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<p>Page 4536</p>
<p>wise to have completed the business of the fifth and sixth of october. the new
executive officer would then owe his<br>situation to those who are his creators as
well as his masters; and he might be bound in interest, in the society
of<br>crime, and if in crimes there could be virtues in gratitude to serve those
who had promoted him to a place of great<br>lurce and great sensual indulgence,
and of something more; for more he must have received from those who
certainly<br>would not have limited an aggrandized creature, as they have done a
submitting antagonist. a king circumstanced as the<br>present, if he is totally
stupefied by his misfortunes so as to think it not he necessity but the premium
and privilege of<br>life to eat and sleep, without any regard to glory, can never
be fit for the office. if he feels as men commonly feel, he<br>mist be sensible
that an office so circumstanced is one in whcih he can obtain no fame or
reputation. he has no<br>generous interest that can excite him to action. at best,
his conduct will be passive and defensive. to inferior people such<br>an office
might be matter of honor. but to be raised to it, are different things and suggest
different<br>sentiments. does he really name the ministers. they will have a
sympathy with him. are they forced upon him. the whole<br>business between them
and the nominal king will be mutual counteraction. in all other countries, the
office of ministers of<br>state is of the highest dignity. in france it is full of
peril, and incapable of glory. rivals, however, they will have in<br>their
nothingness, whilst shallow ambition exists in the world, or the desire of a
miserable salary is an incentive to short<br>sighted avarice. those competitors of
the ministers are enabled by your constitution to attack them in their vital
parts,<br>whilst they have not the means of repelling their charges in any other
than the degrading character of culprits. the<br>ministers of state in france are
the only persons in that country who are incapable of a share in the national
councils.<br>what ministers what councils what a nation but they are responsible.
it is a poor service that is to be had from<br>responsibility. the elevation of
mind to be derived from fear will neve make a nation glorious. responsibility
prevents<br>crimes. it makes all attempts against the laws dangerous. but for a
principle of active and zealous service, none but<br>idiots could think of it. is
the conduct of a war to be trusted to a man who may abhor its principle, who, in
every step<br>he may take to render it successful, confirms the power of those by
whom he is oppressed. will foreign states seriously<br>treat with him who has no
prerogative of peace or war. no, not so much as in a single vote by himself or his
ministers,<br>or by any one whom he can possibly influence. a state of contempt is
not a state for a prince; better get rid of him at<br>once. i know it will be said
that these humors in the court and executive government will continue only through
this<br>generation, and that the king has been brought to declare the dauphin
shall be educated in a conformity to his<br>situation. if he is made to conform to
his situation, he will have no education at all. his training must be worse,
even,<br>than that of an arbitrary monarch. if he readswhether he reads or not
some good or evil genius will tell him his<br>ancestors were kings, thenceforward
his object must be to assert himself and to avenge his parents. this you will say
is<br>not his duty. that may be; but it is nature; and whilst you pique nature
against you, you do unwisely to trust to duty.<br>in this futile scheme of polity,
the state nurses in its bosom, for the present, a source of weakness,
perplecity,<br>counteraction, inefficiency, and decay; and it prepares the means
of its final ruin. in short, i see nothing in the executive<br>force i cannot call
it authority that has even an appearance of vigor, or that has the smallest degree
of just<br>correspondence or symmetry, or amicable relation with the supreme
power, either as it now exists or as it is planned for<br>the future government.
you have settled, by an economy as perverted as the policy, two establishments of
government one<br>real, one ficitious. both maintained at a vast expense, but the
fictitious at, i think, the greatest. such a machine as the<br>latter is not worth
the grease of its wheels. the expense in exorbitant, and neither the show nor the
use deserve the tenth<br>part of the charge. oh but i dont do justice to the
talents of the legislators: i dont allow, as i ought to do, for<br>necessity.
their scheme of executive force was not their choice. this pageant must be kept.
the people would have heaven and<br>earth to bend you do know how to conform
yourselves to the nature and circumstances of things. but when you were<br>obliged
to conform thus far to circumstances, you ought to have carried your submission
further, and to have made, what<br>you were obliged to take, a proper instrument,
and useful to its end. that was in your power. for instance, among many<br>others,
it was in your power to leave to your king the right of peace and war. what to
leave to the executive magistrate<br>the most dangerous of all prerogatives. i
know none more dangerous, nor any one more necessary to be so trusted. i do</p>
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