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n general, no corrosion allowance will be given for removable internals made of stainless
steel (13% Cr and above) as also for those made of non-ferrous high alloyed. However, a
corrosion allowance shall be specified for some internals exposed to severe conditions such
as non removable internals of reactor, catalyst bed support beams of reactor. These internals
shall therefore have the CA, based on the reactor design life specified in paragraph
"Equipment Design Life, on each exposed surface.
No corrosion is considered for internals made with V wire screen or wire mesh.
***? P'&1-// P*2*#6
For uniform corrosion, corrosion allowance for piping can be distributed as follows:
)=2-1.-3 '".- C&''&/*&# "!!&<"#1-
> 5 mpy 1/16 (1.5mm)
5 mpy <rate > 12 mpy 1/8 (3 mm)
12mpy < rate > 18 mpy 3/16 (4.5 mm)
18 mpy < rate > 25 mpy (6mm)
> 25 mpy Upgrade the Material Specification
mpy : thousands of inch per year
As a standard general practice, corrosion allowance for carbon steel piping can usually be split
into four different levels of specifications as mentioned here below:
Non-corrosive environment 0 1.5 mm
Compressed Air, Nitrogen,
Dry Hydrocarbon, etc.
Mildly-corrosive environment
Cooling water, Humid Hydrocarbons, 1/16 (1.5mm)
Steam, etc.
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Moderately-corrosive environment 1/8 (3mm)
Sour Water, Wet Sour Gas, Amines
Caustics, etc.
Severely-corrosive environment 1/4 (6mm)
Aerated water, Hot sulfur or sulfide
(>260C), wet salts, wet CO2
(ambient temperature), Hot steam (>540C),
etc.
'ote: E(cept for specific cases) or following owner requirements) it is the !icensor*s general
practice to specif+ a minimum corrosion allowance of ,&-$ "&$ mm on the stainless steel made
piping components&
1? M*#*(4( D-/*6# M-."! T-(2-'".4'- >MDMT?
MDMT parameter shall be defined during material design in order to select materials capable of
resisting brittle fracture at the said Minimum Design Metal Temperature. This is purely a
mechanical design requirement (no corrosion concern).
Three different criteria may be used to establish the minimum design temperature:
t may be based on consideration of the lowest expected operating temperature, the lowest
ambient temperature or an operational upset such as auto-refrigeration, or any kind of other
source of low temperature. A transient condition such as auto-refrigeration may be governing,
particularly if the restarting procedure does not permit warm-up before re-pressurising.
t may be established as the minimum exemption temperature allowed by the applicable
engineering code. For example, the ASME B31-3 piping code permits most carbon steel
piping with wall thickness of 12.7mm or less to be exempt from impact testing if used at
temperature not colder than 29
o
C.
f the material of construction is impact tested, the Minimum Design Temperature is usually
taken to be the said impact test temperature (which is, for example, the case for HDT reactor).
The impact test conditions being defined as a function of the steel grade. Minimum Design
Metal Temperature for reactors components is usually specified as 30
o
C or 18
o
C
(depending on steel grade considered) unless process conditions and/or owner requirement
dictate a lower temperature
n the same manner, suitable measures shall be taken in respect of the water temperature during
the hydrostatic test to avoid any brittle fracture.
3? T-(2-'".4'- )(,'*..!-(-#.
Low alloy steel such as 2.25Cr 1Mo, 2.25Cr 1 Mo V and 3Cr 1 Mo V are susceptible to
temper embrittlement when operated in the temperature range of typically 300 550
o
C (i.e.
hydrotreaters or hydrocrackers).
Under such operating conditions, embrittlement phenomena may appear in connection with the
behaviour of Cr-Mo steels after long term service exposure.
Affected material can show a considerable reduction in toughness properties at ambient
temperature, and special precautions need therefore to be taken to avoid brittle fracture,
especially during transient phases (start-ups and shut-downs) and hydraulic pressure tests.
This mainly applies to the components made from steel grade specified here above for such
equipment as the reactors, associated vessels and certain HP heat exchangers. t is stressed that
temper embrittlement effects are normally much more moderate for lower alloyed steels (e.g.
1.25Cr-0.5Mo).
i) R-/.'*1.*&#/ .& 18-(*1"! 1&(2&/*.*&#
Project Name
MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
Project No. Document No.
D10169B904LI1001
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ssue 04 ,30.10.1998 ssue: Rev. , Sheet 28 of 36
Refer to section for specific recommendations for the metallurgy of the reactors
**? I#1'-"/- &% .'"#/*.*&# .-(2-'".4'-
n addition to the stringent restriction of the chemical composition, most users specify a sampled
step cooling of steels coupons issued from material used for fabrication of shell and heads
susceptible to Temper Embrittlement. Step cooling treatment, imperatively performed after
PWHT, will simulate a fraction of the increase in the ductility-brittle transition that should occur
after long-term service.
For information only, a typical step cooling sequence could be:
Heat to 595
o
C Hold for 1 hour, cool at 6
o
C/h max. to 540
o
C.
Heat to 540
o
C Hold for 15 hours, cool at 6
o
C/h max. to 525
o
C
Heat to 525
o
C Hold for 24 hours, cool at 6
o
C/h max. to 495
o
C
Heat to 495
o
C Hold for 60 hours, cool at 3
o
C/h max. to 470
o
C
Heat to 470
o
C Hold for 100 hours, cool at 28
o
C/h max. down to 315
o
C and then Air cooling.
This simulated isothermal embrittlement results in a certain increase (shift) of the material's
transition temperature. The increase in transition temperature (TT55) from its original value has
become an accepted tool for the determination of temper embrittlement susceptibility. n order to
characterise a material for temper embrittlement resistance, a relationship was developed using
the original or "as fabricated TT55 and the increase in TT55 (A TT55).
After step cooling heat treatment for impact properties (Charpy-V at 1/4T and 1/2T material
thickness ) should meet the following requirements:
TT55 + 3ATT55 < 10
o
C
Where : TT55 : the 55 Joule transition temperature
ATT55 : (TT55 [step cooled] TT55 [original value])
The method generally used to avoid brittle fracture consists in maintaining pressure at a low level
until reactor vessel exceeds the Minimum Pressurising Temperature (in that way, resulting
stresses are then reduced below a stress value which could lead to brittle fracture propagation).
This MPT takes into account the TT55 estimated for the embrittled conditions and a safety margin
which mainly takes into account the effect of hydrogen absorbed during operation (effect
depending on wall thickness, steel quality and process conditions, it is the vessel vendor
responsibility to guaranty the MPT values for the considered equipment).
Below the MPT, the pressure should be kept not exceeding 25% of the design pressure for
equipment built per ASME Code Section V, Div. 2 (some owners may allow higher value for
equipment built per ASME Code Section V, Div.1 considering the higher safety factor on
allowable stress values in that case). Any way, the MPT criteria for HP Reactors should always be
given or approved by vessel vendor.
-? S.",*!*A*#6 @-". T'-".(-#.
Austenitic stainless steel can become sensitised after prolonged exposure at elevated
temperatures in the range of 425 850
o
C (800 1600
o
F). This structural transformation during
long term service at elevated temperature is due to a precipitation of chromium carbides
(generally Cr23C6). n fact, this precipitation at the grain boundaries does not affect the mechanical
properties. On the other hand, it involves sensitising to intergranular corrosion (refer to
"Polythionic acids).
Although stabilised types of stainless steels (such as 321, 347 and 316Ti) have a much higher
resistance towards sensitisation than the non-stabilised ones, literature indicates that their
resistance can be further improved by stabilising heat treatment (around 900 C) of the solid SS
individual components. This procedure encourages the formation of stable carbides, formed
either from Titanium for Types 321 and 316 Ti or from Niobium/Columbium for Types 347, without
chromium depletion.
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Therefore such stabilisation heat treatment is recommended for the furnace tubes. n addition it
could even be decided to apply such heat treatment also for (the hottest parts of) the stainless
steel piping despite its operating temperature remains somewhat lower.
Note that no fissuring corrosion experiences have been reported to Licensor when using overlaid
347 SS (refer to Polythionic Acid Attack here after).
%? M-."!!4'69 S-!-1.*&# G4*3- D-/*6#
The various modes of main corrosion concerns that are specific to refinery hydro-treating units
are exposed and discussed in the following.
*? @*68 T-(2-'".4'- @ A.."1$
n services containing hydrogen, materials are selected based on their resistance to high
temperature hydrogen attack. Hydrogen attack can occur at temperature above about 220C.
Dissolved hydrogen can react with iron carbides generating methane gas (CH4) which is trapped
into the metal. As the concentration of methane gas increases, increasing pressure begins to tear
the grain boundary, causing fissures and then cracks. Simultaneously, the loss of carbides lowers
the strength of the metal.
Material recommendation is based on the Nelson curves (refer to AP RP 941: "Steels for
Hydrogen Service at Elevated Temperatures and Pressures in Petroleum Refineries and
Petrochemical Plants) for hydrogen resistance. The material is selected based on the maximum
operating temperature, and hydrogen partial pressure, with appropriate allowance added to each
of the variables to account for various operating modes.
As the figures considered in AP RP 941 are based largely upon empirical experience, safety
margin of 28
C (50
F
) and 3.4 bar (50 psi) below the relevant curves (respectively for maximum
operating temperature and maximum operating hydrogen partial pressure) are typically used when
selecting steels.
'otes:
.he (/).) values for 'elson 0urves application shall not be compared with the 1echanical Design
/ressure and .emperature which are used for mechanical calculation&
2f the temperature and pressure fall on one of the curves) then the higher allo+ shall be used&
There is no credit taken for a corrosion resistant stainless steel cladding, since hydrogen can still
diffuse through the cladding. Where alloy cladding is used, the base metal shall consequently be
selected for H2 Service.
**? @*68 T-(2-'".4'- @/@S C&''&/*&#
The choice of material for services containing H2S in hydrogen rich environment is based on the
acceptable corrosion rate, to obtain the desired equipment life. At temperatures higher than
200C, the corrosion rate is estimated as a function of temperature and H2 S partial pressure for
the selected material. The corrosion rate curves for the various metallurgy is based on the
original NACE data (Couper & Gorman curves), and this is considered to provide a desirable
degree of conservatism in the design.
***? @*68 T-(2-'".4'- S4!28*3- C&''&/*&# *# @ F'-- )#;*'&#(-#.
The corrosion rate for services containing organic sulphur at temperatures above 260C in
hydrogen free environments (considered to be with ppH2 < 50 psia) is obtained from curves based
on the original NACE and AP data.
The estimated corrosion rates may be obtained, by using the Mc Conomy curves, as a function of
normal operating temperature and organic sulphur content.
*;? N"28.8-#*1 A1*3 C&''&/*&#
Naphthenic acid is the collective name given to the organic acids contained in some crude oils.
The naphthenic acid content of the raw feed is generally expressed as neutralisation number, as
determined by ASTM test methods D 664 or D974.
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t can cause corrosion at temperatures as low as 175
C (350
C (450
F).
Type 316L or 317 L SS (SS containing at least 2,5% wt. of molybdenum) should be used when
neutralisation number exceeds 1.5 mg KOH/g oil for operating temperatures above 230
C.
Type 317 being preferred for severe combinations of TAN (Total Acid Number), Temperature, and
velocity/turbulence, since the molybdenum content of this grade ranges from 3.0 to 4.0 wt. %.
Carbon steel metallurgy is considered to be sufficient for equipment and piping for Total Acid
Number TAN < 1.5 mg KOH/g and temperatures below 230C. For all other conditions stainless
steel specification shall be considered.
;? C-. @S C&''&/*&#
Wet sour services are common in the hydrocarbon producing and processing industries. The
major concern for such services is the various forms of hydrogen cracking produced by wet
hydrogen sulphide corrosion.
As a matter of fact, H2S dissociation in presence of free water leads to atomic hydrogen formation
(particularly) in the cold part of the reaction section after the washing water injection in the reactor
effluent, H2S amine absorbers and strippers overhead equipment are concerned), and can cause
the following:
Sulphide Stress Corrosion Cracking (SSCC)
Hydrogen blistering, Hydrogen nduced Cracking (HC), Stress Oriented Hydrogen nduced
Cracking (SOHC).
The susceptibility of deterioration by the above mentioned risks are lowered, by specifying the
following for the carbon steel metallurgy:
Definition of different types of associated specifications
Typical Applicable Documents:
- Material requirements for Sulfide Stress Corrosion Cracking Resistant Metallic
Material as per NAC) S."#3"'3 MR 01-75, latest edition.
- Materials and Fabrication Practices for New Pressure Vessels Used in wet H2S
Refinery Service as per NAC) I#.-'#".*&#"! P4,!*1".*&# :M194.
- Methods and Control to Prevent n-Service Environmental Cracking of Carbon Steel
Weldments in Corrosive Petroleum Refining environments as per NAC) S."#3"'3
RP047, latest edition.
Licensor's general recommendations for carbon steel in "H2S Service.
Carbon steel must be Fully Killed Carbon Steel type
Maximum Allowable Hardness 22 HRC
Ni content less than 1%
Carbon content shall be 0.20% maximum
Plate material shall be supplied in Normalised condition, regardless of thickness
Typical limitation of Carbon Equivalent are the following:
- Ceq < 0.42% for plate less than 2 thick
- Ceq < 0.45% for plate from 2 thick to 4 thick
- Ceq < 0.48% for plates greater than 4 thick
With Ceq = C+Mn/6 + (Cr+Mo + V)/5 + (Ni + Cu)/15
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.hese 0eq values are indicative and ma+ be re-considered if needed regarding the
used steel grade& 2n that case) new proposed values should be submitted to E/0 for
approval&
Thermal Stress Relieving required for all welds (PWHT) and/or for cold bend zone, even if
it is not required by code.
Typical recommendations for Process Piping and accessories in "H2S service
- Process piping shall be seamless type piping
- /iping and accessories:
Recommended Maximum allowable Phosphorus content 0.030%
Recommended Maximum allowable sulphur content 0.020%
An acceptable designation is ASTM A-106 Gr.B (applicable also for vessel's
nozzles as ASME SA-106-B)
- 3langes and accessories:
Recommended Maximum allowable phosphorus content 0.030%
Recommended Maximum allowable Sulphur content 0.025%
An acceptable designation is ASTM A-105 for forging and ASTM A-216 WCB
for castings (applicable also for vessel's flanges as ASME SA-105).
.hese impurities level criteria are given for information) the final specification concerning the /
4 5 impurities contents will be decided b+ the E/0 (based on the owner specification if an+)
following its t+pical practice for 6/iping in 5our 5ervice7&
Licensor's recommendations for Carbon Steel Plates "HC resistant:
The most important factor to avoid HC is the purity (cleanliness) of the steel. The non-
metallic inclusions must be very low.
n addition to the general recommendations relative to "H2S Service, when "HC resistant
steel is specified, the following requirements should also be met:.
/lates for /ressure /arts of the 8essels:
Carbon steel made by vacuum degassing process
Oxygen content less than 0.002%
Maximum allowable Phosphorus content 0.008%
Maximum allowable Sulphur content 0.002% (0.007% if inclusion shape
controlled by calcium treatment)
Calcium treatment, if any, shall be Ca/S ratio > 1.2
t is required to pass the NACE standard TM 0284 (Evaluation of Pipeline and
Pressure Vessels Steels for Resistance to Hydrogen-nduced Cracking) by
using the acidified test solution specified in NACE standard TM0177
(Laboratory Testing of Metals for Resistance to Sulfide Stress Cracking and
Stress Corrosion Cracking in H2S environments) with:
Crack Length Ratio (CLR) 5%
Mill test reports shall include the values for the crack length ratio (CLR), crack
sensitivity ratio (CSR) and crack thickness ratio (CTR) as defined in NACE
standard TM-02-84 and also carbon equivalent (CE).
A possible designation is ASTM A 516 gr60.
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MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
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'ote : .he use of a standard carbon steel grade with 55 cladding can be an alternative to
620 resistant steels7 especiall+ for thick-wall vessels like cold / separator since it should
involve onl+ a small cost premium over 620 resistant steel7 construction (the procurement
could even be sometime more eas+)& .he resulting protection against corrosion would be
enhanced provided that 55 solution would not lead to other kind of corrosion and9or
deterioration&
;*? A(*#- S.'-// C&''&/*&# C'"1$*#6
Amine solutions can cause pitting and stress corrosion cracking in carbon steels.
Amine stress corrosion cracking can attack non-stress-relieved CS piping and equipment. Hence,
stress relieving (PWHT) is recommended for all the welds and the cold formed parts of CS
equipment and piping, regardless of operating temperature. AP RP-945 (Avoiding Environmental
Cracking in Amine Units) and the guides from technical committee NACE T- 8-16 would apply to
these services for equipment and lines.
Killed carbon steel is usually considered as acceptable under amines operation when fluid
velocities are limited to a maximum of 0.9 m/s (3 ft/s) for rich amine and of 2.1 m/s (7 ft/s) for lean
amine.
On the other hand, it is recommended to specify type 316 stainless steel for turbulence and/or
flash zone and/or high fluid velocities.
Note that it is generally preferred to use stainless steel as cladding and not as solid form on
account of possible presence of chlorides, highly dangerous for SS, in the fluid.
The recommendations outlined for the wet H2 S corrosion are applicable for the amine service as
well. n particular, HC resistant steels should be used for amine H2S absorbers.
;**? A((&#*4( B*-S4!28*3- C&''&/*&#
Water injection upstream of the reactor effluent coolers is required to prevent plugging from water-
soluble ammonium bi-sulphide salts. The water injection rate should be adequate for saturating
the vapour phase, and to provide about 25% excess water as liquid phase, at the coolers inlet.
The water injection rate should also be sufficient to reduce the salt content of the sour water to
less than 4 wt %.
Licensor had specified Killed CS metallurgy for this service in several units.
Based on Licensor's experience, Killed CS metallurgy is sufficient for this service if the sour water
salt content is maintained at less than 4 wt %, and the total fluid velocity is kept in the range of 3
to 6 m/s. Also, it is important to control the wash water quality as recommended by Licensor,
especially the oxygen (less than 15 ppbw) and chloride (less than 50 ppmw) content to minimise
corrosion.
;***? P&!9.8*&#*1 A1*3 A.."1$
Where austenitic stainless steels have been selected, chemically stabilised types (321 SS and
347 SS) are required for processes in which the normal maximum sustained operating
temperature exceeds 425 C, because of their higher resistance to intergranular corrosion and
stress corrosion cracking caused by polythionic acid attack. This kind of attack can occur,
especially during the shutdown periods as a result of sensitisation during service.
As a matter of fact, once opened to the atmosphere, the association of iron sulphides produced
during operation and air/moisture leads to formation of polythionic acids H2 SxO6 . The resulting
acid corrosion leads to the formation of intergranular cracks, typical of polythionic SCC corrosion
(mainly into Heat Affected Zone).
t is therefore strongly recommended to passivate the unit before contacting the equipment with
atmosphere. The NACE Standard RP 0170 should also be followed as a guideline to carry out the
soda ash washing of all the zones to be in contact with atmosphere after shut-down. This
procedure is recommended in all the cases, even in the case of stabilized SS use.
Based on Licensor's experience, 347 SS shows a better resistance to sensitisation than 321 SS,
and is recommended for severe services.
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MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
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However for maximum resistance to sensitisation, types 321 and 347 SS should be subjected to a
stabilising heat treatment.
*=? C8!&'*3- A.."1$
Aqueous chlorides provide an excellent electrolytic environment for corrosion.
Austenitic stainless steels are well known for their susceptibility to failure by chloride stress
corrosion cracking (CSCC).
This phenomenon may appear under almost any set of circumstances relative to the following
critical variables:
Temperature : CSCC is virtually unknown for neutral pH solutions at temperature below 60C
(140 F).
Chloride concentration : n evaluating the risks for CSCC, consider concentration
mechanisms such as evaporation, which can increase low contents to dangerous levels. For
this reason, vapour-liquid interfaces and crevices such as socket welds are to be avoided.
Even trace of chloride into water is sufficient to induce stress corrosion cracking.
Stress: Stresses are usually due to the residual tensile stress caused by welding or cold work
such as U-Bending heat exchanger tubes. Stress relieving heat treatment is also sometimes
used to reduce cold forming or welding induced residual stresses in austenitic stainless steels.
n consequence of the difficulties to guaranty the environment state in presence of chloride, CSCC
resistant alloys should be specified where CSCC is anticipated.
ncrease in molybdenum content enhances resistance of austenitic stainless steel to chloride
attack (317L > 316 > 304, 321). Super austenitic stainless steel (904L), or duplex alloy stainless
steel, as alloy 2205 (22 Cr-5.5 Ni-3 Mo-N/UNS S31803) or higher nickel alloys types such as Alloy
400 and Alloy 825 which are significantly more resistant to CSCC than austenitic 18-8 SS should
also be considered.
Notes :
1onel) which ma+ be specified where resistance to h+drochloric acid is required (top section
of the crude tower for e(ample)) shall not be used when ammonia is in:ected for corrosion
control due to its high susceptibilit+ to stress corrosion cracking&
;ater used for flushing or during h+dro-tests in presence of austenitic stainless steel materials
should t+picall+ have a chloride content of <, ppm) not e(ceeding $, ppm&
=? C"4/.*1 S&3"
Carbon steel is the basic recommended material of construction for moderate temperatures and
concentrations.
Threshold of operating limits are usually determined by using existing NACE caustic soda services
curves which indicates preferred material at various temperatures and concentrations.
PWHT is recommended for Carbon Steel welds in services above these thresholds to minimise
the risk of stress corrosion cracking.
Austenitic stainless steels may sometimes be specified up to 120 C (beyond this temperature
threshold, these alloys can be susceptible to caustic stress corrosion cracking).
However, caustics being often contaminated with chlorides, and since there are other competitive
materials choices, selection of austenitic stainless steels for caustic service is usually avoided.
For high severity services, Nickel Alloys such as Monel will be preferred.
Anyway, it is highly recommended in caustic soda services to avoid at one and the same time
piping low points where caustic could become highly concentrated, and hot spots.
Project Name
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Note :
Systems in which carbon steel could be in contact with caustic soda carryover during upsets
should be stress relieved/postweld heat treated. f not possible, this system should be made of
appropriated alloys as defined here above.
7.0 P'&1-// C&#.'&! "#3 I#/.'4(-#.".*&#
7.1 Unit operations shall be controlled from a central control room common to other units and shall
be a microprocessor based Distributed Digital Control with Supervisory computer system. All
process and product streams shall be measured and recorded. Level alarms wherever required shall
be used. Dial thermometers shall be provided at inlet and outlet of heat exchangers. n case of very
critical services hardwired alarms shall be provided as stand by unit.
For Thermocouples in Temperature Control Loop, closed loop or connected to PLC, Temperature
Transmitters shall be used.
7. C&#.'&! P8*!&/&289
The plant shall be operated through Video Consoles along with Console panel with few dedicated
nstruments, Recorders, Annunicators etc. and a Console desk having selector switches, push
buttons, status indicators. The field switches, which are required to be triplicated for this purpose
are shown on the P& Diagram. The nterlocks (LOGC) for the unit shall be performed in PLC
capable of communicating with DCS. 2 out of 3 voting logic is envisaged for critical interlocks
only.
7.3 I#/.'4(-#./
All alarm points, Software and hardwired to be indicated in P&D with proper legend as per
SA symbol.
All specification data sheets shall be as per SA.
For security interlocks transmitters shall be used as field instruments connected to Analog
nput card of PLC directly. No switches shall be used.
For temperature, Flow and interface level Transmitters shall be used, Switches shall not be
used.
N& /<*.18-/ .& ,- 4/-3 "#9<8-'- *# .8- 4#*. *#1!43*#6 .8- 2"1$"6-3 *.-(/
All OCL standards and instrument hook-up drawings may be used
For all Temperature closed loops, field mounted temperature transmitters to be used.
1 " flanged type thermowell with minimum flange rating of 300# shall be considered.
Screwed type thermowells shall not be used.
Dedicated field instruments (Transmitters) shall be used for trip activation and critical alarms.
Separate nozzle / tapping shall be used for such instruments.
Limit switch : proximity type limit switch may be used.
The symbols to be used will be in accordance with SA (see General legend diagrams).
Alarms and shutdown devices:
Alarms and shutdown devices will be specified where required for process, safety or
equipment protection considerations.
Shutdown device connections will be independent from instrument connections.
All safety devices are connected to a PLC (Programmable Logic Controller
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nstrument impulse lines to be insulated / traced, wherever required, to avoid condensation /
congealing.
Critical rotating equipment to have vibration monitoring system with control room indication.
7.4 S"%-.9 D"!;-/
Double safety valves shall be provided with isolation valves, such that on-stream isolation and
maintenance of a safety valve is possible without affecting unit operational safety
requirements. This shall be considered for all operation failure cases (guided or no-guided).
Where safety valve provision is guided by fire case, single safety valve with isolation valve
(locked open) shall be provided. However, in case of provision of safety valve considering fire
case as governing case and where such provision is also required from process point of view,
stand-by safety valve is to be considered. All isolation valves of pressure safety valves shall
be lock open/close type. The isolation valves shall be mechanically interlocked where ever
two PSVs are provided.
Pressure relief valves are normally installed on the equipment.
Pressure relief valves in hydrocarbon vapour service will normally discharge to a vapour
system.
All relief valves load and size shall be calculated according to the following mentioned codes:
- AP 520
- AP 521
- AP 526
- AP 527
- AP 2000
The size of relief valves are based on either over-pressure condition, fire exposure or vacuum
situation for a particular system.
Typical over pressure conditions are:
- Blocked Discharge
- nadvertent Valve Opening
- Utility Failure
- Electrical / Mechanical Failure
- Loss of Air Cooler Fans
- Loss of Heat in Fractionation
- Loss of nstrument Air or Electric Power
- nstrument Failure or Blow-by
- Reflux Failure
- Abnormal Heat nput From Reboilers
- Heat Exchanger Tube Failure
- Trapped Liquid Expansion
The following guidelines shall be applied for safety valve selection and line sizing:
- Valve selection will be based on maximum operating temperature and relief valve
set pressure.
Project Name
MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
Project No. Document No.
D10169B904LI1001
Sheet / of
36/6
Revision
00
EDP dent. No. 190729521.doc Derived from GFA 0373E
ssue 04 ,30.10.1998 ssue: Rev. , Sheet 36 of 36
- Conventional type relief valves shall be used for the cases where the built-up back
pressure and the variable superimposed backpressure doesn't exceed 10% of the
set pressure. For the cases, where it exceeds 10%, but is below 50 % of the set
pressure, balanced bellow type relief valves shall be used.
Pilot operated relief valves shall be used for the systems where maximum set point
accuracy is required. Such relief valves shall be installed in equipment, which
operate very close to the set pressure.
- Safety valves on column circuits are preferred to be located at the highest point in
the overhead vapors lines.
- Pressure drop in a PSV inlet line must not exceed 3% of the set pressure of the
PSV.
- PSV inlet and outlet line size has to be equal or greater as the PSV nozzle sizes.
- PSV discharge to be free draining to flare header. PSV inlet to be free draining
towards the source.
- nlet and outlet valves to be full port.
- Relief valves, which are susceptible to plugging, shall be steam traced and have a
rupture disc installed under them.
- Staggered pressure setting may be specified to minimise losses.
- For atmospheric relief, the open end of discharge will be located 30m from any
source of ignition. Discharge is usually 3m higher than any equipment or manholes
(ladder, platform etc.) within 15m radius.
- Relieving device discharge lines, shall be sized based on the back pressure data
- The flare header shall be sized according to pressure drop constraints.
All drains on safety valves (wherever provided) shall be connected to the CBD. All safety
valves shall normally have carbon steel body with stainless steel trim. Other trim material can
be considered if any particular service demands a different material. Bronze or cast iron
bodied valves shall not be used.
7.5 C&#.'&! D"!;-/
As a default, control valves upto 8 size and in steam service shall be provided with a
manifold of block and bypass valves. Bypass valves shall be globe valves. For control valve
above 8 size, block and bypass requirement shall be decided on case to case basis.
However, Control valves not having block and bypass provision shall be provided with
handwheel for manual operation.
All control valves should have two isolation valves and min one bypass valve.
All control valves shall be provided with 3/4 drain valves, which can be provided as:
Upstream and downstream of all control valves
Drain valve shall be capped (n non-hydrocarbon & non-BR LP steam service)
Drain valve shall be blind flange (n all Hydrocarbon, toxic/hazardous chemicals & BR
steam service)
Shut down valves shall not be provided with block and bypass valves.
The control valve pressure drop should be the greater of the following
50 60 % of the total frictional loss excluding the control valve
0.7 Kg/cm
2
15 % of the pump differential head
Project Name
MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
Project No. Document No.
D10169B904LI1001
Sheet / of
37/6
Revision
00
EDP dent. No. 190729521.doc Derived from GFA 0373E
ssue 04 ,30.10.1998 ssue: Rev. , Sheet 37 of 36
For valves installed in extremely long or high pressure drop lines, the percentage drop across
control valve may be lower, but at least 15 % up to 25%, where possible, of the system friction
drop.
The selected control valve must allow maximum flow through it at 80% opening (maximum)
and minimum flow at 15 to 20% opening minimum.
Control valves must be evaluated for flashing / cavitation and choked flow condition before
selection.
7.6 F!&< I#3*1".*&#
F&' (".-'*"! B"!"#1- "!! %!&< *#3*1".*&#/ /8&4!3 ,- &% ("// %!&< .92-
A#9 &.8-' %!&< *#/.'4(-#./ /8&4!3 8";- 2'-//4'- "#3 .-(2-'".4'- 1&(2-#/".*&#.
Flow indications with totaliser for the following streams entering / leaving the battery limit shall
be available in the control room over and above those required for process control of the unit:
- All Feed to the unit
- All Products from the unit
- Fuel gas to the unit
- Hydrogen rich gas to the unit
- Hydrogen for start-up
- Hydrogen to the unit
- Any other relevant streams
Flow indications with totaliser for the following utility streams shall be available in the control
room:
- HP/MHP steam to/from the unit
- MP steam to and from the unit
- LP steam to and from the unit
- Cooling water to the unit
- Condensate from the unit
- Condensate from other units
- Nitrogen to the unit
- BFW to the unit
- Plant Air & nstrument Air to the Unit
- DM Water to the Unit
7.7 L-;-! I#/.'4(-#./
Standpipes with a default size of 2 NB shall be considered for only clean, non-viscous and
non-crystallizing services. Standpipes shall be used if more than 4 vessels nozzles are
anticipated for mounting all the level instruments in a given service.
Standpipes bottom tapping should be from side only. Standpipe bottom tapping not to have
any low pocket in order to ensure free draining of standpipe liquid into the vessel.
For other cases level instruments shall be mounted directly on the equipment. n this case
minimum liquid level indicated shall be 150 mm above the BTL of the equipment.
Project Name
MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
Project No. Document No.
D10169B904LI1001
Sheet / of
3:/6
Revision
00
EDP dent. No. 190729521.doc Derived from GFA 0373E
ssue 04 ,30.10.1998 ssue: Rev. , Sheet 38 of 36
Following specific requirements for standpipes is to be followed:
Standpipe shall not have instruments other than for level.
Standpipe accommodating level gage / transmitter shall be separate from standpipe / vessel
tappings for level switches for alarm and trip.
Standpipe shall not be connected to process lines
Standpipes to have isolation valves at top and bottom tapping.
Standpipe bottom tapping to have slope towards the vessel.
Standpipe connections to be on sides only.
Radar type of level gauges shall be specified for tanks
Diaphragm seals shall be specified for congealing / high viscosity / corrosive / crystallizing
services (pressure upto 600#).
7.: U.*!*.9 L*#-/ ,"..-'9 !*(*. I#/.'4(-#.".*&#
Utility Lines : As a minimum, the following shall be provided in unit utility headers:
UTLTY Local
P
DCS
P
DCS
PAL/
PAH
Local
T
DCS
T
DCS
TAL/
TAH
DCS
F
DCS
FAL/
FAH
DCS
FQ
MP/LP Steam YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Condensate YES YES YES YES
CW supply YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
CW return YES YES YES
nstrument Air YES YES YES YES YES
Plant Air YES YES YES
Nitrogen YES YES YES YES YES
Fuel Gas YES YES YES YES YES
Hydrogen YES YES YES YES YES
BFW YES YES YES YES YES YES
DM water YES YES YES YES
Service Water YES
Potable water YES
Flare YES YES
7.9 S."#3"'3 @-". )=18"#6-' I#/.'4(-#.".*&#
solation valves at both inlet & outlet in cooling water service
solation and bypass valves for only exchangers which can be taken out for maintenance
when plant is running.
Local T at process inlet and outlet of each service
Project Name
MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
Project No. Document No.
D10169B904LI1001
Sheet / of
39/6
Revision
00
EDP dent. No. 190729521.doc Derived from GFA 0373E
ssue 04 ,30.10.1998 ssue: Rev. , Sheet 39 of 36
DCS T at cooling water outlet of each exchanger.
DCS T at process inlet and outlet of each service
Local and DCS P at process inlet & outlet
Local PG in inlet and outlet of CW
N&.-B
T8- 3-."*! 3"." /8--. %&' "!!.8- *#/.'4(-#.//CD//SDD// F*#"! C&#.'&! )!-(-#. *#1!43*#6 T/C
!-#6.8, %!"#6- /*A-,3*"(-.-' .& ,- 2'&;*3-3.
A!! *#/.'4(-#./ /8&4!3 ,- 1!&/- 1&42!- .92-.
N& ,!&1$ & ,!--3 ;"!;- .& ,- 4/-3 "/ *#/.'4(-#. ."22*#6 .
&4. &% 3 ;&.*#6 /8"!! ,- 1&##-1.-3 .& DCS/PLC *# 3*%%-'-#. 1"'3/.
:.0 U#*./ &% M-"/4'-(-#.
MKS (Old Metric)
Temperature C
Pressure kg/cmg
Vacuum mmHg
Weight kg
Volume m
Flow of Process fluid
Liquid - Mass flow kg/h
Volume flow m/h
Flow of steam kg/h
Enthalpy Kcal/Kg
Heat duty MMKcal/h
Power kW
Heat Transfer rate Kcal/m C.h
Fouling resistance m C.h/Kcal
Viscosity cP
Equipment size mm
Pipe length km
Pipe diameter in
Vessel nozzle sizes in
The normalized conditions for gas measurement are:
Standard : 760 mmHg, 15.5C (60F) (Sft/mn or SCFM)
Normal : 760 mmHg, 0C (Nm/h)
9.0 C&3-/, S."#3"'3/ & P'"1.*1-/
Project Name
MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
Project No. Document No.
D10169B904LI1001
Sheet / of
40/6
Revision
00
EDP dent. No. 190729521.doc Derived from GFA 0373E
ssue 04 ,30.10.1998 ssue: Rev. , Sheet 40 of 36
Latest revisions of following documents
P!-"/- 2'&;*3- .8- !".-/. -3*.*&#/ &% .8- 1&3-///."#3"'3/ "/ 6*;-# ,-!&<. F&' -="(2!-
%&' C-#.'*%46"! 24(2/ .8- !".-/. -3*.*&# &% API /."#3"'3 610 */ 10
.8
-3*.*&# "#3 #&.
:.8 -3. >A46. 95?
9.1 P!&. P!"#
OSD-STD-118 Rev 1, July 1995
9. D-//-!/
ASM) >1995?, /-1.*&# DIII B
Div. 1
Div. 2 (High pressure services)
9.3 C&(2'-//&'/
Reciprocating : AP standard 618, 4th ed. (June 95)
Centrifugal : AP standard 617, 6th ed. (Feb. 95)
9.4 P4(2/
Positive displacement Reciprocating : AP standard 674, 2nd ed. (June 95)
Positive displacement Controlled volume : AP standard 675, 2nd ed. (Oct. 94)
Centrifugal : AP standard 610, 8th ed. (Aug. 95)
9.5 F*'-3 8-".-'/
AP standard 560, 2nd ed. (Sept. 95)
9.6 S8-!! "#3 T4,- @-". )=18"#6-'/
AP standard 660, 5th ed. (June 93)
TEMA, 8th ed. (1999)
9.7 A*'-1&&!-3 8-". -=18"#6-'/
AP standard 661, 4th ed. (Nov. 97)
TEMA, 8th ed. (1999)
9.: P*2*#6
ASME/ANS B 16.5 (1996, Add. 98)
B 31.3 (1996)
9.9 M".-'*"!//C&''&/*&#
Hydrogen service : AP standard 941, 5th ed. (Jan. 97)
Amine service : AP standard 945, 2nd ed. (Oct. 97)
Wet H2S service : NACE 8X 194 (June 94)
Project Name
MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
Project No. Document No.
D10169B904LI1001
Sheet / of
41/6
Revision
00
EDP dent. No. 190729521.doc Derived from GFA 0373E
ssue 04 ,30.10.1998 ssue: Rev. , Sheet 41 of 36
NACE MR 175-95
Polythionic Acid service : NACE RP 0170 (1997)
9.10 P'-//4'-- R-!*-;*#6 "#3 D-2'-//4'*#6 S9/.-(/
AP recommended practice 520 Part , 6th ed. (March 93)
Part , 4th ed. (Dec. 94)
AP recommended practice 521, 4th ed. (March 97)
ASME section (Boiler and pressure vessels code)
9.11 I#/.'4(-#.".*&#
SA 55.1 (July 92)
ASTM
9.1 Q4"!*.9 C&#.'&!
SO 9001, rev. 2 (1994)
10.0 )74*2(-#. D-/*6#".*&# "#3 N4(,-'*#6
10.1 U#*. #4(,-'*#6
U#*. #"(- N4(,-'
Naphtha Splitter 034
Reformate Splitter 035
HDT 036
somerisation 037
10. )74*2(-#. #4(,-'*#6 "#3 *3-#.*%*1".*&#
"? )74*2(-#. *3-#.*%*1".*&#
S9(,&! )74*2(-#.
FF Heaters
RB Reactors
CC Towers and Columns
VV Drums, Separators
EE Heat Exchangers
EA Air coolers
DR Dryers
RP Pumps
KA Compressors
T TT Storage Tanks
M Miscellaneous
PM Motors (pumps)
Project Name
MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
Project No. Document No.
D10169B904LI1001
Sheet / of
4/6
Revision
00
EDP dent. No. 190729521.doc Derived from GFA 0373E
ssue 04 ,30.10.1998 ssue: Rev. , Sheet 42 of 36
KM Motors (compressors)
KT Turbines (compressors)
Type of Equipment
CF Centrifugal
GR Geared
RP Reciprocating
SC Screw
MT Metering
SM Submersible
Axens has kept identification code "M for all the packages under PMC/EPCC scope. However PMC should
assign equipment identification code as the list provided above.
,? )74*2(-#. #4(,-'*#6
Example : 034 - PA - CF - 001 A/B
Where:
034 is unit number
PA is equipment symbol
CF is type of pump, i.e. centrifugal type
001 is equipment number
11.0 L*#- N4(,-'*#6 "#3 I3-#.*%*1".*&# S9/.-(
11.1 G-#-'"! N&.-/
Numbering will start at 01.
The number changes after control valves and main equipment..
The number is different for the lines connected to equipment in parallel.
Each type of fluid will have a separate numbering sequence.
Drains and vents without permanent flows are neither identified nor listed.
Design pressures and temperatures are shown on piping specification sheets.
11. )="(2!- &% L*#- #4(,-'*#6
Line number: 6 -P - 034 - 0103 - A1A-H
Where:
6 is nominal pipe size
Project Name
MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
Project No. Document No.
D10169B904LI1001
Sheet / of
43/6
Revision
00
EDP dent. No. 190729521.doc Derived from GFA 0373E
ssue 04 ,30.10.1998 ssue: Rev. , Sheet 43 of 36
P is fluid code
034 is unit number
01 is P&D number
03 is line sequential number
A1A-H is piping specification
Example of line numbering:
11.3 F!4*3 1&3-/
@-".*#6 / C&&!*#6
@O Heat transfer fluid
SL Low pressure steam CL
LC
Low pressure steam condensate
SM Medium pressure steam CM
MC
Medium pressure steam condensate
SM@ Medium high pressure steam C@ High pressure steam condensate
S@ High pressure steam
SSL Low pressure superheated steam
SSM Medium pressure superheated steam
SS@ High pressure superheated steam
CCS Cooling water supply CCR Cooling water return
FR Refrigerant
Project Name
MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
Project No. Document No.
D10169B904LI1001
Sheet / of
44/6
Revision
00
EDP dent. No. 190729521.doc Derived from GFA 0373E
ssue 04 ,30.10.1998 ssue: Rev. , Sheet 44 of 36
M - P - 0MM - GGMM + B1AS - I@
5. S2-1*%*1".*&# J /2-1*"! '-74*'-(-#.
><-. @S %&' *#/."#1-?
. F!4*3
1. N&(*#"! 2*2- /*A-
4. L*#- #4(,-'
6. I#/4!".*&#
3. U#*. #4(,-'
FG Fuel gas FO Fuel oil
C8-(*1"!/
IG nert gas OS
NA
Caustic soda
N Nitrogen OA
GA
Ammonia
CT CA Catalyst OC C Chemicals
AI IA nstrument air AP
PA
Process air (oil free)
AS UA Utility air
CR Raw water CP
PC
Process water
DC DM Demineralised water CT
TC
Tempered water
BFC Boiler feed water CDE Drinking water
FC Fired Water SC Service Water
)%%!4-#./ 3*/2&/"!
BD CBD Close Blow down CS Chemical sewer
SCS Sour water sewer OS
OCS
Oily Water sewer
ATM DA Vent to atmosphere FL Flare
P SL Slops CAS Closed amine system
SS Storm Sewer
P'&1-// %!4*3/
P Process AMN Amine
Piping Specification: T8- (".-'*"! /2-1*%*1".*&# .& ,- %&!!&<-3 */ 6*;-# */ 8-'- ,-!&<B
11.4
Project Name
MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
Project No. Document No.
D10169B904LI1001
Sheet / of
45/6
Revision
00
EDP dent. No. 190729521.doc Derived from GFA 0373E
ssue 04 ,30.10.1998 ssue: Rev. , Sheet 45 of 36
M".-'*"! %&' 2*2- >1 3*6*. - !-..-'?
T92- M".-'*"! ASTM /2-1/. 4/-3 ,9 A=-#/ %&'
/18-34!- &' .8*1$#-// 1"!14!".*&#
A CS A106-B
B Killed CS A 333 Gr6
C C-1/2 Mo A 335 P1
D 1 Cr Mo A335 P12
) 11/4Cr Mo A335 P11
F 21/4Cr 1 Mo A335 P22
G 3Cr 1 Mo A335 P21
@ 5Cr-1/2 Mo A335 P5
I 9Cr 1 Mo A335-P9
H SS-TP316 A31 - TP316
E SS-TP316L A312 - TP316L
L SS-TP304 A312 - TP304
M SS-TP304L A312 TP304L
N SS-TP321 A312-TP321
P SS-TP347 A312 TP347
U Monel 400 B-165
Project Name
MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
Project No. Document No.
D10169B904LI1001
Sheet / of
46/6
Revision
00
EDP dent. No. 190729521.doc Derived from GFA 0373E
ssue 04 ,30.10.1998 ssue: Rev. , Sheet 46 of 36
C&''&/*&# "!!&<"#1- >1 3*6*. + #4(,-'?
0 0.25 mm
1 1.0 mm
1.5 mm
3 3.0 mm
6 6.0 mm
S2-1*"! R-74*'-(-#. >I 3*6*. + !-..-'?
S Sulfide stress cracking resistant
@IC Hydrogen induced cracking resistant
R nternal lining
F!"#6- '".*#6 >1 &' 3*6*./ + #4(,-'?
I.-( ANSI R".*#6
1 150 lbs
3 300 lbs
6 600 lbs
F!"#6- .92- >1 3*6*. + !-..-'?
F Raised face
H Ring type Joint
I#/4!".*&# >1 3*6*. + !-..-'?
I.-( D-/*6#".*&#
@ Heat conservation
P Personal protection
C Refrigeration conservation
T Tracing
H Jacketing
Special requirement (1 digit - letter)
Wet
!
S or amine ser"ices Specific requirement
S "ategor& 1: Moderate ser,ice
12et )
2
3 resistant steels1
.40
# 5nternal lining
"ategor& 2: 3e,ere ser,ice
1)5" resistant steels1
.40
$ 62)7
.440
mandator& +or corrosion reason
(%) 8e+er to Axens 3tandard Material
3-eci+ication 5N-9
(%%) 62)7: 6ost 2eld )eat 7reatment
&nsulation
&tem 'esignation &tem 'esignation
& )eat conser,ation &T 7racing
&P 6ersonal -rotection &( :ac;eting
Project Name
MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
Project No. Document No.
D10169B904LI1001
Sheet / of
47/6
Revision
00
EDP dent. No. 190729521.doc Derived from GFA 0373E
ssue 04 ,30.10.1998 ssue: Rev. , Sheet 47 of 36
&$ 8e+rigeration conser,ation
1.0 I#/.'4(-#. #4(,-'*#6
1.1 S9(,&!/
According to SA code
1. N4(,-'*#6
Example: 34 T 0101
Where:
35 (two digits) is Unit number
T (2 to 4 letters) is instrument symbol as per SA code
01 (2 digits) is P&D number
01 (2 digits) is instrument serial number
On P&D's: T XX01 (XX = P&D number)
On data sheet : 34 T XX01 (34 = Unit number)
Example of instrument numbering:
A/B : One PSV to remain as standby WTH NDVDUAL SOLATON VALVES HAVNG following locking
ARRANGEMENT:
13.0 A#"!9/*/ 2&*#. #4(,-'*#6
The analysis points will be listed with their type (A, B, C..). The type conforms to the typical
analysis point schemes (see General legend diagrams).
Project Name
MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
Project No. Document No.
D10169B904LI1001
Sheet / of
4:/6
Revision
00
EDP dent. No. 190729521.doc Derived from GFA 0373E
ssue 04 ,30.10.1998 ssue: Rev. , Sheet 48 of 36
U#*. #4(,-'
L"/. .<& 3*6*. &% P&ID/ #&.
I#/.'4(-#. 3-/*6#".*&#
0MM - GGGG + OOGGA/B
S-'*"! #& /."'.*#6 %'&( P01Q %&' -"18 P&ID/
Example: 34AP.A 0101
Where:
34 is unit number
A is type of analysis point
01 is P & D number
01 is serial number
Example : )** - S+ - ,,--
W.ere/ )** : 0nit 1o
+ : T2pe of sample point
,, : P3&' 1o
-- : Serial 1o
14.0 P'-//4'- '-!*-% ;"!;- #4(,-'*#6
Same as for instruments
Example:
On data sheet : 34 PSV XX01 (XX = P&D number)
On PD: PSV XX01
Example of PS4 numbering:
A/B B O#- PSD .& '-("*# "/ /."#3,9
15.0 S"%-.9 R-1&((-#3".*&#/
PSM (Process Safety management) regulations (e.g. OSHA 1910.119) refer to the need of using
good engineering practices (GEPs).
A GEP is a generally recognised and acceptable way of accomplishing a technical goal.
n the VPP (Voluntary Protection Program) Participant's Association Conference, Sept. 1995, OSHA
for instance indicated that GEPs published by AP, ACHE are sources of GEPs. This is also
outlined in the Appendix C to regulation 1910.119 : ' Compliance guidelines and Recommendations
for Process Safety management'.
Project Name
MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
Project No. Document No.
D10169B904LI1001
Sheet / of
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00
EDP dent. No. 190729521.doc Derived from GFA 0373E
ssue 04 ,30.10.1998 ssue: Rev. , Sheet 49 of 36
U#*. #4(,-'
PSD NUMB)R
I#/.'4(-#. 3-/*6#".*&#
0MM - PSD + OOGG A/B
P&ID/ #&.
t is the duty and responsibility of the refiner in order to protect the safety of its employees and
public make sure that GEPs are incorporated in the design of the plant.
The following safety recommendations are derived from the use of GEPs.
15.1 SIS >S"%-.9 I#/.'4(-#.-3 S9/.-(/?
"? SIS '-!".-3 .& 18-(*/.'9
n case of risk due to the chemistry of the reaction, Licensor advises the SL (Safety ntegrity
Level) in order to specify the corresponding SS
For this project i.e. Units 85/86/87, 034/035/036/037 the SS for chemistry risk is not applicable (as
per SA 584 or EC 61 508)
,? SIS #&. '-!".-3 .& 18-(*/.'9
The SL and the corresponding SS connected to equipment protection will be the responsibility of
the LSTK contractor. Licensor has shown on P&D a simple configuration of the SS
15. F"/. 3-2'-//4'*/".*&#
Fire case: Normally considered for the reaction sections operating at a pressure < 17 barg,
the depressurisation shall be done normally through HC from DCS. Also, a push button shall
be provided at field DCS at grade level with protection from spurious operation. Duration of
depressurization : 15 minutes.
Fast depressurization shall be done in two steps i.e. 7 kg/cm
2
per minute and 21 kg/cm
2
per
minute depending on the requirement.
For vessel with thickness lower than 25 mm or for vessel with light hydrocarbons (C
3
to C
5
) the depressurization shall be done to 7 barg (or 50 per cent of the vessel design
pressure if lower), duration : 15 minutes.
Runaway case : Considered for the possibility of runaway in the reactor, Axens will
specify depressurization device and the activation in accordance with the SL level. The SS
corresponding to this depressurization shall be in accordance with the SL level already
specified for the risk of runaway.
15.3 S84.3&<# &% 24(2/ ,9 !&< !-;-! *# 42/.'-"( ;-//-!
Licensor will specify automatic shutdown of the pumps by low level in upstream vessel for:
feed pumps with high delta P< 70 barg
Sealless pumps
For all other cases, LSTK Contractor will check with the pump's vendor if automatic shutdown is
required.
15.4 M*#*(4( %!&< ,92"// &# 1-#.'*%46"! 24(2/ <*.8 %!&< 1&#.'&!
Licensor will indicate a minimum flow bypass with flow control for centrifugal pumps for the
following cases:
high differential pressure multistage pumps (water differential head <360m)
large pumps with driver power > 180 kW
for process reason (turndown), flow rate > 30% of max flow rate
the control valve at the pump discharge fails in close position
The pump data sheet will specify the process flow without provision for the minimum flow which
will be specified by the pump's vendor.
15.5 A4.&(".*1 */&!".*&# ;"!;-/ ,-.<--# 2'&1-// ;-//-! "#3 24(2/
Project Name
MSQ UPGRADATION - IOCL DIGBOI
Project No. Document No.
D10169B904LI1001
Sheet / of
50/6
Revision
00
EDP dent. No. 190729521.doc Derived from GFA 0373E
ssue 04 ,30.10.1998 ssue: Rev. , Sheet 50 of 36
Licensor has considered automatic isolation valves for:
an inventory of the process vessel over 8 m of light ends (LPG)
an inventory of the process vessel over 8 m and with a product above its autoignition
temperature or at a temperature above 250C
an inventory of the process vessel above 16 m and a flammable product.
15.6 @*68 !-;-! *# %--3 3'4( &' '-"1.*&# /-1.*&# /-2"'".&' 3'4(
To avoid overfilling, an independent high high level alarm via LT (LAH LLHH) to be has been
specified
15.7 P'-;-#.*&# &% ,"1$ %!&< &;-'2'-//4'-
Following devices will be considered at the pump discharge:
P > 40 barg: one check valve
40 > P > 80 barg: two check valves of different conception
P < 80 barg: two check valves of different conception plus an automatic shut-off valve in case
of reverse flow
15.: B"1$ %!&< 2'-;-#.*&# &% " %*'-3 8-".-'
n case of tube rupture in a fired heater and to minimise the consequences of a fire, check valve
or motor operated isolation valve will be installed at the outlet of a fired heater in the following
cases:
heater operation at high pressure < 70 barg
reboiling heater of a large a column with high gas inventory
15.9 S-"!/ &# 24(2/
Dual mechanical seals (pressurised or unpressurised according to process considerations) shall be
considered in the following cases:
LPG
Hydrocarbons above their auto ignition temperature or at a temperature > 250C
Toxic or carcinogenic fluid (HCl, benzene etc.)
High pressure pumps (> 50 barg)
&xpert Committee
MeetingMo&'("""