Art Beyond Representation

i
AR1 BL\OND RLPRLSLN1A1ION

1be Perforvatire Porer of tbe !vage
ii
iii
1be Perforvatire Porer of tbe !vage
BARBARA BOL1
ir
Published in 2004 by I.B.1auris & Co Ltd
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Copyright Barbara Bolt, 2004
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lor Lstelle
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rii
CON1LN1S
!v.tratiov. riii
.cvoreagevevt. i
Introduction 1
1ranscending Representationalism 11
Contingency and the Lmergence o Art 52
1he \ork` o Art 8
Shedding Light or the Matter 123
\orking lot: A Materialist Ontology 149
Conclusion 18
Notes 191
Reerences 201
riii
ILLUS1RA1IONS
1. Barb Bolt, Reaaivg ictiov, 1995 2
2. Barb Bolt, Reaaivg 1beory, 1995 3
i
ACKNO\LLDGLMLN1S
1his book is dedicated to Lstelle Barrett. ler encouragement and unstinting
support took many orms, ranging rom that o sitter, conidant and coner-
sationalist to that o intellectual and editorial adiser. 1he inal orm o this
book emerged as a testament to a collaboration between two people with
mutual intellectual interests. I would also like to thank Susan Lawson, editor
or I.B.1auris. \ithout her generous and enthusiastic endorsement, this book
would not hae been possible.
I am greatly indebted to both the Uniersity o Melbourne and the Uni-
ersity o Sunshine Coast or supporting me in the preparation and publica-
tion o this book. In particular I would like to acknowledge the contribution
o Proessor Robert Llliot, rom the Uniersity o Sunshine Coast, whose
adice helped set this project on its way into book orm.
1his book emerged rom my Ph.D thesis which was completed through
Murdoch Uniersity. I would like to thank Alec Mcloul or his ongoing
adice and support. lis insistence on careul analysis and close attention to
detail enabled me to deelop discipline in both my research and writing.
Additionally I would like to thank Marion Campbell, Michael O`1oole and
Cathy \aldby, or their encouragement in the early phases o this project.
1heir support helped me to secure a Murdoch Uniersity Research Scholar-
ship and two traelling awards, which allowed me to trael oerseas to attend
the 1rav.forvatiov. conerence at Lancaster in 199 and the Coivg .v.traiav:
Recovfigvrivg evivi.v ava Pbio.opby conerence at \arwick in 1998. A grant
rom Arts \A and the Visual Arts and Crats Board o Australia also as-
sisted in these entures.
I am indebted to the organizers o Coivg .v.traiav, particularly Christine
Battersby, Rachel Jones and Judy Purdom, or giing me the courage to take
a dierent path rom the one I was on. I would also like to acknowledge
Penny llorence and Nicola loster, editors o the collection o essays Differ
evtia .e.tbetic.. 1he Australian,United Kingdom connection has proed to
be a ery rich one or me.
Ultimately, it is colleagues and riends who bear the brunt o the daily
grind inoled in the birth o a book. I would like to thank my colleagues at
the Uniersity o Sunshine Coast, especially Llizabeth Lddy, Julie Matthews,
Margaret 1urner, 1ony \right and Gary Crew, or their ongoing support.
Additionally, I would like to thank Meredith \ilkie or her patience in pre-
paring the inal manuscript or publication. I would like to acknowledge 1rish
Go, Maggie layes, Llizabeth lord, Ben Joel and 1ed Snell, whose inspira-
tional teaching instilled in me a passion or drawing and painting. My appre-
ciation also goes to Anne Marie Smith or the eentul portrait sitting that
started this whole project on its way.
Melbourne
December 2003
1
IN1RODUC1ION
IN1RODUC1ION
Practice has a logic which is not that o the logician. 1his has to be
acknowledged in order to aoid asking o it more logic than it can gie,
thereby condemning onesel either to wring incoherence out o it or to
thrust a orced coherence upon it. ,Bourdieu 1990:80,
1
he impetus or this book emerged in the heat o practice. It was in the
experience o painting two works-Reaaivg ictiov ,1995, ,Illus. 1, and
Reaaivg 1beory ,1995, ,Illus. 2,-that I came to question the
representationalist logic that underpins contemporary understandings o the
work o art. Reaaivg ictiov and Reaaivg 1beory were painted within weeks o each
other at a time when I had been working constantly and persistently at my crat.
1he two paintings were part o a series. Both are quite large works-0.9m x
0.m and 1.5m x 1.2m respectiely-and each was completed rapidly in a single
sitting oer a three-hour period.
lor the purpose o my argument I want to recall the process o the painting.
At irst the work proceeded according to established principles o painting prac-
tice-blocking in the shapes, establishing a composition, paying attention to
proportion and the shapes o light and dark-a re-iteration o habits and strat-
egies o working. loweer, at some undeinable moment, the painting took on
a lie that seemed to hae almost nothing to do with my conscious attempts to
control it. 1he work` ,as erb, took on its own momentum, its own rhythm
and intensity. \ithin this intense and urious state, I no longer had any aware-
ness o time, o pain or o making decisions. In the ury o painting, rules gie
way to tactics and the pragmatics o action. 1he painting takes on a lie o its
own. It breathes, ibrates, pulsates, shimmers and generally runs away rom me.
1he painting no longer merely represents or illustrates reading. Instead, it per-
orms. In the perormatiity o imaging, lie gets into the image.
2
In the painting Reaaivg ictiov, the lie` that seemed to emerge in the work
was the lie o Michael Ondaatje`s 1be vgi.b Patievt. As I proceeded with the
painting I was obliious to the act that my sitter was reading this noel. \et
there, in the painting, the acidity o the colours, the texture o the paint and
play o light assumed the eerie atmosphere that eneloped the Lnglish pa-
tient:
1he illa drits in darkness. In the hallway by the Lnglish patient`s
room the last candle burns, still alie in the night. \heneer he opens
his eyes out o sleep, he sees the odd waering yellow light. lor him
now the world is without sound, and een light seems an unneeded
thing. ,Ondaatje 1992:298,
1. Barb Bolt Reaaivg ictiov ,1995,
In Reaaivg ictiov, it seemed to me as i the lie in the noel had insinuated itsel
into the painting. 1he odd, waering yellow light had come to inect the painting,
whilst the ragged breath o the dying Lnglish patient seemed to make it heae
and tremble.
1he second painting, Reaaivg 1beory took a ery dierent turn. lere lelix
Guattari`s theoretical treatise Cbao.vo.i. appeared to transcend its unction as a
readerly text and began to write itsel into the portrait o its reader. As the
painting proceeded, the portrait was no longer exactly human but became, as in
3
IN1RODUC1ION
Guattari`s text, hal-thing hal-soul, hal-man hal-beast, machine and lux, matter
and sign . a becoming ancestral, animal, egetal, cosmic` ,Guattari 1995:102,
2. Barb Bolt Reaaivg 1beory ,1995,
Such accounts o practice raise a undamental question. I a painting comes to
perorm rather than merely represent some other tbivg what is happening In
this questioning, I am reminded o the narratie o Oscar \ilde`s 1be Pictvre of
Doriav Cray. In the noel the protagonist, Dorian Gray, makes a wish that his
own youthul and beautiul ace remain untarnished and untouched, whilst
Basil lallwell`s portrait o him would, in time, come to bear the burden o his
passions and his sins` and be seared with the lines o suering and thought`
,\ilde 1980:8,. Dorian`s subsequent astonishment at the transormation on
the canas resonated with my own amazement at the lie some o my own
canases hae taken on. low had Dorian`s wish come to be ulilled Surely this
was impossible:
It seemed monstrous een to think o them. And, yet, there was the
picture beore him, with the touch o cruelty in the mouth. ,\ilde
1980:34,
Is this just a story, a able with a moral, or is the relationship between real
bodies` and imaging more powerul than customarily belieed Does the isual
image, like the speech act, hae the power to bring into being that which it
4
igures Can the image transcend its structure as representation and be perorma-
tie rather than representational 1hese questions proides the central ocus o
this book.
A Logic of Practice?
1he problem o thinking and writing about isual arts practice is a diicult
one. Is it possible, or example, to articulate a logic o isual practice or does
practice escape such theoretical contemplation altogether In his attempts to
deelop a logic o practice`, Pierre Bourdieu admits that it is not easy to speak
o practice other than negatiely-especially those aspects o practice that are
seemingly most mechanical, most opposed to the logic o thought and dis-
course` ,Bourdieu 1990:80,. I practice does not hae the a priori logic o the
logician, then what is to be gained rom attempts to theorise a logic o practice
Bourdieu`s 1be ogic of Practice ,1990, and Michel de Certeau`s 1be Practice of
reryaay ife ,1984, oer an initial ramework or thinking about the problem
o ormulating a logic o practice. \orking within the ramework o sociology,
de Certeau and Bourdieu are concerned with the operational logic o practice,
rather than its mere products. In their attempts to articulate the relation between
theory and practice, de Certeau and Bourdieu lay out the problematics o deel-
oping such a logic.
1heorists or logicians o practice tend to approach the task o theorising
practice as a dressmaker approaches the task o making a garment. Using theo-
retical schemas or patterns, shapes are cut out` rom the continuous low o
practices. 1hese shapes are inerted and then become metonymic or the practices
they purport to describe or explain. 1he part becomes the whole. In the totalisation
o theory, Bourdieu claims, the uzziness` o practice is replaced by the demar-
cation o semi-academic arteacts. Discontinuance is imposed on lux, time is
rozen, and a system o productions is substituted or production in itsel. le
calls this the theorisation eect` ,Bourdieu 1990:86,.
De Certeau ,1984, makes the comment, that in any theorisation, practice and
its practitioners are excluded:
Only what can be transported can be treated. \hat cannot be uprooted
remains by deinition outside the ield o research. lence the priilege
that these studies accord to ai.covr.e., the data that can most easily be
grasped, recorded, transported and examined in secure places. ,de Certeau
1984:20,
5
IN1RODUC1ION
1hus, in our attempts to grasp, diide, classiy and reorganise the results o
research into a particular code or logic, practice is it.ef eaced. In a sleight o
hand, there is the substitution o a representation or data ,word, graph or table,
or an action. In such statistical inestigations, de Certeau claims, the materials or
elements are grasped, but not their orm or phasing ,de Certeau 1984: xiii,.
\hat gets let out is the art o practising.
Art Research
In research on art, the theorisation eect works to subsume the question o
art practice` into that which can be identiied, classiied, ealuated and inter-
preted by historians and theorists. In his article A Deence o Art listory`,
Bernard Smith explains how this schema operates in the discipline o Art lis-
tory ,Smith 2000:6,. lis claim that art history is ounded upon a ourold
unction, that o identiication, classiication, ealuation and interpretation, con-
irms that art history is concerned with data and not with action. In its character
as research, art history inoles a demarcation o an area o knowledge speciic to
the discipline and the deinition o undamental concepts that underpin this
ield. 1he establishment and maintenance o these boundaries is o central
concern to the maintenance and prolieration o the discipline. In all o this
theorising, howeer, what can we say about practice in itsel \e ind that the
unruliness` o practice is diicult, i not impossible, to insinuate into the
discipline that has come to be known as Art listory.
Artworks` don`t seem to proide us with the same problem as that o the
work o art`. \e can identiy artworks, classiy them, interpret them and make
ealuations according to criteria established by the discipline o Art listory. \e
can exhibit artworks and study the reception o them. loweer, does this allow
us to get any closer to the work` o art
1he ocus on artworks, rather than practice, has produced a gap in our under-
standing o the work o art as process. 1his gap is eident in ormal and semiotic
analyses o artwork. lor example, using the logic o Greenbergian ormalism, I
could classiy and ealuate work in terms o what is unique and irreducible to a
particular art orm. Similarly, I could ollow Bauhaus principles and engage in a
ormal analysis o an artwork: identiy the ocal point, pinpoint directional low,
show how the moement in a work is actiated by rhythm and repetition, and
make some ealuation as to whether the image works ormally. Alternatiely, I
can make a semiotic reading o an image through an analysis o the codes
operating in the image. lere I can identiy the paradigmatic choices that an artist
has made and ealuate how the syntagmatic combination o these isual ele-
6
ments, enable the work to be read or social meaning. lurther, I can bring ormal
and semiotic models together and demonstrate how the ormal and semiotic
elements operate to strengthen coherence in a work. In all this thoughtul analy-
sis, do we know any more about the practise o art \hat tools are aailable to
enable us to apprehend or understand what is inoled in this work
In sociology and anthropology, participant obseration enables the researcher
to engage in the obseration o the day-to-day actiities o indiiduals, groups
and societies. Questionnaires, interiews and other recordings proide raw data,
which the researcher then proceeds to identiy, classiy and interpret. Art research
has also come to adopt such methods in its attempts to understand the work o
art.
As social science research and cultural studies methods hae iniltrated the
discipline o art history and theory, artists too, become the object o research
methodologies. lilm captures` the actions o artists, interiews record their
ponderings and researchers bring their skills o analysis to this data in order that
we may gain a greater understanding o the actiity o artists. In this process,
researchers are concerned with the place o the artist and art in contemporary
society. In this context, Norman Bryson argues, painting is a practice that enters
into interaction with the other domains o practice in the social ormation`
,Bryson 1983:11,. \et, in drawing attention to the social production o art,
Bryson is also keenly aware that western art history and theory ail to take into
account the space o the studio and the body o labour engaged in the material
practice o making. le acknowledges the problematic that, in western thinking,
there is not as yet a uniied theory o isual practice, not as data, but as a process
that has a particular logic.
So where can we begin As the painter takes up a position beore the canas
and begins work, contends Bryson, there is an encounter between a complex o
practical knowledge and a noel situation. Under the pressure o the noel
demands o the encounter, the complex itsel is modiied and its tradition
extended` ,Bryson 1983:16,. 1his relation, between the artist, the complex o
practical knowledges, the materials o practice and the noel situation, orms the
central concern o this book. Is it possible to postulate a theory o practice that
may help us understand it as a generatie process
In 1i.iov ava Paivtivg: tbe ogic of tbe Cae ,1983,, Bryson presents us with a
description o the process o Matisse at work painting, as ilmed through a
transparent glass surace:
IN1RODUC1ION
1he brush, held a ew inches rom the canas, begins an arc that moes
in slow motion closer and closer to the surace, the point o the brush
contacts the canas, and as the hairs bend, a smooth, een trace o pig-
ment appears, as the brush is still completing that irst arc, a second
moement begins in the painter`s arm, commencing at the shoulder,
which moes towards the easel, at the same time, the elbow moes out
rom the easel, so that the wrist can rotate and realign, like a leer, all the
angles o the ingers. 1he brush, unaware o these deelopments, is still
completing its irst moement, but at a certain moment its trajectory
changes, slowly liting rom the surace at an angle dierent rom that o
its arrial, the trace becomes slender, its edges curing inwards as the
hairs on the brush come together, exuding a thick, rich trail o pigment
until, as the brush lits rom the canas altogether, the last ilament
breaks with the surace, to complete the stroke in space. ,Bryson 1983:163,
Bryson proides a richly textured description, tracing the moements o the
painter. le suggests that ilm is able to demonstrate a dimension o intention
and decision that otherwise would neer hae become known. loweer, I would
like to ask: \hat does this description really tell us about the intention and
decisions inoled \hat can it reeal to us about the work` o art Bryson`s
description, o the process o Matisse painting, exempliies the diiculty in
getting at` the art o practice. \hat cav it tell us about practice in itsel and the
logic that is inherent in such a practice
I suspect that by ocusing on enunciatie practices, that is, the systems o
abrication rather than systems o signiication, there is a possibility o inesti-
gating the ield o an art o practice` starting rom the bottom, rather than
rom the top down. It is through an analysis o the subtle logic o artistic
process that we can begin to articulate the logic o practice. 1his logic ollows on
rom practice rather than prescribing it.
Strategies and 1actics
In its ailure to take into account the body engaged in the material practice o
art, art history and theory hae missed the opportunity to deelop a logic o art
practice. De Certeau`s analysis o the subtle logic o eeryday actiities reeals an
opportunity or beginning this task. In this analysis, de Certeau distinguishes
between strategies and tactics. Strategy, according to de Certeau, is the model
upon which political, economic and scientiic rationality has been structured. A
subject acts strategically according to what has been set beore her,him as an
object. In this representationalist world, there is a separation o the subject rom
8
the object o research. le argues that strategy is a representationalist mode o
operation that is dependent on abstract models or predetermining its outcome.
1hese theoretical models then proide a blueprint or how the world will be
organised. In his estimation, the statistical analysis o social scientiic research
exempliies precisely such a strategic approach to engaging with the world. In
tactics, on the other hand, there is no setting o an object beore a subject. Rather,
in de Certeau`s thinking, a tactic insinuates itsel into the other`s place, ragmentarily,
without taking it oer in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance` ,de
Certeau 1988:xi,. In his discussion o tactics, de Certeau notes that a tactic
boldly juxtaposes dierse elements in order suddenly to produce a lash shed-
ding a dierent light` ,de Certeau 1988:3-38,. According to such a logic, oppor-
tunities are seized in the heat o the moment. Decisions are made, not according
to logical thought, but as a direct and elt response to handling elements.
\hat releance does this theorisation o the practices o the eeryday hae or
considering the work o art Does it, or example, oer us a way to think a logic
o practice as Bourdieu claims 1he argument-that acts and decisions occur in
the heat o the moment not as the result o rational logic-unsettles this quest
to deelop a logic. 1he suggestion that these actions do not take a discursie
orm, but shed a aifferevt type o light rom the light o rational thinking
questions such a goal. I we think o logic` only as the rational actiity o a ,sel,
conscious mind, then perhaps it is wrong to think o practice in terms o logic at
all. low then might we think this question o practice
.rt eyova Repre.evtatiov oers an alternatie conception o logic. It takes as
its central theme the proposition that art is a perormatie, rather than merely a
representational practice. In contrast to preailing understandings o art as a
representational or a signiying practice, this book argues that, through creatie
practice, a dynamic material exchange can occur between objects, bodies and
images. In the dynamic productiity o material practice, reality can get into
images. Imaging, in turn, can produce real material eects in the world. 1he
potential o a mutual relection between objects, images and bodies, orms the
basis o my argument or the deormational and transormatie potential o
images. 1his perormatie potential constitutes the power o imaging.
1he irst three Chapters in this book, consider key writings by the philoso-
pher Martin leidegger. \hilst the book is not a book on Martin leidegger, his
work on representation, technology and art, allow me to adance a theory o art
beyond representation and argue or a theory based on a perormatie logic o
practice. In proposing to moe beyond representation, the irst task o this
book inoles setting out the stakes o such an endeaour.
9
IN1RODUC1ION
1hrough attention to the philosophical debates surrounding representation,
Chapter One proposes that representation is not just an outcome, but also
establishes a representationalist mode o thinking that enables humans to ex-
press a will to ixity and mastery oer the world. Representationalism orders the
world and predetermines what can be thought. As the ehicle through which
representationalism can eect a will to ixity and mastery, representation has
become the ocus o critique amongst both artists and philosophers. In at-
tempting to address the representationalist limits o representation or deelop-
ing a logic o practice, this Chapter oers a counter-representational model based
on notions o handling and handlability. In this conception, the logic o practice
asserts a dynamic relationship with the representationalist logic o a sel-con-
scious mind.
Representational representation goes hand-in-hand with the instrumental
thinking o contemporary technocratic society. \orking with leidegger`s essay
1he Question Concerning 1echnology` ,1954,, Chapter 1wo oers a critique o
instrumentalist understandings o the work o art. 1hrough attention to the
processes and methodologies o practice, this Chapter reigures the relations o
artistic practice. In a reersal o the causal chain o means and ends, the relation-
ship between objects, artists, materials and processes, emerges as one o co-
responsibility and indebtedness, rather than one o mastery. According to such
a counter-representational understanding o art, the work o art is no longer an
object or a subject, the relationship between the artist, objects, materials and
processes is no longer one o mastery and all elements are co-responsible or the
emergence o art.
In their struggle to negotiate the eeryday business o art`, many contem-
porary artists orget that art is a poitic reealing, not just a means to an end.
According to leidegger`s conception o art, it is art as a mode o reealing, not
the artwork, that constitutes the work o art. By contrasting the enraming mode
o reealing that characterises art business, with art as poi.i., Chapter 1hree
questions whether it is een possible to make art in a contemporary technocratic
era. \here art business thries, what is the uture or art as a mode o reealing
the Being o art 1his question is critical or all orms o contemporary art
practice. low can we apprehend the work` o art in contemporary society
\hilst leidegger`s theorisation o the reealing potential o the work o art
goes beyond representation, it continues to operate within Lnlightenment modes
o thought. lis positioning can not accommodate the possibility that the peror-
matie potential o images inoles a productie materiality, not just a shit in
modes o thought. Chapter lour employs the experience o the blinding glare o
10
Australian light in oering a critique o the Lnlightenment assumptions under-
pinning the work o art as a reealing. Drawing on the cultural practices o Indig-
enous Australian artists, the Chapter proposes a radical material perormatiity in
the work o art. It engages with Paul Carter`s term vetbei., to elaborate the
productie materiality o ritual practices in Indigenous Australian culture. 1he
material perormatiity o such practices, suggests the possibility o a materialist
ontology o the work o art. 1he perormatie power o images and imaging goes
beyond its capacity to reeal.
In the inal Chapter I address the question o what a radical material perormatiity
might actually look like in the making o work. I suggest that by giing attention
to the productie materiality o the perormatie act`, we are able to commence
the task o deeloping a theory o practice that takes into account the matter o
bodies and objects. Such a materialist account o creatie practice questions our
customary ways o thinking about the work o art. 1hrough a consideration o
both literature and painting, this Chapter argues that in the uzziness` o practice,
there is the potential or a vvtva relection between imaging and reality. In this
monstrous perormatiity, the body becomes language rather than merely in-
scribed by language. I argue that it is through process or practice that the outside
world enters the work and the work casts its eects back into the world. In the
dynamic productiity o the perormatie act, the work o art produces ontological
eects.
In a world where contemporary artists are oten so caught up in the business o
art, art-in-itsel tends to become subsumed by the creation and marketing o
artworks or an art market. In this pre-occupation with art business, artists tend to
reduce art to an instrumentalist unction, orgetting that art has much greater
power. In returning to practice as a source or rethinking the work o art, I make the
claim that the relationship between art and the artist moes beyond the realm o
representationalist representation. I argue that practice inoles a radical material
perormatiity. In a materialist ontology o the work o art, there may be a mutual
relection between imaging and reality. I this is so, then images-including mass
media images-are een more powerul than currently imagined. In going beyond
representational understandings o the image and imaging and ocussing on
the operational logic o practice, .rt eyova Repre.evtatiov oers a new para-
digm in isual aesthetics.
11
1RANSCLNDING RLPRLSLN1A1IONALISM
1RANSCLNDING
RLPRLSLN1A1IONALISM
By accident, and sometimes on the brink o an accident, I ind mysel
writing without seeing. Not with my eyes closed, to be sure, but open
and disorientated in the night, or else during the day, my eyes ixed on
something else, while looking elsewhere, in ront o me, or example
when at the wheel: I then scribble with my right hand a ew squiggly
lines on a piece o paper attached to the dashboard or lying on the seat
beside me. Sometimes, still without seeing, on the steering wheel it-
sel. ,Derrida 1993:3,
A
rt i. a representational practice and its products are representations.
1his statement seems so obiously true, that we rarely pause to ques-
tion its alidity or een deine its terms. \hen we speak, write, draw,
take a photograph, construct a digital image or make a ideo, there seems little
dispute that what we are inoled in is making representations. Viewers and
readers engage with representations. Countless books are written about it. But
what is this thing we call representation, and why does it hold such a grip on
our imagination More to the point, why should this book plot a trajectory
beyond representation
In the isual arts, art theorists and historians continue to ground their
discussions o art on the unquestioned assumption that art i. representa-
tional. 1hus Donald Brook begins his essay On Non-erbal Representa-
tion`,199, with the statement:
Among the problems raised by representational practices the most
undamental are surely those arising in connection with representa-
tions that might as well-in the unassuming terms o ordinary lan-
guage-be called vovrerba. O these, isible ,or isual, representations
12
are prominent, and hae always sered the purposes o discussion in
an exemplary way. ,Brook 199:232,
1
In Brook`s discussion o representational practices, the term representation is
a gien. Like many other writers on representation, Brook does not see the
need to deine the term. Representation remains unremarked.
1his raises some undamental questions. \hy does representation con-
tinue to operate as the seemingly unassailable and assumed truth underpin-
ning isual practice Is it possible, or example, to think our productions
outside o the paradigm o representation \hat would it be like to conceie
an image not as a representation In all this wondering and imagining, how-
eer, I am caught short, orced to recognise that perhaps this mental actiity,
this capacity or imagining i. itsel representational. Man as representing sub-
ject`, notes leidegger, antasizes . he moes in ivagivatio` ,leidegger
19a:14,.
1he question o representation is central to any debate around the making
and interpretation o images. So much has been said against representation by
philosophers ,such as leidegger, Deleuze and Irigaray, and so many attempts
hae been made by contemporary artists ,particularly postmodern, postcolonial
and eminist artists,, to eliminate representation once and or all. And yet the
spectre o representation continues to loom large as the system that prescribes
the way we know our world.
So what is representation, how does it work and why does it cause so much
debate amongst philosophers and artists Commonsense understandings o
the term, tend to conceie representation as a substitute or, or copy o real-
ity` in some imagistic orm-ilm, literature or isual art. Such a conception
has particular consequences or the arts. In the isual arts, or example, repre-
sentation tends to be conlated with realism or iguration. lere representa-
tional art is opposed to abstract or so-called non-representational art. low-
eer, according to its critics, representation cannot be conceied so literally. It is
not just concerned with realism or iguration, but rather, representation posits
a particular relation to, or way o thinking about the world.
\hat is at issue is not so much representation in itsel, but rather how, in
the modern world, representation has come to be understood as the structure
that enables representationalism to dominate our contemporary way o think-
ing. Representationalism is a system o thought that ixes the world as an
object and resource or human subjects. As a mode o thought that prescribes
13
all that is known, it orders the world and predetermines what can be thought.
Representation becomes the ehicle through which representationalism can
eect this will to ixity and mastery.
As one o its most trenchant critics, Martin leidegger oers the clearest
explication o representation and representationalism. In order to grasp the
modern essence o the term representation, leidegger suggests that, we must
return to the etymological root o the word and concept to represent`. In his
enquiry, to represent` |ror.teev| is to:
Set out beore onesel and to set orth in relation to onesel. 1hrough
this, whateer is comes to a stand as object and in that way alone
receies the seal o Being. 1hat the world becomes picture is one and
the same eent with the eent o man`s becoming .vbiectvv in the
midst o that which is. ,leidegger 19a:132,
lor leidegger, representation, or representationalism is a relationship where,
whateer i., is igured as an object or man-as-subject. It is this objectiication
o what i. by man-as-subject ,.vbiectvv, that constitutes the central ocus o
the critique o representation.
One o the greatest eorts in philosophy and art in modern times has been
deoted to oercoming the limits o representation. Gilles Deleuze suggests
that we must irst experiment with these limits. le comments that it is:
A question o extending representation as ar as the too large and the
too small o dierence, o adding a hitherto unsuspected perspectie
to representation . it is a question o causing a little Dionysian blood
to low in the organic eins o Apollo. ,Deleuze 1994:262,
In this Chapter, I will take up this quest and demonstrate how, through
practice, the perspectie o handling or handlability` can disrupt the ixity o
representationalism. landlability inoles our concrete dealings with things
in the world, rather than our abstract thinking about the world. It is concerned
with the logic o practice. In handling, as I will show, Dionysian blood comes
to pulse through Apollo`s eins.
Beore turning to the potential o handlability, this Chapter will set in place
the grounds or the critique o representation and representationalism. Draw-
ing on the philosophical criticisms oered by Martin leidegger, Bruno Latour
and Gilles Deleuze, the Chapter oregrounds the ice-like grip that representa-
14
tionalism holds on contemporary thought. 1his extended argument against
representation and representationalism, is countered by Jacques Derrida`s de-
ence o representation. Positioning himsel against leidegger, Derrida ar-
gues or an internal moement within representation. le suggests that this
condition within representation oercomes the presumed and stultiying ix-
ity o representationalism. lere, both Derrida and Deleuze agree that moe-
ment is the key to oercoming the ixity o representationalism. leidegger`s
position does not hold open a space or representation. loweer, his counter-
representationalist understanding o handling and handlability proides a
concrete way o thinking how this moement might occur.
My discussion will demonstrate the releance o such debates or thinking
a logic o practice. I will argue that the understandings that arise through
handling or practice operate in a dierent register rom those that belong to the
representational paradigm o man-as-subject in relation to mere objects. In
this conceptualisation o practice I hope to demonstrate a moement rom
representation as a mode o thought to representation as bodies in process.
Re-presentation
Representation may hae its limits, but what would we know i represen-
tation did not structure our being-in-the-world \ere we to eliminate repre-
sentation once and or all, would we be plunged into the abyss o chaos I ,as
has been argued since Schopenhauer,, we only know the world through repre-
sentation, what o Martin leidegger`s argument that Descartes ushered in the
epoch o representation
2
\hat happened beore representation \e know
people made images and looked at them beore Descartes, so how did they
apprehend them i not as representations \hat did the makers o these
images think they were doing And what o cultures not under the sway o
Cartesianism, or example, pre-Socratic or Indigenous Australian cultures
low do they comprehend the image i not as representation I will return to
these questions in later Chapters, but irstly, I wish to set out the stakes in-
oled in a representationalist relation to the world.
In the introduction to his paper Sending: On Representation` ,1982, Jacques
Derrida asks what it means to represent something. One may say that we
represent something ,vov. .ovve. ev repre.evtatiov,`. But then he continues:
Are we sure we know what this means, today` ,Derrida 1982:295,. Represen-
tation has a strong purchase on eeryday lie. \e represent and are represented
in many dierent ways, in parliaments, in the courts, in textual, erbal, aural,
isual orms and so orth. As a painter, I am represented by a gallery at the
15
same time as I paivt representations. 1he extent to which representation per-
meates our lies is summed up in Bruno Latour`s obseration that:
1he most humble o us lies surrounded by a princely retinue o
delegates and representaties. Lery night, on teleision, our repre-
sentaties in Parliament talk on our behal. \e hae delegated to hun-
dreds o non-human lieutenants the task o disciplining, making, and
moing other humans or non-humans-lits, cars, trains, machines.
lundreds o scientiic disciplines and instruments constantly bring ar
away places, objects and time to us which are thus represented-that is
presented agaiv-or our inspection. In dozens o books, moies,
plays and paintings, human and non-human characters represent us
with our iolence and our ears, populating our world with crowds o
riends and enemies. ,Latour 1988a:15-16,
Used in many dierent contexts, in many dierent ways, it seems extraordi-
nary that one single word could create such a multiarious and colourul cast o
characters. Political representaties sit side by side with technological and aes-
thetic representaties and representations. low can this be, and what is it that
allows all these dierent eents and things to operate under the one term, that
o representation And so it seems that some law, some shared or common
quality will come to regulate this multiplicity, justiy the use o the term repre-
sentation and allow this representation to represent it. As I will show it is
precisely this regulation or ordering-that allows one conception o represen-
tation to hold sway oer all other conceptions-that is so opposed by Martin
leidegger in his critique o representation and representationalism.
1he re` o representation suggests that to represent, is to present again.
In his article Visualization and Social Reproduction` ,1988a,, Latour claims
that, in western culture there hae existed two astly dierent regimes o
representation. In the irst regime-a regime that he relates to early Christian
and medieal understandings o representation-the re-presentation is pre-
sented anew a. if or the irst time. It inoles presenting again and anew. In
the second regime, which he equates with Cartesian understandings o repre-
sentation, the representation stands iv tbe pace o an absent object. 1hus:
what is meant by aithul is the ability to maintain through all the
transormations o scale, all the arious places and times, some in-
scriptions, some traces that allow those who hold them and look at
them to return to the original setting without a prior acquaintance o
the scene. ,Latour 1988a:23,
16
In the irst regime, coinciding with early Christian and medieal painting, there
is a sense in which the representation i. the thing. Such a sense o presence can
be illustrated in relation to medieal paintings o Jesus Christ. lere, Christ is
re-presented as the eer present Christ` ,Latour 1988a:21,. In the second re-
gime o representation, there is an assumption o a gap between the thing or
reerent and its representation. According to this Cartesian regime, the repre-
sentation stands in the place o the absent object. Representation is a model,
not a re-presentation. 1hrough this modelling, portrayals o distant places
and times can be made. Latour exempliies this by reerence to the globe o the
world represented in lans lolbein`s painting 1be .vba..aaor. ,1533,. le
claims that the globe proided explorers with a model o the world that
helped acilitate the conquest o preiously uncharted places.
Latour argues that, in contemporary western society, this second Cartesian
regime o representation, where there is a standing-in-or another, has come
to dominate our conception o representation. 1his regime accounts or our
political understanding o representation, where a person stands or others. It
also ulils our aesthetic understanding o representation, where the work o
art operates as an analogue or something beyond itsel, where this something
is no longer present. As I will argue in the next section, leidegger equates this
second regime o representation with the modern era. It is this Cartesian
regime that becomes the subject o the critique o representation in this Chap-
ter.
In western aesthetics, representation, conceied as a substitute or some-
thing else, irst ound its orm in Renaissance art with the conjoining o the
systems o perspectie and mimesis. Perspectie oered a window onto the
world, whilst mimesis ensured that the iew out this window corresponded
with perceptual reality. 1his modelling created a isual system so powerully
real that western imaging-including digital imaging-continues to be held in
its sway.
Our common sense understanding o representation has grown out o
this modelling o the world. According to this mode o thought, re-presenta-
tion can be understood as a copy o a model. In the world o models and
copies, the model exists out there` as some pre-existing static reality which
the copy then imitates. Reality is what-is, and the representation is only eer a
copy o it. Representation relects reality.
3
1he preoccupation with models and copies can be traced back to Plato`s
postulation o an Ideal world o lorms. In this conception, Ideal lorm pre-
1
exists any actuality. 1he image or what we hae come to know as representation
can only eer be an imperect copy o an Ideal lorm. 1he isual arts, een more
than language or philosophy, are inected with models and copies. In the case
o the western isual tradition, howeer, Aristotle`s interest in mimesis, rather
than Plato`s Ideal lorms has come to inorm the debate on models and
copies.
As a consequence, in the \est, discussions and debates around representa-
tion hae been, as Bryson ,1983, points out, underpinned by notions o
natural attitude` and essential copy`.
4
Such notions inorm dierse and oten
contradictory iews about representation. On the one hand commonsense`
artistic judgements are oten based on assessing the degree o exactitude be-
tween representation and reality. At quite a dierent leel, the gap or lack
between representation and reality has come to inorm such theories as psy-
choanalysis and structuralism. Psychoanalytic theories, or example the theo-
ries o Jacques Lacan, are grounded in the assumption that the gap between
representation and reality can neer be bridged. Consequently, in this iew, we
are oreer lacking.
As a result o this conceptual raming o representation, the critique o
Cartesian representation has tended to be conlated with the critique o realism
or iguration. In this conlation, representation equals realism which is op-
posed to abstraction or non-representation. loweer, what is at stake in the
act o representation is not, as is commonly supposed, simply the realistic or
iguratie representation o a reality that exists out there`. As I will argue in
the next section, representation is not an outcome, but rather a mode o
thinking and a relationship to the world that inoles a will to ixity and
mastery. According to such a conception, representation should not be con-
used with realism. Moreoer, abstraction may be as representationalist as
realism.
1he Age of the World Picture
In his essay 1he Age o the \orld Picture` ,1950, leidegger designates the
modern epoch a. the era o representation.
5
In this era, the world is reduced to
a picture, that is, to a representation. In order to understand what he means by
this and to be able to adance my argument that modern or Cartesian repre-
sentation is a mode o thought that inoles a will to ixity and mastery, I
want to return to Martin leidegger`s careul unpacking o the term represen-
tation.
18
In his attempts to grasp the modern essence o representedness, leidegger
sets out the origins o the term to represent` which he translates as ror.teev.
lor leidegger, ror.teev inoles a relationship where the world is set out
beore onesel and set orth in relation to onesel ` ,leidegger 19a:132,. In
this relation o setting beore and in relation to onesel, the world becomes a
picture or a human subject.
6
\hen we think o the word picture`, we tend to think irst o all o a copy
o something, perhaps a painting, drawing, photograph, written description
or more commonly a mental image. \e tend to assume that a picture has the
quality o being like something in the world. loweer, leidegger makes it
clear that when he talks o a world picture`, he does not mean a picture in the
sense o a copy o the world. 1his conception is too literal and alls back into
the presumptions o natural attitude and essential copy. In the leideggerian
conception o representation, the term is neither used in its eeryday multiplic-
ity o uses nor in the sense o presenting an image, but rather as a regime or
system o organizing the world, by which the world is reduced to a norm or a
model. In this mediation, the world is conceied and grasped primordially as
a picture ,leidegger 19a:129,.
It was Descartes, according to leidegger, who inaugurated the new para-
digm o representation and reduced the world to a picture.
In her article
Representation and its Limits in Descartes` ,1988,, Dalia Judoitz examines
how the Cartesian notion o the prototype reigures what is meant by a pic-
ture. She argues that by raming the world in a particular order, the Cartesian
mathematical rhetorical demand reduces the world to an object that has the
character o a picture` ,Judoitz 1988:5,. 1his picture is not a mimetic image,
but rather is a prototype, model or schema or what the world could be like.
Urban planning and architectural design can proide us with an example o
this compulsion to model. Small cardboard, MDl and matchstick models are
made and displayed or our perusal. 1he models proide a prototype or schema
and predetermine what the world will be like.
A prototype implies the ormulation o a concept beore an actualisation,
that the thing` is thought beore it is brought into being. 1hus Judoitz
says:
Rather than merely describing things, it actually prescribes them by
setting them up in adance hypothetically as a prototype. Since math-
ematics axiomatically constructs the objects it proposes to recognise, it
discoers only that which it produces. ,Judoitz 1988:4,
8
19
Descartes` mathematisation o knowledge proided the conditions o possi-
bility or reducing the world to a schema, a set o standards or norms. It is not
a representation, in the sense o a repetition o presence as with the early
Greeks or early Christians, but literally a re-presentation o the world. lor
leidegger, it inoles a projection o what-is ,leidegger 19a:144,. 1hus
modern Cartesian representation is not concerned with a isual picturing, with
mimesis, but rather with a modelling or raming o the world. It is the reduc-
tion o the world to data.
Cartesian representation, with its ormal normatie character predestines
our understanding o the world. 1hus or leidegger, representation does not
operate in the paradigm o resemblance, and does not operate as a copy o
some prior original, nor is it redolent o Plato`s Ideal lorms. In Plato`s igura-
tion, Ideal lorms exist anterior to any human attempt to model them, con-
ceptually or actually. 1his is not the case with representation as conceptualised
by Descartes. In representation someone conceptualises, someone models the
world. In this schema, what counts as Being is already pre-meditated and, or
leidegger, this means that Being-as-such is precluded. lerein lays the basis o
the leideggerian critique o representation.
In Descartes` conception o the world, the objectie structure o represen-
tation implies an ordering. In the leideggerian schema, it is man-as-subject
,.vbiectvv, who orders the world and produces the picture.
9
Dorothea
Olkowski suggests, that it is in the guise o the technological-calculatie man`
posing as master`, that the world is conceied and grasped as a picture`
,Olkowski 1988:106,. 1he world becomes a picture and is able to be modelled
because man looks upon it and represents it. In setting the world beore, and
in relation to himsel, man places himsel at the centre o all relations ,Olkowski
1988:106,. le becomes .vbiectvv.
In order to understand the paradigm shit that enabled humans to become
the centre o all relations, I wish to turn to leidegger`s discussion o the
historical relation between Being` and what-is`. 1hrough this discussion
we come to understand that the undamental basis o leidegger`s critique o
Cartesian representation deries rom the propensity o humans to objectiy
and master. In a comparison o early Greek and Modern epochs, leidegger
explains the historical shit in the understanding o what-is. le suggests that
in the pre-Socratic Greek world, man is the one who is looked upon by what-
is. In the Modern epoch a reersal occurs. Man is the one who does the look-
ing. le becomes the one who looks upon what-is. \hat-is becomes an object
o man`s scrutiny.
20
lor the early Greeks, what-is, was presence. In this conception, thought and
being were not separated. In the Greek world, leidegger argues that:
Man is the one who is . gathered towards presencing, by that which
opens itsel.. 1hereore, in order to ulil his essence, Greek man
must gather ;egeiv) and sae ;.eiv), catch up and presere, what opens
itsel in its openness, and he must remain exposed ;atbeveiv) to all its
sundering conusion. ,leidegger 19a:131,
Olkowski claims, that in this world where man was looked upon by that
which-is, Prometheus is tied to the rock, Pentheus dismembered by the Bacchae
|and| Acteon changed into a stag and torn to bits by his own pack o hounds`
,Olkowski 1988:9,. Reality looms up beore man and conronts him in the
power o its presence. 1he openness and exposure to that-which-lies-beore
;bypoeivevov), was or the Greeks the horizon o unconcealment. In this
apprehension o the world, leidegger proposes, the ego tarries within the
horizon o unconcealment that is meted out to it` ,leidegger 19a:145,.
\hat opens up in this horizon becomes present as what-is, so that the I`
belongs in the company o what-is. In the company o what-is, man is neither
priileged nor detached, but rather merely exists among other things. 1hus in
the ery ancient Greek world, Being is presencing and truth is unconcealment`
,leidegger 19a:14,. In this openness and exposure, the world is not a
picture, that is, not a representation. Representation did not negotiate what-is.
Man could not be .vbiectvv.
In contrast, in the modern epoch, man becomes the determining centre o
reality. It is rom this secure centre that man goes orth rom out o himsel.
le sets what is present at hand beore himsel and sets it in place as an object
or a subject. In this new relationship to reality, says leidegger, man as repre-
senting subject . moes in ivagivatio, in that his representing imagines, pic-
tures orth whateer is, as the objectie, into the world as picture` ,leidegger
19a:14,. Man is no longer ulnerable or open to that which lies beore and
looms up to conront him, but instead, he secures himsel as centre and takes
precedence oer all other possible centres o relationship. le is no longer
looked upon by what-is, but is the one who represents what-is.
According to leidegger, the pre-Socratic Greek world was not predicated
on a concept o representation and the Greeks did not think representationally.
loweer, according to leidegger, late Greek thinking prepared the conditions
and proided the possibility or representation to be set in place. leidegger
identiies Platonic thought as oundational in preparing the way or the repre-
21
sentational epoch. le claims that Plato`s notion o lorms or Ideas laid the
oundation that enabled a separation o what-is rom presence. \hat-is came
to be determined as eiao., mere appearance or look. In this shit rom presence
to look, the oundations are laid or what-is to be conceied as an image ,ia,.
1his recognition proided the doctrinal basis that, according to leidegger,
would one day permit the world to become ia, become a picture.
leidegger`s critique o Cartesian representation hinges on the act that it
establishes a rame that produces the objectiication and mastery o the world
by man as .vbiectvv. leidegger argues that, where what-is, is reduced to a
schema, there is a halt in Being. In setting the Greek apprehension o the
world as presencing, against the modern representation o the world as .vbiectvv,
leidegger aims to bring to the surace what constitutes this loss o, or halt to,
Being. lor the early Greeks, notes Derrida, the being o what-is neer consists
in an object ;Cegev.tava) brought beore man, ixed, stopped, aailable or the
human subject who would possess a representation o it` ,Derrida 1982:306,.
leidegger obseres, on the other hand, that modern man brings what-is
present at hand ;aa. 1orbavaeve) beore himsel as something standing oer
against` ,leidegger 199a:131,. Man relates it to himsel since he is the one
representing it. In this, man becomes the centre oer and aboe all other
possible centres. In the world o representation and man as .vbiectvv, repre-
senting is no longer sel-unconcealing as with the Greeks, but is rather a laying
hold o and grasping. leidegger claims that in the epoch o Cartesian repre-
sentation, assault rules. 1he regime o representation produces iolence. le
concludes:
1hat which is, is no longer that which presences, it is rather that which,
in representing, is irst set oer against, that which stands ixedly oer
against, which has the character o an object.. Representing is mak-
ing-stand-oer-against, an objectiying that goes orward and mas-
ters.. In this way representing dries eerything together into the
unity o that which is thus gien the character o object. ,leidegger
19a:150,
No longer is man amongst, and looked upon by, that which-is, he now is the
one who looks. In this relation, eerything that-is is transormed and set in
order, as standing resere ,e.tava,. 1hrough man`s ability to represent or model
the world, he secures the world or his own use. But with this newly acquired
power, leidegger warns, a terrible loss is incurred. Because man no longer lays
himsel open to the world, he can no longer experience what-is as Being.
22
Representationalism and the 1echnologisation of 1hought
One o the more insightul contributions o 1he Age o the \orld Pic-
ture` is the link that leidegger establishes between research and science, tech-
nology and representation. On irst impressions this may appear to hae little
releance or isual arts practice, since it is oten assumed that the isual arts
hae nothing in common with science or research. loweer, in contemporary
art practice, where technology, conceptualism and creatie arts research hae
become dominant orces shaping the ield o practice, leidegger`s argument
that knowing as research conceies what-is representationally, reminds us that
artistic inquiry, like science research has a propensity to rame what can be
known and seen.
leidegger`s argument proceeds on the premise that research is the
mathematisation o knowledge, a mode o thought that pre-conceies its
outcome. In this train o thought he continues:
\e irst arrie at science as research when the Being o whateer is, is
sought in . objectieness. 1his objectiying o whateer is, is accom-
plished in a setting beore, a representing, that aims at bringing each
particular being beore it in such a way that man who calculates can be
sure, and that means be certain o that being. ,leidegger 19a:12,
le proposes that science as research proceeds through the delimitation o
spheres o objects and the projecting o ground plans that speciy laws. It is
these laws that prescribe in adance what is to be known. lollowing Descartes`
understanding that science proceeds rom a uniersal order that anticipates the
particular, leidegger suggests that the conditions that deine an experiment
are anticipated by a law that has already been set in place.
10
1hus he says to set
up an experiment means to represent or conceie ;ror.teev) the conditions
under which a speciic series o motions can . be controlled in adance by
calculation` ,leidegger 19a:121,. In this conception o scientiic methodol-
ogy, a ramework is set in place and it is this ramework that enrames.
1he assertion that modern science as research is enraming, proides
leidegger with a context in which to deelop his critique o representational-
ism as an objectiying mode o thought. 1he methods o science enable us to
witness, irst hand, the reduction o what-is to objects. 1hese objects are in
turn reduced to standing resere. \illiam Loitt argues that as standing re-
sere, objects exist in their readiness or use by man as representing subject
,Loitt in leidegger 19a:xxix,. 1hings in the world exist out there, ready to
23
be collected, quantiied and calculated, turned into representations, so that
man may use them in his quest to master the world. In the next Chapter I will
return to the dangers o enraming as a mode o knowing the world. low-
eer, in this Chapter, I am concerned with how enraming or instrumentalism
operates in research.
leidegger suggests that through its ability to reduce eerything to an ob-
ject, science as research enrames us, it sets a limit on what and how we think.
Judoitz terms this the technologisation o thought. Judoitz speciies that
technologisation o thought i. representationalist thought. She argues that:
1he essence o representation is technological insoar as this schema
that it applies to the world rames it in such a way that the world can
only appear or be igured within its limits and as its eriication. ,Judoitz
1988:5,
Don Ihde notes that or leidegger, art is not as reductie in the same way as
science as research, since art is essentially anti-reductie in its imaginatie ecun-
dity` ,Ihde 19:129,. loweer, in a time when art practice has increasingly
taken on the quality o inquiry or research, the critique o the technologisation
o thought raises urgent questions. I we take the iew that art i. research, it
could be argued that the artist, as much as scientist or bureaucrat, looks upon
the world as standing resere. 1hrough her,his ability to model the world, s,
he secures the world or her,his own use. Considered in the light o this
ramework, representationalism or the technologisation o thought can be
implicated in abstraction and conceptualism just as much as in realism. 1he
dilemma or artists is how to resist the temptation o conceiing the world
only as a resource or her,his ends, whilst remaining open to the world so as
to experience what-is as being.
Immutable Mobiles
lor Latour, the technologisation o thought was enabled by a signiicant
paradigm shit that occurred in the sixteenth century. Unlike leidegger who
relects on the metaphysical ground which underpins the essence o modern
science, Labour attributes this paradigm shit to moements in the precise
practice and cratsmanship o knowing` ,Latour 1986:3,. Using the igure o
the immutable mobile`, Latour sets out to demonstrate how scientiic inno-
ations in writing and imaging cratsmanship enabled reality to be turned into
data and transported oer space and time.
11
24
1he example o Gutenberg`s printing press best illustrates the ormatie
role o technology in such a paradigm shit. 1he printing process enabled
cheap, mass produced re-presentations o inscriptie processes ,words, draw-
ings, maps etc.,, which could then be widely distributed amongst the popu-
lace. As a result o this mobility, data became moeable een as it became
immutable. 1hus scientiic empiricism and its ehicles, immutable mobiles,
acilitated a undamental shit in the way humans came to understand their
world.
Immutable mobiles can best be described as inscriptions or mappings
distilled rom raw data or reality. By inscriptions, Latour reers to inscriptions
as the marks, signs, prints and diagrams made by humans. 1hese inscriptions
orm into chains or cascades. 1he key character o these chains or cascades is an
unchanging orm that can be moed across ast distances and presented in
other places in the absence o the things they reer to. Absent things are able to
be transmitted with optical consistency. 1he lrench Ambassador`s globe, in
lolbein`s painting 1be revcb .vba..aaor., proides one such example. A map
drawn on paper also has the qualities o mobility and immutability whereas a
map drawn in the sand will be washed away with the next incoming tide.
Possessing the qualities o mobility and immutability, immutable mobiles`
are thereore a means o presenting absent things. 1he re-presentations are
objects o knowledge that hae, according to Latour, the properties o being
vobie but also ivvvtabe, pre.evtabe, reaaabe and covbivabe with one another`
,Latour 1986:,.
12
1o illustrate the operation o the logic o immutable mobiles, Latour cites
his experience as a scientist working in a laboratory. le gies the example o
the transormation o rats and chemicals onto paper. In a laboratory situation,
he argues, anything and eerything was transormed into inscriptions` ,Latour
1986:3-4,. 1hese inscriptions, he obseres, are combinable, superimposable
and could . be integrated as igures in the text or the articles people were
writing` ,Latour 1986:4,.
1his transormation o lesh into data is one o the hallmarks deining our
contemporary lies. \e willingly proide inormation in orms that can be
turned into immutable mobiles. 1he inormation we gie, whether it is in
opinion polls, census collections, taxation returns, enrolment orms or social
security applications, is transormed into data. 1his data takes the orm o
tables o igures, which are then used by bureaucracies and goernments to
make decisions that impact upon our lies. Inscriptions stand in our place.
1hey are abstractions which are able to be moed around, combined, com-
25
pared, superimposed and used to represent us and to make decisions about
our lies. And so people running, cycling or walking the dog, become shapes
on a bar graph or numbers in a table. Reality is ixed and set beore human
subjects as an object o inestigation.
Latour`s explication o immutable mobiles demonstrates how the regime
o representation has become so authoritatie and perasie. lor Latour,
what is at stake:
Is not the isual characteristics o a painting, o a drawing, o a map,
o a diagram, but the regime o re-presentation o which the isual
implementation is but a consequence. 1he key question is not about
degrees o realism` but about the articulation to be made between
mobility and immutability. ,Latour 1988a:26,
\hat becomes clear in this, is that we are dealing with a particular underlying
logic and not merely a question o appearances. 1his is the logic o representa-
tionalism.
Latour`s elaboration o inscriptions and immutable mobiles proides a
way o thinking about the precise practice and cratsmanship o knowing that
enabled science as research and now enables art as inquiry. le argues that the
articulation and prolieration o inscriptions and immutable mobiles enabled
the paradigm shit that we hae come to associate with the modern. It is
through the operation o inscriptions, cascades and immutable mobiles, that
the world cav become a picture or theme in the leideggerian sense. 1he mo-
bilisation through space and time, enabled by technology, produces the world
as picture.
Latour`s understanding o inscriptions, cascades and immutable mobiles
orms a productie dialogue with leidegger`s explication o the world as
picture. According to this iew the undamental eent o the modern age has
been the conquest o the world as picture. Man has been able to structure his
reality through an ability to set beore himsel what-is. 1his structured image
or immutable mobile is a consequence o the act that:
Man brings into play his unlimited power or the calculating, planning,
and moulding o all things. Science as research is an absolutely neces-
sary orm o this establishing o sel in the world. ,leidegger
19a:135,
26
In research, the institutionalisation o knowledge produces cascades o im-
mutable mobiles which take us on a predestined trajectory. Photographs, maps
o the world, architectural models o a uture building, town plans, the genetic
code and statistics are immutable mobiles that proide the prototypes or a
technological world. 1his data and these inscriptions can then be used to make
decisions that aect the actual lies o the people and others whose Being was,
in the inscription, reduced to a statistic or a model. 1he immutable mobile
becomes emblematic o the technologisation o thought. It pictures the world.
1he logic o the immutable mobile disregards or rather suppresses ariabil-
ity. It assumes that i we repeated the actions, the results would always be the
same. In contrast, the ariability produced by bodies in interaction produces an
inexhaustible complexity that can neer be reduced to ixity. In many ways,
immutable mobiles remain crude, but neer-the-less powerul igures that
enable ixity where there is in act ariability. It is the politics o representation,
rather than the images that is at issue.
Representation and inscriptie processes are interdependent. 1he logic I
hae elaborated may also be seen to be integral to art when it is conceied o as
a product rather than a process. Just as rats and chemicals are transormed into
inscriptions and people transormed into tables o igures, so in the drawing
or painting o a landscape, landorms, plants, skies, clouds, water and chemi-
cals ,paint pigments, photographic chemicals and so orth, can be seen to be
transormed into inscriptions. 1hese inscriptions are integrated as igures in
artworks which appear in galleries, in ilms, on the world-wide-web and else-
where. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 1hree, where art is subsumed under
art business`, it is reduced to data.
Immutable Mobiles and the Politics of Representation
In an inormation age, the politics o immutable mobiles concerns the
struggle or power oer knowledge and inormation and not all inscriptions-
words, drawings, diagrams, maps, charts or tables o igures-eect the way
we ,collectiely and indiidually, come to know and be in the world. \hat
gies some inscriptions the orce to make a dierence to the way we know and
understand the world Latour-in a moe that echoes leidegger`s discussion
o the role o publishing in 1he Age o the \orld Picture`-suggests it is
when those procedures and inscriptions are able to muster, align and win oer
new and unexpected allies` ,Latour 1986:6,. It is this orce that produces shits
in belie and behaiour. 1his shit transorms what and how it is to be.
2
In illuminating the way inscriptie practices come to shape the way we know
and are known, Latour`s elaboration o immutable mobiles has strong ainities
with loucault`s theorisation o the archaeology o knowledge. Latour is con-
cerned with how those material and mundane practices, so close to the eyes and
hands, prooundly inluence the way knowledge is made and distributed. Simi-
larly, loucault ocuses on the use o iles, accounting books and procedures in an
institution to create an inisible power that sees eerything about eeryone`
,Latour 1996:15,.
13
In order to demonstrate this, Latour shows how the technical inentions and
the cratsmanship o mapping, enabled colonial domination in the eighteenth
century. le cites the example o the lrench explorer La Prouse who was dis-
patched rom Versailles, by Louis XVI, to map the coastline o Sakhalin in
China. In Latour`s narratie, an encounter between La Prouse and a local Chi-
nese man exempliies the stakes inoled inscriptie processes. \hilst the Chi-
nese man was content to draw a map in the sand, La Prouse insisted that these
inscriptions be transerred to a notebook with pencil. 1wo sets o inscriptions:
but o ery dierent weight and eect! 1he documentation o perormance and
ephemeral art work entails a similar politic. \ithout photographic, ideo or
written documentation, ephemeral and perormance works hae the same status
as the Chinese man`s drawing. 1hey are erased with the passing o time and the
dimming o memory. 1hey can make no claim to a legitimate place in art dis-
course. Documentation enables such a claim to be made.
A map is a series o drawn lines and marks on a piece o paper. \ou may not
be able to eel the cold, or smell the salt air when you look at La Prouse`s map o
Sakhalin, howeer you could v.e it to ind your way. Riding on La Prouse`s crude
inscription was the quest or ownership oer oreign lands. \hilst the inscrip-
tions in the sand were erased in the rising tide, the inscriptions in the notebook
became a ehicle through which the lrench, and other colonial nations, were able
to plot their conquests o ar away lands. 1he technical inentions and the
cratsmanship o mapping went hand in hand with imperialist and commercial
interests.
14
In La Prouse`s time, the printing press enabled his map to be reproduced
and represented ad ininitum. Now, digital technology has come to usurp the
position o the printing press, speeding up and changing the quality o the
processes o mobilisation and immutability. According to Latour, this mobili-
zation has enabled the links between dierent places in time and space |to be|
completely modiied by |a| antastic acceleration o immutable mobiles which
circulate eerywhere` ,Latour 1986:11,.
28
Latour`s critique o immutable mobiles concurs with leidegger`s critique
o representationalism. In Latour`s laboratory, rats and chemicals are trans-
ormed into marks on paper thus quickly dispatching with the bleeding and
screaming rats. In leidegger`s articulation Being as what-is is set aside. Being
becomes technical, it becomes a product. 1he picture we are let with is one o
alienation rom Being.
Representation 1hought Differentially
leidegger claims that the speciic understanding o truth that holds do-
minion oer the modern age is representation as a schema, rather than a
presencing. loweer, he does not beliee we should submit to its ineitability.
In act, he beliees that we should hae the courage to relect upon the presup-
positions o modern representationalism and call into question its goals. le
warns that i man dawdles about in the mere negating o the age` and does
not take the courage to question its presumptions and its goals, the opportu-
nity to be transported into that between` will be lost ,leidegger 19a:115,.
1he between` that leidegger reers to, is that state in which he belongs to
Being and yet remains a stranger amidst that which is` ,leidegger 19a:136,.
In leidegger`s estimation, ailure to relect on our Being as beings will result in
sel-deception and blindness.
15
I we only had the courage to relect on modernity, leidegger claims, we
would see that the seeds o transormation already exist within the ery ehi-
cles that appear to sustain the representational rame. A sign o this, he claims
is that:
Lerywhere and in the most aried orms and disguises the gigantic is
making its appearance. In so doing, it eidences itsel simultaneously
in the tendency toward the increasingly small.. But as soon as the
gigantic in planning and calculating and adjusting and making shits
oer out o the quantitatie and becomes a special quality, then what is
gigantic, and what can seemingly always be calculated completely, be-
comes, precisely through this incalculable. ,leidegger 19a:135,
lor leidegger, as soon as the gigantic` shits out o the quantitatie into the
qualitatie it ceases to be calculable. 1his becoming incalculable`, as leidegger
puts it, casts an inisible shadow around all things eerywhere when man has
been transormed into .vbiectvv and the world into picture` ,leidegger
19a:135,. As a consequence he concludes:
29
By means o this shadow the modern world extends itsel out into a
space withdrawn rom representation, and so lends to the incalculable
the determinateness peculiar to it. ,leidegger 19a:136,
leidegger`s assessment o the potential o the gigantic to exceed the quantita-
tie within representation and become incalculable, resonates with Deleuze`s
strategy to oercome the limits o representation, by extending representa-
tion as ar as the too large and too small o dierence` ,Deleuze 1994:262,. In
relecting upon the presuppositions o representational thinking, leidegger`s
picturing o representation leaes us at a loss as to the tools and strategies we
need to moe beyond representationalism. I anything, the argument in 1he
Age o the \orld Picture` becomes representationalist itsel. \hilst in the inal
section o this Chapter I will argue that leidegger`s notions o handling and
handlability proide the tools to enact this moe, I irst want to set out Derrida`s
objections to leidegger`s critique o representation.
In his conclusion to Sending: On Representation`, Derrida makes his objec-
tion clear when he makes the point:
Is not the whole schema o leidegger`s reading challengeable in prin-
ciple, deconstructed rom an historical point o iew . i there has
been representation, the epochal reading that leidegger proposes or
it becomes . problematic rom the beginning, at least as a normatie
reading ,and it wishes to be this also,, i not as an open questioning o
what oers itsel to thought beyond the problematic, and een be-
yond the question as a question o Being, o a grouped destiny or o
the evroi o Being. ,Derrida 1982:322-323,
It is not an easy task to relect upon representation and vot re-iterate represen-
tation. Derrida argues that leidegger turns representation against representa-
tion in order to critique representation. le notes that leidegger`s interpreta-
tion o representation presupposes a representational pre-interpretation o
representation` ,Derrida 1982:320,. \hilst leidegger`s critique o representa-
tion is centred on the way representation ixes, holds and masters, Derrida
argues that this is precisely what leidegger achiees. Not only does leidegger
present the modern world as picture, but he also wants to throw the modern
world as picture into relie oer against the medieal and ancient world pic-
tures` ,leidegger 19a:128,. Surely this is a contradiction in terms I the
world, as a picture, is equialent to the world as representation and representa-
tion is characteristic o the modern epoch, then is it not a contradiction to
speak o medieal and ancient world pictures leidegger says as much him-
30
sel. \hereer we hae a world picture, he argues, the Being o whateer is, is
sought and ound in the representedness` o whateer is ,leidegger 19a:130,.
le continues:
Lerywhere that whateer is, is not interpreted in this way . there can
be no world picture. 1he act that whateer is comes into being in and
through representedness transorms the age in which this occurs into
a new age . the expressions world picture o the modern age` and
modern world picture` both . assume something that verer could
hae been beore, namely, a medieal and an ancient world picture.
,leidegger 19a:130: my emphasis,
In this way, representation becomes a trap or leidegger. As a prototype that
rames and enrames, his picture o the world does not allow us to moe
beyond the representational rame. It seems that leidegger`s argument is
itsel representational. As Olkowski has noted, his method o working within
the structure that he wants to supplant, endlessly encircles him in the limits o
representation` ,Olkowski 1988: 106,. In this sense leidegger`s theorisation is
still a representation o representation and as such does not open out onto an
altogether dierent way o thinking. lis epoch traps him in representation. It
is only in his counter-representationalist conception o handling and
handlability that leidegger suggests a way out o this impasse.
Olkowski addresses this problem, not just in terms o leidegger, but as a
criticism o philosophy in general. She says that:
1he concepts that much o social and political philosophy has em-
braced . make change impossible insoar as they are rigid representa-
tional concepts that lack the luidity that is conducie to conceptual
change. ,Olkowski 1999:94,
Derrida takes up the point that the concepts that philosophy has adopted hae
been rigidly representationalist. le accepts that the premise on which represen-
tation is based presupposes an inariable identity and a system o substitut-
ability. According to this regime o representation, notes Derrida:
Despite a diersity o words rom dierse languages, under the dier-
sity o the uses o the same word, under the diersity o contexts or
o syntactic systems, the same reerent, the same representatie content
would keep its iniolable identity. ,Derrida 1982:303,
31
loweer, Derrida is not content to accept these terms. \hat i kernels o
dierent meanings start to bud, grow and disrupt unity, thus racturing such
identity Derrida`s question is simple. \hy do we maintain this compulsion
to try to ix meaning and oercome the polysemy o a word ,Derrida 1982:299-
300,
Derrida`s opportunity to break open representation is proided by the tra-
jectory o leidegger`s argument against representation. lor leidegger, says
Derrida, representational logic produces what-is as an object brought beore
man, ixed, stopped, aailable or the human subject who would possess a
representation o it` ,Derrida 1982:306,. loweer, i as leidegger argues,
what-is can mutate rom what-is as presence in the Greek world, to what-is as
a relation o representation in the modern, what is to say that representation
itsel is not undergoing transormations Moreoer i, as leidegger argues,
Plato set up the preconditions or representation and sent it on its way, then
perhaps moement is a undamental condition inside representation itsel.
Moement i. imbricated in leidegger`s concept o destining` or sending
,evroi.,. le recognises this when he points out that, that which has the charac-
ter o destining moes, in itsel at any time, toward a special moment that
sends it into another destining, in which, howeer, it is not simply submerged
and lost` ,leidegger 19a:3,. I this is the case, then perhaps representation
can neer presume ixity or inariability. Perhaps leidegger`s critique o repre-
sentation`s will to ixity` is not born out by an inherent condition that oper-
ates inside representation itsel. According to Derrida, this condition can best
be understood as the operation o aifferavce.
In his introduction to the essay Differavce` ,1968,, Derrida explains that
aifferavce is not a word nor a concept, but rather an economy.
16
Derrida intro-
duces the term .beaf to demonstrate the complex structure o weaing that
occurs in the economy. le proisionally calls this structure aifferavce. le sug-
gests that this complex structure is an interlacing which permits the dierent
threads and dierent lines o meaning-or orce-to go o again in dierent
directions, just as it is always ready to tie itsel up with others` ,Derrida 1992:109,.
Deried rom the Latin aifferre, the erb aifferer has two distinct meanings. In
one sense, aifferer reers to the action o putting o until later. Derrida notes
that according to this meaning, there is implied an economical calculation, a
detour, a delay, a relay, a resere, a representation` ,Derrida 1992:112,. Used in
this sense, aifferer inoles a temporal dimension. In its other usage, says
Derrida aifferer means to be not identical, to be other, discernible` ,Derrida
1992:112,. Understood in the dual sense o deerral and dierence, Derrida
argues that aifferavce designates a constitutie, productie and originary causal-
32
ity, the process o scission and diision which would produce or constitute
dierent things or dierences` ,Derrida 1992:112-113,. 1hought in terms o
aifferavce, representation begins to bud and grow in a disorderly ashion. It
becomes incalculable.
Derrida`s deence o representation is contained in his Sending: On Repre-
sentation`. In setting out his own deence o representation, Derrida employs a
strategy that is both an argument or and an enactment o aifferavce. 1he lecture
was presented as the opening address o a congress o lrench-speaking philo-
sophical societies at Strasbourg. le used his position as a representatie o a
philosophical society, presenting a paper on representation, at a philosophical
conerence on representation, to lay out the stakes inoled in representation. In
this paper he takes leidegger`s epochal reading o representation and unraels
its presumed ixity. In Derrida`s argument, Strasbourg becomes a metaphor or
the congress, or the encounter o dierent languages and or the debate on
representation. Derrida suggests that in its position as a border or rontier town
between lrance and Germany, Strasbourg is an ideal place to test the presumed
inariable identity o representation. As a place where dierent languages and
dierent cultural practices encounter each other, the eects o passage and o
translation on representation become palpable. In Strasbourg dierence comes
up against dierence and the possibility opens or something to happen.
In Strasbourg, where lrench and German come ace to ace, Derrida takes on
leidegger`s argument against representationalism and builds his own deence
o representation. Derrida goes to the root o the concept o representation and
sets out to show how aifferavce operates to produce, what Deleuze has termed,
a eritable theatre o metamorphoses and permutations` ,Deleuze 1983:56,. It
is through the lesson o translation that Derrida builds a place or representa-
tion. lor him, the crux o the mutability o representation turns on the axis o
translation, the translation rom one state to another, rom one orm to another
and so on. Representation is a sending or a sending on ,evroi,. 1hrough his use
o leidegger`s own term sending`, accompanied by a careul unpicking o
leidegger`s argument, he demonstrates how representation as process is inher-
ently transormatie in character.
1he eect o translation can be demonstrated simply enough by juxtaposing
two dierent translations o the same section o leidegger`s text. 1he irst
translation o leidegger`s text is a segment o Derrida`s translation o leidegger`s
Age o the \orld Picture` re-translated by Peter and Anne-Marie Caws. 1he
second is a translation o the same section o the essay by \illiam Loitt. 1he
translation o Derrida`s translation reads:
33
It is something entirely dierent that, in contrast to Greek understand-
ing, signiies ;veivt) modern representation ;aa. veveiticbe 1or.teev),
whose signiication ;eaevtvvg) reaches its best expression ;.v.arvc)
in the word reprae.evtatio. 1or.eteev beaevtet bier, representation signi-
ies here: aa. 1orbavaeve a. eiv vtgegev.tebevae. ror .icb brivgev, avf .icb,
aev 1or.teevaev v beiebev vva iv aie.ev v .icb a. aa. va..egebevaev
ereicb vrvcrivgev, to make the existent ,which is already beore one:
1orbavaeve, come beore one as a standing-oer-against, to relate it to
the sel who represents it and in this way to orce it back on sel as a
determining ield. ,Derrida 1982:30,
In contrast, Loitt`s translation reads:
In distinction rom Greek apprehending, modern representing whose
meaning the word reprae.evtatio irst brings to its earliest expression,
intends something quite dierent. lere to represent ,ror.teev, means
to bring what is present at hand ,aa. 1orbavaev) beore onesel as
something standing oer against, to relate it onesel, to the one repre-
senting it, and to orce it back into this relationship to onesel as the
normatie realm. ,leidegger 19a:131,
1he coupling o these two translations demonstrates Derrida`s point. 1he
process o translation necessarily inoles corruption. It is this corruption that
produces permutations and brings about metamorphosis. leidegger`s own
translation o reprae.evtatio as ror.tevvg, demonstrates this clearly. Repre.evtatio
means to render present. 1he re` o reprae.evtatio eokes the power-o-bring-
ing-back-to-presence in a repetitie way. 1or.tevvg, the word which leidegger
takes as equialent o reprae.evtatio, takes on quite a dierent emphasis. It
signiies to place, dispose beore onesel, a sort o theme or thesis` ,Derrida
1982:30,. low then can we reconcile these two seemingly contradictory senses,
that o presence and appearance or presence as an image beore one Did
leidegger not set up an opposition between presence and representation
\asn`t presence the domain o the Greeks, whilst representation was the
destiny o the modern epoch Derrida explains this seeming contradiction or
opposition:
1his power-o-bringing-back, in a repetitie way, is marked simultane-
ously by the re- o representation ava in this positionality, this power-
o-placing, disposing, putting, that is to be read in teev and which at
the same time reers back to the sel, that is to the power o a subject
34
who can bring back to presence and make present, make something
present to itsel, indeed just make itsel present. 1his making present can
be understood in two senses at least, this duplicity is at work in the term
representation. ,Derrida 1982:308,
laing laid out the duplicity at work in the term representation, Derrida asks
whether this so-called relation or substitution already escapes the orbit o repre-
sentation. lis exegesis demonstrates precisely the opening potential, the already-
not-yet that is implicit in the ery act o translation.
Against leidegger`s argument that representationalism produces totalisation
and ixity, Derrida returns us to the re` o representation. le argues that the idea
o being beore, is already implicit in pre-sent. According to him, the re` o
reprae.evtatio allows or a revaerivg present o a summonsing as a power-o-
bringing-back-to-presence` ,Derrida 1982:30,. le claims that the power-o-bring-
ing-back-to-presence in a repetitie way can be read in the .teev o 1or.teev. So
how does this power-o-bringing-back-to-presence break open representation
to another rendering
1he power-o-bringing-back-to-presence, suggested in the duplicity o repre-
sentation, recalls leidegger`s distinction between what-is as presence and what-
is as representation. Instead o opposing them, seeing them as belonging to
dierent times and dierent places, we can take a dierent trajectory. \e can bring
to the ore, Derrida`s notion o sending ,evroi,, which itsel is indebted to
leidegger`s destining. In destining ,Ce.cbic,, says leidegger, there is that send-
ing-that-gathers ,rer.avvveae cbicev, that starts man upon a way o reealing`
,leidegger 19a:24,.
In 1he Age o the \orld Picture`, leidegger notes that the displacement o
presence by representation inds its beginnings in the igure o Plato. leidegger
identiies the impetus or a representational mode o thinking within Platonic
thought. \hilst Plato existed within Greek thinking, his postulation o an Ideal
world o lorms, constituted that sending-that-gathers and started man upon a
way to a representational reealing. In the world o Ideal lorms, Being is per-
ectly and timelessly present to itsel. 1he actual world by contrast is but an
imperect copy. lere, ibrating on the edge between the world as presence and
the world as representation, Plato dispatched a possibility, sent an enoy on its
way. Derrida details this particular moment as that which is already-not-yet.
But i as leidegger argues, Plato prepared the conditions or representation
and sent it on its way, did he also cut the umbilical cord that detached presence
35
rom representation Did representation detach itsel rom the world o pres-
ence and go on its way uninected by presence Derrida proposes that in his
singling out and detachment or delegation, leidegger ails to take into ac-
count the lessons o translation. !f there has been representation then it may
be that it begins by reerring back ;par e revroi) ,Derrida 1982:324,. Derrida
argues that, in reerring back:
It does not begin, and once this breaking open or this partition di-
ides, rom the ery start, eery revroi, there is not a single revroi, but
rom then on, always a multiplicity o revroi., so many dierent traces
reerring back to other traces and to the traces o others. ,Derrida
1982:324,
Derrida is emphatic. 1his is not a lack, nor is representation indiisible. In
sending out, there is biurcation. As Derrida puts it, there is a condition or
there being an evroi, possibly an evroi o being, a dispensation or a git o being
and time, o the present and o representation. 1hese revroi. o traces or traces
o revroi. do not hae the structure o representaties or o representations`
,Derrida 1982:324,. At one leel they are like Latour`s cascades. loweer, un-
like the immutability o Labour`s mobiles, these revroi. mutate.
1he mutability and multiplicity o revroi. ,so many dierent traces reerring
back to other traces, is analogous to improisation in dance. A dance improi-
sation begins by reerring back, to other dances, to other steps and moe-
ments. In the moement back, in the recall, the dancers moe orward and the
dance breaks open and diides and multiplies. It becomes a production, both
a presence and a representation. Drawing could be similarly described. One
begins by reerring back: to the pedagogy o one`s training, to the moti, to the
imagination or whateer is. loweer in the moement back and orward,
rom looking up and down and looking back, recalling and doing, there emerges
a multiplicity where many traces or marks reer back to other traces and the
traces o others. In the process o doing, we ind we are no longer in the grip
o representation.
In Derrida`s rethinking o representation as revroi., he argues that there is a
need to think a history o Being, o sending Being on its way, no longer
regulated or centred on representation` ,Derrida 1982:313,. I Derrida`s reread-
ing o the re` o representation allows that power-o-bringing-back-to-pres-
ence, then it is possible to argue that representation renders possible a double
articulation around what-is as presence ava what-is as representation. 1his
double articulation casts representation in a dierent light altogether. Instead
36
o creating ixity and indiisibility, representation sends on and on, and in the
translation there is ineitable mutability. Derrida`s apprehension produces an
improisation that is a double articulation, both presencing and representing.
1o conclude this argument, I want to present an example that teases us with
the duplicitous nature o representation. In sending out, there is biurcation and
in the aifferavce there is, as Derrida puts it, a condition or there being a dispen-
sation or a git o Being and time, o the present and o representation` ,Derrida
1982:324,. 1his condition o possibility allows what-is to sometimes co-exist
both as presence and as representation. Roland Barthes` Cavera vciaa ,1981,
urnishes me with this example. Barthes begins Cavera vciaa with:
One day, quite some time ago, I happened upon a photograph o Napo-
leon`s youngest brother, Jerome, taken in 1852. And I realised with
amazement I hae not been able to lessen since: I am looking at the eyes
that looked at the Lmperor`. ,Barthes 1981:3,
In this recognition, time had collapsed and Barthes was looking into the eyes o
Napoleon`s youngest brother a. re a. looking at a photograph o him. 1he
git` or Barthes was that the photograph was simultaneously apprehended as
both presence and representation.
!f there has been representation, Derrida thinks it may be because the evroi o
being was originally menaced in its being together . by diisibility or dissen-
sion` ,Derrida 1982:323,. Rather than an inariable identity o sense, o unity,
there is a moement o diision, a biurcation that continues to biurcate and
multiply ad ininitum. 1hus Derrida re-iterates that, i there has been represen-
tation, it is because dierentiation and diision is stronger, strong enough to no
longer guarantee, keep or sae the sustaining sense o unity. ,Derrida 1982: 323,.
Instead o closure, there is continual opening out. It is in the sending ;evroi) that
a double articulation gathers in and then dierentiates.
Derrida`s strategy o actiating the process o sending is instructie when
posed against the will to ixity that leidegger argues is the condition o moder-
nity. Sending, it has been argued, produces moement. It enables representation
to extend as ar as the too large and the too small o dierence. Representation
becomes engorged. It sheds it skin and keeps on multiplying. It is monstrous.
Derrida`s elaboration o evroi. and revroi., can be seen as a metaphor or what
happens in practice. In demonstrating how engagement triggers a process o
aifferavce, he proides a critical link that enables us to go beyond representation-
alism.
3
1he Ruin of Representation?
1
I Derrida`s lecture Sending: on Representation` is a deence o representa-
tion, we might well ask why he inds the need to substitute the terms evroi and
revroi or representation. Is the weight o its history so oerpowering, that our
continued use o the word representation proes unproductie lor Derrida,
as I hae argued, it is not a question o substitution, but rather an attempt to
distil and demonstrate a condition that operates inside representation itsel.
Against leidegger`s position that the will to ixity and totalisation grounds
representation, Derrida has presented us with the iew that change is inherent
to representation.
18
Deleuze, on the other hand, is not coninced. le suspects
that change can not be eected i one continues to work within the represen-
tational rame. Unlike Derrida, he makes no deence o representation. le
argues that new terms and processes, conducie to luidity and moement, are
needed to enable that conceptual change. Derrida`s introduction o the terms
evroi. and revroi. could perhaps be seen to indicate this. In Deleuze`s estima-
tion, representation has ossiied, become sedimented and ixed. le is com-
mitted to an ontology o change. In this endeaour, he pits the monstrous
nature o repetition against the stability and hierarchy o representation
,Olkowski 1999:24,. lere we can return to the question o practice. In the
repetitie nature o practice it is neer a question o repetition o the same.
Rather, as Deleuze argues, repetition produces only the same o that which
diers` ,Deleuze 1990:289,. 1his monstrous logic is the logic o practice.
\hilst there are points o correspondence between leidegger and Deleuze`s
critique o representation, particularly representation`s will to ixity and indi-
isibility, there are also marked dierences in their projects. \hilst leidegger is
concerned with ontology, Deleuze is intent on oering a pragmatics o action.
I will return to discuss this dierence in the inal section o this Chapter, but
irstly I want to sketch out Deleuze`s opposition to what he calls organic
representation`. I will use this critique to launch a dierent way o thinking
about the work o art.
Deleuze, like leidegger, identiies Platonism as preparing or, signalling
and setting in chain the conditions or the adent o representation. loweer,
or Deleuze it was Aristotle`s metaphysics, which proided the ramework that
enabled representation. \hilst Plato`s contribution was piotal in enabling
the world to become an image, he argues that it was Aristotle`s structuring that
enabled this image to establish its oundations.
As we hae seen, it was within a theory o Ideas and lorms that Plato was
38
to make the critical distinction between the Idea ,the model, and the copy. Deleuze
argues that Plato`s distinction established an ivterva relation between the model
and the copy, not just one o appearance. In this schema, the copy stands in an
internal, spiritual, noological and ontological relation with the idea or model`
,Deleuze 1994a:264,. lere Plato inaugurated a system o thinking that subordi-
nated dierence to instances o the Same, the Similar, the Analogous and the
Opposed` ,Deleuze 1994a:265,.
In the transition to representation, a slippage in thinking occurred. 1he inter-
nal relation between model and copy was undone. 1he moral origin and presup-
positions that mitigated the relations between model and copy were orgotten.
All that remained through this orgetting was the relation o appearances. Larlier
in this Chapter, we saw this relation operating in the designations natural atti-
tude` and essential copy`. In this Aristotelian inspired mode o thinking, thought
was coered oer by an image oerwhelmed by a schema ,Deleuze 1994a:265,.
Deleuze suggests that it is this schema that is deployed in the world o represen-
tation. 1he schema entails a classiicatory system built around appearances and
predicated on the same, the similar, the analogous and the opposed. lrom
Aristotle on, this schema shaped thought.
Aristotle`s obsession with classiication, enabled the heterogeneity o the
image ,word or isual, to be gathered up and organised as representation. Clas-
siication enables knowledge to be organised and ordered hierarchically. In all
disciplines o knowledge, taxonomies or classiicatory systems order knowledge.
In biology this ordering takes the orm o taxonomies o plants and animals,
organised hierarchically in terms o increasing complexity. In anthropology, this
taxonomy is realised through reerence to lines o descent and ainity. In chem-
istry and geology it takes the orm o chemical tables and, in the humanities and
literature concepts are organised into dictionaries o words and thoughts.
19
All
these taxonomies build on a ramework where the key determinants are similari-
ties or resemblances between things, ideas, shapes and colours. 1his system
orders inormation. Deleuze has termed this system organic representation`.
In Deleuze and Guattari`s theorisation, organic representation takes the orm
and structure o a tree. 1he tree with its roots, trunks, branches and leaes orms
a solid indiisible whole. 1hey note how odd it is that the tree has dominated
western thought and systems o knowledge, rom botany to biology, anatomy
to anthropology. More sobering, rom their point o iew, is that this arbores-
cent system has also dominated gnosiology, theology, ontology and all o phi-
losophy ,Deleuze and Guattari 198:18,. It also perades the eeryday.
39
Deleuze and Guattari contrast the arborescent structure underlying organic
representation with the rhizome. In their thinking, the rhizome deies the
classiicatory tree-like structure that grounds and ixes thinking. 1he rhizome
buds at any point, breaks o and keeps on budding and prolierating. In this
way rhizomatic thinking is o a dierent order rom representational thinking.
1he structure o the world-wide-web demonstrates how the rhizome works
in the actual world. loweer, whilst it may be argued that the web is rhizomatic,
I would suggest that the principles underpinning web site design are no dier-
ent rom those o other taxonomic systems. 1hey inole categorisation and
organisation o data according to the principles o representation. In this
endeaour, hypertext and web designers organise data using the same princi-
ples that underpin the organisation o taxonomies o plants, animals, chemi-
cals or words. 1hus whilst the world-wide-web might oer us the possibility
o escape rom representation, it seems we need representational logic, at the
outset, in order to enable us to negotiate it.
Similarly, whilst the process o art may dey representationalism, its catego-
risation in art history and art theory does not. As we hae seen, the discipline
o art history is ounded on the ourold unction o identiication, classiica-
tion, ealuation and interpretation. It conorms to Aristotle`s arborescent
classiicatory system.
Deleuze argues that the arborescent model operates according to the
quatripartite structure o the same, the similar, the analagous and the op-
posed. 1his quatripartite ramework can be exempliied by reerence to the
classiicatory system we know so well, that o the amily tree. 1he amily tree is
predicated upon principles o identity ,I am a Bolt,, resemblance ,I look like
my ather,, analogy ,a amily has its roots, trunks and branches, and opposi-
tion ,you do not belong because you are not blood, you hae no ailiations
with my amily and thereore hae no place in my amily,.
20
Aristotle`s conceptualisation not only creates a hierarchy o thought and
coherence, it also legitimises practices-isual, linguistic, social and political-
that demand intelligibility, rigidity and hegemony. lor example, amily trees
proide the rationale or amily inheritance, social realism has tended to be adopted
by totalitarian regimes as a model or ideal to be emulated, and political member-
ship deines ailiation. lor Deleuze, the Aristotelian model o organic represen-
tation - organised around identity, opposition, analogy, and resemblance-
dominates most political, social, artistic, ethnic, economic, scientiic, linguist, and
philosophical practices ,Olkowski 1999:20,. Organic representation is consti-
40
tuted according to this our-part judgement in which dierence is subordi-
nated to identity, to resemblance, to the analogy o judgement and to the
negatie. Organic representation ixes and totalises. In this sense then, Deleuze`s
critique has strong resonances with the critique o representation ound in
1he Age o the \orld Picture`.
Deleuze`s particular critique o the Aristotelian metaphysical ramework
and its ehicle, the arborescent model o representation, is grounded in the
elision o dierence. In representation, he says, dierence is subordinated by
the thinking subject to the identity o the concept` ,Deleuze 1994a:266,. In
order to classiy objects, bodies, words, images or chemicals, this system be-
gins with commonalities or similarities between things. Len when some-
thing is classiied` as being dierent, it is always seen as dierent rom`.
Dierence is qualiied in terms o what it is vot. Olkowski notes that or
Aristotle, dierence is only allowed to exist in terms o identity with regard to
a generic concept.` ,Olkowski 1999:18,. Dierence as such is excluded rom
representation.
In Deleuze`s puzzling, to think non-representationally inoles thinking
dierence in itsel. 1he problem is, that dierence cannot be thought in itsel,
so long as it is subject to the requirements o representation` ,Deleuze
1994a:262,. It becomes the most diicult o problems to think dierence
dierently or dierentially. Can we eer think dierence without thinking what
it is dierent rom Deleuze`s treatise, Differevce ava Repetitiov ,1994a,, is an
attempt to do just that. Repetition with dierence proides the key to his
strategy and it is through practice that this can be demonstrated.
Defying the Gravitation of Representationalism
In the Aristotelian rame, Being and moement are in opposition.
21
In this
ormulation, there is no moement. Deleuze`s approach to cracking open the
circle o representation is pragmatic. le suspects that practice creates the moe-
ment and moement proides the key to breaking open the ixity o represen-
tation. It is not that representation can be expelled rom the scene, but rather
at the leel o practice, representation can be set wobbling on its axis and can be
toppled. Practice inoles moement and moement inoles setting things
in process. Practice necessarily inoles a process o becoming.
In practice, as we hae seen, the work can take on a lie o its own. 1his
moement, suggests Deleuze, is:
41
Capable o aecting the mind outside o all representation, it is a
question o making moement itsel a work, without interposition, o
substituting direct signs or mediating representations, o inenting
ibrations, rotations, whirlings, graitations, dances or leaps which di-
rectly touch the mind. ,Deleuze 1994a:8,
So what is this dynamic that enables ibrations, whirlings, graitation, dances or
leaps which directly touch the mind low do you produce within a work, a
moement capable o aecting the mind outside o all representation Deleuze
and Guattari argue it is when the molecular elements within a work produce
lines o light, moements o deterritorialization and destratiication` ,Deleuze
and Guattari 198:3,. 1his is not chaos, but rather a coniguration o speeds,
accelerations, intensities and rupture. Such an image o thought, Olkowski claims,
is necessary to the articulation o dierence thought dierentially and to the
realization o mobility` ,Olkowski 1999:2,. Such an articulation o dierence
occurs in practice itsel. lere the preconceptions about things are relinquished as
the action establishes its own rhythm or logic.
Deleuze and Guattari suggest a pragmatic strategy or negotiating this lux.
1hey begin with a recognition that we necessarily operate within the social orma-
tion. Lodge yoursel on a stratum`, they say, and experiment with the opportu-
nities it oers` ,Deleuze and Guattari 198:161,. Once you hae ound an adan-
tageous place rom which to ind potential moments or lines o light, connect
with them and sur them. 1hey claim that it is only through a meticulous
relation with the strata that one can succeed in reeing lines o light. It is this
success that can cause conjugated lows to pass and escape ,Deleuze and Guattari
198:161,. I representation is a stratum, then it is true to say any line o light
rom it, must begin with being well ersed in its ramework. It is also true that
we must experiment with the opportunities it proides. loweer, once we hae
ound potential places rom which to launch lines o light, it behoes us to leap
o the stratum into the unknown.
loweer, Deleuze and Guattari caution us against too wild a destratiication:
I you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then instead o
drawing the plane you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or een
dragged toward catastrophe. Staying stratiied-organised, signiied,
subjected-is not the worst that can happen, the worst that can hap-
pen is i you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse.
,Deleuze and Guattari 198:161,
42
I want to slow down the speed or a moment and ponder how this might
actually work in practice, gien Olkowski`s claim that the ruin o representation
can be accomplished only on the leel o actual practices ,Olkowski 1999:25,.
At the Level of Actual Practices
In researching and writing this book, I recognise that the allusions I make, the
analogies I draw, the examples and the igures o speech I employ, situate me
irmly in the regime o representation, both in leideggerian and Deleuzian
understandings o the term. And so I orm a question. Isn`t the ery discipline
inoled in reading, note-taking and orming an argument representationalist
rom the start I am required to ind correspondences between my own thinking
and the writings o releant theorists working in my ield. I identiy with the
ideas o other writers and ind analogies between my ideas and the ideas o
those writers. I seek out threads o resemblance that link my ideas with particular
theoretical positions. I oppose my position to other stated positions. I garner
eidence that will enable my position to hold in the ace o opposition rom
other theories. 1he model o academic enquiry operates according to the logic o
organic representation or representationalism. But is this all that happens
Moements in knowledge suggest that something else is also happening. In
reerencing preious authors and theories, the aim is not merely to repeat them,
but rather repeat them dierently. 1his moement is itsel revroi., a multiplicity
o revroi., so many dierent traces reerring back to other traces and to the traces
o others` ,Derrida 1982:324,. In inoking revroi., is it possible to suggest that
Derrida`s elaboration o revroi., is the realisation o mobility as theorised by
Deleuze Can Derrida`s notion o aifferavce be equated with Deleuze`s dierence
thought dierentially I think not. Derrida`s moement is a condition ritbiv
representation. Deleuze`s dierence operates in a dierent register and against
the grain o representation.
Deleuze argues that to restore dierence in thought, we need to irst untie the
knot which consists o representing dierence through the identity o the con-
cept and the thinking subject` ,Deleuze 1994:266,. So I go again to practice and to
the process o working through this project. I dig up the notes I hae made at
dierent times when I didn`t eel I had a ix on anything, when it appeared more
as i representation had led the scene altogether. In these moments my thinking
took quite a dierent trajectory:
Iè been working solidly or three days. Neer as much or as long as I
want. 1his reading is so slow and I oten seem to understand nothing.
43
1he words just make no sense at all. But does it matter Does it really
matter It makes no sense at all. 1his morning there was nothing. No-
where to go. No place to start. But one does as eery day. Just sit down
and start. Oercome the inertia. 1his is the adice Leinas gies. 1he
eort to oercome inertia. One hour, two hours o struggling, o slow
laborious reading and extensie note taking and the words swell around
and engul me. 1hen in the middle o something else-reading Rosalind
Krauss about Duchamp, another stream starts lowing out and I hae to
write it out quickly beore it eaporates and disappears as quickly as it
appears. My rationale or rethinking perormatiity. Vicki Kirby`s rework-
ing o Derrida`s proocation that there is nothing outside the text. And
then as quick as it comes, it goes . it seems as i without leaing a trace
in me . so, I hae to write it out in haste, in shorthand:
Duchamp. Manray. rayograph. photograms.
grammatology.writing. and the connection with what I am reading
Krauss as saying, the image created is o the ghostly traces o departed
objects`. lere we hae the intrusion o the real` in representation .
yes that is the connection . rom Peirce to . the index . and Rosalind
Krauss again. 1he rayograph or photogram makes explicit what is the
case in all photography. It is the real. ,Bolt 2000,
1he passage is a passage o changing speeds and intensities. It isn`t altogether
logical. It isn`t een necessarily grammatical. It was written in the heat o the
moment. Cascades o words tumble out in a rush, one ater the other and oer
the top o each other. It is the thinking that occurs in the middle o the night
when one wakes and scribbles down words or images and that, the next day, are
barely i at all legible. It is thinking without knowing. Derrida writes o this
thinking without knowing or as he puts it, writing without seeing. And so I
want to return and requote the citation gien at the commencement o this
Chapter:
By accident, and sometimes on the brink o an accident, I ind mysel
writing without seeing. Not with my eyes closed, to be sure, but open
and disorientated in the night, or else during the day, my eyes ixed on
something else, while looking elsewhere, in ront o me, or example
when at the wheel: I then scribble with my right hand a ew squiggly
lines on a piece o paper attached to the dashboard or lying on the seat
beside me. Sometimes, still without seeing, on the steering wheel it-
sel. 1hese notations-unreadable graiti-are or memory, one would
later think them to be a ciphered writing. ,Derrida 1993:3,
44
Derrida asks, what happens when one writes without seeing` I am back on
amiliar territory or the moment. I think o Deleuze`s concept o lines o
light. Dorothea Olkowski elaborates the process:
Comparatie rates o low on these lines produce phenomena o rela-
tie slowness and iscosity, or on the contrary acceleration and rup-
ture.. 1urned toward lines o light that are vorevevt. o
deterritorialization` and destratiication,` . the assemblage is dis-
mantled as an organism. ,Olkowski 1999:2,
Creatiity inoles becoming deterritorialized` and taking a line o light. 1his
light is ery ast, ery intense and does not hae time to coagulate in a repre-
sentation. Being radically unstable, it takes on a lie o its own. It is not linear
but connects and disconnects as it takes up its light.
As I pull the ragments together and align them with concepts, I am back in
the realm o representational thinking, talking about a line o light is not
necessarily the same as taking one. In Derrida`s musings, howeer, there is an
oscillation between writing whilst seeing and this ertiginous line o light
that happens` when one writes without seeing. 1his oscillation takes me back
to his assertion that there is the possibility or there being an evroi, a dispensa-
tion o a git o being and time o the present ava of repre.evtatiov` ,Derrida
1982:324, my emphasis,. loweer, beore we collapse back into Derrida`s
notions o evroi and revroi., it must be remembered that he posits sending` as
a condition within representation itsel. On the other hand, in Derrida`s expe-
rience o writing without seeing, I would argue that something else is happen-
ing. I would go so ar as to say that this experience is not o the representa-
tional type.
It is by accident, and sometimes on the brink o an accident` that Derrida
inds himsel writing without seeing ,Derrida 1993:3,. I want to pause or a
moment and relect on what this might mean. In western philosophy ision
proides the key to the way we understand the world. Philosophy has deel-
oped around a dualistic conception o ision or sight. As I will show in
Chapter lour, in this dualistic conception ision is conceied either as the
obseration with the two eyes o the body or as speculation with the eye o
the mind.
22
It is these understandings o ision that underpin repre-
sentationalist thought. In Derrida`s scribblings, howeer, he neither sees with
his eyes nor speculates with the eye o the mind. Derrida notes that he would
later think these notations to be ciphered writing. 1hat is true, but in the heat
45
o the moment these scribblings on the dashboard or on the steering wheel
are not thought this way at all. It is as i there is an oscillation between two
quite dierent ways o thinking.
Deleuze and Guattari identiy this oscillation as the double articulation
between the molar and the molecular. In their schema, the molar` can be
exempliied by the great binary aggregates such as sex or class or, or the
purpose o my argument, representation.
23
A molar structure has a rigid linear
segmentarity. It is an arborescent structure. loweer, in their thinking, there is
always something that lows or lees, that escapes the binary organization, the
resonance apparatus, and the oercoding machine` ,Deleuze and Guattari
198:216,. 1his they term molecularization`. 1hus as a molecular moement,
singing or composing, painting and writing hae no other aims than to un-
leash . becomings` ,Deleuze and Guattari 198:25,. Again, all becomings
are molecular.
1o proide an understanding o molecularity, they take the idea o mass
and class and analyse its processes and relations. lor them, mass is a molecular
motion since it is not ordered and classiied in any ormal way. Class, on the
other hand is a molar segmentarity. loweer, they note that classes are ash-
ioned rom masses. Classes are the crystallisation or sedimentation o a mass
into a molarity. And in this sedimentation, they obsere, masses constantly
low rom classes ,Deleuze and Guattari 198:216,.
1he relation between molar and molecular is an oscillation or, as they would
put it, a double articulation between stratiication and destratiication. 1hey are
at pains to point out that whilst they operate according to a dierent logic, they
are inseparable, they coexist and cross oer into each other ,Deleuze and Guattari
198:213,. 1hus:
A molecular low was escaping, minuscule at irst, then swelling, with-
out, howeer ceasing to be unassignable. 1he reerse, howeer, is also
true: molecular escapes and moements would be nothing i they did
not return to molar organizations. ,Deleuze and Guattari 198:216-,
1he double articulation between molar moments and molecular moements
can be exempliied in the process o drawing. Lndowed with organs and
unctions, I` am deined by my orm. My orm distinguishes me as a molar
entity. A piece o charcoal, a pencil, a rubber, a can o ixatie and sheet o paper
are also molar entities. loweer, when these entities enter into composition
with a landscape, a model or whateer, they transorm and moe towards the
46
molecular. Charcoal, body, rubber and paper enter an intense state, a state o
arying moements o speed, hesitation, slowness and rest. My hand be-
comes charcoal marking the paper. Charcoal and speed and landscape be-
come within the paper. 1he paper enters into composition with a rame and
the picture-rame enters into composition within the gallery. 1he picture-
rame-gallery enters into composition again and again in dierent ways and
at dierent speeds with each iewer who enters into the space ad ininitum.
1here are moments when the work coalesces into a molarity such as in an
interpretie moment. But een in the interpretatie act, another low es-
capes. 1his low may be miniscule at irst, but then it swells and escapes the
rame. \e are no longer completely in the realm o the Cartesian .vbiectvv or
the leideggerian picture. In the process, the picture has led the regime o
representation.
In Paul Czanne`s ti ife ritb Civger Pot ,1888-90,, the two modes o
seeing and recording operate, creating a tension and upheaal in the work.
1ilted suraces, trembling jugs, heaing sugar bowls, a mismatched table top
and collapsing chairs may be attributed to poor drawing skills or more oten
to a wilul distortion o the tradition o western illusionism. In line with
the latter argument, Michael loward suggests that Czanne`s manipulation
o orms is quite conscious:
1hese objects are presented to the iewer with a complete disregard
or the traditional rules o perspectie. 1he wicker basket laden with
ruit is precariously balanced on the corner o the table, next to it a
ginger jar is in a similar predicament. 1he size o the objects seem to
swell or diminish at the artist`s will, according to their unction within
the composition. ,loward 1990:116,
Gien Czanne`s doubt at his ability to realise, howeer, I wonder whether
Czanne`s will and consciousness were so strongly controlling and ordering.
Instead, I would like to suggest that this work exempliies the oscillation
between the molar and the molecular. In this process, instead o creating
isual intelligibility and coherence, Czanne sets in motion a perpetual dis-
equilibrium, which makes the whole isual system heae. It makes it stut-
ter`.
I would argue that the transormation that occurs in art is the result o
this becoming molecular`. \es-Alain Bois describes the work o Czanne,
germinating under our eyes both as a molecular surace and a depicted object.
lor him, the molecular process eident in Czanne`s work:
4
Is not simply additie, but multiplying. lis works are geologically
constructed o layers, or rather leels, o skeins o molecules more or
less loose, each skein responding both to the ones that precede it and
to the whiteness o the support. None o these leels entirely uses
with the others . the atoms must remain identiiable as such..
Czanne`s works cancel the linearity o time, they breathe. ,Bois 1988:39,
1hese two interpretations proide us with a moment, when moement is
coalesced into a molarity. Bourdieu points out the dilemma o interpretation.
Interpretation, he says, is concerned with proiding coherence to a mass o
primary experience. It is a grouping o material that is ordered to gie a coher-
ent account o those experiences and acts. It is a construction ,Bourdieu
1990:10-11,. Interpretation tends to operate according to representational logic,
not the logic o practice.
In Deleuze`s theorisation, representation is a molar ormation. According
to Massumi, it is a system o image production whose elements are signs
,arrested images, images as eaporatie meaning eects, grasped as wholes
composed o working parts, between which analogical relations are estab-
lished by rhetorical transerence-metaphor, synecdoche, allegory-any igu-
ratie` meaning machine` ,Massumi 1992:192,. lor Deleuze and Guattari,
representation belongs to the molar.
loweer, against the idea that a molarity is oreer, Deleuze and Guattari
enisage that there is moement between molarities. Molarities are not oreer
bounded and ixed. \hilst the interpretie moment may be a molarisation,
there will always be another low. 1his low may be miniscule at irst, but then
it may swell and escape the rame. \hat is important to note is that molar
systems are in constant motion between one state or degree o molarity and
another. As Deleuze and Guattari note:
Between substantial orms and determined subjects, between the two,
there is not only the whole operation o demonic local transports but
a natural play o haecceities, degrees, intensities, eents, and accidents
that composed indiiduations totally dierent rom those o the well-
ormed subjects that receie them. ,Deleuze and Guattari 198:253,
1he moement between substantial orms and determined subjects is a moe-
ment o the molecular. In their assertion that all becomings are already mo-
lecular, Deleuze and Guattari claim to extricate becoming rom the regime o
48
representation.
24
lor them, becoming is not o the order o imitation or
identiication. It is not a question o establishing ormal relations, nor is it
analogy. Its relations are relations o moement, not imitation o a subject
nor proportionality o a orm` ,Deleuze and Guattari 198:22,.
Against the horizontal and the ertical lines o the grid o organisation,
Deleuze and Guattari pose the diagonal. Lery artist knows intuitiely`
that the diagonal is a line o moement and instability. It is easy to lie
horizontally or stand ertically, but ery much harder to orientate yoursel
diagonally. Attempt this and you will all! In the schema o the grid o
organisation, creation is the mutant line, the diagonal. It detaches itsel rom
the task o representing a world` ,Deleuze and Guattari 198:296,. lor
Deleuze, the work o art can leae the domain o representation in order to
become experience.
Counter-representationalism
But what is it that takes us out o ourseles, so to speak, so that the work
o art leaes the domain o representation to become experience leidegger`s
conceptualisation o praxical knowledge or handlability, as irst deeloped in
eivg ava 1ive ,192,, supports the argument that it is through the handling
o materials, methods, tools and ideas in practice, that art becomes experi-
ence. 1hus it is at the leel o eyes and hands that the work o art escapes
rom the rame o representationalism.
According to Immanuel Leinas, leidegger`s account o man`s being-in-
the-world contrasts with the kind o setting-beore that characterises repre-
sentation. Leinas argues that in leidegger`s conceptualisation o handlability,
he transports us away rom notions o the sel-conscious subject and oers
a relation o a totally dierent order rom the representationalist conception
o as man-as-subject in relation to objects. In order to understand this
dierent mode o being in the world, Leinas points to leidegger`s concep-
tion o beings as Da.eiv. Da.eiv, meaning being-right-there, encapsulates the
experience o beings always already in the middle o things.
25
lor leidegger, the drama o human existence is orientated around the
possibilities that being-in-the-world throws up. \e are thrown into the
midst o lie. In this thrownness` ,Cerorfevbeit,, we are always already in the
middle o possibility. Being in the middle o things, it is in use, not in
consciousness, that we hae access to things. Leinas summarises this state
o aairs in relation to tools:
49
1ools are thus objects that Dasein reeals by a gien mode o its
existence-handling. 1ools are not then simply things.` landling is
in some way the airmation o their being. landling determines not
what tools are but the manner in which they encounter Dasein, the
manner in which they are.. And it is precisely because handling does
not ollow upon a representation that handlability is not a simple
presence` |prsence| ,orhandenheit, on which a new property is
grated. landlability is entirely irreducible. ,Leinas 1996:19-20,
Radically, Martin leidegger argues that it is not consciousness that orms the
basis o our understanding. le proposes that we do not come to know the
world theoretically through contemplatie knowledge in the irst instance.
Rather, we come to know the world theoretically, only ater we hae come to
understand it through handling. laced with what is thrown up during this
handling, possibility is seized in its ery possibility. Acts and decisions occur in
the heat o the moment and not as the result o rational logic. Leinas ob-
seres that this way o being thrown towards one`s own possibilities is, or
leidegger, a crucial moment o understanding ,Leinas 1996: 24-25,.
\hen leidegger talks o understanding, he is not reerring to understand-
ing as a cognitie aculty that is imposed on existence. Understanding is the
care that comes rom handling, o being thrown into the world and dealing
with things. Leinas notes that the originality o leidegger`s conception o
existence lies in positing a relation that is not centred on the sel-conscious
subject. le says in contrast to the traditional idea o sel-consciousness`
|cov.cievce ivterve|, this sel-knowledge, this inner illumination, this under-
standing . reuses the subject,object structure` ,Leinas 1996:23,. 1his rela-
tion o care is not the relation o a knowing subject and an object known. It
deies the logic o representationalism.
O what use` is this insight I want to return to my earlier struggle to
come to grips with the complex theoretical understandings, required to progress
this project. I suggested that the research process itsel could be conceied o
as representationalist. lor example, when I irst read leidegger`s work, I would
try to it it into preconceied categories in my endeaour to grasp the mean-
ing`. loweer this approach changed as I handled his writings. Reading
leidegger is one thing. loweer it has been through my concernul dealings
with his ideas that I hae come to understand them. Just as one cannot
understand the potential o pots o paint, bundles o brushes and rolls o
canas just by looking at them, neither is anything reealed by just looking at
50
the printed word. Our concernul dealings with ideas constitute the work o
philosophy and the work o conceptual art just as the concernul dealings
with brushes, paint and canas, ideas or moti, constitute the work o paint-
ing. Seen rom the perspectie o handlability, then, een the research process
can be cast in a ery dierent light. In working with leidegger`s texts, I came
to understand his project, in the leideggerian sense o handlability.
1he 6DA=JHA of Practice
It would seem that representation is too perasie to be merely sus-
pended or bracketed out. I this is the case, then perhaps our eorts will be
oreer caught up in relecting upon the limits o representation. It has been
in the dialogue between art and philosophy that these limits hae come
under sustained critique and a great deal o eort has gone into bringing
about the ruin o representation`.
26
In the isual arts, as Dorothea Olkowski
has obsered, postmodern artists hae consciously worked to subert, dis-
perse and counter its system o mastery ,Olkowski 1999:105,. loweer, I
wonder whether we hae in act become too sel-conscious, that is
representationalist, in our quest to ruin representation Perhaps we need to
approach the task in quite a dierent manner.
Deleuze`s proposition-that modern art is a eritable tbeatre o meta-
morphoses and permutations, which actually leaes the domain o repre-
sentation in order to become experience,` ,Deleuze 1983:56,, becomes a proo-
cation that shits this sel-conscious critique. lor Deleuze it is practice that
realises this moement ,Olkowski 1999:26,. I beliee that it is in the asser-
tion that practice realises moement, that we can begin the task o unrael-
ling the knot that representationalism holds on our comprehension o the
work o art.
My task in this Chapter has been to take up this proocation and to
demonstrate how, through practice, the work o art may realise a moement
that leaes the domain o representation altogether. I would suggest that in
practice we can neer predict what will happen in adance. Rather, it is through
the encounter between tools, materials, knowledges, objects and bodies that
moement happens. 1he work o art i. this moement. And, this moe-
ment, says Leinas, gains access to objects not only in an origiva way, but
also in an origivary way, the moement does not foor vpov a representation`
,Leinas 1996:19,. In the lux o practice, we grope towards an understand-
ing that is not representational. Acts and decisions occur in the heat o the
moment and not as the result o rational logic. Such knowing operates at the
51
leel o hands and eyes and operates in a dierent register rom the represen-
tational paradigm o man-as-subject in relation to mere objects. \e do not
set orth the things that we encounter and place them in relation to ourseles,
but rather we work in the heat o the moment` and in relation to tools and
materials to produce moement. In this way art is not necessarily a representa-
tional practice.
52
CON1INGLNC\ AND 1lL

LMLRGLNCL Ol AR1
I
hae so ar asserted that leidegger`s elaboration o handlability, or
what he comes to term equipmentality, proides a key to rethinking the
conditions o possibility o creatie practice. I hae suggested that this
orm o understanding, with the hands and eyes`, operates in a dierent
register rom the representational paradigm o man-as-subject in relation to
objects. landling is a relation o care and concernul dealings, not a relation
where the world is set beore us ,knowing subjects, as an object. It does not set
orth the things that we encounter and place them in an epistemic relation to
sel. In proposing that it is through use that we come to understand the Being
o tools, leidegger`s work on handlability enables us to rethink the relation
that we hae come to know as artistic practice. In this relationship, the work o
art is the particular understanding that is realised though our concernul deal-
ings with the tools and materials o production.
leidegger`s assertion that handlability or equipmentality does not ollow
upon representational logic proided the irst critical turn in my attempt to
rethink the work o art as practice. In his later essay 1he Question Concerning
1echnology` ,1954,, leidegger makes another and, in my opinion, more radi-
cal moe which enables us to recast the relations between artist, materials and
tools altogether. In this essay he questions the contemporary instrumentalist
understanding o the human-tool relationship-using tools and materials as
a means to an end-and in a challenge to this relationship o mastery, posits
one o co-responsibility and indebtedness. In a reersal o the causal chain o
means and ends, artist, objects, materials and processes are posited as co-
responsible or the emergence o art. In this reersal, leidegger recasts our
eeryday understanding o causality. 1ools are no longer conceied o as a
means to an end, but rather are co-responsible ,along with other elements, or
bringing orth something into appearance.
In this Chapter, I bring this reiguration o the tool-human relationship to
53
CON1INGLNC\ AND 1lL LMLRGLNCL Ol AR1
bear on our understanding o the complex relationship between humans,
objects, tools and materials in artistic production. In the relation o care that
characterises production, the artist or cratsperson is no longer the sole creator
or master o the work o art. Argued rom this perspectie, artistic practice
shows us that the artist`s relation with her,his tools is no longer one o
mastery, nor is it instrumentalist. Rather, the artist is co-responsible or bring-
ing art orward into appearance. Artistic practice inoles a particular respon-
sieness to, or conjunction with, other contributing elements that make up the
particular art ensemble. lor leidegger, this conjunction can set something ree
and start it on its way into arrial` ,leidegger 19a:9,. In the process o
making art, it is art in itsel that is set on its way. 1hrough this dynamic and
productie relation, art emerges as a reealing. According to this conception,
then, each eent or occasioning, inoles a unique encounter o inexhaustible
complexity that can neither be known in adance nor predicted. Art igured
this way is neither representationalist, nor is it mastery.
1echnological Revealing as Lnframing
leidegger most cogently deelops his understanding o handlability, or
what he later comes to term equipmentality, in eivg ava 1ive. \hilst Leinas
recognised that concrete handling enables us to deelop a counter
representationalist iew o the world, leidegger`s original ormulation o
handlability, suggests a more instrumentalist apprehension o tools. In his
rendering o the human-tool relationship, tools are conceied o as existing
in-order-to. 1ools are set to use in-order-to achiee a particular end. Seen this
way, production is thought instrumentally.
In his later essay 1he Question Concerning 1echnology`, leidegger is
much less sure about the liberation proided by an equipmental iew o the
world. leidegger`s ambialence stems rom a human will to mastery`.
1hrough this will, says leidegger, man sets the world in place as a resource. As
.vbiectvv, techno-calculatie man orders this resource to achiee his own ends.
In this schema the tool is conceied o as an instrument, ready-to-hand
,Zvbavaev,, or use by man. 1he tool is a means to an end. In this instrumental
iew o the tool, man ocuses on what tools can do or him, not on the
manner in which they are. leidegger`s own ambialence towards the human-
tool relationship suggests it is important to tease out his arguments concern-
ing technology.
In 1he Question Concerning 1echnology`, leidegger sets out to worry
our commonsense assumptions and understandings o technology. le re-
54
quires us to reassess our relation to technology so that we can perhaps deelop a
dierent relationship with it. lor leidegger, it is clear that technology, in its
material maniestation as tools, equipment and instruments is not equialent to
the essence o technology. In leidegger`s estimation, so long as we represent the
world as a resource, and technology as an instrument in-order-to achiee our
ends, we will remain transixed in the will to master it` ,leidegger 19a:32,. In
this ixation with technology as a means to an end, the later leidegger is ada-
mant that man ails to understand that the essence o technology does not lie at
all in the making. 1he essence o technology, says leidegger, lies in the reealing:
1echnology is thereore no mere means. 1echnology is a way o reeal-
ing. I we gie heed to this, then another whole realm or the essence o
technology will open itsel up to us.. 1echnology comes to presence
|!e.t| in the realm where reealing and unconcealment takes place, where
atbeia, truth happens. ,leidegger 19a:12-13,
In his assessment, howeer, human beings tend to get caught up in the techno-
logical ,in the ontic realm o things,, without giing due attention to the essence
o technology. 1he problem or a modern technophilic society is how to access
the essence o technology when we are so caught up in what it can do or us.
According to leidegger, this has produced deleterious eects in the world.
\ritten between 1949 and 1954, against the background o the social and
political reality o post-war Germany, 1he Question Concerning 1echnology`
can be seen as a response to the deastation o the human use o technology as
a means to an end.
1
lis concern is to rethink this relation and instead promote
a ree relation between human existence and technology. 1his quest should not
be conused with airming or promoting technology as a means to an end.
Rather his concern, in questioning technology, is to enable human existence to
open to the essence o technology, so that we are able to experience the techno-
logical within its own bounds . |and are not| deliered oer to it in the worst
possible way` ,leidegger 19a:4,.
leidegger begins his questioning o technology by stating what is assumed
as commonsense. 1echnology is both a means to an end ava a human actiity. le
continues:
1he manuacture and utilization o equipment, tools, and machines,
the manuactured and used things themseles, and the needs and ends
that they sere, all belong to what technology is. ,leidegger 19a:4,
55
\ho would eer deny that technology was an instrument or a means to an end
or that technology was a human actiity It is so uncannily correct, says leidegger,
that it holds or modern technology as well as or older handwork technology.
le comments that i we can obtain the right relation with technology, we will
get` technology spiritually at hand.` \e will master it` ,leidegger 19a:5,.
leidegger`s rhetorical questioning unsettles the presumption o the instru-
mental deinition o technology. \hat i technology were not merely a means to
an end established by human beings low would this sit with the will to
mastery displayed by humans \hat i technology were not about the use o
tools, machines and computers by humans \hat i technology were instead
conceied o as a way o reealing low then might this change our thinking
concerning the relationship with the technological, whether it is a computer, a
hammer, a ideo camera or a paintbrush And, more to the point, what stops us
rom questioning in this manner
leidegger argues that modern man`s representationalist thinking orecloses
our capacity to think any other way. In order to proide a context or this discus-
sion, I wish to summarise my earlier oeriew o leidegger`s critique o repre-
sentation and proide the link between representationalism and our current
habit o becoming caught in the merely ontic world o things. lor leidegger, as
I hae argued, representation traps us in a mode o thought that insists on
grasping reality through imposed conceptual structures. In representational think-
ing, he suggests, there begins that way o being human which mans the realm
o human capability as a domain gien oer to measuring and executing or the
purpose o gaining mastery oer that which is as a whole` ,leidegger 19a:132,.
luman beings become the sel-conscious shapers and guarantors o all that
comes to them rom outside o them. Under the soereignty o representation,
to be human is no longer to be open to what-is, but rather to become caught up
in a quest to get things under control.
lor leidegger, it is the particular mode o technological reealing that ena-
bles the hegemony o representation to maintain soereignty. Under this re-
gime, objects are reduced to standing-resere and, as such, they are aailable to
some ends as destined by modern representing humans. In this schema, objects
are ordered and reduced to their readiness or use. 1he consequence o the
transormation o the world into standing-resere is that the earth is iewed as
a resource which humans dominate through technology. In this way, notes art
theorist Matthew Biro, the richness and ariety o a thing is replaced by a reduced
set o properties: the thing`s use alue as well as its position in a global network
o transormation and exchange` ,Biro 1998:201,.
56
1he ordering that reduces objects to standing-resere belongs to the do-
minion or soereignty o Ce.te ,enraming,. In leidegger`s thinking, this
enraming constitutes the essence o modern technology. Lnraming, like the
much aoured poitic reealing, to be discussed later in this Chapter, is one
orm o a being`s mode o coming to presence. loweer, unlike poitic reeal-
ing, enraming does not allow the Being o a thing to be brought orth into
appearance. Rather, it is a challenging setting-upon ;teev), which sets eery-
thing in place as supply`, or use by human beings ,leidegger 19a:21,.
1he technological mode o reealing, as enraming, iews the world as stand-
ing-resere and places man in the position o ordering it. In this challenging-
reealing, nature is transormed into energy that can be stored and used as a
means to an end. In this mode:
A tract o land is challenged into the putting out o coal and ore. 1he
earth now reeals itsel as a coal-mining district, the soil as mineral de-
posit.. Agriculture is now the mechanized ood industry. Air is now
set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, or
example, uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be re-
leased either or destruction or or peaceul use. ,leidegger 19a:14-15,
leidegger cautions that conceiing and setting up the world in the mode o
enraming is a dangerous thing. 1he danger that lurks concerns its relations to
destining.
Destining ,Ce.cbic, means to send or start something on its way. lor
leidegger, it is a sending-that-gathers |rer.avveae cbicev| which irst starts
man upon a way o reealing` ,leidegger 19a:24,. Once set in place and set on
its way, a particular mode o destining gathers momentum and multiplies. 1he
danger o enraming as a mode o destining is that, as it multiplies and takes
hold o human consciousness, it threatens to oreclose eery other mode o
reealing. Its exponential expansion, as the only way o reealing, endangers
man`s relationship to himsel and to eerything else. 1hus in leidegger`s esti-
mation, enraming as a mode o ordering and reealing is the supreme danger.
le notes that:
1his danger attests itsel to us in two ways. As soon as what is uncon-
cealed no longer concerns man een as object, but does so, rather exclu-
siely as standing-resere, and man in the midst o objectlessness is
nothing but the orderer o the standing-resere, then he comes to the
ery brink o a precipitous all, that is, he comes to the point where he
5
himsel will hae to be taken as standing-resere. Meanwhile man, pre-
cisely as the one so threatened, exalts himsel to the posture o lord o
the earth. ,leidegger 19a:2,
leidegger talks about this precipitous all in which man is reduced to standing-
resere, by reerring to that mode o being that reduces beings to becoming
mere resources. As mere resources, the potential or human beings to under-
stand their own Being becomes lost.
luman beings so easily succumb to this danger, since it enhances their power
oer nature ,including other humans, and it conirms their position as lord o
the earth`. It gies humans the capacity to unlock the powers inherent in nature
and use them as a means to an end. 1hus technological reealing allows humans
to extend their ision urther into nature and extend their mastery. 1hus we talk,
or example, o human resources and human resource management.
In contemporary culture, this habit o reducing man to a mere resource inds
its nemesis in the actiity o corporate-head hunting and the commodiication
o popstars, ilmstars, artists and sports stars. 1hese celebrities become mere
resources, used as a means to promote and sell other products. Artists are not
exempt rom this reduction to standing resere. Josephine Starrs and Leon
Cmielewski hae obsered that:
Artists are like popstars, the more amous and controersial the more
likely they are to sell their work. And now there are billboards at leathrow
airport o 1racey Lmin selling Bombay Sapphire Gin. lirst artists be-
come products to be promoted and, then when amous enough they
can be used to sell other products. ,Starrs and Cmielewski 2000:8,
leidegger warns o the supreme danger that this way o being exempliies.
\here enraming holds sway, leidegger claims it dries out eery other possi-
bility o reealing. Reealing becomes characterised by a regulating and securing
o standing-resere ,leidegger 19a:2,. And in this mode o reealing, man
is in danger o apprehending nothing apart rom what is reealed in ordering.
1his ordering becomes the standard on which eerything is based. leidegger`s
explication o standing-resere proides a gloomy prognosis o the ate that
awaits humanity.
In its seductie power, as a destining o reealing, enraming threatens to
oreclose eery other mode o reealing. \hilst we accumulate more and more
things, we become totally distracted rom the task o understanding our Be-
58
ing. loweer, whilst enraming proides modern man with a seductie way o
being, leidegger contends that it is not a ate that compels humans to obey. le
argues that whilst we are under the sway o enraming, this destining in no way
conines us to a stultiied compulsion to push on blindly with technology or .
rebel against it as the work o the deil` ,leidegger 19a:26,. I humans recog-
nise the danger o the totalizing power o enraming, they become open to the
potential o other modes o reealing. In this recognition, leidegger argues,
comes the saing.
1he challenge is or humans to grope towards a dierent mode o reealing,
one that no longer positions eery being, including human be-ings, as standing
resere. leidegger is o the opinion that i we are open to the essence o
technology and i we recognise that technological reealing is also a concealing,
then we are in a good position to be unexpectedly taken into a reeing claim`
,leidegger 19a:26,. lor leidegger the saing power comes in the mode o
aesthetic reealing. le beliees that aesthetic reealing as poi.i. can presere hu-
mans rom the danger o the particular technological reealing that is enraming.
1he Ambivalence of 6A?D&
In the mid 1980s the German artist Anselm Kieer set up his studio in an old
actory and proceeded to run his workshop according to actory-like modes o
production. le engaged specialized labour power and deeloped technologically
intensie production techniques to enable him to produce series o large-scale
works. At one leel, it could be argued that Kieer illustrates a case where art
seems to operate in the realm o enraming.
2
1he scale o the operation and the
employment o quasi-mass production methods parallel industrial production,
and yet or Kieer, there is a dierence. lor him, the actory became the symbol
or the site o artistic practice as opposed to industrial capitalism. 1he materials
and tools o production were not conceied as standing-resere. Kieer did not
see himsel as engaged in industrial production, but rather as an alchemist en-
gaged in a process o transormation. In this role, Biro obseres that Kieer
igured himsel as a quasi-religious, quasi-scientiic igure who labours to release
the transormatie potential in the materials upon which he works` ,Biro
1998:209,.
3
In other words, Kieer`s work is not representationalist.
1he blurring o the boundaries between art production and other orms o
production, illustrated in Kieer`s practice, has raised many questions about the
nature and role o art in contemporary society. lrom a leideggerian position, it
questions the Being o art. 1his has become especially so where an artwork
might look like any product o mass production.
4
I Kieer is concerned with
59
the transormatie potential o the material upon which he works, how does
this dier rom the instrumental deinition o technology \hat makes his
labours so dierent rom the unlocking, transorming, storing and distributing
and switching about` that, according to leidegger, is characteristic o technologi-
cal reealing ,leidegger 19a:16, low is the aesthetic reealing o Kieer any
dierent rom enramement
lor leidegger, the answer lies in the act that art does not take the world
simply as a means, as something to be used. Art prolierates possibilities, rather
than reducing them. In order to argue this position, leidegger uses a philo-
sophical strategy that characterises much o his later philosophy. le returns to us
to the ancient Greeks as a starting point or deeloping his concept o aesthetic
reealing. In the thinking o the ancient Greeks, leidegger detects particular
moements and understandings that oer humans a way out o, or beyond
technological calculating representation, or representationalism. In 1he Age o
the \orld Picture`, we are brought to an apprehension o Being as presencing. In
1he Question Concerning 1echnology`, leidegger deelops the idea o tecbv
as poi.i..
Poi.i., like enraming, is a mode o being`s coming to presence. loweer,
leidegger clearly dierentiates between the two modes. \hilst enraming con-
cerns an ordering and mastery oer what-is poi.i. inoles openness beore
what-is. As we saw in the irst Chapter, the openness beore what-is, relates to
the ancient Greek understanding o presencing. It is a bringing orth or
unconcealment o Being. leidegger obseres that or Plato, eery occasion or
whateer passes oer and goes orward into presencing rom that which is not
presencing is poi.i., is bringing-orth` ,leidegger 19a:10,.
1he bringing-orth that ensues with poi.i. is quite dierent rom the bringing
o whateer is beore onesel as an object, characteristic o representation and
technological reealing. \hilst the bringing orth o enraming is an ordering,
this is not at all the case with poi.i.. Poi.i. is a bringing orth o something out
o itsel. leidegger notes that:
Bringing-orth brings hither out o concealment orth into
unconcealment. Bringing-orth comes to pass only insoar as something
concealed comes into unconcealment. 1his coming rests and moes
reely within what we call reealing |aa. vtbergev|. ,leidegger 19a:11-
12,
1he Greeks use the word atbeia or such unconcealment or reealing.
60
leidegger proposes that pby.i. or the reealing that occurs in nature is poi.i.
in its highest sense ,leidegger 19a:10,. le cites the bursting orth o a blos-
som into bloom as an example o pby.i. and contrasts this bringing orth o
something out o itsel, with the bringing orth o art:
\hat is bought orth by the artisan or the artist, e.g., the siler chalice, has
the bursting open belonging to bringing-orth not in itsel, but in an-
other ,ev ai,, in the cratsman or the artist. ,leidegger 19a:10-11,
1o that bringing orth that belongs to the bringing orth o the artist or artisan,
leidegger designates the term tecbv. In his introduction to leidegger`s essay,
Loitt explains that in tecbv, through art and handcrat, man participated in
conjunctions with other contributing elements-with matter`, aspect`, and
circumscribing bounds`-in the bringing orth o a thing into being` ,Loitt
in leidegger 19a:xxi,.
1ecbv is a particular orm o bringing orth that appears to acillate between
poi.i. and enraming. \here tecbv belongs to bringing orth as reealing,
leidegger notes, it is poitic ,leidegger 19a:13,. loweer, when understood
as the term or the actiities and skills o the cratsman, tecbv comes to be seen
in an instrumental way. It is a means to an end. I thought instrumentally, tecbv
assumes the character o a controlling reealing. It is this tendency towards
control and mastery that establishes the ambialence o tecbv. lurther, in
leidegger`s estimation, it is this tendency that ushers in the modern technologi-
cal age. And thus:
1he reealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not
unold into a bringing-orth in the sense o poi.i.. 1he reealing that
rules in modern technology is a challenging |erav.foraerv|, which puts
to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be
extracted and stored as such. ,leidegger 19a:14,
1he dierence between tecbv as poi.i. and tecbv as enraming is exempliied in
a discussion in which leidegger contrasts two dierent usages o the title 1he
Rhine`. In the irst example, that o modern technology, 1he Rhine` is a rier
damned up to supply power. In the second example, 1be Rbive` is the title o
one o lolderlin`s hymns. leidegger argues that where 1he Rhine` is damned
or man`s use as water power supply, it is a challenging-orth. 1his challenging
orth takes place in the ollowing way:
61
1he energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is trans-
ormed, what is transormed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn,
distributed, and what is distributed is switched about eer anew. Un-
locking, transorming, storing, distributing, and switching about are
ways o reealing. ,leidegger 19a:16,
1he character o this reealing is one o regulation. lere 1he Rhine` is seen
in its capacity to be regulated and secured merely or man`s use.
In contrast, the reealing in lolderlin`s hymn 1be Rbive` is not a reealing
limited by such regulation. On the contrary, the work o art brings 1he
Rhine` into appearance. 1ecbv, as poi.i., sets 1he Rhine` ree. It opens up
this possibility or that. It is not determined. 1hus it could be argued that the
work o art i. the setting o 1he Rhine` on its way into arrial. 1he contrast
between tecbv as enraming and tecbv as poi.i. is starkly laid out in this
example. \hilst lolderlin`s hymn enables a ree relation and starts something
on its way, the challenging orth o the ormer oers a determined relation o
ordering and regulating.
leidegger is emphatic: so long as we represent technology as an instru-
ment, we will retain our will to master it. 1he problem o tecbv as enraming
is that objects and equipment become absorbed into the totality o standing-
resere and een lose their character as objects. 1hey become subject to the law
o orderability and substitutability. In this relation or mode o reealing, the
machine ,whether it is a computer, a paint brush, a potter`s wheel, a pencil or a
hammer, deries its Being rom its orderability as standing resere. As stand-
ing-resere it cannot blossom into bloom as itsel.
leidegger argues that modernity is characterised by a mode o grasping the
world as an object. It is enraming, as a mode o reealing, that enables this to
happen. Lnraming, as I hae argued, is characterised by a way o thinking that
sees things as a means to an end. In the collapse o the technological apparatus
with standing-resere, the relationship o humans to their tools becomes one
o mastery. But here we need to stop and ponder. \hat i the relationship
between human be-ings and their technological apparatus were a responsie
one rather than a mastering one
lor leidegger, this dierent being-in-the-world would signal the end o
modernity. No longer would tools be ready at hand or use by man in-order-
to. 1he question is whether this dierent mode o relating to the world is
possible. In order to think a dierent relation to technology, leidegger posits
62
poi.i.. In turning to poi.i. as a dierent and saing mode o reealing, howeer,
he remains strangely silent as to what the relationship between human beings
and technological apparatus would be in this case. I the essence o technology
is nothing technological and i poi.i. is a maniold reealing, what might this
relationship be In this mode o reealing, surely tools would not be ready-to-
hand or standing-resere in-order-to. low then, might we see them leidegger
is quite clear in declaring that poi.i. as a mode o the Being o beings, is charac-
terised by an emergent quality, rather than constituting a knowing in adance.
Casting 1echnology as 6A?D&
\here technology is conceied in terms o tecbv as poi.i., another mode o
reealing presents itsel. In his attempt to reigure technology in terms o tecbv
as poi.i., leidegger returns to the etymology o the word technology. leidegger
tells us that the modern term technology` is deried rom the Greek word
tecbviov. 1ecbviov means that which belongs to tecbv ` ,leidegger 19a:12,.
leidegger traces the use o tecbv and points to an historical linkage with epi.tv.
In contemporary understandings, we recognize epi.tv as the root o episte-
mology, that is, the study o, or the theory o knowledge. Seen together, tecbv
and epi.tv are concerned broadly with knowing. lor leidegger knowing is an
opening up.
loweer, so as not to collapse tecbv into epi.tv, leidegger asserts that as an
opening up, tecbv is a reealing. And, as a mode o reealing, tecbv is a place
where atbeveiv ,reealing, happens. In contrast with epi.tv, tecbv as atbeveiv
does not set knowledge beore us as an object o study. Rather tecbv:
Reeals whateer does not bring itsel orth and does not yet lie beore
us, what eer can look and turn out now one way and now another.
\hoeer builds a house or a ship or orges a sacriicial chalice reeals what
is to be brought orth. ,leidegger 19a:13,
Understood in terms o its character as a mode o reealing ;atbeveiv), tecbv is
not concerned with means and ends, nor is it concerned with mere making,
manipulating, modelling or manuacturing. 1hus argued as tecbv, technology
can be conceied as a bringing-orth, as poi.i.. 1echnology is a mode o reealing:
1echnology comes to presence |!e.t| in the realm where reealing and
unconcealment take place, where atbeia, truth, happens. ,leidegger
19a:13,
63
In ollowing through his argument, leidegger makes the point that, or the
Greeks, tecbv was not just resered or the actiities and the skills o the
cratsman. 1ecbv was a term that was also applied to the ine arts. It is in ine
arts rather than crat that leidegger seeks redemption or technology as tecbv.
1his exalting o ine art becomes eident in the conclusion o the essay:
\hat was art-perhaps only or that brie but magniicent age \hy
did art bear the modest name tecbv Because it was a reealing that
brought orth and made present and thereore belonged within poi.i..
It was inally that reealing which holds complete sway in all the ine
arts, in poetry, and in eerything poetical that obtained poi.i. as its
proper name. ,leidegger 19a:34,
As a mode o reealing or bringing orth, ine art as tecbv belongs within the
realm o poi.i.. leidegger considers this mode o reealing as much richer
and reer than the mode o reealing oered by enraming. lis bias is unmis-
takeable. As Ihde points out, leidegger reies tecbv as art, so as to broaden
and enrich technological reealing ,Ihde 199:115,.
5
1he deelopment o leidegger`s work on modes o reealing raises a
undamental question. \here being-in-the-world is characterised by an
enraming reealing, how do other modes o reealing-or example a poitic
reealing-enable an escape rom the rame o enraming It would seem that
technological reealing has come to suit modern humans. Da.eiv, allen, is so
caught up in the eeryday actiities o unlocking, transorming, storing, dis-
tributing and switching about` ,leidegger 19a:16,, that it has orgotten that
there are any other possibilities or Being other than this enraming mode o
Being. \here the ordering o the world enables human beings to accumulate
more and more things, where the dollar is the master attractor, what alue
does a poitic understanding oer \hat can conince humans o the enriched
reealing o poi.i. \hat would induce humans to alue technology as poitic,
rather than pursue technology as a means to an end or human beneit As I
will show in the next section, this realuation inoles deeloping a ery dier-
ent relationship to technology.
Praxis
In order to re-ealuate our relation to technology, I want to return to
leidegger`s understanding o handlability or equipmentality as deeloped in
his tool analysis in eivg ava 1ive. It is through his analysis o the human-tool
relationship that we may ind a dierent relationship to technology. leidegger`s
64
tool analysis needs to be contextualised in terms o his understanding o
what it is to be in the world. As I hae shown in the preious Chapter, or
leidegger, the drama o human existence is orientated around the possibili-
ties that being-in-the-world throws up. In his phenomenology, the world is
not the objectie world o things and places, but rather the world is that into
which Da.eiv is thrown.
As we saw in Chapter One, leidegger reseres the term Da.eiv, or the
undamental act o being-right-there that characterises being thrown into the
middle o things.
6
1his is the drama o human existence. 1hus, it is not
things in themseles or entities which constitute the experience o the world,
but rather the world is discoered through Da.eiv`s inolement with it. 1his
constitutes what leidegger terms the worlding o the world. 1his inole-
ment or relationship with the world underpins the primarily praxical nature o
being in the world. It is through concernul dealings with or handling o
things, that the nature o the world is reealed to beings.
According to Ihde, leidegger`s tool analysis is the ehicle by which leidegger
elaborates how the worldhood o the world is made phenomenologically
apparent ,Ihde 199:116,. 1hrough this analysis we gain an apprehension o
the shape accorded to the human-tool ensemble. It is through our concernul
dealings with things that the world is reealed to us.
leidegger`s model o how the world is already discoered through the use
o a piece o equipment is orientated around a constellation o praxical terms.
lor leidegger, the primary dealings we hae with the world are those things
that we put to use. le says:
1he kind o dealing which is closest to us . is not bare perceptual
cognition, but rather that kind o concern which manipulates things
and puts them to use. Such entities are not thereby objects or know-
ing the world` theoretically, they are simply what gets used, what gets
produced, and so orth. ,leidegger 1962:95,
1hrough such dealings, the apprehension is neither merely perceptual nor
rational. Rather, such handling reeals its own kind o knowledge.
1wo aspects become clear in this statement. lirstly, the radical potential o
leidegger`s philosophy becomes apparent in his notion o concernul deal-
ings. In setting orth what it means to be a particular sort o being that takes
care o things in its dealings, leidegger suggests that concernul dealings
65
extend beyond the puriew o human beings. Secondly, leidegger initiates a
praxical dimension to the worlding o the world. Da.eiv does not come to know
the world theoretically through contemplatie knowledge in the irst instance. It
comes to know the world theoretically, only ater it has come to understand it
equipmentally. 1hus, it is only through use that we gain access to the world.
leidegger makes this distinction between theoretical conception and praxical
understanding clear when he argues that it is through actie use, we establish
original relations with things. le cites the example o the using a hammer to
support his contention:
1he less we just stare at the thing called hammer, the more actiely we use
it, the more original our relation to it becomes and the more undisguisedly
it is encountered as what it is, as a useul thing. 1he act o hammering
itsel discoers the speciic handiness` o the hammer.. No matter
how keenly we just oo at the outward appearance` o things consti-
tuted in one way or another, we cannot discoer handiness. \hen we
just look at things theoretically,` we lack an understanding o handi-
ness. But association which makes use o things is not blind, it has its
own way o seeing which guides our operations and gies them their
speciic thingly quality. ,leidegger 1996:65,
1he kind o being which equipment possesses comes to light in the context o
handlability. I can look at pots o dierent coloured paints, a camera or a compu-
ter screen and take pleasure in contemplating them, but it is only in use that they
begin to reeal their potential. I can lay out my brushes and set a resh canas
beore me, but until I actually begin to work with them in making a painting I
can not understand their Being.
1he two-way action or mutual relection between practice and theory, in what
has become termed praxis, becomes central to my rethinking o the relationship
o theory and practice in creatiity. lollowing this logic, I would argue that art can
be seen to emerge in the inolement with materials, methods, tools and ideas
o practice. It is not just the representation o an already ormed idea. In this
ormulation a praxical engagement with tools, materials and ideas becomes
primary oer the assumed theoretical-cognitie engagement ,Ihde 199:11,. In
this matrix, engagement with tools or technology produces its own kind o
sight. leidegger terms the kind o sight, through which we come to know how
to paint, to dance or to write, circumspection` ,|v.icbt,. lor leidegger, it is
through circumspection that the new` emerges. In this way, adds Leinas, we
gain access to the world in an original and an originary way` ,Leinas 1996:19,.
66
Beyond Instrumentalism
In his distinction between theoretical knowledge and use, leidegger iden-
tiies that tools can be articulated as two dierent kinds o beings. le pro-
poses that where the being o tool is discoered in handling, it is reealed in its
readiness-to-hand ,Zvbavaevbeit, ,leidegger 1996:6,. 1his being, as ready-
to-hand, contrasts with a second kind o being, that o simple presence. In
commenting on leidegger`s distinction, Leinas notes that it is precisely be-
cause handling does not ollow upon a representation that handlability is not
a simple presence`` ,Leinas 1996:19,. leidegger notes that, in presence,
entities appear as just there, as presence-at-hand ,1orbavaevbeit,.
In use, a tool`s qualities emanate rom its usability and manipulability in-
order-to do something. 1he Being o the ready-to hand deries rom its
character as something for something. In this conception, equipment mani-
ests itsel in its readiness-to-hand in-order-to do something. According to
this description, the ready-to-hand belongs to the realm o productiity, not
that o contemplation. In other words, production has the structure o the
assignment o something to something.
\hilst Leinas has shown us that leidegger`s tool analysis suggests that
man`s being in the world is not in the representationalist mode, leidegger`s
understanding o equipment as readiness-to-hand in-order-to do something
sounds suspiciously like the instrumental deinition o technology o which
leidegger is so strongly critical, in 1he Question Concerning 1echnology`.
In the human-tool relationship, leidegger`s assignment o something to
something could be seen to reduce the ready-to-hand to a means to an end or
human use. At one leel leidegger encourages this interpretation with his
comments that equipment is manipulable in the broadest sense and at our
disposal` ,leidegger 1962:98,. Moreoer, the ready-to-hand anticipates the
concept o standing-resere, which is deined in terms o being aailable to
some ends as destined by man. 1his can be seen in leidegger`s assessment o
nature as a natural resource, where wood is a orest o timber, the mountain
a quarry o rock, the rier is water power |and| the wind is wind in the sails``
,leidegger 1962:100,.
In the Question Concerning 1echnology`, the ready-to-hand collapses into
standing-resere. In this reduction o the ready-to-hand, nature, objects and
equipment are absorbed into the totality o the standing-resere. lor Ihde, a
writer on the human-technology relationship, what is lost, is the tool shop`
6
itsel, and with it, the direct expressiity which characterises the ready-to-hand`
,Ihde 199:126,. In this conception, nature, objects and equipment are all
iewed as a potential ield or source o energy that can be captured, stored and
used by humans. In the particular mode o reealing that is an ordering ,or
enraming, humans see their destiny as the domination o nature through
technology. According to this iew then, the tools o technology-the materi-
als, techniques and tools-are still seen as aailable or humans to use.
In the interening period between eivg ava 1ive and writing 1he Ques-
tion Concerning 1echnology,` leidegger`s assessment o modern humanity
became increasingly pessimistic. In eivg ava 1ive, it is not leidegger`s inten-
tion to reduce equipment to its usability. Rather his interest is in how the kind
o being that equipment is, reeals itsel in its assignment o something or
something. le is concerned with what is discoered in use, that is, what shows
itsel. In his example o a hammer hammering, leidegger makes it clear that,
in such dealings, we do not grasp them thematically. le proposes that:
\here we put something to use our concern subordinates itsel to the
in-order-to` which is constitutie or the equipment we are employ-
ing at the time, the less we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the
more we seize hold o it and use it, the more primordial does our
relationship to it become, and the more uneiledly is it encountered as
that which it is-as equipment. 1he hammering itsel uncoers the
speciic manipulability . o the hammer. ,leidegger 1962:98,
1he peculiar quality that presents itsel in circvv.pectiov is that when we are
using a tool, we are no longer aware o its qualities as tool. \e are so concerned
with the working that we no longer know the tool in a theoretical sense. 1he
tool as merely present-at-hand recedes or withdraws. It is only when a tool ails
or is unusable that we once again become aware o it. It becomes unready-to-
hand. laced with the tool`s unreadiness-to-hand, leidegger argues, it be-
comes a mere thing that lies there. It is just there as present-at-hand. In its
unreadiness-to-hand as being-just-present-at-hand, leidegger contends we
are helpless. In this helpless mode, he suggests that, we exhibit a deicient
mode o concern ,leidegger 1962:103,.
In eeryday lie, we tend to be come helpless and rustrated when aced with
the unreadiness-to-hand. Contemporary art, in contrast, tends to capitalise on
the possibilities produced by unreadiness-to-hand. Deleuze and Guattari ges-
ture to this propensity in contemporary art through reerence, to what they call,
the art-machine. 1he art-machine is an assemblage o heterogeneous linkages
68
that inoles both human and non-human elements in the productiity o
art. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the art-machine takes the opportuni-
ties presented by the unready-to-hand, on a dierent line o light. 1hey use
the term desiring-machine`, to dierentiate between the technical machine
which is tied to the ready-to-hand, and the type o artistic machine that only
works when it is not unctioning properly. 1he work o art is a desiring-
machine that oten short-circuits social production and intereres with the
reproductie unction o technical machines. 1hus the artist presents us
with:
Shattered, burned, broken-down objects conerting them to the re-
gime o desiring-machines, breaking down is part o the ery unc-
tioning o desiring-machines, the artist presents paranoiac machines,
miraculating machines, and celibate machines as so many technical
machines, so as to cause desiring machines to undermine technical
machines. ,Deleuze and Guattari 1983:32,
1hey cite the charred iolins o Arman, Cesar`s compressed car bodies and
Rael`s compositions as eidence that art thries where things don`t work
properly. Rather than producing helplessness, in these cases, the unreadiness-
to-hand produces possibility. Possibilities exist where art is sel suicient
and has no unction beyond its Being as art. It is the space o creatie play,
where objects and tools no longer exist in-order-to.
According to leidegger`s way o thinking, the taking and re-assembling
o elements into installations, collages and ound objects may not bring us
any closer to understanding the Being o beings. In capitalising on the unready-
to-hand, this modern art could be seen to adopt the ery modes o the
challenging setting-orth, that is characteristic o enraming. In unlocking,
transorming and switching about, this mode o reealing is undamentally
distinct rom the mode o poitic reealing so esteemed by leidegger. It is a
mere tinkering and operates in the realm o the ontic or the eeryday.
loweer, we should not dismiss Deleuze and Guattari`s pre-occupation
with possibility too quickly. leidegger is also centrally concerned with being
open to the possibilities that the existence throws up. In existing, as we hae
already seen, Da.eiv is already thrown into the midst o its possibilities. In
being in the midst and not positioned beore them, Da.eiv takes the oppor-
tunity to seize possibility its ery possibility ,Leinas 1996:24-25,. Such is
the dynamism o being-in-the-world.
69
So how might this openness to possibility enable us to igure a dierent
relation to the unready-to-hand, whether it is in eeryday lie or in artistic
practice Leinas suggests that when a tool is damaged, it stands out against
the system in which it exists. It is this standing out, that emphasises the
totality o the system o reerrals inoled:
In this momentary loss o handlability, the reerral, in iew o which
the tool exists` |reroi a ce ev rve ae qvoi `v.tev.ie e.t|, is achieed. It
awakens, stands out, and comes to light. And we are turned in that
manner towards the totality o the system o reerrals-a totality al-
ways implicitly understood but not till then emphasized. lere is a
series o reerrals which can only be realised in an in-iew-o-which`
which is no longer in iew o some other thing but in iew o itsel.
\e recognize Da.eiv itsel in this structure. ,Leinas 1996:20,
1o illustrate this state o aairs, I wish to cite the eeryday example o my car
breaking down. As I stand on the side o the road waiting or mechanical
assistance, I become all too aware that, when it is working, my car enables me
to negotiate the world, to get rom home to work, to the shops, to isit
riends and so orth. \ithout it, I am lost and helpless. In its broken state, the
presence o the car brings recognition that it is the car`s unctioning ,handlability,
that is central to my ability to negotiate the world. Leinas notes that, through
this momentary loss o handlability, we come to understand that handlability
is not a property o the tool, but is its mode o Being ,Leinas 1996:22,.
In leidegger`s praxical ormulation, entities are not grasped thematically,
but only in use. It is through dealings`-or example through the hammer-
ing o the hammer-that the hammer cuts its own measure. In these deal-
ings, the hammer itsel uncoers its own speciic manipulability. 1hus or
leidegger:
1he hammering does not simply hae knowledge about the ham-
mer.. 1he hammer`s character is equipment, but it has appropriated
this equipment in a way which could not possibly be more suitable.
,leidegger 1962:98,
loweer, in his pre-occupation with the in-order-to` quality o tools,
leidegger`s understanding o praxis tends to ocus on the means to an end,
rather than engaging with what happens in the process itsel. In an editor`s
ootnote to 1962 edition o eivg ava 1ive, Macquarrie and Robinson note
that when leidegger talks about work |!er|, he tends to ocus on the prod-
uct achieed rather than the process o working ,leidegger 1962:99,. leidegger
0
conirms this when he says, that with which our eeryday dealings proximally
dwell is not the tools themseles. On the contrary, that with which we concern
ourseles primarily is the work` ,leidegger 1962:120,.
According to leidegger, in our concernul dealings, we use and manipulate
tools. 1hrough this use, the kind o Being which equipment possesses mani-
ests itsel in its own right. le compounds this iew when he comments that,
only because equipment has this being-in-itsel ` and does not merely occur,
is it manipulable in the broadest sense and at our disposal` ,leidegger 1962:98,.
Does this equipmental-being constitute the horizon o our encounters
with tools and equipment In the next Chapter I, will argue that it does not.
loweer, in order to step out o our habitual ways o thinking about tools
and equipment equipmentally, we hae to take quite radical steps. In an alterna-
tie reading o the human relationship with the hammer, lelix Guattari be-
gins to break down the iew that the hammer is something at our disposal. le
sets the art-machine in process when he implores us to, associate the hammer
with the arm, the nail with the anil` and let their collectie dance` bring to
lie the deunct guild o blacksmiths` ,Guattari 1995:35-36,.
Guattari inokes the dynamism o what we might call the unready-to-hand
in taking the hammer on a dierent trajectory rom that o leidegger. le asks
the what i ` question:
\hat i we take a hammer apart by remoing its handle It`s still a
hammer is it not, albeit in a mutilated state It is no longer ready-to-
hand as a hammer hammering. Let us instead reduce the head` o the
hammer by usion. ,Guattari 1995:35,
1hrough this process, obseres Guattari, the hammer will then cross a threshold
o ormal consistency where it will lose its orm.. \e are simply in the
presence o metallic mass returned to smoothness, to the deterritorialization
that precedes it appearance in machinic orm` ,Guattari 1995:35,. In process,
the metallic mass is no longer just a hammer, but is now open to a myriad o
possibilities. 1he art-machine launches itsel on such possibilities.
\e hae seen that it is through our continual encounters with possibility
that the drama o existence is played out. 1he art-machine oers a unique
opportunity to witness this play in its most distilled orm. In liing lie,
human be-ings tend to get caught up in the noise and clutter o the eeryday.
1he art-machine, as a specialised machinic ensemble deoted to process, is
1
much more ocussed on possibility in itsel. 1he in-order-to unction o tools
is no longer the imperatie that inlicts the desiring machine. In seizing possi-
bility the art-machine has the possibility to transcend itsel. 1his, as I will argue
in the ollowing Chapters, is the perormatiity o art.
In thinking through the place o possibility in the philosophy o Deleuze
and Guattari, I would like to draw some parallels with leidegger`s Da.eiv. As
I hae repeatedly shown, Da.eiv is always already thrown into the midst o
possibility. Because Da.eiv understands existence as possibility, it has the po-
tential to transcend itsel and be its possibilities. 1hus, when Leinas exclaims
that Da.eiv is always already beyond itsel |av aea ae .oiveve|` ,Leinas 1996:24,,
he proides the grounds or us to understand that the mode o Being o
Da.eiv necessarily inoles seizing possibility in its ery possibility. le contin-
ues:
1his way o being thrown orward towards one`s own possibilities o
adumbrating |e.qvi..er| them throughout one`s ery existence, is a cru-
cial moment o understanding. ,Leinas 1996:24-25,
Leinas is emphatic that this way o being thrown orward towards one`s own
possibilities does not hae the character o a plan established beorehand, that
is, it is not o the representational kind. Rather, it is what leidegger terms
vtrvrf, that is, project-in-drat` or projection`. 1his is a crucial moment o
understanding in the leideggerian sense. lere we must remember that un-
derstanding` is not to be iewed as a cognitie aculty that is imposed on
existence. It is not representational. Rather what is critical to leidegger`s no-
tion o understanding is that understanding emerges through the care o
handling. It is being-in-the-world. In this way, handling as care comes to
supplant the instrumental ersion o in-order-to that threatens to derail
leidegger`s account o tools.
In relocating our interest in handling as care, we can once again address the
question o art practice. Seen this way, the paint, brushes and canas are not the
means to an end, the subject matter being painted is not merely present-at-
hand, and nor is the artwork merely an end. landling as care produces a crucial
moment o understanding and that understanding is a reealing o possibil-
ity in its ery possibility. 1his, not the completed artwork, i. the work o art. In
all o this, Deleuze and Guattari note, tools exist only in relation to the
interminglings they make possible or that make them possible` ,Deleuze and
Guattari 198:90,. 1hus rather than ocussing on the artwork, the emphasis
shits to the precise state o interminglings`.
2
Care and Contingency
1he relationship o care and concernul dealings signals a dierent way o
thinking the precise state o interminglings between humans and technology.
In the modern world, ecological necessity has re-awakened a concern to estab-
lish a dierent relation to the technological. I humans continue to posit the
world as standing resere, the real danger is that we will not hae a world at all.
leidegger`s critique o technological thinking and his ability to rethink the
relation to technology dierently, oers us a way orward.
In the 1he Question Concerning 1echnology`, leidegger lays the ounda-
tions or such a mode o Being. In his reersal o the causal chain o means
and ends, leidegger reormulates the human-technology relation and posits
it as one o co-responsibility and indebtedness. In this section I will demon-
strate how the precise interminglings that occur between objects, artist, mate-
rials and processes in artistic practice, can be seen to exempliy this particular
relationship o care that leidegger sees as critical to deeloping a dierent
relation to technology.
lor leidegger, human be-ings need to lend a hand` to enable the coming
to presence or presencing o technology` ,leidegger 19a:3,. 1his is not as
easy as it seems. As we hae seen, humans hae some obstacles to oercome,
not least o which is the reductionism o an enraming reealing. In this age o
technological calculating representation, the world is ordered, regulated and
secured or human use. 1hus beore humans are able to lend a hand to the
coming to presence o technology, leidegger suggests that they must assume
a role proper to their essence. le suggests that through consciousness, hu-
mans hae a responsibility to become guardians o Being. In this role,
leidegger expects humans to co-operate with technology to supplant the
mastery o representation. In the spirit o co-operation, he says, man`s es-
sence must . open itsel to the essence o technology` ,leidegger 19a:39,.
le suggests that, in place o an instrumental understanding o technology,
we think our relation to technology in terms o care ,.orge,.
In order to eect the shit rom instrumentality to care, leidegger looks to
creatie practice and cites the example o the making o a siler chalice. Instead
o discussing this production in terms o mastery and attribution, leidegger
establishes that the artistic process is one o responsibility and indebtedness.
lurther, he claims that the artist is not alone in causing art to come about. In
his estimation, a number o contributing elements, or conjunctions are attrib-
uted with responsibility. In the example o the making o the siler chalice,
3
leidegger identiies the other responsible elements inoled in the process as
matter, aspect and circumscribing bounds ,leidegger 19a:6,. 1ogether with
the artist, these ways o being responsible do not make an artwork, since art,
like technology, is not concerned with making. Rather, they enable or bring-
orth something into appearance. leidegger beliees it is through this bring-
ing-orth, that this occasioning enables the growing things o nature as well as
whateer is completed through the crats and the arts |to| come at any gien
time to their appearance` ,leidegger 19a:11,.
leidegger deries his understanding o bringing-orth or occasioning rom
Aristotle`s doctrine o the our causes. Although an instrumental interpreta-
tion o the our causes inoles a reduction o means to an end, leidegger`s
interpretation produces a quite dierent dynamic: one that shits the terms
rom mastery to care and indebtedness. In order to achiee this moe, leidegger
irst sets out the terms o Aristotle`s doctrine o causality clearly and precisely.
Secondly, he reerses the chain o causality arguing that indebtedness, rather
than causality allows us to rethink our relation to technology.
In Aristotle`s doctrine o causality, the irst cause is identiied as cav.a vateriai..
1his is the matter or material out o which something is made. In leidegger`s
example o the making o a siler chalice, the cav.a vateriai. is siler. 1he
second cause, cav.a forvai., relates to the orm that the thing takes or the shape
into which the material enters. 1he orming o a chalice can be contrasted with
the orming o a book, or a wheel-thrown pot can be contrasted with a hand
built pot. 1hus, or example, a thrown pot will take quite a dierent orm
rom a hand built pot because o the centriugal orce o the pottery wheel.
1he third cause is the cav.a fivai.. 1he cav.a fivai. is the end or the purpose or
which the thing was made. 1his end determines the orm o the thing and
thus its relation to cav.a forvai. becomes immediately obious. 1hus the
sacriicial rite or which the siler chalice was required determined, to some
extent, its orm and matter. 1he ourth cause is the cav.a efficiev.. 1he cav.a
efficiev. is that which brings about the inished object. In the conception o the
our causes, it is the silersmith who brings about this eect ,leidegger
19a:6,.
In the theory o means and ends which has dominated our understanding
o technology ,including the making o art,, we hae ocused on the cause that
brings something about, the cause that gets results. It is or this reason that
leidegger suggests that it is the cav.a efficiev. that sets the standard or all
causality` ,leidegger 19a:,.
According to this accepted iew, the artist and

cratsperson is the one who obtains results and consequently the one who is
4
assigned authorship and ownership or the work. In harnessing means to
ends, the artist justiiably can sign her,his name as the one who has made or
caused a work to come into being.
loweer, this explanation does not satisy leidegger. In a moe that
eectiely reerses the chain o causality, leidegger introduces the notions o
indebtedness and responsibility. lis argument unolds as ollows:
Siler is that out o which the siler chalice is made. As this matter ,bye,,
it is co-responsible or the chalice. 1he chalice is indebted to, that is, owes
thanks to, the siler out o which it consists. But the sacriicial essel is
indebted not only to the siler. As a chalice, that which is indebted to the
siler appears in the aspect o a chalice and not in that o a brooch or a
ring. 1hus the sacriicial essel is at the same time indebted to the aspect
,eiao., or idea o chaliceness. Both the siler into which the aspect is
admitted as chalice and the aspect in which the siler appears are in their
respectie ways co-responsible or the sacriicial essel.. But there re-
mains yet a third that is aboe all responsible or the sacriicial essel. It is
that which in adance conines the chalice within the realm o consecra-
tion and bestowal. linally there is a ourth participant in the responsi-
bility or the inished sacriicial essel`s lying beore us ready or use, i.e.,
the silersmith. ,leidegger 19a:-8,
leidegger`s moe deries rom his questioning o the essence o causality.
le argues that the essence o causality is not, as modern thought would hae
it, a simple case o cause and eect. le suggests that, thought as the Greeks
thought it, causality is the letting o what is not yet present arrie into
presencing` ,leidegger 19a:10,. 1hrough a careul unpacking o the etymol-
ogy o the term cav.a, leidegger traces it back to the Roman and then the
Greek. \hilst cav.a was the Roman designation or cause, the Greeks used the
term aitov. In Greek thinking, aitov carries with it a dierent sense. lere,
according to leiddegger, aitov means that to which something else was in-
debted` ,leidegger 19a:,. lrom this analysis he concludes that the doctrine
o our causes can be rearticulated and the trajectory o means and ends re-
ersed. In this reiguration the our causes are the ways, all belonging at once
to each other, o being responsible or something else` ,leidegger 19:,.
1his thinking unhinges our customary ways o conceiing the artistic rela-
tionship. 1he artist`s responsibility neither deries rom her,his role as cav.a
efficiev., nor because in working s,he brings about the inished object.
leidegger contends that the silersmith is co-responsible or bringing the
5
siler chalice orth into appearance ,leidegger 19a:8,. leidegger teases out a
dierent relation between the silersmith, the siler and the chalice. As matter is
co-responsible or the chalice, so the chalice is indebted to the siler ,leidegger
19a:,. In his thinking, the other ways o being responsible are also indebted
to the eorts o the silersmith or the that` and the how` o their coming
into appearance and into play` ,leidegger 19a:8,. In a similar way, the siler-
smith is indebted to matter, aspect and circumscribing bounds or this bringing
into appearance.
\here we hae come to accept the iew that humans use materials and meth-
ods to achiee an artistic end, leidegger makes the claim that the our ways o
being responsible ,rather than the our causes, let something come to lie ready
beore us. In his example, the siler chalice comes to lie ready beore us as a
sacriicial essel` ,leidegger 19a:9,. In bringing something into appearance the
our ways o being responsible set something on its way:
1hey set it ree to the place and so start it on its way into its complete
arrial. 1he principal characteristic o being responsible is this starting
something on its way into arrial. It is in the sense o starting something
on its way into arrial that being responsible is an occasioning or induc-
ing to go orward. ,leidegger 19a:9,
In his discussion o indebtedness and responsibility and later in his elaboration
o tecbv as poi.i., leidegger suggests a dierent relationship or engagement
than that o instrumentality. lere I want to recall Loitt`s obseration that it is
in tecbv, through art and handcrat that humans can participate in conjunctions
with other contributing elements in the bringing orth o a thing into being`
,Loitt in leidegger 19a:xxi,. In this statement and also in leidegger`s use
o the term concernul dealings with the enironment, there is the suggestion
that the relationship between humans and the ready-to-hand is not necessarily
one o mastery. It inoles an ethics other than the ethics o mastery.
In his attribution o responsibility and indebtedness to the siler and to the
chalice, leidegger grants agency to both the siler and the chalice. In doing so, he
opens the possibility or theorising a ery dierent relation between humans,
materials and tools. loweer, as we saw in the irst Chapter, it is not conscious-
ness that orms the basis o our understanding. Rather consciousness proceeds
rom understanding and this understanding is predicated upon our dealings in
the world. 1hus or example, in the irst instance, we do not know painting
theoretically. \e come to know how to paint through our dealings with paint,
brushes, canas and with a moti.
6
1hese concernul dealings in practice, allow us to understand leidegger`s
critique o mastery. Mastery oer, operates in the realm o representationalism.
Skill with, on the other hand, operates according to a dierent logic, that is, the
logic o practice. It may be seen to reside in the realm o concernul dealings.
1hus skill implies an ethical relation o care and responsibility, not a relation o
means and ends.
leidegger`s discussion o responsibility and indebtedness proide us with
quite a dierent way to think about artistic practice. 1hought this way, humans
no longer set the world beore them. Nor are they pre-occupied with ordering
and switching around the world or their use. Indebtedness and responsibility
usher in dierent way o relating in the world. 1hey actiate a mode o being
that lets something come into appearance ,leidegger 19a:9,. In the place o
an enraming mode o Being, this mode o Being o beings inoles estab-
lishing conjunctions with other contributing elements in-the-world.
Material-Semiotic Actors
\hilst leidegger can be interpreted as granting agency to the siler and the
chalice in this complex ensemble o practice, he does not seem to be aware o
the radical nature o such an assertion. 1his omission may be partially histori-
cal. \hen leidegger was writing this essay between 1949 and 1954, the possi-
bility o attributing agency to objects was, at least in the \est, largely unthought.
It was impossible or him to think outside o this rame.
A more recent pre-occupation with the agency o objects has enabled us to
think radically outside the paradigm that set humans as the standard or all
causality. Some contemporary thinkers, or example, Bruno Latour and Donna
laraway assert that objects are actors with agency. 1his assertion enables us to
reisit the relationship between the siler, equipment and the artisan, and
recast this relationship somewhat dierently. In place o the logic o reelation
or discoery, posited by leidegger, laraway introduces the power-charged
social relation o conersation`` ,laraway 1991:198,. She contends that:
1he world neither speaks itsel nor disappears in aour o a master
decoder. 1he codes o the world are not still, waiting only to be read.
1he world is not raw material |standing-resere| or humanization.
,laraway 1991:198,
lor laraway, acknowledging the agency o the world is central or reisioning
the world and reiguring a dierent politics o practice. lere the world is no

longer conceied representationally as an object or .vbiectvv, nor is it a resource
or use by humans as a means to an end. 1he world becomes an actor in the
drama o existence.
low do we igure the dynamic conersation where the world and its objects
are actors too 1he central term in laraway`s elaboration is the material-semiotic
actor. 1his actor may be human or non-human, machine or non-machine.
8
\hat is critical to her position is that the material-semiotic actor actiely contrib-
utes to the production. 1hus an object o knowledge is no longer a resource,
ground, matrix, object, material or instrument to be used by humans as a means
to an end. Rather an object o knowledge is an actie, meaning-generating axis
o the apparatus o bodily production` ,laraway 1991:200,. It operates quite
dierently to the immutable mobiles upon which much o our knowledge is
grounded.
laraway`s notion o the material-semiotic actor grew out o her engagement
with writer Katie King`s apparatus o literary production`. In King`s schema,
the apparatus o literary production is the matrix that spawns literature. Litera-
ture emerges at the intersection o art, business and technology ,laraway
1991:200,. In this ensemble, language is as much an actor as is the author. As
laraway sees it:
King`s objects called poems`. are sites o literary production where
language also is an actor independent o intentions and authors, bodies
as objects o knowledge are material-semiotic generatie nodes. 1heir
boundaries materialize in social interaction. ,laraway 1991:200-201,.
In this way, laraway attends to the relations and orces that take place within the
ery process or tissue o making. As she makes clear, these are some o the liely
languages that actiely intertwine in the production o literary alue` ,laraway
1991:210,. Language is set in process.
In her elaboration o material-semiotic actors, laraway oregrounds the ques-
tion o artistic or authorial intentionality. ler assertion, that in literary produc-
tion, language is an actor independent o intentions and authors, supports
loucault`s argument presented in \hat is an Author` ,1984,. In her particular
reiguration, conscious thought and intentions may play a part but they are, as
Brian Massumi shows us, one line o causality among the many prolierations`
,Massumi 1992:28,. 1aking this back to leidegger`s rethinking o causality, we
can see that the artist or cratsperson is co-responsible or what emerges as art.
8
1he dialogical and emergent nature o literary production also resonates
with Ldward Sampson`s ,1999, notion o the acting ensemble`. lor him, the
acting ensemble presents a dialogical construct that takes into account the
emergent quality o creatie practice. le would argue that creatiity, like intelli-
gence, is the property o the acting ensemble, not the indiidual. 1he acting
ensemble takes in the totality o the acting enironment. In Sampson`s think-
ing, we are woen together with context`. le speaks o embodied interactie
emergence`, arguing that the acting ensemble is characterised by its emergent
property. 1his remoes the ocus rom the acting indiidual and places it in the
relations between actors. In this shit rom the indiidual artist to the relations
between the indiidual body, the social body and the material conditions o
making ,say a painting,, the actors can include paint, the canas, type o sup-
port, the weather, the wind and graity as well as discursie knowledges.
9
In the act or eent o painting, sensory and other bodily responses are ully
ocussed on the demands o the unpredictable and uncontrollable materiality
o paint interacting with the enironment. 1heorist Lstelle Barrett, notes that
stimuli arise in the heat o the moment to which the creatie gesture becomes
a reaction that is released rom conceptual ways o thinking` ,Barrett 2002:114,.
In this experience, painting may be seen as a response to what happens in the
interaction between paint, oil, turps, canas, graity, sun, heat, the occasional
lie beast and the human body. In this process, the body, the materiality o the
paint and the enironment are implicated and mutually dependent, so that art
emerges in the interactie labour o making. 1his dynamic relation igures
material practice in terms o co-emergence rather than mastery. It is the play o
the matter o bodies, the materials o production and matters o discourse in
sign work. As I will demonstrate in Chapter lie, in a co-emergent practice
matter is not impressed upon. lere, matter is in process as a dynamic interplay
through which meaning and eects emerge. 1his is the logic o practice.
Linkages and Assemblages
In laraway`s theorisation o the material-semiotic actor-with its empha-
sis on language as an actor independent o intentions and bodies as material-
semiotic generatie nodes-there can be ound strong correspondences with
Deleuze and Guattari`s ,1983, notion o machinic assemblages. 1heir elabora-
tion o machinic assemblages presents a challenge to those theoretical para-
digms that assume the centrality o the knowing subject.
In eoking the terms machine`, machinic assemblages` and desiring
machines`, Deleuze and Guattari appear to eoke the technological. loweer,
9
their concern is not the technological per .e. In Deleuze and Guattari`s under-
standing o the machine and the machinic, we are asked to orget our
commonsense understanding o what a machine i.. As the essence o technol-
ogy is nothing technological or leidegger, so the machine, in Deleuze and
Guattari, is neither machinery nor equipment. In order to make this clear, they
dierentiate between the mechanical and the machinic. 1he mechanical, as
exempliied in the orm o technological apparatus, is characterised by a struc-
tural interrelationship between the discrete parts working together to perorm
work. 1his echoes leidegger`s ontic realm o technological actiity, replete
with its assembly o rods, pistons and chassis. But just as this assembly in no
way comprises enraming itsel nor brings it about, so Deleuze and Guattari`s
mechanical` must not be conused with the ery dierent logic o the machinic.
1he dierentiation brings us back to the distinction between molar and
molecular that was introduced in the irst Chapter. As Deleuze and Guattari
emphasize:
1he real dierence is . between on the one hand the molar ma-
chine-whether social, technical, or organic-and on the other the de-
siring machine, which is o a molecular order. Desiring-machines are
the ollowing: ormatie machines, whose ery misirings are unc-
tional, and whose unctioning is indiscernible rom their ormation:
chronogeneous machines engaged in their own assembly ,vovtage,.
,Deleuze and Guattari 1983:286,
In their pragmatics, the machine and the machinic are deined in terms o what
they do. \hat they are i. what they do. In conceptualising the machinic, their
concern is with production and the interminglings that constitute this process
o production. Put simply, a machine is an agevcevevt or an arrangement o
orces. In contrast with leidegger`s conception o production as the assign-
ment o something ready-to-hand in-order-to do something, Deleuze and
Guattari ocus on the production o production itsel. In this praxiological
ontology, machines are not instrumental, not just a means to an end, but, as
Grosz notes, are the conditions as well as the eect o any making, any pro-
ducing` ,Grosz 1994:168,. Lerything is production, a production o produc-
tion. lumans and nature are one and the same thing as producer-product.
Production is seen as the essential reality o humans and nature. In this ma-
trix, the rules goerning the relationship are always those o connectiity, not
o mastery. One machine is always coupled with another. 1his coupling, they
term a machinic assemblage`.
80
1he category assemblage` has an important place in the ocabulary and
practice o contemporary isual art practice. It is used to describe art, usually
sculpture, which uses pre-existing and ound objects in the work. Jean 1ingueley
and Robert Rauschenberg are oten cited as practitioners o the art o assem-
blage`. Assemblage and its two dimensional counterparts collage and montage
bring together disparate elements and materials into conjunction, in the produc-
tion o a new work o art. But the critical question remains. low can the practice
o assemblage help us to understand Deleuze and Guattari`s conception o
assemblage
Llizabeth Grosz sets out the terms which deine the machinic assemblage:
Assemblages are heterogeneous, disparate, discontinuous alignments
or linkages that are bought together in conjunctions ,x plus y plus z, or
seered through disjunctions and breaks. ,Grosz 1994:16,
As proisional linkages o elements, ragments and lows, art assemblages ap-
pear to meet the criteria set out by Grosz in her deinition o the machinic
assemblage. Bits o junk, materials bought rom shops, domestic ware, tradi-
tional artists` materials and bits and pieces rom magazines, photographs,
photocopies and newspapers are brought together by the artist to create an
assemblage. Robert Rauschenberg`s Cavyov ,1959,, or example, combines oil
on canas, wood, printed matter, a stued eagle and a pillow tied to the canas
with a cord. lere, the bringing together o heterogeneous, disparate and dis-
continuous alignments to orm physical conjunctions, initially unsettle pre-
conceptions about the nature o art thus creating intellectual disjunctions.
More proound perhaps is the work o Jean 1inguely. 1inguely is best
known or his explosie` sculptural assemblages. lor example, in his ovage
to èr Yor: . efcov.trvctivg, efae.trvctivg !or of .rt ,1960,, Jean 1inguely
made an assemblage that both created conjunctions and seered them through
disjunctions and breaks. Not only did the work not do what machines are
usually supposed to do, but it also created a happening` and destroyed itsel
in the process. In relecting on the work, 1inguely commented, I try to distil
the renzy o our joyul, industrial conusion` ,1inguely quoted in Lucie-
Smith 198:,.
Modern art may hae a priileged place in the lexicon o Deleuze and Guattari,
but do the modes o practice airmed in assemblage, montage and collage,
encapsulate the breadth that is enisaged in their elaboration o the machinic
assemblage Does 1ingueley`s ovage to èr Yor: . efcov.trvctivg, ef
81
ae.trvctivg !or of .rt, perorm as a machinic assemblage` in the sense in
which Deleuze and Guattari conceie it lurther, does such work enable the
mode o poitic reealing that is gien priileged status in leidegger`s think-
ing
At one leel it could be argued that in these particular assemblages, we see
a type o reealing that is an enraming. According to such an assessment,
items rom the standing resere are transormed, stored, distributed and
switched about` ,leidegger 19a:16, in order to make assemblages. 1hus a
challenging reealing characterised by orderability and substitutability could
be seen to characterise the art assemblage. lrom this position, does the art o
assemblage just make more standing resere I this is so, then in their role
as the orderer o standing resere, artists remain within a representationalist
relation with the world.
On the other hand the art o assemblage can be seen to do more than just
add to standing resere. In their capacity to create connections and couplings
in a ree relation that starts something on its way, assemblages enable a poitic
rather enraming reealing. \here the danger lurks, or assemblage, as with
all other artworks, is when it lies in the stock rooms o art galleries and
auction houses. As standing resere, it gets caught up in creating a deter-
mined relation o ordering and regulating.
In Deleuze and Guattari`s conception o the machinic assemblage there is
no hierarchical or central order or organisation. In such an assemblage, the
proisional linkage o elements, ragments and lows, includes ideas, things-
human and non-human, animate and inanimate-and these exist on the
same plane. 1hey all hae the same praxiological status:
An assemblage has neither base nor superstructure, neither deep struc-
ture nor supericial structure, it lattens all o its dimensions onto a
single plane o consistency upon which reciprocal presuppositions
and mutual insertions play themseles out. ,Deleuze and Guattari
198:90,
As Llizabeth Grosz makes clear, there is no hierarchy o Being, no pre-
ordained order to the collection and no central organisation or plan to which
elements must conorm. Rather their law is the imperatie o endless ex-
perimentation, metamorphosis, or transmutation, alignment and re-align-
ment` ,Grosz 1994:16,. She suggests that:
82
Assemblages are the consequence o a practice, whether it be that o
a bee in relation to the lower and the hie or a subject making some-
thing using tools or implements. ,Grosz 1994:16-8,
In this deinition, Grosz comes close to articulating a conception o the as-
semblage that resonates with leidegger`s understanding o Da.eiv where, in
the midst o possibility, beings continually seize possibility in all its possibili-
ties. 1inguely also came some way towards understanding this imperatie
when he entitled his assemblage ovage to èr Yor: . efcov.trvctivg, ef
ae.trvctivg !or of .rt. In this title, he iterates a recognition ,oten stated by
artists, that, in the making o a work, there is a point at which the work takes
oer and the artist is no longer in control.
In Cbao.vo.i.: .v tbicoae.tbetic Paraaigv ,1995,, Guattari addresses the
conundrum brought about by the shit that is enabled in an assemblage. In
the machinic-technical world that structures our lies:
I there`s choice and reedom at certain superior` anthropological
stages, it is because we will also ind them at the most elementary strata
o machine concatenations. But the notions o elements and com-
plexity are susceptible to being brutally inerted. 1hose that are the
most dierentiated and undierentiated co-exist within the same chaos
which, at ininite speed, plays its irtual registers-one against the
other and one with the other. ,Guattari 1995:53,
1hrough its moements, speeds and actions, the assemblage brutally inerts
the strata, biurcates and engenders new ields o the possible. In the assem-
blage, it is not just about changing the meanings we make, but more radically,
the concern is with changing the way we make meanings.
10
\ith its emphasis
on moement, speeds and action, I am again reminded o laraway`s power-
charged social relation o conersation`` ,laraway 1991:198,. In this sense,
Deleuze and Guattari and laraway all attend to the relations and orces that
take place within the ery process or tissue o making. 1hey contest the
objectiication o representationalism and its propensity to set an object be-
ore a human subject.
Deleuze and Guattari`s understanding o the machinic assemblage and
assemblages o enunciation begins to allow us to think dierently about
artistic practice. It no longer priileges a human body or a single consciousness.
Rather, as Olkowski has pointed out, what is produced is a multiplicity o
connections inoling the body` ,Olkowski 1999:44,. In this conception, the
83
body she speaks o should not be conused with the singular bounded body o
a unitary human being. Rather, the body is seen in broad terms, not as a bounded
oneness`, not as a medium` . boay does not designate substance . rather
boay is a term that expresses the relationship between orces ,Olkowski 1999:44,.
lor Deleuze and Guattari, as Olkowski obseres, the body is conceptualised
in terms o speeds and intensities, productie lows o orces seeking to escape
the authority o unity, organization, and hierarchy` ,Olkowski 1999:44,. In this
designation, it is possible to conceie o artistic practice as a productie low o
dierent orces, dierent speeds and intensities operating to create a machinic
assemblage.
In the thinking o Deleuze and Guattari, human consciousness is just one
element in the complex interplay o practice and no longer a priileged one at
that. In their conception, practice doesn`t reeal, but rather realises moement.
Deleuze and Guattari`s realisation o moement includes the conditions as well
as the eects o making ,Grosz 1994:168,. 1his moement, says Brian Massumi
is a consequence o the encounter o dierent speeds, intensities and orces
,Massumi 1992:15,. In this encounter, the human is no longer outside o the
assemblage directing the proceedings. 1he human being becomes just one ma-
terial-semiotic actor engaged in complex conersation with other players.
In this assemblage o dierent orces, speeds and intensities, it is not just
humans who possess these qualities. 1ools and materials also display them.
1hey are not passie to the dierent speeds and intensities o dierent hu-
mans.
11
In the human-computer-internet assemblage or the human-computer-
sotware assemblage, we are constantly aware o the operation o these dierent
speeds and intensities. On a clear day on the internet, the connections are almost
instantaneous and inormation is receied and sent speedily on its way. An older
slower sotware package ,or modem, or lie connection, will oten be dispensed
with because o its limitations and will be replaced by a speedier ersion.
But what o the subtler example o the wood-tool encounter In talking o
the relation between the woodworker, the wood and the plane, Massumi makes
the point that the signs in the wood are not passie, een i their action is slower
and their orce less actie than the tool or the human. In looking at the wood-
tool encounter, we can come closer to an understanding o the dynamism o
material practice. Massumi contends that the encounter between the wood, the
tool and the human in woodworking is a hand-to-hand combat o energies`
,Massumi 1992:14,. It does not produce orm as we normally think it, nor is it
static:
84
It is a dynamism, composed o a number o interacting ectors. 1he
kind o unity` it has in no way itiates that multiplicity-it is precisely
an interaction between a multiplicity o terms, an interrelation o rela-
tions, an integration o disparate elements. It is a diagram o a process
o becoming. ,Massumi 1992:14,
In this dynamism, diagramming cannot be known in adance nor can it be
mapped and translated into a dierent situation as a prototype. Such a process
does not produce immutable mobiles. Although we may hae some awareness
o the potential o a tool or a piece o wood-or example, through preious
dealings with wood and tools-eery new situation brings about a dierent
constellation o orces and speeds. 1he wood may be a bit harder, the tool
sharper or blunter and our own energies more or less ocussed. 1hus our rela-
tion to technical things is ineitably characterised by a play between the
understandings that we bring to the situation and the contingency o the situa-
tion itsel. 1his relation is not a relation o mastery. In the heat o practice, I
would like to suggest, that the relation to the technological is awesome. It is a
sublime encounter.
lrancis Bacon`s obseration concerning his attempts to deal` with paint,
support this contention:
Paint is so malleable that you neer do really know. It`s such an extraor-
dinary supple medium that you neer do quite know what paint will do.
I mean, you een don`t know that when you put it on wilully, as it were,
with a brush-you neer quite know how it will go on. ,Bacon in Sylester
1980:96,
le continues:
In one`s conscious actiity in painting-at any rate in oil painting, which
is such a luid and curious medium-oten the tension will be com-
pletely changed by just the way a stroke o the brush goes on. It breeds
another orm that the orm you`re making can take. ,Bacon in Sylester
1980:9,
Creatie practice can be conceied o as a perormance in which linkages are
constantly being made and remade. As one o the actors, the artist becomes a
orce or intensity inoled in the action. 1he other actors similarly become orces
and intensities. \hilst each has the same praxiological status, each has its own
85
character and contribution to make. 1hus creatie practice is a co-emergent prac-
tice. \hen Daid Sylester obseres, that at the end o Bacon`s paintings there is
the residue o the actiity`, he betrays his representationalism ,Sylester 1980:89,.
le orecloses process and conceies the artwork as product.
lor leidegger, as we will see in the ollowing Chapter, there is much more
than merely the residue o the actiity. According to his thinking, it is the respon-
sibility o the contributing elements to start something on its way into arrial
,leidegger 19a:9,. As such, the responsibility o contributing elements is as a
reeing claim. On this, he is emphatic:
lreedom goerns the open in the sense o the cleared and lighted up..
lreedom is that which conceals in a way that opens to light, in whose
clearing here shimmers that eil that coers what comes to presence o all
truth and lets the eil appear as that what eils. lreedom is the realm o
destining that at any gien time starts a reealing on its way. ,leidegger
19a:25,
1he Challenge of Contemporary Practice
I would like to argue that artists in the modern age are so ocussed on creating
and marketing artwork that they orget they are co-responsible ,along with other
contributors, or letting art come orth into being. In their pre-occupation with
being be-ings, some artists become engaged in art business and tend to reduce
their materials and tools to a means to an end. In the world o art business it is
so easy to become caught up in an enraming mode o reealing. In contempo-
rary society, as we hae seen, an enraming reealing threatens to oreclose all
other modes o reealing. As I will argue in the ollowing Chapter, where
enraming dominates, art gets lost in art business.
I beliee leidegger is quite right when he makes the assessment that in
contemporary society humans lie under an illusion:
Man exalts himsel to the posture o lord o the earth. In this way the
impression comes to preail that eerything man encounters exists only
insoar as it is his construct. 1his illusion gies rise in turn to one inal
delusion: It seems as though man eerywhere and always only encoun-
ters himsel.. In truth, howeer, precisely nowhere does man today any
longer encounter himsel, i.e., his essence. Man stands so decisiely in
attendance on the challenging-orth o enraming that he does not ap-
prehend enraming as a claim, that he ails to see himsel as the one
86
spoken to, and hence also ails in eery way to hear in what respect he ek-
sists, rom out o his essence, in the realm o an exhortation or address,
and thus cav verer encounter only himsel. ,leidegger 19a:2,
In this assessment, leidegger poses a most timely challenge to those artists and
theorists who subscribe to theories that propose that art is a social construction
or that there can neer be anything outside o representation. In presenting
leidegger`s questioning concerning technology, and drawing out its implica-
tions or rethinking the question o art, the task o this Chapter has been to
demonstrate two things. lirstly, a particular mode o art in the modern age has
become imbricated in the ordering challenging orth o enraming. Secondly,
whilst this mode o reealing has the propensity to drie out eery other possi-
bility o reealing, including a poitic reealing, this ate is not ineitable. In
presenting leidegger`s elaboration o equipmentality and his reworking o
Aristotle`s doctrine o the our causes, I hae prepared the way to think again
what constitutes the work o art. 1his question orms the basis o the ollowing
Chapters.
8
1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
!
1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
Art is the origin o the artwork and o the artist. ,leidegger 19b:182,
1he origin o the work o art-that is, the origin o both the creators
and the preserers, which is to say o a people`s historical existence-is
art. 1his is so because art is in its essence an origin: a distinctie way in
which truth comes into being, that is, becomes historical. ,leidegger
19b:202,
I
concluded the preious Chapter by arguing that contemporary art practice
has become implicated in an enraming mode o reealing. \et leidegger
has argued that art is, in its essence, a reealing or bringing into being o
truth`. 1wo critical questions emerge rom these seemingly contradictory
assessments. lirstly, what truth` is set to work in a technocratic era. Secondly,
is it possible to make art, in the leideggerian sense, in the contemporary
world In addressing these questions, I wish to turn to leidegger`s critical
essay on art, 1he Origin o the \ork o Art` ,1935,. In the epilogue to this
essay, leidegger makes the proocatie statement that, perhaps lied experi-
ence is the element in which art dies ,leidegger 19b:204,. 1his statement
requires clariication. low can lied experience be the element in which art dies,
when leidegger also claims that the work o art emerges through lied, em-
bodied experience le airms this when he says that lied experience is the
source that is standard not only or art appreciation and enjoyment but also or
artistic creation` ,leidegger 19b:204,.
1he conundrum that leidegger`s two statements present, reoles around
the distinction that he draws between Art` and art`, or as he puts it between
the essence o art and art business`. lor leidegger, the essence o art or Art,
operates in the realm o Being. On the other hand, art business is what hap-
pens in the midst o beings as human beings try to negotiate the business o
making, exhibiting, iewing, buying and selling artwork in a modern techno-
88
cratic society. 1his distinction needs at the outset to be put in the context o
leidegger`s central metaphysical question. low in the midst o beings, that is in
the midst o culturally mediated lied experience, is Being realised
In this questioning leidegger returns to what he posits as the undamental
distinction between the Being o beings ,aa. eiv ae. eievaev, and be-ing ,aa.
eievae,. lor leidegger, Being is always concerned with the Being o beings as
such, not with human be-ings per .e. 1his distinction is what leidegger terms
the ontological dierence. In his thinking, ontology is concerned with Being as
such, whereas the ontic is concerned with the lied, culturally mediated experience
o human beings. 1his creates the parameters or his discussion o Art and art
business. \hilst Art or the essence o art is concerned with the ontological, the
lie o an indiidual artist, the art practice o an artist, and the artwork, all operate
in the ontic realm o be-ings. 1he ontic is the realm o art business and much
else as well. \ithin this context, the central task in this Chapter will be to ines-
tigate whether the essence o art can be realised in the midst o art business. As
I will demonstrate, leidegger`s concern that we transcend the mere ontic and
pose the ontological question o Being, creates an unresoled tension. I the
question o the essence o art is to be addressed, how do we deal with the
question o lie experience, the experience o art appreciation and artistic crea-
tion
1he 1ruth in Art
leidegger worries that in our pre-occupation with art business, Art in itsel
may no longer be the essential and necessary way in which truth happens in our
historical age ,leidegger 19b:205,. \here art business rules supreme, the
truth o art is orgotten. 1his concern raises two urther questions: \hat is the
truth o art \hat is its essence
In Chapter 1wo, we came to understand that, or leidegger, the essence o
technology did not lie in making, manipulating or manuacturing. In 1he Ori-
gin o 1he \ork o Art`, leidegger airms that this is also true or the essence
o art. Just as the essence o technology is not concerned with making and
manipulating, so neither is the essence o art concerned with making, manipu-
lating or manuacturing artworks. 1he work` that art aoe., is categorically not the
object-painting, sculpture, drawing, print and so on-that we hae come to
call an artwork. 1his ealuation also holds or musical and poetical works.
So what is art`s essence At the outset I must clariy that leidegger`s use o
the terms essence` and truth` is not essentialist. 1here is no single essence
89
1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
and no single truth that he is trying to pinpoint and ix. In leidegger`s think-
ing, art in its essence is a mode o creating an open region in which truth
,atbeia, or instances o truth emerge. As he notes, Art is the setting-into-
work o truth.. Art lets truth originate` ,leidegger 19b:202,. In this de-
lineation o the task o art, we are reminded o the central thesis o 1he
Question Concerning 1echnology`. 1he essence o technology, states leidegger,
is to be ound in its character as a mode o reealing. 1echnology comes to
presence |!e.t| in the realm where reealing and unconcealment take place,
where atbeia, truth, happens` ,leidegger 19a:13,.
In some ery signiicant ways, the questions raised in the 1he Question
Concerning 1echnology` relate to the central concerns underpinning 1he Ori-
gin o the \ork o Art`. In particular, leidegger`s criticism o enraming as
the distinctie mode o reealing operating in the modern technological age,
mirrors his critique o art business. Just as enraming is characterised by a
challenging setting-orth and ordering o the world as standing resere, so the
business o art is similarly concerned. In act, art business as a mode o reeal-
ing is an enraming. leidegger makes it clear that as enraming, art business
takes us away rom the essence o art or Art:
As soon as the thrust into the awesome is parried and captured by the
sphere o amiliarity and connoisseurship, the art business has begun.
Len a painstaking transmission o works to posterity, all scientiic
eorts to regain them, no longer reach the work`s own being, but only
a remembrance o it. ,leidegger 19b:193,
In this mode, art is a resource at the disposal o man. \hat is lost in the
reduction o art to standing resere, is a mode o reealing that enables truth
to be set-to-work.
1he sort o thinking that typiies art business is part o what Mcloul
terms cultural thinking`. le remarks that, or leidegger, cultural thinking is
a mistaken thinking that leads away rom questioning o the irst rank, that is,
rom questioning matters in their essence` ,Mcloul 2000a:24,. 1he task o
1he Origin o the \ork o Art` is to take us back to that central question:
\hat is the essence o art or what leidegger terms Art` In putting this
question to the ore, leidegger asks us to step back rom the busy work o art
business and re-assess the stakes inoled in Art as reealing. In this re-orien-
tation to questioning matters in their essence, it becomes clear why leidegger
worries that lied experience might be the element in which Art dies.
90
1he concern-that while socially mediated lied experience proides the
source or art appreciation, enjoyment and artistic creation it also endangers
Art-orms the basis or my meditation on his essay. low, in the midst o art
business, can the essence o art be realised I want to extend leidegger`s
question and ask: low, in the midst o all o the designing and communicat-
ing that is expected rom the work o contemporary art, can the essence o art
itsel be realised
1he Work of Art
lor leidegger, the question concerning the origin o the work o art turns
out to be a question about the essence o art. le asks an obious, but too
oten neglected question. low are we to talk about the work` o art i we do
not know beorehand, what a work o art is leidegger inds that our com-
mon preconceptions about the character o the work o art conceal rather than
reeal the work` o art. lor this reason, he beliees we need to go the work o
art and ask what and how it is. It is ery diicult to set aside our preconceptions
and listen` to the work o art. 1o be able to hear what the work o art has to
say, one has to be receptie to its particular oice. lor leidegger, receptieness
necessarily inoles openness. 1he openness that is required to allow the work
o art to speak is no less diicult or the iewer than it is or the artist. It is in
the sense o preseration o art that leidegger proposes we hae an ethical
responsibility to listen to art, since the work`s own peculiar actuality . is only
brought to bear where the work is presered in the truth that happens through
the work itsel ` ,leidegger 19b:193,. As we will see shortly, it is through
preseration` that instances o truth are reealed.
In order to start us on the way, leidegger urges us to go to the actual work
and ask it what and how it is. Our irst task in this quest is to dierentiate
works o art rom other things in the world. leidegger suggests that works
are as naturally present as are things` ,leidegger 19b:145,. \orks hae a
thingly` quality, as does a naturally-occurring thing like a stone or a clod o
earth. I this is so and i the work o art is as naturally present as are these other
things, what makes a work o art`s thingly` quality any dierent rom that o
a stone or a acuum cleaner \hat, or example, dierentiates Duchamp`s
ovvtaiv ,191, rom any ordinary urinal to be ound in a public toilet And, i
it is qualitatiely dierent, how does this thingly quality eature in the work
that the artist properly makes
1he urinal that Duchamp bought rom the J.L. Mott`s Ironworks was just
an ordinary urinal, no dierent rom any other ound in lrench public toilets
91
1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
o the period. loweer, in the act o signing it R. Mutt and attempting to
exhibit it as an artwork in the 1916 Society o Independent Artists` Annual
Lxhibition in New \ork, Duchamp transormed it into a new being. In re-
sponse to its rejection, Duchamp`s artist riend Beatrice \ood deended the
action and claimed its status as Art:
\hether Mr Mutt with his own hands made the ountain or not has
no importance. le ClOSL it. le took an ordinary article o lie,
placed it so that its useul signiicance disappeared under the new title
and point o iew-created a new thought or that object. ,\ood
quoted in Godrey 1998:30,
In \ood`s estimation, the urinal`s use alue, or equipmental-being had disap-
peared and an opening had been created in which a new thought or that object
could emerge. 1his is precisely the setting-into-work o truth` ,leidegger
19b:202, that leidegger sees as the essence o art.
On irst impression it may appear that Duchamp`s action was caught up in
the connoisseurship o art business-negotiating the business o making,
exhibiting, iewing and criticising. loweer, in questioning what Art was, his
proocation unsettled preconceptions and produced moement in thought
itsel. In putting the basic concept o art in crisis, Duchamp proided the
preconditions or setting, what has come to be known as, conceptual art on its
way into arrial. lor leidegger this moement is the task o philosophical
thinking. In this critical turn, art was bought much closer to philosophy and
the artist or writer put in the position o the philosopher.
1
loweer this discussion still does not address the thingly quality o the
work o art. 1he thingly element prookes serious questioning in a contem-
porary context, where an artwork may not appear as naturally present in the
same way as a acuum cleaner or a stone. \hat is the status o a perormance,
a conceptual piece or a irtual immersie work Is the thingly eature o a work
o art concerned with the materiality or objecthood o the thing or does it hae
some other character In the plastic arts, such as painting, sculpture and
printmaking, it is hard to separate the thingly quality o a work o art rom its
appearance as a material object-but what o those conceptual and irtual
artworks that do not take material orm \ithout material orm, can concep-
tual and irtual art be said to possess a thingly character \hat does the artist
properly make, in what has been termed a post-medium culture
2
leidegger did not anticipate such dilemmas when he wrote 1he Origin o
the \ork o Art`, despite the crisis in representation that had been precipitated
92
by the adent o photography and other technological innoations, which had
impacted on the art business. loweer, by recourse to Kant`s thing-in-it-
sel `, he does proide a way orward. Kant`s thing-in-itsel reers to the sort
o thing that does not show itsel. As leidegger notes, in philosophy, both
things-in themseles and things that appear are called things ,leidegger
19b:14,. leidegger extends this understanding o the thing by returning
to pre-Socratic understanding o thingness`. In this reckoning, a thing does
not necessarily need a material orm. In pre-Socratic understandings o
thingness, up` and down` become things. In leidegger`s thinking, death
and judgement are the last o such things. I, as leidegger argues, God is just
one o those things, it seems alid to argue that irtual images are also things.
So i a thing is not deined by its material orm or by its appearance, what is
it lor leidegger, a thing is whateer is not simply nothing` ,leidegger
19b:14,. 1hus a work o art, whether it is material or irtual can be consid-
ered a thing, just as a stone or a clod o earth is a thing. \hat use is this concept
to us in thinking about the essence o art, or or my purposes, the work o art
leidegger begins his inquiry into the essence o art with the enigmatic
statement that the work o art maniests something else oer and aboe the
thingly element`, and it is this which constitutes its artistic nature ,leidegger
19b:145,. In the work o art, this something other` is bought together
with the thing that is made. \hat is this curious something other that a work
o art maniests leidegger tells us that it is allegory. Allegory allows a work to
make public something other than itsel.
In western culture ,and it is primarily western culture that leidegger is
dealing with, allegory has requently been used to express generalisations about
the existence o human beings.
3
An allegory is a story, image or object with
two meanings: a literal meaning and a second coded or symbolic meaning,
whereby it stands in or some abstract idea. 1he coded meaning is embedded
in the work and the reader or iewer is gien hooks in order that they can access
this second leel o meaning.
1he operation o allegory, as this something other`, can be demonstrated
in the contrast between a rock and a sculpture, or example, Massimiliano
Soldani`s bronze 1irtve 1rivvpbavt orer 1ice. \e look at the rock lying in ront
o us. 1he rock is just a rock.
4
In contrast, Soldani`s sculpture o a emale
igure standing oer a male igure is not to be taken so literally. As the title tells
us, the woman in the sculpture is vot just a woman. Rather, she stands in
symbolically or something else. ler standing oer` signiies irtue`s ictory
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1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
oer ice. Depending on the context in which it is presented, the sculpture
immediately opens out onto a range o possible cultural readings. A eminist
reading o Soldani`s sculpture would reeal a ery dierent understanding rom
that o a ormal or an iconographic reading. 1hrough all this cultural actiity, a
sculpture is dierent rom a rock that just lies there. A sculpture is a coded text
that must be deciphered to allow its richness o meanings to be released to the
iewer.
5
In order to understand the allegory, one has to be inducted into the
social codes upon which its meanings depend.
As a socially-agreed code, allegory allows social meanings to be transmitted
through a work o art. Meaning is brought together in the work o art through
allegory or the sharing o symbolic codes. lrom this point o iew, we could
argue quite conclusiely that the origin o the work o art lies in its social consti-
tution. 1he argument seems to be turning to the question o signs. It is through
the operation o symbolic codes or signs that meaning inheres in the work o
art. \ithout these shared codes, there would be no Art let alone works o art.
1he thing` would be a thing that lies beore us and nothing more.
Let us pause or a moment and consider the assertion that the origin o the
work o art is social. It seems sel-eident that the category o art is a social, not
a natural` category. leiddeger`s suggestion that we consider works o art in
terms o how they are experienced and enjoyed by those who encounter them,
can be seen to support the assertion that the essence o art lies in its socially
constituted meaning. 1he origin o the work o art lies in socially ascribed mean-
ing and meaning comes about through sign work or semiosis.
6
Is this what
leidegger is talking about when he inquires into the origin o the work o art
and suggests that the something other`, that the work maniests, is allegory
Surely this suggestion would return us to the realm o the ontic, the realm that
is central to art business.
leidegger`s position can be intuited rom his critique o representational
thinking. 1he preconception o art as a sign would colour eery experience o
beings. \e would no longer see the thingly eature o the artwork. Rather, where
art is conceied as a sign, beings get caught in the ontic, rather than being open to
the Being o art or Art. lence we need to go back to leidegger`s assertion that
the something other` o art is allegory and ask again just what he means by this
assertion. \hat is this something other i it is not socially agreed upon mean-
ing lis answer is cryptic:
1his one element in a work that maniests another, this one element
that joins with another, is the thingly eature in the artwork. It seems
94
almost as though the thingly element in the artwork is like the sub-
structure into and upon which the other, proper element is built.
And is it not this thingly eature in the work that the artist properly
makes by his handcrat ,leidegger 19b:146,
1hus the something other o art is not an oerlaid superstucture that its
onto the thing and gies it aesthetic alue or meaning, rather it subsists
within the structure itsel. It is the work o art`s purposieness without
purpose, whereby it intimates or stries towards something else. \e tend to
assume that this intimation is towards something useul, like meaning.
loweer this is not the case. 1he work o art may in act be totally useless.
1he work o art stries or stretches towards its own essence or its own truth.
1his purposieness without purpose operates in a dierent order rom the
realm o signs.
Commonsense Assumptions about the Work of Art
A painting may hang on the wall next to a barometer or a calendar. A
sculpture may sit in a crate in the back o a remoalist`s an alongside cup-
boards, beds, rerigerators, washing machines and acuum cleaners. A print
may wait at the ramer`s, side by side with amily photos and certiicates o
merit. leidegger claims that all works hae a thingly character. 1he sculpture,
the acuum cleaner, the print, the calendar and the certiicate are all things.
Moreoer, they hae all been ormed by human action. \hat then, dieren-
tiates the work o art rom the certiicate o merit or the barometer or the
acuum cleaner Je Koons`s placement o three acuum cleaners one on
top o the other, in perspex cases, in èr cbetov !et,Dry 1ripeDecer
,1981, worries any neat distinction. \hat makes his acuum cleaners dier-
ent rom my looer low is it a work o art low can we think about this
problem
In order to tease out this conundrum, leidegger`s irst task is to test
commonly held assumptions about the work o art as a thing. le identiies
three commonly held assumptions or ways o thinking about the thingness
o things that persist in \estern thought. 1he irst way o thinking about
thingness consists o identiying a thing`s traits or its characteristics. Sec-
ondly, thingness may be conceied o as the unity o a maniold o sensa-
tions. linally, and most commonly, in thought about artwork, we conceie
the thingness o the thing as ormed matter ,leidegger 19b:156,. 1hus,
or example, a ceramic bowl is ormed clay. lis critique o these three modes
o thinking thingness, proceeds in tenacious leideggerian ashion. le
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1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
presents each approach as a sel-eident truth and then cuts through this sel
deception to demonstrate the inability o such modes o thought to reeal
the speciicity o the thingness o the work o art.
\e commonly identiy a thing by its core characteristics. 1he core character-
istics o the thing are those that are always and already there in the thing. As an
example, leidegger describes a block o granite in terms o its characteristics.
A block o granite is characterised by its hardness, heainess, extended bulki-
ness, shapelessness, roughness, colouredness and dull shininess ,leidegger
19b:148,. \e see these as the characteristics o the block o granite. 1hey
belong to the granite. 1hey are its properties. But this raises an obious ques-
tion. Do these properties reeal the graniteve.. o granite lor example, i we
perorm a chemical analysis o granite, do we know the granite any better
Similarly, i we analyze an artwork, are we able to get at its Being Does it enable
us to get to the core o the thing and apprehend its thingness
In proposing that the core o the thing is that which is always and already
there, leidegger reminds us that these particular designations relate to the
Greek experience o the Being o beings, or presence. le cites the Greek word,
bypoeivevov as the core o the thing that was always already there, where the
thing had ree range to display its thingly character` ,leidegger 19b:148-9,.
leidegger laments that what was or the Greeks something which lay at the
ground o the thing as always already there, has been undamentally trans-
ormed in the modern era. In the shit rom bypoeivevov to .vbiectvv, this
sense o presence has gien way to that which lies beore man. In the transla-
tion rom the Greek bypoeivevov to the Latin .vbiectvv, the thing in itsel was
subsumed under the mere character o the thing. \hat lay at the ground o
the thing became the sel-eident character o the thing as that which is set
beore us.
I read in the Real Lstate section o Saturday`s paper a sales adertisement
or a 4 x 2 brick and tile house. In response to the designated characteristics or
properties o the house, I conjure up an image in my mind. loweer, in this
imagining, the houseness` o the house disappears. It is subsumed by these
descriptors. I already hae a preconception o the house and as yet, I hae not
experienced its thingness. 1he characteristics are presented as sel-eident. 1he
house has our bedrooms and two bathrooms. In leidegger`s estimation,
language, in its eeryday use, does not reeal the thingness o the thing. In
eeryday language, the thing disappears amidst the thing-concept.

1he thing-
concept is representational thinking.
96
leidegger proposes that what is now to us so natural` as to be a sel-
eident characteristic trait, once struck man as strange and caused him to think
and wonder. I ponder on the nature o this thinking and wondering and
wonder how the early Greeks experienced it. Is it any longer possible to expe-
rience this thoughtul wonder I think o children`s play and how, in play, they
become totally absorbed. Is the wonderment o a child`s irst encounter with
something akin to this wonder \hat o our own engagement with new
things and experiences Don`t we experience wonder at the ery nature o
things beore amiliarity takes oer 1he problem, as leidegger notes, is that
once amiliarity sets in, we tend to reduce the thing to its identiiable character-
istics and no longer see the thing-in-itsel. 1his city is noisy, technology has its
own unyielding logic, a particular person is stubborn and a painting is just a
painting. Once reduced in this way, these core characteristics colour the way
things appear beore us. As I argued in Chapter One, this representationalist
thought preents us rom being open to that which lies beore.
So how can we stop amiliarity taking oer low do we return to the
unamiliar source rom which it arose leidegger presents us with a second
way o thinking about the thingness o things. I we are open to the maniold
sensations that are presented to us, then perhaps we will experience the thing`s
thingness. 1he eent o the techno-dance party could be cited as an example o
where the throng o sensation oerwhelms the senses. lere sensation oer-
whelms representational thought as the boundaries o I`, as .vbiectvv, col-
lapse into the collectie techno-experience. In the combination o the beat o
bodies, heat, music, ibration, lights and drugs, the techno experience creates
an intensiication that is obliious to wisdom or to the limits o the organism:
1he lights transorm eerything into lie and moement and blend the
dierent colours into a magic coerall.. Lery-one seems to deelop
a sense o urgent rhythm. ,Piri 1homas quoted in Deleuze 1986:51,
1his collapse into sensation may not operate according to the paradigm o
representationalism. loweer, leidegger is asking us a dierent question:
Does it allow us to experience the thingness o the thing
lere, leidegger returns us again to the Greek notion o presencing. I we
allow ourseles to experience the undistorted presencing o things, then maybe
the thingness o things will be reealed. I we are open to things then perhaps
they will moe us bodily. In this presencing, leidegger contends:
9
1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
1he situation always preails. In what the senses o sight, hearing, and
touch coney, in the sensations o colour, sound, roughness, hard-
ness, things moe us bodily, in the literal meaning o the word. 1he
thing is the ai.tbtov, that which is perceptible by sensations in the
sense belonging to sensibility.. 1he concept later becomes a com-
monplace. ,leidegger 19b:151,
But can we eer really be open to this prousion o unmediated sensations
No experience can eer be unmediated, not een or a newly born child. low-
eer, rbat if an unmediated presencing were possible Imagine that or a
moment. low would it present itsel low would it be experienced \hat
would it be like to be literally hit by a total prousion o sensations at any one
moment-the colours, sounds, noises, smells, ibrations, moements, tex-
tures and temperatures-without dierentiation \ould we be catapulted
into an untenable chaos
Just as a new and unamiliar experience can proide a source o wonder, so
it can also proide a sense o what it is to be oerwhelmed by sensations. I I
go to a techno-dance party or a rae what do I perceie Am I so close in
sensation` that I can perceie the partiness` o party or the danceness` o
the dance leidegger thinks not. le says that, we neer really irst perceie a
throng o sensations` in the appearance o things. le continues: Much closer
to us than all sensations are the things themseles` ,leidegger 19b:151-
152,. 1hus he would argue that I experience the noisiness and lieliness` o
the dance rather than, or example, hearing the bare acoustical sounds. In order
to hear a bare sound, he aers, we hae to listen away rom things, diert our
ear rom them, i.e., listen abstractly` ,leidegger 19b:152,.
\e hae encountered this particular dynamic beore in leidegger`s tool
analysis. Just as readiness-to-hand is really only made isible when there is a
breakdown and a tool becomes unready-to-hand, so nothing is bought to
light in the throng o sensations. So leidegger would argue that just as the
relationship between language and the thing reuses to reeal the thingness`
o things, so the sensation o things also can not reeal it.
laing dispensed with two possible, but ultimately unsatisactory ways o
thinking through the thingness o a thing, leidegger proceeds to present us
with a third possibility. 1his possibility, suggests leidegger, lies in the synthe-
sis o matter and orm. \hat is constant in the orm-matter synthesis, says
leidegger, is the act that matter stands together with a orm. 1he thing is
ormed matter` ,leidegger 19b:152,. Clie Bell`s notion o signiicant orm
98
exempliies this way o thinking about the thingness o the thing as it pertains
to a work o art. lor Bell, all works o art possess the quality o signiicant orm.
Signiicant orm has nothing to do with the content o the work, but rather is
eected by an aesthetically moing synthesis o lines and colours in a work.
Certain strands o aesthetics and art theory, particularly those inluenced by
Kant-or example, the work o Schiller-tell us that art is ormed matter.
leidegger notes that where art is conceied o as ormed matter, matter be-
comes the substrate and ield or the artist`s ormatie action` ,leidegger
19b:152,. According to this conception, artists could be said to shed light on
the matter. In this iew, as I will argue in the next Chapter, orm is correlated with
the rational, with light and knowledge, and matter with the irrational, with the
dark and the unknown. 1he danger in this conception, says leidegger, is as
ollows:
I orm is correlated with the rational and matter with the irrational, i
the rational is taken to be the logical and the irrational the alogical, i in
addition the subject-object relation is coupled with the conceptual pair
orm-matter, then representation has at its command a conceptual ma-
chinery that nothing is capable o withstanding. ,leidegger 19b:153,
In Chapter One, we came to understand the dangers o representationalism,
through our analysis o leidegger`s essay 1he Age o the \orld Picture`. lere,
leidegger re-iterates this danger by showing how the orm-matter synthesis
upholds representationalism. In Chapter 1wo, I hae shown that leidegger
undamentally disagrees with the proposition that matter is the substrate or the
artist`s actions. Rather, in 1he Question Concerning 1echnology`, leidegger
presents the position that matter, together with aspect, circumscribing bounds
and the artist are co-responsible or bringing art into appearance. 1hrough these
earlier discussions we hae come to understand that leidegger is deeply critical
o the orm-matter synthesis, and has shown that it does not proide us a way
to think about Art`s emergence. Matter becomes standing resere, which is then
taken and used by the artist as a means to an end. Accordingly clay is used to make
a bowl whilst ilm stock is used to create a ilm. In a realist or illusionistic
painting, paint is used in-order-to create an illusion. In this use paint disappears
into useulness. 1he orm-matter synthesis traps us in an enraming mode o
knowing.
\hilst he is critical o the orm-matter way o thinking, leidegger neerthe-
less recognises that it is not so easily dismissed. A painting or a thrown jug is
a ormed thing. 1he orm-matter constellation seems to make commonsense.
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1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
1o work through this puzzle, he distinguishes between mere` things and
ormed` things. lere we can return to the example o the block o granite
and contrast it with the shape o a jug. \hereas, in a block o granite, the orm
is a consequence o the prior distribution o matter, this is not the case with
the jug. 1he jugness o the jug, he suggests, prescribes the kind and selection
o matter. Because a jug is required to contain liquids, it must be impermeable.
lere we witness a reerence to the notion o circumscribing bounds, as deel-
oped in the 1he Question Concerning 1echnology`. loweer, in the Origin
o the \ork o Art`, he has yet to deelop his understanding o indebtedness
and co-responsibility and instead elaborates the idea o circumscribing bounds
as useulness.
1he Bauhaus dictum orm ollows unction` exempliies a situation where
circumscribing bounds is seen to determine the orm o an object or design.
lere, in the oundations o contemporary design, we see that the interusion
between orm and matter is determined by its purpose. leidegger notes that
where purpose determines orm:
Both the ormatie act and the choice o material-a choice gien with
the act-and therewith the dominance and the conjunction o matter
and orm, are all grounded in such useulness. A being that alls under
useulness is always the product o the process o making. It is made
as a piece o equipment or something. ,leidegger 19b:154,
Again we hear echoes o leidegger`s tool analysis. loweer, in this analysis,
leidegger is much more critical. \e are reminded o the instrumental inter-
pretation o technology. In this case, matter and orm are not the original
determinants o the ormed thing, equipmentality is. 1he ormed thing is
made as a piece o equipment or something.
I would like to return to the case o acuum cleaners. Lquipment and
artwork may be seen to hae ainities in that they are both produced by or in
conjunction with the human hand. 1hey could be conceied o as a orm-
matter structure. In this sense, my looer acuum cleaner and Je Koon`s
èr cbetov !et,Dry 1ripeDecer may be seen to be similar. loweer,
leidegger argues that the artwork does not hae useulness as its key determi-
nant. \hereas the use-object becomes aailable to be used by hands, the
artwork is not. 1hus, in contrast to my acuum cleaner, Je Koons`s èr
cbetov !et,Dry 1ripeDecer is not aailable to acuum the loors. It is not
made because o its useulness. Similarly, Duchamp`s ovvtaiv is no longer
useul as a urinal. In both cases they become totally useless. In leidegger`s
100
thinking, an artwork is sel-suicient.
8
In this sense, it is closer to a mere`
thing than it is to the use-object.
lere, or leidegger, the work o art sits precariously between being equip-
ment and being a mere thing. \hat can this tell us about the thing-being o
the thing Can the Being o equipment, the orm-matter structure, by which
leidegger claims the being o a piece o equipment is determined, proide
leidegger with a way o comprehending the thing-being o a thing Because
Art has become a sel-eident truth`, leidegger says it can not and claims
that this is because Art has become a sel eident truth. le questions whether
the thingly character o a thing can come into iew at all in the process o
stripping o eerything equipmental. Ultimately the orm-matter structure o
equipmentality goes no closer to the thing-being o the thing. In act, accord-
ing to leidegger, it assaults the thing ,leidegger 19b:156,.
linally, we can summarise leidegger`s objections to the three customary
ways o thinking the thingness o the thing. Like the interpretation o the
thing as a bearer o traits or a maniold o sensations, the orm-matter inter-
pretation results in the thingness o things getting lost in pre-conceptions
about things. leidegger suggests that these modes o thought, in isolation
or in combination, hae come to operate as totalising categories into which all
experience is incorporated. Such modes o thinking categorise all experience,
including our experience o things, equipment and work. Our experience is
pre-conceied through the preailing thing-concept. And so or leidegger:
Preconception shackles relection on the Being o any gien beings.
1hus it comes about that preailing thing-concepts obstruct the way
toward the thingly character o the thing as well as toward the
equipmental character o equipment, and all the more toward the workly
character o the work. ,leidegger 19b:156-,
leidegger demonstrates that the three customary ways o thinking the thingly
quality o the work, hinder any eort to understand the origin o the work o
art. 1hrough this critique, he argues that the essence o art can no more be
deried rom higher concepts than it can by identiying the characteristics o
actual artworks. It is, he says, sel-deception to select characteristics rom among
gien objects or derie concepts rom principles ,leidegger 19b:144,.
lence, leidegger obseres, it comes about that preailing thing-concepts
obstruct the way toward the thingly character o the thing` ,leidegger
19b:156,. Representationalist thinking obstructs the way towards the
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1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
thingliness o things, the equipmental character o equipment and the workly
character o work. Under the grip o representational thinking, our preconcep-
tions o things conceal the thingness o things and inhibit relection on the
Being o beings. Ultimately, leidegger concedes, the most diicult task ,at
least or modernity, is to let a thing be as it is, let it rest upon itsel in its ery
own essence.
A Work of Art Speaks
\here hae we come in thinking the essence o the work o art Not ar it
would seem. Despite all the tenaciousness that leidegger allows us to muster,
it seems stubbornly to resist ormulation. loweer, in his elaboration o
equipmentality, leidegger has a hunch. Since equipment takes an intermediate
place between mere things and work, he suspects that non-equipmental be-
ings-things and works and ultimately all beings-are to be comprehended
with the help o the Being o equipment ,the orm-matter structure,`
,leidegger 19b:155,. le again asks the question: \hat is the equipmental
quality o equipment le asks us to consider this without alling into the trap
o preconception.
\e hae been asked this question beore, albeit in relation to tools. In that
context, we were told that tools were not merely things. 1he equipmental
being o tools or equipment, is to be ound in handlability, not in the contem-
plation o the thing just lying there. Leinas recognised the signiicance o
leidegger`s ormulation. 1hrough the handling o the tool, Leinas airmed,
we gain access to it in a itting and entirely new way` ,Leinas 1996:19,. 1his
access to the tool does not ollow upon representation.
\hat happens when a use-object is a.o the content o the work o art, such
as in Koons`s èr cbetov !et,ary 1ripe Decer, or Van Gogh`s painting .
Pair of boe. ,1886, \e no longer handle them in the same way as the acuum
cleaner or a pair o shoes.
9
In addressing this, leidegger takes Van Gogh`s
painting o peasant shoes and presents us with a description o shoes, as
realised in the work o art:
But what is there to see here Leryone knows what shoes consist o.
I they are not wooden or bast shoes, there will be leather soles and
uppers, joined together by thread and nails. Such gear seres to clothe
the eet. Depending on the use to which the shoes are to be put,
whether or work in the ield or or dancing, matter and orm will
dier. ,leidegger 19b:158,
10
102
leidegger`s obseration that orm and matter will depend on whether the
shoes are or working in the ield or or dancing, seems a sensible conclusion to
come to. ligh heel suede shoes will be o no use or chasing sheep in a muddy
paddock, just as heay Rossi work boots will not be useul on the dance loor
doing the tango ,although they may be ery appropriate or line dancing,. 1he
equipmental quality o equipment rests in its useulness. But leidegger does
not rest here. \hat is useulness itsel low do we get at its useulness
Reerring to the example o the peasant woman standing and walking in
shoes in the ield, he argues that it is in the process o using equipment that we
actually encounter the character o equipment. In other words, we will neer
discoer the equipmental being o equipment unless we use it.
According to this line o reasoning, simply looking at Van Gogh`s shoes
won`t get us any closer to understanding the truth o their equipmentality. Or
will it leidegger expounds his iew in the ollowing way:
lrom the dark opening o the worn insides o the shoes the toilsome
tread o the worker stares orth. In the stily rugged heainess o the
shoes there is the accumulated tenacity o her slow trudge through the
ar-spreading and eer-uniorm urrows o the ield swept by raw
wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness o the soil. Under
the soles stretches the loneliness o the ield-path as eening alls. In
the shoes ibrates the silent call o the earth, its quiet git o the ripen-
ing grain and its unexplained sel-reusal in the allow desolation o
the wintry ield. 1his equipment is peraded by uncomplaining worry
as to the certainty o bread, the wordless joy o haing once more
withstood want, the trembling beore the impending childbed and
shiering at the surrounding menace o death. 1his equipment be-
longs to the eartb, and it is protected in the rora o the peasant woman.
lrom out o this protected belonging the equipment itsel rises to its
resting-within-itsel. ,leidegger 19b:159-160,
leidegger`s description o the lie o the peasant woman is disquieting. le
romanticises her lie, suggesting that she eels a healthy atigue` and wordless
joy at haing once more withstood want`. \hat, I wonder, would she make
o this summation o her experience
leidegger`s projection is strongly criticised by Derrida in his chapter Resti-
tutions` in 1be 1rvtb iv Paivtivg ,198,. Derrida is rankly disappointed that, in
the midst o 1he Origin o the \ork o Art`, leidegger`s academic high
seriousness degenerates into illustration:
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1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
One is not only disappointed by the consumerlike hurry towards the
content o a representation, by the heainess o the pathos, by the
coded triiality o this description, which is both oerloaded and im-
poerished, and one neer knows i its busying itsel around a picture,
real` shoes, or shoes that are imaginary but outside painting, not only
disappointed by the crudeness o the raming, the arbitrary and bar-
baric nature o the cutting out, the massie sel assurance o the iden-
tiication: a pair o peasants` shoes,` just like that! \here did he get
that rom \here does he explain himsel on this matter. One
ollows step by step the moes o a great thinker,` as he returns to
the origin o the work o art and o truth, traersing the whole history
o the \est and then suddenly at the bend in a corridor, here we are on
a guided tour, as schoolchildren or tourists. ,Derrida 198:292-293,
\orse than his representationalism, is leidegger`s use o the peasant woman
as a piece o equipment to illustrate a philosophical claim.
11
It is quite diicult
to set aside leidegger`s projection ,a preconception no less, to get at what he
is really trying to say about the work o art. \hat protected belonging is he
talking about \hat causes the equipment to rise to its resting-within-itsel
1he protected belonging turns out to be the experience o being placed in
ront o Van Gogh`s painting o a pair o peasant shoes. As leidegger puts
it, the painting spoke. It let us know the truth ,atbeia, o the shoes. In the
context o our contemporary understandings o the image, this is an extraor-
dinary claim. low can the work o art speak Isn`t leidegger oering us his
own reading` o this work and aren`t these meanings culturally constituted
Doesn`t reception theory tell us that when we interpret a work, we interpret it
rom our own cultural and subjectie perspectie leidegger`s romanticisation
o the peasant woman`s healthy atigue demonstrates precisely this point.
low then, can we take seriously leidegger`s claim that it would be the worst
sel-deception to think that our description, as a subjectie action, had irst
depicted eerything thus and then projected it onto the painting` ,leidegger
19b:161, low can the painting speak \hat nonsense is this
\hen aced with the work o art, it is true to say that the interpretation is
coloured by cultural background and experience. In our struggle to under-
stand the work o art, we resort to our preconceied ways o understanding it.
\e look at the work as a puzzle and try to ind clues to make sense o it. \e
identiy its core characteristics, sense the maniold sensations operating within
a work and,or we try to take apart its orm-structure. loweer, in the haste to
104
make ,social, meaning, perhaps we miss something. \hilst it may be argued
that interpretation opens up a work and enables us to gain a deeper apprehen-
sion o what orces are operating in the work ,ormal and semiotic or example,,
at another leel it closes o possibility.
12
It orecloses the possibility o coming
close to the thing-in-itsel. 1hough leidegger does not preclude experiencing a
work o art at the leel o thing-concept, he oers us a caution against the
particular blindness that this can produce. And so or leidegger:
It is necessary to know about these thing-concepts, in order thereby to
take heed o their proenance and their boundless presumption, but
also o their semblance o sel-eidence. 1his knowledge becomes all the
more necessary when we risk the attempt to bring to iew and express in
words the thing character o a thing.. 1o this end, howeer, only one
element is needul: to keep at a distance all the preconceptions . to leae
the thing to rest in its own sel, or instance in its thing-being. ,leidegger
19b:15,
In other words, to allow the work o art to come near, one must keep preconcep-
tions at a distance. leidegger wants us to be open to the particular possibility
that the image can be thought and experienced in quite a dierent way, as open-
ness. I we are open, then we may ind ourseles in a position where the artwork
speaks to us, rather than remaining in a place where we are always calling the tune,
always being masterul. Derrida also implores us to listen to the painting. I we
listen to the painting he says, citing Artaud, it would strip` us . o the
obsession` o making objects be other`` ,Derrida 198:381,. \hen the art-
work speaks, it cuts through the thing-concept and allows us to come near the
thing character o the thing. 1he being o the painting comes orth and speaks.
Creation and the Activity of the Artist
I the work o art has the capacity to speak, what role does the artist play in the
process o creation \hilst the workly character o the work is characterised by it
haing been created by an artist, leidegger does not beliee that creation is the act
o the genius artist. leidegger thinks that modern subjectiism has misinter-
preted creation, taking it as the soereign subject`s perormance o genius`
,leidegger 19b:200,. 1o create he insists, is to let something emerge as a thing
that has been brought orth. 1he work`s becoming a work is a way in which truth
becomes and happens` ,leidegger 19b:185,.
In order to address the question o the creatie work o the artist, leidegger
asks what dierentiates creation rom other orms o handicrat. 1hey are, ater
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1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
all, both orms o bringing orth. lere leidegger distinguishes between bring-
ing orth as creation and bringing orth as a mode o making. At irst appear-
ance it may seem that the potter and the sculptor and the joiner and the painter
engage in the same procedure. 1heir work inoles cratsmanship. loweer,
as we hae already seen, just as the essence o technology is not technological,
so the essence o art is not to be related to the skill and cratsmanship o the
artist. \e remember that the Greeks used tecbv or both the actiity o crat
and art. 1hey named both the cratsman and the artist as tecbvite.. loweer, in
this deinition, the Greeks were neer reerring to cratsmanship. 1ecbv was a
mode o knowing that was an unconcealing. leidegger is emphatic: tecbv
neer signiies the action o making` ,leidegger 19b:184,.
13
I the act o creation inoles letting something emerge as a thing rather
than making a thing, what role does the artist play in createdness leidegger
addresses this question obliquely. In great art, he argues, the artist remains
inconsequential as compared to the work, almost like a passageway that de-
stroys itsel in the creatie process or the work to emerge` ,leidegger
19b:166,. \hat does leidegger mean by this \hat is the experience o
being like a passageway that destroys itsel in the creatie process leidegger
does not elaborate. \et this is the crux o my questioning.
According to the orm-matter structure discussed earlier, an artwork comes
into being through the artist`s ormatie action. 1he artist`s identity as creator
is conirmed in this action. \et in arguing that the artist is like a passageway that
destroys itsel in the creatie process, leidegger reerses the stakes. Art is
gien priority. 1he artist as passageway acts as the conduit through which art
emerges. And in the creatie process this passageway destroys itsel.
\hat does leidegger mean by this 1here are too many great artists who
hae enjoyed long and ruitul careers to gie this proposition credibility. \hilst
leidegger likens the artist to a passageway, he does not say that the artist
destroys her,himsel. It is the artist as passageway that destroys itsel. \hat
then, is the passageway lis trenchant criticism o representationalism and a
corresponding critique o man as .vbiectvv, as one who sets the world beore
him as an object or a subject, proides us with a clue. In the creatie act, the
passage may occur when the artist no longer sets the world beore her,him as
an object Rather, in process, the artist allows a total openness to the Being o
art, the essence o art
lere I would like to establish a link between this assertion, and the reigured
conceptualisation o the role o the artist as set out in Chapter 1wo. \e recall
106
that according to such a re-conceptualisation, the artist no longer masters and
is no longer the cause o art. \orking with notions o indebtedness and co-
responsibility, the artist is conceied o as one contributing element participat-
ing in conjunctions with other contributing elements in enabling Art to come
orth. Such a role requires the artist to be open to the call o Art.
leidegger`s repeated reerence to bypoeivevov, the Greek experience o
being open to what-is, supports such an assertion. lor the Greeks, as we saw
in Chapter One, reality loomed up beore man and conronted him in the
power o its presence. In order to ulil his essence, leidegger noted that the
Greek man must gather ,egeiv, and sae ,.eiv,, catch up and presere, what
opens itsel in its openness, and he must remain exposed ,atbeveiv, to all its
sundering conusion` ,leidegger 19a:131,. And so we pondered as
Prometheus was tied to the rock, Pentheus dismembered by the Bacchae and
Acteon changed into a stag only to be torn to bits by his own pack o hounds
,Olkowski 1988:9,.
\hilst we must in no way collapse Greek man` and the artist`, I surmise
that or each the task is similar. Both are concerned with openness to Being.
1hus in order to ulil her,his essence, it could be argued that the artist must
remain exposed ,atbeveiv, to all o art`s sundering conusion. 1he artist must
be open to the Being o art.
leidegger most clearly dierentiates between the knowing o a .vbiectvv
and the knowing that inoles openness, in his discussion o preseration.
Just as a work is in need o creators, so he argues it is also in need o preser-
ers. Preseration means or leidegger, standing within the openness o be-
ings that happens in the work` ,leidegger 19b:192,. lor leidegger, the
standing-within o preseration is a orm o knowing that is distinct rom the
knowing o a .vbiectvv who sets the world beore him as an object or a
subject. leidegger says:
Knowing does not consist in mere inormation and notions about
something. le who truly knows beings knows what he wills to do in
the midst o them. ,leidegger 19b:192,
In this statement, leidegger dierentiates between willing as a preconceied
thinking ,Nietzsche`s will to power`,, and willing as the possibility o an
ecstatic entry o the human being into the unconcealment o Being. It is not a
question o imposing one`s will, but o being willing to be open. 1his willing,
or what leidegger calls resoluteness:
10
1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
Is not the deliberate action o a subject but the opening up o human
being, out o its captiity in beings, to the openness o Being..
Neither in the creation mentioned beore nor in the willing mentioned
now do we think o the perormance or act o a subject striing to-
wards himsel as his sel-posited goal.... Presering the work, as know-
ing, is a sober standing-within the awesomeness o truth that is hap-
pening in the work. ,leidegger 19b:192,
1he ecstasy that accompanies the entry into the awesomeness o truth that
happens in the work, proides a way back to leidegger`s statement that the
artist remains inconsequential as compared to the work, almost like a passage-
way that destroys itsel in the creatie process or the work to emerge` ,leidegger
19b:166,. In the ecstasy o the nearness o the work, it could be argued that
we are catapulted into a space that is somewhere else than we usually tend to
be. In being taken out o the space o representationalism, we are beside
ourseles. lere we can return to Chapter One and Deleuze`s assertion that
creatiity inoles becoming deterritorialized` and taking a line o light.
It would be easy to read leidegger`s distinction between creators and pre-
serers, as artists` and iewers`, but I don`t beliee that is what leidegger
intends. 1here is no reason at all why beings should be diided into makers o
art and iewers. Viewers are as much creators as artists are preserers. \hat is
essential is this willingness to openness. 1hrough openness, preseration sets
the work` o art in train. loweer, in remaining open to the conusion o
possibility, there is also the danger o dissolution altogether. Deleuze and
Guattari warn o this danger when they caution that, too wild a destratiication
will cause us to be dragged towards catastrophe` ,Deleuze and Guattari
198:161,.
lor leidegger, the preserers o the work, those who come to experience
and apprehend the work o the work, belong as much to the createdness as the
creators. In createdness, the work asserts that it i.. leidegger`s insistence that
this enables us to be transported out o the realms o the ordinary into an
open region raises certain diiculties or mere` mortals.
1o be transported out o the realm o the ordinary, we must suspend our
usual way o looking and thinking about the world. But how can we achiee
this Surely our preconceptions about what art is, mediate eery experience o
art I we come to the work blinded by our intentions and preconceptions or
armed with existing models o interpretation we won`t eer be able to moe
beyond the ontic into the openness o Being. \here eerything that i., is
108
standing resere and at man`s disposal as a means to an end, it is ery hard or
humans to let it be. lor as leidegger says as soon as the thrust into the
awesome is parried and captured by the spheres o amiliarity and
connoisseurship . art business has begun` ,leidegger 19b:193,. Once the
art business has been set in motion, we do not let the work be a work, but
rather iew it as an object, or worse still, as standing resere.
low can the, tbat it i. o createdness oercome the ilter o representationalist
thinking leidegger conirms that it is the most diicult o tasks to keep our
preconceptions at a distance: diicult, perhaps, but not impossible. In order to
stay with the truth that is happening in the work, we must restrain ourseles.
\e must just let it be. \e are reminded that preseration requires great re-
straint. In order to let the work be work, we must presere it. Preseration
opens up the human being to the openness o Being. It enables us to step
outside o the noise o eeryday existence and relect on what it is to be.
1he Origin of the Work of Art
I the preserer and the creator belong to the createdness o the work, are
they the origin o the work o art Does the origin o the work o art lie in the
eyes o the beholder as much as it lies in the actions o the artist leidegger
says not. Art is the origin o the work and, as the origin o the work, it lets the
creator and the preserer originate, each in their essence. And so leidegger
asks, \hat is art itsel that we call it rightly an origin` ,leidegger 19b:196,.
1he assertion that art is the origin o the work o art may seem preposter-
ous. It has been argued that art is a social construct, a consequence o social
production, not ice ersa. leidegger would not disagree in as much as art
business is a social production. loweer, leidegger is neither concerned with
art business, nor with the art object. le is concerned with the essence o art
and or him this lies in the ror o the work o art. 1he work o the work is the
setting-into-work o truth.. Art then is a becoming and happening o
truth` ,leidegger 19b:196,. 1hanks to art, the creator and preserer open up
into the open region, each in their own essence.
In the setting-into-work o truth, we are catapulted out o the ordinariness
o our day-to-day existence and into the actuality o the work o art. Duchamp
achieed this in 191, when he signed R. Mutt on a urinal, titled it ovvtaiv and
exhibited it. leidegger igures that such eents jolt us out o our eeryday
habits and habitual ways o knowing and project us towards the possibility o
Being. 1his orceul expulsion rom our tenacious habits, or projection, is the
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1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
release o a throw by which unconcealment inuses itsel into beings as such`
,leidegger 19b:198,. It is an eent that brings about undamental change.
It moes us out o the world with which we are amiliar and into a dierent
opening. \e become aced with the thing-being o the thing.
A critical question persists. low can we remain open to the thing-being,
rather than being taken oer by the thing-concept \hilst Duchamp`s ovvtaiv
created openness to the thing-being o the work, by rupturing preconceptions
about the work o art, this does not necessarily hold or subsequent works
that are similarly created.
14
Such works risk being quickly subsumed under the
thing-concept, the readymade`. It is ery diicult to escape the mode o
thought that positions something representationally ,in the leideggerian
sense,, as a ready made, an abstract painting, a sculpture or a conceptual work
o art.
15
In an encounter with Joseph Kosuth`s Ove ava 1bree Cbair. ,1965,,
or example, how does one set aside the thought that it is conceptual art ,the
thing-concept, and instead be open to the work`s thing-being Is it possible,
as leidegger would argue, to let it rest upon itsel in its ery own essence`
,leidegger 19b:15, 1his as we hae seen, is an extremely diicult task
requiring resoluteness.
In a lecture entitled low is it 1here An Open Letter to Marisa` ,2000,,
John Berger attends to this question o openness. 1hrough this lecture, he
inquires into the secrets that painting holds about lie. le turns to the work o
painter Giogio Morandi ,amongst others,, to deelop his theme. Morandi
painted still lie paintings. le was, as Berger claims, the most austere still lie
painter o all time. During his long lie, he repeatedly painted the same dozen
or so objects: his bottles, whose glass he painted white or red beore painting
them on canas, his coee pot, his two jugs, his carae, his dried lowers, his
sea-shells` ,Berger 2000:19,. At the leel o the thing-concept, it could be
claimed that Morandi is a still lie painter. loweer, as Berger demonstrates,
the work` o ,Morandi`s, art is not concerned with the thing-concept. \hat
emerges in the work is a struggle to come to the thing-being, rather than the
thing-concept.
In attempting to draw out the stakes inoled in this struggle, Berger
delineates three distinct phases or periods in the work o ,Morandi`s, art.
During the irst period, rom the 1920s to the 1940s, he argues that Morandi
painted in order to approach the objects being painted. le gets closer and
closer` ,Berger 2000:19,. In this closeness, or what leidegger has termed near-
ness`, there is no attempt to achiee photographic precision, rather Morandi is
concerned with eeling the presence o the object. As Berger obseres, it is a
110
question o the presence o the object, almost its body temperature being elt
,Berger 2000:19,.
In the second period, between 1940 and 1950, Berger argues that Morandi is
no longer the one who is moing. le senses that it is the objects that were
approaching the canas. le waited and they arried` ,Berger 2000:19,. I am
reminded again o leidegger`s description o the Greek world, where man is
the one who is looked upon by what-is. In this world where man is looked
upon by that which-is, reality looms up beore man and conronts him in the
power o its presence` ,leidegger 19a:131,.
linally, rom 1951 until his death in 1964, the objects in Morandi`s paintings
seemed to be on the erge o disappearance. It was not that they are aint, Berger
notes, but rather they are weightless, in lux, on the rontier o existence` ,Berger
2000:19,. Berger`s quest to understand these paintings, leads him to postulate
that, what is o concern to Morandi is the process o the isible irst becoming
isible, beore the object seen has been gien a name or acquired a alue` ,Berger
2000:19,. 1his, to my understanding, relates to what leidegger means when he
talks o the struggle to escape the shackles o preconception. In this way, Morandi`s
quest resonates with leidegger`s struggle to explain the truth ,atbeia, o Art.
\hilst Berger is more concerned with aect, his relections on Morandi`s
paintings hae some correspondences with leidegger`s elaboration o Van
Gogh`s painting o the peasant shoes. Just as Van Gogh`s painting is concerned
with the disclosure o what the pair o peasant shoes i. in truth, so Morandi`s
painting reeals how the becoming isible o isibility i.. In order to enable his
reader to understand Morandi`s project o appearances, Berger asks us to:
Imagine the world as a sheet o paper and a creator`s hand drawing,
trying out objects which don`t yet exist. 1races are not only what is let
when something has gone, they can also be marks or a project, o
something to come. 1he isible begins with light. And as soon as there
is light there is shade. All drawing is a shadow around light.
le continues:
1he marks weae together, quier, alternate. And slowly the eye registers
and reads the space which the coee pot and the jug are going to occupy.
In other words, the object Morandi paints can be bought in no lea
market. 1hey are not objects. 1hey are places, places where some little
thing is about to come into being. ,Berger 2000:19,
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1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
In taking us on this journey, Berger hopes that we can remain open and allow the
work to emerge out o the quiering matrix o painterly marks. 1he term still
lie` becomes a misnomer when Morandi`s paintings are experienced this way.
1he Work-being of the Work
Berger`s elucidation o Morandi`s paintings returns us to leidegger`s
conceptualisation o the work o the work o art. \hat is the work o ,Morandi`s,
art 1he place or places created in these paintings proide the context or Art, as
some little thing to come about, to come into being. In the work or art, it is
possible that the truth o Being sets itsel to work. In act, or leidegger, herein
lies the essence o art:
1he artwork opens up in its own way the Being o beings. 1his opening
up, i.e., this reealing, i.e., the truth o beings, happens in the work. In
the artwork, the truth o beings has set itsel to work. Art is truth setting
itsel to work. ,leidegger 19b:165,
lere we see the critical distinction between the work o art ,as a erb, and the
artwork ,noun,.
In extrapolating the distinction between the artwork and the work o art,
leidegger identiies the object-being o works ,the artwork, and contrasts it
with their work-being ,the work o art,. \e are surrounded by artworks. 1hey
hang in galleries, on the walls o corporate businesses and in priate and public
collections. Art historians, theorists and critics talk about them while art dealers
deal in them. In the meantime, large numbers o people emerge rom art schools,
identiy themseles as artists and lay claim to the work o art.
16
In all this
prolieration o actiity, leidegger suspects that we constantly encounter the
object-being o work. loweer do we come any closer to the work o art, that is,
to the work-being o the work o art and thence to Art as such In order to come
closer to the work-being o the work, leidegger suggests that it would be
necessary to allow it to stand alone. 1o enable the work-being o work to stand
alone, he suggests that the work must be remoed rom all relations to some-
thing other than itsel.
1he modernist art gallery, the so-called white cube`, was ostensibly designed
with the intention o allowing an artwork to stand alone. In accordance with
laws as rigorous as those or building a medieal church`, notes Michael O`Doherty,
the modernist gallery proides a place or relectie contemplation:
112
1he outside world must not come in, so windows are usually sealed o.
\alls are painted white. 1he ceiling becomes the source o light. 1he
wooden loor is polished so that you click along clinically, or carpeted so
that you pad soundlessly, resting the eet while the eyes hae at the wall.
1he art is ree, as the saying used to go, to take on its own lie`.
,O`Doherty 1986:15,
loweer, rather than enabling art to come to presence as Art, the white cube is
replete with its own preconceptions which rame the work as art`. As O`Doherty
notes, it completes the transposition rom lie to ormal alues. In other words,
it sets up art business.
So how do we gain access to the work-being o the work i, as leidegger has
argued, the gallery obstructs access to the work-being o the work 1o elucidate
this dilemma, leidegger contrasts the setting up o an exhibition in a gallery
with the setting up o a Greek temple. Len though a gallery may be built
according to laws as rigorous as those or building a medieal church and may
aspire to being a cathedral or the worship o art, it is ultimately concerned with
the isible, with the object-being o artwork, not with its work-being. In con-
trast, he claims that the setting up` o a temple proides the conditions or the
gods` coming to presence. In the splendour o the dedication and praise o the
temple, god comes to presence.
1
In this splendour ,or ecstasy,, the holy is
opened up as holy and the god is inoked into the openness o his presence`
,leidegger 19b:169,. 1his opens a space where, as Daid Lein suggests,
extra-ordinary moments o local isionary unconcealment illuminate the
presencing o beings a. a rboe` ,Lein 1993:213,.
\hen leidegger cites the example o the temple, he is not reerring to the
actual physical structure o the gallery or the temple, but rather to a space,place
that towers up within itsel. le claims the work, in its work-being, demands it.
1hus he notes that, in the dignity and splendour o the work o erecting,
consecrating and giing praise, the work opens up a rora and keeps it abidingly
in orce` ,leidegger 19b:169,. 1he work o the art opens onto possibility. In
unconcealment ,atbeia,, the artwork opens truth in its own way.
lor leidegger, the work-being o the work consists in setting up a world and
the setting orth o earth. \hat does leidegger mean by a world and what does
he mean by the setting orth o earth low does the setting up o a world and
the setting orth o earth exhibit in the work itsel leidegger has already pro-
ided a clue in talking about Van Gogh`s shoes. lere, he made the statement
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that the shoes are equipment. lurther, equipment belongs to the eartb, and it is
protected in the rora o the peasant woman. lrom out o this protected be-
longing the equipment itsel rises to its resting-within-itsel ` ,leidegger
19b:159-160,. low can we igure this
\e know rom leidegger`s tool analysis that the ready-to-handness o equip-
ment disappears in use. lence in the case o the peasant woman, leidegger
suggests that, by irtue o the reliability o the shoes, the peasant woman is
made priy to the silent call o the earth, by irtue o the reliability o the
equipment she is sure o her world` ,leidegger 19b:160,. \hilst I hae noted
my concern about leidegger`s claims to know how the peasant woman would
experience her world, this statement does reeal something important about his
understanding o equipmentality. In this particular scenario, there is eidence o
a double moement. 1he equipmentality o the shoes belongs to the earth, and
in use the earth disappears. But in its disappearance or concealment it enables an
unconcealment o the world.
18
lere we become aware o the centrality o process. 1he work as work sets up
a world. \hen leidegger talks o the work setting up a world, he makes it clear
that he is neither reerring to the world` as the tangible space o the physical
world, nor o our preconceptions o what the world is. \hen the rora rora., it
cannot be encompassed within the parameters o our representational rame. It
cannot be set beore us as an object or a subject. Rather it inoles an opening up
o the world in which the scope and limits o Being are experienced. Process is
perormatie. It opens onto possibility and brings it into being. leidegger
terms this opening to Being, spaciousness.
In worlding the world, the work as work creates a spacious opening. At this
abstract leel, the work opens up Being to the possibility o possibility. In the
next Chapter I will argue that this ecundity can be understood in terms o
perormatiity, but irstly I want to return to the work o art as it is reealed in
Morandi`s paintings. Morandi`s paintings proide spaciousness or the isible to
irst become isible, beore the object seen has been gien a name or acquired a
alue` ,Berger 2000:19,. 1hey hold open the open region o the world and
proide a dedicated place where some little thing is about to come into being. As
Berger concludes, Morandi`s work insinuates an ininity o becoming, o in-
completion` ,Berger 2000:19,.
I the work o ,Morandi`s, art creates a spaciousness in which the work sets
up a world, there also occurs the second complementary moement in which
the work sets orth earth. In setting up o a world and setting orth earth,
114
Morandi`s paintings can be compared with the peasant woman`s shoes as
encapsulated in Van Gogh`s painting o peasant shoes. But what dierentiates
the actual peasant shoes rom Van Gogh`s painting o the peasant shoes
lere, we are reminded that the peasant shoes, unlike the rock are more than
just a thing`. 1heir essence is inextricably tied to their untion. 1hey exist in-
order-to. In equipmentality, as we hae seen, what is ready-to hand disappears
in use. Matter is used up or rather it disappears into useulness. Matter disap-
pears in orm-matter. 1he leather in the peasant shoes disappeared in useul-
ness. As we hae seen, this in-order-to belongs to the realm o enramement.
In contrast, in the work o art, matter emerges or the ery irst time.
In his bid to demonstrate this, leidegger turns again to temple-work`.
1emple-work, is the work o setting up a world in such a way that allows the
work-being to emerge into the open region o the work`s world. In contrast
with equipmentality, the setting up, or setting orth, o the work-being o
work does not cause the material to disappear. It emerges into the clearing. In
this setting orth:
1he rock comes to bear and rest and so irst becomes rock, metals come
to glitter and shimmer, colours to glow, tones to sing, the word to say.
All this comes orth as the work sets itsel back into the massieness
and heainess o stone, into the irmness and pliancy o wood, into
the hardness and lustre o metal, into the brightening and darkening
o colour, into the clang o tone, and into the naming power o the
world. ,leidegger 19b:11,
In its work as work, temple-work sets matter orward into the openness or
the ery irst time and keeps it there. 1wo things are important here. lirst,
leidegger emphasises that the material emerges or the ery irst time. 1em-
ple-work, or the work o the work o art, is a constant renewal, neer a sheer
repetition. Secondly, in the setting orth o the material, the work sets itsel
back. 1his setting back o itsel, leidegger calls earth. In setting up a world,
the work sets orth the earth.. 1be ror et. tbe eartb be av eartb` ,leidegger
19b:12,.
In the unconcealment there is an opposing moement. In unconcealment,
there is also concealment. In the setting orth, colour may come to rest and
bear and so irst maniest its colouredness` in all its brilliance, howeer any
attempt to quantiy and qualiy this setting orth is doomed. Under rational
analysis, the colour withdraws. Measuring the waelengths o colour reeals
nothing about the colouredness o colour. In this elaboration, leidegger
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1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
reiterates his argument against techno-calculatie man and the obsession with
mastery o the earth. In leidegger`s estimation, eartb is a cunning trickster that
will dey any attempt to pin it down. Under the microscope o human curios-
ity, it slides away. In the setting orth, the work sets itsel back. It is sel-
secluding. In each sel-secluding, he claims, there is the same not-knowing-o-
one-another. \hilst the work o art unolds in an inexhaustible ariety o
modes and shapes, rational means will not bring it into the open region o the
world and keep it there.
1he unolding o work in the open region o the world is the realm o
perormatiity where the logic o practice, not rationality, operates. In this
realm a not-knowing-o-the other contrasts with representationalist knowing
o .vbiectvv. An object is no longer set beore a .vbiectvv. In this moement or
lux, the artist becomes like a passageway that allows or the emergence o Art.
As I will show in the ollowing Chapter, it is through process or perormatiity
that representation can escape the domain o representationalism.
1he Lquipmental-being of the Work of Art
\hilst the work-being o the work o art sets-to-work the truth o art, its
equipmental-being is identiied as its useulness or something. \e can see
this in contrasting the mason`s use o stone with a sculptor`s handling o
stone. In contrast with the mason who uses up stone, leidegger suggests
that the sculptor only uses up stone when the work miscarries ,leidegger
19b:13,. Similarly in using pigment, the painter does not use colour up,
but rather sets it orth and allows it to shine. In this distinction, leidegger
makes it clear that the equipmental-being is o a dierent order rom the work-
being o the work. \hilst the equipmental being o the work inoles use
alue`, the work-being o the work consists in the setting up o a rora and the
setting orth o eartb. In the unity o rora and eartb, the work-being o the
work comes to rest in itsel.
19
lor leidegger, truth` and useulness` appear to operate in dierent
registers and truth` is o a higher order than is useulness`. But this seem-
ingly easy distinction becomes more ambiguous i we consider the historical
existence o people as one instance o beings. leidegger insists that, in its
essence as an origin, art is a distinctie way in which truth comes into being,
that is, becomes historical` ,leidegger 19b:202,. \hat then, i the deining
character o contemporary art lay in its equipmental-being \hat i, in a mod-
ern technological era, the truth` that was set to work, was its equipmental-
being
116
In a technocratic epoch, it is so easy to conuse the work-being o the work
with its equipmental-being. In our eorts to design the world, the equipmental
aspect o the work is reealed and the work-being o the work stays under
coer. leidegger recognises this olly when he says that we hae unwittingly
taken the work as equipment to which we then also ascribe a superstructure
supposed to contain its artistic quality` ,leidegger 19b:164,. 1his miscon-
ception` comes to the ore in our current writing and theorising about art.
Contemporary artspeak` conirms this assessment.
In order to illustrate my claim, I wish to demonstrate the unwitting way in
which both art theory and art criticism, hae contributed to the enraming o
art, so that it is reealed in its equipmental-being. In demonstrating how
equipmentality underpins all the business o art, rom artistic creation, art
appreciation and enjoyment, I want to return to the question o how or
whether, in the midst o the equipmental-being o art, Art can emerge.
I hae already alluded to the contemporary tendency to conceie o art in
semiotic terms. In the current, but waning domination o art theory by semi-
otics, art has been theorised in terms o its sign-unction. Art becomes a sign.
A sign, says C.S. Peirce, is something which stands to somebody or some-
thing in some respect or capacity` ,Peirce 1932:135,. leidegger takes this dei-
nition o the sign and reeals how, when categorised as a sign, what-is be-
comes an item o equipment:
A sign is not a 1hing which stands to another 1hing in the relation-
ship o indicating, it is rather av itev of eqvipvevt rbicb epicity rai.e. a
totaity of eqvipvevt ivto ovr circvv.pectiov .o tbat togetber ritb it tbe roray
cbaracter of tbe reaaytobava avvovvce. it.ef. ,leidegger 1962:110,
According to such an assessment, a sign can be seen to unction equipmentally.
It has an in-order-to` quality. As a sign or communicating meaning, then, art
is also reealed in its equipmental-being. 1he problem is that, in thinking
about art in terms o use alue, the work o art gets used up. It disappears into
useulness.
I contemporary art is conceied in terms o its sign quality and i, as
leidegger argues, a sign is an item o equipment, what can we say about the
distinctie way in which truth comes into being, that is, becomes historical
low, in the contemporary context, can we reconcile the work-being o a work
with the equipmental character o contemporary art
11
1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
1he problem with semiotics, as with any such representational thinking is
that it pre-conceies all immediate experience o beings and being and ob-
structs the possibility or openness to Being. 1hus, or example, where an
artwork is igured as a sign, it is diicult or it to be conceied as anything other
than a sign. 1heorised only in terms o its sign unction, art is reduced to its
equipmental-being. 1his enraming mode o reealing threatens to oreclose
eery other mode o reealing. \e become to busy interpreting the many
codes that make up the work and the meanings that belong to these codes to
eer allow us to be open to the presence o the work, to allow the thing
character o the thing to come near. Semiotic understandings o the work o
art are not unique in reducing art to its equipmental-being. Interpretie schemes,
as we saw at the outset, hae the propensity to grasp, diide, classiy and re-
organise processes into usable data. 1hey are, in essence, reductie and
equipmental.
Art practice can also displays such a propensity. In illusionistic painting, as I
hae preiously noted, the medium is used in-order-to create an illusion ,orm-
matter,. Paint is used to up to make a picture. In this use, the matter o
paint` disappears into useulness. Bryson supports this assertion when he
argues that western representational painting used up paint, rather than allow-
ing paint to come into being as paint. In his thinking, paint was used as an
erasie medium to coer the tracks o the paint`s work:
\hat it must irst do is erase the surace o the picture-plane: isibility
o the surace would threaten the coherence o the undamental tech-
nique through which the \estern representational image classically
works the trace, o ground-to-igure relations: ground`, the absence
o igure is neer accorded parity, is always a .vbtractire term.. 1he
pigment must equally obey a second erasie imperatie, and coer its
own tracks . stroke conceals canas, as stroke conceals stroke.. 1he
indiidual history o the oil painting is thereore largely irretrieable,
or although the isible surace has been worked, and worked as a total
expanse, the iewer cannot ascertain the degree to which other suraces
lie concealed beneath the planar display: the image that suppresses
deixis has no interest in its own genesis or past, except to bury it in a
palimpsest o which only the inal ersion shows through. ,Bryson
1983: 92,
Bryson is reerring to the realist tradition that aimed to arrest moement and
ix an object or a subject. In this tradition, paint was useul in making an
illusion o reality. Paint as matter` disappeared into its equipmentality. In
118
this use o art to conceal art there is the intimation that the equipmental
character o illusionist painting conceals the work-being o the work o art.
1he ormalist critic, Clement Greenberg, also claimed that illusionistic art
dissembled the medium, using art to conceal art ,Greenberg 1992:55,. It was
his belie that art should call attention to art in order to bring out the essence
o art. As the oremost exponent o Modernist-or what has become known
as ormalist-painting, he championed those artists including Morris Louis,
Kenneth Noland and Jackson Pollock, whose abstract work ocussed on the
speciic qualities o paint. \hat was speciic to painting, he claimed, was the
latness o the surace, the shape o the support and the properties o the
pigment. lor Greenberg, each art orm had to be pared back to its pure` and
unique qualities. le claimed that:
1he task o sel-criticism became to eliminate rom the eects o each
art any and eery eect that might conceiably be borrowed rom or by
the medium o any other art. 1hereby each art would be rendered
pure`, and in its purity` ind the guarantee o its standards o
quality as well as its independence. Purity` meant sel-deinition, and
the enterprise o sel-criticism in the arts became one o sel-deinition
with a engeance. ,Greenberg 1992:55,
In this conception, narratie painting and illusionism were not proper to
painting and thereore reduced painting`s purity.
1he sel-deinition that Greenberg claims or Modernist painting resonates
with the sel-suicient emergence that leidegger claims or art. 1he question
remains: In its claim to purity, does Greenberg`s Modernism get to the essence
o art, as explicated by leidegger Are we any more open to the work-being o
the work lere we need to remind ourseles o the mode o thinking that
reduces the thingness o the thing to its core traits, its characteristics and
properties. Greenbergian ormalism apprehends art in terms o its characteris-
tics and properties. leidegger would suggest that this brings us no closer to
the thing-being o the thing, or the work-being o the work. Indeed, or
leidegger, the modern can only be representationalist.
leidegger`s insights on the equipmental-being and the work-being o a
work proe instructie or setting out the limits o any analysis or interpreta-
tion o the work o art. Interpretie rames are necessarily representationalist.
1hey reduce the continuous low o practices to patterns or theoretical schemas.
1hus a Greenbergian schema would ocus on what is unique and irreducible in
119
1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
any particular art orm whilst a semiotic analysis would identiy the opera-
tion o the way meaning is produced through the interaction o semiotic
codes.
1he limitation o this representationalist thinking can also be seen in
approaches to practice. As a practitioner, I can be presented with a brie,
which sets out the context or a work o art-an exhibition, a competition,
a perormance, a speciic design or perhaps a public artwork. I could apply my
knowledge o the ormal and semiotic language o art quite consciously to
the creation o the work. I can decide the meanings I want the work to
communicate and design the work to achiee these. I can make preliminary
sketches o the idea and produce a maquette or a prototype and present
these prototypes beore a selection panel. In all this analysis, in all this
thoughtul designing, do we know any more about the work o the work o
art
leidegger would strongly argue in the negatie. Such a representationalist
approach reeals the equipmental-being o the work, not the work-being o
the work o art. \here the artist is engaged in the manipulation o existing
signs as a way o coneying meaning and the equipmental character o the
actiity comes to the ore, it could be said that cratsmanship dominates.
Sign work is akin to the work o the cratsman. It operates in the realm o
the ontic, the realm o art business.
I we are to presere the work within the openness o Being and ensure
its independence so that a work o art can rest in itsel, we need to aoid the
danger o dragging the work into the sphere o mere lied experience. 1his
resting o the work in itsel is, in leideggerian terms, the realisation o the
essence o art or Art. loweer we must remember that art happens in the
midst o beings as human beings try to negotiate the business o making,
exhibiting and selling their work in a modern technocratic society. Gien this
context, then, the central question in this Chapter is not whether in the
midst o art business, Art cav be realised, but rather bor in the midst o art
business i. Art realised
1he Historical Distinctiveness in Which 1ruth is Unconcealed
In 1he Question Concerning 1echnology`, leidegger argued that ine art
as tecbv belonged within poi.i.. As poi.i., art is openness beore what-is.
loweer, in proposing that at each time the openness o being had to be
established in beings themseles by the ixing in place o truth in igure`,
120
leidegger suggests that in a ery critical sense, art is essentially historical
,leidegger 19b:201,. 1hus whilst, in the Greek era, the distinctie way in
which truth came into being was poitic, can we say the same o the modern
technological era Can we still say that tecbv belongs within poi.i.
leidegger tells us that the modern technological era is characterised by
enraming as a mode o reealing. Poi.i., like enraming is a mode o being`s
coming to presence. loweer in contrast with the openness beore what-is o
poi.i., enraming inoles an ordering and mastering o what is. Objects and
equipment become absorbed into the totality o standing-resere and lose their
quality as objects. In the light o this assessment o the technological era, does
tecbv become an enraming mode o being`s coming to presence in the modern
age
1he recognition o the historical nature o the mode o being`s coming to
presence as art, impacts on the way we apprehend the work o contemporary art.
Do we apprehend contemporary art in the sense o poi.i. as tecbv, or do we
conceie it in terms o enramement I the distinctie way o coming to truth
that characterises our contemporary age is enraming, is it olly to een speculate
on tecbv as a poitic mode o being`s coming to presence as contemporary art
Bearing in mind leidegger`s belie that there was but or a short time, a magnii-
cent era where tecbv as poi.i. held sway, it is little wonder that leidegger takes up
legel`s concern that art can no longer count as the highest manner in which
truth obtains existence or itsel ` ,legel quoted in leidegger 19b:204,.

In this
assessment, howeer, we can detect a blind spot in leidegger`s thinking. \hilst
we may argue that in the modern era poi.i. is dominated by equipmentality, can
we be sure that equipmentality didn`t play a role in the way the early Greek`s
understood their world In his romanticisation o early Greek thinking,
leidegger ails to acknowledge Greek culture, that is, the culturally mediated
lied experience o the Greeks. low do we assess whether, at the leel o
culturally mediated experience, the distinctie way in which truth came into being
was poitic
leidegger`s emphasis on the distinctie way in which truth comes into being
is the critical point here. Along with the scientiic and technological changes
brought by modernisation, modernity has transormed the way truth comes
into being. lence in modern technocratic society, where it could be argued that all
beings could be perceied to all under useulness, isn`t the Being o beings
necessarily realised dierently Since Art as the setting to work o truth belongs
to Being, is it possible that the truth o Art has changed in some undamental
way In recognising this possibility, Daniel Palmer notes:
121
1lL \ORK` Ol AR1
Because the technological understanding o being has gained such an all-
persuasie hold, across cultures and sectors o human aairs, there is the
possibility that we will be so swept away in this single manner o reeal-
ing as to cut o or good the possibility o uture ways o reealing .
|and| there is the danger that in our absorption in the practices that
embody this mode o concealing we will completely coer oer its char-
acter as reealing. ,Palmer 1998:409,
1hus in contemporary times art is not the saing claim, that leidegger claims or
it. In alling under the sway o enraming, the potential or art to open up our
understanding o Being and reealing has been concealed. 1his, leidegger would
claim, is the space where art business as opposed to Art thries. low must we
negotiate that
In concluding this Chapter, I want to return to the questions I posed at the
outset. lirstly what, i any, truth is set to work in a technocratic era and secondly
is it possible to make Art, in the leideggerian sense, in the contemporary world
I as leidegger proposes Art is, in its essence a distinctie way in which truth
comes into being` ,leidegger 19b:202,, and i the distinctie way that truth
comes into being in a modern technological society is in its useulness, what can
we say about contemporary Art low, in the midst o art business, can Art
emerge
I hae argued that the historically distinctie mode o reealing in the modern
technological age has changed beings. I beliee that this necessarily changes the
way in which art as truth happens. Art is reealed in its equipmental-being. 1he
alue o leidegger`s lesson is that he reminds us that a work o art is not already
or een a sign, nor just an image or een just a lat two dimensional surace with
pigment on it. I we are open to the work o the work, we are open to possibility.
loweer when leidegger makes the statement that the sculptor only uses up
stone when the work miscarries and that the painter does not use colour up, but
rather sets it orth and allows it to shine, he maintains a distinction that priileges
the truth oer equipmentality`. In this, he orecloses the possibility that the
work o art may operate in multiple and dierential relations. I would like to
return to my earlier comments about leidegger`s blind spot in relation to the
early Greeks. \hilst he maintains that the distinctie mode o reealing or the
Greeks was poitic, he does not address how the lied experience o the Greeks
mediated the mode o reealing that preailed. Is it possible that the Greek
experience o things oscillated between their work-being and their equipmental-
being In his explanation so ar, leidegger`s undamentalism does not allow a
122
work to moe between its work-being and its equipmental-being. Surely the
work o art may set orth and allow colour to shine a. it tells a narratie, reeals
a pair o shoes or presents a group o bottles. I the work o art does not inoke
this multiplicity, I don`t beliee Art can be realised in the midst o art business in
contemporary society.
leidegger`s critique o art business warns us o the danger that an enraming
mode o reealing poses or contemporary society. loweer, een whilst recog-
nising that worlding the world inoles being-in-the-world, leidegger`s am-
bialence about socially mediated lied experience or cultural thinking creates an
unresoled tension. le worries that where the ontic experience o be-ings be-
comes an obstacle to Being, lied experience may be the element in which Art
dies. In his concern, that we can become caught up in the ontic realm o human
be-ings and orget the question o Being in itsel, leidegger inadertently sets in
place an opposition between the ontological and the ontic.
20
Mcloul suggests that leidegger`s critique o cultural thinking neglects the
possibility that there might be an essence o culture. 1hus Mcloul beliees that
leidegger`s obsession to expose the limits o cultural thinking, leads him away
rom questioning culture in its essence. lere leidegger orecloses the potential
or a mutual relection between the ontic and ontological. In the next Chapter, I
will argue that lied embodied experience enables us to question Being in itsel.
In this way I will show that the relational mutuality between the ontic and the
ontological is the dimension in which Art thries.
In a time when art business dominates, I would argue that it is crucial to read
leidegger on art. \e are thrown into lie and get carried along by the demands
o liing. \e rarely stop to ponder and wonder. Art is an eent o stopping, o
making an open clearing in the noise o the eeryday. \e quite literally express
this in our words and actions. \hen I work, I hae to clear my desk, clear my
studio so that I hae an open space in which to work. At a more abstract leel,
leidegger identiies the work o art as creating the clearing in which Art might
happen. In the middle o lie and in the middle o the work unconcealment
unolds. 1his I think is the central lesson o leidegger`s essay. \hilst Art may
be the priileged site in which unconcealment happens, we hae seen that it may
not happen in the realm o art business. I Art is to be an essential and necessary
part o the Being o beings, then it is in the midst o beings that Art must
happen. Leryday actiities such as cooking, gardening, renoating and eating
may be experienced as poitic rather than instrumentally. In the next Chapter, I
will argue that the concept o perormatiity allows us to understand how Art
occurs in the midst o lie.
123
SlLDDING LIGl1 lOR 1lL MA11LR
"
SlLDDING LIGl1 lOR
1lL MA11LR
1
he irst three Chapters o this book are concerned with the releance
o leidegger`s thought or rethinking the question o artistic practice.
leidegger`s meditations on representation, on the question concern-
ing technology and the origin o the work o art hae been ery instructie in
my own thinking about the work o art. 1hey proide a ramework or a
sustained critique o western subjectiist interpretations o art and present a
counter-representationalist reormulation o the work o art. loweer, whilst
leidegger`s critique may proide us with the conceptual tools or a critique o
western models o thinking about the work o art, I would suggest that his
thinking remains embedded in western Lnlightenment metaphorics. In
leidegger`s work, this metaphorics presents itsel speciically in the way the
beneicence o light allows truth ,atbeia, to be reealed. 1hus, in the Ques-
tion Concerning 1echnology`, we are summoned to hope in the growing light
o the saing power` ,leidegger 19a:33, and in 1he Origin o the \ork o
Art`, light joins its shining to and into the work` ,leidegger 19b:181,. It is
as light, that what is concealed comes to be reealed. I would suggest that in
his particular iguring o art and technology as a mode o reealing, leidegger
ixes us yet again in the light o the Luropean sun.
leidegger was a German philosopher whose experience o the world was
predicated on the assumed illuminating quality o Luropean light. lis think-
ing about art as a reealing, is grounded in an assumption that ,sun,light does
actually hae the capacity to reeal something`. In place o the relected light
o Plato`s cae, leidegger posits the reealing power o ,sun,light. lor him,
relected light can only eer relect on the ontic condition o beings, whilst,
,sun,light, on the other hand, has the capacity to reeal the Being o beings.
loweer, I would question whether this assumption always holds. leidegger`s
attitude towards light is metaphysical and this attitude is carried through in his
metaphorics o light. lurther, his raming o the ontological and ontic is
Lurocentric. It ails to take into account a dierent ontology.
124
In this Chapter, I want to consider light rom the point o iew o an
Australian liing in the glare o an Australian sun. Viewed rom this optic
another question emerges: \hat i there is too vvcb light \hat i, in the glare
o the midday sun, nothing is reealed I will argue that, in a particular Aus-
tralian context, that o \estern Australia, the actual` experience o light
necessitates a reconsideration o the photological underpinnings o leidegger`s
thinking. It is my contention that we need to grapple with the acts o another
sun-light, one that is no longer reealing, but insinuates itsel in the acts o
matter`.
According to a leideggerian position, my assertion could be seen to all
into the merely ontic`. \e hae already witnessed how, according to leidegger,
the human tendency to get caught in the merely ontic` limits possibility.
Leryday opinion, he contends, sees in the shadow only the lack o light, i
not light`s complete denial` ,leidegger 19a: 154,. loweer, according to my
own experience o the glare`, I am compelled to ask: \hat i, in the glare o
the midday sun, there is no shadow Nothing is concealed, yet nothing is
reealed. In this context, the metaphorics o light comes up against a limit and
runs out. I return to the realm o the ontic, but with an eye, still, on the
ontological. \hat can my mere experience o light tell us about the Being o
art, or example
\e recall rom the preious Chapter, that work unolds in the open region
o the world. In the unolding, we recognize that the worlding o the world is
concerned with being-in-the-world, that is, process. It is through the
perormatiity o process that world is opened up and the scope and limits o
Being are experienced. lere I will draw out the relational nature o the ontic
and the ontological in order to show that the lie o be-ings can create moe-
ment in Being in itsel. Rather than the ontic experience o be-ings presenting
an obstacle in the way o Being, lied embodied experience enables us to
question Being in itsel. In this Chapter, I demonstrate how the experience o
the Australian light brings into question assumed understandings o the
illuminating quality o light. 1hrough this elaboration, I will argue or a dier-
ent understanding o the Being o art.
Luropean igurations o light do not correlate with the type o under-
standing that comes rom liing with the glare o the Australian sun. Visual
practice may be inconceiable without a consideration o light, howeer I
propose that it is equally inconceiable to practise under Luropean notions o
light, when in the glare o Australian light. 1oo much light on the matter sheds
no light on the matter. 1he Australian glaring light is not the kind o light that
125
joins its shining to and into the work` in the same way that leidegger claims or
a ,Luropean, reealing kind o light.
In the glare o the Australian sun-light, I query leidegger`s heliophilia and
suggest that his understanding o the work o art as unconcealment ,bringing-
to-light,, does not take into account another sun-light. In his ormulation o the
work o art as transiguration, it is the reulgent quality o the sunlight that
allows truth to be illuminated and to shine orth. In the dazzling glare o the
Australian sun, howeer, this does not igure. In the glare, no-thing is brought
to light. 1he matters o act`, emerge out o the thickness or uzziness` o
practice. In this uzziness, acts and decisions occur in the heat o the moment
and shed a aifferevt type o light rom the light o rational thinking.
I will argue that the glare o the Australian sun ractures the nexus between
light, orm, knowledge and subjectiity, or what leidegger has termed the orm-
matter structure. Instead, I propose that the glare produces a massie moe-
ment o deterritorialisation that reconigures the relationship between light and
matter. In this reormulation, I suggest a shit rom shedding light ov the matter
to shedding light for the matter.
I theorise this moement according to the perormatie principle o vetbei..
Paul Carter describes vetbei. as a non-representational principle that inoles
an act o concurrent actual production` ,Carter 1996:84,. As an act o concurrent
actual production, vetbei. is transormatie and not merely representational. It
engenders a material transormation that is not o a representational kind. In
this material transormation, I show that vetbei. moes beyond the transigu-
ration that leidegger claims or art.
Shedding Light on the Matter
Secrets are discoerable, they say, bones, mistakes, the passage o blood
through the body. And is it not the case that this uneiling as it were, this
great moment o truth has a luminous quality that circulates such that
knowledge claims a moral category and sets itsel the task o shedding
light on the matter` ,\ilson 199:3,
1
\e still like to shed light on the matter`, such is our belie that light reeals,
uneils, illuminates, makes perceptible and renders legible our relation to the
world in which we lie. 1he metaphorics o light proides language with a rich
ocabulary with which to shed light on the matter. Josephine \ilson`s ironic
coupling o light, truth and knowledge in her post-colonial perormance work,
126
Ceograpbie. of avvtea Pace. ,199,, lays open the metaphysics o light that
underpins these metaphors o light. It is a metaphysics that has inormed
Luropean philosophy rom Plato`s cae until its apotheosis in Lnlightenment
thinking and beyond. \ilson is not paying homage to the Lnlightenment.
Ceograpbie. of avvtea Pace., sketches the way in which the colonisation o
Australia was achieed and rationalised under the Lnlightenment. In \ilson`s
writings, light` becomes one o the technologies complicit in the colonisation
o countries, peoples and bodies. Colonisation took place through light, and
ision was its logical collaborator. As \ilson so eloquently puts it:
And 1i.iov, being the prerogatie o Kings, Captains, cartographers,
scientists and priests it is not surely just and right that the Discoerable
should inhabit a space o perpetual darkness-silent, inert, suspended
in the amniotic luid o blind possibility, waiting, waiting or the sur-
geon with his knie. ,\ilson, 199:3,
1he unknown would become known. In the heliophilia o Lnlightenment
thinking, the relationship between light, knowledge and truth is assumed, and it
is through ision that this nexus is achieed.
In Dorvca.t ye.: tbe Devigratiov of 1i.iov iv tbe 1revtietb Cevtvry ,1993,,
Martin Jay describes the logical` co-existence o light and ision. le obseres
that in western thought, light has been conceptualized in terms o the distinc-
tion between vvev and v. Light, understood as the perect linear orm that
operates according to the laws o geometric rays, was deined as vvev. vvev
was seen to be the essence o lumination. In contrast, v emphasized the actual
experience o human sight ,Jay 1993:29,. 1his dualistic concept o light as vvev
and v complemented the dual concept o ision. On one hand, ision was
conceied as obseration with the two eyes o the body, whilst on the other, as
speculation with the eye o the mind.
\estern philosophy has oscillated between-and attempted to reconcile-
obseration with the eyes ,empiricism, and speculation with the eye o the mind
,reason and mysticism,. loweer whilst empiricism and rationalism may be-
long to two distinct historical trajectories, Lein argues, that both are under-
pinned by a shared ocularcentric genealogy that has its roots in the Greek idea as
eiao.. iao. is that which is made isible or that which is oered in appearance. In
empiricism, suggests Lein, ideas are directly linked with perceptual experience.
1he idea is, in the most literal sense, an abstraction prised away rom the percep-
tual object that is its source and reerent` ,Lein 1993:19,. \hat we see` is an
idea ,eiao., or representation o the appearing object. In rationalism, on the other
12
hand, the idea is a prototype. It is prior to our worldly experience. As a prototype,
Lein contends that the idea is paradigmatic or perceptual experience, it is the
source o the possibility o perceptual experience and the reerent or the illumi-
nation o the meaning that the perceptual object is gien` ,Lein 1993:19,.
Inormed by rationalism, Lnlightenment thinking ixed on the eye o the
mind, but as reason, not mysticism. According to Jay, this thinking was charac-
terised by speculation, or the rational perception o . clear and distinct orms
with the unclouded eye o the mind` ,Jay 1995:29,. Under this optic, matter had
no meaning, until the mind imposed orm on it ,Audi 1995:21,. In lans
Blumenberg`s discussion o the relationship between light, knowledge and truth,
he suggests that light was the medium at man`s disposal to bring clarity to his
ision ,Blumenberg, 1993,. And so we must question the assumption that
truth has a luminous quality and that light is at man`s disposal so that he can
shed light on the matter.
1he relationship between light and matter is a exed one. In Lnlightenment
accounts, light is always shed on the matter. 1here is neer any passage frov
matter to light. 1hree contemporary philosophers, Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
Lmmanuel Leinas and Luce Irigaray, hae been critically engaged in rethinking
the relationship between light and matter. All three are in agreement that the
relationship between ision and embodiment orms the nexus o signiication.
loweer Irigaray has taken exception to Merleau-Ponty`s and Leinas`s blind-
spots on questions o matter. In her opinion, such blind-spots reinorce a
gendered reading o matter. In .v tbic. of eva Differevce ,1993,, Irigaray has
deeloped a dierent genealogy o light, a genealogy that takes into considera-
tion the passage between matter and light. She reigures light through touch, to
take into account sexual dierence. She considers light in terms o matter. I am
also concerned with the passage rom matter to light.
In 1etvre. of 1i.iov: 1i.iov ava vboaivevt iv !rigaray, eriva. ava Mereav
Povty ,1994, Catherine Vasseleu elaborates Irigaray`s position on light. 1hrough
Irigiray, she argues that in Lnlightenment philosophy, light is assumed to be a
neutral medium that allows us to see and understand. She explains:
One strategy is the use o light as a source o uniersal illumination, or
noble bond between existence and truth. 1his strategy, which treats light
as a metaphor, separates matter rom illumination. A second strategy is
to use light as a common end, as an objectie, which can be uniersally
achieed, and the most desirable means or making things accessible.
lere light is regarded as a transparent medium, which oers no resist-
128
ance to incorporation. A third strategy is the iguration o light as a
dazzling inchoate medium which once rendered legible, orms the basis
o subjectiity. ,Vasseleu: 1994:16,
According to this paradigm, light is the source o uniersal knowledge, which
seres as a as an objectie to be uniersally achieed. lere light proides the
metaphor or rational intelligibility that underpins western understandings o
human subjectiity. Gien the nexus between light and ision, it is not surpris-
ing that the photological tenets o western philosophy also underpin its orms
o isual representation. In isual representation, light creates a uniied ision o
the world through its ability to render orm legible. lorm and content are re-
ealed through the light that alls on objects.
leidegger made the obseration that Plato already knew that there could be,
no outward appearance without light` ,leidegger 19b:386,. 1his seems so
sel eident that it is rarely een questioned, een by the philosopher who set
about to question all that had been thought in the history o metaphysics.
leidegger`s heliophilia preents him rom seeing that light is a logical conspira-
tor in representationalist thinking. le assumes light to be a neutral medium that
allows the world to be unconcealed. In act, in 1he Question Concerning 1ech-
nology`, leidegger couples light with reedom:
lreedom is that which conceals in a way that opens to light, in whose
clearing there shimmers that eil that coers what comes to presence o
all truth and lets the eil appear as what eils. ,leidegger 19a:25,
leideggerian scholars suggest that, in substituting isual metaphors with aural
metaphors, leidegger works to oercome the ocularocentrism o western phi-
losophy.
2
lor example in his assertion that the artwork speaks, leidegger shits
the terms in which art is understood. \e no longer just look at the work o art,
but we need to i.tev attentiely to what it has to .ay. loweer his language
remains illed with isual metaphors. In 1he Origin o the \ork o Art`, the
oice o the artwork takes on a decidedly luminescent shine. le says the more
essentially the work opens itsel, the more luminous becomes the uniqueness o
the act that it is rather than is not` ,leidegger 19b:190,. Moreoer in this
essay, he tends to mix the isual and the erbal. 1hus, language, by naming
things or the irst time, irst brings beings to word and to appearance` ,leidegger
19b:198,.
1he Origin o the \ork o Art` was an attempt to open up the work o art
to quite a dierent way o thinking art, one that was no longer grounded in the
129
orm-matter structure. It is in its mode as reealing, that art allows unconcealment
as such |to| happen in regard to beings as a whole` ,leidegger 19b:181,.
loweer, in leidegger`s ormulation, we remember that it is light that joins its
shining to and in to the work. 1his shining, joined in the work is the beautiul`
,leidegger 19b:181,. According to the understanding oered in this essay,
then, unconcealment is a bringing-to-light. Unconcealment inoles light.
leidegger`s blind-spot on light is best illustrated with reerence to his critique
o the orm-matter structure, the structure that he claims underpins
representationalist thought and especially art history and aesthetics. \e remem-
ber his concern that i orm is correlated with the rational and matter with the
irrational, i the rational is taken to be the logical and the irrational the alogical, i
in addition the subject-object relation is coupled with the conceptual pair orm-
matter, then representation has at its command a conceptual machinery that
nothing is capable o withstanding` ,leidegger 19b:153,. loweer, in his
claim that the orm-matter structure proides the covceptva .cbeva rbicb i. v.ea, iv
tbe greate.t rariety of ray., qvite geveray for a art tbeory ava ae.tbetic.` ,leidegger
19b:153,, leidegger ails to take into account the role o light as actor.
I agree with leidegger that it is through representational practices that matter
becomes transormed, matter attains a legible orm. loweer, in Chapter 1hree,
I made the obseration that, according to the orm-matter structure, artists
could be said to shed light on the matter through their ormatie actions. In this
obseration, I make a connection that is missing rom leidegger`s critique o
the orm-matter structure. lere, light enters into the equation. Light becomes
coupled with rationality, orm and the subject. It is light that gies coherence to
representation`s conceptual machinery. In this conception a certain correlation
begins to emerge:
LIGl1 ~ lORM ~ KNO\LLDGL ~ SUBJLC1
DARK ~ MA11LR ~ UNKNO\N ~ OBJLC1
1hus orm is correlated with light, rational knowledge and with the subject,
whilst matter is associated with the irrational, with the dark and the unknown.
Luropean notions o light enable representationalism.
1he Glare
leliophilia or the worship o the sun and the Australian light, has mythical
status. In a orum on regionalism and the arts in \estern Australia, artist
Andrew Gaynor suggested that:
130
1he constant worship o sunlight and good weather so marks discus-
sions about Perth. 1his constant worship is perceied as one o the
problems o the way isual artists deal with Perth and \estern Aus-
tralia, so it would seem that eeryone is permanently on holidays en-
joying such warm and loely weather. ,Gaynor 1996,
le continues:
But the point was raised that it seems strange or Perth artists to
produce dark and gloomy art, or dare I say thought-prooking art.
Couldn`t it be seen as a maniestation o the rustration o these
artists who are dealing with weightier issues in the ace o constant
warm uzzies. ,Gaynor 1996,
Gaynor was responding to an argument about the prolieration o the
dark` in artistic practice een in the ace o the bleaching out` produced by
the intensity o the Australian light. It struck me then ,and still does now, that
Australian art practice continues to operate under Luropean notions o light
and within a predominantly Luropean aesthetic.
lollowing the Luropean model, the aant-garde project in Australia, is
concerned with the sublime imperatie o deling into the dark, the unknown
and the unconscious, and o transorming matter into orm. In this context
light,dark, orm,matter remain as binaries and it is the prerogatie o the
artist to present the unrepresentable, in short to shed light on the matter.
3
According to this logic, light ,as already being known and knowable,, is con-
sidered riolous, the site o, as Gaynor puts it, warm uzzies` and no more.
As a colloquial term used to describe an amorphous creeping eeling o warmth
and well being, warm uzzies` is an aectie corporeal experience. Gien its
corporeal oundations, I would suggest that it is this uzziness` that can
become the site,sight or reiguring isual,philosophical practices. luzziness
inokes notions o ibration, o thickness, an operation o a dierent register
rom the light,dark binary. It is neither known, nor unknown but in process.
My position has emerged rom a sustained period o participant obsera-
tion, o sitting under the sun in Kalgoorlie, trying to make landscape paint-
ings. I hae many more reckles, suspicious sunspots, pterygiums and deeply
urrowed weather beaten-skin to show or it ... and a ew paintings.
131
Kalgoorlie, a gold mining town about 00 kilometers east o Perth, \est-
ern Australia, is located in marginal desert country. Cloudless skies, low
humidity, red earth, low scrubby egetation, open mine pits and depthless
mine shats characterise the region. In winter, temperatures plummet to
below reezing, whilst in summer, temperatures hoer around orty degrees
Celsius.
I had been making landscape paintings beore I went to Kalgoorlie, but
in this arid landscape, there was nothing to grasp hold o, no-thing to pin
down. In the struggle to paint a representation o the landscape, the glare
was so intense that no-thing at all was reealed. Moreoer the landscape was
so ractured and messy that no orm emerged. It was impossible to use light
to render orm legible. 1he rules o linear and aerial perspectie would not
work either. 1he horizon remained but objects did not appear to get smaller
in the distance. Nor did distant objects become more greyed out and dimin-
ish in sharpness and chiaroscuro in the distance. In act, because o the lack
o moisture in the air, the distant horizon oten seemed more deined than
the oreground and the colour appeared stronger there. As a result, the
background seemed to jump oer the oreground.
It struck me that, in a place where blinds are constantly drawn against the
light, where people coer their windows with siler oil to keep out the light
and heat, where the sun`s glare blinds and where sunglasses sere a unc-
tional rather than a cosmetic purpose, it was time to rethink the relationship
between light and orm, light and knowledge.
In the blind` light o the glare, light can no longer be assumed to equal
orm and knowledge. Light itsel becomes unthematized, deterritorialised.
Paul Carter points out that in glare, there is no point o access or the
classiying eye` ,Carter 1996:219,. 1he glare takes apart the Lnlightenment
triangulation o light, knowledge and orm. In act light becomes implicated
bodily, in the acts o the matter. My pterygiums and sun beaten skin, my
mother and ather`s melanomas and the incidence o glaucoma implicate the
sun in a ery dierent set o processes. \ithin this context, I would argue
that light can no longer be postulated as the catalyst that joins objects whilst
itsel remaining unbent and unimplicated. According to this obseration, it
is no longer useul to speak o shedding light on the matter`. low then
can we rethink the relationship between light and matter Perhaps the
uzziness that Gaynor spoke o can be recast in a dierent way, as the dirac-
tion o light through matter, a process that implicates both light and matter
in signiying practices.
132
1he notion o the glare enables a reiguring o this relationship. Glare`
is a term that has contradictory or polar meanings. As a erb, to glare` is to
look with a ierce or piercing stare` ,Delbridge et al 199:900,. Used as a noun,
on the other hand, glare is a strong, dazzling light, brilliant lustre` ,Delbridge
et al 199:900, or an oppressie light, tawdry brilliance` ,Sykes198:366,. In
the ormer sense, glare ixes, in the latter it undoes ixity and creates dispersion.
1he polar nature o the glare becomes a useul deice or unpacking the as-
sumed relationship between light and knowledge and proides a point o
departure or rethinking the work o art.
5?DAEEC Glare?
I want to return once more to leidegger`s critique o representationalism
as a starting point or such a reiguration. As leidegger has demonstrated, the
western iew o the work o art has been igured in terms o the orm-matter
structure. In this iew, he points out: Matter is the substrate and ield or the
artist`s ormatie actions` ,leidegger 19b:152,. It is through the enigbtened
actions o the artist that matter is ormed into the work o art. In this concep-
tion, as I hae asserted, orm is correlated with the rational, with light and
knowledge, and matter with the irrational, with the dark and the unknown.
leidegger is correct when he obseres that the orm-matter structure proides
representationalism with a conceptual ramework that is so encompassing that
it is extremely diicult to think art dierently. \hen we incorporate light into
this equation, the representationalist ramework becomes een more ormida-
ble.
Gien leidegger`s use o the metaphorics o light in elaborating his un-
derstanding o reealing and unconcealment, I think it is important to under-
stand the thinking behind his use o light, or more speciically his use o
sunlight. It is through engagement with leidegger`s use o the term cbeiv,
that I will lay out the assumptions that underpin this thinking. cbeiv is a term
that leidegger actiates in his meditations on art in his series o lectures on
Nietzsche. In this context, leidegger posits art as transiguration. le pro-
poses that, as transiguration, art opens up higher possibilities that can neither
be contained within logic nor explained by the possibilities o praxis. In other
words, the work o art cannot be reduced either to logic or to the rational
eorts o the artist engaged in the creatie act. 1he transiguring o openness
is igured as the illumination o what is still unhazarded and thereore not yet at
hand` ,leidegger 198:23,. 1his illumination, he says, has the character o
raaiavt appearavce` ,leidegger 198:23,. le terms this cbeiv.
133
leidegger identiies an essential ambiguity inherent in cbeiv. le dierenti-
ates between reulgence and illusion. Radiance as reulgence is conceied in the
sense o sunshine. It is an illumination and a shining orth. Radiance as illusion,
on the other hand, is a mere seeming-so ,a bush near a path at night appears to
be a man but is really only a bush,` ,leidegger 198:23,. 1he illusion or sem-
blance is not o the same order as reulgence. lor leidegger, art as transigura-
tion operates in the realm o the radiance, resplendence and gleaming qualities o
reulgence. Its light has the quality o the brilliance o the sun. Illusion, on the
other hand is the way o seeing o eeryday lie. 1he brilliance o its light is much
duller, dimmer and more supericial. As Lein notes, the brilliance o eeryday
appearing does not endure. It is mere semblance.
\hat is at stake, in this aspect o leidegger`s understanding o the work o
art, is his coniguring o art in terms o the shining light o the sun. low does
the glare o the Australian sun igure art dierently rom the cbeiv o the
Luropean sunshine Let me contrast the two terms. \hilst both cbeiv and the
glare` are related to the eects o sunlight, I would argue that their conse-
quences are o a dierent order. As applies in cbeiv, there is an inherent ambigu-
ity in glare. On the one hand, glare ixes, and on the other, it possesses the quality
o dazzling brilliance. In its capacity to ix us with a ierce or piercing stare, the
glare brings us to a standstill. On the other hand, in the sense that the glare is a
strong dazzling light that is characterized by a brilliant lustre, it appears to corre-
spond with cbeiv. 1he reulgent quality o cbeiv has this brilliance. loweer, it
must be remembered that, in its dazzling brilliance, the glare is also oppressie.
And in its oppressie and dazzling brilliance, the glare can cause us to lee. Under
the light o the Australian sun the glare does not to allow, what leidegger calls,
the bringing-to-shining-and-appearing o art. Moreoer in the middle o a
summer`s day, there are no shadows to lee to. In the Australian glare, leidegger`s
metaphorics do not work. As light, the glare does not reeal what is concealed.
1he glare suggests that leidegger`s sunlight-illed eocation o art as trans-
iguration needs to be rethought. \hat is art, then, i not a bringing-to-shining-
and-appearing 1he clue lies in the glare`s capacity to turn and lee. In the quest to
oer an alternatie iguration, I turn away rom leidegger towards the philoso-
phy o Deleuze and Guattari. In their notions o aciality` and acialization`, I
ind resonances with the moement o the glare.
In Civeva 1: 1be Morevevt!vage ,1986,, Deleuze deelops the polar nature
o the ace, using the analogy o the painted portrait. Sometimes, he suggests,
painting grasps the ace as an outline by an encircling line which traces the nose,
the mouth, the edge o the eyelid` ,Deleuze 1986:88,. On the other hand, there
134
are times when painting works through dispersed eatures . ragmentary
and broken lines which indicate here the quiering o the lips, there the bril-
liance o a look, and which inole a content which to a greater or lesser extent
rebels against the outline` ,Deleuze 1986:88,. In the ormer tendency, or what
Deleuze calls acialization,aceiication`, there is a ixing on an object. lere the
ace thinks about something, is ixed on an object . and the ace has a alue
aboe all through its surrounding outline, its relecting unity which raises all
the parts to itsel ` ,Deleuze 1986:88,. 1his coding o the surace is representa-
tion, in the leideggerian sense o the term. At the other end o this con-
tinuum, when painting works through dispersion, it escapes the outline and
orms part o an intensie series. In this moement the parts do not relect
unity, or orm, but rather successiely traerse as ar as paroxysm, each part
taking on a kind o momentary independence` ,Deleuze 1986:88-89,. Like the
dazzling glare, this produces a quiering uzziness that disperses rather than
creates unity. 1his tendency, Deleuze terms aciality` or aceicity ;ri.ageite)`.
lor Deleuze, acialization` is the mechanism by which we classiy, stratiy
and ix. I would suggest this corresponds with the glare in its incarnation as a
ierce and piercing stare. Operating at this end o the spectrum, acialization`
and the glare are colonising moements. Deleuze and Guattari postulate a
correlation between the ace and the landscape that exempliies this:
lace and landscape manuals ormed a pedagogy, a strict discipline, and
were an inspiration to the arts as much as the arts were an inspiration to
them. Architecture positions its ensembles-houses, towns or cities,
monuments or actories-to unction like aces in the landscape they
transorm. Painting takes up the same moement, but also reerses it,
positioning a landscape as a ace, treating one like the other. ,Deleuze
and Guattari 198:12,
It is much harder to sit under the sun and map the ground anew than to resort
to the rules and guidelines presented in one`s training. loweer, under the
dazzling glare o the Australian light, the landscape manuals proided no help
in coming to understand the ground nor in presenting it anew. As I hae
demonstrated, when one sits in this landscape under the oppressieness o
the glare, there is nothing to grasp hold o, no point o access or the classiy-
ing eye. 1he quiering o the light, the ragmentary and broken lines o the
landscape, produce intensity and mark an ascent towards a paroxysm. Instead
o being able to ix on an object, sitting under the sun proides, what Deleuze
and Guattari describe as, a point o departure in a passional line in the process
o sweeping away towards realness` that is ertiginously asigniying, asubjectie
135
and aceless` ,Deleuze and Guattari, 198:18,. In the intensity o the glare, the
plane o organisation is ruptured, creating a massie deterritorialisation. 1he
dazzling glare undoes ixity and in the glare o the sun`s light, dierent strat-
egies or mapping are required. 1hese mappings are not representations, rather
they trace the trajectory o the body in moement through space and time and
in relation to place. 1hese mappings are perormatie.
Methexis
In Kalgoorlie, it was strategically necessary to keep one`s hat on and one`s
head down to aoid the glare, to preent onesel alling down a mineshat and
to aoid stepping on broken glass or more liely ground creatures. 1his was
also necessary in order to ind paths others had trekked beore. One always
kept one`s eyes to the ground, in order to be sensitie to, and aware o the
olds, the contours, the inclines and the mess o the landscape. Paul Carter
suggests that the gesture o hanging one`s head ,and this includes the political
action o hanging one`s head in shame,, is the reerse o what happened to
Indigenous Australians with colonisation and the coming o enigbtenment
thinking. 1he induction o Indigenous Australians into enigbtenment ways
o seeing the land inoled a undamental shit in looking. 1he action jerked
the head upwards through ninety degrees, shiting the eyes rom the ground
to the horizon o linear perspectie.
4
In this action, Carter argues, the horizon
came into iew and seeing was diorced rom the dance` ,Carter 1996:51,.
Carter sees this re-orientation as a shit rom vetbetic trace to representa-
tional image. Representation suggests that an image only stands in or objects,
eents and concepts. Metbei., on the other hand, is a non representational
principle ... an act o concurrent actual production, a pattern danced on the
ground` ,Carter 1996:84,. Carter deries his understanding rom Cornord`s
elaboration o vetbei. in rov Reigiov to Pbio.opby: . tvay iv tbe Origiv. of
!e.terv pecvatiov ,1991,. According to Cornord, vetbei. was a term used by
Pythagoras to describe the relation based on participation. 1he particular rela-
tion characterised by vetbei. was one o participation and passage between
the diine plane and the human plane. Cornord summarises this relation as:
1hat peculiar relation, best called participation` ,vetbei.,, in which .
a group stands to its immanent collectie soul. 1he passage rom the
diine plane to the human, and rom the human to the diine, re-
mains permeable and is perpetually traersed. 1he One can go out into
the many, the many can lose themseles in reunion with the One.
,Cornord 1991:204,
136
Metbei. is a term that has its roots in ancient Greek thinking. In this sense we are
once again returned to pre-Socratic thought. loweer, used in the context o
Indigenous Australian culture, Carter allows vetbei. another dimension. In the
permeability o the passage rom the diine plane to the human and the human
to the diine` he acknowledges that the ritual perormances o human beings can
be undamentally transormatie. 1hus in this context, the statement that the
passage rom the diine plane to the human, and the human to the diine,
remains permeable and is perpetually traersed` ,Cornord 1991:204, takes on a
distinctly dierent understanding rom that o Greek thinking. 1he passage is
productie and the eects are, or want o a better word, real`. Perormance
produces real or material eects. It produces rather than represents reality.
In western philosophy and art, it is ery diicult to think outside the para-
digm o representation and posit a non-representational principle, particularly
one that produces material aects. In a series o interiews with art historian
Daid Sylester, British artist lrancis Bacon, reeals his struggle to articulate his
painting practice as perormatie rather than representational. le attempts to
grope towards the idea that the acts emerge in the matter. \hen Daid Sylester
asks him i he can throw light on the paintings, Bacon replies:
I don`t know what it`s about mysel. I don`t really know how these
orms come about. And I look at them as a stranger, not knowing how
these things hae come about and why hae these marks that hae
happened on the canas eoled into these particular orms. ,Bacon in
Sylester 1980:102,
1he suggestion o an eolution to, or passage` rom, matter into orm, or
orms breeding rom other orms, is not a shedding light on the matter. 1his is
suggestie o Irigaray`s genealogy o light. Bacon enisages a kind o structured
painting in which images would arise rom a rier o lesh` ,Bacon in Sylester
1980:83,. Bacon oertly rejects the Cartesian claim that it is the mind which
senses, not the body. On the contrary, it is the body that senses. \ith its possible
relation to the brain, the mind could be seen as part o this sensing nerous
system.
5
lis concern is with making images as accurately o the nerous sys-
tem as he can` ,Bacon in Sylester 1980:83,.
In his rejection o reason and his attempts to return the act onto the ner-
ous system in a more iolent way` ,Bacon in Sylester 1980:81,, Bacon is reerring
to the potential o painting to exceed its own structures ia a radical painting
perormatiity. lact`, in this sense according to Jay, is not the rational percep-
tion o clear and distinct orms with the unclouded eye o the mind` ,Jay 1995:29,.
13
lact`, or rather matters o act`, emerge out o the thickness or uzziness o
the practice.

Rather than grasping the ace as an outline ,acialization`,, Bacon is
concerned with escaping the outline and allowing or the quiering o lips, the
ragmentary and broken lines. lis concern is the experience where the painting
o the portrait becomes, in Deleuze`s thinking, an ascent towards a critical in-
stant, prepares a paroxysm` ,Deleuze 1986:8,.
Bacon`s painting operated against a backdrop o Luropean light and perspec-
tie and was a reaction against the legacy o Luropean representational practice.
1he vetbetic perormatiity I am proposing, howeer, has quite a dierent
genesis. It is not merely a reaction against representation, but proides a dierent
model o mapping the world altogether. 1he dazzling glare o the Australian
light necessitates a downward look and an attention to the patterns and rhythms
o the ground. It is a perormatie model where the landscape` emerges through
the tracing o patterns on the ground.
According to Paul Carter, vetbetic perormatiity has been integral to Indig-
enous Australians` cultural practices. Carter suggests that it was in the repressie
moement o acialization that the Aranda people had their heads jerked up-
wards through ninety degrees, transorming the vetbetic trace into representa-
tion, participation into imitation. In the re-orientation to the horizon, seeing
and moing become disconnected. lere, as Carter has noted, seeing was di-
orced rom the dance` ,Carter 1996:51,. Seeing through the screen o enigbten-
ment made the Aranda people momentarily alter and, in doing so, lose their
step and their rhythm.
Carter claims the shit rom vetbetic trace to representational image took
place when the Aranda men took up western modes o landscape painting ater
the isit o watercolourists Rex Battabee and John Gardner to their lands in the
1930s. 1he shit brought about by the introduction o Luropean ways o seeing
into the culture o Aranda people was then seen as liberating`. In the orward
to Battarbee`s book, Moaerv .v.traiav .borigiva .rt ,1952,, 1.G.l. Strehlow
proposed that:
1he traditional habit o looking at eerything rom aboe limited the
ision o the artist and rustrated his endeaours to express himsel
with reedom and clarity. 1he day o liberation came when white men
irst showed coloured pictures to the naties |who| now gazed with
delight upon a world depicted as seen by eyes that hae stopped staring
at the ground in search o tracks and are looking instead at the landscape
itsel. ,Strehlow quoted in Carter 1996:50,
138
Strehlow was iewing the world rom a Luropean optic, or more precisely rom
a Cartesian perspectie. lrom this particular distanced, panoramic optic, ision
was equated with clarity and rationality. 1hrough the mechanics and metaphorics
o ision, light was shed on matter. Carter, on the other hand, lamented that
this jerking o the head upwards transormed the vetbetic trace into represen-
tation` ,Carter 1996:51,. lor Carter, the consequence o entering the realm o
representation was to enter the house o western history, with its books, its
windows and doorways. It is no longer to see all around ,with the ears as much
as eyes, a radiating enironment o tracks and breezes` ,Carter 1996:54,.
Carter argues or a philosophy that takes into account a dierent conception
o the land and our relationship to it. lis critique o representation and its
relation to ision resonates with Irigaray`s critique o western ocularocentrism.
She argues that:
Vision is eectiely a sense that can totalize, enclose, in its own way. More
than the other senses, it is likely to construct a landscape, a horizon.
,Irigaray 1993:15,
In accord with Carter, Irigaray suggests that moement is a more adequate way
o thinking the body than is ision. lor her, moing through the world, across
the unierse o dancing, I construct more o a dwelling or mysel than through
ision` ,Irigaray 1993:15,. ler ocus on doing` suggests a non-representa-
tional principle, akin to Carter`s elaboration o vetbei.. It is this non-represen-
tational principle that Carter suggests is behind Celtic, and Aranda, art, whose
spirals and mazes reproduced by an act o concurrent actual production a pattern
danced on the ground` ,Carter 1996:84,. 1hese cultural productions or presenta-
tions, showings and maniestations, produced reality or the Aranda and Celtic
peoples. Metbei. is productie and perormatie, not representatie.
Paul Carter`s elaboration o the theory o vetbei. is, as I hae shown, deried
rom his reading o Cornord`s work on the origins o western speculation.
Cornord traces the notion o vetbei. rom Pythagoreas through to Plato. In
talking o the immanent` collectie soul as opposed to a transcendental`
collectie soul, Cornord reminds us that, or Plato, the immanent idea is in-
ected with human lesh and colours and all sorts o mortal rubbish` ,Cornord
1991:252,. 1hus it could be argued that the two-way passage between the many
and the One and the One and the many, allows the One to be inected with the
lied experiences and perormances o mortals. Such a state o aairs challenges
any sense o binary between the ontic and the ontological.
139
In eoking this peculiar continuum, I would like to draw some corre-
spondences between vetbei. and Deleuze and Guattari`s understanding o
assemblages. In this understanding, as 1hrit notes, the world is made up
o proisional linkages o elements, ragments, lows, all o heterogeneous
substance and status` ,1hrit 199:132,. In Deleuze and Guattari`s concep-
tion o the machinic assemblage, as I hae preiously noted, ideas, things,
animals, humans all bear the same ontological status. And so Llizabeth
Grosz proposes that assemblages are:
Composed o lines, o meetings, o speeds, and intensities, rather
than o things and their relations. Assemblages or multiplicities,
then, because they are essentially in moement, in action, are always
made, not ound. 1hey are the consequence o a practice. ,Grosz,
1994:16-168,
It could be argued that this conception, with its emphasis on assemblages
and multiplicities, moement, lines, meetings and speeds, traels well with
the Pythagorean belie that the One can go out into the many, the many can
lose themseles in reunion with the One` ,Cornord 1991:204,.
In this conception, the relationship between the many` and the One`
is not one o opposition, but rather exists in a continuum. 1his can be
exempliied in the relationship between Indigenous perormers and their
totemic ancestors in ritual ceremonies. lere the perormer is simultaneously
totemic ancestor and human sel. 1hus while the Lmu man still eels he is
an Lmu, the eathers he puts on, the gait he emulates, are his own.` ,Carter
1996:1,. Carter obseres there is neer any question o the artist, dancer or
singer conusing himsel with the power inoked ,Carter 1996:82,. In the
perormance o language, dance, painting, singing and other rituals in the
Aranda tribe, the emphasis is not on what the dance,song,painting repre-
sents, but rather on what it can do and what eects it will hae. Metbei. is
productie.
6
1hrough this example, we can return to and clariy the particular under-
standing o vetbei. that Carter inokes in relation to Indigenous Austral-
ian cultures and distinguish it rom the pre-Socratic understanding elabo-
rated in Cornord. In pre-Socratic thinking, the many` reers to the actual
things that exist in the world, whilst the One` reers to the uniied cosmos.
1hus, actual emus may be seen to belong to the many`, whilst the One`
is the eternal collectie understanding that is emulated by the Lmu man.
1his relation o the many` to the One` comes together in Plato`s under-
140
standing o lorms. In Carter`s elaboration, howeer, there is a dimension
that cannot be contained by this ormulation. 1his relates to Carter`s claim
that vetbei. is an act o concurrent actual production.
I want to return to Cornord`s claim that vetbei. inoles a peculiar`
relation in which the passage rom the diine plane to the human, and rom
the human to the diine, remains permeable and is perpetually traersed`
,Cornord 1991:204,. 1he permeability o the passage is critical to Carter`s
elaboration o vetbetic perormatiity. In Indigenous Australian culture, ritual
actiities are predicated on the capacity o the perormance to traerse the plane
between the human and the diine. Ceremonial perormances do not just
hae symbolic alue. 1hey produce real eects both on the human and on the
diine plane. lere we may return to the Lmu man. 1he Lmu man is not just
emulating the eternal idea o emu`. Rather, through his perormance as the
Lmu man, the passage between the human and the diine is traersed.
\hilst representation suggests that an image only stands in or objects,
eents and concepts, vetbei. is perormatie, a concurrent actva production
which has real eects in the world o humans and on the diine plane.
1he
perormatie presentations, showings and maniestations o eeryday lie en-
sure that the balance between the human and the diine is maintained. Lery
action and eery utterance plays its part in this perormatie balance. 1hus
Carter argues that, or the Aranda people, language is also vetbetic. 1he lan-
guage system o the Aranda is an agglutinatie system, which is drawn into
rhythmic patterns. le suggests:
Like the dot` o the traditional Central Australian dot-and-circle paint-
ing, the erb stem always implies other dots, a pattern or grouping o
marks. 1his implication does not arise rom any pleasure we may ind
in turning isolated marks into isually signiicant patterns but grows
rom the act that the dots are a physical trace o the jabbing hand, as
palpably imprinting the surace as the euros` oot marks the ground.
1hey are not the representation o ideas. ,Carter 1996:66,
1he dot, as John \elchman suggests, is a trace o,on the ceremonial site, a
granular magniication o the original sand support, and a daub on the surace
o the body` ,\elchman 1996:25,. Viewed at a distance, the dot matrix creates
an oscillation, a pulsation. Under ery close scrutiny, each dot is still palpable, a
mark in the process o becoming. Viewed vetbeticay, the dot doesn`t be-
come a sign that stands in or something, rather it is perormatie. 1he dot
matrix is a deictic marker, a trace o the labour o the perormance, not just o
141
one person, but also oten o many. 1his argument is supported by Julie
Dowling, an artist rom the \amatji tribe. She obseres o the painters rom
the Balgo region, that:
As the girls were doing it they were singing a song about it |and| they
were doing the actions with it.. Lach step means there`s another step
to go on and this part o the country is this part o the picture so that
as you are acting out the dot, dot, dot, dot, dot, een the action in itsel
is quite rhythmical, but when you bring that into connection with the
heartbeat and also I`m telling a story now, this dot connects with this
dot, this story is about this ... the whole connection with the land
comes rom the process up. ,interiew with Julie Dowling, April 199,
Until the introduction o canas and acrylic to Aboriginal communities, the
connection with the land was quite literal. Paintings were made rom dierent
coloured sands spread out on the ground in accordance with ritual. 1he sand
paintings played a ital role in ritual actiities, including increase ceremonies.
1he acting out o ertility rites inoling dance, song and painting was not
representatie, but productie. 1his explanation suggests meaning and reality
are constituted in the perormance. Meaning is not arbitrary nor is it deerred,
rather it emerges rom actions and the interplay between country, cultural
knowledges and materially constituted bodies, both indiidual and collectie.
Metbei. shits the terms in the economy o representation. Knowledge pro-
duction is embodied and locally situated. Metbei. has real eects in bodies
and on the ground.
In Indigenous Australian ritual practices, the interplay between country, bod-
ies and language produces a eritable production. Lie is seen as productie. In
this conception, instead o birth being seen as the irst displacement, the irst
expulsion and ruin, it is understood as the primary emplacement, as the irst
choreography o the ground` ,Carter 1996:84,. 1his conception o birth as the
irst choreography on the ground is critical to rethinking what it is to be a desiring
acting human being.
8
1he ocus on choreography shits the ocus rom the actor,
the act and the acted upon, to the action. As Carter obseres:
1o perorm, is always to perorm something. 1here is neer an actor on
one side, something to be acted on the other, the two come into being
through each other. ,Carter 1996:82-3,
Carter has mobilised the term vetbei. to elaborate the relationship between
the Aranda and their totemic ancestors, between the indiidual and the group,
142
between the group and the land. Aboriginal painting rhymes the rhythms o
the landscape and the rhythms o the heart beat. 1he role Aboriginal paint-
ings-both sand paintings and more recently acrylic paintings-play as a posi-
tie re-airmation o an historical tradition` is central to an understanding o
vetbei. ,Carter 1996:80,. It could be argued that the paintings produce a
perormatiity where the language mimes the motions o the body and the
landscape.
\hat is critical to this discussion is that perormance is an act o concurrent
actual production` through which embodied knowledge is produced ,Carter
1994:84,. Meanings emerge in the acts o the matter. Rather than meaning
being reealed or clariied, it is through perormance that social meanings are
produced. 1his is vetbei. in operation and not representation. In this schema,
the terms o the economy o representation shit. Images no longer stand in
or or signiy concepts, ideas or things, nor are images signs that ceaselessly
circulate, rather, meaning is produced as an embodied, situated eent. Imaging
produces real material eects.
A Productive Materiality
Rachel Jones notes that, as a liing tradition, vetbei. opens ways o think-
ing both a non-representational principle and a productie materiality inisible
to the enlightened subject o western modernity` ,Jones 2000:15,. In this
sense, she argues that vetbetic production proides modes o resistance to
the hegemony o the Luropean gaze. 1his inisibility` proides the key to
understanding the possibility o eading the disciplining procedures o a
culture, which doubts anything that it cannot see. 1hus Jones explains that, in
the colonisation o Australia, Luropean eyes could not and would not see
anything other than terra vviv. and remained blind to the alue o other, pre-
existing modes o liing on and relating to the land` ,Jones 2000:15,. Because
the subject o western philosophy sees nothing, it does not mean that there is
nothing to be seen or done. In this context, vetbetic production can be
igured as being accompanied by a double blindness, the blindness o the
enlightened` iewer not being able to see anything and the blindness` o a
practice that embraces the possibility ,no, necessity, that things are happening.
Jones draws out the implications o shedding light or the matter in a vetbetic
perormatiity when she states:
Methektic perormance does not inole actie orm-giing orces ,light,
the speculatie gaze, shaping a passie materiality . the hand marking
143
o the body or canas is itsel marked by the rhythms o dotting, just as
the body tracing patterns on the ground through dance is itsel pat-
terned by that moment, as breathing and heartbeat change along with
the coniguration o limbs. ,Jones 2000:15,
1he assertion that vetbetic perormatiity does not hae the character o the
orm-matter structure dependent on the orm-giing orce o light, but, is rather,
a patterning that emerges in matter, requires that we think quite dierently about
the work o art. In one sense it echoes leidegger`s claim that, as a transigura-
tion, art cannot be deined by the non-contradiction o logic nor the easibility o
praxis ,leidegger 198:23,. I it cannot be contained within logic nor explained
by praxis, how can we think about the transiguratie potential o the work o
art
\e will recall that in his elaboration o the logic o practice, Bourdieu tells us
that practice has a logic which is not that o the logician ,1990:86,. In the uzzy
logic o practice, he claims, there is an interchangeability between things. 1his
uzzy coherence or ainity among all objects o the unierse-what the Stoics
called .yvpatbeia tv boov-is a generatie principle. Bourdieu argues that this:
Ainity among all the objects o a unierse in which meaning is eery-
where and eerywhere superabundant, has as its basis, or its price, the
indeterminacy or oerdetermination o each o the elements and each o
the relationships among them: logic can be eerywhere only because it is
truly present nowhere. ,Bourdieu 1990: 8,
Logic is concerned with deeloping statements that describe internally consistent
claims about the relationship between things, that is, with logical or mathemati-
cal relations between statements about the world. I want to address the question
o a productie materiality, not just a question o relations between statements.
But I cannot achiee this i I persist with representationalist logic.
Logic is built on particular assumption about the relation between truth and
act. Logical truth can only be true i it corresponds with act. In this coupling o
logic, truth and act, we can return to leidegger`s criticism o truth as correctness,
as correspondence with act. In 1he Origin o the \ork o Art`, he tells us that
propositional truth is always correctness:
1he critical concepts o truth which, since Descartes, start out rom truth
as certainty, are merely ariations o the deinition o truth as correctness.
1he essence o truth which is amiliar to us-correctness in representa-
144
tion-stands and alls with truth as unconcealment o beings. ,leidegger
19b:1,
leidegger reminds us that we hae to consider what lies underneath this worn
out conception o truth as mere correctness. In the midst o beings, he claims,
there is a clearing and it is thanks to this clearing that beings are unconcealed in
certain changing degrees` ,leidegger 19b:18,. In this unconcealment, truth
happens`.
As we hae seen, this understanding o truth does not lie at all in correctness.
Nor is there a logical connection with act. In his relections on leiddegger`s
ontology, Leinas suggests that leidegger`s understanding o act relates to his
elaboration o throwness ,Cerorfevbeit,. In this ormulation, act` reers to the
experience o always already haing been thrown into the midst o possibility.
le describes this as the ontological description o act`` ,Leinas 1996:24,.
I would like to recall Bacon`s desire to turn act` onto the nerous system, in
an attempt to enisage a kind o painting in which images would arise rom a
rier o lesh` ,Bacon in Sylester 1980:81-83,. lact`, in the leideggerian sense,
can be seen to resonate with Bacon`s notion o act`. It is not, as Jay reminds us,
the rational perception o clear and distinct orms with the unclouded eye o the
mind` ,Jay 1995:29,. Rather, it could be argued, that Bacon`s matter o act is
precisely the experience that Leinas describes where Da.eiv has been thrown
into the world, abandoned and deliered up to onesel ` ,Leinas 1996:24,.
lact`, or rather matters o act`, emerges out o the thickness or uzziness o
the practice.
lere I want to reinoke Gaynor`s comments on warm uzzies and suggest
that perhaps the uzziness he talks o can be recast in a much more productie
way. In the blind light o the glare, as I hae argued, light itsel becomes
unthematised. \here there is no point o access or the classiying eye, matters
o act emerge out o the thickness or uzziness o the practice. In my attempt
to build a politics o practice rom the ground up, I want to think through the
uzziness o practice.
lere I wish to return once more to Cornord`s explication o vetbei..
Cornord notes that Plato took the Pythagorean relation o vetbei. and de-
eloped it in terms o his notion o lorms. Platonic lorms hae tended to be
understood to be transcendental, existing prior to our experience o entities.
loweer, Cornord picks up on Plato`s notion o the immanent idea and,
through this, opens up his lorms to the eect o matter. le suggests that
145
Platonic ideas may exist as transcendental purity or as embodied, present` in
the things they inorm` ,Cornord 1991:252,. 1o ocus on Plato`s transcenden-
tal orm would trap us in the world o light. In this world, orm is the a priori
aspect o experience. In Cornord`s discussion o Platonic lorms and Ideas, I
ind mysel interested in the potential o the immanent or embodied idea,
rather than the transcendental idea.
lor Plato, the immanent idea is permeated with earthly` substance. 1hus,
as the soul is illed by the body with passions and appetites and ears and all
sorts o phantoms and rubbish, so the Idea, when it is inoled in its isible
embodiments, is inected with human lesh and colours and all sorts o mor-
tal rubbish` ,Cornord 1991:252,. \hilst or Plato inection is negatie, a con-
tamination, I would cast it in quite a dierent light. lor me this inection is
productie. 1hus the inection with human lesh and colours and all sorts o
mortal rubbish suggests that the idea` emerges in,through the lesh as an
inection. It is mutable. Inection implies transmutation rather than stasis or
replication o the same. My human lesh, my colour and my mortal rubbish
are quite dierent rom your lesh, colour and mortal rubbish. In other words,
my lesh and my experience o the world gie me a speciicity, and gie a
speciicity to my tactics and actions, een as I take my place in the social collec-
tie. 1he ontic and the ontological are mutually interdependent.
1ransfiguration
An understanding that the immanent idea emerges in and through lesh,
gies some substance to my argument that we may shed light for the matter. It
suggests that the matter o lesh is productie. loweer, I want to extend my
understanding o the productiity o matter by returning to leidegger`s or-
mulation o the our modes o occasioning. \e recall that in the Question
Concerning 1echnology`, leidegger argues or co-responsibility in the creation
o the artwork. According to this account, the siler chalice is not conceied o
as ormed matter and creation is not the soereign subject`s perormance o
genius` ,leidegger 19b:200,. Instead leidegger proposes that the work o
art eoles through the complex interplay between matter ,bye,, aspect ,eiao.,,
circumscribing bounds, and the artist or cratsman. leidegger suggests that
this interplay o interacting orces is co-responsible or the chalice. In this constel-
lation o orces, we note that matter ,bye, takes its place as co-responsible or the
coming into being o the artwork. 1hrough this transiguration, leidegger
notes, the work o art does not cause material to disappear, but rather allows it
to emerge or the ery irst time ,leidegger 19b:11,.
146
In Chapter 1hree, I concluded that leidegger`s assertion-that the our ways
o being responsible bring something into appearance-granted agency to mat-
ter. I extended this discussion by introducing laraway`s material-semiotic actor.
In this discussion, matter becomes one o the seeral conersationalists engaged
in the process o making. laraway`s notion o the material-semiotic actor ena-
bles us to demonstrate the dialogic and emergent qualities o artistic practice.
leidegger`s our modes o occasioning or being responsible and laraway`s
material-semiotic actor proide us with a critical understanding required to chal-
lenge the orm-matter interpretation o art. In this Chapter, I hae made sugges-
tions o a radical material nature that extends our understandings o the emer-
gent qualities o artistic practice beyond modes o thought. In arguing or a
vetbetic productiity, I hae posited the notion that material practice is
transiguratie.
As we hae seen, leidegger recognises the transiguratie power o the work
o art. lor leidegger, transiguration inoles the illumination o what is still
unhazarded and thereore not yet at hand` ,leidegger 198:23,. loweer, in
his thinking, this metamorphosis inoles a change in appearance and that, in
turn, inoles light. 1he transiguratie potential o perormatie practice that I
am arguing or, on the other hand, does not inole the illuminating qualities o
light. I am suggesting that transiguration occurs through matter, not though
light. It is in the chiasmus between country, cultural knowledges and materially
constituted bodies ,both human and non-human,, that poii.i. makes anew.
Seen rom a leideggerian perspectie, it could be argued that what is uncon-
cealed is the act that material practice has material eects. 1his is what I beliee
Jones means when she talks o a productie materiality`.
A Materialist Politic
I am claiming that, instead o shedding light on the matter, vetbei. allows
or a eritable production, which transorms rather than reproduces the same.
Perormance inoles shedding light for the matter. In this conception, perorm-
ance produces signiication and signiication in turn has real eects. Sign produc-
tion is a vetbetic production inoling the interplay o culture, bodies and
languages. It is a becoming sign through matter.
\hat begins to emerge in the matter is a dierent sort o practice, a dier-
ent politics o practice that is not tied to, in Cathryn Vasseleu`s words, abstract
illumination, metaphysical light, or a disembodied eye` ,Vasseleu 1994:11,.
1here is no longer a singular imaginary working here. 1he acts` o painting
emerge in and through matter. 1he perormance o painting is shedding light
14
or the matter. Painting can then be said to operate vetbeticay or, as Paul
Carter puts it, as a communication, as an oscillation, as a contact across dier-
ence` ,Carter 1995:84,.
So where does thinking through matter take us Christine Battersby`s asser-
tion that, in vetbei. a pattern begins to emerge rom amongst the swirling
shapes o relational ontologies`, suggests a relational ontology o isual prac-
tice ,Battersby 2000:14,. 1his account o humans embedded in concrete situ-
ations o action returns us to the early leidegger`s elaboration o praxical
knowledge and, in particular, his argument that the speciic quality or character
o a thing emerges in our practical dealings with it. 1hus, just as hammering in
a workshop shows up the web o signiicant relations, so in vetbei. a pattern
begins to emerge rom amongst the swirling shapes o relational ontologies.
leidegger`s dealings` become extended and enlarged in the process o vetbei.
where, as Jones states, patternings emerge collectiely through the rhythmic
intersections o land and bodies` ,Jones 2000:158,.
Carter has applied the idea o vetbei. to elaborate the relationship between
the Aranda and their totemic ancestors, between the indiidual and the group,
between the group and the land. Is the term releant or re-iguring contem-
porary cultural practices Is it o strategic or tactical importance in plotting the
way we moe in the world Can we build a dierent kind o politics rom the
ground up and postulate a matter o acts` instead o shedding light on the
matter.
I would agree with Carter when he argues that it is necessary to inhabit the
world dierently, to remoe one`s gaze rom a horizon that is as much histori-
cal as isual` ,Carter 1996:113,. le suggests that we need once again to turn to
tracing the patterns in the ground, since this would inole a dierent concep-
tion o moement, one that deepened grooes` ,Carter 1996:113,. My concep-
tion o moement is dierent: it inoles not a deepening o grooes but
sensing and moing with the rhythms in,through the ground, so that in the
carnal acts between bodies ,human and non-human,, the presentations, show-
ings and maniestations, can exceed their own structures in a radical
perormatiity. Shedding light for the matter inoles both an ecological and
ethical challenge and presents a dierent conception o isual practice and
isual aesthetics. Practice becomes imbricated in culture as an alternatie mode
o representation.
1o think vetbeticay is to think quite dierently about the potential o
isual practices. It inoles thinking through matter. In the heat and the glare
148
o the Australian light, I hae suggested a ery speciic critique can be launched
against Lnlightenment ision. In this iew, isual art practice is not concerned
with shedding light on the matter, but can be conceied o as the relations in
and between matter. lere, I hae begun to choreograph a moement rom
shedding light on the matter to shedding light or matter. In the inal Chapter,
I wish to extend Jones`s explication o productie materiality in a moe which
reconstitutes contemporary understandings o perormatiity. 1hrough this,
I argue that the work o art is a materialising practice.
149
\ORKING lO1: A MA1LRIALIS1 ON1OLOG\
#
\ORKING lO1: A MA1LRIALIS1
ON1OLOG\
I perceie the reerent ,here, the photograph really transcends itsel: is
this not the sole proo o its art 1o annihilate itsel as medium, to be
no longer a sign but the thing itsel,. ,Barthes 1981:45,
I
n the preious Chapter, I proposed that vetbei. was the perormatie
principle that underpinned Indigenous Australian perormatie presenta-
tions, showings and maniestations. I argued that vetbei. was a non-
representational principle inoling an act o concurrent actual production that
allows or a eritable production rather than representation. I concluded the
Chapter by asking i the productie materiality o vetbei. was releant or a re-
ealuation o contemporary cultural practices. I pondered as to whether the
principle o vetbei. was important or reiguring a dierent politics o prac-
tice, a practice that builds rom the ground up and engages with the acts o
matter`.
In this Chapter, I propose to demonstrate that the productie materiality o
vetbei., enables us to commence the task o deeloping a theory o practice that
takes into account the matter o bodies and objects. Such a materialist account o
creatie practice questions both representational theories o art and the contem-
porary pre-occupation with the understanding o art as a sign system. I suggest
that attention to the productie materiality o the perormatie act` enables us
to reconigure our understandings o the work o art. Against the position that
a picture is necessarily a representation, understood in the leideggerian sense, or
that the image-as-sign, bears little or no relation to a reerent, I will argue that in
the uzziness o practice, there is the potential or a vvtva relection and trans-
mutation between imaging and reality. In this monstrous perormatiity, the
body becomes language rather than merely inscribed by language.
Deleuze`s elaboration o the concept lexion` and Charles Sanders Peirce`s
idea o semiosis proide me with the conceptual tools to think through the
150
question o how we might experience a work as both a concurrent actual
production and a sign. Deleuze`s concept o lexion enables us to apprehend
how perormatiity is a process through which the body becomes language
rather than merely being inscribed by language. Peirce`s elaboration o the
dynamic object` and the indexical sign` enables me to extend current con-
ceptions o perormatiity. I will show that it is through process or practice
that the outside world enters the work and the work casts its eects back into
the world. 1hus, I will argue that the material practice o art can transcend its
structure as representationalist representation and in the dynamic productiity
o the perormatie act, produce ontological eects.
In recognising the productie materiality o perormatiity, as a process that
produces ontological eects, I take up Olkowski`s proocation that, in some
photographs, what is created, what is thought is no longer a sign within a
symbolic system but becomes the thing itsel ` ,Olkowski 1999:208,. 1hrough
attention to the perormatie power o art, I would like to extend Olkowski`s
claim beyond photography to the ror o art. I propose that the orce o the
work o art cav, in Olkowski`s terms, become more than the medium that
bears it, so that it can transcend its structure as representation and as a sign`
,Olkowski 1999:208,. Matter is transormed in the exchange between objects,
bodies and images. In this way, I will begin to sketch the shape o a radical
material ontology o the work o art.
Performativity and Materialisation
In arguing or a productie materiality, two terms, perormatiity` and
materialisation`, become central to my proposition. In oaie. tbat Matter: Ov
tbe Di.cvr.ire ivit. of e ,1993,, Judith Butler brings these two terms to-
gether and argues that perormatiity is the ehicle through which ontological
eects are established` ,Butler in Osbourne and Segal 1994:23,. Butler is spe-
ciically concerned with the way that the perormatie speech act brings into
being that which it names ,Butler in Osbourne and Segal 1994:23,. In her
elaboration o perormatiity, Butler argues that materialisation emerges
through perormance. Materialisation is a process o sedimentation that re-
sults rom iteration or citation ,Butler 1993:15,. In her account, repetition and
recitation constitute our being in the world. It is through this productie
perormatiity that ontological eects are installed.
Butler`s theory o perormatiity is conined to the ormation o the subject
through discourse. In Butler`s thesis, there is no subject who precedes the repeti-
tion. 1hrough perormance, I` come into being. She argues that there is no
151
perormer prior to the perormed, the perormance is perormatie |and| the
perormance constitutes the appearance o a subject` as its eect` ,Butler
1991:24,. Is it possible to draw a distinction between Butler`s perormatiity and
the perormatie principle o vetbei.
In an interiew with Osbourne and Segal ,1993,, Butler distinguishes be-
tween perormance` and perormatiity`. lirstly, she proposes that while
perormance presumes a subject, the notion o perormatiity contests the ery
notion o the subject. She demonstrates this through a discussion o how
discourse produces the subject:
I begin with the loucaultian premise that power works in part through
discourse and it works in part to produce and destabilize subjects. But
then, when one starts to think careully about how discourse might be
said to produce a subject, it`s clear that one`s already talking about a
certain igure or trope or production. It is at this point that it`s useul to
turn to the notion o perormatiity, and perormatie speech acts in
particular-understood as those speech acts that bring into being that
which they name. 1his is the moment in which discourse becomes
productie in a airly speciic way. So what I`m trying to do is think
about perormatiity as that aspect o discourse that has the capacity to
produce what it names. 1hen I take a urther step . and suggest that
this production actually always happens through a certain kind o rep-
etition and recitation. So . I guess perormatiity is the ehicle through
which ontological eects are established. Perormatiity is the discur-
sie mode by which ontological eects are installed. ,Butler in Osbourne
and Segal 1994:23,
In this statement we may draw certain correspondences with leidegger`s under-
standing o throwness` ,Cerorfevbeit,. \e remember that, in this thrownness,
we get caught up in the midst o eeryday aairs. \e come to address our Being
as beings, through our dealings with the world. \e also recall that, or leidegger,
these dealings are characterised by handlability and that handlability does not
ollow upon representation ,Leinas 1996:19,. Is it possible, then, that our
concernul dealings or our handling o things can be seen as perormatie Can
we propose that Butler`s peormatiity, like handlability, inoles a non-
representationalist principle lurther, does Butler`s claim that perormatiity
contests the subject, stem rom the act that perormatiity ails to ollow upon
representation I this is so, then perormatiity could be posited as a counter-
representationalist understanding o our being-in-the-world.
152
In order to test this tentatie proposition, I wish to extend my discussion
o Butler`s understanding o perormatiity. As we hae seen, Butler suggests
that perormatiity is a re-iteratie and citational practice by which discourse
produces the eects it names` ,Butler 1993:2,. \hilst her elaboration specii-
cally addresses the way in which sex and gender are materialised, there are some
curious similarities between this and the way in which art` becomes material-
ised. Art practice is perormatie in that it enacts or produces art as an eect. lor
Butler:
Perormatiity is not a singular act`, or it is always a reiteration o a
norm or set o norms, and to the extent that it acquires an act-like
status in the present, it conceals or dissimulates the conentions o
which it is a repetition. ,Butler 1993:12,
It could be argued that artists engage with, re-iterate and question the norms
o art ,art business, existing in the socio-cultural context at a particular histori-
cal moment. Similarly, aant-garde art practice tends to conceal the conentions
o which it is a repetition. 1he re-iteration that operates in an artist`s practice
produces a naturalised` eect which we come to label as an artist`s style.
Butler`s argument that the process o materialisation stabilizes oer time to
produce the eect o boundary, ixity and surace` ,Butler 1993:9,, can be
exempliied in an artist`s style. \e can identiy a work as an Ana Mendieta`, or
a John Constable` through the sedimented or habitual style that characterises
their oeure or their body o work. lurther, the disciplinary operations o art
business encourage such repetition and re-iteration. It is to this sedimented or
habitual style, that art business` attributes alue. 1hus the sedimentation or
stabilisation that produces the eect o boundary, ixity and surace is a conse-
quence o the habit-prooking mode o discourse.
loweer, within the repetitie and reiteratie behaiour, Butler igures that
there exist possibilities or disrupting the habit` or the norm`. \ithin the
re-iteration, repetition or citation o the discursie law, too perect perorm-
ances, bad perormances, excessie perormances and playul perormances
create what she calls ,de,constituting possibilities ,Butler 1993:10,. She claims
that these perormances parody and subert norms, putting them into con-
structie crisis ,Butler 1993:10,.
Lxcessie and ironic perormances and parodic re-iterations shit the ground
o what is considered the norm. In political and artistic practices, these suber-
sie perormances hae been employed strategically. 1he aant-garde, and more
recently, eminist, queer and post-colonial practices hae actiely engaged in
153
prying open the gaps and issures produced through re-iteration, in an eort
to disrupt and to get outside or beyond the norm. Aant-garde artistic prac-
tices, in particular, hae made strategic use o too perect`, distorted`, play-
ul` and inerted` perormances in an attempt to create the new`. leminist
and postmodernist artists hae consciously taken a parodic and ironic ap-
proach in their critique o modernism and its claims to intentionality, original-
ity, genius and representation. loweer, as I argued in the conclusion to my
irst Chapter, it is possible that these sel-conscious attempts to bring about
the ruin o representation` are in themseles representationalist. 1o parody,
ironise, or perorm in a distorted way, suggests a model or category against
which to perorm. 1hrough such strategies, the work o art becomes con-
cerned with the manipulation o existing signs. lere matter, as material sub-
stance, seems to hae disappeared into discourse.
In her suggestion that matter is the eect o the stabilisation o the process
o materialisation as a ixity, surace or boundary, Butler imbricates her deini-
tion o matter in discursie structures ,Butler 1993:9,. lor her, the materialisa-
tion o matter occurs as a result o the operations o regulatory power. 1hus
she obseres that:
1he act that matter is always materialized has, I think, to be thought in
relation to the productie and, indeed, materialising eects o regula-
tory power in the loucaultian sense. ,Butler 1993:9-10,
1he regulatory power o discourse shapes what we can think and say about art
and it has material eects. loucault`s discussion o the author unction` in
\hat is an author` ,1984,, attests to this. loweer there is another materiali-
sation that seems to be excluded rom Butler`s account. In her concern with
perormatiity as the discursie mode by which ontological eects are in-
stalled` ,Butler 1994:23,, Butler seems unable to account or the materialisa-
tion that occurs in the interplay between the matter` o bodies, the materials
o production ava discourse. 1he materialisation that occurs in a material
practice, particularly in isual practice, is ar more diicult to access or analyse
than is language.
\hat makes an Ana Mendieta` or a John Constable` recognisable is not
just the materialisation o power in a loucaultian sense ,although that does
produce eects,, but also the speciicity o the particular material process that
produces, as its eect, a material work that is a work o art. 1he risk in priileging
language and discourse is the result o a conlation o to matter` and to
materialise` with meaning or signiication. Vicki Kirby argues that Butler`s
154
strategy o returning matter to the sign, allows the stu o matter to slip away
,Kirby 199:108,. Butler quite clearly admits to the problem. She acknowl-
edges that:
1o think through the indissolubility o materiality and signiication is
no easy matter. I matter ceases to be matter once it becomes a concept,
and i a concept o matter`s exteriority to language is always less than
absolute, what is the status o this outside ,Butler 1993:31,
Does this leae matter unthematised until discourse imposes some orm on
it In returning matter to the sign, what happens to the matter o bodies,
objects and the matter o materials in this materialisation Is there a space or
an act o concurrent actual production, a materialisation o matter that does
not just veav, but has real` eects
In Butler`s theorisation o matter and materialisation, Kirby inds we are
only eer dealing with the signiication o matter rather than the stu o
matter` ,Kirby 199:10,. Just when we are getting close to dealing with what
happens in the interaction between the matter o bodies, objects and materi-
als, matter eludes us. Kirby continues:
Our sense o the materiality o matter, its palpability and its physical
insistence, is rendered unspeakable . or the only thing that can be
known about it is that it exceeds representation. ,Kirby 199:108,
Despite Butler`s claims that the body bears on language all the time` ,Butler
1993:68,, she conlates to matter` and to materialise` with meaning and
thus ultimately locates her understanding o matter in signiication. She urges
that to return to matter requires that we return to matter as a sign` ,Butler
1993:49,. Kirby argues that, in this linguistic turn, matter as such slips away
,Kirby 199:108,.
1he sign`, as elaborated in Butler`s work, rests on the Saussurian notion
o the sign. Saussurian semiotics is a linguistically based model that ocuses on
the play o the signiier. In this model, where the play o signiier is priileged,
the reerent no longer plays a part and, as a consequence, matter is eaced. lor
Butler, as Kirby argues, the representation o matter is something ultimately
separable rom matter itsel ,Kirby 199:109,. lor Butler, the reerent persists
only as a kind o absence or loss, that which language does not capture, but
instead, that which impels language repeatedly to attempt that capture, that
circumscription - and to ail` ,Butler, 1993:6,. In Butler`s ramework we can
155
only know matter through the sign. 1he energy and insistence o matter can
not be accommodated.
In taking on Saussure`s notion o the sign and a psychoanalytic under-
standing o the relation between language and the real, Butler is caught in a
paradigm that can only eer conceie o the representation as a substitute, as a
sign o, or or something other than itsel. In this paradigm, the representa-
tion stands in or or signiies the thing, but can neer be the thing. According
to this model, Kirby argues, there is a loss or an absence that language is
unable to repair` ,Kirby 199:109,. In her adherence to psychoanalytic notions
o lack, Butler`s claim to inuse matter with a constitutie energy ails. Instead
she re-asserts the ineitability o logic and ideality. I beliee that we need to
return to the energetic potential o matter i we are to disrupt the ineitability
o the logics o loss, ideality and language. In order to adance my argument
or a productie materiality that acknowledges the insistent and energetic po-
tential o matter, I wish to contrast Butler`s understanding o perormatiity
with that o Deleuze, as deeloped in 1be ogic of ev.e ,1990, and le
Stuttered` ,1994b,.
A Radical Lingual Performativity
Butler and Deleuze draw on speech act theory to deelop their respectie
ideas o the perormatie. Butler looks to Searle and Austin, whilst Deleuze
ocuses on Austin alone. 1hough both are concerned with the power o the
perormatie to perorm the actions they name, each has deeloped quite a
dierent understanding o perormatiity. In her preoccupation with gender
ormation, Butler priileges the discursie eect that language has on produc-
ing subjects. lence in her ramework, perormatiity is the discursie mode
by which ontological eects are installed` ,Butler in Osbourne and Segal
1994:23,. Deleuze, on the other hand, goes beyond the discursie. lollowing
Austin, his interest is in positioning bodies in a ield o orces` ,Olkowski
1999:22,. lere, perormatiity inoles the body becoming language rather
than merely being inscribed by language. 1hus whilst Butler is concerned with
signiication and meaning, Deleuze takes up the orceul and transormatie
potential o language and suggests that it is through process or practice that
perormatiity eects a deormation at the leel o matter rather than orm.
Deleuze`s elaboration o repetition or re-iteration takes us on a trajectory
that is suggested but not ollowed through by Butler`s theorisation. lis com-
mitment to an ontology o change, and interest in creatie practice, has re-
sulted in a productie turn not enisaged in Butler`s model. \hilst, or Butler,
156
repetition is repetition o the norm, repetition o the same, Deleuze argues
that repetition produces only the same o that which diers` ,Deleuze
1990:289,. lor Deleuze, repetition is not repetition o the same, or equialence
to a norm. Rather repetition or re-iteration is ound in the intensity o the
dierent` ,Deleuze 1990:289,.
Repetition produces only the same o that which diers`. 1his phrase
hightlights the critical dierence between Butler and Deleuze. \hilst, or But-
ler, there is no I` prior to the perormance, perormatiity aoe. produce the
eect o boundary or ixity. lor Deleuze, on the other hand, each perormance,
each repetition inoles dierent intensities, dierent lows, and dierent con-
nections so that each repetition is aray. a singular behaiour. Deleuze draws
on literature and art to support his assertion. In his analysis o Pierre
Klossowski`s e ovffevr, Deleuze points to the character Roberte as exempli-
ying this intensie singularity. As he notes, Roberte designates:
An intensity` in hersel, she comprises a dierence in itsel, an in-
equality, the characteristic o which is to return or to be repeated. In
short, the double, the relection, or the simulacrum opens up at last to
surrender its secret: repetition does not presuppose the Same or the
Similar-these are not its prerequisites. It is repetition, on the contrary,
which produces only the same` o that which diers, and the only
resemblance o the dierent. ,Deleuze 1990:289,
Such an intensie singularity is not just the domain o iction. 1he intensity o
the dierent operates in artistic repetition. lollowing Deleuze`s line o reason-
ing Olkowski notes that it is counterproductie to speak o an artist`s work in
terms o stylistic unity. Rather, she notes that while a series may resonate in
relation to one another, there is no genus or species drawing them together as
the unitary style o an integrated person` ,Olkowski 1999:209,.
Butler`s articulation o re-iteration ails to take into account the dierences
in intensities, lows and connections that produce dierence in its singularity.
In her description, re-iteration is a process o sedimentation. Sedimentation
produces strata or ixity. ler ocus on the regulatory unction o perormatiity
tends to underplay its capacity to engender transormation. In Deleuze`s con-
ception, re-iteration and repetition can be iewed both as a regulatory moe-
ment towards molarisation, and as a destratiying moement that inaugurates
moement and transormation. In his account, there is necessarily and simul-
taneously, the operation o the double articulation between stratiication and
destratiication. 1he dynamic relation between bodies-language inaugurates
15
this double moement. Deleuze applies Klossowski`s term lexion` to ac-
count or this productie relation between bodies and language.
Ilexion
lor Deleuze, lexion is that act o language which abricates a body or the
mind . language transcends itsel as it relects the body` ,Deleuze 1990:25,.
In lexion, Deleuze proposes, there is a double transgression that occurs in
both language and in lesh:
I language ivitate. bodies, it is not through onomatopoeia, but
through lexion. And i bodies imitate language, it is not through
organs, but through lexion.. In lexion, according to Klossowski,
there is a double transgression-o language by the lesh and o the
lesh by language. ,Deleuze 1990:286,
1he body that writes and is simultaneously written suggests a mutual relec-
tion between bodies and language. As a double transgression between bodies
and language, lexion is a monstrosity` which eects de-ormation at the
leel o matter rather than orm.
In Deleuze`s ontology o change, monstrosity is where, the bottom rises
to the surace, the grid is eaced, modelling is deeated, and orm is destroyed`
,Olkowski 1999:1,. 1he grid to which Deleuze reers is the plane o organisa-
tion ,the social ormation and the world o the Saussurian sign,. \hen the
grid is eaced, the diision between language and the body disappears. In
Deleuzian terms, this is the molecular dimension o the double articulation
between molar and molecular. \here molecular becomings are inoled, the
body comes to bear on language. Matter is at work at the molecular leel.
In an article entitled, 1he Cunning Lingua` o Desire: Bodies-language
and Pererse Perormatiity` ,1995,, Carolyn Chisholm brings Deleuze`s un-
derstanding o lexion to an analysis o Kathleen Mary lallon`s noel !orivg
ot ,1989,. She argues that in !orivg ot, lallon puts language to work to
produce an erotically charged, eicacious languaging that perorms rather than
merely represents. 1his erbal play is inaugurated through a series o incanta-
tions between loers:
ya wannabit a the old mons enis hey
abituataste u the old monso eneseo she`s a nice
drop hey wanme to go a a bit u a tit a tit wi ya
158
clit hey a bit atheoldbluetongue between the
leggings lass want a bitu a tonguing where it counts
do ya sheila
aw playin possum are we. ,lallon 1989:84-5,
In this linguistic perormatiity, Chisholm suggests that lallon uses language
to enact a double transgression in which language exceeds itsel as it relects the
body. In this monstrous` setting-in-motion o language, language tran-
scends its structure as representation.
Chisholm`s discussion o !orivg ot begins with Le Sedgwick`s posi-
tion on lingual perormatiity. In Sedgwick`s ersion o perormatiity, her
indebtedness to Butler is eident:
Certain utterances ,perormaties,, do not merely describe, but actually
perorm the actions they name . language can really be said to pro-
duce eects o identity, enorcement, seduction, challenge. ,Sedgwick
quoted in Chisholm 1995:22,
Chisholm inds Sedgewick`s deinition limited to the eects o discourse. Like
Julia Kristea and Deleuze, Chisholm is concerned with the somatic dimen-
sion o language.
1
In order to moe beyond the limits o discourse and
representation, Chisholm extends the deinition o lingual perormatiity to
include the mutual relection o bodies and language. In conceiing o
perormatiity as the mutual relection o bodies and language, Chisholm
suggests that lallon`s lingual perormatiity is carnal. According to Chisholm,
lallon is a cunning lingamist` who employs lingual perormatiity to eect
erotic action. She terms this lingual perormatiity cunning lingua`. lor
Chisholm, cunning lingua is a register o language which has the orce o
action:
Cunning lingua is not so much a signiier or signiying system, which
stands in as a linguistic ,or discursie representatie,.. Cunning lin-
gua is not representatie o anything, rather it is an eicient and eica-
cious simulacrum, neither an abstract symbol nor a real organ, but a
word-thing-act, a prosthesis composed o erbal matter, capable o
orming, touching and arousing lallon`s interlocutors. ,Chisholm
1995:24,
Cunning lingua does not only operate in the discursie domain, that is, the
regime o knowledge-power. It also operates through a register where there is
159
a mutual relection between bodies and language. In taking a somatic turn,
Chisholm challenges Butler`s notion o discursie perormatiity. She con-
ceies lallon`s cunning lingua in terms o Deleuze`s conception o
perormatiity and lexion.
1he world o lallon`s !orivg ot is an intense world inhabited by orces,
lows, intensities and elocity. It is a passional domain, where according to
Guattari, polysemic, animistic, and transindiidual subjectiity can be ound
equally in the worlds o inancy, madness, amorous passion and artistic crea-
tiity ,Guattari 1995:101,. It is a space where words no longer merely signiy
but also possess a orce that enables moement and transormation. lallon
writes:
I was only a orce last night you know I lost my
body my sex my humanness the heart knew nothing
o the onslaught-just a orce-graity momentum
whatnot I was maleolent and ecstatic. ,lallon 1989:84,
Lingual perormatiity bursts its own limits and exceeds Butler`s notion o
linguistic perormatiity. \orking with Deleuze`s notion o lexion, Chisholm
proposes that lallon engages in a word-thing-act, in which language exceeds
its own structures in a radical perormatiity` ,Chisholm 1995:25-26,. 1he
perormatie undoes the sign. Olkowski suggests that:
1he perormatie is the motion that inaugurates . ariations in lan-
guage, or the perormatie is both language and body, it is simultane-
ously corporeal insoar as it actualizes something in bodies, it inoles
the actions and passions o bodies, it is doing by saying. ,Olkowski,
1999:229,
1his i. working hot`.
Deleuze argues that, in the disequilibrium that is produced through the
radical perormatiity o lexion, the system birucates and language itsel can
be seen to ibrate and stutter` ,Deleuze 1994b:24,. Stuttering` is a term Deleuze
uses to describe the situation where:
1he stutter no longer aects pre-existing words, but, rather itsel ush-
ers in the words that it aects, in this case, the words do not exist
independently o the stutter, which selects and links them together. It
is no longer the indiidual who stutters in his speech, it is the writer
160
who .tvtter. iv tbe avgvage .y.tev ,avgve,: he causes language as such to
stutter. ,Deleuze 1994b:23,
\hen Deleuze talks o stuttering as the limit o language he eokes an out-
side, not as something external to language, but rather as the possibility o an
ovt.iae of language. 1he ibration and stuttering o the language occur in the
interaction o the matter o a body with the language system. 1his dierent
alency shits the notion o perormatiity rom one in which the body is
iv.cribea by language to one where the body becove. language. In this
reconceptualisation, the sign is pulerised by the rhythms and pulsions o the
body. Deleuze suggests that:
Just as the new language is not external to the language system, the
asyntactic limit is not external to language, not outside o it. It is not a
painting or a piece o music, but a music o words, a painting with
words, a silence within words, as i the words were not disgorging
their content-a grandiose ision or a sublime audition. 1he words
paint and sing but only at the limit o the path they trace through their
diision and combination. ,Deleuze 1994b:28,
Deleuze requently uses isual and musical metaphors in his elaboration o
the literary arts. In his iew, writers paint with words whilst the words them-
seles paint and sing ,Deleuze 1994b:28,. loweer, Deleuze`s understanding
is not exclusiely metaphoric. le argues, that in literature, linguistic
perormatiity inoles setting language in motion so that it comes to per-
orm rather than merely describe.
A Stranger in Language
In his writing on creatiity, Deleuze is particularly concerned with how the
writer achiees this transiguration in language. lis elaboration relates to what
Chisholm has described as the linguistic perormatiity o the artist` ,Chisholm
1995:25,. \here the writing becomes a orce, it eects transormation at the
leel o matter. According to Deleuze, such a moement is molecular. \here
language begins to stutter, notes Deleuze, the writer becomes:
A oreigner in his own language: he does not mix another language
with his, he shapes and sculpts a oreign language that does not pre-
exist ritbiv his own language.. 1he point is to make language itsel
cry, to make it stutter, mumble or een whisper. ,Deleuze 1994b:25,
161
162
It is not just the isual perormatiity o the artist that has the capacity to
make the isual language stutter. According to Andrew Benjamin, matter in
itsel achiees this disruption o isual narratie. In his article, Matter`s Insist-
ence: 1ony Scherman`s avqvo`. vvera` ,1996,, Benjamin examines how tech-
nique and the materiality o the paint, work to undercut the narratie claims in
the series avqvo`. vvera. le argues that the materiality o the medium pro-
ides an insistent orce within the images. lere, Benjamin distinguishes be-
tween paint`s presence and the materiality o paint. According to Benjamin,
paint`s presence constitutes the way the content is ordered and presented and,
as such, it is inextricably linked to the meanings we derie rom a work ,Benjamin
1996:4,. Materiality, on the other hand, is the insistence o the medium
within the operation o the work`s meaning` ,Benjamin 1996:4,. Benjamin
argues that it is the operation o matter that causes the disruption o the
traditional categories o interpretation. Materiality produces the isual stutter
which disrupts isual language and isual narratie. le suggests that paint
works by staging an appearance. In staging an appearance, matter insists.
Benjamin`s elaboration o the orceul eects o matter in the work o
painting, returns us to leidegger`s insistence that matter ,bye, is core.pov.ibe
or the work o art. In arguing or a productie materiality in the work o art,
I would contend that it is in the interaction between the matter o bodies,
objects and the materiality o the paint that a isual stutter is eected. Accord-
ingly, matter`s insistence does not only include the materiality o the medium,
but also includes the matter o the artist in a graphic perormatiity and the
matter o the thing itsel. 1he becoming present` that Benjamin identiies
inoles a co-emergence or a vetbetic perormatiity. It suggests a material
ontology o the work o art.
1owards a Productive Material Account of the Work of Art
I asked Anne-Marie Smith i she would sit or a portrait. At irst she had
some reserations:
My irst reaction was I thought that at the time I was being asked out
o politeness, that nobody would want to do a portrait o me, so I
should reuse politely. And then when I was asked again and then I
realised there was some real interest there, I elt a bit scared. I was a bit
nerous, quite nerous about being pinned down in one place, in one
spot and somebody actually getting hold o me. I was giing some o
mysel away. ,Anne-Marie Smith in interiew with Barrett, lebruary
1990,
163
Anne-Marie`s reaction to haing her portrait painted raises questions about
the relationship between an artwork and its reerent. lor Anne-Marie, the act
o sitting or a portrait inoled a risk. 1he danger o being captured in paint
eoked the ear o actual capture or loss. 1he belie that some trace o her
could be taken and transerred into the portrait, that she would somehow be in
the portrait, suggests that or Anne-Marie an image does not just stand in or,
or represent her. 1he portrait comes to embody her being in some way. lor
Anne-Marie, a portrait is perceied as an act in which representation has the
potential to transcend its structure as representation. \here representation
transcends its own structure, claims Deleuze, it enacts the mutual relection`
o body and language` ,Deleuze quoted in Chisholm 1995:25,. In this tran-
scendence, representation disappears. I this is the case, and it i. in many
cultural contexts, the portrait is not just a representation o a person, or an
object or humans as .vbiectvv. It actually becove. the person in some peculiar
way. As Lucien lreud obsered to Laurence Gowing, I would wish my por-
traits to be of people, not ie them. Not haing the look o the sitter, being
them` ,lreud quoted in Gayord 1993:22,.
Anne-Marie`s ear and Lucien lreud`s proocation, question the unda-
mental premise that pre-determines contemporary understandings o the image
as representation. In Chapter One, I raised the idea that according to a
representationalist mode o understanding, the world is reduced to a schema
or model. In this schema, as in an enraming mode o reealing, eerything is
reduced to the status o an object or a .vbiectvv. In Chapter 1hree, I demon-
strated urther, that where the orm-matter structure is coupled with the sub-
ject-object relation, representation possesses the conceptual machinery that is
hard to escape. \here this mode o thinking dominates our understanding
o Being, it threatens to drie out all other possibilities. In this context, is it
possible to take the statements o Lucien lreud and Anne-Marie Smith as
more than mere igures o speech \hilst the claim, that there can be a mutual
relection between imaging and reality in Indigenous Australian ritual prac-
tices, is beginning to gain some currency in academic discourse, the suggestion
that this understanding has consequences or western cultural practices is less
comortable. low does western culture respond to the challenge that an image
just might transcend its own structure as representation
1ranscendence or transiguration raises questions concerning the power o
the image. In the Luropean world, it was initially through religious debates
concerning the power o ritual objects and images, that such questions were
addressed.
2
1he debate that has shaped contemporary western understandings
o the power o the image crystallised around the Catholic and Protestant
164
understandings o the meaning o the sacrament. 1he Catholic understand-
ing o the sacrament was grounded in the notion o transubstantiation, that
is, a belie in the transormatie power o the image. Protestant liturgy, on the
other hand, stresses the symbolic role o the sacrament. lor Catholics, conse-
cration o the wine and bread enacts a transormation o the wine into the
blood o Christ and bread into the body o Christ. In the Protestant church,
on the other hand, there is no transormation. According to Protestant liturgi-
cal practice, the consecrated wine stands in or the blood and the consecrated
bread stands in or the body. \ine and bread are ascribed symbolic alue only.
1he diergence in thought between Luther and Calin is critical in elaborat-
ing this undamental distinction. Luther belieed that the word was powerul
enough to transorm the element into the sacrament. lis belie in the
transormatie power o the sacrament was in keeping with the Catholic tradi-
tion o transubstantiation. Calin, on the other hand, denied any possibility
that there could be transormation between matter and spirit. lans Belting
argues that, or Calin, the separation between God and the world, between
spirit and matter, was irreersible, and the spirit was imperious to all sensu-
ous or personal experience` ,Belting 1994:466,. lere we can contrast Calin`s
iew with a Pythagorean vetbetic understanding. In Calin`s thinking, there is
no permeability in the passage between the diine and the human, or any
possibility that this passage could be traersed. 1here could neer be a vetbetic
or productie perormance o ritual. Belting notes, that Calin preached the
bread was only a sign, which, like all signs, can neer actually become what it
merely signiies. 1he Body o Christ is thus only a igure o speech`` ,Belting
1994:466,.
During the Reormation, the Catholic understanding o the power o
images, exempliied in the notion o transubstantiation, was dislodged by the
mode o thought that posited images as substitutes or signs that stood in or
objects. In iew o this paradigm shit, the image came to be conceied o as
a sign. It no longer had the power o transcendence, but came to stand as a
substitute or representation o its object. In this historical shit, representa-
tion has become conlated with the sign. Viewed as a sign, a representation can
only stand in or or represent an object or humans as .vbiectvv. Gien this
conlation, I would like to return to representationalism and reconsider the
conceptual machinery` that this iew o representation has at its command.
I we add the sign-unction to the orm-matter structure and the subject-
object relation, we can begin to understand why representationalism is so ery
hard to dislodge as tbe mode o thinking Being. In Chapter 1hree, I suggested
that, when conceied as a sign, art was reealed in its equipmental-being as
165
equipment or communicating. I also suggested that where the equipmental
being o the work o art dominated, it threatened to drie out all other possi-
bilities o Being. In the sign-being` o the image, it can be argued, that the
possibility o a transormatie-being o the image has been elided. In place o
the transormational power o the image, we hae come to understand the
image as a ehicle through which social meanings and signiications circulate.
Its unction is primarily inormational and communicatie.
In this ocus on the equipmental or sign-being o an image, it is assumed
that the isual is irst and oremost a language that can be decoded in the same
way as erbal and written language. James Llkins suggests that, according to
this iew, isual representation is conceied o as a sign or complex o signs
that coneys social meaning. 1his conlation between the isual and the textual
has produced a speciically isual semiotics parallel to the linguistic model
,Llkins 1998:9,. 1his conception o the isual image as a sign system or a
isual language has resulted in the application o the tools o semiotic analysis
to both isual images and written texts equally. Visual images become discur-
sie productions or texts` which can be decoded or read`, to reeal their
social meanings. Such an approach to isual images has enabled us to map
how art comes to mean in a social context. O critical importance is the way in
which such a methodology has enabled a mapping o the way power works
through discourse. In this way, the work o art has been reed rom its dimen-
sion as the expression o an artist`s genius, and placed irmly within the realm
o the social. 1he isual image, like a erbal text, becomes a play o signs.
loucault demonstrates how sign-work moes us on rom those aestheticist
theories o art that alorise the artist as genius`. Image making, like writing
has:
lreed itsel rom the dimension o expression. Reerring only to itsel,
but without being restricted to the conines o its interiority, writing is
identiied with its own unolded exteriority. 1his means that it is an
interplay o signs arranged less according to its signiied content than
according to the ery nature o the signiier. \riting unolds like a
game ,;ev) that inariably goes beyond its own rules and transgresses
its limits. In writing, the point is not to maniest or exalt the act o
writing. ,loucault 1984:102,
Underpinning this interpretation o writing as play o the signiier, is de
Saussure`s linguistically based model o semiotics. In ocusing on the signiier
and its play, Saussurian semiotics brackets out the object o representation ,the
166
reerent, and ignores the material production o the work. loucault`s ,1983,
reading` o Ren Magritte`s image, 1be 1rea.ov of !vage. ,1928-9,, in his book
1bi. i. òt a Pipe, shows how the interplay o signs unolds like a game. In a
playul linguistic game, loucault demonstrates the play o signiiers and the
subsequent bracketing out o the reerent. 1his` is not a pipe. A picture o a
pipe is not a pipe, nor does the combination o the letters p-i-p-e make a pipe.
loucault`s reading teases out the conundrum produced in the interaction be-
tween image, text and reality. le argues that the representing ,the sign, is quite
separate rom the object o representation ,its reerent, and this representation
takes on a lie o its own in the play o the signiier. Cei `è.t pa. vve Pipe is not
a pipe.
1he game that loucault plays with Magritte`s painting 1be 1rea.ov of !vage.,
exempliies the textual,linguistic turn in contemporary isual research. Accord-
ing to James Llkins, the semiotic analysis o images, depends on suppressing
the semiotic nature o marks in order to proceed with readings that hinge on
narratie` ,Llkins 1998:4,. loweer, he asserts that, pictures are dierent rom
texts. Llkins argues that what is at stake here is nothing less than the pictorial
nature o pictures` ,Llkins 1998:13,. 1hus he claims that what needs to be
recognised is that graphic marks are simultaneously signs and not signs` ,Llkins
1998:45,. 1ony Bond is in agreement with Llkins`s proocation. le asserts that
while semiotic analysis may hae proided us with the tools or unpicking the
social text` embedded in the image, it is seldom sensitie to the sensory eect
o materials that engage bodily memory` ,Bond 1998:1,. Lqually, literary criti-
cism does not bring us closer to the poetry or sound sense o writing, or as we
remember the equipmental-being o a work does not bring us any closer to the
work-being o the work.
Materialising Practices
low can we engage the sensory eect o materials that actiate bodily memory
i we become so caught up in the play o signiiers low can we address Anne-
Marie Smith`s concern that a painting might contain some o her being in its ery
abric \hat i there were a dynamic relationship between the object and its
image, instead o merely a relationship o substitution and play Bryson urges
art historians to deelop a theorisation that conceies o orm in dynamic terms:
As matter in process, in the sense o the original, pre-Socratic word or
orm: rbvtbvo., rhythm, the impress on matter o the body`s internal
energy, in the mobility and ibrancy o its somatic rhythms, the body o
labour, o material practice. ,Bryson, 1983:131,
16
\hat is required to enable such a theorisation low can we conceie o a
dynamic relation between a conception o orm that is concerned with the
mobility and ibrancy o somatic orms and matter in process I, as Llkins
argues, graphic marks can be understood as objects that are simultaneously
signs and not signs` ,Llkins 1998:45,, then what is the character o such marks
In order to address this challenge, I wish to return to Oscar \ilde`s noel,
1be Pictvre of Doriav Cray. In the narratie, Dorian Gray, a young man o great
beauty, is asked to sit or a portrait by the artist Basil lallward. As the story
unolds, a transormation occurs whereby the representation transcends its
own structure as representation and takes on the lie o its subject. \hile the
character Dorian Gray retains his youth, the painted image o Dorian begins to
age and distort. 1here is a transmutation between the materiality o the body
o the sitter and the materiality o the painting.
1he transormation is ushered in by Dorian`s erbal wish that he would
remain beautiul while the painting grew old:
low sad it is! I shall grow old, and horrible, and dreadul. But this
picture will remain always young. It will neer be older than this par-
ticular day o June.. I it were only the other way! I it were I who
was to be always young, and the picture was to grow old! lor that-or
that-I would gie eerything! \es, there is nothing in the whole
world I would not gie! I would gie my soul or that. ,\ilde 1980:34,
Dorian could not enisage that his words could eect or perorm his utterance.
\et as the image undergoes a transormation, Dorian`s rational belie in the
separation between the representation and reality is undone:
Surely his wish had not been ulilled Such things were impossible. It
seemed monstrous een to think o them. And, yet, there was the
picture beore him, with the touch o cruelty in the mouth. ,\ilde
1980:34,
\hilst his own ace remained lawless and beautiul, the ace on the canas
became scarred with the eents and traesties o Dorian`s lie. In this narratie,
Dorian`s speech act proed to be perormatie. It set something on its way
into arrial.
My argument here can be easily dismissed as mere illustration. 1be Pictvre of
Doriav Cray is just a noel and its story is no more than a able with a moral on
168
anity and class priilege. loweer, in light o my preious discussions o
perormatiity, perhaps the relationship between real bodies and imaging is
more powerul than customarily belieed. Does the speech act hae the power
to bring into being that which it names Can the image take up this challenge
and transcend its structure as representation Austin`s work on speech act
theory suggests that the perormatie does possess this potency. As we hae
seen, the perormatie speech act does hae the ability to enact or produce that
which it names.
Is it possible to make the same claim or isual imaging Is isual imaging
perormatie in this sense Can it enact or produce that which it images
Georges Bataille has argued that the unction o representation commits the
ery lie o those who take it on` ,Bataille quoted in \ilson 1996:23,. In
\ilde`s narratie, Dorian Gray`s ate becomes inextricably tied to his portrait,
to the image o him. I the unction o representation does commit the ery
lie o those who take it on, then perhaps isual representation takes on a ery
dierent alue rom what is currently belieed in contemporary art theory and
history.
1he suggestion that the material practice o art has real material eects and
there could possibly be a mutual exchange between the matter o bodies and
the image o bodies, has limited currency in western art history and theory. 1o
argue such a position is to cast into doubt the identity o the sign and the
generally held iew that there is a gap between the sign and its reerent. It
questions the assumption that representation is always ,and only, mediated.
Instead we are presented with the possibility that the image may actually be in
a dynamic relation with matter. According to such a thesis, it could be argued
that the image is not a substitute, a sign o or or something other than itsel,
rather the act o imaging has the power to materialise the acts o matter.
1hought this way, image making could be posited as a productie materiality
or a vetbetic perormatiity.
1he Matter of Iact
Reiguring the relationship between the image and the reerent raises ques-
tions about the production o an image. I there is a dynamic relationship
between the reerent and the representation, what is the relationship between
the maker and the work low do we apprehend the space o interplay be-
tween the artist, the reerent, materials and the image low do we theorise this
relationship without reducing it to the circulation o signs or reerting to
expressionist notions o art
169
In 1be Pictvre of Doriav Cray, the artist Basil lallward comments that, in
making the painting, he had betrayed too much o himsel, gien too much
away. le muses:
\hether it was the Realism o the method, or the mere wonder o
your own personality, thus directly presented to me without mist or
eil, I cannot tell. But I know that as I worked at it, eery lake and ilm
o colour seemed to me to reeal my secret. I grew araid that others
would know o my idolatry. I elt, Dorian, that I had told too much,
that I had put too much o mysel in it. ,\ilde 1980:94,
In this statement a number o possible interpretations can be put orward. \e
could interpret lallward`s statement within the ramework o Realism. As a
method o working Realism still retains a certain priilege as a mode o imaging
that produces a true` re-presentation o reality. As a true representation o
reality, lallward`s painting may hae reealed an instance o truth. Secondly,
we could bring Lxpressionist interpretations to bear upon his statement.
According to Lxpressionist theories o art, lallward may be igured as ex-
pressing his own personality or his inner essence` on the canas.
loweer, neither the Realist nor the Lxpressionist interpretations o art sit
comortably with contemporary theories that embrace semiotics and social
constructionism. According to the latter, there is no original` to be copied,
nor is there any inner essence` to be expressed. lrom the position o discur-
sie theories o art, both Realism and Lxpressionism are seen to produce
reality eects` rather than haing any substance in act. A reality eect, accord-
ing to Judith Butler, seres to produce the eects o its own reality ,Butler
1991:21,. 1hus Realism is the eect o discourses o Realism and Lxpression-
ism the eect o discourses o Lxpressionism. Neither hae any substance in
act. According to such a critique, Basil lallward misrecognises reality eect or
reality.
loweer, there may be another way to conceie the reelation that occurs at
the leel o the lake and ilm o colour. 1he directness o the ace-to-ace
contact between Dorian Gray and Basil lallward, without mist or eil, sug-
gests an encounter that exceeds the eects o discourse. 1he reelation that
occurs at the leel o the lake and ilm o colour` gies an indication that
lallward had insinuated himsel materially as a trace in the painting. It sug-
gests a material exchange or transmutation that short circuits or transcends the
social. 1he exchange occurs at the leel o what Barthes terms priva vateria, that
is, what exists prior to the diision operated by meaning` ,Barthes 1988:166,.
10
In his article Representation`, \.J.1. Mitchell argues that according to the
expressie aesthetic, the aesthetic object does not represent` something, ex-
cept incidentally, it is` something, an object with an indwelling spirit, a trace
in matter o the actiity o the immaterial` ,Mitchell 1995:16,. I am coninced
by the suggestion that the aesthetic object is something, as well as representing
something. In Mitchell this is-ness` is a trace o the actiity o the immaterial
ov matter. Like Mitchell, Bryson is also interested in the dynamic relationship
between orm and matter. loweer, in his explication o this dynamism, he
makes it clear that, in this relationship, matter is not eloquent. It is the impress
ov matter o the body`s internal energy, in the mobility and ibrancy o its
somatic rhythms`, that constitutes the body o labour in material practice
,Bryson 1983:131,. lor Bryson the material practice o painting deries rom
the dynamism o human labour ,Bryson 1983:13,. 1hus painters are:
Agents operating through labour on the materiality o the isual sign,
what must be recognised is that crucial term labour, work o the body
on matter, transormation o matter through work.,Bryson 1983:150,
My understanding o the is-ness` o the work o art, contrasts somewhat
with Mitchell and Bryson`s conceptions. In both Bryson`s and Mitchell`s inter-
pretations, I worry that matter is not eloquent. In their igurations matter
remains mute, a surace to be inscribed by human energy. Rather than this is-
ness` being a trace in matter or an impress on matter, I want to suggest that
this inoles a scripturing resulting rom the actiity o matter itsel. Instead
o orm being imposed on matter, matter becomes a scribe. lere matter
becomes language.
As I hae already noted, Benjamin gestures to the insistent actiity o
matter in his article Matter`s Insistence`. In his distinction between paint`s
presence and the materiality o paint, Benjamin proides us with the means to
be able to dierentiate between materialisation at the leel o social meaning
and the materialisation o matter. In identiying paint`s presence as the way
content is ordered and presented, Benjamin reers to the paradigmatic selec-
tion and the syntagmatic organisation o elements in a painting. 1he way that
isual elements are selected and organized enables us to read social meaning in
the work o art. Materiality, on the other hand, is the operation o the energy
o matter in a work. lor Benjamin, it is the insistence o the medium within
the operation o the work`s meaning` ,Benjamin 1996:4,. In this distinction,
he makes it clear that matter is eloquent. Just as the mobility and ibrancy o
the human body`s somatic rhythms are eident in the artwork, so too is mat-
ter`s insistence elt. 1hus, the is-ness` that Mitchell reers to, is not a trace iv
11
matter or an impress ov matter`. It is a trace o the actiity o matter itsel, both
human and non-human. lere, I want to return the Deleuze`s notion o
perormatiity and argue that in process, the body becomes language rather
than merely inscribed by language.
In an article 1he \isdom o Art` ,1988,, Roland Barthes supports such a
ecund perormatiity. le obseres that in the alchemical mix that constitutes
the work o art, the materials exist as matter, een i some meaning comes
out o the painting` ,Barthes 1988:16,. 1hus, he continues, pencil and colour
remain as things`, as stubborn substances whose obstinacy in being there`
nothing . can destroy` ,Barthes 1998:16,. le exempliies the power o
being there` or the is-ness` o this act` in relation to Cy 1wombly`s work:
Beore eerything else, there happens . some pencil strokes, oils,
paper, canas. It is a act. 1wombly imposes his materials on us not as
something that is going to sere some purpose, but as absolute mat-
ter, maniested in its glory . the materials are vateria priva, as or the
Alchemist. ,Barthes 1988:16,
Such obserations concerning the insistence o matter may proide a clue to
Llkins`s assertion that pictorial images are simultaneously signs and not signs.
1he degree to which an image is a sign marks its place in the discursie order o
things. loweer, I hae proposed that images cannot be contained within the
discursie rame. 1he not-sign` materiality o the image deorms the sign.
Materiality is matter`s insistence.
A Monstrous Performativity
In western philosophy and western art, as I hae argued, it is ery diicult
to think outside the paradigm in which representation is conceied as a gap, an
absence or, as Kirby says, a not here` or not now`. low can we enisage
representation as an act o concurrent actual production 1o think through the
indissolubility o materiality and signiication` is, as Butler has obsered, no
easy matter ,Butler 1993:31,.
loweer, this diiculty is not uniersal. \e hae examined how, in Indig-
enous Australian culture, no such gap exists. lor Indigenous Australians,
ritual actiities produce reality. 1hus increase or ertility rituals inole a pro-
ductie materiality. 1he perormance o ertility rites is not representational,
but productie. In rhyming the rhythms o the landscape and the body, mean-
ing and reality are constituted in the perormance. I, in a vetbetic perormatiity,
12
there is no gap to be crossed or absence to be illed, then perhaps Kirby is right
when she asserts that matter is more articulated than imagined ,Kirby 199:14,.
Kirby deelops her thesis on the articulateness o matter in 1eivg e.b: 1be
vb.tavce of tbe Corporea ,199,. In a chapter entitled Corpus Delicti: 1he Body
as the Scene o \riting`, Kirby argues that the Saussurian elaboration o the sign
represses matter. She proposes that we need to return to the matter and insists
that there is an intertwining o substance and representation. She claims that the
body is unstable - a shiting scene o inscription that both writes and is written`
,Kirby 199:61,. ler discussion o dermagraphism-the autographic capacity
o the skin-demonstrates a monstrous` perormatiity, an intertext that
implicates the body in the sign. 1his discussion demonstrates the eect o
energetic matter.
In her analysis o Charcot`s experiments with hysterics in the Salptriere in the
late nineteenth century, Kirby demonstrates that the stu o matter is not mute,
but is transormatie and transormed. Charcot`s medical experiments inoled
hypnosis. In these experiments, erbal directions to hysterical patients` inaugu-
rated a series o corporeal transormations. She cites an eyewitness account by
Barthlmy who describes how the patients came to perorm Charcot`s instruc-
tions corporeally. Barthlmy obsered that in ront o a medical audience:
A patient is hypnotized: the doctor writes his own name on the patient`s
orearms with a rubber stylet and issues the ollowing suggestion: 1his
eening, at 4 pm, ater alling asleep, you will bleed rom the lines that I
hae drawn on your arms`. At the appointed time, the patient obliges.
1he characters appear in bright relie on his skin, and droplets o blood
rise in seeral spots. ,Didi-luberman quoted in Kirby 199:5,
Kirby suggests that dermagraphism demonstrates a capacity o the body to
sign itsel ` ,Kirby 199:59, and not just be written upon. In this radical
perormatiity, the word literally becomes lesh. Ideality and materiality are en-
meshed and empowered . |in| what Derrida might call an inscriptie eicacy, a
writing together o traces`` ,Kirby 199:55,.
1he implication o Kirby`s analysis is proound. It suggests that the body
simultaneously writes and is written in a transormatie and material producti-
ity. Kirby airms this when she comments that the image could be said to
rewrite the image-maker in a moement o production` ,Kirby 199:61,. 1his
claim-that an image could be said to rewrite the image-maker-returns us to
1be Pictvre of Doriav Cray. lor Dorian, it was monstrous to think that his wish
13
could be ulilled, yet, there was the picture beore him, with the touch o
cruelty in the mouth` ,\ilde 1980:34,. 1he monstrousness that Dorian
encounters bears out Kirby`s claim that the monstrous elasticity o the body,
demonstrated by demographism, includes the tissue o the body in the
sensible textile o an arche-writing`` ,Kirby 199:56,.
1hese obserations bring into doubt the separation o sign and reerent
and pose continuity between the work o art and the artwork. I there is
continuity, then perhaps it is possible to argue that an image can exceed its
structure as representation in a radical material perormatiity where it per-
orms rather than stands or its object In the perormatiity o lexion, the
body writes and is simultaneously written. lere, as we hae seen, the notion
o perormatiity shits rom one in which the body is inscribed by lan-
guage, to one where the body becomes language. 1his proposition raises
two inal questions: \hat might a radical material perormatiity actually
look like in the making o work \hat consequences might such a process
produce
1he Shape of a Materialist Ontology of the Work of Art
In a materialist ontology o the work o art, materialisation is not just
enacted discursiely. More radically, through material and somatic processes,
materialisation implicates the lie o matter. \hilst or Butler, language and
materiality are embedded in each other, are chiasmic in their interdepend-
ency` ,Butler 1993:69,, representation is necessarily a language eect`. In her
linguistic turn, materiality is disempowered and robbed o its insistence.
Representation is reduced to the ,Saussurian, sign, the play o signiiers.
loweer, we must also remember Llkins`s iew that graphic marks need to
be understood as objects that are simultaneously signs and not signs` ,Llkins
1998:45,. \here the pictorial nature o pictures is at stake, isual images
exceed the sign as it is commonly understood. Pictures veav, but also they
are, they are both signs and a materialisation o matter.
low do we experience a work as both an act o concurrent actual produc-
tion and a sign Charles Sanders Peirce`s concept o semiosis proides me
with the conceptual tools to think through this question. 1hrough his elabo-
ration o the dynamic object`, Peirce shows how, through process, the
outer world enters into semiosis. 1ogether with his account o the causal
relationship between a sign and its reerent in the indexical sign, Peirce`s
theorisation enables me to deelop and shape a materialist ontology o the
work o art.
14
1he Dynamic Object and Matters of Iact
Preiously I hae demonstrated the limits o Saussurian semiotics or a
materialist ontology. In primarily being concerned with the play o the signiier,
Saussurian semiotics omits the process o making-both how signs are made
and the relation between signs and a reerent. 1heresa de Lauretis attests to this
inadequacy when she argues that:
1he arbitrary nature o the linguistic sign caused semiology to extend the
categorical distinction between language . and reality to all orms and
processes o representation, and thus to posit an essential discontinuity
between the orders o the symbolic and the real. ,de Lauretis 198:39,
In the application o semiology to isual representations, the discontinuity be-
tween the symbolic and the real has been carried oer. John liske argues that the
key term missing in this translation is eect` ,liske 1990:51,. C.S Peirce`s semiol-
ogy, with its elaboration o the dynamical object and the indexical sign, addresses
the Saussurian omission o eect.
Like Saussure, Peirce agreed on the centrality o the sign. loweer whilst
Saussure`s roots in linguistics led him to ocus on the relationship between the
signiier and the signiied, Peirce is interested in the relationship between signii-
cation and the material world. 1his concern is explored through an examination
o the connection between a sign and its reerent. lirstly, he is interested in the
way the outer world enters semiosis. Secondly, he is concerned with the dynami-
cal relationship between sign and reerent. James Llkins`s claim that graphic
marks can be understood as simultaneously signs and not signs` ,Llkins 1998:45,
becomes more explicable in the light o Peirce`s elaboration o semiosis. lor
Peirce, as de Lauretis obseres, the outer world enters into semiosis at both ends
o the signiying process: irst through the object, more speciically the dynamic
object,` and second through the inal interpretant` ,de Lauretis 198:39,. \hat
contribution does the idea o the dynamic object make to the task o deeloping
a materialist ontology o the work o art
Peirce dierentiates between the dynamic object and the immediate object.
Operating in the realm o ideas, the immediate object is the object as represented
or denoted. 1he dynamic object, on the other hand is external to the sign.
Umberto Lco, writing on Pierce, elaborates this distinction in the ollowing way:
Signs hae a direct connection with Dynamic Objects only insoar as
objects determine the ormation o a sign, on the other hand, signs only
15
know` Immediate Objects, that is meanings. 1here is a dierence be-
tween tbe ob;ect of rbicb a .igv i. a .igv and the ob;ect of a .igv: the ormer
is the Dynamic Object, a state o the outer world, the latter is a semiotic
construction. ,Lco 199:193,
Deined this way, Peirce`s immediate object operates within the sphere o social
meanings. 1he dynamic object, on the other hand, deies such discursie struc-
tures.
1he assertion that the dynamic object is a state o the outer world seems at
odds with its determining quality, that is, with its capacity to eect the ormation
o the sign in some way. loweer this is not the case. Peirce argues that the
dynamic object is an insistent orce which puts pressure on, and deorms the
sign. In an account o Peirce`s dynamic object, Anne lreadman notes that its
dynamic energy or orce has the capacity to surprise:
Surprise is the counter to predictability, the always already known, the
only thing with the power to change our minds,signs,theories, the as-
yet-unsaid impinging on the talked-oer, the site o discontinuity and
the place or questions. ,lreadman 1986:101,
In isual terms, this is the as-yet-unseen ,in Llkins`s terms, the unpresentable,
the unpicturable, the inconceiable and the unseeable,, impinging on the seen
and represented. lere, we again witness reerence to the ield o orces that
operate on bodies. 1he dynamic object operates as a pressure on, or pulse in, the
see-able.
3
1he insistence o the dynamic object, constitutes a key energy or orce
in the work o art. 1hus, a picture is not just the coded, immediate object. A
picture also bears the pressure o the dynamical object. In this way, the dynamic
object preents the picture rom being reduced to just a sign.
Peirce`s theory o semioisis and transormation is predicated on this pressure
rom outside the immediate object. In his iew, we lie in two worlds, a world
o act and a world o ancy . we call the world o ancy the internal world, the
world o act the external world` ,Peirce 1931:160,. \ere it not or the garment
o contentment and habituation`, Peirce continues:
A person would ind his internal world rudely disturbed and his iats
set at naught by brutal inroads o ideas rom without. I call such
orcible modiication o our ways o thinking the inluence o the
world o act or eperievce ,Peirce 1931:160,.
16
Peirce`s act` is to be understood in a ery speciic way. Like leidegger`s act`,
Peirce`s use o the term act bears no relation to logic or rationality. \here
leidegger`s understanding o act relates to throwness ,Cerorfevbeit,, Peirce`s
act also pertains to our being-in-the world. Although he reers to ideas rom
without, his act` is not the act o conceptual thought, nor is it a sign. lact`
is the eect o the dynamic object insinuating itsel into our being and conse-
quently into our perormatie presentations, showings and maniestations.
1hus, in our imaging the dynamic object insists that its presence is elt. Its
pressure and ibrations erupt as the work o art. lact is the pressure o matter
as sensation.
\e hae come across this the link between act` and sensation` beore in
reerence to lrancis Bacon`s paintings.
4
In the Sylester interiew, Bacon reers
to the brutality o act`. lor him, the brutality o act is where painting is
returning act onto the nerous system in a more iolent way` ,Sylester
1988:59,. Similarly, in 1he \isdom o Art`, Barthes eokes act as vateria
priva, as or the Alchemists. 1he vateria priva is what exists prior to the dii-
sion operated by meaning` ,Bryson 1988:166,. It is as matter that the dynamic
object insists.
lrancis Bacon`s reerence to the brutality o act does not relate to iolence in
painting, but rather is concerned with the iolence o paint. It is the way paint`s
materiality comes to aect us as beings. Bacon conirms this when he contends
that this iolence has nothing to do at all with the iolence o war. Rather the
iolence o paint is inseparable rom its direct action on the nerous system
. it has nothing to do with the nature o the represented object` ,Bacon in
Deleuze 2003:25,.
In her article, 1he Violence o Paint`, Pareen Adams attempts to account
or Bacon`s notion o the brutality o act in psychoanalytic terms. \hilst her
concluding remarks support Bacon`s claim that what is at stake is not iolence
but paint, Adams proposes that, in Bacon`s paintings, the iolence o act is a
consequence o the detachment o the gaze rom ision ,Adams 1993:58,. She
argues that in this detachment, the spectator`s relation to the image is dis-
turbed |and| the illusion o wholeness has been, as it were, castrated` ,Adams
1993:55,.
1he disturbance that Adams details has correspondences with Peirce`s claim
that a person`s internal world is rudely disturbed and his iats set at naught by
brutal inroads o ideas rom without` ,Peirce 1931:160,. But can we attribute
this brutality to notions o castration and lack Castration assumes a cut or
1
loss. Adams`s argument, like Butler`s, is underpinned by psychoanalytic no-
tions o desire as lack and detachment as loss. In this understanding, as we
hae seen:
1he reerent persists only as a kind o absence or loss, that which
language does not capture, but instead, that which impels language
repeatedly to attempt that capture, that circumscription-and to ail.
,Butler 1993:6,
1hus where Adams poses synaesthetic mobility as being attributable to the
detachment o the gaze, I am more inclined to pose this synaesthetic mobility
as a consequence o the prolieration engendered by the pressure o acts.
lere, I return to Chisholm`s productie word-thing-act, where act inoles
the abandonment o the specular arena o the split subject or the aural
|isual,tactile,oral| medium o bodies-language` ,Chisholm 1995:36,. Like
Chisholm, I would abandon the castrated and castrating eye,I` or the pleni-
tude o act.
Bacon alludes to this when he argues that the task o an artist is to set a trap
by which you hope to trap this liing act alie` ,Bacon in Sylester 1988:5,.
Czanne also subscribes to this in his proclamation that I hae a hold o my
moti ` ,Czanne quoted in Merleau-Ponty 1993:6,. lor him, act had to be
caught alie in a net` ,Merleau-Ponty 1993:6,. \hile both artists betray a
modern representationalist will to mastery, they beliee that act should lie on
in a painting. lor Czanne the act materialized within him. 1he landscape
thinks itsel in me . and I am its consciousness` ,Czanne quoted in Merleau-
Ponty 1993:6,. 1hus, rather than asserting his will to mastery, Czanne aban-
doned himsel to the chaos o sensation ,Merleau-Ponty 1993:63,.
Czanne`s method o working and his doubt about his ability to realise his
little sensations, reeal something o the relationship between the dynamic
object and the immediate object or the mental representation. 1he expectation
o wholeness, that Adams claims is disturbed or the spectator in the detach-
ment o the gaze rom ision, is not necessarily the expectation o the maker.
1here is no uniied ield o ision or the artist who is immersed in acts.
Instead, each moment o seeing and marking is a dierent moment, a dier-
ent sensation and a dierent realisation o act. Merleau-Ponty notes that in
abandoning the treatise o his training to map the world anew, Czanne pur-
sued reality with no other guide than the immediate impression o nature,
without contours, with no outline to enclose the colour, with no perspectial
or pictorial arrangement` ,Merleau-Ponty 1993:63,. Czanne`s suicide was to
18
open him sel continually to act. In doing so, his internal world was continu-
ously disturbed by the ideas rom without. \e are once again reminded o
leidegger`s conception o createdness. In opening him sel to act, Czanne
became like a passageway. le was open to the creatie process and in this
openness he allowed the work-being o the work to emerge.
Merleau-Ponty`s obseration-that Czanne pursued reality with no other
guide than the immediate impression o nature-also takes us back to Deleuze`s
notion o aceicity ,ri.ageite,. \e recall that, when painting operates through
dispersion, it escapes the outline and orms part o an intensie series ,Deleuze
1986:88-89,. 1he intensie series o little sensations and colouring sensations
in Czanne`s watercolours exempliies the operation o aceicity. 1hese little
sensations produce intensity. Accordingly, they produce a point o departure
in a passional line in the process o sweeping away to realness`` ,Deleuze and
Guattari 198:18,. Bois`s description o Czanne`s touch supports this con-
tention:
Czanne`s touch was the bridge between his pigment and the sub-
stances, orms, and the spatiality o the world.. It was what allowed
him to conceie his paintings as worlds under construction, similar-
in their mode o existence or our perception-to nature itsel.. 1o
look at a Czanne . is to see simultaneously its molecular surace and
the depicted object in the act o germinating under our ery eyes. ,Bois
1998:39,
In Bois`s reerence to the depicted object there is a resonance with Peirce`s
immediate object. Simultaneously, we become aware o its molecular surace
in the act o germinating under our ery eyes. 1his molecularity or
molecularisation is the elt pressure o the Peircian dynamic object.
1hrough Czanne`s paintings, we become aware that a picture is not sepa-
rate rom its production. A picture emerges simultaneously, as both a sign and
not a sign. 1his dynamic relation igures material practice in terms o co-
emergence rather than mastery. In a co-emergent practice, matter is not im-
pressed upon, but rather matter enters into process in the dynamic interplay
through which meaning and eects emerge. A picture emerges in and through
the play o the matter o objects ,the dynamic object,, the matter o bodies,
the materials o production and the matter o discourse. It is not just a play o
signs.
19
1hrough reerence to Peirce`s elaboration o the dynamic object, I hae argued
that isual practice is an act o concurrent actual production which produces an
image that is both a sign and a not sign`. \et it remains to be seen how this
productiity is materialised as a trace or index in the work itsel. I the act` is
alie, where is the eidence o this in a isual work low can we map its eects
Performative Indices
Peirce`s categorisation o signs as iconic, symbolic and indexical opens the
sign to an exteriority that allows or the eect o the dynamic object. In Peirce`s
trichotomy, the icon represents its object by irtue o likeness, the symbol repre-
sents objects by irtue o a rule or conention or code, and the index represents
its object by irtue o being really aected by it ,Greenlee 193:0,. In this
system, it is the index, with its dynamical relation to its object that opens the sign
to the dynamic object.
1he dynamical quality o the indexical sign can be exempliied through atten-
tion to the use o complementary colours in a painting. In Gauguin`s painting,
efportrait ,1889,, or example, red daubs o paint come together iconically to
represent an apple. In western culture, a red apple in a painting will also tend to
be read symbolically. According to Christian symbolism, the red apple signiies
temptation. \et, there is also a third leel at which the red apple engages corpo-
really with the iewer. 1his palpability has nothing to do with its iconic or
symbolic alue. It inoles the indexical quality o the paint and the effect that
this has on the iewer. 1he juxtaposition o the red and green in the painting
creates a ibration that hits us bodily. 1hus the optical eect o complementary
colours is one example o the dynamism o the index.
Brigid Riley`s optical paintings could also be seen in terms o the dynamism
o the index. lere, as with the optical eect o complementary colours, the
causal relation needs to be theorised in terms o sensation and the body. Deleuze
conirms this when he argues that colour, as sensation, is an embodied phe-
nomena. le comments that:
Colour is in the body, sensation is in the body, and not in the air. Sensa-
tion is what is painted. \hat is painted on the canas is the body, not
insoar as it is represented as an object, but insoar as it is experienced as
sustaining this sensation. ,Deleuze 2003:23,
Peirce`s indexical sign, with its causal relation between the thing and its sign,
points to a way o considering the matter o things-the matter o objects, o
180
the body in process and the matter o the work. 1he index does not produce
meaning in the same way as the symbol.
5
1he index has real material eects. It
allows us to witness the orce o materialisation. It is the actual modiication o
the sign by the object that gies the index its quality ,Peirce 1955:102,. 1his takes
us beyond the sign to the acts o matter.
\hilst the indexical quality o cultural objects has been central to many non-
western cultures, such interest has waxed and waned in western culture. In many
non-western societies, the power o the index is neer disputed ,1aussig, 1993,.
In early Christian and medieal societies, there was also a belie in the eectie
orce o the index. 1he eneration o the brova of 1vriv and other religious
relics exempliies the belie in the power o images. loweer, as I argued earlier
in this Chapter, the conceptual machinery o representationalism has robbed the
image o this potential. 1he belie in the power o images, and consequently the
orce o the index was dislodged by a mode o thought that posited images as
substitutes or signs that stood in or their object.
Despite this shit in mode o thought, there has been a renewed interest in
the indexical sign in twentieth century art. 1his reial has become eident in
contemporary art`s use o objects in, and as the work. Artists hae come to
replace illusionism` with the real thing`. In particular, indexical elements pro-
ide the key to the being o collage, assemblage, perormance art and eniron-
mental art. Cornelia Parker`s installation, Coa Dar Matter: .v poaea 1ier
,1991,, is an exemplary example o such uses o the index. loweer, this resur-
gence o interest tends to be accompanied by a ery dierent belie structure
rom that which was eident in medieal society.
In A Paradigm Shit in 1wentieth Century Art` ,1998,, 1ony Bond argues
that the twentieth century engagement with the index has produced a paradigm
shit in contemporary art practice. le traces this engagement to two dierent
impetuses. lirstly, he argues, that interest in the index was stimulated by an
aant-garde reaction to the crisis in mimetic representation. As a result o this
crisis, artists came to use real objects and elements instead o illusionism. Sec-
ondly there has been a renewed interest in medieal belies in the orce o the
index. In medieal religious art, as Bond obseres, the medieal icon could
unction as a holy object with spiritual power oer and aboe its pictorial,iconic
content. I the medieal icon contained a piece o the cross or part o a bone or
a saint, contact with it could delier real eects` ,Bond 1998:2,.
Picasso`s collages exempliy the aant-garde engagement with the index. In
his collage, a ve ;Ca.. ava otte of ve) ,1912,, or example, the bottle label
181
ve` is taken rom an actual bottle o ve.
6
In this case, the signiier is also the
reerent. loweer, whilst the use o indexical elements in his collages may enrich
the social meanings that a iewer can gain rom the work, Picasso does not claim
that the index carries with it any power other than its symbolic richness. 1his
contrasts with contemporary work that in some way acknowledges a medieal
belie in the orce o the index. Lcological eminist art practices-or example the
work o Ana Mendieta-and shamanistic tendencies-such as in the perorm-
ances o Joseph Beuys-exempliy this second impetus.
1he dierence between twentieth century aant-garde applications o the
index, and shamanistic and eco-eminist attention to the index points to quite a
dierent understanding o the power or orce o the index.
1he latter, as Bond

points out, is grounded in the medieal belie in the power o the index. In a
secular culture, where the work o art no longer is ascribed such power, is it
possible to re-instate the image with a dynamical orce akin to the relic
1he Power of Imaging
Peirce`s elaboration o the index helps us to address this question. Peirce irst
used the notion o the index to theorise the relationship between the photo-
graph and its object ,lreadman 1986:9,. 1he link between the photograph and
the reerent has been complicated by darkroom and digital manipulation, but
there remains, particularly in amily photographs, a belie in the existence o the
reerent. In asserting this link with the reerent, Olkowski makes the comment
that:
In certain photographs, those that are loed, the act that the photo-
graph is literally an emanation o a real body, that light is the carnal
medium, that the image is extracted, mounted, expressed by the action
o light and the body touches me with its rays, attests to the act that
what I see is a reality and not the product o any schema. ,Olkowski 1999
209,
Actiating Barthes` notion o the pvvctvv, Olkowski argues that it is the pvvctvv
that proide this expansie orce in a photograph.
8
She contends it is this orce
that becomes more than the photographic medium that bears it so that what
you see, what is created, what is thought is no longer a sign within a symbolic
system but becomes the thing itsel ` ,Olkowski 1999:208,.
1his assertion raises some interesting questions or contemporary photo-
graphic practices, particularly photo-documentary. Gien the expansie orce o
182
the punctum, could the photo-documentation o Ana Mendieta`s perormance
work become more than a sign that stands in or the perormance Miwon
Kwon`s claim that these photo-documents are souenirs`, is based on a notion
o loss-the missing body iv the image and the missing eent of the image`
,Kwon 1995:10,. lollowing Olkowski, I would argue dierently. I would pro-
pose that, rather than being markers o loss, the souenirs o Ana Mendieta`s
land,body works can burst the boundaries o their medium and actually be-
come what Mendieta claimed or them, ater-images`.
In photography, we can explain the trajectory rom the reerent to photo-
graph by reerence to the physics o light. Photography is indexical. 1here is a
direct causal link between the reerent and the photograph. In collage the reerent
can become identical with the sign. \hat o a realistic or mimetic painting \hat
is its relation to the reerent
I hae already proposed that mimetic painting can exceed its status as a sign
and become the thing in some way Drawing on Peirce`s elaboration o the
dynamic object and the indexical sign I hae argued that a dynamical relationship
between the immediate object and the dynamic object implicates the acts o
matter. I now want to turn to Peirce`s deinition o the sign to question the
standing in or` that tends to characterise the contemporary critique o mimetic
imaging, since in this relationship painting comes to be seen as representationalist.
Peirce deines a sign or representatum as something which stands to some-
body or something in some respect or capacity.. 1he sign stands or some-
thing, its ob;ect` ,Peirce 1932:135,. 1o stand in or` and to stand or` are to be
understood dierently. \ith respect to mimesis, the object has been assumed to
be what Pierce terms the immediate object, that is, the idea or mental representa-
tion that is already a semiotic construction. 1his assumption precludes the dy-
namic object, since it is outside the sign and, as Butler points out, we cannot
know this outside. lor Butler we can only eer talk about the sign o the matter,
since matter ceases to be matter once it becomes a concept. In a similar way, it
seems that the object ceases to be an object once it becomes the idea o the object.
In the slippery world o signiication, the dynamic object is elided and we can
only deal with the sign o objects. Moreoer, according to this paradigm, the
reerent can only persist as a kind o absence or loss ,Butler 1993:6,. According
to such conceptualisations, the painting can only stand in or its object, it can
neer be it.
At the leel o the reception, the work o art tends to be limited by such a
mode o thinking. It blocks other modes o apprehension. At the leel o
183
practice, this mode o thinking encourages the suppression o the deictic or
indexical mark in aour o meaning and signiication. 1hus, Llkins obseres
that, semiotic accounts tend to gloss oer marks in aour o the scenes
themseles` ,Llkins 1998:3,. 1he not-sign` in the picture goes unremarked. In
this relation, the painting is reduced to representation and its equipmental-
being as sign orecloses other possible modes o Being.
Attention to the selection and organisation o iconic and symbolic ele-
ments within a painting-or what Benjamin calls paint`s presence-allows us
to describe the painting and ascribe meaning to it. loweer, what new insights
can we gain i we shit our ocus to take into account the materiality o the
paint as well as paint`s presence \hat i the sign is open to the energies and
orces o matter, the matter o objects, bodies and materials
\e are in the habit o asking the question as to how meaning is mediated
by paint`s presence, but are less inclined to ask how paint`s presence is mediated
by materiality. I want to put a dierent spin on Peirce`s ob;ect. I would suggest
that this some-tbivg, is not just the immediate object, which is already an idea,
but also includes the dynamic object, and thus operates at the leel o matter
as well as at the leel o orm.
Bois ,1998, tries to get at this thing`, in his analysis o Czanne`s paint-
ings. In his quest to understand the change in the dynamics in Czanne`s
paintings, Bois contrasts Czanne`s late watercolours with his paintings o the
Coviarae period. O the late watercolours he would claim that the works are
themseles lungs . they breathe` ,Bois 1998:39,. In contrast, he notes that
the heay acture o the Couillarde` period, although strictly atomic, could
only preent . transparency and luidity` ,Bois 1998:39,. 1hey were breath-
less. le suggests that, in these earlier works, there was a struggle to work
something that was yet to be unconcealed. Bois describes this as a contradic-
tory anticipation o |a| method which he could not yet enision` ,Bois 1998:39,.
In Czanne`s struggle to realise, there was something` that had not yet
materialised. It was not as yet constituted as a sign. In the interplay between
the moti, the matter o Czanne`s body, the materials o production and
cultural knowledges, this something was in process. 1he painting becomes a
dissembling presence, rather than a representation or a sign. In this concep-
tion, the painting cannot be reduced to a sign, but cav become more than its
medium can bear. 1he work breathes. 1hus, Bois makes the comment that the
late watercolours o Czanne are lungs. 1hey breathe ,Bois 1998:39,.
184
1his materialisation recalls Butler`s claim that matter is always materialised
,Butler 1993:9,. loweer Butler`s exhortation that to return to matter re-
quires that we return to the matter as a sign` ,Butler 1993:49,, situates matter
within the world o already-constituted language and meaning. \et, this is not
where we can locate Czanne`s struggle. As Bois points out, during his Coviarae
period, Czanne was unable to enisage what he was doing and where this
might lead ,Bois 1998:39,.
1he breath in Czanne`s paintings brings us back to Deleuze`s understand-
ing o the mutual relection between bodies and language. It is also suggestie
o Norman Bryson`s elaboration o deixis. According to Bryson, the deictic
marker is resered or utterances that contain inormation concerning the
locus o utterance` ,Bryson 1983:8,. It is utterance in carnal orm` ,Bryson
1983:88,. 1he indexical sign or deictic marker thus links us back to the making
and allows us to consider the trace or index o both human and non-human
actors. Deleuze`s notion o lexion, the Peircian index, Bryson`s deictic marker
and Benjamin`s materialisation, suggest that there is a relation between matter
and materialisation. Materialisation is an eect` that points directly back to
the dynamic object and the external world, both the materials and the body o
labour. It is no longer merely an absence that the sign attempts to ill. Rather
it is the eect o the productiity that occurs in the interaction between the
dierent bodies in labour. lere bodies are both human and non-human.
Working Hot
I hae noted that each artwork exempliies or eokes a particularity or singu-
larity. low do we explain that some works hae a lie and breath, whilst others
are heay and breathless Not eery painting or drawing is so productie that
it breathes or becomes, as Bois puts it, simultaneously a molecular surace and
the depicted object in the act o germinating` ,Bois 1998:39,. lere I want to
turn to Benjamin`s analysis o 1ony Scherman`s painting ecate a. tag ,1994,.
In his reiew, Benjamin questions whether the painting comes to perorm
lecate a. stag. 1he central problem, as Benjamin sees it, is whether the paint`s
presence and the materiality o the paint can achiee the transiguration whereby
it becomes-present a. Stag.
Not eery work, or eery work o one artist, yields a productiity that i.. It
is not an easy matter to produce an intensie series that is transormatie. In
the heat o practice, the body has the potential to become language and the
work may take on a lie o its own. loweer, nothing can guarantee such
isual perormatiity, or predict it in adance. Visual and lingual perormatiity
185
inole a complex interaction o orces and energies. Some days are hot and
some are not. Moreoer, the moment the logic o practice is interrupted by the
logic o contemplation, the intensity o work changes. 1he molecular low
solidiies into a molar mass. Consciousness interenes and representational
thinking can take oer rom the logic o practice. In this mode o apprehen-
sion, rhythm gies way to conscious reiteration. 1he breath goes out o the
work. lere the danger exists that the work becomes an illustration o an idea,
not a realisation o little sensations`. It becomes representational rather than
perormatie. Perormatiity is inextricably tied to a dynamical relation be-
tween the matter o bodies and objects. In this ery sense, the perormatiity
o the work o art is a consequence o thrownness or being-in-the-world.
1he perormatiity o practice is a central paradox in art practice. In the
creatie act, the artist may no longer set the world beore her,him as an object,
but rather becomes a passageway which allows or a total openness to the
essence o art. leidegger`s understanding o thrownness is central to the
trajectory taken here. \e recall that, in its thrownness, Da.eiv has the propen-
sity to transcend the existing situation. 1his propensity to go beyond, notes
Leinas, does not hae the character or a plan established beorehand` ,Leinas
1996:25,. It is not representational, nor is it accessible to contemplation. In the
heat o the moment, possibility is seized in its ery possibility. 1he crucial
moment o understanding, that is the work o art, happens in this being
thrown towards one`s own possibilities and in the realisation o small sensa-
tions. \orking hot is this crucial moment o understanding.
Art is a Performative Practice
In this Chapter, I hae argued that lie gets into painting through what
Peirce has termed the dynamic object`. 1his relation is a dynamical ,including
spatial, connection both with the indiidual object, on the one hand, and with
the senses or memory o the person or whom it seres as a sign` ,Peirce
1955:10,. I we accept that the index stands in dynamical relation to its object,
I beliee that we can argue that the work o art can exceed its limits as represen-
tation and become more than the medium that bears it. lurther, I would
suggest that this materialisation inoles a mutual relection rather than a one-
way causality.
Deleuze`s notion o lexion allows us to extend our understanding o the
perormatiity o creatie practice, to include the possibility that there cav be a
vvtva relection between bodies and language. In the perormatiity o lexion,
the body writes and is simultaneously written. In this way just as lie gets into
186
images, so imaging also produces reality. According to this proposition the
material practice o art can transcend its structure as representation and, in the
dynamic productiity o the perormatie act, produce ontological eects.
It is through such obserations that we can return to Martin leidegger`s
remark that the artist remains inconsequential as compared to the work, al-
most like a passageway that destroys itsel in the creatie process or the work
to emerge` ,leidegger 19b:166,. In the creatie act, the artist no longer sets
the world beore her,him as an object, but rather allows a total openness to
the Being o art, that is the work` o art. 1his openness is expressed in
Czanne`s claim that the landscape thinks itsel in me . and I am its con-
sciousness` ,Merleau-Ponty 1993:63, and in Petyarre`s obseration that the
old women are also holding their country as they dance` ,Voight 1996:221,. In
this way I beliee we can begin to understand that art is a perormatie not a
representational practice.
18
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
L
ie imitates art` is a throw away line used when we are aced with an
inexplicable situation where eeryday lie seems, in some uncanny sense,
to exceed what we normally expect o reality`. At such a time, we may
doubt what we hae witnessed or experienced. \et, we rarely inquire urther into
our sense o the bizarre relationship between reality` and art. .rt eyova Repre
.evtatiov: 1be Perforvatire Porer of tbe !vage embarks on such an inquiry. \orking
rom experiences that hae risen in my art practice, I hae addressed some o the
instances where there appears to hae been an odd exchange or mutual transmu-
tation between imaging and reality.
As praxis, this book has proceeded in its and starts. At times it has moed at
a great pace, with ideas tumbling oer one another and jostling or space. At
other times the work has been laborious. It has taken paths already taken beore
and has traersed them painstakingly. Initially I was preoccupied with the need to
moe tactically so as not to create a picture` and make a representation o
practice. I elt I had to take care that I didn`t become too sel-conscious or
representationalist in my eort to bring about the ruin o representation`.
loweer, as we hae seen, the praxical engagement with tools, materials and
ideas produces its own kind o sight. Such knowing occurs at the leel o hands
and eyes and operates in a dierent register rom the representational paradigm
o I`-as-subject in relation to mere objects. In the lux o practice, acts and
decisions occur in the heat o the moment and not as the result o rational logic.
In this space art produces eects o a ery dierent order to that o mere repre-
sentation. It is here that the relationship between lie and art may be considered
anew. In the dynamic productiity o practice, imaging doesn`t merely represent
reality. 1hrough a monstrous perormatiity, images leak into the world and
produce it in some unorseen way. 1his is the power o the work o art.
It is through leidegger`s notion o handling that we come to understand
that moement i. a condition within practice itsel. At the leel o hands and
188
eyes, the artist works in relation to tools and materials, producing a moement
away rom representationalism. 1hrough a return to the relations o artistic
practice, I hae demonstrated that the artist`s relation to her,his tools is not
one o mastery, nor is it instrumental. 1he relations o care and responsibility
that characterise artistic practice inole a particular responsieness to, or con-
junction with other contributing elements that make up the particular art
ensemble. 1hrough leidegger`s notion o concernul dealings and my own
practice as an artist and writer, I hae come to understand that through our
dealings with tools, materials and ideas, we are co-responsible or allowing the
emergence o art. It is through this dynamic and productie relation that art
emerges as a reealing. 1he work o art i. this moement.
1he problem or artists in a contemporary technocractic era, is that we be-
come so ocussed on creating and marketing artwork that we orget we hae a
responsibility or the emergence o art. As a result o the domination o art by
art business, I hae wondered whether it is still possible to make art. In the
world o art business it is so easy to become caught up in an enraming mode
o reealing. lere, our materials and tools become means to an end. In the
contemporary world it ery diicult to experience art in its poitic mode since we
are constantly in the process o making it or exhibition, promoting it, analys-
ing it and writing about it. In all these multiarious actiities, the work o art
tends to be reduced to its equipmental-being. loweer, I hae come to under-
stand that it is through proce.. that we can escape such instrumentalism. In
handling our materials and our ideas, the work asserts itsel and speaks. Proc-
ess lits us out o the molar ield o instrumentalist logic into the molecular
ield o the logic o practice. lere art is reealed in its poitic orm.
\hilst art may once hae been iewed as the priileged site o poitic reeal-
ing this no longer holds. I art is to be an essential and necessary part o being,
then it is in the midst o beings that art must happen. 1hus, i in our eeryday
lie we are open to possibility, such day-to-day practices as cooking and eating
may be poitic rather than instrumental. lere, lied embodied experience is the
element in which art thries. In our contemporary technocratic society, art is no
longer contained within the proince o art business. Art has been brought
into the midst o lie.
In the early Chapters o this book I took up leidegger`s notion o art as
reealing. loweer, as I proceeded, I began to worry that this notion o
reealing is grounded in Lurocentric and Lnlightenment understandings o
our being-in-the-world. \hilst leidegger`s theorisation o the reealing po-
tential o the work o art goes beyond representationalism, it continues to
189
CONCLUSION
operate within Lnlightenment modes o thought. lis positioning can not
accommodate the possibility that the perormatie potential o images in-
oles a productie materiality. In my experience as an artist working in the
blinding glare o Australian light, I came to understand that ontological expe-
riences are situated. leidegger`s conception o light reers to a Luropean expe-
rience and he maintains a Descartian binary between the ontic and the onto-
logical. In conceiing o art as a reealing, his ontology ails to take into account
a dierent experience o light and the way in which the ontic and the ontologi-
cal are co-emergent. My experience o the Australian sunlight has led me to
question the undamentalism o leidegger`s earlier work.
In my endeaour to show the way in which the ontic and the ontological are
co-emergent and to open up the possibility o a materialist ontology o the
work o art, I drew on my experience o working in the glare o the Australian
sunlight. 1hrough this, I hae been able to demonstrate that the co-emergence
o the ontic and the ontological is dierential and relational and that art as
reealing is culturally mediated. An examination o the cultural practices o
Indigenous Australian artists allowed me to establish a material basis or this
dierential and relational ontology. lollowing the work o Paul Carter, I acti-
ated the term vetbei. to account or the radical material perormatiity o
Indigenous Australian cultural productions. \hat emerges in and through
vetbei. is a dierent sort o practice and a dierent politics o practice. Just as
hammering in a workshop shows up the web o signiicant relations, so in
vetbei. a pattern begins to emerge rom amongst the shiting shapes o
relational ontologies. 1he process o vetbei. allows us to recognise how it is
that there is a transmutation between art and lie. It is concerned with the
eritable material productiity o the perormatie act.
In the concept o vetbei. there emerges the possibility or articulating an
embodied theory o practice that takes into account the matter o bodies and
objects. Such a materialist account o creatie practice questions our customary
ways o thinking about the work o art. In a world where the conceptual has
become the dominant ramework inorming both isual arts practice and its
reception, my argument may seem at odds with preailing iews. loweer,
my earlier discussions o handling and handlability, suggests that any attempt
to separate the conceptual rom the material is problematic. 1he conceptual
artist, who conceies o a work, but does not physically crat it still handles`
ideas. Our concernul dealings with ideas constitute the work o philosophy
and theory as art. lence the practice o conceptual` art operates in the same
way as the concernul dealings with brushes, paint, canas and ideas or objects
in painting. 1he claim that certain orms o art, or example, conceptual art,
190
only address the brain and rationality, whilst other orms act directly on the
nerous system, seres to reinorce the Descartian mind,body split. Since the
brain i. part o the nerous system, such a separation o the conceptual rom
material or bodily processes creates a alse dichotomy. 1he practice o art is
always embodied. My argument that there is potential or a transmutation
between imaging and reality in the work o art, holds as much or conceptual
art as it does or literature or material practice such as sculpture or drawing.
In the carnal acts between bodies ,human and non-human,, the work o
art exceeds its own structures in a radical perormatiity. In the heat o practice,
the body has the potential to become language and the work may take on a lie
o its own. 1hrough process, the outside world enters the work and the work
casts its eects back into the world. \e are quite literally moed.
Such a materialist ontology oers both an ecological and ethical challenge to
contemporary technocratic conceptions o the work o art. It sets in place a
dierent conception o isual practice and isual aesthetics. Practice becomes
imbricated in culture as an alternatie mode o representation. In setting out a
materialist ontology o the work o art, I hae suggested that we can set the
work o art in motion to take us to a place other than where we usually are.
191 NO1LS
NO1LS
Chapter J: 1ranscending Representationalism
1
Donald Brook`s article was initially entitled On the Ontology o Visual
Representation`.
2
Martin leidegger makes the obseration that we irst arrie at science as
research when and only when truth has been transormed into the certainty
o representation. \hat it is to be is or the irst time deined as the
objectieness o representing, and truth is irst deined as the certainty o
representing in the work o Descartes` ,leidegger 19a:134,.
3
1he iew that representation is a relection o reality has been oerturned
and its successors hae in turn been oerturned. lrom being a relection,
representation mutated into a system o signs which constructed reality
and was then oerturned by the dissimulation o simulacra which, at least
in Baudrillard`s world, expelled reality altogether. In this re-presentation is
oerwhelmed by simulations. See Baudrillard ivvacra ava ivvatiov ,1994,
4
See Norman Bryson`s 1i.iov ava Paivtivg: 1be ogic of tbe Cae ,1983,, or
an extensie discussion o the natural attitude` and the essential copy`.
5
1he Age o the \orld Picture` was originally published in orege
,1950,. In this thesis I am reerring to the text published in translation in
1be Qve.tiov Covcervivg 1ecbvoogy ava Otber ..ay. ,19a,. 1he translator
or this edition is \illiam Loitt. 1hat the ersion I read is in Lnglish and
not German is signiicant in terms o Derrida`s discussions o representa-
tion and translation. I do not read or speak German and thus what I am
dealing with is a representation o 1or.tevvg.
6
leidegger argues that the eent in which the world becomes a picture
occurs simultaneously with the eent o man`s becoming .vbiectvv in the
midst o that which is` ,leidegger 19a:132,.
Michel loucault ,192, also attributes representationalism to Descartes,

although he identiies a dierent periodization.
8
1he root o mathematics is vatbe.i., meaning ore-knowledge.
192 AR1 BL\OND RLPRLSLN1A1ION
9
leidegger`s use o the generic term man` to denote human beings is
problematic. loweer because o the complexity o the argument, I hae
ollowed other commentators and hae maintained this usage in the irst
Chapter o the book.
10
Judoitz proposes that, in Descartes, the unknown must always be
already igured or represented in the order o the known ,Judoitz 1988:5,.
11
Latour`s ocus on the precise practice and cratsmanship o knowing is
supported by loucault`s discussion o the interdependency o science and
technology in 1be Oraer of 1bivg. ,190,. lor both thinkers, it was this
interdependency that changed the way knowledge was made and hence the
way the world was understood. lor example, it was the coming together
o science and technology in the inention o perspectie that enabled
man to place himsel at the centre.
12
In Latour`s thinking, immutable mobiles play a crucial role in the practice
and politics o persuasion. 1hey are representations. As representations,
they are the ehicles used to bring others oer to a particular point o iew.
In his ery speciic concern with inscriptie processes, he demonstrates
how people argue with one another using paper, signs, prints and dia-
grams ,Latour 1986:3,.
13
loucault`s archaeology o knowledge addresses the general space o
knowledge, its conigurations, and the mode o being o things` ,loucault
190:xxiii,. Latour suggests that it is in Di.cipive ava Pvvi.b ,199, that
loucault`s analysis o the operation o discursie and disciplinary practices
comes closest to his own notion o inscriptions.
14
1he link between inscriptions and market economics has long been
debated in the isual arts. In his article 1he Sublime and the Aant-garde`
,1984b, Lyotard shows how the quest o artists to bring the unknown
into the known, or present the unpresentable, becomes complicit with
market economics. Lyotard`s criticism o the collusion between market
economics and the aant-garde deries rom the aant-garde`s quest or the
new and its direct relationship with the need o market economics to keep
eeding the monstrous desire or the new and innoation. le makes the
point that one has to concede that the art market, subject as are all markets
to the soereignty o the new, can exert a kind o seduction or artists`
,Lyotard 1984b:43, Nye has termed this constant craing the consumer
sublime`. See D.L. Nye 1be .vericav 1ecbvoogica vbive ,1994,.
15
1he understanding o Being orms the central ocus o all leidegger`s
philosophical enquiries. In order to get to the being o beings, he estab-
lishes a undamental distinction between a be-ing ,aa. eievae, and the
Being o beings ,aa. eiv ae. eievaev,. lor leidegger, the central question
193 NO1LS
is not the actiities or practices o human be-ings, but rather what such
actiities and practices can reeal or disclose about the Being o be-ings.
leidegger obseres that in our attempts to understand the being o the
human being we hae a tendency to all ,1erfaev, into the habit o the
eerydayness o be-ings.
16
Derrida`s essay has been reproduced extensiely. I am working rom the
ersion reprinted in A. Lasthope and K. McGowan ,eds, . Critica ava
Cvtvra 1beory Reaaer ,1992,.
1
1he phrase the ruin o representation` has been used by seeral emi-
nist writers, including Dorothy Olkowski, Joanna Isaak and Michele
Montrelay. Joanna Isaak initially used the term in her reiew o the exhibi-
tion Differevce: Ov Repre.evtatiov ava evaity ,1984-5,. She saw the aim o
the exhibition as being to inestigate the means by which the subject is
produced and. to eect the ruin o representation`` ,Isaak quoted in
Olkowski 1999:69,.
18
It needs to be remembered that leidegger`s pre-occupations lie else-
where. le is not undamentally concerned with genesis. lis primary con-
cern is with the orgetting o Being and how Being has been replaced by a
concern with beings.
19
Interestingly there has neer been any success in compiling a dictionary
o isual language. \hilst there may be taxonomies o isual symbols,
graphic marks seem to dey such classiicatory systems. 1his is not to say
that we don`t attribute meaning to dierent marks.
20
1his could be contrasted with the rhizomatic structure that characterises
riendship structures. As Deleuze and Guattari note, the tree is iliation,
but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance` ,Deleuze and Guattari 198:25,
21
In her article leidegger and the limits o representation` ,1988,,
Olkowski attributes leidegger`s ailure to get beyond representation to
his conception o being and time. \hilst he may hae withdrawn time
rom the straight line, she argues that he then became caught up in the
circle. She proposes that leidegger is compelled to ollow the circle, ap-
propriation remains the trace, the presence o what is absent, be it being or
time` ,Olkowski 1988:104,.
22
See Martin Jay ,1993, and Michael Lein ,1993,.
23
It is in this conception that we come closest to leidegger`s
conceptualisation o the world as picture`. Olkowski contends that the
system o representation operates by establishing a ixed standard as the
norm or model` ,Olkowski 1999:2,.
24
In dierentiating between being and becoming, Leinas makes the point
that een whilst becoming can be seen in its intimate sense as duration, it
does not undamentally transorm the ontological basis o consciousness
,Leinas 1996:28,.
25
In his article 1he Ontology o Culture-way-markers`, Mcloul deines
Da-sein as any being that, in leidegger`s undamentally non-psychologist
and non-cognitie sense, understands its being, in its ery being, as what it
is itsel ` ,Mcloul 1999:89,.
26
1he quest to deelop non-representational theories is addressed in Nigel
1hrit`s article, 1he Still Point: Resistance, Lxpressie Lmbodiment and
Dance` ,199,. le proides a summary o the some o the key ideas that
underpin so-called non-representational theory.
Chapter 2: Contingency and the Lmergence of Art
1
Although leidegger`s examples are somewhat dated, his undamental
question becomes o greater releance the more humans intermingle with
machines. Deelopments in the ield o robotics and genetics ampliy this
trend.
2
Andy \arhol`s actory oers a urther example that could be the subject
o such analysis.
3
See Matthew Biro`s book .v.ev Kiefer ava tbe Pbio.opby of Martiv
eiaegger ,1988, or an analysis o the counterpoints between the work o
Kieer and the theorising o leidegger.
4
1he work o Je Koons is exemplary in the context o this discussion.
5
In his distinction between the cratsman and the ine artist and between
tecbv as enraming and tecbv as poi.i., leidegger pre-empts and rein-
orces the priileging o ine art oer crat. Like crat, art is technological as
tecbv. loweer in its mode o reealing the Being o beings leidegger
sees art as undamentally dierent. Art subsists within the mode o reeal-
ing as poi.i., whilst crat subsists within the mode o reealing as enraming.
In this mode, the tools o the cratsman exist as standing resere and crat
ultimately is destined to an instrumental role.
6
leidegger designates the study o being-right-there as the analytic o
Da.eiv.
195 NO1LS

loucault`s article \hat is an Author` ,1984, is a response to this way o
thinking.
8
See also Bruno Latour`s elaboration o objects as actors, particularly his
article Mixing lumans and Nonhumans 1ogether: 1he Sociology o a
Door Stopper` ,1998b,. In his theorising, Latour conceies o objects as
lieutenants who hae been delegated to carry out particular unctions. 1hus
he argues that what deines our social relations is in large measure prescribed
back to us by non-humans. In this, he continues, knowledge, morality, crat,
orce, sociability are not properties o humans but o humans accompanied
by their retinue o delegated characters` ,Latour 1988b:301,.
9
laraway distinguishes between actors and actants. Actors hae character,
whilst actants operate at the leel o unction ,laraway 1992:331,. In that
sense, it may be suggested that actors with their own particularities contrib-
ute to actants, which are structured according to what they do. 1hus humans
and non-humans become part o the unctional collectie that makes up an
actant` ,laraway 1992:331,. In leidegger`s example, siler smithing could
be seen to be the actant bringing together a collectie o actors including the
siler, equipment, chemicals, artist etc. in productiity.
10
Conersation with Lstelle Barrett 23,08,00.
11
A Deleuzian analysis o orces, speeds and intensities could proide an
alternatie account o Lxpressionism to traditional art historical explana-
tions. Lxpressionist explanations place the ocus on the artist expressing
inner most eelings and thoughts. Deleuze`s input would not deny the
aectie element o an expressionist account o art production, but rather to
complicate any such account.
Chapter 3: 1he Work of Art
1
In 1be Po.tvoaerv Covaitiov ,1984, Lyotard argues that the postmodern
artist or writer is in the position o the philosopher. le writes that the text
he writes, the work he produces are not in principle goerned by pre-estab-
lished rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining judg-
ment, by applying amiliar categories to the text or the work. 1hose rules and
categories are what the work o art itsel is looking or` ,Lyotard:1984a:81,.
2
In her book . 1oyage to tbe òrtb ea: .rt iv tbe .ge of tbe Po.tveaivv
Covaitiov ,1999,, Rosalind Krauss adopts the term post-medium` to de-
scribe such phenomena.
3
leidegger`s essay A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an
Inquirer` ,191, proides an exception to his preoccupation with \estern
culture.
4
I iterate that the apprehension that a rock is just a rock only holds or a
certain \estern thinking that does not attribute lie or spirit` to inanimate
things.
5
1hat a rock is called` a rock is also dependent on a socially agreed code.
lere I want to tease out the way allegory works to encode layers o meaning.
6
Jean Baudrillard has called this sign work semiurgy`. 1he concept o
semiurgy is deeloped in or a Critiqve of tbe Poitica covovy of tbe igv
,1981,. In his understanding, an object`s status is determined by the system.
An object is a status o meaning and orm. Gary Genesko puts it simply:
\ork in metal has gien way to the work o signs` ,Genesko 199:5,.

Not all language conceals the thingness o the thing. Poetry has a priileged
place in leidegger`s lexicon. lor him the essence o art is poetry. It proides
that open region that brings beings to shine and ring out` ,leidegger
19b:19,. In act leidegger goes urther and claims that in setting the
truth o beings on its way, all art is, in essence, poetry` ,leidegger 19b:19,.
8
\here art enters the economy o exchange it has exchange alue or use
alue. 1his is where art business takes oer Art.
9
Mcloul notes that it is signiicant that whilst most artworks are created by
hand, ery ew are consumed, read or appreciated by hand ,dialogue with
Mcloul 25,05,01,. In act, until recently touch` has been actiely discour-
aged in most traditional art museum contexts.
10
Meyer Schapiro wrote to leidegger and asked him: \hich picture exactly
were you reerring to` In reply, leidegger said that he was reerring to a
painting exhibited in Amsterdam in 1930. lor Schapiro, this clearly indicated
that the painting he was reerring to was de la laille`s no. 255` ,Schapiro
quoted in Derrida 198:26,. Derrida questions whether this is actvay the
ersion reerred to in leidegger`s essay. \hat complicates the puzzle is that
the painting discussed is ariously titled as Oa oot. ritb ace., Oa boe. ritb
ace. and . Pair of boe..
11
1he problem o illustration besets much o philosophical discourse on
art. Art is used to illustrate a philosophical point.
12
In his discussion o signs, in eivg ava 1ive, leidegger does not intro-
duce the notion o interpretation. le talks about the equipmental character
o signs. See Okrent ,1988:84-86,.
13
1he distinction between cratsmanship and tecbv is oten used to create
a hierarchy o artist` oer cratsman`. 1he deelopment o leidegger`s
19 NO1LS
argument does nothing to dispel this. le is keen to dierentiate the artist`s
actions rom crat, een i the artist is also a cratsman. \hat looks like
crat in the creation o a work is o a dierent sort` ,leidegger 19b:185,.
14
1he same can be said about the contemporary reception o ovvtaiv. Its
thing-being has been oertaken by the thing-concept. It is reduced to a
ready-made`.
15
lormalism aimed to do this by eliminating the object altogether. low-
eer, ormalism ended up replacing the representation o realism with the
representation o abstraction which is also representationalist in its thought.
1hus bottles and bodies and landscape are replaced by shapes, rhythms,
orms and colours.
16
1he Australian Council o Art and Design Schools released the ollow-
ing preamble to their 2000 conerence: Artists are proessionals. 1hey work
in an arts industry` in which outputs can be measured in terms o em-
ployment, inestment and export potential. Since artists are in business`
they need business skills, marketing, promotional and inancial manage-
ment skills. Codes o practice hae been set in place to proide the neces-
sary practice benchmarks` and to ensure compliance with codes o prac-
tice. Art and design schools hae adopted models o training to bridge the
gap between training and proessional practice. linally best practice` has
been adopted so that artists are able to broker partnerships, engage in
resource sharing and utilisation, ind external sources o reenue, be lex-
ible and ind the best options, solutions and actions` ,ACUADS 2000,.
1
Lein suggests that leidegger`s reerence to gods` can be deciphered as
those extraordinary moments o local isionary unconcealment in which
something o the greatest importance about the presencing o beings a. a
rboe is gien to illumination` ,Lein 1993:212-213,.
18
In some senses, the Gestalt image o the ase and two acing proiles
can illustrate this moement. I we bring into ocus the ase shape, the
two proiles disappear. I, on the other hand, we see the two proiles we
can no longer apprehend the ase shape that is we cannot simultaneously
apprehend the ase and the proiles.
19
1his state o coming to rest in itsel, leidegger terms repose`. \et, a
state o repose can only be enisaged in relation to moement. In the
setting up o a world and the setting orth o the earth, there is moe-
ment. 1his moement produces intensiication. It produces an inner con-
centration o motion. 1hus, leidegger suggests that where rest includes
motion, there can exist a repose which is an inner concentration o mo-
tion, hence supreme agitation, assuming that the mode o motion re-
quires such a rest` ,leidegger 19b:13,.
20
In deeloping his thinking on Da.eiv, leidegger pays particular atten-
tion to its emanation as eeryday Da.eiv. 1he distinction between Da.eiv
and eeryday Da.eiv returns us to the dierentiation between the ontic lie
o human beings and a being`s concern with its ery Being. \here Da.eiv
understands its undamental possibility o being-in-the-world, it is open
to sel-understanding. 1his is Da.eiv. loweer existing necessarily leads
Da.eiv to all into eerydayness. Leinas explains that this all into
eerydayness results in Da.eiv understanding itsel ia entities in the world
rather than ia the world itsel.
Chapter 4: Shedding Light for the Matter
1
Josephine \ilson is a Perth-based writer working in the area o perorm-
ance writing. 1he perormance text, Ceograpbie. of avvtea Pace. ,199,,
oers a eminist and post-colonial critique o British imperialism in Aus-
tralia.
2
See Lein ,1993, or a discussion o leidegger`s attempts to oercome
ocularocentrism.
3
Presenting the unpresentable` reers to Lyotard`s elaboration o the
sublime which is deeloped in the article, Presenting the Unpresentable:
1he Sublime` ,1982,. I would suggest that Lyotard`s model still remains
within the binaries o Lnlightenment thinking. I agree with Daid
Rodowick that Lyotard`s discussion o aesthetic work and postmodernity
implies an Lnlightenment conception o the subject. Rodowick sets out
his discontent in the ootnotes to his article, Reading the ligural` ,1990,.
4
lor a critique o the impact o Cartesian perspectiism on Indigenous
Australians see Ian McLean`s book on 1be .rt of Coraov evvett ,1996,
5
In an article Im,pulsie practices: 1he Logic o Sensation and Painting`
,19,, I argue against Deleuze`s dichotomisation between the rationality
o the brain and the nerous system. Since the brain is part o the nerous
system, his claim that certain orms o abstraction appear to address the
brain and rationality whilst the igural acts directly on the nerous system
seems to set up a alse dichotomy.
6
Drawing on her ieldwork with the \arlpiri people, Biddle argues that
the orceul and constitutie eects o these the re-iteratie and citational
practices include rejuinating the country or a species, controlling ertility,
regulating social relations and relatedness, causing illness and healing` ,Biddle
199 NO1LS
2001:19,. 1he Kvrvrarri sign, according to Biddle, is not representation,
not as that which reers, deers, to speech, sound or word, but rather as a
orce itsel with eects: an inscription that inscribes, an imprintation that
produces, marks that make` ,Biddle 2001:183,.

In this context it is interesting to compare the Greek myths with what is
known as the Dreaming`. In the modern age, the Greek legends hae
become just` myths. 1his ate also threatens the stories o the Dreaming.
loweer, Indigenous elders warn o the danger o such a ate. It is only
through the maintenance o the Dreaming, that they beliee their country
can be sustained, maintained and productie.
8
1he contrast between birth as the irst choreography and birth as the irst
displacement relates to psychoanalytic notions o linking lack with desire.
Metbei., it could be argued, digs desire` out o the hole o lack and locates
it in the olds o the ground, along with colour and all sorts o mortal
rubbish. 1hus vetbei. could be seen to sit comortably with Llizabeth
Grosz`s conception o desire`. She proposes desire as actualisation: In-
stead o aligning desire with antasy and opposing to the real, instead o
seeing it as a yearning, desire is an actualization, a series o practices, bring-
ing things together or separating them, making machines, making reality.
Desire does not take or itsel a particular object whose attainment it re-
quires, rather it aims at nothing aboe its own prolieration or sel-expan-
sion. It assembles things out o singularities and breaks things, assem-
blages, down into their singularities. It moes, it does` ,Grosz 1994:165,.
Chapter S: Working Hot: A Materialist Ontology
1
lor Kristea`s theorisation o the somatic dimension o language, see
De.ire iv avgvage: . eviotic .pproacb to iteratvre ava .rt ,1982, and Rerov
tiov iv Poetic avgvage ,1984,.
2
See 1aussig`s ,1994, elaboration o the power o the image in non-western
understandings o ritual images and ritual objects and Belting`s ,1994, dis-
cussion o the comprehension o the image beore the age o art.
3
Rosalind Krauss` article 1he Im,pulse to See` ,1988, explores the pressure
on or pulse in the see-able.
4
See Deleuze`s writings on the logic o sensation in ravci. acov: ogiqve ae
a ev.atiov ,1981,. 1his work has been translated as ravci. acov: tbe ogic of
ev.atiov ,2003, by Daniel Smith.
5
Jonathon Culler ,195, has renamed Peirce`s symbol as the sign proper`.
In this redesignation there is recognition that both the icon and the index
hae qualities that exceed the sign as commonly understood.
6
lrancis lrascina ,195, proides a semiotic reading some o Picasso`s
collages, including a reading o a ve ;Ca.. ava otte of ve) ,1912,.

lor a discussion o this dierence see Rosalind Krauss`s ,1988, article
Notes on the Index: Seenties Art in America` and Georges Didi-
luberman`s ,1988, article 1he Index o the Absent \ound ,Monograph
on a Stain,`.
8
Roland Barthes` notion o the punctum in photography inds its corre-
spondence in painting, in Mieke Bal`s ,1991, elaboration o the nael.
201
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AR1 BL\OND RLPRLSLN1A1ION

CON1INGLNC\ AND 1lL

According to this accepted iew, the artist and

CON1INGLNC\ AND 1lL LMLRGLNCL Ol AR1

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Michel loucault ,192, also attributes representationalism to Descartes,

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