Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C

hil

1. 18 SCRA 47 NO. L 22797 SEPTEMBER 22, 1966 TESTACY OF MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS, ROSALINDA SANTOS (EXECUTRIX), petitioner and appellee vs. FLORA BLAS DE BUENAVENTURA (Legatee) oppositor and appellant. 2. 47 PHIL 938 NO. 24168 SEPTEMBER 22, 1925 FLORANTE MANALO, as guardian of the minors Lazaro and Daria Mendieta, petitioner vs. HON. ISIDRO PAREDES, Judge of First Instance of Laguna, et al, respondents 3. 38 PHIL 29 NO. 12397 APRIL 2, 1918 FLORENCIA AMURAN, plaintiff and appellee vs. ANA AQUINO and RUFINA ORTIZ, defendants, ANA AQUINO, appellant 4. 14 SCRA 563 NO. L 19281 JUNE 30, 1965 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO SANTILLON, petitioner appellant vs. PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO M. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors appellees 5. 79 SCRA 364 ADM. MATTER NO. 190 RET OCTOBER 18, 1977 RE CLAIMS FOR BENEFITS OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO, FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO, MARIO B. CHANLIONGCO II, MS. ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA and MARIO C. CHANLIONGCO JR. claimants 6. 37 SCRA 315 NO. L 28093 JANUARY 30, 1971 BASILIA BERDIN VDA. DE CONSUEGRA, JULIANA PACITA, MARIA LOURDES, JOSE, JR, RODRIGO, LINEDA and LUIS, all surnamed CONSUEGRA, petitioners appellants vs. GSIS, et. al, respondents, appellees 7. 104 PHIL 1065 8. 26 SCRA 658 NO. L 26170 JANUARY 27, 1969 THE GSIS, plaintiff vs. SUSANA, ROMUALDO, JULIAN, MACARIO, CELESTINA, and LUISA, all surnamed CUSTODIO, defendants 9. G.R. NO. 22402 JUNE 30, 1967 10. 80 SCRA 421 NO. L 37365 NOVEMBER 29, 1977 GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et. al, plaintiffs appellees vs. GERONIMO ALMANZA, et. al, defendant, FLORENTINO CARTENA, defendant appellant

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C

G.R. No. L-22797

September 22, 1966

TESTACY OF MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS. ROSALINA SANTOS (Executrix), petitioner and appellee, vs. FLORA BLAS DE BUENAVENTURA (Legatee), oppositor and appellant. FACTS: On October 22, 1956, Rosalina Santos filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the last will allegedly executed on September 22, 1956 by the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas. 1 The nearest of kin of the deceased were her brothers and a sister, nephews and nieces. Rosalinda Santos, petitioner-appellee herein, is one of said nieces. Among the legatees or more accurately, devisees mentioned in the will is Flora Blas de Buenaventura. She is not related by blood to the deceased. Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia filed on November 28, 1956 an opposition to the probate of said will. Among the grounds for the opposition of Flora Blas and Justo Garcia were that the will was not executed in accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon the testatrix Maxima Santos in the execution thereof; that the signature of Maxima was secured through fraud; and that at the time of the execution of the will Maxima was mentally incapable of making a will.2 After the probate court had received the evidence for both the petitioner and oppositors, but before the latter could close their evidence, Flora Blas on November 6, 1957 filed a manifestation that she is withdrawing her opposition to the probate of the will. The proceedings continued however as to the opposition of Justo Garcia. On December 24, 1957, the court below issued an order allowing the probate of the will. After the order had become final and executory, Flora Blas on filed a petition praying for the delivery to her of a fishpond as a specific devise in her favor. To this petition, in spite of apparent understanding, Rosalina Santos filed an opposition predicated on the ground that said specific devise in favor of Flora was forfeited in favor of the other residuary heirs, pursuant to a provision of the will that should any of the heirs, devisees or legatees contest or oppose its probate, the latter shall lose his or her right to receive any inheritance or benefit under it, which shall be forfeited in favor of the other heirs, devisees and legatees. In its order, the court a quo sustained the theory that the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will was valid and had the effect of depriving Flora of her devise in view of her previous opposition to its probate, which it held not justified under the circumstances. Accordingly, it denied the motion for delivery of the specific devise, declaring the same forfeited in favor of the other residuary heirs. Flora's motion for reconsideration, superseded by a subsequent amended motion to the same effect, was denied by the probate court. The court a quo's conclusion is that "there is no justification for her to oppose or contest the probate of said will" because "from the evidence given by her and by her witnesses during the pendency of the probate of the will ..., it appears that Flora Blas was aware of the true facts surrounding the execution of the will and of the mental state of mind of the said testatrix at the time of the execution of the will in question, and yet she has charge her benefactor, the late Maxima Santos, as not enjoying sound mind when the latter executed

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C her will on September 22, 1956", and that "there is no proof to show that the said Flora Blas was in any manner related by blood to Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas so that her contest of the said will cannot benefit her." But the most important single factor that should engender reasonable doubt as to the physical and mental capacity of a person to execute a will, was the condition of Maxima Blas as gleaned from the records of the case. She was an old woman more than 86 years old who suffered from various ailments Several documents executed by her before the alleged date of execution of the will, were no longer signed but merely thumbmarked by her,7 whereas the will appealed to have been signed. ISSUE: WON there is no justification for the legatee to oppose or contest the probate of a will. HELD: It is difficult for Us to imagine that one situated and equally faced with the above enumerated facts and circumstances as the appellant was, should keep her peace. She had her doubts, and to resolve them she had to conduct inquiries and investigations. Her findings all the more strengthened her belief that there was something untoward about the execution of the will. Thus, in her desire to know the truth and to protect her rights, she opposed the probate of the will. After all, had the contest been continued and the will held invalid on any of the grounds provided by law for the disallowance of a will,8 she would have contributed in no small measure to the cause of the truth which the courts have been in a position to apply the proper legal provisions which are for the greater interests of the testatrix. Through said withdrawal, Flora conformed to the testatrix's wish that her dispositions of her properties under the will be carried out. It follows that, taken as a whole, Flora's actuations subserved rather than violated the testatrix's intention. There is, therefore, no further need to discuss the second issue on the validity of a "no contest and forfeiture" clause in this jurisdiction, since, at any rate, said clause was not violated in this case. Wherefore, the appealed orders dated April 30, 1958 and March 7, 1959 are hereby reversed, and this case is remanded to the court a quo with the instruction that appellant's devise under the will be forthwith delivered to her.

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C

G.R. No. 24168

September 22, 1925

FLORENCIO MANALO, as guardian of the minors Lazaro Mendieta and Daria Mendieta, petitioner, vs. Honorable ISIDRO PAREDES, Judge of First Instance of Laguna, and PHILIPPINE FOOD COMPANY, respondents. This is a proceeding for the issuance of a writ of mandamus addressed to the Honorable Isidro Paredes, Judge of the CFI of Laguna, ordering the publication of the petition for the probate of the will of the deceased Francisco Villegas. FACTS: On March 22, 1924, Laureana Hidalgo, surviving spouse of Francisco Villegas, filed with the CFI of Laguna an application for letters of administration of the estate left by her deceased husband, who, according to the application, died intestate In the course of said administration and on May 5, 1924, Justina Mendieta, and others, supposed testamentary executor, through their attorney, filed a motion with the court, praying for the probate of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas, wherein most of his property was given as a legacy to said Justina Mendieta, the latter's children and the legitimate wife of the deceased Francisco Villegas. On August 8, 1924, Messrs. E.M. Lopez and V.F. Reyes, attorneys, on behalf of the executor Melecio Fule, filed a motion wherein they stated that the attesting witnesses, had assured them that the supposed will had not been executed by Francisco Villegas in accordance with law, and that the executor Melecio Fule no longer took interest in the case On June 5, 1924, having received an order of the court requiring her to produce the supposed will of Francisco Villegas, Justina Mendieta filed a motion wherein, among other things, stating that she know not of any will executed by the deceased Francisco Villegas, except the one that she had had said deceased Francisco Villegas signed on January 18, 1924, which he signed at her request and inducement in order that her children begotten by him might have a share in his estate, as said deceased did in fact sign said will only in her presence and compelled by the pressure exerted by her and for her aforesaid children. Notwithstanding the foregoing motions, the court, ordered the publication in the newspaper of the application of Melecio Fule and of Justina Mendieta, and of others for the probate of the supposed will, setting said application for hearing. On September 5, 1924, Justina Mendieta, together with her children, filed another application for the probate of the same will through their attorneys, and also filed a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for said minors At the trial which was held, the court below appointed Justina Mendieta, natural mother of said minors, as their guardian ad litem. Laureana Hidalgo entered her objection to the probate of the will and immediately the court proceeded to hear the evidence of the parties, each and everyone of the attesting witnesses of the supposed will, having testified, and the applicants having introduced and the opponent

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C When the case was filed, for the continuation of the trial, Justina Mendieta, for herself and in her capacity as guardian ad litem of her minor children represented by their attorneys, Messrs. Lontok and Azada, on the one hand, and Laureana Hidalgo, represented by her attorney, on the other, submitted to the court an agreement wherein Justina Mendieta stated that she withdrew her application for the probate of the supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the probate of said will, and consequently, she prayed that said will be held not allowable to probate and that the deceased died intestate, without leaving any more heirs than his legitimate wife, Laureana Hidalgo, and his two adulterous children, and that the property of the deceased be distributed in accordance with said agreement . By an order dated October 25, 1924, the court approved said stipulation and rendered judgment, holding that the supposed will of Francisco Villegas could not be probated, and awarding to the heirs of the deceased the estate left by him in accordance with said agreement . From this order no appeal has been taken. On January 7, 1925, one Gelacio Malihan, who claimed to be first cousin of the deceased Francisco Villegas, filed with the court a new application for the probate of the same supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas As may be seen from the facts above stated, the will, the probate of which is applied for in the petition dated January 7, 1925, is the same one that was the subject of the application of May 5, 1924, and of September 5, 1924. The only difference lies in that the first application was filed by Justina Mendieta and her minor children and Melecio Fule, supposed testamentary executor, all represented by the attorney, Mr. Eusebio M. Lopez; the second by Justina Mendieta and her minor children, represented by the attorneys Messrs. Azada and Veluz; and the third and last by one Gelacio Malihan who claimed to be first cousin of the deceased Francisco Villegas. ISSUE: WON the said will be held not allowable to probate HELD: The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem and the court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be entered is binding against all of them. Through the publication ordered by the CFI of Laguna of the application for the probate of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas., and the court having approved said stipulation and declared that Francisco Villegas died intestate according to said agreement, all the parties became bound by said judgment; and if any of them or other persons interested were not satisfied with the court's decision, they had the remedy of appeal to correct any injustice that might have been committed, and cannot now through the special remedy of mandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a new application for the probate of the same will in order to compel the respondent judge to comply with his ministerial duty imposed by section 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure; because this remedy, being extraordinary, cannot be used in lieu of appeal, or writ of error; especially when the parties interested have agreed to disregard the testamentary provisions and divide the estate as they pleased, each of them taking what pertained to him .

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C

G.R. No. L-12397

April 2, 1918

FLORENCIA ANURAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANA AQUINO and RUFINA ORTIZ, administratrices of the intestate estate of Quiteria Ortiz, defendants. ANA AQUINO, appellant. The evidence of record in this case clearly discloses that the plaintiff, Florencia Anuran, is the widow of Ambrosio Aquino, deceased, to whose estate the property described in the complaint belongs; that the defendant, Ana Aquino, is the natural child of a sister of the deceased, that on the death of Ambrosio Aquino; the appointed administrator of his intestate estate, at the instance of Ana Aquino, acting collusion with the administrator fraudulently represented to the court that Ambrosio Aquino, had died intestate, leaving no heirs other than Ana Aquino, a daughter of his deceased sister; that at the time when these representations were made, both Ana Aquino and the administrator well knew that the plaintiff, Florencia Anuran, was the surviving spouse of Ambrosio Aquino, deceased, and that Ana Aquino was not a legitimate but a natural daughter of the deceased sister of Ambrosio Aquino; that, without notice to the widow, Ana Aquino, acting in collusion with the administrator appointed at her instance, fraudulently procured the entry of an order in the administration proceedings, authorizing and approving the delivery by the administrator of all property of the estate to the alleged sole heir, Ana Aquino, the defendant in this suit, and that the motion of the administrator on which this order was based was supported by the affidavit of Ana Aquino, setting forth the false and misleading statement of the alleged facts as hereinbefore indicated. FACTS: The widow, who was not a party of record in the administration proceedings, did not discover that this order had been entered until when she promptly entered her appearance in the administration proceedings and moved that the order be set aside, and that she be declared the sole heir of the deceased, who, as she alleged, had died without leaving either ascendants, or descendants, or collateral relatives entitled to share in the estate. The court declined to entertain this motion on the ground that the alleged fraudulent order had been entered more than six months prior to the date of the motion, so that under the provisions of section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion to set it aside. Thereafter the widow promptly instituted this separate action, wherein the trial court after declaring the order null and void, in that it had been procured by fraudulent collusion in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Ana Aquino for the possession of the lands and other property turned over to the latter by the administrator, and for damages for their detention. The facts upon which the trial judge based his judgment are fully sustained by the evidence of record, and clearly entitle the plaintiff to the relief granted her. ISSUE: WON a natural and not a legitimate daughter of a deceased sister has a right to succeed? HELD: NO. The only ruling upon the facts by the trial judge as to which there is any real question at this time is his finding that the defendant, Ana Aquino, is a natural and not a

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C legitimate daughter of a deceased sister. In the absence of any showing to the contrary this evidence is amply sufficient to sustain the finding. In the light of these facts, there is not and cannot be any substantial question as to the right of the widow to take the estate of her deceased husband as his sole heir under the provisions of articles 943 and 952 of the Civil Code. These articles are as follows: A natural or legitimized child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives inherit from the natural or legitimated child. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews, children, whether of the whole blood or not, of the same surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce, shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. We are not much impressed by the various formal and procedural objections urged by the appellant to the proceedings had in the court below. There can be no question as to the right of any person adversely affected by a judgment to maintain an action to enjoin its enforcement and to have it declared a nullity on the ground of fraud and collusion practiced in the very matter of obtaining the judgment when such fraud is extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in the issues raised at the trial which resulted in such judgment; and fraudulent collusion between an administrator and a third person resulting in an order or judgment whereby an interested person is unjustly deprived of his rights in or to the estate under administration, has always been recognized as a sufficient ground for the grant of relief from the order or judgment thus fraudulently procured. As to the claim that the question of title to a part of the property described in the complaint is res adjudicata, it is only necessary to indicate that in the present case the plaintiff bases her right to this property upon her statutory right to inherit the estate of her husband (article 952, Civil Code). We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C

G.R. No. L-19281

June 30, 1965

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant, vs. PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors-appellees. This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, specifying the respective shares of the principal parties herein in the intestate estate of Pedro Santillon. FACTS: On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province. About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate. On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a project of partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon. On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2. After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961, issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS it is hereby ruled and ordered that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties. ... .

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate on Art. 892 of the New Civil Code which provides that: If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. ... . As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the other hand, cites Art. 996 which provides: If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children. Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and unequitable to the extent that it grants the widow the same share as that of the children in intestate succession, whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2. Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should control, regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory construction, the plural word "children" includes the singular "child." ISSUE: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child? HELD: Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996. This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter on legal or intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist. On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower "gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her survivor). Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations. The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C

A.M. No. 190 October 18, 1977 RE: CLAIMS FOR BENEFITS OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO, FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO, MARIO B. CHANLIONGCO II, MA. ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA and MARIO C. CHANLIONGCO, JR., claimants. This matter refers to the claims for retirement benefits filed by the heirs of the late ATTY. MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO an attorney in this Court, under the provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as amended by R.A. No. 4986, which was approved by this Court in its resolution from the records that at the time of his death. Atty. Chanliongco was more than 63 years of age, with more than 38 years of service in the government. FACTS: The above named flied the appellants for benefits with the accruing and with the Government Service System. Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Chanliongco and an only Intimate Mario it appears that there are other deceased to namely, Mrs. Angelina C., Jr., both born out of wedlock to Angelina R Crespo, and duly recognized by the deceased. Except Mario, Jr., who is only 17 years of age, all the claimants are of legal age. According to law, the benefits accruing to the deceased consist of: (1) retirement benefits; (2) money value of terminal leave; (3) life insurance and (4) refund of retirement premium. The record also shows that the late Atty. Chanliongco died ab intestato and that he filed or over to state in his application for membership with the GSIS the beneficiary or benefits of his retirement benefits, should he die before retirement. Hence, the retirement benefits shall accrue to his estate and will be distributed among his Legal heirs in with the benefits on intestates. It further appears that at the time of his death the late Atty. Chanliongco had an outstanding account with the Supreme Court Savings & Loans Association. Deduction plus another sum representing withhold tax due from him, and the net sum, available for distribute to the claimant. ISSUE: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be distributed when the estate is not sufficient to cover the legitime of all compulsory heirs? HELD: In this case, to divide the estate between the surviving spouse and the legitimate child that deprive the illegitimate children of their legitimes. So, the decendent's estate is distributed in the proportion of 1/2 for the legitimate child, 1/4 for the widow and 1/8 each for the two illegitimate children. Also not of possible application to this case is the rule that the legal rights of an acknowledged natural child is 1/2 of the legitime of the legitimate child of that of the spurious child is 2/5 of that of the intimate child or 4/5 of that of that of the acknowledged natural child. The rule be applied because the estate is not sufficient to cover the legitime of all compulsory heirs. That is one of the flaws of the law of succession. A situation as in the instant case may arise where the illegitimate children get less than their legitime.

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C

G.R. No. L-28093 January 30, 1971 BASILIA BERDIN VDA. DE CONSUEGRA; JULIANA, PACITA, MARIA LOURDES, JOSE, JR., RODRIGO, LINEDA and LUIS, all surnamed CONSUEGRA, petitionersappellants, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS, HIGHWAY DISTRICT ENGINEER OF SURIGAO DEL NORTE, COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, and ROSARIO DIAZ, respondents-appellees. Appeal on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte, dated March 7, 1967, in its Special Proceeding No. 1720. FACTS: The late Jose Consuegra, at the time of his death, was employed as a shop foreman of the office of the District Engineer in the province of Surigao del Norte. In his lifetime, Consuegra contracted two marriages, the first with herein respondent Rosario Diaz, solemnized in the parish church of San Nicolas de Tolentino, Surigao, Surigao, on July 15, 1937, out of which marriage were born two children, namely, Jose Consuegra, Jr. and Pedro Consuegra, but both predeceased their father; and the second, which was contracted in good faith while the first marriage was subsisting, with herein petitioner Basilia Berdin, on May 1, 1957 in the same parish and municipality, out of which marriage were born seven children, namely, Juliana, Pacita, Maria Lourdes, Jose, Rodrigo, Lenida and Luz, all surnamed Consuegra. Being a member of the GSIS when Consuegra died, the proceeds of his life insurance were paid by the GSIS to petitioner Basilia Berdin and her children who were the beneficiaries named in the policy. Having been in the service of the government for 22 years, Consuegra was entitled to retirement insurance benefits pursuant to Section 12(c) of Commonwealth Act 186 as amended by Republic Acts 1616 and 3836. Consuegra did not designate any beneficiary who would receive the retirement insurance benefits due to him. Respondent Rosario Diaz, the widow by the first marriage, filed a claim with the GSIS asking that the retirement insurance benefits be paid to her as the only legal heir of Consuegra, considering that the deceased did not designate any beneficiary with respect to his retirement insurance benefits. Petitioner Basilia Berdin and her children, likewise, filed a similar claim with the GSIS, asserting that being the beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy of Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to receive the retirement insurance benefits due the deceased. Resolving the conflicting claims, the GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of the late Jose Consuegra were Rosario Diaz, his widow by his first marriage who is entitled to one-half, or 8/16, of the retirement insurance benefits, on the one hand; and Basilia Berdin, his widow by the second marriage and their seven children, on the other hand, who are entitled to the remaining one-half, or 8/16, each of them to receive an equal share of 1/16. Hence the present appeal by herein petitioners-appellants, Basilia Berdin and her children. It is the contention of appellants that the lower court erred in not holding that the designated beneficiaries in the life insurance of the late Jose Consuegra are also the exclusive beneficiaries in the retirement insurance of said deceased. In other words, it is the submission of appellants that because the deceased Jose Consuegra failed to designate the beneficiaries in his retirement insurance, the appellants who were the beneficiaries named in the life insurance should automatically be considered the

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C beneficiaries to receive the retirement insurance benefits, to the exclusion of respondent Rosario Diaz. From the arguments adduced by appellants in their brief We gather that it is their stand that the system of life insurance and the system of retirement insurance, that are provided for in Commonwealth Act 186 as amended, are simply complementary to each other, or that one is a part or an extension of the other, such that whoever is named the beneficiary in the life insurance is also the beneficiary in the retirement insurance when no such beneficiary is named in the retirement insurance. ISSUE: Whom should the deceased retirement insurance benefits be paid? HELD: In the case of the proceeds of a life insurance, the same are paid to whoever is named the beneficiary in the life insurance policy. As in the case of a life insurance provided for in the Insurance Act (Act 2427, as amended), the beneficiary in a life insurance under the GSIS may not necessarily be a heir of the insured. The insured in a life insurance may designate any person as beneficiary unless disqualified to be so under the provisions of the Civil Code.4 And in the absence of any beneficiary named in the life insurance policy, the proceeds of the insurance will go to the estate of the insured. It is Our view, therefore, that the respondent GSIS had correctly acted when it ruled that the proceeds of the retirement insurance of the late Jose Consuegra should be divided equally between his first living wife Rosario Diaz, on the one hand, and his second wife Basilia Berdin and his children by her, on the other; and the lower court did not commit error when it confirmed the action of the GSIS, it being accepted as a fact that the second marriage of Jose Consuegra to Basilia Berdin was contracted in good faith. This Court, held "that since the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband's share in the property here in dispute.... " And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, "[t]he only best and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage."

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C

G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986 FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO, defendants-appellants. This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise": 1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles. 2. That plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant. The family relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart attached hereto and made an integral part of this stipulation. 3. That Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer Certificates of Title of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached to this stipulation. 4. That Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the aforementioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares. 5. That in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by TCT of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached hereto, were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares. 6. That in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently annotated on the TCT. 7. That in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C 8. That on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho. 9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns onehalf (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko. 10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon. 11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals. 12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted upon legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all their claims against each other for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which this Honorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall be borne by the respective parties. On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions, rendering judgment as follows: ... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by the defendant Dalisay D. TiocoCamacho from the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals. ISSUE: 1. Whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower Court, all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista 2. Whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question HELD:

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which reads: Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (811), That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, where the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant. Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario. Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendantappellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C

G.R. No. L-26170

January 27, 1969

THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, plaintiff, vs. SUSANA, ROMUALDO, JULIAN, MACARIO A., MOISES, MACARIO, C., ADRIANO, CELESTINA and LUISA, all surnamed CUSTODIO, defendants.

FACTS: Proceedings were initiated in the CFI of Rizal, by the GSIS by a complaint in interpleader for the determination of who, among the several defendants, is entitled to the retirement benefits, that fell due to a deceased member of the System, one Simeon Custodio. Defendant-cross-claimant-appellee Susana Custodio, a surviving sister of the decedent and the aunt of the other defendants, claims to be the sole beneficiary thereof; but her nephews and nieces contest her recognition as such and claim to be entitled to share in the proceeds by right of representation of their deceased fathers, who are three (3) brothers of the late Simeon. These nephews and nieces (defendants-crossclaimants-appellees in this case) are the following: Macario, C., Macario A., Luisa, David, Romualdo, Julian, Moises, Adriano and Celestina, all surnamed "Custodio". It will thus be noted from the stipulation of facts and its annexes that the deceased retiree, Simeon Custodio had one (1) sister, appellee Susana Custodio and three (3) brothers, namely, Vicente, Crispin and Jacinto, who had predeceased him; that the appellants are the children of these brothers; that two (2) among these children are both named "Macario" (Macario A. and Macario C.; that the children, Macario C., Luisa, and David Custodio did not sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement; and that Macario C. is the only child of Crispin, while Luisa and David are two (2) of the six (6) children of Jacinto. From her opposition to the motion for reconsideration dated 20 April 1960, appellee Susana Custodio made clear her non-opposition to the division of the estate where Macario C. Luisa and David would share per stirpes. In submitting their Stipulation of Facts for approval, the parties prayed the trial court "to resolve the questions of law raised in said stipulation of facts". On 2 January 1960, the trial court approved the Stipulation of Facts and required the interpleading defendants to submit their memoranda "within fifteen (15) days on a question of law", with the understanding that the case shall be considered submitted for decision on said issue after the filing of the memoranda or upon expiration of the period herein required". Appellants nephews and nieces moved to reconsider, and on denial, they appealed to the Court of Appeals. Finding no question of fact involved in the case, but only questions of law, said appellate court certified the appeal to the Supreme Court. Appellants' first assignment of error is well-taken; that the intestate heirs, Macario C., Luisa and David Custodio who did not sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement, not be considered as having recognized Susana Custodio, as the only beneficiary of Simeon's retirement money. There is no evidence the case having been submitted for decision below solely on a stipulation of facts, that these non-signatory heirs had agreed, or accepted other benefits under the deed of partition, as appellee now claims. Susana Custodio did not oppose their separate motion for reconsideration and, actually, even prayed that said motion be granted, although the court denied it just

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C the same. These three (3) heirs should inherit per stirpes, in accordance with Article 1005 of the Civil Code. As Macario C. Custodio (as distinguished from Macario A., who signed the agreement) is the only child of Crispin, said Macario C. inherits by representation the one-fourth () share pertaining to his father, while Luisa and David Custodio being two (2) of six (6) children of Jacinto, are each entitled to a sixth of onefourth (1/6 x 1/4) equivalent to 1/24 of the hereditary mass. ISSUES: WON the deed of extrajudicial settlement was valid? HELD: The failure to secure the signatures of Luisa, David, and Macario Custodio could not have escaped their co-heirs, now appellants, and it is unfair to lay blame therefor on Susana Custodio. The intervention of Leon Tongohan, her son-in-law, is without particular significance, since none of the signers was illiterate, nor was the deed notarized by him. As to the appellants' having repudiated their signatures, the same was a self-serving act, more indicative of a belated intention to squirm out of a disadvantageous transaction, after they entered it with open eyes, which is no ground for setting the same aside (Noble vs. City of Manila, 67 Phil. 1). Certainly, it should take much weightier proof to invalidate a written instrument. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, with the modification that Macario C. Custodio is declared entitled to a share of onefourth (1/4), and Luisa Custodio and David Custodio to a share of one-twenty-fourth (1/24) each, of the retirement benefits..

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C

G.R. No. L-22402

June 30, 1969

CLEMENTE ALVIAR, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CESAREO ALVIAR, ET AL., defendants-appellants. Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, originally taken to the Court of Appeals, but subsequently certified by the latter to the Supreme Court, upon the ground that only questions of law are involved therein, the facts having been stipulated by the parties. FACTS: Clemente Alviar, the original plaintiff herein, and Belen Alviar were legitimate children of Florentino Alviar and Bibiana Carillo. Sometime after the latter's death Florentino Alviar married Flora Erasga, who begot him five (5) children, namely; Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa, Zenaida and Castor, all surnamed Alviar. Belen Alviar died intestate. She was single and had been survived by her brother Clemente Alviar, and five (5) half brothers and sisters, said Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa, Zenaida and Castor Alviar. Belen's estate consisted of two (2) parcels of agricultural land situated in the Barrio of Sukol, Calamba, Laguna, otherwise known as lots 2 and 3 of subdivision plan and more particularly described in TCT No. 3033 of the Province of Laguna, and a residential lot in Pasay City, otherwise known as Lot No. 223-D of subdivision plan nd more particularly described in TCT No. 1578 of the Province of Rizal. On June 28, 1955, these six (6) brothers and sisters executed a deed of extrajudicial partition adjudicating to Clemente Alviar the two (2) parcels of agricultural land in Calamba, Laguna, and to the five (5) half brothers and sisters of the deceased the residential lot in Pasay City. In pursuance of said deed, the parties took possession of their respective shares. Moreover, Clemente Alviar secured TCT No. 15307 and 15308 to said Lots 2 and 3 of subdivision plan in Calamba, Laguna. The residential land in Pasay City was, in turn, partitioned among his aforesaid half brothers and sisters and subdivided into lots Nos. 223-D-1 and 223-D-2. The first was allotted to Luisa and Zenaida Alviar, who secured thereto TCT No. 8495 in their names, whereas the second was covered by TCT No. 8496 in the name of Cesareo Alviar, his sister Fabiana having renounced her share therein in his favor. Their brother Castor had, likewise, waived his share in said residential land. Over five (5) years later, Clemente Alviar commenced the present action, against his half brother and sisters, Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa and Zenaida Alviar, and their mother, and his step-mother, Flora Erasga, to annul the deed of extrajudicial partition covering the residential lot in Pasay City, as well as to recover the possession thereof and the title thereto, upon the ground that, acting in bad faith and conspiring, confederating and conniving with each other, as well as "taking advantage of plaintiff's lack of education, illiteracy and ignorance, and knowing fully well that" the "children by second marriage of Florentino Alviar had no rights, participation and interest over" the three (3) lots left by Belen Alviar, the defendants had "misled" the plaintiff "into signing" said deed. Inasmuch as Clemente Alviar died soon thereafter, his widow, Paulina Pamulaklakin and their children, substituted him as plaintiff in this case. The defendants having filled an answer denying specifically the allegations of the complaint regarding the irregularities allegedly attending the execution of the deed of extrajudicial partition, both parties later filed a stipulation of facts on the relationship between them, the civil status of Belen Alviar, the properties constituting her estate, the

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C execution of the deed of extrajudicial partition and the steps taken to carry out its provisions. Plaintiffs maintained that since Clemente Alviar was a full brother of Belen Alviar, whereas the main defendants herein are merely her half brothers and sisters, Clemente is a relative of Belen nearer in degree than said defendants, who are more distant to her, so that they (defendants) are excluded by Clemente, and he is entitled to succeed to the entire estate of Belen. The trial court in effect overruled this pretense and rendered a decision holding that both parties "are entitled to inherit from Belen Alviar, ... plaintiffs to receive two-seventh (2/7)" of the residential lot in Pasay City, and "each of the defendants" Cesareo Fabiana, Luisa, Castor and Zenaida Alviar "one-seventh (1/7) thereof. The defendants moved for a reconsideration of this decision, upon the ground that the same should have ordered the redistribution, not only of the lot in Pasay City, but, also, of the two (2) parcels of agricultural land in Laguna. This motion having been denied, the defendants appealed to the C.A. which, as above pointed out, subsequently certified the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Who are the parties entitled to participate in the inheritance of Belen Alviar, and in what proportion?" WON as a full brother of Belen Alviar, the degree of relationship to her of the deceased Clemente Alviar was nearer than that of their half brothers and sisters, the children of their father by second marriage and he excluded them in the succession to her estate HELD: The lower court decided this question in the negative and correctly. Indeed, "proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations" and "each generation forms a degree." 1 In relation to Belen Alviar, her full brother, Clemente Alviar, is, therefore, in the same degree of relationship as their half brothers and sisters, the aforementioned defendants, for all of them constitute the first generation of descendants of their common father, Florentino Alviar. In fact, this rationalization is rendered superfluous, apart from being confirmed, by the explicit language of Arts. 1003, 1004 and 1006 of our Civil Code, reading: ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. ART. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter. These provisions, particularly the last, leave no room for doubt that brothers and sisters of full blood do not exclude those of half blood, for, otherwise, there would be no occasion for the concurrence of both classes and the application of said Art. 1006. More important than this, however, is the fact that Clemente Alviar had entered into a contract with his half brothers and sisters for the extrajudicial partition of the properties of the deceased Belen Alviar and that there is nothing in the stipulation of

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C facts submitted by the parties to warrant the annulment or rescission of said agreement. The validity thereof thus being indubitable, there is absolutely no reason why the same should be disturbed.

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C

G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977 GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO CARTENA, defendantappellant. This is an appeal certified to this Court by the C.A. in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, since the only issue raised is the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter which is purely a legal question. FACTS: The subject matter of the complaint concerns the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso, Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic. After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the properties having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of the same to the defendants. After trial, the court rendered judgment, in favor of the plaintiffs who are hereby declared to be entitled to ten twenty-fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land in dispute. The defendant Engracio Manese and the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Almanza, who are represented in the instant case by the administrator Florentino Cartena, are hereby required to pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959 the sum of P625.00 per annum until the ten-twenty fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land are delivered to the plaintiffs, with legal interest from the time this decision shall have become final. Florentino Cartena, the substitute defendant for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the C.A. Hence, the subject matter of the case on appeal was limited to the one-half undivided portion of only three of the five parcels of land described in the complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to be only in his possession. On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of Arts. 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code, applied by the trial court in allowing plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the properties left by Maura Bagsic were not the applicable provisions. He asserts that in the course of the trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs requested defendants to admit that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood of Maura Bagsic, died on May 9. 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14, 1952, Felipa succeeded to

Zoraida Masillam Aripin LLB - 3C Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the NCC which provides that "should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares," and he concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code) On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was not raised as an issue in the trial court. It was even the subject of stipulation of the parties as clearly shown in the transcript of the stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic died on May 9. 1945. ISSUE: WON the nephews and nieces inherit by right of representation.

HELD: We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the NCC are applicable to the admitted facts of the case at bar. These Articles provide: Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions." Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter. Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood. In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the NCC. By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased." The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood citing Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic. We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and jurisprudence. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.