Name: July 3, 2013 Wednesday TITLE:

Jabe

Tecson

Gica

REPUBLIC vs. VILLASOR

CITATION: ! "C#A $3 G%#% NO% L&30'(1 )ATE: No*embe+ 2$, 1,(3

-ACT": The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges the validity of an order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of irst !nstance of Cebu, "ranch !, declaring a decision final and e#ecutory and of an alias $rit of e#ecution directed against the funds of the %rmed orces of the Philippines subse&uently issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged ground being e#cess of 'urisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion. (n July ), *+,*, a decision $as rendered in -pecial Proceedings .o. /*0,1R in favor of respondents P. J. 2iener Co., 3td., Gavino 4nchuan, and !nternational Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner, confirming the arbitration a$ard in the amount of P*,5*/,)+,.67, sub'ect of -pecial Proceedings. !t $as declared final and e#ecutory by Respondent 8on. Guillermo P. Villasor, directing the -heriffs of Ri9al Province, :ue9on City ;as $ell as< =anila to e#ecute the said decision. Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding %lias >rit of ?#ecution $as issued. The Provincial -heriff of Ri9al served notices of garnishment $ith several "an@s, specially on the Amonies due the %rmed orces of the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said >rit of ?#ecutionAB the Philippine Veterans "an@ received the same notice of garnishment. The funds of the %rmed orces of the Philippines on deposit $ith the "an@s are

public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allo$ances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the %rmed orces of the Philippines. The petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in e#cess of 'urisdiction ;or< $ith grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac@ of 'urisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias $rit of e#ecution against the properties of the %rmed orces of the Philippines, hence, the %lias >rit of ?#ecution and notices of garnishment issued are null and void.

I"".E":

C*D >hether or not the >rit of ?#ecution issued by Villasor is valid.

T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. >hat $as done by respondent Judge is not in conformity $ith the dictates of the Constitution. !t is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flo$ing from the 'uristic concept of sovereignty that the state as $ell as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. !t is readily understandable $hy it must be so. !n the classic formulation of 8olmes: A% sovereign is e#empt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that ma@es the la$ on $hich the right depends.A % corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the ob'ect of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability ad'udged. !t is made clear $hy the Republic of the Philippines could rightfully allege a legitimate grievance. The $rits of certiorari and prohibition are GR%.T?E, nullifying and setting aside both the order of June /6, *+,+ declaring e#ecutory the decision of July ), *+,* as $ell as the alias $rit of e#ecution issued thereunder.

TITLE: REPUBLIC vs. FELICIANO CITATION: 1!$ "C#A !2! )ATE: 1a+c2 12, 1,$(
G.R. No. 70853

-ACT": Petitioner see@s the revie$ of the decision of the !ntermediate %ppellate Court dated %pril )7, *+F0 reversing the order of the Court of irst !nstance of Camarines -ur, "ranch V!, dated %ugust /*, *+F7, $hich dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo eliciano for recovery of o$nership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non1suability of the -tate. (n January //, *+57, eliciano filed a complaint $ith the then Court of irst !nstance of Camarines -ur against the RP, represented by the 3and %uthority, for the recovery of o$nership and possession of a parcel of land. The defendant, represented by the 3and %uthority, filed an ans$er, raising by $ay of affirmative defenses lac@ of sufficient cause of action and prescription. (n %ugust /+, *+57, the trial court rendered a decision declaring 3ot .o. *, $ith an area of 57*.+7,6 hectares, to be the private property of eliciano. % motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of %ugust /+, *+57 $as filed by eighty1si# CF,D settlers. (n January /0, *+5*, the court a quo reconsidered its decision, reopened the case and directed the intervenors to file their corresponding pleadings and present their evidence $hile plaintiff C elicianoD, as $ell as the Republic of the Philippines, could present additional evidence. The interveners did not appear on the day scheduled for the presentation of evidence and submitted a motion for postponement instead $hich $as denied. eliciano, on the other hand presented additional evidence. Thereafter the case $as submitted for decision and the court ruled in favor of eliciano.

The interveners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued $ithout its consent hence the action cannot prosper. The motion $as opposed by eliciano. I"".E": C*D >hether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land

T/E CO.#T0" #.LING:

% suit against the state is not permitted, e#cept upon a sho$ing that the state has consented to be sued, either e#pressly of by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. >aiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, $ill not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris Cof strictest rightD. =oreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the -tate to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. The >aiver of -tate immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body
>orthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the -olicitor General, that the informacion posesoria registered in the (ffice of the Register of Eeed of Camarines -ur on -eptember /), *+0/ $as a AreconstitutedA possessory informationB it $as Areconstituted from the duplicate presented to this office CRegister of EeedsD by Er. Pablo eliciano,A $ithout the submission of proof that the alleged duplicate $as authentic or that the original thereof $as lost. Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original. 10 These circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the Ainformacion posesoriaA relied upon by respondent eliciano. %dding to the dubiousness of said document is the fact that Apossessory information calls for an area of only *77 hectares,A 11 $hereas the land claimed by respondent eliciano comprises

*,),6.6*55 hectares, later reduced to 57*1+7,6 hectares. Courts should be $ary in accepting Apossessory information documents, as $ell as other purportedly old -panish titles, as proof of alleged o$nership of lands. Judgment $as rendered reversing and setting aside the appealed decision of the !ntermediate %ppellate Court, dated %pril )7, *+F0, and affirming the order of the court a quo, dated %ugust /*, *+F7, E!-=!--!.G the complaint filed by respondent Pablo eliciano against the Republic of the Philippines.

TITLE: PNB vs. PABALAN CITATION: $3 "C#A 31! G%#% No% L&33112

)ATE: June 1 , 1,($

-ACT": The reliance of petitioner Philippine .ational "an@ in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding against respondent Judge Javier Pabalan $ho issued a $rit of e#ecution, follo$ed thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds of respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco %dministration, deposited $ith it, is on the fundamental constitutional la$ doctrine of non1suability of a state, it being alleged that such funds are public in character. !t is undisputed that the 'udgment against respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco %dministration had reached the stage of finality. % $rit of e#ecution $as, therefore, in order. !t $as accordingly issued on Eecember *5, *+57. There $as a notice of garnishment for the full amount mentioned in such $rit of e#ecution. !n vie$ of the ob'ection, ho$ever, by petitioner Philippine .ational "an@ on the above ground, coupled $ith an in&uiry as to $hether or not respondent Philippine

Virginia Tobacco %dministration had funds deposited $ith petitionerGs 3a 4nion branch, it $as not until January /0, *+5* that the order sought to be set aside in this certiorari proceeding $as issued by respondent Judge. !ts dispositive portion reads as follo$s: HConformably $ith the foregoing, it is no$ ordered, in accordance $ith la$, that sufficient funds of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco %dministration no$ deposited $ith the Philippine .ational "an@, 3a 4nion "ranch, shall be garnished and delivered to the plaintiff immediately to satisfy the >rit of ?#ecution for one1half of the amount a$arded in the decision of .ovember *,, *+57.I I"".E": C*D >hether or not the funds are public in character, thus immune from suit T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: !t is to be admitted that under the present Constitution, $hat $as formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional la$ has been set forth in e#press terms: HThe -tate may not be sued $ithout its consent.I !f the funds appertained to one of the regular departments or offices in the government, then, certainly, such provision $ould be a bar to garnishment. -uch is not the case here.

!t is $ell1settled that $hen the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated li@e any other corporation. "y engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation sub'ect to the rules of la$ governing private corporations. The non1suability clause raised by PVT% being a government o$ned corporation $as also denied citing previous decisions held by the -upreme Court specifically citing that of =anila 8otel ?mployees %ssociation vs =anila 8otel Company and to &uote Jit is $ell1settled that $hen the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated li@e any other corporation.J This petition for certiorari and prohibition $as E!-=!--?E. .o costs

TITLE: DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE vs. NLRC, et al CITATION: G%#% No% 10!2', No*embe+ 11, 1,,3 )ATE:

-ACT":
Petitioner E(% and -ultan -ecurity %gency and -ultan -ecurity %gency entered into a contract for security services to be provided to the said government entity. !n -eptember *), *++7, several security guards of the -ultan -ecurity %gency filed a complaint for underpayment of $ages, non1payment of *) th month pay, uniform allo$ances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as $ell as for damages against the E(% and the -ultan -ecurity %gency before the Regional %rbitration "ranch in Cagayan Ee (ro City.

The 3abor %rbiter rendered a decision finding the E(% 'ointly and severally liable $ith the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The E% and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and e#ecutory. The 3abor %rbiter issued a $rit of e#ecution to enforce and e#ecute the 'udgment against the property of the E% and the security agency. Petitioner E(% filed a Hpetition for in'unction, prohibition and mandamus, $ith prayer for preliminary in'unctionI $ith the .RC Cagayan Ee (ro. !t argued that the $rit of e#ection $as effected $ithout the 3abor %rbiter hacing ac&uired 'urisdiction over the E(%. 8ence, its decision $as null and void. !t also pointed out that the attachment of its property $ould 'eopardi9e its governmental functions to the pre'udice of the public good. .3RC dismissed the petition for in'unction for lac@ of basis. The $rit of preliminary in'unction previously issued is Lifted and Set Aside and in lieu thereof, a Temporary Stay of Execution is issued for a period of t$o C/D months but not e#tending beyond the last &uarter of calendar year *++*. !n this petition for certiorari, the petitioner ;E(%< charges the .3RC $ith grave abuse of discretion for refusing to &uash the $rit of e#ecution. !t argued that money claims against the Eepartment falls under the e#clusive 'urisdiction of the Commission on %udit. =ore importantly, the petitioner asserts, the .3RC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non1suability of the -tate. The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly $aived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract $ith -ultan -ecurity %gency. .3RC, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly $aived its immunity from suit by concluding service contract $ith -ultan -ecurity %gency.

I"".E": C*D >hether or not the Eepartment of %griculture can be sued T/E CO.#T0" #.LING": The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that Hthe -tate may not be sued $ithout its consentI reflects nothing less than recognition of the sovereign character of the -tate and an e#press affirmation of the un$ritten rule effectively insulating it from the 'urisdiction of courts. !t is based on the very essence of sovereignty. % sovereign is e#empt from suit based on the logical and

practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that ma@es the la$ on $hich the right depends. The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances. (n the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, Athe state may not be sued $ithout its consentBA its clear import then is that the -tate may be sued at times. The -tateGs consent may be given e#pressly or impliedly. ?#press consent may be made through a general la$ or a special la$. !mplied consent, on the other hand, is conceded $hen the -tate itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or $hen it enters into a contract. !n this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. "ut not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a $aiver of its non1 suabilityB distinction must still be made bet$een one $hich is e#ecuted in the e#ercise of its sovereign function and another $hich is done in its proprietary capacity. % -tate may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only $hen it enters in to business contracts. !t does not apply $here the contract relates to the e#ercise of its sovereign functions.

!n the case, the E% has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity $hen it entered into the &uestioned contractB nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. "ut, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of $ages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for -ervice, clearly constitute money claims. %ct .o. )7F), aforecited, gives the consent of the -tate to be Asued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, e#press or implied. Pursuant, ho$ever, to Common$ealth %ct CAC.%.AD .o. )/5, as amended by Presidential Eecree CAP.E.AD .o. **60, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on %udit.

The petition $as GR%.T?E. The resolution, dated /5 .ovember *++*, is hereby R?V?R-?E and -?T %-!E?. The $rit of e#ecution directed against the property of the Eepartment of %griculture is nullified, and the public respondents are hereby en'oined permanently from doing,

issuing and implementing any and all $rits of e#ecution issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the 3abor %rbiter against said petitioner.

TITLE:

MOBIL

PHILIPPINES

EXPLORATION,

INC.

vs.

CUSTOMS

ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS CITATION: 1$ "C#A 1120 G%#% No% L&2313, )ATE: )ecembe+ 1(, 1,'' -ACT":

our cases of rotary drill parts $ere shipped from abroad on -.-. A3eovilleA, sometime in .ovember of *+,/, consigned to =obil Philippines ?#ploration, !nc., =anila. The shipment arrived at the Port of =anila on %pril *7, *+,), and $as discharged to the custody of the Customs %rrastre -ervice, the unit of the "ureau of Customs handling arrastre operations. The Customs %rrastre -ervice later delivered to the bro@er of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. (n %pril 6, *+,6 =obil Philippines ?#ploration, !nc., filed suit in the Court of irst

!nstance of =anila against the Customs %rrastre -ervice and the "ureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of P*F,6+).)5 plus other damages. (n %pril /7, *+,6 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the la$, defendants cannot be sued. %fter plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on %pril /0, *+,6, dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither the Customs %rrastre -ervice nor the "ureau of Customs is suable. Plaintiff appealed to 4s from the order of dismissal. Raised, therefore, in this appeal is the purely legal &uestion of the defendantsJ suability under the facts stated. %ppellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suitB that defendant "ureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of =anila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals. I"".E": C*D >hether or not the defendants can invo@e state immunity. T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: The Rules of Court, in -ection *, Rule ), provide: -?CT!(. *. Who may be parties.K(nly natural or 'uridical persons or entities authori9ed by la$ may be parties in a civil action.

%ccordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be C*D a natural personB C/D a 'uridical person or C)D an entity authori9ed by la$ to be sued. .either the "ureau of Customs nor Ca fortioriD its function unit, the Customs %rrastre -ervice, is a person. They are

merely parts of the machinery of Government. The "ureau of Customs is a bureau under the Eepartment of inance C-ec. F*, Revised %dministrative CodeDB and as stated, the Customs %rrastre -ervice is a unit of the "ureau of Custom, set up under Customs %dministrative (rder .o. F1,/ of .ovember +, *+,/ C%nne# A%A to =otion to Eismiss, pp. *)1*0, Record an %ppealD. !t follo$s that the defendants herein cannot he sued under the first t$o abovementioned categories of natural or 'uridical persons. .onetheless it is urged that by authori9ing the "ureau of Customs to engage in arrastre service, the la$ thereby impliedly authori9es it to be sued as arrastre operator, for the reason that the nature of this function Carrastre serviceD is proprietary, not governmental. Thus, insofar as arrastre operation is concerned, appellant $ould put defendants under the third category of Aentities authori9ed by la$A to be sued. -tated differently, it is argued that $hile there is no la$ e#pressly authori9ing the "ureau of Customs to sue or be sued, still its capacity to be sued is implied from its very po$er to render arrastre service at the Port of =anila, $hich it is alleged, amounts to the transaction of a private business. The "ureau of Customs, to repeat is part of the Eepartment of inance $ith no

personality of its o$n apart from that of the national government. !ts primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting la$ful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties. To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. The order of dismissal appealed from $as affirmed, $ith costs against appellant.

TITLE: NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORP vs. TEODORO CITATION: ,1 3/IL 203 1, 2

-ACT": The .ational %irports Corporation $as organi9ed under Republic %ct .o. //6, $hich e#pressly made the provisions of the Corporation 3a$ applicable to the said corporation. (n .ovember *7, *+07, the .ational %irports Corporation $as abolished by ?#ecutive (rder .o. ),0 and to ta@e its place the Civil %eronautics %dministration $as created. "efore the abolition, the Philippine airlines, !nc. paid the .ational %irports Corporation P,0, /60 as fees for landing and par@ing on "acolod %irport .o. / for the period up to and including July )*, *+6F. These fees are said to have been due and payable to the Capitol -ubdivision, !nc. $hich o$ned the land used by the .ational %irports Corporation as airport, and the o$ner commenced an action in the Court of irst !nstance of .egros (ccidental against the Philippine %irlines, !nc. !n *+0* to recover the above amount, The Philippine %irlines, !nc. countered $ith a third1party complaint against the .ational %irports Corporation, $hich by that time had been dissolved, and served summons on the Civil %eronautics %dministration. )ATE: A4+il 30,

The

third

party

plaintiff

alleged the

that

it

had

paid the

to

the

.ational

% i r p o r t s Corporation

fees

claimed

by

Capitol

- u b d i v i s i o n , ! n c . A o n t h e b e l i e f a n d assumption that the third party defendant $as the lessee of the lands sub'ect of the complaint and that the third party defendant and its predecessors in interest $ere theoperators and maintainers of said "acolod %irport .o. /The -olicitor General, after ans$ering the third party complaint, filed a motion todismiss on the ground that the court lac@s 'urisdiction to entertain the third1 party c o m p l a i n t , f i r s t , b e c a u s e t h e .ational %irports Corporation Ahas lost its 'uridicalpersonality,A and, second, because agency of the Republic of the P h i l i p p i n e s , unincorporated and not possessing 'uridical personality under the la$, is incapable of suing and being sued.A

I"".E":

(1) >hether or not government corporate agency may be sued (2) >hether or not the Civil %eronautics %dministration can be sued

T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: %s a general rule, state cannot be sued $ithou t its consent and there can be nol e g a l b a s i s a g a i n s t t h e a u t h o r i t y t h a t f o r m u l a t e t h e l a $ a n d $ h i c h t h e l a $ depends. "ut the e#emptions are the unincorporated type of government andfunctioning for proprietary. .ot all government entities, $hether corporate or non1c o r p o r a t e , a r e i m m u n e t o s u i t s . ! m m u n i t y f r o m s u i t s i s d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e character of the ob'ects for $hich the entity $as organi9ed. ho$ever contendedthat $hen a sovereign state enters into a contract $ith a private person, the statecan be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individualfrom $hich Jit can be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under thecontract/ . % m o n g t h e g e n e r a l p o $ e r s o f t h e C i v i l % e r o n a u t i c s %dministration are, under section ) of ?#ecutive (rder .o. ),0, to e#ecute contracts of any @ind, topur chase property, and to grant concession rights, and under section 6, toc h a r g e l a n d i n g f e e s , r o y a l t i e s o n s a l e s t o a i r c r a f t o f a v i a t i o n g a s o l i n e , accessories and supplies, and rentals for. the use of any property under its management. These provisions confer upon Jthe Civil %eronautics %dministrationthe po$er to sue and be sued, $hich is implied from the po$er to transact privatebusiness. %nd if it has the po$er to sue and be sued on its behalf, the Civil %eronautics %dministration $ith greater reason should have the po$er toprosecute and defend suits for and against the =ational %irports Corporation,having ac&uired all the properties, funds and choses in action and assumed allthe liabilities of the latter. The petition $as denied $ith costs against the Civil %eronautics %dministration.

TITLE: PNB vs. CIR CITATION: $1 "C#A 31!

-ACT": I"".E":

)ATE:

T/E CO.#T0" #.LING:

TITLE: MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION ROMEO N. FIRME

CITATION: G%#% No% L& 21(, $, 1,,1

!. HON. "UDGE

)ATE: A4+il

-ACT": This is a petition for certiorari $ith prayer for the issuance of a $rit of preliminary mandatory in'unction see@ing the nullification or modification of the proceedings and the orders issued by the respondent Judge Romeo .. irme in Civil Case .o. *751"G, entitled AJuana Rimando "aniLa, et al. vs. =acario .ieveras, et al.A, decision dated (ctober *7, *+5+ ordering defendants =unicipality of -an ernando, 3a 4nion and %lfredo "islig to pay, 'ointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral e#penses, actual damages consisting of the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, attorneyJs fees and costs of suit and dismissing the complaint against the ?state of =acario .ieveras and "ernardo "alagot. (n (ctober *7, *+5+ the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion is hereunder &uoted as follo$s: !. V!?> ( %33 ( CsicD T8? (R?G(!.G, 'udgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs, and defendants =unicipality of -an ernando, 3a 4nion and %lfredo "islig are ordered to pay 'ointly and severally, plaintiffs Juana Rimando1"aniLa, =rs. Priscilla ". -urell, 3aureano "aniLa Jr., -or =arietta "aniLa, =rs. e ". -oriano, =ontano "aniLa, (r'a "aniLa and 3ydia ". "aniLa the sums of P*,077.77 as funeral e#penses and P/6,566./6 as the lost e#pected earnings of the late 3aureano "aniLa -r., P)7,777.77 as moral damages, and P/,077.77 as attorneyJs fees. Costs against said defendants. The Complaint is dismissed as to defendants ?state of =acario .ieveras and "ernardo "alagot. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a ne$ trial $ithout pre'udice to another motion $hich $as then pending. =otion $as first denied. inally, the

respondent 'udge issued an order dated Eecember ), *+5+ providing that if defendantsG municipality and "islig further $ish to pursue the matter disposed of in the order of July /,, *+5+, such should be elevated to a higher court in accordance $ith the Rules of Court. 8ence, this petition. Petitioner maintains that the respondent 'udge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to e#cess of 'urisdiction in issuing the aforesaid orders and in rendering a decision. urthermore, petitioner asserts that $hile appeal of the decision maybe available, the same is not the speedy and ade&uate remedy in the ordinary course of la$. (n the other hand, private respondents controvert the position of the petitioner and allege that the petition is devoid of merit, utterly lac@ing the good faith $hich is indispensable in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The controversy boils do$n to the main issue of $hether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion $hen it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non1suability of the -tate amounting to lac@ of 'urisdiction in a motion to dismiss. Issues: C*D >hether or not the 'udge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac@ of 'usrisdiction for failing to resolve defense of non1suability and holding =unicipality liable T2e Cou+50s #ulin6: !n the case at bar, the 'udge deferred the resolution of the defense of non1suability of the -tate until trial. 8o$ever, the 'udge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded $ith the trial and then rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver. The 'udge did not commit G%E $hen it arbitrarily failed to resolve the issue of non1suability of the -tate in the guise of the municipality. 8o$ever, the 'udge acted in e#cess of his 'urisdiction $hen in his decision he held the municipality liable for the &uasi1delict committed by its regular employee. The doctrine of non1suability of the -tate is e#pressly provided for in %rticle MV!, -ection ) of the Consti, to $it: Athe -tate may not be sued $ithout its consent.A ?#press consent may be embodied in a general la$ or a special la$. The standing consent of the -tate to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in %ct .o. )7F). % special la$ may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged &uasi1delict. Consent is implied $hen

the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also $hen the -tate files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. =unicipal corporations are agencies of the -tate $hen they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should en'oy the sovereign immunity from suit. .evertheless, they are sub'ect to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. % distinction should first be made bet$een suability and liability. A-uability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable la$ and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liableB on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. 3iability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allo$ed itself to be sued. >hen the state does $aive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.A %nent the issue of $hether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on $hether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. t has already been remar@ed that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. .evertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held ans$erable only if it can be sho$n that they $ere acting in a proprietary capacity. !n the case at bar, the driver of the dump truc@ of the municipality insists that Ahe $as on his $ay to the .aguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of -an ernandoJs municipal streets.A !n the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to -ection )CmD of Rule *)* of the Revised Rules of Court. 8ence, >e rule that the driver of the dump truc@ $as performing duties or tas@s pertaining to his office.>e already stressed in the case of Palafo#, et. al. vs. Province of !locos .orte, the Eistrict ?ngineer, and the Provincial Treasurer that Athe construction or maintenance of roads in $hich the truc@ and the driver $or@ed at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities.A %fter a careful e#amination of e#isting la$s and 'urisprudence, >e arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee !ho !as then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. 8ence, the death of the passenger NN tragic and deplorable though it may be NN imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.

%ll premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent 'udgeJs dereliction in failing to resolve the issue of non1suability did not amount to grave abuse of discretion. "ut said 'udge e#ceeded his 'urisdiction $hen it ruled on the issue of liability. %CC(RE!.G3O, the petition is GR%.T?E and the decision of the respondent court is hereby modified, absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private respondents.

TITLE: MERRIT

!. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

CITATION: G%#% No% L&111 ! )ATE: 1a+c2 21, 1,1'

-ACT":

!t is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that $hen the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, $hen an ambulance of the General 8ospital struc@ the plaintiff in an intersection. "y reason of the resulting collusion, the plaintiff $as so severely in'ured that, according to Er. -aleeby, he $as suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a $ound in the same place and in the bac@ part of his head, $hile blood issued from his nose and he $as entirely unconscious. The mar@s revealed that he had one or more fractures of the s@ull and that the grey matter and brain had suffered material in'ury.

4pon recovery the doctor noticed that the plaintiffGs leg sho$ed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very $ea@ and painful at the point of the fracture. ?#amination of his head revealed a notable read'ustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The damages that the plaintiff got from the collision disabled him to do this $or@ as a contractor and forced him to give up contracts he recently had.

%s the negligence $hich cause the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the in&uiry at once arises $hether the Government is legally1liable for the damages resulting therefrom. The Philippine 3egislature made an %ct C%ct .o. /605D that authori9es the plaintiff to bring suit against the GP! and authori9ing the %ttorney1 General to appear in said suit.

I"".E: 718>hether or not the Government is legally liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff

#.LING: !t is &uite clear that %ct. .o. /605 does not operate to e#tend the GovernmentGs liability to any cause not previously recogni9ed.

%ccording to paragraph 0 of %rticle *+7) of the Civil Code and the principle laid do$n in a decision, among others, of the =ay *F, *+76, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that $hich it contracts through a special agent, duly empo$ered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged $ith some definite purpose $hich gives rise to the claim, and not $here the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged $ith some administrative or technical office $ho can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid do$n by the la$ of civil responsibility. Conse&uently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of %rticles *+7/ and *+7) of the Civil Code.

!t is, therefore, evidence that the -tate CGP!D is only liable, according to the above &uoted decisions of the -upreme Court of -pain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees $hen they act as special agents $ithin the meaning of paragraph 0 of %rticle *+7), supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General 8ospital $as not such an agent.

or the foregoing reasons, the 'udgment appealed from must be reversed, $ithout costs in this instance. >hether the Government intends to ma@e itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, $hich the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, be legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefore, $e are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely $ith the 3egislature and not $ith the courts.

TITLE: USA

!. GUINTO )ATE: ebruary

CITATION: G%#% No% (''0( /,, *++7

-ac5s: The private respondents are suing several officers of the 4.-. %ir orce stationed in Clar@ %ir "ase in connection $ith the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base. (n ebruary /6, *+F,, the >estern Pacific Contracting (ffice, (@ina$a %rea ?#change, 4.-. %ir orce, solicited bids for such contracts through its contracting officer, James . -ha$. The bidding $as $on by Ramon Ei9on, over the ob'ection of the private respondents, $ho claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities, including the Civil ?ngineering %rea, $hich $as not included in the invitation to bid. The private respondents complained to the Philippine %rea ?#change CP8%MD. The latter, through its representatives, petitioners Ovonne Reeves and rederic =. -mouse e#plained that the Civil ?ngineering concession had not been a$arded to Ei9on as a result of the ebruary /6, *+F, solicitation. Ei9on $as already operating this concession, then @no$n as the .C( club concession, and the e#piration of the contract had been e#tended from June )7, *+F, to %ugust )*, *+F,. They further e#plained that the solicitation of the C? barbershop $ould be available only by the end of June and the private respondents $ould be notified. (n June )7, *+F,, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court to compel P8%M and the individual petitioners to cancel the a$ard to defendant Ei9on, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allo$ the private respondents by a $rit of preliminary in'unction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation.

4pon the filing of the complaint, the respondent court issued an ex parte order directing the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo. (n July //, *+F,, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary in'unction on the ground that the action $as in effect a suit against the 4nited -tates of %merica, $hich had not $aived its non1suability. The individual defendants, as official employees of the 4.-. %ir orce, $ere also immune from suit. (n the same date, July //, *+F,, the trial court denied the application for a $rit of preliminary in'unction. (n (ctober *7, *+FF, the trial court denied the petitionersJ motion to dismiss, holding in part as follo$s: rom the pleadings thus far presented to this Court by the parties, the CourtJs attention is called by the relationship bet$een the plaintiffs as $ell as the defendants, including the 4- Government, in that prior to the bidding or solicitation in &uestion, there $as a binding contract bet$een the plaintiffs as $ell as the defendants, including the 4- Government. "y virtue of said contract of concession it is the CourtJs understanding that neither the 4- Government nor the herein principal defendants $ould become the employerPs of the plaintiffs but that the latter are the employers themselves of the barbers, etc. $ith the employer, the plaintiffs herein, remitting the stipulated percentage of commissions to the Philippine %rea ?#change. The same circumstance $ould become in effect $hen the Philippine %rea ?#change opened for bidding or solicitation the &uestioned barber shop concessions. To this e#tent, therefore, indeed a commercial transaction has been entered, and for purposes of the said solicitation, $ould necessarily be entered bet$een the plaintiffs as $ell as the defendants. !ssues: C*D >hether or not the defendants $ere immune from suit under the RP14"ases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance if their official duties T2e Cou+50s #ulin6: % state may not be sued $ithout its consent. This doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. The rule says that the state may not be sued $ithout its consent, $hich clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.

The

consent

of

the

state

to

be

sued

may

be

manifested

e#pressly

or

impliedly. ?#press consent may be embodied in a general la$ or a special la$. Consent is implied $hen the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. >hen the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit $ith its implied consent. >aiver is also implied $hen the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. The 4-%, li@e any other state, $ill be deemed to have impliedly $aived its non1 suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the 4- %rmed forces. Therefore, petition to plead immunity $as E?.!?E. Case should be remanded to the lo$er court.

TITLE: REPUBLIC of INDONESIA CITATION: G%#% NO% 1 !(0

/,, /77) -ACT":

!. VIN#ON )ATE: June

This is a petition for revie$ on certiorari to set aside the Eecision of the Court of %ppeals dated =ay )7, /77/ and its Resolution dated %ugust *,, /77/, in C%1G.R. -P .o. ,,F+6 entitled"The #epublic of $ndonesia %is Excellency Ambassador Soeratmin and &inister 'ounselor A(hari )asim v. %on. 'esar Santamaria *residing +udge #T' ,ranch -./ &a0ati 'ity and +ames 1in(on doing business under the name and style of 1in(on Trade and Services.2

Petitioner, Republic of !ndonesia, entered into a =aintenance %greement in %ugust *++0 $ith respondent James Vin9on, sole proprietor of Vin9on Trade and -ervices. The agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified e&uipment at the ?mbassy =ain "uilding, ?mbassy %nne# "uilding and the >isma Euta, the official residence of petitioner %mbassador -oeratmin. The e&uipments covered by the agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, $ater heaters, and $ater motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and $ill rene$ itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior $ritten notice from the date of e#piry. Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of e#piration of the said agreement, they informed respondent that the rene$al of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of %dministration, $ho allegedly found respondentsG $or@ and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance $ith the standards set in the %greement. 8ence, the !ndonesian ?mbassy terminated the agreement. Petitioners claim that they had earlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement. (n the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination $as arbitrary and unla$ful. 8ence, respondent filed a complaint in the CRTCD of =a@ati. Petitioners filed a =otion to Eismiss, alleging that the Republic of !ndonesia, as a foreign sovereign -tate, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party1defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further alleged that %mbassador -oeratmin and =inister Counsellor 2asim are diplomatic agents as defined under the Vienna Convention on Eiplomatic Relations and therefore en'oy diplomatic immunity. !n turn, respondent filed on =arch /7, /77*, an (pposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of !ndonesia has e#pressly $aived its immunity from suit. 8e based this claim upon the follo$ing provision in the =aintenance %greement: CaD %ny legal action arising out of this =aintenance %greement shall be settled according to the la$s of the Philippines and by the proper court of =a@ati City, Philippines. Respondents (pposition li@e$ise alleged that %mbassador -oeratmin and =inister Counsellor 2asim can be sued and held liable in their private capacities for tortuous acts done $ith malice and bad faith. The trial court denied herein petitioners =otion to Eismiss. !t li@e$ise denied the =otion for Reconsideration subse&uently filed. The trial courts denial of the =otion to Eismiss $as brought up to the Court of %ppeals by herein petitioners in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The said petition alleged that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the Republic of !ndonesia gave its consent to be sued and voluntarily submitted itself to

the la$s and 'urisdiction of Philippine courts and that petitioners %mbassador -oeratmin and =inister Counsellor 2asim $aived their immunity from suit. Issues: C*D >hether or not the Court of %ppeals erred in sustaining the trial courtGs decision that petitioners have $aived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the abovementioned provision in the =aintenance %greement. #.LING: The petition is impressed $ith merit. !nternational la$ is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and e&uality of -tates $hich $ere adopted as part of the la$ of our land under %rticle !!, -ection / of the *+F5 Constitution. The rule that a -tate may not be sued $ithout its consent is a necessary conse&uence of the principles of independence and e&uality of -tates. %nnunciated in -anders v. Veridiano !!, the practical 'ustification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the authority that ma@es the la$ on $hich the right depends. !n the case of foreign -tates, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign e&uality of -tates, as e#pressed in the ma#im par in parem non habet imperium. %ll states are sovereign e&uals and cannot assert 'urisdiction over one another. % contrary attitude $ould unduly ve# the peace of nations. The rules of !nternational 3a$, ho$ever, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change. The increasing need of sovereign -tates to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected $ith the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a ne$ concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recogni9ed only $ith regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not $ith regard to private acts. !n 3nited States of America v. #ui( , for instance, $e held that the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a $harf at a 4nited -tates .aval -tation is an act jure imperii. (n the other hand, $e considered as an act 'ure gestionis the hiring of a coo@ in there creation center catering to %merican servicemen and the general public at the John 8ay %ir -tation in "aguio City, as $ell as the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clar@ %ir "ase in %ngeles City. The petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 668 ! are RE"ERSED and SET AS#DE and the co$plaint in Ci%il Case No. &8'() a*ainst petitioners is D#S+#SSED.

TITLE:

U.S.A. vs. RUI#

CITATION: )ATE: 1ay 22, 1,$

-ACT":

13'

"C#A

!$(

The 4nited -tates of %merica had a naval base in -ubic, Qambales. The base $as one of those provided in the =ilitary "ases %greement bet$een the Philippines and the 4nited -tates. 4- invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. ?ligio de Gu9man R Co., !nc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied $ith the re&uests based on the letters received from the 4.-. % letter $as received by the ?ligio Ee Gu9man R Co in June *+5/ indicating that the company did not &ualify to receive an a$ard for the pro'ects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea $all at the boat landings of the 4.-. .aval -tation in -ubic "ay. The company sued the 4nited -tates of %merica and =essrs. James ?. Gallo$ay, >illiam !. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the ?ngineering Command of the 4.-. .avy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allo$ the plaintiff to perform the $or@ on the pro'ects and, in the event that specific performance $as no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also as@ed for the issuance of a $rit of preliminary in'unction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts $ith third parties for $or@ on the pro'ects. The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of &uestioning the 'urisdiction of this court over the sub'ect matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the sub'ect matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant 4nited -tates of %merica, a foreign sovereign $hich has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint. -ubse&uently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint $hich included an opposition to the issuance of the $rit of preliminary in'unction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the $rit. The defendants moved t$ice to reconsider but to no avail. 8ence the instant petition $hich see@s to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case .o. 55+1= for lac@ of 'urisdiction on the part of the trial court.

I"".E": C*D >hether or not the 4- naval base in bidding for said contracts e#ercise governmental functions to be able to invo@e state immunity.

T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: The traditional rule of -tate immunity e#empts a -tate from being sued in the courts of another -tate $ithout its consent or $aiver. This rule is a necessary conse&uence of the principles of independence and e&uality of -tates. 8o$ever, the rules of !nternational 3a$ are not petrifiedB they are constantly developing and evolving. %nd because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them1bet$een sovereign and governmental acts C'ure imperiiD and private, commercial and proprietary acts C'ure gestionisD. The result is that -tate immunity no$ e#tends only to acts 'ure imperil Csovereign R governmental actsD. The restrictive application of -tate immunity is proper only $hen the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. -tated differently, a -tate may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only $hen it enters into business contracts. !t does not apply $here the contract relates to the e#ercise of its sovereign functions. !n this case the pro'ects are an integral part of the naval base $hich is devoted to the defense of both the 4nited -tates and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest orderB they are not utili9ed for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. Correct test for the application of -tate immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a -tate but the legal nature of the act. The petition $as grantedB the &uestioned orders of the respondent 'udge are set aside and Civil Case .o. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

TITLE:

FROILAN vs. PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING No% L '0'0

CITATION: G%#% )ATE: "e45embe+ 30, 1, !

-ACT": (n ebruary ), *+0*, plaintiff1appellee, ernando %. roilan, filed a complaint

against the defendant1appellant, Pan (riental -hipping Co., alleging that he purchased a vessel from the -hipping Commission and agreeing to pay the balance in installmentsB that to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he e#ecuted a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the -hipping CommissionB that for various reason, among them the non1payment of the installments, the -hipping Commission too@ possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelledB that the -hipping Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant1appellant Pan (riental -hipping Co. sub'ect to the approval of the President of the PhilippinesB that he appealed the action of the -hipping Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting on %ugust /0, *+07, the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original contract $ith the -hipping CommissionB that he had repeatedly demanded from the Pan (riental -hipping Co. the possession of the vessel in &uestion but the latter refused to do so. 8e, therefore, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a $rit of replevin be issued for the sei9ure of said vessel $ith all its e&uipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be ad'udged to have the rightful possession thereof. (n ebruary ), *+0*, the lo$er court issued the $rit of replevin prayed for by

roilan and by virtue thereof the Pan (riental -hipping Co. $as divested of its possession of said vessel. The defendant filed its ans$er denying the right of roilan to the possession of the said vessel. %fter the leave of the lo$er court had been obtained, the intervenor1appellee, Government of the Republic f the Philippines, filed a complaint in intervention alleging that roilan failed to pay the -hipping Commission the balance due on the purchase price of the vessel in &uestion. The Pan (riental -hipping Co. filed an ans$er to the complaint in intervention alleging that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines $as obligated to deliver the vessel in &uestion to it by virtue of a contract of bare1boat charter $ith option to purchase e#ecuted on June *,, *+6+, by the latter in favor of the formerB it also alleged that it had made necessary and useful e#penses on the vessel and

claimed the right of retention of the vessel. !t, therefore, prayed that, if the Republic of the Philippines succeeded in obtaining possession of the said vessel, to comply $ith its obligations of delivering to it CPan (riental -hipping co.D or causing its delivery by recovering it from roilan. % motion to dismiss the counterclaim interposed by the defendant in its ans$er to the complaint in intervention $as filed.

I"".E": C*D >hether or not the Court has 'urisdiction over the intervenor government of the Republic of the Philippines in connection $ith the counterclaim of the defendant Pan (riental -hipping Co. T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: The lo$er court erred as the intervenor had not made any claim against the defendant, the latterJs counterclaim had no foundation. The complaint in intervention sought to recover possession of the vessel in &uestion from the plaintiff, and this claim is logically adverse to the position assumed by the defendant that it has a better right to said possession than the plaintiff $ho alleges in his complaint that he is entitled to recover the vessel from the defendant. %t any rate a counterclaim should be 'udged by its o$n allegations, and not by the averments of the adverse party. !t should be recalled that the defendantJs theory is that the plaintiff had already lost his rights under the contract $ith the -hipping %dministration and that, on the other hand, the defendant is relying on the charter contract e#ecuted in its favor by the intervenor $hich is bound to protect the defendant in its possession of the vessel. !n other $ords, the counterclaim calls for specific performance on the part of the intervenor. %s to $hether this counterclaim is meritorious is another &uestion $hich is not no$ before us. The defendantJs counterclaim $as dismissed for the reason that the -tate is immune from suit. This is untenable, because by filing its complaint in intervention the Government in effect $aived its right of non1suability. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its o$n courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. !n short, by ta@ing the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes do$n to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically ac&uires, $ithin certain limits,

the right to set up $hatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state. The 4nited -tates -upreme Court thus e#plains: A.o direct suit can be maintained against the 4nited -tates. "ut $hen an action is brought by the 4nited -tates to recover money in the hands of a party $ho has a legal claim against them, it $ould be a very rigid principle to deny to him the right of setting up such claim in a court of 'ustice, and turn him around to an application to Congress.A C-inco, Philippine Political 3a$, Tenth ?d., pp. ),1)5, citing 4. -. vs. Ringgold, F Pet. *07, F 3. ed. F++.D !t is ho$ever, contended for the intervenor that, if there $as at all any $aiver, it $as in favor of the plaintiff against $hom the complaint in intervention $as directed. This contention is untenable. %s already stated, the complaint in intervention $as in a sense in derogation of the defendantJs claim over the possession of the vessel in &uestion. The appealed order $as reversed and set aside and the case remanded to the lo$er court for further proceedings. -o ordered, $ithout costs.

TITLE:

AMIGABLE vs. CUENCA "C#A 3'0

CITATION: !3 )ATE: -eb+ua+y 2,, 1,(2

-ACT":

The appellant herein, Victoria %migable, is the registered o$ner of 3ot .o. ,)+ of the "anilad ?state in Cebu City. %t the bac@ of her Transfer Certificate of Title C*+/6D, there $as no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. >ithout prior e#propriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot, $ith an area of ,,*,5 s&uare meters, for the construction of the =ango and Gorordo %venues. (n =arch /5, *+0F %migableJs counsel $rote the President of the Philippines, re&uesting payment of the portion of her lot $hich had been appropriated by the government. The claim $as indorsed to the %uditor General, $ho disallo$ed it in his +th !ndorsement dated Eecember +, *+0F. % copy of said indorsement $as transmitted to %migableJs counsel by the (ffice of the President on January 5, *+0+. (n ebruary ,, *+0+ %migable filed in the court a &uo a complaint, $hich $as later amended on %pril *5, *+0+ upon motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and .icolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public

8igh$ays for the recovery of o$nership and possession of the ,,*,5 s&uare meters of land traversed by the =ango and Gorordo %venues. -he also sought the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P07,777.77 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages in the sum of P/0,777.77, attorneyJs fees in the sum of P0,777.77 and the costs of the suit. (n July /+, *+0+ said court rendered its decision holding that it had no 'urisdiction over the plaintiffJs cause of action for the recovery of possession and o$nership of the portion of her lot in &uestion on the ground that the government cannot be sued $ithout its consentB that it had neither original nor appellate 'urisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiffJs claim for compensatory damages in the sum of P07,777.77, the same being a money claim against the governmentB and that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it have 'urisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued. %ccordingly, the complaint $as dismissed. %migable appealed to the Court of %ppeals, 4nable to secure reconsideration, $hich subse&uently certified the case to us, there being no &uestion of fact involved.

I"".E": C*D >hether or not the appellant, %migable may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.

T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: =inisterio vs. Court of irst !nstance of Cebu: $here the government ta@es a$ay

property from a private lando$ner for public use $ithout going through the legal process of e#propriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government $ithout thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit $ithout its consent Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the bac@ of her certificate of title and that she has not e#ecuted any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the o$ner of the $hole lot.

%s registered o$ner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in &uestion at any time because possession is one of the attributes of o$nership. 8o$ever, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is no$ and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to ma@e due compensation $hich it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the ta@ing The plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it $as ta@en up to the time that payment is made by the government. The government should pay for attorneyJs fees, the amount of $hich should be fi#ed by the trial court after hearing. The government is .(T immune to the suit. The decision appealed from $as set aside and the case remanded to the court a &uo for the determination of compensation, including attorneyJs fees, to $hich the appellant is entitled as above indicated. .o pronouncement as to costs.

TITLE:

BASCO vs. PAGCOR G%#% No% ,1'!,

CITATION: )ATE: 1ay 1!, 1,,1

-ACT": Petitioners see@ to annul the P%GC(R charter PE *F,+ for being allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, monopolistic R tends to$ard Hcrony economy because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because:

!t constitutes a $aiver of a right pre'udicial to a third person $ith a right recogni9ed by la$. !t $aived the =anila City governmentJs right to impose ta#es and license fees, $hich is recogni9ed by la$B

or the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the la$ has intruded into the local governmentJs right to impose local ta#es and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomyB

!t violates the e&ual protection clause of the constitution in that it legali9es P%GC(R K conducted gambling, $hile most other forms of gambling are outla$ed, together $ith prostitution, drug traffic@ing and other vicesB

!t violates the avo$ed trend of the Cory government a$ay from monopolistic and crony economy, and to$ard free enterprise and privati9ation. Cp. /, %mended PetitionB p. 5, #olloD

!n their -econd %mended Petition, petitioners also claim that PE *F,+ is contrary to the declared national policy of the Ane$ restored democracyA and the peopleJs $ill as e#pressed in the *+F5 Constitution. The decree is said to have a Agambling ob'ectiveA and therefore is contrary to -ections **, */ and *) of %rticle !!, -ec. * of %rticle V!!! and -ection ) C/D of %rticle M!V, of the present Constitution Cp. ), -econd %mended PetitionB p. /*, #olloD. The procedural issue is $hether petitioners, as ta#payers and practicing la$yers Cpetitioner "asco being also the Chairman of the Committee on 3a$s of the City Council of =anilaD, can &uestion and see@ the annulment of PE *F,+ on the alleged grounds mentioned above.

I"".E": C*D >hether or not PE *F,+ is constitutional.

T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: ?very la$ has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. or a la$ to be

nullified, it must be sho$n that there is a clear R une&uivocal breach of the Constitution. The grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.

The &uestion of $hether PE *F,+ is a $ise legislation is up for Congress to determine. The po$er of 3G4s to regulate gambling through the grant of franchises, licenses or permits $as $ithdra$n by PE 55*, and is no$ vested e#clusively on the .ational Government. .ecessarily, the po$er to demandPcollect license fees is no longer vested in the City of =anila. 3G4s have no po$er to ta# Government instrumentalities. P%GC(R, being a G(CC, is therefore e#empt from local ta#es. The .ational Government is supreme over local governments. %s such, mere creatures of the -tate cannot defeat national policies using the po$er to ta# as a Htool for regulationI. The po$er to ta# cannot be allo$ed to defeat an instrumentality of the very entity $hich has the inherent po$er to $ield it. The po$er of 3G4s to impose ta#es R fees is al$ays sub'ect to limitation provided by Congress. The principle of local autonomy does not ma@e 3G4s sovereign $ithin a state, it simply means decentrali9ation. % la$ doesnGt have to operate in e&ual force on all personsPthings. The e&ual protection clause doesnGt preclude classification of individuals $ho may be accorded different treatment under the la$ as long as the classification is not unreasonableParbitrary. The mere fact that some gambling activities are legali9ed under certain conditions, $hile others are prohibited, does not render the applicable la$s unconstitutional. The petition $as E!-=!--?E for lac@ of merit.

TITLE:

TOLENTINO e5 al %s. COMELEC

CITATION: G%#% )ATE: Janua+y 21, 200!

-ACT":

No%

1!$33!

Petitioners assailed the manner by $hich the simultaneous regular and special elections of /77* $ere conducted by the C(=?3?C. Petitioners contend that C(=?3?C issued Resolution .o. 7*1770 $ithout 'urisdiction because: C*D it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as re&uired under -ection / of Republic %ct .o. ,,60 CHR.%. .o. ,,60ID C/D it failed to re&uire senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy $hether they see@ election under the special or regular elections as allegedly re&uired under -ection 5) of "atas Pambansa "lg. FF*B *;0< and, conse&uently, C)D it failed to specify in the Voters !nformation -heet the candidates see@ing election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly re&uired under -ection 6, paragraph 6 of Republic %ct .o. ,,6, CHR.%. .o. ,,6,ID. Petitioners add that because of these omissions, C(=?3?C canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the *6 =ay /77* elections $ithout distinction such that Hthere $ere no t$o separate -enate elections held simultaneously but 'ust a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.I -tated other$ise, petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as $ell as in the canvassing of their results. To support their claim, petitioners cite the special elections simultaneously held $ith the regular elections of *) .ovember *+0* and F .ovember *+00 to fill the seats vacated by -enators ernando 3ope9 and Carlos P. Garcia, respectively, $ho became Vice1Presidents during their tenures in the -enate./;F< Petitioners point out that in those elections, C(=?3?C separately canvassed the votes cast for the senatorial candidates running under the regular elections from the votes cast for the candidates running under the special elections. C(=?3?C also separately proclaimed the $inners in each of those elections. Thirteen senators $ere proclaimed from the said election $ith the *)th placer to serve that of the remaining term of -en. Guingona, $ho vacated a seat in the senate. Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, conse&uently, the declaration of the *)th elected senator.

* /

!n their Comments, C(=?3?C, 8onasan, and Recto all claim that a special election to fill the seat vacated by -enator Guingona $as validly held on *6 =ay /77*. C(=?3?C and 8onasan further raise preliminary issues on the mootness of the petition and on petitionersG standing to litigate. 8onasan also claims that the petition, $hich see@s the nullity of his proclamation as -enator, is actually a &uo $arranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for lac@ of 'urisdiction. or his part, Recto, as the */th ran@ing -enator, contends he is not a proper party to this case because the petition only involves the validity of the proclamation of the *) th placer in the *6 =ay /77* senatorial elections.

I"".E": C*D >hether or not the Court has 'urisdiction over the issue. C/D >hether or not the petition is moot. C)D >hether or not the -pecial ?lection for a -ingle, Three1Oear Term -enatorial -eat $as Validly 8eld on *6 =ay /77*.

T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: The Court has 'urisdiction because $hat petitioners $ere &uestioning $as the validity of the special election on *6 =ay /77* in $hich 8onasan $as elected and not to determine 8onasanGs right in the e#ercise of his office as -enator proper under a &uo $arranto. (n the issue of mootness, it $as held that courts $ill decide a &uestion other$ise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading revie$. Regarding the validity of the ?lection, the Court held that the =ay *6, /77* ?lection $as valid. The Court held that C(=?3?CGs ailure to Give .otice of the Time of the -pecial ?lection as re&uired under R% ,,60, as amended, did .ot .egate the Calling of such ?lection. -ection / of R.%. .o. ,,60 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the -enate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously $ith the ne#t succeeding regular election. The la$ charges the voters $ith @no$ledge of this statutory notice and C(=?3?CGs failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it. urther, there $as .o Proof that C(=?3?CGs ailure to Give .otice of the (ffice to be illed and the =anner of Eetermining the >inner in the -pecial ?lection =isled Voters. !T could not be said that the voters $ere not informed since there had been other accessible information resources.

inally, the Court held that unless there had been a patent sho$ing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court $ill not interfere $ith the affairs and conduct of the C(=?3?C.

TITLE:

$URODA vs. "ALANDONI $3 3/IL 1(1

CITATION: )ATE: 1a+c2 2', 1,!,

-ACT":

ormer 3ieutenant1General, -hinegori 2uroda of the Japanese !mperial %rmy and Commanding General of the Japanese !mperial orces in the Philippines $ere charged before the Philippine =ilitary Commission for $ar crimes. %s he $as the commanding general during such period of $ar, he $as tried for failure to discharge his duties and permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of the la$s and customs of $ar. !n support of his case petitioner tenders the follo$ing principal arguments. C*D AThat ?#ecutive (rder .o. ,F is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of our constitutional la$ but also our local la$s to say nothing of the fact CthatD the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the 8ague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering 3and >arfare and therefore petitioners is charged of JcrimesJ not based on la$, national and international.A 8ence petitioner argues K AThat in vie$ off the fact that this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional la$ an illegal order this commission is $ithout 'urisdiction to try herein petitioner.A C/D That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the Commission in behalf of the 4nited -tate of %merica of attorneys =elville 8ussey and Robert Port $ho are not attorneys authori9ed by the -upreme Court to practice la$ in the Philippines is a diminution of our personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not &ualified to practice la$ in the Philippines. C)D That %ttorneys 8ussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the 4nited -tate not being a party in interest in the case.

?#ecutive (rder .o. ,F, establishing a .ational >ar Crimes (ffice prescribing rule and regulation governing the trial of accused $ar criminals, $as issued by the President of the Philippines on the /+th days of July, *+65 This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. A+5icle 2 o9 ou+ Cons5i5u5ion 4+o*ides in i5s sec5ion 3, that HThe Philippines renounces $ar as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international la$ as part of the of the nationI. 2uroda, in his petition, argues that the =ilitary Commission is not a valid court because the la$ that created it, ?#ecutive (rder .o. ,F, is unconstitutional. 8e further contends that using as basis the 8ague ConventionGs Rules and Regulations covering 3and >arfare for the $ar crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines $as not a signatory of such rules in such convention.

urthermore, he alleges that the 4nited -tates is not a party of interest in the case and that the t$o 4- prosecutors cannot practice la$ in the Philippines. I"".E": C*D >hether or not ?#ecutive (rder .o. ,F is constitutional. C/D >hether or not the 4- is a party of interest to this case.

T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: The -upreme Court ruled that ?#ecutive (rder .o. ,F, creating the .ational >ar Crimes (ffice and prescribing rules on the trial of accused $ar criminals, is constitutional as it is aligned $ith "ec 3, A+5icle II of the Constitution $hich states that HThe Philippines renounces $ar as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international la$ as part of the la$ of the nation.I The generally accepted principles of international la$ include those formed during the 8ague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other international 'urisprudence established by 4nited .ations. These include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, $ho have been guilty of planning, preparing or $aging a $ar of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses in violation of la$s and customs of $ar, are to be held accountable. !n the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines abides by these principles and therefore has a right to try persons that commit such crimes and most especially $hen it is committed against its citi9ens. !t abides $ith it even if it

$as not a signatory to these conventions by the mere incorporation of such principles in the constitution. The 4nited -tates is a party of interest because the country and its people have been e&ually, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes $ith $hich the petitioner is charged for. "y virtue of ?#ecutive (rder .o. ,F, the =ilitary Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special la$. The Court )ENIE) the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of ?.(. .o. ,F.

TITLE:

PHILIP MORRIS vs. COURT OF APPEALS G%#% No% ,1332

CITATION: )ATE: July 1', 1,,3

-ACT": Petitioners, Philip =orris, !nc., "enson and 8edges CCanadaD, !nc., and abri&ues of Tabac Reunies, -.%., are ascribing $himsical e#ercise of the faculty conferred upon magistrates by -ection ,, Rule 0F of the Revised Rules of Court $hen respondent Court of appeals lifted the $rit of preliminary in'unction it earlier issued against ortune Tobacco Corporation, herein private respondent, from manufacturing and selling H=%R2I cigarettes in the local mar@et. "an@ing on the thesis that petitionersG respective symbols H=%R2 V!!I, H=%R2 T?.I, and H=%R2I, also for cigarettes, must be protected against unauthori9ed appropriation. or its part, ortune Tobacco Corporation admitted petitionersJ certificates of

registration $ith the Philippine Patent (ffice sub'ect to the affirmative and special defense on mis'oinder of party plaintiffs. Private respondent alleged further that it has been authori9ed by the "ureau of !nternal Revenue to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the trademar@ A=%R2A, and that A=%R2A is a common $ord

$hich cannot be e#clusively appropriated Cp.*0F, Court of %ppeals #ollo in %.C.1G.R. -P .o. *)*)/D. Philip =orris, !ncorporated is a corporation organi9ed under the la$s of the -tate of Virginia, 4nited -tates of %merica, and does business at *77 Par@ %venue, .e$ Oor@, .e$ Oor@, 4nited -tates of %merica. The t$o other plaintiff foreign corporations, $hich are $holly1o$ned subsidiaries of Philip =orris, !nc., are similarly not doing business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated transaction. Plaintiffs1 petitioners asserted that defendant ortune Tobacco Corporation has no

right to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly similar trademar@. Plaintiffs admit in the complaint that they are not doing business in the Philippines and are suing on an isolated transaction. This simply means that they are not engaged in the sale, manufacture, importation, e#portation and advertisement of their cigarette products in the Philippines.

I"".E": C*D >hether or not there has been an invasion o plaintiffsJ right of property to such trademar@ or trade name. C/D >hether or not the !nternational %greement on protection of trademar@s is violated.

T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: There is no proof $hatsoever that any of the plaintiffsG products $hich they see@ to protect from any adverse effect of the trademar@ applied for by the defendant, is in actual use and available for commercial purposes any$here in the Philippines. To sustain a successful prosecution of their suit for infringement, petitioners as foreign corporations not engaged in local commerce, rely on "ec5ion 21&A of the Trademar@ 3a$ reading as follo$s: "ec5ion 21&A : %ny foreign corporation or 'uristic person to $hich a mar@ or trade1 name has been registered or assigned under this act may bring an action hereunder for infringement, for unfair competition, or false designation of origin and false description, $hether or not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines under %ct .umbered ourteen hundred and fiftynine, as amended, other$ise @no$n as the Corporation 3a$, at the time it brings complaint: Provided, That the country of $hich the said foreign corporation or 'uristic person is a citi9en or in $hich it is domiciled, by treaty, convention or la$, grants a similar privilege to corporate or

'uristic persons of the Philippines. C%s inserted by -ection 5 of Republic %ct .o. ,)FD To drive home the point that they are not precluded from initiating a cause of action in the Philippines on account of the principal perception that another entity is pirating their symbol $ithout any la$ful authority to do so. The petition $as E!-=!--?E and the Resolutions of the Court of %ppeals dated -eptember *6, *+F+ and .ovember /+, *+F+ are hereby % !R=?E.

TITLE:

SECRETARY OF "USTICE vs. LANTION No% 13,!'

CITATION: G%#% )ATE: Janua+y 1$, 2000

-ACT": President erdinand ?. =arcos on January *), *+55 issued Presidential Eecree .o. *7,+ APrescribing the Procedure for the ?#tradition of Persons >ho 8ave Committed Crimes in a oreign CountryA. The Eecree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the ConstitutionB the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state $here it $as committed and the state $here the criminal may have escapedB the e#tradition treaty $ith the Republic of !ndonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties $ith other interested countriesB and the need for rules to guide the e#ecutive department and the courts

in the proper implementation of said treaties Chereinafter referred to as the RP14?#tradition TreatyD. The -enate, by $ay of Resolution .o. **, e#pressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. !t also e#pressed its concurrence in the Eiplomatic .otes correcting Paragraph 7 8 7a8, A+5icle ( thereof Con the admissibility of the documents accompanying an e#tradition re&uest upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the re&uested state resident in the Re&uesting -tateD. (n .ovember *), *++6, then -ecretary of Justice ran@lin =. Erilon, representing

the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in =anila the A?#tradition Treaty bet$een the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the 4nited -tates of %mericaA. (n June *F, *+++, the Eepartment of Justice received from the Eepartment of oreign %ffairs 4.-. .ote Verbale .o. 70// containing a re&uest for the e#tradition of private respondent =ar@ Jimene9 to the 4nited -tates. %ttached to the .ote Verbale $ere the Grand Jury !ndictment, the $arrant of arrest issued by the 4.-. Eistrict Court, -outhern Eistrict of lorida, and other supporting documents for said e#tradition. "ased on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the 4nited -tates $ith violation of the follo$ing provisions of the 4nited -tates Code C4-CD.

I"".E": C*D >hether or not there is a conflict bet$een the treaty and the due process clause in the ConstitutionS

T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: .o, these t$o components of the la$ of the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to choose $hich of the t$o should be upheld. !nstead, $e see a void in the provisions of the RP14- ?#tradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Eecree .o. *7,+, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective e#traditee at the evaluation stage of e#tradition proceedings. rom the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the e#tradition petition and during the 'udicial determination of the propriety of e#tradition, the rights of notice and

hearing are clearly granted to the prospective e#traditee. 8o$ever, prior thereto, the la$ is silent as to these rights. Reference to the 4.-. e#tradition procedures also manifests this silence. !n the absence of a la$ or principle of la$, $e must apply the rules of fair play. %n application of the basic t$in due process rights of notice and hearing $ill not go against the treaty or the implementing la$. .either the Treaty nor the ?#tradition 3a$ precludes these rights from a prospective e#traditee. The doctrine of incorporation is applied $henever municipal tribunals Cor local courtsD are confronted $ith situations in $hich there appears to be a conflict bet$een a rule of international la$ and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. ?fforts should first be e#erted to harmoni9e them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal la$ $as enacted $ith proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international la$ in observance of the observance of the !ncorporation Clause in the above1cited constitutional provision. This Court hereby (rders the respondents, namely: the -ecretary of Justice, the -ecretary of oreign %ffairs and the Eirector of the .ational "ureau of !nvestigation, their agents andPor representatives to maintain the status &uo by refraining from committing the acts complained ofB from conducting further proceedings in connection $ith the re&uest of the 4nited -tates Government for the e#tradition of the petitionerB from filing the corresponding Petition $ith a Regional Trial courtB and from performing any act directed to the e#tradition of the petitioner to the 4nited -tates, for a period of t$enty C/7D days from service on respondents of this (rder, pursuant to -ection 0, Rule 0F of the *++5 Rules of Court. The hearing as to $hether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary in'unction, as agreed upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is set on %ugust *5, *+++ at +:77 oGcloc@ in the morning. The respondents are, li@e$ise, ordered to file their $ritten comment andPor opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary !n'unction on or before said date. Petition $as E!-=!--?E for lac@ of merit.

TITLE:

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES vs. PURGANAN No% 1!$ (1

CITATION: G%#% )ATE: "e45embe+ 2!, 2002

-ACT": The 4nited -tates Government, in pursuant to the e#isting RP14- ?#tradition Treaty, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government .ote Verbale .o. 70// dated June *,, *+++, supplemented by .ote .os. 70+5, 75/7 and 7F7+ and accompanied by duly authenticated documents re&uesting the e#tradition of =ar@ ". Jimene9, also @no$n as =ario "atacan Crespo. 4pon receipt of the .otes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs C- %D transmitted them to the secretary of 'ustice C-(JD for appropriate action, pursuant to -ection 0 of Presidential Eecree CPED .o. *7,+, also @no$n as the ?#tradition 3a$. 4pon learning of the re&uest for his e#tradition, Jimene9 sought and $as granted a Temporary Restraining (rder CTR(D by the RTC of =anila, "ranch /0. The TR( prohibited the Eepartment of Justice CE(JD from filing $ith the RTC a petition for his e#tradition. The validity of the TR( $as, ho$ever, assailed by the -(J in a Petition before this Court in the said GR .o. *)+6,0. !nitially, the Court 11 by a vote of +1, 11dismissed the Petition. The -(J $as ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the e#tradition re&uest and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period $ithin $hich to file a comment and supporting evidence. %cting on the =otion for Reconsideration filed by the -(J, this Court issued its (ctober *5, /777 Resolution.
+

"y an identical vote of +1, 11 after three 'ustices

changed their votes 11 it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Eecision. !t held that private respondent $as bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the e#tradition process. This Resolution has become final and e#ecutory. inding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the 4nited -tates of %merica, represented by the Philippine E(J filed $ith the RTC on =ay *F, /77*, the appropriate Petition for ?#tradition $hich $as doc@eted as ?#tradition Case .o. 7**+/7,*. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimene9 $as the sub'ect of an arrest $arrant issued by the 4nited -tates Eistrict Court for the -outhern Eistrict of lorida on %pril *0, *+++. The $arrant had been issued in connection $ith the follo$ing charges in !ndictment .o. ++177/F* CR1-?!TQ: C*D conspiracy to defraud the 4nited -tates and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title *F 4- Code -ection )5* C/D ta# evasion, in violation of Title /, 4- Code -ection 5/7* C)D $ire fraud, in violation of Title *F 4- Code -ections *)6) and / C6D false statements, in violation of Title *F 4- Code -ections *77* and / C0D illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title / 4- Code -ections 66*b, 66*f and 6)5gCdD and Title *F 4- Code -ection /.

!n order to prevent the flight of Jimene9, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his Aimmediate arrestA pursuant to -ection , of PE .o. *7,+. "efore the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimene9 filed before it an A4rgent =anifestationP?#1Parte =otion,A
*7

$hich prayed that petitionerGs application for an

arrest $arrant be set for hearing. !n its assailed =ay /), /77* (rder, the RTC granted the =otion of Jimene9 and set the case for hearing on June 0, /77*. !n that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allo$ing the accused in an e#tradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a $arrant of arrest. %fter the hearing, the court a &uo re&uired the parties to submit their respective memoranda. !n his =emorandum, Jimene9 sought an alternative prayer: that in case a $arrant should issue, he be allo$ed to post bail in the amount of P*77,777. The alternative prayer of Jimene9 $as also set for hearing on June *0, /77*. Thereafter, the court belo$ issued its &uestioned July ), /77* (rder, directing the issuance of a $arrant for his arrest and fi#ing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.
**

%fter he had surrendered his passport and posted the

re&uired cash bond, Jimene9 $as granted provisional liberty via the challenged (rder dated July 6, /77*. I"".E": C*D >hether or not Jimene9 is entitled to notice and hearing before a $arrant for his arrest can be issued. C/D >hether or not he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty $hile the e#tradition proceedings are pending.

T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: %s a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court $ill not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain e#ceptions: C*D $hen the issue raised is purely of la$, C/D $hen public interest is involved, or C)D in case of urgency. C6D the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine &ua non, $hen the &uestions

raised are the same as those that have already been s&uarely argued and e#haustively passed upon by the lo$er court.

%side from being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure &uestions of la$ that are of public interest. 8ence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed $ith. 3i@e$ise, this Court has allo$ed a direct invocation of its original 'urisdiction to issue $rits of certiorari $hen there are special and important reasons therefore, The -upreme Court has the full discretionary po$er to ta@e cogni9ance of the petition filed directly ;before< it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues rose, $arrant. This has been the 'udicial policy to be observed and $hich has been reiterated in subse&uent cases, namely: 4y vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. %rran9, "ercero vs. Ee Gu9man, and, %dvincula vs. 3egaspi, et. al. %s $e have further stated in Cuaresma: H% direct invocation of the -upreme CourtGs original 'urisdiction to issue these $rits should be allo$ed only $hen there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the petitionI. This is established policy. The Petition $as GR%.T?E. The assailed RTC (rder dated =ay /), /77* $as declared .433 and V(!E, $hile the challenged (rder dated July ), /77* $as -?T %-!E? insofar as it granted bail to Respondent =ar@ Jimene9. The bail bond posted by private respondent $as C%.C?33?E. The Regional Trial Court of =anila $as directed to conduct the e#tradition proceedings before it, $ith all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our ?#tradition Treaty $ith the 4nited -tates as $ell as our ?#tradition 3a$. .o costs.

TITLE:

ICHONG vs. HERNANDE# 101 3/IL 11

CITATION: )ATE: 1ay 31, 1, (

-ACT":

Republic %ct **F7 entitled H%n %ct to Regulate the Retail "usinessI Nnationali9es the retail trade business. The main provisions of the %ct are: C*D prohibition against persons, not citi9ens of the Phils., and against associations, partnerships and corporations the capital of $hich are not $holly o$ned by citi9ens of the Phils., from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade C/D prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business. Petitioner, for and in his o$n behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic %ct **F7, brought this action to obtain a 'udicial declaration that said %ct is unconstitutional because it denies to alien residents the e&ual protection of the la$s and deprives of their liberty and property $ithout due process of la$ and that it violates international treaties. !n ans$er, the solicitor1General and the iscal of the City of =anila contend that the %ct $as passed in the valid e#ercise of the police po$er of the -tate, $hich e#ercise is authori9ed in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival and that no treaty or international obligations are infringed. I"".E": C*D >hether or not Republic %ct **F7 is a valid e#ercise of police po$er. T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: Police po$er has become almost impossible to limit its s$eep. %s it derives its e#istence from the very e#istence of the -tate itself, it does not need to be e#pressed or defined in its scopeB it is said to be coTe#tensive $ith selfTprotection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. ?specially is it so under a modern democratic frame$or@ $here the demands of society and of nations have

multiplied to almost unimaginable proportionsB the field and scope of police po$er has become almost boundless, 'ust as the fields of public interest and public $elfare have become almost allTembracing and have transcended human foresight. (ther$ise stated, as $e cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and $elfare in this constantly changing and progressive $orld, so $e cannot delimit beforehand the e#tent or scope of police po$er by $hich and through $hich the -tate see@s to attain or achieve interest or $elfare.

-o it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or e#tent of the police po$er of the -tateB $hat they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the e&ual protection clause. Resuming $hat $e have set forth above $e hold that the disputed la$ $as enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citi9ens and country from dominance and controlB that the enactment clearly falls $ithin the scope of the police po$er of the -tate, thru $hich and by $hich it protects its o$n personality and insures its security and futureB that the la$ does not violate the e&ual protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds e#ist for the distinction bet$een alien and citi9en in the e#ercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of la$ clause, because the la$ is prospective in operation and recogni9es the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilegeB that the $isdom and efficacy of the la$ to carry out its ob'ectives appear to us to be plainly evident K as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary K and that in any case such matter falls $ithin the prerogative of the 3egislature, $ith $hose po$er and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfereB that the provisions of the la$ are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affectedB and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict $ith treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the sub'ect and the police po$er may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. The petitions are E!-=!--?E. .o pronouncement as to costs

TITLE:

GON#ALES vs. HECHANOVA , "C#A 230

CITATION: )ATE: Oc5obe+ 22, 1,'3

-ACT": Respondent ?#ecutive -ecretary authori9ed the importation of ,5,777 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Thereupon, herein petitioner, Ramon %. Gon9ales, a rice planter, and president of the !loilo Palay and Corn Planters %ssociation, filed the petition herein, averring that, in ma@ing or attempting to ma@e said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents Hare acting $ithout 'urisdiction or in e#cess of 'urisdiction,I because Republic %ct .o. //75, e#plicitly, prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the HRice and Corn %dministration or any other government agency.I Respondents $ere re&uired to file their ans$er to the petition $hich they did, and petitionerJs pray for a $rit of preliminary in'unction $as set for hearing at $hich both parties appeared and argued orally. =oreover, a memorandum $as filed, shortly thereafter, by the respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution said incident may re&uire some pronouncements that $ould be more appropriate in a decision on the merits of the case, the same $as set for hearing on the merits thereafter. The parties, ho$ever, $aived the right to argue orally, although counsel for respondents filed their memoranda. Respondents allege, ho$ever, that said provisions of Republic %ct .os. //75 and )60/, prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any Agovernment agencyA, do not apply to importations Amade by the Government itselfA, because the latter is not a Agovernment agencyA. This theory is devoid of merit. The Eepartment of .ational Eefense and the %rmed orces of the Philippines, as $ell as respondents herein,

and each and every officer and employee of our Government, our government agencies andPor agents.

I"".E": C*D >hether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts.

T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled in the affirmative by providing in -ection / of %rticle V!!! thereof, that the -upreme Court may not be deprived Hof its 'urisdiction to revie$, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or $rit of error as the la$ or the rules of court may provide, final 'udgments and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in $hich the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, la$, ordinance, or e#ecutive order, or regulation is in &uestion.I

!n other $ords, our Constitution authori9es the nullification of a treaty, not only $hen it conflicts $ith the fundamental la$, but also, $hen it runs counter to an act of Congress. The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts $ith Vietnam and "urma does not render this case academic. Republic %ct .o. //75 en'oins our government not from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, e#cept under the conditions prescribed in said %ct. % 'udicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation $ould not compel our Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted $ith the sellers of rice in &uestion because aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied $ithout importing the said commodity into the Philippines, the proposed importation may still be legali9ed by complying $ith the provisions of the aforementioned la$s. The 'udgment $as rendered declaring that respondent ?#ecutive -ecretary had and has no po$er to authori9e the importation in &uestionB that he e#ceeded his 'urisdiction in granting said authorityB said importation is not sanctioned by la$ and is contrary to its provisionsB and that, for lac@ of the re&uisite ma'ority, the in'unction prayed for must be and is, accordingly denied.

TITLE:

AGLIPAY vs. RUI# '! 3/IL 201

CITATION: )ATE: March 13, 1937

-ACT": The petitioner, Gregorio %glipay, -upreme 8ead of the Philippine !ndependent Church, see@s the issuance from this court of a $rit of prohibition to prevent the respondent Eirector of of the Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative Thirty1third !nternational ?ucharistic Congress.

!n =ay, *+),, the Eirector of Posts announced in the dailies of =anila that he $ould order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of =anila of the Thirty1third international ?ucharistic Congress, organi9ed by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of $hat he considers to be a civic duty, re&uested Vicente -otto, ?s&., member of the Philippine "ar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. !n spite of the protest of the petitionerJs attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the 4nited -tates the designs of the postage stamps for printing CA!n the center is chalice, $ith grape vine and stal@s of $heat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, bro$n, cardinal red, violet and orange, * inch by *,7+6 inches. The denominations are for /, ,, *,, /7, ), and 07 centavos.AD.

The said stamps $ere actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein. I"".E": C*D >hether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty1third !nternational ?ucharistic Congress.

T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active po$er that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recogni9ed. %nd, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. >hen the ilipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored Athe aid of 4ivine *rovidence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general $elfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of 'ustice, liberty and democracy,A they thereby manifested reliance upon 8im $ho guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recogni9ed here as else$here.

Religion as a profession of faith to an active po$er that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recogni9ed. %nd in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Ac5 No% !0 2 Hadvantageous to the governmentI does not authori9e violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps $as not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They $ere not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of sho$ing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of =anila, $ith the $ords H-eat MMM!!! !nternational ?ucharistic Congress.I The focus of the stamps $as not the ?ucharistic Congress but the city of =anila, being the seat of that congress. This $as to Hto advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists,I the officials merely too@ advantage of an event considered of international importance. %lthough such issuance and sale may be inseparably lin@ed $ith the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it $as not the aim or purpose of the Government.

The petition for a $rit of prohibition $as denied, $ithout pronouncement as to costs

TITLE:

VALMONTE vs. BELMONTE

CITATION: 1(0 "C#A 2 ' )ATE:

-ACT": I"".E": T/E CO.#T0" #.LING:

TITLE:

CALALANG vs. %ILLIAMS )ATE:

CITATION: (0 3/IL (2'

-ACT": I"".E": T/E CO.#T0" #.LING: