1837-38:

Rebellion
ALLAN

Reconsidered
GREER

THERE WAS A TIME when historiansthought they understood the eventsof 1837-38.They did not much likethe Rebellion,and their accounts of the eventitselfwere often sketchy in the extreme,but theyknewwhereit belonged in the broadsweep of Canadian history: theycouldexplainwhyit happened andwhatit meant.For the generation of academic historians writingbefore the delugeof the 1960s, the lesssaid about the illegal machinations of Louis-Joseph Papineau, William Lyon Mackenzie,and their followersthe better. And yet, curiously, the Rebellionformed a major- I think it wouldbe fair to say,themajor - focalpoint in their writingsabout the pre-Conederafion century.Like the ghostof Hamlet's father, it brooded over a stagethat historians proceeded to furnishwith politicalbackgrounds, social and economic causes, and imperialresults. Developmentsconverged on 1837,and then movedoff in novel directions after 1838,but the tumultuous turning-pointitself did not seem a worthy object of research once its essentialcharacter had been
identified.

Donald Creightonsawthe Rebellionas the climactic episodein the long-termstruggle of 'commerce and agriculture. '2 Reformers,
1 For the sakeof brevity,I am confiningmy attentionhere to influentialworks belonging to whatmightbe calledthe academic mainstream. Dissenting interpretationsthat neverreceived the attentiontheydeserved includeS.D. Clark, Movements ofPolitical Protest in Canada, 1640-1840(Toronto:University of Toronto Press 1959),and Stanley B. Ryerson, Unequal Union: Confederation and theRoots of Conflict in theCanadas, 1815-1873(Toronto:Progress Books1973). My ownapproach owes muchto these writers,particularly Clark. 2 DonaldCreighton,The Empire of theSt.Lawrence (Toronto:Macmillan1956),
255-320

Canadian Historical Rev/ew,LXXVI, 1, 1995

0008-3755/95/0003-0001 $01.25/0 University of TorontoPress Incorporated

2 THE

CANADIAN

HISTORICAL

REVIEW

rebels,and patriotes representeda narrow-minded agrarianism opposedto the expansionist commercialism of the Montreal merchants and their Tory political allies.This second,capitalist/conservative campwasthe one that grasped Canada's potentialfor greatness, promotedeconomic development, and, more or less unconsciously, laid
the foundations of a transcontinental nation. Their conflict with the

carpingradicals came to a violenthead in 1837,but, fortunately, thingsturnedout for the best:rebellionwascrushed and the empire
of the St Lawrence gained a new lease on life. The defeat of the rebelsis hardlysurprising, for, in Creighton's account,they had set their facesagainstthe forwardmarchof Historyitself. Creighton's liberal-minded contemporarieshad a somewhat

differentviewof the subject? Sympathetic to moderate reformand criticalof the colonialoligarchy, theybelievedthat a few extremists had temporarily hijackeda perfectly legitimate politicalmovement. The ascendancy of Mackenzieand the radicalpatriotes had come about partly becauseof Tory intransigence, and the result was a
revolt misguidedin its principlesand disastrous in its results.The liberal historians, too, had their view of the overarching thrust of Canadianhistory.It wasa storyof the gradualand peacefuldevelopment of British liberty within a frameworkof growingcolonial autonomy.What wasso deplorableabout the rebelsof 1837wasnot only their violence but also their republicanism,their failure to appreciatethe wondersof the Britishconstitution. And yet, in the grand schemeof things,the role of the radicals and their revoltwas ultimately positive, for, by their foolishactions, theyunwittingly summonedup a saviour in the form of Lord Durham. Durham setin motion the liberalizingmachinerythat, in the fullnessof time, brought forth Responsible Government, Confederation,and dominion autonomy. 'The Rebellions,'wrote A.R.M. Lower, 'were blessings in disguise, the cornerstones of Canadian nationhood.'4 While liberal and business/conservative interpretations held sway in EnglishCanada,French-Canadian historiography wasdominated by a Catholic nationalistschoolbest representedby Abb Lionel

Groulx. 5 Papineauand the patriotes (like most Quebechistorians

3 See,for example, A.R.M. Lower,Colony toNation: A History of Canada (Toronto: Longmans, Green 1946), 213-56;J.M.S.Careless, Canada: A Story of Challenge (Toronto:Macmillan1963), 164-87;KennethMcNaught,ThePelican History of Canada(Harmondsworth: Penguin 1969), 85-9. 4 Lower,Colony toNation,256 5 Lionel Grou|x,Histoire du Canadafranqais depuis la dcouverte, 2nd ed. 2 vols (Montreal:Fides1960), 2: 162-77.For an excellentoverview of the historiogo

REBELLION

RECONSIDERED

then and now, Groulx had little to sayabout the Rebellion crisis outsidethe bordersof Lower Canada) posedvexing problemsfor Groulx. Quite clearly, they were defendersof the nation, and that role gavethem a major claim on the sympathies of a historianwhose central preoccupation was the struggleof his people to maintain their ever-threatened cultural identity.But French Canadawas,at its core, a Catholic and conservative society,as far as Groulx wasconcerned, and it was difficult to ignore the democratic,anti-clerical, and, in the end, revolutionary character of the patriote movement. To
some extent, the historian contrived to reconcile his divided reac-

tionsby downplaying the patriotes' radicalism and by arguingthat, strictlyspeaking, theywere innocentof the crime of rebellion since it was the governmentthat attackedthem. Yet, insofar as the 'mistakes'of the insurgents couldnot be ignored,Groulxwasquite prepared to condemnthem;consequently, hisaccountfeatureda moral dissection whereby readers wereadvised to admirethe patriotes' good points (their nationalism)and reject their bad points (their deism and republicanism). There are somestrikingaffinitieshere with the liberal anglophone historians. Groulx'spulpit-style languagemay be more overtly judgmental than theirs,but in both the liberal and the Catholic versions of the Rebellion, resistance to constituted authority wasseenasan understandable, thoughnonetheless egregious, error. All theseinterpretiveschemes that dominatedCanadianhistorical writing through the middle decades of the twentiethcentury werebuilt on the assumption that history had a discernible direction and flow. Canadawasmovingtowards a goal in the nineteenth century; whether this end point was the construction of a transcontinental, commercial, and political union, the development of parliamentary government, or the preservation and resurrection of French Canada,it wascertainlya Good Thing. Thus the rebels of 1837werequite literallyon the wrongtrack.They lostbecause they had to lose;. theywere not simplyoverwhelmed by superiorforce, they were justly chastised by the god of History. (The narrative structurein theseolder accounts resembles the revolutionary triumphalismthen prevalentin American,French, and Soviethistoriography, though, in the Canadiancase,the form is inverted.) The Rebellionwasthe necessary anomalyin this providentialaccountof

raphyof the Rebellionin LowerCanada,see Jean-Paul Bernard,'L'(volution de l'historiographie depuis les (v(mements (1837-1982),' in Les Rkbellions de 1837-1838: Les patriotes du Bas-Canada dansla mbrnoire collective etchez leshistoriens
(Montreal: Bor(al1983), 17-61.

4 THE

CANADIAN

HISTORICAL

REVIEW

the past,the sorry fate of the insurgents serving to validatethe larger pattern, as well as providingCanadians with powerfulmoral and
political lessons. These teleologicalmodes of explanation continue to resound

down to the presentday, even though historians long ago abandoned the confidentoverview genre favouredby Creighton,Groulx, and the rest. Original scholarship in the lastfew decades hasveered in the oppositedirection, awayfrom overarching themesand towards specialized researchon down-to-earth particulars.Moreover, sinceconflictand violencehaveceased to be taboosubjects, empirical research on the Rebellionitselfhasmade greatstrides sincethe 1960s. Military specialists have told us about troop movements and casualties; 6 imperialhistorians haveshown us howWhitehallviewed

the affair. 7 Meanwhile, research on the economy hasrevealed the financialand agrarian distress that helpedto poison the atmosphere of the times. 8A rich social-history literaturehasconcentrated attention, asneverbefore,on the ordinarypeoplewho formedthe great majorityof thosecaughtup in the Rebellion; even the religious

6 Elinor KyteSenior,Redcoats andPatriotes: TheRebellions in Lower Canada, 1837- 38 (Ottawa:Canada's Wings 1985); Mary BeacockFryer, Volunteers and Redboats,
Rebels and Raiders (Toronto: Dundurn 1987). Pleasenote that, in this note, and

in those whichfollow,onlya fewof the moresignificant recently published books are included.This is not a comprehensive bibliographic essay. 7 Peter Burroughs,The CanadianCrisisand BritishColonial Policy,1828-1841 (Toronto: Macmillan1972); Phillip A. Buckner, The Transition to Responsible Government: British Policy in BritishNorthAmerica, 1815-1850(Westport,Conn.: Greenwood 1985),205-49.Imperialhistory of a differentsortcanbe found in GeorgeRude, Protest and Punishment: TheStory of theSocial and Political Prytesters 'lYansparted toAustrzzlia, 1788-1868 (Oxford:Clarendon Press 1978). 8 The relevantliteratureis vast,but the worksof FernandOuellet are particularly noteworthy: Economic and Social Historyof Quebec, 1760-1850:Structures and Conjunctures (Toronto:Macmillan1980),and Lower Canada 1791-1840: Sodal Change andNationalism, translated by PatriciaClaxton (Toronto:McClelland& Stewart1980). See alsothe highly perceptivediscussion by DouglasMcCalla in Planting thePrwince: TheEconomic History of Upper Canada, 1784-1870 (Toronto: University of TorontoPress 1993),187-93. 9 In additionto the works by Ouellet citedabove, seeLeoA. Johnson, History ofthe County of Ontario, 1615-1875 (Whitby: Countyof Ontario 1973),95-127;Colin Read,TheRising in Western Upper Canada, 1837-87:The Duncombe Revolt andAfter (Toronto:University of Toronto Press 1982);BryanPalmer,Working-Class Experience: Rethinking the History of Canadian Labour; 1800-1991(Toronto:McClelland & Stewart1992), 69-75; Allan Greer, ThePatriots and thePeople: TheRebellion of 1837in RuralLower Canada (Toronto:University of TorontoPress 1993).

REBELLION

RECONSIDERED

background to 1837hasbeenexplored. 0The result hasbeena great advance in empirical knowledge:myths have been punctured,
generalizations havebeen qualified,and a wealthof factualdata has
been accumulated.

However, reflection at the conceptual levelhasnot kept pacewith the progress of empiricaland microscopic research.One can only pity the poor studentor non-specialist readerwho wanders into this historiographical terrainin search of answers to fairlybasic questions aboutthe Rebellion:What exactly wasit?Wasthisa singlephenomenon with variousaspects and phases - the Rebellion- or were there twoor more distinctrebellions? Whydid it (they) occurand whydid it turn out as it did? Was it a minor disturbance or an important event with lasting consequences? The student or reader will encounter a literature that seemsmore concernedwith interpretive fine pointsthan fundamentalissues. Data aboundon the rebels- the number who were Methodists, or the percentage who owned more than four cows- but what exactly makes someonea rebel? Books and articlesenumeratethe regimentsinvolvedin the battlesof St Denis and St Eustache,but they saylittle about the effectsof the Britishmilitarypresence on LowerCanadianpolitics. This is not to saythat the recentworkslack conclusions, only that
little thought seemsto havegone into them. When it comestime to sumup, the discussion becomes crudeand schematic; in manycases, historiansfall back on the shopwornformulae of the traditional accounts. Even more pervasive is the 'police officer's'conceptionof just what constitutes rebellion: it is essentially a crime, accordingto conservative historians, an illegal deed concertedin advanceby illdisposed traitors. More modern, liberal-mindedwriters try to avoid loaded vocabularyand strive to bring out the mitigating circumstances, but they still portray the revolt as a simple, unilateral act, something that rebels did - for whatever combination of social, economic,and political reasons. The behaviourof the government and of other actorsis, in most accounts(though not those of the French-Canadian nationalists), merely reactive:normal, unremarkable, unproblematic.

This police officer'sview of the subjectunderliesmany of the implicit definitionsof rebellioncurrentlyfavouredin the literature.
10 RichardChabot, Le curb decampagree etla contestation locale au Qubbec de1791aux tvubles de 1837-38 (Montreal: Hurtubise 1975); Gilles Chauss6, Jean-Jacques Lartigue, premier bvque de Montreal(Montreal: Fides 1980); Albert Schrauwers, Awaiting theMillennium: TheChildren of Peace and theVillage of Hope,1812-1889 (Toronto: Universityof Toronto Press1993)

6 THE

CANADIAN

HISTORICkL

REVIEW

For many historians, particularlythosewho concentrateon Upper

Canada and on Mackenzie, a rebellion seems to be a sudden and

forcible attempt to unseat a government, somethingvirtually indis-

tinguishable from a coup dtat. But if Mackenzie's attackon Toronto is the Rebellion,what term do we applyto the all-importantcontext of that exploit, a situationin which Upper Canadianradicals believed legitimate governmenthad alreadyceasedto exist? Violence seems to be a defining feature of rebellion in many accounts,and it is usuallyassociated with the rebels, even though the violenceof the governmentand its supporters wasfar more extensive and deadly. There is evena tendency to assimilate the fightingof 1837-38with the various riots and brawls that punctuated the history of preConfederation Canada. Conservative commentators thus find confir-

mation of their viewthat the Rebellionwassimplythe mostdramatic of many casesof lower-class hell-raising,while writers on the left, seduced by a visionof the toilingmasses in arms,find thisa cheering instance of popular resistance.(Resistance to what? to whom?) Missingagain is an appreciationof context, of the exceptional political circumstances which brought conflict to a bloodyclimax, and which gavethe fightingan importancequite differentfrom that of a canalworkers'riot or an Orange-Green brawl. The time hascome,I believe,for somebasic rethinkingaboutthe

Rebellion of 1837-38, andI will suggest lineson whichsuch a reconsideration might proceed. In myview,we shouldpause in the search for causesand effectsand concentratefirst on identifyingmore clearlythe phenomenonthat is to be explained.Surelythe 'what' questionis prior to the 'why' question. We can bestapproachthis definitionalproblem, I would argue,by looking more closely at the crisis of 1837-38as a complexseries of events, one involving the actions and interactions of several parties,notjust thoseidentifiedas
rebels.Rather than focusingon a one-dimensional act of revolt,we shouldrecognizethe contingency of events.Choiceswere made, actions taken, not asthe inevitable resultof metaphysical forces or of rigidly determiningstructures, but in response to rapidlychanging circumstances. Placingthe accenton complexityand contingency may seema recipe for chaosrather than definitionalclarity;nevertheless,as I hope to show,this is the only way to achievean integratedviewof the Rebellionand to graspits essential nature. Two major obstacles standin the wayof anysynthetic initiatives of the sort outlined above: the comparative isolation of Canadian historiography from larger internationalcurrents,and the yawning chasm separatingstudiesof Lower Canada and workson Upper Canada.The historiography of this country,strongin many other

REBELLION

RECONSIDERED

areas, lacksprecisely the language and conceptual toolsneededto makesense of revolutionary matters. GivenCanada's history,aswell as the historiographic traditions mentionedearlier, this is hardlya cause for wonder; what is surprisingis the failure of Rebellion specialists to makefuller useof the enormous literature,empirical and theoretical,on revolutionary episodes in Europeand the Americasin thelateeighteenth andearlynineteenth centuries. TM Not that the Canadashad the same experienceas Belgium and Poland in 1830,or asArgentinaand Venezuela in 1808.Naturally,there were numerouspointsof contrast, as well as similarities, but we cannot evenbegin to identifyelements that are peculiarly and specifically
Canadian in the absenceof a comparativeframework. Indeed, we

can hardlyfind the words to describe the events of 1837-38without drawingon the histories of other revolutionary outbreaks. While a broaderinternational viewmightprovideusefulconcepts and points of comparison, any attempt to constructan integrated
accountof the CanadianRebellionis still bedevilledby a particularly

advanced caseof historiographical apartheid.Creightonwasquite preparedto encompass UpperandLowerCanada in hisclassic work,

but since his time, researchers on the two sides of the Ottawa River

havebeen pursuing differentissues usingdifferentmethods and, on thewhole,ignoring oneanother. 12 The Canadian Historical Association, followingthe prevailingtrendsbut alsoawardingthem a sortof officialstampof approval, commissioned twoHistoricalBooklets on the Rebellion: one devoted to Upper Canada, the other to Lower Canada.This gap,mirroringthe separation of French-and EnglishCanadian historiographies, greatly magnifiesthe effects of fragmented viewsand specialized research- a situationprevailing in almost all fields of history- and makes considerationof larger questions particularly difficult.Above all, it tends to obscurethe linksconnecting developments in the twoprovinces. Thesedays, it appears that onlythe authors of textbooksyntheses are forced to examine both rebellions. Drawing of necessity on a bifurcated monographicliterature, thesewritersoften seem, quite understandably, at a loss asto how to integratethe diverse materials on the two provinces. Thosewriting in French tend to solvethe

11 A qualificationis in order: on particular themes,Rebellion specialists have indeeddrawnon a comparative literaturecovering suchmatters asriotsin eighteenth-century Britainor the agrarian economy on the eveof the FrenchRevolution, but theyhaveshown hardlyany interestin revolutionary episodes per se and in their integrity. 12 Mea culpa!

8 THE

CANADIAN

HISTORICAL

REVIEW

problem by simply ignoring Upper Canada altogether and con-

centrating on the historical ancestor of the provinceof Quebec?

English textbook writers do their best to present a pan-Canadian view of the Rebellion, but the resultsare still disjointed- in most instances the two rebellionsare coveredin separatechapters- and rather cockeyed owingto the effectsof an anglophoneand Ontario bias.In four recentlypublished histories of Canada,I found roughly equalspace allottedto the Upper and LowerCanadianphases of the Rebellion,in spiteof the fact that the crisis in Lower Canadawasfar deeper and, by any standard,much more significant. Three of the booksplacedthe Upper Canadianrising before the Lower Canadian, even though the chronologicaland logical order of eventswasjust

the opposite. TM The remainingwork getsthe sequence right, but

recognizes no connectionbetween the two rebellions,as if it were pure coincidence that Mackenzieattacked Torontojust after fighting

brokeout in the Montrealregion. My own view,as shouldbe apparentby now, is that eventsin the twoprovinces were indeed connected; in fact,I believethey can best
be understoodas various elements of a single phenomenon. It is quite true that conflict took different forms in Upper Canada and Lower Canada, and that the populationsinvolvedcame from dissimilarbackgrounds, but the Canadas are not the only Britishpossessionwhere revoltsoccurredin dispersed locationsand involvedpeo-

ple of differentreligions and languages. The IrishRebellion of 1798

sawrisingsin variousareasof the north and the south;Protestants and Catholics, English-speakers and Irish-speakers, all clashedwith the existingorder (and with one another aswell) in a complicated

eruption of violence? The Indian Rebellionof 1857 (formerly

known as the Mutiny) wasjust as multidimensional: there were ag-

13 An exception is Denis Vaug. eoisandJacques Lacoursire, eds,Canada-Qubbec:

synthbse historique (Montreal: Editions du Renouveau pdagogique 1976),306-18,
which integrates a good, though verybrief, accountof Upper Canadianevents into a chapterdevotedprimarilyto the Rebellionin LowerCanada. 14 R. DouglasFrancisand Donald B. Smith, Origins: Canadian History to Confederation(Toronto:Holt, Rinehartand Winston1988),227-31,249-53; DavidJ.Bercusonet al., Colonies: Canadato 1867 (Toronto: McGraw-HillRyerson1992), 219-24, 236-9; J.M. Bumsted, ThePetrple of Canada:A Pre-Confederation Histmy (Toronto:Oxford University Press 1992),248-57 15 Margaret Conrad, Alvin Finkel, and CorneliusJaenen, Histmyof the Canadian Petrples, vol. 1: Beginnings to 1867(Toronto:CoppClarkPitman1993),412-24 16 Gearold O'Tuathaigh,Irelandbefore theFamine,1798-1848(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan1972);ThomasPakenham, TheYear ofLiberty: TheSttn oftheCa'eat Irish Rebellion of 1798(London:Hodder and Stoughton1969)

REBELLION

RECONSIDERED

rarian insurrectionsas well as military revolts;various provinces,

ethnic groups, religions, andcastes wereinvolved. 7 And yet,in both

the Irish and the Indian cases, historiansseemto have no difficulty applyingthe singularterm 'rebellion' to events that were actually far

more pluralthan the Canadian crisis. J8 In otherwords, there is no reasonto consider dispersal over space and diversity in form to be, in themselves, groundsfor denyingthe basicunity of a revolt. Althoughmy point is mainlyabout the integrityof the events of 1837-38,I might alsoobserve that the structural antecedents of revolt in the two Canadas were not asdissimilar ashasoften been supposed.Bothprovinces had essentially pre-industrial economies and a preponderance of independentfarming families.Everywhere there was widespread anxiety aboutprocuring newlandsto settlethe rising generation, and so governmentpolicies that threatened to restrict access to wilderness landswere naturallya matter of graveconcern in these settlements. Tensionsbetween town and countrywere as much apparentin the Toronto region as in Montreal'shinterland, and, as a consequence,conflict tended to follow a rural-urban patternwhenfightingbrokeout in 1837.Seigneurial tenure,on the other hand, wasunique to LowerCanada,and with it went landlordhabitant friction, a dynamic of rebellion in that colony. Lower Canadawas,in general,an older settlementwith a larger population that wasin majorityFrenchCanadian;in contrast, its neighbourwas expandingrapidly, thanksto the effectsof agriculturalprosperity and massive immigrationfrom the British Isles.Some immigrants alsosettledin Lower Canada,with the resultthat a linguisticminority of Britishorigin sharedthe provincewith the old-stock canadiens. Accordingto Lord Durham and a long succession of historians after him, tensions between English and Frenchin LowerCanadalay
at the root of the civil strife of 1837-38. The Rebellion in Lower

Canada,we are often told, was'racial' and, as a consequence, it was

sharperthan - indeed fundamentally diftrent from - the milder strife that disturbed 'English' Upper Canada. But, in fact, Upper Canada was also a divided societywith friction between British immigrantsand older settlers of Canadianand American origin, as

17 Christopher Hibbert, TheGreat Mutiny: India 1857(London:Penguin1978);Eric Stokes,7hePeasant Armed: TheIndian Rebellion ofi857 (Oxford: Clarendon 1986) 18 I am on record as favouringthe term revolutionary crisisrather than rebellion (Greer, Patriots and thePeople, 4). I still think the former phraseapplies,but consideration of the Irish and Indian cases makes me more inclinedto go along with the prevailingusagewhich prescribes the word 'rebellion' for colonial revolts that do not culminate in the overthrow of the imperialregime.

10 THE

CANADIAN

HISTORICAL

REVIEW

anyone who has read Susanna Moodie can attest. Furthermore,

researchby Ronald Staggand Colin Read revealsthat the North American-bornand the recent immigrantstended to gravitateto opposing camps whencivilstrifebrokeout in this'racially' homoge-

neouscolony. lThe language of racesuitsthe purposes of those

wishing to emphasize distinctions between the Upper and the Lower Canadianrebellions and to denigratethe latter (a matterof prejudicesrather than principles), but it doessoby concealing an important similarity. The civilstrifeof 1837-38saw an ethnocultural polarization on both sidesof the OttawaRiver- long-established settlers tending to come to blowswith unassimilated newcomers. The fact that immigrants were, in relativeterms,somuch more numerousin Upper Canadagoesa longwayto explainingthe weakershowing of insurrection in that province. The constitutions of the two provinces were identical,though politics had developed along somewhatdifferent lines. Without delvinginto the complexparticulars of ideologies, grievances, and programs,we might simplynote the existencein both Canadasof polarizing tendenciesthat produced, by the mid-1830s, two basic political camps:on one side, office-holdingoligarchiesloosely affiliatedto more broadly based'Tory parties,'composed mainlyof Britishimmigrants, and,on the other, a 'Reform'opposition, critical of existing powerstructures. Because of the largerproportion of immigrants in the Upper Canadian population, Toriesin thatprovince, and not LowerCanada, enjoyed considerable electoral strength. The patriote opposition in Lower Canadawasmarkedby its originsas a French-Canadian ethnic movement,thoughits nationalism wasfar less narrow by 1837thanit hadbeenearlier. An outlook thatmight, for shorthandpurposes, be labelled masculine-democratic-republican predominatedamongpatriotes, their rhetoric dwellingon the rightsof the people (read propertied men), the dangers of corruption, and the need to defendthe independence and prerogatives of the colonialAssembly? Mackenziespokefor thosewho took a similar radical line in Upper Canada,though mostReform politiciansin that province favoured a more moderateapproach.

19 RonaldJ. Stagg,'The YongeStreetRebellionof 1837:ga Examination of the SocialBackground and a Reassessment of the Events'(PhD thesis, University of Toronto 1976),chaps 6 and 8; Read, The Rising in Western Upper Canada, 164-204 20 Affinitiesin the rhetoric,tactics, and politicalstyles betweenthe colonialradicals and analogous elementsin Britain haveyet to be exploredin depth. The term 'reform' had rich and varied connotations in the early 1830s, and Mackenzie's useof the term 'political unions'wouldhavehad powerful Old-Country

REBELLION

RECONSIDERED

11

This, very roughly,wasthe situationin the Canadas on the eve of the Rebellion. I am quite awarethat this compressed sketchof the socialand political backgroundcould be debated in almost every one of its particulars.Indeed, my hope is that bravesouls will somedaycomeforwardto examinetheseissues in somedepth and from an integratedpoint of viewencompassing both Canadas. Meanwhile,

I am anxious to geton to the events of 1837-38. The pottedhistory

that followspaysparticularattentionto the linkages connectingdevelopmentsin Upper Canadaand Lower Canadain an attempt to gain a better graspof the essential nature of the Rebellioncrisis asa
whole.

If we place ourselves at the beginningof 1837,almosta year

beforearmed struggle erupted,we find the Canadas alreadyembroiled in a seriouspolitical crisis.The legislativebusiness of Lower Canadahad by then ground to a completehalt, owing to acuteconflict betweenthe electedand the appointed elementsof the legislature. City councilsand schoolboardsno longer existedbecause the statutes creatingthem had expired and could not be renewed.No budgets were approved, and fundsfor routine stateoperations had to be raisedby extraordinarymeans.In Upper Canada,the situation was superficiallynormal; harmony reigned between the executive and a Tory-dominated Assembly. However,the legitimacyof that Assembly wasby no meansuniversally accepted;it wasa matter of notorietythat the 1836 electionhad been marked by poll violence, fraud, and gubernatorialinterference,and, whether or not these factors had truly determined the defeat of Reform, many Upper Canadians certainlythoughttheyhad.The Toriesclearlyhad doubts about their popularityfor, knowingthat the king did not have long to live and that consequently a new electionwould haveto be called soon, they passeda bill extending the life of the Assembly in disregard to the established practiceof dissolving the Houseupon the death of a monarch. Reform politiciansconcludedthat traditional parliamentary politicswere at an end; the moderates among them retired from public life, while Mackenzie used his newspaperto propoundthe view that the current Assembly wasnot simplyof the wrongpoliticalcomplexion, but wasillegaland illegitimate.

resonances. See.John Belcham,'Republicanism, PopularConstitutionalism and the RadicalPlatformin EarlyNineteenth-Century England,' Social History 6 (,]an.
1981): 1-32.

12 THE

CANADIAN

HISTORICAL

REVIEW

Manypatriotes and radicalReformers seemto havelookedforward to the day when Canadawould be free of the 'baneful domination'

of Great Britain. However,thiswasa blessing they expected in the distant future;meanwhile, the threatof secession couldbe employed to extract concessions from the Colonial Office. Historians are

quick to warn us that, at this stage,and even later when the crisis deepened,mostUpper Canadians did not want a revolution.Insofar
as revolution was associated with lawlessnessand bloodshed, this

observation is of courseperfectlycorrect,and it appliesto Lower Canadians as well. But theydid not want tyranny,oppression, and injustice either. The fact that mostCanadians lackedwhatmight be calleda revolutionary consciousness in 1837is quiteunremarkable; it simply putsthem in the samecategory asmostFrenchpeoplein thespring of 1789, most Russians in early1917, andmost Europeans at the beginning of 1848.Revolutions are almostnever launchedin consequence of some prior shift of public opinion in favour of revolt. Of course,the developmentof widespreadalienationfrom the existing order doesfrequently playa role in precipitating a crisis of government,but the populaceneed not haveinsurrection on its mind at the outset.It is when the authorities are unableto co-opt, channel,or crush opposition, or when they are overwhelmed by financialcollapse(France,1788) or militaryfailure (Russia, 1905 and 1917),that the situation becomes explosive. In otherwords, revolutions occurwhen governments find themselves unableto govern, and thiswas just the situation facingthe colonialadministration of the Canadas asthe spring of 1837approached. Dangerous politicalgridlockcouldnot be allowed to endureindefinitely; His Majesty's government,claiming ultimate authorityover British North America, therefore had to find a way out of the impasse. After yearsof vacillation and repeatedattempts to conciliate irreconcilable colonialparties,the cabinet now opted for a crackdownon the Lower Canadianpatriotes. Lord John Russell's Ten Resolutionswere not exactlydraconianin their specificprovisions, but theydid constitutea clear rejectionofpatriote demandsfor democratic constitutionalreform. Furthermore, they allowed the colonial governorpower to spendfundswithout the approvalof the Assembly, and this violated the sacredprinciple of 'no taxationwithout representation' proclaimedsincethe time of the AmericanRevolution. In the strained atmosphereof the day, these measures were bound to provokeangryreactions; the Colonial Office understood this clearly and immediatelyordered additional troops to Lower Canada.Sure enough, as soonas newsof the provocative Russell

REBELLION

RECONSIDERED

13

Resolutions reachedQuebec,radicalnewspapers beganhowlingwith indignationabout 'despotism' and 'robbery'of the public purse. Only the lowerprovince wasdirectlyimplicatedin thesedevelopments,but Upper Canadians of all political stripesfollowed them with the closest attention.In LowerCanada's ongoingcrisis, theynot only sawa more vividand starkly drawnversionof their own debates and conflicts,but they discernedunmistakableportents for the
future of their corner of British North America. Thus, in the furore

over the RussellResolutions, Upper Canadian Tories fulminated against'treason'and 'Frenchrepublicanism,' while an increasingly
anti-British Mackenzie sounded more and more like the leader of a

Lower Canadasolidarity campaign.ParanoidTory fantasies notwithstanding,thiswasnot the productof any interprovincial revolutionary conspiracy. Indeed, communications with the patriotes were limited, and personalrelationsbetweenMackenzieand Papineau were lessthan cordial, but when the British moved to provoke a confrontation with their neighbours, Upper Canadianradicalsknew that their own future was hanging in the balance. The famous declaration(28 July) of the Toronto Friendsof Reform put it this way:'The Reformers of Upper Canadaare calledupon by everytie of feeling, interest, and duty, to make common causewith their
fellow citizens of Lower Canada, whose successful coercion would

doubtless be in timevisited uponus. ,31 Meanwhile, the patriotes were mobilizing a wider public for a massive campaign of protest.Localcommittees were established and, betweenMay and September, rallieswere held in towns and villages across LowerCanada.Upper Canada followedsuitbeginningin July. Mackenzie wasthe drivingforce,usingthe pages of his newspaper to urge the creationof local 'politicalunions'and touringthe outlying settlements to rouseaudiences with his fiery oratory.The speeches and the resolutions passed at theseUpper Canadianmeetings naturallydwelton the familiarlitanyof FamilyCompact abuses and other grievances of strictlylocal interest.The occasion of the campaign, unprecedented in its intensity, wasnevertheless the confrontation betweenthe Lower Canadianpatriote movementand the government of the British empire. 'We earnestlyrecommend every town-

shipto form politicalunions,'editorialized the StThomasLiberal, 'to

21 Colin Read and RonaldJ. Stagg,eds, TheRebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada: A Collection ofDocuments (Ottawa: Carleton University Press 1985),54. Compare 62,
70, 77, 87, 104, 105, 107, 316.

14 THE

CANADIAN

HISTORICAL

REVIEW

hold meetings and to express boldlyand aboveboard their determination to rise or fall with their brethren in Lower Canada. '22

Through the summerand fall, conflict in Lower Canadaonly intensified. The governor, in a vain attemptto stemthe agitation, had outlawed 'seditiousassemblies' in June; they continued unabated,in spiteof government effortsto get localofficials to enforce the ban. The administration's next recourse wasto dismiss 'disloyal' militia officers andJustices of the Peace,but thisactionpoliticized local governmentand precipitatedpatriote countermoves against 'loyal' magistrates and officers.The upshotwasthat, by late October-earlyNovember, large sections of the rural Districtof Montrealhadsetup theirownrevolutionized localregimes. 23 Such a state of affairs constituteda clear challengeto the sovereignty of the BritishEmpireand so,with everlargernumbers of soldiers arriving in Montreal,it became increasingly apparent thatarmedforcewould soonbe usedagainst the patriotes. These new and graverdevelopments had a double impact on Upper Canada. Firstof all, theyprovided an opportunity for action by stripping the province of British troops. The military build-up in the Districtof Montrealtookplaceat the expense of other colonial garrisons withthe effect that,byearlyNovember, not a single soldier remainedin Upper Canada.Powerrelations accordingly tilted in favourof the anti-government forces, thoughnot to the degreethat Mackenzie, greatly underestimating the loyalist militia,thought. The LowerCanadian drift towards war provided an impulse, aswell asan opportunity, to Upper Canadian radicals. Facinga major military onslaught, the patriotes stoodin obvious need of support: not just support in the customary form of speeches and encouraging resolutions,but substantial diversionary action.'Let me advise every friend of the people,' Mackenzie wroteon theeveof theBattle of StDenis, 'to provide himself with a rifle, or a musket or gun ... keep youreyes on Lower Canada. '4In earlyDecember, shortly after news wouldhave reachedUpper Canadaof the outbreakof armedconflictin the District of Montreal,insurgents marched downYonge Street in their ill-fated attemptto capture Toronto.Word quickly spread westward

22 ReadandStagg, eds,1837in Upper Canada, 65.Mackenzie even announced his initial plansto organize an extra-parliamentary network halfway throughan article describing the progress of the anti-government campaign in Lower Canada. Clark,Movements ofPolitical Protest, 375
23 For flirther details seeGreet, ThePatriots andthe People, 219-26.

24 ?he Constitution, 22Nov.1837, quoted in Anthony W. Rasporich, ed.,William Lyon Mackenzie (Toronto: Holt, RinehartandWinston1972),69 (emphasis in original)

REBELLION

RECONSIDERED

15

to the London Districtand there, in a tertiary reaction, radical forces assembled in supportof their colleagues but dispersed withoutfiring a shotwhen it becameclearthat the gamewasup and that resistance wasfutile. The fightingin 1837had been far more extensive and intensein Lower than in Upper Canada;the casualty figuresreflect the disparity: about 250 men killed in battle in the former, four in the latter? Yet it wasonly a matter of weeksfrom the time the bullets began to fly until the governmentand its supportershad triumpheddecisively in both provinces. The crisiswasby no meansat an end, however.Hundreds, perhapsthousands, of refugees fled to the United States in the wakeof the first round of fightingand, in the process, they helped to keep the revolutionalivewhile wideningits geographicscope.There was tremendous publicsupport for the Canadianrebels, especially in the borderlands of northernVermont, New York, Ohio, and Michigan. However, the United Statesgovernment,a major actor in the crisis of 1837-38, decided to preserve peacewith Great Britain at the expenseof revolutionin the Canadas, and this decisioneventually sealedthe fate of the latter.Yet, for a time, the federalgovernment had difficulty imposingits will on the turbulent northern frontier. 'Patriots,' Americanaswell asFrench-and English-Canadian, launched a series of border raids in 1838; these culminated in November of

that year in a comparatively large-scale invasionof Lower Canada, coupled with a risingof LowerCanadian rebels. Cross-border actions against Upper Canadatendedincreasingly to be the work of UScitizens,lockednowin conflictnot onlywith the Britishcolonialrgime but also with their own government,which quickly expanded its army by about 50 per cent in order to take activemeasures to preserve Americanneutrality and bring northernPatriots to heel. 26 By the end of 1838,the colonialregimehad completely mastered the situationfrom a militarypoint of view;politically, far-reaching

25 Senior,Redcoats andPatriotes, 213;G.M. Craig, Upper Canada: The Formative Years, 1784-1841 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart 1963),247-8.Notethatthese figures applyto the firstphaseof the Rebellioncrisis only.My thanksto Colin Readfor guidanceon thissubject. 26 See especially Albert B. Corey, The Crisis of 1830-1842 in Canadian-American Relations (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress1941), 44-69, but also Oscar A. Kinchen, TheRise andFall ofthe Patriot Hunters (New York:Bookman1956);Orrin EdwardTiffany, TheRelations of the United States to the Canadian Rebellion of 1837-1838(Buffalo1905);EdwinC. Guillet, TheLives and Times of thePatriots (Toronto:University of TorontoPress 1968);John Duffyand H. Nicholas Muller, 'The Great Wolf Hunt: The Popular Responsein Vermont to the Patriote Uprising of 1837,' Journal ofAmerican Studies 8 (Aug.1974):153-69.

16 THE

CANADIAN

HISTORICAL

REVIEW

changes were under way,all designed to consolidate the victoryand strengthengovernment.For the Rebellionwasnot exclusively - or evenprimarily- a militaryaffair, nor wasit only the work of 'rebels.' The seriousness of the crisiscan be gauged not only in the farreachingchallenges to the existingorder, but alsoin the extraordinary measures taken to preserve Britishrule. In addition to mounting militaryassaults against itsLowerCanadianfoes,the government alsoeffectedan unprecedented juridical revolutionto guarantee its victory. Martial law was imposed, habeascorpus suspended, and arrestswere carried out on a massivescale and largely without charges being laid. Legal surgery waslessradicalin Upper Canada where the revolutionarythreat waslessserious,but even here the right of habeascorpuswas abridged:an unorthodox system was established of summaryconviction and attainderof prisoners who petitionedfor pardons.Finally,legislation passed in March 1838 gaveimmunity from prosecution to loyalists who may havebroken

the lawin apprehending rebels?Thislastprovision points usin the directionof the unofficialbut veryreal actionstaken against opponents of governmentin the Rebellion years.Both Canadianprovincesprovidedozensof instances of assault, theft and destruction of property,and arbitraryarrestcommittedby loyalist forces. Of course, such irregularitiesare almost inevitablein times of civil strife, but they do constitutean additional dimensionto the abandonmentof
the rule of law.

In the years followingthe fighting,the Britishcolonialregimewas

not so much restored as reconstituted. The state, in its administrative

and executive aspects, grewenormously in size,scope, and power.In the short run, soldiersand police proliferated,but, before long, more peacefulagencies of regulationcameto predominate: schools, prisons,asylums, and aboveall, bureaucracies. (By the end of the 1840s an arrangementknownasResponsible Government had been worked out to help coordinate executive,legislature,and electorate.) The provincial Assemblyof Lower Canada was gone for good;in its place,an appointedSpecialCouncil (1838-41) wasfree to pass unpopularmeasures in fieldssuchas the law, property,and

municipalgovernment?The two Canadas were united, as is well

known,in order to allowthe resumption of the parliamentary system

27 Readand Stagg,TheRebellion of 1837in Upper Canada, !xxxvii-viii 28 Brian Young,'Positive Law, Positive State:Class Realignmentand the Transformation of Lower Canada, 1815-1866,' in Allan Greer and Ian Radforth, eds,

ColonialLeviathan:StateFormation in Mid-Nineteenth CenturyCanada(Toronto: Universityof Toronto Press1992), 50-63

REBELLION

RECONSIDERED

17

withoutlettingthe FrenchCanadians havethe degreeof powertheir numberswould otherwiseentitle them to. A punitive forced marriage, the Act of Union attempted to solvethe 'French-Canadian problem' throughrepression, and, assuch,it represented the negation of the insurgent spiritof 1837-38 with itsimplicitcommitment to self-determination and mutualsupport.(Successor regimes would be payingthe pricefor that authoritarian solutionfor manyyearsto come!) All in all, the decisive defeatof republicanoppositionin the Canadas pavedthe wayfor a major transformation of imperial rule. No matter how paltry the militarycontests of the Rebellionmay seem,thishad been a politicalturning-point of the first magnitude. From the summerof 1837until the end of 1838,the centralpart of British North America underwenta thoroughgoingcrisisof sovereignty,one in whichthe veryframework of statepowerwasin danger of collapse. Fundamental questions cameto the fore, not asabstract debatingpointsbut as real problemsrequiring immediateanswers:
Who would rule the Canadas? How would that rule be carried out?

Its legitimacycontestedin theory and challengedin practice, the statecould hardlycarryout its normal function as ultimate arbiter; insteadof containingand channellingpolitical contention,it was now the actual object of conflict.Wherever there are partiesand factionsone finds competitionfor power and influence, and, in parliamentary systems, for the right to form a government; but, in 1837-38,the actualframework of politics wasat stake:that is what made this a revolutionary crisis. Much hasof necessity been left out of thiscompressed accountof the crisis of 1837-38.However, I hope that its inadequacies can be overlooked in keeping with the spiritof the exercise. I havetried to bring out the contingency of events and to dispense with the metaphysical forces of Fate,Destiny, and capital-h History; alsoabsent are master-plotters scripting their revolutionary scenarios in advance of events. Almosteveryaction,whetherby rebels,loyalists, or government, wasalsoa reaction:developments were interconnected and

reciprocal,repression and resistance provokingone another in dialecticalfashion. A spatial dynamic is also apparent, with the effects of conflictradiatingoutwardfrom an epicentrein the District of Montreal. Each succeeding political or military explosionthere sentout shockwaves that detonatedsecondary upheavals, first in the Toronto area, then around London, and finally acrossadjacent regions of the UnitedStates. Clashes tookdifferentformsin eachof thewidelydispersed areas affected; moreover, the peopleinvolved in
the two Canadas and in the United States spokedifferent languages,

partookof differentpoliticalcultures, and cherished a varietyof

18 THE

CANADIAN

HISTORICAL

REVIEW

aspirations. Yet, for all its internal diversity, thiswasa singlehistorb cal phenomenon,and no phaseof it can be fully understoodin
isolation from the whole?

29 Certainly the Rebellion was multifacetedan'd,as a consequence, historiansof ethnicityor of class struggle,gender formation or popular violence,can find ample materialin 1837-38for research and reflection.I hope it is understood

that,far from disparaging inquiries of thissort,I welcome them.Similarly, there is no reasonto object to the studyof the Rebellionin the context of Ontario history or Quebechistory, aslongasneitherprovince is treatedasa completely self-contained entity.
The author wishesto thank an anonymousCanadian Historical Review assessor for helptiff comments,and the Social Scienceand HumanitiesResearchCouncil of Canadafor research funding.