Priest 1 Colin W. Priest Fr.

William Joensen Knowledge, Truth and Reality Synthetic Comparison Essay

Mental Causation and Clarkes Teleology Andrew Jaeger makes the claim in his article, Mental Causation as Teleological Causation, that mental causes provides the ends for our actions. Jaeger states that our mental causation, in addition to sufficient efficient physical cause, gives a total explanation for why an action x takes place instead of some other possibility. W. Norris Clarke would agree with Jaeger; his explanation of efficient causal explanation as well as the mental teleological cause as being the source of a total explanation for why action x took place instead of some other and how it came as written to be as such. A point of contrast between Clarke and Jaeger is their use of terminology and that Clarke reasons his teleology back to an intelligent Designer. First their philosophies on causality shall be presented. Clarke states that an efficient cause is that which is responsible by its action for the real existence of another (OM, 179). He says that the efficient cause gives sufficient reason for any being must be either contained within the thing itself or in the efficient cause of the being. This efficient cause is extrinsic to the being and it explains the existence of the being (OM, 179). But in order for there to be an efficient cause at all, there must be a final cause contained within the efficient cause. A distinction ought to be made here; efficient causality is distinguishable from final causality, they are separate in being. Though final causes are present within the efficient causes, they are separate in being. Final causes are the guiding force for the efficient cause which

Priest 2 focuses the efficient cause towards an end (OM, 204); it gives the explanation for why an efficient cause produced a certain effect rather than a number of other possible effects (OM, 199). The teleological cause, or final cause, as understood by Clarke accounts for the fact that in efficient causality there are an infinite number of possible effects that can come about from a given efficient cause (OM, 199) and that there must be a teleological explanation or goal that determines the effect as opposed to some other possible option. Action is directed towards and goal. Clarke sees an end-directed cause as operating from within the efficient cause in order to produce a specific efficient cause rather than some other possibilities that are also just as likely (OM, 199). Clarke says that this final cause answers the question of why a certain efficient cause produced a certain effect, not how it caused it (OM, 199). He states that every efficient cause must have a final cause in order to explain why it was produced and not some other efficient cause, otherwise it would be an indeterminant action, which he says is no action at all (OM, 201). Clarke says that in order for a final cause to exist there must be intelligence present. Andrew Jaeger, in his article Mental Causation as Teleological Causation, says that efficient causation gives sufficient efficient physical reason as to how event e happened as opposed to some other possible event (MCTC, 11). Sufficient efficient physical causes cannot give an explanation as to why a certain event happened, only how it was brought about. This seems to be paradoxical, that a sufficient cause is really insufficient for the explanation of the event. But Jaeger says that the physical efficient causation does not explain by itself why the action took place without considering the teleological cause, the efficient cause can give a sufficient explanation of how event e came about but not the total explanation (MCTC, 10). Jaeger argues that we can know everything there is to know about efficient causes of actions but

Priest 3 that does not mean we will know for why for the sake of which an action was done (MCTC, 10) He then argues that this is not enough, in order for an event to take place there must be a reason as to why it came about. In order for there to be an explanation for why there are certain causes instead of some other, there must be a goal, end or need that guides the action of the efficient cause (MCTC, 12). This, he says, is contained within mental causation. Jaeger also states that mental causation will give a total explanation for an action when combined with the sufficient efficient physical cause. It is important to note here that mental causation is not restricted to certain kinds of being. Jaeger gives the example of a sunflower turning towards the sun for a reason, in order to achieve the needs that it has (MCTC, 11). The efficient causal process of the turning sunflower could be sufficiently explained in the swelling and shrinking of the pulvinus can explain the physical cause for how the sunflower turns, but does not explain why (MCTC, 12). This is done by considering the needs and goals of the plant, i.e. to obtain nourishment to sustain itself which is found in the teleological cause. This can explain the movement in the first place towards the sun in order to obtain nourishment. Mental causation is that which holds the goals and ends for which actions are done and are directed towards (MCTC, 10); it gives us the total explanation for why a thing is done. Jaeger states that mental causes are teleological causes. It is by ones mental causes, ones intention of doing action x and not y for the sake of attaining some goal or end that one seeks. These plan and direct our actions to achieve a goal. Through mental causes, one can say why action x was done and not some other. He gives the example of getting a glass of water by moving his foot and walking through a door (MCTC, 13). These actions are simply sufficient efficient physical causes that say how he is doing action x but it does not give the answer why he started the action in the first place; this comes from the intention of his mental causation, i.e. to quench his thirst. Jaeger

Priest 4 sees teleological mental causation as giving intention to action and purpose to efficient causes (MCTC, 13). Clarkes philosophy lines up very nicely with Jaegers in the realm of efficient and final causation. Both would agree that efficient causes give the sufficient reason for how an effect was brought about in a certain way. Efficient causes contribute positively to another being in some way. In addition to this, both would agree that final causes and efficient causes together can give a total explanation for why action x has happened. Clarke would say that the final cause is contained within the efficient cause as a guiding force that directs the efficient cause and Jaeger would say that the final cause of which Clarke is speaking is the mental cause because the intention for any action is held within the mind. Both would agree that the planning power with which teleological goals can be achieved are located within the mind. However, Clarke reasons that the presence of intelligence ultimately drives one back to an Intelligent Designer whereas Jaeger has not mention of this in his article. One point of contrast for Clarke and Jaeger is their different use of language. Referring to final causes, Clarke uses the term ends while Jaeger uses teleology to refer to goals or wants. Both ultimately arrive at the same position in that they seek to describe the final destination of action and the end-in-view. One difference between the two, however, is that Clarkes seems to suggest that final causes are more than intentions for our actions; they are found in the nature of the being. He says that every real nature that is active has an idea at work in it which it has not thought up itself (OM, 204). This seems to go beyond Jaegers definition of a teleological mental cause and points to the nature of the being, Clarke sees the final cause as being ascribed by God; whereas Jaeger makes no mention of God. Jaeger makes his case for teleological causation on a mostly physical level; he even remarks that a physicalist might be able to accept his philosophy

Priest 5 (MCTC, 14). Clarke, on the other hand, takes his reasoning all the way back to the necessity of an intelligent Designer as the provider of the ends in nature (OM, 203-204) resulting in a teleology that goes beyond a purely physical philosophy as Jaegers does. In conclusion, both Clarke and Jaeger root teleological causes in mental activity or intelligence. Both agree that efficient causes cannot give a total reason as to why event e happened instead of some other event. And both agree that in order to have this total explanation, one must appeal to final or teleological causes. Though Jaeger finds his teleological causation in mental acts, Clarke ultimately takes his teleology back to an intelligent Designer as the reason for the presence of ends in nature. However their philosophies are not necessarily in conflict with one another, Clarke just takes his philosophy to a more conclusive and ultimate level which provides an explanation for ends in the first place.