G.R. No.

L-1800

January 27, 1948

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Ca !a"#n Mana#er o$ Coale%&e' M"nor"(y Par("e%, petitioner, vs. )AL*RIANO *. +,GOSO, Mayor o$ C"(y o$ Man"la, respondent. Ramon Diokno for petitioner. City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondent. +*RIA, J.This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitoner, Cipriano Primicias, a campaig manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon, ovember !", !#$%, for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances on the groun that the respondent refused to grant such permit. &ue to urgency of the case, this Court, after mature deliberation, issued a 'rit of mandamus, as prayed for in the petition of ovember !(, !#$%, 'ithout pre)udice to 'riting later an e*tended and reasoned decision. The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the Constitutions of democratic countries. +ut it a casettled principle gro'ing out of the nature of 'ell,ordered civil societies that the e*ercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be in)urious to the e-ual en)oyment of others having e-ual rights, not in)urious to the rights of the community or society. The po'er to regulate the e*ercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign .police po'er. 'hich is the po'er to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general 'elfare of the people. This sovereign police po'er is e*ercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of la's regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as to'ns, municipalities, and cities authorizing their legislative bodies, called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose. The Philippine legislature has delegated the e*ercise of the police po'er to the Municipal +oard of the City of Manila, 'hich according to section /$0# of the 1dministrative Code is the legislative body of the City. Section /$$$ of the same Code grants the Municipal +oard, among others, the follo'ing legislative po'er, to 'it2 .(p to provide for the prohibition and suppression of riots, affrays, disturbances, and disorderly assemblies, 3u4 to regulate the use of streets, avenues ... par5s, cemeteries and other public places. and .for the abatement of nuances in the same,. and .3ee4 to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for sanitation and safety, the furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general 'elfare of the city and its inhabitants.. 6nder the above delegated po'er, the Municipal +oard of the City of Manila, enacted sections 7$$ and !!!#. Section of the 8evised 9rdinances of !#/% prohibits as an offense against public peace, and section !/"/ of the same 8evised 9rdinance penalizes as a misdemeanor, .any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or e*cite a riot: or collect 'ith other persons in a body or cro'd for any unla'ful purpose: or disturb or dis-uiet any congregation engaged in any la'ful assembly.. 1nd section !!!# provides the follo'ing2 .S;C. !!!# Free for use of pu!lic < The streets and public places of the city shall be 5ept free and clear for the use of the public, and the side'al5s and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as

provided by ordinance or regulation2 Pro"ided, that the holding of athletic games, sports, or e*ercise during the celebration of national holidays in any streets or public places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district in -uestion, may be permitted by means of a permit issued by the Mayor, 'ho shall determine the streets or public places or portions thereof, 'here such athletic games, sports, or e*ercises may be held2 And pro"ided# furt$er# That the holding of any parade or procession in any streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from the Mayor 'ho shall, on every such ocassion, determine or specify the streets or public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of such parade or procession2 1nd pro"ided# finally, That all applications to hold a parade or procession shall be submitted to the Mayor not less than t'enty,four hours prior to the holding of such parade or procession.. 1s there is no e*press and separate provision in the 8evised 9rdinance of the City regulating the holding of public meeting or assembly at any street or public places, the provisions of saif section !!!# regarding the holding of any parade or procession in any street or public paces may be applied by analogy to meeting and assembly in any street or public places. Said provision is susceptible to t'o constructions2 one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested 'ith unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a la'ful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila: and the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit 'hich shall be granted by the Mayor, sub)ect only to the latter=s reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, 'ith the vie' to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide ade-uate and proper policing to minimize the ris5 of disorder. 1fter a mature deliberation, 'e have arrived at the conclusion that 'e must adopt the second construction, that is construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the po'er to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places 'here the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held. 9ur conclusions find support in the decision in the case of >illis Co* "s. State of e' ?ampshire, 0!/ 6.S., ("#. @n that case, the statute of e' ?ampshire P.A. Chap. !$(, section /, providing that .no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the select men of the to'n or from licensing committee,. 'as construed by the Supreme Court of e' ?ampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfetted discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. 1nd the Supreme Court of the 6nited States in its decision 3!#$!4 penned by Chief Bustice ?ughes firming the )udgement of the State Supreme Court, held that . a statute re-uiring pe'rsons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or a freedom of speech and press, 'here, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration, the time, place, and manner of the parade and procession, 'ith a vie' to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing and are not invested 'ith arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, ... .. >e can not adopt the alternative construction or constru the ordinance under consideration as conferring upon the Mayor po'er to grant or refuse to grant the permit, 'hich 'ould be tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for holding of meetings, parades or processions, because such a construction 'ould ma5e the ordinance invalid and void or violative of the constitutional limitations. 1s the Municipal

+oards is empo'ered only to regulate the use of streets, par5s, and the other public places, and the 'ord .regulate,. as used in section /$$$ of the 8evised 1dministrative Code, means and includes the po'er to control, to govern, and to restrain, but can not be construed a synonimous 'ith construed .suppressed. or .prohibit. 3C'ong Sing "s. City of Manila, $! Phil., !D04, the Municipal +oard can not grant the Mayor a po'er that it does not have. +esides, the po'ers and duties of the Mayor as the Chief ;*ecutive of the City are e*ecutive and one of them is .to comply 'ith and enforce and give the necessary orders for the faithful performance and e*ecution of la's and ordinances. 3section /$0$ E!F of the 8evised 1dministrative Code4, the ligislative police po'er of the Municipal +oard to enact ordinances regulating reasonably the e*cercise of the fundamental personal rights of the citizens in the streets and other public places, can not be delgated to the Mayor or any other officer by conferring upon him unregulated discretion or 'ithout laying do'n rules to guide and control his action by 'hich its impartial e*ecution can be secured or partiality and oppression prevented. @n City of Chicago "s. Trotter, !0" @ll., $0D, it 'as held by the Supreme Court of @llinois that, under 8ev. ST. @ll. c. /$, article ( section !, 'hich empo'ers city councils to regulate the use of public streets, the council has no po'er to ordain that no processions shall be allo'ed upon the streets until a permit shall be obtained from the superintendent of police, leaving the issuance of such permits to his discretion, since the po'ers conferred on the council cannot be delegated by them. The Supreme C9urt of >isconsin in State e% rel. Garrabad "s. &ering, 7$ >is., (7(: ($ .>., !!D$, held the follo'ing2 .The ob)ections urged in the case of City of +altimore "s. 8adec5e, $# Md., /!%, 'ere also, in substance, the same, for the ordinance in that case upon its face committed to the unrestrained 'ill of a single public officer the po'er to determine the rights of parties under it, 'hen there 'as nothing in the ordinance to guide or cintrol his action, and it 'as held void because .it lays do'n no rules by 'hich its impartial e*ecution can be secured, or partiality and oppression prevented.. and that .'hen 'e remember that action or nonaction may proceed from enmity or pre)udice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and other improper influences and motives easy of concealment and difficult to be detected and e*posed, it becomes unnecessary to suggest or to comment upon the in)ustice capable of being 'rought under cover of such a po'er, for that becomes apparent to every one 'ho gives to the sub)ect a moment=s consideration. @n fact, an ordinance 'hich clothes a single individual 'ith such po'er hardly falls 'ithin the domain of la', and 'e are constrained to pronounce it inoperative and void.. ... @n the e*ercise of police po'er, the council may, in its discretion, regulate the e*ercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but can not suppress them, directly or indirectly, by attempting to commit the po'er of doing so to the mayor or any other officer. The discretion 'ith 'hich the council is vested is a legal discretion, to be e*ercised 'ithin the limits of the la', and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer and arbitrary authority, ma5ing him in its e*ercise a petty tyrant.. &n re Frazee, "0 Michigan 0##, 0D .>., %/, a city or ordinance providing that .no person or persons, or associations or organizations shall march, parade, ride or drive, in ou upon or through the public streets of the City of Grand 8apids 'ith musical instrument, banners, flags, ... 'ithout first having obtained the consent of the mayor or common council of said city:. 'as held by the Supreme Court of Michigan to be unreasonable and void. Said Supreme Court in the course of the decision held2 .. . . >e must therefore construe this charter, and the po'ers it assumes to grant, so far as it is not plainly unconstitutional, as only conferring such po'er over the sub)ects referred to as 'ill enable the city to 5eep order, and suppress mischief, in

accordance 'ith the limitations and conditions re-uired by the rights of the people themselves, as secured by the principles of la', 'hich cannot be less careful of private rights under the constitution than under the common la'.. .@t is -uite possible that some things have a greater tendency to produce danger and disorder in cities than in smaller to'ns or in rural places. This may )ustify reasonable precautionary measures, but nothing further: and no inference can e*tend beyond the fair scope of po'ers granted for such a purpose, and no grant of absolute discretion to suppress la'ful action altogther can be granted at all. . . . .. .@t has been customary, from time immemorial, in all free countries, and in most civilized countries, for people 'ho are assembled for common purposes to parade together, by day or reasonable hours at night, 'ith banners and other paraphernalia, and 'ith music of various 5inds. These processions for political, religious, and social demonstrations are resorted to for the e*press purpose of 5eeping unity of feeling and enthusiasm, and fre-uently to produce some effect on the public mind by the spectacle of union and numbers. They are a natural product and e*ponent of common aims, and valuable factors in furthering them. ... >hen people assemble in riotous mobs, and move for purposes opposed to private or public security, they become unla'ful, and their members and abettors become punishable. . . .. .@t is only 'hen political, religious, social, or other demonstrations create public disturbances, or operate as a nuisance, or create or manifestly threaten some tangible public or private mischief, that the la' interferes.. .This by,la' is unreasonable, because it suppresses 'hat is in general perfectly la'ful, and because it leaves the po'er of permitting or restraining processions, and thier courses, to an unregulated official discretion, 'hen the 'hole matter, if regualted at all, must be permanent, legal provisions, operating generally and impartially.. @n 8ich "s. apervill, $/ @ll., 1pp. ///, the -uestion 'as raised as to the validity of the city ordinance 'hich made it unla'ful for any person, society or club, or association of any 5ind, to parade any of the streets, 'ith flags, banners, or transparencies, drums, horns, or other musical instruments, 'ithout the permission of the city council first had and obtained. The appellants 'ere members of the Salvation 1rmy, and 'ere prosecuted for a violation of the ordinance, and the court in holding the ordinance invalid said, .9rdinances to be valid must be reasonable: they must not be oppressive: they must be fair and impartial: they must not be so framed as to allo' their enforcement to rest on official discretion ... ;ver since the landing of the Pilgrims from the Mayflo'er the right to assemble and 'orship accordingto the dictates of one=s conscience, and the right to parade in a peaceable manner and for a la'ful purpose, have been fostered and regarded as among the fundamental rights of a free people. The spirit of our free institutions allo's great latitude in public parades and emonstrations 'hether religious or political ... @f this ordinance is held valid, then may the city council shut off the parades of those 'hose nations do not suit their vie's and tastes in politics or religion, and permit li5e parades of those 'hose nations do. >hen men in authority are permitted in their discretion to e*ercise po'er so arbitrary, liberty is subverted, and the spirit of of our free institutions violated. ... >here the granting of the permit is left to the unregulated discretion of a small body of city eldermen, the ordinance cannot be other than partial and discriminating in its practical operation. The la' abhors partiality and discrimination. ... 3!# A.8.1., p. 7"!4 @n the case of Tru)illo "s. City of >alsenburg, !D7 Col., $/%: !!7 P. E/dF, !D7!, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in construing the provision of section ! of 9rdinance o. /%0 of the City of >alsenburg, 'hich provides2 .That it shall be unla'ful for any person or persons or association to use the street of the City of >alsenburg, Colorado for any parade, procession

or assemblage 'ithout first obtaining a permit from the Chief of Police of the City of >alsenburg so to do,. held the follo'ing2 .E!F The po'er of municipalities, under our state la', to regulate the use of public streets is conceded. .0( C.S.1., chapter !"0, section !D, subparagraph %. .The privilege of a citizen of the 6nited States to use the streets ... may be regulated in the interest of all: it is not absolute, but relative, and must be e*cercised in subordination to the general, be abridged or denied.. ?ague, Mayor "s. Committee for @ndustrial 9rganization, 0D% 6.S., $#", (!": (# S. Ct., #($, #"$: 70 Aa', ed., !$/0. E/, 0F 1n e*cellent statement of the po'er of a municipality to impose regulations in the use of public streets is found in the recent case of Co* "s. e' ?ampshire, 0!/ 6.S., ("#: "! S. Ct., %"/, %"(: 7( Aa', ed. !D$#: !00 1.A.8., !#0", in 'hich the follo'ing appears: .The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public high'ays has never been regarded as inconsistent 'ith civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon 'hich they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. >here a restriction of the use of high'ays in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted e*cercise of some civil right 'hich in other circumstances 'ould be entitled to protection. 9ne 'ould not be )ustified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means to direct public attention to an announcement of his opinions. 1s regulation of the use of the streets for parades and processions is a traditional e*cercise of control by local government, the -uestion in a particular case is 'hether that control is e*erted so as not to deny or un'arrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public -uestions immemorially associated 'ith resort to public places. Aovell "s. Criffin, 0D0 6.S., $$$, $(!:(7 S. Ct., """, ""7, 7/ Aa'. ed., #$# E#(0F: ?ague "s. Committee for @ndustrial 9rganization, 0D% 6. S., $#", (!(, (!": (# S. Ct., #($, #"0, #"$: 70 Aa'. ed., !$/0 E!$0", !$0%F: Scheneider "s. State of e' Bersey ETo'n of @rvingtonF: 0D7 6.S., !$%, !"D: "D S. Ct., !$", !(D: 7$ Aa'. ed., !(( E!"$F: Cant'ell vs. Connecticut, 0!D 6. S., /#", 0D", 0D%: "D S. Ct., #DD, #D$: 7$ Aa'. ed., !/!0 E!/!#, !//DF: !/7 1.A.8. !0(/.. E$F 9ur concern here is the validity or nonvalidity of an ordinance 'hich leaves to the uncontrolled official discretion of the chief of police of the municipal corporation to say 'ho shall, 'ho shall not, be accorded the privilege of parading on its public streets. o standard of regulation is even remotely suggested. Moreover, under the ordinance as dra'n, the chief of police may for any reason 'hich he may entertain arbitrarily deny this privelege to any group. in Co* "s. e' ?ampshire, 0!/ 6. S., ("#, 7( Aa'. ed., !D$#, !D($, said2 .@n the instant case the uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege of using the public streets in a la'ful manner clearly is apparent from the face of the ordinance before us, and 'e therefore hold it null and void.. The Supreme Court of the 6nited States in ?ague vs. Committee for @ndustrial 9rganization, 0D% 6. S., $#", (!(, (!": 70 Aa'. ed., !$/0, declared that a municipal ordinance re-uiring the obtaining of a permit for a public assembly in or upon the public streets, high'ays, public par5s, or public buildings of the city and authorizing the director of public safety, for the purpose of preventing riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblage, to refuse to issue a permit 'hen after investigation of all the facts and circumstances pertinent to the application he believes it to be proper to refuse to issue a permit, is not a valid

e*ercise of the police po'er. Said Court in the course of its opinion in support of the conclusion said2 .. . . >herever the title of streets and par5s may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts bet'een citizens, and discussing public -uestions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the 6nited States to use the streets and par5s for communication of vie's on national -uestions may be regulated in the interest of all: it is not absolute, but relative, and must be e*ercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance 'ith peace and good order: but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied. .>e thin5 the court belo' 'as right in holding the ordinance -uoted in ote ! void upon its face. @t does not ma5e comfort or convenience in the use of streets or par5s the standard of official action. @t enables the &irector of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such refusal 'ill prevent =riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.= @t can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free e*pression of vie's on national affairs for the prohibition of all spea5ing 'ill undoubtedly =prevent= such eventualities. +ut uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection 'ith the e*ercise of the right.. Section /$0$ of the 1dministrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, 'hich provides that the Mayor shall have the po'er to grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes, cannot be cited as an authority for the Mayor to deny the application of the petitioner, for the simple reason that said general po'er is predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal +oard re-uiring licenses or permits to be issued by the Mayor, such as those found in Chapters $D to 7% of the 8evised 9rdinances of the City of Manila. @t is not a specific or substantive po'er independent from the corresponding municipal ordinances 'hich the Mayor, as Chief ;*ecutive of the City, is re-uired to enforce under the same section /$0$. Moreover .one of the settled ma*ims in constitutional la' is that the po'er conferred upon the Aegislature to ma5e la's cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority,. e*cept certain po'ers of local government, specially of police regulation 'hich are conferred upon the legislative body of a municipal corporation. Ta5ing this into consideration, and that the police po'er to regulate the use of streets and other public places has been delegated or rather conferred by the Aegislature upon the Municipal +oard of the City 3section /$$$ EuF of the 1dministrative Code4 it is to be presumed that the Aegislature has not, in the same breath, conferred upon the Mayor in section /$0$ 3m4 the same po'er, specially if 'e ta5e into account that its e*ercise may be in conflict 'ith the e*ercise of the same po'er by the Municipal +oard. +esides, assuming arguendo that the Aegislature has the po'er to confer, and in fact has conferred, upon the Mayor the po'er to grant or refuse licenses and permits of all classes, independent from ordinances enacted by the Municipal +oard on the matter, and the provisions of section /$$$ 3u4 of the same Code and of section !!!# of the 8evised 9rdinances to the contrary not'ithstanding, such grant of unregulated and unlimited po'er to grant or refuse a permit for the use of streets and other public places for processions, parades, or meetings, 'ould be null and void, for the same reasons stated in the decisions in the cases above -uoted, specially in >illis Co* vs. e' ?ampshire, supra, 'herein the -uestion involved 'as also the validity of a similar statute of e' ?amsphire. +ecause the same constitutional limitations applicable to ordinances apply to statutes, and the same ob)ections to a municipal ordinance 'hich grants unrestrained discretion upon a city officer are applicable to a la' or statute that confers unlimited po'er to any officer either of the municipal or state governments. 6nder our democratic system of government no such

unlimited po'er may be validly granted to any officer of the government, e*cept perhaps in cases of national emergency. 1s stated in State e* rel. Garrabad vs. &ering, supra, .The discretion 'ith 'hich the council is vested is a legal discretion to be e*ercised 'ithin the limits of the la', and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer an arbitrary authority ma5ing in its e*ercise a petty tyrant.. @t is true that Mr. Bustice 9strand cited said provision of article /$0$ 3m4 of the 1dministrative Code apparently in support of the decision in the case of ;vangelista vs. ;arnsha', (% Phil., /((, /"!, but evidently the -uotation of said provision 'as made by the 'riter of the decision under a mista5en conception of its purvie' and is an obiter dictum, for it 'as not necessary for the decision rendered. The popular meeting or assemblage intended to be held therein by the Communist Party of the Philippines 'as clearly an unla'ful one, and therefore the Mayor of the City of Manila had no po'er to grant the permit applied for. 9n the contrary, had the meeting been held, it 'as his duty to have the promoters thereof prosecuted for violation of section 7$$, 'hich is punishable as misdemeanor by section !/"/ of the 8evised 9rdinances of the City of Manila. For, according to the decision, .the doctrine and principles advocated and urged in the Constitution and by,la's of the said Communist Party of the Philippines, and the speeches uttered, delivered, and made by its members in the public meetings or gatherings, as above stated, are highly seditious, in that they suggest and incite rebelious conspiracies and disturb and obstruct the la'ful authorities in their duty.. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, .that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches 'ill be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, 'hich might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order.. 1s the re-uest of the petition 'as for a permit .to hold a peaceful public meeting,. and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it 'as to be a la'ful assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of the permit can not be given any consideration. 1s stated in the portion of the decision in ?ague vs. Committee on @ndustrial 9rganization, supra, .@t does not ma5e comfort and convenience in the use of streets or par5s the standard of official action. @t enables the &irector of Safety to refuse the permit on his mere opinion that such refusal 'ill prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage. @t can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free e*pression of vie's on national affairs, for the prohibition of all spea5ing 'ill undoubtedly =prevent= such eventualities.. To this 'e may add the follo'ing, 'hich 'e ma5e our o'n, said by Mr. Bustice +randeis in his concurring opinion in >hitney vs. California, %! 6. S. 3Aa'. ed.4, !!D(,!!D%2 .Fear of serious in)ury cannot alone )ustify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared 'itches and burned 'omen. @t is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To )ustify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil 'ill result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . . . .Those 'ho 'on our independence by revolution 'ere not co'ards. They did not fear political change. They did not e*alt order at the cost of liberty. . . . .Moreover, even imminent danger cannot )ustify resort to prohibition of these functions essential effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it 'ould be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to a society. . . . The fact that speech is li5ely to result in some violence or in destruction

of property is not enough to )ustify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious in)ury to the state. 1mong freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crimes are education and punishment for violations of the la', not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly.. >hitney vs. California, 6. S. Sup. Ct. 8ep., %! Aa'., ed., pp. !!D",!!D%.4 @n vie' of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is granted and, there appearing no reasonable ob)ection to the use of the Plaza Miranda, Huiapo, for the meeting applied for, the respondent is ordered to issue the corresponding permit, as re-uested. So ordered. 'oran# C. J.# Pa!lo# Perfecto# Bengzon and Briones# JJ.# concur.