Spinoza-The Chief Works

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Benedict de Spinoza, The Chief Works of

Benedict de Spinoza, vol. 2 [1662]
The Online Library Of Liberty

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Online Library of Liberty: The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, vol. 2
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Edition Used:
The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, translated from the Latin,
with an Introduction by R.H.M. Elwes, vol. 2 De Intellectus
Emendatione - Ethica. (Select Letters). Revised edition (London:
George Bell and Sons, 1901).
Author: Benedict de Spinoza
Translator: Robert Harvey Monro Elwes
About This Title:

Volume 2 contains Spinozas ethical writings and selected letters.
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to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and
responsible individuals.
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Table Of Contents
On the Improvement of the Understanding.
The Ethics.
Part I.: Concerning God.
Part II.: Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind.
Part III.: On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions.
Part IV.: Of Human Bondage, Or the Strength of the Emotions.
Part V.: Of the Power of the Understanding, Or of Human
Freedom.
Spinozas Correspondence.
Letter I. (i. 1 ): Henry Oldenburg 2 to B. De Spinoza.
Letter II. (ii.): Spinoza to Oldenburg.
Letter III. (iii.): Oldenburg to Spinoza.
Letter IV. (iv.): Spinoza to Oldenburg.
Letter V. (v.): Oldenburg to Spinoza.
Letter VI. (vi.): Spinoza to Oldenburg.
Letter VII. (vii.): Oldenburg to Spinoza.
Letter Viii (xi.): Oldenburg to Spinoza.
Letter IX. (xiii.): Spinoza to Oldenburg.
Letters X.XIV. 1: Letter XIII. A.: Oldenburg to Spinoza.
Letter XV. (xxxii.): Spinoza to Oldenburg.
Letter XVI. (xxxiii.): Oldenburg to Spinoza.
Letter XVII. (lxi.): Oldenburg to Spinoza.
Letter XVIII. (lxii.): Oldenburg to Spinoza.
Letter XIX. (lxviii.): Spinoza to Oldenburg.
Letter XX. (lxxi.): Oldenburg to Spinoza.
Letter XXI. (lxxiii.): Spinoza to Oldenburg.
Letter XXII. (lxxiv.): Oldenburg to Spinoza.
Letter XXIII. (lxxv.): Spinoza to Oldenburg.
Letter XXIV. (lxxvii.): Oldenburg to Spinoza.
Letter XXV. (lxxviii.)
Letter XXV. A.: Oldenburg to Spinoza.
Letter XXVI. (viii.): Simon De Vries 1 to Spinoza.
Letter XXVII. (ix.): Spinoza to Simon De Vries.
Letter XXVIII. (x.): Spinoza to Simon De Vries.
Letter XXIX. (xii.): Spinoza to L. M. 1 (lewis Meyer).
Letter XXIX. A. 1: Spinoza to Lewis Meyer.
Letter XXX. (xvii.): Spinoza to Peter Balling. 1
Letter XXXI. (xviii.): William De Blyenbergh 1 to Spinoza.
Letter XXXII. (xix.): Spinoza to Blyenbergh.
Letter XXXIII. (xx.): Blyenbergh to Spinoza.
Letter XXXIV. (xxi.): Spinoza to Blyenbergh.
Letter XXXV. (xxii.): Blyenbergh to Spinoza.
Letter XXXVI. (xxiii.): Spinoza to Blyenbergh.
Letter XXXVII. (xxiv.): Blyenbergh to Spinoza.
Letter XXXVIII. (xxvii.): Spinoza to Blyenbergh.

Letter XXXIX.: Spinoza to Christian Huyghens.
Letter Xl. (xxxv.): Spinoza to Christian Huyghens.
Letter Xli. (xxxvi.): Spinoza to Christian Huyghens.
Letter Xli. A.: Spinoza to * * * * * 1 (may Or June, 1665).
Letter Xlii. (xxxvii.): Spinoza to I. B. 1
Letter Xliii. (xxxviii.): Spinoza to I. V. M. 1
Letters Xliv., Xlv., Xlvi. (xxxix., Xl., Xli.): Spinoza to I. I. 2
Xliv.
Xlv.
Xlvi.
Letter Xlvii. (xliv.): Spinoza to I. I.
Letter Xlviii.
Letter Xlix.: Spinoza to Isaac Orobio. 1
Letter L. (l.): Spinoza to Jarig Jellis.
Letter Li. (xlv.): Godfrey Leibnitz to Spinoza.
Letter Lii. (xlvi.): Spinoza to Leibnitz.
Letter Liii. (xlvii.): Fabritius to Spinoza.
Letter Liv. (xlviii.): Spinoza to Fabritius.
Letter Lv. (li.): Hugo Boxel to Spinoza.
Letter Lvi. (lii.): Spinoza to Hugo Boxel.
Letter Lvii. (liii.): Hugo Boxel to Spinoza.
Letter Lviii. (liv.): Spinoza to Hugo Boxel.
Letter Lix. (lv.): Hugo Boxel to Spinoza.
Letter Lx. (lvi.): Spinoza to Hugo Boxel.
Letter Lxi. (lvii.): * * * * * to Spinoza. 1
Letter Lxii. (lviii.): Spinoza to * * * * * 2 (the Hague, October,
1674).
Letter Lxiii. (lix.): * * * * * to Spinoza. 1
Letter Lxiv. (lx.): Spinoza to * * * * *. 1
Letter Lxv. (lxiii.): G. H. Schaller to Spinoza. 1
Letter Lxvi. (lxiv.): Spinoza to * * * * *. 1
Letter Lxvii. (lxv.): * * * * * 1 to Spinoza.
Letter Lxviii. (lxvi.): Spinoza to * * * * *. 1
Letter Lxviii. A.: G. H. Schaller to Spinoza.
Letter Lxviii. B.: Spinoza to Schaller.
Letter Lxix. (lxxx.): * * * * * 1 to Spinoza.
Letter Lxx. (lxxxi.): Spinoza to * * * * * 1
Letter Lxxi. (lxxxii.): * * * * * 1 to Spinoza.
Letter Lxxii. (lxxxiii.): Spinoza to * * * * 1
Letter Lxxiii. (lxvii.): Albert Burgh to Spinoza.
Letter Lxxiv. (lxxvi.): Spinoza to Albert Burgh.
Letter Lxxv. (lxix.): Spinoza to Lambert Van Velthuysen (
Doctor of Medicine At Utrecht. ) 1
[Back to Table of Contents]
ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE

UNDERSTANDING.
[TRACTATUS DE INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE.]
AFTER experience had taught me that all the usual surroundings of
social life are vain and futile; seeing that none of the objects of my
fears contained in themselves anything either good or bad, except
in so far as the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to
inquire whether there might be some real good having power to
communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the
exclusion of all else: whether, in fact, there might be anything of
which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy
continuous, supreme, and unending happiness. I say I finally
resolved, for at first sight it seemed unwise willingly to lose hold
on what was sure for the sake of something then uncertain. I could
see the benefits which are acquired through fame and riches, and
that I should be obliged to abandon the quest of such objects, if I
seriously devoted myself to the search for something different and
new. I perceived that if true happiness chanced to be placed in the
former I should necessarily miss it; while if, on the other hand, it
were not so placed, and I gave them my whole attention, I should
equally fail.
I therefore debated whether it would not be possible to arrive at
the new principle, or at any rate at a certainty concerning its
existence, without changing the conduct and usual plan of my life;
with this end in view I made many efforts, but in vain. For the
ordinary surroundings of life which are esteemed by men (as their
actions testify) to be the highest good, may be classed under the
three headsRiches, Fame, and the Pleasures of Sense: with these
three the mind is so absorbed that it has little power to reflect on
any different good. By sensual pleasure the mind is enthralled to
the extent of quiescence, as if the supreme good were actually
attained, so that it is quite incapable of thinking of any other
object; when such pleasure has been gratified it is followed by
extreme melancholy, whereby the mind, though not enthralled, is
disturbed and dulled.
The pursuit of honours and riches is likewise very absorbing,
especially if such objects be sought simply for their own sake1 ,
inasmuch as they are then supposed to constitute the highest good.
In the case of fame the mind is still more absorbed, for fame is
conceived as always good for its own sake, and as the ultimate end
to which all actions are directed. Further, the attainment of riches
and fame is not followed as in the case of sensual pleasures by
repentance, but, the more we acquire, the greater is our delight,

and, consequently, the more are we incited to increase both the one
and the other; on the other hand, if our hopes happen to be
frustrated we are plunged into the deepest sadness. Fame has the
further drawback that it compels its votaries to order their lives
according to the opinions of their fellow-men, shunning what they
usually shun, and seeking what they usually seek.
When I saw that all these ordinary objects of desire would be
obstacles in the way of a search for something different and
newnay, that they were so opposed thereto, that either they or it
would have to be abandoned, I was forced to inquire which would
prove the most useful to me: for, as I say, I seemed to be willingly
losing hold on a sure good for the sake of something uncertain.
However, after I had reflected on the matter, I came in the first
place to the conclusion that by abandoning the ordinary objects of
pursuit, and betaking myself to a new quest, I should be leaving a
good, uncertain by reason of its own nature, as may be gathered
from what has been said, for the sake of a good not uncertain in its
nature (for I sought for a fixed good), but only in the possibility of
its attainment.
Further reflection convinced me, that if I could really get to the
root of the matter I should be leaving certain evils for a certain
good. I thus perceived that I was in a state of great peril, and I
compelled myself to seek with all my strength for a remedy,
however uncertain it might be; as a sick man struggling with a
deadly disease, when he sees that death will surely be upon him
unless a remedy be found, is compelled to seek such a remedy with
all his strength, inasmuch as his whole hope lies therein. All the
objects pursued by the multitude not only bring no remedy that
tends to preserve our being, but even act as hindrances, causing
the death not seldom of those who possess them, and always of
those who are possessed by them.1 There are many examples of
men who have suffered persecution even to death for the sake of
their riches, and of men who in pursuit of wealth have exposed
themselves to so many dangers, that they have paid away their life
as a penalty for their folly. Examples are no less numerous of men,
who have endured the utmost wretchedness for the sake of gaining
or preserving their reputation. Lastly, there are innumerable cases
of men, who have hastened their death through over-indulgence in
sensual pleasure. All these evils seem to have arisen from the fact,
that happiness or unhappiness is made wholly to depend on the
quality of the object which we love. When a thing is not loved, no
quarrels will arise concerning itno sadness will be felt if it
perishesno envy if it is possessed by anotherno fear, no hatred,
in short no disturbances of the mind. All these arise from the love
of what is perishable, such as the objects already mentioned. But
love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind wholly with
joy, and is itself unmingled with any sadness, wherefore it is greatly
to be desired and sought for with all our strength. Yet it was not at
random that I used the words, If I could go to the root of the
matter, for, though what I have urged was perfectly clear to my
mind, I could not forthwith lay aside all love of riches, sensual
enjoyment, and fame. One thing was evident, namely, that while my
mind was employed with these thoughts it turned away from its
former objects of desire, and seriously considered the search for a
new principle; this state of things was a great comfort to me, for I
perceived that the evils were not such as to resist all remedies.
Although these intervals were at first rare, and of very short
duration, yet afterwards, as the true good became more and more
discernible to me, they became more frequent and more lasting;
especially after I had recognized that the acquisition of wealth,
sensual pleasure, or fame, is only a hindrance, so long as they are
sought as ends not as means; if they be sought as means, they will
be under restraint, and, far from being hindrances, will further not
a little the end for which they are sought, as I will show in due
time.
I will here only briefly state what I mean by true good, and also
what is the nature of the highest good. In order that this may be
rightly understood, we must bear in mind that the terms good and
evil are only applied relatively, so that the same thing may be called
both good and bad, according to the relations in view, in the same
way as it may be called perfect or imperfect. Nothing regarded in
its own nature can be called perfect or imperfect; especially when
we are aware that all things which come to pass, come to pass
according to the eternal order and fixed laws of nature. However,
human weakness cannot attain to this order in its own thoughts,
but meanwhile man conceives a human character much more
stable than his own, and sees that there is no reason why he should
not himself acquire such a character. Thus he is led to seek for
means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection, and calls
everything which will serve as such means a true good. The chief
good is that he should arrive, together with other individuals if
possible, at the possession of the aforesaid character. What that
character is we shall show in due time, namely, that it is the
knowledge of the union existing between the mind and the whole of
nature.1 This, then, is the end for which I strive, to attain to such a
character myself, and to endeavour that many should attain to it
with me. In other words, it is part of my happiness to lend a helping
hand, that many others may understand even as I do, so that their
understanding and desire may entirely agree with my own. In order
to bring this about, it is necessary to understand as much of nature
as will enable us to attain to the aforesaid character, and also to
form a social order such as is most conducive to the attainment of
this character by the greatest number with the least difficulty and
danger. We must seek the assistance of Moral Philosophy1 and the
Theory of Education; further, as health is no insignificant means for
attaining our end, we must also include the whole science of
Medicine, and, as many difficult things are by contrivance rendered
easy, and we can in this way gain much time and convenience, the
science of Mechanics must in no way be despised. But, before all
things, a means must be devised for improving the understanding
and purifying it, as far as may be at the outset, so that it may
apprehend things without error, and in the best possible way.
Thus it is apparent to everyone that I wish to direct all sciences to
one end and aim,2 so that we may attain to the supreme human
perfection which we have named; and, therefore, whatsoever in the
sciences does not serve to promote our object will have to be
rejected as useless. To sum up the matter in a word, all our actions
and thoughts must be directed to this one end. Yet, as it is
necessary that while we are endeavouring to attain our purpose,
and bring the understanding into the right path, we should carry on
our life, we are compelled first of all to lay down certain rules of
life as provisionally good, to wit the following:
I. To speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude, and to comply
with every general custom that does not hinder the attainment of
our purpose. For we can gain from the multitude no small
advantages, provided that we strive to accommodate ourselves to
its understanding as far as possible: moreover, we shall in this way
gain a friendly audience for the reception of the truth.
II. To indulge ourselves with pleasures only in so far as they are
necessary for preserving health.
III. Lastly, to endeavour to obtain only sufficient money or other
commodities to enable us to preserve our life and health, and to
follow such general customs as are consistent with our purpose.
Having laid down these preliminary rules, I will betake myself to
the first and most important task, namely, the amendment of the
understanding, and the rendering it capable of understanding
things in the manner necessary for attaining our end.
In order to bring this about, the natural order demands that I
should here recapitulate all the modes of perception, which I have
hitherto employed for affirming or denying anything with certainty,
so that I may choose the best, and at the same time begin to know
my own powers and the nature which I wish to perfect.
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Reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge may be

reduced to four:
I. Perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which
everyone may name as he pleases.
II. Perception arising from mere experiencethat is, from
experience not yet classified by the intellect, and only so called
because the given event has happened to take place, and we have
no contradictory fact to set against it, so that it therefore remains
unassailed in our mind.
III. Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred
from another thing, but not adequately; this comes1 when from
some effect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some
general proposition that some property is always present.
IV. Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is perceived
solely through its essence, or through the knowledge of its
proximate cause.
All these kinds of perception I will illustrate by examples. By
hearsay I know the day of my birth, my parentage, and other
matters about which I have never felt any doubt. By mere
experience I know that I shall die, for this I can affirm from having
seen that others like myself have died, though all did not live for
the same period, or die by the same disease. I know by mere
experience that oil has the property of feeding fire, and water of
extinguishing it. In the same way I know that a dog is a barking
animal, man a rational animal, and in fact nearly all the practical
knowledge of life.
We deduce one thing from another as follows: when we clearly
perceive that we feel a certain body and no other, we thence clearly
infer that the mind is united to the body,1 and that their union is
the cause of the given sensation; but we cannot thence absolutely
understand the nature of the sensation and the union.2 Or, after I
have become acquainted with the nature of vision, and know that it
has the property of making one and the same thing appear smaller
when far off than when near, I can infer that the sun is larger than
it appears, and can draw other conclusions of the same kind.
Lastly, a thing may be perceived solely through its essence; when,
from the fact of knowing something, I know what it is to know that
thing, or when, from knowing the essence of the mind, I know that
it is united to the body. By the same kind of knowledge we know
that two and three make five, or that two lines each parallel to a
third, are parallel to one another, &c. The things which I have been
able to know by this kind of knowledge are as yet very few.
In order that the whole matter may be put in a clearer light, I will
make use of a single illustration as follows. Three numbers are
givenit is required to find a fourth, which shall be to the third as
the second is to the first. Tradesmen will at once tell us that they
know what is required to find the fourth number, for they have not
yet forgotten the rule which was given to them arbitrarily without
proof by their masters; others construct a universal axiom from
their experience with simple numbers, where the fourth number is
self-evident, as in the case of 2, 4, 3, 6; here it is evident that if the
second number be multiplied by the third, and the product divided
by the first, the quotient is 6; when they see that by this process
the number is produced which they knew beforehand to be the
proportional, they infer that the process always holds good for
finding a fourth number proportional. Mathematicians, however,
know by the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book
of Euclid, what numbers are proportionals, namely, from the nature
and property of proportion it follows that the product of the first
and fourth will be equal to the product of the second and third: still
they do not see the adequate proportionality of the given numbers,
or, if they do see it, they see it not by virtue of Euclids proposition,
but intuitively, without going through any process.
In order that from these modes of perception the best may be
selected, it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means
necessary for attaining our end.
I. To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to
perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in general.
II. To collect in this way the differences, the agreements, and the
oppositions of things.
III. To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified.
IV. To compare this result with the nature and power of man. We
shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection to which man is
capable of attaining. We shall then be in a position to see which
mode of perception we ought to choose.
As to the first mode, it is evident that from hearsay our knowledge
must always be uncertain, and, moreover, can give us no insight
into the essence of a thing, as is manifest in our illustration; now
one can only arrive at knowledge of a thing through knowledge of
its essence, as will hereafter appear. We may, therefore, clearly
conclude that the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be
scientific in its character. For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone

whose understanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way.
The second mode of perception1 cannot be said to give us the idea
of the proportion of which we are in search. Moreover its results
are very uncertain and indefinite, for we shall never discover
anything in natural phenomena by its means, except accidental
properties, which are never clearly understood, unless the essence
of the things in question be known first. Wherefore this mode also
must be rejected.
Of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner that it
gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it enables us to draw
conclusions without risk of error; yet it is not by itself sufficient to
put us in possession of the perfection we aim at.
The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of a thing
without danger of error. This mode, therefore, must be the one
which we chiefly employ. How, then, should we avail ourselves of it
so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with the least delay
concerning things previously unknown? I will proceed to explain.
Now that we know what kind of knowledge is necessary for us, we
must indicate the way and the method whereby we may gain the
said knowledge concerning the things needful to be known. In
order to accomplish this, we must first take care not to commit
ourselves to a search, going back to infinitythat is, in order to
discover the best method for finding out the truth, there is no need
of another method to discover such method; nor of a third method
for discovering the second, and so on to infinity. By such
proceedings, we should never arrive at the knowledge of the truth,
or, indeed, at any knowledge at all. The matter stands on the same
footing as the making of material tools, which might be argued
about in a similar way. For, in order to work iron, a hammer is
needed, and the hammer cannot be forthcoming unless it has been
made; but, in order to make it, there was need of another hammer
and other tools, and so on to infinity. We might thus vainly
endeavour to prove that men have no power of working iron. But as
men at first made use of the instruments supplied by nature to
accomplish very easy pieces of workmanship, laboriously and
imperfectly, and then, when these were finished, wrought other
things more difficult with less labour and greater perfection; and so
gradually mounted from the simplest operations to the making of
tools, and from the making of tools to the making of more complex
tools, and fresh feats of workmanship, till they arrived at making,
with small expenditure of labour, the vast number of complicated
mechanisms which they now possess. So, in like manner, the
intellect, by its native strength,1 makes for itself intellectual
instruments, whereby it acquires strength for performing other

intellectual operations,2 and from these operations gets again fresh
instruments, or the power of pushing its investigations further, and
thus gradually proceeds till it reaches the summit of wisdom.
That this is the path pursued by the understanding may be readily
seen, when we understand the nature of the method for finding out
the truth, and of the natural instruments so necessary for the
construction of more complex instruments, and for the progress of
investigation. I thus proceed with my demonstration.
A true idea3 (for we possess a true idea) is something different
from its correlate (ideatum); thus a circle is different from the idea
of a circle. The idea of a circle is not something having a
circumference and a centre, as a circle has; nor is the idea of a
body that body itself. Now, as it is something different from its
correlate, it is capable of being understood through itself; in other
words, the idea, in so far as its actual essence (essentia formalis) is
concerned, may be the subject of another subjective essence
(essentia objectiva).1 And, again, this second subjective essence
will, regarded in itself, be something real, and capable of being
understood; and so on, indefinitely. For instance, the man Peter is
something real; the true idea of Peter is the reality of Peter
represented subjectively, and is in itself something real, and quite
distinct from the actual Peter. Now, as this true idea of Peter is in
itself something real, and has its own individual existence, it will
also be capable of being understoodthat is, of being the subject of
another idea, which will contain by representation (objective) all
that the idea of Peter contains actually (formaliter). And, again, this
idea of the idea of Peter has its own individuality, which may
become the subject of yet another idea; and so on, indefinitely. This
everyone may make trial of for himself, by reflecting that he knows
what Peter is, and also knows that he knows, and further knows
that he knows that he knows, &c. Hence it is plain that, in order to
understand the actual Peter, it is not necessary first to understand
the idea of Peter, and still less the idea of the idea of Peter. This is
the same as saying that, in order to know, there is no need to know
that we know, much less to know that we know that we know. This
is no more necessary than to know the nature of a circle before
knowing the nature of a triangle.2 But, with these ideas, the
contrary is the case: for, in order to know that I know, I must first
know. Hence it is clear that certainty is nothing else than the
subjective essence of a thing: in other words, the mode in which we
perceive an actual reality is certainty. Further, it is also evident
that, for the certitude of truth, no further sign is necessary beyond
the possession of a true idea: for, as I have shown, it is not
necessary to know that we know that we know. Hence, again, it is
clear that no one can know the nature of the highest certainty,
unless he possesses an adequate idea, or the subjective essence of

a thing: for certainty is identical with such subjective essence.
Thus, as the truth needs no signit being sufficient to possess the
subjective essence of things, or, in other words, the ideas of them,
in order that all doubts may be removedit follows that the true
method does not consist in seeking for the signs of truth after the
acquisition of the idea, but that the true method teaches us the
order in which we should seek for truth itself,1 or the subjective
essences of things, or ideas, for all these expressions are
synonymous. Again, method must necessarily be concerned with
reasoning or understandingI mean, method is not identical with
reasoning in the search for causes, still less is it the comprehension
of the causes of things: it is the discernment of a true idea, by
distinguishing it from other perceptions, and by investigating its
nature, in order that we may thus know our power of
understanding, and may so train our mind that it may, by a given
standard, comprehend whatsoever is intelligible, by laying down
certain rules as aids, and by avoiding useless mental exertion.
Whence we may gather that method is nothing else than reflective
knowledge, or the idea of an idea; and that as there can be no idea
of an ideaunless an idea exists previously,there can be no
method without a pre-existent idea. Therefore, that will be a good
method which shows us how the mind should be directed,
according to the standard of the given true idea.
Again, seeing that the ratio existing between two ideas is the same
as the ratio between the actual realities corresponding to those
ideas, it follows that the reflective knowledge which has for its
object the most perfect being is more excellent than reflective
knowledge concerning other objectsin other words, that method
will be most perfect which affords the standard of the given idea of
the most perfect being whereby we may direct our mind. We thus
easily understand how, in proportion as it acquires new ideas, the
mind simultaneously acquires fresh instruments for pursuing its
inquiries further. For we may gather from what has been said, that
a true idea must necessarily first of all exist in us as a natural
instrument; and that when this idea is apprehended by the mind, it
enables us to understand the difference existing between itself and
all other perceptions. In this, one part of the method consists.
Now it is clear that the mind apprehends itself better in proportion
as it understands a greater number of natural objects; it follows,
therefore, that this portion of the method will be more perfect in
proportion as the mind attains to the comprehension of a greater
number of objects, and that it will be absolutely perfect when the
mind gains a knowledge of the absolutely perfect being, or
becomes conscious thereof. Again, the more things the mind
knows, the better does it understand its own strength and the order
of nature; by increased self-knowledge, it can direct itself more
easily, and lay down rules for its own guidance; and, by increased
knowledge of nature, it can more easily avoid what is useless.
And this is the sum total of method, as we have already stated. We
may add that the idea in the world of thought is in the same case as
its correlate in the world of reality. If, therefore, there be anything
in nature which is without connection1 with any other thing, and if
we assign to it a subjective essence, which would in every way
correspond to the objective reality, the subjective essence would
have no connection with any other ideasin other words, we could
not draw any conclusion with regard to it. On the other hand, those
things which are connected with othersas all things that exist in
naturewill be understood by the mind, and their subjective
essences will maintain the same mutual relations as their objective
realitiesthat is to say, we shall infer from these ideas other ideas,
which will in turn be connected with others, and thus our
instruments for proceeding with our investigation will increase.
This is what we were endeavouring to prove. Further, from what
has just been saidnamely, that an idea must, in all respects,
correspond to its correlate in the world of reality,it is evident
that, in order to reproduce in every respect the faithful image of
nature, our mind must deduce all its ideas from the idea which
represents the origin and source of the whole of nature, so that it
may itself become the source of other ideas.
It may, perhaps, provoke astonishment that, after having said that
the good method is that which teaches us to direct our mind
according to the standard of the given true idea, we should prove
our point by reasoning, which would seem to indicate that it is not
self-evident. We may, therefore, be questioned as to the validity of
our reasoning. If our reasoning be sound, we must take as a
starting-point a true idea. Now, to be certain that our starting-point
is really a true idea, we need a proof. This first course of reasoning
must be supported by a second, the second by a third, and so on to
infinity. To this I make answer that, if by some happy chance
anyone had adopted this method in his investigations of
naturethat is, if he had acquired new ideas in the proper order,
according to the standard of the original true idea, he would never
have doubted of the truth of his knowledge,1 inasmuch as truth, as
we have shown, makes itself manifest, and all things would flow, as
it were, spontaneously towards him. But as this never, or rarely,
happens, I have been forced so to arrange my proceedings, that we
may acquire by reflection and forethought what we cannot acquire
by chance, and that it may at the same time appear that, for
proving the truth, and for valid reasoning, we need no other means
than the truth and valid reasoning themselves: for by valid
reasoning I have established valid reasoning, and, in like measure,

I seek still to establish it. Moreover, this is the order of thinking
adopted by men in their inward meditations. The reasons for its
rare employment in investigations of nature are to be found in
current misconceptions, whereof we shall examine the causes
hereafter in our philosophy. Moreover, it demands, as we shall
show, a keen and accurate discernment. Lastly, it is hindered by the
conditions of human life, which are, as we have already pointed
out, extremely changeable. There are also other obstacles, which
we will not here inquire into.
If anyone asks why I have not at the starting-point set forth all the
truths of nature in their due order, inasmuch as truth is selfevident, I reply by warning him not to reject as false any paradoxes
he may find here, but to take the trouble to reflect on the chain of
reasoning by which they are supported; he will then be no longer in
doubt that we have attained to the truth. This is why I have begun
as above.
If there yet remains some sceptic, who doubts of our primary truth,
and of all deductions we make, taking such truth as our standard,
he must either be arguing in bad faith, or we must confess that
there are men in complete mental blindness, either innate or due to
misconceptionsthat is, to some external influence.
Such persons are not conscious of themselves. If they affirm or
doubt anything, they know not that they affirm or doubt: they say
that they know nothing, and they say that they are ignorant of the
very fact of their knowing nothing. Even this they do not affirm
absolutely, they are afraid of confessing that they exist, so long as
they know nothing; in fact, they ought to remain dumb, for fear of
haply supposing something which should smack of truth. Lastly,
with such persons, one should not speak of sciences: for, in what
relates to life and conduct, they are compelled by necessity to
suppose that they exist, and seek their own advantage, and often
affirm and deny, even with an oath. If they deny, grant, or gainsay,
they know not that they deny, grant, or gainsay, so that they ought
to be regarded as automata, utterly devoid of intelligence.
Let us now return to our proposition. Up to the present, we have,
first, defined the end to which we desire to direct all our thoughts;
secondly, we have determined the mode of perception best adapted
to aid us in attaining our perfection; thirdly, we have discovered the
way which our mind should take, in order to make a good
beginningnamely, that it should use every true idea as a standard
in pursuing its inquiries according to fixed rules. Now, in order that
it may thus proceed, our method must furnish us, first, with a
means of distinguishing a true idea from all other perceptions, and
enabling the mind to avoid the latter; secondly, with rules for
perceiving unknown things according to the standard of the true
idea; thirdly, with an order which enables us to avoid useless
labour. When we became acquainted with this method, we saw
that, fourthly, it would be perfect when we had attained to the idea
of the absolutely perfect Being. This is an observation which should
be made at the outset, in order that we may arrive at the
knowledge of such a being more quickly.
Let us then make a beginning with the first part of the method,
which is, as we have said, to distinguish and separate the true idea
from other perceptions, and to keep the mind from confusing with
true ideas those which are false, fictitious, and doubtful. I intend to
dwell on this point at length, partly to keep a distinction so
necessary before the readers mind, and also because there are
some who doubt of true ideas, through not having attended to the
distinction between a true perception and all others. Such persons
are like men who, while they are awake, doubt not that they are
awake, but afterwards in a dream, as often happens, thinking that
they are surely awake, and then finding that they were in error,
become doubtful even of being awake. This state of mind arises
through neglect of the distinction between sleeping and waking.
Meanwhile, I give warning that I shall not here give the essence of
every perception, and explain it through its proximate cause. Such
work lies in the province of philosophy. I shall confine myself to
what concerns methodthat is, to the character of fictitious, false,
and doubtful perception, and the means of freeing ourselves
therefrom. Let us then first inquire into the nature of a fictitious
idea.
Every perception has for its object either a thing considered as
existing, or solely the essence of a thing. Now fiction is chiefly
occupied with things considered as existing. I will, therefore,
consider these firstI mean cases where only the existence of an
object is feigned, and the thing thus feigned is understood, or
assumed to be understood. For instance, I feign that Peter, whom I
know to have gone home, is gone to see me,1 or something of that
kind. With what is such an idea concerned? It is concerned with
things possible, and not with things necessary or impossible. I call
a thing impossible when its existence would imply a contradiction;
necessary, when its non-existence would imply a contradiction;
possible, when neither its existence nor its non-existence imply a
contradiction, but when the necessity or impossibility of its nature
depends on causes unknown to us, while we feign that it exists. If
the necessity or impossibility of its existence depending on external
causes were known to us, we could not form any fictitious
hypothesis about it; whence it follows that if there be a God, or
omniscient Being, such an one cannot form fictitious hypotheses.

For, as regards ourselves, when I know that I exist, I cannot
hypothesize that I exist or do not exist,1 any more than I can
hypothesize an elephant that can go through the eye of a needle;
nor when I know the nature of God, can I hypothesize that He
exists or does not exist.2 The same thing must be said of the
Chimra, whereof the nature implies a contradiction. From these
considerations, it is plain, as I have already stated, that fiction
cannot be concerned with eternal truths.3
But before proceeding further, I must remark, in passing, that the
difference between the essence of one thing and the essence of
another thing is the same as that which exists between the reality
or existence of one thing and the reality or existence of another;
therefore, if we wished to conceive the existence, for example, of
Adam, simply by means of existence in general, it would be the
same as if, in order to conceive his existence, we went back to the
nature of being, so as to define Adam as a being. Thus, the more
existence is conceived generally, the more is it conceived
confusedly, and the more easily can it be ascribed to a given object.
Contrariwise, the more it is conceived particularly, the more is it
understood clearly, and the less liable is it to be ascribed, through
negligence of Natures order, to anything save its proper object.
This is worthy of remark.
We now proceed to consider those cases which are commonly
called fictions, though we clearly understand that the thing is not
as we imagine it. For instance, I know that the earth is round, but
nothing prevents my telling people that it is a hemisphere, and that
it is like a half apple carved in relief on a dish; or, that the sun
moves round the earth, and so on. However, examination will show
us that there is nothing here inconsistent with what has been said,
provided we first admit that we may have made mistakes, and be
now conscious of them; and, further, that we can hypothesize, or at
least suppose, that others are under the same mistake as ourselves,
or can, like us, fall under it. We can, I repeat, thus hypothesize so
long as we see no impossibility. Thus, when I tell anyone that the
earth is not round, &c., I merely recall the error which I perhaps
made myself, or which I might have fallen into, and afterwards I
hypothesize that the person to whom I tell it, is still, or may still fall
under the same mistake. This I say, I can feign so long as I do not
perceive any impossibility or necessity; if I truly understood either
one or the other I should not be able to feign, and I should be
reduced to saying that I had made the attempt.
It remains for us to consider hypotheses made in problems, which
sometimes involve impossibilities. For instance, when we saylet
us assume that this burning candle is not burning, or, let us assume
that it burns in some imaginary space, or where there are no

physical objects. Such assumptions are freely made, though the last
is clearly seen to be impossible. But, though this be so, there is no
fiction in the case. For, in the first case, I have merely recalled to
memory another candle1 not burning, or conceived the candle
before me as without a flame, and then I understand as applying to
the latter, leaving its flame out of the question, all that I think of
the former. In the second case, I have merely to abstract my
thoughts from the objects surrounding the candle, for the mind to
devote itself to the contemplation of the candle singly looked at in
itself only; I can then draw the conclusion that the candle contains
in itself no cause for its own destruction, so that if there were no
physical objects the candle, and even the flame, would remain
unchangeable, and so on. Thus there is here no fiction, but true and
bare assertions.1
Let us now pass on to the fictions concerned with essences only, or
with some reality or existence simultaneously. Of these we must
specially observe that in proportion as the minds understanding is
smaller, and its experience multiplex, so will its power of coining
fictions be larger, whereas as its understanding increases, its
capacity for entertaining fictitious ideas becomes less. For
instance, in the same way as we are unable, while we are thinking,
to feign that we are thinking or not thinking, so, also, when we
know the nature of body we cannot imagine an infinite fly; or, when
we know the nature of the soul,2 we cannot imagine it as square,
though anything may be expressed verbally. But, as we said above,
the less men know of nature the more easily can they coin fictitious
ideas, such as trees speaking, men instantly changed into stones,
or into fountains, ghosts appearing in mirrors, something issuing
from nothing, even gods changed into beasts and men, and infinite
other absurdities of the same kind.
Some persons think, perhaps, that fiction is limited by fiction, and
not by understanding; in other words, after I have formed some
fictitious idea, and have affirmed of my own free will that it exists
under a certain form in nature. I am thereby precluded from
thinking of it under any other form. For instance, when I have
feigned (to repeat their argument) that the nature of body is of a
certain kind, and have of my own free will desired to convince
myself that it actually exists under this form, I am no longer able to
hypothesize that a fly, for example, is infinite; so, when I have
hypothesized the essence of the soul, I am not able to think of it as
square, &c. But these arguments demand further inquiry. First,
their upholders must either grant or deny that we can understand
anything. If they grant it, then necessarily the same must be said of
understanding, as is said of fiction. If they deny it, let us, who know
that we do know something, see what they mean. They assert that
the soul can be conscious of, and perceive in a variety of ways, not
itself nor things which exist, but only things which are neither in
itself nor anywhere else, in other words, that the soul can, by its
unaided power, create sensations or ideas unconnected with things.
In fact, they regard the soul as a sort of god. Further, they assert
that we or our soul have such freedom that we can constrain
ourselves, or our soul, or even our souls freedom. For, after it has
formed a fictitious idea, and has given its assent thereto, it cannot
think or feign it in any other manner, but is constrained by the first
fictitious idea to keep all its other thoughts in harmony therewith.
Our opponents are thus driven to admit, in support of their fiction,
the absurdities which I have just enumerated; and which are not
worthy of rational refutation.1
While leaving such persons in their error, we will take care to
derive from our argument with them a truth serviceable for our
purpose, namely, that the mind, in paying attention to a thing
hypothetical or false, so as to meditate upon it and understand it,
and derive the proper conclusions in due order therefrom, will
readily discover its falsity; and if the thing hypothetical be in its
nature true, and the mind pays attention to it, so as to understand
it, and deduce the truths which are derivable from it, the mind will
proceed with an uninterrupted series of apt conclusions; in the
same way as it would at once discover (as we showed just now) the
absurdity of a false hypothesis, and of the conclusions drawn from
it.
We need, therefore, be in no fear of forming hypotheses, so long as
we have a clear and distinct perception of what is involved. For, if
we were to assert, haply, that men are suddenly turned into beasts,
the statement would be extremely general, so general that there
would be no conception, that is, no idea or connection of subject
and predicate, in our mind. If there were such a conception we
should at the same time be aware of the means and the causes
whereby the event took place. Moreover, we pay no attention to the
nature of the subject and the predicate. Now, if the first idea be not
fictitious, and if all the other ideas be deduced therefrom, our hurry
to form fictitious ideas will gradually subside. Further, as a
fictitious idea cannot be clear and distinct, but is necessarily
confused, and as all confusion arises from the fact that the mind
has only partial knowledge of a thing either simple or complex, and
does not distinguish between the known and the unknown, and,
again, that it directs its attention promiscuously to all parts of an
object at once without making distinctions, it follows, first, that if
the idea be of something very simple, it must necessarily be clear
and distinct. For a very simple object cannot be known in part, it
must either be known altogether or not at all. Secondly, it follows
that if a complex object be divided by thought into a number of
simple component parts, and if each part be regarded separately,

all confusion will disappear. Thirdly, it follows that fiction cannot be
simple, but is made up of the blending of several confused ideas of
diverse objects or actions existent in nature, or rather is composed
of attention1 directed to all such ideas at once, and unaccompanied
by any mental assent.
Now a fiction that was simple would be clear and distinct, and
therefore true, also a fiction composed only of distinct ideas would
be clear and distinct, and therefore true. For instance, when we
know the nature of the circle and the square, it is impossible for us
to blend together these two figures, and to hypothesize a square
circle, any more than a square soul, or things of that kind. Let us
shortly come to our conclusion, and again repeat that we need have
no fear of confusing with true ideas that which is only a fiction. As
for the first sort of fiction of which we have already spoken, when a
thing is clearly conceived, we saw that if the existence of that thing
is in itself an eternal truth, fiction can have no part in it; but if the
existence of the thing conceived be not an eternal truth, we have
only to be careful that such existence be compared to the things
essence, and to consider the order of nature. As for the second sort
of fiction, which we stated to be the result of simultaneously
directing the attention, without the assent of the intellect, to
different confused ideas representing different things and actions
existing in nature, we have seen that an absolutely simple thing
cannot be feigned, but must be understood, and that a complex
thing is in the same case if we regard separately the simple parts
whereof it is composed; we shall not even be able to hypothesize
any untrue action concerning such objects, for we shall be obliged
to consider at the same time the causes and the manner of such
action.
These matters being thus understood, let us pass on to consider the
false idea, observing the objects with which it is concerned, and the
means of guarding ourselves from falling into false perceptions.
Neither of these tasks will present much difficulty, after our inquiry
concerning fictitious ideas. The false idea only differs from the
fictitious idea in the fact of implying a mental assentthat is, as we
have already remarked, while the representations are occurring,
there are no causes present to us, wherefrom, as in fiction, we can
conclude that such representations do not arise from external
objects: in fact, it is much the same as dreaming with our eyes
open, or while awake. Thus, a false idea is concerned with, or (to
speak more correctly) attributable to, the existence of a thing
whereof the essence is known, or the essence itself, in the same
way as a fictitious idea. If attributable to the existence of the thing,
it is corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea under similar
circumstances. If attributable to the essence, it is likewise
corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea. For if the nature of

the thing known implies necessary existence, we cannot possibly be
in error with regard to its existence; but if the nature of the thing
be not an eternal truth, like its essence, but contrariwise the
necessity or impossibility of its existence depends on external
causes, then we must follow the same course as we adopted in the
case of fiction, for it is corrected in the same manner. As for false
ideas concerned with essences, or even with actions, such
perceptions are necessarily always confused, being compounded of
different confused perceptions of things existing in nature, as, for
instance, when men are persuaded that deities are present in
woods, in statues, in brute beasts, and the like; that there are
bodies which, by their composition alone, give rise to intellect; that
corpses reason, walk about, and speak; that God is deceived, and
so on. But ideas which are clear and distinct can never be false: for
ideas of things clearly and distinctly conceived are either very
simple themselves, or are compounded from very simple
ideasthat is, are deduced therefrom. The impossibility of a very
simple idea being false is evident to everyone who understands the
nature of truth or understanding and of falsehood.
As regards that which constitutes the reality of truth, it is certain
that a true idea is distinguished from a false one, not so much by its
extrinsic object as by its intrinsic nature. If an architect conceives a
building properly constructed, though such a building may never
have existed, and may never exist, nevertheless the idea is true;
and the idea remains the same, whether it be put into execution or
not. On the other hand, if anyone asserts, for instance, that Peter
exists, without knowing whether Peter really exists or not, the
assertion, as far as its asserter is concerned, is false, or not true,
even though Peter actually does exist. The assertion that Peter
exists is true only with regard to him who knows for certain that
Peter does exist. Whence it follows that there is in ideas something
real, whereby the true are distinguished from the false. This reality
must be inquired into, if we are to find the best standard of truth
(we have said that we ought to determine our thoughts by the given
standard of a true idea, and that method is reflective knowledge),
and to know the properties of our understanding. Neither must we
say that the difference between true and false arises from the fact,
that true knowledge consists in knowing things through their
primary causes, wherein it is totally different from false knowledge,
as I have just explained it: for thought is said to be true, if it
involves subjectively the essence of any principle which has no
cause, and is known through itself and in itself. Wherefore the
reality (forma) of true thought must exist in the thought itself,
without reference to other thoughts; it does not acknowledge the
object as its cause, but must depend on the actual power and
nature of the understanding. For, if we suppose that the
understanding has perceived some new entity which has never

existed, as some conceive the understanding of God before He
created things (a perception which certainly could not arise from
any object), and has legitimately deduced other thoughts from the
said perception, all such thoughts would be true, without being
determined by any external object; they would depend solely on the
power and nature of the understanding. Thus, that which
constitutes the reality of a true thought must be sought in the
thought itself, and deduced from the nature of the understanding.
In order to pursue our investigation, let us confront ourselves with
some true idea, whose object we know for certain to be dependent
on our power of thinking, and to have nothing corresponding to it
in nature. With an idea of this kind before us, we shall, as appears
from what has just been said, be more easily able to carry on the
research we have in view. For instance, in order to form the
conception of a sphere, I invent a cause at my pleasurenamely, a
semicircle revolving round its centre, and thus producing a sphere.
This is indisputably a true idea; and, although we know that no
sphere in nature has ever actually been so formed, the perception
remains true, and is the easiest manner of conceiving a sphere. We
must observe that this perception asserts the rotation of a
semicirclewhich assertion would be false, if it were not
associated with the conception of a sphere, or of a cause
determining a motion of the kind, or absolutely, if the assertion
were isolated. The mind would then only tend to the affirmation of
the sole motion of a semicircle, which is not contained in the
conception of a semicircle, and does not arise from the conception
of any cause capable of producing such motion.
Thus falsity consists only in this, that something is affirmed of a
thing, which is not contained in the conception we have formed of
that thing, as motion or rest of a semicircle. Whence it follows that
simple ideas cannot be other than truee.g. the simple idea of a
semicircle, of motion, of rest, of quantity, &c.
Whatsoever affirmation such ideas contain is equal to the concept
formed, and does not extend further. Wherefore we may form as
many simple ideas as we please, without any fear of error. It only
remains for us to inquire by what power our mind can form true
ideas, and how far such power extends. It is certain that such
power cannot extend itself infinitely. For when we affirm somewhat
of a thing, which is not contained in the concept we have formed of
that thing, such an affirmation shows a defect of our perception, or
that we have formed fragmentary or mutilated ideas. Thus we have
seen that the motion of a semicircle is false when it is isolated in
the mind, but true when it is associated with the concept of a
sphere, or of some cause determining such a motion. But if it be the
nature of a thinking being, as seems, prim facie, to be the case, to
form true or adequate thoughts, it is plain that inadequate ideas

arise in us only because we are parts of a thinking being, whose
thoughtssome in their entirety, others in fragments
onlyconstitute our mind.
But there is another point to be considered, which was not worth
raising in the case of fiction, but which gives rise to complete
deceptionnamely, that certain things presented to the
imagination also exist in the understandingin other words, are
conceived clearly and distinctly. Hence, so long as we do not
separate that which is distinct from that which is confused,
certainty, or the true idea, becomes mixed with indistinct ideas. For
instance, certain Stoics heard, perhaps, the term soul, and also
that the soul is immortal, yet imagined it only confusedly; they
imagined, also, and understood that very subtle bodies penetrate
all others, and are penetrated by none. By combining these ideas,
and being at the same time certain of the truth of the axiom, they
forthwith became convinced that the mind consists of very subtle
bodies; that these very subtle bodies cannot be divided, &c. But we
are freed from mistakes of this kind, so long as we endeavour to
examine all our perceptions by the standard of the given true idea.
We must take care, as has been said, to separate such perceptions
from all those which arise from hearsay or unclassified experience.
Moreover, such mistakes arise from things being conceived too
much in the abstract; for it is sufficiently self-evident that what I
conceive as in its true object I cannot apply to anything else. Lastly,
they arise from a want of understanding of the primary elements of
nature as a whole; whence we proceed without due order, and
confound nature with abstract rules, which, although they be true
enough in their sphere, yet, when misapplied, confound
themselves, and pervert the order of nature. However, if we
proceed with as little abstraction as possible, and begin from
primary elementsthat is, from the source and origin of nature, as
far back as we can reach,we need not fear any deceptions of this
kind. As far as the knowledge of the origin of nature is concerned,
there is no danger of our confounding it with abstractions. For
when a thing is conceived in the abstract, as are all universal
notions, the said universal notions are always more extensive in the
mind than the number of individuals forming their contents really
existing in nature.
Again, there are many things in nature, the difference between
which is so slight as to be hardly perceptible to the understanding;
so that it may readily happen that such things are confounded
together, if they be conceived abstractedly. But since the first
principle of nature cannot (as we shall see hereafter) be conceived
abstractedly or universally, and cannot extend further in the
understanding than it does in reality, and has no likeness to

mutable things, no confusion need be feared in respect to the idea
of it, provided (as before shown) that we possess a standard of
truth. This is, in fact, a being single1 and infinite; in other words, it
is the sum total of being,2 beyond which there is no being found.
Thus far we have treated of the false idea. We have now to
investigate the doubtful ideathat is, to inquire what can cause us
to doubt, and how doubt may be removed. I speak of real doubt
existing in the mind, not of such doubt as we see exemplified when
a man says that he doubts, though his mind does not really
hesitate. The cure of the latter does not fall within the province of
method, it belongs rather to inquiries concerning obstinacy and its
cure. Real doubt is never produced in the mind by the thing
doubted of. In other words, if there were only one idea in the mind,
whether that idea were true or false, there would be no doubt or
certainty present, only a certain sensation. For an idea is in itself
nothing else than a certain sensation; but doubt will arise through
another idea, not clear and distinct enough for us to be able to
draw any certain conclusion with regard to the matter under
consideration; that is, the idea which causes us to doubt is not clear
and distinct. To take an example. Supposing that a man has never
reflected, taught by experience, or by any other means, that our
senses sometimes deceive us, he will never doubt whether the sun
be greater or less than it appears. Thus rustics are generally
astonished when they hear that the sun is much larger than the
earth. But from reflection on the deceitfulness of the senses1 doubt
arises, and if, after doubting, we acquire a true knowledge of the
senses, and how things at a distance are represented through their
instrumentality, doubt is again removed. Hence we cannot cast
doubt on true ideas by the supposition that there is a deceitful
Deity, who leads us astray even in what is most certain. We can only
hold such an hypothesis so long as we have no clear and distinct
ideain other words, until we reflect on the knowledge which we
have of the first principle of all things, and find that which teaches
us that God is not a deceiver, and until we know this with the same
certainty as we know from reflecting on the nature of a triangle
that its three angles are equal to two right angles. But if we have a
knowledge of God equal to that which we have of a triangle, all
doubt is removed. In the same way as we can arrive at the said
knowledge of a triangle, though not absolutely sure that there is
not not some arch-deceiver leading us astray, so can we come to a
like knowledge of God under the like condition, and when we have
attained to it, it is sufficient, as I said before, to remove every
doubt which we can possess concerning clear and distinct ideas.
Thus, if a man proceeded with our investigations in due order,
inquiring first into those things which should first be inquired into,
never passing over a link in the chain of association, and with
knowledge how to define his questions before seeking to answer

them, he will never have any ideas save such as are very certain,
or, in other words, clear and distinct; for doubt is only a suspension
of the spirit concerning some affirmation or negation which it
would pronounce upon unhesitatingly if it were not in ignorance of
something, without which the knowledge of the matter in hand
must needs be imperfect. We may, therefore, conclude that doubt
always proceeds from want of due order in investigation.
These are the points I promised to discuss in this first part of my
treatise on method. However, in order not to omit anything which
can conduce to the knowledge of the understanding and its
faculties, I will add a few words on the subject of memory and
forgetfulness.
The point most worthy of attention is, that memory is strengthened
both with and without the aid of the understanding. For the more
intelligible a thing is, the more easily is it remembered, and the
less intelligible it is, the more easily do we forget it. For instance, a
number of unconnected words is much more difficult to remember
than the same number in the form of a narration. The memory is
also strengthened without the aid of the understanding by means of
the power wherewith the imagination or the sense called common
is affected by some particular physical object. I say particular, for
the imagination is only affected by particular objects. If we read,
for instance, a single romantic comedy, we shall remember it very
well, so long as we do not read many others of the same kind, for it
will reign alone in the memory. If, however, we read several others
of the same kind, we shall think of them altogether, and easily
confuse one with another. I say, also, physical. For the imagination
is only affected by physical objects. As, then, the memory is
strengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding,
we may conclude that it is different from the understanding, and
that in the latter considered in itself there is neither memory nor
forgetfulness. What, then, is memory? It is nothing else than the
actual sensation of impressions on the brain, accompanied with the
thought of a definite duration of the sensation.1 This is also shown
by reminiscence. For then we think of the sensation, but without
the notion of continuous duration; thus the idea of that sensation is
not the actual duration of the sensation or actual memory. Whether
ideas are or are not subject to corruption will be seen in my
philosophy. If this seems too absurd to anyone, it will be sufficient
for our purpose, if he reflect on the fact that a thing is more easily
remembered in proportion to its singularity, as appears from the
example of the comedy just cited. Further, a thing is remembered
more easily in proportion to its intelligibility; therefore we cannot
help remembering that which is extremely singular and sufficiently
intelligible.
Thus, then, we have distinguished between a true idea and other

perceptions, and shown that ideas fictitious, false, and the rest,
originate in the imaginationthat is, in certain sensations
fortuitous (so to speak) and disconnected, arising not from the
power of the mind, but from external causes, according as the body,
sleeping or waking, receives various motions.
But one may take any view one likes of the imagination so long as
one acknowledges that it is different from the understanding, and
that the soul is passive with regard to it. The view taken is
immaterial, if we know that the imagination is something indefinite,
with regard to which the soul is passive, and that we can by some
means or other free ourselves therefrom with the help of the
understanding. Let no one then be astonished that before proving
the existence of body, and other necessary things, I speak of
imagination of body, and of its composition. The view taken is, I
repeat, immaterial, so long as we know that imagination is
something indefinite, &c. As regards a true idea, we have shown
that it is simple or compounded of simple ideas; that it shows how
and why something is or has been made; and that its subjective
effects in the soul correspond to the actual reality of its object. This
conclusion is identical with the saying of the ancients, that true
science proceeds from cause to effect; though the ancients, so far
as I know, never formed the conception put forward here that the
soul acts according to fixed laws, and is as it were an immaterial
automaton. Hence, as far as is possible at the outset, we have
acquired a knowledge of our understanding, and such a standard of
a true idea that we need no longer fear confounding truth with
falsehood and fiction. Neither shall we wonder why we understand
some things which in nowise fall within the scope of the
imagination, while other things are in the imagination but wholly
opposed to the understanding, or others, again, which agree
therewith. We now know that the operations, whereby the effects of
imagination are produced, take place under other laws quite
different from the laws of the understanding, and that the mind is
entirely passive with regard to them. Whence we may also see how
easily men may fall into grave errors through not distinguishing
accurately between the imagination and the understanding; such as
believing that extension must be localized, that it must be finite,
that its parts are really distinct one from the other, that it is the
primary and single foundation of all things, that it occupies more
space at one time than at another, and other similar doctrines, all
entirely opposed to truth, as we shall duly show.
Again, since words are a part of the imaginationthat is, since we
form many conceptions in accordance with confused arrangements
of words in the memory, dependent on particular bodily
conditions,there is no doubt that words may, equally with the
imagination, be the cause of many and great errors, unless we keep

strictly on our guard. Moreover, words are formed according to
popular fancy and intelligence, and are, therefore, signs of things
as existing in the imagination, not as existing in the understanding.
This is evident from the fact that to all such things as exist only in
the understanding, not in the imagination, negative names are
often given, such as incorporeal, infinite, &c. So, also, many
conceptions really affirmative are expressed negatively, and vice
vers, such as uncreate, independent, infinite, immortal, &c.,
inasmuch as their contraries are much more easily imagined, and,
therefore, occurred first to men, and usurped positive names. Many
things we affirm and deny, because the nature of words allows us to
do so, though the nature of things does not. While we remain
unaware of this fact, we may easily mistake falsehood for truth.
Let us also beware of another great cause of confusion, which
prevents the understanding from reflecting on itself. Sometimes,
while making no distinction between the imagination and the
intellect, we think that what we more readily imagine is clearer to
us; and also we think that what we imagine we understand. Thus,
we put first that which should be last: the true order of progression
is reversed, and no legitimate conclusion is drawn.
Now, in order at length to pass on to the second part of this
method,1 I shall first set forth the object aimed at, and next the
means for its attainment. The object aimed at is the acquisition of
clear and distinct ideas, such as are produced by the pure intellect,
and not by chance physical motions. In order that all ideas may be
reduced to unity, we shall endeavour so to associate and arrange
them that our mind may, as far as possible, reflect subjectively the
reality of nature, both as a whole and as parts.
As for the first point, it is necessary (as we have said) for our
purpose that everything should be conceived, either solely through
its essence, or through its proximate cause. If the thing be selfexistent, or, as is commonly said, the cause of itself, it must be
understood through its essence only; if it be not self-existent, but
requires a cause for its existence, it must be understood through its
proximate cause. For, in reality, the knowledge of an effect is
nothing else than the acquisition of more perfect knowledge of its
cause.2 Therefore, we may never, while we are concerned with
inquiries into actual things, draw any conclusion from abstractions;
we shall be extremely careful not to confound that which is only in
the understanding with that which is in the thing itself. The best
basis for drawing a conclusion will be either some particular
affirmative essence, or a true and legitimate definition. For the
understanding cannot descend from universal axioms by
themselves to particular things, since axioms are of infinite extent,
and do not determine the understanding to contemplate one

particular thing more than another. Thus the true method of
discovery is to form thoughts from some given definition. This
process will be the more fruitful and easy in proportion as the thing
given be better defined. Wherefore, the cardinal point of all this
second part of method consists in the knowledge of the conditions
of good definition, and the means of finding them. I will first treat
of the conditions of definition.
A definition, if it is to be called perfect, must explain the inmost
essence of a thing, and must take care not to substitute for this any
of its properties. In order to illustrate my meaning, without taking
an example which would seem to show a desire to expose other
peoples errors, I will choose the case of something abstract, the
definition of which is of little moment. Such is a circle. If a circle be
defined as a figure, such that all straight lines drawn from the
centre to the circumference are equal, every one can see that such
a definition does not in the least explain the essence of a circle, but
solely one of its properties. Though, as I have said, this is of no
importance in the case of figures and other abstractions, it is of
great importance in the case of physical beings and realities: for
the properties of things are not understood so long as their
essences are unknown. If the latter be passed over, there is
necessarily a perversion of the succession of ideas which should
reflect the succession of nature, and we go far astray from our
object.
In order to be free from this fault, the following rules should be
observed in definition:
I. If the thing in question be created, the definition must (as we
have said) comprehend the proximate cause. For instance, a circle
should, according to this rule, be defined as follows: the figure
described by any line whereof one end is fixed and the other free.
This definition clearly comprehends the proximate cause.
II. A conception or definition of a thing should be such that all the
properties of that thing, in so far as it is considered by itself, and
not in conjunction with other things, can be deduced from it, as
may be seen in the definition given of a circle: for from that it
clearly follows that all straight lines drawn from the centre to the
circumference are equal. That this is a necessary characteristic of a
definition is so clear to anyone, who reflects on the matter, that
there is no need to spend time in proving it, or in showing that,
owing to this second condition, every definition should be
affirmative. I speak of intellectual affirmation, giving little thought
to verbal affirmations which, owing to the poverty of language,
must sometimes, perhaps, be expressed negatively, though the idea

contained is affirmative.
The rules for the definition of an uncreated thing are as follows:
I. The exclusion of all idea of causethat is, the thing must not
need explanation by anything outside itself.
II. When the definition of the thing has been given, there must be
no room for doubt as to whether the thing exists or not.
III. It must contain, as far as the mind is concerned, no
substantives which could be put into an adjectival form; in other
words, the object defined must not be explained through
abstractions.
IV. Lastly, though this is not absolutely necessary, it should be
possible to deduce from the definition all the properties of the thing
defined.
All these rules become obvious to anyone giving strict attention to
the matter.
I have also stated that the best basis for drawing a conclusion is a
particular affirmative essence. The more specialized the idea is, the
more is it distinct, and therefore clear. Wherefore a knowledge of
particular things should be sought for as diligently as possible.
As regards the order of our perceptions, and the manner in which
they should be arranged and united, it is necessary that, as soon as
is possible and rational, we should inquire whether there be any
being (and, if so, what being), that is the cause of all things, so that
its essence, represented in thought, may be the cause of all our
ideas, and then our mind will to the utmost possible extent reflect
nature. For it will possess, subjectively, natures essence, order, and
union. Thus we can see that it is before all things necessary for us
to deduce all our ideas from physical thingsthat is, from real
entities, proceeding, as far as may be, according to the series of
causes, from one real entity to another real entity, never passing to
universals and abstractions, either for the purpose of deducing
some real entity from them, or deducing them from some real
entity. Either of these processes interrupts the true progress of the
understanding. But it must be observed that, by the series of
causes and real entities, I do not here mean the series of particular
and mutable things, but only the series of fixed and eternal things.
It would be impossible for human infirmity to follow up the series of
particular mutable things, both on account of their multitude,
surpassing all calculation, and on account of the infinitely diverse
circumstances surrounding one and the same thing, any one of

which may be the cause for its existence or non-existence. Indeed,
their existence has no connection with their essence, or (as we
have said already) is not an eternal truth. Neither is there any need
that we should understand their series, for the essences of
particular mutable things are not to be gathered from their series
or order of existence, which would furnish us with nothing beyond
their extrinsic denominations, their relations, or, at most, their
circumstances, all of which are very different from their inmost
essence. This inmost essence must be sought solely from fixed and
eternal things, and from the laws, inscribed (so to speak) in those
things as in their true codes, according to which all particular
things take place and are arranged; nay, these mutable particular
things depend so intimately and essentially (so to phrase it) upon
the fixed things, that they cannot either be or be conceived without
them.
Whence these fixed and eternal things, though they are themselves
particular, will nevertheless, owing to their presence and power
everywhere, be to us as universals, or genera of definitions of
particular mutable things, and as the proximate causes of all
things.
But, though this be so, there seems to be no small difficulty in
arriving at the knowledge of these particular things, for to conceive
them all at once would far surpass the powers of the human
understanding. The arrangement whereby one thing is understood
before another, as we have stated, should not be sought from their
series of existence, nor from eternal things. For the latter are all by
nature simultaneous. Other aids are therefore needed besides
those employed for understanding eternal things and their laws;
however, this is not the place to recount such aids, nor is there any
need to do so, until we have acquired a sufficient knowledge of
eternal things and their infallible laws, and until the nature of our
senses has become plain to us.
Before betaking ourselves to seek knowledge of particular things, it
will be seasonable to speak of such aids, as all tend to teach us the
mode of employing our senses, and to make certain experiments
under fixed rules and arrangement which may suffice to determine
the object of our inquiry, so that we may therefrom infer what laws
of eternal things it has been produced under, and may gain an
insight into its inmost nature, as I will duly show. Here, to return to
my purpose, I will only endeavour to set forth what seems
necessary for enabling us to attain to knowledge of eternal things,
and to define them under the conditions laid down above.
With this end, we must bear in mind what has already been stated,
namely, that when the mind devotes itself to any thought, so as to
examine it, and to deduce therefrom in due order all the legitimate
conclusions possible, any falsehood which may lurk in the thought
will be detected; but if the thought be true, the mind will readily
proceed without interruption to deduce truths from it. This, I say, is
necessary for our purpose, for our thoughts may be brought to a
close by the absence of a foundation. If, therefore, we wish to
investigate the first thing of all, it will be necessary to supply some
foundation which may direct our thoughts thither. Further, since
method is reflective knowledge, the foundation which must direct
our thoughts can be nothing else than the knowledge of that which
constitutes the reality of truth, and the knowledge of the
understanding, its properties, and powers. When this has been
acquired we shall possess a foundation wherefrom we can deduce
our thoughts, and a path whereby the intellect, according to its
capacity, may attain the knowledge of eternal things, allowance
being made for the extent of the intellectual powers.
If, as I stated in the first part, it belongs to the nature of thought to
form true ideas, we must here inquire what is meant by the
faculties and power of the understanding. The chief part of our
method is to understand as well as possible the powers of the
intellect, and its nature; we are, therefore, compelled (by the
considerations advanced in the second part of the method)
necessarily to draw these conclusions from the definition itself of
thought and understanding. But, so far, we have not got any rules
for finding definitions, and, as we cannot set forth such rules
without a previous knowledge of nature, that is without a definition
of the understanding and its power, it follows either that the
definition of the understanding must be clear in itself, or that we
can understand nothing. Nevertheless this definition is not
absolutely clear in itself; however, since its properties, like all
things that we possess through the understanding, cannot be
known clearly and distinctly, unless its nature be known previously,
the definition of the understanding makes itself manifest, if we pay
attention to its properties, which we know clearly and distinctly.
Let us, then, enumerate here the properties of the understanding,
let us examine them, and begin by discussing the instruments for
research which we find innate in us.
The properties of the understanding which I have chiefly remarked,
and which I clearly understand, are the following:
I. It involves certaintyin other words, it knows that a thing exists
in reality as it is reflected subjectively.
II. That it perceives certain things, or forms some ideas absolutely,

some ideas from others. Thus it forms the idea of quantity
absolutely, without reference to any other thoughts; but ideas of
motion it only forms after taking into consideration the idea of
quantity.
III. Those ideas which the understanding forms absolutely express
infinity; determinate ideas are derived from other ideas. Thus in the
idea of quantity, perceived by means of a cause, the quantity is
determined, as when a body is perceived to be formed by the
motion of a plane, a plane by the motion of a line, or, again, a line
by the motion of a point. All these are perceptions which do not
serve towards understanding quantity, but only towards
determining it. This is proved by the fact that we conceive them as
formed as it were by motion, yet this motion is not perceived unless
the quantity be perceived also; we can even prolong the motion so
as to form an infinite line, which we certainly could not do unless
we had an idea of infinite quantity.
IV. The understanding forms positive ideas before forming negative
ideas.
V. It perceives things not so much under the condition of duration
as under a certain form of eternity, and in an infinite number; or
rather in perceiving things it does not consider either their number
or duration, whereas, in imagining them, it perceives them in a
determinate number, duration, and quantity.
VI. The ideas which we form as clear and distinct, seem so to follow
from the sole necessity of our nature, that they appear to depend
absolutely on our sole power; with confused ideas the contrary is
the case. They are often formed against our will.
VII. The mind can determine in many ways the ideas of things,
which the understanding forms from other ideas: thus, for instance,
in order to define the plane of an ellipse, it supposes a point
adhering to a cord to be moved round two centres, or, again, it
conceives an infinity of points, always in the same fixed relation to
a given straight line, or a cone cut in an oblique plane, so that the
angle of inclination is greater than the angle of the vertex of the
cone, or in an infinity of other ways.
VIII. The more ideas express perfection of any object, the more
perfect are they themselves; for we do not admire the architect
who has planned a chapel so much as the architect who has
planned a splendid temple.
I do not stop to consider the rest of what is referred to thought,

such as love, joy, &c. They are nothing to our present purpose, and
cannot even be conceived unless the understanding be perceived
previously. When perception is removed, all these go with it.
False and fictitious ideas have nothing positive about them (as we
have abundantly shown), which causes them to be called false or
fictitious; they are only considered as such through the
defectiveness of knowledge. Therefore, false and fictitious ideas as
such can teach us nothing concerning the essence of thought; this
must be sought from the positive properties just enumerated; in
other words, we must lay down some common basis from which
these properties necessarily follow, so that when this is given, the
properties are necessarily given also, and when it is removed, they
too vanish with it.
******
The rest of the treatise is wanting.

Note, page 4.
The pursuit of honours and riches is likewise very absorbing,

especially of such objects be sought simply for their own sake. This
might be explained more at large and more clearly: I mean, by
distinguishing riches according as they are pursued for their own
sake, or in furtherance of fame, or sensual pleasure, or the
advancement of science and art. But this subject is reserved to its
own place, for it is not here proper to investigate the matter more
accurately.
THE ETHICS.
[ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata.]
PART I.
CONCERNING GOD.
Definitions.
I. BY that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence
involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable
as existent.
II. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by
another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called
finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a
thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by
thought, nor a thought by body.
III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived
through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be
formed independently of any other conception.
IV. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as
constituting the essence of substance.
V. By mode, I mean the modifications1 of substance, or that which
exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.
VI. By God, I mean a being absolutely infinitethat is, a substance
consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal
and infinite essentiality.
Explanation.I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind: for,
of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be
denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence
whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation.
VII. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of
its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself
alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather
constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to
a fixed and definite method of existence or action.
VIII. By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived
necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is
eternal.
Explanation.Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal

truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be
explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance
may be conceived without a beginning or end.
Axioms.
I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something
else.
II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be
conceived through itself.
III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows; and,
on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible
that an effect can follow.
IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the
knowledge of a cause.
V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the
one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve
the conception of the other.
VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.
VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does
not involve existence.
Propositions.
Prop. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.
Proof.This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.

Prop. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have
nothing in common.
Proof.Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in itself, and
be conceived through itself; in other words, the conception of one
does not imply the conception of the other.
Prop. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the
cause of the other.
Proof.If they have nothing in common, it follows that one cannot

be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and, therefore, one
cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.). Q.E.D.
Prop. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the
other, either by the difference of the attributes of the substances,
or by the difference of their modifications.
Proof.Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in

something else (Ax. i.),that is (by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing is
granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and its
modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given besides the
understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one
from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see Ax.
iv.), their attributes and modifications. Q.E.D.
Prop. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances
having the same nature or attribute.
Proof.If several distinct substances be granted, they must be

distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of their
attributes, or by the difference of their modifications (Prop. iv.). If
only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that
there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the
difference of their modificationsas substance is naturally prior to
its modifications (Prop. i.),it follows that setting the modifications
aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly, (Deff. iii. and
vi.), there cannot be conceived one substance different from
another,that is (by Prop. iv.), there cannot be granted several
substances, but one substance only. Q.E.D.
Prop. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.
Proof.It is impossible that there should be in the universe two

substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have anything
common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop. iii.), one
cannot be the cause of another, neither can one be produced by the
other. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced
by anything external to itself. For in the universe nothing is
granted, save substances and their modifications (as appears from
Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.). Now (by the last Prop.) substance cannot
be produced by another substance, therefore it cannot be produced
by anything external to itself. Q.E.D. This is shown still more
readily by the absurdity of the contradictory. For, if substance be
produced by an external cause, the knowledge of it would depend
on the knowledge of its cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would
itself not be substance.
Prop. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substance.
Proof.Substance cannot be produced by anything external

(Corollary, Prop. vi.), it must, therefore, be its own causethat is,
its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence belongs to
its nature.
Prop. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.
Proof.There can only be one substance with an identical attribute,

and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.); its nature,
therefore, involves existence, either as finite or infinite. It does not
exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it would then be limited by something
else of the same kind, which would also necessarily exist (Prop.
vii.); and there would be two substances with an identical attribute,
which is absurd (Prop. v.). It therefore exists as infinite. Q.E.D.
Note I.As finite existence involves a partial negation, and infinite
existence is the absolute affirmation of the given nature, it follows
(solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance is necessarily infinite.
Note II.No doubt it will be difficult for those who think about
things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them by
their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Prop.
vii.: for such persons make no distinction between the
modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and
are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence
they attribute to substances the beginning which they observe in
natural objects. Those who are ignorant of true causes, make
complete confusionthink that trees might talk just as well as
menthat men might be formed from stones as well as from seed;
and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So,
also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human, readily
attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long as they do
not know how passions originate in the mind. But, if people would
consider the nature of substance, they would have no doubt about
the truth of Prop. vii. In fact, this proposition would be a universal
axiom, and accounted a truism. For, by substance, would be
understood that which is in itself, and is conceived through
itselfthat is, something of which the conception requires not the
conception of anything else; whereas modifications exist in
something external to themselves, and a conception of them is
formed by means of a conception of the thing in which they exist.
Therefore, we may have true ideas of non-existent modifications;
for, although they may have no actual existence apart from the
conceiving intellect, yet their essence is so involved in something
external to themselves that they may through it be conceived.
Whereas the only truth substances can have, external to the
intellect, must consist in their existence, because they are
conceived through themselves. Therefore, for a person to say that
he has a clear and distinctthat is, a trueidea of a substance, but

that he is not sure whether such substance exists, would be the
same as if he said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether
or no it was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if
anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same as
saying that a false idea was truein short, the height of absurdity.
It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the existence of
substance as its essence is an eternal truth. And we can hence
conclude by another process of reasoningthat there is but one
such substance. I think that this may profitably be done at once;
and, in order to proceed regularly with the demonstration, we must
premise:
1. The true definition of a thing neither involves nor expresses
anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. From this it
follows that
2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number of
individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature of
the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangle
expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it does
not imply any fixed number of triangles.
3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a cause
why it should exist.
4. This cause of existence must either be contained in the nature
and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated apart
from such definition.
It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual things exist
in nature, there must be some cause for the existence of exactly
that number, neither more nor less. For example, if twenty men
exist in the universe (for simplicitys sake, I will suppose them
existing simultaneously, and to have had no predecessors), and we
want to account for the existence of these twenty men, it will not be
enough to show the cause of human existence in general; we must
also show why there are exactly twenty men, neither more nor less:
for a cause must be assigned for the existence of each individual.
Now this cause cannot be contained in the actual nature of man,
for the true definition of man does not involve any consideration of
the number twenty. Consequently, the cause for the existence of
these twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must
necessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we may
lay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist of
several individuals must have an external cause. And, as it has been
shown already that existence appertains to the nature of substance,
existence must necessarily be included in its definition; and from
its definition alone existence must be deducible. But from its

definition (as we have shown, Notes ii., iii.), we cannot infer the
existence of several substances; therefore it follows that there is
only one substance of the same nature. Q.E.D.
Prop. IX. The more reality or being a thing has the greater the
number of its attributes (Def. iv.).
Prop. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be
conceived through itself.
Proof.An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of

substance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.). and, therefore,
must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.). Q.E.D.
Note.It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in fact,
conceived as distinctthat is, one without the help of the
otheryet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two
entities, or two different substances. For it is the nature of
substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself,
inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed
simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other; but
each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is, then, far
from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one substance:
for nothing in nature is more clear than that each and every entity
must be conceived under some attribute, and that its reality or
being is in proportion to the number of its attributes expressing
necessity or eternity and infinity. Consequently it is abundantly
clear, that an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined
as consisting in infinite attributes, each of which expresses a
certain eternal and infinite essence.
If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to distinguish
different substances, let him read the following propositions, which
show that there is but one substance in the universe, and that it is
absolutely infinite, wherefore such a sign would be sought for in
vain.
Prop. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of
which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily
exists.
Proof.If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God does not

exist: then his essence does not involve existence. But this (by
Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists.
Another proof.Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason must
be assigned, either for its existence, or for its non-existence e.g. if
a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be granted for its

existence; if, on the contrary, it does not exist, a cause must also be
granted, which prevents it from existing, or annuls its existence.
This reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the
thing in question, or be external to it. For instance, the reason for
the non-existence of a square circle is indicated in its nature,
namely, because it would involve a contradiction. On the other
hand, the existence of substance follows also solely from its nature,
inasmuch as its nature involves existence. (See Prop. vii.)
But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle does not
follow from the nature of those figures, but from the order of
universal nature in extension. From the latter it must follow, either
that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is impossible that it
should exist. So much is self-evident. It follows therefrom that a
thing necessarily exists, if no cause or reason be granted which
prevents its existence.
If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the
existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must
certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a reason
or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the very
nature of God, or be external to himthat is, drawn from another
substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, God,
by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But substance of
another nature could have nothing in common with God (by Prop.
ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or to destroy his
existence.
As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine existence
cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine nature, such
cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn from Gods
own nature, which would involve a contradiction. To make such an
affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect,
is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of God, nor externally to
his nature, can a cause or reason be assigned which would annul
his existence. Therefore, God necessarily exists. Q.E.D.
Another proof.The potentiality of non-existence is a negation of

power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence is a power, as
is obvious. If, then, that which necessarily exists is nothing but
finite beings, such finite beings are more powerful than a being
absolutely infinite, which is obviously absurd; therefore, either
nothing exists, or else a being absolutely infinite necessarily exists
also. Now we exist either in ourselves, or in something else which
necessarily exists (see Axiom i. and Prop. vii.). Therefore a being
absolutely infinitein other words, God (Def. vi.)necessarily
exists. Q.E.D.
Note.In this last proof, I have purposely shown Gods existence

posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily followed, not
because, from the same premises, Gods existence does not follow
priori. For, as the potentiality of existence is a power, it follows
that, in proportion as reality increases in the nature of a thing, so
also will it increase its strength for existence. Therefore a being
absolutely infinite, such as God, has from himself an absolutely
infinite power of existence, and hence he does absolutely exist.
Perhaps there will be many who will be unable to see the force of
this proof, inasmuch as they are accustomed only to consider those
things which flow from external causes. Of such things, they see
that those which quickly come to passthat is, quickly come into
existencequickly also disappear; whereas they regard as more
difficult of accomplishmentthat is, not so easily brought into
existencethose things which they conceive as more complicated.
However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here show
the measure of truth in the proverb, What comes quickly, goes
quickly, nor discuss whether, from the point of view of universal
nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: I need only
remark, that I am not here speaking of things, which come to pass
through causes external to themselves, but only of substances
which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any external cause.
Things which are produced by external causes, whether they
consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever perfection or reality
they possess solely to the efficacy of their external cause, and
therefore their existence arises solely from the perfection of their
external cause, not from their own. Contrariwise, whatsoever
perfection is possessed by substance is due to no external cause:
wherefore the existence of substance must arise solely from its own
nature, which is nothing else but its essence. Thus, the perfection
of a thing does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts
it. Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore we
cannot be more certain of the existence of anything, than of the
existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfectthat is, of God.
For inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and involves
absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his existence is
done away, and the utmost certainty on the question is given. This,
I think, will be evident to every moderately attentive reader.
Prop. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it
would follow that substance can be divided.
Proof.The parts into which substance as thus conceived would be

divided, either will retain the nature of substance, or they will not.
If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will necessarily be
infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self-caused, and (by Prop. v.) will
perforce consist of a different attribute, so that, in that case,
several substances could be formed out of one substance, which (by

Prop. vi.) is absurd. Moreover, the parts (by Prop. ii.) would have
nothing in common with their whole, and the whole (by Def. iv. and
Prop. x.) could both exist and be conceived without its parts, which
everyone will admit to be absurd. If we adopt the second
alternativenamely, that the parts will not retain the nature of
substancethen, if the whole substance were divided into equal
parts, it would lose the nature of substance, and would cease to
exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is absurd.
Prop. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.
Proof.If it could be divided, the parts into which it was divided

would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite substance, or
they would not. If the former, we should have several substances of
the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd. If the latter, then (by
Prop. vii.) substance absolutely infinite could cease to exist, which
(by Prop. xi.) is also absurd.
Corollary.It follows, that no substance, and consequently no
extended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.
Note.The indivisibility of substance may be more easily
understood as follows. The nature of substance can only be
conceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing else can
be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii.) involves
a manifest contradiction.
Prop. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.
Proof.As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute

that expresses the essence of substance can be denied (by Def. vi.),
and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any substance besides
God were granted, it would have to be explained by some attribute
of God, and thus two substances with the same attribute would
exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore, besides God no
substance can be granted, or, consequently, be conceived. If it
could be conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as
existent; but this (by the first part of this proof) is absurd.
Therefore, besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.
Q.E.D.
Corollary I.Clearly, therefore: 1. God is one, that is (by Def. vi.)
only one substance can be granted in the universe, and that
substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already indicated (in
the note to Prop. x.).
Corollary II.It follows: 2. That extension and thought are either

attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents (affectiones) of the
attributes of God.
Prop. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be,
or be conceived.
Proof.Besides God, no substance is granted or can be conceived

(by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which is in itself and is
conceived through itself. But modes (by Def. v.) can neither be, nor
be conceived without substance; wherefore they can only be in the
divine nature, and can only through it be conceived. But substances
and modes form the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore,
without God nothing can be, or be conceived. Q.E.D.
Note.Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and
mind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have
strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been
said. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywise reflected on
the divine nature deny that God has a body. Of this they find
excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body a definite
quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a certain shape,
and it is the height of absurdity to predicate such a thing of God, a
being absolutely infinite. But meanwhile by the other reasons with
which they try to prove their point, they show that they think
corporeal or extended substance wholly apart from the divine
nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefrom the divine
nature can have been created, they are wholly ignoratn; thus they
clearly show, that they do not know the meaning of their own
words. I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at any rate in my
own judgment (Coroll. Prop. vi., and Note 2, Prop. viii.), that no
substance can be produced or created by anything other than itself.
Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.), that besides God no substance can
be granted or conceived. Hence we drew the conclusion that
extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God.
However, in order to explain more fully, I will refute the arguments
of my adversaries, which all start from the following points:
Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists, as they
think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be infinite, or,
consequently, that it can appertain to God. This they illustrate with
many examples, of which I will take one or two. If extended
substance, they say, is infinite, let it be conceived to be divided into
two parts; each part will then be either finite or infinite. If the
former, then infinite substance is composed of two finite parts,
which is absurd. If the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large
as another infinite, which is also absurd.
Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths, it will

consist of an infinite number of such parts; it would equally consist
of an infinite number of parts, if each part measured only an inch:
therefore, one infinity would be twelve times as great as the other.
Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn two
diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance apart, but
are produced to infinity, it is certain that the distance between the
two lines will be continually increased, until at length it changes
from definite to indefinable. As these absurdities follow, it is said,
from considering quantity as infinite, the conclusion is drawn, that
extended substance must necessarily be finite, and, consequently,
cannot appertain to the nature of God.
The second argument is also drawn from Gods supreme perfection.
God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely perfect being, cannot
be passive; but extended substance, in so far as it is divisible, is
passive. It follows, therefore, that extended substance does not
appertain to the essence of God.
Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who by
them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the divine
nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto. However, I think an
attentive reader will see that I have already answered their
propositions; for all their arguments are founded on the hypothesis
that extended substance is composed of parts, and such a
hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Coroll. Prop. xiii.) to be
absurd. Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all these
absurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not now discussing),
from which it is sought to extract the conclusion that extended
substance is finite, do not at all follow from the notion of an infinite
quantity, but merely from the notion that an infinite quantity is
measurable, and composed of finite parts: therefore, the only fair
conclusion to be drawn is that infinite quantity is not measurable,
and cannot be composed of finite parts. This is exactly what we
have already proved (in Prop. xii.). Wherefore the weapon which
they aimed at us has in reality recoiled upon themselves. If, from
this absurdity of theirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that
extended substance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting
like a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares,
and, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to
deny that circles have any centre, from which all lines drawn to the
circumference are equal. For, taking extended substance, which
can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible (Props. viii.,
v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that it is finite, that it is
composed of finite parts, and that it can be multiplied and divided.
So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of points,

can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be
infinitely divided. Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert that
extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it would be
to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface of lines, and
a line of points. This must be admitted by all who know clear
reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who deny the
possibility of a vacuum. For if extended substance could be so
divided that its parts were really separate, why should not one part
admit of being destroyed, the others remaining joined together as
before? And why should all be so fitted into one another as to leave
no vacuum? Surely in the case of things, which are really distinct
one from the other, one can exist without the other, and can remain
in its original condition. As, then, there does not exist a vacuum in
nature (of which anon), but all parts are bound to come together to
prevent it, it follows from this also that the parts cannot be really
distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is
substance cannot be divided.
If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally so
prone to divide quantity? I answer, that quantity is conceived by us
in two ways; in the abstract and superficially, as we imagine it; or
as substance, as we conceive it solely by the intellect. If, then, we
regard quantity as it is represented in our imagination, which we
often and more easily do, we shall find that it is finite, divisible, and
compounded of parts; but if we regard it as it is represented in our
intellect, and conceive it as substance, which it is very difficult to
do, we shall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is
infinite, one, and indivisible. This will be plain enough to all, who
make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination,
especially if it be remembered, that matter is everywhere the same,
that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as we
conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are
distinguished, not really, but modally. For instance, water, in so far
as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts to be
separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is extended
substance; from this point of view it is neither separated nor
divisible. Further, water, in so far as it is water, is produced and
corrupted; but, in so far as it is substance, it is neither produced
nor corrupted.
I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in fact,
founded on the same assumption as the firstnamely, that matter,
in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed of parts. Even
if it were so, I do not know why it should be considered unworthy of
the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God (by Prop. xiv.) no
substance can be granted, wherefrom it could receive its
modifications. All things, I repeat, are in God, and all things which
come to pass, come to pass solely through the laws of the infinite
nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly show) from the necessity
of his essence. Wherefore it can in nowise be said, that God is
passive in respect to anything other than himself, or that extended
substance is unworthy of the Divine nature, even if it be supposed
divisible, so long as it is granted to be infinite and eternal. But
enough of this for the present.
Prop. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an
infinite number of things in infinite waysthat is, all things which
can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.
Proof.This proposition will be clear to everyone, who remembers

that from the given definition of any thing the intellect infers
several properties, which really necessarily follow therefrom (that
is, from the actual essence of the thing defined); and it infers more
properties in proportion as the definition of the thing expresses
more reality, that is, in proportion as the essence of the thing
defined involves more reality. Now, as the divine nature has
absolutely infinite attributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses
infinite essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of
its nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which
can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must necessarily
follow. Q.E.D.
Corollary I.Hence it follows, that God is the efficient cause of all
that can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect.
Corollary II.It also follows that God is a cause in himself, and not
through an accident of his nature.
Corollary III.It follows, thirdly, that God is the absolutely first
cause.
Prop. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not
constrained by anyone.
Proof.We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from the
necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing, solely
from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things absolutely
follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved (in Prop. xv.),
that without God nothing can be nor be conceived; but that all
things are in God. Wherefore nothing can exist outside himself,
whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to act. Wherefore
God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not
constrained by anyone. Q.E.D.
Corollary I.It follows: 1. That there can be no cause which, either

extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the perfection of his own
nature, moves God to act.
Corollary II.It follows: 2. That God is the sole free cause. For God
alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature (by Prop. xi. and
Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole necessity of his nature,
wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the sole free cause. Q.E.D.
Note.Others think that God is a free cause, because he can, as
they think, bring it about, that those things which we have said
follow from his naturethat is, which are in his power, should not
come to pass, or should not be produced by him. But this is the
same as if they said, that God could bring it about, that it should
not follow from the nature of a triangle, that its three interior
angles should not be equal to two right angles; or that from a given
cause no effect should follow, which is absurd.
Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this proposition,
that neither intellect nor will appertain to Gods nature. I know that
there are many who think that they can show, that supreme
intellect and free will do appertain to Gods nature; for they say
they know of nothing more perfect, which they can attribute to
God, than that which is the highest perfection in ourselves. Further,
although they conceive God as actually supremely intelligent, they
yet do not believe, that he can bring into existence everything
which he actually understands, for they think that they would thus
destroy Gods power. If, they contend, God had created everything
which is in his intellect, he would not be able to create anything
more, and this, they think, would clash with Gods omnipotence;
therefore, they prefer to assert that God is indifferent to all things,
and that he creates nothing except that which he has decided, by
some absolute exercise of will, to create. However, I think I have
shown sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from Gods supreme
power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of thingsthat is, all
things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of ways,
or always follow from the same necessity; in the same way as from
the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for eternity,
that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles.
Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from all
eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state of activity.
This manner of treating the question attributes to God an
omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect. For, otherwise, we
are compelled to confess that God understands an infinite number
of creatable things, which he will never be able to create, for, if he
created all that he understands, he would, according to this
showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render himself imperfect.
Wherefore, in order to establish that God is perfect, we should be
reduced to establishing at the same time, that he cannot bring to

pass everything over which his power extends; this seems to be a
hypothesis most absurd, and most repugnant to Gods
omnipotence.
Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the will
which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain to the
eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some
significations quite different from those they usually bear. For
intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God,
would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human
intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with them
but the name; there would be about as much correspondence
between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly
constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks. This I will prove as
follows. If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it cannot be in
nature, as ours is generally thought to be, posterior to, or
simultaneous with the things understood, inasmuch as God is prior
to all things by reason of his causality (Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.). On the
contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is as it is, because
it exists by representation as such in the intellect of God.
Wherefore the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to
constitute Gods essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of
their essence and of their existence. This seems to have been
recognized by those who have asserted, that Gods intellect, Gods
will, and Gods power, are one and the same. As, therefore, Gods
intellect is the sole cause of things, namely, both of their essence
and existence, it must necessarily differ from them in respect to its
essence, and in respect to its existence. For a cause differs from a
thing it causes, precisely in the quality which the latter gains from
the former.
For example, a man is the cause of another mans existence, but
not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and, therefore,
the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but must be
different in existence; and hence if the existence of one of them
cease, the existence of the other will not necessarily cease also; but
if the essence of one could be destroyed, and be made false, the
essence of the other would be destroyed also. Wherefore, a thing
which is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of a
given effect, must differ from such effect both in respect to its
essence, and also in respect to its existence. Now the intellect of
God is the cause of both the essence and the existence of our
intellect; therefore, the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived
to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in
respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in
anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before. The
reasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyone can

easily see.
Prop. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all
things.
Proof.All things which are, are in God, and must be conceived

through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.) God
is the cause of those things which are in him. This is our first point.
Further, besides God there can be no substance (by Prop. xiv.), that
is nothing in itself external to God. This is our second point. God,
therefore, is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all
things. Q.E.D.
Prop. XIX. God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.
Proof.God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.)

necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains to its
nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its definition;
therefore, God is eternal (by Def. viii.). Further, by the attributes of
God we must understand that which (by Def. iv.) expresses the
essence of the divine substancein other words, that which
appertains to substance: that, I say, should be involved in the
attributes of substance. Now eternity appertains to the nature of
substance (as I have already shown in Prop. vii.); therefore,
eternity must appertain to each of the attributes, and thus all are
eternal. Q.E.D.
Note.This proposition is also evident from the manner in which
(in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God; it is evident, I
repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God, like his essence,
is an eternal truth. Further (in Prop. xix. of my Principles of the
Cartesian Philosophy), I have proved the eternity of God, in
another manner, which I need not here repeat.
Prop. XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the
same.
Proof.God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are eternal,
that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses existence.
Therefore the same attributes of God which explain his eternal
essence, explain at the same time his eternal existencein other
words, that which constitutes Gods essence constitutes at the
same time his existence. Wherefore Gods existence and Gods
essence are one and the same. Q.E.D.
Coroll. I.Hence it follows that Gods existence, like His essence, is
an eternal truth.
Coroll. II.Secondly, it follows that God, and all the attributes of

God, are unchangeable. For if they could be changed in respect to
existence, they must also be able to be changed in respect to
essencethat is, obviously, be changed from true to false, which is
absurd.
Prop. XXI. All things which follow from the absolute nature of any
attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in other
words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.
Proof.Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the proposition to be

denied), that something in some attribute of God can follow from
the absolute nature of the said attribute, and that at the same time
it is finite, and has a conditioned existence or duration; for
instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought. Now
thought, in so far as it is supposed to be an attribute of God, is
necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its nature infinite. But, in so far as it
possesses the idea of God, it is supposed finite. It cannot, however,
be conceived as finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.);
but it is not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted
the idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite); therefore, it is
limited by thought, in so far as it has not constituted the idea of
God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.) must necessarily exist.
We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the idea
of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally follow
from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for it is conceived
as constituting, and also as not constituting, the idea of God),
which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, if the idea of God
expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed, anything else in any
attribute of God (for we may take any example, as the proof is of
universal application) follows from the necessity of the absolute
nature of the said attribute, the said thing must necessarily be
infinite, which was our first point.
Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the
nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. For if it can,
suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of the nature of
some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God, for instance, the
idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, and let it be
supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be about not to
exist.
Now thought being an attribute of God, must necessarily exist
unchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.); and beyond the
limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the latter at
some time not to have existed, or not to be going to exist) thought
would perforce have existed without the idea of God, which is
contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that, thought being

given, the idea of God necessarily flowed therefrom. Therefore the
idea of God expressed in thought, or anything which necessarily
follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, cannot
have a limited duration, but through the said attribute is eternal,
which is our second point. Bear in mind that the same proposition
may be affirmed of anything, which in any attribute necessarily
follows from Gods absolute nature.
Prop. XXII. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so far
as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as
infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily and
as infinite.
Proof.The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the

preceding one.
Prop. XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as
infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of
some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a
modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.
Proof.A mode exists in something else, through which it must be

conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists solely in God, and
solely through God can be conceived. If therefore a mode is
conceived as necessarily existing and infinite, it must necessarily
be inferred or perceived through some attribute of God, in so far as
such attribute is conceived as expressing the infinity and necessity
of existence, in other words (Def. viii.) eternity; that is, in so far as
it is considered absolutely. A mode, therefore, which necessarily
exists as infinite, must follow from the absolute nature of some
attribute of God, either immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the
means of some modification, which follows from the absolute
nature of the said attribute; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which exists
necessarily and as infinite.
Prop. XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not involve
existence.
Proof.This proposition is evident from Def. i. For that of which the

nature (considered in itself) involves existence is self-caused, and
exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.
Corollary.Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of things
coming into existence, but also of their continuing in existence, that
is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of the being of things
(essendi rerum). For whether things exist, or do not exist,
whenever we contemplate their essence, we see that it involves
neither existence nor duration; consequently, it cannot be the cause

of either the one or the other. God must be the sole cause,
inasmuch as to him alone does existence appertain. (Prop. xiv.
Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.
Prop. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of
things, but also of their essence.
Proof.If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the essence
of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by Ax. iv.) be
conceived without God. This (by Prop. xv.) is absurd. Therefore,
God is the cause of the essence of things. Q.E.D.
Note.This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi. For it
is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the essence of
things must be inferred from it, no less than their existencein a
word, God must be called the cause of all things, in the same sense
as he is called the cause of himself. This will be made still clearer
by the following corollary.
Corollary.Individual things are nothing but modifications of the
attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are
expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears from
Prop. xv. and Def. v.
Prop. XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular
manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that
which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to
act.
Proof.That by which things are said to be conditioned to act in a

particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is
obvious); therefore both of its essence and of its existence God by
the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props. xxv. and
xvi.); this is our first point. Our second point is plainly to be
inferred therefrom. For if a thing, which has not been conditioned
by God, could condition itself, the first part of our proof would be
false, and this, as we have shown, is absurd.
Prop. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a
particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.
Proof.This proposition is evident from the third axiom.

Prop. XXVIII.Every individual thing, or everything which is finite
and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to
act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause
other than itself, which also is finite, and has a conditioned
existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist, or be
conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action

by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned
existence, and so on to infinity.
Proof.Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been thus
conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv., Coroll.)
But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence, cannot be
produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for
whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God
is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.). It must, therefore, follow from
some attribute of God, in so far as the said attribute is considered
as in some way modified; for substance and modes make up the
sum total of existence (by Ax. i. and Def. iii., v.), while modes are
merely modifications of the attributes of God. But from God, or
from any of his attributes, in so far as the latter is modified by a
modification infinite and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow.
Wherefore it must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and
action by God or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are
modified by some modification which is finite, and has a
conditioned existence. This is our first point. Again, this cause or
this modification (for the reason by which we established the first
part of this proof) must in its turn be conditioned by another cause,
which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and, again,
this last by another (for the same reason); and so on (for the same
reason) to infinity. Q.E.D.
Note.As certain things must be produced immediately by God,

namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute
nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which,
nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it
follows:1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those
things immediately produced by him. I say absolutely, not after his
kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of God cannot either exist
or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop. xxiv., Coroll.).
2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote cause of
individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing these from
what he immediately produces, or rather from what follows from
his absolute nature. For, by a remote cause, we understand a cause
which is in no way conjoined to the effect. But all things which are,
are in God, and so depend on God, that without him they can
neither be nor be conceived.
Prop. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are
conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the
necessity of the divine nature.
Proof.Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.). But God cannot be

called a thing contingent. For (by Prop. xi.) he exists necessarily,
and not contingently. Further, the modes of the divine nature follow
therefrom necessarily, and not contingently (Prop. xvi.); and they
thus follow, whether we consider the divine nature absolutely, or
whether we consider it as in any way conditioned to act (Prop.
xxvii.). Further, God is not only the cause of these modes, in so far
as they simply exist (by Prop. xxiv., Coroll.), but also in so far as
they are considered as conditioned for operating in a particular
manner (Prop. xxvi.). If they be not conditioned by God (Prop.
xxvi.), it is impossible, and not contingent, that they should
condition themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God,
it is impossible, and not contingent, that they should render
themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by
the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also to exist
and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing that is
contingent. Q.E.D.
Note.Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what we
should understand by nature viewed as active (natura naturans),
and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata). I say to explain, or
rather call attention to it, for I think that, from what has been said,
it is sufficiently clear, that by nature viewed as active we should
understand that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself,
or those attributes of substance, which express eternal and infinite
essence, in other words (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll.
ii.) God, in so far as he is considered as a free cause.
By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which follows
from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the attributes
of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, in so far as
they are considered as things which are in God, and which without
God cannot exist or be conceived.
Prop. XXX. Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function infinite,
must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of
God, and nothing else.
Proof.A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in other
words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect in
representation must necessarily be granted in nature. But in nature
(by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save God, nor any
modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in God, and cannot
without God either be or be conceived. Therefore the intellect, in
function finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the
attributes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing else.
Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as

will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to passive nature and not
to active nature.
Proof.By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute

thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from other
modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.) requiring to
be conceived through absolute thought. It must (by Prop. xv. and
Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which expresses the
eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so conceived, that
without such attribute it could neither be nor be conceived. It must
therefore be referred to nature passive rather than to nature
active, as must also the other modes of thinking. Q.E.D.
Note.I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function, admit that
there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality: but, wishing to
avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of what is most clearly
perceived by us, namely, of the very act of understanding, than
which nothing is more clearly perceived. For we cannot perceive
anything without adding to our knowledge of the act of
understanding.
Prop. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a
necessary cause.
Proof.Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like intellect;

therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist, nor be conditioned
to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause other than itself,
which cause is conditioned by a third cause, and so on to infinity.
But if will be supposed infinite, it must also be conditioned to exist
and act by God, not by virtue of his being substance absolutely
infinite, but by virtue of his possessing an attribute which
expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought (by Prop.
xxiii.). Thus, however it be conceived, whether as finite or infinite,
it requires a cause by which it should be conditioned to exist and
act. Thus (Def. vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a
necessary or constrained cause. Q.E.D.
Coroll. I.Hence it follows, first, that God does not act according to
freedom of the will.
Coroll. II.It follows, secondly, that will and intellect stand in the
same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and rest, and
absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be conditioned by
God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular manner. For will,
like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by which it is conditioned to
exist and act in a particular manner. And although, when will or
intellect be granted, an infinite number of results may follow, yet
God cannot on that account be said to act from freedom of the will,
any more than the infinite number of results from motion and rest
would justify us in saying that motion and rest act by free will.
Wherefore will no more appertains to God than does anything else
in nature, but stands in the same relation to him as motion, rest,
and the like, which we have shown to follow from the necessity of
the divine nature, and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a
particular manner.
Prop. XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by
God in any manner or in any order different from that which has in
fact obtained.
Proof.All things necessarily follow from the nature of God (Prop.

xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist and act in a
particular way (Prop. xxix.). If things, therefore, could have been of
a different nature, or have been conditioned to act in a different
way, so that the order of nature would have been different, Gods
nature would also have been able to be different from what it now
is; and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that different nature also would have
perforce existed, and consequently there would have been able to
be two or more Gods. This (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd.
Therefore things could not have been brought into being by God in
any other manner, &c. Q.E.D.
Note I.As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at
noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things
contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall attach
to the word contingent; but I will first explain the words necessary
and impossible.
A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence or in
respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing necessarily follows,
either from its essence and definition, or from a given efficient
cause. For similar reasons a thing is said to be impossible; namely,
inasmuch as its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or
because no external cause is granted, which is conditioned to
produce such an effect; but a thing can in no respect be called
contingent, save in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge.
A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or does
not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it does not
involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt concerning the
existence, because the order of causes escapes us,such a thing, I
say, cannot appear to us either necessary or impossible. Wherefore
we call it contingent or possible.
Note II.It clearly follows from what we have said, that things
have been brought into being by God in the highest perfection,
inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a most perfect
nature. Nor does this prove any imperfection in God, for it has
compelled us to affirm his perfection. From its contrary
proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just shown), that
God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been brought into
being in any other way, we should have to assign to God a nature
different from that, which we are bound to attribute to him from
the consideration of an absolutely perfect being.
I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and will
refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply because
they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very different from
that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced. They assign to him, in short,
absolute free will. However, I am also convinced that if such
persons reflect on the matter, and duly weigh in their minds our
series of propositions, they will reject such freedom as they now
attribute to God, not only as nugatory, but also as a great
impediment to organized knowledge. There is no need for me to
repeat what I said in the note to Prop. xvii. But, for the sake of my
opponents, I will show further, that although it be granted that will
appertains to the essence of God, it nevertheless follows from his
perfection, that things could not have been by him created other
than they are, or in a different order; this is easily proved, if we
reflect on what our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it
depends solely on the decree and will of God, that each thing is
what it is. If it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all
things. Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from
all eternity by God himself. If it were otherwise, God would be
convicted of imperfection or change. But in eternity there is no
such thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solely from
the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never could
have decreed anything but what is; that God did not exist before his
decrees, and would not exist without them. But, it is said,
supposing that God had made a different universe, or had ordained
other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and her order, we
could not therefore conclude any imperfection in God. But persons
who say this must admit that God can change his decrees. For if
God had ordained any decrees concerning nature and her order,
different from those which he has ordainedin other words, if he
had willed and conceived something different concerning
naturehe would perforce have had a different intellect from that
which he has, and also a different will. But if it were allowable to
assign to God a different intellect and a different will, without any
change in his essence or his perfection, what would there be to
prevent him changing the decrees which he has made concerning
created things, and nevertheless remaining perfect? For his
intellect and will concerning things created and their order are the
same, in respect to his essence and perfection, however they be
conceived.
Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that Gods
intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as they also
admit that Gods intellect, and Gods will, and Gods essence are
identical, it follows that, if God had had a different actual intellect
and a different will, his essence would also have been different; and
thus, as I concluded at first, if things had been brought into being
by God in a different way from that which has obtained, Gods
intellect and will, that is (as is admitted) his essence would
perforce have been different, which is absurd.
As these things could not have been brought into being by God in
any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as the
truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection of
God; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to
believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were in
his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he had
understood them.
But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor
imperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to be
called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the will
of God. If God had so willed, he might have brought it about that
what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection, and vice
vers. What is such an assertion, but an open declaration that God,
who necessarily understands that which he wishes, might bring it
about by his will, that he should understand things differently from
the way in which he does understand them? This (as we have just
shown) is the height of absurdity. Wherefore, I may turn the
argument against its employers, as follows:All things depend on
the power of God. In order that things should be different from
what they are, Gods will would necessarily have to be different.
But Gods will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly
demonstrated) from Gods perfection. Therefore neither can things
be different. I confess, that the theory which subjects all things to
the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that they are all
dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth than the theory of
those, who maintain that God acts in all things with a view of
promoting what is good. For these latter persons seem to set up
something beyond God, which does not depend on God, but which
God in acting looks to as an exemplar, or which he aims at as a
definite goal. This is only another name for subjecting God to the
dominion of destiny, an utter absurdity in respect to God, whom we
have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of all
things and also of their existence. I need, therefore, spend no time

in refuting such wild theories.
Prop. XXXIV. Gods power is identical with his essence.
Proof.From the sole necessity of the essence of God it follows that

God is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all things (Prop. xvi.
and Coroll.). Wherefore the power of God, by which he and all
things are and act, is identical with his essence. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God,
necessarily exists.
Proof.Whatsoever is in Gods power, must (by the last Prop.) be

comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it necessarily
follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect does
not follow.
Proof.Whatsoever exists expresses Gods nature or essence in a

given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Coroll.); that is (by Prop.
xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a given conditioned manner
Gods power, which is the cause of all things, therefore an effect
must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow. Q.E.D.
Appendix.
In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties of
God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one: that he
is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature; that he is the
free cause of all things, and how he is so; that all things are in God,
and so depend on him, that without him they could neither exist
nor be conceived; lastly, that all things are predetermined by God,
not through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature
of God or infinite power. I have further, where occasion offered,
taken care to remove the prejudices, which might impede the
comprehension of my demonstrations. Yet there still remain
misconceptions not a few, which might and may prove very grave
hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things, as I
have explained it above. I have therefore thought it worth while to
bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason.
All such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained,
that all things in nature act as men themselves act, namely, with an
end in view. It is accepted as certain, that God himself directs all
things to a definite goal (for it is said that God made all things for
man, and man that he might worship him). I will, therefore,
consider this opinion, asking first, why it obtains general credence,

and why all men are naturally so prone to adopt it? secondly, I will
point out its falsity; and, lastly, I will show how it has given rise to
prejudices about good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame,
order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like. However,
this is not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the
nature of the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a
starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely, that
all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all have the
desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they are
conscious of such desire. Herefrom it follows, first, that men think
themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions
and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the
causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire. Secondly,
that men do all things for an end, namely, for that which is useful to
them, and which they seek. Thus it comes to pass that they only
look for a knowledge of the final causes of events, and when these
are learned, they are content, as having no cause for further doubt.
If they cannot learn such causes from external sources, they are
compelled to turn to considering themselves, and reflecting what
end would have induced them personally to bring about the given
event, and thus they necessarily judge other natures by their own.
Further, as they find in themselves and outside themselves many
means which assist them not a little in their search for what is
useful, for instance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and
animals for yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for
breeding fish, &c., they come to look on the whole of nature as a
means for obtaining such conveniences. Now as they are aware,
that they found these conveniences and did not make them, they
think they have cause for believing, that some other being has
made them for their use. As they look upon things as means, they
cannot believe them to be self-created; but, judging from the means
which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they are
bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe endowed
with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted everything
for human use. They are bound to estimate the nature of such
rulers (having no information on the subject) in accordance with
their own nature, and therefore they assert that the gods ordained
everything for the use of man, in order to bind man to themselves
and obtain from him the highest honour. Hence also it follows, that
everyone thought out for himself, according to his abilities, a
different way of worshipping God, so that God might love him more
than his fellows, and direct the whole course of nature for the
satisfaction of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. Thus the
prejudice developed into superstition, and took deep root in the
human mind; and for this reason everyone strove most zealously to
understand and explain the final causes of things; but in their
endeavour to show that nature does nothing in vain, i.e., nothing
which is useless to man, they only seem to have demonstrated that

nature, the gods, and men are all mad together. Consider, I pray
you, the result: among the many helps of nature they were bound
to find some hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases,
&c.: so they declared that such things happen, because the gods
are angry at some wrong done them by men, or at some fault
committed in their worship. Experience day by day protested and
showed by infinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the
lot of pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their
inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such
contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they
were ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition
of ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning
and start afresh. They therefore laid down as an axiom, that Gods
judgments far transcend human understanding. Such a doctrine
might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the human race
for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished another standard
of verity in considering solely the essence and properties of figures
without regard to their final causes. There are other reasons (which
I need not mention here) besides mathematics, which might have
caused mens minds to be directed to these general prejudices, and
have led them to the knowledge of the truth.
I have now sufficiently explained my first point. There is no need to
show at length, that nature has no particular goal in view, and that
final causes are mere human figments. This, I think, is already
evident enough, both from the causes and foundations on which I
have shown such prejudice to be based, and also from Prop. xvi.,
and the Corollary of Prop. xxxii., and, in fact, all those propositions
in which I have shown, that everything in nature proceeds from a
sort of necessity, and with the utmost perfection. However, I will
add a few remarks, in order to overthrow this doctrine of a final
cause utterly. That which is really a cause it considers as an effect,
and vice vers: it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and
that which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect.
Passing over the questions of cause and priority as self-evident, it is
plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that that effect is most perfect
which is produced immediately by God; the effect which requires
for its production several intermediate causes is, in that respect,
more imperfect. But if those things which were made immediately
by God were made to enable him to attain his end, then the things
which come after, for the sake of which the first were made, are
necessarily the most excellent of all.
Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God: for, if
God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something which he
lacks. Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a distinction
between the object of want and the object of assimilation; still they
confess that God made all things for the sake of himself, not for the
sake of creation. They are unable to point to anything prior to
creation, except God himself, as an object for which God should act,
and are therefore driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God
lacked those things for whose attainment he created means, and
further that he desired them.
We must not omit to notice that the followers of this doctrine,
anxious to display their talent in assigning final causes, have
imported a new method of argument in proof of their
theorynamely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to
ignorance; thus showing that they have no other method of
exhibiting their doctrine. For example, if a stone falls from a roof
on to someones head, and kills him, they will demonstrate by their
new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man; for, if it had
not by Gods will fallen with that object, how could so many
circumstances (and there are often many concurrent
circumstances) have all happened together by chance? Perhaps you
will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was
blowing, and the man was walking that way. But why, they will
insist, was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very
time walking that way? If you again answer, that the wind had
then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day
before, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had
been invited by a friend, they will again insist: But why was the
sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time? So they
will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at last you take
refuge in the will of Godin other words, the sanctuary of
ignorance. So, again, when they survey the frame of the human
body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of the causes of so great
a work of art, conclude that it has been fashioned, not
mechanically, but by divine and supernatural skill, and has been so
put together that one part shall not hurt another.
Hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and
strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being,
and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as
an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the
interpreters of nature and the gods. Such persons know that, with
the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their only
available means for proving and preserving their authority would
vanish also. But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my third
point.
After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is created
is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as the chief
quality in everything that which is most useful to themselves, and
to account those things the best of all which have the most
beneficial effect on mankind. Further, they were bound to form

abstract notions for the explanation of the nature of things, such as
goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth, cold, beauty,
deformity, and so on; and from the belief that they are free agents
arose the further notions praise and blame, sin and merit.
I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human nature;
the former I will briefly explain here.
Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God they
have called good, everything which hinders these objects they have
styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not understand the
nature of things do not verify phenomena in any way, but merely
imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their imagination for
understanding, such persons firmly believe that there is an order in
things, being really ignorant both of things and their own nature.
When phenomena are of such a kind, that the impression they
make on our senses requires little effort of imagination, and can
consequently be easily remembered, we say that they are wellordered; if the contrary, that they are ill-ordered or confused.
Further, as things which are easily imagined are more pleasing to
us, men prefer order to confusionas though there were any order
in nature, except in relation to our imaginationand say that God
has created all things in order; thus, without knowing it, attributing
imagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God
foresaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it
should be most easily imagined. If this be their theory, they would
not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an infinite number
of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and very many
others which confound its weakness. But enough has been said on
this subject. The other abstract notions are nothing but modes of
imagining, in which the imagination is differently affected. though
they are considered by the ignorant as the chief attributes of
things, inasmuch as they believe that everything was created for
the sake of themselves; and, according as they are affected by it,
style it good or bad, healthy or rotten and corrupt. For instance, if
the motion which objects we see communicate to our nerves be
conducive to health, the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a
contrary motion be excited, they are styled ugly.
Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are styled
fragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter, full-flavoured
or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, &c.
Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise, sound, or
harmony. In this last case, there are men lunatic enough to believe,
that even God himself takes pleasure in harmony; and philosophers
are not lacking who have persuaded themselves, that the motion of
the heavenly bodies gives rise to harmonyall of which instances

sufficiently show that everyone judges of things according to the
state of his brain, or rather mistakes for things the forms of his
imagination. We need no longer wonder that there have arisen all
the controversies we have witnessed, and finally scepticism: for,
although human bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many
others they differ; so that what seems good to one seems bad to
another; what seems well ordered to one seems confused to
another; what is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on. I
need not further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat
the subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well
known. It is commonly said: So many men, so many minds;
everyone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as
palates. All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things
according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than
understand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as
mathematics attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I have
urged.
We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly given
of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate the
true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the
imagination; and, although they have names, as though they were
entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them entities
imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all arguments against us
drawn from such abstractions are easily rebutted.
Many argue in this way. If all things follow from a necessity of the
absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there so many
imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things corrupt to the
point of putridity, loathsome deformity, confusion, evil, sin, &c. But
these reasoners are, as I have said, easily confuted, for the
perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature
and power; things are not more or less perfect, according as they
delight or offend human senses, or according as they are
serviceable or repugnant to mankind. To those who ask why God
did not so create all men, that they should be governed only by
reason, I give no answer but this: because matter was not lacking
to him for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest
to lowest; or, more strictly, because the laws of his nature are so
vast, as to suffice for the production of everything conceivable by
an infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.
Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if there are
any more of the same sort, everyone may easily dissipate them for
himself with the aid of a little reflection.
PART II.
OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE
MIND.
Preface.
I NOW pass on to explaining the results, which must necessarily
follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and infinite being;
not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part. i., Prop. xvi., that an
infinite number must follow in an infinite number of ways), but only
those which are able to lead us, as it were by the hand, to the
knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness.
Definitions.
I. By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain determinate
manner the essence of God, in so far as he is considered as an
extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv. Coroll.)
II. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which
being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and, which being
removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; in other words,
that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing,
can neither be nor be conceived.
III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is formed by the
mind as a thinking thing.
Explanation.I say conception rather than perception, because the

word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect
to the object; whereas conception seems to express an activity of
the mind.
IV. By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so far as it is
considered in itself, without relation to the object, has all the
properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.
Explanation.I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark which is

extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and its object
(ideatum).
V.Duration is the indefinite continuance of existing.
Explanation.I say indefinite, becouse it cannot be determined

through the existence itself of the existing thing, or by its efficient
cause, which necessarily gives the existence of the thing, but does
not take it away.
VI.Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.
VII. By particular things, I mean things which are finite and have a
conditioned existence; but if several individual things concur in one
action, so as to be all simultaneously the effect of one cause, I
consider them all, so far, as one particular thing.
Axioms.
I. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that is,
it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or that man
does or does not exist.
II. Man thinks.
III. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of the
passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same individual
an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the idea can exist
without the presence of any other mode of thinking.
IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.
V. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and modes
of thought.
N.B. The postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop. xiii.
Propositions.
Prop. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.
Proof.Particular thoughts, or this or that thought, are modes

which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature of God
(Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.). God therefore possesses the attribute
(Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved in all particular
thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby. Thought, therefore, is
one of the infinite attributes of God, which express Gods eternal
and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def. vi.). In other words, God is a
thinking thing. Q.E.D.
Note.This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we are
able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, in proportion as a
thinking being is conceived as thinking more thoughts, so is it
conceived as containing more reality or perfection. Therefore a

being, which can think an infinite number of things in an infinite
number of ways, is, necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite. As,
therefore, from the consideration of thought alone we conceive an
infinite being, thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of
the infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.
Prop. II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended
thing.
Proof.The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the last.

Prop. III. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his
essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his
essence.
Proof.God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an infinite
number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same thing, by
Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence, and of all things
which necessarily follow therefrom. Now all that is in the power of
God necessarily is. (Pt. i., Prop. xxxv.) Therefore, such an idea as
we are considering necessarily is, and in God alone. Q.E.D. (Part i.,
Prop. xv.)
Note.The multitude understand by the power of God the free will
of God, and the right over all things that exist, which latter are
accordingly generally considered as contingent. For it is said that
God has the power to destroy all things, and to reduce them to
nothing. Further, the power of God is very often likened to the
power of kings. But this doctrine we have refuted (Pt. i., Prop.
xxxii., Corolls. i. and ii.), and we have shown (Part i., Prop. xvi.) that
God acts by the same necessity, as that by which he understands
himself; in other words, as it follows from the necessity of the
divine nature (as all admit), that God understands himself, so also
does it follow by the same necessity, that God performs infinite acts
in infinite ways. We further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that Gods
power is identical with Gods essence in action; therefore it is as
impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive him
as non-existent. If we might pursue the subject further, I could
point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to God is
not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the multitude
as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a negation of
power. However, I am unwilling to go over the same ground so
often. I would only beg the reader again and again, to turn over
frequently in his mind what I have said in Part i. from Prop. xvi. to
the end. No one will be able to follow my meaning, unless he is
scrupulously careful not to confound the power of God with the
human power and right of kings.
Prop. IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things
follow in infinite ways, can only be one.
Proof.Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the attributes

of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.). Now God is one
(Part i., Prop. xiv., Coroll.). Therefore the idea of God, wherefrom
an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.
Q.E.D.
Prop. V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so
far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far as he is
unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of the
attributes of God and of particular things do not own as their
efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things perceived, but
God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.
Proof.This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this Part. We

there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea of his
essence, and of all things which follow necessarily therefrom, solely
because he is a thinking thing, and not because he is the object of
his own idea. Wherefore the actual being of ideas owns for cause
God, in so far as he is a thinking thing. It may be differently proved
as follows: the actual being of ideas is (obviously) a mode of
thought, that is (Part i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.) a mode which expresses
in a certain manner the nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking
thing, and therefore (Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no
other attribute of God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not
the effect of any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being
of ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a
thinking thing, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so
far as he is considered through the attribute of which they are
modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any other
attribute.
Proof.Each attribute is conceived through itself, without any

other (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each attribute
involve the conception of that attribute, but not of any other. Thus
(Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only in so far as he is
considered through the attribute whose modes they are, and not in
so far as he is considered through any other. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Hence the actual being of things, which are not modes
of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because that
nature has prior knowledge of the things. Things represented in
ideas follow, and are derived from their particular attribute, in the
same manner, and with the same necessity as ideas follow

(according to what we have shown) from the attribute of thought.
Prop. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the
order and connection of things.
Proof.This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv. For the idea
of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of the cause,
whereof it is an effect.
Corollary.Hence Gods power of thinking is equal to his realized
power of actionthat is, whatsoever follows from the infinite
nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter), follows without
exception in the same order and connection from the idea of God in
the world of thought (objective).
Note.Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what has
been pointed out abovenamely, that whatsoever can be perceived
by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance,
belongs altogether only to one substance: consequently, substance
thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance,
comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other.
So, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and
the same thing, though expressed in two ways. This truth seems to
have been dimly recognized by those Jews who maintained that
God, Gods intellect, and the things understood by God are
identical. For instance, a circle existing in nature, and the idea of a
circle existing, which is also in God, are one and the same thing
displayed through different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive
nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of
thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same order,
or one and the same chain of causesthat is, the same things
following in either case.
I said that God is the cause of an ideafor instance, of the idea of a
circle,in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a circle, in so far
as he is an extended thing, simply because the actual being of the
idea of a circle can only be perceived as a proximate cause through
another mode of thinking, and that again through another, and so
on to infinity; so that, so long as we consider things as modes of
thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature, or the
whole chain of causes, through the attribute of thought only. And,
in so far as we consider things as modes of extension, we must
explain the order of the whole of nature through the attribute of
extension only; and so on, in the case of other attributes.
Wherefore of things as they are in themselves God is really the
cause, inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for
the present explain my meaning more clearly.
Prop. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not

exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the
same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes are
contained in the attributes of God.
Proof.This proposition is evident from the last; it is understood

more clearly from the preceding note.
Corollary.Hence, so long as particular things do not exist, except
in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of God, their
representations in thought or ideas do not exist, except in so far as
the infinite idea of God exists; and when particular things are said
to exist, not only in so far as they are involved in the attributes of
God, but also in so far as they are said to continue, their ideas will
also involve existence, through which they are said to continue.
Note.If anyone desires an example to throw more light on this
question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any, which
adequately explains the thing of which I here speak, inasmuch as it
is unique; however, I will endeavour to illustrate it as far as
possible. The nature of a circle is such that if any number of
straight lines intersect within it, the rectangles formed by their
segments will be equal to one another; thus, infinite equal
rectangles are contained in a circle. Yet none of these rectangles
can be said to exist, except in so far as the circle exists; nor can the
idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as
they are comprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that,
from this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The ideas of
these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the idea
of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of those
rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the remaining
ideas of the remaining rectangles.
Prop. IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused
by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is
considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually existing,
of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected by a third idea,
and so on to infinity.
Proof.The idea of an individual thing actually existing is an

individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes (by
the Corollary and Note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus (by Prop. vi.
of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only as he is a thinking
thing. But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.) in so far as he is a thing
thinking absolutely, only in so far as he is considered as affected by
another mode of thinking; and he is the cause of this latter, as
being affected by a third, and so on to infinity. Now, the order and
connection of ideas is (by Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the
order and connection of causes. Therefore of a given individual

idea another individual idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as
modified by that idea, is the cause; and of this second idea God is
the cause, in so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to
infinity. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of any

idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as he has the
idea of the object.
Proof.Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its idea is
in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he is infinite, but in
so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of an
individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by Prop. vii. of this part)
the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and
connection of things. The knowledge, therefore, of that which takes
place in any individual object will be in God, in so far only as he has
the idea of that object. Q.E.D.
Prop. X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence
of manin other words, substance does not constitute the actual
being1of man.
Proof.The being of substance involves necessary existence (Part

i., Prop. vii.). If, therefore, the being of substance appertains to the
essence of man, substance being granted, man would necessarily
be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and, consequently, man would
necessarily exist, which is absurd (II. Ax. i.). Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.
Note.This proposition may also be proved from I. v., in which it is
shown that there cannot be two substances of the same nature; for
as there may be many men, the being of substance is not that
which constitutes the actual being of man. Again, the proposition is
evident from the other properties of substancenamely, that
substance is in its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, &c., as
anyone may see for himself.
Corollary.Hence it follows, that the essence of man is constituted
by certain modifications of the attributes of God. For (by the last
Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to the essence of
man. That essence therefore (by i. 15) is something which is in God,
and which without God can neither be nor be conceived, whether it
be a modification (i. 25 Coroll.), or a mode which expresses Gods
nature in a certain conditioned manner.
Note.Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
conceived without God. All men agree that God is the one and only
cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence; that
is, God is not only the cause of things in respect to their being
made (secundum fieri), but also in respect to their being (secundum
esse).
At the same time many assert, that that, without which a thing
cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing;
wherefore they believe that either the nature of God appertains to
the essence of created things, or else that created things can be or
be conceived without God; or else, as is more probably the case,
they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think the cause for such
confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the proper order of
philosophic thinking. The nature of God, which should be reflected
on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge and
the order of nature, they have taken to be last in the order of
knowledge, and have put into the first place what they call the
objects of sensation; hence, while they are considering natural
phenomena, they give no attention at all to the divine nature, and,
when afterwards they apply their mind to the study of the divine
nature, they are quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses,
with which they have overlaid the knowledge of natural
phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are no help towards
understanding the Divine nature. So that it is hardly to be
wondered at, that these persons contradict themselves freely.
However, I pass over this point. My intention here was only to give
a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing cannot be
or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing: individual
things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God does not
appertain to their essence. I said that I considered as belonging to
the essence of a thing that, which being given, the thing is
necessarily given also, and which being removed, the thing is
necessarily removed also; or that without which the thing, and
which itself without the thing can neither be nor be conceived. (II.
Def. ii.)
Prop. XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being of
the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually
existing.
Proof.The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.) is

constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely (by
II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II. Ax. iii.) the
idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is given, the other modes
(namely, those of which the idea is prior in nature) must be in the
same individual (by the same Axiom). Therefore an idea is the first
element constituting the human mind. But not the idea of a nonexistent thing, for then (II. viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be
said to exist; it must therefore be the idea of something actually
existing. But not of an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I. xxi.,
xxii.), must always necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve
an absurdity. Therefore the first element, which constitutes the
actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually
existing. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of the

infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human mind
perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has this or
that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is
displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he
constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when we say that
God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he constitutes the
essence of the human mind, but also in so far as he, simultaneously
with the human mind, has the further idea of another thing, we
assert that the human mind perceives a thing in part or
inadequately.
Note.Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and will call
to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate; I therefore
beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and not to
pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the end.
Prop. XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea,
which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the
human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human
mind of the said occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea
constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in
that body without being perceived by the mind.
Proof.Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea, the

knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Coroll.), in so far as
he is considered as affected by the idea of the said object, that is
(II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind of anything. Therefore,
whatsoever takes place in the object constituting the idea of the
human mind, the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God, in so far
as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by II. xi.
Coroll.) the knowledge of the said thing will necessarily be in the
mind, in other words the mind perceives it.
Note.This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly to be
understood from II. vii., which see.
Prop. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is
the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which actually
exists, and nothing else.
Proof.If indeed the body were not the object of the human mind,
the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in God (II.
ix. Coroll.) in virtue of his constituting our mind, but in virtue of his
constituting the mind of something else; that is (II. xi. Coroll.) the
ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in our mind:
now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the ideas of the modifications of
the body. Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human
mind is the body, and the body as it actually exists (II. xi.). Further,
if there were any other object of the idea constituting the mind
besides body, then, as nothing can exist from which some effect
does not follow (I. xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our
mind an idea, which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.);
but (II. Ax. v.) there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of our
mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. Q.E.D.
Note.We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is
united to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind
and body. However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately or
distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the nature of
our body. The propositions we have advanced hitherto have been
entirely general, applying not more to men than to other individual
things, all of which, though in different degrees, are animated.1 For
of everything there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is
the cause, in the same way as there is an idea of the human body;
thus whatever we have asserted of the idea of the human body
must necessarily also be asserted of the idea of everything else.
Still, on the other hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects,
differ one from the other, one being more excellent than another
and containing more reality, just as the object of one idea is more
excellent than the object of another idea, and contains more reality.
Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind differs
from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is necessary
for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of the human body.
What this nature is, I am not able here to explain, nor is it
necessary for the proof of what I advance, that I should do so. I will
only say generally, that in proportion as any given body is more
fitted than others for doing many actions or receiving many
impressions at once, so also is the mind, of which it is the object,
more fitted than others for forming many simultaneous
perceptions; and the more the actions of one body depend on itself
alone, and the fewer other bodies concur with it in action, the more
fitted is the mind of which it is the object for distinct
comprehension. We may thus recognize the superiority of one mind
over others, and may further see the cause, why we have only a
very confused knowledge of our body, and also many kindred
questions, which I will, in the following propositions, deduce from
what has been advanced. Wherefore I have thought it worth while
to explain and prove more strictly my present statements. In order

to do so, I must premise a few propositions concerning the nature
of bodies.
Axiom I. All bodies are either in motion or at rest.
Axiom II. Every body is moved sometimes more slowly, sometimes
more quickly.
Lemma I. Bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of
motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of
substance.
Proof.The first part of this proposition is, I take it, self-evident.

That bodies are not distinguished in respect of substance, is plain
both from I. v. and I. viii. It is brought out still more clearly from I.
xv., note.
Lemma II. All bodies agree in certain respects.
Proof.All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the

conception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.). Further, in
the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly, and may be
absolutely in motion or at rest.
Lemma III. A body in motion or at rest must be determined to
motion or rest by another body, which other body has been
determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third again
by a fourth, and so on to infinity.
Proof.Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which (Lemma I.)
are distinguished one from the other in respect to motion and rest;
thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be determined to motion or
rest by another individual thing, namely (II. vi.), by another body,
which other body is also (Ax. i.) in motion or at rest. And this body
again can only have been set in motion or caused to rest by being
determined by a third body to motion or rest. This third body again
by a fourth, and so on to infinity. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in motion,
until it is determined to a state of rest by some other body; and a
body at rest remains so, until it is determined to a state of motion
by some other body. This is indeed self-evident. For when I suppose,
for instance, that a given body, a, is at rest, and do not take into
consideration other bodies in motion, I cannot affirm anything
concerning the body a, except that it is at rest. If it afterwards
comes to pass that a is in motion, this cannot have resulted from its
having been at rest, for no other consequence could have been
involved than its remaining at rest. If, on the other hand, a be given
in motion, we shall, so long as we only consider a, be unable to

affirm anything concerning it, except that it is in motion. If a is
subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result of
as previous motion, for such motion can only have led to continued
motion; the state of rest therefore must have resulted from
something, which was not in a, namely, from an external cause
determining a to a state of rest.
Axiom I.All modes, wherein one body is affected by another body,

follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected and the
body affecting; so that one and the same body may be moved in
different modes, according to the difference in the nature of the
bodies moving it; on the other hand, different bodies may be moved
in different modes by one and the same body.
Axiom II.When a body in motion impinges on another body at
rest, which it is unable to move, it recoils, in order to continue its
motion, and the angle made by the line of motion in the recoil and
the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving body has
impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line of motion of
incidence and the same plane.
So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies, which
are only distinguished one from the other by motion and rest,
quickness and slowness. We now pass on to compound bodies.
Definition.When any given bodies of the same or different

magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or if
they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so that their
mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certain
fixed relation, we say that such bodies are in union, and that
together they compose one body or individual, which is
distinguished from other bodies by this fact of union.
Axiom III.In proportion as the parts of an individual, or a
compound body, are in contact over a greater or less superficies,
they will with greater or less difficulty admit of being moved from
their position; consequently the individual will, with greater or less
difficulty, be brought to assume another form. Those bodies, whose
parts are in contact over large superficies, are called hard; those,
whose parts are in contact over small superficies, are called soft;
those, whose parts are in motion among one another, are called
fluid.
Lemma IV. If from a body or individual, compounded of several
bodies, certain bodies be separated, and if, at the same time, an
equal number of other bodies of the same nature take their place,
the individual will preserve its nature as before, without any

change in its actuality (forma).
Proof.Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect of
substance: that which constitutes the actuality (formam) of an
individual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of bodies; but this
union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will (by our
hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore, will retain its
nature as before, both in respect of substance and in respect of
mode. Q.E.D.
Lemma V. If the parts composing an individual become greater or
less, but in such proportion, that they all preserve the same mutual
relations of motion and rest, the individual will still preserve its
original nature, and its actuality will not be changed.
Proof.The same as for the last Lemma.

Lemma VI. If certain bodies composing an individual be compelled
to change the motion, which they have in one direction, for motion
in another direction, but in such a manner, that they be able to
continue their motions and their mutual communication in the
same relations as before, the individual will retain its own nature
without any change of its actuality.
Proof.This proposition is self-evident, for the individual is

supposed to retain all that, which, in its definition, we spoke of as
its actual being.
Lemma VII. Furthermore, the individual thus composed preserves
its nature, whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at rest, whether
it be moved in this or that direction; so long as each part retains its
motion, and preserves its communication with other parts as
before.
Proof.This proposition is evident from the definition of an

individual prefixed to Lemma iv.
Note.We thus see, how a composite individual may be affected in
many different ways, and preserve its nature notwithstanding. Thus
far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies only
distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and rest,
speed and slowness; that is, of bodies of the most simple character.
If, however, we now conceive another individual composed of
several individuals of diverse natures, we shall find that the
number of ways in which it can be affected, without losing its
nature, will be greatly multiplied. Each of its parts would consist of
several bodies, and therefore (by Lemma vi.) each part would
admit, without change to its nature, of quicker or slower motion,

and would consequently be able to transmit its motions more
quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts. If we further
conceive a third kind of individuals composed of individuals of this
second kind, we shall find that they may be affected in a still
greater number of ways without changing their actuality. We may
easily proceed thus to infinity, and conceive the whole of nature as
one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways,
without any change in the individual as a whole. I should feel
bound to explain and demonstrate this point at more length, if I
were writing a special treatise on body. But I have already said that
such is not my object, I have only touched on the question, because
it enables me to prove easily that which I have in view.
Postulates.
I. The human body is composed of a number of individual parts, of
diverse nature, each one of which is in itself extremely complex.
II. Of the individual parts composing the human body some are
fluid, some soft, some hard.
III. The individual parts composing the human body, and
consequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety of
ways by external bodies.
IV. The human body stands in need for its preservation of a number
of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak, regenerated.
V. When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an
external body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes the
surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the impression
thereupon of the external body which impels it.
VI. The human body can move external bodies, and arrange them in
a variety of ways.
Prop. XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a great number
of things, and is so in proportion as its body is capable of receiving
a great number of impressions.
Proof.The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in very
many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many ways of
affecting external bodies. But (II. xii.) the human mind must
perceive all that takes place in the human body; the human mind is,
therefore capable of perceiving a great number of things, and is so
in proportion, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human
mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas.
Proof.The idea constituting the actual being of the human mind is

the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is composed of a great
number of complex individual parts. But there is necessarily in God
the idea of each individual part whereof the body is composed (II.
viii. Coroll.); therefore (II. vii.), the idea of the human body is
composed of these numerous ideas of its component parts. Q.E.D.
Prop. XVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body is
affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human
body, and also the nature of the external body.
Proof.All the modes, in which any given body is affected, follow

from the nature of the body affected, and also from the nature of
the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.),
wherefore their idea also necessarily (by I. Ax. iv.) involves the
nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of every mode, in which
the human body is affected by external bodies, involves the nature
of the human body and of the external body. Q.E.D.
Corollary I.Hence it follows, first, that the human mind perceives
the nature of a variety of bodies, together with the nature of its
own.
Corollary II.It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which we have of
external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our own body
than the nature of external bodies. I have amply illustrated this in
the Appendix to Part I.
Prop. XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner which
involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will
regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to
itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to exclude
the existence or the presence of the said external body.
Proof.This proposition is self-evident, for so long as the human

body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human mind (II.
xii.) regard this modification of the bodythat is (by the last Prop.),
it will have the idea of the mode as actually existing, and this idea
involves the nature of the external body. In other words, it will have
the idea which does not exclude, but postulates the existence or
presence of the nature of the external body; therefore the mind (by
II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will regard the external body as actually existing,
until it is affected, &c. Q.E.D.
Corollary.The mind is able to regard as present external bodies,

by which the human body has once been affected, even though they
be no longer in existence or present.
Proof.When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the
human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they
change the surface of the last named (Post. v.); hence (Ax. ii. after
Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in a different
manner from that which they followed before such change; and,
further, when afterwards they impinge on the new surfaces by their
own spontaneous movement, they will be refracted in the same
manner, as though they had been impelled towards those surfaces
by external bodies; consequently, they will, while they continue to
be thus refracted, affect the human body in the same manner,
whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again take cognizancethat is (II.
xvii.), the mind will again regard the external body as present, and
will do so, as often as the fluid parts of the human body impinge on
the aforesaid surfaces by their own spontaneous motion.
Wherefore, although the external bodies, by which the human body
has once been affected, be no longer in existence, the mind will
nevertheless regard them as present, as often as this action of the
body is repeated. Q.E.D.
Note.We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case, that
we regard as present things which are not. It is possible that the
same result may be brought about by other causes; but I think it
suffices for me here to have indicated one possible explanation, just
as well as if I had pointed out the true cause. Indeed, I do not think
I am very far from the truth, for all my assumptions are based on
postulates, which rest, almost without exception, on experience,
that cannot be controverted by those who have shown, as we have,
that the human body, as we feel it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.).
Furthermore (II. vii. Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly
understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of Peter,
which constitutes the essence of Peters mind, and the idea of the
said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The former directly
answers to the essence of Peters own body, and only implies
existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicates rather the
disposition of Pauls body than the nature of Peter, and, therefore,
while this disposition of Pauls body lasts, Pauls mind will regard
Peter as present to itself, even though he no longer exists. Further,
to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications of the human
body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us,
we will call the images of things, though they do not recall the
figure of things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we
say that it imagines. I will here draw attention to the fact, in order
to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the mind,
looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The mind does not
err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded

as being without the idea, which excludes the existence of such
things as it imagines to be present to it. If the mind, while
imagining non-existent things as present to it, is at the same time
conscious that they do not really exist, this power of imagination
must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and not to a fault,
especially if this faculty of imagination depend solely on its own
naturethat is (I. Def. vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free.
Prop. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two or
more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines
any of them, it will straightway remember the others also.
Proof.The mind (II. xvii. Coroll.) imagines any given body,

because the human body is affected and disposed by the
impressions from an external body, in the same manner as it is
affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said external
body; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then so disposed, that
the mind imagined two bodies at once; therefore, it will also in the
second case imagine two bodies at once, and the mind, when it
imagines one, will straightway remember the other. Q.E.D.
Note.We now clearly see what Memory is. It is simply a certain
association of ideas involving the nature of things outside the
human body, which association arises in the mind according to the
order and association of the modifications (affectiones) of the
human body. I say, first, it is an association of those ideas only,
which involve the nature of things outside the human body: not of
ideas which answer to the nature of the said things: ideas of the
modifications of the human body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.),
those which involve the nature both of the human body and of
external bodies. I say, secondly, that this association arises
according to the order and association of the modifications of the
human body, in order to distinguish it from that association of
ideas, which arises from the order of the intellect, whereby the
mind perceives things through their primary causes, and which is
in all men the same. And hence we can further clearly understand,
why the mind from the thought of one thing, should straightway
arrive at the thought of another thing, which has no similarity with
the first; for instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an
apple), a Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the
fruit apple, which has no similitude with the articulate sound in
question, nor anything in common with it, except that the body of
the man has often been affected by these two things; that is, that
the man has often heard the word pomum, while he was looking at
the fruit; similarly every man will go on from one thought to
another, according as his habit has ordered the images of things in
his body. For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the tracks of a
horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of a horse to the
thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought of war, &c.; while
a countryman will proceed from the thought of a horse to the
thought of a plough, a field, &c. Thus every man will follow this or
that train of thought, according as he has been in the habit of
conjoining and associating the mental images of things in this or
that manner.
Prop. XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does
not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications
whereby the body is affected.
Proof.The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the

human body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far as he is
regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing actually
existing: or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the human body stands in need
of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were, continually
regenerated; and the order and connection of ideas is the same as
the order and connection of causes (II. vii.); this idea will therefore
be in God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by the ideas of
very many particular things. Thus God has the idea of the human
body, or knows the human body, in so far as he is affected by very
many other ideas, and not in so far as he constitutes the nature of
the human mind; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.), the human mind does
not know the human body. But the ideas of the modifications of
body are in God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human
mind, or the human mind perceives those modifications (II. xii.),
and consequently (II. xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually
existing; therefore the mind perceives thus far only the human
body. Q.E.D.
Prop. XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God,
following in God in the same manner, and being referred to God in
the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human body.
Proof.Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); therefore (II. iii.)

there must necessarily be in God the idea both of thought itself and
of all its modifications, consequently also of the human mind (II.
xi.). Further, this idea or knowledge of the mind does not follow
from God, in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is affected by
another idea of an individual thing (II. ix.). But (II. vii.) the order
and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of
causes; therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and
is referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of
the body. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same
way as the mind is united to the body.
Proof.That the mind is united to the body we have shown from

the fact, that the body is the object of the mind (II. xii. and xiii.);
and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must be united
with its object, that is, with the mind in the same manner as the
mind is united to the body. Q.E.D.
Note.This proposition is comprehended much more clearly from
what we said in the note to II. vii. We there showed that the idea of
body and body, that is, mind and body (II. xiii.), are one and the
same individual conceived now under the attribute of thought, now
under the attribute of extension; wherefore the idea of the mind
and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived
under one and the same attribute, namely, thought. The idea of the
mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are in God by the same necessity
and follow from him from the same power of thinking. Strictly
speaking, the idea of the mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is
nothing but the distinctive quality (forma) of the idea in so far as it
is conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object;
if a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows
it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and
so on to infinity. But I will treat of this hereafter.
Prop. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications of
the body, but also the ideas of such modifications.
Proof.The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God in the

same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner, as the
ideas of the said modifications. This is proved in the same way as II.
xx. But the ideas of the modifications of the body are in the human
mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence
of the human mind; therefore the ideas of these ideas will be in
God, in so far as he has the knowledge or idea of the human mind,
that is (II. xxi.), they will be in the human mind itself, which
therefore perceives not only the modifications of the body, but also
the ideas of such modifications. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it
perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.
Proof.The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows in God in

the same manner, and is referred to God in the same manner, as
the idea or knowledge of the body. But since (II. xix.) the human
mind does not know the human body itself, that is (II. xi. Coroll.),
since the knowledge of the human body is not referred to God, in so
far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore,
neither is the knowledge of the mind referred to God, in so far as
he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore (by the
same Coroll. II. xi.), the human mind thus far has no knowledge of
itself. Further the ideas of the modifications, whereby the body is

affected, involve the nature of the human body itself (II. xvi.), that
is (II. xiii.), they agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the
knowledge of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the
mind; but (by the last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the
human mind itself; wherefore the human mind thus far only has
knowledge of itself. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXIV.The human mind does not involve an adequate
knowledge of the parts composing the human body.
Proof.The parts composing the human body do not belong to the

essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate their
motions to one another in a certain fixed relation (Def. after Lemma
iii), not in so far as they can be regarded as individuals without
relation to the human body. The parts of the human body are highly
complex individuals (Post. i.), whose parts (Lemma iv.) can be
separated from the human body without in any way destroying the
nature and distinctive quality of the latter, and they can
communicate their motions (Ax. i., after Lemma iii.) to other bodies
in another relation; therefore (II. iii.) the idea or knowledge of each
part will be in God, inasmuch (II. ix.) as he is regarded as affected
by another idea of a particular thing, which particular thing is prior
in the order of nature to the aforesaid part (II. vii.). We may affirm
the same thing of each part of each individual composing the
human body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the
human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many ideas
of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body
only, in other words, the idea which constitutes the nature of the
human mind (II. xiii.); therefore (II. xi. Coroll.), the human mind
does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does
not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.
Proof.We have shown that the idea of a modification of the human

body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as that
external body conditions the human body in a given manner. But, in
so far as the external body is an individual, which has no reference
to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is in God (II. ix.),
in so far as God is regarded as affected by the idea of a further
thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior to the said external body.
Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the external body is not in
God, in so far as he has the idea of the modification of the human
body; in other words, the idea of the modification of the human
body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.
Q.E.D.
Prop. XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body
as actually existing, except through the ideas of the modifications
of its own body.
Proof.If the human body is in no way affected by a given external

body, then (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human body, in other
words, the human mind, affected in any way by the idea of the
existence of the said external body, nor does it any manner
perceive its existence. But, in so far as the human body is affected
in any way by a given external body, thus far (II. xvi. and Coroll.) it
perceives that external body. Q.E.D.
Corollary.In so far as the human mind imagines an external body,
it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.
Proof.When the human mind regards external bodies through the
ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it imagines
(see II. xvii. note); now the mind can only imagine external bodies
as actually existing. Therefore (by II. xxv.), in so far as the mind
imagines external bodies, it has not an adequate knowledge of
them. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body does
not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.
Proof.Every idea of a modification of the human body involves the

nature of the human body, in so far as the human body is regarded
as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.). But, inasmuch as the human
body is an individual which may be affected in many other ways,
the idea of the said modification, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in
so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clear
and distinct, but confused.
Proof.The ideas of the modifications of the human body involve

the nature both of the human body and of external bodies (II. xvi.);
they must involve the nature not only of the human body but also of
its parts; for the modifications are modes (Post. iii.), whereby the
parts of the human body, and, consequently, the human body as a
whole are affected. But (by II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge
of external bodies, as also of the parts composing the human body,
is not in God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by the human
mind, but in so far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas.
These ideas of modifications, in so far as they are referred to the
human mind alone, are as consequences without premisses, in
other words, confused ideas. Q.E.D.
Note.The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind is,
in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in itself
alone, clear and distinct; as also is the case with the idea of the
human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of the
human body, in so far as they are referred to the mind only, as
everyone may easily see.
Prop. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the human
body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind.
Proof.The idea of a modification of the human body (II. xxvii.)

does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body, in other
words, does not adequately express its nature; that is (II. xiii.) it
does not agree with the nature of the mind adequately; therefore (I.
Ax. vi.) the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature
of the human mind, or does not involve an adequate knowledge
thereof.
Corollary.Hence it follows that the human mind, when it
perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an
adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself,
of its own body, and of external bodies. For the mind does not know
itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications
of body (II. xxiii.). It only perceives its own body (II. xix.) through
the ideas of the modifications, and only perceives external bodies
through the same means; thus, in so far as it has such ideas of
modification, it has not an adequate knowledge of itself (II. xxix.),
nor of its own body (II. xxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but
only a fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and
note.) Q.E.D.
Note.I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but only
a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of external bodies,
whenever it perceives things after the common order of nature;
that is, whenever it is determined from without, namely, by the
fortuitous play of circumstance, to regard this or that; not at such
times as it is determined from within, that is, by the fact of
regarding several things at once, to understand their points of
agreement, difference, and contrast. Whenever it is determined in
anywise from within, it regards things clearly and distinctly, as I
will show below.
Prop. XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
duration of our body.
Proof.The duration of our body does not depend on its essence (II.
Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I. xxi.). But (I. xxviii.) it is
conditioned to exist and operate by causes, which in their turn are
conditioned to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation by

other causes, these last again being conditioned by others, and so
on to infinity. The duration of our body therefore depends on the
common order of nature, or the constitution of things. Now,
however a thing may be constituted, the adequate knowledge of
that thing is in God, in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and
not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only. (II. ix.
Coroll.) Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in
God very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as
constituting the nature of the human mind; that is (II. xi. Coroll.),
this knowledge is very inadequate in our mind. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
duration of particular things external to ourselves.
Proof.Every particular thing, like the human body, must be

conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a
fixed and definite relation; this other particular thing must likewise
be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity. (I. xxviii.) As we
have shown in the foregoing proposition, from this common
property of particular things, we have only a very inadequate
knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a similar
conclusion with regard to the duration of particular things, namely,
that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration
thereof. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Hence it follows that all particular things are
contingent and perishable. For we can have no adequate idea of
their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must
understand by the contingency and perishableness of things. (I.
xxxiii., Note i.) For (I. xxix.), except in this sense, nothing is
contingent.
Prop. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are
true.
Proof.All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with their
objects (II. vii. Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are all true. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them
to be called false.
Proof.If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive mode of

thinking, which should constitute the distinctive quality of
falsehood. Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II. xxxii.);
external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. xv.). Therefore
there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to be called
false. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and

perfect, is true.
Proof.When we say that an idea in us is adequate and perfect, we

say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that the idea is adequate and
perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of our mind;
consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such an idea is true. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which
inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.
Proof.There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to be

called false (II. xxxiii); but falsity cannot consist in simple privation
(for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to be mistaken), neither
can it consist in absolute ignorance, for ignorance and error are not
identical; wherefore it consists in the privation of knowledge, which
inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve. Q.E.D.
Note.In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error consists in the
privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more light on the
subject I will give an example. For instance, men are mistaken in
thinking themselves free; their opinion is made up of consciousness
of their own actions, and ignorance of the causes by which they are
conditioned. Their idea of freedom, therefore, is simply their
ignorance of any cause for their actions. As for their saying that
human actions depend on the will, this is a mere phrase without
any idea to correspond thereto. What the will is, and how it moves
the body, they none of them know; those who boast of such
knowledge, and feign dwellings and habitations for the soul, are
wont to provoke either laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look
at the sun, we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred
feet; this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact that,
while we thus imagine, we do not know the suns true distance or
the cause of the fancy. For although we afterwards learn, that the
sun is distant from us more than six hundred of the earths
diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near; for we do not
imagine the sun as near us, because we are ignorant of its true
distance, but because the modification of our body involves the
essence of the sun, in so far as our said body is affected thereby.
Prop. XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same
necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.
Proof.All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they are
referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Coroll.) adequate;
therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate, except in
respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and xxviii.); therefore all
ideas, whether adequate or inadequate, follow by the same

necessity (II. vi.). Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II. above),
and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not constitute
the essence of any particular thing.
Proof.If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it constitutes

the essence of some particular thing; for instance, the essence of b.
Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without b either exist or be conceived;
but this is against our hypothesis. Therefore it does not appertain
to bs essence, nor does it constitute the essence of any particular
thing. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and which
are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except
adequately.
Proof.Let a be something, which is common to all bodies, and

which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the
whole. I say a cannot be conceived except adequately. For the idea
thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II. vii. Coroll.), both in
so far as God has the idea of the human body, and also in so far as
he has the idea of the modifications of the human body, which (II.
xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in part the nature of the human body and
the nature of external bodies; that is (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God
will necessarily be adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the
human mind, and in so far as he has the ideas, which are in the
human mind. Therefore the mind (II. xi. Coroll.) necessarily
perceives a adequately, and has this adequate perception, both in
so far as it perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or
any external body, nor can a be conceived in any other manner.
Q.E.D.
Corollary.Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or notions
common to all men; for (by Lemma ii.) all bodies agree in certain
respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.) must be adequately or
clearly and distinctly perceived by all.
Prop. XXXIX. That, which is common to and a property of the
human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human
body, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in the
whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.
Proof.If a be that, which is common to and a property of the

human body and external bodies, and equally present in the human
body and in the said external bodies, in each part of each external
body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of a in God
(II. vii. Coroll.), both in so far as he has the idea of the human body,
and in so far as he has the ideas of the given external bodies. Let it
now be granted, that the human body is affected by an external
body through that, which it has in common therewith, namely, a;
the idea of this modification will involve the property a (II. xvi.),
and therefore (II. vii. Coroll.) the idea of this modification, in so far
as it involves the property a, will be adequate in God, in so far as
God is affected by the idea of the human body; that is (II. xiii.), in so
far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II.
xi. Coroll.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to perceive

adequately more things, in proportion as its body has more in
common with other bodies.
Prop. XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are
therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.
Proof.This proposition is self-evident. For when we say that an

idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are therein
adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that an idea is in
the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not in so far as he is
infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by the ideas of very many
particular things, but only in so far as he constitutes the essence of
the human mind.
Note I.I have thus set forth the cause of those notions, which are
common to all men, and which form the basis of our ratiocination.
But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions, which it
would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours; for it
would thus appear what notions are more useful than others, and
what notions have scarcely any use at all. Furthermore, we should
see what notions are common to all men, and what notions are only
clear and distinct to those who are unshackled by prejudice, and
we should detect those which are ill-founded. Again we should
discern whence the notions called secondary derived their origin,
and consequently the axioms on which they are founded, and other
points of interest connected with these questions. But I have
decided to pass over the subject here, partly because I have set it
aside for another treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying
the reader by too great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit
anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes,
whence are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being,
Thing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that the human
body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a certain
number of images (what an image is I explained in II. xvii. note)
within itself at the same time; if this number be exceeded, the
images will begin to be confused; if this number of images, which
the body is capable of forming distinctly within itself, be largely

exceeded, all will become entirely confused one with another. This
being so, it is evident (from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll. and xviii.) that the
human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously,
as its body can form images simultaneously. When the images
become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all
bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend
them, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute
of Being, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawn from the
fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from other
analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for the
purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to consider one
only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms represent ideas in
the highest degree confused. From similar causes arise those
notions, which we call general, such as man, horse, dog, &c. They
arise, to wit, from the fact that so many images, for instance, of
men, are formed simultaneously in the human mind, that the
powers of imagination break down, not indeed utterly, but to the
extent of the mind losing count of small differences between
individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and their definite number, and
only distinctly imagining that, in which all the individuals, in so far
as the body is affected by them, agree; for that is the point, in
which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body; this the
mind expresses by the name man, and this it predicates of an
infinite number of particular individuals. For, as we have said, it is
unable to imagine the definite number of individuals. We must,
however, bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed
by all men in the same way, but vary in each individual according
as the point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected
and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For
instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the
stature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal of
erect stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some
other attribute, will form a different general image of man, for
instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal
without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases,
everyone will form general images of things according to the habit
of his body.
It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who seek
to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of them, so
many controversies should have arisen.
Note II.From all that has been said above it is clear, that we, in
many cases, perceive and form our general notions:(1.) From
particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily,
confusedly, and without order through our senses (II. xxix. Coroll.);
I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge
from the mere suggestions of experience.1 (2.) From symbols, e.g.,

from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember
things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those
through which we imagine things (II. xviii. note). I shall call both
these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind, opinion,
or imagination. (3.) From the fact that we have notions common to
all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (II. xxxviii.
Coroll., xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.); this I call reason and knowledge
of the second kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is,
as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we will
call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate
idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the
adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I will illustrate all
three kinds of knowledge by a single example. Three numbers are
given for finding a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second
is to the first. Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by
the third, and divide the product by the first; either because they
have not forgotten the rule which they received from a master
without any proof, or because they have often made trial of it with
simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth
proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the
general property of proportionals.
But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For instance,
one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the fourth
proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we infer the
fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio, which the
first bears to the second.
Prop. XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity,
knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.
Proof.To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the foregoing

note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate and confused;
therefore this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity (II.
xxxv.). Furthermore, we assigned to the second and third kinds of
knowledge those ideas which are adequate; therefore these kinds
are necessarily true (II. xxxiv.). Q.E.D.
Prop. XLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not
knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from
the false.
Proof.This proposition is self-evident. He, who knows how to

distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea of
true and false. That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must know the true and
the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.
Prop. XLIII. He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he
has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing
perceived.
Proof.A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God, in so

far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind (II. xi.
Coroll.). Let us suppose that there is in God, in so far as he is
displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea, a. The idea
of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be referred to him
in the same way as the idea a (by II. xx., whereof the proof is of
universal application). But the idea a is supposed to be referred to
God, in so far as he is displayed through the human mind;
therefore, the idea of the idea a must be referred to God in the
same manner; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.), the adequate idea of the
idea a will be in the mind, which has the adequate idea a; therefore
he, who has an adequate idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.),
must at the same time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of
his knowledge; that is, obviously, he must be assured. Q.E.D.
Note.I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by the idea
of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing proposition is in
itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has a true idea, is ignorant
that a true idea involves the highest certainty. For to have a true
idea is only another expression for knowing a thing perfectly, or as
well as possible. No one, indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks
that an idea is something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not
a mode of thinkingnamely, the very act of understanding. And
who, I ask, can know that he understands anything, unless he do
first understand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of
a thing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what can
there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a
standard of truth? Even as light displays both itself and darkness,
so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.
I think I have thus sufficiently answered these questionsnamely, if
a true idea is distinguished from a false idea, only in so far as it is
said to agree with its object, a true idea has no more reality or
perfection than a false idea (since the two are only distinguished by
an extrinsic mark); consequently, neither will a man who has true
ideas have any advantage over him who has only false ideas.
Further, how comes it that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can
anyone be sure, that he has ideas which agree with their objects?
These questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently
answered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea is
plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is related to the
latter as being is to not-being. The causes of falsity I have set forth
very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv. with the note. From what is there
stated, the difference between a man who has true ideas, and a
man who has only false ideas, is made apparent. As for the last
questionas to how a man can be sure that he has ideas that agree
with their objects, I have just pointed out, with abundant clearness,
that his knowledge arises from the simple fact, that he has an idea
which corresponds with its objectin other words, that truth is its
own standard. We may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives
things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.);
therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as
necessarily true as the ideas of God.
Prop. XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as
contingent, but as necessary.
Proof.It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly (II. xli.),

namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in themselvesthat is (I. xxix.), not
as contingent, but as necessary. Q.E.D.
Corollary I.Hence it follows, that it is only through our
imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the
future or the past, as contingent.
Note.How this way of looking at things arises, I will briefly
explain. We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.) that the mind
always regards things as present to itself, even though they be not
in existence, until some causes arise which exclude their existence
and presence. Further (II. xviii.), we showed that, if the human
body has once been affected by two external bodies simultaneously,
the mind, when it afterwards imagines one of the said external
bodies, will straightway remember the otherthat is, it will regard
both as present to itself, unless there arise causes which exclude
their existence and presence. Further, no one doubts that we
imagine time, from the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved
some more slowly than others, some more quickly, some at equal
speed. Thus, let us suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the
first time in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening;
then, that to-day he again sees Peter in the morning. It is evident,
from II. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he
will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky, as
it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other words, he will
imagine a complete day, and, together with his imagination of the
morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he will imagine Paul;
and with evening, he will imagine Simonthat is, he will imagine
the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to a future time; on the
other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening, he will refer Peter and
Paul to a past time, by imagining them simultaneously with the
imagination of a past time. If it should at any time happen, that on
some other evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he
will, on the following morning, associate with his imagination of
evening sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for

the child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of
them, not both together. His imagination will therefore waver; and,
with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first one,
then the otherthat is, he will imagine them in the future, neither
of them as certain, but both as contingent. This wavering of the
imagination will be the same, if the imagination be concerned with
things which we thus contemplate, standing in relation to time past
or time present: consequently, we may imagine things as
contingent, whether they be referred to time present, past, or
future.
Corollary II.It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under

a certain form of eternity (sub qudam ternitatis specie).
Proof.It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as
contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.). Reason perceives this
necessity of things (II. xli.) trulythat is (I. Ax. vi.), as it is in itself.
But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is the very necessity of the
eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the nature of reason to
regard things under this form of eternity. We may add that the
bases of reason are the notions (II. xxxviii.), which answer to things
common to all, and which (II. xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence
of any particular thing: which must therefore be conceived without
any relation to time, under a certain form of eternity.
Prop. XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing
actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite
essence of God.
Proof.The idea of a particular thing actually existing necessarily

involves both the existence and the essence of the said thing (II.
viii.). Now particular things cannot be conceived without God (I.
xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they have God for their cause, in so
far as he is regarded under the attribute of which the things in
question are modes, their ideas must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.)
the conception of the attribute of those ideasthat is (I. vi.), the
eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.
Note.By existence I do not here mean durationthat is, existence
in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a certain form of
quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is
assigned to particular things, because they follow in infinite
numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal necessity of Gods
nature (I. xvi.). I am speaking, I repeat, of the very existence of
particular things, in so far as they are in God. For although each
particular thing be conditioned by another particular thing to exist
in a given way, yet the force whereby each particular thing
perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of Gods

nature (cf. I. xxiv. Coroll.).
Prop. XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of
God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.
Proof.The proof of the last proposition is universal; and whether a

thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea thereof, whether
of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.), will involve Gods
eternal and infinite essence. Wherefore, that, which gives
knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God, is common to
all, and is equally in the part and in the whole; therefore (II.
xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate. Q.E.D.
Prop. XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the
eternal and infinite essence of God.
Proof.The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II. xxiii.) it
perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and external bodies (II.
xvi. Coroll. I. and II. xvii.) as actually existing; therefore (II. xlv.
xlvi.) it has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite
essence of God. Q.E.D.
Note.Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the eternity of
God are known to all. Now as all things are in God, and are
conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer many
things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that third
kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. xl., and of
the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to speak in
Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as they have of
general notions, because they are unable to imagine God as they do
bodies, and also because they have associated the name God with
images of things that they are in the habit of seeing, as indeed they
can hardly avoid doing, being, as they are, men, and continually
affected by external bodies. Many errors, in truth, can be traced to
this head, namely, that we do not apply names to things rightly. For
instance, when a man says that the lines drawn from the centre of a
circle to its circumference are not equal, he then, at all events,
assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that
assigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make mistakes in
calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and another
on the paper. If we could see into their minds, they do not make a
mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, that they have the
same numbers in their mind as they have on the paper. If this were
not so, we should not believe them to be in error, any more than I
thought that a man was in error, whom I lately heard exclaiming
that his entrance hall had flown into a neighbours hen, for his
meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear. Very many controversies
have arisen from the fact, that men do not rightly explain their
meaning, or do not rightly interpret the meaning of others. For, as a
matter of fact, as they flatly contradict themselves, they assume
now one side, now another, of the argument, so as to oppose the
opinions, which they consider mistaken and absurd in their
opponents.
Prop. XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the
mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also
been determined by another cause, and this last by another cause,
and so on to infinity.
Proof.The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II. xi.),

therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I. xvii. Coroll.
ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolute faculty of positive or
negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it must be determined by a
cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this
last by another, &c. Q.E.D.
Note.In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind no
absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c. Whence it
follows, that these and similar faculties are either entirely fictitious,
or are merely abstract or general terms, such as we are
accustomed to put together from particular things. Thus the
intellect and the will stand in the same relation to this or that idea,
or this or that volition, as lapidity to this or that stone, or as
man to Peter and Paul. The cause which leads men to consider
themselves free has been set forth in the Appendix to Part I. But,
before I proceed further, I would here remark that, by the will to
affirm and decide, I mean the faculty, not the desire. I mean, I
repeat, the faculty, whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true
or false, not the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turns
away from any given thing. After we have proved, that these
faculties of ours are general notions, which cannot be distinguished
from the particular instances on which they are based, we must
inquire whether volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas
of things. We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any
affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as it
is an idea, involves. On which subject see the following proposition,
and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should suggest itself. For by
ideas I do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the
eye, or in the midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought.
Prop. XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and
negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,
involves.
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Proof.There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive or

negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely, this or that
affirmation, and this or that negation. Now let us conceive a
particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking whereby the mind
affirms, that the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two
right angles. This affirmation involves the conception or idea of a
triangle, that is, without the idea of a triangle it cannot be
conceived. It is the same thing to say, that the concept a must
involve the concept b, as it is to say, that a cannot be conceived
without b. Further, this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.)
without the idea of a triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can
neither be nor be conceived, without the idea of a triangle. Again,
this idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely,
that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles.
Wherefore, and vice vers, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor
be conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmation
belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing
besides. What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we have
selected it at random) may be said of any other volition, namely,
that it is nothing but an idea. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Will and understanding are one and the same.
Proof.Will and understanding are nothing beyond the individual
volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note). But a particular volition and
a particular idea are one and the same (by the foregoing Prop.);
therefore, will and understanding are one and the same. Q.E.D.
Note.We have thus removed the cause which is commonly
assigned for error. For we have shown above, that falsity consists
solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas which are
fragmentary and confused. Wherefore, a false idea, inasmuch as it
is false, does not involve certainty. When we say, then, that a man
acquiesces in what is false, and that he has no doubts on the
subject, we do not say that he is certain, but only that he does not
doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false, inasmuch as there are
no reasons, which should cause his imagination to waver (see II.
xliv. note). Thus, although the man be assumed to acquiesce in
what is false, we shall never say that he is certain. For by certainty
we mean something positive (II. xliii. and note), not merely the
absence of doubt.
However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully
explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and I will
furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced against
our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple, I have
thought it worth while to point out some of the advantages, which

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follow therefrom. I say some, for they will be better appreciated

from what we shall set forth in the fifth part.
I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to make an
accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of the mind,
and the images of things which we imagine. It is further necessary
that they should distinguish between idea and words, whereby we
signify things. These threenamely, images, words, and ideasare
by many persons either entirely confused together, or not
distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care, and hence people
are generally in ignorance, how absolutely necessary is a
knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for philosophic
purposes and for the wise ordering of life. Those who think that
ideas consist in images which are formed in us by contact with
external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas of those things,
whereof we can form no mental picture, are not ideas, but only
figments, which we invent by the free decree of our will; they thus
regard ideas as though they were inanimate pictures on a panel,
and, filled with this misconception, do not see that an idea,
inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an affirmation or negation.
Again, those who confuse words with ideas, or with the affirmation
which an idea involves, think that they can wish something
contrary to what they feel, affirm, or deny. This misconception will
easily be laid aside by one, who reflects on the nature of
knowledge, and seeing that it in no wise involves the conception of
extension, will therefore clearly understand, that an idea (being a
mode of thinking) does not consist in the image of anything, nor in
words. The essence of words and images is put together by bodily
motions, which in no wise involve the conception of thought.
These few words on this subject will suffice: I will therefore pass on
to consider the objections, which may be raised against our
doctrine. Of these, the first is advanced by those, who think that
the will has a wider scope than the understanding, and that
therefore it is different therefrom. The reason for their holding the
belief, that the will has wider scope than the understanding, is that
they assert, that they have no need of an increase in their faculty of
assent, that is of affirmation or negation, in order to assent to an
infinity of things which we do not perceive, but that they have need
of an increase in their faculty of understanding. The will is thus
distinguished from the intellect, the latter being finite and the
former infinite. Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems
to teach us especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our
judgment before assenting to things which we perceive; this is
confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as
he perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.

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For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not therefore

admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not deceived, unless
he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist. Nothing
therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience, than that
the will or faculty of assent is free and different from the faculty of
understanding. Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation
does not apparently contain more reality than another; in other
words, that we do not seem to need for affirming, that what is true
is true, any greater power than for affirming, that what is false is
true. We have, however, seen that one idea has more reality or
perfection than another, for as objects are some more excellent
than others, so also are the ideas of them some more excellent than
others; this also seems to point to a difference between the
understanding and the will. Fourthly, it may be objected, if man
does not act from free will, what will happen if the incentives to
action are equally balanced, as in the case of Buridans ass? Will he
perish of hunger and thirst? If I say that he would, I shall seem to
have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather than an
actual man. If I say that he would not, he would then determine his
own action, and would consequently possess the faculty of going
and doing whatever he liked. Other objections might also be raised,
but, as I am not bound to put in evidence everything that anyone
may dream, I will only set myself to the task of refuting those I
have mentioned, and that as briefly as possible.
To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a wider
scope than the understanding, if by the understanding be meant
only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will has a wider
scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of forming conceptions;
nor do I see why the faculty of volition should be called infinite, any
more than the faculty of feeling: for, as we are able by the same
faculty of volition to affirm an infinite number of things (one after
the other, for we cannot affirm an infinite number simultaneously),
so also can we, by the same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in
succession) an infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is
an infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,
that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,
consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be urged, if
God wished to bring it about that we should perceive them, he
would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of perception,
but not a greater faculty of volition than we have already. This is
the same as to say that, if God wished to bring it about that we
should understand an infinite number of other entities, it would be
necessary for him to give us a greater understanding, but not a
more universal idea of entity than that which we have already, in
order to grasp such infinite entities. We have shown that will is a
universal entity or idea, whereby we explain all particular

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volitionsin other words, that which is common to all such

volitions.
As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or
universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be wondered at
that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself into the infinite,
beyond the limits of the understanding: for what is universal is
predicated alike of one, of many, and of an infinite number of
individuals.
To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a free
power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that anyone
suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he does
not perceive the matter in question adequately. Suspension of
judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and not free
will. In order to illustrate the point, let us suppose a boy imagining
a horse, and perceiving nothing else. Inasmuch as this imagination
involves the existence of the horse (II. xvii. Coroll.), and the boy
does not perceive anything which would exclude the existence of
the horse, he will necessarily regard the horse as present: he will
not be able to doubt of its existence, although he be not certain
thereof. We have daily experience of such a state of things in
dreams; and I do not suppose that there is anyone, who would
maintain that, while he is dreaming, he has the free power of
suspending his judgment concerning the things in his dream, and
bringing it about that he should not dream those things, which he
dreams that he sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in
dreams we suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we
are dreaming.
Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as actual
perception extendsthat is, I grant that the minds imaginations,
regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II. xvii., note); but I
deny, that a man does not, in the act of perception, make any
affirmation. For what is the perception of a winged horse, save
affirming that a horse has wings? If the mind could perceive
nothing else but the winged horse, it would regard the same as
present to itself: it would have no reasons for doubting its
existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless the imagination of a
winged horse be joined to an idea which precludes the existence of
the said horse, or unless the mind perceives that the idea which it
possesses of a winged horse is inadequate, in which case it will
either necessarily deny the existence of such a horse, or will
necessarily be in doubt on the subject.
I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third objection,
namely, that the will is something universal which is predicated of
all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is common to all

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ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate essence must,

therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the abstract, be in
every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the same in all, not in so
far as it is considered as constituting the ideas essence: for, in this
respect, particular affirmations differ one from the other, as much
as do ideas. For instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of
a circle, differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle, as
much as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.
Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal power of
thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and to affirm that
that which is false is true. These two affirmations, if we regard the
mind, are in the same relation to one another as being and notbeing; for there is nothing positive in ideas, which constitutes the
actual reality of falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).
We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when we
confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason and
abstractions with realities. As for the fourth objection, I am quite
ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium described
(namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst, a certain food
and a certain drink, each equally distant from him) would die of
hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether such an one should not
rather be considered an ass than a man; I answer, that I do not
know, neither do I know how a man should be considered, who
hangs himself, or how we should consider children, fools, madmen,
&c.
It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this
doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered
from what has been said. The doctrine is good,
1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the decree of
God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so much the
more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and more
understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely tranquillizes
our spirit, but also shows us where our highest happiness or
blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of God, whereby we
are led to act only as love and piety shall bid us. We may thus
clearly understand, how far astray from a true estimate of virtue
are those who expect to be decorated by God with high rewards for
their virtue, and their best actions, as for having endured the direst
slavery; as if virtue and the service of God were not in itself
happiness and perfect freedom.
2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselves
with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which are not in our
own power, and do not follow from our nature. For it shows us, that

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we should await and endure fortunes smiles or frowns with an

equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of
God by the same necessity, as it follows from the essence of a
triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles.
3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to hate
no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be angry with
any. Further, as it tells us that each should be content with his own,
and helpful to his neighbour, not from any womanish pity, favour, or
superstition, but solely by the guidance of reason, according as the
time and occasion demand, as I will show in Part III.
4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the
commonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and
led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do
whatsoever things are best.
I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this note,
and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a close. I think I
have therein explained the nature and properties of the human
mind at sufficient length, and, considering the difficulty of the
subject, with sufficient clearness. I have laid a foundation, whereon
may be raised many excellent conclusions of the highest utility and
most necessary to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly
made plain.

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PART III.
ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE
EMOTIONS.
MOST writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be
treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural
phenomena following natures general laws. They appear to
conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a
kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows
natures order, that he has absolute control over his actions, and
that he is determined solely by himself. They attribute human
infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in general, but
to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which accordingly
they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens, abuse: he,
who succeeds in hitting of the weakness of the human mind more
eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is looked upon as a
seer. Still there has been no lack of very excellent men (to whose
toil and industry I confess myself much indebted), who have written
many noteworthy things concerning the right way of life, and have
given much sage advice to mankind. But no one, so far as I know,
has defined the nature and strength of the emotions, and the power
of the mind against them for their restraint.
I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he believed,
that the mind has absolute power over its actions, strove to explain
human emotions by their primary causes, and, at the same time, to
point out a way, by which the mind might attain to absolute
dominion over them. However, in my opinion, he accomplishes
nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own great
intellect, as I will show in the proper place. For the present I wish
to revert to those, who would rather abuse or deride human
emotions than understand them. Such persons will, doubtless think
it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and folly
geometrically, and should wish to set forth with rigid reasoning
those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason,
frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. However, such is my plan. Nothing
comes to pass in nature, which can be set down to a flaw therein;
for nature is always the same, and everywhere one and the same in
her efficacy and power of action; that is, natures laws and
ordinances, whereby all things come to pass and change from one
form to another, are everywhere and always the same; so that there
should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of
all things whatsoever, namely, through natures universal laws and
rules. Thus the passions of hatred, anger, envy, and so on,
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considered in themselves, follow from this same necessity and

efficacy of nature; they answer to certain definite causes, through
which they are understood, and possess certain properties as
worthy of being known as the properties of anything else, whereof
the contemplation in itself affords us delight. I shall, therefore,
treat of the nature and strength of the emotions according to the
same method, as I employed heretofore in my investigations
concerning God and the mind. I shall consider human actions and
desires in exactly the same manner, as though I were concerned
with lines, planes, and solids.
Definitions.
I. By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its effect
can be clearly and distinctly perceived. By an inadequate or partial
cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, its effect cannot be
understood.
II. I say that we act when anything takes place, either within us or
externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; that is (by the
foregoing definition) when through our nature something takes
place within us or externally to us, which can through our nature
alone be clearly and distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say
that we are passive as regards something when that something
takes place within us, or follows from our nature externally, we
being only the partial cause.
III. By emotion I mean the modifications of the body, whereby the
active power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or
constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications.
N.B. If we can be the adequate cause of any of these modifications,
I then call the emotion an activity, otherwise I call it a passion, or
state wherein the mind is passive.
Postulates.
I. The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its
power of activity is increased or diminished, and also in other ways
which do not render its power of activity either greater or less.
N.B. This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and Lemmas v.
and vii., which see after II. xiii.
II. The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless,
retain the impressions or traces of objects (cf. II. Post. v.), and,
consequently, the same images of things (see note II. xvii.).

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Prop. I. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases

passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily active,
and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive.
Proof.In every human mind there are some adequate ideas, and
some ideas that are fragmentary and confused (II. xl. note). Those
ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also in God,
inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl. Coroll.),
and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise (by the
same Coroll.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as he contains in
himself the essence of the given mind alone, but as he, at the same
time, contains the minds of other things. Again, from any given idea
some effect must necessarily follow (I. 36); of this effect God is the
adequate cause (III. Def. i.), not inasmuch as he is infinite, but
inasmuch as he is conceived as affected by the given idea (II. ix.).
But of that effect whereof God is the cause, inasmuch as he is
affected by an idea which is adequate in a given mind, of that
effect, I repeat, the mind in question is the adequate cause (II. xi.
Coroll.). Therefore our mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas (III.
Def. ii.), is in certain cases necessarily active; this was our first
point. Again, whatsoever necessarily follows from the idea which is
adequate in God, not by virtue of his possessing in himself the mind
of one man only, but by virtue of his containing, together with the
mind of that one man, the minds of other things also, of such an
effect (II. xi. Coroll.) the mind of the given man is not an adequate,
but only a partial cause; thus (III. Def. ii.) the mind, inasmuch as it
has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases necessarily passive; this
was our second point. Therefore our mind, &c. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Hence it follows that the mind is more or less liable to
be acted upon, in proportion as it possesses inadequate ideas, and,
contrariwise, is more or less active in proportion as it possesses
adequate ideas.
Prop. II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind
determine body to motion or rest or any state different from these,
if such there be.
Proof.All modes of thinking have for their cause God, by virtue of

his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of his being displayed
under any other attribute (II. vi.). That, therefore, which
determines the mind to thought is a mode of thought, and not a
mode of extension; that is (II. Def. i.), it is not body. This was our
first point. Again, the motion and rest of a body must arise from
another body, which has also been determined to a state of motion
or rest by a third body, and absolutely everything which takes place
in a body must spring from God, in so far as he is regarded as
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thought (II. vi.); that is, it cannot spring from the mind, which is a
mode of thought. This was our second point. Therefore body cannot
determine mind, &c. Q.E.D.
Note.This is made more clear by what was said in the note to II.
vii., namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing,
conceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under the
attribute of extension. Thus it follows that the order or
concatenation of things is identical, whether nature be conceived
under the one attribute or the other; consequently the order of
states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in nature
with the order of states of activity and passivity in the mind. The
same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we proved II.
xii.
Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though there be no
further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe, until the fact is
proved by experience, that men can be induced to consider the
question calmly and fairly, so firmly are they convinced that it is
merely at the bidding of the mind, that the body is set in motion or
at rest, or performs a variety of actions depending solely on the
minds will or the exercise of thought. However, no one has hitherto
laid down the limits to the powers of the body, that is, no one has as
yet been taught by experience what the body can accomplish solely
by the laws of nature, in so far as she is regarded as extension. No
one hitherto has gained such an accurate knowledge of the bodily
mechanism, that he can explain all its functions; nor need I call
attention to the fact that many actions are observed in the lower
animals, which far transcend human sagacity, and that
somnambulists do many things in their sleep, which they would not
venture to do when awake: these instances are enough to show,
that the body can by the sole laws of its nature do many things
which the mind wonders at.
Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the
body, nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the
body, nor how quickly it can move it. Thus, when men say that this
or that physical action has its origin in the mind, which latter has
dominion over the body, they are using words without meaning, or
are confessing in specious phraseology that they are ignorant of
the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at it.
But, they will say, whether we know or do not know the means
whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at any rate,
experience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit state to
think, the body remains inert. Moreover, we have experience, that
the mind alone can determine whether we speak or are silent, and
a variety of similar states which, accordingly, we say depend on the

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minds decree. But, as to the first point, I ask such objectors,

whether experience does not also teach, that if the body be inactive
the mind is simultaneously unfitted for thinking? For when the body
is at rest in sleep, the mind simultaneously is in a state of torpor
also, and has no power of thinking, such as it possesses when the
body is awake. Again, I think everyones experience will confirm
the statement, that the mind is not at all times equally fit for
thinking on a given subject, but according as the body is more or
less fitted for being stimulated by the image of this or that object,
so also is the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said
object.
But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the laws of
nature considered as extended substance, we should be able to
deduce the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of that kind,
which are produced only by human art; nor would the human body,
unless it were determined and led by the mind, be capable of
building a single temple. However, I have just pointed out that the
objectors cannot fix the limits of the bodys power, or say what can
be concluded from a consideration of its sole nature, whereas they
have experience of many things being accomplished solely by the
laws of nature, which they would never have believed possible
except under the direction of mind: such are the actions performed
by somnambulists while asleep, and wondered at by their
performers when awake. I would further call attention to the
mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses in complexity
all that has been put together by human art, not to repeat what I
have already shown, namely, that from nature, under whatever
attribute she be considered, infinite results follow. As for the
second objection, I submit that the world would be much happier, if
men were as fully able to keep silence as they are to speak.
Experience abundantly shows that men can govern anything more
easily than their tongues, and restrain anything more easily than
their appetites; whence it comes about that many believe, that we
are only free in respect to objects which we moderately desire,
because our desire for such can easily be controlled by the thought
of something else frequently remembered, but that we are by no
means free in respect to what we seek with violent emotion, for our
desire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance of anything
else. However, unless such persons had proved by experience that
we do many things which we afterwards repent of, and again that
we often, when assailed by contrary emotions, see the better and
follow the worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing
that we are free in all things. Thus an infant believes that of its own
free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely
desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires to
run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the
free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would

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willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous

woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe that they
speak from the free decision of their mind, when they are in reality
unable to restrain their impulse to talk. Experience teaches us no
less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be free,
simply because they are conscious of their actions, and
unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined;
and, further, it is plain that the dictates of the mind are but another
name for the appetites, and therefore vary according to the varying
state of the body. Everyone shapes his actions according to his
emotion, those who are assailed by conflicting emotions know not
what they wish; those who are not attacked by any emotion are
readily swayed this way or that. All these considerations clearly
show that a mental decision and a bodily appetite, or determined
state, are simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing,
which we call decision, when it is regarded under and explained
through the attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when it is
regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the
laws of motion and rest. This will appear yet more plainly in the
sequel. For the present I wish to call attention to another point,
namely, that we cannot act by the decision of the mind, unless we
have a remembrance of having done so. For instance, we cannot
say a word without remembering that we have done so. Again, it is
not within the free power of the mind to remember or forget a
thing at will. Therefore the freedom of the mind must in any case
be limited to the power of uttering or not uttering something which
it remembers. But when we dream that we speak, we believe that
we speak from a free decision of the mind, yet we do not speak, or,
if we do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the body. Again, we dream
that we are concealing something, and we seem to act from the
same decision of the mind as that, whereby we keep silence when
awake concerning something we know. Lastly, we dream that from
the free decision of our mind we do something, which we should
not dare to do when awake.
Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two sorts
of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free? If our folly
does not carry us so far as this, we must necessarily admit, that the
decision of the mind, which is believed to be free, is not
distinguishable from the imagination or memory, and is nothing
more than the affirmation, which an idea, by virtue of being an
idea, necessarily involves (II. xlix.). Wherefore these decisions of
the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity, as the ideas of
things actually existing. Therefore those who believe, that they
speak or keep silence or act in any way from the free decision of
their mind, do but dream with their eyes open.

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Prop. III. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate
ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on inadequate
ideas.
Proof.The first element, which constitutes the essence of the

mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent body (II.
xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is compounded of many other ideas,
whereof some are adequate and some inadequate (II. xxix. Coroll.,
II. xxxviii. Coroll). Whatsoever therefore follows from the nature of
mind, and has mind for its proximate cause, through which it must
be understood, must necessarily follow either from an adequate or
from an inadequate idea. But in so far as the mind (III. i.) has
inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive: wherefore the activities
of the mind follow solely from adequate ideas, and accordingly the
mind is only passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas. Q.E.D.
Note.Thus we see, that passive states are not attributed to the
mind, except in so far as it contains something involving negation,
or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature, which cannot be
clearly and distinctly perceived through itself without other parts: I
could thus show, that passive states are attributed to individual
things in the same way that they are attributed to the mind, and
that they cannot otherwise be perceived, but my purpose is solely
to treat of the human mind.
Prop. IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external to
itself.
Proof.This proposition is self-evident, for the definition of

anything affirms the essence of that thing, but does not negative it;
in other words, it postulates the essence of the thing, but does not
take it away. So long therefore as we regard only the thing itself,
without taking into account external causes, we shall not be able to
find in it anything which could destroy it. Q.E.D.
Prop. V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the
same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the other.
Proof.If they could agree together or co-exist in the same object,

there would then be in the said object something which could
destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is absurd,
therefore things, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist
in its own being.
Proof.Individual things are modes whereby the attributes of God

are expressed in a given determinate manner (I. xxv. Coroll.); that

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is (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express in a given determinate

manner the power of God, whereby God is and acts; now no thing
contains in itself anything whereby it can be destroyed, or which
can take away its existence (III. iv.); but contrariwise it is opposed
to all that could take away its existence (III. v.). Therefore, in so far
as it can, and in so far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist in its
own being. Q.E.D.
Prop. VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence of
the thing in question.
Proof.From the given essence of any thing certain consequences

necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.), nor have things any power save such
as necessarily follows from their nature as determined (I. xxix.);
wherefore the power of any given thing, or the endeavour whereby,
either alone or with other things, it acts, or endeavours to act, that
is (III. vi.), the power or endeavour, wherewith it endeavours to
persist in its own being, is nothing else but the given or actual
essence of the thing in question. Q.E.D.
Prop. VIII. The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist in
its being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.
Proof.If it involved a limited time, which should determine the

duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from that power
whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not exist beyond the
limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed; but this (III. iv.) is
absurd. Wherefore the endeavour wherewith a thing exists involves
no definite time; but, contrariwise, since (III. iv.) it will by the same
power whereby it already exists always continue to exist, unless it
be destroyed by some external cause, this endeavour involves an
indefinite time.
Prop. IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas,
and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist in
its being for an indefinite period, and of this endeavour it is
conscious.
Proof.The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and

inadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so far as it
possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the latter, it
endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for an indefinite
time (III. viii.). Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is necessarily conscious
of itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body, the mind
is therefore (III. vii.) conscious of its own endeavour.

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Note.This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is called

will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it is called
appetite; it is, in fact, nothing else but mans essence, from the
nature of which necessarily follow all those results which tend to its
preservation; and which man has thus been determined to perform.
Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference, except
that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as they
are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly be thus
defined: Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof. It is thus
plain from what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish
for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but
on the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive
for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it.
Prop. X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body, cannot
be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.
Proof.Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be postulated

therein (III. v.). Therefore neither can the idea of such a thing occur
in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II. ix. Coroll.); that
is (II. xi. xiii.), the idea of that thing cannot be postulated as in our
mind, but contrariwise, since (II. xi. xiii.) the first element, that
constitutes the essence of the mind, is the idea of the human body
as actually existing, it follows that the first and chief endeavour of
our mind is the endeavour to affirm the existence of our body: thus,
an idea, which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary to
our mind, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the
power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or
diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.
Proof.This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II. xiv.

Note.Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes, and
can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes to a
state of lesser perfection. These passive states of transition explain
to us the emotions of pleasure and pain. By pleasure therefore in
the following propositions I shall signify a passive state wherein the
mind passes to a greater perfection. By pain I shall signify a
passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection.
Further, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mind
together I shall call stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas),
the emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or
melancholy. But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and
suffering are attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more
affected than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts

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are alike affected. What I mean by desire I have explained in the

note to Prop. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no
other primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other
emotions arise from these three. But, before I go further, I should
like here to explain at greater length Prop. x. of this part, in order
that we may clearly understand how one idea is contrary to
another. In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the idea, which
constitutes the essence of mind, involves the existence of body, so
long as the body itself exists. Again, it follows from what we
pointed out in the Coroll. to II. viii., that the present existence of
our mind depends solely on the fact, that the mind involves the
actual existence of the body. Lastly, we showed (II. xvii. xviii. and
note) that the power of the mind, whereby it imagines and
remembers things, also depends on the fact, that it involves the
actual existence of the body. Whence it follows, that the present
existence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed, as
soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body.
Now the cause, why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the
body, cannot be the mind itself (III. iv.), nor again the fact that the
body ceases to exist. For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms
the existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist;
therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the
existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but (II.
xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes the
present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind, and
which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essence of
our mind.
Prop. XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive those
things, which increase or help the power of activity in the body.
Proof.So long as the human body is affected in a mode, which

involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will
regard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and consequently
(II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an external body as
present, that is (II. xvii. note), conceives it, the human body is
affected in a mode, which involves the nature of the said external
body; thus so long as the mind conceives things, which increase or
help the power of activity in our body, the body is affected in modes
which increase or help its power of activity (III. Post i.);
consequently (III. xi.) the minds power of thinking is for that
period increased or helped. Thus (III. vi. ix.) the mind, as far as it
can, endeavours to imagine such things. Q.E.D.
Prop. XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminishor
hinder the bodys power of activity, it endeavours, as far as
possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the
first-named things.

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Proof.So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind alluded

to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or constrained (cf.
III. xii. Proof); nevertheless it will continue to conceive it, until the
mind conceives something else, which excludes the present
existence thereof (II. xvii.); that is (as I have just shown), the power
of the mind and of the body is diminished, or constrained, until the
mind conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the
former thing conceived: therefore the mind (III. ix.), as far as it can,
will endeavour to conceive or remember the latter. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Hence it follows, that the mind shrinks from conceiving
those things, which diminish or constrain the power of itself and of
the body.
Note.From what has been said we may clearly understand the
nature of Love and Hate. Love is nothing else but pleasure
accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing else
but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. We further
see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have, and to keep
present to him, the object of his love; while he who hates
endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred. But I
will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.
Prop. XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at
the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of
the two, be also affected by the other.
Proof.If the human body has once been affected by two bodies at
once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it will
straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.). But the minds
conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than the
nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.); therefore, if the body,
and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been once affected by
two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards
affected by one of the two, be also affected by the other.
Prop. XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain,
or desire.
Proof.Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously affected

by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor diminishes its
power of activity, and the other does either increase or diminish the
said power (III. Post. i.). From the foregoing proposition it is
evident that, whenever the mind is afterwards affected by the
former, through its true cause, which (by hypothesis) neither
increases nor diminishes its power of action, it will be at the same
time affected by the latter, which does increase or diminish its
power of activity, that is (III. xi. note) it will be affected with

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pleasure or pain. Thus the former of the two emotions will, not
through itself, but accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain. In
the same way also it can be easily shown, that a thing may be
accidentally the cause of desire. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing with

the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not the
efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate it.
Proof.For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that the mind
afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with the emotion of
pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note), according as the power of the
mind and body may be increased or diminished, &c.; and
consequently (III. xii.), according as the mind may desire or shrink
from the conception of it (III. xiii. Coroll.), in other words (III. xiii.
note), according as it may love or hate the same. Q.E.D.
Note.Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or
hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us;
merely, as the phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy. We should
refer to the same category those objects, which affect us
pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other
objects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in the next
Prop. I am aware that certain authors, who were the first to
introduce these terms sympathy and antipathy, wished to
signify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I think
we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known or
manifest qualities.
Prop. XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given
object has some point of resemblance with another objectwhich is
wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the point
of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions, we
shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate.
Proof.The point of resemblance was in the object (by hypothesis),

when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus (III. xiv.), when the
mind is affected by the image thereof, it will straightway be
affected by one or the other emotion, and consequently the thing,
which we perceive to have the same point of resemblance, will be
accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of pleasure or pain. Thus (by the
foregoing Corollary), although the point in which the two objects
resemble one another be not the efficient cause of the emotion, we
shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate. Q.E.D.
Prop. XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect us
painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing which is
wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we

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shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shall love
it.
Proof.The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause of pain,
and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with this emotion, we
shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceive that it has some
point of resemblance to something else, which is wont to affect us
with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall with an
equally strong impulse of pleasure love it (III. xvi.); thus we shall
both hate and love the same thing. Q.E.D.
Note.This disposition of the mind, which arises from two contrary
emotions, is called vacillation; it stands to the emotions in the same
relation as doubt does to the imagination (II. xliv. note); vacillation
and doubt do not differ one from the other, except as greater differs
from less. But we must bear in mind that I have deduced this
vacillation from causes, which give rise through themselves to one
of the emotions, and to the other accidentally. I have done this, in
order that they might be more easily deduced from what went
before; but I do not deny that vacillation of the disposition
generally arises from an object, which is the efficient cause of both
emotions. The human body is composed (II. Post. i.) of a variety of
individual parts of different nature, and may therefore (Ax. i. after
Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) be affected in a variety of different ways by
one and the same body; and contrariwise, as one and the same
thing can be affected in many ways, it can also in many different
ways affect one and the same part of the body. Hence we can easily
conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause of many
and conflicting emotions.
Prop. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by
the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing
present.
Proof.So long as a man is affected by the image of anything, he

will regard that thing as present, even though it be non-existent (II.
xvii. and Coroll.), he will not conceive it as past or future, except in
so far as its image is joined to the image of time past or future (II.
xliv. note). Wherefore the image of a thing, regarded in itself alone,
is identical, whether it be referred to time past, time future, or time
present; that is (II. xvi. Coroll.), the disposition or emotion of the
body is identical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or
present. Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same, whether
the image be of a thing past or future. Q.E.D.
Note I.I call a thing past or future, according as we either have
been or shall be affected thereby. For instance, according as we
have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has recreated

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us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us, or will harm
us. For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its existence; that is, the
body is affected by no emotion which excludes the existence of the
thing, and therefore (II. xvii.) the body is affected by the image of
the thing, in the same way as if the thing were actually present.
However, as it generally happens that those, who have had many
experiences, vacillate, so long as they regard a thing as future or
past, and are usually in doubt about its issue (II. xliv. note); it
follows that the emotions which arise from similar images of things
are not so constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of
other things, until men become assured of the issue.
Note II.From what has just been said, we understand what is

meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence Despair, Joy, and
Disappointment.1Hope is nothing else but an inconstant pleasure,
arising from the image of something future or past, whereof we do
not yet know the issue. Fear, on the other hand, is an inconstant
pain also arising from the image of something concerning which we
are in doubt. If the element of doubt be removed from these
emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear becomes Despair. In
other words, Pleasure or Pain arising from the image of something
concerning which we have hoped or feared. Again, Joy is Pleasure
arising from the image of something past whereof we doubted the
issue. Disappointment is the Pain opposed to Joy.
Prop. XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed
will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved he will feel
pleasure.
Proof.The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to conceive those

things which increase or help the bodys power of activity (III. xii.);
in other words (III. xii. note), those things which it loves. But
conception is helped by those things which postulate the existence
of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered by those which exclude the
existence of a thing (II. xvii.); therefore the images of things, which
postulate the existence of an object of love, help the minds
endeavour to conceive the object of love, in other words (III. xi.
note), affect the mind pleasurably; contrariwise those things, which
exclude the existence of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid
mental endeavour; in other words, affect the mind painfully. He,
therefore, who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will
feel pain, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed
will feel pleasure.
Proof.The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive those things,

which exclude the existence of things whereby the bodys power of

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activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III. xiii. note), it

endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the existence of
what it hates; therefore the image of a thing, which excludes the
existence of what the mind hates, helps the aforesaid mental effort,
in other words (III. xi. note), affects the mind pleasurably. Thus he
who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will feel
pleasure. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXI. He who conceives, that the object of his love is affected
pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected pleasurably or
painfully; and the one or the other emotion will be greater or less in
the lover according as it is greater or less in the thing loved.
Proof.The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.) which

postulate the existence of the object of love, help the minds
endeavour to conceive the said object. But pleasure postulates the
existence of something feeling pleasure, so much the more in
proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater; for it is (III. xi.
note) a transition to a greater perfection; therefore the image of
pleasure in the object of love helps the mental endeavour of the
lover; that is, it affects the lover pleasurably, and so much the
more, in proportion as this emotion may have been greater in the
object of love. This was our first point. Further, in so far as a thing
is affected with pain, it is to that extent destroyed, the extent being
in proportion to the amount of pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III.
xix.) he who conceives, that the object of his love is affected
painfully, will himself be affected painfully, in proportion as the said
emotion is greater or less in the object of love. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some
object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards that thing.
Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an object of our love
painfully, we shall be affected with hatred towards it.
Proof.He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of our

love, affects us also pleasurably or painfullythat is, if we conceive
the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or pain (III. xxi.).
But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come to us accompanied
by the idea of an external cause; therefore (III. xiii. note), if we
conceive that anyone affects an object of our love pleasurably or
painfully, we shall be affected with love or hatred towards him.
Q.E.D.
Note.Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of Pity, which we may
define as pain arising from anothers hurt. What term we can use
for pleasure arising from anothers gain, I know not.

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We will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on another,
Approval; and the hatred towards him who injures another, we will
call Indignation. We must further remark, that we not only feel pity
for a thing which we have loved (as shown in III. xxi.), but also for a
thing which we have hitherto regarded without emotion, provided
that we deem that it resembles ourselves (as I will show presently).
Thus, we bestow approval on one who has benefited anything
resembling ourselves, and, contrariwise, are indignant with him
who has done it an injury.
Prop. XXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is
painfully affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he thinks that
the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel pain. Each of
these emotions will be greater or less, according as its contrary is
greater or less in the object of hatred.
Proof.In so far as an object of hatred is painfully affected, it is

destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the strength of the pain (III.
xi. note). Therefore, he (III. xx.) who conceives, that some object of
his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure, to an extent
proportioned to the amount of pain he conceives in the object of his
hatred. This was our first point. Again, pleasure postulates the
existence of the pleasurably affected thing (III. xi. note), in
proportion as the pleasure is greater or less. If anyone imagines
that an object of his hatred is pleasurably affected, this conception
(III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour to persist; in other words
(III. xi. note), he who hates will be painfully affected. Q.E.D.
Note.This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and without
any mental conflict. For (as I am about to show in Prop. xxvii.), in so
far as a man conceives that something similar to himself is affected
by pain, he will himself be affected in like manner; and he will have
the contrary emotion in contrary circumstances. But here we are
regarding hatred only.
Prop. XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object
of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards himalso. If we conceive
that he painfully affects the said object, we shall feel love towards
him.
Proof.This proposition is proved in the same way as III. xxii.,

which see.
Note.These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable to
envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so far as it is
regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in anothers hurt, and to
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Prop. XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and

concerning what we love, everything that we conceive to affect
pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object. Contrariwise, we
endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect
painfully ourselves or the loved object.
Proof.That, which we conceive to affect an object of our love

pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably or painfully (III.
xxi.). But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as far as possible, to
conceive those things which affect us pleasurably; in other words
(II. xvii. and Coroll.), it endeavours to regard them as present. And,
contrariwise (III. xiii.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of
such things as affect us painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm
concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever
we conceive to affect ourselves, or the loved object pleasurably.
Q.E.D.
Prop. XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we
hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and,
contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything
which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.
Proof.This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the foregoing

proposition followed from III. xxi.
Note.Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may
easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and,
contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This feeling is called
pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of himself, and
is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with his eyes open,
thinking that he can accomplish all things that fall within the scope
of his conception, and thereupon accounting them real, and
exulting in them, so long as he is unable to conceive anything
which excludes their existence, and determines his own power of
action. Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing from a man thinking
too highly of himself. Again, the pleasure which arises from a man
thinking too highly of another is called over-esteem. Whereas the
pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man is called
disdain.
Prop. XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like
ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion, to be
affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like
emotion (affectus).
Proof.The images of things are modifications of the human body,

whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to us (II.
xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the ideas involve the nature of

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our body, and, at the same time, the nature of external bodies as
present. If, therefore, the nature of the external body be similar to
the nature of our body, then the idea which we form of the external
body will involve a modification of our own body similar to the
modification of the external body. Consequently, if we conceive
anyone similar to ourselves as affected by any emotion, this
conception will express a modification of our body similar to that
emotion. Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to
be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like
emotion. If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we
shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not similar,
emotion. Q.E.D.
Note I.This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to pain, is

called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is referred to desire,
it is called emulation, which is nothing else but the desire of
anything, engendered in us by the fact that we conceive that others
have the like desire.
Corollary I.If we conceive that anyone, whom we have hitherto
regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something similar to
ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him. If, on the
other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the same, we shall
be affected with hatred towards him.
Proof.This is proved from the last proposition in the same manner
as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.
Corollary II.We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because its
misery affects us painfully.
Proof.If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice in its
pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.
Corollary III.We seek to free from misery, as far as we can, a
thing which we pity.
Proof.That, which painfully affects the object of our pity, affects
us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition); therefore,
we shall endeavour to recall everything which removes its
existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii.); in other words (III. ix.
note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we shall be determined for its
destruction; thus, we shall endeavour to free from misery a thing
which we pity. Q.E.D.
Note II.This will or appetite for doing good, which arises from
pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is called
benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from

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compassion. Concerning love or hate towards him who has done

good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like ourselves,
see III. xxii. note.
Prop. XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive
to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or destroy
whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to
conduce to pain.
Proof.We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive that which we

imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in other words (II. xvii.)
we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as possible as present or
actually existing. But the endeavour of the mind, or the minds
power of thought, is equal to, and simultaneous with, the
endeavour of the body, or the bodys power of action. (This is clear
from II. vii. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.). Therefore we make an
absolute endeavour for its existence, in other words (which by III.
ix. note come to the same thing) we desire and strive for it; this
was our first point. Again, if we conceive that something, which we
believed to be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we
hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.). We shall, therefore (by
the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy the same, or (III.
xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may not regard it as present;
this was our second point. Wherefore whatsoever conduces to
pleasure, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoeverwe conceive
men1to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink
from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.
Proof.From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate anything,

we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.). That is (III. xiii.
note), from this mere fact we shall feel pleasure or pain at the
things presence. And so we shall endeavour to do whatever we
conceive men to love or regard with pleasure, etc. Q.E.D.
Note.This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely in
order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so
eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit certain
things to our own or anothers hurt: in other cases it is generally
called kindliness. Furthermore I give the name of praise to the
pleasure, with which we conceive the action of another, whereby he
has endeavoured to please us; but of blame to the pain wherewith
we feel aversion to his action.
Prop. XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives as
affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure,
accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he

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will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has done
anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully, he will
regard himself with pain.
Proof.He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure or
pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with pleasure or
pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II. xix. and xxiii.) is conscious of
himself through the modifications whereby he is determined to
action, it follows that he who conceives, that he affects others
pleasurably, will be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea
of himself as cause; in other words, will regard himself with
pleasure. And so mutatis mutandis in the case of pain. Q.E.D.
Note.As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an
external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of an
external cause; the pleasure and pain in question will be a species
of love and hatred. But, as the terms love and hatred are used in
reference to external objects, we will employ other names for the
emotions now under discussion: pleasure accompanied by the idea
of an external cause1 we will style Honour, and the emotion
contrary thereto we will style Shame: I mean in such cases as
where pleasure or pain arises from a mans belief, that he is being
praised or blamed: otherwise pleasure accompanied by the idea of
an external cause is called self-complacency, and its contrary pain
is called repentance. Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Coroll.) that
the pleasure, wherewith a man conceives that he affects others,
may exist solely in his own imagination, and as (III. xxv.) everyone
endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives
will affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a vain
man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all, when
in reality he may be an annoyance to all.
Prop. XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates
anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall
thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love,
&c. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from
something that we love, we shall undergo vacillation of soul.
Proof.From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves

anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.): but we are
assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, a new cause of love,
whereby our former emotion is fostered; hence we shall thereupon
love it more steadfastly. Again, from the mere fact of conceiving
that anyone shrinks from anything, we shall ourselves shrink from
that thing (III. xxvii.). If we assume that we at the same time love it,
we shall then simultaneously love it and shrink from it; in other
words, we shall be subject to vacillation (III, xvii. note). Q.E.D.

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Corollary.From the foregoing, and also from III. xxviii. it follows

that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause others to
love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself hates: as
the poet says: As lovers let us share every hope and every fear:
ironhearted were he who should love what the other leaves.2
Note.This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes and
dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really ambition (see
III. xxix. note); wherefore we see that everyone by nature desires
(appetere), that the rest of mankind should live according to his
own individual disposition: when such a desire is equally present in
all, everyone stands in everyone elses way, and in wishing to be
loved or praised by all, all become mutually hateful.
Prop. XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something,
which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour to bring it
about that the man in question shall not gain possession thereof.
Proof.From the mere fact of our conceiving that another person

takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Coroll.) we shall ourselves
love that thing and desire to take delight therein. But we assumed
that the pleasure in question would be prevented by anothers
delight in its object; we shall, therefore, endeavour to prevent his
possession thereof (III. xxviii.). Q.E.D.
Note.We thus see that mans nature is generally so constituted,
that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies those who fare
well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his own love for the
goods in their possession. Further, we see that from the same
property of human nature, whence it follows that men are merciful,
it follows also that they are envious and ambitious. Lastly, if we
make appeal to Experience, we shall find that she entirely confirms
what we have said; more especially if we turn our attention to the
first years of our life. We find that children, whose body is
continually, as it were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because
they see others laughing or crying; moreover, they desire forthwith
to imitate whatever they see others doing, and to possess
themselves whatever they conceive as delighting others: inasmuch
as the images of things are, as we have said, modifications of the
human body, or modes wherein the human body is affected and
disposed by external causes to act in this or that manner.
Prop. XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves we
endeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love us in
return.
Proof.That which we love we endeavour, as far as we can, to

conceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.). If the thing be

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similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it pleasurably in

preference to anything else (III. xxix.). In other words, we shall
endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it about, that the thing should
be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourselves,
that is (III. xiii. note), that it should love us in return. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a
loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our
complacency.
Proof.We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, to bring about,

that what we love should love us in return: in other words, that
what we love should be affected with pleasure accompanied by the
idea of ourself as cause. Therefore, in proportion as the loved
object is more pleasurably affected because of us, our endeavour
will be assisted.that is (III. xi. and note) the greater will be our
pleasure. But when we take pleasure in the fact, that we
pleasurably affect something similar to ourselves, we regard
ourselves with pleasure (III. 30); therefore the greater the emotion
with which we conceive a loved object to be affected, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love joins
itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself has
attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards the loved object
and with envy towards his rival.
Proof.In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved object is well

affected towards him, will be the strength of his self-approval (by
the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note), of his pleasure; he will,
therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour, as far as he can, to imagine the
loved object as most closely bound to him: this endeavour or desire
will be increased, if he thinks that someone else has a similar
desire (III. xxxi.). But this endeavour or desire is assumed to be
checked by the image of the loved object in conjunction with the
image of him whom the loved object has joined to itself; therefore
(III. xi. note) he will for that reason be affected with pain,
accompanied by the idea of the loved object as a cause in
conjunction with the image of his rival; that is, he will be (III. xiii.)
affected with hatred towards the loved object and also towards his
rival (III. xv. Coroll.), which latter he will envy as enjoying the
beloved object. Q.E.D.
Note.This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy is
called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a wavering of
the disposition arising from combined love and hatred,
accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied. Further, this
hatred towards the object of love will be greater, in proportion to
the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont to derive from

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the reciprocated love of the said object; and also in proportion to

the feelings he had previously entertained towards his rival. If he
had hated him, he will forthwith hate the object of his love, because
he conceives it is pleasurably affected by one whom he himself
hates: and also because he is compelled to associate the image of
his loved one with the image of him whom he hates. This condition
generally comes into play in the case of love for a woman: for he
who thinks, that a woman whom he loves prostitutes herself to
another, will feel pain, not only because his own desire is
restrained, but also because, being compelled to associate the
image of her he loves with the parts of shame and the excreta of
another, he therefore shrinks from her.
We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved with
the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives him pain
as a lover, as I will now show.
Prop. XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once
taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances
as when he first took delight therein.
Proof.Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction with the

object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of pleasure
(III. xv.); he will, therefore, desire to possess it, in conjunction with
that wherein he has taken delight; in other words, he will desire to
possess the object of his love under the same circumstances as
when he first took delight therein. Q.E.D.
Corollary.A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of the aforesaid
attendant circumstances be missing.
Proof.For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to be missing,
he conceives something which excludes its existence. As he is
assumed to be desirous for loves sake of that thing or
circumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he conceives it
to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.). Q.E.D.
Note.This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence of the
object of love, is called Regret.
Prop. XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or
love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.
Proof.Pain diminishes or constrains mans power of activity (III.

xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes or constrains the
effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in his own being;
therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said endeavour: thus all the
endeavours of a man affected by pain are directed to removing that

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pain. But (by the definition of pain), in proportion as the pain is

greater, so also is it necessarily opposed to a greater part of mans
power of activity; therefore the greater the pain, the greater the
power of activity employed to remove it; that is, the greater will be
the desire or appetite in endeavouring to remove it. Again, since
pleasure (III. xi. note) increases or aids a mans power of activity, it
may easily be shown in like manner, that a man affected by
pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it, and his desire
will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure.
Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain and
pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour, appetite, or
desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be greater in
proportion to the hatred or love. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, so
that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal,
regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and his
hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love.
Proof.If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more of his
appetites are put under restraint than if he had never loved it. For
love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man endeavours as far as
he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.); he does so by regarding
the object of his love as present, and by affecting it as far as he can
pleasurably; this endeavour is greater in proportion as the love is
greater, and so also is the endeavour to bring about that the
beloved should return his affection (III. xxxiii.). Now these
endeavours are constrained by hatred towards the object of love
(III. xiii. Coroll. and III. xxiii.); wherefore the lover (III. xi. note) will
for this cause also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion
as his love has been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused
by hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the
object; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater
pain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never loved
it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former love was
greater. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an
injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue to
himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the same
law, seek to benefit him.
Proof.To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him as a cause

of pain; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to remove or
destroy him. But if anything more painful, or, in other words, a
greater evil, should accrue to the hater therebyand if the hater
thinks he can avoid such evil by not carrying out the injury, which

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he planned against the object of his hatehe will desire to abstain

from inflicting that injury (III. xxviii.), and the strength of his
endeavour (III. xxxvii.) will be greater than his former endeavour to
do injury, and will therefore prevail over it, as we asserted. The
second part of this proof proceeds in the same manner. Wherefore
he who hates another, etc. Q.E.D.
Note.By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all that
conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our longings,
whatsoever they may be. By evil, I mean every kind of pain,
especially that which frustrates our longings. For I have shown (III.
ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because we deem it good,
but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because we desire it:
consequently we deem evil that which we shrink from; everyone,
therefore, according to his particular emotions, judges or estimates
what is good, what is bad, what is better, what is worse, lastly, what
is best, and what is worst. Thus a miser thinks that abundance of
money is the best, and want of money the worst; an ambitious man
desires nothing so much as glory, and fears nothing so much as
shame. To an envious man nothing is more delightful than anothers
misfortune, and nothing more painful than anothers success. So
every man, according to his emotions, judges a thing to be good or
bad, useful or useless. The emotion, which induces a man to turn
from that which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from,
is called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear
whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as
future by encountering a lesser evil (III. xxviii.). But if the evil
which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness. Lastly, if
the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the fear of another
evil, so that the man knows not which to choose, fear becomes
consternation, especially if both the evils feared be very great.
Prop. XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and
believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate that
other in return.
Proof.He who conceives another as affected with hatred, will

thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III. xxvii.), that is, with
pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But, by the
hypothesis, he conceives no cause for this pain except him who is
his enemy; therefore, from conceiving that he is hated by some one,
he will be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of his
enemy; in other words, he will hate his enemy in return. Q.E.D.
Note.He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred will
(III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame; but this case (III. xxv.)
rarely happens. This reciprocation of hatred may also arise from
the hatred, which follows an endeavour to injure the object of our

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hate (III. xxxix.). He therefore who conceives that he is hated by

another will conceive his enemy as the cause of some evil or pain;
thus he will be affected with pain or fear, accompanied by the idea
of his enemy as cause; in other words, he will be affected with
hatred towards his enemy, as I said above.
Corollary I.He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates him,
will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. For, in so far as he
conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is determined to hate
his enemy in return. But, by the hypothesis, he nevertheless loves
him: wherefore he will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.
Corollary II.If a man conceives that one, whom he has hitherto
regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from motives of
hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in kind.
Proof.He who conceives, that another hates him, will (by the last
proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.) will endeavour
to recall everything which can affect him painfully; he will
moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.). Now the first
thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury done to himself;
he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to repay it in kind. Q.E.D.
Note.The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called Anger;
the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves is called
Revenge.
Prop. XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and
believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love that
other in return. (Cf. III. xv. Coroll., and III. xvi.)
Proof.This proposition is proved in the same way as the preceding

one. See also the note appended thereto.
Note.If he believes that he has given just cause for the love, he
will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note); this is what most often
happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its contrary took place
whenever a man conceives himself to be hated by another. (See
note to preceding proposition.) This reciprocal love, and
consequently the desire of benefiting him who loves us (III. xxxix.),
and who endeavours to benefit us, is called gratitude or
thankfulness. It thus appears that men are much more prone to
take vengeance than to return benefits.
Corollary.He who imagines, that he is loved by one whom he
hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. This is proved in
the same way as the first corollary of the preceding proposition.

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Note.If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavour to

injure him who loves him; this emotion is called cruelty, especially
if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary cause for hatred.
Prop. XLII. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives
of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the benefit is
received without gratitude.
Proof.When a man loves something similar to himself, he

endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should be
loved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.). Therefore he who has
conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which he
feels of being loved in return; that is (III. xxxiv.) from the hope of
honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure; hence he will endeavour, as far
as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or to regard it as
actually existing. But, by the hypothesis, he conceives something
else, which excludes the existence of the said cause of honour:
wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III. xix.). Q.E.D.
Prop. XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on
the other hand be destroyed by love.
Proof.He who conceives, that an object of his hate hates him in

return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the former hatred
(by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.). But if, on the other hand, he
conceives that the object of hate loves him, he will to this extent
(III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure, and (III. xxix.) will
endeavour to please the cause of his emotion. In other words, he
will endeavour not to hate him (III. xli.), and not to affect him
painfully; this endeavour (III. xxxvii.) will be greater or less in
proportion to the emotion from which it arises. Therefore, if it be
greater than that which arises from hatred, and through which the
man endeavours to affect painfully the thing which he hates, it will
get the better of it and banish the hatred from his mind. Q.E.D.
Prop. XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes
into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not
preceded it.
Proof.The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop. xxxviii. of this

Part: for he who begins to love a thing, which he was wont to hate
or regard with pain, from the very fact of loving feels pleasure. To
this pleasure involved in love is added the pleasure arising from aid
given to the endeavour to remove the pain involved in hatred (III.
xxxvii.), accompanied by the idea of the former object of hatred as
cause.

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Note.Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate anything,

or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying this greater
pleasure; that is, no one will desire that he should be injured, in the
hope of recovering from the injury, nor long to be ill for the sake of
getting well. For everyone will always endeavour to persist in his
being, and to ward off pain as far as he can. If the contrary is
conceivable, namely, that a man should desire to hate someone, in
order that he might love him the more thereafter, he will always
desire to hate him. For the strength of the love is in proportion to
the strength of the hatred, wherefore the man would desire, that
the hatred be continually increased more and more, and, for a
similar reason, he would desire to become more and more ill, in
order that he might take a greater pleasure in being restored to
health: in such a case he would always endeavour to be ill, which
(III. vi.) is absurd.
Prop. XLV. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself hates
anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will hate that
person.
Proof.The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him who

hates it (III. xl.); therefore the lover, in conceiving that anyone
hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing as affected by
hatred, in other words (III. xiii.), by pain; consequently he is
himself affected by pain accompanied by the idea of the hater of
the beloved thing as cause; that is, he will hate him who hates
anything which he himself loves (III. xiii. note). Q.E.D.
Prop. XLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by
anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if the
pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said
stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or
nation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the individual
stranger, but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs.
Proof.This is evident from III. xvi.

Prop. XLVII. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is
destroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by a
certain pain in us.
Proof.This is evident from III. xxvii. For in so far as we conceive a

thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain, we ourselves
feel pain.
Note.This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary to II.
xvii. Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not actually
exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is affected in the

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same manner; wherefore, in so far as the remembrance of the thing

is strong, a man is determined to regard it with pain; this
determination, while the image of the thing in question lasts, is
indeed checked by the remembrance of other things excluding the
existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not destroyed: hence, a man
only feels pleasure in so far as the said determination is checked:
for this reason the joy arising from the injury done to what we hate
is repeated, every time we remember that object of hatred. For, as
we have said, when the image of the thing in question is aroused,
inasmuch as it involves the things existence, it determines the man
to regard the thing with the same pain as he was wont to do, when
it actually did exist. However, since he has joined to the image of
the thing other images, which exclude its existence, this
determination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoices
afresh as often as the repetition takes place. This is the cause of
mens pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight in narrating
dangers from which they have escaped. For when men conceive a
danger, they conceive it as still future, and are determined to fear
it; this determination is checked afresh by the idea of freedom,
which became associated with the idea of the danger when they
escaped therefrom: this renders them secure afresh: therefore they
rejoice afresh.
Prop. XLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is
destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain
involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of
another cause: and will be diminished in proportion as we conceive
Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion.
Proof.This Prop. is evident from the mere definition of love and

hatred (III. xiii. note). For pleasure is called love towards Peter, and
pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply in so far as Peter is
regarded as the cause of one emotion or the other. When this
condition of causality is either wholly or partly removed, the
emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part vanishes. Q.E.D.
Prop. XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to
be free, must, other conditions being similar, begreater than if it
were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.
Proof.A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def. vii.) be

perceived through itself without anything else. If, therefore, we
conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we shall therefore (III.
xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall do so with the utmost love or
hatred that can arise from the given emotion. But if the thing which
causes the emotion be conceived as acting by necessity, we shall
then (by the same Def. vii. Part I.) conceive it not as the sole cause,

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but as one of the causes of the emotion, and therefore our love or
hatred towards it will be less. Q.E.D.
Note.Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to be free,

feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards
anything else: to this consideration we must add the imitation of
emotions treated of in III. xxvii. xxxiv. xl. and xliii.
Prop. L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or
fear.
Proof.This proposition is proved in the same way as III. xv., which

see, together with the note to III. xviii.
Note.Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or fear are
called good or evil omens. Now, in so far as such omens are the
cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of hope and fear
given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of pleasure and pain;
consequently we, to this extent, regard them with love or hatred,
and endeavour either to invoke them as means towards that which
we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles, or causes of that
which we fear. It follows, further, from III. xxv., that we are
naturally so constituted as to believe readily in that which we hope
for, and with difficulty in that which we fear; moreover, we are apt
to estimate such objects above or below their true value. Hence
there have arisen superstitions, whereby men are everywhere
assailed. However, I do not think it worth while to point out here
the vacillations springing from hope and fear; it follows from the
definition of these emotions, that there can be no hope without fear,
and no fear without hope, as I will duly explain in the proper place.
Further, in so far as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with
love or hatred; thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear
what we have said concerning love and hatred.
Prop. LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same
object, and the same man may be differently affected at different
times by the same object.
Proof.The human body is affected by external bodies in a variety

of ways (II. Post. iii.). Two men may therefore be differently
affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. i. after Lemma iii.
after II. xiii.) may be differently affected by one and the same
object. Further (by the same Post.) the human body can be affected
sometimes in one way, sometimes in another; consequently (by the
same Axiom) it may be differently affected at different times by one
and the same object. Q.E.D.

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Note.We thus see that it is possible, that what one man loves
another may hate, and that what one man fears another may not
fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he once
hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on. Again,
as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good, what
bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it follows that
mens judgments may vary no less than their emotions,1 hence
when we compare some with others, we distinguish them solely by
the diversity of their emotions, and style some intrepid, others
timid, others by some other epithet. For instance, I shall call a man
intrepid, if he despises an evil which I am accustomed to fear; if I
further take into consideration, that, in his desire to injure his
enemies and to benefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by
the fear of an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him
daring. Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears an evil
which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further take into
consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil,
which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that he is
cowardly; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment.
Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human judgment,
inasmuch as a man often judges of things solely by his emotions,
and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause pleasure or
pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent, are often
purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of things alluded
to in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that a man may be at one
time affected with pleasure, and at another with pain, accompanied
by the idea of himself as cause. Thus we can easily understand
what are Repentance and Self-complacency, Repentance is pain,
accompanied by the idea of ones self as cause; Self-complacency is
pleasure accompanied by the idea of ones self as cause, and these
emotions are most intense because men believe themselves to be
free (III. xlix.).
Prop. LII. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction
with others, and which we do not conceive to have any property
that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so long,
as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar to
itself.
Proof.As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in

conjunction with others, we at once remember those others (II.
xviii. and note), and thus we pass forthwith from the contemplation
of one object to the contemplation of another object. And this is the
case with the object, which we conceive to have no property that is
not common to many. For we thereupon assume that we are
regarding therein nothing, which we have not before seen in
conjunction with other objects. But when we suppose that we

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conceive in an object something special, which we have never seen

before, we must needs say that the mind, while regarding that
object, has in itself nothing which it can fall to regarding instead
thereof; therefore it is determined to the contemplation of that
object only. Therefore an object, &c. Q.E.D.
Note.This mental modification, or imagination of a particular

thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called Wonder; but if it
be excited by an object of fear, it is called Consternation, because
wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed in the simple
contemplation thereof, that he has no power to think of anything
else whereby he might avoid the evil. If, however, the object of
wonder be a mans prudence, industry, or anything of that sort,
inasmuch as the said man is thereby regarded as far surpassing
ourselves, wonder is called Veneration; otherwise, if a mans anger,
envy, &c., be what we wonder at, the emotion is called Horror.
Again, if it be the prudence, industry, or what not, of a man we
love, that we wonder at, our love will on this account be the greater
(III. xii.), and when joined to wonder or veneration is called
Devotion. We may in like manner conceive hatred, hope,
confidence, and the other emotions, as associated with wonder; and
we should thus be able to deduce more emotions than those which
have obtained names in ordinary speech. Whence it is evident, that
the names of the emotions have been applied in accordance rather
with their ordinary manifestations than with an accurate
knowledge of their nature.
To wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises from the
fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or fearing
something, or because something, at first sight, appears to be like
things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, &c., we are, in
consequence (III. xv. Coroll. and iii. xxvii.), determined to wonder
at, love, or fear that thing. But if from the presence, or more
accurate contemplation of the said thing, we are compelled to deny
concerning it all that can be the cause of wonder, love, fear, &c.,
the mind then, by the presence of the thing, remains determined to
think rather of those qualities which are not in it, than of those
which are in it; whereas, on the other hand, the presence of the
object would cause it more particularly to regard that which is
therein. As devotion springs from wonder at a thing which we love,
so does Derision spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or
fear, and Scorn from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder
at prudence. Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope,
honour, &c., in association with contempt, and can thence deduce
other emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by
any recognized name.

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Prop. LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of
activity, it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in proportion
to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power
of activity.
Proof.A man does not know himself except through the

modifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and xxiii.).
When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate itself, it is thereby
assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or (III. xi. note) to feel
pleasure; and the pleasure will be greater in proportion to the
distinctness, wherewith it is able to conceive itself and its own
power of activity. Q.E.D.
Corollary.This pleasure is fostered more and more, in proportion
as a man conceives himself to be praised by others. For the more
he conceives himself as praised by others, the more will he imagine
them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
himself (III. xxix. note); thus he is (III. xxvii.) himself affected with
greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself. Q.E.D.
Prop. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as
assert its power of activity.
Proof.The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual essence

thereof (III. vii.); but the essence of the mind obviously only affirms
that which the mind is and can do; not that which it neither is nor
can do; therefore the mind endeavours to conceive only such things
as assert or affirm its power of activity. Q.E.D.
Prop. LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels
pain thereat.
Proof.The essence of the mind only affirms that which the mind
is, or can do; in other words, it is the minds nature to conceive
only such things as assert its power of activity (last Prop.). Thus,
when we say that the mind contemplates its own weakness, we are
merely saying that while the mind is attempting to conceive
something which asserts its power of activity, it is checked in its
endeavourin other words (III. xi. note), it feels pain. Q.E.D.
Corollary.This pain is more and more fostered, if a man conceives
that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in the same way as
the corollary to III. liii.
Note.This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness, is
called humility; the pleasure, which springs from the contemplation
of ourselves, is called self-love or self-complacency. And inasmuch
as this feeling is renewed as often as a man contemplates his own

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virtues, or his own power of activity, it follows that everyone is fond

of narrating his own exploits, and displaying the force both of his
body and mind, and also that, for this reason, men are troublesome
one to another. Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III.
xxiv. note, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomings of their
equals, and feeling pain at their virtues. For whenever a man
conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III. liii.), in
proportion as his actions display more perfection, and he conceives
them more distinctlythat is (II. xl. note), in proportion as he can
distinguish them from others, and regard them as something
special. Therefore, a man will take most pleasure in contemplating
himself, when he contemplates some quality which he denies to
others. But, if that which he affirms of himself be attributable to the
idea of man or animals in general, he will not be so greatly pleased:
he will, on the contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own
actions fall short when compared with those of others. This pain
(III. xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong
construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he can,
embellishing his own.
It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred and envy,
which latter is fostered by their education. For parents are
accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely by the spur of
honour and envy. But, perhaps, some will scruple to assent to what
I have said, because we not seldom admire mens virtues, and
venerate their possessors. In order to remove such doubts, I
append the following corollary.
Corollary.No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his equal.
Proof.Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or (III. xiii. note)
pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification whereby a mans power of
activity, or endeavour towards activity, is checked. But a man does
not endeavour or desire to do anything, which cannot follow from
his nature as it is given; therefore a man will not desire any power
of activity or virtue (which is the same thing) to be attributed to
him, that is appropriate to anothers nature and foreign to his own;
hence his desire cannot be checked, nor he himself pained by the
contemplation of virtue in some one unlike himself, consequently
he cannot envy such an one. But he can envy his equal, who is
assumed to have the same nature as himself. Q.E.D.
Note.When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii., we
venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude, &c., we
do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar to him,
and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no more envy
their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions for being
courageous.

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Prop. LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire,

and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations of
spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear, &c.,
as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected.
Proof.Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions

compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or passive
states (III. xi. note); now we are necessarily passive (III. i.), in so
far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in so far as we have such
ideas are we passive (III. iii.); that is, we are only necessarily
passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we conceive, or (II. xvii. and note)
in so far as we are affected by an emotion, which involves the
nature of our own body, and the nature of an external body.
Wherefore the nature of every passive state must necessarily be so
explained, that the nature of the object whereby we are affected be
expressed. Namely, the pleasure, which arises from, say, the object
a, involves the nature of that object a, and the pleasure, which
arises from the object b, involves the nature of the object b;
wherefore these two pleasurable emotions are by nature different,
inasmuch as the causes whence they arise are by nature different.
So again the emotion of pain, which arises from one object, is by
nature different from the pain arising from another object, and,
similarly, in the case of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation, &c.
Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain, love,
hatred, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected.
Now desire is each mans essence or nature, in so far as it is
conceived as determined to a particular action by any given
modification of itself (III. ix. note); therefore, according as a man is
affected through external causes by this or that kind of pleasure,
pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words, according as his nature is
disposed in this or that manner, so will his desire be of one kind or
another, and the nature of one desire must necessarily differ from
the nature of another desire, as widely as the emotions differ,
wherefrom each desire arose. Thus there are as many kinds of
desire, as there are kinds of pleasure, pain, love, &c., consequently
(by what has been shown) there are as many kinds of desire, as
there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected. Q.E.D.
Note.Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last proposition,

must be very numerous, the chief are luxury, drunkenness, lust,
avarice, and ambition, being merely species of love or desire,
displaying the nature of those emotions in a manner varying
according to the object, with which they are concerned. For by
luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition, &c., we simply mean
the immoderate love of feasting, drinking, venery, riches, and fame.
Furthermore, these emotions, in so far as we distinguish them from
others merely by the objects wherewith they are concerned, have

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no contraries. For temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are

wont to oppose to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions
or passive states, but indicate a power of the mind which
moderates the last-named emotions. However, I cannot here
explain the remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are as
numerous as the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be
necessary. It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine the
strength of the emotions, and the minds power over them, to have
a general definition of each emotion. It is sufficient, I repeat, to
understand the general properties of the emotions and the mind, to
enable us to determine the quality and extent of the minds power
in moderating and checking the emotions. Thus, though there is a
great difference between various emotions of love, hatred, or
desire, for instance between love felt towards children, and love
felt towards a wife, there is no need for us to take cognizance of
such differences, or to track out further the nature and origin of the
emotions.
Prop. LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the
emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of the
one individual differs from the essence of the other.
Proof.This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which see after

Lemma iii. Prop. xiii. Part ii.). Nevertheless, we will prove it from
the nature of the three primary emotions.
All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain, as their
definitions above given show. But desire is each mans nature or
essence (III. ix. note); therefore desire in one individual differs from
desire in another individual, only in so far as the nature or essence
of the one differs from the nature or essence of the other. Again,
pleasure and pain are passive states or passions, whereby every
mans power or endeavour to persist in his being is increased or
diminished, helped or hindered (III. xi. and note). But by the
endeavour to persist in its being, in so far as it is attributable to
mind and body in conjunction, we mean appetite and desire (III. ix.
note); therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or
appetite, in so far as by external causes they are increased or
diminished, helped or hindered, in other words, they are every
mans nature; wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man
differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in so far
as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the essence of
the other; consequently, any emotion of one individual only differs,
&c. Q.E.D.
Note.Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals which are

called irrational (for after learning the origin of mind we cannot
doubt that brutes feel) only differ from mans emotions, to the

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extent that brute nature differs from human nature. Horse and man
are alike carried away by the desire of procreation; but the desire
of the former is equine, the desire of the latter is human. So also
the lusts and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary
according to the several natures. Thus, although each individual
lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein
he has his being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices,
is nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and
hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of another,
to the extent that the essence of one differs from the essence of
another. Lastly, it follows from the foregoing proposition, that there
is no small difference between the joy which actuates, say, a
drunkard, and the joy possessed by a philosopher, as I just mention
here by the way. Thus far I have treated of the emotions
attributable to man, in so far as he is passive. It remains to add a
few words on those attributable to him in so far as he is active.
Prop. LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or
passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and
desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.
Proof.When the mind conceives itself and its power of activity, it

feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind necessarily contemplates
itself, when it conceives a true or adequate idea (II. xliii). But the
mind does conceive certain adequate ideas (II. xl. note 2).
Therefore, it feels pleasure in so far as it conceives adequate ideas;
that is, in so far as it is active (III. i). Again, the mind, both in so far
as it has clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused
ideas, endeavours to persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such
an endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.);
therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we
understand, or (III. i.) in so far as we are active. Q.E.D.
Prop. LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as
active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or pain.
Proof.All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, or pain, as

their definitions, already given, show. Now by pain we mean that
the minds power of thinking is diminished or checked (III. xi. and
note); therefore, in so far as the mind feels pain, its power of
understanding, that is, of activity, is diminished or checked (III. i.);
therefore, no painful emotions can be attributed to the mind in
virtue of its being active, but only emotions of pleasure and desire,
which (by the last Prop.) are attributable to the mind in that
condition. Q.E.D.
Note.All actions following from emotion, which are attributable to
the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set down to strength of

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character (fortitudo), which I divide into courage (animositas) and

highmindedness (generositas). By courage I mean the desire
whereby every man strives to preserve his own being in accordance
solely with the dictates of reason. By highmindedness I mean the
desire wherebyevery man endeavours, solely under the dictates of
reason, to aid other men and to unite them to himself in friendship.
Those actions, therefore, which have regard solely to the good of
the agent I set down to courage, those which aim at the good of
others I set down to highmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety,
and presence of mind in danger, &c., are varieties of courage;
courtesy, mercy, &c., are varieties of highmindedness.
I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their primary
causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit, which arise
from the combination of the three primary emotions, to wit, desire,
pleasure, and pain. It is evident from what I have said, that we are
in many ways driven about by external causes, and that like waves
of the sea driven by contrary winds we toss to and fro unwitting of
the issue and of our fate. But I have said, that I have only set forth
the chief conflicting emotions, not all that might be given. For, by
proceeding in the same way as above, we can easily show that love
is united to repentance, scorn, shame, &c. I think everyone will
agree from what has been said, that the emotions may be
compounded one with another in so many ways, and so many
variations may arise therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of
computation. However, for my purpose, it is enough to have
enumerated the most important; to reckon up the rest which I have
omitted would be more curious than profitable. It remains to
remark concerning love, that it very often happens that while we
are enjoying a thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of
enjoyment, acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in
another way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind
begins to conceive and desire something fresh. For example, when
we conceive something which generally delights us with its flavour,
we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it. But whilst we are thus enjoying
it, the stomach is filled and the body is otherwise disposed. If,
therefore, when the body is thus otherwise disposed, the image of
the food which is present be stimulated, and consequently the
endeavour or desire to eat it be stimulated also, the new disposition
of the body will feel repugnance to the desire or attempt, and
consequently the presence of the food which we formerly longed
for will become odious. This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or
weariness. For the rest, I have neglected the outward modifications
of the body observable in emotions, such, for instance, as
trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c., for these are attributable
to the body only, without any reference to the mind. Lastly, the
definitions of the emotions require to be supplemented in a few

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points; I will therefore repeat them, interpolating such observations

as I think should here and there be added.
Definitions Of The Emotions.

I.Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, as
determined to a particular activity by some given modification of
itself.
Explanation.We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of this

part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof; further,
that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is determined to
act in a way tending to promote its own persistence. But, in the
same note, I also remarked that, strictly speaking, I recognize no
distinction between appetite and desire. For whether a man be
conscious of his appetite or not, it remains one and the same
appetite. Thus, in order to avoid the appearance of tautology, I have
refrained from explaining desire by appetite; but I have taken care
to define it in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head,
all those endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the
terms appetite, will, desire, or impulse. I might, indeed, have said,
that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as
determined to a particular activity; but from such a definition (cf.
II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its
desire or appetite. Therefore, in order to imply the cause of such
consciousness, it was necessary to add, in so far as it is determined
by some given modification, &c. For, by a modification of mans
essence, we understand every disposition of the said essence,
whether such disposition be innate, or whether it be conceived
solely under the attribute of thought, or solely under the attribute
of extension, or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneously to
both these attributes. By the term desire, then, I here mean all
mans endeavours, impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary
according to each mans disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom
opposed one to another, according as a man is drawn in different
directions, and knows not where to turn.
II.Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater
perfection.
III.Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less
perfection.
Explanation.I say transition: for pleasure is not perfection itself.

For, if man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he
would possess the same, without the emotion of pleasure. This
appears more clearly from the consideration of the contrary
emotion, pain. No one can deny, that pain consists in the transition
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to a less perfection, and not in the less perfection itself: for a man
cannot be pained, in so far as he partakes of perfection of any
degree. Neither can we say, that pain consists in the absence of a
greater perfection. For absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of
pain is an activity; wherefore this activity can only be the activity of
transition from a greater to a less perfectionin other words, it is
an activity whereby a mans power of action is lessened or
constrained (cf. III. xi. note). I pass over the definitions of
merriment, stimulation, melancholy, and grief, because these terms
are generally used in reference to the body, and are merely kinds of
pleasure or pain.
IV.Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein the
mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in question
has no connection with other concepts (cf. III. lii. and note).
Explanation.In the note to II. xviii. we showed the reason, why

the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway falls to
the contemplation of another thing, namely, because the images of
the two things are so associated and arranged, that one follows the
other. This state of association is impossible, if the image of the
thing be new; the mind will then be at a stand in the contemplation
thereof, until it is determined by other causes to think of something
else.
Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is of the
same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not include wonder
among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include it,
inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no positive
cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but merely from
the absence of a cause, which should determine the mind to pass
from the contemplation of one object to the contemplation of
another.
I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary emotions (as
I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure, pain, and desire. I
have spoken of wonder, simply because it is customary to speak of
certain emotions springing from the three primitive ones by
different names, when they are referred to the objects of our
wonder. I am led by the same motive to add a definition of
contempt.
V.Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind
so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those qualities
which are not in it, rather than such as are in it (cf. III. lii. note).
The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for I am
not aware that any emotions are named after them.

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VI.Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
Explanation.This definition explains sufficiently clearly the

essence of love; the definition given by those authors who say that
love is the lovers wish to unite himself to the loved object
expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and, as such
authors have not sufficiently discerned loves essence, they have
been unable to acquire a true conception of its properties,
accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted to be very
obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I say that it is a
property of love, that the lover should wish to unite himself to the
beloved object, I do not here mean by wish consent, or conclusion,
or a free decision of the mind (for I have shown such, in II. xlviii., to
be fictitious); neither do I mean a desire of being united to the
loved object when it is absent, or of continuing in its presence
when it is at hand; for love can be conceived without either of these
desires; but by wish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover,
on account of the presence of the beloved object, whereby the
pleasure of the lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.
VII.Hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
Explanation.These observations are easily grasped after what has

been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf. also III.
xiii. note).
VIII.Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of something
which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.
IX.Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which is
accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).
X.Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.
Explanation.Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III.

lii.) from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it happens that the
object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall cease to
wonder at it; thus we see, that the emotion of devotion readily
degenerates into simple love.
XI.Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of
a quality, which we despise, in an object which we hate.
Explanation.In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, we

deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that extent rejoice (III.
xx.). But since we assume that man hates that which he derides, it
follows that the pleasure in question is not without alloy (cf. III.
xlvii. note).

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XII.Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of

something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the
issue.
XIII.Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of something
past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue (cf.
III. xviii. note).
Explanation.From these definitions it follows, that there is no

hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope. For
he, who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of
anything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes the
existence of the said thing in the future; therefore he, to this
extent, feels pain (cf. III. xix.); consequently, while dependent on
hope, he fears for the issue. Contrariwise he, who fears, in other
words doubts, concerning the issue of something which he hates,
also conceives something which excludes the existence of the thing
in question; to this extent he feels pleasure, and consequently to
this extent he hopes that it will turn out as he desires (III. xx.).
XIV.Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something past
or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
XV.Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or
future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
Explanation.Thus confidence springs from hope, and despair from

fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event has been
removed: this comes to pass, because man conceives something
past or future as present and regards it as such, or else because he
conceives other things, which exclude the existence of the causes
of his doubt. For, although we can never be absolutely certain of
the issue of any particular event (II. xxxi. Coroll.), it may
nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt concerning it. For we
have shown, that to feel no doubt concerning a thing is not the
same as to be quite certain of it (II. xlix. note). Thus it may happen
that we are affected by the same emotion of pleasure or pain
concerning a thing past or future, as concerning the conception of
a thing present; this I have already shown in III. xviii., to which,
with its note, I refer the reader.
XVI.Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past,
which has had an issue beyond our hope.
XVII.Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of something
past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.

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XVIII.Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has

befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf.
III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).
Explanation.Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) there

seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term is
used in reference to a particular action, and the latter in reference
to a disposition.
XIX.Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.
XX.Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to another.
Explanation.I am aware that these terms are employed in senses

somewhat different from those usually assigned. But my purpose is
to explain, not the meaning of words, but the nature of things. I
therefore make use of such terms, as may convey my meaning
without any violent departure from their ordinary signification. One
statement of my method will suffice. As for the cause of the abovenamed emotions see III. xxvii. Coroll. i., and III. xxii. note.
XXI.Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love
we bear him.
XXII.Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone, because we
hate him.
Explanation.Thus partiality is an effect of love, and

disparagement an effect of hatred: so that partiality may also be
defined as love, in so far as it induces a man to think too highly of a
beloved object. Contrariwise, disparagement may be defined as
hatred, in so far as it induces a man to think too meanly of a hated
object. Cf. III. xxvi. note.
XXIII.Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be pained by
anothers good fortune, and to rejoice in anothers evil fortune.
Explanation.Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, by

doing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore be
thus defined:
XXIV.Sympathy (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a man
to feel pleasure at anothers good fortune, and pain at anothers
evil fortune.
Explanation.Concerning envy see the notes to III. xxiv. and xxxii.

These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain accompanied by
the idea of something external, as cause either in itself or

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accidentally. I now pass on to other emotions, which are

accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause.
XXV.Self-approval is pleasure arising from a mans contemplation of
himself and his own power of action.
XXVI.Humility is pain arising from a mans contemplation of his
own weakness of body or mind.
Explanation.Self-complacency is opposed to humility, in so far as

we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of our own
power of action; but, in so far as we mean thereby pleasure
accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe we have
performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposed to
repentance, which we may thus define:
XXVII.Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some action,
which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our
mind.
Explanation.The causes of these emotions we have set forth in III.

li. note, and in III. liii. liv. lv. and note. Concerning the free decision
of the mind see II. xxxv. note. This is perhaps the place to call
attention to the fact, that it is nothing wonderful that all those
actions, which are commonly called wrong, are followed by pain,
and all those, which are called right, are followed by pleasure. We
can easily gather from what has been said, that this depends in
great measure on education. Parents, by reprobating the former
class of actions, and by frequently chiding their children because of
them, and also by persuading to and praising the latter class, have
brought it about, that the former should be associated with pain
and the latter with pleasure. This is confirmed by experience. For
custom and religion are not the same among all men, but that
which some consider sacred others consider profane, and what
some consider honourable others consider disgraceful. According
as each man has been educated, he feels repentance for a given
action or glories therein.
XXVIII.Pride is thinking too highly of ones self from self-love.
Explanation.Thus pride is different from partiality, for the latter

term is used in reference to an external object, but pride is used of
a man thinking too highly of himself. However, as partiality is the
effect of love, so is pride the effect or property of self-love, which
may therefore be thus defined, love of self or self-approval, in so far
as it leads a man to think too highly of himself. To this emotion
there is no contrary. For no one thinks too meanly of himself
because of self-hatred; I say that no one thinks too meanly of

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himself, in so far as he conceives that he is incapable of doing this

or that. For whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of
doing, he imagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so
disposed, that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he
cannot do. For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long
is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it
impossible for him to do it. However, if we consider such matters as
only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable that a man may
think too meanly of himself; for it may happen, that a man,
sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, should imagine that he is
despised by all men, while the rest of the world are thinking of
nothing less than of despising him. Again, a man may think too
meanly of himself, if he deny of himself in the present something in
relation to a future time of which he is uncertain. As, for instance,
if he should say that he is unable to form any clear conceptions, or
that he can desire and do nothing but what is wicked and base, &c.
We may also say, that a man thinks too meanly of himself, when we
see him from excessive fear of shame refusing to do things which
others, his equals, venture. We can, therefore, set down as a
contrary to pride an emotion which I will call self-abasement, for as
from self-complacency springs pride, so from humility springs selfabasement, which I will accordingly thus define:
XXIX.Self-abasement is thinking too meanly of ones self by reason
of pain.
Explanation.We are nevertheless generally accustomed to oppose

pride to humility, but in that case we pay more attention to the
effect of either emotion than to its nature. We are wont to call
proud the man who boasts too much (III. xxx. note), who talks of
nothing but his own virtues and other peoples faults, who wishes
to be first; and lastly who goes through life with a style and pomp
suitable to those far above him in station. On the other hand, we
call humble the man who too often blushes, who confesses his
faults, who sets forth other mens virtues, and who, lastly, walks
with bent head and is negligent of his attire. However, these
emotions, humility and self-abasement, are extremely rare. For
human nature, considered in itself, strives against them as much as
it can (see III. xiii. liv.); hence those, who are believed to be most
self-abased and humble, are generally in reality the most ambitious
and envious.
XXX.Honour1 is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action
of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.
XXXI.Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our
own, which we believe to be blamed by others.

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Explanation.On this subject see the note to III. xxx. But we should
here remark the difference which exists between shame and
modesty. Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are
ashamed. Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains a
man from committing a base action. Modesty is usually opposed to
shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I will duly show;
however, the names of the emotions (as I have remarked already)
have regard rather to their exercise than to their nature.
I have now fulfilled my task of explaining the emotions arising from
pleasure and pain. I therefore proceed to treat of those which I
refer to desire.
XXXII.Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something, kept
alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same time
constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the
existence of it.
Explanation.When we remember a thing, we are by that very fact,

as I have already said more than once, disposed to contemplate it
with the same emotion as if it were something present; but this
disposition or endeavour, while we are awake, is generally checked
by the images of things which exclude the existence of that which
we remember. Thus when we remember something which affected
us with a certain pleasure, we by that very fact endeavour to
regard it with the same emotion of pleasure as though it were
present, but this endeavour is at once checked by the
remembrance of things which exclude the existence of the thing in
question. Wherefore regret is, strictly speaking, a pain opposed to
that pleasure, which arises from the absence of something we hate
(cf. III. xlvii. note). But, as the name regret seems to refer to desire,
I set this emotion down, among the emotions springing from desire.
XXXIII.Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in us by
our conception that others have the same desire.
Explanation.He who runs away, because he sees others running

away, or he who fears, because he sees others in fear; or again, he
who, on seeing that another man has burnt his hand, draws
towards him his own hand, and moves his body as though his own
hand were burnt; such an one can be said to imitate anothers
emotion, but not to emulate him; not because the causes of
emulation and imitation are different, but because it has become
customary to speak of emulation only in him, who imitates that
which we deem to be honourable, useful, or pleasant. As to the
cause of emulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note. The reason why this
emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from III. xxxii.
and note.

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XXXIV.Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire or zeal springing

from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar
feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us. Cf. III. xxxix. note
and xl.
XXXV.Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity. Cf.
III. xxvii. note.
XXXVI.Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we are induced
to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.
XXXVII.Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through
mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has injured
us. (See III. xl. Coroll. ii. and note.)
XXXVIII.Cruelty or savageness is the desire, whereby a man is
impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.
Explanation.To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not a

passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man restrains his
anger and revenge.
XXXIX.Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we
dread, by undergoing a lesser evil. Cf. III. xxxix. note.
XL.Daring is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do something
dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.
XLI.Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by the
fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.
Explanation.Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else but the fear of

some evil, which most men are wont not to fear; hence I do not
reckon it among the emotions springing from desire. Nevertheless,
I have chosen to explain it here, because, in so far as we look to the
desire, it is truly opposed to the emotion of daring.
XLII.Consternation is attributed to one, whose desire of avoiding
evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.
Explanation.Consternation is, therefore, a species of cowardice.

But, inasmuch as consternation arises from a double fear, it may be
more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a man so
bewildered and wavering, that he is not able to remove the evil. I
say bewildered, in so far as we understand his desire of removing
the evil to be constrained by his amazement. I say wavering, in so
far as we understand the said desire to be constrained by the fear
of another evil, which equally torments him: whence it comes to
pass that he knows not, which he may avert of the two. On this
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subject, see III. xxxix. note, and III. lii. note. Concerning cowardice
and daring, see III. li. note.
XLIII.Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the
desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining
from that which should displease them.
XLIV.Ambition is the immoderate desire of power.
Explanation.Ambition is the desire, whereby all the emotions (cf.

III. xxvii. and xxxi.) are fostered and strengthened; therefore this
emotion can with difficulty be overcome. For, so long as a man is
bound by any desire, he is at the same time necessarily bound by
this. The best men, says Cicero, are especially led by honour.
Even philosophers, when they write a book contemning honour,
sign their names thereto, and so on.
XLV.Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living sumptuously.
XLVI.Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.
XLVII.Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.
XLVIII.Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual intercourse.
Explanation.Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is still

called lust. These last five emotions (as I have shown in III. lvi.)
have no contraries. For deference is a species of ambition Cf. III.
xxix. note.
Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety, and
chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the mind. It
may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an ambitious, or a
timid man may abstain from excess in eating, drinking, or sexual
indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear are not contraries to
luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery. For an avaricious man often
is glad to gorge himself with food and drink at another mans
expense. An ambitious man will restrain himself in nothing, so long
as he thinks his indulgences are secret; and if he lives among
drunkards and debauchees, he will, from the mere fact of being
ambitious, be more prone to those vices. Lastly, a timid man does
that which he would not. For though an avaricious man should, for
the sake of avoiding death, cast his riches into the sea, he will none
the less remain avaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast,
because he cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of
abstention, cease to be lustful. In fact, these emotions are not so
much concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c., as with the
appetite and love of such. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to

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these emotions, but high-mindedness and valour, whereof I will

speak presently.
The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I pass
over in silence, first, because they arise from the compounding of
the emotions already described; secondly, because many of them
have no distinctive names, which shows that it is sufficient for
practical purposes to have merely a general knowledge of them.
However, it is established from the definitions of the emotions,
which we have set forth, that they all spring from desire, pleasure,
or pain, or, rather, that there is nothing besides these three;
wherefore each is wont to be called by a variety of names in
accordance with its various relations and extrinsic tokens. If we
now direct our attention to these primitive emotions, and to what
has been said concerning the nature of the mind, we shall be able
thus to define the emotions, in so far as they are referred to the
mind only.
General Definition Of The Emotions.

Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a confused idea,
whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or any part thereof,
a force for existence (existendi vis) greater or less than before, and
by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one
thing rather than another.
Explanation.I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soul is a

confused idea. For we have shown that the mind is only passive, in
so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas. (III. iii.) I say, further,
whereby the mind affirms concerning its body or any part thereof a
force for existence greater than before. For all the ideas of bodies,
which we possess, denote rather the actual disposition of our own
body (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.) than the nature of an external body. But the
idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or
express the disposition of the body, or of some part thereof, which
is possessed by the body, or some part thereof, because its power of
action or force for existence is increased or diminished, helped or
hindered. But it must be noted that, when I say a greater or less
force for existence than before, I do not mean that the mind
compares the present with the past disposition of the body, but that
the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion affirms
something of the body, which, in fact, involves more or less of
reality than before.
And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II. xi.
xiii.), that it affirms the actual existence of its own body, and
inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very essence of a
thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater or less perfection,
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when it happens to affirm concerning its own body, or any part

thereof, something involving more or less reality than before.
When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind is
increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind had formed
of its own body, or of some part thereof, an idea involving more or
less of reality, than it had already affirmed concerning its own body.
For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of thinking are
measured by the excellence of the object. Lastly, I have added by
the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing
rather than another, so that, besides the nature of pleasure and
pain, which the first part of the definition explains, I might also
express the nature of desire.

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PART IV.
OF HUMAN BONDAGE, OR THE STRENGTH
OF THE EMOTIONS.
Preface.
HUMAN infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name
bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not his
own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he is
often compelled, while seeing that which is better for him, to follow
that which is worse. Why this is so, and what is good or evil in the
emotions, I propose to show in this part of my treatise. But, before I
begin, it would be well to make a few prefatory observations on
perfection and imperfection, good and evil.
When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has brought
it to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect, not only by
himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks that he
knows, the intention and aim of its author. For instance, suppose
anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not yet completed), and
knows that the aim of the author of that work is to build a house,
he will call the work imperfect; he will, on the other hand, call it
perfect, as soon as he sees that it is carried through to the end,
which its author had purposed for it. But if a man sees a work, the
like whereof he has never seen before, and if he knows not the
intention of the artificer, he plainly cannot know, whether that work
be perfect or imperfect. Such seems to be the primary meaning of
these terms.
But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out types of
houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain types to
others, it came about, that each man called perfect that which he
saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the thing in
question, and called imperfect that which he saw agree less with
his own preconceived type, even though it had evidently been
completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer. This seems to
be the only reason for calling natural phenomena, which, indeed,
are not made with human hands, perfect or imperfect: for men are
wont to form general ideas of things natural, no less than of things
artificial, and such ideas they hold as types, believing that Nature
(who they think does nothing without an object) has them in view,
and has set them as types before herself. Therefore, when they
behold something in Nature, which does not wholly conform to the
preconceived type which they have formed of the thing in question,
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they say that Nature has fallen short or has blundered, and has left
her work incomplete. Thus we see that men are wont to style
natural phenomena perfect or imperfect rather from their own
prejudices, than from true knowledge of what they pronounce
upon.
Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does not
work with an end in view. For the eternal and infinite Being, which
we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as that whereby
it exists. For we have shown, that by the same necessity of its
nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works (I. xvi.). The reason or
cause why God or Nature exists, and the reason why he acts, are
one and the same. Therefore, as he does not exist for the sake of an
end, so neither does he act for the sake of an end; of his existence
and of his action there is neither origin nor end. Wherefore, a cause
which is called final is nothing else but human desire, in so far as it
is considered as the origin or cause of anything. For example, when
we say that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house,
we mean nothing more than that a man, conceiving the
conveniences of household life, had a desire to build a house.
Wherefore, the being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as a final
cause, is nothing else but this particular desire, which is really the
efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause, because men
are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires They are, as I
have often said already, conscious of their own actions and
appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are determined
to any particular desire. Therefore, the common saying that Nature
sometimes falls short, or blunders, and produces things which are
imperfect, I set down among the glosses treated of in the Appendix
to Part I. Perfection and imperfection, then, are in reality merely
modes of thinking, or notions which we form from a comparison
among one another of individuals of the same species; hence I said
above (II. Def. vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same
thing. For we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to
one genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the
category of Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature
belong. Thus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this
category, and comparing them one with another, find that some
possess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent, say
that some are more perfect than others. Again, in so far as we
attribute to them anything implying negationas term, end,
infirmity, etc.,we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because
they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call
perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or because
Nature has blundered. For nothing lies within the scope of a things
nature, save that which follows from the necessity of the nature of
its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from the necessity of the
nature of its efficient cause necessarily comes to pass.

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As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive quality in
things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of thinking,
or notions which we form from the comparison of things one with
another. Thus one and the same thing can be at the same time
good, bad, and indifferent. For instance, music is good for him that
is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is deaf, it is
neither good nor bad.
Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be retained.
For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a type of
human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful for us to
retain the terms in question, in the sense I have indicated.
In what follows, then, I shall mean by good that which we
certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the
type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by
bad, that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in
approaching the said type. Again, we shall say that men are more
perfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more or
less nearly to the said type. For it must be specially remarked that,
when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a greater perfection,
or vice vers, I do not mean that he is changed from one essence or
reality to another; for instance, a horse would be as completely
destroyed by being changed into a man, as by being changed into
an insect. What I mean is, that we conceive the things power of
action, in so far as this is understood by its nature, to be increased
or diminished. Lastly, by perfection in general I shall, as I have
said, mean realityin other words, each things essence, in so far
as it exists, and operates in a particular manner, and without
paying any regard to its duration. For no given thing can be said to
be more perfect, because it has passed a longer time in existence.
The duration of things cannot be determined by their essence, for
the essence of things involves no fixed and definite period of
existence; but everything, whether it be more perfect or less
perfect, will always be able to persist in existence with the same
force wherewith it began to exist; wherefore, in this respect, all
things are equal.
Definitions.
I. By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us.
II. By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to
us in the attainment of any good.
(Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the
end.)

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III. Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while regarding

their essence only, we find nothing therein, which necessarily
asserts their existence or excludes it.
IV. Particular things I call possible in so far as, while regarding the
causes whereby they must be produced, we know not, whether
such causes be determined for producing them.
(In I. xxxiii. note i., I drew no distinction between possible and
contingent, because there was in that place no need to distinguish
them accurately.)
V. By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in
different directions, though they are of the same kind, such as
luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are
contraries, not by nature, but by accident.
VI. What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future, present,
and past, I explained in III. xviii., notes i. and ii., which see.
(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly conceive
distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit; that is, all
objects distant from us more than two hundred feet, or whose
distance from the place where we are exceeds that which we can
distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distance from us, and all in
the same plane; so also objects, whose time of existing is conceived
as removed from the present by a longer interval than we can
distinctly conceive, seem to be all equally distant from the present,
and are set down, as it were, to the same moment of time.)
VII. By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a
desire.
VIII. By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that is
(III. vii.), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a mans nature
or essence, in so far as it has the power of effecting what can only
be understood by the laws of that nature.
Axiom.
There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is not
another more powerful and strong. Whatsoever thing be given,
there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.
Prop. I. No positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed by
the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being true.

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Proof.Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which

inadequate ideas involve (II. xxxv.), nor have they any positive
quality on account of which they are called false (II. xxxiii.);
contrariwise, in so far as they are referred to God, they are true (II.
xxxii.). Wherefore, if the positive quality possessed by a false idea
were removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being
true, a true idea would then be removed by itself, which (IV. iii.) is
absurd. Therefore, no positive quality possessed by a false idea, &c.
Q.E.D.
Note.This proposition is more clearly understood from II. xvi.
Coroll. ii. For imagination is an idea, which indicates rather the
present disposition of the human body than the nature of the
external body; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly; whence it
comes to pass, that the mind is said to err. For instance, when we
look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant from us about two
hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so long as we are in
ignorance of its true distance; when its true distance is known, the
error is removed, but not the imagination; or, in other words, the
idea of the sun, which only explains the nature of that luminary, in
so far as the body is affected thereby: wherefore, though we know
the real distance, we shall still nevertheless imagine the sun to be
near us. For, as we said in II. xxxv. note, we do not imagine the sun
to be so near us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but
because the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent
that the body is affected thereby. Thus, when the rays of the sun
falling on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we
imagine the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of
its real position; and similarly other imaginations, wherein the
mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition of
the body, or that its power of activity is increased or diminished,
are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at its presence. It
happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an evil, the fear
vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the contrary also
happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will certainly come,
and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings; thus
imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth, in virtue of
its being true, but because other imaginations, stronger than the
first, supervene and exclude the present existence of that which we
imagined, as I have shown in II. xvii.
Prop. II. We are only passive, in so far as we are a part of Nature,
which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.
Proof.We are said to be passive, when something arises in us,

whereof we are only a partial cause (III. Def. ii.), that is (III. Def. i.),
something which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our
nature. We are passive therefore, in so far as we are a part of

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Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.

Q.E.D.
Prop. III. The force whereby a man persists in existing is limited,
and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.
Proof.This is evident from the axiom of this part. For, when man is
given, there is something elsesay amore powerful; when a is
given, there is something elsesay bmore powerful than a, and
so on to infinity; thus the power of man is limited by the power of
some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of
external causes. Q.E.D.
Prop. IV. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of Nature,
or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes, save such
as can be understood through his nature only as their adequate
cause.
Proof.The power, whereby each particular thing, and

consequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or of
Nature (I. xxiv. Coroll.); not in so far as it is infinite, but in so far as
it can be explained by the actual human essence (III. vii.). Thus the
power of man, in so far as it is explained through his own actual
essence, is a part of the infinite power of God or Nature, in other
words, of the essence thereof (I. xxxiv.). This was our first point.
Again, if it were possible, that man should undergo no changes
save such as can be understood solely through the nature of man, it
would follow that he would not be able to die, but would always
necessarily exist; this would be the necessary consequence of a
cause whose power was either finite or infinite; namely, either of
mans power only, inasmuch as he would be capable of removing
from himself all changes which could spring from external causes;
or of the infinite power of Nature, whereby all individual things
would be so ordered, that man should be incapable of undergoing
any changes save such as tended towards his own preservation.
But the first alternative is absurd (by the last Prop., the proof of
which is universal, and can be applied to all individual things).
Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be capable of
undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely
through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as
we have shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from
the infinite power of God, and consequently (I. xvi.) from the
necessity of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded as affected
by the idea of any given man, the whole order of nature as
conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must be
deducible. It would therefore follow (I. xxi.) that man is infinite,
which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. It is, therefore,

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impossible, that man should not undergo any changes save those
whereof he is the adequate cause. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a prey

to his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order of
nature, and that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as the
nature of things demands.
Prop. V. The power and increase of every passion, and its
persistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby we
ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of an
external cause compared with our own.
Proof.The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our

essence alone (III. Deff. i. and ii.), that is (III. vii.), the power of a
passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we ourselves
endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in II. xvi.) must
necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared
with our own. Q.E.D.
Prop. VI. The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the
rest of a mans activities or power, so that the emotion becomes
obstinately fixed to him.
Proof.The force and increase of any passion and its persistence in

existing are defined by the power of an external cause compared
with our own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore (IV. iii.) it can
overcome a mans power, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. VII. An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by
another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for
controlling emotion.
Proof.Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is an idea,

whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of
existence than before (cf. the general Definition of the Emotions at
the end of Part III.). When, therefore, the mind is assailed by any
emotion, the body is at the same time affected with a modification
whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished. Now this
modification of the body (IV. v.) receives from its cause the force for
persistence in its being; which force can only be checked or
destroyed by a bodily cause (II. vi.), in virtue of the body being
affected with a modification contrary to (III. v.) and stronger than
itself (IV. Ax.); wherefore (II. xii.) the mind is affected by the idea of
a modification contrary to, and stronger than the former
modification, in other words, (by the general definition of the
emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and
stronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy

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the existence of the former emotion; thus an emotion cannot be

destroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger
emotion. Q.E.D.
Corollary.An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, can

only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a modification of
the body contrary to, and stronger than, that which we are
undergoing. For the emotion which we undergo can only be
checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to, and stronger than,
itself, in other words, (by the general Definition of the Emotions)
only by an idea of a modification of the body contrary to, and
stronger than, the modification which we undergo.
Prop. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the
emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof.
Proof.We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or the

reverse in preserving our being (IV. Deff. i. and ii.), that is (III. vii.),
when it increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our power of
activity. Thus, in so far as we perceive that a thing affects us with
pleasure or pain, we call it good or evil; wherefore the knowledge
of good and evil is nothing else but the idea of the pleasure or pain,
which necessarily follows from that pleasurable or painful emotion
(II. xxii.). But this idea is united to the emotion in the same way as
mind is united to body (II. xxi.); that is, there is no real distinction
between this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification of the
body, save in conception only. Therefore the knowledge of good and
evil is nothing else but the emotion, in so far as we are conscious
thereof. Q.E.D.
Prop. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with us
at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive the
cause to be with us.
Proof.Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the mind

regards a thing as present (II. xvii. note), but which indicates the
disposition of the mind rather than the nature of the external thing
(II. xvi. Coroll. ii). An emotion is therefore a conception, in so far as
it indicates the disposition of the body. But a conception (by II.
xvii.) is stronger, so long as we conceive nothing which excludes
the present existence of the external object; wherefore an emotion
is also stronger or more intense, when we conceive the cause to be
with us at the present time, than when we do not conceive the
cause to be with us. Q.E.D.
Note.When I said above in III. xviii. that we are affected by the
image of what is past or future with the same emotion as if the
thing conceived were present, I expressly stated, that this is only

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true in so far as we look solely to the image of the thing in question

itself; for the things nature is unchanged, whether we have
conceived it or not; I did not deny that the image becomes weaker,
when we regard as present to us other things which exclude the
present existence of the future object: I did not expressly call
attention to the fact, because I purposed to treat of the strength of
the emotions in this part of my work.
Corollary.The image of something past or future, that is, of a

thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time future, to
the exclusion of time present, is, when other conditions are equal,
weaker than the image of something present; consequently an
emotion felt towards what is past or future is less intense, other
conditions being equal, than an emotion felt towards something
present.
Prop. X. Towards something future, which we conceive as close at
hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that its
time for existence is separated from the present by a longer
interval; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have
not long passed away we are affected more intensely, than if we
conceive that it has long passed away.
Proof.In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or not

long passed away, we conceive that which excludes the presence of
the object less, than if its period of future existence were more
distant from the present, or if it had long passed away (this is
obvious); therefore (by the foregoing Prop.) we are, so far, more
intensely affected towards it. Q.E.D.
Corollary.From the remarks made in Def. vi. of this part it follows
that, if objects are separated from the present by a longer period
than we can define in conception, though their dates of occurrence
be widely separated one from the other, they all affect us equally
faintly.
Prop. XI. An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary
is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion
towards that which is possible, or contingent, or non-necessary.
Proof.In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we, to that

extent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we deny a things
existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be necessary (I. xxxiii.
note i.); wherefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards that which is
necessary is, other conditions being equal, more intense than an
emotion towards that which is non-necessary. Q.E.D.

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Prop. XII. An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist

at the present time, and which we conceive as possible, is more
intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a
thing contingent.
Proof.In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are

affected by the conception of some further thing, which would
assert the existence of the former (IV. Def. iii.); but, on the other
hand, we (by hypothesis) conceive certain things, which exclude its
present existence. But, in so far as we conceive a thing to be
possible in the future, we thereby conceive things which assert its
existence (IV. iv.), that is (III. xviii.), things which promote hope or
fear: wherefore an emotion towards something possible is more
vehement. Q.E.D.
Corollary.An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist
in the present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far fainter,
than if we conceive the thing to be present with us.
Proof.Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist, is
more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as future
(IV. ix. Coroll.), and is much more vehement, than if the future time
be conceived as far distant from the present (IV. x.). Therefore an
emotion towards a thing, whose period of existence we conceive to
be far distant from the present, is far fainter, than if we conceive
the thing as present; it is, nevertheless, more intense, than if we
conceived the thing as contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a
thing, which we regard as contingent, will be far fainter, than if we
conceived the thing to be present with us. Q.E.D.
Prop. XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know not
to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal, fainter than
an emotion towards a thing past.
Proof.In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are not

affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the
existence of the said thing (IV. Def. iii.), but, on the other hand (by
hypothesis), we conceive certain things excluding its present
existence. But, in so far as we conceive it in relation to time past,
we are assumed to conceive something, which recalls the thing to
memory, or excites the image thereof (II. xviii. and note), which is
so far the same as regarding it as present (II. xvii. Coroll.).
Therefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards a thing contingent, which we
know does not exist in the present, is fainter, other conditions
being equal, than an emotion towards a thing past. Q.E.D.

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Prop. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any
emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is considered
as an emotion.
Proof.An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body

a greater or less force of existing than before (by the general
Definition of the Emotions); therefore it has no positive quality,
which can be destroyed by the presence of what is true;
consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot, by virtue of
being true, restrain any emotion. But, in so far as such knowledge
is an emotion (IV. viii.) if it have more strength for restraining
emotion, it will to that extent be able to restrain the given emotion.
Q.E.D.
Prop. XV. Desire arising from the knowledge of good andbad can be
quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from the
emotions whereby we are assailed.
Proof.From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it is

an emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the
strength of which is proportioned to the strength of the emotion
wherefrom it arises (III. xxxvii.). But, inasmuch as this desire arises
(by hypothesis) from the fact of our truly understanding anything, it
follows that it is also present with us, in so far as we are active (III.
i.), and must therefore be understood through our essence only (III.
Def. ii.); consequently (III. vii.) its force and increase can be defined
solely by human power. Again, the desires arising from the
emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as
the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore their force and
increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes,
which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it
(IV. iii.); hence the desires arising from like emotions may be more
vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge of
good and evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it. Q.E.D.
Prop. XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil, in so
far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more easily
controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is agreeable at the
present moment.
Proof.Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future, is

fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV. ix. Coroll.).
But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil,
though it be concerned with things which are good at the moment,
can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong desire (by the
last Prop., the proof whereof is of universal application). Wherefore
desire arising from such knowledge, when concerned with the
future, can be more easily controlled or quenched, &c. Q.E.D.

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Prop. XVII. Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and
evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is
contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire for
things that are present.
Proof.This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop. from
IV. xii. Coroll.
Note.I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved
by opinion more readily than by true reason, why it is that the true
knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul, and often
yields to every kind of passion. This state of things gave rise to the
exclamation of the poet:1
The better path I gaze at and approve,
The worseI follow.
Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind, when
he says, He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. I have
not written the above with the object of drawing the conclusion,
that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or that a wise
man is on a par with a fool in controlling his emotions, but because
it is necessary to know the power and the infirmity of our nature,
before we can determine what reason can do in restraining the
emotions, and what is beyond her power. I have said, that in the
present part I shall merely treat of human infirmity. The power of
reason over the emotions I have settled to treat separately.
Prop. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is, other conditions being
equal, stronger than desire arising from pain.
Proof.Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions, i.),

that is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist in his
own being. Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by the fact of
pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the contrary, desire
arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being felt, diminished or
hindered; hence the force of desire arising from pleasure must be
defined by human power together with the power of an external
cause, whereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human
power only. Thus the former is the stronger of the two. Q.E.D.
Note.In these few remarks I have explained the causes of human
infirmity and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide by the
precepts of reason. It now remains for me to show what course is
marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions are in harmony
with the rules of human reason, and which of them are contrary
thereto. But, before I begin to prove my propositions in detailed

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geometrical fashion, it is advisable to sketch them briefly in

advance, so that everyone may more readily grasp my meaning.
As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands, that
every man should love himself, should seek that which is useful to
himI mean, that which is really useful to him, should desire
everything which really brings man to greater perfection, and
should, each for himself, endeavour as far as he can to preserve his
own being. This is as necessarily true, as that a whole is greater
than its part. (Cf. III. iv.)
Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the
laws of ones own nature (IV. Def. viii.), and as no one endeavours
to preserve his own being, except in accordance with the laws of
his own nature, it follows, first, that the foundation of virtue is the
endeavour to preserve ones own being, and that happiness
consists in mans power of preserving his own being; secondly, that
virtue is to be desired for its own sake, and that there is nothing
more excellent or more useful to us, for the sake of which we
should desire it; thirdly and lastly, that suicides are weak-minded,
and are overcome by external causes repugnant to their nature.
Further, it follows from Postulate iv. Part II., that we can never
arrive at doing without all external things for the preservation of
our being or living, so as to have no relations with things which are
outside ourselves. Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our
intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could
understand nothing besides itself. There are, then, many things
outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to be
desired. Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than those
which are in entire agreement with our nature. For if, for example,
two individuals of entirely the same nature are united, they form a
combination twice as powerful as either of them singly.
Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than mannothing,
I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being can be wished
for by men, than that all should so in all points agree, that the
minds and bodies of all should form, as it were, one single mind
and one single body, and that all should, with one consent, as far as
they are able, endeavour to preserve their being, and all with one
consent seek what is useful to them all. Hence, men who are
governed by reasonthat is, who seek what is useful to them in
accordance with reason,desire for themselves nothing, which
they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and, consequently,
are just, faithful, and honourable in their conduct.
Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus briefly to
indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater detail. I have
taken this course, in order, if possible, to gain the attention of those

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who believe, that the principle that every man is bound to seek
what is useful for himself is the foundation of impiety, rather than
of piety and virtue.
Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the case, I go
on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby I have hitherto
proceeded.
Prop. XIX. Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily desires
or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.
Proof.The knowledge of good and evil is (IV. viii.) the emotion of

pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof; therefore,
every man necessarily desires what he thinks good, and shrinks
from what he thinks bad. Now this appetite is nothing else but
mans nature or essence (cf. the Definition of Appetite, III. ix. note,
and Def. of the Emotions, i.). Therefore, every man, solely by the
laws of his nature, desires the one, and shrinks from the other, &c.
Q.E.D.
Prop. XX. The more every man endeavours, and is able to seek
what is useful to himin other words, to preserve his own
beingthe more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in
proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that is,
to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.
Proof.Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by mans

essence (IV. Def. viii.), that is, which is defined solely by the
endeavour made by man to persist in his own being. Wherefore, the
more a man endeavours, and is able to preserve his own being, the
more is he endowed with virtue, and, consequently (III. iv. and vi.),
in so far as a man neglects to preserve his own being, he is wanting
in power. Q.E.D.
Note.No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or
preserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causes
external and foreign to his nature. No one, I say, from the necessity
of his own nature, or otherwise than under compulsion from
external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself: which latter
may be done in a variety of ways. A man, for instance, kills himself
under the compulsion of another man, who twists round his right
hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a sword, and forces
him to turn the blade against his own heart; or, again, he may be
compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrants command, to open his own
veinsthat is, to escape a greater evil by incurring a lesser; or,
lastly, latent external causes may so disorder his imagination, and
so affect his body, that it may assume a nature contrary to its
former one, and whereof the idea cannot exist in the mind (III. x.)

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But that a man, from the necessity of his own nature, should
endeavour to become non-existent, is as impossible as that
something should be made out of nothing, as everyone will see for
himself, after a little reflection.
Prop. XXI. No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and to
live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, to act, and to
livein other words, to actually exist.
Proof.The proof of this proposition, or rather the proposition

itself, is self-evident, and is also plain from the definition of desire.
For the desire of living, acting, &c., blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of
the Emotions, i.) the essence of manthat is (III. vii.), the
endeavour made by everyone to preserve his own being. Therefore,
no one can desire, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this endeavour to
preserve ones own being.
Proof.The effort for self-preservation is the essence of a thing (III.

vii.); therefore, if any virtue could be conceived as prior thereto,
the essence of a thing would have to be conceived as prior to itself,
which is obviously absurd. Therefore no virtue, &c. Q.E.D.
Corollary.The effort for self-preservation is the first and only
foundation of virtue. For prior to this principle nothing can be
conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.
Prop. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular
action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said
to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described, in so far
as he is determined for the action because he understands.
Proof.In so far as a man is determined to an action through

having inadequate ideas, he is passive (III. i.), that is (III. Deff. i.
and iii.), he does something, which cannot be perceived solely
through his essence, that is (by IV. Def. viii.), which does not follow
from his virtue. But, in so far as he is determined for an action
because he understands, he is active; that is, he does something,
which is perceived through his essence alone, or which adequately
follows from his virtue. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us the
same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve ones being (these three
terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with the dictates of
reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to ones self.
Proof.To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but

to act according to the laws of ones own nature. But we only act, in
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so far as we understand (III. iii.): therefore to act in obedience to

virtue is in us nothing else but to act, to live, or to preserve ones
being in obedience to reason, and that on the basis of seeking what
is useful for us (IV. xxii. Coroll.). Q.E.D.
Prop. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of
anything else.
Proof.The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to persist

in its being, is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself (III.
vii.); from this alone, and not from the essence of anything else, it
necessarily follows (III. vi.) that everyone endeavours to preserve
his being. Moreover, this proposition is plain from IV. xxii. Coroll.,
for if a man should endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of
anything else, the last-named thing would obviously be the basis of
virtue, which, by the foregoing corollary, is absurd. Therefore no
one, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is
nothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in so far
as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it, save
such things as are conducive to understanding.
Proof.The effort for self-preservation is nothing else but the

essence of the thing in question (III. vii.), which, in so far as it
exists such as it is, is conceived to have force for continuing in
existence (III. vi.) and doing such things as necessarily follow from
its given nature (see the Def. of Appetite, III. ix. note). But the
essence of reason is nought else but our mind, in so far as it clearly
and distinctly understands (see the definition in II. xl. note ii.);
therefore (II. xl.) whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason
is nothing else but to understand. Again, since this effort of the
mind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons, to
preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding; this
effort at understanding is (IV. xxii. Coroll.) the first and single basis
of virtue, nor shall we endeavour to understand things for the sake
of any ulterior object (IV. xxv.); on the other hand, the mind, in so
far as it reasons, will not be able to conceive any good for itself,
save such things as are conducive to understanding.
Prop. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save
such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are able
to hinder us from understanding.
Proof.The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing beyond

understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself, save such
things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing Prop.). But
the mind (II. xli. xliii. and note) cannot possess certainty

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concerning anything, except in so far as it has adequate ideas, or

(what by II. xl. note, is the same thing) in so far as it reasons.
Therefore we know nothing to be good or evil save such things as
really conduce, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXVIII. The minds highest good is the knowledge of God, and
the minds highest virtue is to know God.
Proof.The mind is not capable of understanding anything higher

than God, that is (I. Def. vi.), than a Being absolutely infinite, and
without which (I. xv.) nothing can either be or be conceived;
therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.), the minds highest utility or (IV. Def.
i.) good is the knowledge of God. Again, the mind is active, only in
so far as it understands, and only to the same extent can it be said
absolutely to act virtuously. The minds absolute virtue is therefore
to understand. Now, as we have already shown, the highest that the
mind can understand is God; therefore the highest virtue of the
mind is to understand or to know God. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXIX. No individual thing, which is entirely different from our
own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and absolutely
nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has something in
common with our nature.
Proof.The power of every individual thing, and consequently the

power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be
determined by an individual thing (I. xxviii.), whose nature (II. vi.)
must be understood through the same nature as that, through
which human nature is conceived. Therefore our power of activity,
however it be conceived, can be determined and consequently
helped or hindered by the power of any other individual thing,
which has something in common with us, but not by the power of
anything, of which the nature is entirely different from our own;
and since we call good or evil that which is the cause of pleasure or
pain (IV. viii.), that is (III. xi. note), which increases or diminishes,
helps or hinders, our power of activity; therefore, that which is
entirely different from our nature can neither be to us good nor
bad. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality which
it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in so far as it
is contrary to our nature.
Proof.We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV. viii.),
that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note), when it diminishes or
checks our power of action. Therefore, if anything were bad for us
through that quality which it has in common with our nature, it
would be able itself to diminish or check that which it has in

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common with our nature, which (III. iv.) is absurd. Wherefore

nothing can be bad for us through that quality which it has in
common with us, but, on the other hand, in so far as it is bad for us,
that is (as we have just shown), in so far as it can diminish or check
our power of action, it is contrary to our nature. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it is
necessarily good.
Proof.In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it cannot

be bad for it. It will therefore necessarily be either good or
indifferent. If it be assumed that it be neither good nor bad,
nothing will follow from its nature (IV. Def. i.), which tends to the
preservation of our nature, that is (by the hypothesis), which tends
to the preservation of the thing itself; but this (III. vi.) is absurd;
therefore, in so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it is
necessarily good. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing is in
harmony with our nature, so is it more useful or better for us, and
vice vers, in proportion as a thing is more useful for us, so is it
more in harmony with our nature. For, in so far as it is not in
harmony with our nature, it will necessarily be different therefrom
or contrary thereto. If different, it can neither be good nor bad (IV.
xxix); if contrary, it will be contrary to that which is in harmony
with our nature, that is, contrary to what is goodin short, bad.
Nothing, therefore, can be good, except in so far as it is in harmony
with our nature; and hence a thing is useful, in proportion as it is in
harmony with our nature, and vice vers. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXII. In so far as men are a prey to passion, they cannot, in
that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.
Proof.Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are

understood to agree in power (III. vii.), not in want of power or
negation, and consequently not in passion (III. iii. note); wherefore
men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions, cannot be said to
be naturally in harmony. Q.E.D.
Note.This is also self-evident; for, if we say that white and black
only agree in the fact that neither is red, we absolutely affirm that
they do not agree in any respect. So, if we say that a man and a
stone only agree in the fact that both are finitewanting in power,
not existing by the necessity of their own nature, or, lastly,
indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causeswe should
certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in no respect alike;
therefore, things which agree only in negation, or in qualities which
neither possess, really agree in no respect.

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Prop. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are assailed
by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states; and to
this extent one and the same man is variable and inconstant.
Proof.The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained

solely through our essence or nature (III. Deff. i. ii.), but it must be
defined by the power, that is (III. vii.), by the nature of external
causes in comparison with our own; hence it follows, that there are
as many kinds of each emotion as there are external objects
whereby we are affected (III. lvi.), and that men may be differently
affected by one and the same object (III. li), and to this extent differ
in nature; lastly, that one and the same man may be differently
affected towards the same object, and may therefore be variable
and inconstant. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are
passions, they can be contrary one to another.
Proof.A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Pauls feeling
pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar to that which
Paul hates (III. xvi.), or because Peter has sole possession of a thing
which Paul also loves (III. xxxii. and note), or for other causes (of
which the chief are enumerated in III. lv. note); it may therefore
happen that Paul should hate Peter (Def. of Emotions, vii.),
consequently it may easily happen also, that Peter should hate Paul
in return, and that each should endeavour to do the other an injury
(III. xxxix.), that is (IV. xxx.), that they should be contrary one to
another. But the emotion of pain is always a passion or passive
state (III. lix.); hence men, in so far as they are assailed by
emotions which are passions, can be contrary one to another.
Q.E.D.
Note.I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives that
Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from this it
seems, at first sight, to follow, that these two men, through both
loving the same thing, and, consequently, through agreement of
their respective natures, stand in one anothers way; if this were
so, Props. xxx. and xxxi. of this Part would be untrue. But if we give
the matter our unbiassed attention, we shall see that the
discrepancy vanishes. For the two men are not in one anothers
way in virtue of the agreement of their natures, that is, through
both loving the same thing, but in virtue of one differing from the
other. For, in so far as each loves the same thing, the love of each is
fostered thereby (III. xxxi.), that is (Def. of the Emotions, vi.) the
pleasure of each is fostered thereby. Wherefore it is far from being
the case, that they are at variance through both loving the same
thing, and through the agreement in their natures. The cause for
their opposition lies, as I have said, solely in the fact that they are

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assumed to differ. For we assume that Peter has the idea of the
loved object as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of
the loved object as lost. Hence the one man will be affected with
pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus they will be
at variance one with another. We can easily show in like manner,
that all other causes of hatred depend solely on differences, and
not on the agreement between mens natures.
Prop. XXXV. In so far only as men live in obedience to reason, do
they always necessarily agree in nature.
Proof.In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are passions,

they can be different in nature (IV. xxxiii.), and at variance one with
another. But men are only said to be active, in so far as they act in
obedience to reason (III. iii.); therefore, whatsoever follows from
human nature in so far as it is defined by reason must (III. Def. ii.)
be understood solely through human nature as its proximate cause.
But, since every man by the laws of his nature desires that which
he deems good, and endeavours to remove that which he deems
bad (IV. xix.); and further, since that which we, in accordance with
reason, deem good or bad, necessarily is good or bad (II. xli.); it
follows that men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human
nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV. xxxi. Coroll.);
in other words, such things as are in harmony with each mans
nature. Therefore, men in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
necessarily live always in harmony one with another. Q.E.D.
Corollary I.There is no individual thing in nature, which is more
useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. For
that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony with his
nature (IV. xxxi. Coroll); that is, obviously, man. But man acts
absolutely according to the laws of his nature, when he lives in
obedience to reason (III. Def. ii.), and to this extent only is always
necessarily in harmony with the nature of another man (by the last
Prop.); wherefore among individual things nothing is more useful to
man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. Q.E.D.
Corollary II.As every man seeks most that which is useful to him,
so are men most useful one to another. For the more a man seeks
what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself, the more
is he endowed with virtue (IV. xx.), or, what is the same thing (IV.
Def. viii.), the more is he endowed with power to act according to
the laws of his own nature, that is to live in obedience to reason.
But men are most in natural harmony, when they live in obedience
to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore (by the foregoing Coroll.)
men will be most useful one to another, when each seeks most that
which is useful to him. Q.E.D.

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Note.What we have just shown is attested by experience so

conspicuously, that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: Man is to
man a God. Yet it rarely happens that men live in obedience to
reason, for things are so ordered among them, that they are
generally envious and troublesome one to another. Nevertheless
they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so that the definition of
man as a social animal has met with general assent; in fact, men do
derive from social life much more convenience than injury. Let
satirists then laugh their fill at human affairs, let theologians rail,
and let misanthropes praise to their utmost the life of untutored
rusticity, let them heap contempt on men and praises on beasts;
when all is said, they will find that men can provide for their wants
much more easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their
forces can they escape from the dangers that on every side beset
them: not to say how much more excellent and worthy of our
knowledge it is, to study the actions of men than the actions of
beasts. But I will treat of this more at length elsewhere.
Prop. XXXVI. The highest good of those who follow virtue is
common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.
Proof.To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason (IV.

xxiv.), and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to reason is
to understand (IV. xxvi.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the highest good for
those who follow after virtue is to know God; that is (II. xlvii. and
note) a good which is common to all and can be possessed by all
men equally, in so far as they are of the same nature. Q.E.D.
Note.Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of
those who follow after virtue were not common to all? Would it not
then follow, as above (IV. xxxiv.), that men living in obedience to
reason, that is (IV. xxxv.), men in so far as they agree in nature,
would be at variance one with another? To such an inquiry I make
answer, that it follows not accidentally but from the very nature of
reason, that mans highest good is common to all, inasmuch as it is
deduced from the very essence of man, in so far as defined by
reason; and that a man could neither be, nor be conceived without
the power of taking pleasure in this highest good. For it belongs to
the essence of the human mind (II. xlvii.), to have an adequate
knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.
Prop. XXXVII. The good which every man, who follows after virtue,
desires for himself he will also desire for other men, and so much
the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge of God.
Proof.Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, are most

useful to their fellow men (IV. xxxv.; Coroll. i.); therefore (IV. xix.),
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about that men should live in obedience to reason. But the good
which every man, in so far as he is guided by reason, or, in other
words, follows after virtue, desires for himself, is to understand (IV.
xxvi.); wherefore the good, which each follower of virtue seeks for
himself, he will desire also for others. Again, desire, in so far as it is
referred to the mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. of the
Emotions, i.); now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge
(II. xi.), which involves the knowledge of God (II. xlvii.), and without
it (I. xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived; therefore, in proportion
as the minds essence involves a greater knowledge of God, so also
will be greater the desire of the follower of virtue, that other men
should possess that which he seeks as good for himself.Q.E.D.
Another Proof.The good, which a man desires for himself and

loves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others love it also
(III. xxxi.); he will therefore endeavour that others should love it
also; and as the good in question is common to all, and therefore all
can rejoice therein, he will endeavour, for the same reason, to bring
about that all should rejoice therein, and this he will do the more
(III. xxxvii.), in proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is
greater.
Note I.He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause
others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the
world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse, and is,
therefore, hateful, especially to those who take delight in
something different, and accordingly study and, by similar impulse,
endeavour, to make men live in accordance with what pleases
themselves. Again, as the highest good sought by men under the
guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be possessed by
a single individual, it follows that those who love it are not
consistent in their intentions, but, while they delight to sing its
praises, fear to be believed. But he, who endeavours to lead men by
reason, does not act by impulse but courteously and kindly, and his
intention is always consistent. Again, whatsoever we desire and do,
whereof we are the cause in so far as we possess the idea of God,
or know God, I set down to Religion. The desire of well-doing,
which is engendered by a life according to reason, I call piety.
Further, the desire, whereby a man living according to reason is
bound to associate others with himself in friendship, I call honour;1
by honourable I mean that which is praised by men living according
to reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the
gaining of friendship. I have also shown in addition what are the
foundations of a state; and the difference between true virtue and
infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have said; namely,
that true virtue is nothing else but living in accordance with
reason; while infirmity is nothing else but mans allowing himself to
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determined to act in a manner demanded by the general disposition

of things rather than by his own nature considered solely in itself.
Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. xviii. of this
Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the slaughtering of
animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity
than on sound reason. The rational quest of what is useful to us
further teaches us the necessity of associating ourselves with our
fellow-men, but not with beasts, or things, whose nature is different
from our own; we have the same rights in respect to them as they
have in respect to us. Nay, as everyones right is defined by his
virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than
beasts have over men. Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I
deny is, that we may not consult our own advantage and use them
as we please, treating them in the way which best suits us; for their
nature is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different
from human emotions (III. lvii. note). It remains for me to explain
what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit. On these points see
the following note.
Note II.In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain praise

and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.
Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note: the
time has now come to treat of the remaining terms. But I must first
say a few words concerning man in the state of nature and in
society.
Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and, consequently, by
sovereign natural right performs those actions which follow from
the necessity of his own nature; therefore by sovereign natural
right every man judges what is good and what is bad, takes care of
his own advantage according to his own disposition (IV. xix. and
xx.), avenges the wrongs done to him (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and
endeavours to preserve that which he loves and to destroy that
which he hates (III. xxviii.). Now, if men lived under the guidance of
reason, everyone would remain in possession of this his right,
without any injury being done to his neighbour (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.).
But seeing that they are a prey to their emotions, which far surpass
human power or virtue (IV. vi.), they are often drawn in different
directions, and being at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii.
xxxiv.), stand in need of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note). Wherefore, in
order that men may live together in harmony, and may aid one
another, it is necessary that they should forego their natural right,
and, for the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can
injure their fellow-men. The way in which this end can be attained,
so that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. iv.
Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each

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other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV. vii.
and III. xxxix. It is there shown, that an emotion can only be
restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to itself, and
that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of incurring a greater
injury themselves.
On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps in its
own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging injury, and
pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it also possesses the
power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to pass laws
sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in restraining
emotion, but by threats (IV. xvii. note). Such a society established
with laws and the power of preserving itself is called a State, while
those who live under its protection are called citizens. We may
readily understand that there is in the state of nature nothing,
which by universal consent is pronounced good or bad; for in the
state of nature everyone thinks solely of his own advantage, and
according to his disposition, with reference only to his individual
advantage, decides what is good or bad, being bound by no law to
anyone besides himself.
In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it can only
exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on by common
consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State authority.
Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is therefore
punished by the right of the State only. Obedience, on the other
hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is thought worthy of
merit, if he takes delight in the advantages which a State provides.
Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent master
of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be said to
belong to one man rather than another: all things are common to
all. Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no wish to
render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that which
belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in the state of
nature answering to justice and injustice. Such ideas are only
possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common consent
what belongs to one man and what to another.
From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and
injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes
which display the nature of the mind. But I have said enough.
Prop. XXXVIII. Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to
render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways,
or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways, is
useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is thereby
rendered more capable of being affected or affecting other bodies

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in an increased number of ways; contrariwise, whatsoever renders

the body less capable in this respect is hurtful to man.
Proof.Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body
increases also the minds capability of perception (II. xiv.);
therefore, whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it
capable, is necessarily good or useful (IV. xxvi. xxvii.); and is so in
proportion to the extent to which it can render the body capable;
contrariwise (II. xiv. IV. xxvi. xxvii.), it is hurtful, if it renders the
body in this respect less capable. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the
proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body
mutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a
change in such proportion is bad.
Proof.The human body needs many other bodies for its

preservation (II. Post. iv.). But that which constitutes the specific
reality (forma) of a human body is, that its parts communicate their
several motions one to another in a certain fixed proportion (Def.
before Lemma iv. after II. xiii.). Therefore, whatsoever brings about
the preservation of the proportion between motion and rest, which
the parts of the human body mutually possess, preserves the
specific reality of the human body, and consequently renders the
human body capable of being affected in many ways and of
affecting external bodies in many ways; consequently it is good (by
the last Prop.). Again, whatsoever brings about a change in the
aforesaid proportion causes the human body to assume another
specific character, in other words (see Preface to this Part towards
the end, though the point is indeed self-evident), to be destroyed,
and consequently totally incapable of being affected in an
increased numbers of ways; therefore it is bad. Q.E.D.
Note.The extent to which such causes can injure or be of service
to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part. But I would here
remark that I consider that a body undergoes death, when the
proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually among its
several parts is changed. For I do not venture to deny that a human
body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and other
properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to consist, may
none the less be changed into another nature totally different from
its own. There is no reason, which compels me to maintain that a
body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse; nay, experience
would seem to point to the opposite conclusion. It sometimes
happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that I should hardly
call him the same. As I have heard tell of a certain Spanish poet,
who had been seized with sickness, and though he recovered
therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his past life, that he would

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not believe the plays and tragedies he had written to be his own:
indeed, he might have been taken for a grown-up child, if he had
also forgotten his native tongue. If this instance seems incredible,
what shall we say of infants? A man of ripe age deems their nature
so unlike his own, that he can only be persuaded that he too has
been an infant by the analogy of other men. However, I prefer to
leave such questions undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the
superstitious for raising new issues.
Prop. XL. Whatsoever conduces to mans social life, orcauses men
to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever brings
discord into a State is bad.
Proof.For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony

also causes them to live according to reason (IV. xxxv.), and is
therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason)
whatsoever brings about discord is bad. Q.E.D.
Prop. XLI. Pleasure in itself is not bad but good: contrariwise, pain
in itself is bad.
Proof.Pleasure (III. xi. and note) is emotion, whereby the bodys

power of activity is increased or helped; pain is emotion, whereby
the bodys power of activity is diminished or checked; therefore (IV.
xxxviii.) pleasure in itself is good, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good;
contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad.
Proof.Mirth (see its Def. in III. xi. note) is pleasure, which, in so

far as it is referred to the body, consists in all parts of the body
being affected equally: that is (III. xi.), the bodys power of activity
is increased or aided in such a manner, that the several parts
maintain their former proportion of motion and rest; therefore
Mirth is always good (IV. xxxix.), and cannot be excessive. But
Melancholy (see its Def. in the same note to III. xi.) is pain, which,
in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in the absolute
decrease or hindrance of the bodys power of activity; therefore (IV.
xxxviii.) it is always bad. Q.E.D.
Prop. XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the other
hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is bad.
Proof.Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is pleasure,

which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in one or some
of its parts being affected more than the rest (see its Definition, III.
xi. note); the power of this emotion may be sufficient to overcome
other actions of the body (IV. vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed

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therein, thus rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of

other ways: therefore (IV. xxxviii.) it may be bad. Again, grief,
which is pain, cannot as such be good (IV. xli.). But, as its force and
increase is defined by the power of an external cause compared
with our own (IV. v.), we can conceive infinite degrees and modes of
strength in this emotion (IV. iii.); we can, therefore, conceive it as
capable of restraining stimulation, and preventing its becoming
excessive, and hindering the bodys capabilities; thus, to this
extent, it will be good. Q.E.D.
Prop. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive.
Proof.Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external

cause (Def. of Emotions, vi.); therefore stimulation, accompanied by
the idea of an external cause is love (III. xi. note); hence love may
be excessive. Again, the strength of desire varies in proportion to
the emotion from which it arises (III. xxxvii.). Now emotion may
overcome all the rest of mens actions (IV. vi.); so, therefore, can
desire, which arises from the same emotion, overcome all other
desires, and become excessive, as we showed in the last
proposition concerning stimulation.
Note.Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived
more easily than it can be observed. For the emotions, whereby we
are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of the body
which is affected more than the rest; hence the emotions are
generally excessive, and so fix the mind in the contemplation of one
object, that it is unable to think of others; and although men, as a
rule, are a prey to many emotionsand very few are found who are
always assailed by one and the sameyet there are cases, where
one and the same emotion remains obstinately fixed. We sometimes
see men so absorbed in one object, that, although it be not present,
they think they have it before them; when this is the case with a
man who is not asleep, we say he is delirious or mad; nor are those
persons who are inflamed with love, and who dream all night and
all day about nothing but their mistress, or some woman,
considered as less mad, for they are made objects of ridicule. But
when a miser thinks of nothing but gain or money, or when an
ambitious man thinks of nothing but glory, they are not reckoned to
be mad, because they are generally harmful, and are thought
worthy of being hated. But, in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, &c.,
are species of madness, though they may not be reckoned among
diseases.
Prop. XLV. Hatred can never be good.

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Proof.When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III.

xxxix.), that is (IV. xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that is
bad. Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.
N.B. Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred
towards men.
Corollary I.Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and other

emotions attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are bad; this
is evident from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii.
Corollary II.Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is base,
and in a State unjust. This also is evident from III. xxxix., and from
the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV. xxxvii. note.
Note.Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to be
bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference. For laughter, as
also jocularity, is merely pleasure; therefore, so long as it be not
excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.). Assuredly nothing forbids
man to enjoy himself, save grim and gloomy superstition. For why is
it more lawful to satiate ones hunger and thirst than to drive away
ones melancholy? I reason, and have convinced myself as follows:
No deity, nor anyone else, save the envious, takes pleasure in my
infirmity and discomfort, nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs,
fear, and the like, which are signs of infirmity of spirit; on the
contrary, the greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the
greater the perfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more
must we necessarily partake of the divine nature. Therefore, to
make use of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as
possible (not to the point of satiety, for that would not be
enjoyment) is the part of a wise man. I say it is the part of a wise
man to refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant
food and drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of
growing plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with
theatres, and the like, such as every man may make use of without
injury to his neighbour. For the human body is composed of very
numerous parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need
of fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be
equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from the
necessity of its own nature; and, consequently, so that the mind
may also be equally capable of understanding many things
simultaneously. This way of life, then, agrees best with our
principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if there be any
question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is the best,
and in every way to be commended. There is no need for me to set
forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.

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Prop. XLVI. He, who lives under the guidance of reason,

endeavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness, for
other mens hatred, anger, contempt, &c., towards him.
Proof.All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. xlv. Coroll. i.); therefore
he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour, as far as
possible, to avoid being assailed by such emotions (IV. xix.);
consequently, he will also endeavour to prevent others being so
assailed (IV. xxxvii.). But hatred is increased by being reciprocated,
and can be quenched by love (III. xliii.), so that hatred may pass
into love (III. xliv.); therefore he who lives under the guidance of
reason will endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, with
kindness. Q.E.D.
Note.He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is assuredly
wretched. But he, who strives to conquer hatred with love, fights
his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands many as easily as
one, and has very little need of fortunes aid. Those whom he
vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but through increase
in their powers; all these consequences follow so plainly from the
mere definitions of love and understanding, that I have no need to
prove them in detail.
Prop. XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves
good.
Proof.Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain. For

fear is pain (Def. of the Emotions, xiii.), and hope (Def. of the
Emotions, Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without fear;
therefore (IV. xli.) these emotions cannot be good in themselves,
but only in so far as they can restrain excessive pleasure (IV. xliii.).
Q.E.D.
Note.We may add, that these emotions show defective knowledge
and an absence of power in the mind; for the same reason
confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs of a want of
mental power. For although confidence and joy are pleasurable
emotions, they nevertheless imply a preceding pain, namely, hope
and fear. Wherefore the more we endeavour to be guided by
reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to free
ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate fortune,
directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.
Prop. XLVIII. The emotions of over-esteem and disparagement are
always bad.
Proof.These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi. xxii.) are

repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) bad. Q.E.D.

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Prop. XLIX. Over-esteem is apt to render its object proud.
Proof.If we see that any one rates us too highly, for loves sake,
we are apt to become elated (III. xli.), or to be pleasurably affected
(Def. of the Emotions, xxx.); the good which we hear of ourselves
we readily believe (III. xxv.); and therefore, for loves sake, rate
ourselves too highly; in other words, we are apt to become proud.
Q.E.D.
Prop. L. Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason, is in
itself bad and useless.
Proof.Pity (Def. of the Emotions, xviii.) is a pain, and therefore

(IV. xli.) is in itself bad. The good effect which follows, namely, our
endeavour to free the object of our pity from misery, is an action
which we desire to do solely at the dictation of reason (IV. xxxvii.);
only at the dictation of reason are we able to perform any action,
which we know for certain to be good (IV. xxvii.); thus, in a man
who lives under the guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and
bad. Q.E.D.
Note.He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from the
necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in accordance with
the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not find anything worthy
of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will he bestow pity on
anything, but to the utmost extent of human virtue he will
endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to rejoice. We may add,
that he, who is easily touched with compassion, and is moved by
anothers sorrow or tears, often does something which he
afterwards regrets; partly because we can never be sure that an
action caused by emotion is good, partly because we are easily
deceived by false tears. I am in this place expressly speaking of a
man living under the guidance of reason. He who is moved to help
others neither by reason nor by compassion, is rightly styled
inhuman, for (III. xxvii.) he seems unlike a man.
Prop. LI. Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree
therewith and arise therefrom.
Proof.Approval is love towards one who has done good to another

(Def. of the Emotions, xix.); therefore it may be referred to the
mind, in so far as the latter is active (III. lix.), that is (III. iii.), in so
far as it understands; therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c.
Q.E.D.
Another Proof.He, who lives under the guidance of reason,
desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV. xxxvii.);
wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow his own

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endeavour to do good is aided; in other words, he will feel pleasure

(III. xi. note) accompanied by the idea of the benefactor. Therefore
he approves of him. Q.E.D.
Note.Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions, xx.) is

necessarily evil (IV. xlv.); we may, however, remark that, when the
sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace punishes a citizen
who has injured another, it should not be said to be indignant with
the criminal, for it is not incited by hatred to ruin him, it is led by a
sense of duty to punish him.
Prop. LII. Self-approval may arise from reason, and that which
arises from reason is the highest possible.
Proof.Self-approval is pleasure arising from a mans

contemplation of himself and his own power of action (Def. of the
Emotions, xxv.). But a mans true power of action or virtue is
reason herself (III. iii.), as the said man clearly and distinctly
contemplates her (II. xl. xliii.); therefore self-approval arises from
reason. Again, when a man is contemplating himself, he only
perceives clearly and distinctly or adequately, such things as follow
from his power of action (III. Def. ii.), that is (III. iii.), from his
power of understanding; therefore in such contemplation alone
does the highest possible self-approval arise. Q.E.D.
Note.Self-approval is in reality the highest object for which we
can hope. For (as we showed in IV. xxv.) no one endeavours to
preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior object, and, as this
approval is more and more fostered and strengthened by praise
(III. liii. Coroll.), and on the contrary (III. lv. Coroll.) is more and
more disturbed by blame, fame becomes the most powerful of
incitements to action, and life under disgrace is almost
unendurable.
Prop. LIII. Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason.
Proof.Humility is pain arising from a mans contemplation of his

own infirmities (Def. of the Emotions, xxvi.). But, in so far as a man
knows himself by true reason, he is assumed to understand his
essence, that is, his power (III. vii.). Wherefore, if a man in selfcontemplation perceives any infirmity in himself, it is not by virtue
of his understanding himself, but (III. lv.) by virtue of his power of
activity being checked. But, if we assume that a man perceives his
own infirmity by virtue of understanding something stronger than
himself, by the knowledge of which he determines his own power of
activity, this is the same as saying that we conceive that a man
understands himself distinctly (IV. xxvi.), because1 his power of
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a mans contemplation of his own infirmity, does not arise from the
contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion. Q.E.D.
Prop. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason;
but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm.
Proof.The first part of this proposition is proved like the foregoing

one. The second part is proved from the mere definition of the
emotion in question (Def. of the Emotions, xxvii.). For the man
allows himself to be overcome, first, by evil desires; secondly, by
pain.
Note.As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these two
emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and Fear,
bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had better
sin in that direction. For, if all men who are a prey to emotion were
all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing, and would fear
nothing; how then could they be joined and linked together in
bonds of union? The crowd plays the tyrant, when it is not in fear;
hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who consulted the
good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously commended Humility,
Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed those who are a prey to these
emotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the
guidance of reason, that is, to become free and to enjoy the life of
the blessed.
Prop. LV. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance of
self.
Proof.This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and xxix.

Prop. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of
spirit.
Proof.The first foundation of virtue is self-preservation (IV. xxii.

Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.). He, therefore, who
is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the foundation of all virtues,
and consequently of all virtues. Again, to act virtuously is merely to
act under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.): now he, that acts under
the guidance of reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II.
xliii.). Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and
consequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue; in
other words (IV. Def. viii.), is most infirm of spirit. Thus extreme
pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and the
dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.

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Note.Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride; for

the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a painful
emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful (IV. xviii.).
Prop. LVII. The proud man delights in the company of flatterers and
parasites, but hates the company of the high-minded.
Proof.Pride is pleasure arising from a mans overestimation of

himself (Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and vi.); this estimation the
proud man will endeavour to foster by all the means in his power
(III. xiii. note); he will therefore delight in the company of flatterers
and parasites (whose character is too well known to need definition
here), and will avoid the company of high-minded men, who value
him according to his deserts. Q.E.D.
Note.It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the evil
results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all the
emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity. I
cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact, that a man may be
called proud from his underestimation of other people; and,
therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising
from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider himself
superior to his fellows. The dejection, which is the opposite quality
to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising from the false
opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior to his fellows.
Such being the case, we can easily see that a proud man is
necessarily envious (III. xli. note), and only takes pleasure in the
company, who fool his weak mind to the top of his bent, and make
him insane instead of merely foolish.
Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the
dejected man very near akin to the proud man. For, inasmuch as his
pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity and other
mens power or virtue, it will be removed, or, in other words, he
will feel pleasure, if his imagination be occupied in contemplating
other mens faults; whence arises the proverb, The unhappy are
comforted by finding fellow-sufferers. Contrariwise, he will be the
more pained in proportion as he thinks himself inferior to others;
hence none are so prone to envy as the dejected, they are specially
keen in observing mens actions, with a view to fault-finding rather
than correction, in order to reserve their praises for dejection, and
to glory therein, though all the time with a dejected air. These
effects follow as necessarily from the said emotion, as it follows
from the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
right angles. I have already said that I call these and similar
emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man. The laws
of nature have regard to natures general order, whereof man is but
a part. I mention this, in passing, lest any should think that I have

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wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds of men rather
than the nature and properties of things. For, as I said in the
preface to the third Part, I regard human emotions and their
properties as on the same footing with other natural phenomena.
Assuredly human emotions indicate the power and ingenuity of
nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully as other things which
we admire, and which we delight to contemplate. But I pass on to
note those qualities in the emotions, which bring advantage to man,
or inflict injury upon him.
Prop. LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may
arise therefrom.
Proof.This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxx., and also

from the definition of an honourable man (IV. xxxvii. note i.).
Note.Empty honour, as it is styled, is self-approval, fostered only
by the good opinion of the populace; when this good opinion ceases
there ceases also the self-approval, in other words, the highest
object of each mans love (IV. lii. note); consequently, he whose
honour is rooted in popular approval must, day by day, anxiously
strive, act, and scheme in order to retain his reputation. For the
populace is variable and inconstant, so that, if a reputation be not
kept up, it quickly withers away. Everyone wishes to catch popular
applause for himself, and readily represses the fame of others. The
object of the strife being estimated as the greatest of all goods,
each combatant is seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals
in every possible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is
more proud of having done harm to others than of having done
good to himself. This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being
nothing.
The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred from
what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance. I will only
add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue, is yet good,
in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is really imbued with
the desire to live honourably; in the same way as suffering is good,
as showing that the injured part is not mortified. Therefore, though
a man who feels shame is sorrowful, he is yet more perfect than he,
who is shameless, and has no desire to live honourably.
Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon concerning
the emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the desires, they are good
or bad according as they spring from good or evil emotions. But all,
in so far as they are engendered in us by emotions wherein the
mind is passive, are blind (as is evident from what was said in IV.
xliv. note), and would be useless, if men could easily be induced to
live by the guidance of reason only, as I will now briefly show.

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Prop. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by

emotion wherein the mind is passive, we can be determined
without emotion by reason.
Proof.To act rationally is nothing else (III. iii. and Def. ii.) but to
perform those actions, which follow from the necessity of our
nature considered in itself alone. But pain is bad, in so far as it
diminishes or checks the power of action (IV. xli.); wherefore we
cannot by pain be determined to any action, which we should be
unable to perform under the guidance of reason. Again, pleasure is
bad only in so far as it hinders a mans capability for action (IV. xli.
xliii.); therefore to this extent we could not be determined by it to
any action, which we could not perform under the guidance of
reason. Lastly, pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with
reason (for it consists in the fact that a mans capability for action
is increased or aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except in so
far as a mans power of action is not increased to the extent of
affording him an adequate conception of himself and his actions
(III. iii. and note).
Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to such
a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception of
himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more, capable
of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion wherein the
mind is passive. But all emotions are attributable to pleasure, to
pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv. explanation); and desire
(Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing else but the attempt to act;
therefore, to all actions, &c. Q.E.D.
Another Proof.A given action is called bad, in so far as it arises

from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion. But no
action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad (as we
pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same action being
sometimes good, sometimes bad; wherefore to the action which is
sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion, we may be led by
reason (IV. xix.). Q.E.D.
Note.An example will put this point in a clearer light. The action
of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far as
we merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his
fist, and moves his whole arm violently downwards, is a virtue or
excellence which is conceived as proper to the structure of the
human body. If, then, a man, moved by anger or hatred, is led to
clench his fist or to move his arm, this result takes place (as we
showed in Pt. II.), because one and the same action can be
associated with various mental images of things; therefore we may
be determined to the performance of one and the same action by
confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas. Hence it is evident

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that every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is
passive, would become useless, if men could be guided by reason.
Let us now see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the
mind is passive, is called by us blind.
Prop. LX. Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not
attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts
thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole.
Proof.Let it be assumed, for instance, that a, a part of a body, is

so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails over the
remaining parts (IV. vi.). This part will not endeavour to do away
with its own powers, in order that the other parts of the body may
perform its office; for this it would be necessary for it to have a
force or power of doing away with its own powers, which (III. vi.) is
absurd. The said part, and, consequently, the mind also, will
endeavour to preserve its condition. Wherefore desire arising from
a pleasure of the kind aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man
as a whole. If it be assumed, on the other hand, that the part, a, be
checked so that the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in
the same manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in
respect to a man as a whole. Q.E.D.
Note.As pleasure is generally (IV. xliv. note) attributed to one part
of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being without
taking into consideration our health as a whole: to which it may be
added, that the desires which have most hold over us (IV. ix.) take
account of the present and not of the future.
Prop. LXI. Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.
Proof.Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered absolutely is the

actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as in any way
determined to a particular activity by some given modification of
itself. Hence desire, which arises from reason, that is (III. iii.),
which is engendered in us in so far as we act, is the actual essence
or nature of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to such
activities as are adequately conceived through mans essence only
(III. Def. ii.). Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature
considered in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would
be able to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction. Therefore,
such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.
Prop. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the
dictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be of a
thing future, past, or present.

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Proof.Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of

reason, it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II. xliv.
Coroll. ii.), and is therefore affected with the same certitude (II.
xliii. and note). Wherefore, whether the thing be present, past, or
future, the mind conceives it under the same necessity and is
affected with the same certitude; and whether the idea be of
something present, past, or future, it will in all cases be equally
true (II. xli.); that is, it will always possess the same properties of
an adequate idea (II. Def. iv.); therefore, in so far as the mind
conceives things under the dictates of reason, it is affected in the
same manner, whether the idea be of a thing future, past, or
present. Q.E.D.
Note.If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration
of things, and could determine by reason their periods of existence,
we should contemplate things future with the same emotion as
things present; and the mind would desire as though it were
present the good which it conceived as future; consequently it
would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the present for the sake
of a greater good in the future, and would in no wise desire that
which is good in the present but a source of evil in the future, as
we shall presently show. However, we can have but a very
inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (II. xxxi.); and the
periods of their existence (II. xliv. note) we can only determine by
imagination, which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by
the present. Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we
possess is merely abstract or general, and the judgment which we
pass on the order of things and the connection of causes, with a
view to determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is
rather imaginary than real. Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the
desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it
looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the desire of
things which are agreeable at the present time. (Cf. IV. xvi.)
Prop. LXIII. He who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape
evil, is not led by reason.
Proof.All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as

active, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and
desire (III. lix.); therefore, he who is led by fear, and does good in
order to escape evil, is not led by reason.
Note.Superstitious persons, who know better how to rail at vice
than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by
reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape evil
than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as wretched
as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if they be
generally troublesome and odious to their fellow-men.

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Corollary.Under desire which springs from reason, we seek good

directly, and shun evil indirectly.
Proof.Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a
pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III. lix.), in
other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive (IV. lxi.),
and not from pain; wherefore this desire springs from the
knowledge of good, not of evil (IV. viii.); hence under the guidance
of reason we seek good directly and only by implication shun evil.
Q.E.D.
Note.This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick
and a healthy man. The sick man through fear of death eats what
he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes pleasure in his
food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of life, than if he were in
fear of death, and desired directly to avoid it. So a judge, who
condemns a criminal to death, not from hatred or anger but from
love of the public well-being, is guided solely by reason.
Prop. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.
Proof.The knowledge of evil (IV. viii.) is pain, in so far as we are

conscious thereof. Now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection
(Def. of the Emotions, iii.) and therefore cannot be understood
through mans nature (III. vi. and vii.); therefore it is a passive
state (III. Def. ii.) which (III. iii.) depends on inadequate ideas;
consequently the knowledge thereof (II. xxix.), namely, the
knowledge of evil, is inadequate. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed only
adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.
Prop. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the
greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.
Proof.A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is

in reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to things, in
so far as we compare them one with another (see preface to this
Part); therefore, evil is in reality a lesser good; hence under the
guidance of reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and
the lesser evil. Q.E.D.
Corollary.We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the
lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun the
lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil. For the
evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good, and the lesser
good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the former and shun the
latter. Q.E.D.

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Prop. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater

good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, and
we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a greater
evil in the future.1
Proof.If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things

future, it would be affected towards what is future in the same way
as towards what is present (IV. lxii.); wherefore, looking merely to
reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do, there is no
difference, whether the greater good or evil be assumed as present,
or assumed as future; hence (IV. lxv.) we may seek a greater good
in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, &c.
Q.E.D.
Corollary.We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a lesser
evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater good in the
future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present, because it is
the cause of a greater evil in the future. This Corollary is related to
the foregoing Proposition as the Corollary to IV. lxv. is related to
the said IV. lxv.
Note.If these statements be compared with what we have pointed
out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part up to Prop.
xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a man, who is led
solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is led by reason. The
former, whether he will or no, performs actions whereof he is
utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and only performs
such actions, as he knows are of primary importance in life, and
therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the former a slave, and
the latter a free man, concerning whose disposition and manner of
life it will be well to make a few observations.
Prop. LXVII. A free man thinks of death least of all things; and his
wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.
Proof.A free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason,
who is not led by fear (IV. lxiii.), but who directly desires that which
is good (IV. lxiii. Coroll.), in other words (IV. xxiv.), who strives to
act, to live, and to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his
own true advantage; wherefore such an one thinks of nothing less
than of death, but his wisdom is a meditation of life. Q.E.D.
Prop. LXVIII. If men were born free, they would, so long as they
remained free, form no conception of good and evil.
Proof.I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore,
who is born free, and who remains free, has only adequate ideas;

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therefore (IV. lxiv. Coroll.) he has no conception of evil, or

consequently (good and evil being correlative) of good. Q.E.D.
Note.It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of this

Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as we look
solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so far as the
latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the cause of mans
existence.
This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to
have been signified by Moses in the history of the first man. For in
that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save that
whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he provided
solely for mans advantage; it is stated that God forbade man, being
free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that,
as soon as man should have eaten of it, he would straightway fear
death rather than desire to live. Further, it is written that when
man had found a wife, who was in entire harmony with his nature,
he knew that there could be nothing in nature which could be more
useful to him; but that after he believed the beasts to be like
himself, he straightway began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.),
and to lose his freedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by
the patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of
God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire
for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have shown
above (IV. xxxvii.).
Prop. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great, when it
declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.
Proof.Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion

contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining
emotion (IV. vii.). But blind daring and fear are emotions, which can
be conceived as equally great (IV. v. and iii.): hence, no less virtue
or firmness is required in checking daring than in checking fear
(III. lix. note); in other words (Def. of the Emotions, xl. and xli.), the
free man shows as much virtue, when he declines dangers, as when
he strives to overcome them. Q.E.D.
Corollary.The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in
combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind,
whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.
Note.What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby, I
explained in III. lix. note. By danger I mean everything, which can
give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord, &c.

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Prop. LXX. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives, as
far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.
Proof.Everyone judges what is good according to his disposition

(III. xxxix. note); wherefore an ignorant man, who has conferred a
benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon it, and, if it appears
to be estimated less highly by the receiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.).
But the free man only desires to join other men to him in friendship
(IV. xxxvii.), not repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of
like value, but guiding himself and others by the free decision of
reason, and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary
importance. Therefore the free man, lest he should become hateful
to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than reason, will
endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving their favours.
Note.I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant, yet are
they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human aid, the
most excellent of all things: therefore it is often necessary to accept
favours from them, and consequently to repay such favours in kind;
we must, therefore, exercise caution in declining favours, lest we
should have the appearance of despising those who bestow them,
or of being, from avaricious motives, unwilling to requite them, and
so give ground for offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it.
Thus, in declining favours, we must look to the requirements of
utility and courtesy.
Prop. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to another.
Proof.Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another, and

associated among themselves by the closest necessity of friendship
(IV. xxxv. and Coroll. i.), only such men endeavour, with mutual zeal
of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV. xxxvii.), and, therefore,
only they are thoroughly grateful one to another. Q.E.D.
Note.The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire have
for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement, rather
than pure goodwill. Moreover, ingratitude is not an emotion. Yet it
is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a man is affected by
excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, &c. He who, by reason of
his folly, knows not how to return benefits, is not ungrateful, much
less he who is not gained over by the gifts of a courtesan to serve
her lust, or by a thief to conceal his thefts, or by any similar
persons. Contrariwise, such an one shows a constant mind,
inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be corrupted, to his own or the
general hurt.
Prop. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudently, but always in good
faith.

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Proof.If it be asked: What should a mans conduct be in a case

where he could by breaking faith free himself from the danger of
present death? Would not his plan of self-preservation completely
persuade him to deceive? this may be answered by pointing out
that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would persuade all men
to act in a similar manner, in which case reason would persuade
men not to agree in good faith to unite their forces, or to have laws
in common, that is, not to have any general laws, which is absurd.
Prop. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in a
State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in
solitude, where he is independent.
Proof.The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey through

fear (IV. lxiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to preserve his being
according to the dictates of reason, that is (IV. lxvi. note), in so far
as he endeavours to live in freedom, he desires to order his life
according to the general good (IV. xxxvii.), and, consequently (as
we showed in IV. xxxvii. note ii.), to live according to the laws of his
country. Therefore the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom,
desires to possess the general rights of citizenship. Q.E.D.
Note.These and similar observations, which we have made on
mans true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to
courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note). I do not think it
worth while to prove separately all the properties of strength;
much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no man, is angry
with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no man, despises no
man, and least of all things is proud. These propositions, and all
that relate to the true way of life and religion, are easily proved
from IV. xxxvii. and xlvi.; namely, that hatred should be overcome
with love, and that every man should desire for others the good
which he seeks for himself. We may also repeat what we drew
attention to in the note to IV. l., and in other places; namely, that
the strong man has ever first in his thoughts, that all things follow
from the necessity of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he
deems to be hurtful and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to
him impious, horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance
owing to his own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the
universe. Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things
as they really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge,
such as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar
emotions, which I have mentioned above. Thus he endeavours, as
we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on his
way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of attaining to such
a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in the
following Part.

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Appendix.
What I have said in this Part concerning the right way of life has
not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view, but
has been set forth piece-meal, according as I thought each
Proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it. I
propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them
under leading heads.
I. All our endeavours or desires so follow from the necessity of our
nature, that they can be understood either through it alone, as
their proximate cause, or by virtue of our being a part of nature,
which cannot be adequately conceived through itself without other
individuals.
II. Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner, that
they can be understood through it alone, are those which are
referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to consist
of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only referred to the
mind, in so far as it conceives things inadequately, and their force
and increase are generally defined not by the power of man, but by
the power of things external to us: wherefore the former are rightly
called actions, the latter passions, for the former always indicate
our power, the latter, on the other hand, show our infirmity and
fragmentary knowledge.
III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by mans
power or reason, are always good. The rest may be either good or
bad.
IV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect the
understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone mans
highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed blessedness is
nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which arises from the
intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the understanding is
nothing else but to understand God, Gods attributes, and the
actions which follow from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore of
a man, who is led by reason, the ultimate aim or highest desire,
whereby he seeks to govern all his fellows, is that whereby he is
brought to the adequate conception of himself and of all things
within the scope of his intelligence.
V. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational life: and
things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his enjoyment of
the intellectual life, which is defined by intelligence. Contrariwise,
whatsoever things hinder mans perfecting of his reason, and
capability to enjoy the rational life, are alone called evil.

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VI. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are necessarily
good, no evil can befall man except through external causes;
namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal nature, whose
laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to conform to in
almost infinite ways.
VII. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of nature, or that
he should not follow her general order; but if he be thrown among
individuals whose nature is in harmony with his own, his power of
action will thereby be aided and fostered, whereas, if he be thrown
among such as are but very little in harmony with his nature, he
will hardly be able to accommodate himself to them without
undergoing a great change himself.
VIII. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be capable of
injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the rational life, we
may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems safest to us; on
the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good or useful for
preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the rational life, we
may appropriate to our use and employ as we think best. Everyone
without exception may, by sovereign right of nature, do whatsoever
he thinks will advance his own interest.
IX. Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any given
thing than other individuals of the same species; therefore (cf. vii.)
for man in the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of the
rational life there is nothing more useful than his fellow-man who is
led by reason. Further, as we know not anything among individual
things which is more excellent than a man led by reason, no man
can better display the power of his skill and disposition, than in so
training men, that they come at last to live under the dominion of
their own reason.
X. In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of hatred,
one towards another, they are at variance, and are therefore to be
feared in proportion, as they are more powerful than their fellows.
XI. Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and highmindedness.
XII. It is before all things useful to men to associate their ways of
life, to bind themselves together with such bonds as they think
most fitted to gather them all into unity, and generally to do
whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship.
XIII. But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness. For men
are diverse (seeing that those who live under the guidance of
reason are few), yet are they generally envious and more prone to

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revenge than to sympathy. No small force of character is therefore

required to take everyone as he is, and to restrain ones self from
imitating the emotions of others. But those who carp at mankind,
and are more skilled in railing at vice than in instilling virtue, and
who break rather than strengthen mens dispositions, are hurtful
both to themselves and others. Thus many from too great
impatience of spirit, or from misguided religious zeal, have
preferred to live among brutes rather than among men; as boys or
youths, who cannot peaceably endure the chidings of their parents,
will enlist as soldiers and choose the hardships of war and the
despotic discipline in preference to the comforts of home and the
admonitions of their father: suffering any burden to be put upon
them, so long as they may spite their parents.
XIV. Therefore, although men are generally governed in everything
by their own lusts, yet their association in common brings many
more advantages than drawbacks. Wherefore it is better to bear
patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to strive to promote
whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and friendship.
XV. Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are
attributable to justice, equity, and honourable living. For men brook
ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is reckoned
disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received customs of
their society. For winning love those qualities are especially
necessary which have regard to religion and piety (cf. IV. xxxvii.
notes, i. ii.; xlvi. note; and lxxiii. note).
XVI. Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such harmony
is insecure. Further, fear arises from infirmity of spirit, and
moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason: the same is true of
compassion, though this latter seems to bear a certain resemblance
to piety.
XVII. Men are also gained over by liberality, especially such as have
not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain life. However, to
give aid to every poor man is far beyond the power and the
advantage of any private person. For the riches of any private
person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call. Again, an
individual mans resources of character are too limited for him to
be able to make all men his friends. Hence providing for the poor is
a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, and has regard only to
the general advantage.
XVIII. In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our duty
must be wholly different (cf. IV. lxx. note; lxxi. note).

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XIX. Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of generation arising
from bodily beauty, and generally every sort of love, which owns
anything save freedom of soul as its cause, readily passes into hate;
unless indeed, what is worse, it is a species of madness; and then it
promotes discord rather than harmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.).
XX. As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in harmony
with reason, if the desire for physical union be not engendered
solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to beget children and
to train them up wisely; and moreover, if the love of both, to wit, of
the man and of the woman, is not caused by bodily beauty only, but
also by freedom of soul.
XXI. Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by means of
the vile offence of slavishness or treachery. None are more readily
taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be first, but are not.
XXII. There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety and
religion. Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet is he that
abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. lvii. note).
XXIII. Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such matters
as cannot be hid. Further, as shame is a species of pain, it does not
concern the exercise of reason.
XXIV. The remaining emotions of pain towards men are directly
opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion; and, although
indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance to equity, yet is
life but lawless, where every man may pass judgment on anothers
deeds, and vindicate his own or other mens rights.
XXV. Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire of
pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to
piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note i.). But, if it spring from emotion,
it is ambition, or the desire whereby men, under the false cloak of
piety, generally stir up discords and seditions. For he who desires
to aid his fellows either in word or in deed, so that they may
together enjoy the highest good, he, I say, will before all things
strive to win them over with love: not to draw them into
admiration, so that a system may be called after his name, nor to
give any cause for envy. Further, in his conversation he will shrink
from talking of mens faults, and will be careful to speak but
sparingly of human infirmity: but he will dwell at length on human
virtue or power, and the way whereby it may be perfected. Thus
will men be stirred not by fear, nor by aversion, but only by the
emotion of joy, to endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in
obedience to reason.

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XXVI. Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature in

whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with
ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore,
whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our
advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or
destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our
use as best we may.
XXVII. The advantage which we derive from things external to us,
besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from
observing them, and from recombining their elements in different
forms, is principally the preservation of the body; from this point of
view, those things are most useful which can so feed and nourish
the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their functions. For, in
proportion as the body is capable of being affected in a greater
variety of ways, and of affecting external bodies in a great number
of ways, so much the more is the mind capable of thinking (IV.
xxxviii. xxxix.). But there seem to be very few things of this kind in
nature; wherefore for the due nourishment of the body we must use
many foods of diverse nature. For the human body is composed of
very many parts of different nature, which stand in continual need
of varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally
capable of doing everything that can follow from its own nature,
and consequently that the mind also may be equally capable of
forming many perceptions.
XXVIII. Now for providing these nourishments the strength of each
individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one another
mutual aid. But money has furnished us with a token for
everything: hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind of
the multitude is chiefly engrossed: nay, it can hardly conceive any
kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the idea of money
as cause.
XXIX. This result is the fault only of those, who seek money, not
from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, but because they
have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring themselves to
great splendour. Certainly they nourish their bodies, according to
custom, but scantily, believing that they lose as much of their
wealth as they spend on the preservation of their body. But they
who know the true use of money, and who fix the measure of wealth
solely with regard to their actual needs, live content with little.
XXX. As, therefore, those things are good which assist the various
parts of the body, and enable them to perform their functions; and
as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid to, mans power, in so
far as he is composed of mind and body; it follows that all those
things which bring pleasure are good. But seeing that things do not

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work with the object of giving us pleasure, and that their power of
action is not tempered to suit our advantage, and, lastly, that
pleasure is generally referred to one part of the body more than to
the other parts; therefore most emotions of pleasure (unless reason
and watchfulness be at hand), and consequently the desires arising
therefrom, may become excessive. Moreover we may add that
emotion leads us to pay most regard to what is agreeable in the
present, nor can we estimate what is future with emotions equally
vivid. (IV. xliv. note, and lx. note.)
XXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as good all
that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure. However, as
we said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious take delight in
my infirmity and trouble. For the greater the pleasure whereby we
are affected, the greater is the perfection whereto we pass, and
consequently the more do we partake of the divine nature: no
pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated by a true regard for
our advantage. But contrariwise he, who is led by fear and does
good only to avoid evil, is not guided by reason.
XXXII. But human power is extremely limited, and is infinitely
surpassed by the power of external causes; we have not, therefore,
an absolute power of shaping to our use those things which are
without us. Nevertheless, we shall bear with an equal mind all that
happens to us in contravention to the claims of our own advantage,
so long as we are conscious, that we have done our duty, and that
the power which we possess is not sufficient to enable us to protect
ourselves completely; remembering that we are a part of universal
nature, and that we follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct
understanding of this, that part of our nature which is defined by
intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will
assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence
will endeavour to persist. For, in so far as we are intelligent beings,
we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary, nor yield
absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which is true:
wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding of these
things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is in harmony
with the order of nature as a whole.

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PART V.
OF THE POWER OF THE UNDERSTANDING,
OR OF HUMAN FREEDOM.
Preface.
AT length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is
concerned with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore treat
therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the reason can
control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or
Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much more powerful
the wise man is than the ignorant. It is no part of my design to
point out the method and means whereby the understanding may
be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the body may be so
tended, as to be capable of the due performance of its functions.
The latter question lies in the province of Medicine, the former in
the province of Logic. Here, therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of
the power of the mind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show the
extent and nature of its dominion over the emotions, for their
control and moderation. That we do not possess absolute dominion
over them, I have already shown. Yet the Stoics have thought, that
the emotions depended absolutely on our will, and that we could
absolutely govern them. But these philosophers were compelled, by
the protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess,
that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate
them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the example
(if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house-dog and the
other a hunting-dog. For by long training it could be brought about,
that the house-dog should become accustomed to hunt, and the
hunting-dog to cease from running after hares. To this opinion
Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that the soul or
mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely, to
that part called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is
enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body,
and also external objects, and which the mind by a simple act of
volition can put in motion in various ways. He asserted, that this
gland is so suspended in the midst of the brain, that it could be
moved by the slightest motion of the animal spirits: further, that
this gland is suspended in the midst of the brain in as many
different manners, as the animal spirits can impinge thereon; and,
again, that as many different marks are impressed on the said
gland, as there are different external objects which impel the
animal spirits towards it; whence it follows, that if the will of the

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soul suspends the gland in a position, wherein it has already been

suspended once before by the animal spirits driven in one way or
another, the gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and
determining them to the condition wherein they were, when
repulsed before by a similar position of the gland. He further
asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature to a
certain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever anyone
desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition causes the
pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in question had
only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the mere wish to dilate it
would not have brought about the result, inasmuch as the motion of
the gland, which serves to impel the animal spirits towards the
optic nerve in a way which would dilate or contract the pupil, is not
associated in nature with the wish to dilate or contract the pupil,
but with the wish to look at remote or very near objects. Lastly, he
maintained that, although every motion of the aforesaid gland
seems to have been united by nature to one particular thought out
of the whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our
life, yet it can nevertheless become through habituation associated
with other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de
lme, I. 50. He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak,
that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power over
its passions. For passions as defined by him are perceptions, or
feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are referred to the soul
as species, and which (mark the expression) are produced,
preserved, and strengthened through some movement of the
spirits. (Passions de lme, I. 27.) But, seeing that we can join any
motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any volition,
the determination of the will depends entirely on our own powers;
if, therefore, we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in
the direction to which we wish our actions to tend, and associate
the motions of the passions which we wish to acquire with the said
decisions, we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our passions.
Such is the doctrine of this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I
gather it from his own words); it is one which, had it been less
ingenious, I could hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a
man. Indeed, I am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had
stoutly asserted, that he would draw no conclusions which do not
follow from self-evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which
he did not clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often
taken to task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities
through occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which
occult qualities are commonplace. What does he understand, I ask,
by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and distinct
conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a
certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like him to
explain this union through its proximate cause. But he had so
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could not assign any particular cause of the union between the two,
or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse to the cause
of the whole universe, that is to God. Further, I should much like to
know, what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal
gland, and with what force can it hold it suspended? For I am in
ignorance, whether this gland can be agitated more slowly or more
quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits, and whether the
motions of the passions, which we have closely united with firm
decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom by physical causes;
in which case it would follow that, although the mind firmly
intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision the
motions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might
become suspended in a way, which would preclude the mind
thinking of anything except running away. In truth, as there is no
common standard of volition and motion, so is there no comparison
possible between the powers of the mind and the power or strength
of the body; consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be
determined by the strength of the other. We may also add, that
there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed
that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also
that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the
brain. Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes concerning
the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have abundantly proved
that his premisses are false. Therefore, since the power of the
mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the understanding only,
we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the mind the
remedies against the emotions, which I believe all have had
experience of, but do not accurately observe or distinctly see, and
from the same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions, which
have regard to the minds blessedness.
Axioms.
I. If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a change
must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of the two,
and continue until they cease to be contrary.
II. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, in so
far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its
cause.
(This axiom is evident from III. vii.)
Prop. I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and
associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or the
images of things precisely in the same way arranged and
associated in the body.

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Proof.The order and connection of ideas is the same (II. vii.) as

the order and connection of things, and vice vers the order and
connection of things is the same (II. vi. Coroll. and vii.) as the order
and connection of ideas. Wherefore, even as the order and
connection of ideas in the mind takes place according to the order
and association of modifications of the body (II. xviii.), so vice vers
(III. ii.) the order and connection of modifications of the body takes
place in accordance with the manner, in which thoughts and the
ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind. Q.E.D.
Prop. II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, from
the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other thoughts,
then will the love or hatred towards that external cause, and also
the vacillations of spirit which arise from these emotions, be
destroyed.
Proof.That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred, is

pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause
(Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.); wherefore, when this cause is
removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it; therefore
these emotions and those which arise therefrom are destroyed.
Q.E.D.
Prop. III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as
soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.
Proof.An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by the

general Def. of the Emotions). If, therefore, we form a clear and
distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only be distinguished
from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, by
reason (II. xxi. and note); therefore (III. iii.), the emotion will cease
to be a passion. Q.E.D.
Corollary.An emotion therefore becomes more under our control,
and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as it is
more known to us.
Prop. IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot
form some clear and distinct conception.
Proof.Properties which are common to all things can only be

conceived adequately (II. xxxviii.); therefore (II. xii. and Lemma ii.
after II. xiii.) there is no modification of the body, whereof we
cannot form some clear and distinct conception. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof we
cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is
the idea of a modification of the body (by the general Def. of the

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Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve

some clear and distinct conception.
Note.Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by an

effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly understand
whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate (II. xl.), it
follows that everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly
understanding himself and his emotions, if not absolutely, at any
rate in part, and consequently of bringing it about, that he should
become less subject to them. To attain this result, therefore, we
must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, as far as possible, a
clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion, in order that the
mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those
things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully
acquiesces: and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from
the thought of an external cause, and may be associated with true
thoughts; whence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred,
&c. will be destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires,
which are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable
of being excessive (IV. lxi.). For it must be especially remarked, that
the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and that
through which he is said to be passive is one and the same. For
instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted, that
everyone desires his fellow-men to live after his own fashion (III.
xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by reason, this appetite is a
passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ from
pride; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an
activity or virtue which is called piety (IV. xxxvii. note i. and second
proof). In like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in
so far as they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are
accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by
adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to any
given action, may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate
ideas (IV. lix.). Than this remedy for the emotions (to return to the
point from which I started), which consists in a true knowledge
thereof, nothing more excellent, being within our power, can be
devised. For the mind has no other power save that of thinking and
of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above (III. iii.).
Prop. V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceivesimply, and
not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other
conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.
Proof.An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be free,

is greater than one towards what we conceive to be necessary (III.
xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one towards what we
conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.). But to conceive a thing
as free can be nothing else than to conceive it simply, while we are

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in ignorance of the causes whereby it has been determined to

action (II. xxxv. note); therefore, an emotion towards a thing which
we conceive simply is, other conditions being equal, greater than
one, which we feel towards what is necessary, possible, or
contingent, and, consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D.
Prop. VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is less
subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as necessary.
Proof.The mind understands all things to be necessary (I. xxix.)

and to be determined to existence and operation by an infinite
chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoing Proposition), it thus far
brings it about, that it is less subject to the emotions arising
therefrom, and (III. xlviii.) feels less emotion towards the things
themselves. Q.E.D.
Note.The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is
applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly and
vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, as
experience also testifies. For we see, that the pain arising from the
loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as the man who has lost it
perceives, that it could not by any means have been preserved. So
also we see that no one pities an infant, because it cannot speak,
walk, or reason, or lastly, because it passes so many years, as it
were, in unconsciousness. Whereas, if most people were born fullgrown and only one here and there as an infant, everyone would
pity the infants; because infancy would not then be looked on as a
state natural and necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in
Nature; and we may note several other instances of the same sort.
Prop. VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if we
take account of time, are stronger than those,which are
attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.
Proof.We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the

emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body being
affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the said
thing (II. xvii.). Wherefore, the emotion, which is referred to the
thing which we regard as absent, is not of a nature to overcome the
rest of a mans activities and power (IV. vi.), but is, on the contrary,
of a nature to be in some sort controlled by the emotions, which
exclude the existence of its external cause (IV. ix.). But an emotion
which springs from reason is necessarily referred to the common
properties of things (see the def. of reason in II. xl. note ii.), which
we always regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude
their present existence), and which we always conceive in the same
manner (II. xxxviii.). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always
remains the same; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which are

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contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external causes,
will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more, until they
are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the emotion which
springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.
Prop. VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of
simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.
Proof.Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few

(III. vii.): therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased number of
simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion becomes
stronger. Q.E.D.
Note.This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii.
Prop. IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse
causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion
itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less
affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different and
equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a single
cause.
Proof.An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders the

mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.); therefore, an
emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of
several things at once, is less hurtful than another equally powerful
emotion, which so engrosses the mind in the single contemplation
of a few objects or of one, that it is unable to think of anything else;
this was our first point. Again, as the minds essence, in other
words, its power (III. vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the
mind is less passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to
think of several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong
emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few or
of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this emotion
(III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to several causes, is less
powerful in regard to each of them. Q.E.D.
Prop. X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our
nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the
modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.
Proof.The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that is (IV.

xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind
from understanding (IV. xxvii.). So long, therefore, as we are not
assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the minds power,
whereby it endeavours to understand things (IV. xxvi.), is not
impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear and distinct ideas
and to deduce them one from another (II. xl. note ii. and xlvii.

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note); consequently we have in such cases the power of arranging

and associating the modifications of the body according to the
intellectual order. Q.E.D.
NoteBy this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily

modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by
evil emotions. For (V. vii.) a greater force is needed for controlling
the emotions, when they are arranged and associated according to
the intellectual order, than when they are uncertain and unsettled.
The best we can do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a
perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to frame a system of right
conduct, or fixed practical precepts, to commit it to memory, and to
apply it forthwith1 to the particular circumstances which now and
again meet us in life, so that our imagination may become fully
imbued therewith, and that it may be always ready to our hand. For
instance, we have laid down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and
note), that hatred should be overcome with love or highmindedness, and not requited with hatred in return. Now, that this
precept of reason may be always ready to our hand in time of need,
we should often think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally
committed by men, and in what manner and way they may be best
warded off by high-mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of
wrong with the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always
be ready for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.) If we keep
also in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good
which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships;
further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result of
the right way of life (IV. lii.), and that men, no less than everything
else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such case I say the
wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises therefrom, will
engross a very small part of our imagination and will be easily
overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a grievous wrong be
not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be overcome, though not
without a spiritual conflict, far sooner than if we had not thus
reflected on the subject beforehand. As is indeed evident from V. vi.
vii. viii. We should, in the same way, reflect on courage as a means
of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers of life should frequently
be brought to mind and imagined, together with the means
whereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind we
can avoid and overcome them. But we must note, that in arranging
our thoughts and conceptions we should always bear in mind that
which is good in every individual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.),
in order that we may always be determined to action by an emotion
of pleasure. For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the
pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for which
it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain it. Let
him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the fickleness of
mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except through a

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morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do the most

ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of gaining
the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving vent to their
anger would fain appear wise. Wherefore it is certain that those,
who cry out the loudest against the misuse of honour and the vanity
of the world, are those who most greedily covet it. This is not
peculiar to the ambitious, but is common to all who are ill-used by
fortune, and who are infirm in spirit. For a poor man also, who is
miserly, will talk incessantly of the misuse of wealth and of the
vices of the rich; whereby he merely torments himself, and shows
the world that he is intolerant, not only of his own poverty, but also
of other peoples riches. So, again, those who have been ill received
by a woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy,
treachery, and other stock faults of the fair sex; all of which they
consign to oblivion, directly they are again taken into favour by
their sweetheart. Thus he who would govern his emotions and
appetite solely by the love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to
gain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his
spirit with the joy which arises from the true knowledge of them:
he will in no wise desire to dwell on mens faults, or to carp at his
fellows, or to revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will
diligently observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are
not difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for the
most part, to direct his actions according to the commandments of
reason.
Prop. XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to more
objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and occupies
the mind more.
Proof.In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is referred

to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can be
aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind
contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion;
therefore the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in full
vigour, and (V. viii.) occupies the mind more. Q.E.D.
Prop. XII. The mental images of things are more easily associated
with the images referred to things which we clearly and distinctly
understand, than with others.
Proof.Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand, are

either the common properties of things or deductions therefrom
(see definition of Reason, II. xl. note ii.), and are consequently (by
the last Prop.) more often aroused in us. Wherefore it may more
readily happen, that we should contemplate other things in
conjunction with these than in conjunction with something else,
and consequently (II. xviii.) that the images of the said things

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should be more often associated with the images of these than with
the images of something else. Q.E.D.
Prop. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as it is
associated with a greater number of other images.
Proof.In proportion as an image is associated with a greater

number of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes
whereby it can be aroused. Q.E.D.
Prop. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily modifications
or images of things may be referred to the idea of God.
Proof.There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind may

not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.); wherefore it
can bring it about, that they should all be referred to the idea of
God (I. xv.). Q.E.D.
Prop. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his
emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he
more understands himself and his emotions.
Proof.He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his

emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is (by the last
Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God; therefore (Def. of the
Emotions, vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the same reason) so
much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and
his emotions. Q.E.D.
Prop. XVI. This love towards God must hold the chief place in the
mind.
Proof.For this love is associated with all the modifications of the

body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.); therefore (V. xi.), it
must hold the chief place in the mind. Q.E.D.
Prop. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by any
emotion of pleasure or pain.
Proof.All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true (II.
xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and therefore (by the general
Def. of the Emotions) God is without passions. Again, God cannot
pass either to a greater or to a lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.);
therefore (by Def. of the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any
emotion of pleasure or pain.
Corollary.Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For
God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of

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pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.) he

does not love or hate anyone.
Prop. XVIII. No one can hate God.
Proof.The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (II.

xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God, we are
active (III. iii.); consequently (III. lix.) there can be no pain
accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of the
Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.
Note.It may be objected that, as we understand God as the cause
of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of pain.
But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of
pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a passion, that is, it
ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore, in so far as we understand
God to be the cause of pain, we to that extent feel pleasure.
Prop. XIX. He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should
love him in return.
Proof.For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V. xvii.

Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and
consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is absurd
(III. xxviii.). Therefore, he who loves God, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion
of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in
proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to
God by the same bond of love.
Proof.This love towards God is the highest good which we can

seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common to
all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice therein (IV.
xxxvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.), it cannot be stained
by the emotion of envy, nor by the emotion of jealousy (V. xviii. see
definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note); but, contrariwise, it must
needs be the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater
number of men to rejoice therein. Q.E.D.
Note.We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion
directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be destroyed;
therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God is the most
constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as it is referred to
the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the body be destroyed also.
As to its nature, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, we shall
presently inquire.
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I have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions, or
all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them.
Whence it appears that the minds power over the emotions
consists:
I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note).
II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an
external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V. ii. and iv. note).
III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions referred to
things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those referred to
what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner (V. vii.).
IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications1 are
fostered, which have regard to the common properties of things or
to God (V. ix. xi.).
V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate,
one with another, its own emotions (V. x. note and xii. xiii. xiv.).
But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be
better understood, it should be specially observed that the
emotions are called by us strong, when we compare the emotion of
one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man is more
troubled than another by the same emotion; or when we are
comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another,
and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than by
another. For the strength of every emotion is defined by a
comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause.
Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its
infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge only: it
therefore follows, that that mind is most passive, whose greatest
part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it may be
characterized more readily by its passive states than by its
activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active, whose
greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that, although it may
contain as many inadequate ideas as the former mind, it may yet be
more easily characterized by ideas attributable to human virtue,
than by ideas which tell of human infirmity. Again, it must be
observed, that spiritual unhealthiness and misfortunes can
generally be traced to excessive love for something which is subject
to many variations, and which we can never become masters of. For
no one is solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it;
neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except in regard
to things whereof no one can be really master.

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We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct
knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge (II. xlvii.
note), founded on the actual knowledge of God, possesses over the
emotions: if it does not absolutely destroy them, in so far as they
are passions (V. iii. and iv. note); at any rate, it causes them to
occupy a very small part of the mind (V. xiv.). Further, it begets a
love towards a thing immutable and eternal (V. xv.), whereof we
may really enter into possession (II. xlv.); neither can it be defiled
with those faults which are inherent in ordinary love; but it may
grow from strength to strength, and may engross the greater part
of the mind, and deeply penetrate it.
And now I have finished with all that concerns this present life: for,
as I said in the beginning of this note, I have briefly described all
the remedies against the emotions. And this everyone may readily
have seen for himself, if he has attended to what is advanced in the
present note, and also to the definitions of the mind and its
emotions, and, lastly, to Propositions i. and iii. of Part III. It is now,
therefore, time to pass on to those matters, which appertain to the
duration of the mind, without relation to the body.
Prop. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what
is past, while the body endures.
Proof.The mind does not express the actual existence of its body,
nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as actual, except
while the body endures (II. viii. Coroll.); and, consequently (II.
xxvi.), it does not imagine any body as actually existing, except
while its own body endures. Thus it cannot imagine anything (for
definition of Imagination, see II. xvii. note), or remember things
past, except while the body endures (see definition of Memory, II.
xviii. note). Q.E.D.
Prop. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea, which
expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of
eternity.
Proof.God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or that

human body, but also of its essence (I. xxv.). This essence,
therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the very essence
of God (I. Ax. iv.), and be thus conceived by a certain eternal
necessity (I. xvi.); and this conception must necessarily exist in God
(II. iii.). Q.E.D.
Prop. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with
the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.

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Proof.There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which

expresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which,
therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence of
the human mind (II. xiii.). But we have not assigned to the human
mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as it
expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained
through duration, and may be defined by timethat is (II. viii.
Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body
endures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is
conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence
of God (last Prop.); this something, which appertains to the essence
of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.
Note.This idea, which expresses the essence of the body under
the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode of thinking,
which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is necessarily
eternal. Yet it is not possible that we should remember that we
existed before our body, for our body can bear no trace of such
existence, neither can eternity be defined in terms of time, or have
any relation to time. But, notwithstanding, we feel and know that
we are eternal. For the mind feels those things that it conceives by
understanding, no less than those things that it remembers. For the
eyes of the mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none
other than proofs. Thus, although we do not remember that we
existed before the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it
involves the essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is
eternal, and that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of
time, or explained through duration. Thus our mind can only be
said to endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed
time, in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus
far only has it the power of determining the existence of things by
time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.
Prop. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more do
we understand God.
Proof.This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll.

Prop. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest
virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.
Proof.The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate

idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the
essence of things (see its definition II. xl. note ii.); and, in
proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better
understand God (by the last Prop.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
highest virtue of the mind, that is (IV. Def. viii.) the power, or

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nature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to understand

things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable of
understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires
more to understand things by that kind.
Proof.This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive the mind to be

capable of conceiving things by this kind of knowledge, we, to that
extent, conceive it as determined thus to conceive things; and
consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the mind desires so to do, in
proportion as it is more capable thereof. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXVII. From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest
possible mental acquiescence.
Proof.The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV. xxviii.),

or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge (V. xxv.), and
this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind knows things more
by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.): consequently, he who
knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the summit of
human perfection, and is therefore (Def. of the Emotions, ii.)
affected by the highest pleasure, such pleasure being accompanied
by the idea of himself and his own virtue; thus (Def. of the
Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of knowledge arises the highest
possible acquiescence. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to know things by the third
kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second
kind of knowledge.
Proof.This proposition is self-evident. For whatsoever we

understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through
itself, or through that which is conceived through itself; that is,
ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are referred to
the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note ii.) cannot follow from ideas
that are fragmentary and confused, and are referred to knowledge
of the first kind, but must follow from adequate ideas, or ideas of
the second and third kind of knowledge; therefore (Def. of the
Emotions, i.), the desire of knowing things by the third kind of
knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind.
Q.E.D.
Prop. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of
eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present
actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving the essence
of the body under the form of eternity.

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Proof.In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its

body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be determined
by time, and to that extent only has it the power of conceiving
things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.). But eternity cannot be
explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii and explanation).
Therefore to this extent the mind has not the power of conceiving
things under the form of eternity, but it possesses such power,
because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under the
form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll. ii.), and also because it is of the
nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the
form of eternity (V. xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing
which belongs to the essence of mind (II. xiii.). Therefore this
power of conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs
to the mind in virtue of the minds conceiving the essence of the
body under the form of eternity. Q.E.D.
Note.Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways, either as
existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in
God and following from the necessity of the divine nature.
Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we
conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the
eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in II. xlv. and
note, which see.
Prop. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body under
the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of
God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived through God.
Proof.Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this involves

necessary existence (I. Def. viii.). Therefore to conceive things
under the form of eternity, is to conceive things in so far as they are
conceived through the essence of God as real entities, or in so far
as they involve existence through the essence of God; wherefore
our mind, in so far as it conceives itself and the body under the
form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God,
and knows, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as
its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.
Proof.The mind does not conceive anything under the form of

eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the
form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is eternal (V.
xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so far as it is eternal, it
possesses the knowledge of God, which knowledge is necessarily
adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is
capable of knowing everything which can follow from this given
knowledge of God (II. xl.), in other words, of knowing things by the

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third kind of knowledge (see Def. in II. xl. note ii.), whereof
accordingly the mind (III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the
adequate or formal cause of such knowledge. Q.E.D.
Note.In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in this

kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of himself
and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect and blessed, as
will appear more clearly in the sequel. But we must here observe
that, although we are already certain that the mind is eternal, in so
far as it conceives things under the form of eternity, yet, in order
that what we wish to show may be more readily explained and
better understood, we will consider the mind itself, as though it had
just begun to exist and to understand things under the form of
eternity, as indeed we have done hitherto; this we may do without
any danger of error, so long as we are careful not to draw any
conclusion, unless our premisses are plain.
Prop. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of
knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by
the idea of God as cause.
Proof.From this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible

mental acquiescence, that is (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), pleasure,
and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself
(V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the idea also of God as cause.
Q.E.D.
Corollary.From the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises the
intellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge arises
pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is (Def of
the Emotions, vi.), the love of God; not in so far as we imagine him
as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we understand him to be
eternal; this is what I call the intellectual love of God.
Prop. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from the
third kind of knowledge, is eternal.
Proof.The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. xxxi. I. Ax. iii.);

therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises therefrom is
also necessarily eternal. Q.E.D.
Note.Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing Prop.)
no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of love, just as
though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll. of the last Prop.
Nor is there here any difference, except that the mind possesses as
eternal those same perfections which we feigned to accrue to it,
and they are accompanied by the idea of God as eternal cause. If
pleasure consists in the transition to a greater perfection, assuredly

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blessedness must consist in the mind being endowed with

perfection itself.
Prop. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject to
those emotions which are attributable to passions.
Proof.Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind contemplates a

thing as present (II. xvii. note); yet this idea indicates rather the
present disposition of the human body than the nature of the
external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.). Therefore emotion (see general
Def. of Emotions) is imagination, in so far as it indicates the
present disposition of the body; therefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only
while the body endures, subject to emotions which are attributable
to passions. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is
eternal.
Note.If we look to mens general opinion, we shall see that they
are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they
confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the imagination or
the memory which they believe to remain after death.
Prop. XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.
Proof.God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.), that is (II. Def. vi.), the
nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection; and such rejoicing is
(II. iii.) accompanied by the idea of himself, that is (I. xi. and Def.
i.), the idea of his own cause: now this is what we have (in V. xxxii.
Coroll.) described as intellectual love.
Prop. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is that
very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as he is
infinite, but in so far as he can be explainedthrough the essence of
the human mind regarded under the form of eternity; in other
words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the
infinite love wherewith God loves himself.
Proof.This love of the mind must be referred to the activities of

the mind (V. xxxii. Coroll. and III. iii.); it is itself, indeed, an activity
whereby the mind regards itself accompanied by the idea of God as
cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.); that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.),
an activity whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through
the human mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of
himself; therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of
the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. Q.E.D.

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Corollary.Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves himself,

loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God towards men,
and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are identical.
Note.From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein
our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in the
constant and eternal love towards God, or in Gods love towards
men. This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, called Glory, and not
undeservedly. For whether this love be referred to God or to the
mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of spirit, which (Def. of
the Emotions, xxv. xxx.) is not really distinguished from glory. In so
far as it is referred to God, it is (V. xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still
use that term, accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it
is referred to the mind, it is the same (V. xxvii.).
Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge,
whereof the beginning and the foundation is God (I. xv. and II. xlvii.
note), it becomes clear to us, in what manner and way our mind, as
to its essence and existence, follows from the divine nature and
constantly depends on God. I have thought it worth while here to
call attention to this, in order to show by this example how the
knowledge of particular things, which I have called intuitive or of
the third kind (II. xl. note ii.), is potent, and more powerful than the
universal knowledge, which I have styled knowledge of the second
kind. For, although in Part I. I showed in general terms, that all
things (and consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their
essence and existence on God, yet that demonstration, though
legitimate and placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect
our mind so much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the
actual essence of some particular thing, which we say depends on
God.
Prop. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to this
intellectual love, or which can take it away,
Proof.This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of

the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through the nature of
God as an eternal truth (V. xxxiii. and xxix.). If, therefore, there
should be anything which would be contrary to this love, that thing
would be contrary to that which is true; consequently, that, which
should be able to take away this love, would cause that which is
true to be false; an obvious absurdity. Therefore there is nothing in
nature which, &c. Q.E.D.
Note.The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular things, in
so far as they are regarded in relation to a given time and place: of
this, I think, no one can doubt.

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Prop. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things

by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to
those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.
Proof.The minds essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.);

therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by
the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the
part of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently (by the
last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not touched by the
emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in other words, evil
(IV. xxx.). Thus, in proportion as the mind understands more things
by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the
part of it, that remains unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject
to emotions, &c. Q.E.D.
Note.Hence we understand that point which I touched on in IV.
xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part; namely,
that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the minds clear
and distinct knowledge is greater, and, consequently, in proportion
as the mind loves God more. Again, since from the third kind of
knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it
follows that the human mind can attain to being of such a nature,
that the part thereof which we have shown to perish with the body
(V. xxi.) should be of little importance when compared with the part
which endures. But I will soon treat of the subject at greater
length.
Prop. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is
eternal.
Proof.He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number

of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which are evil (IV.
xxxviii.)that is (IV. xxx.), by those emotions which are contrary to
our nature; therefore (V. x.), he possesses the power of arranging
and associating the modifications of the body according to the
intellectual order, and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all
the modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God;
whence it will come to pass that (V. xv.) he will be affected with love
towards God, which (V. xvi.) must occupy or constitute the chief
part of the mind; therefore (V. xxxiii.), such a man will possess a
mind whereof the chief part is eternal. Q.E.D.
Note.Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number of
activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such a nature,
that they may be referred to minds possessing a great knowledge
of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest or chief part is
eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely fear death. But, in

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order that this may be understood more clearly, we must here call
to mind, that we live in a state of perpetual variation, and,
according as we are changed for the better or the worse, we are
called happy or unhappy.
For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a corpse, is
called unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness, if we have
been able to live through the whole period of life with a sound mind
in a sound body. And, in reality, he, who, as in the case of an infant
or a child, has a body capable of very few activities, and depending,
for the most part, on external causes, has a mind which, considered
in itself alone, is scarcely conscious of itself, or of God, or of things;
whereas, he, who has a body capable of very many activities, has a
mind which, considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself,
of God, and of things. In this life, therefore, we primarily endeavour
to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far as its nature
allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into something else
capable of very many activities, and referable to a mind which is
highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things; and we desire so to
change it, that what is referred to its imagination and memory may
become insignificant, in comparison with its intellect, as I have
already said in the note to the last Proposition.
Prop. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection,
so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice vers, in proportion
as it is more active, so is it more perfect.
Proof.In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it possesses

more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, consequently (III. iii. and note), it
is to that extent more active and less passive. This demonstration
may be reversed, and thus prove that, in proportion as a thing is
more active, so is it more perfect. Q.E.D.
Corollary.Hence it follows that the part of the mind which
endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest. For the
eternal part of the mind (V. xxiii. xxix.) is the understanding,
through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.); the part which we
have shown to perish is the imagination (V. xxi.), through which
only we are said to be passive (III. iii. and general Def. of the
Emotions); therefore, the former, be it great or small, is more
perfect than the latter. Q.E.D.
Note.Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set forth
concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded without relation to
the body; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other places, it is plain
that our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of
thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking,

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and this other by a third, and so on to infinity; so that all taken

together at once constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God.
Prop. XLI. Even if we did not know that our mind iseternal, we
should still consider as of primary importance piety and religion,
and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed to be
attributable to courage and high-mindedness.
Proof.The first and only foundation of virtue, or the rule of right

living is (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.) seeking ones own true interest.
Now, while we determined what reason prescribes as useful, we
took no account of the minds eternity, which has only become
known to us in this Fifth Part. Although we were ignorant at that
time that the mind is eternal, we nevertheless stated that the
qualities attributable to courage and high-mindedness are of
primary importance. Therefore, even if we were still ignorant of
this doctrine, we should yet put the aforesaid precepts of reason in
the first place. Q.E.D.
Note.The general belief of the multitude seems to be different.
Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so far as they
may obey their lusts, and that they cede their rights, in so far as
they are bound to live according to the commandments of the
divine law. They therefore believe that piety, religion, and,
generally, all things attributable to firmness of mind, are burdens,
which, after death, they hope to lay aside, and to receive the
reward for their bondage, that is, for their piety and religion; it is
not only by this hope, but also, and chiefly, by the fear of being
horribly punished after death, that they are induced to live
according to the divine commandments, so far as their feeble and
infirm spirit will carry them.
If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the mind
perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life remains
for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of piety,
they would return to their own inclinations, controlling everything
in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey fortune rather
than themselves. Such a course appears to me not less absurd than
if a man, because he does not believe that he can by wholesome
food sustain his body for ever, should wish to cram himself with
poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he sees that the mind is not
eternal or immortal, he should prefer to be out of his mind
altogether, and to live without the use of reason; these ideas are so
absurd as to be scarcely worth refuting.
Prop. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself;
neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but,

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contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our

lusts.
Proof.Blessedness consists in love towards God (V. xxxvi. and
note), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V. xxxii.
Coroll.); therefore this love (III. iii. lix.) must be referred to the
mind, in so far as the latter is active; therefore (IV. Def. viii.) it is
virtue itself. This was our first point. Again, in proportion as the
mind rejoices more in this divine love or blessedness, so does it the
more understand (V. xxxii.); that is (V. iii. Coroll.), so much the more
power has it over the emotions, and (V. xxxviii.) so much the less is
it subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in proportion
as the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, so has it the
power of controlling lusts. And, since human power in controlling
the emotions consists solely in the understanding, it follows that no
one rejoices in blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts,
but, contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this
blessedness itself. Q.E.D.
Note.I have thus completed all I wished to set forth touching the
minds power over the emotions and the minds freedom. Whence it
appears, how potent is the wise man, and how much he surpasses
the ignorant man, who is driven only by his lusts. For the ignorant
man is not only distracted in various ways by external causes
without ever gaining the true acquiescence of his spirit, but
moreover lives, as it were unwitting of himself, and of God, and of
things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.
Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is
scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself,
and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal necessity, never
ceases to be, but always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit.
If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems
exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it
be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be possible, if
salvation were ready to our hand, and could without great labour
be found, that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all
things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.

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SPINOZAS CORRESPONDENCE.
[abridged.]

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LETTER I. (I.1 )
Henry Oldenburg2To B. De Spinoza.
[Oldenburg, after complimenting Spinoza, asks him to enter into a
philosophical correspondence.]
ILLUSTRIOUS Sir, And Most Worthy Friend,

So painful to me was the separation from you the other day after
our meeting in your retreat at Rhijnsburg, that it is my first
endeavour, now that I am returned to England, to renew, as far as
is possible by correspondence, my intercourse with you. Solid
learning, conjoined with courtesy and refinement of manners
(wherewith both nature and art have most amply endowed you),
carries with it such charms as to command the love of every
honourable and liberally-educated man. Let us then, most excellent
sir, join hands in sincere friendship, and let us foster the feeling
with every zealous endeavour and kind office in our power.
Whatever my poor means can furnish I beg you to look on as your
own. Allow me in return to claim a share in the riches of your
talents, as I may do without inflicting any loss on yourself.
We conversed at Rhijnsburg of God, of extension, of infinite
thought, of the differences and agreements between these, of the
nature of the connection between the human soul and body, and
further, of the principles of the Cartesian and Baconian
philosophies.
But, as we then spoke of these great questions merely cursorily and
by the way, and as my mind has been not a little tormented with
them since, I will appeal to the rights of our newly cemented
friendship, and most affectionately beg you to give me at somewhat
greater length your opinion on the subjects I have mentioned. On
two points especially I ask for enlightenment, if I may presume so
far; first: In what do you place the true distinction between thought
and matter? secondly: What do you consider to be the chief defects
in the Cartesian and Baconian philosophies, and how do you think
they might best be removed, and something more sound
substituted? The more freely you write to me on these and similar
subjects, the more closely will you tie the bonds of our friendship,
and the stricter will be the obligation laid on me to repay you, as
far as possible, with similar services.

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There is at present in the press a collection of physiological

discourses written by an Englishman of noble family and
distinguished learning.1 They treat of the nature and elasticity of
the air, as proved by forty-three experiments; also of its fluidity,
solidity, and other analogous matters. As soon as the work is
published, I shall make a point of sending it to you by any friend
who may be crossing the sea. Meanwhile, farewell, and remember
your friend, who is
Yours, In All Affection And Zeal,

Henry Oldenburg.
London, Aug., 1661.

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LETTER II. (II.)

Spinoza To Oldenburg.
[Answer to Letter I. Spinoza defines God, and attribute, and
sends definitions, axioms, and first four propositions of Book I. of
Ethics. Some errors of Bacon and Descartes discussed.]
Illustrious Sir,
How pleasant your friendship is to me, you may yourself judge, if
your modesty will allow you to reflect on the abundance of your
own excellences. Indeed the thought of these makes me seem not a
little bold in entering into such a compact, the more so when I
consider that between friends all things, and especially things
spiritual, ought to be in common. However, this must lie at the
charge of your modesty and kindness rather than of myself. You
have been willing to lower yourself through the former and to fill
me with the abundance of the latter, till I am no longer afraid to
accept the close friendship, which you hold out to me, and which
you deign to ask of me in return; no effort on my part shall be
spared to render it lasting.
As for my mental endowments, such as they are, I would willingly
allow you to share them, even though I knew it would be to my own
great hindrance. But this is not meant as an excuse for denying to
you what you ask by the rights of friendship. I will therefore
endeavour to explain my opinions on the topics you touched on;
though I scarcely hope, unless your kindness intervene, that I shall
thus draw the bonds of our friendship closer.
I will then begin by speaking briefly of God, Whom I define as a
Being consisting in infinite attributes, whereof each is infinite or
supremely perfect after its kind. You must observe that by attribute
I mean everything, which is conceived through itself and in itself,
so that the conception of it does not involve the conception of
anything else. For instance, extension is conceived through itself
and in itself, but motion is not. The latter is conceived through
something else, for the conception of it implies extension.
That the definition above given of God is true appears from the
fact, that by God we mean a Being supremely perfect and
absolutely infinite. That such a Being exists may easily be proved
from the definition; but as this is not the place for such proof, I will
pass it over. What I am bound here to prove, in order to satisfy the
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first inquiry of my distinguished questioner, are the following

consequences; first, that in the universe there cannot exist two
substances without their differing utterly in essence; secondly, that
substance cannot be produced or createdexistence pertains to its
actual essence; thirdly, that all substance must be infinite or
supremely perfect after its kind.
When these points have been demonstrated, my distinguished
questioner will readily perceive my drift, if he reflects at the same
time on the definition of God. In order to prove them clearly and
briefly, I can think of nothing better than to submit them to the bar
of your judgment proved in the geometrical method.1 I therefore
enclose them separately and await your verdict upon them.
Again, you ask me what errors I detect in the Cartesian and
Baconian philosophies. It is not my custom to expose the errors of
others, nevertheless I will yield to your request. The first and the
greatest error is, that these philosophers have strayed so far from
the knowledge of the first cause and origin of all things; the second
is, that they did not know the true nature of the human mind; the
third, that they never grasped the true cause of error. The necessity
for correct knowledge on these three points can only be ignored by
persons completely devoid of learning and training.
That they have wandered astray from the knowledge of the first
cause, and of the human mind, may easily be gathered from the
truth of the three propositions given above; I therefore devote
myself entirely to the demonstration of the third error. Of Bacon I
shall say very little, for he speaks very confusedly on the point, and
works out scarcely any proofs: he simply narrates. In the first place
he assumes, that the human intellect is liable to err, not only
through the fallibility of the senses, but also solely through its own
nature, and that it frames its conceptions in accordance with the
analogy of its own nature, not with the analogy of the universe, so
that it is like a mirror receiving rays from external objects
unequally, and mingling its own nature with the nature of things,
&c.
Secondly, that the human intellect is, by reason of its own nature,
prone to abstractions; such things as are in flux it feigns to be
constant, &c.
Thirdly, that the human intellect continually augments, and is
unable to come to a stand or to rest content. The other causes
which he assigns may all be reduced to the one Cartesian principle,
that the human will is free and more extensive than the intellect,
or, as Verulam himself more confusedly puts it, that the
understanding is not a dry light, but receives infusion from the

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will.1 (We may here observe that Verulam often employs

intellect as synonymous with mind, differing in this respect from
Descartes). This cause, then, leaving aside the others as
unimportant, I shall show to be false; indeed its falsity would be
evident to its supporters, if they would consider, that will in general
differs from this or that particular volition in the same way as
whiteness differs from this or that white object, or humanity from
this or that man. It is, therefore, as impossible to conceive, that will
is the cause of a given volition, as to conceive that humanity is the
cause of Peter and Paul.
Hence, as will is merely an entity of the reason, and cannot be
called the cause of particular volitions, and as some cause is
needed for the existence of such volitions, these latter cannot be
called free, but are necessarily such as they are determined by
their causes; lastly, according to Descartes, errors are themselves
particular volitions; hence it necessarily follows that errors, or, in
other words, particular volitions, are not free, but are determined
by external causes, and in nowise by the will. This is what I
undertook to prove.

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LETTER III. (III.)

Oldenburg To Spinoza.
[Oldenburg propounds several questions concerning God and His
existence, thought, and the axioms of Eth. I. He also informs
Spinoza of a philosophical society, and promises to send Boyles
book.]
Most Excellent Friend,

Your learned letter has been delivered to me, and read with great
pleasure.
I highly approve of your geometrical method of proof, but I must
set it down to my dulness, that I cannot follow with readiness what
you set forth with such accuracy. Suffer me, then, I beg, to expose
the slowness of my understanding, while I put the following
questions, and beg of you to answer them.
First. Do you clearly and indisputably understand solely from the

definition you have given of God, that such a Being exists? For my
part, when I reflect that definitions contain only the conceptions
formed by our minds, and that our mind forms many conceptions of
things which do not exist, and is very fertile in multiplying and
amplifying what it has conceived, I do not yet see, that from the
conception I have of God I can infer Gods existence. I am able by a
mental combination of all the perfections I perceive in men, in
animals, in vegetables, in minerals, &c., to conceive and to form an
idea of some single substance uniting in itself all such excellences;
indeed my mind is able to multiply and augment such excellences
indefinitely; it may thus figure forth for itself a most perfect and
excellent Being, but there would be no reason thence to conclude
that such a Being actually exists.
Secondly. I wish to ask, whether you think it unquestionable, that
body cannot be limited by thought, or thought by body; seeing that
it still remains undecided, what thought is, whether it be a physical
motion or a spiritual act quite distinct from body?
Thirdly. Do you reckon the axioms, which you have sent to me, as
indemonstrable principles known by the light of nature and
needing no proof? Perhaps the first is of this nature, but I do not
see how the other three can be placed in a like category. The
second assumes that nothing exists in the universe save substances
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and accidents, but many persons would say that time and place
cannot be classed either as one or the other. Your third axiom, that
things having different attributes have no quality in common, is so
far from being clear to me, that its contrary seems to be shown in
the whole universe. All things known to us agree in certain respects
and differ in others. Lastly, your fourth axiom, that when things
have no quality in common, one cannot be produced by another, is
not so plain to my groping intelligence as to stand in need of no
further illumination. God has nothing actually in common with
created things, yet nearly all of us believe Him to be their cause.
As you see that in my opinion your axioms are not established
beyond all the assaults of doubt, you will readily gather that the
propositions you have based upon them do not appear to me
absolutely firm. The more I reflect upon them, the more are doubts
suggested to my mind concerning them.
As to the first, I submit that two men are two substances with the
same attribute, inasmuch as both are rational; whence I infer that
there can be two substances with the same attribute.
As to the second, I opine that, as nothing can be its own cause, it is
hardly within the scope of our intellect to pronounce on the truth of
the proposition, that substance cannot be produced even by any
other substance. Such a proposition asserts all substances to be
self-caused, and all and each to be independent of one another,
thus making so many gods, and therefore denying the first cause of
all things. This, I willingly confess, I cannot understand, unless you
will be kind enough to explain your theory on this sublime subject
somewhat more fully and simply, informing me what may be the
origin and mode of production of substances, and the mutual
interdependence and subordination of things. I most strenuously
beg and conjure you by that friendship which we have entered into,
to answer me freely and faithfully on these points; you may rest
assured, that everything which you think fit to communicate to me
will remain untampered with and safe, for I will never allow
anything to become public through me to your hurt or
disadvantage. In our philosophical society we proceed diligently as
far as opportunity offers with our experiments and observations,
lingering over the compilation of the history of mechanic arts, with
the idea that the forms and qualities of things can best be
explained from mechanical principles, and that all natural effects
can be produced through motion, shape, and consistency, without
reference to inexplicable forms or occult qualities, which are but
the refuge of ignorance.
I will send the book I promised, whenever the Dutch Ambassadors
send (as they frequently do) a messenger to the Hague, or

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whenever some other friend whom I can trust goes your way. I beg
you to excuse my prolixity and freedom, and simply ask you to take
in good part, as one friend from another, the straightforward and
unpolished reply I have sent to your letter, believing me to be
without deceit or affectation,
Yours Most Faithfully,

Henry Oldenburg.
London, 27 Sept., 1961.

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LETTER IV. (IV.)

[Spinoza answers some of Oldenburgs questions and doubts, but
has not time to reply to all, as he is just setting out for Amsterdam. ]
Illustrious Sir,
As I was starting for Amsterdam, where I intend staying for a week
or two, I received your most welcome letter, and noted the
objections you raise to the three propositions I sent you. Not having
time to reply fully, I will confine myself to these three.
To the first I answer, that not from every definition does the
existence of the thing defined follow, but only (as I showed in a note
appended to the three propositions) from the definition or idea of
an attribute, that is (as I explained fully in the definition given of
God) of a thing conceived through and in itself. The reason for this
distinction was pointed out, if I mistake not, in the abovementioned note sufficiently clearly at any rate for a philosopher,
who is assumed to be aware of the difference between a fiction and
a clear and distinct idea, and also of the truth of the axiom that
every definition or clear and distinct idea is true. When this has
been duly noted, I do not see what more is required for the solution
of your first question.
I therefore proceed to the solution of the second, wherein you seem
to admit that, if thought does not belong to the nature of extension,
then extension will not be limited by thought; your doubt only
involves the example given. But observe, I beg, if we say that
extension is not limited by extension but by thought, is not this the
same as saying that extension is not infinite absolutely, but only as
far as extension is concerned, in other words, infinite after its kind?
But you say: perhaps thought is a corporeal action: be it so, though
I by no means grant it: you, at any rate, will not deny that
extension, in so far as it is extension, is not thought, and this is all
that is required for explaining my definition and proving the third
proposition.
Thirdly. You proceed to object, that my axioms ought not to be

ranked as universal notions. I will not dispute this point with you;
but you further hesitate as to their truth, seeming to desire to show
that their contrary is more probable. Consider, I beg, the definition
which I gave of substance and attribute, for on that they all
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depend. When I say that I mean by substance that which is

conceived through and in itself; and that I mean by modification or
accident that, which is in something else, and is conceived through
that wherein it is, evidently it follows that substance is by nature
prior to its accidents. For without the former the latter can neither
be nor be conceived. Secondly, it follows that, besides substances
and accidents, nothing exists really or externally to the intellect.
For everything is conceived either through itself or through
something else, and the conception of it either involves or does not
involve the conception of something else. Thirdly, it follows that
things which possess different attributes have nothing in common.
For by attribute I have explained that I mean something, of which
the conception does not involve the conception of anything else.
Fourthly and lastly, it follows that, if two things have nothing in
common, one cannot be the cause of the other. For, as there would
be nothing in common between the effect and the cause, the whole
effect would spring from nothing. As for your contention that God
has nothing actually in common with created things, I have
maintained the exact opposite in my definition. I said that God is a
Being consisting of infinite attributes, whereof each one is infinite
or supremely perfect after its kind. With regard to what you say
concerning my first proposition, I beg you, my friend, to bear in
mind, that men are not created but born, and that their bodies
already exist before birth, though under different forms. You draw
the conclusion, wherein I fully concur, that, if one particle of matter
be annihilated, the whole of extension would forthwith vanish. My
second proposition does not make many gods but only one, to wit, a
Being consisting of infinite attributes, &c.

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LETTER V. (V.)
[Oldenburg sends Boyles book, and laments that Spinoza has not
been able to answer all his doubts.]
Most Respected Friend,

Please accept herewith the book I promised you, and write me in
answer your opinion on it, especially on the remarks about nitre,
and about fluidity, and solidity. I owe you the warmest thanks for
your learned second letter, which I received to-day, but I greatly
grieve that your journey to Amsterdam prevented you from
answering all my doubts. I beg you will supply the omission, as
soon as you have leisure. You have much enlightened me in your
last letter, but have not yet dispelled all my darkness; this result
will, I believe, be happily accomplished, when you send me clear
and distinct information concerning the first origin of things.
Hitherto I have been somewhat in doubt as to the cause from
which, and the manner in which things took their origin; also, as to
what is the nature of their connection with the first cause, if such
there be. All that I hear or read on the subject seems inconclusive.
Do you then, my very learned master, act, as it were, as my torchbearer in the matter. You will have no reason to doubt my
confidence and gratitude. Such is the earnest petition of
Yours Most Faithfully,

Henry Oldenburg.

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LETTER VI. (VI.)

[Containing detailed criticisms by Spinoza of Robert Boyles book. ]
Omitted.

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LETTER VII. (VII.)

[After thanking Spinoza, in the name of himself and Boyle,
Oldenburg mentions the foundation of the Royal Society, and begs
his correspondent to publish his theological and philosophical
works.]
******
The body of philosophers which I formerly mentioned to you has
now, by the kings grace, been constituted as a Royal Society, and
furnished with a public charter, whereby distinguished privileges
are conferred upon it, and an excellent prospect afforded of
endowing it with the necessary revenues.
I would by all means advise you not to begrudge to the learned
those works in philosophy and theology, which you have composed
with the talent that distinguishes you. Publish them, I beg,
whatever be the verdict of petty theologians. Your country is free;
the course of philosophy should there be free also. Your own
prudence will, doubtless, suggest to you, that your ideas and
opinions should be put forth as quietly as possible. For the rest,
commit the issue to fortune. Come, then, good sir, cast away all
fear of exciting against you the pigmies of our time. Long enough
have we sacrificed to ignorance and pedantry. Let us spread the
sails of true knowledge, and explore the recesses of nature more
thoroughly than heretofore. Your meditations can, I take it, be
printed in your country with impunity; nor need any scandal among
the learned be dreaded because of them. If these be your patrons
and supporters (and I warrant me you will find them so), why
should you dread the carpings of ignorance? I will not let you go,
my honoured friend, till I have gained my request; nor will I ever,
so far as in me lies, allow thoughts of such importance as yours to
rest in eternal silence. I earnestly beg you to communicate to me,
as soon as you conveniently can, your decision in the matter.
Perhaps events will occur here not unworthy of your knowledge.
The Society I have mentioned will now proceed more strenuously
on its course, and, if peace continues on our shores, will possibly
illustrate the republic of letters with some extraordinary
achievement. Farewell, excellent sir, and believe me,

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Your Most Zealous And Friendly,

Henry Oldenburg.

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LETTER VIII (XI.)

[After further replying to Spinozas criticisms on Boyles book,
Oldenburg again exhorts his correspondent to publish.]
******
I now proceed to the question which has arisen between us. First,
permit me to ask you whether you have finished the important little
work, in which you treat of the origin of things and their
dependence on the first cause, and of the improvement of our
understanding. Truly, my dear sir, I believe nothing more pleasing
or acceptable to men of true learning and discrimination could
possibly be published than such a treatise. This is what a man of
your talent and disposition should look to, far more than the
gratification of theologians of our time and fashion. The latter have
less regard for truth than for their own convenience. I, therefore,
conjure you, by the bond of our friendship, by every duty of
increasing and proclaiming the truth, not to begrudge us, or
withhold from us your writings on these subjects. If anything of
greater importance than I can foresee prevents you from publishing
the work, I earnestly charge you to give me a summary of it by
letter.
Another book is soon to be published by the learned Boyle, which I
will send you as an exchange. I will add papers, which will acquaint
you with the whole constitution of our Royal Society, whereof I,
with twenty others, am on the Council, and, with one other, am
Secretary. I have no time to discourse of any further subjects. All
the confidence which honest intentions can inspire, all the
readiness to serve, which the smallness of my powers will permit, I
pledge to you, and am heartily,
Dear Sir, Yours Wholly,

H. Oldenburg.
London, 3 April, 1663.

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LETTER IX. (XIII.)

[Spinoza informs Oldenburg that he has removed to Rhijnsburg,
and has spent some time at Amsterdam for the purpose of
publishing the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy. He then replies
to Boyles objections.]
Distinguished Sir,
I have at length received your long wished for letter, and am at
liberty to answer it. But, before I do so, I will briefly tell you, what
has prevented my replying before. When I removed my household
goods here in April, I set out for Amsterdam. While there certain
friends asked me to impart to them a treatise containing, in brief,
the second part of the principles of Descartes treated
geometrically, together with some of the chief points treated of in
metaphysics, which I had formerly dictated to a youth, to whom I
did not wish to teach my own opinions openly. They further
requested me, at the first opportunity, to compose a similar treatise
on the first part. Wishing to oblige my friends, I at once set myself
to the task, which I finished in a fortnight, and handed over to
them. They then asked for leave to print it, which I readily granted
on the condition that one of them should, under my supervision,
clothe it in more elegant phraseology, and add a little preface
warning readers that I do not acknowledge all the opinions there
set forth as my own, inasmuch as I hold the exact contrary to much
that is there written, illustrating the fact by one or two examples.
All this the friend who took charge of the treatise promised to do,
and this is the cause for my prolonged stay in Amsterdam. Since I
returned to this village, I have hardly been able to call my time my
own, because of the friends who have been kind enough to visit me.
At last, my dear friend, a moment has come, when I can relate
these occurrences to you, and inform you why I allow this treatise
to see the light. It may be that on this occasion some of those, who
hold the foremost positions in my country, will be found desirous of
seeing the rest of my writings, which I acknowledge as my own;
they will thus take care that I am enabled to publish them without
any danger of infringing the laws of the land. If this be as I think, I
shall doubtless publish at once; if things fall out otherwise, I would
rather be silent than obtrude my opinions on men, in defiance of my
country, and thus render them hostile to me. I therefore hope, my
friend, that you will not chafe at having to wait a short time longer;

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you shall then receive from me either the treatise printed, or the
summary of it which you ask for. If meanwhile you would like to
have one or two copies of the work now in the press, I will satisfy
your wish, as soon as I know of it and of means to send the book
conveniently.
[The rest of the letter is taken up with criticisms on Boyles book. ]

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LETTERS X.XIV.1
[Contain further correspondence concerning Boyles book, and
kindred subjects.]
LETTER XIII.A.
[The place of this letter is between Letters XIII. and XIV. It was
written apparently in September, 1665. It mentions the plague,
which was then at its height, the war, and the labours of the Royal
Society, and especially of Boyle. Then comes the passage here
given. The letter terminates with references to the comets, and to
Huyghens.]
******
I see that you are engaged not so much in philosophy as in
theology, if I may say so. That is, you are recording your thoughts
about angels, prophecy, and miracles, but you are doing this,
perhaps, in a philosophical manner; however that may be, I am
certain that the work1 is worthy of you, and that I am most anxious
to have it. Since these most difficult times prevent free intercourse,
I beg at least that you will not disdain to signify to me in your next
letter2 your design and aim in this writing of yours.
Here we are daily expecting news of a second3 naval battle, unless
indeed your fleet has retired into port. Virtue,4 the nature of which
you hint is being discussed among your friends, belongs to wild
beasts not to men. For if men acted according to the guidance of
reason, they would not so tear one another in pieces, as they
evidently do. But what is the good of my complaining? Vices will
exist while men do;5 but yet they are not continuous, but
compensated by the interposition of better things.
******

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LETTER XV. (XXXII.)

[Spinoza writes to his friend concerning the reasons which lead us
to believe, that every part of nature agrees with the whole, and is
associated with all other parts. He also makes a few remarks
about Huyghens.]
Distinguished Sir,
For the encouragement to pursue my speculations given me by
yourself and the distinguished R. Boyle, I return you my best
thanks. I proceed as far as my slender abilities will allow me, with
full confidence in your aid and kindness. When you ask me my
opinion on the question raised concerning our knowledge of the
means, whereby each part of nature agrees with its whole, and the
manner in which it is associated with the remaining parts, I
presume you are asking for the reasons which induce us to believe,
that each part of nature agrees with its whole, and is associated
with the remaining parts. For as to the means whereby the parts
are really associated, and each part agrees with its whole, I told
you in my former letter that I am in ignorance. To answer such a
question, we should have to know the whole of nature and its
several parts. I will therefore endeavour to show the reason, which
led me to make the statement; but I will premise that I do not
attribute to nature either beauty or deformity, order or confusion.
Only in relation to our imagination can things be called beautiful or
deformed, ordered or confused.
By the association of parts, then, I merely mean that the laws or
nature of one part adapt themselves to the laws or nature of
another part, so as to cause the least possible inconsistency. As to
the whole and the parts, I mean that a given number of things are
parts of a whole, in so far as the nature of each of them is adapted
to the nature of the rest, so that they all, as far as possible, agree
together. On the other hand, in so far as they do not agree, each of
them forms, in our mind, a separate idea, and is to that extent
considered as a whole, not as a part. For instance, when the parts
of lymph, chyle, &c., combine, according to the proportion of the
figure and size of each, so as to evidently unite, and form one fluid,
the chyle, lymph, &c., considered under this aspect, are part of the
blood; but, in so far as we consider the particles of lymph as
differing in figure and size from the particles of chyle, we shall
consider each of the two as a whole, not as a part.
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Let us imagine, with your permission, a little worm, living in the

blood, able to distinguish by sight the particles of blood, lymph,
&c., and to reflect on the manner in which each particle, on
meeting with another particle, either is repulsed, or communicates
a portion of its own motion. This little worm would live in the blood,
in the same way as we live in a part of the universe, and would
consider each particle of blood, not as a part, but as a whole. He
would be unable to determine, how all the parts are modified by the
general nature of blood, and are compelled by it to adapt
themselves, so as to stand in a fixed relation to one another. For, if
we imagine that there are no causes external to the blood, which
could communicate fresh movements to it, nor any space beyond
the blood, nor any bodies whereto the particles of blood could
communicate their motion, it is certain that the blood would always
remain in the same state, and its particles would undergo no
modifications, save those which may be conceived as arising from
the relations of motion existing between the lymph, the chyle, &c.
The blood would then always have to be considered as a whole, not
as a part. But, as there exist, as a matter of fact, very many causes
which modify, in a given manner, the nature of the blood, and are,
in turn, modified thereby, it follows that other motions and other
relations arise in the blood, springing not from the mutual relations
of its parts only, but from the mutual relations between the blood as
a whole and external causes. Thus the blood comes to be regarded
as a part, not as a whole. So much for the whole and the part.
All natural bodies can and ought to be considered in the same way
as we have here considered the blood, for all bodies are
surrounded by others, and are mutually determined to exist and
operate in a fixed and definite proportion, while the relations
between motion and rest in the sum total of them, that is, in the
whole universe, remain unchanged. Hence it follows that each
body, in so far as it exists as modified in a particular manner, must
be considered as a part of the whole universe, as agreeing with the
whole, and associated with the remaining parts. As the nature of
the universe is not limited, like the nature of blood, but is
absolutely infinite, its parts are by this nature of infinite power
infinitely modified, and compelled to undergo infinite variations.
But, in respect to substance, I conceive that each part has a more
close union with its whole. For, as I said in my first letter1
(addressed to you while I was still at Rhijnsburg), substance being
infinite in its nature,2 it follows, as I endeavoured to show, that
each part belongs to the nature of substance, and, without it, can
neither be nor be conceived.
You see, therefore, how and why I think that the human body is a
part of nature. As regards the human mind, I believe that it also is
a part of nature; for I maintain that there exists in nature an

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infinite power of thinking, which, in so far as it is infinite, contains

subjectively the whole of nature, and its thoughts proceed in the
same manner as naturethat is, in the sphere of ideas.3 Further, I
take the human mind to be identical with this said power, not in so
far as it is infinite, and perceives the whole of nature, but in so far
as it is finite, and perceives only the human body; in this manner, I
maintain that the human mind is a part of an infinite
understanding.
But to explain, and accurately prove, all these and kindred
questions, would take too long; and I do not think you expect as
much of me at present. I am afraid that I may have mistaken your
meaning, and given an answer to a different question from that
which you asked. Please inform me on this point.
You write in your last letter, that I hinted that nearly all the
Cartesian laws of motion are false. What I said was, if I remember
rightly, that Huyghens thinks so; I myself do not impeach any of the
laws except the sixth, concerning which I think Huyghens is also in
error. I asked you at the same time to communicate to me the
experiment made according to that hypothesis in your Royal
Society; as you have not replied, I infer that you are not at liberty
to do so. The above-mentioned Huyghens is entirely occupied in
polishing lenses. He has fitted up for the purpose a handsome
workshop, in which he can also construct moulds. What will be the
result I know not, nor, to speak the truth, do I greatly care.
Experience has sufficiently taught me, that the free hand is better
and more sure than any machine for polishing spherical moulds. I
can tell you nothing certain as yet about the success of the clocks
or the date of Huyghens journey to France.

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LETTER XVI. (XXXIII.)

[After some remarks on Spinozas last letter, and an account of
experiments at the Royal Society and at Oxford, Oldenburg
mentions a report about the return of the Jews to Palestine].
******
But I pass on to politics. Everyone here is talking of a report that
the Jews, after remaining scattered for more than two thousand
years, are about to return to their country. Few here believe in it,
but many desire it. Please tell your friend what you hear and think
on the matter. For my part, unless the news is confirmed from
trustworthy sources at Constantinople, which is the place chiefly
concerned, I shall not believe it. I should like to know, what the
Jews of Amsterdam have heard about the matter, and how they are
affected by such important tidings which, if true, would assuredly
seem to harbinger the end of the world. * * * Believe me to be
Yours Most Zealously,

Henry Oldenburg
London, 8 Dec., 1665.
P.S. I will shortly (d.v.) tell you the opinion of our philosophers on
the recent comets.

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LETTER XVII. (LXI.)

[Oldenburg thanks Spinoza for the Tractatus Theoligico-Politicus
despatched but not received, and modifies an adverse verdict
expressed in a former letter (now lost).]
I was unwilling to let pass the convenient opportunity offered me
by the journey to Holland of the learned Dr. Bourgeois, an adherent
of the Reformed religion, for expressing my thanks a few weeks ago
for your treatise forwarded to me, but not yet arrived. But I am
doubtful whether my letter was duly delivered. I indicated in them
my opinion on the treatise; but on deeper and more careful
inspection I now think that my verdict was hasty. Certain
arguments seemed to me to be urged at the expense of religion, as
measured by the standard supplied by the common run of
theologians and the received formulas of creeds which are
evidently biassed. But a closer consideration of the whole subject
convinced me, that you are far from attempting any injury to true
religion and sound philosophy, but, on the contrary, strive to exalt
and establish the true object of the Christian religion and the divine
loftiness of fruitful philosophy.
Now that I believe that this is your fixed purpose, I would most
earnestly beg you to have the kindness to write frequently and
explain the nature of what you are now preparing and considering
with this object to your old and sincere friend, who is all eager for
the happy issue of so lofty a design. I sacredly promise you, that I
will not divulge a syllable to anyone, if you enjoin silence; I will only
endeavour gently to prepare the minds of good and wise men for
the reception of those truths, which you will some day bring before
a wider public, and I will try to dispel the prejudices, which have
been conceived against your doctrines. Unless I am quite mistaken,
you have an insight deeper than common into the nature and
powers of the human mind, and its union with the human body. I
earnestly beg you to favour me with your reflections on this
subject. Farewell, most excellent Sir, and favour the devoted
admirer of your teaching and virtue,
Henry Oldenburg.
London, 8 June, 1675.1

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LETTER XVIII. (LXII.)

[Oldenburg rejoices at the renewal of correspondence, and alludes
to the five books of the Ethics which Spinoza (in a letter now lost)
had announced his intention of publishing.]
Our correspondence being thus happily renewed, I should be
unwilling to fall short of a friends duty in the exchange of letters. I
understand from your answer delivered to me on July 5, that you
intend to publish your treatise in five parts. Allow me, I beg, to
warn you by the sincerity of your affection for me, not to insert any
passages which may seem to discourage the practice of religion
and virtue; especially as nothing is more sought after in this
degenerate and evil age than doctrines of the kind, which seem to
give countenance to rampant vice.
However, I will not object to receiving a few copies of the said
treatise. I will only ask you that, when the time arrives, they may
be entrusted to a Dutch merchant living in London, who will see
that they are forwarded to me. There is no need to mention, that
books of the kind in question have been sent to me: if they arrive
safely to my keeping, I do not doubt that I can conveniently dispose
of some copies to my friends here and there, and can obtain a just
price for them. Farewell, and when you have leisure write to
Yours Most Zealously,

Henry Oldenburg.
London, 22 July, 1675.

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LETTER XIX. (LXVIII.)

[Spinoza relates his journey to Amsterdam for the purpose of
publishing his Ethics; he was deterred by the dissuasions of
theologians and Cartesians. He hopes that Oldenburg will inform
him of some of the objections to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,
made by learned men, so that they may be answered in notes.]
Distinguished And Illustrious Sir,

When I received your letter of the 22nd July, I had set out to
Amsterdam for the purpose of publishing the book I had mentioned
to you. While I was negotiating, a rumour gained currency that I
had in the press a book concerning God, wherein I endeavoured to
show that there is no God. This report was believed by many. Hence
certain theologians, perhaps the authors of the rumour, took
occasion to complain of me before the prince and the magistrates;
moreover, the stupid Cartesians, being suspected of favouring me,
endeavoured to remove the aspersion by abusing everywhere my
opinions and writings, a course which they still pursue. When I
became aware of this through trustworthy men, who also assured
me that the theologians were everywhere lying in wait for me, I
determined to put off publishing till I saw how things were going,
and I proposed to inform you of my intentions. But matters seem to
get worse and worse, and I am still uncertain what to do.
Meanwhile I do not like to delay any longer answering your letter. I
will first thank you heartily for your friendly warning, which I
should be glad to have further explained, so that I may know, which
are the doctrines which seem to you to be aimed against the
practice of religion and virtue. If principles agree with reason, they
are, I take it, also most serviceable to virtue. Further, if it be not
troubling you too much I beg you to point out the passages in the
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus which are objected to by the
learned, for I want to illustrate that treatise with notes, and to
remove if possible the prejudices conceived against it. Farewell.

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LETTER XX. (LXXI.)

As I see from your last letter, the book you propose to publish is in
peril. It is impossible not to approve your purpose of illustrating
and softening down those passages in the Tractatus TheologicoPoliticus, which have given pain to its readers. First I would call
attention to the ambiguities in your treatment of God and Nature: a
great many people think you have confused the one with the other.
Again, you seem to many to take away the authority and value of
miracles, whereby alone, as nearly all Christians believe, the
certainty of the divine revelation can be established.
Again, people say that you conceal your opinion concerning Jesus
Christ, the Redeemer of the world, the only Mediator for mankind,
and concerning His incarnation and redemption: they would like
you to give a clear explanation of what you think on these three
subjects. If you do this and thus give satisfaction to prudent and
rational Christians, I think your affairs are safe. Farewell.
London, 15 Nov., 1675.
P.S.Send me a line, I beg, to inform me whether this note has
reached you safely.

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LETTER XXI. (LXXIII.)

Distinguished Sir,
I received on Saturday last your very short letter dated 15th Nov.
In it you merely indicate the points in the theological treatise,
which have given pain to readers, whereas I had hoped to learn
from it, what were the opinions which militated against the
practice of religious virtue, and which you formerly mentioned.
However, I will speak on the three subjects on which you desire me
to disclose my sentiments, and tell you, first, that my opinion
concerning God differs widely from that which is ordinarily
defended by modern Christians. For I hold that God is of all things
the cause immanent, as the phrase is, not transient. I say that all
things are in God and move in God, thus agreeing with Paul,1 and,
perhaps, with all the ancient philosophers, though the phraseology
may be different; I will even venture to affirm that I agree with all
the ancient Hebrews, in so far as one may judge from their
traditions, though these are in many ways corrupted. The
supposition of some, that I endeavour to prove in the Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus the unity of God and Nature (meaning by the
latter a certain mass or corporeal matter), is wholly erroneous.
As regards miracles, I am of opinion that the revelation of God can
only be established by the wisdom of the doctrine, not by miracles,
or in other words by ignorance. This I have shown at sufficient
length in Chapter VI. concerning miracles. I will here only add, that
I make this chief distinction between religion and superstition, that
the latter is founded on ignorance, the former on knowledge; this, I
take it, is the reason why Christians are distinguished from the rest
of the world, not by faith, nor by charity, nor by the other fruits of
the Holy Spirit, but solely by their opinions, inasmuch as they
defend their cause, like everyone else, by miracles, that is by
ignorance, which is the source of all malice; thus they turn a faith,
which may be true, into superstition. Lastly, in order to disclose my
opinions on the third point, I will tell you that I do not think it
necessary for salvation to know Christ according to the flesh: but
with regard to the Eternal Son of God, that is the Eternal Wisdom
of God, which has manifested itself in all things and especially in
the human mind, and above all in Christ Jesus, the case is far
otherwise. For without this no one can come to a state of
blessedness, inasmuch as it alone teaches, what is true or false,
good or evil. And, inasmuch as this wisdom was made especially
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manifest through Jesus Christ, as I have said, His disciples

preached it, in so far as it was revealed to them through Him, and
thus showed that they could rejoice in that spirit of Christ more
than the rest of mankind. The doctrines added by certain churches,
such as that God took upon Himself human nature, I have expressly
said that I do not understand; in fact, to speak the truth, they seem
to me no less absurd than would a statement, that a circle had
taken upon itself the nature of a square. This I think will be
sufficient explanation of my opinions concerning the three points
mentioned. Whether it will be satisfactory to Christians you will
know better than I. Farewell.

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LETTER XXII. (LXXIV.)

[Oldenburg wishes to be enlightened concerning the doctrine of
fatalism, of which Spinoza has been accused. He discourses on
mans limited intelligence and on the incarnation of the Son of
God.]
As you seem to accuse me of excessive brevity, I will this time avoid
the charge by excessive prolixity. You expected, I see, that I should
set forth those opinions in your writings, which seem to discourage
the practice of religious virtue in your readers. I will indicate the
matter which especially pains them. You appear to set up a
fatalistic necessity for all things and actions; if such is conceded
and asserted, people aver, that the sinews of all laws, of virtue, and
of religion, are severed, and that all rewards and punishment are
vain. Whatsoever can compel, or involves necessity, is held also to
excuse; therefore no one, they think, can be without excuse in the
sight of God. If we are driven by fate, and all things follow a fixed
and inevitable path laid down by the hard hand of necessity, they
do not see where punishment can come in. What wedge can be
brought for the untying of this knot, it is very difficult to say. I
should much like to know and learn what help you can supply in the
matter.
As to the opinions which you have kindly disclosed to me on the
three points I mentioned, the following inquiries suggest
themselves. First, In what sense do you take miracles and
ignorance to be synonymous and equivalent terms, as you appear
to think in your last letter?
The bringing back of Lazarus from the dead, and the resurrection
from death of Jesus Christ seem to surpass all the power of created
nature, and to fall within the scope of divine power only; it would
not be a sign of culpable ignorance, that it was necessary to exceed
the limits of finite intelligence confined within certain bounds. But
perhaps you do not think it in harmony with the created mind and
science, to acknowledge in the uncreated mind and supreme Deity
a science and power capable of fathoming, and bringing to pass
events, whose reason and manner can neither be brought home nor
explained to us poor human pigmies? We are men; it appears,
that we must think everything human akin to ourselves.1

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Again, when you say that you cannot understand that God really
took upon Himself human nature, it becomes allowable to ask you,
how you understand the texts in the Gospel and the Epistle to the
Hebrews, whereof the first says, The Word was made flesh,2 and
the other, For verily he took not on him the nature of angels; but
he took on him the seed of Abraham.3 Moreover, the whole tenor
of the Gospel infers, as I think, that the only begotten Son of God,
the Word (who both was God and was with God), showed Himself in
human nature, and by His passion and death offered up the
sacrifice for our sins, the price of the atonement. What you have to
say concerning this without impugning the truth of the Gospel and
the Christian religion, which I think you approve of, I would gladly
learn.
I had meant to write more, but am interrupted by friends on a visit,
to whom I cannot refuse the duties of courtesy. But what I have
already put on paper is enough, and will perhaps weary you in your
philosophizing. Farewell, therefore, and believe me to be ever an
admirer of your learning and knowledge.
London, 16 Dec., 1675.

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LETTER XXIII. (LXXV.)

[Spinoza expounds to Oldenburg his views on fate and necessity,
discriminates between miracles and ignorance, takes the
resurrection of Christ as spiritual, and deprecates attributing to the
sacred writers Western modes of speech.]
Distinguished Sir,
At last I see, what it was that you begged me not to publish.
However, as it forms the chief foundation of everything in the
treatise which I intended to bring out, I should like briefly to
explain here, in what sense I assert that a fatal necessity presides
over all things and actions. God I in no wise subject to fate: I
conceive that all things follow with inevitable necessity from the
nature of God, in the same way as everyone conceives that it
follows from Gods nature that God understands Himself. This
latter consequence all admit to follow necessarily from the divine
nature, yet no one conceives that God is under the compulsion of
any fate, but that He understands Himself quite freely, though
necessarily.
Further, this inevitable necessity in things does away neither with
divine nor human laws. The principles of morality, whether they
receive from God Himself the form of laws or institutions, or
whether they do not, are still divine and salutary; whether we
receive the good, which flows from virtue and the divine love, as
from God in the capacity of a judge, or as from the necessity of the
divine nature, it will in either case be equally desirable; on the
other hand, the evils following from wicked actions and passions
are not less to be feared because they are necessary consequences.
Lastly, in our actions, whether they be necessary or contingent, we
are led by hope and fear.
Men are only without excuse before God, because they are in Gods
power, as clay is in the hands of the potter, who from the same
lump makes vessels, some to honour, some to dishonour.1 If you
will reflect a little on this, you will, I doubt not, easily be able to
reply to any objections which may be urged against my opinion, as
many of my friends have already done.
I have taken miracles and ignorance as equivalent terms, because
those, who endeavour to establish Gods existence and the truth of
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religion by means of miracles, seek to prove the obscure by what is

more obscure and completely unknown, thus introducing a new
sort of argument, the reduction, not to the impossible, as the
phrase is, but to ignorance. But, if I mistake not, I have sufficiently
explained my opinion on miracles in the Theologico-Political
treatise. I will only add here, that if you will reflect on the facts;
that Christ did not appear to the council, nor to Pilate, nor to any
unbeliever, but only to the faithful,; also that God has neither right
hand nor left, but is by His essence not in a particular spot, but
everywhere; that matter is everywhere the same; that God does not
manifest himself in the imaginary space supposed to be outside the
world; and lastly, that the frame of the human body is kept within
due limits solely by the weight of the air; you will readily see that
this apparition of Christ is not unlike that wherewith God appeared
to Abraham, when the latter saw men whom he invited to dine with
him. But, you will say, all the Apostles thoroughly believed, that
Christ rose from the dead and really ascended to heaven: I do not
deny it. Abraham, too, believed that God had dined with him, and
all the Israelites believed that God descended, surrounded with
fire, from heaven to Mount Sinai, and there spoke directly with
them; whereas, these apparitions or revelations, and many others
like them, were adapted to the understanding and opinions of those
men, to whom God wished thereby to reveal His will. I therefore
conclude, that the resurrection of Christ from the dead was in
reality spiritual, and that to the faithful alone, according to their
understanding, it was revealed that Christ was endowed with
eternity, and had risen from the dead (using dead in the sense in
which Christ said, let the dead bury their dead1 ), giving by His
life and death a matchless example of holiness. Moreover, He to
this extent raises his disciples from the dead, in so far as they
follow the example of His own life and death. It would not be
difficult to explain the whole Gospel doctrine on this hypothesis.
Nay, 1 Cor. ch. xv. cannot be explained on any other, nor can Pauls
arguments be understood: if we follow the common interpretation,
they appear weak and can easily be refuted: not to mention the
fact, that Christians interpret spiritually all those doctrines which
the Jews accepted literally. I join with you in acknowledging human
weakness. But on the other hand, I venture to ask you whether we
human pigmies possess sufficient knowledge of nature to be able
to lay down the limits of its force and power, or to say that a given
thing surpasses that power? No one could go so far without
arrogance. We may, therefore, without presumption explain
miracles as far as possible by natural causes. When we cannot
explain them, nor even prove their impossibility, we may well
suspend our judgment about them, and establish religion, as I have
said, solely by the wisdom of its doctrines. You think that the texts
in Johns Gospel and in Hebrews are inconsistent with what I
advance, because you measure oriental phrases by the standards of

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European speech; though John wrote his gospel in Greek, he wrote

it as a Hebrew. However this may be, do you believe, when
Scripture says that God manifested Himself in a cloud, or that He
dwelt in the tabernacle or the temple, that God actually assumed
the nature of a cloud, a tabernacle, or a temple? Yet the utmost that
Christ says of Himself is, that He is the Temple of God,1 because,
as I said before, God had specially manifested Himself in Christ.
John, wishing to express the same truth more forcibly, said that
the Word was made flesh. But I have said enough on the subject.

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LETTER XXIV. (LXXVII.)

[Oldenburg returns to the questions of universal necessity, of
miracles, and of the literal and allegorical interpretation of
Scripture.]
.
You hit the point exactly, in perceiving the cause why I did not wish
the doctrine of the fatalistic necessity of all things to be
promulgated, lest the practice of virtue should thereby be
aspersed, and rewards and punishments become ineffectual. The
suggestions in your last letter hardly seem sufficient to settle the
matter, or to quiet the human mind. For if we men are, in all our
actions, moral as well as natural, under the power of God, like clay
in the hands of the potter, with what face can any of us be accused
of doing this or that, seing that it was impossible for him to do
otherwise? Should we not be able to cast all responsibility on God?
Your inflexible fate, and your irresistible power, compel us to act in
a given manner, nor can we possibly act otherwise. Why, then, and
by what right do you deliver us up to terrible punishments, which
we can in no way avoid, since you direct and carry on all things
through supreme necessity, according to your good will and
pleasure? When you say that men are only inexcusable before God,
because they are in the power of God, I should reverse the
argument, and say, with more show of reason, that men are
evidently excusable, since they are in the power of God. Everyone
may plead, Thy power cannot be escaped from, O God; therefore,
since I could not act otherwise, I may justly be excused.
Again, in taking miracles and ignorance as equivalent terms, you
seem to bring within the same limits the power of God and the
knowledge of the ablest men; for God is, according to you, unable
to do or produce anything, for which men cannot assign a reason, if
they employ all the strength of their faculties.
Again, the history of Christs passion, death, burial, and
resurrection seems to be depicted in such lively and genuine
colours, that I venture to appeal to your conscience, whether you
can believe them to be allegorical, rather than literal, while
preserving your faith in the narrative? The circumstances so clearly
stated by the Evangelists seem to urge strongly on our minds, that
the history should be understood literally. I have ventured to touch

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briefly on these points, and I earnestly beg you to pardon me, and
answer me as a friend with your usual candour. Mr. Boyle sends
you his kind regards. I will, another time, tell you what the Royal
Society is doing. Farewell, and preserve me in your affection.
London, 14 Jan., 1676.

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LETTER XXV. (LXXVIII.)

Written 7 Feb., 1676.
Spinoza to Oldenburg.
[Spinoza again treats of fatalism. He repeats that he accepts
Christs passion, death, and burial literally, but His resurrection
spiritually.]
Distinguished Sir,
When I said in my former letter that we are inexcusable, because
we are in the power of God, like clay in the hands of the potter, I
meant to be understood in the sense, that no one can bring a
complaint against God for having given him a weak nature, or
infirm spirit. A circle might as well complain to God of not being
endowed with the properties of a sphere, or a child who is tortured,
say, with stone, for not being given a healthy body, as a man of
feeble spirit, because God has denied to him fortitude, and the true
knowledge and love of the Deity, or because he is endowed with so
weak a nature, that he cannot check or moderate his desires. For
the nature of each thing is only competent to do that which follows
necessarily from its given cause. That every man cannot be brave,
and that we can no more command for ourselves a healthy body
than a healthy mind, nobody can deny, without giving the lie to
experience, as well as to reason. But, you urge, if men sin by
nature, they are excusable; but you do not state the conclusion
you draw, whether that God cannot be angry with them, or that
they are worthy of blessednessthat is, of the knowledge and love
of God. If you say the former, I fully admit that God cannot be
angry, and that all things are done in accordance with His will; but
I deny that all men ought, therefore, to be blessedmen may be
excusable, and, nevertheless, be without blessedness and afflicted
in many ways. A horse is excusable, for being a horse and not a
man; but, nevertheless, he must needs be a horse and not a man.
He who goes mad from the bite of a dog is excusable, yet he is
rightly suffocated. Lastly, he who cannot govern his desires, and
keep them in check with the fear of the laws, though his weakness
may be excusable, yet he cannot enjoy with contentment the
knowledge and love of God, but necessarily perishes. I do not think
it necessary here to remind you, that Scripture, when it says that
God is angry with sinners, and that He is a Judge who takes
cognizance of human actions, passes sentence on them, and judges
them, is speaking humanly, and in a way adapted to the received

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opinion of the masses, inasmuch as its purpose is not to teach

philosophy, nor to render men wise, but to make them obedient.
How, by taking miracles and ignorance as equivalent terms, I
reduce Gods power and mans knowledge within the same limits, I
am unable to discern.
For the rest, I accept Christs passion, death, and burial literally, as
you do, but His resurrection I understand allegorically. I admit, that
it is related by the Evangelists in such detail, that we cannot deny
that they themselves believed Christs body to have risen from the
dead and ascended to heaven, in order to sit at the right hand of
God, or that they believed that Christ might have been seen by
unbelievers, if they had happened to be at hand, in the places
where He appeared to His disciples; but in these matters they
might, without injury to Gospel teaching, have been deceived, as
was the case with other prophets mentioned in my last letter. But
Paul, to whom Christ afterwards appeared, rejoices, that he knew
Christ not after the flesh, but after the spirit.1 Farewell,
honourable Sir, and believe me yours in all affection and zeal.

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LETTER XXV.A.
[Oldenburg adduces certain further objections against Spinozas
doctrine of necessity and miracles, and exposes the inconsistency
of a partial allegorization of Scripture.]
To the most illustrious Master Benedict de Spinoza Henry
Oldenburg sends greetings.
In your last letter,2 written to me on the 7th of February, there are
some points which seem to deserve criticism. You say that a man
cannot complain, because God has denied him the true knowledge
of Himself, and strength sufficient to avoid sins; forasmuch as to
the nature of everything nothing is competent, except that which
follows necessarily from its cause. But I say, that inasmuch as God,
the Creator of men, formed them after His own image, which seems
to imply in its concept wisdom, goodness, and power, it appears
quite to follow, that it is more within the sphere of mans power3 to
have a sound mind than to have a sound body. For physical
soundness of body follows from mechanical causes, but soundness
of mind depends on purpose and design. You add, that men may be
inexcusable,1 and yet suffer pain in many ways. This seems hard at
first sight, and what you add by way of proof, namely, that a dog2
mad from having been bitten is indeed to be excused, but yet is
rightly killed, does not seem to settle the question. For the killing of
such a dog would argue cruelty, were it not necessary in order to
preserve other dogs and animals, and indeed men, from a
maddening bite of the same kind.
But if God implanted in man a sound mind, as He is able to do,
there would be no contagion of vices to be feared. And, surely, it
seems very cruel, that God should devote men to eternal, or at least
terrible temporary, torments, for sins which by them could be no
wise avoided. Moreover, the tenour of all Holy Scripture seems to
suppose and imply, that men can abstain from sins. For it abounds
in denunciations and promises, in declarations of rewards and
punishments, all of which seem to militate against the necessity of
sinning, and infer the possibility of avoiding punishment. And if this
were denied, it would have to be said, that the human mind acts no
less mechanically than the human body.
Next, when you proceed to take miracles and ignorance to be
equivalent, you seem to rely on this foundation, that the creature

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can and should have perfect insight into the power and wisdom of
the Creator: and that the fact is quite otherwise, I have hitherto
been firmly persuaded.
Lastly, where you affirm that Christs passion, death, and burial are
to be taken literally, but His resurrection allegorically, you rely, as
far as I can see, on no proof at all. Christs resurrection seems to be
delivered in the Gospel as literally as the rest. And on this article of
the resurrection the whole Christian religion and its truth rest, and
with its removal Christs mission and heavenly doctrine collapse. It
cannot escape you, how Christ, after He was raised from the dead,
laboured to convince His disciples of the truth of the Resurrection
properly so called. To want to turn all these things into allegories is
the same thing, as if one were to busy ones self in plucking up the
whole truth of the Gospel history.
These few points I wished again to submit in the interest of my
liberty of philosophizing, which I earnestly beg you not to take
amiss.
Written in London, 11 Feb., 1676.
I will communicate with you shortly on the present studies and
experiments of the Royal Society, if God grant me life and health.

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LETTER XXVI. (VIII.)

Simon De Vries1To Spinoza.
[Simon de Vries, a diligent student of Spinozas writings and
philosophy, describes a club formed for the study of Spinozas MS.
containing some of the matter afterwards worked into the Ethics,
and asks questions about the difficulties felt by members of the
club.2 ]
Most Honourable Friend,

I have for a long time wished to be present with you; but the
weather and the hard winter have not been propitious to me. I
sometimes complain of my lot, in that we are separated from each
other by so long a distance. Happy, yes most happy is the fellowlodger, abiding under the same roof with you, who can talk with
you on the best of subjects, at dinner, at supper, and during your
walks.1 However, though I am far apart from you in body, you have
been very frequently present to my mind, especially in your
writings, while I read and turn them over. But as they are not all
clear to the members of our club, for which reason we have begun
a fresh series of meetings, and as I would not have you think me
unmindful of you, I have applied my mind to writing this letter.
As regards our club, the following is its order. One of us (that is
everyone by turn) reads through and, as far as he understands it,
expounds and also demonstrates the whole of your work, according
to the sequence and order of your propositions. Then, if it happens
that on any point we cannot satisfy one another, we have resolved
to make a note of it and write to you, so that, if possible, it may be
made clearer to us, and that we may be able under your guidance
to defend the truth against those who are superstitiously religious,
and against the Christians,2 and to withstand the attack of the
whole world. Well then, since, when we first read through and
expounded them, the definitions did not all seem clear to us, we
differed about the nature of definition. Next in your absence we
consulted as our authority a celebrated mathematician, named
Borel:3 for he makes mention of the nature of definition, axiom, and
postulate, and adduces the opinions of others on the subject. But
his opinion is as follows: Definitions are cited in a demonstration
as premisses. Wherefore it is necessary, that they should be
accurately known; otherwise scientific or accurate knowledge
cannot be attained by their means. And elsewhere he says: The
primary and most known construction or passive quality of a given
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subject should not be chosen rashly, but with the greatest care; if
the construction or passive quality be an impossibility, no scientific
definition can be obtained. For instance, if anyone were to say, let
two two straight lines enclosing a space be called figurals, the
definition would be of non-existences and impossible: hence
ignorance rather than knowledge would be deduced therefrom.
Again, if the construction or passive quality be possible and true,
but unknown or doubtful to us, the definition will not be good. For
conclusions arising from what is unknown or doubtful are
themselves uncertain or doubtful; they therefore bring about
conjecture or opinion, but not certain knowledge.
Jacquet1 seems to dissent from this opinion, for he thinks that one
may proceed from a false premiss directly to a true conclusion, as
you are aware. Clavius,2 however, whose opinion he quotes, thinks
as follows: Definitions, he says, are artificial phrases, nor is
there any need in reasoning that a thing should be defined in a
particular way; but it is sufficient that a thing defined should never
be said to agree with another thing, until it has been shown that its
definition also agrees therewith.
Thus, according to Borel, the definition of a given thing should
consist as regards its construction or passive quality in something
thoroughly known to us and true. Clavius, on the other hand, holds
that it is a matter of indifference, whether the construction or
passive quality be well known and true, or the reverse; so long as
we do not assert, that our definition agrees with anything, before it
has been proved.
I should prefer Borels opinion to that of Clavius. I know not which
you would assent to, if to either. As these difficulties have occurred
to me with regard to the nature of definition, which is reckoned
among the cardinal points of demonstration, and as I cannot free
my mind from them, I greatly desire, and earnestly beg you, when
you have leisure and opportunity, to be kind enough to send me
your opinion on the matter, and at the same time to tell me the
distinction between axioms and definitions. Borel says that the
difference is merely nominal, but I believe you decide otherwise.
Further, we cannot make up our minds about the third definition.1 I
adduced to illustrate it, what my master said to me at the Hague,2
to wit, that a thing may be regarded in two ways, either as it is in
itself, or as it is in relation to something else; as in the case of the
intellect, for that can be regarded either under the head of thought,
or as consisting in ideas. But we do not see the point of the
distinction thus drawn. For it seems to us, that, if we rightly
conceive thought, we must range it under the head of ideas; as, if
all ideas were removed from it, we should destroy thought. As we

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find the illustration of the matter not sufficiently clear, the matter
itself remains somewhat obscure, and we need further explanation.
Lastly, in the third note to the eighth proposition,3 the beginning
runs thus:Hence it is plain that, although two attributes really
distinct be conceived, that is, one without the aid of the other, we
cannot therefore infer, that they constitute two entities or two
different substances. For it belongs to the nature of substance, that
each of its attributes should be conceived through itself, though all
the attributes it possesses exist simultaneously in it. Here our
master seems to assume, that the nature of substance is so
constituted, that it may have several attributes. But this doctrine
has not yet been proved, unless you refer to the sixth definition, of
absolutely infinite substance or God. Otherwise, if it be asserted
that each substance has only one attribute, and I have two ideas of
two attributes, I may rightly infer that, where there are two
different attributes, there are also different substances. On this
point also we beg you to give a further explanation. Besides I thank
you very much for your writings communicated to me by P.
Balling,4 which have greatly delighted me, especially your note on
Proposition XIX.1 If I can do you any service here in anything that
is within my power, I am at your dispesal. You have but to let me
know. I have begun a course of anatomy, and am nearly half
through with it; when it is finished, I shall begin a course of
chemistry, and thus under your guidance I shall go through the
whole of medicine. I leave off, and await your answer. Accept the
greeting of
Your Most Devoted

S. J. de Vries.
Amsterdam, 24 Feb., 1663.

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LETTER XXVII. (IX.)

Spinoza To Simon De Vries.
[Spinoza deprecates his correspondents jealousy of Albert Burgh;
and answers that distinction must be made between different kinds
of definitions. He explains his opinions more precisely.]
Respected Friend,
I have received2 your long wished-for letter, for which, and for your
affection towards me, I heartily thank you. Your long absence has
been no less grievous to me than to you; yet in the meantime I
rejoice that my trifling studies are of profit to you and our friends.
For thus while you3 are away, I in my absence speak to you. You
need not envy my fellow-lodger. There is no one who is more
displeasing to me, nor against whom I have been more anxiously on
my guard; and therefore I would have you and all my acquaintance
warned not to communicate my opinions to him, except when he
has come to maturer years. So far he is too childish and inconstant,
and is fonder of novelty than of truth. But I hope, that in a few
years he will amend these childish faults. Indeed I am almost sure
of it, as far as I can judge from his nature. And so his temperament
bids me like him.
As for the questions propounded in your club, which is wisely
enough ordered, I see that your1 difficulties arise from not
distinguishing between kinds of definition: that is, between a
definition serving to explain a thing, of which the essence only is
sought and in question, and a definition which is put forward only
for purposes of inquiry. The former having a definite object ought
to be true, the latter need not. For instance, if someone asks me for
a description of Solomons temple, I am bound to give him a true
description, unless I want to talk nonsense with him. But if I have
constructed, in my mind, a temple which I desire to build, and infer
from the description of it that I must buy such and such a site and
so many thousand stones and other materials, will any sane person
tell me that I have drawn a wrong conclusion because my definition
is possibly untrue? or will anyone ask me to prove my definition?
Such a person would simply be telling me, that I had not conceived
that which I had conceived, or be requiring me to prove, that I had
conceived that which I had conceived; in fact, evidently trifling.
Hence a definition either explains a thing, in so far as it is external
to the intellect, in which case it ought to be true and only to differ
from a proposition or an axiom in being concerned merely with the
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essences of things, or the modifications of things, whereas the

latter has a wider scope and extends also to eternal truths. Or else
it explains a thing, as it is conceived or can be conceived by us; and
then it differs from an axiom or proposition, inasmuch as it only
requires to be conceived absolutely, and not like an axiom as true.
Hence a bad definition is one which is not conceived. To explain my
meaning, I will take Borels examplea man saying that two
straight lines enclosing a space shall be called figurals. If the
man means by a straight line the same as the rest of the world
means by a curved line, his definition is good (for by the definition
would be meant some such figure as (), or the like); so long as he
does not afterwards mean a square or other kind of figure. But, if
he attaches the ordinary meaning to the words straight line, the
thing is evidently inconceivable, and therefore there is no
definition. These considerations are plainly confused by Borel, to
whose opinion you incline. I give another example, the one you cite
at the end of your letter. If I say that each substance has only one
attribute, this is an unsupported statement and needs proof. But, if
I say that I mean by substance that which consists in only one
attribute, the definition will be good, so long as entities consisting
of several attributes are afterwards styled by some name other
than substance. When you say that I do not prove, that substance
(or being) may have several attributes, you do not perhaps pay
attention to the proofs given. I adduced two:First, that nothing
is plainer to us, than that every being may be conceived by us
under some attribute, and that the more reality or essence a given
being has, the more attributes may be attributed to it. Hence a
being absolutely infinite must be defined, &c. Secondly, and I think
this is the stronger proof of the two, the more attributes I assign
to any being, the more am I compelled to assign to it existence; in
other words, the more I conceive it as true. The contrary would
evidently result, if I were feigning a chimera or some such being.
Your remark, that you cannot conceive thought except as consisting
in ideas, because, when ideas are removed, thought is annihilated,
springs, I think, from the fact that while you, a thinking thing, do as
you say, you abstract all your thoughts and conceptions. It is no
marvel that, when you have abstracted all your thoughts and
conceptions, you have nothing left for thinking with. On the general
subject I think I have shown sufficiently clearly and plainly, that the
intellect, although infinite, belongs to nature regarded as passive
rather than nature regarded as active (ad naturam naturatam, non
vero ad naturam naturantem).
However, I do not see how this helps towards understanding the
third definition, nor what difficulty the latter presents. It runs, if I
mistake not, as follows: By substance I mean that, which is in itself
and is conceived through itself; that is, of which the conception

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does not involve the conception of anything else. By attribute I

mean the same thing, except that it is called attribute with respect
to the understanding, which attributes to substance the particular
nature aforesaid. This definition, I repeat, explains with sufficient
clearness what I wish to signify by substance or attribute. You
desire, though there is no need, that I should illustrate by an
example, how one and the same thing can be stamped with two
names. In order not to seem miserly, I will give you two. First, I say
that by Israel is meant the third patriarch; I mean the same by
Jacob, the name Jacob being given, because the patriarch in
question had caught hold of the heel of his brother. Secondly, by a
colourless surface I mean a surface, which reflects all rays of light
without altering them. I mean the same by a white surface, with
this difference, that a surface is called white in reference to a man
looking at it, &c.

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LETTER XXVIII. (X.)

Spinoza To Simon De Vries.
[Spinoza, in answer to a letter from De Vries now lost, speaks of
the experience necessary for proving a definition, and also of
eternal truths.]
Respected Friend,
You ask me if we have need of experience, in order to know
whether the definition of a given attribute is true. To this I answer,
that we never need experience, except in cases when the existence
of the thing cannot be inferred from its definition, as, for instance,
the existence of modes (which cannot be inferred from their
definition); experience is not needed, when the existence of the
things in question is not distinguished from their essence, and is
therefore inferred from their definition. This can never be taught us
by any experience, for experience does not teach us any essences
of things; the utmost it can do is to set our mind thinking about
definite essences only. Wherefore, when the existence of attributes
does not differ from their essence, no experience is capable of
attaining it for us.
To your further question, whether things and their modifications
are eternal truths, I answer: Certainly. If you ask me, why I do not
call them eternal truths, I answer, in order to distinguish them, in
accordance with general usage, from those propositions, which do
not make manifest any particular thing or modification of a thing;
for example, nothing comes from nothing. These and such like
propositions are, I repeat, called eternal truths simply, the meaning
merely being, that they have no standpoint external to the mind,
&c.

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LETTER XXIX. (XII.)

Spinoza To L. M.1(Lewis Meyer).
Dearest Friend,
I have received two letters from you, one dated Jan. 11, delivered
to me by our friend, N. N., the other dated March 26, sent by some
unknown friend to Leyden. They were both most welcome to me,
especially as I gathered from them, that all goes well with you, and
that you are often mindful of me. I also owe and repay you the
warmest thanks for the courtesy and consideration, with which you
have always been kind enough to treat me: I hope you will believe,
that I am in no less degree devoted to you, as, when occasion
offers, I will always endeavour to prove, as far as my poor powers
will admit. As a first proof, I will do my best to answer the
questions you ask in your letters. You request me to tell you, what I
think about the infinite; I will most readily do so.
Everyone regards the question of the infinite as most difficult, if not
insoluble, through not making a distinction between that which
must be infinite from its very nature, or in virtue of its definition,
and that which has no limits, not in virtue of its essence, but in
virtue of its cause; and also through not distinguishing between
that which is called infinite, because it has no limits, and that, of
which the parts cannot be equalled or expressed by any number,
though the greatest and least magnitude of the whole may be
known; and, lastly, through not distinguishing between that, which
can be understood but not imagined, and that which can also be
imagined. If these distinctions, I repeat, had been attended to,
inquirers would not have been overwhelmed with such a vast crowd
of difficulties. They would then clearly have understood, what kind
of infinite is indivisible and possesses no parts; and what kind, on
the other hand, may be divided without involving a contradiction in
terms. They would further have understood, what kind of infinite
may, without solecism, be conceived greater than another infinite,
and what kind cannot be so conceived. All this will plainly appear
from what I am about to say.
However, I will first briefly explain the terms substance, mode,
eternity, and duration.
The points to be noted concerning substance are these: First, that
existence appertains to its essence; in other words, that solely from
its essence and definition its existence follows. This, if I remember
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rightly, I have already proved to you by word of mouth, without the

aid of any other propositions. Secondly, as a consequence of the
above, that substance is not manifold, but single: there cannot be
two of the same nature. Thirdly, every substance must be conceived
as infinite.
The modifications of substance I call modes. Their definition, in so
far as it is not identical with that of substance, cannot involve any
existence. Hence, though they exist, we can conceive them as nonexistent. From this it follows, that, when we are regarding only the
essence of modes, and not the order of the whole of nature, we
cannot conclude from their present existence, that they will exist or
not exist in the future, or that they have existed or not existed in
the past; whence it is abundantly clear, that we conceive the
existence of substance as entirely different from the existence of
modes. From this difference arises the distinction between eternity
and duration. Duration is only applicable to the existence of modes;
eternity is applicable to the existence of substance, that is, the
infinite faculty of existence or being (infinitum existendi sive (invit
Latinitate1 ) essendi fruitionem).
From what has been said it is quite clear that, when, as is most
often the case, we are regarding only the essence of modes and not
the order of nature, we may freely limit the existence and duration
of modes without destroying the conception we have formed of
them; we may conceive them as greater or less, or may divide them
into parts. Eternity and substance, being only conceivable as
infinite, cannot be thus treated without our conception of them
being destroyed. Wherefore it is mere foolishness, or even insanity,
to say that extended substance is made up of parts or bodies really
distinct from one another. It is as though one should attempt by the
aggregation and addition of many circles to make up a square, or a
triangle, or something of totally different essence. Wherefore the
whole heap of arguments, by which philosophers commonly
endeavour to show that extended substance is finite, falls to the
ground by its own weight. For all such persons suppose, that
corporeal substance is made up of parts. In the same way, others,
who have persuaded themselves that a line is made up of points,
have been able to discover many arguments to show that a line is
not infinitely divisible. If you ask, why we are by nature so prone to
attempt to divide extended substance, I answer, that quantity is
conceived by us in two ways, namely, by abstraction or superficially,
as we imagine it by the aid of the senses, or as substance, which
can only be accomplished through the understanding. So that, if we
regard quantity as it exists in the imagination (and this is the more
frequent and easy method), it will be found to be divisible, finite,
composed of parts, and manifold. But, if we regard it as it is in the
understanding, and the thing be conceived as it is in itself (which is

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very difficult), it will then, as I have sufficiently shown you before,

be found to be infinite, indivisible, and single.
Again, from the fact that we can limit duration and quantity at our
pleasure, when we conceive the latter abstractedly as apart from
substance, and separate the former from the manner whereby it
flows from things eternal, there arise time and measure; time for
the purpose of limiting duration, measure for the purpose of
limiting quantity, so that we may, as far as is possible, the more
readily imagine them. Further, inasmuch as we separate the
modifications of substance from substance itself, and reduce them
to classes, so that we may, as far as is possible, the more readily
imagine them, there arises number, whereby we limit them.
Whence it is clearly to be seen, that measure, time, and number,
are merely modes of thinking, or, rather, of imagining. It is not to
be wondered at, therefore, that all, who have endeavoured to
understand the course of nature by means of such notions, and
without fully understanding even them, have entangled themselves
so wondrously, that they have at last only been able to extricate
themselves by breaking through every rule and admitting
absurdities even of the grossest kind. For there are many things
which cannot be conceived through the imagination but only
through the understanding, for instance, substance, eternity, and
the like; thus, if anyone tries to explain such things by means of
conceptions which are mere aids to the imagination, he is simply
assisting his imagination to run away with him.1 Nor can even the
modes of substance ever be rightly understood, if we confuse them
with entities of the kind mentioned, mere aids of the reason or
imagination. In so doing we separate them from substance, and the
mode of their derivation from eternity, without which they can
never be rightly understood. To make the matter yet more clear,
take the following example: when a man conceives of duration
abstractedly, and, confusing it with time, begins to divide it into
parts, he will never be able to understand how an hour, for
instance, can elapse. For in order that an hour should elapse, it is
necessary that its half should elapse first, and afterwards half of
the remainder, and again half of the half of the remainder, and if
you go on thus to infinity, subtracting the half of the residue, you
will never be able to arrive at the end of the hour. Wherefore many,
who are not accustomed to distinguish abstractions from realities,
have ventured to assert that duration is made up of instants, and so
in wishing to avoid Charybdis have fallen into Scylla. It is the same
thing to make up duration out of instants, as it is to make number
simply by adding up noughts.
Further, as it is evident from what has been said, that neither
number, nor measure, nor time, being mere aids to the imagination,
can be infinite (for, otherwise, number would not be number, nor

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measure measure, nor time time); it is hence abundantly evident,

why many who confuse these three abstractions with realities,
through being ignorant of the true nature of things, have actually
denied the infinite.
The wretchedness of their reasoning may be judged by
mathematicians, who have never allowed themselves to be delayed
a moment by arguments of this sort, in the case of things which
they clearly and distinctly perceive. For not only have they come
across many things, which cannot be expressed by number (thus
showing the inadequacy of number for determining all things); but
also they have found many things, which cannot be equalled by any
number, but surpass every possible number. But they infer hence,
that such things surpass enumeration, not because of the multitude
of their component parts, but because their nature cannot, without
manifest contradiction, be expressed in terms of number. As, for
instance, in the case of two circles, non-concentric, whereof one
encloses the other, no number can express the inequalities of
distance which exist between the two circles, nor all the variations
which matter in motion in the intervening space may undergo. This
conclusion is not based on the excessive size of the intervening
space. However small a portion of it we take, the inequalities of
this small portion will surpass all numerical expression. Nor, again,
is the conclusion based on the fact, as in other cases, that we do
not know the maximum and the minimum of the said space. It
springs simply from the fact, that the nature of the space between
two non-concentric circles cannot be expressed in number.
Therefore, he who would assign a numerical equivalent for the
inequalities in question, would be bound, at the same time, to bring
about that a circle should not be a circle.
The same result would take placeto return to my subjectif one
were to wish to determine all the motions undergone by matter up
to the present, by reducing them and their duration to a certain
number and time. This would be the same as an attempt to deprive
corporeal substance, which we cannot conceive except as existent,
of its modifications, and to bring about that it should not possess
the nature which it does possess. All this I could clearly
demonstrate here, together with many other points touched on in
this letter, but I deem it superfluous.
From all that has been said, it is abundantly evident that certain
things are in their nature infinite, and can by no means be
conceived as finite; whereas there are other things, infinite in
virtue of the cause from which they are derived, which can, when
conceived abstractedly, be divided into parts, and regarded as
finite. Lastly, there are some which are called infinite or, if you
prefer, indefinite, because they cannot be expressed in number,

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which may yet be conceived as greater or less. It does not follow

that such are equal, because they are alike incapable of numerical
expression. This is plain enough, from the example given, and many
others.
Lastly, I have put briefly before you the causes of error and
confusion, which have arisen concerning the question of the
infinite. I have, if I mistake not, so explained them that no question
concerning the infinite remains untreated, or cannot readily be
solved from what I have said; wherefore, I do not think it worth
while to detain you longer on the matter.
But I should like it first to be observed here, that the later
Peripatetics have, I think, misunderstood the proof given by the
ancients who sought to demonstrate the existence of God. This, as I
find it in a certain Jew named Rabbi Ghasdai, runs as follows:If
there be an infinite series of causes, all things which are, are
caused. But nothing which is caused can exist necessarily in virtue
of its own nature. Therefore there is nothing in nature, to whose
essence existence necessarily belongs. But this is absurd.
Therefore the premise is absurd also. Hence the force of the
argument lies not in the impossibility of an actual infinite or an
infinite series of causes; but only in the absurdity of the assumption
that things, which do not necessarily exist by nature, are not
conditioned for existence by a thing, which does by its own nature
necessarily exist.
I would now pass on, for time presses, to your second letter: but I
shall be able more conveniently to reply to its contents, when you
are kind enough to pay me a visit. I therefore beg that you will
come as soon as possible; the time for travelling is at hand.
Enough. Farewell, and keep in remembrance Yours, &c.
Rhijnsburg, 20 April, 1663.

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LETTER XXIX.A.1
Spinoza To Lewis Meyer.
Dear Friend,
The preface you sent me by our friend De Vries, I now send back to
you by the same hand. Some few things, as you will see, I have
marked in the margin; but yet a few remain, which I have judged it
better to mention to you by letter. First, where on page 4 you give
the reader to know on what occasion I composed the first part; I
would have you likewise explain there, or where you please, that I
composed it within a fortnight. For when this is explained none will
suppose the exposition to be so clear as that it cannot be bettered,
and so they will not stick at obscurities in this and that phrase on
which they may chance to stumble. Secondly, I would have you
explain, that when I prove many points otherwise than they be
proved by Descartes, tis not to amend Descartes, but the better to
preserve my order, and not to multiply axioms overmuch: and that
for this same reason I prove many things which by Descartes are
barely alleged without any proof, and must needs add other
matters which Descartes let alone. Lastly, I will earnestly beseech
you, as my especial friend, to let be everything you have written
towards the end against that creature, and wholly strike it out. And
though many reasons determine me to this request, I will give but
one. I would fain have all men readily believe that these matters
are published for the common profit of the world, and that your
sole motive in bringing out the book is the love of spreading the
truth; and that it is accordingly all your study to make the work
acceptable to all, to bid men, with all courtesy to the pursuit of
genuine philosophy, and to consult their common advantage. Which
every man will be ready to think when he sees that no one is
attacked, nor anything advanced where any man can find the least
offence. Notwithstanding, if afterwards the person you know of, or
any other, be minded to display his ill will, then you may portray his
life and character, and gain applause by it. So I ask that you will
not refuse to be patient thus far, and suffer yourself to be
entreated, and believe me wholly bounden to you, and
Yours With All Affection,

B. de Spinoza.
Voorberg, Aug. 3, 1663.

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Our friend De Vries had promised to take this with him; but seeing
he knows not when he will return to you, I send it by another hand.
Along with this I send you part of the scholium to Prop. xxvii. Part
II. where page 75 begins, that you may hand it to the printer to be
reprinted. The matter I send you must of necessity be reprinted,
and fourteen or fifteen lines added, which may easily be inserted.

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LETTER XXX. (XVII.)

Spinoza To Peter Balling.1
[Concerning omens and phantoms. The mind may have a confused
presentiment of the future.]
Beloved Friend,
Your last letter, written, if I mistake not, on the 26th of last month,
has duly reached me. It caused me no small sorrow and solicitude,
though the feeling sensibly diminished when I reflected on the good
sense and fortitude, with which you have known how to despise the
evils of fortune, or rather of opinion, at a time when they most
bitterly assailed you. Yet my anxiety increases daily; I therefore beg
and implore you by the claims of our friendship, that you will rouse
yourself to write me a long letter. With regard to Omens, of which
you make mention in telling me that, while your child was still
healthy and strong, you heard groans like those he uttered when he
was ill and shortly afterwards died, I should judge that these were
not real groans, but only the effect of your imagination; for you say
that, when you got up and composed yourself to listen, you did not
hear them so clearly either as before or as afterwards, when you
had fallen asleep again. This, I think, shows that the groans were
purely due to the imagination, which, when it was unfettered and
free, could imagine groans more forcibly and vividly than when you
sat up in order to listen in a particular direction. I think I can both
illustrate and confirm what I say by another occurrence, which
befell me at Rhijnsburg last winter. When one morning, after the
day had dawned, I woke up from a very unpleasant dream, the
images, which had presented themselves to me in sleep, remained
before my eyes just as vividly as though the things had been real,
especially the image of a certain black and leprous Brazilian whom
I had never seen before. This image disappeared for the most part
when, in order to divert my thoughts, I cast my eyes on a book, or
something else. But, as soon as I lifted my eyes again without fixing
my attention on any particular object, the same image of this same
negro appeared with the same vividness again and again, until the
head of it gradually vanished. I say that the same thing, which
occurred with regard to my inward sense of sight, occurred with
your hearing; but as the causes were very different, your case was
an omen and mine was not. The matter may be clearly grasped by
means of what I am about to say. The effects of the imagination
arise either from bodily or mental causes. I will proceed to prove

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this, in order not to be too long, solely from experience. We know

that fevers and other bodily ailments are the causes of delirium,
and that persons of stubborn disposition imagine nothing but
quarrels, brawls, slaughterings, and the like. We also see that the
imagination is to a certain extent determined by the character of
the disposition, for, as we know by experience, it follows in the
tracks of the understanding in every respect, and arranges its
images and words, just as the understanding arranges its
demonstrations and connects one with another; so that we are
hardly at all able to say, what will not serve the imagination as a
basis for some image or other. This being so, I say that no effects of
imagination springing from physical causes can ever be omens of
future events; inasmuch as their causes do not involve any future
events. But the effects of imagination, or images originating in the
mental disposition, may be omens of some future event; inasmuch
as the mind may have a confused presentiment of the future. It
may, therefore, imagine a future event as forcibly and vividly, as
though it were present; for instance a father (to take an example
resembling your own) loves his child so much, that he and the
beloved child are, as it were, one and the same. And since (like that
which I demonstrated on another occasion) there must necessarily
exist in thought the idea of the essence of the childs states and
their results, and since the father, through his union with his child,
is a part of the said child, the soul of the father must necessarily
participate in the ideal essence of the child and his states, and in
their results, as I have shown at greater length elsewhere.
Again, as the soul of the father participates ideally in the
consequences of his childs essence, he may (as I have said)
sometimes imagine some of the said consequences as vividly as if
they were present with him, provided that the following conditions
are fulfilled:I. If the occurrence in his sons career be remarkable.
II. If it be capable of being readily imagined. III. If the time of its
happening be not too remote. IV. If his body be sound, in respect
not only of health but of freedom from every care or business which
could outwardly trouble the senses. It may also assist the result, if
we think of something which generally stimulates similar ideas. For
instance, if while we are talking with this or that man we hear
groans, it will generally happen that, when we think of the man
again, the groans heard when we spoke with him will recur to our
mind. This, dear friend, is my opinion on the question you ask me. I
have, I confess, been very brief, but I have furnished you with
material for writing to me on the first opportunity, &c.
Voorburg, 20 July, 1664.

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LETTER XXXI. (XVIII.)

William De Blyenbergh1To Spinoza.
Unknown Friend And Sir,
I have already read several times with attention your treatise and
its appendix recently published. I should narrate to others more
becomingly than to yourself the extreme solidity I found in it, and
the pleasure with which I perused it. But I am unable to conceal my
feeelings from you, because the more frequently I study the work
with attention, the more it pleases me, and I am constantly
observing something which I had not before remarked. However, I
will not too loudly extol its author, lest I should seem in this letter
to be a flatterer. I am aware that the gods grant all things to labour.
Not to detain you too long with wondering who I may be, and how
it comes to pass that one unknown to you takes the great liberty of
writing to you, I will tell you that he is a man who is impelled by his
longing for pure and unadulterated truth, and desires during this
brief and frail life to fix his feet in the ways of science, so far as our
human faculties will allow; one who in the pursuit of truth has no
goal before his eyes save truth herself; one who by his science
seeks to obtain as the result of truth neither honour nor riches, but
simple truth and tranquillity; one who, out of the whole circle of
truths and sciences, takes delight in none more than in
metaphysics, if not in all branches at any rate in some; one who
places the whole delight of his life in the fact, that he can pass in
the study of them his hours of ease and leisure. But no one, I rest
assured, is so blessed as yourself, no one has carried his studies so
far, and therefore no one has arrived at the pitch of perfection
which, as I see from your work, you have attained. To add a last
word, the present writer is one with whom you may gain a closer
acquaintance, if you choose to attach him to you by enlightening
and interpenetrating, as it were, his halting meditations.
But I return to your treatise. While I found in it many things which
tickled my palate vastly, some of them proved difficult to digest.
Perhaps a stranger ought not to report to you his objections, the
more so as I know not whether they will meet with your approval.
This is the reason for my making these prefatory remarks, and
asking you, if you can find leisure in the winter evenings, and, at
the same time, will be willing to answer the difficulties which I still
find in your book, and to forward me the result, always under the
condition that it does not interrupt any occupation of greater
importance or pleasure; for I desire nothing more earnestly than to
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see the promise made in your book fulfilled by a more detailed

exposition of your opinions. I should have communicated to you by
word of mouth what I now commit to paper; but my ignorance of
your address, the infectious disease,1 and my duties here,
prevented me. I must defer the pleasure for the present.
However, in order that this letter may not be quite empty, and in
the hope that it will not be displeasing to you, I will ask you one
question. You say in various passages in the Principia, and in the
Metaphysical Reflections, either as your own opinion, or as
explaining the philosophy of Descartes, that creation and
preservation are identical (which is, indeed, so evident to those
who have considered the question as to be a primary notion);
secondly, that God has not only created substances, but also
motions in substancesin other words, that God, by a continuous
act of creation preserves, not only substances in their normal state,
but also the motion and the endeavours of substances. God, for
instance, not only brings about by His immediate will and working
(whatever be the term employed), that the soul should last and
continue in its normal state; but He is also the cause of His will
determining, in some way, the movement of the soulin other
words, as God, by a continuous act of creation, brings about that
things should remain in existence, so is He also the cause of the
movements and endeavours existing in things. In fact, save God,
there is no cause of motion. It therefore follows that God is not only
the cause of the substance of mind, but also of every endeavour or
motion of mind, which we call volition, as you frequently say. From
this statement it seems to follow necessarily, either that there is no
evil in the motion or volition of the mind, or else that God directly
brings about that evil. For that which we call evil comes to pass
through the soul, and, consequently, through the immediate
influence and concurrence of God. For instance, the soul of Adam
wishes to eat of the forbidden fruit. It follows from what has been
said above, not only that Adam forms his wish through the
influence of God, but also, as will presently be shown, that through
that influence he forms it in that particular manner. Hence, either
the act forbidden to Adam is not evil, inasmuch as God Himself not
only caused the wish, but also the manner of it, or else God directly
brought about that which we call evil. Neither you nor Descartes
seem to have solved this difficulty by saying that evil is a negative
conception, and that, as such, God cannot bring it about. Whence,
we may ask, came the wish to eat the forbidden fruit, or the wish of
devils to be equal with God? For since (as you justly observe) the
will is not something different from the mind, but is only an
endeavour or movement of the mind, the concurrence of God is as
necessary to it as to the mind itself. Now the concurrence of God,
as I gather from your writings, is merely the determining of a thing
in a particular manner through the will of God. It follows that God

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concurs no less in an evil wish, in so far as it is evil, than in a good

wish in so far as it is good, in other words, He determines it. For
the will of God being the absolute cause of all that exists, either in
substance or in effort, seems to be also the primary cause of an evil
wish, in so far as it is evil. Again, no exercise of volition takes place
in us, that God has not known from all eternity. If we say that God
does not know of a particular exercise of volition, we attribute to
Him imperfection. But how could God gain knowledge of it except
from His decrees? Therefore His decrees are the cause of our
volitions, and hence it seems also to follow that either an evil wish
is not evil, or else that God is the direct cause of the evil, and
brings it about. There is no room here for the theological
distinction between an act and the evil inherent in that act. For God
decrees the mode of the act, no less than the act, that is, God not
only decreed that Adam should eat, but also that he should
necessarily eat contrary to the command given. Thus it seems on all
sides to follow, either that Adams eating contrary to the command
was not an evil, or else that God Himself brought it to pass.
These, illustrious Sir, are the questions in your treatise, which I am
unable, at present, to elucidate. Either alternative seems to me
difficult of acceptance. However, I await a satisfactory answer from
your keen judgment and learning, hoping to show you hereafter
how deeply indebted I shall be to you. Be assured, illustrious Sir,
that I put these questions from no other motive than the desire for
truth. I am a man of leisure, not tied to any profession, gaining my
living by honest trade, and devoting my spare time to questions of
this sort. I humbly hope that my difficulties will not be displeasing
to you. If you are minded to send an answer, as I most ardently
hope, write to, &c.
William de Blyenbergh.
Dordrecht, 12 Dec., 1664.

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LETTER XXXII. (XIX.)

Spinoza To Blyenbergh.
(Spinoza answers with his usual courtesy the question propounded
by Blyenbergh.)
Unknown Friend,
I received, at Schiedam, on the 26th of December, your letter dated
the 12th of December, enclosed in another written on the 24th of
the same month. I gather from it your fervent love of truth, and
your making it the aim of all your studies. This compelled me,
though by no means otherwise unwilling, not only to grant your
petition by answering all the questions you have sent, or may in
future send, to the best of my ability, but also to impart to you
everything in my power, which can conduce to further knowledge
and sincere friendship. So far as in me lies, I value, above all other
things out of my own control, the joining hands of friendship with
men who are sincere lovers of truth. I believe that nothing in the
world, of things outside our own control, brings more peace than
the possibility of affectionate intercourse with such men; it is just
as impossible that the love we bear them can be disturbed
(inasmuch as it is founded on the desire each feels for the
knowledge of truth), as that truth once perceived should not be
assented to. It is, moreover, the highest and most pleasing source
of happiness derivable from things not under our own control.
Nothing save truth has power closely to unite different feelings and
dispositions. I say nothing of the very great advantages which it
brings, lest I should detain you too long on a subject which,
doubtless, you know already. I have said thus much, in order to
show you better how gladly I shall embrace this and any future
opportunity of serving you.
In order to make the best of the present opportunity, I will at once
proceed to answer your question. This seems to turn on the point
that it seems to be clear, not only from Gods providence, which is
identical with His will, but also from Gods co-operation and
continuous creation of things, either that there are no such things
as sin or evil, or that God directly brings sin and evil to pass. You
do not, however, explain what you mean by evil. As far as one may
judge from the example you give in the predetermined act of
volition of Adam, you seem to mean by evil the actual exercise of
volition, in so far as it is conceived as predetermined in a particular
way, or in so far as it is repugnant to the command of God. Hence
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you conclude (and I agree with you if this be what you mean) that it
is absurd to adopt either alternative, either that God brings to pass
anything contrary to His own will, or that what is contrary to Gods
will can be good.
For my own part, I cannot admit that sin and evil have any positive
existence, far less that anything can exist, or come to pass,
contrary to the will of God. On the contrary, not only do I assert
that sin has no positive existence, I also maintain that only in
speaking improperly, or humanly, can we say that we sin against
God, as in the expression that men offend God.
As to the first point, we know that whatsoever is, when considered
in itself without regard to anything else, possesses perfection,
extending in each thing as far as the limits of that things essence:
for essence is nothing else. I take for an illustration the design or
determined will of Adam to eat the forbidden fruit. This design or
determined will, considered in itself alone, includes perfection in so
far as it expresses reality; hence it may be inferred that we can
only conceive imperfection in things, when they are viewed in
relation to other things possessing more reality: thus in Adams
decision, so long as we view it by itself and do not compare it with
other things more perfect or exhibiting a more perfect state, we
can find no imperfection: nay it may be compared with an infinity of
other things far less perfect in this respect than itself, such as
stones, stocks, &c. This, as a matter of fact, everyone grants. For
we all admire in animals qualities which we regard with dislike and
aversion in men, such as the pugnacity of bees, the jealousy of
doves, &c.; these in human beings are despised, but are
nevertheless considered to enhance the value of animals. This
being so, it follows that sin, which indicates nothing save
imperfection, cannot consist in anything that expresses reality, as
we see in the case of Adams decision and its execution.
Again, we cannot say that Adams will is at variance with the law of
God, and that it is evil because it is displeasing to God; for besides
the fact that grave imperfection would be imputed to God, if we say
that anything happens contrary to His will, or that He desires
anything which He does not obtain, or that His nature resembled
that of His creatures in having sympathy with some things more
than others; such an occurrence would be at complete variance
with the nature of the divine will.
The will of God is identical with His intellect, hence the former can
no more be contravened than the latter; in other words, anything
which should come to pass against His will must be of a nature to
be contrary to His intellect, such, for instance, as a round square.
Hence the will or decision of Adam regarded in itself was neither

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evil nor, properly speaking, against the will of God: it follows that
God mayor rather, for the reason you call attention to, mustbe
its cause; not in so far as it was evil, for the evil in it consisted in
the loss of the previous state of being which it entailed on Adam,
and it is certain that loss has no positive existence, and is only so
spoken of in respect to our and not Gods understanding. The
difficulty arises from the fact, that we give one and the same
definition to all the individuals of a genus, as for instance all who
have the outward appearance of men: we accordingly assume all
things which are expressed by the same definition to be equally
capable of attaining the highest perfection possible for the genus;
when we find an individual whose actions are at variance with such
perfection, we suppose him to be deprived of it, and to fall short of
his nature. We should hardly act in this way, if we did not hark back
to the definition and ascribe to the individual a nature in
accordance with it. But as God does not know things through
abstraction, or form general definitions of the kind above
mentioned, and as things have no more reality than the divine
understanding and power have put into them and actually endowed
them with, it clearly follows that a state of privation can only be
spoken of in relation to our intellect, not in relation to God.
Thus, as it seems to me, the difficulty is completely solved.
However, in order to make the way still plainer, and remove every
doubt, I deem it necessary to answer the two following
difficulties:First, why Holy Scripture says that God wishes for the
conversion of the wicked, and also why God forbade Adam to eat of
the fruit when He had ordained the contrary? Secondly, that it
seems to follow from what I have said, that the wicked by their
pride, avarice, and deeds of desperation, worship God in no less
degree than the good do by their nobleness, patience, love, &c.,
inasmuch as both execute Gods will.
In answer to the first question, I observe that Scripture, being
chiefly fitted for and beneficial to the multitude, speaks popularly
after the fashion of men. For the multitude are incapable of
grasping sublime conceptions. Hence I am persuaded that all
matters, which God revealed to the prophets as necessary to
salvation, are set down in the form of laws. With this
understanding, the prophets invented whole parables, and
represented God as a king and a law-giver, because He had
revealed the means of salvation and perdition, and was their cause;
the means which were simply causes they styled laws and wrote
them down as such; salvation and perdition, which are simply
effects necessarily resulting from the aforesaid means, they
described as reward and punishment; framing their doctrines more
in accordance with such parables than with actual truth. They
constantly speak of God as resembling a man, as sometimes angry,

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sometimes merciful, now desiring what is future, now jealous and

suspicious, even as deceived by the devil; so that philosophers and
all who are above the law, that is, who follow after virtue, not in
obedience to law, but through love, because it is the most excellent
of all things, must not be hindered by such expressions.
Thus the command given to Adam consisted solely in this, that God
revealed to Adam, that eating of the fruit brought about death; as
He reveals to us, through our natural faculties, that poison is
deadly. If you ask, for what object did He make this revelation, I
answer, in order to render Adam to that extent more perfect in
knowledge. Hence, to ask God why He had not bestowed on Adam a
more perfect will, is just as absurd as to ask, why the circle has not
been endowed with all the properties of a sphere. This follows
clearly from what has been said, and I have also proved it in my
Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, I. 15.
As to the second difficulty, it is true that the wicked execute after
their manner the will of God: but they cannot, therefore, be in any
respect compared with the good. The more perfection a thing has,
the more does it participate in the deity, and the more does it
express perfection. Thus, as the good have incomparably more
perfection than the bad, their virtue cannot be likened to the virtue
of the wicked, inasmuch as the wicked lack the love of God, which
proceeds from the knowledge of God, and by which alone we are,
according to our human understanding, called the servants of God.
The wicked, knowing not God, are but as instruments in the hand of
the workman, serving unconsciously, and perishing in the using;
the good, on the other hand, serve consciously, and in serving
become more perfect.
1 This, Sir, is all I can now contribute to answering your question,
and I have no higher wish than that it may satisfy you. But in case
you still find any difficulty, I beg you to let me know of that also, to
see if I may be able to remove it. You have nothing to fear on your
side, but so long as you are not satisfied, I like nothing better than
to be informed of your reasons, so that finally the truth may appear.
I could have wished to write in the tongue in which I have been
brought up. I should, perhaps, have been able to express my
thoughts better. But be pleased to take it as it is, amend the
mistakes yourself, and believe me,
Your Sincere Friend And Servant.

Long Orchard, near Amsterdam, Jan. 5, 1665.

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LETTER XXXIII. (XX.)

Blyenbergh To Spinoza.
(A summary only of this letter is here given.Tr.)
I have two rules in my philosophic inquiries: i. Conformity to
reason; ii. Conformity to scripture. I consider the second the most
important. Examining your letter by the first, I observe that your
identification of Gods creative power with His preservative power
seems to involve, either that evil does not exist, or else that God
brings about evil. If evil be only a term relative to our imperfect
knowledge, how do you explain the state of a man who falls from a
state of grace into sin? If evil be a negation, how can we have the
power to sin? If God causes an evil act, he must cause the evil as
well as the act. You say that every man can only act, as he, in fact,
does act. This removes all distinction between the good and the
wicked. Both, according to you, are perfect. You remove all the
sanctions of virtue and reduce us to automata. Your doctrine, that
strictly speaking we cannot sin against God, is a hard saying.
[The rest of the letter is taken up with an examination of Spinozas
arguments in respect to their conformity to Scripture.]
Dordrecht, 16 Jan., 1665.

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LETTER XXXIV. (XXI.)

[Spinoza complains that Blyenbergh has misunderstood him: he
sets forth his true meaning.]
Voorburg, 28 Jan., 1665.
Friend And Sir,

When I read your first letter, I thought that our opinions almost
coincided. But from the second, which was delivered to me on the
21st of this month, I see that the matter stands far otherwise, for I
perceive that we disagree, not only in remote inferences from first
principles, but also in first principles themselves; so that I can
hardly think that we can derive any mutual instruction from further
correspondence. I see that no proof, though it be by the laws of
proof most sound, has any weight with you, unless it agrees with
the explanation, which either you yourself, or other theologians
known to you, attribute to Holy Scripture. However, if you are
convinced that God speaks more clearly and effectually through
Holy Scripture than through the natural understanding, which He
also has bestowed upon us, and with His divine wisdom keeps
continually stable and uncorrupted, you have valid reasons for
making your understanding bow before the opinions which you
attribute to Holy Scripture; I myself could adopt no different
course. For my own part, as I confess plainly, and without
circumlocution, that I do not understand the Scriptures, though I
have spent some years upon them, and also as I feel that when I
have obtained a firm proof, I cannot fall into a state of doubt
concerning it, I acquiesce entirely in what is commended to me by
my understanding, without any suspicion that I am being deceived
in the matter, or that Holy Scripture, though I do not search, could
gainsay it: for truth is not at variance with truth, as I have
already clearly shown in my appendix to The Principles of
Cartesian Philosophy (I cannot give the precise reference, for I
have not the book with me here in the country). But if in any
instance I found that a result obtained through my natural
understanding was false, I should reckon myself fortunate, for I
enjoy life, and try to spend it not in sorrow and sighing, but in
peace, joy, and cheerfulness, ascending from time to time a step
higher. Meanwhile I know (and this knowledge gives me the highest
contentment and peace of mind), that all things come to pass by the
power and unchangeable decree of a Being supremely perfect.
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To return to your letter, I owe you many and sincere thanks for
having confided to me your philosophical opinions; but for the
doctrines, which you attribute to me, and seek to infer from my
letter, I return you no thanks at at all. What ground, I should like to
know, has my letter afforded you for ascribing to me the opinions;
that men are like beasts, that they die and perish after the manner
of beasts, that our actions are displeasing to God, &c.? Perhaps we
are most of all at variance on this third point. You think, as far as I
can judge, that God takes pleasure in our actions, as though He
were a man, who has attained his object, when things fall out as he
desired. For my part, have I not said plainly enough, that the good
worship God, that in continually serving Him they become more
perfect, and that they love God? Is this, I ask, likening them to
beasts, or saying that they perish like beasts, or that their actions
are displeasing to God? If you had read my letter with more
attention, you would have clearly perceived, that our whole
dissension lies in the following alternative:Either the perfections
which the good receive are imparted to them by God in His
capacity of God, that is absolutely without any human qualities
being ascribed to Himthis is what I believe; or else such
perfections are imparted by God as a judge, which is what you
maintain. For this reason you defend the wicked, saying that they
carry out Gods decrees as far as in them lies, and therefore serve
God no less than the good. But if my doctrine be accepted, this
consequence by no means follows; I do not bring in the idea of God
as a judge, and, therefore, I estimate an action by its intrinsic
merits, not by the powers of its performer; the recompense which
follows the action follows from it as necessarily as from the nature
of a triangle it follows, that the three angles are equal to two right
angles. This may be understood by everyone, who reflects on the
fact, that our highest blessedness consists in love towards God, and
that such love flows naturally from the knowledge of God, which is
so strenuously enjoined on us. The question may very easily be
proved in general terms, if we take notice of the nature of Gods
decrees, as explained in my appendix. However, I confess that all
those, who confuse the divine nature with human nature, are
gravely hindered from understanding it.
I had intended to end my letter at this point, lest I should prove
troublesome to you in these questions, the discussion of which (as I
discover from the extremely pious postscript added to your letter)
serves you as a pastime and a jest, but for no serious use. However,
that I may not summarily deny your request, I will proceed to
explain further the words privation and negation, and briefly point
out what is necessary for the elucidation of my former letter.
I say then, first, that privation is not the act of depriving, but simply
and merely a state of want, which is in itself nothing: it is a mere

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entity of the reason, a mode of thought framed in comparing one

thing with another. We say, for example, that a blind man is
deprived of sight, because we readily imagine him as seeing, or
else because we compare him with others who can see, or compare
his present condition with his past condition when he could see;
when we regard the man in this way, comparing his nature either
with the nature of others or with his own past nature, we affirm
that sight belongs to his nature, and therefore assert that he has
been deprived of it. But when we are considering the nature and
decree of God, we cannot affirm privation of sight in the case of the
aforesaid man any more than in the case of a stone; for at the
actual time sight lies no more within the scope of the man than of
the stone; since there belongs to man and forms part of his nature
only that which is granted to him by the understanding and will of
God. Hence it follows that God is no more the cause of a blind man
not seeing, than he is of a stone not seeing. Not seeing is a pure
negation. So also, when we consider the case of a man who is led
by lustful desires, we compare his present desires with those which
exist in the good, or which existed in himself at some other time;
we then assert that he is deprived of the better desires, because we
conceive that virtuous desires lie within the scope of his nature.
This we cannot do, if we consider the nature and decree of God.
For, from this point of view, virtuous desires lie at that time no
more within the scope of the nature of the lustful man, than within
the scope of the nature of the devil or a stone. Hence, from the
latter standpoint the virtuous desire is not a privation but a
negation.
Thus privation is nothing else than denying of a thing something,
which we think belongs to its nature; negation is denying of a thing
something, which we do not think belongs to its nature.
We may now see, how Adams desire for earthly things was evil
from our standpoint, but not from Gods. Although God knew both
the present and the past state of Adam, He did not, therefore,
regard Adam as deprived of his past state, that is, He did not
regard Adams past state as within the scope of Adams present
nature. Otherwise God would have apprehended something
contrary to His own will, that is, contrary to His own
understanding. If you quite grasp my meaning here and at the
same time remember, that I do not grant to the mind the same
freedom as Descartes doesL[ewis] M[eyer] bears witness to this
in his preface to my bookyou will perceive, that there is not the
smallest contradiction in what I have said. But I see that I should
have done far better to have answered you in my first letter with
the words of Descartes, to the effect that we cannot know how our
freedom and its consequences agree with the foreknowledge and
freedom of God (see several passages in my appendix), that,

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therefore, we can discover no contradiction between creation by

God and our freedom, because we cannot understand how God
created the universe, nor (what is the same thing) how He
preserves it. I thought that you had read the preface, and that by
not giving you my real opinions in reply, I should sin against those
duties of friendship which I cordially offered you. But this is of no
consequence.
Still, as I see that you have not hitherto thoroughly grasped
Descartes meaning, I will call your attention to the two following
points. First, that neither Descartes nor I have ever said, that it
appertains to our nature to confine the will within the limits of the
understanding; we have only said, that God has endowed us with a
determined understanding and an undetermined will, so that we
know not the object for which He has created us. Further, that an
undetermined or perfect will of this kind not only makes us more
perfect, but also, as I will presently show you, is extremely
necessary for us.
Secondly: that our freedom is not placed in a certain contingency
nor in a certain indifference, but in the method of affirmation or
denial; so that, in proportion as we are less indifferent in
affirmation or denial, so are we more free. For instance, if the
nature of God be Known to us, it follows as necessarily from our
nature to affirm that God exists, as from the nature of a triangle it
follows, that the three angles are equal to two right angles; we are
never more free, than when we affirm a thing in this way. As this
necessity is nothing else but the decree of God (as I have clearly
shown in my appendix), we may hence, after a fashion, understand
how we act freely and are the cause of our action, though all the
time we are acting necessarily and according to the decree of God.
This, I repeat, we may, after a fashion, understand, whenever we
affirm something, which we clearly and distinctly perceive, but
when we assert something which we do not clearly and distinctly
understand, in other words, when we allow our will to pass beyond
the limits of our understanding, we no longer perceive the
necessity nor the decree of God, we can only see our freedom,
which is always involved in our will; in which respect only our
actions are called good or evil. If we then try to reconcile our
freedom with Gods decree and continuous creation, we confuse
that which we clearly and distinctly understand with that which we
do not perceive, and, therefore, our attempt is vain. It is, therefore,
sufficient for us to know that we are free, and that we can be so
notwithstanding Gods decree, and further that we are the cause of
evil, because an act can only be called evil in relation to our
freedom. I have said thus much for Descartes in order to show that,
in the question we are considering, his words exhibit no
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I will now turn to what concerns myself, and will first briefly call
attention to the advantage arising from my opinion, inasmuch as,
according to it, our understanding offers our mind and body to God
freed from all superstition. Nor do I deny that prayer is extremely
useful to us. For my understanding is too small to determine all the
means, whereby God leads men to the love of Himself, that is, to
salvation. So far is my opinion from being hurtful, that it offers to
those, who are not taken up with prejudices and childish
superstitions, the only means for arriving at the highest stage of
blessedness.
When you say that, by making men so dependent on God, I reduce
them to the likeness of the elements, plants or stones, you
sufficiently show that you have thoroughly misunderstood my
meaning, and have confused things which regard the
understanding with things which regard the imagination. If by your
intellect only you had perceived what dependence on God means,
you certainly would not think that things, in so far as they depend
on God, are dead, corporeal, and imperfect (who ever dared to
speak so meanly of the Supremely Perfect Being?); on the contrary,
you would understand that for the very reason that they depend on
God they are perfect; so that this dependence and necessary
operation may best be understood as Gods decree, by considering,
not stocks and plants, but the most reasonable and perfect
creatures. This sufficiently appears from my second observation on
the meaning of Descartes, which you ought to have looked to.
I cannot refrain from expressing my extreme astonishment at your
remarking, that if God does not punish wrongdoing (that is, as a
judge does, with a punishment not intrinsically connected with the
offence, for our whole difference lies in this), what reason prevents
me from rushing headlong into every kind of wickedness?
Assuredly he, who is only kept from vice by the fear of punishment
(which I do not think of you), is in no wise acted on by love, and by
no means embraces virtue. For my own part, I avoid or endeavour
to avoid vice, because it is at direct variance with my proper nature
and would lead me astray from the knowledge and love of God.
Again, if you had reflected a little on human nature and the nature
of Gods decree (as explained in my appendix), and perceived, and
known by this time, how a consequence should be deduced from its
premises, before a conclusion is arrived at; you would not so rashly
have stated that my opinion makes us like stocks, &c.: nor would
you have ascribed to me the many absurdities you conjure up.
As to the two points which you say, before passing on to your
second rule, that you cannot understand; I answer, that the first
may be solved through Descartes, who says that in observing your

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own nature you feel that you can suspend your judgment. If you say
that you do not feel, that you have at present sufficient force to
keep your judgment suspended, this would appear to Descartes to
be the same as saying that we cannot at present see, that so long
as we exist we shall always be thinking things, or retain the nature
of thinking things; in fact it would imply a contradiction.
As to your second difficulty, I say with Descartes, that if we cannot
extend our will beyond the bounds of our extremely limited
understanding, we shall be most wretchedit will not be in our
power to eat even a crust of bread, or to walk a step, or to go on
living, for all things are uncertain and full of peril.
I now pass on to your second rule, and assert that I believe, though
I do not ascribe to Scripture that sort of truth which you think you
find in it, I nevertheless assign to it as great if not greater authority
than you do. I am far more careful than others not to ascribe to
Scripture any childish and absurd doctrines, a precaution which
demands either a thorough acquaintance with philosophy or the
possession of divine revelations. Hence I pay very little attention to
the glosses put upon Scripture by ordinary theologians, especially
those of the kind who always interpret Scripture according to the
literal and outward meaning: I have never, except among the
Socinians, found any theologian stupid enough to ignore that Holy
Scripture very often speaks in human fashion of God and expresses
its meaning in parables; as for the contradiction which you vainly
(in my opinion) endeavour to show, I think you attach to the word
parable a meaning different from that usually given. For who ever
heard, that a man, who expressed his opinions in parables, had
therefore taken leave of his senses? When Micaiah said to King
Ahab, that he had seen God sitting on a throne, with the armies of
heaven standing on the right hand and the left, and that God asked
His angels which of them would deceive Ahab, this was assuredly a
parable employed by the prophet on that occasion (which was not
fitted for the inculcation of sublime theological doctrines), as
sufficiently setting forth the message he had to deliver in the name
of God. We cannot say that he had in anywise taken leave of his
senses. So also the other prophets of God made manifest Gods
commands to the people in this fashion as being the best adapted,
though not expressly enjoined by God, for leading the people to the
primary object of Scripture, which, as Christ Himself says, is to bid
men love God above all things, and their neighbour as themselves.
Sublime speculations have, in my opinion, no bearing on Scripture.
As far as I am concerned I have never learnt or been able to learn
any of Gods eternal attributes from Holy Scripture.
As to your fifth argument (that the prophets thus made manifest
the word of God, since truth is not at variance with truth), it merely

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amounts, for those who understand the method of proof, to asking

me to prove, that Scripture, as it is, is the true revealed word of
God. The mathematical proof of this proposition could only be
attained by divine revelation. I, therefore, expressed myself as
follows: I believe, but I do not mathematically know, that all things
revealed by God to the prophets, &c. Inasmuch as I firmly believe
but do not mathematically know, that the prophets were the most
trusted counsellors and faithful ambassadors of God. So that in all I
have written there is no contradiction, though several such may be
found among holders of the opposite opinion.
The rest of your letter (to wit the passage where you say, Lastly,
the supremely perfect Being knew beforehand, &c; and again,
your objections to the illustration from poison, and lastly, the whole
of what you say of the appendix and what follows) seems to me
beside the question.
As regards Lewis Meyers preface, the points which were still left
to be proved by Descartes before establishing his demonstration of
free will, are certainly there set forth; it is added that I hold a
contrary opinion, my reasons for doing so being given. I shall,
perhaps, in due time give further explanations. For the present I
have no such intention.
I have never thought about the work on Descartes, nor given any
further heed to it, since it has been translated into Dutch. I have
my reasons, though it would be tedious to enumerate them here. So
nothing remains for me but to subscribe myself, &c.

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LETTER XXXV. (XXII.)

[This letter (extending over five pages) is only given here in brief
summary.]
The tone of your last letter is very different from that of your first.
If our essence is equivalent to our state at a given time, we are as
perfect when sinning as when virtuous: God would wish for vice as
much as virtue. Both the virtuous and the vicious execute Gods
willWhat is the difference between them? You say some actions
are more perfect than others; wherein does this perfection consist?
If a mind existed so framed, that vice was in agreement with its
proper nature, why should such a mind prefer good to evil? If God
makes us all that we are, how can we go astray? Can rational
substances depend on God in any way except lifelessly? What is the
difference between a rational beings dependence on God, and an
irrational beings? If we have no free will, are not our actions Gods
actions, and our will Gods will? I could ask several more questions,
but do not venture.
P.S. In my hurry I forgot to insert this question: Whether we cannot
by foresight avert what would otherwise happen to us?
Dordrecht, 19 Feb., 1665.

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LETTER XXXVI. (XXIII.)

[Spinoza replies, that there is a difference between the theological
and the philosophical way of speaking of God and things divine. He
proceeds to discuss Blyenberghs questions. (Voorburg, 13th
March, 1665.)]
Friend And Sir,

I have received two letters from you this week; the second, dated
9th March, only served to inform me of the first written on
February 19th, and sent to me at Schiedam. In the former I see that
you complain of my saying, that demonstration carried no weight
with you, as though I had spoken of my own arguments, which had
failed to convince you. Such was far from my intention. I was
referring to your own words, which ran as follows:And if after
long investigation it comes to pass, that my natural knowledge
appears either to be at variance with the word (of Scripture), or not
sufficiently well, &c.; the word has so great authority with me, that
I would rather doubt of the conceptions, which I think I clearly
perceive, &c. You see I merely repeat in brief your own phrase, so
that I cannot think you have any cause for anger against me,
especially as I merely quoted in order to show the great difference
between our standpoints.
Again, as you wrote at the end of your letter that your only hope
and wish is to continue in faith and hope, and that all else, which
we may become convinced of through our natural faculties, is
indifferent to you; I reflected, as I still continue to do, that my
letters could be of no use to you, and that I should best consult my
own interests by ceasing to neglect my pursuits (which I am
compelled while writing to you to interrupt) for the sake of things
which could bring no possible benefit. Nor is this contrary to the
spirit of my former letter, for in that I looked upon you as simply a
philosopher, who (like not a few who call themselves Christians)
possesses no touchstone of truth save his natural understanding,
and not as a theologian. However, you have taught me to know
better, and have also shown me that the foundation, on which I was
minded to build up our friendship, has not, as I imagined, been laid.
As for the rest, such are the general accompaniments of
controversy, so that I would not on that account transgress the
limits of courtesy: I will, therefore, pass over in your second letter,
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and in this, these and similar expressions, as though they had never
been observed. So much for your taking offence; to show you that I
have given you no just cause, and, also, that I am quite willing to
brook contradiction. I now turn a second time to answering your
objections.
I maintain, in the first place, that God is absolutely and really the
cause of all things which have essence, whatsoever they may be. If
you can demonstrate that evil, error, crime, &c., have any positive
existence, which expresses essence, I will fully grant you that God
is the cause of crime, evil, error, &c. I believe myself to have
sufficiently shown, that that which constitutes the reality of evil,
error, crime, &c., does not consist in anything, which expresses
essence, and therefore we cannot say that God is its cause. For
instance, Neros matricide, in so far as it comprehended anything
positive, was not a crime; the same outward act was perpetrated,
and the same matricidal intention was entertained by Orestes; who,
nevertheless, is not blamedat any rate, not so much as Nero.
Wherein, then, did Neros crime consist? In nothing else, but that
by his deed he showed himself to be ungrateful, unmerciful, and
disobedient. Certainly none of these qualities express aught of
essence, therefore God was not the cause of them, though He was
the cause of Neros act and intention.
Further, I would have you observe, that, while we speak
philosophically, we ought not to employ theological phrases. For,
since theology frequently, and not unwisely, represents God as a
perfect man, it is often expedient in theology to say, that God
desires a given thing, that He is angry at the actions of the wicked,
and delights in those of the good. But in philosophy, when we
clearly perceive that the attributes which make men perfect can as
ill be ascribed and assigned to God, as the attributes which go to
make perfect the elephant and the ass can be ascribed to man; here
I say these and similar phrases have no place, nor can we employ
them without causing extreme confusion in our conceptions.
Hence, in the language of philosophy, it cannot be said that God
desires anything of any man, or that anything is displeasing or
pleasing to Him: all these are human qualities and have no place in
God.
I would have it observed, that although the actions of the good
(that is of those who have a clear idea of God, whereby all their
actions and their thoughts are determined) and of the wicked (that
is of those who do not possess the idea of God, but only the ideas of
earthly things, whereby their actions and thoughts are
determined), and, in fact, of all things that are, necessarily flow
from Gods eternal laws and decrees; yet they do not differ from
one another in degree only, but also in essence. A mouse no less

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than an angel, and sorrow no less than joy depend on God; yet a
mouse is not a kind of angel, neither is sorrow a kind of joy. I think
I have thus answered your objections, if I rightly understand them,
for I sometimes doubt, whether the conclusions which you deduce
are not foreign to the proposition you are undertaking to prove.
However, this will appear more clearly, if I answer the questions
you proposed on these principles. First, Whether murder is as
acceptable to God as alms-giving? Secondly, Whether stealing is as
good in relation to God as honesty? Thirdly and lastly, Whether if
there be a mind so framed, that it would agree with, rather than be
repugnant to its proper nature, to give way to lust, and to commit
crimes, whether, I repeat, there can be any reason given, why such
a mind should do good and eschew evil?
To your first question, I answer, that I do not know, speaking as a
philosopher, what you mean by the words acceptable to God. If
you ask, whether God does not hate the wicked, and love the good?
whether God does not regard the former with dislike, and the latter
with favour? I answer, No. If the meaning of your question is: Are
murderers and almsgivers equally good and perfect? my answer is
again in the negative. To your second question, I reply: If, by good
in relation to God, you mean that the honest man confers a favour
on God, and the thief does Him an injury, I answer that neither the
honest man nor the thief can cause God any pleasure or
displeasure. If you mean to ask, whether the actions of each, in so
far as they posssess reality, and are caused by God, are equally
perfect? I reply that, if we merely regard the actions and the
manner of their execution, both may be equally perfect. If you,
therefore, inquire whether the thief and the honest man are equally
perfect and blessed? I answer, No. For, by an honest man, I mean
one who always desires, that everyone should possess that which is
his. This desire, as I prove in my Ethics (as yet unpublished),
necessarily derives its origin in the pious from the clear knowledge
which they possess, of God and of themselves. As a thief has no
desire of the kind, he is necessarily without the knowledge of God
and of himselfin other words, without the chief element of our
blessedness. If you further ask, What causes you to perform a given
action, which I call virtuous, rather than another? I reply, that I
cannot know which method, out of the infinite methods at His
disposal, God employs to determine you to the said action. It may
be, that God has impressed you with a clear idea of Himself, so that
you forget the world for love of Him, and love your fellow-men as
yourself; it is plain that such a disposition is at variance with those
dispositions which are called bad, and, therefore, could not co-exist
with them in the same man.

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However, this is not the place to expound all the foundations of my

Ethics, or to prove all that I have advanced; I am now only
concerned in answering your questions, and defending myself
against them.
Lastly, as to your third question, it assumes a contradiction, and
seems to me to be, as though one asked: If it agreed better with a
mans nature that he should hang himself, could any reasons be
given for his not hanging himself? Can such a nature possibly exist?
If so, I maintain (whether I do or do not grant free will), that such
an one, if he sees that he can live more conveniently on the gallows
than sitting at his own table, would act most foolishly, if he did not
hang himself. So anyone who clearly saw that, by committing
crimes, he would enjoy a really more perfect and better life and
existence, than he could attain by the practice of virtue, would be
foolish if he did not act on his convictions. For, with such a perverse
human nature as his, crime would become virtue.
As to the other question, which you add in your postscript, seeing
that one might ask a hundred such in an hour, without arriving at a
conclusion about any, and seeing that you yourself do not press for
an answer, I will send none.
I will now only subscribe myself, &c.

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LETTER XXXVII. (XXIV.)

[Blyenbergh, who had been to see Spinoza, asks the latter to send
him a report of their conversation, and to answer five fresh
questions. (Dordrecht, 27th March, 1665.)]
Omitted.

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LETTER XXXVIII. (XXVII.)

[Spinoza declines further correspondence with Blyenbergh, but
says he will give explanations of certain points by word of mouth.
(Voorburg, 3rd June, 1665.)]1
Friend And Sir,

When your letter, dated 27th March, was delivered to me, I was
just starting for Amsterdam. I, therefore, after reading half of it,
left it at home, to be answered on my return: for I thought it dealt
only with questions raised in our first controversy. However, a
second perusal showed me, that it embraced a far wider subject,
and not only asked me for a proof of what, in my preface to
Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, I wrote (with the object of
merely stating, without proving or urging my opinion), but also
requested me to impart a great portion of my Ethics, which, as
everyone knows, ought to be based on physics and metaphysics.
For this reason, I have been unable to allow myself to satisfy your
demands. I wished to await an opportunity for begging you, in a
most friendly way, by word of mouth, to withdraw your request, for
giving you my reasons for refusal, and for showing that your
inquiries do not promote the solution of our first controversy, but,
on the contrary, are for the most part entirely dependent on its
previous settlement. So far are they not essential to the
understanding of my doctrine concerning necessity, that they
cannot be apprehended, unless the latter question is understood
first. However, before such an opportunity offered, a second letter
reached me this week, appearing to convey a certain sense of
displeasure at my delay. Necessity, therefore, has compelled me to
write you these few words, to acquaint you more fully with my
proposal and decision. I hope that, when the facts of the case are
before you, you will, of your own accord, desist from your request,
and will still remain kindly disposed towards me. I, for my part,
will, in all things, according to my power, prove myself your, &c.

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LETTER XXXIX.
Spinoza To Christian Huyghens.
(Treating of the Unity of God.)
Distinguished Sir,
The demonstration of the unity of God, on the ground that His
nature involves necessary existence, which you asked for, and I
took note of, I have been prevented by various business from
sending to you before. In order to accomplish my purpose, I will
premise
I. That the true definition of anything includes nothing except the
simple nature of the thing defined. From this it follows
II. That no definition can involve or express a multitude or a given
number of individuals, inasmuch as it involves and expresses
nothing except the nature of the thing as it is in itself. For instance,
the definition of a triangle includes nothing beyond the simple
nature of a triangle; it does not include any given number of
triangles. In like manner, the definition of the mind as a thinking
thing, or the definition of God as a perfect Being, includes nothing
beyond the natures of the mind and of God, not a given number of
minds or gods.
III. That for everything that exists there must necessarily be a
positive cause, through which it exists.
IV. This cause may be situate either in the nature and definition of
the thing itself (to wit, because existence belongs to its nature or
necessarily includes it), or externally to the thing.
From these premisses it follows, that if any given number of
individuals exists in nature, there must be one or more causes,
which have been able to produce exactly that number of
individuals, neither more nor less. If, for instance, there existed in
nature twenty men (in order to avoid all confusion, I will assume
that these all exist together as primary entities), it is not enough to
investigate the cause of human nature in general, in order to
account for the existence of these twenty; we must also inquire into
the reason, why there exist exactly twenty men, neither more nor
less. For (by our third hypothesis) for each man a reason and a
cause must be forthcoming, why he should exist. But this cause (by
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our second and third hypotheses) cannot be contained in the nature

of man himself; for the true definition of man does not involve the
number of twenty men. Hence (by our fourth hypothesis) the cause
for the existence of these twenty men, and consequently for the
existence of each of them, must exist externally to them. We may
thus absolutely conclude, that all things, which are conceived to
exist in the plural number, must necessarily be produced by
external causes and not by the force of their own nature. But since
(by our second hypothesis) necessary existence appertains to the
nature of God, His true definition must necessarily include
necessary existence: therefore from His true definition His
necessary existence must be inferred. But from His true definition
(as I have already demonstrated from our second and third
hypotheses) the necessary existence of many gods cannot be
inferred. Therefore there only follows the existence of a single God.
Which was to be proved.
This, distinguished Sir, has now seemed to me the best method for
demonstrating the proposition. I have also proved it differently by
means of the distinction between essence and existence; but
bearing in mind the object you mentioned to me, I have preferred
to send you the demonstration given above. I hope it will satisfy
you, and I will await your reply, meanwhile remaining, &c.
Voorburg, 7 Jan., 1666.

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LETTER XL. (XXXV.)

Further arguments for the unity of God.
Distinguished Sir,
In your last letter, written on March 30th, you have excellently
elucidated the point, which was somewhat obscure to me in your
letter of February 10th. As I now know your opinion, I will set forth
the state of the question as you conceive it; whether there be only a
single Being who subsists by his own sufficiency or force? I not only
affirm this to be so, but also undertake to prove it from the fact,
that the nature of such a Being necessarily involves existence;
perhaps it may also be readily proved from the understanding of
God (as I set forth, Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, I. Prop. i.),
or from others of His attributes. Before treating of the subject I will
briefly show, as preliminaries, what properties must be possessed
by a Being including necessary existence. To wit:
I. It must be eternal. For if a definite duration be assigned to it, it
would beyond that definite duration be conceived as non-existent,
or as not involving necessary existence, which would be contrary to
its definition.
II. It must be simple, not made up of parts. For parts must in nature
and knowledge be prior to the whole they compose: this could not
be the case with regard to that which is eternal.
III. It cannot be conceived as determinate, but only as infinite. For,
if the nature of the said Being were determinate, and conceived as
determinate, that nature would beyond the said limits be conceived
as non-existent, which again is contrary to its definition.
IV. It is indivisible. For if it were divisible, it could be divided into
parts, either of the same or of different nature. If the latter, it could
be destroyed and so not exist, which is contrary to its definition; if
the former, each part would in itself include necessary existence,
and thus one part could exist without others, and consequently be
conceived as so existing. Hence the nature of the Being would be
comprehended as finite, which, by what has been said, is contrary
to its definition. Thus we see that, in attempting to ascribe to such
a Being any imperfection, we straightway fall into contradictions.
For, whether the imperfection which we wish to assign to the said
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Being be situate in any defect, or in limitations possessed by its

nature, or in any change which it might, through deficiency of
power, undergo from external causes, we are always brought back
to the contradiction, that a nature which involves necessary
existence, does not exist, or does not necessarily exist. I conclude,
therefore
V. That everything, which includes necessary existence, cannot
have in itself any imperfection, but must express pure perfection.
VI. Further, since only from perfection can it come about, that any
Being should exist by its own sufficiency and force, it follows that,
if we assume a Being to exist by its own nature, but not to express
all perfections, we must further suppose that another Being exists,
which does comprehend in itself all perfections. For, if the less
powerful Being exists by its own sufficiency, how much more must
the more powerful so exist?
Lastly, to deal with the question, I affirm that there can only be a
single Being, of which the existence belongs to its nature; such a
Being which possesses in itself all perfections I will call God. If
there be any Being to whose nature existence belongs, such a
Being can contain in itself no imperfection, but must (by my fifth
premiss) express every perfection; therefore, the nature of such a
Being seems to belong to God (whose existence we are bound to
affirm by Premiss VI.), inasmuch as He has in Himself all
perfections and no imperfections. Nor can it exist externally to
God. For if, externally to God, there existed one and the same
nature involving necessary existence, such nature would be
twofold; but this, by what we have just shown, is absurd. Therefore
there is nothing save God, but there is a single God, that involves
necessary existence, which was to be proved.
Such, distinguished Sir, are the arguments I can now produce for
demonstrating this question. I hope I may also demonstrate to you,
that I am, &c.
Voorburg, 10 April, 1666

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LETTER XLI. (XXXVI.)

[Further discussion concerning the unity of God. Spinoza asks for
advice about polishing lenses. (Voorburg, May, 1666.)]
Distinguished Sir,
I have been by one means or another prevented from answering
sooner your letter, dated 19th May. As I gather that you suspend
your judgment with regard to most of the demonstration I sent you
(owing, I believe, to the obscurity you find in it), I will here
endeavour to explain its meaning more clearly.
First I enumerated four properties, which a Being existing by its
own sufficiency or force must possess. These four, and others like
them, I reduced in my fifth observation to one. Further, in order to
deduce all things necessary for the demonstration from a single
premiss, I endeavoured in my sixth observation to demonstrate the
existence of God from the given hypothesis; whence, lastly, taking
(as you know) nothing beyond the ordinary meaning of the terms, I
drew the desired conclusion.
Such, in brief, was my purpose and such my aim. I will now explain
the meaning of each step singly, and will first start with the
aforesaid four properties.
In the first you find no difficulty, nor is it anything but, as in the
case of the second, an axiom. By simple I merely mean not
compound, or not made up of parts differing in nature or other
parts agreeing in nature. This demonstration is assuredly universal.
The sense of my third observation (that if the Being be thought, it
cannot be conceived as limited by thought, but only as infinite, and
similarly, if it be extension, it cannot be conceived as limited by
extension) you have excellently perceived, though you say you do
not perceive the conclusion; this last is based on the fact, that a
contradiction is involved in conceiving under the category of nonexistence anything, whose definition includes or (what is the same
thing) affirms existence. And since determination implies nothing
positive, but only a limitation of the existence of the nature
conceived as determinate, it follows that that, of which the
definition affirms existence, cannot be conceived as determinate.
For instance, if the term extension included necessary existence, it
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would be alike impossible to conceive extension without existence

and existence without extension. If this were established, it would
be impossible to conceive determinate extension. For, if it be
conceived as determinate, it must be determined by its own nature,
that is by extension, and this extension, whereby it is determined,
must be conceived under the category of non-existence, which by
the hypothesis is obviously a contradiction. In my fourth
observation, I merely wished to show, that such a Being could
neither be divided into parts of the same nature or parts of a
different nature, whether those of a different nature involved
necessary existence or not. If, I said, we adopt the second view, the
Being would be destroyed; for destruction is merely the resolution
of a thing into parts so that none of them expresses the nature of
the whole; if we adopt the first view, we should be in contradiction
with the first three properties.
In my fifth observation, I merely asserted, that perfection consists
in being, and imperfection in the privation of being. I say the
privation; for although extension denies of itself thought, this
argues no imperfection in it. It would be an imperfection in it, if it
were in any degree deprived of extension, as it would be, if it were
determinate; or again, if it lacked duration, position, &c.
My sixth observation you accept absolutely, and yet you say, that
your whole difficulty remains (inasmuch as there may be, you think,
several self-existent entities of different nature; as for instance
thought and extension are different and perhaps subsist by their
own sufficiency). I am, therefore, forced to believe, that you
attribute to my observation a meaning quite different from the one
intended by me. I think I can discern your interpretation of it;
however, in order to save time, I will merely set forth my own
meaning. I say then, as regards my sixth observation, that if we
assert that anything, which is indeterminate and perfect only after
its kind, exists by its own sufficiency, we must also grant the
existence of a Being indeterminate and perfect absolutely; such a
Being I will call God. If, for example, we wish to assert that
extension or thought (which are each perfect after their kind, that
is, in a given sphere of being) exists by its own sufficiency, we must
grant also the existence of God, who is absolutely perfect, that is of
a Being absolutely indeterminate. I would here direct attention to
what I have just said with regard to the term imperfection; namely,
that it signifies that a thing is deficient in some quality, which,
nevertheless, belongs to its nature. For instance, extension can only
be called imperfect in respect of duration, position, or quantity:
that is, as not enduring longer, as not retaining its position, or as
not being greater. It can never be called imperfect, because it does
not think, inasmuch as its nature requires nothing of the kind, but
consists solely in extension, that is in a certain sphere of being.

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Only in respect to its own sphere can it be called determinate or

indeterminate, perfect or imperfect. Now, since the nature of God is
not confined to a certain sphere of being, but exists in being, which
is absolutely indeterminate, so His nature also demands everything
which perfectly expresses being; otherwise His nature would be
determinate and deficient.
This being so, it follows that there can be only one Being, namely
God, who exists by His own force. If, for the sake of an illustration,
we assert, that extension involves existence; it is, therefore,
necessary that it should be eternal and indeterminate, and express
absolutely no imperfection, but perfection. Hence extension will
appertain to God, or will be something which in some fashion
expresses the nature of God, since God is a Being, who not only in a
certain respect but absolutely is in essence indeterminate and
omnipotent. What we have here said by way of illustration
regarding extension must be asserted of all that we ascribe a
similar existence to. I, therefore, conclude as in my former letter,
that there is nothing external to God, but that God alone exists by
His own sufficiency. I think I have said enough to show the meaning
of my former letter; however, of this you will be the best judge. * * *
**
(The rest of the letter is occupied with details about the polishing
of lenses.)

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LETTER XLI.A.
Spinoza To * * * * *1 (May Or June, 1665).
[Spinoza urges his correspondent to be diligent in studying
philosophy, promises to send part of the Ethics, and adds some
personal details.]
Dear Friend,
I do not know whether you have quite forgotten me; but there are
many circumstances which lead me to suspect it. First, when I was
setting out on my journey,2 I wished to bid you good-bye; and, after
your own invitation, thinking I should certainly find you at home,
heard that you had gone to the Hague. I return to Voorburg,
nothing doubting but that you would at least have visited me in
passing; but you, forsooth, without greeting your friend, went back
home. Three weeks have I waited, without getting sight of a letter
from you. If you wish this opinion of mine to be changed, you may
easily change it by writing; and you can, at the same time, point out
a means of entering into a correspondence, as we once talked of
doing at your house.
Meanwhile, I should like to ask you, nay I do beg and entreat you,
by our friendship, to apply yourself to some serious work with real
study, and to devote the chief part of your life to the cultivation of
your understanding and your soul. Now, while there is time, and
before you complain of having let time and, indeed, your own self
slip by. Further, in order to set our correspondence on foot, and to
give you courage to write to me more freely, I would have you know
that I have long thought, and, indeed, been almost certain, that you
are somewhat too diffident of your own abilities, and that you are
afraid of advancing some question or proposal unworthy of a man
of learning. It does not become me to praise you, and expatiate on
your talents to your face; but, if you are afraid that I shall show
your letters to others, who will laugh at you, I give you my word of
honour, that I will religiously keep them, and will show them to no
mortal without your leave. On these conditions, you may enter on a
correspondence, unless you doubt of my good faith, which I do not
in the least believe. I want to hear your opinion on this in your first
letter; and you may, at the same time, send me the conserve of red
roses, though I am now much better.
After my journey, I was once bled; but the fever did not cease,
though I was somewhat more active than before the bleeding,
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owing, I think, to the change of air; but I was two or three times
laid up with a tertian. This, however, by good diet, I have at length
driven away, and sent about its business. Where it has gone, I know
not; but I am taking care it does not return here.
As regards the third part of my philosophy, I will shortly send it
you, if you wish to be its transmitter, or to our friend De Vries; and,
although I had settled not to send any of it, till it was finished, yet,
as it takes longer than I thought, I am unwilling to keep you
waiting. I will send up to the eightieth proposition, or thereabouts.1
Of English affairs I hear a good deal, but nothing for certain. The
people continue to be apprehensive, and can see no reason, why
the fleet should not be despatched; but the matter does not yet
seem to be set on foot. I am afraid our rulers want to be overwise
and prudent; but the event will show what they intend, and what
they will attempt. May the gods turn it all to good. I want to know,
what our people think, where you are, and what they know for
certain; but, above all things, I want you to believe me, &c.

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LETTER XLII. (XXXVII.)

Spinoza To I. B.1
[Concerning the best method, by which we may safely arrive at the
knowledge of things.]
Most Learned Sir And Dearest Friend,

I have not been able hitherto to answer your last letter, received
some time back. I have been so hindered by various occupations
and calls on my time, that I am hardly yet free from them. However,
as I have a few spare moments, I do not want to fall short of my
duty, but take this first opportunity of heartily thanking you for
your affection and kindness towards me, which you have often
displayed in your actions, and now also abundantly prove by your
letter.
I pass on to your question, which runs as follows: Is there, or can
there be, any method by which we may, without hindrance, arrive
at the knowledge of the most excellent things? or are our minds,
like our bodies, subject to the vicissitudes of circumstance, so that
our thoughts are governed rather by fortune than by skill? I think I
shall satisfy you, if I show that there must necessarily be a method,
whereby we are able to direct our clear and distinct perceptions,
and that our mind is not, like our body, subject to the vicissitudes of
circumstance.
This conclusion may be based simply on the consideration that one
clear and distinct perception, or several such together, can be
absolutely the cause of another clear and distinct perception. Now,
all the clear and distinct perceptions, which we form, can only arise
from other clear and distinct perceptions, which are in us; nor do
they acknowledge any cause external to us. Hence it follows that
the clear and distinct perceptions, which we form, depend solely on
our nature, and on its certain and fixed laws; in other words, on our
absolute power, not on fortunethat is, not on causes which,
although also acting by certain and fixed laws, are yet unknown to
us, and alien to our nature and power. As regards other
perceptions, I confess that they depend chiefly on fortune. Hence
clearly appears, what the true method ought to be like, and what it
ought chiefly to consist innamely, solely in the knowledge of the
pure understanding, and its nature and laws. In order that such
knowledge may be acquired, it is before all things necessary to
distinguish between the understanding and the imagination, or
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between ideas which are true and the rest, such as the fictitious,
the false, the doubtful, and absolutely all which depend solely on
the memory. For the understanding of these matters, as far as the
method requires, there is no need to know the nature of the mind
through its first cause; it is sufficient to put together a short history
of the mind, or of perceptions, in the manner taught by Verulam.
I think that in these few words I have explained and demonstrated
the true method, and have, at the same time, pointed out the way
of acquiring it. It only remains to remind you, that all these
questions demand assiduous study, and great firmness of
disposition and purpose. In order to fulfil these conditions, it is of
prime necessity to follow a fixed mode and plan of living, and to set
before one some definite aim. But enough of this for the present,
&c.
Voorburg, 10 June, 1666.

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LETTER XLIII. (XXXVIII.)

Spinoza To I. V. M.1
[Spinoza solves for his friend an arithmetical problem connected
with games of chance. (Voorburg, Oct. 1, 1666.)]
Omitted.

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LETTERS XLIV., XLV., XLVI. (XXXIX., XL., XLI.)

Spinoza To I. I.2
XLIV.
[Remarks on Descartes treatise on Optics.]

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XLV.
[Remarks on some alchemistic experiments, on the third and fourth
meditations of Descartes, and on Optics.]

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XLVI.
[Remarks on Hydrostatics.]

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LETTER XLVII. (XLIV.)

Spinoza To I. I.
[Spinoza begs his friend to stop the printing of the Dutch version of
the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Some remarks on a pernicious
pamphlet, Homo Politicus, and on Thales of Miletus.]
Most Courteous Sir,

When Professor N. N. visited me the other day, he told me that my
Theologico-Political Treatise has been translated into Dutch, and
that someone, whose name he did not know, was about printing it.
With regard to this, I earnestly beg you to inquire carefully into the
business, and, if possible, stop the printing. This is the request not
only of myself, but of many of my friends and acquaintances, who
would be sorry to see the book placed under an interdict, as it
undoubtedly would be, if published in Dutch. I do not doubt, but
that you will do this service to me and the cause.
One of my friends sent me a short time since a pamphlet called
Homo Politicus, of which I had heard much. I have read it, and
find it to be the most pernicious work which men could devise or
invent. Rank and riches are the authors highest good; he adapts
his doctrine accordingly, and shows the means to acquire them; to
wit, by inwardly rejecting all religion, and outwardly professing
whatever best serves his own advancement, also by keeping faith
with no one, except in so far as he himself is profited thereby. For
the rest, to feign, to make promises and break them, to lie, to swear
falsely, and many such like practices call forth his highest praises.
When I had finished reading the book, I debated whether I should
write a pamphlet indirectly aimed against its author, wherein I
should treat of the highest good and show the troubled and
wretched condition of those who are covetous of rank and riches;
finally proving by very plain reasoning and many examples, that the
insatiable desire for rank and riches must bring and has brought
ruin to states.
How much better and more excellent than the doctrines of the
aforesaid writer are the reflections of Thales of Miletus, appears
from the following. All the goods of friends, he says, are in
common; wise men are the friends of the gods, and all things
belong to the gods; therefore all things belong to the wise. Thus in
a single sentence, this wisest of men accounts himself most rich,
rather by nobly despising riches than by sordidly seeking them. In
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other passages he shows that the wise lack riches, not from
necessity, but from choice. For when his friends reproached him
with his poverty he answered, Do you wish me to show you, that I
could acquire what I deem unworthy of my labour, but you so
diligently seek? On their answering in the affirmative, he hired
every oil-press in the whole of Greece (for being a distinguished
astrologer he knew that the olive harvest would be as abundant as
in previous years it had been scanty), and sub-let at his own price
what he had hired for a very small sum, thus acquiring in a single
year a large fortune, which he bestowed liberally as he had gained
it industriously, &c.
The Hague, 17 Feb., 1671.

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LETTER XLVIII.
Written by a physician, Lambert de Velthuysen, to Isaac Orobio,
and forwarded by the latter to Spinoza. It contains a detailed attack
on the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Its tenor may be sufficiently
seen from Spinozas reply. (Written at Utrecht, January 24th, 1671.)
Velthuysen afterwards became more friendly to Spinoza, as appears
from Letter LXXV.

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LETTER XLIX.
Spinoza To Isaac Orobio.1
[A defence of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. (The Hague,
1671.)]
Most Learned Sir,

You doubtless wonder why I have kept you so long waiting. I could
hardly bring myself to reply to the pamphlet of that person, which
you thought fit to send me; indeed I only do so now because of my
promise. However, in order as far as possible to humour my
feelings, I will fulfil my engagement in as few words as I can, and
will briefly show how perversely he has interpreted my meaning;
whether through malice or through ignorance I cannot readily say.
But to the matter in hand.
First he says, that it is of little moment to know what nation I
belong to, or what sort of life I lead. Truly, if he had known, he
would not so easily have persuaded himself that I teach Atheism.
For Atheists are wont greedily to covet rank and riches, which I
have always despised, as all who know me are aware. Again, in
order to smooth his path to the object he has in view, he says that,
I am possessed of no mean talents, so that he may, forsooth, more
easily convince his readers, that I have knowingly and cunningly
with evil intent argued for the cause of the deists, in order to
discredit it. This contention sufficiently shows that he has not
understood my reasons. For who could be so cunning and clever, as
to be able to advance under false pretences so many and such good
reasons for a doctrine which he did not believe in? Who will pass
for an honest writer in the eyes of a man, that thinks one may
argue as soundly for fiction as for truth? But after all I am not
astonished. Descartes was formerly served in the same way by
Vot, and the most honourable writers are constantly thus treated.
He goes on to say, In order to shun the reproach of superstition,
he seems to me to have thrown off all religion. What this writer
means by religion and what by superstition, I know not. But I would
ask, whether a man throws off all religion, who maintains that God
must be acknowledged as the highest good, and must, as such, be
loved with a free mind? or, again, that the reward of virtue is virtue
itself, while the punishment of folly and weakness is folly itself? or,
lastly, that every man ought to love his neighbour, and to obey the
commands of the supreme power? Such doctrines I have not only
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expressly stated, but have also demonstrated them by very solid

reasoning. However, I think I see the mud wherein this person
sticks. He finds nothing in virtue and the understanding in
themselves to please him, but would prefer to live in accordance
with his passions, if it were not for the single obstacle that he fears
punishment. He abstains from evil actions, and obeys the divine
commands like a slave, with unwillingness and hesitation,
expecting as the reward of his bondage to be recompensed by God
with gifts far more pleasing than divine love, and greater in
proportion to his dislike to goodness and consequent unwillingness
to practise it. Hence it comes to pass, that he believes that all, who
are not restrained by this fear, lead a life of licence and throw off
all religion. But this I pass over, and proceed to the deduction,
whereby he wishes to show, that with covert and disguised
arguments I teach atheism. The foundation of his reasoning is,
that he thinks I take away freedom from God, and subject Him to
fate. This is flatly false. For I have maintained, that all things follow
by inevitable necessity from the nature of God, in the same way as
all maintain that it follows from the nature of God, that He
understands Himself: no one denies that this latter consequence
follows necessarily from the divine nature, yet no one conceives
that God is constrained by any fate; they believe that He
understands Himself with entire freedom, though necessarily. I find
nothing here, that cannot be perceived by everyone; if,
nevertheless, my adversary thinks that these arguments are
advanced with evil intent, what does he think of his own Descartes,
who asserted that nothing is done by us, which has not been preordained by God, nay, that we are newly created as it were by God
every moment, though none the less we act according to our own
free will? This, as Descartes himself confesses, no one can
understand.
Further, this inevitable necessity in things destroys neither divine
laws nor human. For moral principles, whether they have received
from God the form of laws or not, are nevertheless divine and
salutary. Whether we accept the good, which follows from virtue
and the divine love, as given us by God as a judge, or as emanating
from the necessity of the divine nature, it is not in either case more
or less to be desired; nor are the evils which follow from evil
actions less to be feared, because they follow necessarily: finally,
whether we act under necessity or freedom, we are in either case
led by hope and fear. Wherefore the assertion is false, that I
maintain that there is no room left for precepts and commands. Or
as he goes on to say, that there is no expectation of reward or
punishment, since all things are ascribed to fate, and are said to
flow with inevitable necessity from God.

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I do not here inquire, why it is the same, or almost the same to say
that all things necessarily flow from God, as to say that God is
universal; but I would have you observe the insinuation which he
not less maliciously subjoins, that I wish that men should practise
virtue, not because of the precepts and law of God, or through hope
of reward and fear of punishment, but, &c. Such a sentiment you
will assuredly not find anywhere in my treatise: on the contrary, I
have expressly stated in Chap. IV., that the sum of the divine law
(which, as I have said in Chap. II., has been divinely inscribed on
our hearts), and its chief precept is, to love God as the highest
good: not, indeed, from the fear of any punishment, for love cannot
spring from fear; nor for the love of anything which we desire for
our own delight, for then we should love not God, but the object of
our desire.
I have shown in the same chapter, that God revealed this law to the
prophets, so that, whether it received from God the form of a
command, or whether we conceive it to be like Gods other decrees,
which involve eternal necessity and truth, it will in either case
remain Gods decree and a salutary principle. Whether I love God
in freedom, or whether I love Him from the necessity of the divine
decree, I shall nevertheless love God, and shall be in a state of
salvation. Wherefore, I can now declare here, that this person is
one of that sort, of whom I have said at the end of my preface, that
I would rather that they utterly neglected my book, than that by
misinterpreting it after their wont, they should become hostile, and
hinder others without benefiting themselves.
Though I think I have said enough to prove what I intended, I have
yet thought it worth while to add a few observationsnamely, that
this person falsely thinks, that I have in view the axiom of
theologians, which draws a distinction between the words of a
prophet when propounding doctrine, and the same prophet when
narrating an event. If by such an axiom he means that which in
Chap. XV. I attributed to a certain R. Jehuda Alpakhar, how could he
think that I agree with it, when in that very chapter I reject it as
false? If he does not mean this, I confess I am as yet in ignorance
as to what he does mean, and, therefore, could not have had it in
view.
Again, I cannot see why he says, that all will adopt my opinions,
who deny that reason and philosophy should be the interpreters of
Scripture; I have refuted the doctrine of such persons, together
with that of Maimonides.
It would take too long to review all the indications he gives of not
having judged me altogether calmly. I therefore pass on to his
conclusion, where he says, that I have no arguments left to prove,

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that Mahomet was not a true prophet. This he endeavours to show

from my opinions, whereas from them it clearly follows, that
Mahomet was an impostor, inasmuch as he utterly forbids that
freedom, which the Catholic religion revealed by our natural
faculties and by the prophets grants, and which I have shown
should be granted in its completeness. Even if this were not so, am
I, I should like to know, bound to show that any prophet is false?
Surely the burden lies with the prophets, to prove that they are
true. But if he retorts, that Mahomet also taught the divine law, and
gave certain signs of his mission, as the rest of the prophets did,
there is surely no reason why he should deny, that Mahomet also
was a true prophet.
As regards the Turks and other non-Christian nations; if they
worship God by the practice of justice and charity towards their
neighbour, I believe that they have the spirit of Christ, and are in a
state of salvation, whatever they may ignorantly hold with regard
to Mahomet and oracles.
Thus you see, my friend, how far this man has strayed from the
truth; nevertheless, I grant that he has inflicted the greatest injury,
not on me but on himself, inasmuch as he has not been ashamed to
declare, that under disguised and covert arguments I teach
atheism.
I do not think, that you will find any expressions I have used
against this man too severe. However, if there be any of the kind
which offend you, I beg you to correct them, as you shall think fit. I
have no disposition to irritate him, whoever he may be, and to raise
up by my labours enemies against myself; as this is often the result
of disputes like the present, I could scarcely prevail on myself to
replynor should I have prevailed, if I had not promised. Farewell.
I commit to your prudence this letter, and myself, who am, &c.

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LETTER L. (L.)
Spinoza To Jarig Jellis.
[Of the difference between the political theories of Hobbes and
Spinoza, of the Unity of God, of the notion of figure, of the book of a
Utrecht professor against the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.]
Most Courteous Sir,

As regards political theories, the difference which you inquire
about between Hobbes and myself, consists in this, that I always
preserve natural right intact, and only allot to the chief magistrates
in every state a right over their subjects commensurate with the
excess of their power over the power of the subjects. This is what
always takes place in the state of nature.
Again, with regard to the demonstration which I establish in the
appendix to my geometric exposition of Cartesian principles,
namely, that God can only with great impropriety be called one or
single, I answer that a thing can only be called one or single in
respect of existence, not in respect of essence. For we do not
conceive things under the category of numbers, unless they have
first been reduced to a common genus. For example, he who holds
in his hand a penny and a crown piece will not think of the twofold
number, unless he can call both the penny and the crown piece by
one and the same name, to wit, coins or pieces of money. In the
latter case he can say that he holds two coins or pieces of money,
inasmuch as he calls the crown as well as the penny, a coin, or
piece of money. Hence, it is evident that a thing cannot be called
one or single, unless there be afterwards another thing conceived,
which (as has been said) agrees with it. Now, since the existence of
God is His essence, and of His essence we can form no general
idea, it is certain, that he who calls God one or single has no true
idea of God, and speaks of Him very improperly.
As to the doctrine that figure is negation and not anything positive,
it is plain that the whole of matter considered indefinitely can have
no figure, and that figure can only exist in finite and determinate
bodies. For he who says, that he perceives a figure, merely
indicates thereby, that he conceives a determinate thing, and how it
is determinate. This determination, therefore, does not appertain to
the thing according to its being, but, on the contrary, is its nonbeing. As then figure is nothing else than determination, and

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determination is negation, figure, as has been said, can be nothing

but negation.
The book, which a Utrecht professor wrote against mine, and which
was published after his death, I saw lying in a booksellers window.
From the little I then read of it, I judged it unworthy of perusal, still
less of reply. I, therefore, left the book, and its author. With an
inward smile I reflected, that the most ignorant are ever the most
audacious and the most ready to rush into print. The Christians
seem to me to expose their wares for sale like hucksters, who
always show first that which is worst. The devil is said to be very
cunning, but to my thinking the tricks of these people are in
cunning far beyond his. Farewell.
The Hague, 2 June, 1674.

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LETTER LI. (XLV.)

Godfrey Leibnitz To Spinoza.
Distinguished Sir,
Among your other merits spread abroad by fame, I understand that
you have remarkable skill in optics. I have, therefore, wished to
forward my essay, such as it is, to you, as I am not likely to find a
better critic in this branch of learning. The paper, which I send you,
and which I have styled a note on advanced optics, has been
published with the view of more conveniently making known my
ideas to my friends and the curious in such matters. I hear that * * *
* * is very clever in the same subject, doubtless he is well known to
you.1 If you could obtain for me his opinion and kind attention, you
would greatly increase my obligation to you. The paper explains
itself.
I believe you have already received the Prodromo of Francis
Lana1 the Jesuit, written in Italian. Some remarkable observations
on optics are contained in it. John Oltius too, a young Swiss very
learned in these matters, has published Physico-Mechanical
Reflections concerning Vision; in which he announces a machine
for the polishing all kinds of glasses, very simple and of universal
applicability, and also declares that he has discovered a means of
collecting all the rays coming from different points of an object, so
as to obtain an equal number of corresponding points, but only
under conditions of a given distance and form of object.
My proposal is, not that the rays from all points should be collected
and re-arranged (this is with any object or distance impossible at
the present stage of our knowledge); the result I aim at is the equal
collection of rays from points outside the optic axis and in the optic
axis, so that the apertures of glasses could be made of any size
desired without impairing the distinctness of vision. But this must
stand according to your skilled verdict. Farewell, and believe me,
distinguished Sir, your obedient servant,
Godfrey Leibnitz,
J. U. D., Councillor of the Elector of Mainz.
Frankfort, 5 Oct., 1671 (new style).

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LETTER LII. (XLVI.)

Spinoza To Leibnitz.
[Answer to the foregoing letter].
Most Learned And Distinguished Sir,

I have read the paper you were kind enough to send me, and return
you many thanks for the communication. I regret that I have not
been able quite to follow your meaning, though you explain it
sufficiently clearly, whether you think that there is any cause for
making the apertures of the glasses small, except that the rays
coming from a single point are not collected accurately at another
single point, but in a small area which we generally call the
mechanical point, and that this small area is greater or less in
proportion to the size of the aperture. Further, I ask whether the
lenses which you call pandoch correct this fault, so that the
mechanical point or small area, on which the rays coming from a
single point are after refraction collected, always preserves the
same proportional size, whether the aperture be small or large. If
so, one may enlarge the aperture as much as one likes, and
consequently these lenses will be far superior to those of any other
shape known to me; if not, I hardly see why you praise them so
greatly beyond common lenses. For circular lenses have
everywhere the same axis; therefore, when we employ them, we
must regard all the points of an object as placed in the optic axis;
although all the points of the object be not at the same distance,
the difference arising thence will not be perceptible, when the
objects are very remote; because then the rays coming from a
single point would, as they enter the glass, be regarded as parallel.
I think your lenses might be of service in obtaining a more distinct
representation of all the objects, when we wish to include several
objects in one view, as we do, when we employ very large convex
circular lenses. However, I would rather suspend my judgment
about all these details, till you have more clearly explained your
meaning, as I heartily beg you to do. I have, as you requested, sent
the other copy of your paper to Mr. * * * *. He answers, that he has
at present no time to study it, but he hopes to have leisure in a
week or two.
I have not yet seen the Prodromo of Francis Lana, nor the
Physico-Mechanical Reflections of John Oltius. What I more
regret is, that your Physical Hypothesis has not yet come to my
hands, nor is there a copy for sale here at the Hague. The gift,
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therefore, which you so liberally promise me will be most

acceptable to me; if I can be of use to you in any other matter, you
will always find me most ready. I hope you will not think it too
irksome to reply to this short note.
Distinguished Sir,
Yours Sincerely,
B. de Spinoza.
The Hague, 9 Nov., 1671.
P.S. Mr. Diemerbroech does not live here. I am, therefore, forced to
entrust this to an ordinary letter-carrier. I doubt not that you know
someone at the Hague, who would take charge of our letters; I
should like to hear of such a person, that our correspondence might
be more conveniently and securely taken care of. If the Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus has not yet come to your hands, I will, unless
you have any objection, send you a copy. Farewell.

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LETTER LIII. (XLVII.)

Fabritius To Spinoza.
[Fabritius, under the order and in the name of the Elector Palatine,
offers Spinoza the post of Professor of Philosophy at Heidelberg,
under very liberal conditions.]
Most Renowned Sir,

His Most Serene Highness the Elector Palatine,1 my most gracious
master, commands me to write to you, who are, as yet, unknown to
me, but most favourably regarded by his Most Serene Highness,
and to inquire of you, whether you are willing to accept an ordinary
professorship of Philosophy in his illustrious university. An annual
salary would be paid to you, equal to that enjoyed at present by the
ordinary professors. You will hardly find elsewhere a prince more
favourable to distinguished talents, among which he reckons
yourself. You will have the most ample freedom in philosophical
teaching, which the prince is confident you will not misuse, to
disturb the religion publicly established. I cannot refrain from
seconding the princes injunction. I therefore most earnestly beg
you to reply as soon as possible, and to address your answer either
under cover to the Most Serene Electors resident at the Hague,
Mr. Grotius, or to Mr. Gilles Van der Hele, so that it may come in
the packet of letters usually sent to the court, or else to avail
yourself of some other convenient opportunity for transmitting it. I
will only add, that if you come here, you will live pleasantly a life
worthy of a philosopher, unless events turn out quite contrary to
our expectation and hope. So farewell.
I Remain, Illustrious Sir,

Your Devoted Admirer,
I. Lewis Fabritius.
Professor of the Academy of Heidelberg, and Councillor of the
Elector Palatine.
Heidelberg, 16 Feb., 1673.

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LETTER LIV. (XLVIII.)

Spinoza To Fabritius.
[Spinoza thanks the Elector for his kind offer, but, owing to his
unwillingness to teach in public, and other causes, humbly begs to
be allowed time to consider it.]
Distinguished Sir,
If I had ever desired to take a professorship in any faculty, I could
not have wished for any other than that which is offered to me,
through you, by His Most Serene Highness the Elector Palatine,
especially because of that freedom in philosophical teaching, which
the most gracious prince is kind enough to grant, not to speak of
the desire which I have long entertained, to live under the rule of a
prince, whom all men admire for his wisdom.
But since it has never been my wish to teach in public, I have been
unable to induce myself to accept this splendid opportunity, though
I have long deliberated about it. I think, in the first place, that I
should abandon philosophical research if I consented to find time
for teaching young students. I think, in the second place, that I do
not know the limits, within which the freedom of my philosophical
teaching would be confined, if I am to avoid all appearance of
disturbing the publicly established religion. Religious quarrels do
not arise so much from ardent zeal for religion, as from mens
various dispositions and love of contradiction, which causes them
to habitually distort and condemn everything, however rightly it
may have been said. I have experienced these results in my private
and secluded station, how much more should I have to fear them
after my elevation to this post of honour.
Thus you see, distinguished Sir, that I am not holding back in the
hope of getting something better, but through my love of quietness,
which I think I can in some measure secure, if I keep away from
lecturing in public. I therefore most earnestly entreat you to beg of
the Most Serene Elector, that I may be allowed to consider further
about this matter, and I also ask you to conciliate the favour of the
most gracious prince to his most devoted admirer, thus increasing
the obligations of your sincere friend,
B. de. S.
The Hague, 30 March, 1673.
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LETTER LV. (LI.)

Hugo Boxel To Spinoza.
[A friend asks Spinozas opinion about Ghosts.]
Distinguished Sir,
My reason for writing to you is, that I want to know your opinion
about apparitions and ghosts or spectres; if you admit their
existence, what do you think about them, and how long does their
life last? For some hold them to be mortal, others immortal. As I am
doubtful whether you admit their existence, I will proceed no
further.
Meanwhile, it is certain, that the ancients believed in them. The
theologians and philosophers of to-day are hitherto agreed as to the
existence of some creatures of the kind, though they may not agree
as to the nature of their essence. Some assert that they are
composed of very thin and subtle matter, others that they are
spiritual. But, as I was saying before, we are quite at cross
purposes, inasmuch as I am doubtful whether you would grant their
existence; though, as you must be aware, so many instances and
stories of them are found throughout antiquity, that it would really
be difficult either to deny or to doubt them. It is clear that, even if
you confess that they exist, you do not believe that some of them
are the souls of the dead, as the defenders of the Romish faith
would have it. I will here end, and will say nothing about war and
rumours, inasmuch as our lot is cast in an age, &c. Farewell.
14 Sept., 1674.

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LETTER LVI. (LII.)

Spinoza To Hugo Boxel.
[Spinoza answers that he does not know what ghosts are, and can
gain no information from antiquity. (The Hague, Sept., 1674.)]
Dear Sir,
Your letter, which I received yesterday, was most welcome to me,
both because I wanted to hear news of you, and also because it
shows that you have not utterly forgotten me. Although some might
think it a bad omen, that ghosts are the cause of your writing to
me, I, on the contrary, can discern a deeper meaning in the
circumstance; I see that not only truths, but also things trifling and
imaginary may be of use to me.
However, let us defer the question, whether ghosts are delusions
and imaginary, for I see that not only denial of them, but even
doubt about them seems very singular to you, as to one who has
been convinced by the numerous histories related by men of to-day
and the ancients. The great esteem and honour, in which I have
always held and still hold you, does not suffer me to contradict you,
still less to humour you. The middle course, which I shall adopt, is
to beg you to be kind enough to select from the numerous stories
which you have read, one or two of those least open to doubt, and
most clearly demonstrating the existence of ghosts. For, to confess
the truth, I have never read a trustworthy author, who clearly
showed that there are such things. Up to the present time I do not
know what they are, and no one has ever been able to tell me. Yet it
is evident, that in the case of a thing so clearly shown by
experience we ought to know what it is; otherwise we shall have
great difficulty in gathering from histories that ghosts exist. We
only gather that something exists of nature unknown. If
philosophers choose to call things which we do not know ghosts, I
shall not deny the existence of such, for there are an infinity of
things, which I cannot make out.
Pray tell me, my dear Sir, before I explain myself further in the
matter, What are these ghosts or spectres? Are they children, or
fools, or madmen? For all that I have heard of them seems more
adapted to the silly than the wise, or, to say the best we can of it,
resembles the pastimes of children or of fools. Before I end, I would
submit to you one consideration, namely, that the desire which
most men have to narrate things, not as they really happened, but
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as they wished them to happen, can be illustrated from the stories

of ghosts and spectres more easily than from any others. The
principal reason for this is, I believe, that such stories are only
attested by the narrators, and thus a fabricator can add or suppress
circumstances, as seems most convenient to him, without fear of
anyone being able to contradict him. He composes them to suit
special circumstances, in order to justify the fear he feels of dreams
and phantoms, or else to confirm his courage, his credit, or his
opinion. There are other reasons, which lead me to doubt, if not the
actual stories, at least some of the narrated circumstances; and
which have a close bearing on the conclusion we are endeavouring
to derive from the aforesaid stories. I will here stop, until I have
learnt from you what those stories are, which have so completely
convinced you, that you regard all doubt about them as absurd, &c.

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LETTER LVII. (LIII.)

Most Sagacious Sir,
You have sent me just the answer I expected to receive, from a
friend holding an opinion adverse to my own. But no matter.
Friends may always disagree on indifferent subjects without injury
to their friendship.
You ask me, before you gave an opinion as to what these spectres
or spirits are, to tell you whether they are children, fools, or
madmen, and you add that everything you have heard of them
seems to have proceeded rather from the insane than the sane. It is
a true proverb, which says that a preconceived opinion hinders the
pursuit of truth.
I, then, believe that ghosts exist for the following reasons: first,
because it appertains to the beauty and perfection of the universe,
that they should; secondly, because it is probable that the Creator
created them, as being more like Himself than are embodied
creatures; thirdly, because as body exists without soul, soul exists
without body; fourthly and lastly, because in the upper air, region,
or space, I believe there is no obscure body without inhabitants of
its own; consequently, that the measureless space between us and
the stars is not empty, but thronged with spiritual inhabitants.
Perhaps the highest and most remote are true spirits, whereas the
lowest in the lowest region of the air are creatures of very thin and
subtle substance, and also invisible. Thus I think there are spirits of
all sorts, but, perhaps, none of the female sex.
This reasoning will in no wise convince those, who rashly believe
that the world has been created by chance. Daily experience, if
these reasons be dismissed, shows that there are spectres, and
many stories, both new and old, are current about them. Such may
be found in Plutarchs book De viris illustribus, and in his other
works; in Suetoniuss Lives of the Csars, also in Wieruss and
Lavaters books about ghosts, where the subject is fully treated and
illustrated from writers of all kinds. Cardano, celebrated for his
learning, also speaks of them in his books De Subtilitate, De
Varietate, and in his Life; showing, by experience, that they have
appeared to himself, his relations and friends. Melancthon, a wise
man and a lover of truth, testifies to his experience of them, as also
do many others. A certain burgomaster, learned and wise, who is
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still living, once told me that he heard by night the noise of working
in his mothers brew-house, going on just as it does while beer is
being brewed in the day; this he attested as having occurred
frequently. The same sort of thing has happened to me, and will
never fade from my memory; hence I am convinced by the abovementioned experiences and reasons, that there are ghosts.
As for evil spirits, who torture wretched men in this life and the
next, and who work spells, I believe the stories of them to be
fables. In treatises about spirits you will find a host of details.
Besides those I have cited, you may refer to Pliny the younger, bk.
vii., the letter to Sura; Suetonius, Life of Julius Csar, ch. xxxii.;
Valerius Maximus, I. viii. 7, 8; and Alexander ab Alexandro,
Dies Geniales. I am sure these books are accessible to you. I say
nothing of monks and priests, for they relate so many tales of souls
and evil spirits, or as I should rather say of spectres, that the
reader becomes wearied with their abundance. Thyrus, a Jesuit,
in the book about the apparition of spirits, also treats of the
question. But these last-named discourse on such subjects merely
for the sake of gain, and to prove that purgatory is not so bad as is
supposed, thus treating the question as a mine, from which they
dig up plenteous store of gold and silver. But the same cannot be
said of the writers mentioned previously, and other moderns, who
merit greater credit from their absence of bias.
As an answer to the passage in your letter, where you speak of fools
and madmen, I subjoin this sentence from the learned Lavater, who
ends with it his first book on ghosts or spectres. He who is bold
enough to gainsay so many witnesses, both ancient and modern,
seems to me unworthy of credit. For as it is a mark of frivolity to
lend incontinent credence to everyone who says he has seen a
ghost; so, on the other hand, rashly and flatly to contradict so many
trustworthy historians, Fathers, and other persons placed in
authority would argue a remarkable shamelessness.
21 Sept., 1674

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LETTER LVIII. (LIV.)

[Spinoza treats of the necessary creation of the worldhe refutes
his friends arguments and quotations.]
Dear Sir,
I will rely on what you said in your letter of the 21st of last month,
that friends may disagree on indifferent questions, without injury to
their friendship, and will frankly tell you my opinion on the reasons
and stories, whereon you base your conclusion, that there are
ghosts of every kind, but perhaps none of the female sex. The
reason for my not replying sooner is that the books you quoted are
not at hand, in fact I have not found any except Pliny and
Suetonius. However, these two have saved me the trouble of
consulting any other, for I am persuaded that they all talk in the
same strain and hanker after extraordinary tales, which rouse
mens astonishment and compel their wonder. I confess that I am
not a little amazed, not at the stories, but at those who narrate
them. I wonder, that men of talent and judgment should so employ
their readiness of speech, and abuse it in endeavouring to convince
us of such trifles.
However, let us dismiss the writers, and turn to the question itself.
In the first place, we will reason a little about your conclusion. Let
us see whether I, who deny that there are spectres or spirits, am on
that account less able to understand the authors, who have written
on the subject; or whether you, who assert that such beings exist,
do not give to the aforesaid writers more credit than they deserve.
The distinction you drew, in admitting without hesitation spirits of
the male sex, but doubting whether any female spirits exist, seems
to me more like a fancy than a genuine doubt. If it were really your
opinion, it would resemble the common imagination, that God is
masculine, not feminine. I wonder that those, who have seen naked
ghosts, have not cast their eyes on those parts of the person, which
would remove all doubt; perhaps they were timid, or did not know
of this distinction. You would say that this is ridicule, not reasoning:
and hence I see, that your reasons appear to you so strong and well
founded, that no one can (at least in your judgment) contradict
them, unless he be some perverse fellow, who thinks the world has
been made by chance. This impels me, before going into your
reasons, to set forth briefly my opinion on the question, whether
the world was made by chance. But I answer, that as it is clear that
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chance and necessity are two contraries, so is it also clear, that he,
who asserts the world to be a necessary effect of the divine nature,
must utterly deny that the world has been made by chance;
whereas, he who affirms, that God need not have made the world,
confirms, though in different language, the doctrine that it has
been made by chance; inasmuch as he maintains that it proceeds
from a wish, which might never have been formed. However, as this
opinion and theory is on the face of it absurd, it is commonly very
unanimously admitted, that Gods will is eternal, and has never
been indifferent; hence it must necessarily be also admitted, you
will observe, that the world is a necessary effect of the divine
nature. Let them call it will, understanding, or any name they like,
they come at last to the same conclusion, that under different
names they are expressing one and the same thing. If you ask
them, whether the divine will does not differ from the human, they
answer, that the former has nothing in common with the latter
except its name; especially as they generally admit that Gods will,
understanding, intellect, essence, and nature are all identical; so I,
myself, lest I should confound the divine nature with the human, do
not assign to God human attributes, such as will, understanding,
attention, hearing, &c. I therefore say, as I have said already, that
the world is a necessary effect of the divine nature, and that it has
not been made by chance. I think this is enough to persuade you,
that the opinion of those (if such there be), who say that the world
has been made by chance, is entirely contrary to mine; and, relying
on this hypothesis, I proceed to examine those reasons which lead
you to infer the existence of all kinds of ghosts. I should like to say
of these reasons generally, that they seem rather conjectures than
reasons, and I can with difficulty believe, that you take them for
guiding reasons. However, be they conjectures or be they reasons,
let us see whether we can take them for foundations.
Your first reason is, that the existence of ghosts is needful for the
beauty and perfection of the universe. Beauty, my dear Sir, is not so
much a quality of the object beheld, as an effect in him who
beholds it. If our sight were longer or shorter, or if our constitution
were different, what now appears beautiful to us would seem
misshapen, and what we now think misshapen we should regard as
beautiful. The most beautiful hand seen through the microscope
will appear horrible. Some things are beautiful at a distance, but
ugly near; thus things regarded in themselves, and in relation to
God, are neither ugly nor beautiful. Therefore, he who says that
God has created the world, so that it might be beautiful, is bound to
adopt one of the two alternatives, either that God created the world
for the sake of mens pleasure and eyesight, or else that He created
mens pleasure and eyesight for the sake of the world. Now,
whether we adopt the former or the latter of these views, how God
could have furthered His object by the creation of ghosts, I cannot

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see. Perfection and imperfection are names, which do not differ

much from the names beauty and ugliness. I only ask, therefore
(not to be tedious), which would contribute most to the perfect
adornment of the world, ghosts, or a quantity of monsters, such as
centaurs, hydras, harpies, satyrs, gryphons, arguses, and other
similar inventions? Truly the world would be handsomely bedecked,
if God had adorned and embellished it, in obedience to our fancy,
with beings, which anyone may readily imagine and dream of, but
no one can understand.
Your second reason is, that because spirits express Gods image
more than embodied creatures, it is probable that He has created
them. I frankly confess, that I am as yet in ignorance, how spirits
more than other creatures express God. This I know, that between
finite and infinite there is no comparison; so that the difference
between God and the greatest and most excellent created thing is
no less than the difference between God and the least created
thing. This argument, therefore, is beside the mark. If I had as
clear an idea of ghosts, as I have of a triangle or a circle, I should
not in the least hesitate to affirm that they had been created by
God; but as the idea I possess of them is just like the ideas, which
my imagination forms of harpies, gryphons, hydras, &c., I cannot
consider them as anything but dreams, which differ from God as
totally, as that which is not differs from that which is.
Your third reason (that as body exists without soul, so soul should
exist without body) seems to me equally absurd. Pray tell me, if it is
not also likely, that memory, hearing, sight, &c., exist without
bodies, because bodies exist without memory, hearing, sight, &c.,
or that a sphere exists without a circle, because a circle exists
without a sphere?
Your fourth, and last reason, is the same as your first, and I refer
you to my answer given above. I will only observe here, that I do
not know which are the highest or which the lowest places, which
you conceive as existing in infinite matter, unless you take the
earth as the centre of the universe. For if the sun or Saturn be the
centre of the universe, the sun, or Saturn, not the earth, will be the
lowest.
Thus, passing by this argument and what remains, I conclude, that
these and similar reasons will convince no one of the existence of
all kinds of ghosts and spectres, unless it be those persons, who
shut their ears to the understanding, and allow themselves to be
led away by superstition. This last is so hostile to right reason, that
she lends willing credence to old wives tales for the sake of
discrediting philosophers.

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As regards the stories, I have already said in my first letter, that I

do not deny them altogether, but only the conclusion drawn from
them. To this I may add, that I do not believe them so thoroughly,
as not to doubt many of the details, which are generally added
rather for ornament than for bringing out the truth of the story or
the conclusion drawn from it. I had hoped, that out of so many
stories you would at least have produced one or two, which could
hardly be questioned, and which would clearly show that ghosts or
spectres exist. The case you relate of the burgomaster, who wanted
to infer their existence, because he heard spectral brewers working
in his mothers brewhouse by night, and making the same noises as
he was accustomed to hear by day, seems to me laughable. In like
manner it would be tedious here to examine all the stories of
people, who have written on these trifles. To be brief, I cite the
instance of Julius Csar, who, as Suetonius testifies, laughed at
such things and yet was happy, if we may trust what Suetonius says
in the 59th chapter of his life of that leader. And so should all, who
reflect on the human imagination, and the effects of the emotions,
laugh at such notions; whatever Lavater and others, who have gone
dreaming with him in the matter, may produce to the contrary.

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LETTER LIX. (LV.)

[A continuation of the arguments in favour of ghosts, which may be
summarized as follows:I say a thing is done by chance, when it
has not been the subject of will on the part of the doer; not when it
might never have happened.Necessity and freedom, not necessity
and chance, are contraries.If we do not in some sense attribute
human qualities to God, what meaning can we attach to the
term?You ask for absolute proof of the existence of spirits; such
proof is not obtainable for many things, which are yet firmly
believed.Some things are more beautiful intrinsically than
others.As God is a spirit, spirits resemble Him more than
embodied creatures do.A ghost cannot be conceived as clearly as
a triangle: can you say that your own idea of God is as clear as your
idea of a triangle?As a circle exists without a sphere, so a sphere
exists without a circle.We call things higher or lower in
proportion to their distance from the earth.All the Stoics,
Pythagoreans, and Platonists, Empedocles, Maximus Tyrius,
Apuleius, and others, bear witness to ghosts; and no modern denies
them.It is presumption to sneer at such a body of testimony. Csar
did not ridicule ghosts, but omens, and if he had listened to Spurina
he would not have been murdered.]

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LETTER LX. (LVI.)

[Spinoza again answers the argument in favour of ghosts. (The
Hague, 1674).]
Dear Sir,
I hasten to answer your letter, received yesterday, for if I delay my
reply, I may have to put it off longer than I should like. The state of
your health would have made me anxious, if I did not understand
that you are better. I hope you are by this time quite well again.
The difficulties experienced by two people following different
principles, and trying to agree on a matter, which depends on many
other questions, might be shown from this discussion alone, if there
were no reason to prove it by. Pray tell me, whether you have seen
or read any philosophers, who hold that the world has been made
by chance, taking chance in your sense, namely, that God had some
design in making the world, and yet has not kept to the plan he had
formed. I do not know, that such an idea has ever entered anyones
mind. I am likewise at a loss for the reasons, with which you want
to make me believe, that chance and necessity are not contraries.
As soon as I affirm that the three angles of a triangle are equal to
two right angles necessarily, I deny that they are thus equal by
chance. As soon as I affirm that heat is a necessary effect of fire, I
deny that it is a chance effect. To say, that necessary and free are
two contrary terms, seems to me no less absurd and repugnant to
reason. For no one can deny, that God freely knows Himself and all
else, yet all with one voice grant that God knows Himself
necessarily. Hence, as it seems to me, you draw no distinction
between constraint or force and necessity. Mans wishes to live, to
love, &c., are not under constraint, but nevertheless are necessary;
much more is it necessary, that God wishes to be, to know, and to
act. If you will also reflect, that indifference is only another name
for ignorance or doubt, and that a will always constant and
determined in all things is a necessary property of the
understanding, you will see that my words are in complete
harmony with truth. If we affirm, that God might have been able
not to wish a given event, or not to understand it, we attribute to
God two different freedoms, one necessary, the other indifferent;
consequently we shall conceive Gods will as different from His
essence and understanding, and shall thus fall from one absurdity
into another.
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The attention, which I asked for in my former letter, has not

seemed to you necessary. This has been the reason why you have
not directed your thoughts to the main issue, and have neglected a
point which is very important.
Further, when you say that if I deny, that the operations of seeing,
hearing, attending, wishing, &c., can be ascribed to God, or that
they exist in Him in any eminent fashion, you do not know what
sort of God mine is; I suspect that you believe there is no greater
perfection than such as can be explained by the aforesaid
attributes. I am not astonished; for I believe that, if a triangle could
speak, it would say, in like manner, that God is eminently triangular,
while a circle would say that the divine nature is eminently circular.
Thus each would ascribe to God its own attributes, would assume
itself to be like God, and look on everything else as ill-shaped.
The briefness of a letter and want of time do not allow me to enter
into my opinion on the divine nature, or the questions you have
propounded. Besides, suggesting difficulties is not the same as
producing reasons. That we do many things in the world from
conjecture is true, but that our reflections are based on conjecture
is false. In practical life we are compelled to follow what is most
probable; in speculative thought we are compelled to follow truth.
A man would perish of hunger and thirst, if he refused to eat or
drink, till he had obtained positive proof that food and drink would
be good for him. But in philosophic reflection this is not so. On the
contrary, we must take care not to admit as true anything, which is
only probable. For when one falsity has been let in, infinite others
follow.
Again, we cannot infer that because sciences of things divine and
human are full of controversies and quarrels, therefore their whole
subject-matter is uncertain; for there have been many persons so
enamoured of contradiction, as to turn into ridicule geometrical
axioms. Sextus Empiricus and other sceptics, whom you quote,
declare, that it is false to say that a whole is greater than its part,
and pass similar judgments on other axioms.
However, as I pass over and grant that in default of proof we must
be content with probabilities, I say that a probable proof ought to
be such that, though we may doubt about it, we cannot maintain its
contrary; for that which can be contradicted resembles not truth
but falsehood. For instance, if I say that Peter is alive, because I
saw him yesterday in good health, this is a probability, in so far as
no one can maintain the contrary; but if anyone says that he saw
Peter yesterday in a swoon, and that he believed Peter to have
departed this life to-day, he will make my statement seem false.
That your conjecture about ghosts and spectres seems false, and

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not even probable, I have shown so clearly, that I can find nothing
worthy of answer in your reply.
To your question, whether I have of God as clear an idea as I have
of a triangle, I reply in the affirmative. But if you ask me, whether I
have as clear a mental image of God as I have of a triangle, I reply
in the negative. For we are not able to imagine God, though we can
understand Him. You must also here observe, that I do not assert
that I thoroughly know God, but that I understand some of His
attributes, not all nor the greater part, and it is evident that my
ignorance of very many does not hinder the knowledge I have of
some. When I learned Euclids Elements, I understood that the
three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, and this
property of a triangle I perceived clearly, though I might be
ignorant of many others.
As regards spectres or ghosts, I have hitherto heard attributed to
them no intelligible property: they seem like phantoms, which no
one can understand. When you say that spectres, or ghosts, in
these lower regions (I adopt your phraseology, though I know not
why matter below should be inferior to matter above) consist in a
very thin rarefied and subtle substance, you seem to me to be
speaking of spiders webs, air, or vapours. To say, that they are
invisible, seems to me to be equivalent to saying that they do not
exist, not to stating their nature; unless, perhaps, you wish to
indicate, that they render themselves visible or invisible at will, and
that the imagination, in these as in other impossibilities, will find a
difficulty.
The authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates, does not carry much
weight with me. I should have been astonished, if you had brought
forward Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius, or any of the atomists, or
upholders of the atomic theory. It is no wonder that persons, who
have invented occult qualities, intentional species, substantial
forms, and a thousand other trifles, should have also devised
spectres and ghosts, and given credence to old wives tales, in
order to take away the reputation of Democritus, whom they were
so jealous of, that they burnt all the books which he had published
amid so much eulogy. If you are inclined to believe such witnesses,
what reason have you for denying the miracles of the Blessed
Virgin, and all the Saints? These have been described by so many
famous philosophers, theologians, and historians, that I could
produce at least a hundred such authorities for every one of the
former. But I have gone further, my dear Sir, than I intended: I do
not desire to cause any further annoyance by doctrines which I
know you will not grant. For the principles which you follow are far
different from my own.

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LETTER LXI. (LVII.)

* * * * * To Spinoza.1
[Philosophers often differ through using words in different senses.
Thus in the question of free will Descartes means by free,
constrained by no cause. You mean by the same, undetermined in a
particular way by a cause. The question of free will is threefold:I.
Have we any power whatever over things external to us? II. Have
we absolute power over the intentional movements of our own
body? III. Have we free use of our reason? Both Descartes and
yourself are right according to the terms employed by each (8th
October, 1674).]

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LETTER LXII. (LVIII.)

Spinoza To * * * * *2 (The Hague, October,
1674).
[Spinoza gives his opinions on liberty and necessity.]
Sir,
Our friend, J. R.3 has sent me the letter which you have been kind
enough to write to me, and also the judgment of your friend4 as to
the opinions of Descartes and myself regarding free will. Both
enclosures were very welcome to me. Though I am, at present,
much occupied with other matters, not to mention my delicate
health, your singular courtesy, or, to name the chief motive, your
love of truth, impels me to satisfy your inquiries, as far as my poor
abilities will permit. What your friend wishes to imply by his
remark before he appeals to experience, I know not. What he adds,
that when one of two disputants affirms something which the other
denies, both may be right, is true, if he means that the two, though
using the same terms, are thinking of different things. I once sent
several examples of this to our friend J. R.,1 and am now writing to
tell him to communicate them to you.
I, therefore, pass on to that definition of liberty, which he says is my
own; but I know not whence he has taken it. I say that a thing is
free, which exists and acts solely by the necessity of its own nature.
Thus also God understands Himself and all things freely, because it
follows solely from the necessity of His nature, that He should
understand all things. You see I do not place freedom in free
decision, but in free necessity. However, let us descend to created
things, which are all determined by external causes to exist and
operate in a given determinate manner. In order that this may be
clearly understood, let us conceive a very simple thing. For
instance, a stone receives from the impulsion of an external cause,
a certain quantity of motion, by virtue of which it continues to move
after the impulsion given by the external cause has ceased. The
permanence of the stones motion is constrained, not necessary,
because it must be defined by the impulsion of an external cause.
What is true of the stone is true of any individual, however
complicated its nature, or varied its functions, inasmuch as every
individual thing is necessarily determined by some external cause
to exist and operate in a fixed and determinate manner.

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Further conceive, I beg, that a stone, while continuing in motion,

should be capable of thinking and knowing, that it is endeavouring,
as far as it can, to continue to move. Such a stone, being conscious
merely of its own endeavour and not at all indifferent, would
believe itself to be completely free, and would think that it
continued in motion solely because of its own wish. This is that
human freedom, which all boast that they possess, and which
consists solely in the fact, that men are conscious of their own
desire, but are ignorant of the causes whereby that desire has been
determined. Thus an infant believes that it desires milk freely; an
angry child thinks he wishes freely for vengeance, a timid child
thinks he wishes freely to run away. Again, a drunken man thinks,
that from the free decision of his mind he speaks words, which
afterwards, when sober, he would like to have left unsaid. So the
delirious, the garrulous, and others of the same sort think that they
act from the free decision of their mind, not that they are carried
away by impulse. As this misconception is innate in all men, it is
not easily conquered. For, although experience abundantly shows,
that men can do anything rather than check their desires, and that
very often, when a prey to conflicting emotions, they see the better
course and follow the worse, they yet believe themselves to be free;
because in some cases their desire for a thing is slight, and can
easily be overruled by the recollection of something else, which is
frequently present in the mind.
I have thus, if I mistake not, sufficiently explained my opinion
regarding free and constrained necessity, and also regarding socalled human freedom: from what I have said you will easily be able
to reply to your friends objections. For when he says, with
Descartes, that he who is constrained by no external cause is free,
if by being constrained he means acting against ones will, I grant
that we are in some cases quite unrestrained, and in this respect
possess free will. But if by constrained he means acting necessarily,
although not against ones will (as I have explained above), I deny
that we are in any instance free.
But your friend, on the contrary, asserts that we may employ our
reason absolutely, that is, in complete freedom; and is, I think, a
little too confident on the point. For who, he says, could deny,
without contradicting his own consciousness, that I can think with
my thoughts, that I wish or do not wish to write? I should like to
know what consciousness he is talking of, over and above that
which I have illustrated by the example of the stone.
As a matter of fact I, without, I hope, contradicting my
consciousness, that is my reason and experience, and without
cherishing ignorance and misconception, deny that I can by any
absolute power of thought think, that I wish or do not wish to write.

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I appeal to the consciousness, which he has doubtless experienced,

that in dreams he has not the power of thinking that he wishes, or
does not wish to write; and that, when he dreams that he wishes to
write, he has not the power not to dream that he wishes to write. I
think he must also have experienced, that the mind is not always
equally capable of thinking of the same object, but according as the
body is more capable for the image of this or that object being
excited in it, so is the mind more capable of thinking of the same
object.
When he further adds, that the causes for his applying his mind to
writing have led him, but not constrained him to write, he merely
means (if he will look at the question impartially), that his
disposition was then in a state, in which it could be easily acted on
by causes, which would have been powerless under other
circumstances, as for instance when he was under a violent
emotion. That is, causes, which at other times would not have
constrained him, have constrained him in this case, not to write
against his will but necessarily to wish to write.
As for his statement, that if we were constrained by external
causes, no one could acquire the habit of virtue, I know not what is
his authority for saying, that firmness and constancy of disposition
cannot arise from predestined necessity, but only from free will.
What he finally adds, that if this were granted, all wickedness
would be excusable, I meet with the question, What then? Wicked
men are not less to be feared, and are not less harmful, when they
are wicked from necessity. However, on this point I would ask you
to refer to my Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, Part II., chap. viii.
In a word, I should like your friend, who makes these objections, to
tell me, how he reconciles the human virtue, which he says arises
from the free decision of the mind, with Gods pre-ordainment of
the universe. If, with Descartes, he confesses his inability to do so,
he is endeavouring to direct against me the weapon which has
already pierced himself. But in vain. For if you examine my opinion
attentively, you will see that it is quite consistent, &c.

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LETTER LXIII. (LIX.)

* * * * * To Spinoza.1
[The writer exhorts Spinoza to publish the treatises on Ethics and
on the Improvement of the Understanding.Remarks on the
definition of motion. On the difference between a true and an
adequate idea.]
Most Excellent Sir,

When shall we have your method of rightly directing the reason in
the acquisition of unknown truths, and your general treatise on
physics? I know you have already proceeded far with them. The
first has already come to my knowledge, and the second I have
become aware of from the Lemmas added to the second part of the
Ethics; whereby many difficulties in physics are readily solved. If
time and opportunity permit, I humbly beg from you a true
definition of motion and its explanation; also to know how, seeing
that extension in so far as it is conceived in itself is indivisible,
immutable, &c., we can infer priori, that there can arise so many
varieties of it, and consequently the existence of figure in the
particles of any given body, which are, nevertheless, in every body
various, and distinct from the figures of the parts, which compose
the reality of any other body. You have already, by word of mouth,
pointed out to me a method, which you employ in the search for
truths as yet unknown. I find this method to be very excellent, and
at the same time very easy, in so far as I have formed an opinion on
it, and I can assert that from this single discovery I have made
great progress in mathematics. I wish therefore, that you would
give me a true definition of an adequate, a true, a false, a fictitious,
and a doubtful idea. I have been in search of the difference
between a true and an adequate idea. Hitherto, however, I can
ascertain nothing except after inquiring into a thing, and forming a
certain concept or idea of it. I then (in order to elicit whether this
true idea is also an adequate idea of its object) inquire, what is the
cause of this idea or concept; when this is ascertained, I again ask,
What is the cause of this prior concept? and so I go on always
inquiring for the causes of the causes of ideas, until I find a cause
of such a kind, that I can not find any cause for it, except that
among all the ideas which I can command this alone exists. If, for
instance, we inquire the true origin of our errors, Descartes will
answer, that it consists in our giving assent to things not yet clearly
perceived. But supposing this to be the true idea of the thing, I

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nevertheless shall not yet be able to determine all things necessary

to be known concerning it, unless I have also an adequate idea of
the thing in question; in order to obtain such, therefore, I inquire
into the cause of this concept, how it happens that we give assent
to things not clearly understoodand I answer, that it arises from
defective knowledge. But here I cannot inquire further, and ask
what is the cause, that we are ignorant of certain things; hence I
see that I have detected an adequate idea of the origin of our
errors. Here meanwhile I ask you, whether, seeing that many things
expressed in infinite modes have an adequate idea of themselves,
and that from every adequate idea all that can be known of its
object can be inferred, though more readily from some ideas than
others, whether, I say, this may be the means of knowing which
idea is to be preferred? For instance, one adequate idea of a circle
consists in the equality of its radii; another adequate idea consists
in the infinite right angles equal to one another, made by the
intersection of two lines, &c., and thus we have infinite
expressions, each giving the adequate nature of a circle, Now,
though all the properties of a circle may be inferred from every one
of them, they may be deduced much more easily from some than
from others. So also he, who considers lines applied to curves, will
be able to draw many conclusions as to the measurement of curves,
but will do so more readily from the consideration of tangents, &c.
Thus I have wished to indicate how far I have progressed in this
study; I await perfection in it, or, if I am wrong on any point,
correction; also the definition I asked for. Farewell.
5 Jan., 1675.

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LETTER LXIV. (LX.)

Spinoza To * * * * *.1
[The difference between a true and an adequate idea is merely
extrinsic, &c. The Hague, Jan., 1675.]
Honoured Sir.
Between a true and an adequate idea, I recognize no difference,
except that the epithet true only has regard to the agreement
between the idea and its object, whereas the epithet adequate has
regard to the nature of the idea in itself; so that in reality there is
no difference between a true and an adequate idea beyond this
extrinsic relation. However, in order that I may know, from which
idea out of many all the properties of its object may be deduced, I
pay attention to one point only, namely, that the idea or definition
should express the efficient cause of its object. For instance, in
inquiring into the properties of a circle, I ask, whether from the
idea of a circle, that it consists of infinite right angles, I can deduce
all its properties. I ask, I repeat, whether this idea involves the
efficient cause of a circle. If it does not, I look for another, namely,
that a circle is the space described by a line, of which one point is
fixed, and the other movable. As this definition explains the
efficient cause, I know that I can deduce from it all the properties
of a circle. So, also, when I define God as a supremely perfect
Being, then, since that definition does not express the efficient
cause (I mean the efficient cause internal as well as external) I
shall not be able to infer therefrom all the properties of God; as I
can, when I define God as a Being, &c. (see Ethics, I. Def. vi.). As
for your other inquiries, namely, that concerning motion, and those
pertaining to method, my observations on them are not yet written
out in due order, so I will reserve them for another occasion.
As regards your remark, that he who considers lines applied to
curves makes many deductions with regard to the measurement of
curves, but does so with greater facility from the consideration of
tangents, &c., I think that from the consideration of tangents
many deductions will be made with more difficulty, than from the
consideration of lines applied in succession; and I assert absolutely,
that from certain properties of any particular thing (whatever idea
be given) some things may be discovered more readily, others with
more difficulty, though all are concerned with the nature of the
thing. I think it need only be observed, that an idea should be
sought for of such a kind, that all properties may be inferred, as
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has been said above. He, who is about to deduce all the properties
of a particular thing, knows that the ultimate properties will
necessarily be the most difficult to discover, &c.

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LETTER LXV. (LXIII.)

G. H. Schaller To Spinoza.1
[Schaller asks for answers to four questions of his friend
Tschirnhausen on the attributes of God, and mentions that
Tschirnhausen has removed the unfavourable opinion of Spinoza
lately conceived by Boyle and Oldenburg.]
Most Distinguished And Excellent Sir,

I should blush for my silence, which has lasted so long, and has laid
me open to the charge of ingratitude for your kindness extended to
me beyond my merits, if I did not reflect that your generous
courtesy inclines rather to excuse than to accuse, and also know
that you devote your leisure, for the common good of your friends,
to serious studies, which it would be harmful and injurious to
disturb without due cause. For this reason I have been silent, and
have meanwhile been content to hear from friends of your good
health: I send you this letter to inform you, that our noble friend
von Tschirnhausen is enjoying the same in England, and has three
times in the letters he has sent me bidden me convey his kindest
regards to the master, again bidding me request from you the
solution of the following questions, and forward to him your hopedfor answer: would the master be pleased to convince him by
positive proof, not by a reduction to the impossible, that we cannot
know any attributes of God, save thought and extension? Further,
whether it follows that creatures constituted under other attributes
can form no idea of extension? If so, it would follow that there must
be as many worlds as there are attributes of God. For instance,
there would be as much room for extension in worlds affected by
other attributes, as there actually exists of extension in our world.
But as we perceive nothing save thought besides extension, so
creatures in the other world would perceive nothing besides the
attributes of that world and thought.
Secondly, as the understanding of God differs from our
understanding as much in essence as in existence, it has, therefore,
nothing in common with it; therefore (by Ethics, I. iii.) Gods
understanding cannot be the cause of our own.
Thirdly (in Ethics, I. x. note) you say, that nothing in nature is
clearer than that every entity must be conceived under some
attribute (this I thoroughly understand), and that the more it has of
reality or being, the more attributes appertain to it. It seems to
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follow from this, that there are entities possessing three, four, or
more attributes (though we gather from what has been
demonstrated that every being consists only of two attributes,
namely, a certain attribute of God and the idea of that attribute).
Fourthly, I should like to have examples of those things which are
immediately produced by God, and those which are produced
through the means of some infinite modification. Thought and
extension seem to be of the former kind; understanding in thought
and motion in extension seem to be of the latter.
And these are the points which our said friend von Tschirnhausen
joins with me in wishing to have explained by your excellence, if
perchance your spare time allows it. He further relates, that Mr.
Boyle and Oldenburg had formed a strange idea of your personal
character, but that he has not only removed it, but also given
reasons, which have not only led them back to a most worthy and
favourable opinion thereof, but also made them value most highly
the Theologico-Political Treatise. Of this I have not ventured to
inform you, because of your health. Be assured that I am, and live,
Most Noble Sir,

For Every Good Office Your Most Devoted
Servant,
G. H. Schaller.
Amsterdam, 25 July, 1675.
Mr. Gent and J. Rieuwerts dutifully greet you.

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LETTER LXVI. (LXIV.)

[Spinoza answers by references to the first three books of the
Ethics.]
Dear Sir,
I am glad that you have at last had occasion to refresh me with one
of your letters, always most welcome to me. I heartily beg that you
will frequently repeat the favour, &c.
I proceed to consider your doubts: to the first I answer, that the
human mind can only acquire knowledge of those things which the
idea of a body actually existing involves, or of what can be inferred
from such an idea. For the power of anything is defined solely by its
essence (Ethics, III. vii.); the essence of the mind (Ethics, II. xiii.)
consists solely in this, that it is the idea of body actually existing;
therefore the minds power of understanding only extends to
things, which this idea of body contains in itself, or which follow
therefrom. Now this idea of body does not involve or express any of
Gods attributes, save extension and thought. For its object
(ideatum), namely, body (by Ethics, II. vi.), has God for its cause, in
so far as He is regarded under the attribute of extension, and not in
so far as He is regarded under any other; therefore (Ethics, I. ax.
vi.) this idea of the body involves the knowledge of God, only in so
far as He is regarded under the attribute of extension. Further, this
idea, in so far as it is a mode of thinking, has also (by the same
proposition) God for its cause, in so far as He is regarded as a
thinking thing, and not in so far as He is regarded under any other
attribute. Hence (by the same axiom) the idea of this idea involves
the knowledge of God, in so far as He is regarded under the
attribute of thought, and not in so far as He is regarded under any
attribute. It is therefore plain, that the human mind, or the idea of
the human body neither involves nor expresses any attributes of
God save these two. Now from these two attributes, or their
modifications, no other attribute of God can (Ethics, I. x.) be
inferred or conceived. I therefore conclude, that the human mind
cannot attain knowledge of any attribute of God besides these,
which is the proposition you inquire about. With regard to your
question, whether there must be as many worlds as there are
attributes, I refer you to Ethics II. vii. note.

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Moreover this proposition might be proved more readily by a

reduction to the absurd; I am accustomed, when the proposition is
negative, to employ this mode of demonstration as more in
character. However, as the question you ask is positive, I make use
of the positive method, and ask, whether one thing can be
produced from another, from which it differs both in essence and
existence; for things which differ to this extent seem to have
nothing in common. But since all particular things, except those
which are produced from things similar to themselves, differ from
their causes both in essence and existence, I see here no reason for
doubt.
The sense in which I mean that God is the efficient cause of things,
no less of their essence than of their existence, I think has been
sufficiently explained in Ethics I. xxv. note and corollary. The axiom
in the note to Ethics I. x., as I hinted at the end of the said note, is
based on the idea which we have of a Being absolutely infinite, not
on the fact, that there are or may be beings possessing three, four,
or more attributes.
Lastly, the examples you ask for of the first kind are, in thought,
absolutely infinite understanding; in extension, motion and rest; an
example of the second kind is the sum of the whole extended
universe (facies totius universi), which, though it varies in infinite
modes, yet remains always the same. Cf. Ethics II. note to Lemma
vii. before Prop. xiv.
Thus, most excellent Sir, I have answered, as I think, the objections
of yourself and your friend. If you think any uncertainty remains, I
hope you will not neglect to tell me, so that I may, if possible,
remove it.
The Hague, 29 July, 1675.

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LETTER LXVII. (LXV.)

* * * * *1To Spinoza.
[A fresh inquiry as to whether there are two or more attributes of
God.]
Distinguished Sir,
I should like a demonstration of what you say: namely, that the soul
cannot perceive any attributes of God, except extension and
thought. Though this might appear evident to me, it seems possible
that the contrary might be deduced from Ethics II. vii. note;
perhaps because I do not rightly grasp the meaning of that
passage. I have therefore resolved, distinguished Sir, to show you
how I make the deduction, earnestly begging you to aid me with
your usual courtesy, wherever I do not rightly represent your
meaning. I reason as follows:Though I gather that the universe is
one, it is not less clear from the passage referred to, that it is
expressed in infinite modes, and therefore that every individual
thing is expressed in infinite modes. Hence it seems to follow, that
the modification constituting my mind, and the modification
constituting my body, though one and the same modification, is yet
expressed in infinite waysfirst, through thought; secondly,
through extension; thirdly, through some attribute of God unknown
to me, and so on to infinity, seeing that there are in God infinite
attributes, and the order and connection of the modifications seem
to be the same in all. Hence arises the question: Why the mind,
which represents a certain modification, the same modification
being expressed not only in extension, but in infinite other
ways,why, I repeat, does the mind perceive that modification only
as expressed through extension, to wit, the human body, and not as
expressed through any other attributes? Time does not allow me to
pursue the subject further; perhaps my difficulties will be removed
by further reflection.
London, 12 Aug., 1675.

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LETTER LXVIII. (LXVI.)

[In this fragment of a letter Spinoza refers his friend to Ethics, I. x.
and II. vii. note.]
Distinguished Sir,
. . . But in answer to your objection I say, that although each
particular thing be expressed in infinite ways in the infinite
understanding of God, yet those infinite ideas, whereby it is
expressed, cannot constitute one and the same mind of a particular
thing, but infinite minds; seeing that each of these infinite ideas has
no connection with the rest, as I have explained in the same note to
Ethics, II. vii., and as is also evident from I. x. If you will reflect on
these passages a little, you will see that all difficulty vanishes, &c.
The Hague, 18 August, 1675.

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LETTER LXVIII.A.
G. H. Schaller To Spinoza.
[Schaller relates to Spinoza Tschirnhausens doings in France, and
letter to him, and makes known to Spinoza the answers contained
in that letter to Spinozas objections in Letter LXVIII. and the
request of Leibnitz to see Spinozas unpublished writings.]
Amsterdam, 14 Nov., 1675.
Most Learned And Excellent Master, My Most

Venerable Patron,
I hope that you duly received my letter withs method,1 and
likewise, that you are up to the present time in good health, as I
am.
But for three months I had no letter from our friend von
Tschirnhausen, whence I formed sad conjectures that he had made
a fatal journey, when he left England for France. Now that I have
received a letter, in my fulness of joy I felt bound, according to his
request, to communicate it to the Master, and to let you know, with
his most dutiful greeting, that he has arrived safely in Paris, and
found there Mr. Huygens, as we had told him, and consequently has
in every way sought to please him, and is thus highly esteemed by
him. He mentioned, that the Master had recommended to him
Huygenss conversation, and made very much of him personally.
This greatly pleased Huygens; so he answered that he likewise
greatly esteemed you personally, and he has now received from you
a copy of the Theologico-Political Treatise, which is esteemed by
many there, and it is eagerly inquired, whether there are extant
any more of the same writers works. To this Mr. von Tschirnhausen
replied that he knew of none but the Demonstrations in the first
and second parts of the Cartesian Principles. But he mentioned
nothing about the Master, but what I have said, and so he hopes
that he has not displeased you herein.
******
To the objection that you last made he replies, that those few words
which I wrote at the Masters dictation,1 explained to him your
meaning more thoroughly, and that he has favourably entertained
the said reasonings (for by these two methods2 they best admit of

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explanation). But two reasons have obliged him to continue in the

opinion implied in his recent objection. Of these the first is, that
otherwise there appears to be a contradiction between the fifth and
seventh propositions of the second book. For in the former of these
it is laid down, that the objects of ideas are the efficient causes of
the ideas, which yet seems to be refuted by the quotation, in the
proof of the latter, of the fourth axiom of Part I. Or, as I rather
think, I do not make the right application of this axiom according to
the authors intention, which I would most willingly be told by him,
if his leisure permits it. The second cause which prevented me from
following the explanation he gives was, that thereby the attribute of
thought is pronounced to extend much more widely than other
attributes. But since every one of the attributes contributes to
make up the essence of God, I do not quite see how this fact does
not contradict the opinion just stated. I will say just this more, that
if I may judge the minds of others by my own, there will be great
difficulty in understanding the seventh and eighth propositions of
Book II., and this for no other reason than that the author has been
pleased (doubtless because they seemed so plain to him) to
accompany the demonstrations annexed to them with such short
and laconic explanations.
He further mentions, that he has found at Paris a man called
Leibnitz, remarkably learned, and most skilled in various sciences,
as also free from the vulgar prejudices of theology. With him he has
formed an intimate acquaintance, founded on the fact that Leibnitz
labours with him to pursue the perfection of the intellect, and, in
fact, reckons nothing better or more useful. Von Tschirnhausen
says, that he is most practised in ethics, and speaks without any
stimulus of the passions by the sole dictate of reason. He adds, that
he is most skilled in physics, and also in metaphysical studies
concerning God and the soul. Finally, he concludes that he is most
worthy of having communicated to him the Masters writings, if you
will first give your permission, for he believes that the author will
thence gain a great advantage, as he promises to show at length, if
the Master be so pleased. But if not, do not doubt, in the least, that
he will honourably keep them concealed as he has promised, as in
fact he has not made the slightest mention of them. Leibnitz also
highly values the Theologico-Political Treatise, on the subject of
which he once wrote the Master a letter, if he is not mistaken. And
therefore I would beg my Master, that, unless there is some reason
against him, you will not refuse your permission in accordance with
your gracious kindness, but will, if possible, open your mind to me,
as soon as may be, for after receiving your answers I shall be able
to reply to our friend von Tschirnhausen, which I would gladly do
on Tuesday evening, unless important hindrances cause my Master
to delay.

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Mr. Bresser,1 on his return from Cleves, has sent here a large
quantity of the beer of that country; I suggested to him that he
should make a present to the Master of half a tun, which he
promised to do, and added a most friendly greeting.
Finally, excuse my unpractised style and hurried writing, and give
me your orders, that I may have a real occasion of proving myself,
most excellent Sir,
Your Most Ready Servant,

G. H. Schaller.

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LETTER LXVIII.B.
Spinoza To Schaller.
[Spinoza answers all the points in Schallers letter, and hesitates to
entrust his writings to Leibnitz.]
Most Experienced Sir, And Valued Friend,

I was much pleased to learn from your letter, received to-day, that
you are well, and that our friend von Tschirnhausen has happily
accomplished his journey to France. In the conversation which he
had about me with Mr. Huygens, he behaved, at least in my
opinion, very judiciously; and besides, I am very glad that he has
found so convenient an opportunity for the purpose which he
intended. But what it is he has found in the fourth axiom of Part I.
that seems to contradict Proposition v. of Part II. I do not see. For in
that proposition it is affirmed, that the essence of every idea has for
its cause God, in so far as He is considered as a thinking thing; but
in that axiom, that the knowledge or idea of a cause depends on the
knowledge or idea of an effect. But, to tell the truth, I do not quite
follow, in this matter, the meaning of your letter, and suspect that
either in it, or in his copy of the book, there is a slip of the pen. For
you write, that it is affirmed in Proposition v. that the objects of
ideas are the efficient causes of the ideas, whereas this is exactly
what is expressly denied in that proposition, and I now think that
this is the cause of the whole confusion.1 Accordingly it would be
useless for me at present to try to write at greater length on this
subject, but I must wait, till you explain to me his mind more
clearly, and till I know whether he has a correct copy. I believe that
I have an epistolary acquaintance with the Leibnitz he mentions.
But why he, who was a counsellor at Frankfort, has gone to France,
I do not know. As far as I could conjecture from his letters, he
seemed to me a man of liberal mind, and versed in every science.
But yet I think it imprudent so soon to entrust my writings to him. I
should like first to know what is his business in France, and the
judgment of our friend von Tschirnhausen, when he has been
longer in his company, and knows his character more intimately.
However, greet that friend of ours in my name, and let him
command me what he pleases, if in anything I can be of service to
him, and he will find me most ready to obey him in everything.
I congratulate my most worthy friend Mr. Bresser on his arrival or
return, and also thank him heartily for the promised beer, and will
requite him, too, in any way that I can. Lastly, I have not yet tried
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to find out your relations method, nor do I think that I shall be able
to apply my mind to trying it. For the more I think over the thing in
itself, the more I am persuaded that you have not made gold, but
had not sufficiently eliminated that which was hidden in the
antimony. But more of this another time: at present I am prevented
by want of leisure. In the meanwhile, if in anything I can assist you,
you will always find me, most excellent Sir, your friend and devoted
servant,
B. de Spinoza.
The Hague, 18 Nov., 1675.

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LETTER LXIX. (LXXX.)

[The writer asks for explanations of some passages in the letter
about the infinite (XXIX.).]
Distinguished Sir,
In the first place I can with great difficulty conceive, how it can be
proved, priori, that bodies exist having motion and figure, seeing
that, in extension considered absolutely in itself, nothing of the
kind is met with. Secondly, I should like to learn from you, how this
passage in your letter on the infinite is to be understood:They do
not hence infer that such things elude number by the multitude of
their component parts. For, as a matter of fact, all mathematicians
seem to me always to demonstrate, with regard to such infinities,
that the number of the parts is so great, as to elude all expression
in terms of number. And in the example you give of the two circles,
you do not appear to prove this statement,2 which was yet what
you had undertaken to do. For in this second passage you only
show, that they do not draw this conclusion from the excessive
size of the interveningspace, or from the fact that we do not know
the maximum and the minimum of the said space; but you do not
demonstrate, as you intended, that the conclusion is not based on
the multitude of parts, &c.
2 May, 1676.

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LETTER LXX. (LXXXI.)

Spinoza To * * * * *1
[Spinoza explains his view of the infinite.]
Distinguished Sir,
My statement concerning the infinite, that an infinity of parts
cannot be inferred from a multitude of parts, is plain when we
consider that, if such a conclusion could be drawn from a multitude
of parts, we should not be able to imagine a greater multitude of
parts; the first-named multitude, whatever it was, would have to be
the greater, which is contrary to fact. For in the whole space
between two non-concentric circles we conceive a greater
multitude of parts than in half that space, yet the number of parts
in the half, as in the whole of the space, exceeds any assignable
number. Again, from extension, as Descartes conceives it, to wit, a
quiescent mass, it is not only difficult, as you say, but absolutely
impossible to prove the existence of bodies. For matter at rest, as it
is in itself, will continue at rest, and will only be determined to
motion by some more powerful external cause; for this reason I
have not hesitated on a former occasion to affirm, that the
Cartesian principles of natural things are useless, not to say
absurd.
The Hague, 5 May, 1676.

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LETTER LXXI. (LXXXII.)

[How can the variety of the universe be shown priori from the
Spinozistic conception of extension?]
Most Learned Sir,

I wish you would gratify me in this matter by pointing out how,
from the conception of extension, as you give it, the variety of the
universe can be shown priori. You recall the opinion of Descartes,
wherein he asserts, that this variety can only be deduced from
extension, by supposing that, when motion was started by God, it
caused this effect in extension. Now it appears to me, that he does
not deduce the existence of bodies from matter at rest, unless,
perhaps, you count as nothing the assumption of God as a motive
power; you have not shown how such an effect must, priori,
necessarily follow from the nature of God. A difficulty which
Descartes professed himself unable to solve as being beyond
human understanding. I therefore ask you the question, knowing
that you have other thoughts on the matter, unless perhaps there
be some weighty cause for your unwillingness hitherto to disclose
your opinion. If this, as I suppose, be not expedient, give me some
hint of your meaning. You may rest assured, that whether you
speak openly with me, or whether you employ reserve, my regard
for you will remain unchanged.
My special reasons for making the requests are as follows:I have
always observed in mathematics, that from a given thing
considered in itself, that is, from the definition of a given thing, we
can only deduce a single property; if, however, we require to find
several properties, we are obliged to place the thing defined in
relation to other things. Then from the conjunction of the
definitions of these things new properties result. For instance, if I
regard the circumference of a circle by itself, I can only infer that it
is everywhere alike or uniform, in which property it differs
essentially from all other curves; I shall never be able to infer any
other properties. But if I place it in relation with other things, such
as the radii drawn from the centre, two intersecting lines, or many
others, I shall be able hence to deduce many properties; this seems
to be in opposition to Prop. xvi. of your Ethics, almost the principal
proposition of the first book of your treatise. For it is there assumed
as known, that from the given definition of anything several
properties can be deduced. This seems to me impossible, unless we
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bring the thing defined into relation with other things; and further,
I am for this reason unable to see, how from any attribute regarded
singly, for instance, infinite extension, a variety of bodies can
result; if you think that this conclusion cannot be drawn from one
attribute considered by itself, but from all taken together, I should
like to be instructed by you on the point, and shown how it should
be conceived.Farewell, &c.
Paris, 23 June, 1676.

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LETTER LXXII. (LXXXIII.)

Spinoza To * * * *1
[Spinoza gives the required explanation. Mentions the treatise of
Huet, &c.]
Distinguished Sir,
With regard to your question as to whether the variety of the
universe can be deduced priori from the conception of extension
only, I believe I have shown clearly enough already that it cannot;
and that, therefore, matter has been ill-defined by Descartes as
extension; it must necessarily be explained through an attribute,
which expresses eternal and infinite essence. But perhaps, some
day, if my life be prolonged, I may discuss the subject with you
more clearly. For hitherto I have not been able to put any of these
matters into due order.
As to what you add; namely, that from the definition of a given
thing considered in itself we can only deduce a single property, this
is, perhaps, true in the case of very simple things (among which I
count figures), but not in realities. For, from the fact alone, that I
define God as a Being to whose essence belongs existence, I infer
several of His properties; namely, that He necessarily exists, that
He is One, unchangeable, infinite, &c. I could adduce several other
examples, which, for the present, I pass over.
In conclusion, I ask you to inquire, whether Huets treatise (against
the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus) about which I wrote to you
before, has yet been published, and whether you could send me a
copy. Also, whether you yet know, what are the new discoveries
about refraction. And so farewell, dear Sir, and continue to regard
yours, &c.
The Hague, 15 July, 1676.

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LETTER LXXIII. (LXVII.)

Albert Burgh To Spinoza.
[Albert Burgh announces his reception into the Romish Church,
and exhorts Spinoza to follow his example.1 ]
I promised to write to you on leaving my country, if anything
noteworthy occurred on the journey. I take the opportunity which
offers of an event of the utmost importance, to redeem my
engagement, by informing you that I have, by Gods infinite mercy,
been received into the Catholic Church and made a member of the
same. You may learn the particulars of the step from a letter which
I have sent to the distinguished and accomplished Professor
Craanen of Leyden. I will here subjoin a few remarks for your
special benefit.
Even as formerly I admired you for the subtlety and keenness of
your natural gifts, so now do I bewail and deplore you; inasmuch as
being by nature most talented, and adorned by God with
extraordinary gifts; being a lover, nay a coveter of the truth, you
yet allow yourself to be ensnared and deceived by that most
wretched and most proud of beings, the prince of evil spirits. As for
all your philosophy, what is it but a mere illusion and chimera? Yet
to it you entrust not only your peace of mind in this life, but the
salvation of your soul for eternity. See on what a wretched
foundation all your doctrines rest. You assume that you have at
length discovered the true philosophy. How do you know that your
philosophy is the best of all that ever have been taught in the
world, are now being taught, or ever shall be taught? Passing over
what may be devised in the future, have you examined all the
philosophies, ancient as well as modern, which are taught here,
and in India, and everywhere throughout the whole world? Even if
you have duly examined them, how do you know that you have
chosen the best? You will say: My philosophy is in harmony with
right reason; other philosophies are not. But all other philosophers
except your own followers disagree with you, and with equal right
say of their philosophy what you say of yours, accusing you, as you
do them, of falsity and error. It is, therefore, plain, that before the
truth of your philosophy can come to light, reasons must be
advanced, which are not common to other philosophies, but apply
solely to your own; or else you must admit that your philosophy is
as uncertain and nugatory as the rest.

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However, restricting myself for the present to that book of yours

with an impious title,1 and mingling your philosophy with your
theology, as in reality you mingle them yourself, though with
diabolic cunning you endeavour to maintain, that each is separate
from the other, and has different principles, I thus proceed.
Perhaps you will say: Others have not read Holy Scripture so often
as I have; and it is from Holy Scripture, the acknowledgment of
which distinguishes Christians from the rest of the world, that I
prove my doctrines. But how? By comparing the clear passages
with the more obscure I explain Holy Scripture, and out of my
interpretations I frame dogmas, or else confirm those which are
already concocted in my brain. But, I adjure you, reflect seriously
on what you say. How do you know, that you have made a right
application of your method, or again that your method is sufficient
for the interpretation of Scripture, and that you are thus
interpreting Scripture aright, especially as the Catholics say, and
most truly, that the universal Word of God is not handed down to us
in writing, hence that Holy Scripture cannot be explained through
itself, I will not say by one man, but by the Church herself, who is
the sole authorized interpreter? The Apostolic traditions must
likewise be consulted, as is proved by the testimony of Holy
Scripture and the Holy Fathers, and as reason and experience
suggest. Thus, as your first principles are most false and lead to
destruction, what will become of all your doctrine, built up and
supported on so rotten a foundation?
Wherefore, if you believe in Christ crucified, acknowledge your
pestilent heresy, reflect on the perverseness of your nature, and be
reconciled with the Church.
How do your proofs differ from those of all heretics, who ever have
left, are now leaving, or shall in future leave Gods Church? All, like
yourself, make use of the same principle, to wit, Holy Scripture
taken by itself, for the concoction and establishment of their
doctrines.
Do not flatter yourself with the thought, that neither the Calvinists,
it may be, nor the so-called Reformed Church, nor the Lutherans,
nor the Mennonites, nor the Socinians, &c., can refute your
doctrines. All these, as I have said, are as wretched as yourself, and
like you are dwelling in the shadow of death.
If you do not believe in Christ, you are more wretched than I can
express. Yet the remedy is easy. Turn away from your sins, and
consider the deadly arrogance of your wretched and insane
reasoning. You do not believe in Christ. Why? You will say:
Because the teaching and the life of Christ, and also the Christian

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teaching concerning Christ are not at all in harmony with my

teaching. But again, I say, then you dare to think yourself greater
than all those who have ever risen up in the State or Church of
God, patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs, doctors, confessors,
and holy virgins innumerable, yea, in your blasphemy, than Christ
himself. Do you alone surpass all these in doctrine, in manner of
life, in every respect? Will you, wretched pigmy, vile worm of the
earth, yea, ashes, food of worms, will you in your unspeakable
blasphemy, dare to put yourself before the incarnate, infinite
wisdom of the Eternal Father? Will you, alone, consider yourself
wiser and greater than all those, who from the beginning of the
world have been in the Church of God, and have believed, or
believe still, that Christ would come or has already come? On what
do you base this rash, insane, deplorable, and inexcusable
arrogance?
******
If you cannot pronounce on what I have just been enumerating
(divining rods, alchemy, &c.), why, wretched man, are you so puffed
up with diabolical pride, as to pass rash judgment on the awful
mysteries of Christs life and passion, which the Catholics
themselves in their teaching declare to be incomprehensible? Why
do you commit the further insanity of silly and futile carping at the
numberless miracles and signs, which have been wrought through
the virtue of Almighty God by the apostles and disciples of Christ,
and afterwards by so many thousand saints, in testimony to, and
confirmation of the truth of the Catholic faith; yea, which are being
wrought in our own time in cases without number throughout the
world, by Gods almighty goodness and mercy? If you cannot
gainsay these, and surely you cannot, why stand aloof any longer?
Join hands of fellowship, and repent from your sins: put on humility,
and be born again.
[Albert Burgh requests Spinoza to consider: (i.) The large number
of believers in the Romish faith. (ii.) The uninterrupted succession
of the Church. (iii.) The fact that a few unlearned men converted
the world to Christianity. (iv.) The antiquity, the immutability, the
infallibility, the incorruption, the unity, and the vast extent of the
Catholic Religion; also the fact, that secession from it involves
damnation, and that it will itself endure as long as the world. (v.)
The admirable organization of the Romish Church. (vi.) The
superior morality of Catholics. (vii.) The frequent cases of
recantation of opinions among heretics. (viii.) The miserable life led
by atheists, whatever their outward demeanour may be.] * * * *

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I have written this letter to you with intentions truly Christian; first,
in order to show the love I bear to you, though you are a heathen;
secondly, in order to beg you not to persist in converting others.
I therefore will thus conclude: God is willing to snatch your soul
from eternal damnation, if you will allow Him. Do not doubt that
the Master, who has called you so often through others, is now
calling you for the last time through me, who having obtained
grace from the ineffable mercy of God Himself, beg the same for
you with my whole heart. Do not deny me. For if you do not now
give ear to God who calls you, the wrath of the Lord will be kindled
against you, and there is a danger of your being abandoned by His
infinite mercy, and becoming a wretched victim of the Divine
Justice which consumes all things in wrath. Such a fate may
Almighty God avert for the greater glory of His name, and for the
salvation of your soul, also for a salutary example for the imitation
of your most unfortunate and idolatrous followers, through our
Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, Who with the Eternal Father liveth
and reigneth in the Unity of the Holy Spirit, God for all Eternity.
Amen.
Florence, III. Non. Sept. CIOIOCLXXV. (Sept. 3, 1675.)1

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LETTER LXXIV. (LXXVI.)

Spinoza To Albert Burgh.
[Spinoza laments the step taken by his pupil, and answers his
arguments. The Hague, end of 1675.]
That, which I could scarcely believe when told me by others, I learn
at last from your own letter; not only have you been made a
member of the Romish Church, but you are become a very keen
champion of the same, and have already learned wantonly to insult
and rail against your opponents.
At first I resolved to leave your letter unanswered, thinking that
time and experience will assuredly be of more avail than reasoning,
to restore you to yourself and your friends; not to mention other
arguments, which won your approval formerly, when we were
discussing the case of Steno,1 in whose steps you are now
following. But some of my friends, who like myself had formed
great hopes from your superior talents, strenuously urge me not to
fail in the offices of a friend, but to consider what you lately were,
rather than what you are, with other arguments of the like nature. I
have thus been induced to write you this short reply, which I
earnestly beg you will think worthy of calm perusal.
I will not imitate those adversaries of Romanism, who would set
forth the vices of priests and popes with a view to kindling your
aversion. Such considerations are often put forward from evil and
unworthy motives, and tend rather to irritate than to instruct. I will
even admit, that more men of learning and of blameless life are
found in the Romish Church than in any other Christian body; for,
as it contains more members, so will every type of character be
more largely represented in it. You cannot possibly deny, unless you
have lost your memory as well as your reason, that in every Church
there are thoroughly honourable men, who worship God with
justice and charity. We have known many such among the
Lutherans, the Reformed Church, the Mennonites, and the
Enthusiasts. Not to go further, you knew your own relations, who in
the time of the Duke of Alva suffered every kind of torture bravely
and willingly for the sake of their religion. In fact, you must admit,
that personal holiness is not peculiar to the Romish Church, but
common to all Churches.
As it is by this, that we know that we dwell in God and He in us (1
Ep. John, iv. 13), it follows, that what distinguishes the Romish

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Church from others must be something entirely superfluous, and

therefore founded solely on superstition. For, as John says, justice
and charity are the one sure sign of the true Catholic faith, and the
true fruits of the Holy Spirit. Wherever they are found, there in
truth is Christ; wherever they are absent, Christ is absent also. For
only by the Spirit of Christ can we be led to the love of justice and
charity. Had you been willing to reflect on these points, you would
not have ruined yourself, nor have brought deep affliction on your
relations, who are now sorrowfully bewailing your evil case.
But I return to your letter, which you begin, by lamenting that I
allow myself to be ensnared by the prince of evil spirits. Pray take
heart, and recollect yourself. When you had the use of your
faculties, you were wont, if I mistake not, to worship an Infinite
God, by Whose efficacy all things absolutely come to pass and are
preserved; now you dream of a prince, Gods enemy, who against
Gods will ensnares and deceives very many men (rarely good ones,
to be sure), whom God thereupon hands over to this master of
wickedness to be tortured eternally. The Divine justice therefore
allows the devil to deceive men and remain unpunished; but it by
no means allows to remain unpunished the men, who have been by
that self-same devil miserably deceived and ensnared.
These absurdities might so far be tolerated, if you worshipped a
God infinite and eternal; not one whom Chastillon, in the town
which the Dutch call Tienen, gave with impunity to horses to be
eaten. And, poor wretch, you bewail me? My philosophy, which you
never beheld, you style a chimera? O youth deprived of
understanding, who has bewitched you into believing, that the
Supreme and Eternal is eaten by you, and held in your intestines?
Yet you seem to wish to employ reason, and ask me, How I know
that my philosophy is the best among all that have ever been
taught in the world, or are being taught, or ever will be taught? a
question which I might with much greater right ask you; for I do
not presume that I have found the best philosophy, I know that I
understand the true philosophy. If you ask in what way I know it, I
answer: In the same way as you know that the three angles of a
triangle are equal to two right angles: that this is sufficient, will be
denied by no one whose brain is sound, and who does not go
dreaming of evil spirits inspiring us with false ideas like the true.
For the truth is the index of itself and of what is false.
But you, who presume that you have at last found the best religion,
or rather the best men, on whom you have pinned your credulity,
you, who know that they are the best among all who have taught,
do now teach, or shall in future teach other religions. Have you
examined all religions, ancient as well as modern, taught here and

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in India and everywhere throughout the world? And, if you have

duly examined them, how do you know that you have chosen the
best since you can give no reason for the faith that is in you? But
you will say, that you acquiesce in the inward testimony of the
Spirit of God, while the rest of mankind are ensnared and deceived
by the prince of evil spirits. But all those outside the pale of the
Romish Church can with equal right proclaim of their own creed
what you proclaim of yours.
As to what you add of the common consent of myriads of men and
the uninterrupted ecclesiastical succession, this is the very catchword of the Pharisees. They with no less confidence than the
devotees of Rome bring forward their myriad witnesses, who as
pertinaciously as the Roman witnesses repeat what they have
heard, as though it were their personal experience. Further, they
carry back their line to Adam. They boast with equal arrogance,
that their Church has continued to this day unmoved and
unimpaired in spite of the hatred of Christians and heathen. They
more than any other sect are supported by antiquity. They exclaim
with one voice, that they have received their traditions from God
Himself, and that they alone preserve the Word of God both written
and unwritten. That all heresies have issued from them, and that
they have remained constant through thousands of years under no
constraint of temporal dominion, but by the sole efficacy of their
superstition, no one can deny. The miracles they tell of would tire a
thousand tongues. But their chief boast is, that they count a far
greater number of martyrs than any other nation, a number which
is daily increased by those who suffer with singular constancy for
the faith they profess; nor is their boasting false. I myself knew
among others of a certain Judah called the faithful,1 who in the
midst of the flames, when he was already thought to be dead, lifted
his voice to sing the hymn beginning, To Thee, O God, I offer up
my soul, and so singing perished.
The organization of the Roman Church, which you so greatly
praise, I confess to be politic, and to many lucrative. I should
believe that there was no other more convenient for deceiving the
people and keeping mens minds in check, if it were not for the
organization of the Mahometan Church, which far surpasses it. For
from the time when this superstition arose, there has been no
schism in its church.
If, therefore, you had rightly judged, you would have seen that only
your third point tells in favour of the Christians, namely, that
unlearned and common men should have been able to convert
nearly the whole world to a belief in Christ. But this reason
militates not only for the Romish Church, but for all those who
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But assume that all the reasons you bring forward tell in favour
solely of the Romish Church. Do you think that you can thereby
prove mathematically the authority of that Church? As the case is
far otherwise, why do you wish me to believe that my
demonstrations are inspired by the prince of evil spirits, while your
own are inspired by God, especially as I see, and as your letter
clearly shows, that you have been led to become a devotee of this
Church not by your love of God, but by your fear of hell, the single
cause of superstition? Is this your humility, that you trust nothing to
yourself, but everything to others, who are condemned by many of
their fellow men? Do you set it down to pride and arrogance, that I
employ reason and acquiesce in this true Word of God, which is in
the mind and can never be depraved or corrupted? Cast away this
deadly superstition, acknowledge the reason which God has given
you, and follow that, unless you would be numbered with the
brutes. Cease, I say, to call ridiculous errors mysteries, and do not
basely confound those things which are unknown to us, or have not
yet been discovered, with what is proved to be absurd, like the
horrible secrets of this Church of yours, which, in proportion as
they are repugnant to right reason, you believe to transcend the
understanding.
But the fundamental principle of the Tractatus TheologicoPoliticus, that Scripture should only be expounded through
Scripture, which you so wantonly without any reason proclaim to
be false, is not merely assumed, but categorically proved to be true
or sound; especially in chapter vii., where also the opinions of
adversaries are confuted; see also what is proved at the end of
chapter xv. If you will reflect on these things, and also examine the
history of the Church (of which I see you are completely ignorant),
in order to see how false, in many respects, is Papal tradition, and
by what course of events and with what cunning the Pope of Rome
six hundred years after Christ obtained supremacy over the
Church, I do not doubt that you will eventually return to your
senses. That this result may come to pass I, for your sake, heartily
wish. Farewell, &c.

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LETTER LXXV. (LXIX.)

Spinoza To Lambert Van Velthuysen (Doctor
Of Medicine At Utrecht.)1
[Of the proposed annotation of the Tractatus TheologicoPoliticus.
Most Excellent And Distinguished Sir,

I wonder at our friend Neustadt having said, that I am meditating
the refutation of the various writings circulated against my book,1
and that among the works for me to refute he places your MS. For I
certainly have never entertained the intention of refuting any of my
adversaries: they all seem to me utterly unworthy of being
answered. I do not remember to have said to Mr. Neustadt anything
more, than that I proposed to illustrate some of the obscurer
passages in the treatise with notes, and that I should add to these
your MS., and my answer, if your consent could be gained, on
which last point I begged him to speak to you, adding, that if you
refused permission on the ground, that some of the observations in
my answer were too harshly put, you should be given full power to
modify or expunge them. In the meanwhile, I am by no means
angry with Mr. Neustadt, but I wanted to put the matter before you
as it stands, that if your permission be not granted, I might show
you that I have no wish to publish your MS. against your will.
Though I think it might be issued without endangering your
reputation, if it appears without your name, I will take no steps in
the matter, unless you give me leave. But, to tell the truth, you
would do me a far greater kindness, if you would put in writing the
arguments with which you think you can impugn my treatise, and
add them to your MS. I most earnestly beg you to do this. For there
is no one whose arguments I would more willingly consider;
knowing, as I do, that you are bound solely by your zeal for truth,
and that your mind is singularly candid, I therefore beg you again
and again, not to shrink from undertaking this task, and to believe
me, Yours most obediently,
B. de Spinoza.
chiswick press: c. whittingham and co., tooks court, chancery lane.
[1 ] See Note, p. 41.

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[1 ] These considerations should be set forth more precisely.

[1 ] These matters are explained more at length elsewhere.
[1 ] N.B. I do no more here than enumerate the sciences necessary
for our purpose; I lay no stress on their order.
[2 ] There is for the sciences but one end, to which they should all
be directed.
[1 ] In this case we do not understand anything of the cause from
the consideration of it in the effect. This is sufficiently evident from
the fact that the cause is only spoken of in very general terms, such
asthere exists then something; there exists then some power, &c.;
or from the fact that we only express it in a negative mannerit is
not this or that, &c. In the second case something is ascribed to the
cause because of the effect, as we shall show in an example, but
only a property, never the essence.
[1 ] From this example may be clearly seen what I have just drawn
attention to. For through this union we understand nothing beyond
the sensation, the effect, to wit, from which we inferred the cause
of which we understand nothing.
[2 ] A conclusion of this sort, though it be certain, is yet not to be
relied on without great caution; for unless we are exceedingly
careful we shall forthwith fall into error. When things are conceived
thus abstractedly, and not through their true essence, they are apt
to be confused by the imagination. For that which is in itself one,
men imagine to be multiplex. To those things which are conceived
abstractedly, apart, and confusedly, terms are applied which are apt
to become wrested from their strict meaning, and bestowed on
things more familiar; whence it results that these latter are
imagined in the same way as the former to which the terms were
originally given.
[1 ] I shall here treat a little more in detail of experience, and shall
examine the method adopted by the Empirics, and by recent
philosophers.
[1 ] By native strength, I mean that bestowed on us by external
causes, as I shall afterwards explain in my philosophy.
[2 ] I here term them operations: I shall explain their nature in my
philosophy.
[3 ] I shall take care not only to demonstrate what I have just
advanced, but also that we have hitherto proceeded rightly, and
other things needful to be known.
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[1 ] In modern language, the idea may become the subject of

another representation. Objectivus generally corresponds to the
modern subjective, formalis to the modern objective.[Tr.]
[2 ] Observe that we are not here inquiring how this first subjective
essence is innate in us. This belongs to an investigation into nature,
where all these matters are amply explained, and it is shown that
without ideas neither affirmation, nor negation, nor volition are
possible.
[1 ] The nature of mental search is explained in my philosophy.
[1 ] To be connected with other things is to be produced by them,
or to produce them.
[1 ] In the same way as we have here no doubt of the truth of our
knowledge.
[1 ] See below the note on hypotheses, whereof we have a clear
understanding; the fiction consists in saying that such hypotheses
exist in heavenly bodies.
[1 ] As a thing, when once it is understood, manifests itself, we
have need only of an example without further proof. In the same
way the contrary has only to be presented to our minds to be
recognized as false, as will forthwith appear when we come to
discuss fiction concerning essences.
[2 ] Observe, that although many assert that they doubt whether
God exists, they have nought but his name in their minds, or else
some fiction which they call God: this fiction is not in harmony with
Gods real nature, as we will duly show.
[3 ] I shall presently show that no fiction can concern eternal
truths. By an eternal truth, I mean that which being positive could
never become negative. Thus it is a primary and eternal truth that
God exists, but it is not an eternal truth that Adam thinks. That the
Chimra does not exist is an eternal truth, that Adam does not
think is not so.
[1 ] Afterwards, when we come to speak of fiction that is concerned
with essences, it will be evident that fiction never creates or
furnishes the mind with anything new; only such things as are
already in the brain or imagination are recalled to the memory,
when the attention is directed to them confusedly and all at once.
For instance, we have remembrance of spoken words and of a tree;
when the mind directs itself to them confusedly, it forms the notion
of a tree speaking. The same may be said of existence, especially
when it is conceived quite generally as entity; it is then readily
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applied to all things occurring together in the memory. This is

specially worthy of remark.
[1 ] We must understand as much in the case of hypotheses put
forward to explain certain movements accompanying celestial
phenomena; but from these, when applied to the celestial motions,
we may draw conclusions as to the nature of the heavens, whereas
this last may be quite different, especially as many other causes are
conceivable which would account for such motions.
[2 ] It often happens that a man recalls to mind this word soul, and
forms at the same time some corporeal image: as the two
representations are simultaneous, he easily thinks that he imagines
and feigns a corporeal soul: thus confusing the name with the thing
itself. I here beg that my readers will not be in a hurry to refute
this proposition; they will, I hope, have no mind to do so, if they pay
close attention to the examples given and to what follows.
[1 ] Though I seem to deduce this from experience, some may deny
its cogency because I have given no formal proof. I therefore
append the following for those who may desire it. As there can be
nothing in nature contrary to natures laws, since all things come to
pass by fixed laws, so that each thing must irrefragably produce its
own proper effect, it follows that the soul, as soon as it possesses
the true conception of a thing, proceeds to reproduce in thought
that things effects. See below, where I speak of the false idea.
[1 ] Observe that fiction regarded in itself, only differs from dreams
in that in the latter we do not perceive the external causes which
we perceive through the senses while awake. It has hence been
inferred that represensations occurring in sleep have no connection
with objects external to us. We shall presently see that error is the
dreaming of a waking man: if it reaches a certain pitch it becomes
delirium.
[1 ] These are not attributes of God displaying His essence, as I will
show in my philosophy.
[2 ] This has been shown already. For if such a being did not exist it
would never be produced: therefore the mind would be able to
understand more than nature could furnish; and this has been
shown above to be false.
[1 ] That is, it is known that the senses sometimes deceive us. But it
is only known confusedly, for it is not known how they deceive us.
[1 ] If the duration be indefinite, the recollection is imperfect; this
everyone seems to have learnt from nature. For we often ask, to

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strengthen our belief in something we hear of, when and where it

happened; though ideas themselves have their own duration in the
mind, yet, as we are wont to determine duration by the aid of some
measure of motion which, again, takes place by aid of the
imagination, we preserve no memory connected with pure intellect.
[1 ] The chief rule of this part is, as appears from the first part, to
review all the ideas coming to us through pure intellect, so as to
distinguish them from such as we imagine: the distinction will be
shown through the properties of each, namely, of the imagination
and of the understanding.
[2 ] Observe that it is hereby manifest that we cannot understand
anything of nature without at the same time increasing our
knowledge of the first cause, or God.
[1 ] Affectiones.
[1 ] Forma.
[1 ] Animata.
[1 ] A Baconian phrase. Nov. Org. Aph. 100. [Pollock, p. 126, n.]
[1 ]Conscienti morsusthus rendered by Mr. Pollock.
[1 ] N.B. By men in this and the following propositions, I mean
men whom we regard without any particular emotion.
[1 ] So Van Vloten and Bruder. The Dutch version and Camerer
read, an internal cause. Honour = Gloria.
[2 ] Ovid. Amores, II. xix. 4, 5. Spinoza transposes the verses.
Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;
Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat.
[1 ] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.
[1 ]Gloria.
[1 ] Ov. Met. vii. 20, Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.
[1 ]Honestas.
[1 ] Land reads: Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvaturwhich I
have translated above. He suggests as alternative readings to
quod quo (= whereby) and quodque (= and that).

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[1 ] Malum prsens minus pr majori futuro. (Van Vloten).

Bruder reads: Malum prsens minus, quod causa est futuri
alicujus mali. The last word of the latter is an obvious misprint,
and is corrected by the Dutch translator into majoris boni.
(Pollock, p. 268, note.)
[1 ]Continuo. Rendered constantly by Mr. Pollock on the ground
that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context. I
venture to think, however, that a tolerable sense may be obtained
without doing violence to Spinozas scholarship.
[1 ]Affectiones. Camerer reads affectusemotions.
[1 ] The number of each letter as arranged in Van Vlotens edition
is given in brackets.
[2 ] See Introduction, p. xvi.
[1 ] Robert Boyle.
[1 ] The allusion is to Eth. I., BeginningProp. iv.
[1 ] Bacon, Nov. Org. I. Aph. 49.
[1 ] These letters are numbered by Van Vloten, XIV., XVI., XXV.,
XXVI., XXXI.
[1 ] The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.
[2 ] Spinozas answer to this letter is not extant.
[3 ] The English fleet twice defeated the Dutch in 1665, on June 3rd
and Sept. 4th. Secundo perhaps means successful, but this hardly
agrees with Oldenburgs politeness.[Tr.]
[4 ] Virtus, de qu disceptare inter vos innuis, ferina est, non
human. I do not think that, in the absence of the previous letter
from Spinoza here referred to, the precise meaning of this sentence
can be ascertained.[Tr.]
[5 ] The same phrase occurs in Tract. Pol. I. ii.
[1 ] Letter II.
[2 ] Ethics, I. viii.
[3 ] I have given what seems to be the meaning of this passage. The
text is very obscure: Nempe quia statuo dare etiam in natura
potentiam infinitam cogitandi, qu, quatenus infinita, in se

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continet totam naturam objective et cujus cogitationes procedunt

ac natura ejus, nimirum idearum. M. Saisset in his French
translation says here, In this place I rather interpret than translate
Spinoza, as his thought does not seem to me completely
expressed.[Tr.]
[1 ] The old edition gives the date 8 Oct., 1665, but this is obviously
incorrect, as the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus was not published
till 1670.
[1 ] See Acts xvii. 28. Cf. 1 Cor. iii. 16, xii. 6; Eph. i. 23.
[1 ] Terence, Heaut. I. i. 25.
[2 ] John i. 14.
[3 ] Heb. ii. 16.
[1 ] Romans ix. 21.
[1 ] Matt. viii. 22; Luke ix. 60.
[1 ] John ii. 19. Cf. Matt. xxvi. 60; Mark xiv. 58.
[1 ] 2 Cor. v. 16.
[2 ] Letter XXV.
[3 ]Potestas, as distinguished from potentiathe word just above
translated powermeans power delegated by a rightful superior, as
here by God. So it is rendered here sphere of power, and in Tract.
Pol. generally authority. It would not be proper to say that the
image of God implied potestas.
[1 ] Surely this is a mistake for excusable[Tr.]
[2 ] See Letter XXV. Oldenburg misunderstands Spinozas
illustration, because he takes canis in the phrase, qui ex morsu
canis furit, to be nominative instead of genitive; a dog which goes
mad from a bite, instead of he who goes mad from the bite of a
dog.
[1 ] For an account of Simon de Vries see Introduction, p. xiv. His
letters are written in very indifferent Latin, which is, perhaps, one
reason, why the present letter at least has been altered freely by
the first editors.
[2 ] The version of this letter in Bruders and former editions is
much altered by the omission of all mention of the club, and of the

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reference to Albert Burgh, and by the change throughout of the

plural referring to the members of the club into the singular
referring to the writer only. The genuine form here followed is to be
found in Van Vlotens Supplementum.
[1 ] This fellow-lodger, again mentioned in the next letter, is
pretty certainly Albert Burgh, concerning whom see Introduction,
p. xv, and Letters LXXIII. and LXXIV.
[2 ] Van Vloten infers that the members of the club were chiefly
Jews.
[3 ] Peter Borel, born 1620, physician to the king of France, died
1689. He wrote several medical and philosophical works, and
became in 1674 a member of the French Academy of Sciences.
[1 ] Andrew Jacquet, born at Antwerp 1611, was mathematical
professor in that town, died 1660.
[2 ] Christopher Clavius, born at Bamberg 1537, was mathematical
professor at Rome, died 1612.
[1 ] The third definition of the Ethics, as they now exist. See p. 45.
[2 ] Spinoza must, therefore, have visited the Hague before he lived
there.
[3 ] In the Ethics as they now exist, in I. x. note, towards the
beginning, to which reading the editors consequently altered the
text, till the true reading was restored by Van Vloten.
[4 ] Peter Balling is the correspondent, to whom Spinoza wrote
Letter XXX., which see. He translated into Dutch Spinozas
Principia, as to which see Introduction, p. xv.
[1 ] There is no note to Ethics, I. xix. As there is nothing to show
what proposition is intended, the old version suppressed the whole
passage from Besides I thank you to medicine.
[2 ] The whole beginning of this letter, till after the mention of the
club, is omitted in the editions before Van Vlotens Supplementum,
to make the letter agree with the altered version of Letter XXVI., to
which it is an answer.
[3 ] You in these two places is plural, and refers to the club; so
also the second your on the next page; elsewhere you and
your refer to De Vries only.
[1 ] See Note 3 on previous page.
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[1 ] See Introduction, pp. xv, xx.

[1 ] Spinoza apologizes here in the original for the use of the
unclassical form essendi, being. The classical Latin verb of being
is, as the ancients themselves admitted, defective in a most
inconvenient degree.
[1 ] Nihilo plus agit, quam si det operam ut sua imaginatione
insaniat. Mr. Pollock paraphrases, It is like applying the
intellectual tests of sanity and insanity to acts of pure imagination.
[1 ] This letter is not given in the Opera Posthuma, but was
preserved in M. Cousins library at the Sorbonne. This version is
reprinted, by kind permission, from Mr. Pollocks Spinoza, his Life
and Philosophy, Appendix C.
[1 ] This letter is from a Latin version of a Dutch original. For
Balling, see Letter XXVI., p. 312, and note there.
[1 ] See Introduction, p. xvi. The correspondence with Blyenbergh
was originally conducted in Dutch.
[1 ] The plague, which had prevailed on the Continent during 1664,
was introduced into London in the very month in which this letter
was written, perhaps from Holland.
[1 ] The last paragraph (not found in the Latin version) is reprinted
by kind permission from Mr. Pollocks translation from the Dutch
original, Pollocks Spinoza, Appendix C. On page 332 a misprint
of perfectioribus for imperfectioribus is corrected from the
original.
[1 ] The true date of this letter is June 3rd, as appears from the
Dutch original printed in Van Vlotens Supplementum. The former
editors gave April.
[1 ] Probably J. Bresser, a member of the Spinozistic Society formed
at Amsterdam. See note to Letter XLII.
[2 ] See Letter XXXVIII., which fixes approximately the date of this.
[1 ] The third and fourth part of the Ethics were probably originally
united.
[1 ] I. B. has been identified by some with John Bredenburg, a
citizen of Rotterdam, who translated into Latin (1675) a Dutch
attack on the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, but the tone of the
letter renders this improbable. Murr and Van Vloten think that I. B.

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may be the physician, John Bresser, who prefixed some verses to

the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy.
[1 ] It is not known who I. v. M. was. Letters XLIII.-XLVII. were
written in Dutch.
[2 ] I. I. Probably Jarig Jellis, a merchant of Amsterdam and a
Mennonite. He translated the Opera Posthuma into Dutch, 1677.
[1 ] The rough copy of this letter is still preserved, and contains
many strong expressions of Spinozas indignation against
Velthuysen, which he afterwards suppressed or mitigated.
[1 ] Probably the name omitted is Diemerbroech, a learned
physician and Cartesian at Utrecht.
[1 ] Francis Lana, of Brescia, 1631-1687. The title of his book is,
Prodromo premesso all Arte maestra. He also wrote Magistr
natur et artis.
[1 ] Charles Lewis, Elector, 1632-1680.
[1 ] This letter is by Van Vloten, followed by Mr. Pollock, assigned
to Ehrenfried Walter von Tschirnhausen, a Bohemian nobleman.
See Introduction, p. xvi. The correspondence with Tschirnhausen
was formerly supposed to be with Lewis Meyer. The letters of
Tschirnhausen contain by far the most acute contemporary
criticism of Spinoza.
[2 ] This letter is addressed to G. H. Schaller, who had sent on
Letter LXI. to Spinoza.
[3 ] John Rieuwerts, a bookseller of Amsterdam.
[4 ] Tschirnhausen; the judgment is Letter LXI.
[1 ] John Ricuwerts.
[1 ] This letter is from Tschirnhausen, who had in the meantime, as
appears from its contents, had an interview with Spinoza.
[1 ] Tschirnhausen.
[1 ] In the Opera Posthuma this letter is arranged, so as to seem to
be from the person who puts the questions himself, and the names
of Schaller and Tschirnhausen are suppressed.
[1 ] Tschirnhausen.

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[1 ] Tschirnhausen.
[1 ] Tschirnhausen.
[1 ] See the next Letter.
[1 ] Letter LXVIII.
[2 ] That is, I think, hearing from the author criticized what his
precise meaning is, and attending carefully to his arguments in
favour of the opinion thus precisely ascertained.[Tr.]
[1 ] See Letters XLI.a, XLII.
[1 ] It appears to me, that Schaller correctly states the difficulty of
Tschirnhausen, but that by leaving out a negative in the sentence in
question, he has attributed the doctrine of Prop. v. to Prop. vii., and
vice vers.[Tr.]
[1 ] Tschirnhausen.
[2 ] Viz., They do not hence infer . . . . component parts.
[1 ] Tschirnhausen.
[1 ] Tschirnhausen.
[1 ] Tschirnhausen.
[1 ] The whole of this very long letter is not given here, but only
such parts as seemed most characteristic, or are alluded to in
Spinozas reply.[Tr.]
[1 ] Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.
[1 ] There is a kind of affectation very consistent with the letter in
the use of the classical calendar and Roman numerals for the date.
[1 ] A Danish anatomist, who renounced Lutheranism for
Catholicism at Florence in 1669.
[1 ] Don Lope de Vera y Alarcon de San Clemente, a Spanish
nobleman who was converted to Judaism through the study of
Hebrew, and was burnt at Valladolid on the 25th July,
1644.PollocksSpinoza, chap. ii., last note. Mr. Pollock refutes
the inference of Grtz, that Spinozas childhood must have been
spent in Spain, by pointing out that the word used here, novi, is
the same as that used above of Albert Burghs knowledge of his
ancestors sufferings, of which he was certainly not an eye-witness.

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[1 ] See Letters XLVIII., XLIX.

[1 ] The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.

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Letter XXXVIII. (xxvii.): Spinoza to Blyenbergh.

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ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE

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repentance, but, the more we acquire, the greater is our delight,

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Reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge may be

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scientific in its character. For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone

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instruments, whereby it acquires strength for performing other

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unless he possesses an adequate idea, or the subjective essence of

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reasoning I have established valid reasoning, and, in like measure,

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omniscient Being, such an one cannot form fictitious hypotheses.

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that it burns in some imaginary space, or where there are no

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simple component parts, and if each part be regarded separately,

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corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea. For if the nature of