No.

3018S-I-III
Millicanv. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
estateandclaimingrightsas astatutorybeneficiary,shebroughtawrongfuldeathaction
againstthegeneralcontractor,N.A.DegerstromInc.,andothers. Thejuryreturneda
defenseverdictfromwhichMs. Millicanappeals.
Ms.Millicancontendsonbehalfofherson'sestatethatthetrialcourterredin(1)
admittingevidencethatDegerstromcontractuallydelegatedsoleresponsibilityforthe
safetyof employeestoitssubcontractors,(2) denyingtheestate'smotionforanewtrial,
and(3)refusingtoinstructthejurythatDegerstromowedadutytothepublictraveling
throughtheconstructionsite. Shearguesindividuallythatthecourterredindismissing
herclaimsonthebasisthatshedidnotqualifYasastatutorybeneficiary.
Weconcludethatitwasanabuseof discretionforthetrialcourttodenythe
estate'smotionseekingto limitDegerstrom'sevidenceandargumentthatitrequiredMr.
Lafayette'semployertoassumesoleresponsibilityfortheprotectionandsafetyofits
ownemployees. Degerstrom'smischaracterizationtothiseffectpervadedits
presentationandcouldnotbecuredbytheconcludinginstructionstothejury. Theestate
andMs.Millicanfail todemonstrateanyothererror,however.
We affirmthetrialcourt'sdismissalofMs. Millican'sindividualclaimbutreverse
thejudgmentonthejury'sverdictandremandforaretrialof theestate'sclaims.
FACTSANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND
InApril2005,theUnitedStatesDepartmentofTransportationFederalHighway
AdministrationawardedN.A. DegerstromInc. acontractto improveafive-milestretch
2
No. 30I8S-I-III
Millicanv. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
of FloweryTrailRoad. DegerstromsubcontractedwithSharp-LineIndustriesInc.to
installsignsandpaintroadstripes. ThesubcontractagreementrequiredSharp-Lineto
indemnityDegerstromfromanyliabilityitsufferedasaresultofSharp-Line's
negligence. Thesubcontractalsocontainedthefollowingprovisionimposing
responsibilityonSharp-Lineforworksitesafety:
Subcontractoracceptsresponsibilitytopreventaccidentstoanypersonwho
maybecloseenoughtoitsoperationtobeexposedto Subcontractor's
work-relatedhazards. Subcontractorshallbesolelyresponsibleforthe
protectionandsafetyofitsemployees,for finalselectionof additional
safetymethodsandmeans,andfordailyinspectionofitsworkareaand
safetyequipment. Failureonthepartof Contractortostopunsafe
SubcontractorpracticesshallinnowayrelieveSubcontractorofits
responsibilityhereunder. SubcontractorshallconformtoContractor'ssite-
specificsafetyplanes)andpoliciesasdirectedbyContractorinwritingor
byContractor'sprojectsupervisor.
Clerk'sPapers(CP)at3227.
OneofSharp-Line'svehiclesusedontheFloweryRoadprojectwasa 1978
Chevroletaugertruckusedtodrillholesinthegroundforsignposts. Thetruckwas
equippedwithoutriggers,whichwereextendedtostabilizeitwhiletheaugerwasbeing
used,andahydraulictamperthatcompactedsoilaroundthesignposts. Theaugerand
tamperwerepoweredbyadevicethatusedthetruck'stransmissiontotransmitpower
fromtheengine. Toengagethedevice,thetruck'senginehadto berunningandthe
transmissionhadtobeinneutral.
3
No. 30185-1-111
Millicanv. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc.
OnthedayMr.Lafayettewaskilled,heandSharp-Line'screwforeman, William
Wright,wereinstallinghighwaysigns. Towardtheendof theday,Mr. Wrightparked
theaugertruckfacingdownhillandMr.LafayetteandMr. Wrightbeganinstallingthe
lastsign. Anothersubcontractorhadsetuptrafficcontrolwithpilotcarsbecausethe
augertruckencroachedontheroadway. Mr. Wrightputthetruckintheparkinggear, left
theengineon,andengagedasupplementalbrakedevicecalledaleverlock,whichlocks
hydraulicfluidinthebrakingsystem. Hedidnot,however,settheemergencybrakeor
chockthetires. ThemenwalkedaroundbehindthetruckandMr.Wrightdeployedthe
outriggersashedrilledaholeforthesignpost. Mr.Wrightthenretractedtheoutriggers
whilethetwomeninstalledthesignpostandbegancompactingsoilaroundthepostwith
thehydraulictamper.
Asheworked,Mr. WrightsawMr.Lafayettesuddenlydropthetamperandbegin
runningafterthetruck,whichwasrollingacrosstheroad. Mr.Lafayettemanagedtopull
himselfintothecabandsteerthetruckawayfromalineof vehiclesfollowingapilotcar
intheoppositelane. Oneofthedriversofthevehicleslatertestifiedthatacollision
seemedinevitableuntilMr. Lafayetteturnedthewheels. Apparentlythebrakeshad
failed, becauseMr.Lafayettewasunabletosloworstopthetruck. Thetruckcontinued
toaccelerateasMr. Lafayettesteereditdownthehillwhereitunavoidablycrashed,
causinghisdeath.
4
No. 30185-1-111
Millicanv. NA.Degerstrom, Inc.
DorothyMillicanwasappointedthepersonalrepresentativeof herson'sestate
and,onbehalf of theestate,suedDegerstrom,MicoInc.(themanufacturerof thelever
lock),andJamesandJaneDoeBonnerd/b/aIndustrialPowerBrake(whohaddone
maintenanceandrepairoftheaugertruck)fordamagesforwrongfuldeath. Sheasserted
anindividualcauseof actionaswell,"asastatutorybeneficiarydefinedinRCW
4.20.020,"aprovisionof thewrongfuldeathstatute. CPat8.
InsuingDegerstrom,sheallegedthatithadanondelegabledutyasgeneral
contractorto ensureSharp-Line'scompliancewithhealthandsafetyregulationsand
contractualsafetyduties,hadallowed"illegal,unsafe,ultra-hazardouspracticesresulting
inanunsafeworkplace,"CPat20, andhadtherebyproximatelycausedherson'sdeath.
Beforetrial, thecourtgrantedthedefendants'jointmotionforpartialsummary
judgmentdismissingMs.Millican'sindividualwrongfuldeathclaim. Itfoundno
evidencecreatingagenuineissueoffactthatshewasdependentonhersonforsupport
qualifyingherasabeneficiaryunderRCW4.20.020. Itdeniedtheestate'smotionin
liminetoexcludeevidenceorargumentbyDegerstromthatitdidnotexerciseorretain
supervisorycontrolorauthorityoverSharp-Lineduringconstructionoperations. Atthe
conclusionof athree-weektrial,thejuryfoundnoneofthedefendantsliable. Thetrial
courtdeniedtheestate'smotionforanewtrialagainstDegerstromandMr.Bonner. The
estateandMs.Millicanappealed.
5
No. 30ISS-I-III
Millican v. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
ANALYSIS
Ms.Millican,onbehalfoftheestateandindividually,makesfourassignmentsof
error. Inthepublishedportionof thisopinion,weaddresstheestate'sassignmentof
errortothetrialcourt'srefusaltoexcludeevidencethatDegerstromdelegatedsole
responsibilityforthesafetyofSharp-Line'semployeestoSharp-Line.
Intheunpublishedportion,weaddresstheestate'sassignmentoferrortothetrial
court'sdenialofitsmotionforjudgmentasamatteroflaw, itsrefusaltoinstructthejury
thatDegerstromowedadutytothepublictravelingthroughtheconstructionsite,and
Ms.Millican'sassignmentoferrortodismissalofherindividualclaim.
Refusalto limitevidenceandargument
ofdelegatedresponsibilityforsafety.
Early intheproceedingsbelow,Degerstrommovedforsummaryjudgment,
arguingthatSharp-Linehadassumedthecontractualobligationtocomplywithallsafety
laws andplans. ThetrialcourtdeniedthemotiononthebasisofDegerstrom's
nondelegabledutytoensureasafeworkenvironment. Initsmotionsinlimine,theestate
remindedthetrialcourtof Degerstrom'slegalposition,whichitcharacterizedas
"factuallyinaccurate,legallymisleading...,andinconsistentwith[the] court'sprior
denialsofitsmotionsforsummaryjudgment." CPat 1549. It askedthecourttoexclude
evidenceorargumentbyDegerstromthatitdidnotexerciseorretainsupervisorycontrol
orauthorityoverSharp-Lineduringconstructionoperations.
6
No.30185-I-III
Millicanv. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc.
Inorallyrulingonthe motion,thetrialcourtobservedthat"thefactual issues...
areallgoingtogetin front of thejury"andthatitviewedtheparties' disagreementover
Degerstrom'slegaldutyasaninstructionalmatter. ReportofProceedings(RP)at2.
Critically,whenthe estatethensoughttoclarifYwhether,inlightofthatreasoning, its
motiontoexcludeevidenceandargumentaboutdutywasgranted,denied,orreservedfor
laterrulings,thetrialcourtrespondedthatthemotionwasdenied. RPat6. Theestate's
motionin liminewassufficienttoraiseandpreserveits objection. Statev. McDaniel,
155 Wn. App. 829, 853 n.l8,230P.3d245 (2010)(becausethepurposeofamotionin
limineistoresolvelegalissuesoutsidethepresenceofthejury,atrialcourt'sruling
denyingamotioninlimineis final andthemovingpartyhasastandingobjection).}
Attrial,Degerstrompresentedextensiveevidenceandargumentonduty,
informingthejuryinopeningstatement,throughevidence,and inclosingargumentthat
it is"typical,""reasonable,""industrystandard,"andmostimportant,"appropriate"and
"allowableunderWashingtonlaw"forageneralcontractorlikeDegerstromtodelegate
itsresponsibilities,andforsubcontractorslikeSharp-Linetoagree, bycontract,to
}Degerstromarguesthattheestatewaiveditsobjectionbylaterquestioning
witnessesaboutthecontractanditsdelegationprovision. Butoncetheevidencewas
permitted,it wasnotawaiverfortheestatetotrytotumtheevidencetoitsadvantageto
anyextentpossible.
7
No.30185-1-III
Millicanv. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc.
assumesoleresponsibilityfortheprotectionandsafetyof itsownemployees. RPat40-
54,845-47.
2
Thegeneralrule in Washingtonisthataprincipalis notliablefor injuriescaused
byanindependentcontractorwhoseservicesareengagedbytheprincipal. Stoutv.
Warren, 176 Wn.2d263,269,290P.3d972 (2012);RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS
409(1965). Twocategoriesofexceptionstothisruleexistatcommonlaw,thefirst
beingexceptionsthatsubjecttheprincipaltoliabilityforitsownnegligenceandthe
secondbeingexceptionsthatsubjecttheprincipaltoliabilityforitscontractor'stortious
conductevenif theprincipalhasitselfexercisedreasonablecare. Compare
RESTATEMENT(SECOND) 410-415(directliability)with 416-429(vicarious
liability). Thelattercategoryof exceptionsgivingrisetovicariousliabilitycomprise
dutiessaidtobenondelegable,as explainedbytheRestatement:
Therules...donotrestuponanypersonalnegligenceof the
employer. Theyarerulesof vicariousliability,makingtheemployerliable
forthenegligenceoftheindependentcontractor, irrespectiveof whetherthe
employerhashimselfbeenatfault. Theyariseinsituationsinwhich, for
reasonsof policy,theemployeris notpermittedtoshifttheresponsibility
fortheproperconductof theworktothecontractor. Theliabilityimposed
iscloselyanalogoustothatof amasterforthenegligenceofhis servant.
Thestatementcommonlymadeinsuchcasesis thattheemployeris
underadutywhichheis notfreetodelegatetothecontractor. Sucha
"non-delegableduty"requiresthepersonuponwhomit is imposedto
answerforitthatcareis exercisedbyanyone,eventhoughhebean
independentcontractor,towhomtheperformanceofthedutyisentrusted.
2 Relevantportionsof Deger strom'sopeningstatementandclosingargumentare
includedinanappendixtothispublishedportionof theopinion.
8
No.30185-I-II1
Millicanv. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)ch. 15,topic2introductorynote. Circumstancesthatgiverise
toaprincipal'snondelegabledutyincludeprecautionsrequiredbystatuteorregulation.
Tauscherv. PugetSoundPower& LightCo., 96Wn.2d274,283,635P.2d426(1981)
(citingKelleyv. HowardS. WrightConstr. Co., 90 Wn.2d323,582P.2d500(1978;
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)424;Pettitv. Dwoskin, 116 Wn. App.466, 472n.l7,68 P.3d
1088(2003)(observingthatwhile 424hasnotbeenformallyadoptedin Washington,
"[i]thas, however, beenfrequentlydiscussedandreliedupon,,).
3
Evenwhereanexceptiontothegeneralruleofnonliabilityapplies,aprincipal
ordinarilyowesitsdutytoonlythirdpartiesotherthantheemployeesofits independent
contractors. Stout, 176Wn.2dat276(quotingEpperlyv. CityofSeattle, 65 Wn.2d777,
783,399P.2d591 (1965)foritsrecognitionof"'thedistinctionbetweenthelevelofduty
tomembersofthepublicandthedutyof theownertooneengagedtoworkuponthe
projectastheemployeeof anindependentcontractor'"); Tauscher, 96Wn.2dat281.
Thepolicyconsiderationsthataresaidtosupportexcludinganindependentcontractor's
employeesfromtheprotectedclassarefound intheworkers' compensationsystemsin
placeinmoststates. Thereasoningisthatbymakingcontractpaymentstoan
3 RESTATEMENT(SECOND) 424provides:
"Onewhobystatuteorbyadministrativeregulationis underadutytoprovide
specifiedsafeguardsorprecautionsforthesafetyofothersissubjecttoliabilitytothe
othersforwhoseprotectiontheduty is imposedforharmcausedbythefailure ofa
contractoremployedbyhimtoprovidesuchsafeguardsorprecautions."
9
No.30185-1-III
Millican v. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
.
independentcontractorthatpresumablyincludeworkers' compensationpremiumsas
overhead,theprincipalhasalreadyassumedsomefinancialresponsibilityforthesafety
ofitsemployees. Id. at281-82;Stout, 176 Wn.2dat276-77.
Theprevailingcommonlawonthesemattersnotwithstanding, Washingtonhas
longrefusedtoexcludeasubcontractor'semployeesfrom ageneralcontractor'sdutyof
careoneithera"noduty"or"nodutytoindependentcontractoremployees"rationale. It
hasinsteadfoundnondelegabledutiesonthepartof thegeneralcontractor,meaningthat
thegeneralcontractoris"[held] liable...althoughhe hashimselfdoneeverythingthat
couldreasonablyberequiredofhim."W. PAGEKEETONETAL.,PROSSERANDKEETON
ON THELAWOF TORTS 511 (5thed.1984)). Prosserobservesthatitisdifficulttosuggest
thecriterionbywhichthenondelegablecharacterofadutymaybedetermined,"other
thantheconclusionof thecourtsthattheresponsibilityis so importanttothecommunity
thattheemployer[here,thegeneralcontractor] shouldnotbepermittedtotransferitto
another." Id. at512.
Beforetheenactmentandeffectivenessof theWashingtonIndustrial Safetyand
HealthActof1973 (WISHA),chapter49.17RCW,ourSupremeCourtheldthata
generalcontractorhadadutytoprovideadequatesafetyprecautionsfor its
subcontractors' employeesunderexceptionsfromthegeneralruleofliabilitybasedin
10
No.30185-1-III
Millican v. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
commonlaw,statute,andcontractualassumptionof duty. Kelley, 90 Wn.2dat330.
4
The
commonlawbasisof thedutycitedbyKelley istheduty,withinthescopeofa
principal'sretainedcontrol,toprovideasafeplaceof work. Thetestofcontrolisnot
actual interferencewiththeworkof thesubcontractor,buttherighttoexercisesuch
control. Id. at330-31 (citing,amongotherauthority,Restatement (Second) 414). The
statutorybasisof thedutycitedinKelley was formerRCW49.16.030(1919),which
imposedadutyonallemployerstofurnishareasonablysafeplaceof work,with
reasonablesafetydevices,andtocomplywithstatesafetyregulations. Id. at333. Kelley
heldthatthestatutecreateda"nondelegableduty"onthepartof thegeneralcontractor.
Id.
WithWISHA,thelegislaturerevisedthestatutoryduty,providingthat"[ e]ach
employer...shallcomplywiththerules,regulations,andorderspromulgatedunder
[chapter49.17RCW]." RCW49.17.060(2). ThisspecificdutytocomplywithWISHA
regulationsis owedtoall oftheemployeesatworkonthejobsiteasmembersofthe
protectedclass. Goucher v. J.R. Simp/ot Co., 104Wn.2d662,673,709P.2d774(1985).
InStute v. P.E.MC, Inc., 114 Wn.2d454,463-64,788P.2d545 (1990),theSupreme
CourtnotedthatWISHA'spredecessorstatutecreatedanondelegabledutyongeneral
contractorstoprovideasafeplacetoworkforemployeesof subcontractorsandthat
4 TheaccidentandinjuryinKelley tookplaceinDecember 1972,priorto
WISHA'seffectivedateof June7, 1973. LAWSOF 1973,atii; 90 Wn.2dat326.
11
No. 30185-1-111
Millican v. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
"[t]hepolicyreasonsbehindthecourt'sholdingshavenotchangedandgiveaddedforce
tothe languageofWISHA." Itcharacterizedthegeneralcontractor'sresponsibility,
beingconcurrentwiththatofits subcontractorsbutprimary,as adutyto"ensure
compliancewithWISHAanditsregulations." Id. at463.
InWashington,then, ageneralcontractornotonlyhas directliability forabreach
ofitscommonlawdutiesarisingfromretainedcontrol,butwhenitcomestoviolationsof
WISHA,vicarious liabilityforbreachofadutythatis nondelegable. Aviolationof
WISHAbyasubcontractor'semployeeis thereforenotonlychargeabletothe
subcontractor,itis alsochargeabletoageneralcontractor-"theprimaryemployer,"
whosesupervisoryauthority"placesthegeneralinthebestpositiontoensurecompliance
withsafetyregulations." Id.
ThespecificdutyclauseofRCW49.17.060 is nottheonlystatutereflectingthe
legislature'sintentthatageneralcontractor'sduty forWISHAcompliancerunsto its
subcontractors' employees. Thelegislaturehasalsoauthorizedcontractualrisk-sharing
ofdamagesanddefensecostsbygeneralcontractorswhoface suchworkplaceinjury
claims. RCW4.24.115 declarescertainindemnificationagreementstobevalidand
enforceableincluding, intheconstructioncontext, an agreementby asubcontractorto
indemnifyageneralcontractoragainstliability fordamagescausedbythenegligenceof
thesubcontractororits agents oremployees. GilbertH Moen Co. v. IslandSteel
Erectors, Inc., 128 Wn.2d745,759-60,912P.2d472(1996). Thesubcontractoris only
12
No. 30185-1-111
Millican v. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc.
permittedtoindemnifythegeneralcontractortotheextentofthesubcontractor's
negligence. Thestatutetherebyimplicitlyrecognizesthatageneralcontractormaybe
concurrentlyliablefor itssubcontractor'sactoromission. Andthestatuteanticipates
claimsagainstageneralcontractorforworkplaceinjurytoasubcontractor'semployee: it
providesthatanindemnitormaywaiveits immunityunderindustrialinsurance,
somethingthatwouldbeunnecessaryexceptinthecaseofaclaimby anindemnitor's
employee. RCW4.24.115(1)(b).
Giventhis statutoryauthorizationofindemnificationagreements,the
Degerstrom/Sharp-Linecontractmaywellhavebeen"typical"and"industrystandard,"
asDegerstromdrovehomeduringthetrial,butnotwiththe legaleffectthatDegerstrom
thensuggestedtothejury. Indemnificationprovisionsenablethegeneralcontractor, if
liabletotheemployee,torecoveritsdefensecostsandjudgmentliabilityfromthe
culpablesubcontractor. Theydonotenablethegeneralcontractortodisavowitsprimary
responsibilityfor WISHAcompliance. See Moen, 128 Wn.2dat753 (enforcing
indemnification"allowscontractorsto allocate 'responsibilitytopurchaseinsurance'
accordingtotheirnegotiatedallocationofriskandpotentialliabilities,"andsettheirfees
'" foundedontheirexpectedliabilityexposureasbargainedandprovidedfor inthe
contract'''(quotingMcDowellv. AustinCo., 105 Wn.2d48,54,710P.2d 192(1985);
BerschauerlPhillipsConstr. Co. v. SeattleSch. Dist. No.1, 124 Wn.2d816, 826-27, 881
P.2d986(1994))).
13
No. 30185-1-111
Millican v. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
Thefacts of Moen illustratetheproperroleandrelevanceofdelegationand
indemnificationagreements. Theplaintiffinthatcasewasanironworker,severely
injuredwhenhefell fromabeam. TheDepartmentof LaborandIndustriesattributedthe
accidenttoalackofsafetyequipment. Itcitedtheplaintiffsemployer,IslandSteel
Erectors,whichitconcludedwasresponsibleforprovidingfallprotectionequipment.
GivenIsland'simmunityfromsuitfortheworkplaceinjury,theplaintiffsuedthegeneral
contractor-Moen-andothers.
MoenhadenteredintoanagreementwithIslandthatrequiredIslandtocomply
withlaws,regulations,andtheprovisionsof Moen'scontractwiththeowner,including
tocomplywithsafetyregulations. TheMoen/Islandagreementalsoincludedan
indemnification.addendumunderwhichIslandagreedtoindemnifyMoenfor damages
resultingfromanyconcurrentnegligenceofMoenandIslandresultingfromthe
negligenceof Islandanditsemployees.
Moendidnotrely onitsagreementwithIslandtoargue(asDegerstromdoes)that
itfulfilleditsduty forWISHAcompliancebydelegatingresponsibilitytoIsland.
Instead, itsettledwiththeplaintiffandsuedIslandfor indemnification. Thecourtheld
thattheindemnificationcontractwasvalidandenforceabletotheextentof Moen'sand
Island'sconcurrentliabilityforthenegligenceofIsland. Inremanding, itpointedoutthat
whatremainedtobedeterminedwere(1)whetherMoenandIslandwereconcurrently
14
No.30185-1-III
Millicanv. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
negligentand(2)theextentof Island'snegligenceforwhichMoenhadbeenrequiredto
pay,butastowhichitwasentitledtobeindemnifiedbyIsland.
Sharp-Line'sagreementtoassumesoleresponsibilityandindemnifYDegerstrom
hasnomoreandno lesssignificancehere. Ifitcomplieswithstatute,thenasbetween
Sharp-LineandDegerstromtheagreementis controlling. AsbetweenMr. Lafayetteand
Degerstrom,foranyWISHAviolationestablishedbytheevidence, itis irrelevant.
Degerstromnonethelessarguesthatourdecisionshouldturnonthestatementin
thepenultimateparagraphof Stutethat"[i]tis thegeneralcontractor'sresponsibilityto
furnish safetyequipmentortocontractuallyrequiresubcontractorstofurnish adequate
safetyequipmentrelevantto theirresponsibilities." 114Wn.2dat464(emphasisadded).
Fromthis,itarguesthatthegeneralcontractor'sdutyforWISHAcompliance
characterizedasnondelegableelsewhereinStutecan,infact, bedelegated. In
proceedingsbelow,thetrialcourtfoundthequotedstatementfromStutetobe
contradictory.5 Thesamestatementwasthebasisfortheconclusionof themajorityin
Degrootthatasubcontractor'scontractualundertakingfor safety"appearsdesignedto
5Thetrialcourtcommented,"[I]fyousaythereis anon-delegable,well,Stute
saysyoucanenterintoacontractwithyoursubcontractortodealwiththesafetyissues.
Thenwehavethecaselawthatsays itis non-delegable. AndIunderstandwhatJudge
Sweeneyistalkingabout[inDegrootv. BerkleyConstr., Inc., 83 Wn. App. 125, 133,920
P.2d619(1996)(Sweeney, C.J.,concurring)],becauseitseemslikethereisa
contradictionhere." RPat2.
15
No. 30185-1-111
Millicanv. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
meetthedutyof careoutlinedinStute." Degrootv. BerkleyConstr., Inc., 83 Wn. App.
125, 129,920P.2d619(1996).
ThestatementfromStuterelieduponbyDegerstromcannotreasonablybereadto
negateStute'sotherwiseclearholdingthatthegeneralcontractor's"primary"
"nondelegable"duty is to"ensurecompliance"withWISHA,however. Readinthe
contextof theentireopinion,thestatementconveysonlythatageneralcontractor's
effortstoensurecompliancewithWISHAmayinclude,andinmanycaseswill
necessarilyinclude,requiringsubcontractorstocomplywithWISHA. "Thelabel
'nondelegableduty' doesnotmeanthatanactoris notpermittedtodelegatetheactivity
toanindependentcontractor. Rather,thetermsignalsthattheactorwillbevicariously
liableforthecontractor'stortiousconductinthecourseof carryingouttheactivity."
RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTORTS:LIABILITYFORPHYSICALANDEMOTIONALHARM 57
cmt. b(2012). Stateddifferently, "a'non-delegableduty' requiresthepersonuponwhom
itis imposedtoanswerforitthatcareisexercisedbyanyone,eventhoughhebean
independentcontractor,towhomtheperformanceof thedutyis entrusted."
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)ch. 15,topic2introductorynote. Here,thequotationfrom
StutesupportsthefactthatDegerstromcouldenterintoits agreementwithSharp-Line
andrelyonSharp-Line'scompliancewithWISHAregulationsassatisfYingits own
duty-notthatitcoulddischargeitsprimaryresponsibilityfor WISHAcompliancebythe
mereactof enteringintotheagreement.
16
No. 30185-1-111
Millicanv. NA.Degerstrom, Inc.
Wereviewatrialcourt'sevidentiaryrulings for anabuseofdiscretion. Atrial
courtabusesitsdiscretionifitsevidentiaryrulingis manifestlyunreasonableoris
exercisedonuntenablegroundsorforuntenablereasons. Here,thetrialcourtrecognized
thatDegerstromhadpreviouslyadvancedalegalpositionastothedutyofageneral
contractorthatwasquestionableanditrecognizedthatlegaldutyshouldbeamatterof
instruction. It nonethelessdeniedthemotioninlimine. Theevidenceondutythat
Degerstromchosetoofferafterthemotionwasdenieddidnottendto "makethe
existenceofanyfactthatis ofconsequencetothedeterminationof theactionmore
probableorlessprobablethanitwouldbewithouttheevidence." ER401 (emphasis
added). Moreimportantly,Degerstrom'sevidenceandargumentthatthecontract
effectivelyshiftedthedutyitowedMr. Lafayettefromit,toSharp-Line,waslegally
wrongandlikelymisledandconfusedthejury. SeeDegroot,83 Wn.App.at133
(Sweeney,C.J.,concurring). ThemischaracterizationpervadedDegerstrom's
presentationandcouldnotbecuredbytheconcludinginstructionstothejury.
Thedenialofthemotioninliminewasthereforeanabuseofdiscretionand
requiresreversalofthejudgmentandremandforanewtrialoftheestate'sclaims.
Forthisreasonandthereasonssetforthintheunpublishedportionof thisopinion,
weaffirmthetrialcourt'sdismissalof Ms.Millican'sindividualclaim,reversethe
dismissaloftheestate'sclaim,andremandforanewtrialconsistentwiththisopinion.
17
No.30185-I-III
Millicanv. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
APPENDIX
Degerstrom'sopeningstatementincludedthe followingpreviewoftheevidenceit
wouldthereafterpresent:
Now, NADegerstrom'sspecialtyis earthwork. Theydon'tcarry
specialtiesinotherthingslike...signageandstripingontheroad. So
whatdidtheydo? Theyhiredspecialtysubcontractorswhohavethe
equipmentandtheknowledgeto dothis installation....
There'salso gonnabe alotofdiscussioninthiscaseaboutNA
Degerstrom'scontractwithSharp-Line. Andas Italkedtoyouearlier,
therewereseveralsubcontractorsonthisjob,andthesesubcontractorswere
was[sic] knownas specialtysubcontractors. TheydidworkthatSharp-
excuseme, thatNADegerstromdidnotqavetheexpertisetoperform. So
whattheydo, typicallyanysortofjoblike,thisyousubcontractitoutto
thosepeoplethatareexpertsintheirfield....
Partoftheirsubcontractagreement, Sharp-Lineagreedtocomply
withall lawsandregulationsthatareapplicabletotheirworkwithregardto
whatwasbeingperformedattheFloweryTrailRoadproject. AndthenI'm
gonnashowyouseveralsafetyprovisions.
RPat40-46. Degerstrom'slawyerthenmadeabriefreferencetojuryinstructionsthat
wouldbegivenattheendofthecaseaddressingwhatwasallowableunderWashington
lawwithregardtodelegatingduties andregardtosafetyontheworksite. Shecontinued:
[W]hatI'mgoingtobeprovidingyoutodayaretheseveral contract
provisionsthatdiscusssafetybetweenSharp-LineandNADegerstrom.
AndIwill again, likeMr. Stockersays, Iwillbeshowingyouthatallthese
provisionsareappropriateandallowableunderWashingtonlaw, andthat
safetyis allowedtobewithregardto aspecialtysubcontractor,NA
Degerstromcoulddelegatethoseresponsibilities.
Andthereasonthatyou'reable-thereasonitmakessenseas far as
delegatingtheseresponsibilities, againNADegerstromis notall knowing
andnotknowledgeableabouteverythingthat'sdoneonthisproject. It's
18
No. 30185-1-111
Millicanv. NA.Degerstrom, Inc.
appropriate, it'sstandardintheindustrythatyouhirespecialty
subcontractorswhohaveexpertiseintheirfield. Sotheyhaveexpertise
withregardtopreventingaccidentsregardingtheirwork,andthat'swhat
thecontractrequested.
Theyalsohave-werequestedthatSharp-Linebesolelyresponsible
forprovidingprotectionandsafetyof itsemployees,againbecauseit
knowswhatthehazardsarewithregardto itsjob. Theyhadthe
responsibilityforfinal selectionof thesafetymethodsandmeans. That
meanshowto--howthatsafetywouldbeconductedontheproject. And
thenfinallytheyhadtheresponsibilityfordoingdailyinspectionsontheir
ownworkareaandsafetyequipmentbecauseDegerstromdoesn'tknow
whattheirequipmentis,howit'sspecialized. There'sbeenplentyof
testimonytodayaboutthisaugertruckandhowitwasaveryspecialized
pieceof equipment. ButNADegerstromcertainlydoesn'tknow,havethe
expertisetorun,orwouldevenberesponsibleif theyranit.
Anothersafetyprovisiontalkedaboutthesitespecificsafetyplans
theaccidentpreventionplanthatNADegerstromhad, infact, forthat
project, andhowSharp-Linehadtocomplywiththosesafetyrequirements.
Andfinally Sharp-Lineagreedthattheywouldhaveawrittensafetyplan
forthisproject,anaccidentpreventionplan,andanyotherdocumentswith'
regardtosafetythatwererequiredforthisproject.
You'regonnabehearingtestimonyfrom agentlemanbythenameof
MikeCraig. Now,MikeCraigisthepresidentofSharp-Line,andhe's
beenthepresidentofSharp-Linesinceitsinceptionin 1987. Mr.Craigwill
betestifYingthathesignedthiscontract,andthatheunderstoodthese
contractprovisions,andthatheunderstoodthatSharp-Linewasrequiredto
furnishtheirownsafetyequipmentandperformtheirworkunderthis
contract,andthattypeof safetyequipmentalsoincludedchocks. You'll
alsobeprovidedtestimonythattheprovisionswithregardtosafetythat
wereinthe [Degerstrom] contractwithSharp-Line,theyaretypicaland
theyarestandardintheindustrybecause,again, if you'reaspecialty
subcontractor,you'retheonewho'sgonnaknowyourequipmentandknow
howtosafelyoperateit.
RPat46-48. Laterinopeningstatement,Degerstrom'slawyertoldthejury:
You'llhearhowCoitWrightwastheemployeeresponsibleforthe
truckthatdayforSharp-Line....You'llhearhowMr. Wrightwasa
laborer,thathedidnothavetrainingonthisequipment,thathewasnotthe
19
I
No. 30185-1-111
Millicanv. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
employeeresponsibleintheoperationofthistruck. You'llhearhowMr.
Wrightmadeseveralpoorchoicesthatwereincontradictiontothetraining
thathereceivedfrom Sharp-Line,andthatattheendofthisworkdaythat
causedthattrucktostartrolling.
SowhatdidMr. Wrightfailtodo? Mr. Wrightprovidedastatement
totheDepartmentofLabor& Industries,andthenhealsowasinterviewed
bytheDepartmentof Labor& Industries. Thatinformationheprovidedto
theDepartmentofLabor& Industries,you'llheartestimonyabout. You'll
heartestimonythatMr. Wrightfailedtosetthetruck'sparkingbrake.
You'llheartestimonythatMr. Wrightfailedtotumthosewheels intothe
downwardslopeortheshoulderof theroad. You'llhearhowMr. Wright
deployedtheoutriggers,butthenforwhateverreasonbroughtthembackin.
You'llalsohearthat,althoughitwasnotrequiredbecausethetruck
wasattended-bothMr. WrightandMr. Lafayettewerethereandthe
enginewasrunning-thatCoitWrightcouldhaveusedreadilyavailable
chocks.
RPat52-53.
Inclosingandsummarizingtheevidencethatithadpresented,Degerstrom's
lawyerargued:
Now,generalcontractors,as youknow,oweadutytoprovideallworkersa
safeworksiteandto ensuresafetyregulationsarecompliedwith. Now
Degerstrom,innoway,disputesthis....
...[O]neofthewaysthatDegerstromandall generalcontractors
ensureasafeworksiteistheyhavetheirsubcontractors-theyhavetheir
subcontractors,undercontract, furnishthesafetyequipment. Andwhyis
that? There'sbeenalotofdiscussion. Becausesubcontractorsarethe
expertsintheirfield, notDegerstrom. They'retheoneswhoknowwhatthe
hazardsare. They'reusingtheirequipment,theyknowwhatis hazardous
andhowtoprotecttheiremployees. Degerstrom'sduty is analogoustoa
forest. Thinkoftheprojectasbeingaforestandthinkofthesubcontractors
beingthetreesinthatforest. Andthesubcontractorsbeingresponsiblefor
theleavesonthosetrees,theirequipment,theirworkers,allthethingsin
ordertodotheirjobsafelyas it'scontractuallyrequiredthattheydo. Now,
ageneralcontractoris notableto seeallthosetreesintheforestatone
20
No. 30185-1-111
Millican v. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc.
time. Norcanitseeanyoftheleavesatanygivenmoment. Butit'sthe
subcontractorsthathaveagreedtotakecareof thoseleaves.
Recallthetestimonyof MarkLawless,thatwasplaintiff'ssitesafety
expert. BothheandMr.Strannestatedit'snotreasonable,orindustry
standard,toexpectageneralcontractortofolloweachsubcontractoreach
andeverymomenttoensurethatsubcontractorsareperformingthis [sic]
jobssafelyandcorrectly. Thereforegeneralcontractorsareallowed,under
thelaw,tocontractuallyrequiretheirsubcontractorsfurnish safety
equipmentrelatedtotheirwork.
Ladiesandgentlemenof thejury,I'mgonnaaskthatyoulookat
ExhibitDI03andthatsafetyprovisionthat'scitedinthatcontract. And1
wantyoutolook, insteadofatthesecondparagraph,lookatthatfirst
paragraphonthatpage,becausethattalksaboutthesafetyrequirementsand
thatSharp-Linewassolelyresponsiblefortheprotectionandsafetyofits
employees, forthefinal selectionofadditionalsafetymeansandmethods,
andfordaily inspectionofitsworkareaandsafetyequipment. It
specificallysayssafetyequipment. Andas youknowfromthetestimonyof
Mr. Craig,theyagreedtobesolelyresponsiblefortheseitems. Andall
witnessesinthiscase,fromMr.CraigtoMr. StrannetoMr.Lawless,all
testifiedthisisatypicalprovisioninasubcontractagreement.
RPat845-47.
Theremainderof thisopinionhasnoprecedentialvalue. Therefore,itwillbefiled
forpublicrecordinaccordancewiththerulesgoverningunpublishedopinions. RCW
2.06.040.
Denial ofthe estate's motion for judgment
on liability as a matter oflaw.
Theestateseeksmoreonappealthanreversalandremand;itasksthatwefind that
thetrialcourtshouldhavegranteditsposttrialmotionforanewtrial. Thenewtrialit
sought,though,wouldbelimitedtodamages-theestatewantedthecourttoinstructthe
jurythatDegerstromwasnegligentanditsnegligencewasaproximatecauseof Mr.
21
No. 30185-1-111
Millican v. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
Lafayette's death. On appeal, it characterizes its posttrial motion as implicitly one for
judgment as a matter oflaw on the issue ofliability. It argues that the court erred in
denying it.
The estate did not move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the
evidence as contemplated by CR 50(b). In authorizing postverdict motions for judgment
as a matter oflaw, CR 50(b) speaks only of renewing an equivalent motion made under
CR 50(a) before the case was submitted to the jury. The estate argues that it was excused
from moving for the relief at the close of the evidence, however, because the motion
would have been futile in light of the trial court's denial of its motion in limine. It cites
Kaplan v. N W Mut. Life Ins. Co., 115 Wn. App. 791, 804 n.6, 65 P.3d 16 (2003) in
support.
Degerstrom's response makes a one-sentence mention of the estate's alleged
waiver of its right to move for judgment as a matter oflaw. Br. of Resp't at 6. But it
does not dispute the estate's argument that its posttrial motion was implicitly a CR 50(b)
motion or provide any authority or argument in opposition to the estate's claimed excuse
of futility. Absent any authority or argument in opposition, we assume without deciding
that the estate's posttrial motion was, in part, a motion for judgment as a matter of law
and that its failure to move for such relief at the close of the evidence is excused. See
RAP 10.3(a)(6) and (b) (a respondent's brief, like the appellant's, must include argument
on the issues presented for decision along with citations to legal authority).
22
No.30185-1-III
Millicanv. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc.
CitingPudmaroffv. Allen, 138 Wn.2d55, 68,977P.2d574(1999),theestate
contendsthatwhileviolationofacontrollingstatuteorregulationisnotnegligenceper
se,evidenceofsuchaviolationcanbeconclusiveiftheviolatorfails topresentany
evidenceofexcuseorjustification. It arguesthatitpresentedevidenceofWISHA
violationsforwhichDegerstrompresentednoexcuseorjustification. It focuseson
regulationsimposingarequirementtochockavehicle'stiresincertainsituations
because,itargues,"thereisnodisputethattheaugertruckwouldneverhaverolledaway
hadthewheelsbeenchocked." Br. of Appellantat31. Ifarequirementfor chockingwas
breacheditarguesthatthe"breachwas, as amatteroflaw,aproximatecauseof[Mr.]
Lafayette'sdeath." Id.
TheprincipalWISHAregulationthatDegerstromallegeswasnotenforcedis
WAC296-155-61 O(2)(b)(entitled"MotorVehiclesonConstructionSites"),which
provides:
(b) Beforeleavingamotorvehicleunattended:
(i) Themotormustbestopped.
(ii) Theparkingbrakemustbeengagedandthewheelsturnedinto
curborbermwhenparkedonanincline.
(iii) If parkingonaninclineandthereis no curborberm,thewheels
mustbechockedorotherwisesecured.
CitingevidencethatDegerstromdidnotrequireSharp-Linetousechocksanddidnot
inspectSharp-Line'svehiclesfor chockusage,theestatecontendsthatDegerstrom
undisputedlyviolatedthisWISHAregulation.
23
No. 30185-1-111
Millicanv. NA.Degerstrom, Inc.
Degerstrom'spositionattrialandonappealis thatthe augertruckinwhichMr.
Lafayettediedwasnot"unattended"andthereforetheregulationdidnotapply.
Degerstrom'sfirst argumentthatthetruckwasnotunattendedbeforebeginningto
rolldowntheinclineis alogicalryfallaciousone:Degerstromarguesthat"[t]he
WashingtonAdministrativeCoderequiresavehicle'smotortobestoppedinorderforit
tobeconsidered'unattended.'" Br.of Resp'tat38(footnoteomitted). Itinfersthis
propositionfromtheregulatorylanguage,"Beforeleavingamotorvehicleunattended:(i)
Themotormustbestopped." Itsconstructionmisconstruesthislanguageas saying
somethingaboutwhatmakesamotorvehicle"unattended,"whenitisinsteadsaying
somethingaboutwhatoperatorsarerequiredtodowhentheyleavea,motorvehicle
unattended. WereDegerstrom'sconstructioncorrect,thentheWACwouldalsorequirea
vehicle'sparkingbraketobeengagedforittobeconsidered"unattended." Forthat
matter,thewheelswouldhavetobeturnedintoacurborbermwhenparkedonanincline
forittobeconsidered"unattended." Andamotorvehicleleftremotelyovernight,with
nooperatoranywhereinthevicinity,wouldbeconsidered"attended,"ratherthan
"unattended,"as longas itsmotorwasrunning,theparkingbrakewasengaged,orits
wheelswereturnedintoacurborbermanditwasparkedonanincline. Clearlythe
regulationisnotdescribingwhatmakesavehicle"unattended"butonlythesafety
measuresthatmustbetakenwhenitis leftunattended.
24
No.30185-1-III
Millican v. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
Elsewhere,Degerstrom'spositionthatavehicle'smotormustbestoppedinorder
forittobeconsidered"unattended"appearstobebasedonthefactthattheaugerand
tamperusedbyMr.Lafayetteandhissupervisorwereoperatedusingapowertake-off
(PTO)fromthetruck's thatthemotorberunning. Degerstrom
considersitobviousthat"unattended"cannotincludetimeswhentheoperatorofatruck
hassteppedoutsideofitscabtooperateaPTO-poweredpieceofequipment. But
WISHAregulationsareconstruedliberallytoachievetheirpurposeofprovidingsafe
workingconditions. Pate/co, Inc. v. Dep'tofLabor& Indus., 166Wn.App.647,653,
272P.3d262(2012). It isnotobviousthattheDepartmentof LaborandIndustrieswould
beunconcernedthatthemotorwasrunning,thecabwasunattended,andtheonly
potentialoperatorsinthevicinityof thistruck(pointeddownhill),wereengagedinother
workthatcoulddistracttheirattentionorpreventthemfromreachingthecabintheevent
ofsomehazard. Thedepartmentmightwellrequirethatavehicleinthissituationbe
attendedbyanemployeeinthecaboronewhowasnotengagedinoperatingPTO
equipment. Whatwedoknowfromtherecord(althoughtheevidenceappearsnotto
havebeenadmittedattrial)wasthatthedepartmentdidciteSharp-Lineforaviolationof
WAC296-155-610(2)(b).
Themeaningof "unattended"thatDegerstromurges is unambiguous(parked,with
themotorstopped, andtheoperatorsnolongerinthevicinity)iscontrarytoanymeaning
25
No. 30185-1-111
Millicanv. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
attachedtothetermunderOSHA.
6
IninterpretingourWISHAregulationsintheabsence
of statedecisions,wemaylooktoOSHAregulationsandconsistentfederaldecisions.
Wash. Cedar&SupplyCo. v. Dep'tofLabor&Indus., 137 Wn.App.592,604, 154P.3d
287(2007)(citingAdkinsv. AluminumCo. ofAm., 110Wn.2d128, 147,750P.2d1257,
756P.2d 142(1988)). OSHA'sconstructionof "unattended"hasnotbeenuniform,
variesdependinguponthecontext, andrecognizesthatavehiclethatis leftrunningmay
beconsidered"unattended." See, e.g.,29C.F.R. 1910.178(m)(5);LetterfromRussellB.
Swanson,Director,Directorateof Construction,toPeterKuchinskyII, Safety
Trainer/Consultant,ConstructionBuildingAnalysts(May 11, 2005),availableat
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIO
NS&p_id=25067;LetterfromRussellB.Swanson,Director,Directorateof Construction,
toPaulHayes,SafetyManager, Skanska(Jan. 14,2004),availableat
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_ document?p _table=INTERPRET ATIO
NS&pjd=24723(statingthat"when[aconstructionvehicleis] leftunattendedand
running,theparkingbrakemustbeset,andifthevehicleisonanincline,inadditionto
settingthebrake,thewheelsmustbechocked"(emphasisadded)).7
6 OccupationalSafetyandHealthActof1970,29U.S.C. 651-678.
7Althoughonlybrieflyreviewed,OSHAregulationsincludeadefinitionand
requirementsforindustrialtrucksusedingeneralindustry(notconstruction):
(ii) Apoweredindustrialtruckisunattendedwhentheoperatoris25
ft. ormoreawayfromthevehiclewhichremainsinhisview,orwhenever
26
No. 30185-1-111
Millicanv. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc.
Theestatearguesforthefirsttimeinitsreplybrief that"[w]hetherasafety
appliesonaparticularjobsiteis aquestionoflawforthecourt." ReplyBr. at
20(citingManson v. Foutch-Miller, 38 Wn. App. 898,902,691P.2d236(1984));see
alsoBallv. Smith, 87 Wn.2d717, 722-25,556P.2d936(1976)(itistheprovinceof the
trialcourt,notanexpertwitness,tointerpretastatuteorordinanceanddetermine
whetherit appliestoaparty). Itsargumentthatthetrialcourtshouldhavedetermined
whetherWAC296-155-61O(2)(b)applied, orat leastinstructedthejuryonameaningfor
"unattended,"appearsworthyofbriefingandconsiderationintheretrial. Wewillnot
considerit inthisappeal,however, fortworeasons: itwasnotraisedinthetrialcourtand
theoperatorleavesthevehicleanditis notinhisview.
(iii) Whentheoperatorof anindustrialtruckisdismountedand
within25 ft. of thetruckstillinhisview,theloadengagingmeansshallbe
fully lowered, controlsneutralized, andthebrakessettopreventmovement.
29 C.F.R. 1910.l78(m)(5). InaMay 11,2005interpretationletteraddressedtoPeter
KuchinskyII, OSHAreferredtothisindustrialtruckregulationinaddressingaquestion
aboutconstructionequipment,stating:
Althoughtheseprovisionsdonotapplytoconstructionorearth-
movingequipment,theyaddresssomeof thesametypeof hazards. After
consideringtheapproachthatwastakenin1910.178(m)(5)andthe
hazardsassociatedwithconstructionequipment,wehavedeterminedthat,
forconstructionequipmentsuchasbobcats,backhoes,andtrenchers,
leavingthemotorrunningwiththeoperatorawayfromthecontrolswillbe
consideredade minimisviolationof1926.600(a)(3)whereallof the
followingaremet:theattachmentislowered,thecontrolsareintheneutral
position,thebrakesareset, allmanufacturerprovidedandrecommended
safetymeasuresareutilized,andtheoperatoris within25 feet(andstillin
view)of theequipment.
LettertoPaulKuchinskyII,supra(footnoteomitted).
27
No. 30185-1111
Millican v. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
wasraisedfor thefirsttimeintheestate'sreplybrief. RAP2.5(a)(appellatecourtsneed
notentertainissuesnotraisedinthetrialcourt);CowicheCanyon Conservancyv. Bosley,
118 Wn.2d801, 809, 828P.2d549(1992)(issueraisedforthefirsttimeinareplybriefis
toolatetowarrantconsideration).
Inthetrialcourt,theestatewascontenttohavethejurydecidewhetherthe
regulationapplied. WhilewerejectthetwoprincipalargumentsDegerstromofferson
appealastowhyitsconstructionoftheregulationis correct,thefactremainsthatthe
estateallowedthemeaningandapplicationoftheregulationtobedecidedbythejury.
Bothparties'witnessesofferedtheirviewsastowhethertheaugertruckwas
"unattended"whentheaugerwasbeingoperated;theestate'switnessessaidthatitwas
unattendedandDegerstrom'switnessestestifiedthatitwasattended,notunattended. As
thecasewastried,andviewedinthelightmostfavorabletoDegerstrom,theevidence
couldsupportajurydeterminationthattheaugertruckwasnotunattendedatthetimeit
beganrollingdowntheincline. CjWieder v. TowmotorCorp., 568 F. Supp. 1058, 1063
(E.D.Pa. 1983)(experts'conflictingopinionsastowhetherforkliftwasleft"unattended"
whendriverdismountedweresubmittedtothejuryforitsdetermination),aff'd,734F.2d
9(3dCir. 1984).
WhileplacingprincipalrelianceonWAC296-155-610(2)(b),theestatepointsto
evidenceit presentedofotherallegedviolationsofWISHAregulationsbyDegerstromas
well. ButthatevidencewassimilarlydisputedbyDegerstrom'semployeesandexpertsat
28
No. 30185-I-III
Millicanv. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc.
trial. AndwithrespecttosomeoftheWISHAregulationstheestatearguedwereviolated
byDegerstrom,theestatedidnotconclusivelydemonstratethatanyviolationwasa
proximatecauseofMr. Lafayette'sdeath.
Thetrialcourtdidnoterrindenyingtheestate'smotionforjudgmentasamatter
oflawonliabilityandanewtrial limitedtotheissueofdamages.
Refusalto instructonadutyowedto thepublic.
Theestatenextappealsthetrialcourt'srefusaltoinstructthejurythatthegeneral
contractoronahighwayconstructionprojecthasadutytoexerciseordinarycareto
protectthetravelingpublicfrom dangerousconditionsthatmayarisewithina
constructionzone. Itclaimstohavereliedonanalternativetheoryofliabilitythat
Degerstrom'snegligentomissionscreatedaperiltothemotoristsonFloweryTrailRoad
whowereinthepathoftheaugertruckas it rolleddownhill. Itsbreachofthatdutyowed
thepubliccreatedliabilitytoanyoneinjuredinareasonableattempttorescuethe
imperiledmotorists-inthiscase,therescuerhappenedtobetheemployeeofa
subcontractor. SeeMcCoyv. Am. SuzukiMotorCorp., 136 Wn.2d350,355,961 P.2d
952(1998)(rescuedoctrinesallowsan injuredrescuertosuethepartythatcausedthe
8Aplaintiffrelyingontherescuedoctrinemustprovethat(1)thedefendantwas
negligenttothepersonrescuedandthatnegligencecreatedanappearancethattheperson
rescuedwas inperil,(2)theperilorappearanceofperilwasimminent,(3)areasonably
prudentpersonwouldhaveconcludedthattheperil existed,and(4)therescueractedwith
reasonablecare. McCoy, 136Wn.2dat355-56.
29
No. 30185-1-111
Millican v. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc.
dangerthatrequiredtherescue). It contendsthatthecourt'srefusaltogivetherequested
instructionpreventeditfromarguingthisseparatetheoryofnegligence.
Juryinstructionsmustallowthepartiestoarguetheirtheoriesofthecase,mustnot
misleadthejury,andmustas awholeinformthejuryoftheapplicablelaw. Thompson v.
King Feed & Nutrition Serv., Inc., 153 Wn.2d447,453, 105P.3d378(2005). "Failureto
permitinstructionsonaparty'stheoryofthecase,wherethereisevidencesupportingthe
theory, isreversibleerror." Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 152 Wn.2d259,266-67,
96P.3d386(2004). "Aswithatrialcourt'sinstructionmisstatingtheapplicablelaw,a
court'somissionof aproposedstatementofthegoverninglawwillbe 'reversibleerror
whereitprejudicesaparty.'" Id. at267(quotingHue v. Farmboy Spray Co., 127Wn.2d
67,92,896P.2d682(1995)). Onappeal,errorsoflawinjuryinstructionsarereviewed
denovo. Hue, 127 Wn.2dat92.
Theestate'sproposedinstructionwasnotaWashingtonpatternjuryinstruction;
theauthorityitcitedinproposingtheinstructionwasSmith v. Acme Paving Co., 16 Wn.
App.389,558P.2d811 (1976)andCummins v. Rachner, 257N.W.2d808(Minn. 1977).
Onappeal, itcitesArgus v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 49Wn.2d853,307P.2d261 (1957)
as additionalauthority. Degerstromarguesthatallthreecasesinvolveddistinguishable
facts: acontractorengagedinroadconstructionwhocreatedahazardinoronthe
physicalroadwaybeingconstructed. We agree;thedutyofthecontractorineachcase
wasidentifiedasbeingtomaintainthestreetsinareasonablysafeconditionandtoguard
30
No.30185-1-III
Millican v. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc.
drivers fromreasonablyanticipatedhazards. Argus,49Wn.2dat856;Smith, 16 Wn.
App. at393;Cummins,257N.W.2dat813. AsstatedinSmith, 16 Wn.App.at393-94,
thisduty"isparticularlyapplicablewheretheconditionscomplainedofariseoutofthe
actualconstruction,repair,andmaintenanceoftheroadway." Degerstromisnotaccused
ofcreatingahazard, butoffailingtosafeguardagainstit.
Nonetheless,otherevidencepresentedattrialsupportedabroaderdutyowedby
Degerstromtothepublic. Degerstrom'sagreementinitsaccidentpreventionprogramto
reasonablyensurethatparked,unattendedvehicleswerechockedoninclinesapparently
wasintendedtoprotectthepublicaswell as employeesfromhazardousrunaway
vehicles. ThereferenceinWISHAregulationstovehiclesparkedatnight,afterwork
hours,provesthisintent. WAC296-155-605(1)(a). Degerstromalsoagreedtosafeguard
thepublicfrom itsoperationsandtoprovideadequatewarningsofhazardsforworkers
andthepublic.
ThisscopeofDeger strom'sdutywasreflectedinotherinstructionsgivenbythe
trialcourt,however, fromwhichtheestatecouldarguethatDegerstrombreachedaduty
of caretothepublicbyfailingtorequireSharp-Linetousechocksontheaugertrucks.
Thetrialcourt'sinstructionsinformedthejurythatnegligenceincludes"thefailuretodo
someactthatareasonablycarefulpersonwouldhavedoneunderthesameorsimilar
circumstances,"CPat3179,andthataviolationofaWISHAregulationisevidenceof
negligence. Theestateelicitedtestimonyfrom severalwitnessesthatitwouldhavebeen
31
No. 30185-1-111
Millican v. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc.
safertousechocksunderthecircumstancesoftheaccident,andarguedthatthe failureto
usechockswasbothunreasonableandaviolationofWISHAsafetyregulations,creating
animminentthreattothepUblic.
Theinstructionsgivenenabledtheestatetoargueanegligentbreachofdutytothe
public. Thetrialcourt'srefusaltogiveamorespecificinstructionwasthereforenot
reversibleerror.
Dismissal ofMs. Millican's individual claim.
Ms. MillicansuednotonlyasthepersonalrepresentativeofMr.Lafayette'sestate
butalsoindividually,as astatutorybeneficiary. RCW4.20.020identifiesafirstand
secondtierof beneficiarieswhomayrecoverdamagesforwrongfuldeath. Armantrout v.
Carlson, 166Wn.2d931,935,214P.3d914(2009). Thefirsttierincludesadecedent's
wife,husband,orregistereddomesticpartner,andanychildrenorstepchildren. Ifthere
arenofirsttierbeneficiaries,asinthecaseof19-year-oldMr.Lafayette,awrongful
deathsuitmaybemaintainedforthebenefitof secondtierbeneficiaries,including
parentsorsiblings"whomaybedependentuponthedeceasedpersonforsupport." RCW
4.20.020; Armantrout, 166 Wn.2dat935.
Thestatutedoesnotdefine"dependent"or"support." Ithaslongbeenconstrued
torequirethatsecondtierbeneficiariesprove'''substantialdependency'" anda
recognitionbythechildof theparent's'''necessitouswant.'" Id. at936(quotingBortle
v. N. Pac. Ry., 60Wash. 552, 554, III P. 788(1910)). Thesubstantialdependencymust
32
No.30185-1-111
Millicanv. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
bebasedonthesituationexistingatthetimeof thedecedent'sdeath,notonapromiseof
futurecontributions. Id. Emotionaldependencyalonewillnotqualifyparentsfor
second-tierbeneficiarystatus. Id. InArmantrout,theWashingtonSupremeCourtheld
thatthetrieroffactmayconsiderservicesprovidedbythedeceasedthathadamonetary
valueforwhichtheparentswouldnototherwisehavebeenabletopay. It maynot,
however,consider"everydayservicesachildwouldroutinelyprovide." Id. at940.
Thedefendantsmovedfor summaryjudgmentdismissingMs.Millican's
individualclaim,arguingthattherewasnogenuineissuethatshewasdependentonher
sonforsupport. It wasundisputedthatMr.Lafayettehadmovedoutofhis mother's
homefourmonths beforetheaccidentandhadbeenlivingindependently. The
defendantssubmittedMs. Millican'sdepositioninsupportoftheirmotion,summarizing
materialconcessionsmadeinthedepositionas follows:
Mrs.Millicandoesnothavedebilitatinghealthproblemsrequiring
necessarycareandassistancefrom herfamilymembers. Shehada
pulmonaryembolismnearlytwentyyearsago andnowhashypertension,
butshetriesnottolimitherselfinactivities. Mr.Lafayettedidnotoffer
anymedicalcaretohismother. In fact, Ms.Millicanis abletoworkattwo
jobs,theRiversideschooldistrictadministrationofficeandafosterhome
forat-riskyouth. Currently,sheis workingabout35 hoursperweekatthe
schooldistrictand35-40hoursperweekatthefosterhome. Mr. Lafayette
didnotgivehis motherany [monetary] support.
CPat645-46(footnotesomitted).
Inresponse,Ms. Millicansubmittedthedeclarationofherprimarycarephysician
thatshehasclassIVpulmonaryhypertensionthatcausesshortnessofbreathwith
33
No.30185-1-III
Millican v. NA. Degerstrom, Inc.
exertionandsignificantlylimitsherabilitytodochores involvingaerobicactivity. She
alsosubmittedevidencethathersonbeganworkingconstructionatage 12 andhad
becomeproficientatconstruction,householdrepair,andlandscaping. Shetestifiedthat
duringhisteenageyearshehadregularlyhandledhouseholdrepairsandmaintenanceand
hadundertakenanumberofimprovementstoherhomeandthe 10-acreparcelonwhich
itislocated. Shearguedthatherphysicallimitationspreventedher,personally,from
performingthemaintenancerequiredonherhomeandproperty.
Shetestifiedthathersonplannedtocontinueprovidingtheseandother
maintenance,repair,andhomeimprovementservicesinthefuture. Insupportofa
motionforreconsiderationshesubmittedadeclarationstatingconclusorilythatsheand
herhusbandwerefinanciallyunabletopaysomeoneelsetoperformthetasksnecessary
forthemaintenanceandupkeepof theirhome. Becausesheandherhusbandcouldnot
keepupthepropertyaswellasMr.Lafayettehad,anditdidnotmakesenseforherto
refinanceahomethatwaslosingvalue,shetestifiedthatshelostherhomeinforeclosure.
Ourreviewof anorderof summaryjudgmentisdenovo,consideringthefacts and
reasonableinferencesinthe lightmostfavorabletothenonmovingparty. Beggs v. Dep't
o/Soc. & Health Servs., 171Wn.2d69,75,247 P.3d421 (2011);Right-Price Recreation,
LLC v. Connells Prairie Cmty. Council, 146Wn.2d370,381,46P.3d789(2002).
Summaryjudgmentisproperif thepleadingsandaccompanyingdocumentaryevidence
showthatthereis nogenuineissueof materialfactandthatthemovingpartyis entitled
34
No.30185-1-III
Millican v. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc.
tojudgmentas amatteroflaw. Phillips v. King County, 136 Wn.2d946,956,968P.2d
871 (1998);CR56(c).
Viewingtheevidenceinthe lightmostfavorabletoMs. Millican,theservicesMr.
Lafayetteprovidedaredifferentfromthetypeof supportservicesdiscussedin
Armantrout thatmakeaparent"dependent...forsupport"withinthemeaningofRCW
4.20.020. Inthatcase, the18-year-olddecedenthadlivedwithhermother,whohad
diabetesandwasblind. Sheactedashermother'sdriverandadministeredhermother's
glucosetestsandinsulininjections. Thedecedenthadcontributedhermonthlydisability
benefitcheckstothehousehold. Armantrout heldthattheseserviceswerethekindfor
whichaneconomicvaluecouldbedetermined. Atthesametime, itendorsedthetrial
court'sinstructiontothejurythatthefinancialdependencerequiredexcludedthe
everydayservicesachildwouldroutinelyprovide. 166 Wn.2dat939.
Ms.Millican'sevidencerespondingtothesummaryjudgmentmotionfailedto
demonstrateagenuineissueofmaterialfact. Mr.Lafayetteprovidednomedicalcareor
monetarysupporttohismother,whowasabletogetaroundonherownandholdmore
thanfull-timeemployment. SomeservicesprovidedbyMr.Lafayette,suchas snow
plowingandyardmaintenance,wereinthenatureof everydayservicesachildwould
routinelyprovide. Extensivefuturehomeandlandscapingimprovementsaccountedfora
35
No. 30185-1-111
Millicanv. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc.
largepartof herdamageclaim9 buttheywerebothhoped-forcontributionsandnotthe
degreeofdependencycontemplatedbythestatute,which"mustberealandsubstantial
andwillnotarisefrom occasionalgiftsorgratuities." Beggs, 171 Wn.2dat82 n.12.
Finally,withrespectto anyassistanceshehadbeenreceivingfromMr.Lafayettethat
Ms. Millicanmightlegitimatelyarguewasnonroutineandrespondedtoarealand
substantialneed,shemadenoshowingoffinancial dependenceonthatassistance.
Thetrialcourtproperlygrantedthedefendants' motionforpartialsummary
judgmentdismissingMs.Millican'sindividual claim.
Weaffirmthetrialcourt'sdismissalofMs.Millican'sindividualclaim,reverse
thedismissalof theestate'sclaim,andremandforanewtrialconsistentwiththis
OpInIOn.
Siddoway,A.C.J.
ICONCUR:
9 SummarizedatCP782-87,Ms. Millican'sdamageclaimincludedthevalueof
the followingimprovementstoherhomethatshehadhopedMr.Lafayettewould
undertakeinthefuture: constructionofanewtwo-cargaragewithstudioapartment;a
two-storyadditiontothehome;akitchenremodel;andnewlawn, sprinkler,anddrip
irrigationsystems.
36
No. 30185-1-111
BROWN, J., (concurring in part, dissenting in part) - I agree the trial court correctly
dismissed Dorothy Millican's individual claim. But in my view under existing law, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion and err in admitting the subcontract between N.A.
Degerstrom (NAD) and Sharp-line Industries, Inc. Pretrial, the Estate of Daren
Lafayette (Estate) unsuccessfully moved to exclude any U[a]rgument or inference that
Degerstrom did not retain control or exercise supervision over [Sharp-line's] work,"
citing ER 401,402, and 403 and Stute v. P.B.M.G., Inc., 114 Wn.2d 454,788 P.2d 545
(1990). Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1549. Attached to the motion was the subcontract
between NAD and Sharp-line, which specified in one provision that Sharp-Line
accepts responsibility to prevent accidents to any person who may be
close enough to its operations to be exposed to Subcontractor's work-
related hazards. Subcontractor shall be solely responsible for the
protection and safety of its employees, for final selection of additional
safety methods and means, and for daily inspection of its work area and
safety equipment.
CP at 3227. The Estate mistakenly contends this provision impermissibly delegated
NAD's responsibility to ensure compliance with the safety regulations of the Washington
Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973 (WISHA), chapter 49.17 RCW.
No. 301851111
Millican v. Degerstrom, Inc. - concurrence/dissent
Evidencemustbe relevantto be admissible, meaning"itmusttendto makethe
existenceofanyfactofconsequenceto theactionmoreorlessprobable." Degroot v.
Berkley Constr., Inc., 83Wn. App. 125, 128,920P.2d619(1996). Even relevant
evidencemaybeexcluded ifitsprobativevalueisoutweighed bythelikelihoodthatit
will misleadthejury. Id. Thetrialcourt'sbalancing ofprobativevalueversusprejudicial
effectisentitledtogreatdeference. Id.
Thesubcontract'ssafetyprovisionwasrelevanttoNAD'sdefensethatittookall
reasonablestepstocomplywithWISHAregulations. UnderRCW49.17.060,each
employer
(1) Shallfurnishtoeachofhisorheremployeesaplaceof
employmentfreefrom recognized hazardsthatarecausing orlikelyto
causeseriousinjuryordeathtohisorheremployees...;and
(2) Shallcomplywiththerules, regulations, and orders
promulgated underthischapter.
Thisstatuteismirrored inWAC296-155040,whichstatesinpart:
(1) Eachemployershallfurnishtoeach employeeaplaceof
employment'free'from recognized hazardsthatarecausing orlikelyto
causeseriousinjuryordeathtoemployees.
(2) Everyemployershall require safetydevices,furnish safeguards,
and shall adoptand usepractices, methods,operations,and processes
whicharereasonablyadequatetorendersuchemploymentand placeof
employmentsafe. Everyemployershall doeverything reasonably
necessarytoprotectthe lifeand safetyofemployees.
See Stute, 114Wn.2d at457,459-60. Stute held RCW49.17.060andWAC291155
040createatwofolddutyforgeneralcontractors. Id. at457. Subsection (1) ofthe
statuteand regulation imposesageneraldutyonemployerstoprotectsolelytheirown
employeesfrom"recognized hazardsnotcovered byspecificsafetyregulations." Id.
2
No. 30185-1-111
Millican v. Degerstrom, Inc. - concurrence/dissent
Subsection (2) of the statute and regulation, however, "imposes a specific duty to
comply with WISHA regulations." Id. This specific duty extends to the employees of
subcontractors. Id. at 458. Thus, a general contractor has a nondelegable duty to
ensure compliance with safety regulations for the safety of a subcontractor's
employees. Id. at 463-64.
In Stute, P.B.M.C., Inc., a general contractor, subcontracted with S &S Gutters
to install gutters on a condominium complex. Mr. Stute, an employee of S & S Gutters,
fell while installing gutters and was injured. The record showed P.B.M.C. knew the
employees of S & S Gutters were working on the roof without safety devices. Id. at 456.
Mr. Stute sued P.B.M.C., alleging the general contractor owed a duty to provide
necessary safety devices on the work site. Citing RCW 49.17.060, WAC 296-155-040,
and the general contractor's "innate supervisory authority," Stute, 114 Wn.2d at 464, the
Supreme Court held a general contractor had a specific duty as a matter of law to
supply safety equipment for all employees on a work site or to contractually require
subcontractors to provide adequate safety equipment relevant to their responsibilities.
Stute, 114 Wn.2d at 464.
Here, the trial court correctly reasoned Stute allowed a general contractor to
contractually require subcontractors to furnish adequate safety equipment. Id. Thus, in
my view, the trial court correctly admitted the subcontract with the understanding it
would deal with the legal issues in the jury instructions.
3
No. 30185-1-111
Millican v. Degerstrom, Inc. - concurrence/dissent
In Degroot, a subcontractor's employee was injured while working on a job site
and sued the general contractors for negligence and WISHA violations. Before trial, the
employee moved to exclude a subcontract safety provision that arguably gave the
subcontractor sole responsibility for the safety of its employees:
"Subcontractor shall, at its own cost and expense, protect its own
employees, employees of Contractor, and all other persons from risk of
death, injury or bodily harm arising out of or in any way connected with the
work to be performed under this Subcontract.
"Subcontractor shall strictly comply with all safety orders, rules,
regulations or requirements of all federal, state and local government
agencies, exercising safety jurisdiction over said work including, but not
limited to, federal OSHA [Occupational Safey and Health Act of 1970,29
U.S.C. 651-678] and state occupational safety and health regulations."
Degroot, 83 Wn. App. at 128. The employee contended that because the safety
provision gave the impression that the general contractors had delegated to the
subcontractor the duty to furnish a relatively safe working environment, the safety
provision was irrelevant and misleading. Id. at 127.
In affirming the trial court's admission of the evidence, the Degroot court found
the boilerplate language in the safety provision appeared to be designed to meet the
duty of care outlined in Stute, particularly the general contractor's duty to "'furnish safety
equipment or to contractually require subcontractors to furnish adequate safety
equipment.'" Id. at 129 (quoting Stute, 114 Wn.2d at 464). Consequently, the safety
provision was "at least relevant to whether [the general contractors] fulfilled their WISHA
responsibility for the safety of all employees on the work site." Id. The Degroot court
concluded the safety provision was not misleading, because the general contractors
4
No. 30185-1-111
Millican v. Degerstrom, Inc. - concurrence/dissent
agreed at trial they had a nondelegable duty to comply with WISHA safety regulations,
never argued the subcontract delegated this duty to the subcontractor, and submitted
the safety provision solely as "evidence of their attempt to exercise reasonable care to
enforce safety regulations on the work site." Id. at 131. The trial court in Degroot
instructed the jury that the provision was not evidence that the general contractors had
delegated their WISHA duties to the subcontractor and that the general contractors
were required to exercise ordinary care to ensure compliance with safety regulations on
the work site. Id.
Under Degroot, subcontract safety provisions may be admissible as evidence of
the steps the general contractor took to comply with WISHA safety regulations, but the
provisions are not admissible to show the general contractor delegated its responsibility
for compliance with the safety regulations to the subcontractor. Id. at 129. As in
Degroot, the subcontract safety provision here is relevant to whether NAD met its duty
to ensure compliance with WISHA safety regulations at the work site. Id.; Stute, 114
Wn.2d at 464; WAC 296-155-040(2).
The trial court found the relevance of the subcontract safety provision here
outweighed the possibility that it might mislead the jury regarding the general
contractor's nondelegable duty to comply with WISHA safety regulations. Although the
subcontract states Sharp-Line is "solely responsible for the protection and safety of its
employees," CP at 3227, NAD acknowledged in its opening and closing statements that
5
No. 30185-1-111
Millican v. Degerstrom, Inc. - concurrence/dissent
generalcontractorshavealegaldutytoprovideasafeworksiteforallemployees. No
objectionwas notedto NAO'sargumentsinthebriefing.
Intermsofafairtrial, NAOemployeestestifiedthatthegeneralcontractor
retainedtheultimateresponsibilityforworksitesafety. Additionally, NAOprovided
evidenceithadasitespecificaccidentpreventionplan, ithad aforemanand
superintendentperformingoversightatthejobsitedaily, aswellasasafetydirector
whochecked in on occasion,and itranweeklysafetymeetingsthatwere requiredforall
workersonthesite. NAO'sclosingstatementexplainedthatasthegeneralcontractor,
itwasrequiredtotakereasonablestepstoensurethesafetyoftheworksite, including
contractuallyrequiring itssubcontractorstofurnish anysafetyequipmentrelatedtotheir
work. Thetrialcourtwas inthebestpositiontoruleon anyobjections, iftheyhad been
made.
Importantly,thejurywasinstructedthatageneralcontractorhas anondelegable
responsibilitytoensurethesafetyofallemployeeson theworksite:
UnderWashington law, ageneralcontractoron aconstruction
projectowesadutytoeveryemployeeatthejobsite, includingemployees
ofsubcontractors,toensurethatitand itssubcontractorscomplywithall
applicablesafetyregulations. Thegeneralcontractoristhepartywith
innatesupervisoryauthorityand persecontroloverthejobsite, soit
bearstheprimary, non-delegabledutytoprovideasafeworkplacefor
subcontractoremployees.
InWashington, allgeneralcontractors haveanon-delegable
specificdutytoensurecompliancewithallWashingtonstateconstruction
safetyregulations.
CP at3182. Weassumejuriesfollowtheinstructions. Degroot, 83Wn. App. at131.
6
No. 30185-1-111
Millican v. Degerstrom, Inc. - concurrence/dissent
Accordingly, Iconcurin affirmingthetrialcourt'sdismissalofMs. Millican's
individualclaim, butbecauseIwould affirmthetrialcourt'sjudgmentonthejury's
verdict, Irespectfullydissent.
Brown, J.
7