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Ganzon v.

CA
August 5, 1991 Sarmiento alycat SUMMARY: Ten administrative complaints were lodged against Mayor Ganzon of Iloilo City. On the basis of three of the complaints, Secretary Santos issued three preventive suspensions, each lasting sixty days each. The first two were carried out, but a TRO was procured to stop the third. It is petitioners claim that the Secretary (the Executive) does not have the power to subject him to disciplinary action. The Supreme Court held that it still does. DOCTRINE: Under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly selfexecuting, but subject to the passage of a local government code, among others. In spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. The Charter also allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. FACTS: Ten administrative complaints were lodged against Mayor Ganzon of Iloilo City. The complaints were set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals: - Mrs. Cabaluna; clerk o Was pulled out of her rightful office and assigned her to work which should be the function of a non-career service employee o A utility worker was detailed to take her place - Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza; Assistant City Health Officer o Handpicked to perform tasks not befitting her position o Office was padlocked o Salary was withheld o Given the run-around treatment when she filed her vacation leave

Was he object of a well-engineered trumpedup charge in an administrative complaint - Mansuelo Malabor; Vice Mayor + members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod o Concilor Larry Ongs office key was taken o Ong had to hold office at the Plaza Libertad, complainants sympathized with Ong and did the same o The Mayor and his security men drove them away o Ong denounced the Mayors actuations on the radio and decided to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand, many people gathered to witness o The Mayor and his security men led the firemen, who dozed water on the people and bystanders - Panchito Erbite; barangay tanod o Arrested and detained at the City Jail without any charge or a warrant o Was mauled by other detainees and caused injuries o Released only the following day Procedural facts: (Skippable, I believe. Bottom line is the Mayor attempted a lot of dilatory tactics and the Secretary of Local Government issued two preventive suspension orders before the Mayor initiated this action.) - The Mayor answered the complained and the cases were set for hearing - Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20 21 o The Mayor asked for a postponement o The hearing officers had to come all the way from Manila o The hearing was actually only held on June 20 (I think the SC made a typo here? It was probably a later date because June 20 was the actual scheduled date.) - The hearings were reset for July 25, 26, and 27 o

The Mayor moved for a postponement This was denied Hence, Secretary of Local Government, Luis Santos, issued a preventive suspension order [FIRST] The next investigation was set for September 21 o The Mayor asked for a postponement o On September 26, the complainants and the Mayor were present o But the Mayor sought another postponement o This was denied The Mayor moved for postponement of the October 24 hearing to November 7 o This was granted o His motion for change of venue was denied o At the hearing, the complainants and the Mayor were present o The Mayor proposed to take the deposition of witnesses in Iloilo o Hearing was indefinitely postponed o Investigation was set to December 13 to 15 o The Mayor sought another postponement o This was denied o The Mayor was given until December 14 to present his evidence On December 14, The Mayor insisted on his motion for postponement o The hearing officers have him until December 15 o On December 15, the Mayor still failed to present evidence o The cases were considered submitted for resolution In the meantime, prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case o Secretary Santos ordered another preventive suspension [SECOND] o The Mayor was able to obtain a restraining order from the RTC o o o

The Mayor instituted an action for prohibition against the Secretary and succeeded. He also instituted an action for prohibition in the CA. Meanwhile, the Secretary issued another order preventively suspending the Mayor for another sixty days [THIRD], and instituting in the meantime ViceMayor Malabor as acting mayor. The Mayor commenced a petition for prohibition before the CA. The CA dismissed both petitions.

MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials YES SUB-ISSUES: (Not discussed in order in the ratio) (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? NO (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? NO (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language? It was meant to meant to stress the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, like the power of local legislation. The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The Mayors argument: The 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. The Constitution is meant: (1) To strengthen self-rule by local government units

(2) To strip the President of the power of control over local governments - by deleting the phrase as may be provided by law The provision in question reads as follows:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.

Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

The deletion of "as may be provided by law" is significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer RATIO: First sub-issue: Notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right, or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. The omission of "as may be provided by law" signifies local governments' autonomy from congress. The Constitution did not, however, intend to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. Autonomy does not contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments. Autonomy is subject to the guiding star, of the legislature (though not control). Under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to the passage of a local government code, among others. In spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. The Charter also allows

Third sub-issue: The deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, like the power of local legislation. The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. Mondano vs. Silvosa: The two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation, when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires. The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three cases, and possibly a fourth one (Pelaez).

Lacson v. Roque: The President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided by law. (reiterated in Hebron v. Reyes and Mondano v. Silvosa) Pelaez v. Auditor General: The President may not suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him. However, neither of the first three cases categorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Lacson v. Roque: Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable. Hebron v. Reyes: Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly. Mondano v. Silvosa: The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor. Pelaez v. Auditor General: The President cannot impose disciplinary measures on local officials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative Code. Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power to suspend/ remove, it was because the law lodged the power elsewhere, and not because the Court did not think that the President cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but. But in those cases which the law gave him the power, the Court found little difficulty in sustaining him. Second sub-issue: The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As earlier said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. In spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect.

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." The Constitution does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local government units. Local governments, are subject to regulation, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- government. Limbona v. Mangelin: Decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to the local levels. Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. On Suspension (This is not topical anymore) The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Ganzon are another matter. Since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not tolerating misfeasance in public office, but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. Layno v. Sandiganbayan: The continuance of a preventive suspension for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter petitioner were acquitted in the criminal case, in the meanwhile, his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted

continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. The sole objective of a suspension is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority" or to keep him off "the records and other evidence. It is a means to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span. Suspension is not a penalty and is like preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty. Suspension is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. A longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and nothing less than tyranny. Imposing 600 days of suspension, which is not a remote possibility, on Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent. It is also to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably. The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the Secretary to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal

apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when the Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort. The Court is not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior, from exercising a legal power, yet it is of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion. The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under question, and that any talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner, which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act. RULING: Mayor Ganzon shall suffer the duration of his third suspension (the TRO is lifted). But insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, the Court urges the Department of Local Government to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, the Court precludes the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.

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