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Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2005, pp.

249--262

Perceived Threats to Democracy: An Examination of Political Affiliation and Beliefs about Terrorism, State Control, and Human Rights
Stamos Papastamou
Panteion University Athens, Greece

Gerasimos Prodromitis
Panteion University Athens, Greece

Tilemachos Iatridis
Panteion University Athens, Greece

This article reports on the results of a survey that was conducted in Greece. It explored 1,027 respondents (a) definitions of and beliefs about terrorism, (b) tolerance of restrictive measures against terrorism, (c) tolerance of violations of the human rights of those accused of terrorism, and (d) political affiliations. Respondents were classified according to their endorsement of anti-terrorist and anti-power beliefs. A multiple correspondence analysis indicated that respondents who endorsed neither anti-terrorist nor anti-power beliefs were most tolerant of restrictive anti-terrorist measures and violations of human rights. These respondents either identified politically with the extreme Right, or refused to place themselves on the political continuum. The concept of terrorism has been subject to diverse views on the exercise of violence and on the institutional practices that ought to regulate public life in modern liberal democracies. It is widely acknowledged that the term lacks a universally accepted definition. More often than not, terrorism is used polemically and rhetorically, in order to condemn an opponents cause as illegitimate rather
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Gerasimos Prodromitis, Panteion University, Syngrou Av. 136, 176 71 Athens, Greece. [e-mail: gprod@panteion.gr]. We would like to thank Dr M. K. Dhami and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this articles. 249
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than describe behavior; it is a pejorative label as much as an analytical tool, especially in popular discourse (Crenshaw, 2000, p. 406). According to a definition advanced by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for instance, terrorism is the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to intimidate the government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof. . . (U.S. Department of Justice, 1999). The events that followed 9/11 have largely reaffirmed the polemical properties of the term, by affording terrorism a tremendous emotional impact and relocating it at the heart of the political debate about the international order. Within the context of the international anti-terrorist campaign launched by the United States and its allies, terrorism is taken to represent an ultimate threat to the international order, public security, and democracy itself. The strict anti-terrorist legislation that was adopted by individual states allegedly in response to terrorism, has raised serious concerns about the impact of anti-terrorism on democracy in general and human rights in particular. As Joyner (2004, p. 243) summarizes, the relevant concerns expressed by the United Nations include the ways in which acts of terrorism destroy human rights and fundamental freedoms, the ways in which acts of terrorism may serve as the rationale by governments to crack down on dissident groups and critics of a regime, and the ways in which counter-terrorist legislation adopted by governments might infringe on human rights and civil liberties of persons in those states. Social psychological literature postulates that despite the broad consensus on human rights (Doise, Spini & Clemence, 1999), whenever these are contextualized (i.e., applied in concrete conditions and anchored in real societal relations) violations are allowed (Doise, 2001; Jesuino, 2004). In the case of persons involved in terrorist action violations of human rights may take extreme forms, perhaps due to an urge to punish those who pose a fundamental threat to peoples ordinary secure life (see Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Tyler & Smith, 1998). Violence, either as premeditated violence . . . in the pursuit of specific political, religious, or social objectives (Parker & Stern, 2002, p. 604), or as asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies outside the forms of contention routinely operating within the current regime (Tilly, 2003, p. 233) may explain why violations of the human rights of terror suspects are tolerated. The question of terrorism is one of the perceived legitimacy of violence. In the context of the widely accepted model of democratic dialogue and peaceful settlement of disputes, it is considered inappropriate to resort to violence in order to regulate human coexistence (Russet, 1993; for a discussion of the philosophical issues at stake see Arendt, 1969). Yet, within the context of liberal democracy, violence may in principle be used in the name of the population or the people and be ultimately legitimized by them. The question of the legitimacy of the means thus becomes intertwined with the perceived righteousness of the cause. This is echoed in alternative definitions of terrorism according to which terrorist violence is just a form of political action aimed at a political change (Hoffman, 1998), or

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even a just reaction to an oppressive regime in the pursuit of restoring justice and emancipation (e.g., Braud, 2004). Conflicting political agendas appear to emphasize selectively the repressive or liberating functions of violence depending on their views upon an existing societal regime. Consequently, beliefs about terrorist violence may be in line with the prevailing anti-terrorist campaign and stress the threat that terrorism represents for democracy. Alternatively, beliefs about terrorist violence may point to structural conditions such as the international division of labor and social injustice and/or their perpetrators such as the governments, the rich (i.e., the authority), in order to hold these responsible for appropriating terrorist action. These beliefs should be related to the diverse views on the institutional practices allegedly employed against terrorist action and on the institutional treatment of individuals accused of terrorist acts. In recent years, a number of scholars have questioned the validity of classic political categorizations mainly in the form of the Left-Right division (e.g., Giddens, 1994). It has been postulated that political controversy over political and societal aims (i.e., political argumentation) has given way to a kind of controversy on moral grounds. This is demonstrated in the appeals made to a radical center as a (non)political milieu wherein consensus and pragmatist concerns are placed above political dispute and division. Mouffe (2000; see also Bobbio, 1987; Marchel & Witkowski, 2003), on the other hand, claims that the Left-Right division still functions effectively in producing contrasting meanings and identities, a claim that has received empirical support in one of our studies (Papastamou, Prodromitis, & Iatridis, 2004; see also Marchand, 2004). It is most likely that both nonpolitical and classic political affiliations would represent different segments of a population. What do individuals with different political affiliations believe about the human rights of suspected terrorists? Would they suggest a modest treatment in line with their centrist convictions? or, would they be ready to deny basic rights to those arrested for terrorism, on the grounds of a moral condemnation of terrorist logic and practice? The present study aims to explore how beliefs about terrorism relate to individuals political affiliations and concerns about the impact of anti-terrorist action on civil liberties and human rights. Tolerance of violations of civil liberties on behalf of the state and of violations of the human rights of people prosecuted for terrorist activity, were examined as indicators of these concerns. The study was conducted in Greece, a country with a distinct experience of terrorism. Whereas terrorist groups inspired by left-wing and anti-imperialist movements in the 1970s had long been disbanded in other European countries (see Kassimeris, 2000), the members of the Greek November 17 were only recently arrested and brought to trial (in early 2003). Their arrest and prosecution fueled a debate about the preconditions and consequences of terrorism, at a time that other forms of terrorism with different political agendas had been at the heart of the public debate on

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terrorism worldwide. What is more, the international anti-terrorist campaign run by the United States, which included military intervention in Afghanistan and (at that time) the prospect of invading Iraq, were met with the disapproval of the Greek population according to the polls and fueled a vague anti-imperialist discourse that made anti-power accounts of terrorism more plausible. Method Respondents One thousand and twenty-seven university students in Athens took part in the study; 348 of them were male (33.9%) and 679 female (66.1%), with a mean age of 19.5 years (SD = 2.54). Measures Three measures were originally constructed for the purpose of the present study. The first set of 8 items measured definitions of terrorism using contrasted definitions and meanings of the term (see Appendix I). The second set of 8 items measured tolerance of institutional restrictive measures against terrorism (see Appendix I). In both measures, respondents were asked to state their agreement or disagreement with each item on 7-point Likert-type scales (where 1 = Disagree, 7 = Agree). Next, respondents chose out of a list of 14 fundamental human rights, as many as in their view the perpetrators of a terrorist attack should be deprived of in the event of their arrest (see Appendix I). The last measure tapped respondents political affiliation in one question asking them to position themselves on a Left wingRight wing 10-point scale (where 1 = Extreme Left, 10 = Extreme Right). Procedure The survey was conducted by the Centre for Social Psychology and Public Opinion Surveys in Panteion University, from December 2002 to February 2003. The data were collected in university classrooms using self-completed, structured questionnaires. No incentive for participation was given to respondents. Results First, the data regarding the definitions of terrorism were entered into a principal components analysis with varimax rotation, which produced two factors (see Table 1). The first factor sums up what may be regarded as an anti-power position in that it denotes a critical stance toward the role of the authority in the perpetuation of terrorism. This critique points to the arbitrariness of the authority and the way

Political Affiliation, State Control, and Human Rights Table 1. Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation on Definitions of Terrorism Component Q4 individual rights under risk from authority Q7 collective security under risk from authority Q1 terrorism perpetuated by authority Q3 eliminate social inequality and injustice Q6 violent form of political struggle Q8 terrorism abuses human rights Q2 terrorism undermines democracy Q5 terrorism against civilized society Eigenvalue Variance explained Anti-power .78 .77 .57 .48 Anti-Terrorism

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1.932 24.15%

.76 .73 .60 1.706 21.33%

M 4.74 4.23 3.67 5.09 4.51 5.13 5.45 5.10

Note. 7-point scales (7 = agree) were used. Loadings < .40 are omitted.

in which it imperils collective security and individual civil rights. Actually, this peril is considered greater for collective security and rights than any risk to them that might arise from terrorism. The second factor captures an anti-terrorist position, which emphasizes the criminal nature of terrorist activity and denies it any political rationale. This particular critique focuses on the disastrous consequences of terrorism for democratic polities, human rights, and civilized coexistence. Next, respondents were classified on the basis of their endorsement of the anti-power and anti-terrorist positions, after calculating the means of the items loading heavily on each factor. Respondents with a mean score below the median of the anti-power position (M = 4.50) were classified as non-anti-power whereas those with a mean score equal to or above the median were classified as antipower. Respondents with a mean score below the median of the anti-terrorist position (M = 5.33) were classified as non-anti-terrorists, and those with a mean score equal to or above the median of the anti-terrorist position were classified as anti-terrorists. Respondents responses to the states practical measures against terrorism were cluster-analyzed (hierarchical cluster analysis, Wards method; see Table 2). A first group (41.6% of the sample) was opposed to general policing, in the sense that they rejected recourse to extreme measures in dealing with terrorist suspects, but also in being opposed to the surveillance of the citizens everyday life. Compared to the other groups, this group was also less willing to condone tighter border controls. A second, much smaller group (18.7%) was in favor of general policing; they accepted prejudicial treatment of terrorist suspects, were amenable to the reinstatement of capital punishment, and disagreed less than the other groups with the rationale and practice of police surveillance of everyday life. Finally, a third group (39.7%) was mainly distinguished for stressing the importance of police control on aliens (simplifying extradition proceedings for suspects, denying political asylum to terrorist suspects, and tightening border controls), and tolerating psychological violence during interrogation of suspects.

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Table 2. Classification of Respondents (Hierarchical Cluster Analysis, Wards Method) by Strength of Responses on Restrictive Measures against Terrorism Opposed to General Policing Q1 extradition proceedings for suspects Q2 psychological force during questioning Q3 surveillance of citizens Q4 physical force during questioning Q5 surveillance of telephone calls Q6 deny asylum to suspects Q7 tighten border controls Q8 reinstate capital punishment Respondents per cluster 3.45 1.78 1.28 1.30 1.31 3.09 5.75 1.40 41.6% In Favor of General Policing 4.92 5.31 3.16 4.42 3.31 5.29 6.10 5.17 18.7% In Favor of Controlling Aliens 4.54 4.38 1.90 2.58 1.98 5.25 6.61 1.63 39.7%

Overall Means 4.16 3.47 1.88 2.39 1.95 4.36 6.16 2.19

Note. Figures in columns are mean responses per cluster, on 7-point scales (7 = agree).

A hierarchical cluster analysis was also performed on respondents ratings of those rights that people accused of terrorism should be denied (see Table 3). Again, three groups of respondents were identified. The first group (30.67% of the sample) supported depriving people accused of terrorism of rights relevant

Table 3. Classification of Respondents (Hierarchical Cluster Analysis, Wards Method) According to the Rights Denied to Accused Terrorists Respondents Typical in the responses a sample (%) Cluster 1: Privacy and Physical Integrity (30.67%) Q12 Protect from arbitrary arrest 5.51 Q5 Protect private/ family life 6.36 Q10 Protect property 4.57 Q1 Protect from torture 5.72 Q7 Protect dignity/ personality 4.48 Cluster 2: Fair Institutional Treatment (17.72%) Q6 Education/ schooling 2.77 Q3 Fair trial 4.05 Q13 Equality before the law 4.23 Q9 Defense in court 4.00 Q4 Opinion/ expression 4.37 Cluster 3: Political Participation (42.45%) Q8 Stand for office 16.76 Q2 Vote 12.15 Q14 Confidentiality of conversations 13.93 Q11 Seek/ propagate ideas 12.11 No response (9.15%)
a

Respondents in Cluster Cluster (%) 9.51 9.18 6.45 7.62 5.84 9.24 9.40 8.43 7.94 7.94 30.64 20.73 20.45 15.58

Respondents Assigned to Each Cluster (%) 70.95 59.35 58.00 54.80 53.57 94.21 65.54 56.22 56.00 51.31 56.07 52.33 45.02 43.00

Value Test 9.58 6.27 4.85 4.43 3.53 15.60 10.47 8.08 7.79 6.81 15.72 11.10 8.00 6.05

p .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001

Typical responses are shown under each cluster. In hierarchical cluster analysis for binary variables, typical variables in each cluster are those in-cluster percentage presents a statistically significant difference from the respective percentage in the whole sample (Lebart, Morineau & Piron, 1995).

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to the protection of privacy and individual physical integrity. The second group (17.72%) supported depriving them of their right to a fair institutional treatment; and a last, largest group (42.45%), supported denying them their rights of political participation and general access to the sphere of public communication. However, a notable portion of respondents refused to respond to this question (no response 9.15%). The responses on our last measure, that of respondents political affiliation on a 10-point scale, were collapsed into five political positions by merging each pair of adjacent points: 5.84% of respondents placed themselves in the Extreme Left, 20.74% described themselves as Left wing, 39.82% defined themselves as Center, while 13.63% and 7.21% of respondents regarded themselves as Right wing and extreme Right wing, respectively. Another 12.76% of respondents refused to position themselves on the scale. Finally, a multiple correspondence analysis was conducted on all classifications of respondents that were presented above. Correspondence analysis is an exploratory technique, which uncovers the associations in large contingency tables (see Benz ecri, 1992; Clausen, 1998). All classifications were entered into the analysis simultaneously. Figure 1 illustrates the contingencies of individual modalities along the first two factors. Factor 1 (13.19% of inertia) was mainly defined by the contrast between the anti-power stance, the Left, opposition to general policing and refusal to deny human rights (i.e., no response in relevant questions) on the one hand, and the non-anti-power stance, police control of aliens, favor of general policing, and against protection of privacy and individual integrity on the other hand (see value tests in Appendix II). Factor 2 (10.21% of inertia) was mainly defined by the contrast between the anti-terrorist stance, the Left, police control of aliens and against political participation on the one hand, and the non-anti-terrorist stance, undeclared political affiliation, favor of general policing, and against fair institutional treatment on the other hand (see value tests in Appendix II). Thus, factor 1 clearly distinguishes the anti-power and non-anti-power stances, whereas factor 2 distinguishes the anti-terrorist and non-anti-terrorist views. Figure 1 shows that respondents beliefs about terrorism and power, as well as anti-terrorist measures and human rights, were directly linked to political affiliations. This is certainly the case in the left-wing opposition to general policing, as opposed to the other political groups that were more prone to tolerate tough antiterrorist measures. Nonetheless, variation within the Left-wing front did emerge. The extreme Left distanced itself from the anti-terrorist position while being critical of authority and refraining from denying any rights of persons charged with terrorist acts. On the other hand, Left-wing moderates, who resembled centrists in taking an anti-terrorist stance, held the authority accountable for the perpetuation of terrorism, and were more willing to turn down suspects rights of participation in politics. The Center-to-Right was adjacent to anti-terrorist and non-anti-power

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Fig. 1. Factorial plan of the multiple correspondence analysis (factorial axes 1,2).

Note. Variables represent beliefs about terrorism and power; tolerance of restrictive measures against terrorism; tolerance of violations of suspects human rights; and respondents political affiliations.

stances and favored an increase of police measures for controlling aliens as a means of anti-terrorist policy. At the same time, they were willing (just as those in the extreme Right) to violate terrorists rights to protection of privacy and individual physical integrity. It is worth noting the affinity between the extreme-Right portion of the sample and the group refusing to declare a political affiliation. This is an area that seems dismissive of both anti-terrorist and anti-power positions. As may be seen in Figure 1, such an apparently nihilist attitude is not at all devoid of stance, which is in fact quite extreme regarding specific anti-terrorist practices. Indeed, this particular group appeared to advocate the taking of extreme policing measures while denying fair institutional treatment of persons charged with terrorism.

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Discussion This study addressed the relation between beliefs about the terrorism and civil liberties and human rights. The two-factor solution from respondents definitions of terrorism indicated strong concerns about the role of authority in the perpetuation of terrorism. Clear sets of respondents beliefs also emerged from their responses with regard to the restrictive measures adopted by the state in response to terrorist action and the human rights allowed or denied to individuals arrested for terrorist activity. It is striking that a disproportionately large subset of the sample were willing to infringe on the rights of accused terrorists in harsh ways, particularly by denying their rights of privacy and physical integrity and their right of fair treatment. This effect was tapped in the polls at the time our data were collected (shortly after the arrest and prosecution of members of November 17). It resembles similar trends in other national contexts that indicate a kind of moral disengagement of respondents (Bandura, 1990, 1999). A sort of moral disengagement is highly plausible considering the links between respondents positions toward the human rights of accused terrorists and respondents tolerance of restrictive counter-terrorist measures. Those respondents who are willing to deprive accused terrorists from fair treatment, and, though less so, those denying the rights of accused terrorists in terms of privacy and physical integrity, were also in favor of general policing. However, similarities and differences between these beliefs are cross-cutting, depending on respondents endorsement of anti-power and anti-terrorist beliefs. The above beliefs about human rights and counter-terrorist measures were shared by those respondents who do not challenge the role of authority in perpetuating terrorism (i.e., non-anti-power). These respondents further endorsed the belief that police control of foreigners should be intensified. Contrary to the former convictions about human rights and counter-terrorist measures, the belief that police control of foreigners should be intensified was also shared by respondents who denigrate terrorism. On the other hand, the consideration of respondents endorsement of anti-terrorist beliefs brings together the appeal to increasing control of foreigners and the denial of political participation of accused terrorists. Hence, the beliefs about power and terrorism are critical to understanding how the human rights allowed or denied to individuals arrested for terrorist activity line up with respondents beliefs about restrictive counter-terrorist measures. The multiple correspondence analysis, by taking into account respondents tolerance of violations of human rights and restrictive counter-terrorist measures, indicated that the beliefs about power and terrorism may either collide or clash. The two positions (anti-terrorist and anti-power) are not mutually exclusive. There may exist a good deal of diversity in beliefs regarding the two kinds of violence, i.e., violence enforced by a democratically legitimized authority and violence

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that contends with such authority in the name of redressing putative notions of equity. Political affiliations were tightly linked to beliefs about terrorism and power, institutional anti-terrorist measures, and human rights of terrorists. All moderate political affiliations from Left to Right (including Center) were close to the anti-terrorist position. Interestingly, the Left-wing propensity for denying political participation rights to those arrested for terrorism was contrasted by a Centrist and Right-wing appeal to increasing control over foreigners. This appeal encapsulates a type of xenophobic shift in emphasis, which would not be fully accounted for by domestic experiences of terrorism. Instead, this shift is most likely in line with the new emphasis on internal security placed by governments (including the Greek government) in response to 9/11, with a direct impact on immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers (Brouwer, 2003). This type of xenophobia, however, is not the only faux that Centrists in particular may be susceptible to. Inasmuch as Centrist respondents were not critical of the role of authority in the perpetuation of terrorism, they resembled their Right-wing counterparts in tolerating violations of terrorists right of privacy and individual physical integrity. Thus, it appears that Centrists are tolerant of violations of human rights, perhaps due to the prevalence of moral rather than political concerns in this particular political milieu. On the other hand, those respondents who refused politically to position themselves appeared to distance themselves from both the anti-terrorist and anti-power positions. The constellation of political (and nonpolitical) affiliations and beliefs at the point where both positions are dismissed, is particularly informative. It encompasses the extreme-Right portion of the sample, the most extreme policing measures, and a clear denial to a fair institutional treatment of persons charged with terrorism. The politics of non-politics thus becomes extreme in fact, counter to scholarly arguments that make a case for a new pragmatic attitude toward coping with change (for a critical review see Weltman, 2004). Change at the societal level may entail increased reflexivity, risk, and hazards. However, people represent these mentally depending on their trust of authority, i.e., on the extent to which they perceive themselves as part of a given power structure (Greenberg, Craighill & Greenberg, 2004). These perceptions are largely a function of the political context. The pragmatic attitude of people refusing politically to position themselves, may turn into a cynical endorsement of the most extreme state violence. Of course, our findings are essentially anchored in the particular situation and the historical experience of political conflict in Greece. As was mentioned in the beginning, this is a long experience, yet it may by no means be compared to the experience of new forms of terrorism resulting in massive costs of human lives in other countries. In short, the vulnerability (Slovic, 2002) of Greek respondents may not have been as high. The political and symbolic connotations of terrorism vary across different contexts. This study indicates that, on sufferance of particular

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beliefs, societys bid to shield itself from terrorism may lead to society terrorizing itself. The tendency to legitimize human rights violations under the pretext of combating terrorism is particularly worrying, and goes back in time, long before 9/11 (e.g., Reinares, 1998). What is at stake thus does not concern the Greek society alone. References
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Reinares, F. (1998). Democratic regimes, internal security policy and the threat of terrorism. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 44, 351371. Russett, B. M. (1993). Grasping the democratic peace: Principles for a post-Cold War world. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Slovic, P. (2002). Terrorism as hazard: A new species of trouble. Risk Analysis, 22, 425426. Tilly, C. (2003). The politics of collective violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tyler, T. R., & Smith, H. J. (1998). Social justice and social movements. In T. D. Gilbert, T. S. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology. Vol. 2 (4th ed., pp. 595629). New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Boston: McGraw-Hill. U.S. Department of Justice (1999). Terrorism in the United States 1999. Federal Bureau of Investigation (ELF ARSON pg.6). Weltman, D. (2004). Political identity and the Third Way: Some social-psychological implications of the current anti-ideological turn. British Journal of Social Psychology, 43, 8398.

STAMOS PAPASTAMOU is Professor of Experimental Social Psychology at the Department of Psychology at Panteion University of Athens, Greece. From September 2004 he is the Rector of Panteion University. His major research interests focus on social influence processes and on mechanisms of formation, diffusion, and change of social representations. GERASIMOS PRODROMITIS is Assistant Professor of Experimental Social Psychology at the Department of Psychology at Panteion University of Athens, Greece. His major research interests focus on social influence processes and on mechanisms of formation, diffusion, and change of social representations. TILEMACHOS IATRIDIS is a post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Psychology, Panteion University. He studied psychology and research methods in Athens and Glasgow, and completed a PhD in experimental social psychology at Panteion University. He has published research on intergroup discrimination and xenophobia. Appendix I Definitions of terrorism (1 = disagree, 7 = agree) Q1 The phenomenon of terrorism is perpetuated by authority so as to justify its arbitrariness and the violence it exerts. Q2 Terrorism is a form of political action that undermines democracy. Q3 The only effective way to combat terrorism is to eliminate its causes: social inequality and injustice. Q4 Individual rights are under greater risk from the arbitrariness of governmental authority than from terrorist activity. Q5 Terrorism flouts the basic tenets of civilized society, while it seeks to conceal its criminal nature behind untenable political arguments.

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Q6 Terrorism is a violent form of political struggle, impelled by political motives and objectives. Q7 Collective civilian security is under greater risk from the arbitrariness of governmental authority than from terrorist activity. Q8 Terrorism is a form of political action that abuses human rights. Measures against terrorism (1 = disagree, 7 = agree) In order to counter terrorism, the state should: Q1 Simplify extradition proceedings for terrorist suspects Q2 Allow use of psychological force during questioning of terrorist suspects Q3 Allow surveillance of citizens everyday life Q4 Allow use of physical force during questioning of terrorist suspects Q5 Allow surveillance of citizens telephone calls Q6 Deny political asylum to terrorist suspects Q7 Tighten controls at all of a countrys access points (sea-ports, border checkpoints, airports) Q8 Reinstate capital punishment for terrorists Fundamental human rights (checklist) Which of the following rights should accused terrorist be deprived? Q1 Protection from torture or inhuman and degrading treatment Q2 Right to vote Q3 Right to a fair, impartial and public trial Q4 Right of opinion and expression Q5 Protection from intrusion into private or family life Q6 Right to education and schooling Q7 Protection from offences against human dignity and personality Q8 Right to stand for office Q9 Right to a full defense in court Q10 Protection from deprivation of property Q11 Right to seek and propagate ideas Q12 Protection from arbitrary arrest Q13 Equality before the law Q14 Confidentiality of correspondence and telephone conversations

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Appendix II Numerical Data of Multiple Correspondence Analysis (Factorial Axes 1,2)


Categories NON ANTI-POWER ANTI-POWER NON ANTI-TERRORISTS ANTI-TERRORISTS Advocates of aliens control Advocates of general policing Opposed to general policing PRIVACY & PHYSICAL INTEGRITY FAIR INSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT POLITICAL PARTICIPATION NO RESPONSE Extreme Left Left-wing Center Right-wing Extreme Right Undeclared Coordinates 1 0,45 0,49 0,34 0,27 0,44 0,64 0,49 0,57 0,51 0,28 1,63 1,28 0,92 0,28 0,77 0,82 0,10 Contribution COS2 Evaluation test

2 1 2 1 2 1 2 0,14 5,96 0,76 0,18 0,02 13,49 4,24 0,12 5,24 0,67 0,18 0,02 13,49 4,24 0,44 3,20 6,89 0,09 0,15 9,68 12,49 0,35 2,57 5,53 0,09 0,15 9,68 12,49 0,32 5,64 3,75 0,16 0,08 13,00 9,32 0,84 4,87 11,04 0,10 0,17 9,87 13,09 0,04 18,76 0,05 0,46 0,00 21,67 1,03 0,17 6,28 0,73 0,14 0,01 12,12 3,64 0,99 2,94 14,05 0,06 0,21 7,61 14,65 0,73 2,07 18,55 0,06 0,40 7,64 20,13 0,92 15,16 6,29 0,26 0,08 16,45 9,32 0,52 5,98 1,28 0,10 0,02 10,15 4,13 0,57 11,03 5,57 0,22 0,09 15,03 9,39 0,26 2,02 2,20 0,05 0,04 7,38 6,77 0,27 5,11 0,79 0,09 0,01 9,80 3,39 0,93 3,06 5,11 0,05 0,07 7,32 8,31 1,27 0,08 16,73 0,00 0,23 1,24 15,52

Note. Coordinates locate modalities on each dimension (factor); absolute contributions express the modalities contributions to the factors; COS2 (i.e. the squared quotient of each modalitys coordinate on each dimension divided by the distance of that modality from the center of dimensions) represent the modalities quality of illustration on the dimensions; evaluation tests stand for the number of standard deviations from the normal distribution (statistics higher than [2] are significant at p < .05). Evaluation tests confirm the higher contributions of individual modalities (Lebart, Morineau & Piron, 1995).