building in the anti-corruption agencies should be assured
training and by associating the required experts dunng enqumes.
investigations. Capacity building among public servants who are to
take commercial / financial decisions should be built through su1table tram1ng
programmes.
(f) The supervisory officers in the investigating agencies shou_ld ensu_re that only
those public servants are prosecuted against whom the evtdence IS stron.g.
{g) There should be profiling of . officers. The
competence, integrity and reputatton proceeding against any
charted out and brought on be made to the profile ot the
government servant, reference s
government setVant concerned. L ,.,
1 . . ld be attached to the proposed o.....,...
{h) A special investigation umt shou k ktas Vtgtlance Commission. to
{Rashtriya Lokayukta) State . Lo mvesttgattve agencies Tht un t
investigate allegattons of also investtgate casos o1 nil ton
should be multldisctphnary an s
163
VAJIRAM & RAVI lti:iii
. . r aling agency. Similar units should also.__
of harassment agarnst the rnves rg ve
set up in states. _ -
---=;:;- --ESfVAMONG CI VIL SERVANTS IN
APPENDIX -REASONS FOR HON l
GOVERNMENT IN FINLAND . .
, h corruption so seldom occurs tn Frnland
There are some o/emenrs whrch exp am w y
1. Egalitarian society - no class distinction .
. h first country in the world to adopt untversal suffrage th
In 1906, became t e t I to vote but to stand as candidates for election to at
included the nght of women no on Y civil servant has b o.
Public administration rs open for everyone and a career as a een open
tor everyone. The welfare sertices have expanded from. the 1960s onward. The rnain
elements of the we/faro society are a basic old age penston for everyone over 65, free
basic education, kindergarten places and higher education, and .health care for
everyone. The state takes care of the unemployed. All the factors have
reducod the urge to bribe civil servants and the temptatton for CIVIl servants to lake
bribes.
2. Good status, adequate pay tor civil ser vants
The career of c1vil servant has always been highly regarded. Salaries have not been
particularly h1gh, but good enc....Jgh. The population and administration in Finland have
been so small that if you lose your good name in society you lose a lot. Thus the risk of
being accused of wrongdoing and being excluded from normal social circles has been a
powerful deterrent. That is why individual cases of corruption have always been rare.
3. Public financing of parties
All over the world, traditional ways of raising funds for political activities have included
membership fees, canvassing, lotteries, donations, private support and small-scale
commercial activities. Finland was one of the first countries to allocate state funds for
political parties. The system has continued since 1967.
4. The legal structure and culture of the administration
A decree in 1817 reserved access to senior civil service posts in Finland for lawyers, or
at least to university graduates with a degree in law. In spite of the modernization of the
public sector. the core of governmental administration has maintained the legal tradition.
An adm nistration without clear political posts, with a low hierarchical structure, and, at
the same t1me, with a high degree of individual and collective responsibility among civil
setvants at ev:ry level of administration, as well as exposure to public scrutiny, does not
nurture corrupt1on.
I. The referendary or rapporteur system
ffllencJary system is an old pillar of legalism in the Finnish administration. A
2!lfll1111daty s a Clvtl servant who researches a matter under advisement, suggests
164
a VAJIRAM & RAVI
. 5 and offers a final proposal
1
.
0
puon . . k' n thrs syst
nan the dectston. ma tng politician or civil em the referendary, who is of lower rank

the supenor party. A Minister can adhere to his or her opinion

opesal of the referendary. If the referend a POhbcal decision that differs from the
f
1
ga11Y binding. A referendary is legally not sign it, it nevertheless becomes
e Minister or the government makes a de .. ns, for the decisions he or she makes. ll
a lved proposed in the matter lhe c c.'ISIOn different from that which the civil servant
invo b . . IVt servant c b .
'ting a response, ut that IS quite unus
1
an o v1ate legal responsibility by
wn d d ua From the .
Fnnish system eman s from the potenr
1
pomt ol view ol corruption, the 1
rwince both the decision maker and the 'a
1
corrupter double work. He or she has to
co . . . . re erendary of his or her interests.
Non-politi cal CIVtl servants as head
1
. . .
6.
5 0
mmtstnes - until 2005
Finland has not had a system of political state secret . . . .
. d permanent civil servants have be anes. Non-pohtrcal, prolesstona\\y
sktlle . . en regarded as the best types tor promoting the
. rests of c1t1zens. In 2005, the appoint ..
tnte . . . ment of pohttcal state secretaries began in
government m1n1stnes.
7.
Transparency and openness
The main . principle. in Fi.nland has always been that everything in the public
administratiOn really IS public, open for criticism by other civil servants, Citizens and the
media. All the diaries and records kept in the public administration are open to \
everybody. \
8. The duty to provide public explanation of the reasons behind decisions and
the duty to be proactive
According to the Constitution, among the most important guarantees ot good
governance are the right to be heard, the right to receive a reasoned and the \
right of appeal. Another important principle is that it is not enough tor a not
to make mistakes. A civil servant must be proactive in carrying out duttes tn the best
interests of the citizens. \
9. The strong positions of the Chancellor of Justice and Ombudsman
The Chancellor of Justice works in the government- is a part of wider government
the Ombudsman is part of parliament. The President nominates both, but they a.re who
independent in their work. They have all the tools and rights. they .nee_d to lnvesttgate an
act. They are the highest and most highly regarded legal officers m Ftnland.
1 0. Collective and collegiate decision structure
. . . akin unit consists of only one person. The
Corruption is facilitated 1f a deciSion-m
9
that Individual As both parttes usu ly
II t
res and resources on
corrupter can focus a ac I . t reveal thetr deahngs and thus ma
benefit, there is little reason for one
0
If however. decisions are m cl b
'bl punitive measures. \bt
themselves liable for poss1 e d"fficult and unsafe, but not 1mpo
. b mes much more I
collegiate body, corruption eco
165
VAJIRAM & RAVI -----..... ...._
-------- "d" . f "::;--__ ' h ad
visability of aec1 mg m avour of
nvincect Df I e 1 llte
More people have to be co lbTt of one would-be corruptee bOWing the -'e't
group and there Is always the
1
making has been a tradition in
on nny shady transaction. Collegate
sinco thO seventeenth century.
Ius personal Independence a
11. Low hierarchical structures P nd se
11
responsibility In administration
desr the civil servants well educated
Tllo has always mo , hese reasons, most civil se and &
democratic mmd-sot has been dommant. For
1
. . . . . rvants de
w1th tholr tasks personally from the beginning dec's.'on

Withouttn&J
lntervontion of superiors. Civil servants are responsible for their action.'" the vertical
horizontal dlroctions. They are obliged to inform others about tasks and their
actions.
Relatively closed civil service careers
In Finland, It is very rare for someone from outside the administration to be appointed
the higher posts within it, even though there is not a closed career system. Finland d to
not have any elite educational establishment for the production of future high
civil servants along the lines of France's Ecole Nationale d' Administration, the ENA
does Finland have very hierarchical administrative structures as in some southe or
European countries. rn
166
........ ----- & RAVI ______ _
CHAPTER-s
MODEL CODE OF ETH
\CS AND \NTEGR\TY
1h
e major sub-heads covered under lh .
I . e topic 'Mod 1 C .
outlined be ow e ode ot Eth1cs and Integrity' are
1. Introduction
2. Principles And Values Gave .
rmng The Public Service
3. Rights And Responsibilities
4. Conclusion
A brief description of the above has been laid th .
In e forthcommg paragraphs.
INTRODUCTION
The Government of India regard ethics and moral principles as essential foundations of
good and the public service is an integral arm of government. Th1s Code of
Ethics is to all workers who serve the public. Public servants
make up a major part of the lndtan workforce and they must be relied on to ensure that
government operates in an efficient and effective manner lor the benefit of the country.
The Code is intended to provide a framework lor their behaviour. Conscientious public
servants already adhere to many of these guidelines so what the Code does is to
formalise and articulate the expectations of the people and the purpose of the service.
The Code of Ethics establishes a set of principles and values which will enable public
serYants to deliver excellent service with the highest standard of courte5y, honesty,
integrity, objectivity and impartiality and with due regard to the best value for money. The
Code applies to all categories of public servants; it complements and is complemented
by existing rules and regulations. including General Orders, which establish standards ol
conduct in the public service.
A strength of the Code lies in the fact that it resulted from a consultative and
incorporates the views and recommendations of public servants of all grades
representatives of their Association. Additionally. the process elicited ideas ot
of all sides, opinion leaders and the citizenry in general. The Code can nghtl-y be satd \o
enjoy national endorsement.
. th Code but they are concerned that the r
Public servants are prepared to subscnbe to e .
. . . . t that are conduciVe to exce\lent serv
employers provide the facthttes and envtronmen
1
albeit of
8
spec1a\ k nd
T . . f ent as public servants a so,
hey regard M1ntsters o governm . d ct and integnty in thetr Th y e
and expect them to be exemplars of be respected and prot t d A
also concerned that their own rights as tndtvtdua ""
167
------- VAJIRAM & HAYI --------
. fleets these Issues. What Is really envisioned Is a culture .of PUblic
sectton of the coc:o re h hghest ethical principles, integrity and professtonalisrn
service charactortsod e;pect loaders with or without a
their office with acceptable standards of fairness, honesty
and rospoct for mdivtdual autonomy.
Tho Umtod Kingdom Committee on Standards in Public. Life has enunciated
Prmctplos of Public Sorvtce which expectations ?.f the conduct of sen1or
public sorvanls _ so/f/essness, integnty, obJeCtiVIty, accountability, openness,
d leadership. These enjoy near universal acceptance and form a fundamental eth1ca1
tor both appointed and elected officials. This Code of Ethics which is
published to underpin the conduct of Montserrat's public reflec.ts these bedrock
prmclples and 1s a guide to professional, humane and democratiC behav1our.
PRINCIPLES AND VALUES GOVERNING THE PUBLIC SERVICE
1. Honesty and Integrity
Public servants must.
(a) Conduct the business of Government honestly and responsibly.
(b) Attend work on time when scheduled, seekmg leave only when necessary
and rn accordance with General Orders.
(c) Use resources including time and internet facilities only for the authorised
public purposes for which they are provided.
(d) Be courteous and respectful while serving the public
(e) Administer public money judiciously and efficiently with a view to obtaining
best value for money and in accordance with Financial Orders.
(f) Resolve any conflict that arises between private interests and official duties
in favour of the public interest.
(g) Not receive presents from any person In the form of money, entertainment or
any service that may be regarded as geared to compromising their integrity.
(G1fts that are of minimal value, infrequent and within the normal custom of
courtesy and appreciation are permissible; and where there is doubt gifts
may be rece1ved and a record kept within the department).
(h) Not solicit or accept bribes from a person whom they are serving or intend to
serve.
(i) Present the facts and relevant issues truthfully when discussing or reporting
on a matter and not seek to mislead Ministers, other members of the
Legtslatwe Council. colleagues and the public in general.
168
# & VAJIRA.M. & RAVl
0) Abide by laws, regulations
their duties. and established proced .
ures when discharging
Accountability and Trans
z. Parency
. servants must:
publiC
(a) Exercise prudence m the use of .
PUblic funds resource d .1. .
)
Not engage in unowc
1
. . . ' san u\1 1t1es.
(b . . . . I Ia actiVIties or pro . . .
such act1V1t1es Within olfice premise dunng ot11ctal hours, or conduct
s or usmg public property.
(c) Be open and transparent when se .
rvmg the public.
(d) Use established criteria in ap oin .
ensure that they do not grant P
1
promotions and dismissals and
friends. pre erentla\ treatment or assiS\ance to family or
3
. Impartiality and Obiectivity
public servants must:
(a) Give courteous and efficient service to all members ol the public regardless
of colour, creed, gender, age, race or status.
(b) Not discriminate against customers including public ofticers in the execution
of their duties.
(c) Give honest, timely and impartial advice to Ministers ol Government and
other members of the Legislative Council.
(d) Be loyal to the government of the day and be politically neutral in their day-
to-day functions.
(e) Comply with the guidelines which have been laid down on political activities
in General Orders or any other official document.
(f) Not use their influence to further personal and other ends which are not part
of government policy, in the course of their duty.
4. Professionalism
Public servants must:
k
.ll d competences necessary tor the
(a) Seek to acquire the knowledge, s I s an
efficient discharge of their duties.
. . I Codes ot Conduct, it \hey aro
(b) Adhere to their respective s doctors lawyers, phann c.s\s
members of professional bodieS sue a ,
airport-workers, media workers.
. de and monitor their per1ormance.
(c) Set targets by wh1ch to gUI
169
VAJJRAM & RAVI
. machinery of government and the Wa .
. . themselves With the Y tt (d) Fam/11anse
functions. rt'cal affiliations in the
(e) Not be influence Y d b soc1al and po
1 1
""' 01
thoir dut1os. . b th h
d dignrty and o serve err ng ts und (f) Troat all customers with respect an er
the constilution.
able directions from persons of legitirnat
{g) Comply with lawful reason that brings credit to their position
authority and behave rn a way .
1 enhances the reputation of the publiC serv ce.
(h) Ensure that what they wrrte an . d say is positive, truthful and constructive in
content and tone.
5. Pursuit of Excellence
Public servants must:
(a) Strive to achieve the highest standard of performance.
(b) Use their time, skills and expertise to attain the approved goals of the
department.
(c) Strive to acquire new knowledge and skills continuously and use thern
effectively.
(d) Recogmse the need for training and seek to obtain it.
(e) Be models and exemplars of the principles and values embodied in the
Code. at the management level.
(f) Encourage and recognise creativity and initiative among subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
6. Confidentiality
Public servants must:
(a) Not disclose, in any form, official information or documents acquired in the
execution of their duties unless under proper authority or required by law to
do so.
{b) Be conftdential in all matters relating to secret and classified information
during and after their term of office in the public service.
(c) Not seek to influence or frustrate the policies, decisions or actions of
government by the unauthorised, improper or premature disclosure of any
information to which they have had access as public officers.
(d) Be 111Jsted to respect the legitimate confidences ot Ministers and colleagues.
170
.......... ----- VAJlRAM & RAVI ------

Deportment and Behaviour
. servants must:
publiC
(a} Maintain good personal hygie
accordance with acceptabl ne and dress 10 respectable attire in
Establishment C1rculars. e norms
01
the public service as stipulated in
(b) Not embarrass colleagues or m be
and behavrour. em rs ol the public by their dress, speech
(c) Not smoke where it is likely to inconvenience others and at any rate not in
the workplace.
(d) Not in activities such as gambling, drinking alcohol and substance
abuse rn such a way as to make them liable to judicial action, affect their
performance on the job, or cause a hazard to themselves or to others, and
certainly not in the workplace.
(e) Not commit rape, sexual battery and molestation or any sexual assault.
(f) Avoid contact which may be regarded as sexual harassment including:
(i) pressure for sexual activity or sexual favour with a fellow employee;
(ii) intentional physical contact which is sexual in nature such as unwelcome
touching, pinching, patting and grabbing;
(iii) sexually suggestive speech and sending e-mails with sexual tone and
content.
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
(a) Management must:
. h th ecessary resources and (
i) endeavour to provide public servants wtt e n . . the public
rt rm at their maxtmum m facilities to enable them .to pe o
service.
a sate working environment as far as (ii) provide public servants with
(iii)
(iv)
possible. ub\lc servants.
give honest and timely feedback on the pertorman::f ppublc seNant"s
. I system which mcludes
effect . his/her performance.
participatiOn In assessmg . . . mmodate the phys caUy
. te access and tacthttes to acco
(v) provide appropna .
challenged at public off,ces.
171
-------- VAJ I RAM ,fit .....
lst ubltc servants with their preparation
1
(b) Management should ass . P and training as necessary. or
rotiremont with appropnato onon
f Admimsrrallon in collaboration with Department Head
(c) Tho Departmtohnatt oall public servants rocoivo a copy of the Code and sign :
must onsuro ..
reco1pt.
Public servants have the right to. (d)
(I) association whether by representat1on of Unions or Staff Associations.
(il) tho expectation of a government which integrity and ensures
that they are treated justly and accorded pnvlleges commensurate Wit!]
their position.
(Iii) seek legal counsel if they fee/they have been unjustly treated.
(iv) seek opportunities tor personal and professional development.
(e) Public se:vants have the fundamental right to . with any
religious, civil or political group, but should not engage m polttrcal advocacy
m public offices.
(f) Public servants who become aware of actions by their colleagues Which
they believe conflict with the Code should counsel them in an effort to
secure conformity, failing which they should refer the matter to their line
manager and thereafter seek advice if necessary from Permanent
Secretary, Human Resource Management.
(g) If the matter (a to f) is not perceived to be adequately and expeditiously
dealt with, it should be reported to the Chief Establishment Officer using the
correct channels.
CONCLUSION
basic aim of the Code of Ethics is to facilitate efficient, effective and courteous
deltvery of services to the public. All public servants are therefore expected to observe it
as part of their contractual relationship with the Government of India. The consultative
out of which the Code emanated should help to ensure wide-spread
commttment to the standards of behaviour and values on which it is based. Failure to
comply can be a ground for discipline in accordance with procedures laid down in
General Orders Public Service Regulations.
172
# z & RAVt -------
CHAPTER -9
ACCOUNTABlllTy ANO
ETHtCAL GOVERNANCE
m
a
1
0 r sub-heads covered Under t" .
rne I "e top,c . Ace ..
utlined be ow- ountab,hty and Ethical Governance
8re o
1 Accountability Of Public Serv
ants
2. Fitness Bar
3. Ways To Promote Accountability To ct
11zens
4. Major Recommendations
A
brief description ot the above has been laid in th
1
... .
e ort"commg paragraphs.
ACCOUNT ABILITY OF PUBLIC SERVAMTS
In most countries, public otficials exercise varying degrees ot po d' h th
. . . . wer 1n 1sc argmg e1r
functions and responsibilities based on the authority vested in them To ensure that there
is proper and responsible use of this power and authority, all countries have
developed and procedures of checks and balances. They have also put in place
incentive mechamsms to reward good performance. These systems and procedures can
broadly be termed as mechanisms that promote accountability.
In all democratic countries, civil servants are accountable both to the political executive
and to citizens for ensuring responsive, transparent and honest policy implementation
and service delivery. But ensuring accountability ior pertormance is not a simple tasl<. m
government service; there are immense complexities involved in mal<.ing public
answerable for outputs and outcomes. Setting pertormance targets ana \he1r
measurement is easier in respect of service delivery agencies particularly when
service provided is tangible and thus an easily measured unit but tor many public
organizations where the output is policy related and therefore, not very. concrete,
assessment of performance becomes much more complicated. \he d1tiUS10n ot
responsibility and authority across different levels in Government and the lack of
between authority and accountability also lead to a system where plausible
non-performance abound, particularly for activities that cut across departmental diVIding
lines or across different functional divisions within departments.
. b adly categonzed as those \hal aro
The accountability mechanisms 10 any country are ro ot
. d Accountability ot the executNO arm
located within the State and those e. unt IS
01
course the tundamen\a\
government to Parliament and to the of the in a democmcy lS through
feature of a democracy. The llnal oi ace nt tor pumshtng and rew rd ng \
the medium of periodic elections whtch ts an tnstrume
173
-------VA.JJRAM & nAVI ------... --
Govommont of mo day. and thOretoro, serves as an ultrmato instrument Of
ilCCOUiltOblhty
An mdopondont Juc1/CillrY omb0c1ros the conslltUtlonal doctrine of soparat1on of P<>w
and 1S nnothor ,mportnnt clement m the system of checks and balances that ox1sts '" or,
domocru11c country In lndm, conshtutional and sl<l tutory bodios such as the office
01

Comptroller & Auc1tor Conoral, tho Electon Commtssion, and the Central Vtgtlan e
Commtss1on (CVC) arc ox:Jmplos of other ovorsiqht mochantsms that aro autonom eo
bur llo wilhin lho flnmowork of rho State. Analysts havo categorized those
mc>chanlsms Into ''horizontal'' accountabtlily mochantsms whtch refer to those loc :tty
within th('t Slato 11S ngoinsr vortte<ll' accountability mechanisms wh1ch are those outaed
tho SUl lO flt1d lncludO t/10 rtlOdiO, CIVIl SOCIOIY and CIIIZOnS. Side
Tho fo/lowmq shows tho carogorllation of such accountability mechanisms in India.
J f1l-!h elL. II\ C'IH: '
1)\\ to
\\ ithin \ t.lh.' (l f111 iwnt.lO




fl.u li.amcm
J uJ h.IU\'
I nk \uLu
( \l,
(\'(

I. lpuni hmcnts
, procedure\
'. ... \ l:nwcmcnl S
r \)rem
1"'1 1'-..: l ,
lmcrn.tl . \ uJ1;
.111\.C R . lr r \ 1 L
The Sixth Central Pa C . . .. u '
. Y ommJssron observed as folio .
The mstitutional structures of to d ws.
have proved inadequate for isolated managerial efforts
174 ance I.e. delivery of results and outcomes.
.....,....,. ... ----VAJlRAM &
Jill"""" RAVI
5
0
ver-rehance on 'command' Iiiii
1 lllOdels
ns and service users are stakeh o, adrninist r
Cil zc ecc.IS to bC 'nshtuhonahzed . elders and part,cra we eltort lor service delivery "
1e n 10 the d 1pants n t .
ro heir
1
nst1tutional 1ntograllon
1010
th a llllnistrative stru t
0
IUS\ customers'. l'his
1Jf1d; cooperative model' ol deCISIOn and hnKed to the specitic
on ,,ccs become habitS and routmes lon and can be based
pta' subsututcd With alternate tns\ltutoaM have to be norms and
and rt. nt also for determtn
1
ng th nahzed pract1ces ih Y analyzed, contronted
developed and adopted.
01
Pertorm.;.,. ol puq>Ose ls
{ t k h ld rnportance ol ncentwe Scheme
monitonnQ to sa e o er-clbzen partictpa\lon a a systems shill trom top down
checkS tS cnttcal for better public servtce dehve;d coproduc\lon with transparency and
Fli NESS BAR
ihe public perception today is that governm t
,nd concerns of citizens and the system den servants are unresponsive to the needs
.... oes not address tn
mechanisms to ensure accountability, integrit and . IS because the
appear to be adequate. The common

pubhc servants do not

against incompetent and erring government s lnl\la\ton ol disciplinary action
ervants IS more an e c t' th h
ihis is supported by a plethora of anecdot
1
.d x ep ton an\ e rule.
nd the eve clearly bring out that th a evl ence. Data obtained lrom the UPSC
a .
1
. . . . ere are very few cases where disciplinary
proceedtngs resu t tn tmpos1t10n of substant1al penalties.
The security provtded to a government servant further leads to such a
distorted tncenttve structure because it is a fact that under the t t
. presen sys em, very
rarely ts a government servant puni shed or removed tor poor per1ormance. As a result,
an element of complacency and inertia has got internalized in the civil services. In tact, it
has been noted that this trend not only manifests itselt in terms of inditterence to and
disregard of citizens' complaints and concerns but also in the form of indiscipline and
insubordination.
The Second Administrative Reforms Commission has recommended a maier revamp of
the present system of disciplinary proceedings against government employees to ensure
greater accountability and to minimize, if not eliminate, misconduct and indi scipline. In
addition, there is also need to find a systemic solution to the Issue of complacency that
stems from the lifelong job security coupled with lack of penal consequences tor non
performance or Inadequate performance.
While the pertormance of government organizations and their sub-Units are
subjected to in-depth reviews, seldom are efforts made to toni< orgamzatoonal
pertormance to the pert ormance at an individual civil In tact, at present, annual
confidenti al records of civil servants are the only mechamsm to assess
at a government servant and these records are used to evaluate the htness ol a cvl
Th s need to have a comprehenswe 10-
servant usually at the time of promot1on. ,, ,ere
1
175
YAJIRAM & RAYI
. officer's career. These assessment
nt milestones m an . s
depth assessment at Import a I f f 4 and 20 years of sorvrce.
od
t on complet on o
should be cam ou .
0
tho purpose of apprising the Pubr
ould pnmarrly sorv d rc
The frrst review at 14 years w h rtcomrngs for hrs/her future a vancement.
. h strengths and s o
scrvi.llllllbout hrs
0
' .
111
needs. The second. revrew at

d f assessmg hrs or ' . h h
This should also bo uso or tho frtness of tho offrcer for rsl er further
I erve to assess ld b
years would marn Y s . Th performance evaluatrons cou e conducted
ent servrco ese
contrnuanco rn governm So far as the second revrew IS concerned, as
by commrttoos constituted for thrs purposee.ssment about a public servant's fitness to
I a more intensrve ass . . .
thiS would rnvo ve
1
d
10
an empowered comm1ttee compns1ng both
continue in service, this may be entrusl e erts The second review would involve a ven.
ff as well as externa exp 1
government .o leers . f the officer's general reputation, and hisfher
careful scrutrny and analySIS
0
. . nvolving higher responsibilities 1n government. lo
potential to wherever available, should be used as an
. the possrble, e: ersonal interview with the officer should normally be a Part of
mput m thrs eTxhorcdlset .. ,e: modalities of this assessment would need to be worked out by
thiS process. e e a1
government.
f bl1c servants who are found to be unfit after the second review at 20 The serv1ces o pu , . . .
hould be dl.scontinued. A provision regard1ng th1s should be made rn the
years, s 't h ld b I
proposed Civil Serv
1
ces Law. Besides, for new appomtments 1 s ou e. express y
prov
1
ded that the period of employment shall be for 20 years only .. continuance in
government serv1ce would depend upon the outcome of the performance
rev1ews. These rev1ews combined with the changes suggested In the performance
management system, disciplinary proceedings and the reforms in the
trammg of c1v1l servants would make the entire system much more proactive, responsrve
and accountable.
The above proposals are not as radical as they may prima facie appear. Elements of
such a system exist in the Armed Forces, for both officers and other ranks. Thus an
officer who does not get promotion from the rank of Colonel to Brigadier, retires at the
age of 54, one who does not get promoted from the rank of Brigadier to Major General
rettres at 56 and so on. Section 560) of the Fundamental Rules (FR) also provides for a
11tness bar 1n respect of civilian government employees. The provision has however been
used only occasionally in the past although it has withstood judicial scrutiny. The present
proposal seeks to broad base and institutionalize such a mechanism for all government
employees. The Sixth Central Pay Commission has recommended that employees
seeKJng VRS should be eligible for pension equal to 50% of the average
emoluments last pay drawn on completion of 20 years of qualifying service thus making
tile VRS more attractrve. Government has accepted this recommendation and the liberal
retrement scheme dovetails well with the mechanism. The system of intensive reviews
coupled With llberal,zed pension and VRS benef1ts can be integrated into the
government s performance management system.
176
_._. ..........
& nAVI-------
S TO PROMOTE ACCOUNT ABILIT
WAY y TO CllrZENs
ntability also means answerability.
"ccou th m Th I.e. questions a k d
,., wered by e ere are two tyPes of s e of PUblic otlicials have to be
ans the RTI Act merely seeks informar /questions that can be asked. One type as
under ation. It promotes transparency data and involves one way transmission of
The second type of to a .much lesser degree accountability in
Gove f . I enqu,res not . t
. nd there ore 1nvo ves a consultative t JUS as to What was done but
providing a feedback in respect of .now of information with the citizens
usu . e delivery of public agencies. Such m ch

of government departments and

surveys, social audits, citizens' re ert an,sms mclude citizens' charters, service
dehve po card and outcome surveys.
MAJOR RECOMMENDATIOI'
A system of two intensive reviews - one on co
1
t' .
a. . mp e 10n of 14 years of serv1ce, and
another on completion of
20
years of service - should be established for all government
servants .
b. The first review at .
14
years would primarily serve the purpose of intimating to the
public servant a?out his/her strengths shortcomings lor his/ her future advancement.
The second revrew 20 would mamly serve to assess the fitness of the officer lor \
his/ her further contrnuatron rn government service. The detailed modalities ot this
assessment system would need to be worked out by government.
The services of public servants, who are found to be unlit alter the second review at

years, should be discontinued. A provision regarding this should be made in the
roposed Civil Services Law. Besides, for new appointments it should be.
p ided that the period of employment shall be tor 20 years. Further contmuance m
service would depend upon the outcome of the intensive pertormance
reviews.
177
-------VAJJRAM & RAVI
CHAPTER - 10
ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FUNDING
. 'Accountability and Ethical Governance
The maJOr sub-hoads covered under the toprc
are outlined below-
1. Introduction
2. Ethical Problems
3. Applied Moral Standards
4. Morality In World Politics
5. Conclusiof)
A brief description of the above has been laid in the forthcoming paragraphs.
INTRODUCTION
In mternational relations nation-states often have to decide on foreign aid or, in times of
a crisis, try to justify strikes that could harm innocent people. The of this .essay
is to discuss these two issues and to state the present opinion on morality and fa1rness
in world politics.
ETHICAL PROBLEMS
Morality and Foreign Aid
Despite the agreement that there is a gap between the standards of living in developed
and Third World countries, it depends on the particular method of interpretation whether
this gap is increasing or decreasing. By just looking at mostly monetary and economic
criteria, it seems like the poor countries are falling farther behind the developed ones;
the present document, however, shares the views of Rosenberg, Birdzell, and officials of
the United Nations Development Programme that this is a one-sided and thus somewhat
deceptive argument. The Human Development Index takes into account other variables
like life expectancy and education and seems to be more credible. This index indeed
shows a closing of the gap. The efforts most governments of developed countries make
therefore seem to be effective if not even sufficient.
Without doubt, there is a limited obligation of rich states to help poor countries. It should
be made certam, though, that the help is aimed at turning the receiving state into a
stable democracy having an improving economy. Short-term foreign aid like food might
be necessary m certam crises; in the long run, though, it may often even be harmful and
drtve the state further 1nto dependence.
178
............. - .. --- VAJlRAM & "RAV
.. \ ................ ...
l
eved that the main reason
1
. be I d or sucn a b .
It IS ent ol the eveloped COuntry n o ligation though should be the
rnitrfl d S govemme t t . , ,
corn y in a well-run emocracy usually e n its own subiects. A !lowering
(IOrfl I h . r presents a goOd .
rnlng out o t e semi-dependence man . partner, especially it
It 1S co ent to improve the standard ot livi Yt countnes lace. It is the duty ot a
economic interdependence, and peopl.e; increasing trade
tostenn.9 goal. e Y lmprovmg 1ts own economy ought to
be a pnmary
ollary, it becomes apparent that .
p..s a le for matters inside its own b a government is principally
lations it should n \ h orders; m the mostly anarchic system ot
r'lternatlonal re d t' fo . .d
0
ave any further obligations. It is the present view, 1
ough. that mo. era e a
1
on the order ol what is done today, tor the reasons
th d above, Will always tmprove the donor country's situation as well
state
Ethics of High Casualties
very similar way the same approach yields an answer to the question whether the
In ar ation of a force that could result in a large number ol innocent victims can be
d Since it is a government's obligation to protect
usute . .
bjects and improve the1r standard of living, it has As a result, one comes to the
ttS suk actions that minimize negative ettects on its conclusion that the u.se ot a
to ta e rmes of a crisis like war it may be Ioree that would kll large
itizens. In
1
. ' . '. . numbers ot people
ible to avo1d that such act10ns tnfhct heavy can only be justihed by a
tmposs s on another nation-state, including killing nation-state 11 1t 1s to
damage h h its own people I rom suttenng a
humans in the other nation t at may not ave . .
1
tt _._ 'The threat has
manY . r Simi ar a a""'
n directly involved tn the conf tct. to be imminent and
bee . overwhelming. Both an action
. htfully elected democratiC government that too weak or too strong would
A ng 'ts people has to carefully weigh the lead to a sub-optimal outcome
represents f' d against such measures, taking into tor the nation-state. 'The moral
guments or an ustilication ot such a measure
ar t both the short-term and the long-term efiects, lean then be derived !rom its
he may be very different from each other:. An protective nature .
Since t y 'I drastic strike, tor example, might
unnecessan Y 'k t al resources
P
romise immediate advantages h e na . the long run however. it may result In
b
lt 'thin the aggressor, m ' t es
or political sta I I y WI . ., that by tar outweigh the advan ag .
sanctions by the international commum Y
MORAL
STANDARDS 1 tol\ow \he
APPLIED . d'scussed above strong Y
lied to the Issues I .
The moral standards app t t deontological theones.
. . m in contras
0
. dent\y ot ns
philosophy of utthtanants , be assessed tndepen
. t the morality of an act can d Utilitananism, on the o\h r
Deontologists behave tha 'ther inherently good or ba . n thetr rcsu\ts nd th l
consequences, i.e. they a.re el are to be judged dependtng o
hand states that the actions
1
as such have no moral va ue. 179
YAJ JRAM & RAVI
. . 'sm in stating that neither foreign aid nor
se of utrlitarram . . lis
The present opinion makes u bad In Itself. In the case, WISely organ e
of a force of mass destruction Is good or mies of both countries, while ill
. ove the econo d o
fore
1
gn atd may help 1mpr ntry or even both. In the secon case, a rnas . r
. h m the needy cou 'ff . Sve
excessive a1d may ar . , own citizens while sacn c.ng another's, th
attack a :trike, on the other hand, internatio Us,
making 11 JUstifiable, a not JUStrfl . net impairment of its own Situation.
sanctions upon the aggressor, causmg a . . ..
. f the people that is of moral S1Qn1f1cance. In lh
In the end, it is only wellb,.emgl
0
relations, it Is a nation state's government th e
anarchic system of 1nterna lona t' at
. fter its interesis; therefore, the governmen s pnmary cancer
own people. In a conflict, this gives the government the
I th ell being of its own subjects over that of others and take th and duty to va ue e w - .
11
d h e
necessary actions, knowing that the opposing government WJ o t e same for its
people.
MORALITY IN WORLD POLITICS
Morality and fairness should certainly play a role in world politics. In t.he situation,
I all humans should be treated equally, i.e. they should have the same nghts of life, liberty,
/ and the pursuit of happiness. As far as this is possible, this should be using
international law; however, due to the d1vers1ty of human cultures and ways of life, those
laws ohen have to be limited to a basic set of rules that is shared by all societies. In
addition to this lack of uniformity, the international system is anarchic, and there is no
government that could rightly make, apply, and enforce international law. As a
consequence, international law can only be made if nation-states volunteer to abide by it.
Natton-states agree to do so only if it is in their own interests, and as long as they are
1
constdered sovereign, this will not change. National sovereignty, although it might
prevent the application of international law, is not a bad concept, though: Due to the
inhomogeneous nature of human cultures, a local government is more apt to understand
the customs and values of i ts people, resulting in differing but more suitable laws. A
world government that replaces sovereign states and that is able to implement
international law might be forced to make invalid generalizations.
CONCLUSION
certam/y should be morality and fairness in international politics. It is the general
that th:s fa1rness actually exists to a certain degree; it is, however, a result of
ndiYidua/ natJOn-states in an anarchic system, each caring for its own people.
180
# VAJittAl\1 & RAVI ------
CHAPTER _
11
CORPORATE. GOVERNANCE.
aj'or sub-heads covered under the t .
"'he 1'11 P
1
C Accountab'l'
' tlined below- 1 1lY and Ethical Governance' are ou
1
. Introduction
2
. Evolution Of Corporate Governance Ret
Perspective orms In India: A Chronological
3. Codifying Good Governance Norms
4. Various Rote In Reform Process
5. Literature Review
6. Corporate Governance In India- From Policies To Reality
7. Regulatory Framework For Corporate Governance In India And Challenges
In Enforcement
a. Enforcement Of Corporate Governance Norms
9. Key Issues In Corporate Governance In India
1 o. Companies Bill, 201 1 And Its Impact On Corporate Governance In India
11. Need For Robust Research To Guide Future Policy Initiatives
A brief description of the above has been laid in the forthcoming paragraphs.
INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance refers to the set of systems, principles and processes by which b a
company is governed. They provide the guidelines as :o :he
directed or cont rolled such that it fulfilbits

the long term

to the value of the company and IS also ene 'ng from the board ot d1rectors
Stakeholders in this case would include society. The management ot
management, shareholders to customers, emp oyf II the others
the company hence assumes the role of a trustee or a .
N
ANCE REFORMS \N 'NOlA:
EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE GOVER
CHRONOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE t d tterentiators ot
of the most lmportan '
Corporate governance is one rowth ard even susta\nab ty ot bu
that has impact on the profitabthty. g
181