=-------- 1 -1 3: 3\ REPUBLIC OF SUPREME COURT JVlANILA EN D./-lNC AUGUSTO L. SYJUCO, JR., Petitioner ' -versus- FLORENCIO D. ABAD, et al., Respondents. x---------------------------------------------x MANUELI'rO R. LUNA, Petitioner ' -versus- SECRETARY J=<LORENCIO ABAD, et a/., Respondents. x---------------------------------------------x JOSE lVIAL VAR VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioner, -versus- TI-lE I-IONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUI'I'O N. OCI-IOA, JR., eta/., Respondents. x---------------------------------------------x G.H.. No. 209135 G.R. No. 209136 G.It. No. 209155 CONSOLlDi\TED COJ\1 t\IENT .')_)juco 1 Jr. t'. b a t ~ et aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 2 of 39 PI-IILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PI-IILCONSA), et a!., Petitioners ' -versus- TI-lE DEPARTI\,IENT OF DUDGET AND MANAGEIVIENT and/or I-ION. FLORENCIO ll. ABAD, Respondent. x---------------------------------------------x INTEGRATED DAR OF TI-IE PI-IILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioner ' -t.Jersus- SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD of the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND 1\MNAGEMENT (DBI\1), Respondent. x---------------------------------------------x MAlliA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, et a/., Petitioners ' -Vel"StiS- BENIGNO SIIVIEON C. AQUINO III, et a!., Respondents. x---------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 2091G4 G.H.. No. 2092GO G.R. No. 209237 CONSOLIDATED COJ\Il\IENT Jjjuco, ]1: v. A bad, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 3 of 39 GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. llELGICA, et a!., Petitioners ' -versus- PllliSIDENT llENIGNO SIIVIEON C. AQUINO III, eta!., Respondents. G.R. No. 20944t.. x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x CONSOLIDATED COM1VIEN1.-. (W1ith Opposition to the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/ or \Vrit of Preliminary Injunction) Respondents, by the Office of the Solicitor General, rcspcclfully state: lillLEV ANT FACTS 1. In the first three quarters of 2011, the Ac1uino administraliull was faced with inefficiencies and other systemic issues that hampered the capacity of some government institutions to spend their I.Judgcts aud implement programs and projects. The national goven1mcnl's disbursement level shrank, falling significant! y below target ~ y 1 G.l percent. 1 'T'his problem was expressed at the 111acroccouomic level iu terms of a reduction in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 2. Apart from the usual transition glitches brought auout Ly a change in leadership, the Aquino administration's undcrspcnJing can alsu Ge traced to the cancellation of some of the programs, activities aud 1 Dureau of the Treasury National Guveuuuent Fiscal Report as of the end of 2011. CoNsouD1\TED Cotil\IENT J)jm;o, jt: t'. A bad, eta!. G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 4 of 39 projects initiated by the previous administration, which were found to Gc anomalous or fraught with irregularities. 2 3. In order to accelerate public spending, the Ac1uino administration evaluated and identified certain projects authorized under the General Appropriations Act (GAA) that fit any of the following criteria: a) Fast-moving or quick-disbursing; b) Urgent or priority in terms of social and econonuc development objectives; and c) Programs or projects performing well and could deliver rnore services to the public with additional funds. 4. The disbursements for these and other similar projects were then prioritized. ,_fhese disbursements were collectively categorized intv and named as the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). Introduced in October 2011, the DAP is a 111echanism of public expenditure designed to fast-track public spcnJing for priority prograrw;, activities and projects with d1e use of savings and the Unprogrammed Fund. 5. The DAP has proven to be effective. Starting with the fourLI1 quarter of 2011, government spending improved and contributeJ to the growth of the country's GDP. In a report released in J\1arch 2012, the \Vorld Dank stated that "[t]he government's Disbursement Acceleration Plan was partially successful and contributed 1.3 percentage points (11pt) to GDP growth in Q4." 3 The acceleration of government spendjnt; alsv contributed to the Philippines' ascent in the Global CompcLiLivcncss Index ratings 4 and to the successive credit ratings upgrades, with tile top sovereign credit raters 5 giving the Philippines investment grade raLiugs in 2013. 2 Frequently AskeJ Questions About the Djsbursement AccelcraLiou Program (DAP), available at last accessed on 15 October 2013. 3 Philippjnes Quarterly Update: From Stability to Prosperity for i\ll, available at httl,!;l_L_y,rww- wds.worldbank.org/ externalldefault/\VDSContentServer /WDSP liD /20 12/06/12/ OOOJJJ 037 20120612011744/RenJereJ/PDF last accessed on 2 November 2013. 4 Supra note 2. 5 StandarJ anti Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch. CONSOLIDATED (Or.lJ\lENT .[JJUC0 1 jt: v. eta!. G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 5 of 39 6. On October 2013, several petitions were filed befurc this Honorable Court seeking to declare the DAP unconsLiLutional and prohibit its implemental.ion.6 PRELIIVIINARY A VER1\1EN1;S 7. No!l-stiability of the President. Petitioners Araullo, et a!. and Belgica, et a!. implead President Benigno Sin1eon C. Aquino lll as respondent. Petitioners Belgica, eta!. clain1 that since "[t]he constitutional authority [to augment] is specifically granted to the President who alunc can act on the matter and may not delegate the same,"7 President Aquino may be sued in his official capacity as an exception to the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit. 8. 'This is a basic misunderstanding of constitutional law. lt is settled that the President, while in office, and in the performance of !tis official functions, is immune from suit. Tlus is necessary to free him from any form of harassment or distraction in the performance of his multifarious duties. Unlike the Congress and the Judiciary, only one person constitutes the Executive Branch and anything that impairs the President's usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs Lhc operation of the govermnent. 8 9. IttsufficietJC)' of Facts. The present peuuons arc brought under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In a Rule 65 petition, the burden is on the petitioners to establish their case and prove grave abuse uf discretion on the part of the respondents. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it 1nust be sufficiently grave, resulting ln lack or excess uf jutiscliction. There is grave abuse ofdiscretion where respondents acl in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. 9 10. The petitions, mostly anchored on ne\vspaper clippings and media reports, are 1niserably lacking on the allegations of facts that would support a claim of grave abuse of discretion. For example, petitioner 6 G.R. Nos. 209135,209136,209155,209164,209260,209287, and 2094<14. 7 Belgica Petition (G.R. No. 209444), at 4. 8 See t'. Amryo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006. 9 Garcia t'. Comt of Ajpeals, G.R. No. 169005, 28 January 2013. (ONSOLllJJ\TED COMMENT J)y.flco, ]1: t' . .Abad, eta/. G.R. Nos. 209135,209136,209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 6 of 39 Villegas admits that he "exhaustively tried to research on the DAP policy or any guidelines on who may avail of the funJs under the program as well as what types of projects may be funued but found nothing."IU Petitioner IBP also admits that "[t]here is no detailed accounting from where the savings supposedly originated from, or from what 'slow- moving' projects these funds were taken, or how much GOCC dividends were received as a windfall." 11 Petitioners Belgica, et aL even engage in speculation, saying that "[fjrom the pronouncements of the spokespersons of the President and by some portion of the DAP having been coursed through many legislators, there is a reasonable probability that these funJs were used for new projects and not merely to augment actual deficiencies."1 2 11. It is incomprehensible, therefore, given the insufficiency allJ uncertainty of facts, how petitioners can allege grave abuse of discretion. 'This is a violation of the Rule 65 requirement for petitioners to allege facts with certainty. On this score alone, the various petitions may be dismissed because they essentially state no cause of action suffi.cient Lo allow this Honorable Court to craft an appropriate relief. The paucity of the factual allegations in the various petitions is bound to transform this litigation .into a trial before an .institution that is unsuited to perform task. Such a proceeding also places respondents in the dif11cult position of defending against vague, theoretical claims that stand on the wejght of conjectures and insinuations. 12. The prudent, proper, and constitutional recourse would have been for these various petitioners to have exercised their right lo information and demanded the Department of Budget and IVIanagcment (DIIM) lo furnish them with sufficient information to determine whether their speculations are rationally and factually grounc.led. the language of Rule 65, this would have been the "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Instead, with hunches and imperfect information, they have gone straight to this Honorable Court alleging constitutional violations, making grand claims about the need for widespread, "programmatic reviews" of abstract concepts of governance. Thus, by the simple ruse of propagandizing theoretical constitutonal violations, petitioners have simultaneously dispensed willt 10 Empbas.is .in the original. Villegas Petition (G.R. No. 209155) at 8. 11 lBP Pet.it.ion (G.R. No. 209260), par. 22. 12 Delgica Petition (G.R. No. 20944), at 10. CoNSOLIDATED Cm.IMENT J)juco, }1: v. Abml, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135,209136,209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 7 of 39 the need to establish facts and effectively placed the burJcn on respondents to prove the constitutionality of the n1inutest aspect of their actions. \Ve submit that constitutional litigation and the attention of the Honorable Court require higher thresholds than this. 13. Considering the foregoing, respondents thus reserve their objections against the various suits on grounds of (1) non-justiciability, and (2) the lack of a case or controversy. Given the innumerable allounents and disbursements involving practically all types of government-fundeJ activities in question, it is incumLent upon pelitioncrs to establish with sufficient clarity what kinds of allotments and disbursements they are complaining about as every relevant agency action with respect to a particular allotment and disbursetnent potentially creates separate and severable questions of fact that cannot be accommodated in an omnibus decision. 14. Furthermore, respondents specifically object to the standing of petitioners to raise the question of (1) presidential impoundment and (2) equal protection with respect to the privilege of legislators to propose DAP-idenlified projects. 'rhese shall be clarified below, in the arguments germane to these topics, ISSUE \VI-IE'lTIER TI-IE DAP IS A VALID EXERCISE OF TI-lE PRESIDENT'S PO\VERS UNDER ARTICLE VI, 25(5) Al'\ID ARTICLE VII, 17 OF TI-lE CONSTITUTION. CoNSI.JLlDi\TED COMMENT ]1: t'. A bad, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 8 of 39 AH.GUMEN'fS I THE DAP IS A FUND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. 15. N of a Fund. 'T'he collective fundmental flaw in petitioners' argument is that the DAP is a "buJ.get within a budge{'13 or an unappropriated funJ., that is, a fund without congressional authorization and therefore an unconstitutional intrusion into the powers of Congress. This is a false assertion. . 16. The DAP is neither a fund nor an appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of prioritizing spending. As is obvious from its name, it is a program for accelerating disbursements. \Vhat is only unstated in the title of tl1e progratn-DAP-is that the sources of funds are from, firH, the legiwnately-generated savings of the government, and the Unprogrammed Fund authorizeJ. in any relevant GAA. 17. No Law Required for the Creatio11 of D .. AP. The President has the constitutional authority to create policies in the execution of laws. Tllis is a necessaty implication of the President's authority as Chief Executive pursuant to Art. VII, 17 of the Also, the DDI\1 is expressly empowered to issue rules and regulations "to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters witllin Uts] jurisJ.iction," 15 for the "achievement of n1ore economy and efficiency in the management of government operations .... "l6 18. The President, through the Dl3Ivf, implemented the DAP in order to accelerate public spending, push economic growth, and promote prudent fiscal management. 'This is plain executive policy-making, nothing more. 'T'he government could have simply called it ".-fhe SpeuJing Program" or "Efficient Fiscal 1\1anagement Program" or "Programa Ng 13 Syjuco Petition (G.R. No. 209135) at 12. 14 CONST., Art. Vll, 17. The President shall have control of all the executive Jeparunems, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executeJ. 15 J\DMINlSTRATlVE CODE, Book IV, Ch. 6, 36(1). 16 CODE, Book IV, Title XVII, Ch. 1, 3. CONSOLIDATED COl\11\IENT Jjjuw, J t ~ l'. b a ~ et al. G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 9 of 39 Pag-gugol ng PonJo Tungo sa Daang lVIatuwid"-none of these nomenclature would have had any constitutional i1nplications. In fact, the government would have been within its authority if it had just spent all available funds, including savings, for the appropriated items in tile budget without any declared program of spending at all. It is in the nature of bureaucracies to label and categorize the activities they perform to comply with their conception of "the orJer of things," to borrow a famous title. . 19. Considering that the DAP is but a label to categorize administrative action and express exlsting powers of the President under the Constitution, the Administrative Code, and the relevant GAAs, petitioners' argument that it is a source of additional powers or that it is in contravention of the powers of Congress is palpably ungrounded. J\s respondents will show, all actions of the President under the DAP arc standard, non-novel exercises of his constitutional powers. II THE DAP IS A CONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO AUGMENT. 20. Petitioners seek to Jeclare the DAP unconstitutional primarily on the ground that it violates Art. VI, 25(5) of the Constitution- No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropnauons; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heaJs of Constitutional Cotntnissions tnay, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offi.ces from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. 21. Respondents agree that Art. VI, 25(5) of the Constitution is the relevant and controlling norm in tlus case. Given that petitioners also do not Lluestion the constitutional and statutory authority of the President to augment items in the GAA, we submit that petitioners' source of confusion is notlung of the sort that cannot be clarified by facts. 22. The Power to Augme1tt. Art. VI, 29(1) of the Constitutiou provides that "[n]o 111oney shall be paid out of the Treasury except lll pursuance of an appropriation made by law." Under Book VI, Ch. 1, 2(1) (ONSOLID;\TED COI'df\IENT J)jttco, ]1: f}. Abad, et a/. G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 10 of 39 of the Administrative Code,17 an "appropriation" is defined as "an authorization made by law or other legislative enactment, directing payment out of government funds under specified conditions or for specified purposes." In other words, an appropriat..ion is an authorizaLiun by Congress to the President allowing funds to be paid out of the ,..freasury for a public purpose it has specified. 23. Art. VII, 17 of the Constitution reqUlres the President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."IS T'hus, when Congress appropriates an amount of money for a specified purpose in the GAJ\, the President has a constitutional duty to achieve that purpose by allotLing an amount to satisfy that specific appropriation. Under Uook VI, Ch. 1, 2(2) of the AdministraLive Code, "'[a]llotment' refers to an authorizaLion issued by the Department of Budget to an agency, which allows .it to incur obligation for specified amounts contained 1n a lcgislaLivc appropriation. " 19 24. Consistent with the above-cited rules and the separation of powers principle, the Constitution prohibits the Prcsiclent frorn issuing allotments beyond what was appropriated by Congress. Simply put, if Congress appropriates an atnount of Pl Billion to construct a Lridgc, the President cannot just decide to countermand that appropriation Ly spending Pl.S Billion. The exception to this rule is the President's power to augment. 25. The Constitution provides that the "President ... _may, by law, be authorized to augment any item .in the general appropriations law for [his] officeO frorn savings in other items of [his] appropriatious." 2 U Following this rule, a legal authorization can be issued to allow Lhc President to go beyond the original appropriation by augmenting deficient items 21 with savings from other items. 17 E.O. No. 292. 18 Supra note 14. 19 Allotments come in Lhe form of (1) an Agency Budget fviatrix (ABM) or what uscJ lo Lc Lhe General Allounent Release Order (GARO), or (2) a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO). 2 CoNST., Art. VI, 25(5). 21 See ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Book VI, Ch. 5, 39; R.A No. 10352 (2013 GJ\A), 5J (General Provisions). CoNSOLIDATED COMMENT j j y t ~ c o ]1: v. A bad, ef aL G.R. Nos. 209135,209136,209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 11 of 39 26. The legislative authorization for the President's exercise of his augmentation power is found in the GAA, the Administrative Codc, 22 and in 44 23 of P.D. No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. The 2013 GAA provides in its General Provisions- Sec. 52. UJe of SavingJ. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use savings in their respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for tile current year in any item of their respective appropriations. 27. The GAA further implements the requirements of Art. VI, 25(5) of the Constitution by defining "savings" and setting parameters as to how they may be created- Sec. 53. Meaning of Sat'tngJ and A11gmentation. Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in tllis Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonp1ent of the work, activity or purpose for wllich the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaitling to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the rec1uired or planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost. Augmentation implies the existence in tllis Act of a program, activity, or project with an appropriation, which upon implementation, or subsequent evaluation of needed resources, is determined to be deficient. In no case shall a non-e:lUstent program, activity, or project, be funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act. 22 Book V1, Ch. 5, 39. Autho1iry to UJe SavingJ in AppropliatiottJ to Cot'er DejicitJ. Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act, any savings .in the regular appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations Act for programs and prujecls of any department, office or agency, may, with the approval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any other item .in the regular appropriations: Provided, that the creation of new positions or increase of salaries shall not be allowed to be funded from budgetary saviugs except when specifically authorized by law: provided, further, that whenever authorized positions are transferred from one program or project to another within the same department, office or agency, the corresponding amounts appropriated for personal services are also deemed transferred, without, however, increasing the total outlay for personal services of tl1e department, office or agency concerned. 23 Granting the President "the authority to augment any appropriation of the Executive Department in the General Appropriations Act, from savings in the appropriations of another department, bureau, office or agency within the Executive Branch, pursuant to ... the Constitution." Thus, the constitutional authority of the President to use savings of his "respective office" to augment items in the GAA for such office extends to the enlire ExecuLive Department. Year 2UI3 2012 2011 ZUlU- __cc __ '-- CoNsouoxmo J)juco 1 jt: t'. Abatl, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135,209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 12 of 39 28. Thus, the President may exercise his authority to augment if (a) there are savings as deilned in the General Provisions of the relevant GAA, and (b) there is an "appropriation cover" or an item of appropriation in the relevant GAA that may be augmented.Z4 These two rel}uirements exhaust the conditions for the exercise of the President's augmentation powers. 29. DAP a1zd Table 1 below shows the annual level of savings of the Aquino administration since it assumed power in 2010 to the present and the amounts of charges to the overall savings Gy way of augmentation. What this shows is that, at an aggregate level, the total augmentations have been matched by a sufflcient amount of savings. In other words, all augmentations have been properly accounted for because they were covered by a corresponding amount of savings. Table 1. (Figures in Thousand Pesos) OVERALL SAYINGS CHARGES Current Continuing Approriation GAA TOTAL DAP Others Appro. Appropriation Current Continuing Sub-'fotal Cuuent Contil1uing Sub-Total Balances Balances GAA GAA Withdtawn Appro. Unobligated Allotnumts 32,877,175 - 32,877,175 4,658,215 - 4,658,215 48,933 48,933
-59.882;977 50,476,7.33 -46,6J1,805 1---c_l ,8 72,966 7,281,893 59,631,592 40,497,512 10,551,125 51,048,637 3,877,170 4,705,785 8,582,955 16,995,381 63,627,186 21,711,779 21,711,779 19,873,665 5,421,242 25,294,907 30. All 1111der the DAP have AjJprojJriatiou Cover. A big part of petitioners' presentation hinges on the claim that Lhe President practically invented non-existent appropriations. T'his is at once untrue and indicative of petitioners' lack of knowledge of how public funds are actually allotted and released. 31. To be sure, the standard practice at the DBI\1 is to specifically itemize the details of a particular allot111ent such that for every augmentation exercise the following facts can be shown- 24 J'ancbez !l. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 127545, 23 April 2008, 552 SCRA 471; Na?jm;tb u. Villm; G.R. No. 188635, 29 January 2013, 689 SCRA 385. . 4/,006,686 CONSOLIDATED COl\li\IENT SJJIICO, Jr. v. A bat{, et al G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 13 of39 a) The particular office of the government concerned; b) T'he PAP code or the "programs, activities or projects" code under the relevant GAA; c) The SARO number of the document; d) 'The date of issuance of the SARO; e) The original amount of the appropriation under the relevant GAA; f) The amount of augmentation involved; and g) The specific page of the GAA where the item may be found. 32. Furthermore, the SARO indicates a PAP code wbicil corresponds to an item of appropriation in the GAA. All SAROs created Gy the software or cornputer application used by the DB1vl have a PAP code. This is a built-in safeguard which cannot be altered unless the SARO itself is fake. 'I'he built-in PAP code ensures that all disbursements have appropriation covers. 33. This can be illustrated with the use of exemplars or samples of ten augmentation exercises _under the DAP that indicate the specific details enumerated above. One readily sees that this unfailing adhcreucc to particularity lias a two-fold function: (1) to ensure proper record- keeping and easy access to the history of evety specific allocation and release of funds; and (2) to provide detailed compliance with tbc constitutional requirements with respect to augmentations. The LCJl exemplars are shown in Table 2 below- Table 2. (Figures in Thousand Pesos) -- AGENCY PAP SARO DATE AUGMENTATION APPH.OPlUATION NO. ISSUED COVEH/PAP CUDE DOST l. lmplementMion of E-11- 22-Dec-12 1,600,000 R.A. No. 10147, p. 748 the Nationwide 02253 Disaster Risk, A.lll.a.lll.a- Generatiun Exposure, Assessment, of new knowleJge & and Migration technologies & tesearch (DREAM) 25 capability building in priorit)' areas identified as strategic to Natioual Development 2. Establishment of E-1 1- 22-Dec-12 300,000 R.A. No. 10147, p. 771 the Advanced Failure ll2254 Analysis Laboratory A.ll.a -Development, 25 DREAM is a major component of DOST's Project NOAH (NationwiJe Operational Assessment of Hazards). CoNSOLIDATED Coivll\IENT J)j11co, }1: v. Abml, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 14 of 39 DILG 3. Repair/ D-11- Rehabilitation of the 01929 PNP Crime Laboratory 4. (PN P) Mission D-13- Essential Equipment 01182 Capability Enhancement Program DND 5. (PAF) On-Base D-11- Housing Facilities and 01459 Communication Equipment 6. (PAF) Rehabilitation D-12- of the Air Educatiorl 01421 and Training Command 7. Additional Funds to Support Unfunded Requirements to address its current capability gap DOTC 8. Capability A-13- Requirements for. the 00584 Operations of PCG in the West Philippine Sea 07-Dec-1 1 29-Jul-13 14-0ct-11 28-Dec-12 04-Mar-13 Integration & Coordination of the National Research for Industry, Energy & Emerging Technology and Related Fields 3,255,837 R.i\. No. 10147, p. 502 A.lll.a.l.a- Conduct of operation and other related confidential activities against dissidents, subversives, lawless elements and organized crime syndicate and campaign against kidnapping, uafficking of women and minors, smuggling, carnapping, gunrunning, illegal fishing and trafficking of illegal drugs 2,516,167 R.A. No. 10352, p. Ml B.l.b- Capability Enhancement Program 29,800 R.A. No. 10147, p. 570 A.II.a.2- Service Support Acti\ities Alll.a.1 -Air and Ground Combat Services A.lll.a.3- Combat Support Services A.lll.b.l- Territorial Defense Activities 367,500 R.A. No. lUI 55, p. 702 A.ll.a.l -Twining Services A.lll.a.l - Jur & Ground Combat Services A.lll.b.l -Territorial Defense Activities A.Ill.c.l -Disaster Response and Relief Services 104,673 R.A. No. 10 I 55, p. 1069 A.Ill.c- Protection of Philippine Coast CONSOLlDi\TED Cor.Il\IENT S_)!_jflco, jt: v. Abatl, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 15 of 39 9. (PCG) Addjtional A-12- MOOE for Patrol 00743 Operations at Bajo de Masinloc DBM I 0. GSIS Premium B-12- Parments for DepEd 00799 personnel 10-Sep-12 28-Sep-12 44,171 R.A. No. 10155, p. IU6Y A.lll.c.l -Promotion of safety of life and property at sea, incluJing safeguarding the matine environment & resources & enforcement of all applicable maritime laws 3,461,685 R.A. No. 10155, p. 97 A.l.a.l.a- General Management anJ Supervjsion 34. If petitioners are interested .in learning the specific details of any government program for which funding was provided, whether or not under the DAP, we .invite them to exercise their constitutional rights by asking the DD.LV1 to provide the specific details of how the government funded any such project, activity, or program. 35. Sources of S avi11gs Determi11ed by Congre.rs, Not the President. There is an .insinuation in the various petitions that U1e President, in order to exercise his augmentation po-wers, has been colluding with the DBl\1 to artificially generate savings. This cannot be farther from the truth because, while the President can augment .items in the GAA w.ith savings, .it .is the legislature that defines what can LJc considered "savings" for purposes of augmentation. The current GAA identifies three sources of savings as "portions or balances of a11y programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encwnbrance which are"- (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation .is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances ansmg from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the CONSOLIDATED (Ol\II\lENT .S)juco, Jr. t'. A bat/, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 16 of 39 required or planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.ZG 36. In essence, savmgs are "appropriations balances" or the difference between the approriation authorized by Congress and the actual amount allotted for such an appropriation. T'he appropriations balances must fall under these three categories. 'I'he Execulive Department and all other institutions that enjoy fiscal autonomy or whose heads of agency are given the constitutional and statut01y license to augment must comply with these standards. 37. 'J'hus, following 'fable 1 above, the total appropnauons balance in 2012 for the Executive Department was P66,417,077,000 of which P59,882,977,000 was used for augmentation purposes. 'I'his means that about P66.4 Billion was the cumulative amount of appropriations balances or "savings" incurred pursuant to the standards set by Congress. Presumably, this is also the same set of standards used by other fiscally autonomous departtnents of government in determining savings that may be used for augmentation purposes. 38. It may also be relevant to point out that a significant amount of savings incurred by most government agencies with capacity Lo augment is from Personnel Services, of which the J'viiscellancous Personnel Benefits Fund (J'YIPBF) is a major component. For example, in 2012, of the total P59,882,977,000 in augmentations, P42,426,3G2,000 came from appropriations balances from Personnel Services. 'This fact is important because inS ancbez v. Commission on Audit} 27 the Honorable Court expressly recognized the use of the MPBF for incurring savings when it declared that "the Chief Justice hitnself transfers funds only when there are actual savings, e.g.) from unfilled positions in the J uJiclary." 28 (Emphasis in the original) 39. F lexibifity i11 the DetertJJittatioJJ of /-lctual Savings. For purposes of augmentation, Congress defines "savings" when it enacts Lhe GAA. In doing so, Congress only sets the parameters of when savings actually occur, because a broad, a priori definition of savings in Lhc GAA 26 R.A. No. 10352 (2013 GAA), 53 (General Provisions). 27 Supra note 24. 28 Id. at 497. CoNSOLIDATED COMMENT J)j11m, }1: t'. A bad, eta/. G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 17 of 39 cannot possibly fix the actual occurrence of savings for the different operations of each implementing agency. Thus, operationally, it is the Executive (or any other constitutional officer with authority to augment) which determines when savings actually occur, because it is only during the implementation of the GAA when it can be determined that there arc savmgs 111 an agency. 40. A good example pertains to the use of the lVIPDF as savings for purposes of augmentation. As stated by this Honorable Court in Sanchez;, salaries for "unfilled positions in the Judiciary" arc savings that can be used for augmentation. In such a case, it is possible to have savings every payday (whether daily, weekly, bi-monthly, or monthly) so long as such unfilled positions remain vacant. Thus, a vacant position in tl1c judiciary with a salary of PSO,OOO a n1onth translates to a monthly savings for the judiciary in the same amount, from January until such vacancy is filled up. T'his illustrates how savings may be incurred early on given the nature of Lhe item involved. 41. It would be impractical for Congress to fix specific and absolute standards to determine when actual savings occur in all agencies. For example, when the Executive uses savings from a bridge construclion project which is "finally abandoned" due to geological conditions, the usc of funds for such project as savings to augment other items in the GAA is not made suspect by the eventual clearing of the geological conclitions, which makes the construction of the bridge feasible again. 'The necessity lo use these funds assumes even greater exigency when we consider the reality that a significant amount of public funds used to operate the government is borrowed money for which interest accrues, whether or not such funds are used. 42. Thus, for both practical and theoretical purposes, the President or the Chief Justice or any other constitutional officer with authority to augment has to have wide cliscretion in the determination of actual savings within the definition provided by Congress in the GJ\A. \Vhen Congress defines "savings" in the GAA, it is not so much intended to constrain the constitutional offlcer, as to provide reasonable standards for the considerable leeway in managing funds for the operation of Lhc government. This much the Court stated in Demetria v. A/ba 29 and Gonzales 29 No. L-71977, 27 february 1987, 148 SCRA 208,214. CONSOLlDi\TED Coivll\IENT J)juco, ]1: v. Abati, el aL G.R. Nos. 209135,209136,209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 18 of 39 v. Aiacaraig, 30 when it said that the power of augmentation is intended to afford a head of a branch of government "considerable flexibility" in the use of public funds and resources. 43. Given this "considerable flexibility" enjoyed by the Executive to determine actual savings, the midyear review under National Budget Circular (NDC) No. 541 is reasonable because it is a good faith determination of "final discontinuance or abandonment" of a project for the fiscal year, based on the actual performance of the agency. The Honorable Court has no judicially manageable standards Lo determine when actual savings accrue because such determination requires intimate knowledge of the implementation conditions of the GAA, facts that arc solely accessible to the Executive. To be sure, this "considerable flexibility" is also enjoyed by other constitutional officers with authority to augment. 44. Natio11al Budget Circular 541 is Not The Face of D_AP. As a preliminaty 1natter, we note some petitioners' exaggeration of the importance of NDC 541 (Re: Adoption of Operational Efficiency Ivieasure-\Vithdrawal of Agencies' Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012) in their attack against the DAP. Again, this is downright false, if we are to ground our conclusion on facts. Following Table 1, we can sec that in the years 2011 and 2012, the total amount of withdraw11 unobligated allotments totalled F7,281,893,000 and 6,315,862,000, respectively. Given that the augmentations through DAP-idcntificd projects, programs and activities accounted for P51,048,637,000 auJ 45,703,540,000 in 2011.and 2012, respectively, tllis 111eans that N13C 541 accounted for only 14.26/o and 13.82/o of the DAP Juring those years. By these standards, NBC 541 cannot possibly be "the face of DAP." 45. lf7ithdraw!1 U11obligated Allotme11fs are Savi11gs. Even as NBC 541 covers only a small percentage of the DAP, the allolmcuts which are withdrawn pursuant to NBC 541 constitute savings pursuant Lo 53 of the General Provisions of the 2013 GA.i\.. They are clearly "portions or balances of any programmed appropriation ... free from any obligation or encumbrances which are: 0 still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the "\Vork, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized .... " 31 ' G.R. No. 87636, 19 November 1990, 191 SCRA 452,472. CoNSOLIDATED COl\Jl\lENT Jjjum, ]1: t'. A bad, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 19 of 39 46. NBC 541 Authorizes the WithdraJPal of Allot!IJenls Pursuant to Book VI, Ch. 5, 38 of the Ad111i11istrative Code. 'The authority of the President under NBC 541 to withdraw allotments has firm statutory grounding- Sec. 38. Suspension of ExjJenditure of Aj;prvpnations. Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for personal services appropriations useJ fur permanent officials aud employees. 47. The "public interest" standard for the President's exercise of the authority to "suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds" is but a recognition of the need to give to the President, as the national economic manager and Chief Executive of the Republic, the widest possible discretion in the determination of the need to continue or discontinue or even abandon the implementation of a program, project or activity mandated by Congress. The Executive Department's institutional capacity-its access to the facts on the ground-uniquely situates his office to exercise such discretion. His decision to withdraw allotments is coextensive with his discretion to discontinue or abandon a "work, activity or purpose" mandated by Congress. 48. NBC 541 is a Spe11di11g, NOT S aviug, PoliCJ' Petitioners should disaLuse themselves of the notion that NBC 541 is a scheme Lo generate savings-the text of NBC 541 belies this claim. A casual reading of NBC 541 shows that it is, in fact, a last-ditch effort of the President to push agencies into actually spending the approrialions authorlzeJ by Congress by using the allounents issued then1. NBC 541 slates- For the first five months of 2012, the national government has not met its spending targets. In order to accelerate spending and sustain the fiscal targets during the year, expenditure measures have to be implemented to optimize the utilization of available resources. Departments/ agencies have registered low spendipg levels in terms uf obligations and disbursements per initial review of their 2012 performance. To enhance agencies' performance, the DBM conducts continuous consultation meetings and/ or send call-up letters, requesting them to iJentify slow-moving programs/projects anJ the factors/issues affecting their performance (Loth pertaining to internal systems and those which are outside the agencies' CONSOLIDATED (Oi\11\IENT Jjj11co, ]1: v. Abad, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 20 of 39 spheres of control). Also, they are asked to formulate strategies and improvement plans for the rest of 2012. Notwithstanding these initiatives, some departments/ agencies have continued lo post low obligation levels as of end of first semester, thus resulting to substantial unobligated allotments. 31 49. Considering that the actual goal of NBC 541 is to push agencies to ensure that they obligate their allotments as soon as possible, it is downright unfair to characterize NBC 541 as a presidential policy meant to take away funds from the various agencies of government so his office can use them as savings. 50. 'fable 3 below shows that all disbursements under the DJ\P were maJe on the second semester of the fiscal year. This belies the claim that the DAP is an arbitrary mechanism for creating savings at the beginning of the year. Table 3. (Figures in Thousand Pesos) D A I ~ AMOUNT DISBURSEMENTS 12-0ct-11 67,722,280 21-Dec-11 11,004,157 27 -Jun-12 21,564,587 05-Sep-12 2,731,080 21-Dec-12 33,082,603 17-Jun-13 4,658,215 26-Sep-13 8,489,600 TOTAL 149,252,523 51. It is important to note that, unlike a household budget, the national budget follows a Keynesian model, z:e., it is a spending program whose underlying theory is the belief in the multiplier effects of government participation .in economic activities. This is the reason why the President's proposed budget is called the "National Expenditure Program." Thus, government agencies at the beginning of the fiscal year are issued general authorizations or the Agency Budget JV[atrix (J-\.131\t) Lo obligate allotn1ents issued pursuant to their respective appropriations. Put otherwise, they are designed to spend their budgets. Tlus also means that the DBJ'vi, consistent with this spending policy, has to monitor the levels of spending by tracking the levels of obligated alloU11cnLs. These 31 NI3C 541, Item l.O, pars. 3-5. ( \ .. ,. CONSOLIDATED (Oi\II\IENT J)juco, ]r: 1'. A bat{, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 21 of 39 "obligation levels" are important because only those allotments which arc obligated will most likely be spent. 52. l::.'ollowing the spending policy of the government, expressed through the slogan "use it or lose it," NBC 541 simply states that "agencies with low levels of obligations" as of the middle of the year may be subjected to the 38 powers of the President. In fact, it is the concerned agencies that inform the President, through the DB.l'vi, that because of certain contingencies (failure of bidding, inability tu expropriate, failure to contract, etc.) they can no longer obligate the existing allotments for a particular project, which is why they are the ones that recommend the withdrawal of the unobligated allotment. 53. The available funds derived fron1 these withdrawn unobligated allotments are textbook appropriations balances in the same way that unused allotments for unfllled positions in the judiciary or any other department or agency of government, by way of lYIPBF, are considered savings. One cannot reasonably insinuate that the President is inventing savings because of the failure of some agencies to conduct successful bids and enter into contracts that result in obligated allotments, in much the same way that no one can charge the Chief Justice with artificially creating savings when some judicial positions arc not filled up because of lack of qualified applicants to judicial posts. 54. NBC 541 is Not atl ItnjJoutzdtneflt Scheme. Given the thtust of the government to spend, not save, as expressed in NBC 541, the notion that NBC 541 is an impoundment measure is self- contradicting. In the United States, the terrn impoundment refers to the decision of the Executive to refuse to spend funds for political or ideological justifications. 32 For example, Richard Nixon refused to spend $14.7 Billion Congress made available for various federal programs on the ground that "excessive" spending would cause inflation or require a tax increase.33 Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy impounded federal funds because they did not want to build new \Veapons syslems.3 4 32 See Note, Presidential Impoundment: Comtitutional Theoties and Politicalllealities, Cil GEO. L. J. 1295 (1973); RI-1. Clark, Presidential Impoundmmt of Approptiated Funds: The Strpreme Court's Fi!Jt Pronouncement, 5 CAP. U. L. REV. 81 (1976). 33 Note, Impoundmellf oJFunds, 86"!-lARV. L. REV. 1505 (1973). 34 ld. at 1509. CONSOLIDATED COl\Il\IENT J)juco, jt: v. Abad, et al. G.R.. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 22 of 39 55. NBC 541 is not an impoundment schen1e precisely because the real objective is to put agencies on notice that their unobligated allotments might be withdrawn if thry failed to obligate, and tberefoi-e their allotments. NBC 541 is calculated to trigger spending pursuant to the original allotments issued to the various agencies of government. It is only when the agencies themselves Jeclare to the DBIYI that they cannot obligate these allotments that they are finally withdrawn by the President. Thus, to equate with the American concept of impoundment the decision of the President to "discontinue or abandon" a project mandated by Congress by withdrawing the allotment therefor is not only to compare apples and oranges but also to misunJerstand the stark disparity in context between impoundment and NBC 541. 56. J urisdictio11al Problems ff7ith Respect to I111jJOtl!tdtJteJJt: Sta11di11g, Case or Co11troversy, a11d N o11-Ripe11ess. \Vhile NBC 5 1 11 or the DAP involves no impoundment at all, any possible quesLion of impoundment in this case poses simultaneous problems of "case or controversy," "prematurity," and "standing" because the petitions clo not identify any injury arising from a particular appropriation that the President refuses to spend. 57. Petitioners suecl as taxpayers based on their interest in jJrez;enting an illegal disbursement of funds. However, a challenge involving impoundment seeks an entirely different form of relief-the release of the impounded funds. An impoundment suit is . meant to . compel the to disburse funds based on a claim that one is actually and directly injureJ by the refusal of the President to spend a particular appropriation. An example is the case of a contractor who cannot proceed with a project because the President has impounded the funds for that activity. Not only is there no such claim here, but also, and in fact, the goal is the opposite-to stop the President from using, disbursing, or releasing funds. 58. Given this procedural posture, petitioners who complain of presidential impoundment have placed themselves in a logical conundrum that affects this Honorable Court's jurisdiction to decide this parLicular issue. If their complaint is about impoundment, then they clearly are not the proper parties because they have not shown any entitlement lo the funds; but if their complaint is about prohibiting the release of public (UNSOLIDJ\TED COMMENT jjj11co, Jr. v. Abatl, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 23 of 39 funds, then they themselves-not the President-are peuuoning for impoundment. Either way, petitioners are not entitled to relief. 59. There is also a substantive concern about the role of the Honorable Court in the question of impoundment. At least in tl1e United States, problems of impoundment raise separation of powers concerns because the televant institutions that deal with such issue arc the Executive Department and tl1e Legislature.JS Defining the contours of savings, characterizing impoundment, and crafting various solutions to the occasional tug-of-war between these two branches of government fall largely witlun tl1e realrn of politics and lawn1aking, not constitutional interpretation. \"V./e ask the Honorable Court to take note of the fact that various bills involving the litigated issues in this case have been D.lcJ Gy different legislators of diverse political backgrounds and inclination. 36 It may very well be that the solutions to tl1e perceived problems of petitioners about good governance are to be found in the clemocraLic arena, not in the session hall of the Supreme Court. 60. The Jf7itbdrawal of Allottneuts 1111der NBC 541 DoeJ Not Involve a Trattsjer of Ftt11ds. Petitioners insist that NBC 541 goes against the decision in Demet1ia because it sanctions the transfer of funds. This is again a basic misconception. The withdrawal of allotment does not involve a transfer of fund because such action does not involve a.changc in the corpus of funds in tl1e National Treasury. There is no mmremcnl of funds because no money is released from the National Treasury through the mere reduction or increase in allotments. 61. To illustrate, we can classify allotrnenls into four categories: a) Allotments that are unobligated; G) Allotments that have been obligated; c) Allounents that have been obligated, the funds fur which have likewise been released; and 35 U. at 1529-1535. 36 Senate Bill (S.B.) No. 404 filed by Sen. Ivliriarn Defensor-Santiago; S.l3. No. 661 filet! by Sen. JV Ejercito; S.B. No. 779 filed by Sen. Jinggoy Estrada; House Bill (I-LB.) No. 1819 filed by Rep. Ben Evardone; H.B. No. 2904 ftled by Rep. Martin Romualdez; H.D. No. 2256 filed by AKDAYAN Reps. Barry Gutierrez and Walden Bello; I-LB. No. 2257 filed Gy AK13AYAN Reps. Barry Gutierrez and Walden Bello. CONSOLIDATED (Ol\ll\IENT J)juco, jt: t'. Aba0 el aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 24 of 39 d) Allotments that have been obligated, the funds for which have been released and paid to the obligee. 62. ,_fhe issuance of a SARO, for instance, is a declaration Lhat funds have been allotted-not actually released-and allows the recipient agency to obligate such funds by entering into binding contracts. Thus, even if the allollnent has already been obligated, it does not ncccssaril y follow that funds have been released to the agency because the Dl3IYI must first issue a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) informing the agency that funds may now be withdrawn from a government depositoq. NDC 541 covers a situation that falls only under the first categoq: unobligaLcd allotments. Therefore, the withdrawal of unobligated allotments docs not involve any transfer of funds because no moneys have yet been released from the National Treasury. Simply put, one cannot transfer funds that, in the first place, have not yet been released. 63. The text of NBC 541 confirms this, as it only limiLs itself Lo unobligated. allotments or those amounts allotted which are not yet "committed to be paid by the Government for any lawful act made by an authorized officer for and in behalf of the Government." 37 Under llcm 5.5 of NBC 541, the withdrawal of allotments is done through the issuance of negative SAROs, which means that the withdrawal is nothing but a modification of the allotment through a reduction of a corresponding amount. 64. The DAP Did Not Fu11d Progra!lls a11d Projects Not in the GAA. Petitioners Araullo, et al. and Belgica, et al. insist that the DJ\P is used to fund new programs and projects with no appropriation in Ll1c GAA. They cite Item 5.7.3 of NDC 541 which provides that a wiLhJra\vn allotment may be- 5.7.3. Used to augment existing programs and projects of any agency and to fund priority programs and projects not considered in the 2012 budget but expected to be started or implemented during the current year. Again, Lhis claim can be clarified by both facts and context. 37 ADJ\HNISTRA TIVE CODE, Book VI, Ch. 1, 2(11) on the definition of "Obligat.ion." CONSOLIDATED (OI\!Iv!ENT j)jur:o, Jr. l'. A bat" et al G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 25 of 39 65. NBC 541 was never meant to be a budget circular empowering the President to spend for projects without legislative authorization. lten1 5.7.3 of NBC 541 only n1eans that withdrawn allotments may be used to (1) augment existing programs and projects; and (2) fund appropriated programs and projects that were previously not considered "priority" in the 2012 budget, but ended up being prioritizeJ in 2012 and therefore "to be started or implemented during the current year." In other words, for the second part of Ite1n 5.7.3, it is the prioli(Jt status of the program or project, not its existence, that was not previously co-msidered in the 2012 budget. 66. This intention is consistent with the policy of NBC 541 Lo prioritize programs or projects that are "fast-1noving" or "quick- disbursing." For instance; some aspects of existing programs with multiple projects that require continuous funding beyond a fiscal year may not have been considered "priority." However, when the project within that progran1 becomes important and is considered "fast-moving/' it may be prioritized and its funding augmented through the DAP. Tllis does not mean that such project did not have an appropriation cover in any relevant GAA. The exemplar for tlus case is that of Project NOAH which was an existing project that became a priority only after a series of calamities brought about by typhoons. 67. Consistent with our sub1i1ission, we challenge petitioners to go beyond speculations and insinuations and bring tl1e debate to the level of facts by pointing out specific disbursen1ents under NDC 5,.,11 for projects they claim have no approprlatioi1 cover. Respondents arc more than willing to oblige them by providing them and this Honorable Court the specific details of any disbursement under any program or project under the Aquino ad1ninis tration. 68. Lump-Sum Discretionary Fu11ds are Expressly Authorized by the Coustitutio11 attd the Admi11istrative Code. Petitioners Belgica, eta!. question the use of the DAP to augment lump- sum discretionary appropriations in the 2013 GAA based on their preliminary claim that these types of appropriations violate Article Vl, CoNSOLIDATED COMMENT J)juco, ]1: v. A bad, et al. G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 26 of 39 25(1) 38 of the Constitution and the Administrative They cite l3ook VI, Ch. 4, 23 of the Administrative Code as authority- Sec. 23. Content if the General ApprojJtiatio11s Act. The General Appropriations Act shall be presented in the form of budgetary programs and projects for each agency of the government, with the corresponding appropriations each program and project, including statutoty provisions of specific agency or general applicability. 69. According to them, since 23 of the Administrative Code speaks only of "programs" or "projects," they conclude that lump-sum discretiona1y funds are unconstitutional because they fail to follow the "form, manner, and preparation of the budget" as prescribed by the Administrative Code. This is belied by express provisions of the Constitution and the same statute petitioners cite-it can only be correct if we declared as unconstitutional some provisions of the Constitution and of the Administrative Code. 70. Article VI, 25(6) of the Constitution expressly allows the creation of "discretiona1y funds" whose purpose may be as broad as any "public purposeD to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law." 'The constitutional authority to create discretionary funds necessarily carries the authority to create lump-sum appropriations. 71. Under Article VI, 29(3), Congress can create a special fund through a tax levied for a special purpose and paid out for such purpose only. This provision, in effect, is constitutional authority for Congress Lo create lump-sum, even automatic, appropriations that go directly to the Executive Department or some other office by way of special levy. To declare that h1n1p-sum discretionary funds are unconstitutional is tu nullify these provisions in the Constitution. 72. The way the Administrative Code defines "programs" or "projects" 1s textually broad to cover lump-sum discretionary appropriations. Book VI, Ch. 1, 2(12) of the Administrative Code defines "program" as "functions and activities for the performance of a major 38 CONST., Art. VI, 25(1). The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the buJget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law. CONSOLlDi\ TED COM!VIENT Sjjuco, ]t: v. A bad, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 27 of 39 purpose for which a government agency is established." A lump-sum discretiona1y appropriation such as the Contingent Fund is intended to perform the "rnajor purpose" of financing "functions and activities" which were not foreseen when the GAA was enacted. On the other hand, Book VI, Ch. 1, 2(13) defines "project" only as a "component of a program covering a homogeneous group of activities that results in the accomplishment of an identifiable output." 73. The Administrative Code expressly authorizes lump-sun1 appropriations. Book VI, Ch. 5, 47 gives to "[t]he Department of Budget [to] administer the Lump-Sum Funds appropriated in the General Appropriations Act. .. " In other words, Congress can give the Executive the power to administer and implement lump-sum funds unJer the GAA. Furthermore, Book VI, Ch. 5, 35 of the Administrative Code states that lun1p-sun1 appropriations "shall be made in accordance with a special budget to be approved by the President. .. " This provision recognizes that the President can propose a lump-sun1 approprialion in the budget and Congress can include it in the GAA. 74. This Honorable Court stated in Philcowa v.
that "[t]he power of appropriation [of Congress] carries with it the power Lo specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be." 40 --rhe purpose of the appropriation 1nay be as broad as a discretionary fund or it may Ge as detailed as a special appropriations law. The Constitution and the Administrative Code envision a budget that covers both the stalic and dynamic needs of a nation over the course of a year, not one that ties the hands of the Executive, creates an auton1aton out of him, and leaves hilll incapacitated to respond to national concerns. 75. Petitioners Belgica, et al.'s conceptual dogmatism is betrayed by their opposition to the augmentation of even the Contingent and Calamity Funds. \Ve restate their submission- Petitioners respectufully submit that insofar as the DAP funJs were used to "augment" provisions of the General Appropriations Act of 2013 that are in the nature of lump sum discretionary appropriations--such as under Title on the Contigency [sic] Fund, under Title on the Calamity 39 G.R. No. 113105, 19 August 1994,235 SCRA 506. 40 Id. 522. CONSOLIDATED (OI\Uv!ENT Sjjflco, }1: v. A bad, et al. G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 28 of 39 Fund, under Title XLV on the Unprogrammed Fund, under Title Xt'C..t'CV on Budgetary Support for GOCCs, under Title XLV [sic] on the Priority Development Assistance Fund and such other special purpose funds - it is illegal and unconstitutional considering tl1at tl1e lump sum discret.iunaty appropriations are contraty to Section 25 (1) Article VI of the Constitution in relation to the Administrative Code of 1987. 41 7 6. By these clai1ns, pet1t1oners effectively argue that the President can do nothing (except, perhaps, beg for private funds or ask for a supple1nental budget) to respond to a present, devastating calamity or emergency once the Calamity and Contingent Funds arc depleted. \'Ve only need to temper our deeply-held interpretive con1mitmcnts with a sense of humanity to recognize the dangers posed by tlus argument. 77. To be sure, petitioners Belgica, et al.'s argument on this point is but a species of an atgument raised during the PDAF oral arguments. \Y/e therefore re-cite our averments in the Me1norandum for Respondents in Be(gica} et aL t). fiott Executive Secretary} et aL4 2 for the benefit of the petitioners and tlus Honorable Court- 70. Averments with respect to the level of specificity of appropriations. It was pointed out during oral arguments that there is an obligation on the part of the Legislature to propose O!t!J line-iterns in the budget, to correspond with tl1e line-item veto of the President. However, there is notlung in the Constitution tl1at mandates Congress to pass only line-item appropriations. The standard, simple solution to a lump-sum appropriation tl1e President does not approve of is an ordinaty veto, nothing more. The presidency is not dinunished by a proposal for a lump-sum appropriation by his counterparts in Congress. Tlus Honorable Court should not create constitutional principles out of thin air. 71. Any notion of a "line-item-only obligation" is in fact textually belied by Article VI, Section 25(6), of tl1e Constitution which allows the creation of "discretionaty furids" whose purpose may be as broad as any "public purposeD to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law." The textually-grounded constitutional authority to create discretionary funds necessarily carries the authority to create lump-sum appropriations. 72. Similarly, under Article VI, Section 29(3), Congress can create a special fund through a tax levied for a special purpose and paid out for such purpose only. This provision, in effect, is constitutional autl1ority for Congress to create lump-sum, even automatic, appropriations that go directly to the Executive Department or some other office by way of special levy. This should 41 Belgica Petition (G.R. No. 209444) at 28. 42 G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493; UDK 14951. CONSOLIDATED COMMENT Jjjuco, ]1: t. A bad, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 29 of 39 eliminate any doubt about the possible existence of an obligation to pass line- item-only appropriations. 73. These constitutional provlslons clearly contemplate different levels of specificity for different kinds of appropriations. The Honorable Court in Philconsa declared that "[t]he power of appropriation [of Congress] carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be." The purpose of the appropriation may be as broad as a discretionary fund or.it may be as detailed as a special appropriations law. To say that only line-item appropriations are permitted is to nullify these provisions in the Constitution. 74. The text of the Constitution env1s10ns a flexible Ludgetary process which is intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy. This Court said in Phi/coma that "[t)he Constitution is a framework of a workable government and its interpretation must take into account the complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of government." Lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. The purposes of a contingency fund, for example, cannot be itemized. If, as conceded by petitioners themselves, lump-sum funds such as the contingency and calamity funds are allowed by the Constitution, then there is no principled way of picking and choosing which other funds are constitutionally invalid. 75. Finally, the idea that the Congress is somehow constitutionally compelled to propose a lump-sum-free budget to allow the President lo use his line-item veto is belied by: first, the fact that the President can exercise his veto power regardless of the level of specificity of the item; and s e c n t ~ it is the Congress which in fact has the greater interest in submitting a more specific budget, not the President, for the simple reason that a more specific appropriation means greater constraint on presidential discretion. This happens all the time because the budget is predominantly a line-item budget. The decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded. Such decision is for Congress, not tlus Honorable Court, to make. It is purely a political matter for Congress to propose such types of funds, on one hand, and for tl1e President to approve them, on the other. 43 43 At 29-30. Citations omitted. CONSOLIDATED COMMENT Jjjf.fco 1 Jr. v. A bad, et al. G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 30 of 39 III THE DAP IS A CONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PO\VER TO SPEND. 78. The PresideJJt's Po1ver to Speud the U11progra1JI!JJed Fund. Aside from savings, the other component of the DAP is the use of the Unprogrammed Fund. The Unprogrammed Fund is an appropriation that authorizes expenditures for stated purposes only if there are, additional revenues received by the government which were not covered by the budget proposal submitted by the President to Congress. These funds arc considered "unprogrammed" because the timing of their existence anJ actual amounts are unpredictable. The 2011 to 2013 GAAs carry substailtially the following Spe.cial Provision with regard to the release of the Unprogrammed Fund: 1. Release of t!Je Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, including collections arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original revenue targets, as certified by the BTr: PROVIDED, That in case of newly approved loans for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds. 79. Thus, expenditures under the Unprogrammed Fund are authorized if there are: a) Revenue collections in excess of the original revenue targets in the budget proposal submitted by the President to Congress; b) New revenues which are collected from sources not originally considered in the budget proposal; and c) Newly-approved loans for foreign-assisted projects that were obtained. 80. Table 4 below shows the amount of disbursements under the DAP charged to the Unprogrammed Fund. CONSOLIDATED COMMENT Sjjtuo, Jt: v. _A_bat" et aL G.R. Nos. 209135,209136,209155, 209164,209260,209287,2091tl4 Page 31 of39 Table 4. (Figures in Thousand Pesos) AMOUNT DAP CHARGED TO DISBURSEMENTS UNPROGRAMMED FUND 1 13,242,030 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 4,398,722 6 7 8,489,600 TOTAL 26,130,352 81. Moneys that flow through the Unprogrammed Fund arc not savings as defined in the GAA. They are either revenues or loan proceeds. Therefore, expenditures under the Unprogramn1ed Fund are merely "usc of funds" that are not subject to any of the restrictions of Art. VI, 25(5) of the Constitution. 82. The Unprogrammed Fund provides flexibility to the Executive to use additional funds brought about by good fiscal management or some contingent event, without need of rcturulng to Congress to obtain authorization to spend such funds. In other words, Congress authorized in advance, through the GAA, the expenditure of these additional funds which were not contemplated when the GAA was enacted. As in Phi/coma, this is part of "a fran1ework of a workable government [which] take[s] into account the complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of governn1en t. "44 83. Nonetheless, expenditures under the Unprogrammed Fund are limited to the purposes stated therein. The common purposes of the Unprogrammed Fund from the 2011 to 2013 GAAs are "Budgetary Support to Government-Owned and/ or Controlled Corporations," "Support to Foreign-Assisted Projects," "General Fund Adjustments," and "Support for Infrastructure Projects and Social Programs." 4 5 ,..fhesc 44 Supra note 37, 523. 45 Adclitional purposes under the 2011 GAA include 0) Strategic Government Reforms; (ii) Support for Pre-School Education; (iii) Collective Negotiation Agreement; and (iv) Payment of Total Administrative Disability Pension. Additional purposes under the 2012 GAA include (i) Disaster Risk Reduction and Management; and (ii) Debt Management Program. CONSOLIDATED COMMENT Jjjuco, ]1: v. Abad, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 32 of 39 purposes provide reasonable limits to the President's power to spend the Unprogrammed Fund. 84. As a funding source for the DAP, the Unprogrammed Fund is used to finance DAP-identified programs, activities and projects. 'There is nothing unconstitutional here so long as the expenditures fall within the statutorily-defined purposes of the Unprogrammed Fund under any of the relevant GAAs. SPECIAL A VE.RJ.VIENTS WITI-1 RESPECT TO TI-lE LEGISLATORS' lillCOMMENDATIONS OF PROJECTS TO THE PRESIDENT 85. Lack of Sta11di11g to Raise Violatiou of Equal ProtectioJJ. Petitioner Luna claims that releases under the DAP were made only to select lawmakers in violation of the equal protection clause. 46 He cites Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Joker Arroyo as among the lawrnakers who did not propose projects to be funded as DAP-identificd projects. This claim is irrelevant. First. T'he argument cannot be taken to 1nean that all the Senators should have been entitled to propose DAP-idenlified projects. If the claim is that the DAP is per se unconstitutional, then no legislator should have been entitled to propose any DAP- identified projects, not that all of tl1em should have been given such entitlement. Second. 'I'hose who have the right to complain about the alleged "uneven and discriminatory implementation of [the] DAP" 47 are the 111embers of Congress tl1emselves. Petitioner Luna is not suing in representation of any such mernber and he himself is not an injured party to tl1e extent that he has not shown any entitlement to propose DAP-identified projects. Additional purposes under the 2013 GAA include (i) AFP Modernization Program; (ii) Debt Management Program; (ill) Payment of Total Administrative Disability Pension; and (iv) People's Survival Fund. 46 Luna Petition (G.R. No. 209136), par. 7.33. 47 ld., par. 7.29. CONSOUD;\TED COJ\HviENT J)Jttco, ]!: v. b a c ~ et al. G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 33 of 39 Tbird. The Equal Protection Clause .is not some doctrine that can be called to function for any perceived .inequality. The doctrine is meant to prevent invidious discrimination or those types of discrimination such as race-, gender-, poverty-, or some other status-based distinctions that are simultaneously unjust and revolting. Obviously, disparities in the President's political treatlnent of his colleagues .in the legislature do not rise to the level of a concern that should be remedied under the Equal Protection Clause. 86. Preside11t Not Constitutio11al[y Barred jro111 Rcceivi11g Proposals 011 Use of S avittgs. Petitioners IBP, Araullo, et a!., Villegas, and BeJgica, eta/. restate. the objections against the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) by saying that the DAP is unconstitutional because some of .its disbursements were made pursuant to "funding requests" 48 by legislators. It .is argued that the DAP is "ec1ually, .if not more so, unconstitutional" 49 because, unlike the PDAF, the ability of legislators to propose and identify projects under the DAP .is not authorized by the GAA. 87. On the contrary, what petitioners consider as Lhe uGjectionable feature of the questioned recommendations-the absence of such a mechanism in the GAA-is what respondents consider their strongest constitutional characteristic. It is precisely the absence of any law which provides for participation by legislators that makes the DAP legitimate. This is because there .is nothing in the Constitution or any law which prohibits legislators from recommending to the President how he may use his department's savings. A Cabinet ]\{ember, a friend of the PresiJ.ent, a civic organization, or any other citizen for that matter can recommend to the President any project, progran1, or activity. That legislators were the ones who made the recommendations to the President does not have any constitutional impact on the President's use of savings any more than the recommendation of any other citizen would. 'The fact that there is no law which recognizes any authority of members of Congress means that whatever request they make to the President .is, at best, recommendatory and, at worst, an unsolicited advice. 48 Belgica Petition (G.R. No. 209444) at 13. 49 Id. .. CONSOLID1\TED COMMENT J)juco, Jr. tJ. A bad, et al. G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 34 of39 88. In Pbilconsa, tlus Honorable Court validated the authority of members of Congress to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the Executive because it is merely recommendatory. Such authority does not legally grant any role to members of Congress in the implementation of the GAA because the President has the ultimate power to accept or reject their recommendations. 89. In fact, .it has been argued tl1at the PDAF ceaseJ to be recommendato1y because there are "Special Provisions" in tl1c recent GAAs which supposedly require the "concurrence" of legislators or "favorable endorse1nent" of the House Committee on Appropriation or the Senate Committee on Finance in the release of funds or realirwment 0 of projects. Wlule we continue to maintain that these special provisions do not destroy the rec01nmendatory nature of legislator identificaLion under the PDAF, these special provisions are not found in the DAP. Thus, "fund requests" by legislators to the President under the DJ\P can only be recommendatory because there is nothing which binds the President to follow or even accept these requests. In fact, what the legislators did in this particular instance is exactly what will be the nonn in a regirne where the PDAF 1nechanisn1. in the bullge t is declared unconstitutional. SPECIAL AVERMENTS \VITI-I RESPECT TO TI-lE SPECIFIC DISBURSEMENTS CITED BY PETI'I'IONERS 90. Petitioners Syjuco and Luna cite the following disbursements as "items" allegetlly not found in the GAA: a) P1.5 Billion to the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA); b) P1.8 Billion to the Ivioro National Liberation Front (MNLF); and c) P700 Million as assistance to the Province of Quezon. 91. 'The disburse1nents for the CPLA and the MNLF were made in line with the P AJYIANA (Payapa at JYiasaganang Pamayanan or Peaceful and Resilient Communities), a program under the Office of tbc Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP). PAI'vLANA is an .. . ... . ....,..-.. .,.. . ..,.,c ...... . CONSOLID1\TED COMMENT Syjuco, }t: t' . .-4batl, et aL G.R. Nos. 20Yl35, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 35 of 39 economic development and aid package launched in conjunction with the government peace process. Projects implemented under the P AiviANA include shelter for internally-displaced persons,. support for agriculture and eco-touris1n, and infrastructure in conflict-affected areas. 92. Contrary to petitioners' assertions, the P AiviANA program is supported by the necessary "appropriations cover" in the GAAs. For the 2011. GAA, P235,880,000 was appropriated to support the activities of the OPAPP. 50 Similar appropriations are present in the 201251 and 20135 2 GAAs. 93. On the other hand, the assistance to the Province of Quezon finds its berth .in the appropriation for Financial Subsidy to Local Government Units, 53 later called the Local Government Support Fund. 54 The amount allocated was augmented to offset outstanding obligations of the national government to the province. 94. The Belgica and former Budget Secretary Benjamin Diokno also complain about a Pl 0 Billion capital infusion into the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. --rhis infusion, as cited by petitioners Belgica, el a/. is for "Budgetary Support to Government Corporations," an iLem of expenditure under the Unprogrammed Fund. T'he release of money from the Unprogrammed Fund, whether under the DAP or any other program, should be uncontroversial as it has an appropriation cover. 95. The above disbursements, like any other disbursement under the DAP, relate to specific appropriations in the budget. There is no genuine question of law, only error in petitioners' appreciation of the facts-a state otherwise avoidable through reasonable inquiry and the reading of publicly available information. 50 ItA. No. 10147 (2011 GAA), II(A)(B)(I)(b). 51 R.A. No. 10155 (2012 GAA), L'CVJ(V). 52 R.A. No. 10352 (2013 GAA), L'XVI(V). . 53 R.A. No. 10147 (2011 GAA), L'CXVI(B); R.A. No. 10155 (2012 GAA), 54 ItA. No. 10352 (2013 GAA), L'C.X.Vl(C). CONSOLIDATED COl\lliiENT Jyjuco, Jr. v. Abad, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 36 of39 PRAYER \VHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that: 1) The application for a 'femporary Restraining Order ancl/ or \X!riL of Prelimlninaty Injuction be DENIED; and 2) The petitions be DISMISSED for LACK OF IVIERIT. Respondents pray for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable. Manila, 7 November 2013. OFFICE OF TI-lE SOLICITOR GENERAL 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village 1229 Makati City Tel. No.: 8186301 to 09 (Trunkline) Fax No.: 8176037 Website: "\Vww.osg.gov.ph Email: docket@osg.gov.ph
FRANCIS II. JARDELEZA Solicitor General Roll No. 25719 IBP Lifetime No. 00037 IVICLE Exemption No. III-008523 J enior J tate J olicitm (OJ]icer-m-Charge, Lorenzo 'Tat ada Division) Roll No. 44957 IBP Lifetime No. 08505 IYICLE Exemption No. IV-001068, 5-14-13 CONSOLIDATED COJ\IMENT Sjjuco, ]1: v. Abad, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 37 of 39 . EMERSON S. BANEZ Associate Solicitor Roll No. 56723 IBP No. 914231, 1-3-13 MCLE Compliance No. IV-0010542, 12-20-12
Solicitor . 'Roll No. 61899 IBP No. 935430, 4-11-13 IviCLE Compliance No. N/ A Assotiate Solicitor Roll No. 59301 IBP No. 932006, 2-26-13 IvlCLE Compliance No. N/ A M IBP No. 935418, 4-11-13 MCLE Compliance No. N/ A CONSOLIDATED COMI\IENT J)juco, jt: v. Abad, et aL G.R. Nos. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 38 of 39 Copy Furnished: AUGUSTO L. S1JUCO, R ~ Petitioner in G.R. No. 209135 No.4 Rodriguez St., Sta. Barbara Iloilo City ATTYS. DANTE N. GARCIA and ROMEO C. LAGUARDIA For Petitio11er itt G.R. No. 209135 3 Flame Tree Road, Forbes Park Makati City ATTY. \VANDAM. TALOSIG Talosig Saquing and Associates Counselfor Petitioner itt G.R. No. 209136 No. 321 FEMII Bldg., (Annex A) A. Soriano, Jr., Ave., Intramuros Manila ATTY. l\1ANUELITO R. LUNA Luna and Associates Petitioner in G.R. No. 209136 No. 4 ~ FEMII Bldg., (Annex A) A. Soriano, Jr., Ave., Intramuros Ivlanila ATTYS. RAYMOND PARSIFAL A. FORTUN and MARIA ROMINA M. DALAGAN Cormsel for Petitiomr in G.R No 209155 137 CRJ\:1 Avenue cor. CRJ\:1 Marina BF Homes Almanza, Las,Pifias City ATTY. MANUEL l\1. LAZARO Cormsel for Petitioners i11 G.R No. 209164 Chatham House l3ldg. Valero cor. Rufino Streets Salcedo Village, Makati City DEAN FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, AT1'YS. RITA LINDA V. JIMENO, REYNALDO Y. MAULIT, and ROMULO B. LUMAUIG ComrselforPetitionersin G.R. No. 209164 . 2"d Floor, Phil trust Building Remedios cor. M.H. Del Pilar Sts. Malate, Manila DEAN PACIFICO A. AGABIN Cormsel for Petitioner in G.R No. 209260 26th Floor, Pacific Star Building Gil Puyat Avenue cor. Makati Avenue Ivlakati City PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO Ill New Executive Building, Malacaiiang Marilla EXECUTIVE SECRETARY I'AQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. Office of the President, Malacafiang Manila SECRETARY FLORENCIO D. AllAD DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT General Solano St., San J'viiguel Manila SENATE PRESIDENT FHANIU.IN lVI. DRILON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES 4th Floor, Senate Building, Roxas Boulevard Pasig City SPEAKER FELICIANO H.. BELMONTE, JR. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES House of Representatives Complex Constitution Hills, Quezon City SECRETARY CESAR V. PUIUSIJ\tli\ DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE DOF Building, BSP Complex Roxas Boulevard, Manila NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V.DELEON DUREAU OF TREASURY Palacio Del Gobernador Duilding Intramuros, Marilla CONSOLIDATED CorviMENT Jjjuco 1 ]1: v. A bat{, eta!. G.R. Nus. 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164,209260,209287,209444 Page 39 of 3.9 ATTYS.JOVENCIO H. EVANGELISTA, VANESSA QUIAl'viBAO MAGUIGAD, and .MARIA CRISTINA P. YAMBOT Commljor Petitioners in G.R No. 209287 No. 45 K-7'h St., Drgy. West Kamias Quezon City PROF. !-lARRY L. ROQUE, JR., ATTYS. JOEL RUIZ B UTUYAN and ROGER R. RAYEL Roque and Butuyan Law Offices Counsel for Petitioners in G.R No. 209442 Antel Corporate Center, Unit 1904, 19th Flr. 121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village Makati City EXPLANATION (Pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) Except for Dean Pacifico A. Agabin and Prof. Harry L. Roc1ue (Roque and Dutuyan Law Offices) who were personally served, the foregoing Consolidated Comment is being served by registered mail due to lack of sufficient personnel in the Office of the Solicitor General to effect personal service. Advance copies will be personally served to all others within Metru 11anila to ensure timely receipt thereof. Attomry II