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Suffering Kritik Impacts

The inability to accept suffering and conflict as arising from chaos produces a sadistic desire to inflict suffering, because forcing others to suffer gives us a false illusion of control Kain 7 Phillip Kain, Professor of Philosophy (Ph.D., University of California at San Diego, 1974, Eternal
Recurrence and the Categorical Imperative, 421&S=R&D=a9h&EbscoContent=dGJyMNXb4kSeprI4yOvqOLCmr0qep7RSsay4TbeWxWXS&ContentCust omer=dGJyMPGqsE60rrVKuePfgeyx44Dt6fIA, 7/04/12, [AR], We live in an empty and meaningless cosmos, a cosmos that does not care about us, and we cannot face this. Suffering we can handle, but meaningless suffering, suffering for no reason at all, we cannot handle. So what do we do? Nietzsche thinks we give suffering a meaning. We invent a meaning. We create an illusion. The Greeks constructed gods for whom wars and other forms of suffering were festival plays and thus occasions
to be celebrated by the poets. Christians imagine a God for whom suffering is punishment for sin. Nietzsche even thinks we used to enjoy inflicting suffering on others. To see others suffer does one good, to make others suffer even more.... [I]n the days when mankind was not yet ashamed of its cruelty, life on earth was more cheerful than it is now.... Today, when suffering is always brought forward as the principal argument against existence, as the worst question mark, one does well to recall the ages in which the opposite opinion prevailed because men were unwilling to refrain from making suffer and saw in it an enchantment of the first order, a genuine seduction to life. Why was the infliction of suffering so enjoyable? Why was it a seduction to life? The answer is not, I do not think, that people of past ages were just sadists, as Danto and others seem to think. Rather,

since meaningless suffering is unbearable, we give it a meaning. We make it a punishment and inflict it ourselves. In doing so, suffering is no longer meaningless; it is made to participate in the web of meaning we have created. That is why it is so enjoyable to inflict suffering. That is why it is a seduction to life. We keep meaninglessness at bay. We engage in practices that invest suffering with the meaning it must have for us. We unconsciously participate in the imposition of meaning. But we are not content, in Nietzsche's opinion, merely to inflict suffering on others. We go further. We inflict it upon ourselves. As society develops and we are unable to discharge our instincts outwardly, we direct them within. We create guilt. And priests are quick to nurture this new development.^" Just as we inflict suffering on others to keep meaningless suffering
at bay, so we inflict it upon ourselves. We give all suffering a meaning. No meaningless suffering is allowed to remain anywhere.

Meaninglessness is eradicated. And just as inflicting suffering on others was a seduction to life, so in inflicting it on ourselves, "life again became very interesting ... one no longer protested against pain, one thirsted for pain; 'more pain! Nietzsche finds all of this highly objectionable. And he will not accept any of it. He rejects it completely. He wants to restore the innocence of existence. He wants to rid the world of guilt and

Ressentiment Impacts
Their imagination of a better world is a continuation of the ascetic ideal. This association of all that is good at not of this world expresses a hatred for the only one weve gotturns case. Fantasizing about a world without suffering produces creative impotence only our relationship to life can escape this paradox of resentment Aydan Turanli, 2003 Department of Humanities and Social Sciences @ Istanbul Technical University,
2003 *journal of nietzche studies 26 (2003) 55-63 p.muse]-AC
The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned

world, being and becoming is the creation of the ressentiment of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (WP III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. [End Page 61] Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of
metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants to

escape from torture" (GM III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of this world'" (GM III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy . It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception
are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest

for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (WP III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world
in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (WP III 586). The way out of the circle created by the ressentiment of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the

will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to
a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (PI 309).

The affirmatives attempt to escape the status quo is a nave display of their hatred of life. Living dangerously allows us to gain value from the dangers of life that they hide from. BRAMAN 2004 [Jorn, Nietzsche: The Dark Side of Things ]-AC One reason why people devalue the physical world, according to Nietzsche, is their fear of life--of lifes innumerable uncertainties, sufferings, and its inescapable finality. It is because of this deep-seated fear that people seek refuge in an ideal and imaginary world where they seem to find everlasting peace and relief from all the ailments that besiege them on earth. People do this either naively, by imagining "another world" in which people somehow continue to exist in the way they do in this world, only more perfectly, or they do it in more sophisticated ways, the ways
philosophers like Plato or other teachers of a spiritual life recommend. But in whatever way people try to escape the imperfections of the physical world, their

retreat is always a manifestation of weakness, an inability to face reality in the way strong individuals would. Strong persons would not only take suffering and other adversities in stride, they would in a sense even welcome them as inevitable aspects of the very nature of life. As there is no life without death, there is also no experience of health without sickness, no enjoyment of wealth without poverty, and no appreciation of happiness without a real knowledge of pain. Live

dangerously is one of Nietzsches well known pieces of advice.(2) It is his reminder that the most exuberant and ecstatic experiences of life do not grow out of a well protected existence where risks and extremes are anxiously kept at bay, but out of a courageous exposure to the forces and conditions of life that activates the best of a persons powers. A good horseback rider will not beat a spirited horse into submission to have an easy ride, but rather learn how to handle a difficult mount. Similarly, a strong and healthy person will not shun the dark and often dangerous sides of the world by retreating to some metaphysical realm of comfortable peace, but rather embrace life in its totality, its hardships and terrors as well as its splendors and joys.

Nietzsche Security Impact

The attempt to find blame for international insecurity leads to a state of emergency and pre-emptive war the arbitrary backlash against Afghanistan after 9/11 proves.
James Der Derian,2005 Director of the Global Security Program and Research Professor of International Studies @ the Watson Institute for International Studies of Brown, 2005 National Security: An Accident Waiting to Happen Harvard International Review fall RJ According to the legal philosopher of Nazi Germany, Carl Schmitt, when the state is unable to deliver on its traditional promissory notes of safety, security, and well-being through legal, democratic means, it will necessarily exercise the sovereign "exception:" declaring a state of emergency, defining friend from foe, and, if necessary, eradicating the threat to the state. But what if the state, facing the global event, cannot discern the accidental from the intentional? An external attack from an internal auto-immune response? The
natural as opposed to the "planned disaster"? The enemy within from the enemy without? We can, as the United States has done since September 11, continue to treat catastrophic threats as issues of national rather than global security, and go it alone. However, once

declared, bureaucratically installed, and repetitively gamed, national states of emergency grow recalcitrant and become prone to even worse disasters. As Paul Virilio, master theorist of the war machine and the integral accident once told me: "The kill-scale accident is now the prolongation of total war by other means. '*

VTL Outweighs
Biology is not the extent of life. Establishing value to life is a prior concern to concerns about preserving life POLOKOVA 2004 [Jolana, chapter 2: struggle for human dignity in extreme situations, ]-AC
An animal which finds itself in a life endangering situation tries to escape quite unambiguously and at any cost, although sometimes in a mediated fashion as dictated by the instinctive attachment to ones offspring, mate or herd. Under such a situation humans do not always behave so unequivocally. Their attitude to their own life is not determined solely by instinct, but is freer and more complicated. Humans

are capable not only of saving their own life, but also of sacrificing it; they are capable of running the risk of losing their life and even of giving it up in passive resignation. Such a free and differentiated approach attests to the fact that humans do not identify what they intrinsically are with their physical existence; somehow they can confirm their humanity independently of their own survival, sometimes even against it. Evidently, they strive to exist somewhat
differently than a biological entity, trying to transcend their physical existence. To put it in positive terms: they strive for a spiritually independent existence. Only on such a basis is it possible to compare life with other values and freely avail oneself of it. This spiritual existence implements a purely human possibility of self-transcendence through a principal attachment to values. Humans

can sacrifice or save their life because of something that exceeds the value of biological life. That is, because of values towards which their life aspires, on which it is based, in which humans invest, with which they identify themselves, and to which they attach supreme meaning . Only a threat to such
values "sublime" or "mundane", but always vitally important constitutes an extreme situation characteristic of man. If the principal values of his life have been destroyed or devalued, ones bare life retains value only if and as one is capable of retaining at least some hope of discovering or creating new values. Then life becomes, provisionally, a supreme value only in the name of those unknown values and in

From a human viewpoint, mere survival does not appear to be an end in itself. It is not something absolute or unconditioned, but rather something to which one can assume a personal attitude; that is, one which is not arbitrary but spiritually free and connected with values. The fact that one carries within oneself something one protects more than ones own life and without which ones life would lose
linkage with them. its meaning and humanity points to the conclusion that, unlike other live beings, ones specific extreme situation involves a threat to values which one regards as supreme. A threat to life is perceived by humans as an extreme situation only insofar as it jeopardizes also their possibility of living for certain values. In a situation of a total value vacuum and hopelessness life tends to become virtually irrelevant to a human person. Thus, one may attach to a certain value, rather than to ones bare life, that which is intrinsically ones own, ones most profound identity, namely, independence and integrity. This

reveals the ontologically unique spiritual nature of the person. What seems to be significant in extreme human situations, therefore, is not any boundary of human potential for biological survival, but rather a limit of this or that individuals value orientation and attachment.

Suffering Turns Case

A life of pain and suffering is a life that is rich in affirmation. The way that the aff conceptualizes solutions avoid the positive aspects of life and stalls them from overcoming the suffering they seek to solve. Philip J. Kain, PhD, professor of philosophy at Santa Clara University, 2009, The British Journal for the
History of Philosophy, Nietzsche, Virtue, and the Horror of Existence, ProQuest
Suppose that you can, as Aristotle suggests, look back over your life as a whole and feel that it was a good one a happy one. Would that make you want to live it again? Would you at the moment in which you feel that your life was a happy one also crave nothing more fervently than to live it again? What if your life was a joyous life or a proud life? It is quite clear isnt it that you could have a very positive attitude toward your life, and not at all want to live it again? In fact, wouldnt the prospect

of eternal repetition, if the idea grew upon you and gained possession of you, begin to sap even the best life of its attractiveness? Wouldnt the expectation of eternal repetition make anything less appealing? Wouldnt it
empty your life of its significance and meaning? Most commentators seem to assume that the only life we could expect anyone to want to live again would be a good life. That makes no sense at all to me. On the other hand, most would assume that a life of intense pain and suffering is not at all the sort of life it makes any sense to want to live again. I think Nietzsche was able to

see that a life of intense pain and suffering is perhaps the only life it really makes sense to want to live again. This requires explanation. For years Nietzsche was ill, suffering intense migraines, nausea and vomiting. Often he was unable to work and confined to bed. He fought this. He tried everything. He sought a better climate. He watched his diet fanatically. He experimented with medicines. Nothing worked. He could not improve his condition. His suffering was out of his control. It dominated his life and determined his every activity. He was overpowered by it. There was
no freedom or dignity here. He became a slave to his illness. He was subjugated by it. What was he to do? At the beginning of the essay, Concerning the Sublime, Schiller wrote: nothing is so beneath the dignity of a human being as to suffer violence . . . whoever cowardly suffers it, tosses his humanity aside . . . Every human being finds himself in this position. He is surrounded by countless forces, all superior to him and all playing the master over him . . . If he can no longer oppose physical forces

with a corresponding physical force, then nothing else remains for him to do to avoid suffering violence than to do completely away with a relation so deleterious to him and to destroy conceptually a brute force that he in fact must endure. However, to destroy a force conceptually means nothing other than to submit to it voluntarily.39 While Nietzsche does not go about it in the way Schiller had in mind, nevertheless, this is exactly what Nietzsche
does. What was he to do about his suffering? What was he to do about the fact that it came to dominate every moment of his life? What was he to do about the fact that it was robbing him of all freedom and dignity? What was he to do about this subjugation and slavery? He decided to submit to it voluntarily. He decided to accept it fully. He decided that he

would not change a single detail of his life, not one moment of pain. He decided to love his fate. At the
prospect of living his life over again, over again an infinite number of times, without the slightest change, with every detail of suffering and pain, he was ready to say, Well then! Once more!40 He could not change his life anyway. This way he broke

the psychological stranglehold it had over him. He ended his subjugation. He put himself in charge. He
turned all it was into a thus I willed it. Everything that was going to happen in his life, he accepted, he chose, he willed. He became sovereign over his life. There was no way to overcome his illness except by embracing it.

Impact Violence
Violence is only a product of slave morality and the attempts to control disorder in the world Deleuze 74 (Gilles, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, Desert Islands and Other Texts,
p. 119, AD: 7/9/09)
This original depth, Zarathoustra's celebrated height-depth, must be named the will to power . Of course, Mr. Birault figured out how we must understand the term "will to power." It's not wanting to live, because how could whatever life is want to live? It's not a desire for domination either, because how could whatever it is that dominates

desire to dominate? Zarathoustra says: "The desire to dominate: now who would call that a desire?" The will to power, then, is not a will that wants power or wants to dominate. Such an interpretation would indeed have two disadvantages. If the will to power meant wanting power, it would clearly depend on long established values, such as honor, money, or social influence, since these values determine the attribution and recognition of power as an object of desire and will. And this power which the will desired could be obtained only by throwing itself into the struggle or fight . More to the point, we ask: who wants such power? who wants to dominate? Precisely those whom Nietzsche calls slaves and the weak.
Wanting power is the image of the will to power which the impotent invent for themselves. Nietzsche always saw in struggle, in fighting, a means of selection that worked in reverse, turning to the advantage of slaves and herds. This is one of Nietzsche's great observations: "The strong must be defended just like the weak." Certainly, in the desire to dominate, in the image of the will to power which the impotent invent for themselves, we discover a will to power: but at its lowest level. The will to power has its highest level in an intense or intensive form, which is neither coveting nor taking, but giving, creating. Its true name, says Zarathoustra, is the virtue that gives.4 And the mask is the most beautiful gift, showing the will to power as a plastic force, as the highest power of art. Power is not what the will wants, but that which wants in wil l, that is to say, Dionysos.

The aff authorizes limitless violence as an attempt to correct the imperfections of our existence Deleuze 83(Gilles, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 118119, AD: 7/9/09)
The imputation of wrongs, the distribution of responsibilities, perpetual accusation . All this replaces aggression. "The aggressive pathos belongs just as necessarily to strength as vengefulness and rancour belong to weakness" (EH I 7 p. 232). Considering gain as a right, considering it a right to profit from actions that he does not perform, the man of ressentiment breaks out in bitter reproaches as soon as his expectations are disappointed. And how could they not be disappointed, since frustration and revenge are the a prioris of ressentiment? "It is your fault if no one loves me, it is your fault if I've failed in life and also your fault if you fail in yours, your
misfortunes and mine are equally your fault." Here we rediscover the dreadful feminine power of ressentiment: it is not content to denounce crimes and criminals, it wants sinners, people who are responsible. We can guess what the creature of

ressentiment wants: he wants others to be evil, he needs others to be evil in order to be able to consider himself good. You are evil, therefore I am good; this is the slave's fundamental formula, it expresses the main point of ressentiment from the typological point of view, it summarises and brings together all the preceding characteristics. This formula must be compared with that of the master: I am good, therefore you are evil . The difference between the two measures the revolt of the slave and his triumph: "This inversion of the valuepositing eye . . . is of the essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile world" (GM 1 10 pp. 36-37). The slave needs, to set the other up as evil from the outset .

Turn Violence is complicit in a negative will to power the process of security involves purging the world of all difference. Der Derian 98 (James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx,
Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet,, AD: 7/7/09)
Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. 33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a
contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle

of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since
Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here. One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil , he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal

instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results." 34 The will to power, then, should not be confused with a
Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and

affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference-that which is not us, not certain, not predictable . Complicit with a negative will to power is the feardriven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37

Impact Wars*
The only way to prevent unending war is to relinquish fear of catastrophe the affirmative is self-defeating and makes its own impacts inevitable Beres 94 (Louis Rene, Ph.D., Princeton University, Professor of International Law, Department of Political Science, Purdue University,
Self-determination, international law and survival on planet earth, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, Spring, 11 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 1) Humankind is different. Of course, the spectacle of catastrophe and annihilation has been with us from the

beginning, and the seeming insignificance of individual life appears to be confirmed by every earthquake or typhoon, by every
pestilence or epidemic, by every war or holocaust. Yet,

each of us is unwilling to accept a fate that points not only to extinction, but also to extinction with insignificance. Where do we turn? It is to promises of
immortality. And from where do we hear such promises? From religion, to be sure, but also from States that have deigned to n46 represent God in his planetary political duties, and that cry out for "self-determination." How do these States sustain the promise of immortality? One way is through the legitimization of the killing of other human beings. And why
is such killing the ostensible protection of one's own life? An answer is offered by Eugene Ionesco as follows: I must kill my visible enemy, the one who is determined to take my life, to prevent him from killing me. Killing gives me a feeling of relief,

because I am dimly aware that in killing him, I have killed death. My enemy's death cannot be held against me, it is
no longer a source of anguish, if I killed him with the approval of society: that is the purpose of war. Killing is a way of relieving n47 one's feelings, of warding off one's own death. There are two separate but interdependent ideas here. The first is the rather pragmatic and mundane observation that killing someone who would otherwise kill you is a life-supporting action. Why assume that your intended victim would otherwise be your assassin? Because, of course, your own government has [*17] clarified precisely who is friend and who is foe. The second, far more complex idea, is that killing in general confers immunity from

mortality. This idea, of death as a zero-sum commodity, is captured by Ernest Becker's paraphrase of Elias Canetti: "Each n48 organism raises its head over a field of corpses, smiles into the sun, and declares life good." Or, according to Otto Rank, "The death fear of the ego is lessened by the killing, the Sacrifice, of the other; n49 through the death of the other one buys oneself free from the penalty of dying, of being killed ." It is

time, in the Spanish philosopher Unamuno's words, "to consider our mortal destiny without flinching." n50
This, lamentably, is easier said than done because the human instinct that clings to life flees from death as the very prototype of evil, and because each singular individual is able to counter the observed fact of mortality with entire categories of exceptions. Such solipsistic boasts have been identified by George Santayana as follows: Any proud barbarian, with a tincture of transcendental philosophy, might adopt this tone. "Creatures that perish," he might say, "are and can be nothing but puppets and painted shadows in my mind. My conscious will forbids its own extinction; it scorns to level itself with its own objects and instruments. The world, which I have never known to exist without me, exists by my co-operation and consent; it can never extinguish what lends it being. The death prophetically accepted by weaklings, with such small insight and courage, I mock and n51 altogether defy: it can never touch me." Nevertheless, the fact of having been born augurs badly for

immortality, and the human inclination to rebel against an apparently unbearable truth inevitably produces the very terrors from which individuals seek to escape. In its desperation to live perpetually, humankind embraces a whole cornucopia of faiths that offer life everlasting in exchange for undying loyalty. In the end, such loyalty is transferred from the faith to the State, which battles with other States in what political
scientists would describe as a struggle for power, but which is often, in reality, a perceived final conflict between the Sons of Light and the Sons of Darkness. The advantage to being on the side of the Sons of Light in such a contest is nothing n52 less than the prospect of eternal life. But the result is ongoing wars around the world. [*18] How, then, do

we end these terrible wars? Most important, we must first understand them as manifestations of humankind's unwillingness to accept personal death. Death defines world politics because individuals wish to escape death. The ironies are staggering, but the connections persist and remain unexamined.