ENVI LAW

Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. 224 SCRA 782 July 1993 FACTS: Plaintiffs, who are minors represented by their parents, alleged that the then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr.s continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country will work great damage and injury to the plaintiffs and their successors. Defendant, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), avers that the plaintiffs failed to state a specific right violated by the defendant and that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question and cannot be tried in the Courts. The RTC of Makati, Branch 66, granted defendants motion to dismiss. ISSUE: Whether or not the case at bar subject to the judicial power of the Court COURT RULING: Being impressed with merit, the Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the Order of the RTC which dismissed the case. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. Although concurring in the result, Justice Feliciano penned his separate opinions on a number of topics pointed by Justice Davide, Jr. in this Court decision. Justice Feliciano said that the concept of the word class is too broad to cover the plaintiffs and their representatives alone, and that the Court may be deemed recognizing anyones right to file action as against both the public administrative agency and the private entities of the sector involved in the case at bar, to wit: Neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provisions of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Justice Feliciano further stated that the Court in the case at bar in effect made Sections 15 and 16 of Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution to be self-executing and judicially enforceable even in its present form, and that these implications are too large and far reaching in nature ever to be hinted in this instant case.

---RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT, E.G., TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES, JOINED IN AND REPRESENTED HEREIN BY HUMAN BEINGS GLORIA ESTENZO RAMOS, ET AL. VS. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, ET AL. G.R. NO. 181527 - CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC), ET AL. VS. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, ET AL. Sirs/Mesdames: Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated APRIL 24, 2012, which reads as follows: G.R. No. 180771- RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHE WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES, Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos, ET AL. vs. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, ET AL. G.R. No. 181527 - CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC), ET AL. vs. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, ET AL. RESOLUTION This Court resolves to GRANT the Motion to Admit Re: Motion for Clarification (By Special Appearance) dated March 19, 2012, filed by counsel for JAPEX Philippines, Ltd.cralaw With regard to its Motion for Clarification (By Special Appearance) dated March 19, 2012, this Court considers JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. as a real party-in-interest in these cases. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Contrary to JAPEX Philippines, Ltd.'s allegation that it is a completely distinct corporation, which should not be confused with JAPEX Company, Ltd., JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. is a mere branch office, established by JAPEX Company, Ltd. for the purpose of carrying out the latter's business transactions here in the Philippines. Thus, JAPEX Philippines, Ltd., has no separate personality from its mother foreign corporation, the party impleaded in this case. Moreover, Section 128 of the Corporation Code provides for the responsibilities and duties of a resident agent of a foreign corporation: SECTION 128. Resident agent; service of process. The Securities and Exchange Commission shall require as a condition precedent to the issuance of the license to transact business in the Philippines by any foreign corporation that such corporation file with the Securities and Exchange Commission a written power of attorney designating some person who must be a resident of the Philippines, on whom any summons and other legal processes may be served in all actions or other legal

proceedings against such corporation, and consenting that service upon such resident agent shall be admitted and held as valid as if served upon the duly authorized officers of the foreign corporation at its home office. Any such foreign corporation shall likewise execute and file with the Securities and Exchange Commission an agreement or stipulation, executed by the proper authorities of said corporation, in form and substance as follows: "The (name of foreign corporation) does hereby stipulate and agree, in consideration of its being granted by the Securities and Exchange Commission a license to transact business in the Philippines, that if at any time said corporation shall cease to transact business in the Philippines, or shall be without any resident agent in the Philippines on whom any summons or other legal processes may be served, then in any action or proceeding arising out of any business or transaction which occurred in the Philippines, service of any summons or other legal process may be made upon the Securities and Exchange Commission and that such service shall have the same force and effect as if made upon the duly-authorized officers of the corporation at its home office." Whenever such service of summons or other process shall be made upon the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commission shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, transmit by mail a copy of such summons or other legal process to the corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such copy by the Commission shall be a necessary part of and shall complete such service. All expenses incurred by the Commission for such service shall be paid in advance by the party at whose instance the service is made. In case of a change of address of the resident agent, it shall be his or its duty to immediately notify in writing the Securities and Exchange Commission of the new address. It is clear from the foregoing provision that the function of a resident agent is to receive summons or legal processes that may be served in all actions or other legal proceedings against the foreign corporation. These cases have been prosecuted in the name of JAPEX Company, Ltd., and JAPEX Philippines Ltd., as its branch office and resident agent, had been receiving the various resolutions from this Court, as evidenced by Registry Return Cards signed by its representatives. However, in the interest of justice this Court, nonetheless, resolves to grant JAPEX Philippines Ltd.'s Motion for Extension of Time (By Special Appearance), dated March 21, 2012, to file its Memorandum. As prayed for by JAPEX Philippines Ltd., it is given thirty (30) days from March 21, 2012 or until April 21, 2012, within which to file its Memorandum." ---VELMONTE VS BALMONTE170 SCRA 256 Facts: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the)

BatasangPambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic)of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, LeoObligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa membersbelonging to the UNIDO and PDP Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information. Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos toBatasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban politicalparties. Held: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46of PD 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977),provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law(CA 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the Systems [Second Whereas Clause, PD1146.] Consequently, as Feliciano Belmonte himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were

therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Still, Belmonte maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the present petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. ----Legaspi vs. CSC G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987 Facts: The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspis request for information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians. Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said information. The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It is asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspis actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit Held: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the

petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. ----Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000 FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount toan unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the Regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private land owners. ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional. HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources somehow against the Regalian doctrine.

OBLICON
Agcaoili vs. GSIS, 165 SCRA 1 Facts: In this case, appellant GSIS approved an application of the appellee Agcaoli for the purchase of a house and lot in the GSIS Housing Project at Nangka, Marikina, subject to the condition that the latter should forthwith occupy the house, a condition that Agcaoli tried to fulfill but could not because the house was absolutely uninhabitable. However, Agcaoli ask a homeless friend, a certain Villanueva, to stay in the premises as some sort of watchman, pending completion of the construction of the house. Agcaoli after paying the first installment and other fees, having thereafter refused to make further payment of other stipulated installments until GSIS had made the house habitable; and appellant having refused to do so, opting instead to cancel the award and demanded the vacation by Agcaoli of the premises; and the latter having sued the GSIS in the Court of First Instance of Manila for specific performance with damages and having obtained a favorable judgment, the cases was appealed by the GSIS. Issue: Whether or not Agcaoli is entitled for specific performance with damages. Held: Appeal of GSIS must fail. There was then a perfected contract of sale between the parties; there had been a meeting of minds upon the purchase by Agcaoli of a determinate house and lot from GSIS at a definite price which is payable in amortizations and from that moment the parties acquired the right to reciprocally demand performance. It was, to be sure, the duty of the GSIS, as seller, to deliver the thing soled in acondition suitable for its enjoyment by the buyer, in other words to deliver the house subject of the contract in a reasonably livable state. This it failed to do. Since GSIS failed to fulfill its obligation, and was not willing to put the house in a habitable state, it cannot invoke Agcaolis suspension of payment as cause to cancel the contract between them. In recipient obligation, neither party incur in delay of the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. Nor may the GSIS succeed in justifying its cancellation of the award by the claim tha Agcaoli had not complied with the condition of occupying the house within three (3) days. The record shows that Agcaoli did try to fulfill the condition. Finally appellant having caused the ambiguity as the exact prestation of the agreement, the question of interpretation arising therefrom, should be resolved against it. --Fabre vs CA Case

Facts: Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a Mazda minibus. They used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in Manila. It was driven by Porfirio Cabil. On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with the petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners the amount of P3,000.00. The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway. The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion. Because of the mishap, several passengers were injured particularly Amyline Antonio. Criminal complaint was filed against the driver and the spouses were also made jointly liable. Spouses Fabre on the other hand contended that they are not liable since they are not a common carrier. The RTC of Makati ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the defendants were ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether the spouses Fabre are common carriers? Held: Petition was denied. Spouses Fabre are common carriers. The Supreme Court held that this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held: 10 Art. 1732, Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public. The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general

population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions. --VALENZUELA VS. CA FACTS: A case was filed by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela, which was an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular accident on June 24, 1990. During the accident, Valenzuelas left leg was severed up to th e middle of her thigh, with only some skin and muscle connected to the rest of the body so she had to be amputated. She was confined in the hospital for twenty days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The lower court found Richard Li, the person driving the Mitsubishi Lancer, guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under 2176 of the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial Inc., Lis employer, was also found jointly and severally liable. Upon appeal, CA agreed with the decision of the lower court regarding the liability of Li. However, CA absolved the liability of Alexander Commercial Inc. CA also reduced the claim for moral damages. Hence, both parties assailed the respondent courts decision by filing two separate petitions. ISSUE: Should Alexander Commercial Inc. be held jointly and severally liable? RULING: Yes. The Court agreed with the CA that the relationship of the employer and employee was not based on the principle of respondent superior, which held the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately fell upon the employer for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees. Under the concept of pater familias embodied by Article 2180, the employer may be relieved from any liability upon showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father of the family. Once the evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the required amount of care, half of the employers burden is overcome. However, the question of diligent supervision depends on the circumstances of employment. In the instant case, Li, as an Assistant Manager of the company, admitted that his functions did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he performs social and work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li, therefore, enabled both to put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latters goodwill

before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel. Assuming that he really came from his officemates place as Li claimed, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to discuss sales and other work related strategies. Moreover, Alexander Commercial Inc. had not demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with Li for the injuries sustained by Valenzuela during the accident. Thus, the decision of the CA was modified with the effect of reinstating the decision of the RTC. --Nakpil & Sons vs CA Facts: The Philippine Bar Association wanted to erect a building in its lot in Intramuros. They were able to obtain a contract with the United Construction Company Inc for the construction of the building and the design was obtained from Juan M. Nakpil & Sons and Juan F. Nakpil. The Building was completed in June 1966. On August 2, 1968 a massive earthquake hit Manila with an intensity of about 7.3. This earthquake caused damage to the building and caused it to lean forward dangerously which led to the vacation of the building. United Construction Company in turn shored up the building and incurred 13,661.28 php as costs. The PBA then instituted a case against UCC for damages due to its negligence regarding the construction of the said building thru its failure to follow the designs coming from the architects. UCC then filed a complint against the archetechts (Nakpil & Sons) alleging that it was the designs that are flawed and that caused the buildings inability to withstand an earthquake. UCC also included the president of PBA for including them in their petition. Nakpil & Sons answer that the petitioners need not to change the defendants in their petition as UCC deviated from the plans which caused the damages to the building. In the course of the trial a commissioner was appointed by both parties to give a report regarding the technical aspects of the case. His report concluded that indeed there were faults arising from the negligence of both defendants. The report stated that the design was flawed and that UCC deviated from the designs which aggravated the problem. The defendants then put up the Act of God defense. Issue: Whether or not the defendants could escape liability from the building due to a fortuitous event which is unforeseeable and inevitable even if their negligence is established

Held: The defendants cannot validly invoke the Act of God defense. This is because of the report submitted by the appointed Commissioner which established their negligence. Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the causes of action by reason of any defect. To exempt the obligor from its liability these requisites should first concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. The report of the Commissioner established that the defects that occurred to the building could be attributed to the act of man specifically that of the architects and the engineers as well as the builders. This was because of the fact that UCC deviated from the plans submitted by the architects and their failure to observe the required marksmanship in constructing the building as well as the required degree of supervision. Nakpil & Sons are also liable for the inadequacies and defect in their submitted plan and specifications. These circumstances are the proximate causes of the damages that the PBA building incurred. The costs are to be paid by the defendants amounting to 5M which includes all appreciable damages as well as indemnity plus 100,000php for the atty fee. One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the natural and probable consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss. --Ang Yu Asuncion vs CA FACTS: Petitioners allege that they are tenants or lessees of residential and commercial spaces owned by defendants in Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila since 1935 and that on several occasions before October 9, 1986, defendants informed plaintiffs that they are offering to sell the premises and are giving them priority to acquire the same. During the negotiations, Bobby Cu Unjieng offered a price of P6-million while petitioners made a counter offer of P5-million. On October 24, 1986, petitioners asked the respondents to specify the terms and conditions of the offer to sell. Petitioners now raise that since respondents failed to specify the terms and conditions of the offer to sell and because of information received that the latter were about to sell the property, plaintiffs were compelled to file the complaint to compel defendants to sell the property to them. The trial court found that the respondents offer to sell was never accepted by the petitioners for the reason that they did not agree upon the terms and conditions of the proposed sale, hence, there was no contract of sale at all. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. This decision was brought to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari which subsequently denied the appeal on May 6, 1991 for insufficiency in form and substance.

On November 15, 1990, while CA-G.R. CV No. 21123 was pending consideration by this Court, the Cu Unjieng spouses executed a Deed of Sale transferring the property in question to herein respondent Buen Realty and Development Corporation, for P15,000,000.00. On July 1, 1991, respondent as the new owner of the subject property wrote a letter to the petitioners demanding that the latter vacate the premises. On July 16, 1991, the petitioners wrote a reply to respondent corporation stating that the latter brought the property subject to the notice of lis pendens regarding Civil Case No. 8741058 annotated on TCT No. 105254/T-881 in the name of the Cu Unjiengs. The lessees filed a Motion for Execution dated August 27, 1991 of the Decision in Civil Case No. 87-41058 as modified by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21123. On August 30, 1991, the RTC ordered the Cu Unjiengs to execute the necessary Deed of Sale of the property in litigation in favor of plaintiffs Ang Yu Asuncion, Keh Tiong and Arthur Go for the consideration of P15 Million pesos in recognition of petitioners right of first refusal and that a new Transfer Certificate of Title be issued in favor of the buyer. The court also set aside the title issued to Buen Realty Corporation for having been executed in bad faith. On September 22, 1991, the Judge issued a writ of execution. On 04 December 1991, the appellate court, on appeal to it by private respondent, set aside and declared without force and effect the above questioned orders of the court a quo. ISSUE Whether or not Buen Realty can be bound by the writ of execution by virtue of the notice of lis pendens, carried over on TCT No. 195816 issued in the name of Buen Realty, at the time of the latters purchase of the p roperty on 15 November 1991 from the Cu Unjiengs. HELD We affirm the decision of the appellate court. In the law on sales, the so-called right of first refusal is an innovative juridical relation. Needless to point out, it cannot be deemed a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code. In a right of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right, however, would be dependent not only on the grantors eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with another but also on terms, including the price, that obviously are yet to be later firmed up. Prior thereto, it can at best be so described as merely belonging to a class of preparatory juridical relations governed not by contracts (since the essential elements to establish the vinculum juris would still be

indefinite and inconclusive) but by, among other laws of general application, the pertinent scattered provisions of the Civil Code on human conduct. The final judgment in Civil Case No. 87-41058, it must be stressed, has merely accorded a right of first refusal in favor of petitioners. The consequence of such a declaration entails no more than what has heretofore been said. In fine, if, as it is here so conveyed to us, petitioners are aggrieved by the failure of private respondents to honor the right of first refusal, the remedy is not a writ of execution on the judgment, since there is none to execute, but an action for damages in a proper forum for the purpose. Furthermore, Buen Realty, not having been impleaded in Civil Case No. 87-41058, cannot be held subject to the writ of execution issued by respondent Judge, let alone ousted from the ownership and possession of the property, without first being duly afforded its day in court. ---

CONSTI LAW 2
David v. Arroyo Facts: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE:Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional. HELD:The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way; Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape

of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty. Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws. Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following: 1 There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president. --People Vs. Marti Case Digest Facts: Accused-appellant went to a forwarding agency to send four packages to a friend in Zurich. Initially, the accused was asked by the proprietress if the packages can be examined. However, he refused. Before delivering said packages to the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of Posts, the husband of the proprietress opened said boxes

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commanderin-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. An d such criterion has been met. Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

for final inspection. From that inspection, included in the standard operating procedure and out of curiosity, he took several grams of its contents. He brought a letter and the said sample to the National Bureau of Investigation. When the NBI was informed that the rest of the shipment was still in his office, three agents went back with him. In their presence, the husband totally opened the packages. Afterwards, the NBI took custody of said packages. The contents , after examination by forensic chemists, were found to be marijuana flowering tops. The appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the agents for questioning. Later on, the trial court found him guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Issue: Whether or Not the items admitted in the searched illegally searched and seized. Whether or Not custodial investigation properly applied. Whether or Not the trial court not give credence to the explanation of the appellant on how said packages came to his possession. Held: No. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated. Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. It was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search. No. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. No. Appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.

--KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct 1920] Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court. Issues: (1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power (2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights. Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city: (l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx. (ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.) In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each every one of them without

distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection for the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare. Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants. -RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919] Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein nonChristian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the nonChristian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The SolicitorGeneral adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. --Plessy v. Ferguson Case Brief Summary Facts Plessy (P) attempted to sit in an all-white railroad car. After refusing to sit in the black railway carriage car, Plessy was arrested for violating an 1890 Louisiana statute that provided for segregated separate but equal railroad accommodations. Those using facilities not designated for their race were criminally liable under the statute. At trial with Justice John H. Ferguson (D) presiding, Plessy was found guilty on the grounds that the law was a reasonable exercise of the states police powers based upon custom, usage, and tradition in the state. Plessy filed a petition for writs of prohibition and certiorari in the Supreme Court of Louisiana against Ferguson, asserting

that segregation stigmatized blacks and stamped them with a badge of inferiority in violation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments. The court found for Ferguson and the Supreme Court granted cert. Issue

valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political rights of blacks have been longest and most earnestly enforced. Disposition Judgment for Ferguson (Plessy loses).

Can the states constitutionally enact legislation requiring persons of different races to use separate but equal segregated facilities? Holding and Rule (Brown) Yes. The states can constitutionally enact legislation requiring persons of different races to use separate but equal segregated facilities. Thirteenth Amendment issue The statute does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime. Slavery implies involuntary servitude and a state of bondage. The Thirteenth Amendment however was regarded as insufficient to protect former slaves from certain laws which had been enacted in the south which imposed upon them onerous disabilities and burdens and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value; and that the Fourteenth Amendment was devised to meet this exigency. Fourteenth Amendment Issue All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are made citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside, and the States are forbidden from making or enforcing any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The proper construction of this amendment involves a question of exclusive privileges rather than race. Its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of former slaves, to give definitions of citizenship of the United States and of the States, and to protect the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States from hostile legislation of the states. It was intended to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but it was intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting and even requiring their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race. Such laws have generally been recognized as within the scope of the states police powers. The most common instance involves the establishment of separate schools, which has been held to be a

-Villegas Vs. Hiu Chiong Case Digest Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance. Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation. While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure. Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.