PADILLA-RUMBAUA VS RUMBAUA FACTS: Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner) challenges, through her petition for review on certiorari,] and

the resolution of the Court of Appeals. The challenged decision reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the marriage of the petitioner and respondent Edward Rumbaua (respondent) null and void on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution on the other hand, denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be remanded to the RTC for further proceeding HELD: No. A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or final order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved partys rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if presented. In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence presented by her former counsel as basis for a remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity prima facie shows that the petitioners counsel had not been negligent in handling the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioners counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.

MESINA VS MEER FACTS: Respondent Humberto Meer is a registered owner of a parcel of land. He discovered that his certificate of title has been cancelled and a new one, was issued in the name of spouses Sergio and Lerma Bunquin. The latter acquired said property by virtue of a deed of sale dated purportedly executed by respondent in their favor. Respondent sought the cancellation of Bunquins title. On the same day, a notice of lis pendens was annotated on the TCT. While the case was pending Bunquins title was replaced with Michaelangelo and Grace Mesina. It appears that the subject property has been conveyed to the petitioners prior to the annotation of lis pendens. Meer impleaded petitioners as additional party defendants. Spouses Bunquin was declared in default. The trial court ruled that the alleged sale

between Meer and Banquin was fraudulent. However, petitioners were adjudged buyers in good faith and thus were entitled to the possession of the subject property. Respondent Meer filed a Motion for Reconsideration against the said Decision but the trial court denied the same. Respondent thereafter filed an Appeal with the RTC. The RTC reversed the trial courts decision.Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court. After reglementary period for appeal has lapsed, petitioners filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment and prayed that the Court of Appeals set aside its Resolution for the following reasons: (a) extrinsic fraud was committed which prevented petitioners from presenting his case to the court and/or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy; (b) mistake and excusable negligence has prevented the petitioner from taking an appeal within the prescribed period; and (c) petitioner has good and substantial defense in his action. ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for Relief under Rule 38 is available as a remedy against the judgment of the Court of Appeals promulgated in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. If the remedy is thus available, whether or not the grounds relied by petitioners are sufficient to give due course to the petition.\ HELD: Court denied the petition. Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptional circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is present. Where the defendant has other available or adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy. The petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same court which rendered the decision. the petitioners allegation of extrinsic fraud should have been brought at issue in the Metropolitan Trial Court. If they truly believe that the default of the spouses Mesina prejudiced their rights, they should have questioned this from the beginning. Yet, they chose to participate in the proceedings and actively presented their defense. And their efforts were rewarded as the Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in their favor. When the respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court, they never raised this issue. Even after the Regional Trial Court reversed the finding of the MeTC, and the Court of Appeals sustained this reversal, petitioners made no effort to bring this issue for consideration. This Court will not allow petitioners, in guise of equity, to benefit from their own negligence.

GARCIA V CA FACTS: Florencio Junior Garcia, representing himself as attorney in fact of the herein petitioners, brought in the name of the latter, an action for collection of sum of money, against the private respondents. The respondent spouses, Rafael Dinglasan and Maria Elena Dinglasan, likewise filed their answer. What the petitioners did was to present a Motion for Summary Judgment, asseverating that they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, since the pleadings and supporting affidavits submitted are barren of any genuine issue which may be controverted. The trial court issued its Order under attack denying the motion for summary judgment. Dissatisfied therewith, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals, theorizing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying their subject motion. Hpwever, the Court of Appeals came out with its assailed Decision upholding the Order of the lower court. ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for summary judgment should be granted HELD: The petition is devoid of merit. A summary judgment is one granted upon motion by a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact posed (except as to the amount of damages) and therefore, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 34 does not vest in the trial court jurisdiction to summarily try the issues on depositions and affidavits but gives it limited authority to render summary judgment only when there is no genuine issue of material fact at bar. Upon a motion for summary judgment, the sole function of the court is to determine whether or not there is an issue of fact to be tried, and any doubt as to the existence of an issue of fact must be resolved against the movant. Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court should take that view of the evidence most favorable to the party against whom it is directed, giving such party the benefit of all favorable inferences. That one may surmise from plaintiff's showing that defendant is unlikely to prevail upon a trial is not a sufficient basis to assume that the allegations of defendant are sham, frivolous or unsubstantial. If the defense relied upon by the defendant is legally sufficient and does not appear patently sham, the motion for summary judgment should be denied

PEOPLE V LI KA KIM FACTS: Li Ka Kim was accused of willfully selling Shabu, a regulated drug, without authority of law or the corresponding license therefor. Appellant, acting upon advice of counsel, did not enter any plea during his arraignment; the court was thus constrained to enter a plea of not guilty in his behalf. The court a quo adjudged the case for the prosecution. The trial court debunked appellants defense of denial. Finding the prosecutions evidence far more credible than that of the defense and to have overwhelmingly established the elements of the crime charged, the trial court convicted appellant and decreed the penalty of death. Initially, appellant, in this appeal, was represented by Atty. Eldorado Lim, who filed a brief for the defense. Fernandez, Pacheco & Dizon Law Offices filed its entry of appearance as being the new counsel for appellant only to be substituted later by Guzman, Tanedo, & Acain Law Offices. The Court noted and granted the request of the law firm to be furnished with copies of all motions, orders, resolutions and judgment in connection with the case. Appellant filed a motion to remand the case for new trial. In his motion, appellant would attempt to overturn his conviction or, at the very least, to be given a chance for a new trial, citing Section 14, Rule 121, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, because of newly discovered evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not trial court erred in finding appellant guilty and if guilty whether or not trial court erred in imposing death penalty HELD: The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial are that - (a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, would likely change the judgment. Not one of the requisites mentioned is attendant. Appellants passport could have easily been presented and produced during the trial. Then, too, the presentation of appellants passport, would hardly be material to the outcome of the case. The totality of evidence presented is convincing and points to appellant as being a person engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. The testimony of the prosecution witnesses identifying appellant to be a seller of illegal drugs appears to be categorical and unfabricated. The Court has great respect for the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of witnesses. It is often said that, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and substance, and there is none, which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted an appellate court will not interfere in the factual findings of the trial court. Accused is still found guilty but death penalty is lowered to reclusion perpetua.

MERCURY DRUG CORP VS CA FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint against herein private respondent for annulment and/or reformation of contract of lease of a commercial building owned by petitioners .Petitioners demand for increase of rentals had been refused by private respondent lessee Mercury Drug Corporation on the ground that there was no official devaluation of the peso thus no basis for a rental increase.

The lower court rendered judgment as favor of the defendant corporation.

The former counsel for the petitioners Atty. Ralph Lou I. Willkom received a copy of the decision but did not inform petitioners nor take any step to protect the interests of his clients by presenting a motion for reconsideration or taking an appeal. Petitioners learned of the judgment only when they visited his office. The 15-day period within which to appeal lapsed. Petitioners filed thru their present counsel a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38. The lower court denied the petition Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied . Aggrieved by the Order of the RTC, the spouses Eduardo and Carmen Yee, the herein respondents, appealed to the Court of Appeals, which granted their Petition and set aside the order of the RTC . Hence this petition of Mercury Drug. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reckoning the sixty-day period to file the Petition for Relief from judgment from the alleged date of actual receipt by Respondents of a copy of the decision of the trial court and not from the date of receipt thereof by their counsel HELD: A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. In order for a petition for relief to be entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of Rule 38.It is also incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the said petition was filed within the reglementary period specified in Section 3, Rule 38 (within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken). And the rule is that the reglementary period is reckoned from the time the partys counsel receives notice of the decision for notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the party for purposes of Section 3 of Rule 38.

In the present case, the ees were served a copy of the judgment of the lower court through their counsel, on March 3, 1995. Thus, the YEES are considered to have received notice on March 3, 1995 when their counsel was served notice and not on March 24, 1995 when they actually learned of the adverse decision. Consequently, their petition for relief, which was filed on May 15, 1995 or over sixty days from notice of their counsel, was filed out of time. This Court has consistently held that the failure of a partys counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence, which is not excusable. However, notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.