Terrorism Studies

and South East Asia:

Crippled by Paradigm Paralysis?

Professor Carl Thayer

School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Seminar Presentation to
Defence and Security Applications Research Centre
July 13, 2007
 Terrorism Studies
z Nota recognised discipline
z Weak research methods
z Nearly half of terrorism literature written by
political scientists
z 80% of all research based on English-
language secondary sources (mainly media
reports)
z 13% of articles rely on interviews (but only
1% are systematic or structured)
z 6% of articles give no sources
 Terrorism Studies
z Weak research methods
z Patternsand relationships not being studied
by use of inferential statistics
z Research influenced by Government
agenda and ‘terrorism industry’
z Media simplification
z Phenomenon of ‘celebrity analysts’
 Greg Sheridan’s 1st Proposition
There has been an institutional failure by
Australian universities and strategic community
to seriously address the threat of terrorism,
especially in Southeast Asia.
1. “there is not a single Australian researcher on
Southeast Asian terrorism of international
repute”
“much of what they [universities] have come
up with in terrorism research is rubbish. Much
of it is postmodern theoretical nonsense…”
 Greg Sheridan’s 2nd Proposition

2. “The strategic community has failed because of

its continued paradigm paralysis, its chronic
inability to regard terrorism as a serious
strategic issue”.
“Universities and think tanks can take comfort in
the chummy common room embrace of dead
paradigms. But, in doing so, they offer
suboptimal service to their nation”.
 Universities
z ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security
z Griffith University + ANU and University of Queensland
z Macquarie University
z Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT)
z Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (Postgraduate Study
Pattern)
z Monash University
z Global Terrorism Research Centre
z Research Network for a Secure Australia
z Administered by the University of Melbourne
z University of Wollongong
z Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention
 Think Tanks
z Australian Strategic Policy Institute
z Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia
(2005)
z Lowy Institute
z Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and
Indonesia (2005)
z Mindanao A Gamble Worth Taking? (2006)
z Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (ANU)
z The Complexities of Dealing with Radical Islam in
Southeast Asia: A Case Study of Jemaah Islamiyah
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 149
(2003)
 Sheridan’s 3 Specialists
z Rohan Gunaratna
z Singapore-government funding, head, International
Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research
z Zachary Abuza
z Funding from U.S. think tanks – Smith Richardson
Foundation, United States Institute for Peace
z Sidney Jones
z Southeast Asia Project Director, International Crisis
Group (ICG)
Rohan Gunaratna
 Review of Inside Al Qaeda
The most disappointing book [of 5 under
review] is Rohan Gunaratna’s Inside Al
Qaeda. Gunaratna… offers many
interesting but poorly substantiated
details. The book itself is more a data
dump than a comprehensive analysis.
Daniel L. Byman, World Politics (Oct 2003),
141.
 Review of Inside Al Qaeda
Of the five [books under review], Gunaratna’s
book is the most problematic. Although it often
overwhelms the reader in detail, many of its key
claims…are unsupported. In addition, it often
relies on intelligence reporting without so much
as a hint of whether the material is from an
interview, a document, or a media leak. Other
claims advanced by Gunaratna deserve
additional substantiation…
Daniel L. Byman, World Politics (Oct 2003), 141.
 Review of Conflict and Terrorism in
Southern Thailand
“Some are likely to see
this book especially as
just another output in
Gunaratna's terror-
mongering academic
exercises… Too many
terror mongers are
better than too few”.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak,
Chulalongkorn University,
Contemporary Southeast Asia,
Arabinda Acharya, Sabrina Chua April 2006
and Rohan Gunaratna, eds.
 Review of Conflict and Terrorism in
Southern Thailand
z Significant factual and interpretive errors
undermine the credibility of the book
z “Overall, the critique demonstrates that various
interpretations of what is happening in the
South of Thailand remain plausible, and the
article concludes that the authors of Conflict and
Terrorism were too poorly equipped to deal with
these competing interpretations to offer any
insights into the conflict.”
z Michael Connors, ‘War on Error and the Southern Fire’, Critical
Asian Studies, 38(1), 2006, 151-175.
Zachary Abuza
 Review of Militant Islam
It takes knowledge of language, history and, of
course, Islam to conduct academic research on
militant Islam. Sadly, Abuza has a minimum
mastery of the relevant areas, and he is a fish
out of water in this academic area…
His minimal knowledge of Islam, and ignorance of
Arabic, Indonesian or Malay and of Islam in
Southeast Asia, led him to cull information for
the book from secondary sources...
This analysis has too many mistakes to serve as a
reference book.
Solahudin, Jakarta Post, December 7, 2003
 Review of Militant Islam
“According to some observers such as the
Indonesian journalist Solahudin, Militant Islam is
weakened considerably by Abuza's lack of
familiarity with Islam, Arabic, Indonesian and
Malay. It may be too harsh, however, as
Solahudin does, to call the entire thesis of
Militant Islam into question because of these
shortcomings. Abuza's study, as long as read not
in isolation but in tandem with other works, will
still prove useful to counter-terrorism analysts
and practitioners”.
-Kumar Ramakrishna, Contemporary Southeast Asia,
April 2004
 Review of Militant Islam
“However, while such arguments contribute to the
debate on terrorism and counter-terrorism in
southeast Asia, overall, this book is a
disappointment. It reads largely like a rough,
unedited first draft, replete with inappropriate
and factual inaccuracies. Regrettably, these
serious, multiple shortcomings – many of which
could have been mitigated by greater editorial
diligence – imply that Militant Islam in Southeast
Asia, as it stands, does not qualify as the
authoritative reference on the subject that had
been widely anticipated”.
Tim Huxley, IISS, Survival, 46(3), 184.
 Review of Militant Islam
“It is tedious to recount the numerous errors of
fact, spelling, and interpretation that plague
Abuza’s work. This may explain why there has
been so little published criticism of it. For
country specialists, these errors expose a weak
grounding in the history, geography, and culture
of the peoples described. Unfortunately, the
errors are reproduced by other regionalists
drawing on Abuza”.
-Kit Collier, Southeast Asian Affairs 2006, 35.
Sidney Jones
z Studied at university in
Iran
z M.A. International
Politics
z Asia Director, Human
Rights Watch/Asia for
14 years
z Southeast Asia Project
Director, International
Crisis Group (ICG) since
2002
 Greg Fealy & Kit Collier

ANU, ex-ONA ANU, ICG

 Greg Fealy and
Virginia Hooker
Anthony Bubalo Malcolm Cook
and Greg Fealy and Kit Collier
Greg Barton & David Wright-Neville

Monash, ex-APCSS Monash, ex-ONA

 Marika Vicziany,
Greg Barton David Wright-Neville,
and Pete Lentini
 Methodology

z Google search using “name” + terrorism

z Scholar search using “name” + terrorism
z Impact = Number of Google Hits divided
by the number of Scholar hits (I = GH/SH)
z Popular impression only
z Dose not assess academic quality
 Classification
z A = Australian academics who write on terrorism
generally (N= 40)
z ASEAS = Australian Southeast Asian specialists
who write on regional terrorism (N= 12)
z MPA – Most Prolific Authors (N = 30)
z O = Overseas academics who write on terrorism
generally (N = 14)
z SEA = academics in Southeast Asia who write on
regional terrorism (N = 8)
z Total N = 104
 Comparison of Sheridan’s 3 Specialists
with Thayer’s 4 (sorted by impact)

Academic Classification Google Scholar Impact

Abuza, Zachary O 30,500 120 254
Jones, Sidney SEA 24,700 118 209
Gunaratna, Rohan SEA 76,200 535 142
Barton, Greg ASEA 1,320 51 26
Collier, Kit ASEA 257 10 26
Wright-Neville, David ASEA 695 49 14
Fealy, Greg ASEA 535 82 7
 Comparison of Sheridan’s 3 with
Australian Southeast Asian Specialists
Academic Google Scholar Impact
Thayer, Carl/Carlyle 14,328 47 305
Abuza, Zachary 30,500 120 254
Jones, Sidney 24,700 118 209
Gunaratna, Rohan 76,200 535 142
Connors, Michael K. 646 14 46
Kingsbury, Damien 33 1 33
Barton, Greg 1,320 51 26
Collier, Kit 257 10 26
Wright-Neville, David 695 49 14
Martin Jones, David 916 90 10
 Average Academic Output on Terrorism
Measured by Impact (July 5, 2007)
Category Google Scholar Impact

Most Prolific Authors 11565 202 41

Australian Southeast Asian
specialists 1729 49 42
Southeast Asian terrorism
specialists 13174 149 50

Australian terrorism specialists 1050 34 55

All categories 8334 119 58

Overseas terrorism specialists 25112 228 119

 Top Ten Global Rankings by Google Hits

Academic Classification Google

Hoffman, Bruce MPA 101,000

Bergen, Peter O 93,700
Gunaratna, Rohan SEA 76,200
Lacqueur, Walter O 61,900
Wilkinson, Paul MPA 57,100

Pape, Robert O 57,000

Burke, Jason O 51,300
Abuza, Zachary O 30,500
Ranstorp, Magnus MPA 30,500
Sageman, Marc O 29,700
 Top 11th-20th Global Rankings by Google Hits
Academic Clalssification Google
Chalk, Peter MPA 26,900
Jones, Sidney SEA 24,700
Sandler, Todd MPA 21,800
Richardson, Louise O 20,300
Horgan, John MPA 19,000
Crenshaw, Martha MPA 18,100
Thayer, Carl/Carlyle ASEA 14,328
Williams, Clive A 13,900
White, Robert MPA 13,800
Israeli, Raphael MPA 12,800
 Top 15 Global Rankings by Impact
Academic Classification Scholar Impact
Kara-Ali, Mustapha A 1 514
Bergen, Peter O 226 415
Williams, Clive A 41 339

Thayer, Carl/Carlyle ASEA 47 305

Burke, Jason O 183 280
Richardson, Louise O 75 271
Abuza, Zachary O 120 254
Townsend, Jacob A 4 222
Williams, Don A 3 218
Jones, Sidney SEA 118 209
Ranstorp, Magnus MPA 146 209
Pape, Robert O 328 174
Gunaratna, Rohan SEA 535 142
Horgan, John MPA 139 137
Moore, Andrew A 82 127
Falsifying Sheridan’s Proposition 1
z Australia does have researchers on Southeast
Asian terrorism of international repute
z Michael Connors, Greg Fealy, Greg Barton, Kit Collier,
David Wright-Neville, David Martin Jones
z Harold Crouch, Virginia Hooker, Anthony Milner, John
Funston, Damien Kingsbury
z Australian academic terrorism specialists and
Australian regional specialists regularly punch
above their weight in terms of impact on the
world wide web
z Andrew Moore, Carl Thayer, Jacob Townsend, Clive
Williams, Don Williams
 Greg Sheridan’s 2nd Proposition

2. “The strategic community has failed because of

its continued paradigm paralysis, its chronic
inability to regard terrorism as a serious
strategic issue”.
“Universities and think tanks can take comfort in
the chummy common room embrace of dead
paradigms. But, in doing so, they offer
suboptimal service to their nation”.
 What Hugh White Wrote
z “I think terrorism poses a serious threat of death and
injury to individuals in our society and governments have
an important responsibility to respond effectively to it.
But the nature and scale of the threat have been
seriously exaggerated since 9/11.
z “Terrorism, even nuclear terrorism, appalling though that
would be, does not endanger the international system. It
does not constitute a global Islamist insurgency and it
cannot be effectively addressed by a Long War, as our
failure in Iraq has made clear. Reshaping the Australian
Defence Force to fight terrorism would therefore lead us
up a blind alley whose dead end is already in plain
view.”
z Hugh White, ‘Neighbourhood Watch’, Australian Literary Review,
The Australian, June 6, 2007.
Al-Qaeda-Centric Paradigm
 Three Key Questions

1. How to characterize al Qaeda

2. How to account for change over
time
3. How to assess the question of
agency in al Qaeda’s relationship
with militant and extremist groups
in Southeast Asia
 Three Approaches
z International Terrorism Experts
z Rohan Gunaratna, Peter Bergen, Jason
Burke
z Regional security specialists
z Zachary Abuza
z ‘Singapore School’
z RAND affiliates
z Country Studies Specialists
z Sidney Jones, Greg Fealy, Greg Barton,
Kit Collier, Michael Connors
 Al Qaeda-Centric Paradigm
• AQ paradigm has and continues to
dominate the analysis of regional and
international terrorist linkages
• Pyramidal structure + global terrorist
network + Afghan base + loose coalition
of terrorist groups (Gunaratna 2002)
• Central leadership + international network
+ front companies + membership cells in
sixty countries (Abuza 2003)
 The Al Qaeda Paradigm
• Three common elements:
• Al Qaeda hardcore
• Scores of other militant Islamic groups
• Others who subscribe to “the idea,
worldview, ideology of ‘al-Qaeda’”
-Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of
Terror (2003)
 Change Over Time
• International and regional experts
employ an approach characterized as
‘back to the future’
• 1988-91 Al Qaeda penetrated Southeast
Asia
• 1993 World Trade Center bombing
• 1995 Operation Bojinka
• organised by Ramsi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh
Mohammad
• Start point: Darul Islam (1948-mid-1960s)
 The Question of Agency
• Southeast Asia as al Qaeda’s ‘second
front’?
• Who or what represented ‘al Qaeda’ in its
dealings with Southeast Asia in the
formative period?
• Who represented Southeast Asia?
• Post-2001 initiative for terrorism in
indigenous hands with al Qaeda
remnants
Is Jemaah Islamiyah a threat to the
Indonesian government?
zI don’t think it has any capacity to
overthrow the government. Nor do I think
it has any mass base support of any
significance in Indonesia, although it
certainly has some. For most Indonesians,
it really is a radical fringe and one that
most people would steer clear of. But it
does have the capacity to engage in
further terror (Sidney Jones, 2003).
 JI and Global Jihad
z “Insum, JI has been able to survive
because it has been able to link its jihad
with that of other militant organizations in
the region. JI has been able to forge a
common cause, in the name of a global
jihad, and this has led to exchanges of
techniques, training, money and support.”
z Z.Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in
Indonesia (2007), p. 60.
 JI - Net Assessment
z "In 2002, JI was probably at its height.”
z The Australian JI cell was "effectively
dismantled" after the 2002 Bali bombings.
z JI lives on but it is "far weaker" confined to
Indonesia with international contacts severed.
z "I don't think the threat to Australia comes from
JI as an organisation but it is the most important
recruiting group for young people.”
z "But we can't rule out another attack and that is
likely to come from a splinter group."
z -Sidney Jones, Adelaide Advertiser, July 7, 2007.
 Conclusion
z Sheridan errs when he asserts that Australia’s
strategic community does not take the threat of
terrorism seriously
z Terrorism is not a strategic threat to the
international system in Southeast Asia
z The threat of terrorism in our region is highly
localised
z JI splinter groups and other extremists
z Australia is better placed to rely on its own
regional specialists rather than ‘celebrity
analysts’
 Terrorism Studies
and South East Asia:
Crippled by Paradigm Paralysis?

c.thayer@adfa.edu.au
(02) 6268 8860 telephone
(02) 6268 8899 fax
0437 376 429 mobile