LEGAL EASEMENTS

A. TOPIC: EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY

estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may the shortest. The trial court and the Court of Appeals have declared the existence of said easement (right of way). This finding of fact both courts below is conclusive on this Court, hence we see no need to further review, but only to re-affirm, this finding. The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement. Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private respondents estate. Petitioners second proposition, that he is not bound by the contract of easement because the same was not annotated in the title and that a notice of lis pendens of the complaint to enforce the easement was not recorded with the Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious. As already explained, it is in the nature of legal easement that the servient estate(of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the dominant estate (of private respondents in this case) ingress from and agrees to the public highway. Petitioners last argument that he was not a party to Civil Case and that he had not been given his day in court, is also without merit. Rule 39, Sec.47, of the Revised Rule of Court applies. Simply stated, a decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties to said case and those who are successor in interest by the title after said case has been commenced or filed in court. In this case, private respondents Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, initiated Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on May 8, 1991, against the original owners, the spouse Maximino and Justina Gabriel. Title in the name of the petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds on March 24, 1995, after he bought the property from the bank which had acquired it from the Gabriels. Hence, the decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 bind the petitioner. For, although not a party to the suit, he is a successor-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action in court. Ramos vs. Gatchalian G.R. No. 75905 October 12, 1987 Facts: Two road lots abut petitioner's (ramos) property namely lot 4133-G-12 and Lot 4135 of the Paraaque Cadastre commonly referred to as Gatchalian Avenue. Respondents Asprec own Lot 4135. Gatchalian Avenue is alongside Lot 4135. Petitioner filed a complaint for an easement of a right of way with preliminary mandatory injunction against the private respondents and alleged that the construction by Gacthalian Realty Inc. of the 7-8 feet concrete wall right infront of petitioners premises blocks his entrance/exit to Gatchalian Road, the nearest, most convenient and adequate entrance/exit to the public road or highway. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter to grant the former a right of way through upon payment by the plaintiff to the defendants Asprecs. However the lower court granted the motions filed by the respondents and thereafter issued an order setting aside its previous decision. After the petitioner had rested his case, the respondent company filed a motion to dismiss based on the insufficiency of the evidence adduced by the petitioner. Thereafter, lower court issued an order finding the motion to dismiss with merit and granted the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence.

BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, JULIO N. SEBASTIAN and SHIRLY LORILLA, respondents.2000 Nov. 27 FACTS: Bryan Villanueva bought a parcel of land from a bank. The land was a foreclosed property of Spouses Gabriel. When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on is southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents (Sebastian and Lorilla). The contract between predecessors of the private respondents and the Gabriels specifically permitted the easement: in order to have an access to and from their aforementioned land where their houses is the nearest public road and the least burdensome to the servient estate and to third persons, it would be necessary for them to pass through spouses Gabriels land. Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the Land, the Gabriels had constructed the aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991, Civil Case for easement, damage and with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against the spouses Gabriel. As successor-in-interest, Sebatian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement. This case won after the CA upheld RTCs decision. So when the case became final and executory, a writ of demolition was issued by Judge Velasco to demolish the small house. The writ was issued after Villanueva had bought the property. So Villanueva filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of Demolition. But Judge Velasco denied since he was not a party. The motion for recon. was also denied. Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. He asserted that the existence of the easement of right of way was not annotated in his title and that he was not a party to Civil Case; hence, the contract of easement executed by the Gabriels did not affect him. CA dismissed for lack of merit. Hence the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the obligation on contract of easement of right of way is transferred to Villanueva. RULING: At the outset, we note that subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntary constituted by agreement between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by necessity or legal easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as provided for in Article 617 of the Civil Code. The essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has n adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts order in ruling that the petitioner failed to establish the existence of the preconditions in order that he could legally be entitled to an easement of a right of way. Hence, a petition was filed in SC. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has successfully shown that all the requisites necessary for the grant of an easement of a right of way in his favor are present? Ruling: An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner as defined in Article 613 of the Civil Code. It is established either by law, in which case it is called legal, or by the will of the parties, in which event it is a voluntary easement. (See Article 619, Civil Code of the Philippines; City of Manila v. Entote, 57 SCRA 497, 503). Since there is no agreement between the contending parties in this case granting a right of way by one in favor of the other, the establishment of a voluntary easement between the petitioner and the respondent company and/or the other private respondents is ruled out. What is left to examine is whether or not the petitioner is entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of a right of way. In the case of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company, Inc. v. Capitol Subdivision, Inc., et al. (17 SCRA 731, 735-6), we held that: ". . . the Central had to rely strictly on its being entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way, under the Civil Code, and it could not claim any such servitude without first establishing the preconditions for its grant fixed by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code of the Philippines: (1) That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); (2) After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, p. 1, end); (3) That the isolation was not due to the Central's own acts (Art. 649, last par.); and (4) That the right of way claimed is 'at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.' (Art. 650). "By express provision of law, therefore, a compulsory right of way cannot be obtained unless the four requisites enumerated are first shown to exist, and the burden of proof to show their existence was on the Central." (See also Angela Estate, Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, 24 SCRA 500, 510) On the first requisite, the petitioner contends that since the respondent company constructed the concrete wall blocking his ingress and egress via the Gatchalian Avenue, the "nearest, most convenient and adequate road" to and from a public highway, he has been constrained to use as his "temporary" way the adjoining lots belonging to different persons. Said way is allegedly "bumpy and impassable especially during rainy seasons because of flood waters, mud and tall 'talahib' grasses thereon." Moreover, according to the petitioner, the road right of way which the private respondents

referred to as the petitioner's alternative way to Sucat Road is not an existing road but has remained a proposed road as indicated in the subdivision plan of the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision. The petitioner's position is not impressed with merit. We find no reason to disturb the appellate court's finding of fact that the petitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case, there is a road right of way provided by the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots. The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite. We agree with the appellate court's observation that the petitioner should have, first and foremost, demanded from the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was from said subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec. To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue inspite of a road right of way provided by the petitioner's subdivision for its buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows petitioner a much greater case in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years regarding an easement of a right of way, that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it." (See Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 2nd ed., 1972, p. 371) Considering that the petitioner has failed to prove the existence of the first requisite as aforestated, we find it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the preconditions for a legal or compulsory right of way. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

COSTABELLA CORPORATION VS CA G.R. No. 80511 January 25, 1991 FACTS: Petitioner owns real estate properties on which it had constructed a resort and hotel. Private respondents, on the other hand, are the owners of adjoining properties. Before the petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel, private respondents, in going to and from their respective properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioners property. The petitioner however closed the aforementioned passageway when it began the construction of its hotel, but nonetheless opened another rout across its property through the private respondents, as in the past, were allowed to pass. Sometime later, when it undertook the construction of the 2nd phase of its beach hotel, petitioner fenced its property thus closing even the alternative passageway and preventing private respondents form traversing any part of it. As a direct consequence of these closures, private respondents filed an action praying for the reopening of the original passageway across the petitioners pro perty. They averred that by closing the alleged road right of way in question, the petitioner had deprived them access to their properties and caused them damages. In its answer, the petitioner justified the walling in of its property in view of the need to insure the safety and security of its hotel and beach resort, and for the protection of the privacy and convenience of its hotel patrons and guests. At any rate, the petitioner alleged, the private respondents were not entirely dependent on the subject passageway as they (private respondents) had another existing and adequate access to the public road through other properties. Trial court ruled in favor of private respondents. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court stating in its decision that:

. . . While it is true that there is another outlet for the private respondents to the main road, yet such outlet is a new road constructed in 1979, while the road closed by petitioner existed since over 30 years before. Legally, the old road could be closed; but since the existing outlet is inconvenient to the private respondents, equitably the private respondents should be given a chance to pay for a more convenient outlet through the land of the petitioner at a point least prejudicial to the latter. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are entitled to an easement of right of way HELD: It is provided under Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code that: Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity. Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate. In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance. This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts. Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Based on the foregoing, the owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. Additionally, the burden of proving the existence of the foregoing pre-requisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate. Here, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had established the existence of the four requisites mandated by law. For one, they failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their respective properties to a public highway. On the contrary, as alleged by the petitioner in its answer to the complaint, and confirmed by the appellate court, "there is another outlet for the private respondents to the main road." Thus, the respondent Court of Appeals likewise admitted that "legally the old road could be closed." Yet, it ordered the re- opening of the old passageway on the ground that "the existing outlet (the other outlet) is inconvenient to the plaintiff." On this score, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is "adequacy." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. For to justify the imposition of an easement or right of way, "there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it." Further, the private respondents failed to indicate in their complaint or even to manifest during the trial of the case that they were willing to indemnify fully the petitioner for the right of way to be

established over its property. Neither have the private respondents been able to show that the isolation of their property was not due to their personal or their predecessors-in-interest's own acts. Finally, the private respondents failed to allege, much more introduce any evidence, that the passageway they seek to be re-opened is at a point least prejudicial to the petitioner. Considering that the petitioner operates a hotel and beach resort in its property, it must undeniably maintain a strict standard of security within its premises. Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons would be compromised. That indubitably will doom the petitioner's business. It is therefore of great importance that the claimed light of way over the petitioner's property be located at a point least prejudicial to its business. Hence, the Private respondents' properties can not be said to be isolated, for which a compulsory easement is demandable. Insofar therefore as the Appellate Court declared the case to be proper as a controversy for a compulsory right of way, this Court is constrained to hold that it was in error. Servitudes of right of way are demanded by necessity, that is, to enable owners of isolated estates to make full use of their properties, which lack of access to public roads has denied them. Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, they are compulsory and hence, legally demandable, subject to indemnity and the concurrence of the other conditions above-referred to. As also earlier indicated, there must be a real necessity therefor, and not mere convenience for the dominant estate. Hence, if there is an existing outlet, otherwise adequate, to the highway, the "dominant" estate can not demand a right of way, although the same may not be convenient. Of course, the question of when a particular passage may be said to be "adequate" depends on the circumstances of each case. Manresa, however, says: "In truth, not only the estate which absolutely does not possess it should be considered in this condition, but also that which does not have one sufficiently safe or serviceable; an estate bordering a public road through an inaccessible slope or precipice, is in fact isolated for all the effects of the easement requested by its owner. On the other hand, an estate which for any reason has necessarily lost its access to a public road during certain periods of the year is in the same condition. . . . There are some who propound the query as to whether the fact that a river flows between the estate and the public road should be considered as having the effect of isolating the estate. . . . If the river may be crossed conveniently at all times without the least danger, it cannot be said that the estate is isolated; in any other case, the answer is in the affirmative." The isolation of the dominant estate is also dependent on the particular need of the dominant owner, and the estate itself need not be totally landlocked. What is important to consider is whether or not a right of way is necessary to fill a reasonable need therefor by the owner. Thus, as Manresa had pointed out, if the passageway consists of an "inaccessible slope or precipice," it is as if there is no passageway, that is, one that can sufficiently fulfill the dominant owner's necessities, although by the existence of that passageway the property can not be truly said that the property is isolated. So also, while an existing right of way may have proved adequate at the start, the dominant owner's need may have changed since then, for which Article 651 of the Code allows adjustments as to width. But while a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the dominant estate is not at liberty to impose one based on arbitrary choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established upon two criteria: (1) at the point least prejudicial to the servient state; and (2) where the distance to a public highway may be the shortest. According, however, to one commentator, "least prejudice" prevails over "shortest distance." Yet, each case must be weighed according to its individual merits, and judged according to the sound discretion of the court. "The court," says Tolentino, "is not bound to establish what is the shortest; a longer way may be established to avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as when there are constuctions or walls which can be avoided by a roundabout way, or to secure the interest of the dominant owner, such as when the shortest distance would place the way on a dangerous decline." It is based on these settled principles that we have resolved this case in favor of petitioner.

ANASTACIA QUIMEN, vs. CA and YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS 1996 May 29 G.R. No. 112331 FACTS: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio designated which the latter divided into two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. In February 1982 Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda, she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property for P200.00 per square meter. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property. In February 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their house, extending about nineteen (19) meters from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and Anastacia's perimeter fence. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach the road. On 29 December 1987 Yolanda filed an action praying for a right of way through Anastacia's property. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. CA reversed the lower court and favour Yolanda. Hence, this appeal. Issue: 1. WON Private respondent is entitled to a right of way through petitioners property 2. WON respondent court erroneously concluded that the right of way proposed by private respondent is the least onerous to the parties. Ruling: As defined, an easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement. It is jus in re aliena, inseparable, indivisible and perpetual, unless extinguished by causes provided by law. A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by law to a person or class of persons to pass over another's property when his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property. The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. 12 The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by the estates of other persons including that of petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the servient estate. 14 These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of court, more so that the trial court itself declared that "[t]he said properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda

Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the public highway and there appears an imperative need for an easement of right of way to the public highway." 2. We cannot agree. Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. This is the test. In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long at the extreme right of petitioner's property, will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda's father which would mean destroying the sari sari store made of strong materials. xxx As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred. National Power Corp vs Suarez GR No. 175725 October 8, 2008 Facts: In order to implement its 350 KV Leyte Luzon HDVC Power Transmission Project which aims to transmit the excess electrical generating capacity from the Leyte Geothermal Plant to Luzon and various load centers, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, a complaint on August 23, 1996 for expropriation of a parcel of land (the property) in Brgy. Bibincahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon registered in the names of Angel Suarez, Carlos Suarez, Ma. Teresa Suarez and Rosario Suarez (respondents). In accordance with Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 42, petitioner deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Legazpi City Branch the amount of P7,465.71 "representing the provisional value" of the property, alleged to cover an area of 24,350 square meters. Respondents filed on May 5, 1997 their Answer with Counterclaim, alleging that the property covers an area of 34,950, not 24,350 square meters, and that petitioner had already constructed two transmission towers in the middle of the property, cut down more or less 737 trees of different varieties (169 fruit bearing coconut trees, 11 coconut trees seven years old and below, 36 various species of fruit trees, 89 bamboo trees, 77 banana trees, 39 shade trees and 50 madre de cacao trees) and an estimated 562.86 board feet of hardwood trees and 706.80 board feet of softwood trees. They thus moved for the determination of just compensation which was granted by the court which appointed commissioners for the purpose. From the Commissioners' Report dated September 11, 1997, the commissioners determined the just compensation by using "Market Data Analysis, Income Productivity and Zonal Valuation" of the property. The commissioners determined that the just compensation of the land in question is in the amount of P783,860.46. In its Manifestation/Comments by way of Opposition to the Commissioners' Report, petitioner assailed the report as bereft of legal basis, the Market Data Analysis and Income Productivity

approaches being mere assumptions, whereas the Zonal Valuation approach is being used only for real estate tax purposes. By Decision of April 15, 1999, the trial court adopted as basis for determining just compensation the recommendation of the Commissioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision Issue: WON NAPOCOR should pay only an easement fee and not the full value of the property. Ruling: Petitioner contends that since it merely seeks an aerial easement over the property, the decision of the appellate court affirming the trial court's order for the payment of just compensation in the amount of P783, 860.46 representing the total value of the property and excluding the application of Section 3A (b) of RA 6395 is erroneous. Petitioner's plea for the application of Section 3A(b) of RA 6395 which directs the payment of an amount equivalent to only 10% of the market value of the property as just compensation for an easement of right of way does not lie. Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondent's property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee and not the full value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. This conclusion finds support in similar cases in which the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. x x x True, an easement of right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation of power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied). Petitioner's assertion that respondents can still make use of the property by planting corn, rice, root crops and similar plants fails to consider that the property was originally tilled and suited for, as reflected in the Commissioners' Report, 234 fruit bearing coconut trees, 617 abaca plants, 50 madre de cacao and 23 jackfruit trees. That petitioner prohibited respondents from planting trees higher than three meters clearly shows that the easement had impaired respondents' beneficial enjoyment of their property to warrant the imposition of payment of its full value. The measure is thus not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to thereby convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The nature, as well as the character of the land at the time of taking is thus the principal criterion in determining just compensation. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, must thus be considered. Encarnacion vs. CA and Sagun March 11, 1991

Facts: Heirs of Sagun owns a 405 sq.m. land facing a highway in Batangas and Encarnacion owns a land of 2,250 sq. meters, the dominant estate, behind Saguns land. It has an existing right of way meters from Saguns land and meters from Magsinos land totaling 1 meter wide, where no compensation was asked nor given for it. Encarnacion has been using the said pathway for his nursery plant business, which grows through the years. He was able to purchase a jeepney for his business but it could not pass through the 1 meter right of way and so requested the Sagun, to sell to him 1 meters wide, and 25 meters long of their land to be added to the existing right of way, which was denied by the former. Encarnacion filed a writ of easement of right of way in RTC Batangas for additional 2 meters wide but both CA and RTC denied the same for there is another way through the dried up river bed where the Encarnacion could pass. Hence the petition for review on certiorari. Issue: WON Encarnacion is entitled to additional easement of right of way. Ruling: Yes. He is entitled to the additional 2 meters by 25 meters long of right of way over the servient estate or a total area of 62.5 square meters after payment of the proper indemnity, for his business as the other passage, a river bed is dangerous. While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters from the dominant tenement, that access is grossly inadequate. Generally, the right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the present case, the river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump four (4) to five (5) meters up. Moreover, during the rainy season, the river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used at certain times of the year. With the inherent disadvantages of the river bed which make passage difficult, if not impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all. Where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. 4 Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time." This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the passage. And these needs may vary from time to time. When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family could easily make do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the national highway. But the business grew and with it the need for the use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have become extremely cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass through the improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can only be counter-productive for all the people concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to accomodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant nursery business. The law decrees that petitioner must indemnify the owners of the servient estate including Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter was taken to constitute the original path several years ago. Since the easement to be established in favor of petitioner is of a continuous and permanent nature, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate pursuant to Article 649 of the Civil Code which states in part: "Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without

adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity. "Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shell consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate. RTC and CA decision are reversed. So ordered. B. TOPIC: EASEMENT OF PARTY WALL

Alburos building. The projection of the wall does not prove that it was a party wall belonging in common to the applicants and the objectors and that the latter shared in the ownership thereof. The objectors have not proved that a part or one-half of the wall in litigation was erected on the land that belonged to the deceased Lorenza Alburo. The fact that the owners of the objectors' property may have surreptitiously inserted some of the timbers or joists of their building in the wall belonging to the applicants is not enough to convert this latter into a party wall, when there are do many exterior signs to indicate the exclusive ownership, of the wall and to conflict with the existence of the easement that the objectors endeavor to establish. The wall in litigation is fully proven by the record to belong exclusively to the applicants. All of the applicants' properties, including the wall in question, should therefore be registered. The decision of RTC is affirmed with modification that the wall should be included in the applicants property. C. TOPIC: EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND VIEW

Lao vs. Alburo GR no. 10372 Dec. 24, 1915 Facts: Spouses Lao filed an application for registration of the four parcels of land they bought from different individuals. The application for the second parcel was objected by the administrator of the deceased Lorenza Alburo, contending that the plan on the northeast side of Lot no. 2 includes a wall that belongs to the latter. RTC ordered the registration of the 4 parcels of land to the Laos but declared the wall to be party wall. Lao filed a bill of exception in SC. Issue: WON the wall was a party wall. Ruling: No. The wall belongs to the Lao because it has exterior signs which negates it to be a party wall. A party wall is a wall that belongs to the adjoining owners of the land and which is erected on each others boundaries (50-50 ratio). Article 572 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of party walls is presumed, unless there is a title or exterior mark or proof to the contrary in the dividing walls of adjoining buildings up to the common point of elevation. Article 573 of the Civil Code also declares that it shall be understood that there are exterior signs which conflict with the easement of party wall, when, among other circumstances, the entire wall is built on one of the lots and not on the line dividing the two adjoining parcels; when the dividing wall, being constructed of stone and cement, has stones projecting at intervals from the surface on one side only and not on the other; and when it supports joists, beams, floors, and the roof timbers of one of the houses but not of the adjoining building. The record shows it to have been duly proven that the enclosing wall of Lot No. 2 of the plan Exhibit A, belonging to the applicants, much higher than the adjoining building of the objectors; that along the top of the said wall there is a gutter which catches the rain water from the eaves of the roof of the applicants' building and carries it thence to Calle Juan Luna through an iron pipe fastened to the said wall; that one-half of the top of the said wall is covered by the roof of the applicants' building; that the supports of the said wall project toward the side of the applicants' land and that none of the buttresses are on the side of the objectors' lot; that the stones of the wall in dispute are bound or inset in the rear enclosing wall of the applicants' property in such wise that the two walls that inclose the lot form but a single construction, the exterior signs of which show that the wall in question is not a party wall, but that it forms a part of the applicants' building and belongs to them. Besides aside from the said wall there was lower wall on the side of the Alburo and there is a space between the disputed wall and that of the lower wall, latter of which according witness Mendoz belongs to the Alburos, which is a wall of the latrine belonging to the latter. These exterior signs contrary to the existence of a party-wall easement cannot be offset the fact that the wall projected 74 centimeters more than Laos building facing Calle Juan Luna, and that the wall is exactly alongside

Juan Gargantos vs. Tan Yanon and CA G.R. No. L-14652, June 30, 1960 FACTS: A parcel of land containing 888 square meters was formerly owned by a Francisco Sanz. He subdivided the lots into three and then sold each portion to different persons. One portion was purchased by Guillermo Tengtio who subsequently sold it to Vicente Uy Veza. Another portion, with the house of strong materials thereon, was sold in 1927 to Tan Yanon, respondent herein. This house has on its northeastern side, doors and windows over-looking the third portion, which, together with the camarin and small building thereon, after passing through several hands, was finally acquired by Juan Gargantos, petitioner herein. On April 23, 1955, Gargantos applied to the Municipal Mayor for a permit to demolish the roofing of the old camarin. The permit having been granted, Gargantos tore down the roof of the camarin. On May 11, 1955, Gargantos asked the Municipal Council of Romblon for another permit, this time in order to construct a combined residential house and warehouse on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed approval of this application. Since both the provincial fiscal and district engineer recommended the granting of building permit, Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him from constructing a building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the view through the window of his house, unless such building is erected at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to enjoin the members of municipal council from issuing the corresponding building permit to defendant. CFI dismissed the complaint. But on appeal, CA set aside the decision of the CFI and enjoined the defendant from constructing the building unless he erects the same at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view against the propert of petitioner Gargantos. RULING: Invoking our decision in Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo (2 Phil., 24), petitioner maintains that respondent has not acquired an easement by prescription because he has never formally forbidden

petitioner from performing any act which would be lawful without the easement, hence the prescriptive period never started. It is obvious, however, that Article 538, O.C.C. (now Article 621, N.C.C.) and the doctrine in the Yu-Tibo case are not applicable herein because the two estates, that now owned by petitioner, and that owner by respondent, were formerly owned by just one person, Francisco Sanz. It was Sanz who introduced improvements on both properties. On that portion presently belonging to respondent, he constructed a house in such a way that the northeastern side thereof extends to the wall of the camarin on the portion now belonging to petitioner. On said northeastern side of the house, there are windows and doors which serve as passages for light and view. These windows and doors were in existence when respondent purchased the house and lot from Sanz. The deed sale did not provide that the easement of light and view would not be established. This then is precisely the case covered by Article 541, O.C.C (now Article 624, N.C.C) which provides that the existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estate is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed. The existence of the doors and windows on the northeastern side of the aforementioned house, is equivalent to a title, for the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title that characterizes its existence (Amor vs. Florentino, 74 Phil., 403). It should be noted, however, that while the law declares that the easement is to "continue" the easement actually arises for the first time only upon alienation of either estate, inasmuch as before that time there is no easement to speak of, there being but one owner of both estates (Articles 530, O.C.C., now Articles 613, N.C.C). We find that respondent Tan Yanon's property has an easement of light and view against petitioner's property. By reason of his easement petitioner cannot construct on his land any building unless he erects it at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line separating the two estates. MAXIMO CORTES VS JOSE PALANCA YU-TIBO G.R. No. 911 March 12, 1903

be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the said easement. He contends that the easement of light is positive; and that therefore the period of possession for the purposes of the acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin from the date on which the enjoyment of the same commenced, or, in other words, applying the doctrine to this case, from the time that said windows were opened with the knowledge of the owner of the house No. 63, and without opposition on this part. The defendant, on the contrary, contends that the easement is negative, and that therefore the time for the prescriptive acquisition thereof must begin from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may have prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the servient estate from doing something which would be lawful but for the existence of the easement. ISSUE: Whether the easement in this case is positive or negative HELD: Negative. A building may receive light in various manners in the enjoyment of an easement of light, because the openings through which the light penetrates may be made in one's own wall, in the wall of one's neighbor, or in a party wall. The legal doctrine applicable in either one of these cases is different, owing to the fact that, although anyone may open windows in his own wall, no one has a right to do so in the wall of another without the consent of the owner, and it is also necessary, in accordance with article 580 of the Civil Code, to obtain the consent of the other coowner when the opening is to be made in a party wall. This suit deals with the first case; that is, windows opened in a wall belonging to the wife of the plaintiff, and it is this phase of the easement which it is necessary to consider in this opinion. When a person opens windows in his own building he does nothing more than exercise an act of ownership inherent in the right of property, which, under article 348 of the Civil Code, empowers him to deal with his property as he may see fit, with no limitations other than those established by law. By reason of the fact that such an act is performed wholly on a thing which is wholly the property of the one opening the window, it does not in itself establish any easement, because the property is used by its owner in the exercise of dominion, and not as the exercise of an easement. Coexistent with this right is the right of the owner of the adjacent property to cover up such windows by building on his own land or raising a wall contiguously to the wall in which the windows are opened (art. 581 of the same Code), by virtue of the reciprocity of rights which should exist between abutting (adjacent) owners, and which would cease to exist if one could do what he pleased on his property and the other could not do the same on his. Hence it is that the use of the windows opened in a wall of one's own property, in the absence of some covenant or express agreement to the contrary, is regarded as an act of mere tolerance on the part of the owner of the abutting property, and does not create any right to maintain the windows to the prejudice of the latter. The mere toleration of such an act does not imply on the part of the abutting owner a waiver of his right to freely build upon his land as high as he may see fit, nor does it avail the owner of the windows for the effects of possession according to article 1942 of the Civil Code, because it is a mere possession at will. From all this it follows that the easement of light with respect to the openings made in one's own edifice does not consist precisely in the fact of opening them or using them, inasmuch as they may be covered up at any time by the owner of the abutting property, and, as Manresa says in his commentaries on the Civil Code, "there is no true easement as long as the right to impede its use exists." The easement really consists of in prohibiting or restraining the adjacent owner from doing anything which may tend to cut off or interrupt the light; in short, it is limited to the obligation of not impeding the light. The latter coincides in its effects, from this point of view, with the obligation of refraining from increasing the height of a building, which, although it constitutes a special easement, has for its object, at times, the prevention of any interruption of the light enjoyed by the adjacent owner. It will be readily observed that the owner of the servient estate subject to such easement is under no obligation whatsoever to allow anything to be done on his tenement, nor to do anything there himself

Caveat: This is an old case so please bear with the difficulty in understanding my case digest because even I had a hard time understanding and reading the full-text hehe.. sorry guys nevertheless, try to understand lng just read it again and again until you can understand or you can read my supplemental notes provided herein to better understand this case.. good luck!! FACTS: A house No. 65 Calle Rosario, property of the wife of the plaintiff, has certain windows therein, through which it receives light and air, said windows opening on the adjacent house, No. 63 of the same street, owned by defendant. These windows have been in the existence since the year 1843 and the defendant, the tenant of the said house No. 63, has commenced certain work with the view to raising the roof of the house in such a manner that one-half of the windows in said house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving the building of a large part of the air and light formerly received through the window. In its decision the court below practically finds the preceding facts, and further finds that the plaintiff has not proven that he has, by any formal act, prohibited the owner of house No. 63, from making improvements of any kind therein at any time prior to the complaint. The contention of the plaintiff is that by the constant and uninterrupted use of the windows referred to above during a period of fifty-nine years he acquired from prescription an easement of light in favor of the house No. 65, and as a servitude upon house No. 63, and, consequently, has acquired the right to restrain the making of any improvements in the latter house which might in any manner

(positive easement), but is simply restrained from doing anything thereon which may tend to cut off the light from the dominant estate, which he would undoubtedly be entitled to do were it not for the existence of the easement (negative easement). If, then, the first condition is that which is peculiar to positive easements, and the second condition that which is peculiar to negative easements, according to the definition of article 533 of the Civil Code, it is our opinion that the easement of lights in the case of windows opened in one's own wall is of a negative character, and, as such, can not be acquired by prescription under article 538 of the Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may, by a formal act have prohibited the owner of the servient estate from doing something which it would be lawful from him to do were it not for the easement. With respect to the provisions of law 15, title 31, third partida, which the appellant largely relied upon in this oral argument before the court, far from being contrary to it, is entirely in accord with the doctrine of the decisions above referred to. This law provides that "if anyone shall open a window in the wall of his neighbor, through which the light enters his house," by this sole fact he shall acquire a prescriptive title to the easement of light, if the time fixed in the same law (ten years as to those in the country and twenty years as to absentees) expires without opposition on the part of the owner of the wall; but, with the exception of this case, that is to say, when the windows are not opened in the wall of the neighbor, the law referred to requires as a condition to the commencement of the running of the time for the prescriptive acquisition of the easement, that "the neighbor be prohibited from raising his house, and from thereby interrupting the light." That is to say, he must be prohibited from exercising his right to build upon his land, and cover the window of the other. This prohibition, if consented to, serves as a starting point for the prescriptive acquisition of the easement. It is also an indispensable requisite, therefore, in accordance with the law of the partidas, above mentioned, that some act of opposition be performed, in order that an easement may be acquired with respect to openings made in one's own wall. For a proper understanding of this doctrine, it is well to hold in mind that the Code of the partidas, as well as the Roman law, clearly distinguishes two classes of easements with respect to the lights of houses, as may be seen in law 2 of title 31, of the third partida. One of them consists in "the right to pierce the wall of one's neighbor to open a window through which the light may enter one's house" (equivalent to the so-called easement of luminum of the Romans); the other is "the easement which one house enjoys over another, whereby the latter can not at any time be raised to a greater height than it had at the time the easement was established, to the end at the light be not interrupted." (Ne luminibus officiatur.) For the prescriptive acquisition of the former the time must begin, as we have seen, from the opening of the window in the neighbor's wall. As to the second, the time commences from the date on which he was "prevented from raising his house." Some of the judgments which establish the doctrine above laid down were rendered by the supreme court of Spain interpreting and applying the above cited law 15, title 31, partida 3, and therefore they can not in any sense be regarded as antagonistic to the law itself. The question as to whether the windows of the house of the plaintiff are, or are not, so-called regulation windows, we consider of but little importance in this case, both because the authority of the decisions of the law of the partidas, above cited, refers to all kinds of windows, and not to regulation windows solely, and because the record does not disclose, nor has the appellant even stated, the requirements as to such regulation windows under the law in operation prior to the Civil Code, which he asserts should be applied and on which he relies to demonstrate that he has acquired by prescription the easement in question. With respect to the watershed which, according to the plaintiff, exists over the window in question, the record does not disclose that the same has been destroyed by the defendant. He expressly denies it on page 7 of his brief, and affirms (p. 8) that the tenant of the appellant's property himself removed it, by reason of the notice served on him; on the other hand, the judgment of the court below contains no findings with respect to this fact, nor does it disclose the former existence of any such watershed. Furthermore, the opinion which we have formed with respect to this matter, in so far as we are able to understand the merits of the case, is that this shed was a mere accessory of the window, apparently having no other purpose than that of protecting

it against the inclemency of the weather; this being so, we are of opinion that it should follow the condition of the window itself, in accordance with the legal maxim that the accessory always follows the principal. The appellant contends that the shed should be regarded as a projection within the provisions of article 582 of the Code; but it is sufficient to observe that this article speaks of windows with direct views, balconies, or similar projections, in order to conclude that the article does not refer to such watersheds, which have not the slightest degree of similarity to balconies, nor are they constructed for the purpose of obtaining the view -- this being the subject-matter which this article expressly purports to control -- inasmuch as such sheds have rather the effect of limiting the scope of the view than of increasing it. The fact that the defendant did not cover the windows of the other house adjacent No. 63 at the time he covered the windows of the appellant, a fact which the latter adduces as proof of the recognition on the part of the former of the prescriptive acquisition of the easement of the light in favor of that house, which, according to his statement, is under precisely the same conditions as the house of the plaintiff, does not necessarily imply, in our opinion, any such recognition, as it might be the result of a mere tolerance on the part of the defendant. Certainly the fact of his tolerating the use by the owner of that house of such windows, supposing the facts to be as stated, does not carry with it as a result an obligation to exercise the same forbearance with respect to the plaintiff; but whatever may be the legal status of the windows in the house referred to with respect to the house No. 63, we cannot pass upon the point, nor can we form suppositions concerning the matter for the purpose of drawing conclusions of any kind therefrom to support our opinion, for the simple reason that it is not a point at issue in the case, and more especially because the defendant not only denied the existence of the alleged easement of light in favor of the house referred to, but, on the contrary, he affirms that demand has been made that the windows in said house be closed. As a result of the opinion above expressed, we hold: 1. That the easement of light which is the object of this litigation is of a negative character, and therefore pertains to the class which can not be acquired by prescription as provided by article 538 of the Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant estate has, in a formal manner, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to do an act which would be lawful were it not for the easement. 2. That, in consequence thereof, the plaintiff, not having executed any formal act of opposition to the right of the owner of the house No. 63 Calle Rosario (of which the defendant is tenant), to make therein improvements which might obstruct the light of the house No. 65 of the same street, the property of the wife of the appellant, at any time prior to the complaint, as found by the court below in the judgment assigned as error, he has not acquired, nor could he acquire by prescription, such easement of light, no matter how long a time have elapsed since the windows were opened in the wall of the said house No. 65, because the period which the law demands for such prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to run, the act with which it must necessarily commence not having been performed. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court below and condemn the appellant to the payment of all damages caused to the plaintiff, and to the payment of the costs of this appeal. So ordered. Supplemental notes by Paras to better understand the case: Prohibition to make an opening thru the party wall (when 2 or more persons co-owned the wall) Example: A and B are co-owners of a party wall. A can not make an opening on the wall without the permission of B (Art. 667 of NCC). If A makes the opening without Bs consent, B can order that the opening be closed unless a sufficient time for prescription has elapsed which would entitle A to the

easement of light and view through the wall. Such prescription shall be reckoned 10 years from the opening of the window or wall. (Art. 668, par. 1 of the NCC) When easement of light and view is positive and when negative a.) Positive if the window is thru a part wall. Therefore, the period of prescription commences from the time window is opened. Note: The mere opening of the window does not create the easement; it is only when after a sufficient lapse of time the window still remains open, that the easement of light and view is created. (Art. 668, par. 1 of the NCC) Note: Even if the window is on ones own wall, still the easement would be positive if the window is on a balcony or projection extending over into the adjoining land. b.) Negative - if the window is thru ones own wall, that is, thru a wall of the dominant estate. (Art. 668, par. 2 of the NCC) (This is illustrated in the case digest above) Therefore, the time for the period of prescription should begin from the time of notarial prohibition upon the adjoining owner. D. TOPIC: VOLUNTARY EASEMENTS

ISSUE: Whether or not the obligation on contract of easement of right of way is transferred to Villanueva. RULING: At the outset, we note that subject easement (right of way) originally was voluntary constituted by agreement between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant petition is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by necessity or legal easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as provided for in Article 617 of the Civil Code. The essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has n adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may the shortest. The trial court and the Court of Appeals have declared the existence of said easement (right of way). This finding of fact both courts below is conclusive on this Court, hence we see no need to further review, but only to re-affirm, this finding. The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement. Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private respondents estate. Petitioners second proposition, that he is not bound by the contract of easement because the same was not annotated in the title and that a notice of lis pendens of the complaint to enforce the easement was not recorded with the Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious. As already explained, it is in the nature of legal easement that the servient estate(of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the dominant estate (of private respondents in this case) ingress from and agrees to the public highway. Petitioners last argument that he was not a party to Civil Case and that he had not been given his day in court, is also without merit. Rule 39, Sec.47, of the Revised Rule of Court applies. Simply stated, a decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties to said case and those who are successor in interest by the title after said case has been commenced or filed in court. In this case, private respondents Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, initiated Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on May 8, 1991, against the original owners, the spouse Maximino and Justina Gabriel. Title in the name of the petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds on March 24, 1995, after he bought the property from the bank which had acquired it from the Gabriels. Hence, the decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 bind the petitioner. For, although not a party to the suit, he is a successor-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action in court.

BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, JULIO N. SEBASTIAN and SHIRLY LORILLA, respondents.2000 Nov. 27 FACTS: Bryan Villanueva bought a parcel of land from a bank. The land was a foreclosed property of Spouses Gabriel. When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on is southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents (Sebastian and Lorilla). The contract between predecessors of the private respondents and the Gabriels specifically permitted the easement: in order to have an access to and from their aforementioned land where their house s is the nearest public road and the least burdensome to the servient estate and to third persons, it would be necessary for them to pass through spouses Gabriels land. Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the Land, the Gabriels had constructed the aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991, Civil Case for easement, damage and with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against the spouses Gabriel. As successor-in-interest, Sebatian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement. This case won after the CA upheld RTCs decision. So when the case became final and executory, a writ of demolition was issued by Judge Velasco to demolish the small house. The writ was issued after Villanueva had bought the property. So Villanueva filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of Demolition. But Judge Velasco denied since he was not a party. The motion for recon. was also denied. Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. He asserted that the existence of the easement of right of way was not annotated in his title and that he was not a party to Civil Case; hence, the contract of easement executed by the Gabriels did not affect him. CA dismissed for lack of merit. Hence the petition.