Fulbright Hearings, 1st Session

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LEf.lSLATIVE PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE WAjE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
-HEARINGS ^fe SENATE

NINETY^SBCJOND COXGKJiSS
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2, S. Res. 66
II,,?*, 21, 22, -AND 28 j MAT -. II. 7^ IS, 25, 30, A*fj> 21; 1W7
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LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
HEARINGS
BEFORC THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
FIRST SESSIONOX
S. 376, S. 974, SJ. Res. 82, SJ. Res. 89, S. Con. Res. 17, S. Res. 62, S. Res. 66
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APRIL 20, 21. 22 AND 28: MAY 3, II. 12, 13, 25, 26 AM) 27. 19M
Tj for (|M- uw of f*K- f'(/nitnlltw on Ifurtifn
Hflationn
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-an. CtivtMtiHKXT rMnnur, ovnr.v.
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN BELATIOKS I. V. rOIAUOHT. AikuiM,

JOHN' SPAKCILANV AUtuu HtKK MA.VHIIELO, MoaikM Flt&VK CHL'RCB. Uafco STUART XTJUVOTOV. Mlwoort CIÂIBOKKE PKLL, Kiok IiUod GAU3 W. iIcOEE, WiMdac >U>MUKU 8. MUMne. iUltt WILUAJC B. CPUSO, /., OEOK6K D. AIKEV. KAKLE. MCKDT. Boot! DikoU CUVTOKO P. CASE. Kew Jcrwr JOBS SHEBMAy COOfEK. JACOB K. JAnT. 5etr Terk JUJGU 8COTT. JAHB8 B. PEAJtSOK,
CAM, HJLMT, CM*/ /

. KCKIs -cnW</ Clerk (n)
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Statement* br: : ;' ntk, Bon. Joseph, president; World Federate^, ;f?.S.A .v;,.. 520 uaan, Hon. Alan.I;.?. Senator from CsKfornni 9S lay, Student* And Yootb for s People'* Peace 211 , Hon. Thorn** F., UJS. Senator frwn Missouri .,-.'; j'^. 317 )r. Prof. EfcharJ A:, Princeton Umvsrtity..., 542 Gardner, John W., chairman. Comaon Oatuw, Washington, p.C 341 ix&thorpe. Edward, president, JIunt-WaMon Foods, Inc. FultMton, Cidif ^ 382 Gregory, Isaon, Wa*binjrton,D.C... .* ". 218 Grucpimj. Hon. Ernca, fontrfr (7.8". Senator (rom.Abuka. JW Bito, Hon. AvflreU, Wiuhingtoji, D.C , .....'.,. A01v lr. Hon. Vance, U.S. SenatorTroro Indians..- ... #> 30 wr*J. Hou. Mark O., U.S. SouU-or from Oregon., key, Dr. Gr%ld C., Social Science Department, the Rand Corp.. 4'J trwin, HOD. John Ni, I), Under ljocrctry of Sfto; accompanied l>y William H. SuUiv*n, I'nputv Amitant Seeretftry for East Asian aad Pacific Affair ." . 283 _ Jacob*. Hon. Aodrcit; Jr., a, ttepreenUttlvc in R((rM from ilie I \&- Concriaalonal/>J9lnct U the StaUr of Indians .'JJ 591 - Jrfviu, Hon. Jteob Kv.-U-S- Senator from New York ...1 103 IfWcy, Joiin, têtiiaif^'iTetcranii Atfaii>rt. the Wsu*._...,-.^.'.." ,.... 180 f/swtev Prof. John Wv Iutitutv of :Political Studi^ SUnford University, SUndfard, Calif ^, 5W Luce, .Don, East Calaw, Vl , 442 . ManbaO, Chu>, Seaitlp, Waait 223 Mcdonkev, Hon. Paul N., Jr,, 4 Kcprotcn'ntivi! >n Congrt from the 1 lib Concr<nionsl Utftrict of the State of CiiUfoniis. COT McGvcm, Von. Georgi!. U.S. Senator from South DiJcot* , '22 MUJer, Hon. Jaek.JU.S. .Siator from Iowa ;; _. 117 Mondalr, lion. Water F., (7.S. Senior front Minnesota ,. 144 Kainwatur, II.-R. coirinijUid7in-fbicf, Veteran* of Foreign. Wad -ff. the Uoll*d Statot, accompanied !>> Cooper T. Uo)t, ^XfrûUvp director, VFW, and Antbouy M. McDonald, director, national ueturity *bdS3wanfcftVtm,VFW.. ..i-.'. 638 S*xbe, Mou, WiUiarii B., IT.^. Senator from Ohio ^. 174 Scogl>ot.i. John, Nashua, N'.K.-. ';;.. 221 KhapUm, Itobcrt, the New .Yorfctr n-îaaiuc , ., ..'.-. 431 Shwip, (Wn, Dvid M., t'aJ. Vtarino .Cnrpt, rrtired 487Stworrton, H;>n. Adlni E., U^ t!-S, KenM'jr from ioiri'îic^. Vert, CUwka W., fornicr b'.H. IVrniMitnf, K^fotcnfaOvr! I'nfccd Vatimw. ._ ., ,,.'.M....' > f^f the record: ^ ^ Tntc/S. 376.V U-...V;..- ...,iX.:... ',. Te*lofS,74..:.-.........: Tfit of Soitt Joint JlUoiutiwivj'/..... .., T-xt of Kena(t Conûrmnf/ Itatolutiunî? Text of Sunato B^wiiiCot: 02. ^. ...; .127' u> tb^ -S&t -J' ..... 2 ...L, 5 7 ,.-.. 10 '. . 15 17 19 tor
i VifWanit on ~HiUv'it u<i-ih*T)!d)'- vrticir. from the , ""Wa*hin(Ct9'lC.**/ April20, fy/t:;..-! r_ IM>
,-'* fnirUon for the record-^ Con tuvued -".- *** - VVietnam Owenj^gsnwnt Art2<J <so*ponsow_: ii'.._ SO *""-"** --*-- jj Cbmmandc^-ro-Cî*!'iAuotber Vj*iv," article b*. iackjuar, American JJiir Association Juurnal, April', ._, - i .;^.^.v...-.->.;:..^,.,-. .--~,-.jx...: .-- . eowttitation*! T*^^ teched by the VTefujun. U>uAct, Inpectod in -tbVCoagi^suOoal Record by :Senator .on May I3,i970 ?....:-.,,.,:.^ --;-.. 57 ,- jxKmi ^CcakorkTidutn pa ibtr Amendment to End lb War, prepared i " , ,- :V- ~,-ir> .tidwrttf'-bf tht Ifkryard Law-School under the'direction of ** Vlfc;:*-.^.,.**?**1-... ;--72 '".-.? Statement of ^r. living Gimabrtrgâwpckror processor of history, Yeahiva I7rverw'ty/Si-fore the Coccioutfê1' on Fonujui .Relations,
"Ky' SceaXoaJc Roaft to1Self-Uefena^Ku^c K^ysPiicôf Puiloutby UJi. i iWsonabk," 4rtick fromxhc New York Tiuwi,, Apiit 19, 1971 _^':'.: ^....: v.-..:.S^ -^ 115 jjtateioect^f Senator Adlal^..Stevenson III-.-" >-.".,.<,;, 1 131 s U-tJ. Sar\'ftfs a>"'Votc O&mna>pj,".tiicic by Gloria ^ od CoKuptiwn War," arUdc by Peter Al'j'ay, the vJCv*abhingtooPoKt,-A>nil30w:1971 ^'./.-...V"-41.3. To MowtorlVtet AltaJn for Next Tbrw'- $*ars," artido by ; ^-: . : Oeorge C. Wibwi>-tte WMbw^tou Po*t, April 21,1971...: ';_\_', 'rfû'l- Obancv for Peace iif yieuiom," letter V>.be editor from Richard Ul 142
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'LaoV.-TboEud f~>4he Line, _ cditoriat lij,' the Washington P*wt, Mafch l,iW71.-~"x..\_. ..-./ .".. 148 "If Soutu Viinaiw Invades North Vitttoam," letter to the editor.! from Pr'K.'JUlea 6. WhitibK. the-Kfc York Time*, Mab 9, 1971." 149 "Cbi>- filicy: Confrontation . ."".," ednorial in the-New York ~ uSr. Mareb II, 17 ,.v :,i 150 ^re;KW*l/';edttdrlaL m rs Willmar Wef. Central D/iUy Trib,February27, l7lV......J 150 ^ , ~ '.'Mondxtt. B|U oc Invattioh {v*rtd Paiuagc," edit'Wial in the- St. Paul ,^ (Minn.) Siflday Ptieer Prcw, February 28, 1971 151 X '-Another Front," editorial in tlie Providence <il L) Journal, March 2, 1971 ,...,^ 151 ' "C "Suicidal Logic,'' edti^nal in the DCS Moinrs (Iowa) itcgutcr, March ' 8,1971...^,. ,. 152 . "Thieu Aski Haijuil n of Drive Into NorthSouth Vietnam'* Chief C DencrilMat Move* as Being 'Only a Matter cf Time,' " article by Michael Parlu.Uic Baltimore .Sicr^cbruary 26, 1971 164 : "Lao*V %'tid-t Nixon l Up To," article by Daniel ftfeberg, Uiu Ne.w . VorHtcxit-wof Book*, March It, 1971 ^;. "155 HtaWnent of former Senator Ktnest Grucning ^..- . Ov.170 Jo^nVTêaty of Peace BvtUWn the People of the United State* aud 1. Uie'PdOpIc of South Vietnam and -North Vietnam .- 23[ The HarrU Survey'Tide of Public Opinion Turns Deciivvly '." -. Acaiiut the War;'xrtick- by Ivxtin Harri*, ttu Wahingtou Pot, "Military and civdioa vur Gwualtiw in Indochina ,., /. 278 Civilian Toll Study," article by George C, WiUon,-the . Pout, April C, J97J1 ..-".: 280 '>n*l authority for PrcKidnnt'n pulley m ViaVuuu...'... .-.'^.. 2<K> adSon during L".#. witbdrawalu .'. .::.r. 292. President Nixou's record on Y'tatnain, 1954-OM -^^-.^. ., 2tlS Tobi^t L*.S. priKODerx of war and miMing in action in Soutbciurt Aflia> .-.' 300 Vr-KZ rortie rate in N'/rtb Laox , 308 Opportunity of HtaU- Drpartun-nt to review Secretary Starw' -jtoecb "Buuker Affayi V'ietfiam Veftrs " article by Alvin Htiurter, tin- New York Tiinm, May 10, 1971 31*
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Itwertiorw for the record Continued -. - ~ "A Lnwoo From Uie French," articte by FVantf..Maokicwiu Tom Bradau, the Wwhingtou Post, May 11, WJv ..... .......:.~ 328 "14,000 S. Viefc Stalled ik .Cwmtodia," article -t>y Petor Onod, the Washington tort, May II, 1971____....:.._____..l.;.^... 338 i; <;ardner,Agr*eii:WjU< Nixon That 'PwSJJlt Arc Fed Uji'~ Growth . and SUCISMW of Comruon Cauac Noted by Politician*, article >>y Flora Lcwia, Uwr Washington Port, May 11; 1971 ----- ...... . ____ 346 "What Wt Wrong?", article by Kmcutl^jUu Hugbwvthc Nw Yori Tune, May 7. J 971 ......... .. ....___, .............. ..L. .S4K Tablr, fimeUouai breakdown of U.S.. Oo>'ernnAUE*Uidget outlays on -A* Fodiral fuutobaMV'oc-fwcaJ.ywirt 1OT(K72.,.A ---- ......... 3.W t*tt.T .t? Senator J. W. Fulljrightrlfruni <!aiJar W. Woinbergrr, Deputy ^Director, Office of Management andsSuJgrtrM^y 3, i971,_ ,",Kl "Tfa-r Cp<i)i,JC"B*- War: Monej: and-Morr," artialy hw.Peof. Dniw ' \'vdlr, Uio CortoOJ Kogiicxr, NoytfilwrJ970... : . . .". . ' : . ::_____, . 361 \' Letter to Prwidoit liicba/J Ni ion from eollcrc comtannfty leaden.-, -368 "fiH) Coilc4>ia4cf^ Conrt^mn War Pob'ry in Letter to Nixon," article It^Jolm Kifoirrtliy S<* York Titntat, 'April 2, I7 1 . . ........... 378 "Youtli Conference ICcjecU V'ictn*irtiwtlon, Ask* 1071 Pullout," rticlf. l>y J'xic WcutttortJi; UM WaKingtoii Pia<^ April 23, t7I_ . 377 r " 'ti<tal)liiihm<inl HrtlAi' &i.vv -?rdflt Motiv!ô Longer Enough," '! l>y BUiot2vict>acIi, Manufacturo Supfstnurket Ke\a*, April , '" cx in-KurpiNr fflirinking Like U)o Dollar." hv Aimlulr Shiib, Uic -WuhinKtou F<Wt( May 12,1 9?!...:; c, ii r i c , . . . -- - - - -. . . - . . . . .....,.--;.Ti- I)oni*r CrM/i: HoatiuK Toward -l(foon?" arUelc^ Time ~ from ' ... .. . . .Statt-iiiL-nt of Ifcury W. Maiw, mayor of Afil'ulccc,-for the NjJion' Ijcaûc.1 of Citii jUid U S, Gjofcrcnw: of Mayon.-. -....'___.".. -.:; " 4W "Tnc War in Ind'octitua Ocpart'Pk Words," artifl* from NcwafttfJ,^ May:i, t07l^VJ.r.;...-^-i. '....,. .r.-:. ...-.-. ^., :.-,...^.,. .426 "U.S. Wnt ToldTy X>rftvc VioOianJ'-JJwclosurejyf 'Ttljer Cage*' i* Hlatuud iu Jiien," articl*' by -Gloria Kmernon, thc-îffjir ôrk TimcK, AprO;^/:J'J7^ ...... ____ I. -_>,: I-', ..... ~. ________ 420 "Saigon Kviotx a Ciitit^" arti'lii from the Bin* iôrk Timor, May I,
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Letter to Senator J..VC." Fii)l>ci|(bt fr>w Huynh'Tsjf Mui, i4tirh)tuj , of tliu VivLututi î'HU>>*iit%)(i>it Uw6j, May *. Id71.,^ ^ - -^ ...... 44* L.-tu.T to *:hfc'.or J., W. Fiil^Kf-t fn>m Prof/ NKU>; -V jw Trun^, - : ' > cJiairmaii, (kr.i/,ittt,f W t& Jiiiprvv.'iiijrt of tlm Prison KrglKic -,in.-*wtli:Victoi,, My-3rwr4..,. .. ..... , :. ,_____.\., ". :.. 444' 'U-tU-r to tin- LT.y.-Siituste-rFort'iKd ^SaUwm CwfloiittW' xrom Mn-i-v >'o ft* Tbaivtr, ViGtimme<! WOHM-II'* >Tovjiwt for Ut? UightJ' Liff, Mav 7, l'J?l . . ..... ^^ ,_____r. . : : . . . . , . _ . . . . . . ,V 14fi >>U<T t^) J. B. Ku-kf>etr;ckr ^-nrruJ. oiitm*:r, iUf K, U lU, .Sfcl^wi, froru"L. V<. Cav ,.i<i4l). <)rtlc*lri <tJiar(;/> of mifttrir-tioii,. I)ci>irtuut :fiU \Wiwy, KiHiubli'ii-ot'yjiibkMii, January 7, J^7t .; ...... ,/:.:S*t."wt if-l>onJwe.. ...;-,;_ . ..______3 . . ..... ...'.".'.. . tti'^pKv of a<m.' IJnvid if. Mhoup.. . ;, .......... .-,.. . ,; 48/j. ; "- ".ÎUOK from rwal %OI(')'M Cofijfn^wionaf Medal of Jli/M'jr'Avftrd-, 4H6 "Riikr fftiJ Lfnuurr on V.MUr War," wtid*- by irf'!tuid *XWr - "vii-l Jt-ifc iTuf-if i'.S. fur.&iri JDcfii. v|j W*sblojtii J'i wt, ,V jVrî>[ wr T, ' . . '. '-A MAtujrof.TfUKi/'ftrfi.'J^b/Â.fitli/my^trin, the- Ni-* y.rkT)mv; . . * ' ^ " . : "Hanr.i-Aitt>, in InU-rvi'-K, Links- I'ultout J)au? i*nd. J*flJKr ' ^by AnUi-tny i,c-w, t*i.- NVw ViVrVTink"' / >Uy 24/( in Vk'toarn," artiOt- by Tom Wick^ f bn. Sw Vork .>,-( 07 j. . . ._____.--.. ..'.;. :.C ....... ; - . . . . n^Winduig f>oiT/'>'l(ru^ by Hi-au Ach<-*m, Ui< .> My20, 197 IT-~---. . - -"-. .f fi.r/nrr >x nat^r-Ji/w.-yb S (itark, pr(î(l<'i]l </f World
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bi>>rtiQii3 fftt^he recordCoutind . . -"A"Jf>3r'tDcncite from Vietnam," artM bjr Oharlra* W. Ypit, -^ Jtlii- Washington Port, April 11. WJ ..... : ...... ..-.. ..-.: -^.. .-' -"535r;iichtrro-Ciuaed OvpnnviHvvmimt," anidc by Charte^W. utl, the WanhioicUik Port, April MV4971 .......... ^ . -: . . - . ~i- , - . :' M8 "\ Mice for tfcuthcatv **a, Afwr U.3. Withdran-al-J-raiu Su*ior Three Ponibte Sccnarioa," tbs Washington Post, May 10, .-, ....................... ...... -:>I_____- ........ ... 539 Mid V"wn -the War Some OwdiKiOfcs on "Ytetoaw;" "- Chirtc* V. A'ort, tk- WwhingloniWt, Ma/23, IKi.. MO Prrf.-&tikaKi A. Falk ....... :>.'1_. ............. .. V*18 Prof. John Witaw Lewis _________ .-.,": ...... ......... Wo HottWflvvrfuUon319____ ____I ..... ,. ,.: ................ - . . , . - 5W > . .'73t iTTkt Support Proposal To.Wttkdmv All Trop Thw Yi,'; artidu hjr G*>r Gallup, the 'Washington Po*t, January ^Jl 197l. 601 "Poll Shows. More A.k Strif, -PullnMt,^1 artidc-iriim the Now York: ' Tinwai, Ja:.aary3JI, 1971____-----...... -:. ..... - ....... / 001 "Aipi>ort. {'<r Nixa on Wjir IVo^w to 34%," artidu by Lcuia Haow,
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iugtm Post, Mav 23, 1&71 ........ _ .......... .............. 603 -Letter lo Secretary of Ocf<m Mt-lvin II. Laird from S-jiator J. W. Fut v 'Lright, April ^0, 1U71 ____ ............. .-'." ........... ......... : 62S Letter to ConKrenrnau John E. Mox from- President Ilichard Nixoti>. April 7, 196. . : ____ .............. ; ......... ; _____ ..... ; 024 Mcntoraoduni for -1-hr b<*d <>f o^'C'jUvr dcpartutrnta and agoci, - cstabliahijig" a ppvc^dun- to govcrju oimpliiu.cc ith congressional d.-iiuuidi-for luforiiiotiou, frr>in Prwidît Richard Nixon . _. . ----- .024 "Xienfc Khx.itang Pruviuc,: Refuna-n in Vientiane Plain," J'tJv 10, 1970 ................... ....... ... ..... ....... *....-...._ 629 Cao Ky: On tbr Sinking Boat,-" article hy Nguyen Cao Ky, w York"Tim.a-, Ma? JV, 1971 ...... ...-. ..... ':. ............ 650 Demand Putlout Dale To Fret- Ok," artidf froln tlir Waohlag- _ IIM Post, May 5, "J7I . . . . . . . ...... , ........................ C'7 Xnnvcruatiim t^twwu Congrouiinan feyinour IIal|M;ni and Nguynn : " Thanh Ix!,DKVdi4i!gaUun,Parui, April 2H. l71 ........ - ..... C57 ' C..ris>c*atu)n Ivctvwu C<mf(cc&>Tnakt fx'yi'tuxir llaljxTn und ilr. N'guj'in Von Ti-'ii. Pft(id.-lcKatiofi, Paru/A|>rilWf. 1971... s ...... 660 "IV. Knm Breed* A Ni-w Kind of X'rt/^riiO'1 by John Whtclrr, th Cfiicafr Triburiu, Apri? II, 1071____/ _...................... 669 "The 'it llcturni . . . ^ Srivcial ôb Probk-ni," artidu Hjy. Gcue (irove, thr H'u.<hiiif(Ujri Star f rmautiiy tnaKaxiuc), April 1 1, 4.'l7l ---- 671 "Our Violent Vitnain Wta," article by Dr. Charks J. L>-v>, in*.Chicajjo Daily N'cwi, ]>cfiicf)tT 1970 ...... ........ ........... ,_67.' "The. l)p'jblo Wouudi* of Wj*r LI'ij<itaJ Car.-. Hrr for Vietnam'* lojurod Cut i>y Adiniiiinrration," articl<; !>> Herbert Mitgang, tlurSew York Tmiot, Oriober IU, 1970..,. ........ ........ 077 J 'T!ip Vietnum VV-r: 'No One Civ.-s H Damii/ " artidf from NVwuwcelc, . . Marrh29,J97l (April 7,-l'J71) .. .......................... 07H - ""3.'i2,000 VStf. V'-iU J>I|>|PU," from tlv Baltiihor*; News-Anicriran, March 2.'i, 1JI71 ...... ! ......... :^................ 680 "OI PtiUout Zobed Only llanaa Solution," from th- Wnxhington CvjufiKta.VMayJ(5, 1971 .................. ....... . ....... 681 Appi-ndix: Hlatcuuir.t xuf/tiiifted l>y law.tiir*: cû)tnifi':i' u Amr-riran Policy Towfl/fIVii*tiianion find-tho-U'iirJîpiiluti''!' ..... ^ ....... 083 SUl/'Kixii KiibiniltcJ Oi thf .Si-nolA F'lf.u'iyi Iti-laUoim CVmi>iitt.-o. liv ' ' " . frnin the Fn>t^tnt uh'jfrh I'-ailcrn oinnullatioii on Victmnti ' ........ . ..... ' : . . . , . . . . 692 in i'ii()|/i>rt of i% coni(ir;niw partition 'jf ttu.- Viut/iEir War... ................... f/Ji*
Appendix Continued " -; -^ . _.. - ^National Student Gx>rdinatmif-~CoiuriilH tar Freedom 5a -" Vietnam_ .'!" i v and Soutbawt Ata'a," official coyiuttc '<{ata<mt)ni'thi: Vietr^meV "*- 1 '- ' '" ' 700 701 "Progrww in the .VitUwan 'tiuu'^f ttc.BuriU-Fi&pulj'tioa," National ; Student .CqurdiMittp^ ,-omrui*ce fc< rrcedwn in Vietnam : and " . ' . Sov(,hf*A8lrr.:7 ........ -l-.-^.-j..-^.:- ----- _..-.. -\ "-.^ ----- .702 v "Cam5x.di*'* 8Uw Against Time," NAU^D^ StilrtvOt'Coorvlinning li Vip.Uiui aUcf Southt^wt \si,^ ,,'....^. ,,.... 704 i. . '' - .' . "Survw>'"f V'JtuSiuf Vietnam Vctcnuw," bj*^08Ct>ti Nwlion.' ----- ....'_ 705 '' - ~ - David . cr*l Court ....... -.;...{.../.. .-..;-.->>. X.. sJ---> ------ ~... -'.. 711 LcUtrto^cnatorJ. W.Ful>n(CrtrtQic Mart Bn.*t, M*y 31, 1071.- 712. LttUr io^8aitor?f . W. .-Pt^mgW. Ir*w Bernard -K. .Thbmu, 3r... . trtt?r to Senator J.'IV. FuIIirighl from Jtuucs Wiu.fiou, June L', 1971 . _ 714 Lutter ind cnrfooed nutctr.cnt of Frattca Ghfwtt Foundation to Sot/.-W-.-fulbright . and mcinlx^f of Cbe <x>mmitlcc oti Fon-igu ' 'from -Gwgc F. Perry, May 10, W?l.',- .-.^-r ...... . 716 LeUtrtoScnaforJ. W.FuIbright from Roesc Kushncr, Ma* W, 1,971.. 717 "The D.ctornl Option in Vietnam: I," rtid<ovlCfiCbtcf K. Ox)rx;r. the N'cw York Timw, AptU 1ft, J'J7^- ...... 1.1; ................ -7J8 "TVf Electoral Opttou in V>tnam: M," article by Chentcr L. Cooper, - tin-New York KJUJ, Aj.ril-l, 1071... ................. ; ..... 72U Lcttw to .^ctiator J. W. FulbrJght from Wavn H. St. Clair, May *fl.
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^ . Ltttcr to Senator J. W. FuIbrifUt from FcrdinAnd A. Improu, Mv 14. - . v- ' 1971...;... ..... :....- .................... . ........... .'.. 721 ^ Ltfbr to Scartor J. W. Fulbriebt froit> Prof. Herman T, Bluracfithal, dctiartuient oC iHj-x.toIo*y. ;WaHl)incton Uuiymitv, St. LOUM, Mo.. Ix;Uir to ^nator John Swarkman from Richard J. Hornbcalc. \ugUHt 10, 197(T. ................... -..^...- ...... :.'.:.. . ....... Ixtttcr to Senator J. W. Fulhriglit from Joan M. Vinswi t Mrs". Bobby (i.), national coordinator, National Lcuguv <if Families Of American Prwoncra and. Miaring in .Soutbeaat Ani, July 1 1971 . . ., ......... ~'i~> .Summary Index: '..-' . ' C 7/7
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April M: 1971.... V-,..-... ..'....I',.:...-.;....'.
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722
PRQPSX&S%LATBiD TO THE WAATO-
ab, ITIV
"' ' '' :JpTB> STATE* SENATE, CpKanrtEK os ForaooN RELATIOXB, The wminuttec met, pureuAnt:t<) notice, at 10 K)5 a.ro., in rooni New SnnjtfV Qffire Building, .Senator J-.W/Fulbrigbt (chairnuui) . . Present; Scatters Fitlbrigh^ Church, -Poll, Spongâse, ooper. itoid J*vits. v \-;--. ' v -. . ; ,11ic CiiAiKJfAS.-.TJie oqmmittee \-i]l conje^ta oyder. .' . ^Ve did not- nnticapttte such a large crowd, in time. We tried to get the <*uciw room, but.k w*s enft*ged. 3. am very sorry, we 4J' - more" ronj,- bul thisucjuH-he l* room tlfat we could obtain,
RTATEMEVT " ' ,
The (>mmittccôn Foreign iJi'bttioua id meeting today in the first of a scries of hearing oh pftudinff lopi-'laf ive proposals reUtini; to ilie war in SouHwast Aiia. TJicxr nr S. 376. S. 974, Seustc Joint Resolution 82, Senate Concurrent. Hctiolutinn 17. St'iuite Reeofutiou *2, and Senate Resolution OG. ol>jotfion tl)se proposals will t>e inaert<>d in the record at , ,(Tfui inforinatioii referred to follows:) '
2 .CONGRESS tarSooar
S.376
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

\-j." JAXCIST 27 (lacnUiirt day, JAXUAW 26), 1971 Mr. UcGotxu (for hiiateU, Mr. BAKU, Mr. CHCBCU, Mr. Guw*ro:r; Mr. KAOUTTOV, Mr~Q*A?EL, Mr. H/k>u,Mr. Iturr, Mr, Hjumue, Mr.' HATTULD, Mr. HOOHM, Mr. Jitorrr, Mr. J*m, Mr. Ksvirnr, Mr. MojotAU, Mr. ! UOM, Mr. Knucnr, Mr. PMZKIBE, Mr. Riaitxirr, Mr. TOWKCT, and Mr. :' WJLUAM ) iulroduced the following bill ; wiuch *TM renf twice utd -_ ' - CBfernd to UM Coounitten oo Foreign Relations
A.
To amend tbe Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, at amended.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and Uftue of Kepreteota2 tiva of the-ffuikid Staiei of America in. Congrcti 3 Thai this Act may he cited-As t\u Vietnam
4 Act- of 1971.
SEC. 2. dmgtetts fiuda and deckre^ that under the Oon-
6 stifition of tbe ITnilod HtaU-t; tic President and t!jc Congress 7 xbare rtpomul>iJity for extfll/IixLbg, defining the authority 8, for, and concluding foreign military coroniitinctitii; thai the d repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Itcsolutiou rawe* new 10 fat about the srmrcc of tuliiorify for Anu-riran inv
IT
2 in Vieuuun; that both the domestic and foreign policy iuter3 wts wf *ue uivJ C-Uo_ .squire an expeditions end to the
' ^ "\ "**
4 warm Vietiuun;.Uiattbcooaflict aw best be resolved th-oogh 5 ft political settlement among the parties concerned; that in C light of aD considentioai, the solution, which offers the 7 greatest safety, the highest measure of honor, the best likeii8 hood for the return of United State; prisoners, and the most 9 meaningful opportunity for a political settlement would be 1 the establishment of a date certain for the orderly with11 drawaJ of all United States Armed Forces from Vietnam. 12 BBC. 3. Chapter 1 of part III of the Foreign Assistance
13 Act of 1961 is amended by adding <it the end thereof the 1* following new section: 15 "gfic. eÔ. (a) In accordance with public statements of
16 polity by the President, no funds authorized to he appro-, 1? priated cnder this or any other Act may be obligated or J expended to maintain a troop level of more than two bun-. 19 Jred and eighty-four tliousand Amwd Forces of the United 2" States in Vietnam after May 1, 1971.
21
"(b) After May 1, 1971, fuud* authorized or ppcjpriated under thi5 or any other Act, may be expeodeil hi
'i
~j coonttrtion with adivities of American Antied Forces ui tutd ^ over Vietnam only to accomplish the following objectives:
1 2 3
4
"OH0
bring about the orderly termination of mih'-
tary operations there and the safe and systematic withdrawal of remaining American Armed Forces by Decem-
her 31, 1971;

" (2) to insure the release of prisoners of war; "(3) to arrange asylum or other means to assure the safety of Sooth Vietnamese who might be physically euuaJigered by withdrawal of American forces; and " (4) to provide assistance to the Republic of Vietnam consistent with the foregoing objectives."
5 7 8 9 10
Mb CONGRESS
S.974

FOWL-ACT 2i (lrplti\ cUy, FKHTOAKV IT), 1KT1 Mr. MIUCDUJC (tor liimwlf And Mr. SAXMC ami Mr. Bvvir. Mr. Onvurnx, Mr. KaaxtHV. Mr. (JKAVTJ, Mr. HAUIN. Mr. Il.vrr. Mr. II \irrxc. Mr. Hroiini, Mr. IlrnTHiirY. Mt. MiiiiAU*. Mr. MMS Mr. Mi xir, Mr. SEIJU>X. Mr. Mr. SrrvKvwiN, Mr. TrKM:r. Mr. WIIJ.IAMI.) uitrutluced 1 1* bill: wliii-h nas rnd tiricr HIM! rrfrncd to t\tf Camtmnrv im ^n Relation*
A BILL
To turieod the Foreigu \tunstaiu-4> Act <>f 19C1, a* ameuded, to probiliit wiy involvement or paflicijtalion <rf IJiiited Htat^H Arnifd F<roe in an invasion of North Vietiuuu without prior aud explicit <)iip-(^.-i(naJ authorization. 1 Be it enacted by the Stnata and Haute of Repraada-
2 tiveM of the United State* of America in Congreu auembltd, 3 Hint chnptiT I of part III of (he Foreign Awittanre Act of 4 I1KJ1 i* amended by adding it the end theror*f the following 5 new wotion: <> "fiEC, 20A. (a) Oongrow find* and dwJnrpK that nn-
7 der the OxiKtitution iA the United Rtate^ the Preident and
JI
the Congress sh&nc responsibility fur establishing, defining
'I the authority for, and concluding foreign military comiiu't3 4 incuts; that tin- 1,'jiiU-d States om in uf ilii* M-<lioii. in (ux-oniaiKx* with pulilic MiiU-incnts of |H|!C\ l>y the I'u-ident. IKI fund" audmrixi'd or ii|)|trojiriaU'd under tlii- <>r any
' otlicr Act shall !>< usc<l << earn,' out an inva>i<>n <>f Xorilr
1(1 1
Viettuini liy I'nitcd Slati-s Anncd Forty's uiilnmt prior nd explicit antliori/juioii of the < 'oiip-css. "( <: ) ^" "II(J utter the dale of ewtdnifin of llii-> M-dicn,
'-
1^5 ipi fund- unlfiori/ed or uppropriitted under thi or :mv oilier 1^ Act nlmll IH- ii^-d lo curn out <-<unlml air support mîvities
1"' withiu the borders of North Vieinani in Mipjn of a jjpumd Ifi I" invasion of North Vicliijin uiihoui prior nnd explicit athorixtttion of (lie < 4
-a=" S. J. RES. 82
IN THE SKJJATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. HUM introduced tl Mlwtng print involution ; wliii-b vw rvd wfc nd referred to U Committee on Foreign iteration*
JOINT RESOLUTION
Expreuing a proposal by Use Oougres* of the linked States for wiring Un- wtfc return of Aiiicrictui aitd allied prisoners of wur and tin; aitu-U-ruled witMmwal of all American miliUir\' tH-jNiuifH'l from Soutii Whereas die Pmad<xit of tiw Uuitd Hui m bin addresi on peace iti ladodtioa ti October 7, 1970 publicly auBowMswl a writ* of )Hr<}HMals f>f mti>i4TJkm fpy tbe <i<iveninieDt of NortL Vtotoam at tb ttuks l>?uig hcW 'w 1'ara; and Wherea* one of lite rrmidml'ii ptopoijj( WM the httOiatuUmo offer to immediately ud uucowlitwumliy exdtt |e all pruooen of war held by both *'.Am; and Wh*rca no preoooditiou WM iudiott^d fey tite Pras eol (w uegottattoti aud actioa u tbic; jnip<rtuJ; and
II
s
Wherens the purpose of the President's program of Victnaniitation is to giv* (he people of Sooth Vietnam . rrasoiMiMo opportunity to achieve the capability of defending Uh-mselves and their country agauurt *n<wd aggmwioti from North Vietnam and against subvention and terror diftvtt-d. controlled, and supplied from North Vietnam in order tlmt the priuuplo of national nclf-dcu-ruiiiuition under the Cimrter of the United Nations may be maintained without further involvcntent of American military pcrwtnud in South Vietnam; and Uie prugnuii >f Vietnuuiizathiii has leCn rapidly moving toward successful cjuij/ldion, jtonm'tting a. coutiiiuvd reduction of large miujUjrR of Anierioau military personnel in , South Vietuain; and Wlwreas it is the uiti-nUoii of die Ooi)gn;< of the L*it'd S(nU< (hot all American iiiilitur) |K-rw>nnol IIP withdmwu from South Vietnam conslsti-nf with t]ie time m- maJdy nccrfiuuy {or Otmiplution of Uio ]ir<tgmn of VietiuuiHxotion and in coufoniiity with tlw: so-iwllcd "Xixon llm-lf'nn-" ttnii(Miiu'c<I liy tl: Proxidcut ui (iiwm on -fuly ii5, IJMiiJ; ;md * Uie flagrant vioJaUuii.hy Xorlh Vi<-tn;uii of tlie f imcv;t vcring trUincni <f jirisoucrx of war IKIX Ac the crediltiiiiy of'Ujc offcr of rqirfwentative* of Um Oownuncnt of Xorth Vu-inujo lo mtgoluu* the exdiwj^c ' of prisoner* of war bfuu* the cvnijtkiU1 witbJmwul of AmcrJin rniJitwy pitrBonw} frow S*mtJj Vif4imi: Vow, therefore, le it Jtetoliwl fni Ihf finuilr urul 7/w/c nf Jlcp/rumtaltiv* of ttif fJiiifrtl Sttilrt nf Amfrv-4} in C'ongrrj(# aiutiiiMrei. Tluit the C*ntcn-1>>' 4>f 'I'4' T'uit4<d Sîex roose* UIA( tlw
Crated States agree to the complete withdrawal of all
2 J\Jnericaa nalimn' personnel from South P&nam within 3 twelve nwindrr following completion, under appropriate iuler4 :uU>nal sap. msion, of lh. exchange of priaoot^ts of war fc* 5 j>rjKw6d by the President ia bu pttbti^ iDDoauoemeot of 5 OctotW 7, 1()70, and die acfotailhig for men missing in 7 aftion; wid 8 Ktolrfd further. Tliat the Congress of tie United
9 SiaUs will fully support any effodx mad< by tbc Prqdect 10 and bis adfiuni-dration v> iinplftoicut: tb'tf proposal.
10
9& CONCKKSS
J N THi: MKN'AXK OK TI1K UNITED STATES

-Annul!, VJfil Mr. SnwK*Mitr.tr<>-u*rl{( Mr. OCASWTO*, Mr. <MI.UX, Mr. HtMHfs, Mr. t. Mr.Jtfuiivn. Mr. Krt.vnn. Mr. Mtînvmir, Mr. HAXI'IJ^, Mr. Xli^kti.) jiiiUiiiloil I!M< folloni;^ ctiiH-uriiMit rrviluliun; wliini
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
<f INtihal Siwiis luilknry iuv<4vJii SMI(|I Viclinmr U (41 ^ntui^ llw fiV-l<iH ninl figlil* of llw icii|t|r i.l (In* siijijHiii. f |ln- I'ltiffi! Sidles I'm1 a i-,-îiiic wliuî r n-I;iiN
-_v inn
llu- /-..miMiMlinj! !,' |]M. Sinllli VUÎUJMCM- HMN* of |{i-|tr(M-n(ii<iu"> mill Jli Mi-nlil;. "t Mw tVi-^di-ii: ;ui.| llu- V'HV
I'li'-ilriij. of SM(ili Vii-liiiiiii ani\ |lit*T4-liy iilhvl <lirrJlv nii.I
iiiHy J|H- IKIH|I^-< 4f/ i /a- win'', i InJ, lwJ liio jirosjfHH for u
V .
11
tJic goal of sdf-dotcnniiiiitioti for Jio IKS>J]C irf Sunll, VtOimia roqniivs tliat tlio ITiutcd Suu^s imt <4ily û-niil support for nuy.niirdJdttli.^ or parties Imt l.s4i () o( any MicU wa^Kut; ami Wiwrcus ilic State* nud Uic GovcTiiiiK'iil 4f tvxiU( YiciJnim <->iil<I <-r<-;ii- u fiilsc wiipusinuKx- rf Mi]jMrt for tin- nvJoHiMi trf i'r-i<l<-ii \ 1 Ilijeu HT Vk* 1'nwMltuit Ky: Now, Uiorcforc, lM-3t ll&olrctl ty tlu- Senate flhe ftovtc of /tcjirfîtlallrtx
2 cimcurring), 'Hut &3CTIOX 1- Tlie CVnipvss naifiiniiy tta tteiUrnliiy <f lln-
4 Uuited 8tnt*^ iu tlic 1971 Koiitii VidiKiUM-sc elcxîitiis mwJ ^ iirgoTUie IVtttiAiit uf tlio Uniuid StiiU-s t asrtirc (Iwl ijnG I'ttrted Soi(M luaiiitnlits MCrat ucjirn4?t) JUM! ijn|iun'mliiy 7 wilJj rrîKS't t< Muii oliîtnis :MU! ll>ai IH
8 MijijKrt in any fi*rui will U' pruviA'd M uny

m
SKC. 2. it i* tl"- '"iiM1 tit' tin- C<iiî't>s ilinl UK
:.1U
< 0 uv S<rudi VM'HuiJiM'f* 1 jrîmc wHiM-li lu'i'cafh r inquire. d <4.it -*T IHU
< lu1(' U*. <iiC S'NJtil
12
J at it* j^rjKiM1 (!' iilwrvalii'ii innl xlitdy f ilnitf
2 iiivulvuuwnt iii Uus 1W7-1 dceuoiw "m SouUi Vietnam.

:!
' 0') 0V TV Commission .JiaJl dUWKt of tlte followiuj* .." '
I c t w i iiwiiWs; .^
T Â)
V\V MfJIlltOTrf 4" tllC (N'Utttf H{]HMilU'4l Ky v ' ,
'
llii* I'lWidfUl ]< 'ictiiiioro f-ll; ^-mUo, ilir*u* of J>o uicanlnfH^'f liif iiiuJ4iri<y {miiy mid twu 1 Uio miiK.iity |tnrty ; HIM!
1" <1
ui>|M>iiitrti liy tlie fSjiotkor ( tlml UIMIIH', (linx* f wiiuiu itimil U> IIK'UIK-IV of tlu- jiuijority juitty iiud tvu nf
fmin ;IJIH>II^ itx jiu'ln^'fK. VtK'-HtM'icM .ii( ilio uxtuii] ut iJw ('<tiimii*Kitt j*)i;ill not. nlT<-4i tin* >iw-i' <t|' UK* '' ''
"*
(wni4iHK uii'Jiiltt'i'H to oxcciih- (1> tluLH'K of dm txuirtMiMi.rii. mill nJiiJi l*o lillixl in I lid Ki4ii<! jiwiiiM'!1 jiit.iii I Ixt <-^*t>. rf 4Jir
'''
(<) JV
ÎMII MY fnu*ii
. .
Y < r
<vui|uii(jn ntwl (Jw w'JtJvitk* of I'jii
^* - Kind1* n^'ticuf, (ulici/iln, jiinl rjii/4ii mid |rrH
13
1 dial country fur such period of tiuto as the Gwiuiibsiou 00112 siders appropriate. 3 (d) (1) The CouunWon.tJiatl ian\if. ' s firi& interim ro-
4 port to (he Congress mt uUw Uuin .Tuly I.r., l!7l. Tlio Oom5 tninioii jfall thcnvfler stilnuil regular interim reports to llm
6 7
OoogiCK md sIuUl .nibnul a fiiuil n^nirt not later tluiu November 30, 1971. EucL report. tJiaJl iin-Judo MKÎ liiwl.
^ iugi, oonduskiM, and roooiniikrndft(inK wiiJi n-sjKî (y (Jic

V- " ".^ .
9 10 11 12
doty imposed upon the Commissioit and witli r<ôl in sucL other tmUeot n the CommiKkm oonKMlcre apiimpfiato.
"O * ^
(2) The Coniuiission haJl. oersc to cimt thirty dnyx .
a/tar ubmtwion of k final report. /o) .Fur piiqKNuii <tf tliix ^xnuutrrrut nwolHlMni^ Uio
1* C<HOIIHUH>U is u4iUurixo(), in ito (hWn^Jon (4) io intiltr ^ cvjH)oJknrct from (lie ooiUJD^cut fuud <if iJio'S'/wU?, (2) to
1'' hold Jicarinp*. (3) to ml ftiul IH! at, iuiy time or pliux*,
J7
(4) to t'ropioy [H:rtuj'<.-l, (.r>) to jnibjuvrw. wi(ju*w< nud
1** licu-uutcnts, (<!) wiiJi (lio \n'u>t roiiHCitt of Uic '' <L^jDruiMMit or uMn;</ '-iimwriu't] uiul tlic '(V '^ r^ Itii^-* Mi'd Adjjuni.xj.i'iiJioii, ^ UMJ oij )i >!M> m'rV'Mx-s of "pWMiiid, infonimlioji, tunl iucilitlt^ of uy
ISS Midi iltfparliiu.'ut, or A%ctny, (7) lî jmmtro tli<t ^ n'ico* (uot in cjia-M of MM ycnrl or inl^nniJIo dîhwiU, or orîno'UiiniH iJicnutf, i llu*
AIM!
1 committee of the Senate may procure such services under 2 section 202 (i) of tho Legislative Reorganization Act of 3 llt-Hi. (8) to interview employees of the Federal Govcm-
4 incut atid other individuals, mod 4'D) to take depositions 5 and other toBUimmy.
c
(f) .BxpctiMiR of Uio Cotumhsioo under this concurrent rcsoIulHHi, which rfinJl not exceed $450,000, shall be iud
"
^ Inna Uic runUiipcnt furuls of the Senate upon vouchers ^ ;i^j>nivtl iy the (Iminjiou of t!:e foininission.
V
10
Sice. 4. X<lhii)g in tliw 'coocurrcnt romliitJoa fihall ta construed Hf creating any commitment of military assistance
. , ^
^
12 13
U> my Soiitli ViotrauieBe government, howsoever that govcrnnicnt comes to power.
15
DCONGRESS I*r
S. RES. 62

Haun 1 (legWativo <ly, FOUIOAIY 17), 1071 Mr. r*oOMMbmktd the following rwolul ion; which WM referral to tlw Committee on Foreign Rmlttiom ,
RESOLUTION
Relative to military disengagement from Ihe Vietnam war. Whewas the Praideat of tue United State* iuc undortalun A hatoric program to diaengage milkaiy force* of die United States from Booth Vietnam; and Wliereai the Oongra* and the American people strongly' endorse the Prendeat's program ia reducing die number of Amfcricafi pflrtonnel in tiut region; nd Wlieraaa (be President h/is formulated a major new doctrine nairiotiaf tlie diroH-tuie of tlw military power of the United States mod empbariring the obligations, of other Rations to defend themselves against aggression wnl externally inspired insurgency; and Wlicreo* the icnoination of American jnilifery involvemeot in South Vietnam poôt grave decision* for the United States,
V-
16
with serious implications for the Nation's future (security {*>sture; and Whereas the Congress and the President slmre responsibility for the presence &od protection of American forces Abroad: Now, therefore be it
1 Jlenolvcd, That in order to facilitate and expedite tho
2 President's programs of military disengagement Troin South f
3 Vietnam, thc'Scuata Cnumittcc* on Foreign ItafeuioiiK, Ap4 propri&tions, and Aruu-d Si>rviceti diould examine Uie rcqiiirc5 inputs uid cwnsfijuwicx-* <( (lio orderly withdrawal of ail (I Aruiftd Forcce of tiic UaiU^d SoUcn from ilmt rog'wn; nud 7 Retained further, That said commitWes shall report
8 to die Senate not kuer than niu^ty days following adoption 9 of thin r.->*>luU<ii su<'L n>couiJiieiidaUoiiti as Uu-y dwjjn ap]in10 priale c<'r"><"i>in|r liie iiuiiiinr, nn-tlnwl, and scheduling of 11 lTiitU.*d fkaU military di^'uga^-rnoiil from 8outhent Aa, 12 jitdiidinir provk'-oii^ for Mife return of Aricricau prigoucri 13 of war DOW hi'ld capUvc in that region.
WoCONGBESS
ft
S. RE*. 66
ft Tin
//
IN THE SKNATK OF TUK HNJTIfll KTATKS

M*w.ii 1 (lepwlntivr <Uy, KKMN AIIV IT), 1971 Mr. HAKTKC vubmiUtd tbe fotWiiijr tvnlnlioti: nliirli ** trfiTreA <i lic CooMnittco ou Kon'ipii li<-Jl MMW
RESOLUTION
IMntiug to die (cnnioadon <rf Tniu-d fitatts military" pmticipation in die
Aniuxi Forces to Ute ludmJiiiui otnflkl, wliiHi HtilJmrily was grunted l*y tlic (/ongixss in flic Tonkin r<>MiIutMii (I'uln Ji<- JAW KK-4^>, 8Hiii ( 'outfits). lw !H-<-II u-it)u]niwn Iiy (lie n'\nti\ >f HUH! n-M'Inlioji: -iis die Iiil<tfjiiim <'4inl]i44 lui" <'o4 (lie I T ni(<-<| S<;il<> a Iinirv 1<>JI in I^HK! nd liVsiwuv JIIH] lnj>: .jtr<Iucc<l iu4>)i!c.ukil>l<' HilTfriii^ from llu- civ<]'uiii jMijuibiliwiH </ ilic
n lw
liin(r IwfK'fil in (lie nîatral inl<-rrt: Now, dMtiWorA, U; it *
18
1 2 3 *
5 6
Keaolved, That Uw Senate ucgcw the I'rcsklwit (1) to wttfadmw imiuedialdy nil Ikiilcd Siats Amicd Forces from Vietnam, Caiubodja, aud lynos, cousidering ouly Urn tnfoty uf tiiusu Afutod Foruo; (2) to tcnuiiuitc imiuodmlely oil other Huilod StaUs military opcraiioiis in Indodiiiui fnnu w!atU>vcf pLwx; of origin, except thoo military ojH'riitioux of a purely lcfeiisivc clraraetcr related sjxxaficaJly to Uic pmUvUon of sucL Anucd Tonxw during Uiu \viUidrawul JHTHH! ; and ('.() (o make tlic u'Hlidrawul yf eutii Artiaxl l''<rcxiH JUH! U*nnuut(4ou <*f UMNO juiliUtry ujtcmUoun cuutiuj;cut UJHHI coiiclutitou o/ a 8aijrfurt4iry umugciru.** willi (lie(Jovenuiiciit of tlir IVxijilcV Itcpuldic of Vktiram Stir tlw njHfdy rt'lraw luid n)ia<rliaitii o{ nil Uuilod HlateH civiliiui tuid military jwrooniiel now' being held by tint Government.
? & ^
1(1 11 12
^* 14
15
1C
19
2u CONGRESS IxrSanox
S. J. RES. 89
IN' THK SKSATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. < <?K (for liiiuwlf ami Mr. Smt.N> intiixluo-il the fotl<inni joint rv*oluli'in; wlm-Ii w.itri'frnvJio tU'Coiji'DiMifuii Knrifni Iirl;ili>>ii
JOINT RESOLUTION
a jiri'jHiMil l>v tin- <Vm(rr<-N> rf iln- I'liitcd Statt-.s fr <:if<- n-funi nf Aincriiiiii Pri-cmcr-: <>i Wnr and lh<- acrclviiilidniwiU <>f all American military forco ami cjiii]>im-nt from South Victitiiiii.
liu- iimincinlly a->ist'<] tin- JIIM-< 'i>miijii]ii>f f>rc<-.- in IiKlin'liin:i -iiir*' I9">4: aiwl thiN :i>oli;inri > li;i> i - \ i I v i i l iiil" compile iiiililiiry. ci-i>ir. ai;<J (iij'l'Hii.'ilic <n}j>il |ir ilic JH'</J>|C <rf .ûiiiii \'i<-l: aud
rnxi- UM- <iuv^m.im-jif nf tlir I'niuil Si:ii^ Ii:i- i-niif/iliiilfil

ny(f $IL'I.<MHI.(HK).(K( jMnl lllr I i \ f > "I < H < T * 4 . < H > -rt il-
filw>t Vnldij; JlK'Il ill llj|'<'rt <>l ill' 1 |nJi|r <
and
I)
Whereas if is the ibt<-utiKi of .tin-' (VKIWVS* *iT tK.- I'mtrtl ?>*<iK

thaf nil Amwionn military personnel lav withdrawn tîy*' \"iHuwit^taa<tj'iit with tin- tiimrreaVjiuWy nwwssatnr"{(jr'fnuipU'ticrti f fir*j-jkfi^rain >f Viotiiamumbî.tHMi In coil-;' fisrawar*: with ifn- Sutiti.HjoctrifH- a .tmi<niit>iVbii July '25,
1909; awl
' '
?:
is lf-
to
vi- t
opportoniiy>f . nttired N> tli<-/|ait nf Miwvfvil omcplrtion: and <iovci;oiwut *A tbf rjjited SK bae tlu-r ; _ nrathlv fulfilled Jfv;>KliiritiiH'iit to ibi^'-giîk1 of South Vii-t-
' rrn.aJiiiug
the (>vfnn.iflth>f ihf I'liiied "";:
its
..
;' - ' - L
icIWfMi J(HI fi t )MTli|ii<-nl of. -!;-
'4 'J'oitfd'S'nrr- nrnl .(In- "liitri-niiin1!:' f V'rffli A'iiSuimi a- ir " ihi- r*-!^^ f AiiH-rii-iiii [i <. tU: l'ii|inrl.$/AU'- khull ilr
* ".*
" - " .
";ir.
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id H liiiic-iy^tiirn ni l <Ai--'ii--.nm- [ii<>iifh~ from the

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9 (luij i<f (he adoption al tiw ,.ri-"inT (jf-w'jj- 4jfr'-H-iil..jV
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- ''.' The .'rfor.MAX. Today and tomorrow the ciynniittec will hear testimony froruYh : sensors of lin^t proposals ami other Members of the x-t$T.ati'. Hot 1 1 rfitt.XtfmTary o.i\>tatP ac? the Sivivian of Dt-frna.1 ha\v bificn Jimtod fti.tfjtify. and f Jtope-tb-Vifo-ywiU he ahleôromo during .tire >onrsp~af thcst1, 'hearing. The. coittinitt<*o has nlso invited a numlier ,Jf dic;iii!['ffchcd Americans to rfmre their views with the committee. , Jfrtalls on the .-Kntcdulo and the names of \vit:i.'Soi-# will lie annoHiiml fti />oo:i as arrangements are
VICTX.VM WAR fV'TKKSlDEXTlAL U\\R
Y'nJcr our sysJou <>>j{rrpss. and ospccuily Uio .Sonati-. shares ri1bponsibtlify w it'll t!i<- Pivsident (or laakmjr our Xatit/n's fon-jgn IHT^:CV. Tliw *-;ir.. liowcvc-c. .tarti-J and .<jntum-s MS a_I>rfe.id'ntial war in which tltv CoajrriiJSjîntt1 the fmudulfur Onlf nf l>mkin not îlii\ri{ a. Significant role. Jft'a.t'Iw.ifriii sjw<'Ii on Xovi-ml.- r '. I'MW. th\;Prf.iidciir said, ami I
Tb AlrK-ricaji ;>H<j)i> oannut and ithtAd n->t lie asked to "snpfx.rt a iAlff whicl; ,'|iv.>Kos thf ovcrridine issues of rr and IKSIO/ pufeSs iLt-y k:;c.<v thTriabatv<Hi'.tliat i*>iiry. .. _:- ' " " r-
Tin- rurn-nt |li!;y Lv .Southrant Air** ^ stiil vairu*1 ihVl amhivalcnt. 'Wv an- :>k-(l i<. tak- uo /uith tin- PrrfidrntVaesiiiiUittthat "the Anwrs-'an'-bivikivvnii-nt ii:'Virtiiain is i-u:iii/ to a -j),4.'! Vt-t thr kirlii'p <if fs-rf^.-AifM-ricaiw nl VirtjHrfnc^'.'i'i.'iil tin- (K-stni'-VKn "f South'-*-ast Asia. ait imif> ai>rl 1 1^; ':ii<l is not - i n : nitr!)?. "^ Mr. Antbrny f>-\ i.-, in ;*. n-<vnt .-oloiiiu. I thought. K>mini.?- i c a r y s u ' j i t i a ^ . .
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-;.Tht: re-jy .> fias jnt Ixt-n tatud h\ Stiv>vart AIoj>, a M'.jijwier of
it is wit jpiai-tl?jk f try to coir'jiiUt* t liidi' a wgr* JJut lias no at all '' '' ^ In .short. lli.i Xi.von [j]i<^ is to jro on Hjrhtijtjf Jiod kiUin^jj in a thar Amrrii-a'deii.onstrably dm-K not want asuJ-Li îiii:^ uji. He sa; we Jiavr to do that Iicratisr orlit.tnvi.if our l!iV* w-ii] >f>|;. U-f ii-.-.in^ u., Vid wi shaJ{ -.toj* hclii-ii:i^ i/V ourwlvi-. ft :.- a vim m IÎit-f tii.if "dcnie.-> not only Hjoinlity htit reason, for onlv'im i-nd to th._''-*ar ean rirî. jrisf ;i.^ aiiyoiir---Jtii MT that only un end
('ongr'.- i- i*'i:it' anki-d to njijir^priatf hi II ion* of dollup. ncit.it'" ' * - , - ^ nor the |rulnit knows h'>tt" nui'-h to finw.'v rontintiatk.: of r vef anothecii.M-ul v-ar. :"
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ft is iriv.oponsibV for the Conjnvgs to approve fnndi for conritmin<r . v a wit r without knowinjMTUim about tlu plan to end American involve: mejir; in the fighting. Congress pivdiunent has n piecrcfrnt in flf li.. 'rutioti experiencvd; by the French National Assembly during the first Ind<ichina~.war. That warcndid onlv aftorlbe National Assembly ' /' ' \ to jirmvht-r public consent and brouirht in a n;tv jrovernmcnf " o negotiate a srttloriicnt ui .Geneva,within a month. "Flint n!5ultoj in fhe /reuevi1 accor*.V ondin^ that"7wr.
Over th<> cxmiv of (?nc^,rnl riie i- and the public was ~Wlirare \M\MI VittiiAn) ?*It *i-ns never to t!n> satisfaction of many nu liters of this commirW, But now ;. yvais Inter, .V2.flOO American lives, am) $120 million htr. fhe <|iie<tion [*in asked by the American ieoplp is no longer ~WKy an\rf there." imt u Wii i n and how do we uvt outs?" On. April IT the President said thu "OuV onl is total American withdrawal from Vieti 'vrn.v Then? is no longer a seriou^ di^jiiite. over v that jroal. Ifon* ^t to ccomplisl'i the troal is the issae. Xi-iUier the President nor Toncrcss lias (^Hionoi>olv on iudjnnent and .-wisdom. Congress has a reiponrjbility to appu- its fndepena/nt judgment to this problem-which" h;a so divided .our Xat:on. Durinjf-' an Tnfonuiil vi*it to the Sf-nati-17 monthsxptf. President Vixon. s ' ii>r of the rJe of.t Lf Sonate in i .leiyii jVeilicy, ?aid:
TJiis ailjbini.stratjyii want* to -a*v-loi> -i Mallcu*' ,> jii ivhlrli tsv will 1 coitouJta*Jvn. and 'n whf:l> we vvfil Iiate- ttiV artx.-*^ 'V't J y f!* coinn-nt. ~- -
Tin- y>irrpowe of the*- Learinî? is 1<> develop tln> Ix-st advictf>nd /r'atiT public understaiitfin^ of th/> poJicy alterit.>Ui\1es availablc.xAil Vi> 'onjTH'^sK/nal action to enil .A jjier'cuil p>7ttt"ipatiin in the war. n; an. virry plwi^'fi rhis moriji-,i;:'to Jiave as OUT first witm^jN'rj---;'fityirj!i- MH'i.ivt-.'ti of SotilJJuOako^j who Ki.j'for--o lon^ rakcu a iparKn (hi-etTortsfî'iid thi* war; " -^ x |>cnHtf>r M f J.w.'ni. we are. VITV pleaded /','havi- you, WilI'vot.
STATEMENT OF'HOV. OEOBGE McGOVEHW. US. SEHATOK EEOM

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S-nator Mc<yovf.KV. Tliartl; toil. >f r. ( 'Ixiiwiah. and S-itjUoT S
. .. , . Mr. fhairmar. J havi: f^fifjGed U-fon- thOc ctnimitti-c. -r conu- "info t l i i > \_ .. / !. - T f.j.t:--th.'--- vc?<ittni; who'-rtt* our ^nest-/! l^re tins rnornin^r. I would--'.'^ |t>5t lik>- to aiiCfhat J haw.-.never U-en j/rîider of 11 pi-cop of Ain'.'ri'-. :^CHI*/than "I iin^ of (hcnc.ljcriibat iHrntn.i'W.'k from \vrfnarM. wlu _""" k,ii"m Mjii|i-(hii/ t 'uliout tbffTribIe raviipa-of (hat wafflrKt liand. and L S " . *-" '*. '^-
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Mho a re'here in the Capita] ttrin^ to re>:h -Ow> 'ortsckncx- of tc v Com?rt^btfn<4tlwr American-people and fhe officials of our tiovnrflnufcn/ I. think'.whst they i^nsdrmohstratim* tu?>'wtvk repiv$euf>Cihe very highest furm of iitHOti{cuir I think ômbtmies it rajoires is mudi courage-foîK-ak up to thr national interest ihon one he)vnt hof^ ' ing-tjvpolitical pivsjûvs; of this nktvwr as it rtrquiros to.nfrfofm thebattleficld. ^::-;L . - ,' -";/ ^; % . >So J-salnte thrsc t^taraiu.vhd I an honored ind'^KSed tfmtthey ftV^-this m o n i i n t o hear thedr-ML^ratk'n-'' l?o^.'ibw T. . , . , Tf-Kji "Oiuirouv. ifty I sav fw.our guests --tîat 1 Joiu Swialor in savihjr we -welcome ,yba here and -you certainly arc ef\f U- here ' Anybody IM. ftoVin'ordor foryoij t IIWIP whalSeiw.-" other wjtiêssrs liave to say, \ou willfcave to t**' "" " >ut it,nnd w* shuro therii%(nit l?top*' you allow-C^wSitor MK5ovi-rn to.pn-sciit hiaiâtyuony w t%t-'every" v Thaftk you-ftry i
" " , ' KXDINO rUMOllXA VTAB
h yofc iK-gin today ''ihay-ix' tlie mdiS important nvet'i-onducfi-d In tJiis dist inîiislicd coniniittV'?. Tlifsc KekVmg are dk^t<-d, as ( uuoVr.sland (<. at finding .(Jvc^hrxt way to end tlio war ui Jndo<"}iiiia. isk'io more urgent -{rn|>$*tive U'fore the Americuî |>eople fpda tout. .-- v . -; '-.. -' _\ . S-."J have no henitaxicc in saying that. the very w*tti of thiji riat'urfi de*ilufify that we niu^take jn'itivfc xoto/i nowv fa. terniiiiatc-otnCrok" : VVitkillinganddtfltrurtionof JVJC K i l l i n g MIIUU-Tvl M |iH <l IndcK\hitia. !.Iii4U*MIJIlIi. '- '".'v \_Lfkc many meo'îers of this wiMtnlttfe, including the clin.lyLmn, I .'have for yeani^pixwcd American nritilary inrolvenulifju i^CthcasI x Aisi. Siii'-e t}jfe"f>i.lj of LO<W. there fm^^cfdojii Ijeen a^{y>X-I*iC'ht fhat ^ my In-art IIM.I n^<t uLJf'-d over the I)!6xiv. j^-jwh'ss condse- wa have been s "-pursuing ii> tlôaoiu* of freedom--and self deU-nniiiiiCJon.''Xever in . ^'history lias the jSîÛ't ween rlivtorti-niid n-ality beiHiio^liinfuIiy wide';' as it Jis lid>n iH^^'c'en Anie.ri'-a's proffwsed aims in .St>u(Feast Asia and - . the actual nîlttôf our polic.y. _" _ ( C "An interveî<ja whi<*L : lN > grfti7rtriie muni*/if A-tfêt'rmination'rtKH. . ''hi fact, preCenlffl indigenous pv^l0>Tal forces in Southeast Asia-fôui . "" achievingr prfrmsof self-determination, ^ An inU'r^rciion which wC* lami'-hi-d in th4^;itfin<-oj'niducijiff.h?iT>r and dvafit haja iiifiii-tt-d otvffv; |HM)pic of IjiuTî'nu such untold Mifffringar-d nuelty that ii isfx-yondcomprejjrjHl'Tir. u Kwu'.-n'fW. our Uiiiilci' nd ailillery nrA-^liit#->at.iHg tlie vilTaj^y, the foî Mipj/Iy.'ihe fohu^'. and the la'iuily lis''Ciu South Virtnain. ^rsriu,lvl^. arid f>uos,^\sa-y ii(/thitig of.V(rtli Vietnam. We n,' all ihoi'b'd iy the Iinrlui4j<n ^->" Myfai, LiiT-do" we consider th*"- rarg^.' crinii1. RHolvcd in killi>'/!^'v<?ral lidiidr1*! jj'iviixand iniKwi-nt civiliaru by Otit'iiiiL'-iiYV fi
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.Do we cousidortliat inorc th*H hi^Tine vjuapes in the five northern . . jjtjjv-iitcvs of -South, Vu-tnaiu have been burned to the ground by Aoi)cioai\trooCtcrtiHery and airpower? C~ *vxsnwMir.that*ncyw higher jien-entapeof tlrvilliigwin larpv
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Do we <*ms5der that aev^hst million Vietnamese, OumboduiC Wld Jju)ti*H ji?*sants and villagers have Wn systematically dri\vri-/{Hn^ , their lioitvsjftid herded into miserable refugee c*unps under the pound-,vig.<rf ocf<ArtiHeiy, our aircraft, and the torching of huts by Zippo l^l^wittfl Ifphti-rs in <h* hanjs of Anvricitn troops? "-""..",, "dMrV;ChairmanT tli\9e crinuw agmiiist huinktn^y are on tbe seal*1 of .tJwMc^tliat led us to sentence to death (JermjuTand Japawsc officers ~ attlit'tcd of.^Torld War II. They wmtraHi/4 ever>thinc tUal iaUemnt in,-|hi' Anierkmit tradition. They cAnnctf:hc> jKtnnitt^r to p> 0 *ny v longer if ..we exfect to preserve ourpYWtwsisas Ntttion and .our self^nesr>ct. In a sense, we are all uiidet rV indictin-it of Lieutenant \-C*wy- Amerioin pilots flyinjj <?\;crlicad do not hval- thtf mrivams of. titwr viftims below. tJnt tho pîa.'und the death are ac n-al H Hie misKficri' at Mylai. ^\- * , /\. ' :- : fan we nlly argue tlut the jîpfi^ of tlicwr lttV coou^rij^ jn. Southeast Asia, aw better Jead.4haji Kwl? Amt-x'prttMde-icigndft'ln decide that issue in the, finjtjJiu*!x .^ " . - --. Viiitnaxnizatioo, as I >old ilin mmntttK^ i.u iiy |&ut ^nftnitw in ^ HVbniary of 1970. is pt'cb*p> tW cnu-K-A ff.iAiuui of nil tlt.thatit actt-lt-rntcs indiscriiuin!tb> airpoKer nU.drtilleiT K it vki to^reduciground forw-s. It sulwidi'/xw th*v>aj'ai.Mirr;lfJlUn(r of tliex- people of Ijidochina by tedinolo^y ttJ-nCTiyn*tiMC.'This is liftt n tt<x'cptable moral, diplomatic, or military ptMf uiP~ fm H <rn-t eountry J"idt iw tlir ' I'ujted States. . C' -.V " -| '-'-
Mr. rhnirmnnv . . is^f. I Ijt-liow; the liest crifcttjow availaMi' lot-hv dnitras* is to teruiltiaU'-all' fuudtnp f nt -T/.>^ military operations iij Indorbina K\î)n J Derj'mU-rf. I of-rhid yenr'.-'f hat is thr forjnaU of ttie Jio-c*Ued iW5ov'ni'Hftffield at^ciKtrar it. /'f bat in thi^formulav^hich i o-f'tlw Ana'ricaifc pi^tpfK.ciitl^ uprtu uîUy. waet io a (.allnp ' is A formula rlm'lfi IJtttroi jirct tju> National LiU'rttion Front have wild would lend to m-^'Ot ratios forllv n-Iea.w^ronr"|>riw)njn* ".iind the HaMy of our foi\*-hHuiiii2.i)i( wi(hr|raVal - Pnt.idfnt N*ix'/VViftiitoiii/nC.j(rf( (ormiilu, OJi the not relertsM- Ainer'u-an prisoiM-is". It doi-snot Im-a1< t nt I'ari**. It dw-x iwrf nid th-- inort.il dnu^ s 7naic \iiierti%in fon-i-s "u> rr-iiiii-f tli<H'H'! hujjilwr; ft uoi-s m.l end ijjw-t roftion of the. jfopC- mid tlnr."j'wjitry*>lc of TtxlfxJtuitf, [t ojrly the hojK- Ibfit l/y ii^jiJi-ifig: ouc'^roiind ' forn*. vie i . . Mr. NuonV Virfiiuinl?urK>u> policy Kîuttji1 ^rurintwK ih.ni or 'rR niil iifWiii ut t.F'Hr Mlo. that <^ tro<|M will rrcin'us ji , rtiiU tilt* rip)tiM(i'f)H wrl! fk stxiU-jl, uifl tltdt Ihf killing n'ill i''. It ilirniiu\'jM> \nA-li Uic t rue tfi I'M A.''H of our Xu'joii ari4 our fj t\i. .*yrld-/il puts its HI th*- jMûrc. a^tlx* jm^rfieKt *iut
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richi-st industrial nation on earth, of using that great. powertu destroy one of the impoverished areas of Asia. ' . -7 . ' There arc those -who argue that a great country cannot. afford to admit that it has mafc mistake, le* its commitments^ questioned elsewhere in the world. Bat, Mr. Chairman, we most, sit irelyrnow that : the mark of a mature and great society is the capacity to admit jttid comet error. That is what distinguishes us from a rigid, totalita-Jan society. ,- -.-""-^ ''"'" Why do we 'grinnr pledge "No more Vietnam** to the Awiencan . people, abd thcc >fty~ we must-remain in Vietnam to prove _oiir good fault to tiw rest of the world ' Do we really want to assure outer na: iions of our determination to repeat this tragic error elsewhere? 1 " submit that Africa will be c greater, mom self-confident, and more respected nation" if, as Tinted representatives of the people, we exer- . eiar' our^vmstitutional responsibilities to terminate supportifor a vrr: thatw*.know is wronga.nd not. in the.national interest. ;~ We are t:>ld that thif President i* worried about a right-wing EB~ *îon in the United Straw if he ends this war too quickly on tenW " that swtn to admit Anwrioan rr&t* J detected this same concern ni . m*vrfiljon8 I %i'0 had receMtlj^with the President's National Security Advisee, ilr. Kissinger. But that concern of qh extreme rightwing reaction fnhn the few betrays narticular lack of confidence in th moml sense of the larger ^Wy >f tne American public. 1 5e a diffetwt kind of mAion'fieizing.America. if we continue this ';- jrara maasA'*' loss of confidence m our leadership, a pi-owing erosion ~ of confidence in ourselves, and,finally, tlie destruction of tlie very spirit of America. TO |*araphraat:tW Scriptures, what does it profit a nation to saves its f art; and losft ifrtsoul ? This is a far more ^*rion matter than tlie kind of recriminations that the Prtrdet and tbf Congress may very well confront from th* so-caltaT radl'7I right, iif the war isxyulod quickly. Furthennon>, by asoulkig cngresicl^l responsibitity ou & broad bipartisan bnsi? for terminating the w.r, we tend to reduce the political hazards that tlicPresident fears ac^tlwirarsend. In-ot.ber words, we assume, as Republican and *>pniK-rati(^ Memher* # trie CongrvsH. some of the burdeu. some of the |)olitiral hazoTu, rht tle Pn-sident may face if he is cidlod upon to terminate this war alone. -
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PLKA rOR r.nTOIfr FOR *. 37U
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." I plea.'! with-thc. membcrx of thi cr/uunittec to give their full en<l<'raciiH>nt to the Vietnam DUtngagmerit-'Act of J971, S. S7C, which I ^.jmr^nvd o_f January- !J7,JlWl T with Senator Halfirld and other Memixn of Ihu .Soâtc. Mr. Ohaitnutn, I ask. unanimous conwnt that the o' i'<5 o[îwore of (FuH act \te in')uded at ttu- condusuni-of my ' . - ; Wiih<vut objection it <o ordered.
Senctor ytfiwuixl Let me cjcariy and briefly RUuunarize tlie proMiojifr.; ft lie Vu-tnini Diacngaci^K'^tf Act. Out -b'n would t^'B dieodluv of Deo-mLcr 31 of th'w year for th rawol of alt "Afwrieau' Jfround, air and <vI Cony** from Vurtniun. - - . - .
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Jioyond -May' 1. I!7l, 'fufe "wouM :rimsin availnluo -only for (I) ;th> orderly b'nninat ion o'f ..militarrôpomtioiw^Vh*' and the "sa.fr ~ und KVsCmatio withdrawal of ivoiHtr.inj* American Anwd Forces .by" pvselnW 3U-.I97X- (.2^ arrahpuifttn*' return of firisonrrs. <",) nrondinj? ^r usvluni or ofh*r means /ff oûmie the sifi'ty of South t.ancjc who wijrhfiw endangered by our withdrawal, mid ,: assisrauce to the JJvpublic of Vivtiufuu, if ibc.Corignlj;appcov( >uch ... ' . - .v'- ^ "OTKEK COOB-E.< TO E>.1 '
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vealiav Mr. riuiinnan.^hat-,tbtv/gltos -other counv.-* that have suggt-stcil to fcriniti* f côur.iuvul\vin(Mit iii Indochina. One is .ly to isbe nir f)ol.-cvDrtk-.ra l^ chan^ thoir enurS;. or to >all upon . tlic PjvSidcnt to set n dduiite withdrawal date. But that is an altcma-> .'..tiv that, sonic of us lia\v cjJiautcd.fM'ycare. and now feel is no longer , ;a ' ' _ ~ altprnatjvc "would IK to seek iinpoachnttfil' dio P-tvsidyU. Btit how^can \\v advocaic.this'coiijsiiiav; Vittc-mjrt^d tl> tongri-jîoiial reiiicdy of curtailing eougrwstiooal . in. <yrtcndcl fil%isiuir ''a^piinsttho. war. But y rcst>rf^to tiiM- tvinftd; Iciore we htyc o^riously sought to .-posftiv^.Mid to the wr tlinouph ; ,thf i-oufrol ; ft[>prouri:iti''-(is? . " , x"r. ^" Still others iiave sacfWsStfurt a dircrt-rliallenge to (he Ptwidtiit i elections o-> 1072, citri-.r -in his/YW'n primary or frobi:thc " iaci* ' x u fifc sidf.' _ " '. v Tins Ts-a, coui'sc .which I am nor undertaking but I dojiiof bolicvv wo can v,%-t.(il January "of J7:J to terminate this U-rnble conflicf>
. . ; C-.t'.ff*^" Turt-JPAKIA'-^'NO l-ROMiT 6CWOBT OF S. 3f v
So-6nc> train 7 cninc-ljc-fon- thirf diflii^cuished rommittw pleading ^
Vb to the
u Jt is' hrpw'd.hv. sonic that the vnVkkiicw of . ^jtiri'Midini-nt fjcuifrinc i.- f h:vf it sr^cs notiiv on t R'cni'tny of thi.muuif of our .ub((iuti(iiii'fit to u-jfurlrawal. Itiit tljit is piffi^y whaf ^bi: sif tuition :(&riiaod$ that^ if we \r.j!i.rr> end tjii^ ;war. -. Both Han'/i^n.-Dhi- N'utioital [".ilKinitiori Kruiit ha.vi-^.uu n-iwatr-sily that thônly-wny ;ifîotfations"(Uin h> Hlu.i1&t"for t ! -oifr-fli.' of ouc' axd f he sa/C-f xit of oiir-foou^ is for us to siyn < f> it di-fiiiit* liju:" fm- fh>' vvif^drawaJ of allÂHwricwi fon_v. ii.''fotp! of ihi:~ ifinx- i.-i uiu<lc' dcafûhi'ii_on*' n-alj^^tliiit it I*-s iii-tlH- rt-lf-Lii<i'rt't4 of-fhanoi and fli: Nuri<niIJ>il.H!'r:it{oii Front to a^'irt,- Jhc KifHy of oiir. fnr'iv and the tvli-iw ofoijr |.rivr;ii;rs a* ~ as we nwke Jii'Iciiry'oJHOjitincnl- to totnl withdrawal. :
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What Mocks the negotiating procoj-svjvhat blocks tlie. release of nur pns^nei'si, what continue* the danger to.*(F- forces is the admmisrrat ion's i.ii!$Lstrn<.i that we arc going to keep iT. residual force there and fontimiu the U3?~vf American -airjwwer in sujii>ort of the Tnieu-Ky irînif jir'Sttiôaiintil inch rime,as that refine .L*ic*fableof.contaiuv in>r rh>"\var under it's own. ^povrcr. ^ -_ -;" ' -Ciiery ^ nu ]>le;tsaat or-^rL^-frcc solution to the disaftttr in Indorfiins. But i am willing "4<5-b*r judged jaîisfory on the assertion tJm( if "we will make a flaf cotum^tment to witlidrawnl of all our forces by th(>-t)0 can break thfi negotiatuig stalemate in PTS.* started on the release of -fr iisoufersN" a4)d secure as-of f-afctj- for- our force? while they arc bcnip'xvrithdwflv 'i'ltat. I firmly believe, is the CCHIRH? thjs cotnmittftc. and this Congress adopt/ f-Applausc.] ""' ' Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous cpnsenr.tliat the1 tertof My remarks iiitrwluring S. :{76. (ojrelher "valh a brief exrexpt apiâringûi this jaorninp's "\VashinRton Poot of th*; statement made by formftr 'Jfavy r/ieutenant (}.p.) John Kerry on ^Mcct Tlic Picss:" on la* Simday.be tbis jxiint in the record.^ Ajr]ijiM use.] '.ii \IKXAV. Without objw-tion Jt i? so ordered. (The informs; tiou referred to follows:) -
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SMwoft. ntoitoK MceovKMt.dr sucrru SUKOTV
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xMOCnDUCOS MIO DSAIkif~Tta CI^COWC*!**, /JMT SMttOM " . . X * ^ "--, - . *

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Senate
kadlnc to th . of oar priioner* and would ptodce a nala exit tor wir troops; A OaHup poO ImatffU Mf.IdrOOVCRM.Mr tmdas* far *nj*eU and (or teuton stowed th* Amoltin people - Uwrtat -. ' Hancu. Cauwrow. Batmtt. , BAYV, thMlornroJ* br 2-W-t narcta. Vn,edtnunM South VlrtttmKutCKW. Chum, HJCT. thane*. Itoen. Jtrr*. KanE*r. JJomuu. -Mo**, Mn- CM fJoMrnnKnl vhlch Terbt> xcfono and' pcmrtfc** conitpi for tb* prfnclptas . , Md entitled- UM "Vietnam that a-Mdd IM itÛuWnifcr. - And white ttxr txar Ah* lndcraeiei ofhe provWon* U Mri* <t; which vouM vof Uiat rrilroe. JLhc '0outh . Vtetaarne*e -meed ttot Pon!n AmUuaet Act 4t people fUH tear. too. the devanaUon of IMf. are dMltar to UHM ^K tte VlttaMQ UiHr countryside and Ut *Vtructkm - ceiMldcrcd In of thetr-lhr*-*)' weapon* tC*t~eaMioC . . ' discern JKlwero rnonr nrt TonocaH. -The war -tat *rad fvtber acraat Wt oflr U. to ttn coutlcUon Cmt it arftnay IMOMMTT Mrn- Icdoehina. ~<troxxt! now wean -the' -lht-Hteoo idinlatatntln' 10- teart AT Uey-'bnhardment. nomlc ruination. And tU the TW a*^*r btnioo ww defeated In Ution tf widening fiaofliet. tbc Benau on -fltDtrabcr J, ITW. by a (A that oxmtrr tvxr. eonftnn prcdwfy rot* of S to JO.-;" " - ' " what the flXmioro MoTwpportertf-oX the. Cdoper-CtfVrtti amendaicnt -MU(ht ta What hu hWTwmd (toe*? n- American- eommitmeot to TOUDC Ancncaiw :CixiOou to blMd - "prereDt yet anoCSfl wobbly Sontheatt Artan and dir And thrtr Mojflcr to n*tf all Uw mre pabtf ul by tb* kntnrUOfB that At bom* owr owa naUonal economy tt irffl atf-Kt not at U U eatm that ' conUnue* in the mojt *odma recew4oo~ to a decade. Cadt month'* indleaton. withdrawal* of 74. force* defy 4hv dmlnlrtri<'i roe-oior*d ba with each *tep rabfnc whiJe the ^reddeut tetoe* who mutt remain a* lh oaltonat program* to a'Tikt rfrqury and war foe* or.. Hundred* of American^ tffl laruuhh To win acctptasn of fen war policy. in enemy prkon camp* with no nat hope ft* admialitraUon h discarded rttal of rdeaM, **Vii*tnafBiitaMiff1'* I*, a tlctaaHM uf K* own capacity to orrra. which, run tfi<.eW?nr~cU DaUyair miMkitw over Cwnbodla vtowould Ma -Uiri. U( ttve Pmldtnf own ruMeUne* Bn in prlMM tot* the Indeflmu f otura. The ,itro 1C u> the t*tn>i of hi* own adntototrmtion-Aplorea their plUtbtlxit Cabinet" "cdB*r* flecrwtary , Boierc on icoore* itorcoaM that would Ttivn 'Umtedia'and Secretary Uatd <m ihe them and our troop* to their bnmnr and . 'oo Tar :ta!<t Invanioiu are incur' famUM*. . ilon,V telluK* are -rirtorlia." air atIt lia become incfeadntjly câr that ' uk4 are "rotaeUve rcactfoo " od We nefotlattoiw to Tail* have no chance Victnam-t* our 'float- hour" of. prodticiaf aKreemeot. TAM rendition The rhcrte cannot, lone tfiteM ftx wul renajn to lone a* w* iCAlnUIa our reafcnm of ji policy mt*talctn frotr the oktlr* t* Via foal on the crjctmate bclnnincr^t.Mii otily dcfifate thr rwf* UMt that w bare long ttbee-foMatme foira of tnut. mud vfU aW r*(Mct on t}ieJ>aitk>M4. But dnfie ftM detmt wbicli are McnU*J to rHecUie aatlonaf of the MoOovem>KatiMd JcadcKhip. U deprive* our *ocietr of the lut fall poknin for the moral ctreflcth U Mete ndir a* owch lur Ubaratton rront and Hanoi at any time in out- ruilknal oiperir*. (hat rf the 04. Oorrmment would de> W wait in vah. (M: oiuwn that can jivt our nalionai ( and avoU toe j)< af! o'.v force*. Uvy would Immedtateljf pain uf admlitinr our ibuiaii*. Tin r*-
ACT or irrt
29
.*ot cS firf cnnci-r leave. * >ourtd to jil.-'Miat nuclliirna brine, would uk .Ûotflc cancer instead? .- J. Or? -war corrupt! all it toucU. We titut e>>(( it now. We must bio now .lie -xedOiPUoa of our own foriclf at horw'and ,'hc rtntarsUon cTw-uJom smd co:i;icc,v\ccjiciu pur potture abroad. Thii Mill* A decisive step tovard tkott fial<i..Ta commitment w complele I'hrfrtwal of BjS. forcei by * da:* ceruia- can op*a. the .ny to political seUKaacRt.li offen tlia ooe , respoa.'uiile. ieullrtlc mwtna of brincIrji U>. prboaorji bocpe. Wlthto -bonrs *i'-t<r adoption "we" CMiTd expecV flie ns ruacWcxry -So **in wortto produce an UnraedUte avtXl.v to prorjuc* an early Oi difference* anjtfic th* tropic themselves. "We -out hose to achieve co more . ' i. H c-3. c]irt a monr l^pJlaT courw Art;'- tliiif bill would al*> i!ctlae- > tupreme obliiauous o;- icar" nd peace. Onlj Die . thcTMakJ can ralM and op^ port art.iic*. Only-inc Conicrett-can dt' claro vrar. And with .tttove powers, Cotv - t;r>sx -xâ Kivcn r> f>Utat!on to revk* lu military dcisoni oner every 2 yoja*. Lar.t ye*v we brard pica* lw Prcûknwaj ricxibilitr. Tb, Prcoteiit has lud It. Tor -AAr ônUtrjis And tiav. icltn . id' live Gulf orTnrJclr, resolution. U Jio Jcr.êr tlxr J;1 V*t Mature of The bill IS. 37> to amend the Forcii-n AxaLV^2icc Act of 196). fc* mnvcndrtl. Introdcccd by Hr. MoGovaa '{or htaaetf aac! otltrr. Setvwr>. m-ai recovrd, m>d twice by lu title, cad referred to the Committee on *WeJun ReUUon*. as follavt: . lit >( eiuv f( by (V- ;<m ,n4 Nour a/ Xcpr>ncua(i>O o/ th* I/mi j< 5rM>i o/ A nv.b cit*a i tn VTtrtjn D<iuigurrfnl Act " - ^ UK J .vaoft***. SiMlt eif* dtclM*. U>î untfv tic Cat- tituUrt'.i of tM Uniu-o tttA tvtmut nart th* 'mafnu-ttu uluty lor wuiUnKn-.e, CeAmnc tlx fur ina eaDc'-itfmi; -KMra miliury crjnrait. hub'*: Uut tlw r^*t r <N C-iU a( Tonkin ROToluUuu jum a** unccrwintm bw'. th *M*rc* of KutboH'.jr (AT AnwrKAB lnrolmmt in VlMnu&;-Tbt both tlw dcmxtx mud forncn policy uurM nf tb* Owinl Scat** r*quu a cxpuditiou* ttjd u> MM wir la VMUiam: ttet th eooSCCt c*n bent bt n> r>:y<l t&nnzh poltUriU wnirnwnl nvn"K Uif pvU conoiMd: Cut in klcht r ir eouidcnuoiu, clw Mluuon which ofloii the . the blclmt ncMun of (wooc, t UkciluouO <>wtiM t'ctum <tf CultM pruocxn 3-) 'to u*t diiv ecrulu br It* (<lt!)of *K C>uud SL.. (vr 1 Chapur 1 cf VS1~- n of lh Fkxfltn. A.k.îX< Art of IMI IwJIMOdMj kty fl'Mnv. ibc rixi tbrnof Uw f<31owu< v- WI-LII>: LM'i'ieiiU of pniinr by ttw .Hr-il<T.t. no Act r IM &DllK>U'. or erpif<ld 10 u*ai'itAjn a travel Jrtrl of mTr tlun two hundred nd Kht.y'four ippropny vd 3bdrr tba ur M>y i>ur A.-l l be <pra4*A. In rontwi-Onn wi-ji ^cUr Anutrican vm<4 fotff* in ttvi nvrr V.*tn otily (A MiMbplU^ Itx MlnvtBC ob>rcUMUon of mlllUry opmlb-o* QMT* oat
Tb
nf
oi~W. (10 () In m>4<iinr with puriix;
in Uw VIbe d)91cvit i^-'-^- -'o flmj . Ojcct*-ho would dJJpW* l'ic uc^ &>r new uttcatjon tu Uw.eondl'i<mi iii4 Uic procedures far cordmitr'jit I to battle.. VfetnHw (-. <Jr]y clrrcctijened Krc rM>emautui Ita constitution*! prr' roâUvce T Aiujxyrt UiaC carh oi>e of ux bai ntacl< Mi own ICdlvldual rcsoliitjon - for '.'no icorr W'jvuiv." -!)>!< can. ws'dca! only la kl*tract -/lvrrii? Whj not be releviu.co totfay?~If wr wor/y ubout WK pa-vie*' xctrsutl for tin- Cotirrw,. 1 tuboirf. tbut bllr ire -Cc/utcritfcovclvcs.witlt nt* procril';rrc U. jtt*vcM fuUrc warn. ? outfit to be e-/en jnxJoiB to uce the pncrdum ct - Cotuljltrtlori "t^ id tlie *-,ir
"Pi-re r iruny niton* to rfcrolve "no more V.r'xwns" ' '- Jxrt u-' mat-n. 'M*n. afalrst '4il oW. er.t Uil1I|M fcirl of UM" "ViJtr*rrt D|ip: ic-tj.' !! .Art { 1971" 1/r rrini^d at ' 11ic-f liiRSH/KAT pro Ir iHI! In- i>i^l rcrj u.-id. ullftnc*. obj<rj|'fn. iJ (n I in'
. - t!!i
<I) To
<3> To urane* MVI^BT or Hint; mtw ta UW o> rmStij at ton i'4i Viuu-i)^<t wr.t fa* pii/>|rufy rc-w;r<l irf "Jjn :<>.- IUK] 1s j pr>rM Mi'cffMflr.' vm wltiu
30
.[Tbr WMhlnrtonPoct. Apr. 2". 1U711
FOB THfcllECOatJ ...
.; -
i' VICTÂU VTTEA>-S O X - A - r H O l T AXH Tin. MUD
( former. >'Pf LI. (jg) Job* Kerry of ttu- rirlnam Vctirann AgaiHit the War, <>ti<-*tU,nv4 tutJffO Xhcctan. of Thf AVir Yurk Tiint on "Mcft ttic //" (.VB^WRC), April 18.} '. ^ Mr. Sbcrhan: . . . Z>3.00(> Anivrttttnx live died In Victtmni^tiid we are told rfpcatcdty \>f JIKJI loxldv the government aud som- out tliat ou> f tin- barff reasons fur cunttnvfnjc 'I'*1 war and tryinc to ]<<uVt- wnm-tblnt nolid Jit-bind in ViHnam IN to JiwUfr tbosc r&.OQO d-tlis Niw it MÎ. ( me (lint wlmt you anil Mr. nublmrd (Al.Hulrfmrd of Victuam \VtcniiiM AjaliuS lie Wur] art: |irn|K*lng IK tii&C tiif otmnfry withdraw from Vjetunni rrptrdlt-s* <.f ili<- ivitwûencfn to VMntioi lurif. and dort-u't tlil.i uiakt- nioaulnplex- tin- iJaorificv <>f th<H<f r>3.000 ' t k i t doyouliav^toKayaliout tliatV C r.'Kftrf : . . . Fim <>f all T dmj't na> mr drd-. Mr IIuli)>nrd <.v wt> xiiuuld out rvcardletw of thr oiusvijuciuvs. 1 tUInt this imiutrj" bas :i IIHII; ul>li* t-i9U in tbc fututv for r<-parurion> to tin- Viptujtiw*- and I think <Hir imllinc out. if '-wv , uli >ut ncrej.tlnt: oialitiun Rnvornmrnt. witJiou: th- Thien-Ky-Dlpui reefniie nimji ' .n do and wliirli IK th only <i|)ta.-)c to our imlling out. would ' I* aNJ>rHUe ninrsontatfrc i>o)ltiral forw. To ittn*T your (ideation a_, to tlw; ilrad. v> -ill luu, ûjfclilnc -with ns iuwllirt^ ol prtnotMTH of i-ar. motlwrx of sijUli*-n..xvUi.lukVf l-wi^Vlllt-d. wlvi< of ImAjisnor nht> lnn'i? l>wn *t!W,.\Vf ve\\\ liv> Marinrn romiiijc <i<m7 SiiTf. mm w-iflt mi Ii-si; wllli .Nuvy Cnrsw-x. Silver Slar*. I'lirj'''' H<rt>, I0( p^r int disM"tI- Tlh-jr sttf. vofulue'lu'w to j>o} to tho inîjilo <if tiiN country. "We !;irc l<ist our xonM. ttr imrc ht otrr hnrimnrf". 1 iort my lep- Km thi- imponant tHnx 4 no* tluif TUit .liaiipcnod. fxt'x not l.-ji kltliiiK i>ct>j'le l justify my IOMI. U-t'n uot jtU/ri/y thcxlcad. Isl'x try and clorify ilic Ifvinjj. J^riV do soinclliln? fur the . 11 vine" And tti<-y would My. f liffL-fori-. duri't li-t it )uiji*-n to any more it dfn.-sii't !<srr to DIH/I let it tmi.|*-ti in wm-our !).
MrGorcru -OatA-M Ilurt tJruP:! Mnndalr
_ .'
FiufletonNVl.;ii Rilii'-off Harti>>> 'Jut-it* - Bayh Jin.nji-
I'roiniln1 HarriK *- fjurophrr) .
; ' "- . .
Tit** CJIMKHA.V. Ix't tin: say ofii-i; nton- tliat it will livi-rv 4liffi<-iilf for us towike |iro^ri-& if tljcrv is too iuwlt (Ii'ni<nitra'iuii. f'ruli-r <Iit; pnicwIun'S f/f tlw 'onuitittif. ns wi'll as t i n - Scitut^, dcnioiist rat ions. . 'irl<'r in lh' paUi-ry or from m,r îu>.i. arc mrf ii'-ii-pJ-iMi-. I tv<*o^.jizj; your Tit}jiiM:.Mn ami int.'n'-it in flii'. vul it crrtaiiily is l'{ril ifni.f-. Cut in order to î^ <m w i t h our liiixicK-bs'tvIiii-li I Mic;*i". jud^rinc from your dvnvuiîriitir/n. your l'ii.-iii<s.a. I )ioj- you w r l l :i]low .is to j'\sK,\'ic or ... ari ov tor ,M(Xio\i'ni. do you Iwlii-xc t'nat / f i i - |-u-.-a{.'i- of vm h.-Mf- tin- fff-(-t of |A.-rsiia<iin;rt!if Pn-riidi-nr f'i jiro.-id w i n t f i A i i c a r fiitiin-. :f h wiâf
31
Senator MKiGvratx. Yes: I hiik it would. Mr Chairman. I think it would IK- a clear indication to the President of the t'nited States that a majority of the elected representatives of the Congress of the Vniu-d Siates want the war brought t<On early end, and that tlt-y arc willing to share, any political hazards involved" in that judgment.* If thenv is any truth to the reports we hear that the President ; worried alxmt some kind of a [K>ntieal reaction to any action on bis part that might WrO alXMy; aiut-arly ejid to the war. we could helj> reduce. that anxiety ar.tt fifo monl and political Mipjwrt to the Presi'dent by sliwruigtluu burden with him. t haw. always thought fhat was one of th< strengths of the so-called amendment, that it does, rjH-r.it ing within our oon:tfit itf ional authorif y. indicate our willingness ro assume that authority arid thnt. ivs|x>iiHihility, J think it mighfs.aiso encourage the President to rake it lxl(iT stand in Bringing ahout an end to the war.
ACTION l.KAIUMi TO KKKVCII WITHpBAW.U.
Tho Cif AIKMAX. That, in fact, was what happened in tin: case of the Frc-nrh. Tin- art ion of the French Assembly in iliat cast- did persuade the then Prim* Minister of France to proceed within a very short time, which J think naalout '< or C weeks, to cojiclude that war )>y a negotiate! st-Uk-nK'nt at (Icik-va. IstJ-al IKX a isn't i S< > iiator.\f<'<J<rtKj(S. Tliat Jscvrnvt. 'IIAIKM AN. The war had dragged on for some 0 years, I liolieve. h had a -wju-what .>imihir ex[K'rieiice. altliough it wasn't a> - a^n:r. They dilii"t liaiethecajracity for dest ni'-tion that have. N'cv^rtJie^Sfi. whaf actually hapjK-i-eJ was that w!ie:: the Asscii)l)!y made its jx>shi<>n very clear, tln-y obtaiiu J :; i'oinmitmei:t from th- I'rinie Mini.-rter conceniing-Giis very s-Hine country. This is the ivaNI why I t h i n k it is so appropriaie, ai'd F would think Ciat this could lierrtvrt|v in |NTsujidiiigtnePrer.id't. Among the reasons for rx'rMjflding the Pivsident is that the (Vnv gn-MS. I In- it;pre*'nUri^^ f (In- pcoplr. would have, in a -^nsc. a.Sbun-d him t h a t there would l.t- no dL^fni^t or, as you put it. right-wing re:u:Mo!i. i think thai is very sound logic.^.' ."^niitot \fi4!(fiTJ:N. Mr. Chairman; l-t'-ink the French exjHTieinv -h iiis((qi-ti\i- in another way, in thaf the fea of WJ;IK- jx-opic that vmirli/wr -ifa: t^nit.'<l States wfuIJ !* .limiriifelu'd 1:1 ihv eirs of the wiiHil if v.i- wntluJrc-w fro'î Vietnam is not boriii* mt by tin 1 Fn-iwJi C\|MTII nc.'_ f (liink 'n if fjcr'to say thaf Fiance li-cameM more nspr<cd .-mil moii- .-u/Ti-vfuJ i>iivr in t-iie world, and n-rtainly did letlei- in liiuid'irtr U" oh JM 'i! IciiiJi. after its w'uliflMwai from Jndocliiua. and tiii-u InUr'-fujiij AlgTia. than woufcf ha\c \*t'ti te nisi' had they con(iiiiii-ii irs* war> indefinitely. T!i<' danget t^> t!i> - ir own fonvs viid f< (! |H-op|e if tli'se ernlmtfled ureas fell off very sharply oiim- Kivnch nii';t.ir\ puver Kiir 1 removed. So | ifiid/i u lot of th(M- frnrK rnll in** materialize in fa'-f. There hiav !< .^'.iin1 cvtMirnii-d bUioii.-.hiui smd Htniggle iit J-odo'hina after we w i f h d r a n if for iw* 'rfln-r iv;jviri ((inn (h ve liaie left an Army theie of over a iriilli'Ti voiilh Vii-ttiumese fniceM thai are united and i-'jitipjH-d. ]t i ;i f a i r l y gry<| pri->iimp<ion tliat tlu'y might contin"j' |i- (i^'[i(. fiui l^c t h y t ;iv if i i i a ) , < l i c Fff/iclj e\|MTieiice point* ill tue '}>?><( IMM nf teducetj i-asuaft ir, on nil wides iui:e the d'f*LWrti is made t.o
32
RELKASE u FRENCH PRISOXERS OF WAR
The- CH.UBMAX. There was no problem abopt the prisoners of war arf soon as t-lio agreement had Uvn reached at (ieneva : was there? Senatoi McOovFjtx. There was no problem. There were no French soldiers"&liof while Ihey were trying to withdraw, there were no piisoners held |M-rriuwcntly by tlie enemy once the decision was made to disengage, and that. I think, is the clear distinction between .the formula that C. being: pnn>osod here in the aiuendment *Jiat I um auggestJng t the committee. and the formula 4hat the President proposes ' which doe.3 leave our troops in prison and leaves our troops in continued danger, even though the President deserves whatever credit is due for reducing tle. numherof foras on the ground. C RBQriktarevrs or s. 3T The CHAIRMAN. Does your bill require the withdrawal of I\S. milipity |Mrsoiuicl in Thailand and the stopping of I'.S. nijval earner <ij)eraCr.ns offjiotv from Vietnam i Senutor Mcii<'V>ut\. {INloes not s|M-.ik to the ([itestion of Thailand., It N[*eiikH only to the states in wliaCwns Irdoriiimi. Xoilli and South Vietnam. Tûos, and Cambodia. It would .stop any kind of military o|H'nUioiih against any of those rountries from naval forces offshore us well as from tiie airoi the ground, and it provides. Mr. Chairman. . that after May J of this yftr, in oth<-r word.*, almut 10 days hence. funds ant hori/ud or appropriated rould only IM- used lo bring ul>out tlie orderly termination of military_operations timv, and {he sufe and , systvinafie withdraxval of ivmaHiing Aîieriean Anned Forced by Pe-vl cetnlter .'ll. 1971. It also s|eak* alxmt the use of funds to iii-iiire ilie relense of prisoners of war. to arrange asylum or other means to assure the sttfety j>f >%outh Vietnamese who might In- physically endangered by withdrawal of our font's and, finallv, to provide assistant.'*! to the Republic of Vietnam consistent .with tliew forgoing objectives.
lint tlKWe provisions would beconu'0|i'fativf if we had time to pass t h i * Ir'l I K; fore May 1. by the firsl of May. Vow J recognize tlutt t h a t N not pnnlical |M*Mbility now ami tliiit dale wo'fld have to \w. adj/jstttl in ai-conlam-e with the tinM 1 when ,ve njisUer this ;i;neiidme;if. ^ iox OF i >. rmi<'t* ^ Tlif ( '11 M U M A V . Would your bill prevent tlie PreMiJt-ril fron: taking >i'li offensive or (defensive ai-tion us lie dn-me| ne'Vhsiiry ]i>^ order !o proteil our forces during tin* withdrawal |iro.-es>.^ *i'iialor M<./!ovtj:\v. No: it would no*. bec:inst it s|>ecifically that firiulv-ixn !< i-xj^'iiflcd rf uring that withdruvval |M-rio<Lf>^ (lie hafi? ;Mul systeniiit i'- witli'lra\\:il of rem.'iiiiing Aiiu'/'ii-an Armed Forces. \fi CJciirman. I t h i n k thai ugaiii i an inuiginry danger. Oii/-e we h;r, mail- n flat coii'iiiidiient for the \< illnirHU?' t^f out fop-o it WiilliM \- the height of *hlf>idity fnr tlif otln-i MI]C In li;u;i^ llifdi Mini to inukf it diftl< i.ll ('r them to u i t h d n i u , xiid f h;ive no doulit ut u'l
33
ihnt Hanoi and the National Liberation Front would readily the jneoessity of providing safe assurance during this withdrawal unWss. tint Uvause they are saints lint because it l in their selfish interest iu< tn inijiede our withdrawal once we agree to it. but we haven't agreed to!hat under the present formulal In fact, every implication is we HIV goinr to stay there with the Air Force and naval j>ower offshore and logistical backup forces to whatever extent fs necessary to keep the Saigon regime in power. The. CH \IKM.\\. I will reserve the rest of my questions so I can <rive my colleagues an o]portuiiiv to ask fjue.stions. Senator Case, .senator TASK. Thank von. Mr. Chairman. riKrosK OK iir.Mtivtis First. may I say that I want to express to the chairman my own njprv:l!ttioD fur his initiative in }rranging these hearing. We have had historic he.irings in this committee in re<viit years and I think if \r- coi rei-t that these hearings will U* us im|x>rtant. and I am sun- as roiij-inictixv. aw any that tvp have hod in the past, I war. much interested in the quotation that the chairman rve of a statement by I'res.idi:nt Nixon, with wliich I fully concur, as the chairman dov^. that the relationship between the 1'naiident uud Uu- S(!iuit should l>e one of advi/v. pn-snmably i>n the part of the Senate, as well as consent. I think the role of this connrittw under the Constitution necessarily means that this proo-ss should occur. I fake if that these henr'mtrs rejnesent an effort to satisfy that commitment which the Constitution puts upon us. ifr. Chairman, just a word or two. As the Senator fu . the ^reat State of South I/akotn know^, I am a cospons'ir of the bill which he has presented. Senator MrffOVKBV. Ves.
/
n.KX!HiuiT UK wninm.vw'Ai. I>\T>:
S-natorCA*K. I joined on the understundin^that he and thccosj>onrif i Lr nieaMiiv regard the <ln(e as v>mc liuf u flexible matter and. as he Inu indicated already in repird to OIK of (lie dates in the bill. m-mvtarili tlwre will June to U- xmw changes In-fon- it is- i.Macted, MTK! I jojiird Hfi i!i<> Hsyumption w,- r.iav arrive a( > I'rnc sr>me(hing like the middle of nest yeitrasa moii1 realistic- period. Senator M-<;<fvjiN. ( 'an I re?|>f/nd ti> the Senator on tJtaf jxiint ( Senat-rn- C.vnt:. [ didn't mean to put anything in the Senator's rnoutjj Ixic jiint telling him how I feel about it. Senator M<<iovijc.v. 1 know the S-natoi lias had those ivsj-rratiojix at.'i J appreciate if. t 'Link th'-rv in a jK.int ilml if not undfivi.KxI. not bv the Senator front New Jersey but L\ some (x-opd1 alxxif (hi.-, uiin-iuJiiient, J noted a n-rujrf. thai sonic u-teiTins against the war had lood Corigrenxr.'oiiiu ,\b/ng ntid < 'ongre^mitii ife('lo>l;e\ OM fht-ir Ktat<-uienf fhnt t.'ii-y wunt<-l to w<- all American foicei. w i f i i J t n v u i by tinend nf tins ji-iir and tlu-> k win it couldn't I*- don- now. Now I t h i n k tiit miAîithc |>oint.
34
The purpose of this amendment, as I understand it. at least this is my puqmse. is to see a definite deadline announced, in other words, a flat commitment that all American forces are coming out of there by such and such a date. It is my own very deep conviction that the minute the President announces that declaration of American policy that the killinjr could stop in Indochina, and that the negotiating stalemate would be broken. Of course. I realize I might lie disappointed in that expectation, but I really believe that. From that standpoint the date of full withdrawal is not so important a> the date when wo announced it. In other words, I am more interested in gett ing the President or the Congress to announce tomorrow or the next dav or the next month that we are going to come out of Vietnam by a definite time, that all forces are fuming out of then4, than I am interested in the j-xact date when f!w withdrawal process lias to i>e completed. I stress that the reason that is so important i that I think the hang up on negotiations in Paris is our unwillingness to Commit ourselves to a definite withdrawal date of all American forces. Once that is announced then I am not going to quarrel over whether it is iVcemU'r *'>! or what date it is liccause I think the killing would stop. I think negotiations would Itegin. and we would le well on the wav to a |Kacefti| resolution of this w n r t h a t would probably even anticipate \\ hatever withdrawal deadline we finally agree on. Senator CASK. I agree with yon as to what would happen if we were to ndo|* the Vietnam Disengagement Act, even with some adjustment in the time.
Qt'KSTlOV OF f.S. MIKTAKK
I would like to raise a question with you about an expression which you have used in vour statement, and which I would have preferred you had n<* used. I say this without in any sense derogating from the tremendous job you have dour. I am referring to \our suggestion we should IK* big enough to admit we have made a mistake (Reaction from audicii'-.) If th<-Chair will keep order here. The Til MBH \x. Will you !* imict. Senator < "ARK. This is precisely tin- kind of thing that I think is not helpful, and the [xiint I want to make here i> this. That I am not one who lielicvcs that we went into this war with any had motive, with any evil intention or anything but the desire, whetlier we chose the wisest way or not. to do good in that part of tlie world. I do rot think, therefore, tliat we should bett ourselves OUT tlw Ju-ad UvaiiM- it has turned out that what we have IN-CII trying to do has turned out to Ixvery bad indeed. I don't t h i n k Me have to dwell on that and I thinl: tt it. iinfoctunate for us to do so Iierauw what I think has hap|>encd IK that we tried to do tlie liest we could. It turned out it was impossible to do it tlw way were doing it. and we ought to change the way *< a redoing U. That is the way I regard it, Si-nator M<<fO*Hf\. \r\ \\v wiy in the Senator I am not luboring the [uiint that our original motives were had. Tin-re is a great diffiTeinv Ifrtween Baying that our Bourse war- mistuken und suggesting that <mr riM>tiies were eiil. but I do t h i n k that the whole pur|>otte of theM- hearing* is to \r\ to face up tu tin* fui-t that there has \fei\ error id our |Ktli<-y. and tliai it need* to he corrected.
> 35
I don't want to ace a big vendetta started either in this country in trying to set up a series of srkpeiajsts or try to decide who is'tlw biggest war criminal Vr who-is roost iotlame." There is enotudi Maimto go * round for all qf us to sf Ufe,c But I do think that we haw lcn in error, we have lxii in tragK* error, in Indochbtu tiiat the American jxviple have fotHnfcrstand that, and I think fhey aiv-big eaowgh to be to}d tlic facts. *nd th*l we can't go on idling the American jwople that this is in enormous venture, that it iVa great struggle for freedom a.uq that bomeltow tb honor of the Jetton is at stake in That we are doing there and then exjM^-t them to endorse a jwliry that, brings about un early end to our disengagement. . In other words, aft I said in my statement. I don't know how we can keep telling the American iWsplc no more Yietnams and then saying we have to st^j' then in order in prove our coa>{nitmcnts to the rest of the. worl(J. 1 >'"'".ADIIK&l<V ftp r>. MIHT.IKK Ql KSTIO>">
Senator-CAWS.-Well, t-his is the point ' want to make, Senator M-Goveni. It iicn-ally slixr['*'"<><> uive ]'ust said, this Imsinras fitnohion- Vietnams. Idim't likrtocoiKliK-i foreign jx>Ii-y ordomi-stic ijoli^v by slogans, Km! I think it is not beJpfnl to approach it this way. 1 think the Anwriran people are entitled to feel that tlu-ir leaders, including biiccwdiug 1'residents. weJt into thU thing with the licst of motives and UK- drairc to fulfill the. role tint 01 r (Dmitry is give!) to perfonn in the world. I don't think we have to heat ourselves over the la-ad and rail ourselves wit or anything el*\ Mnny things are involved in this*. Many people whose sons, whoa*- brotliers. who> \n\*lfc>d luie lieen killr-d, would rat!;f-r not have this Nation >..n- that VifUjatn was all a trrribh> mistake from the v?n Itegirniinjr. :u. . . il thing in its inception or it$ intention. Vow if thenare people who ijecnnw they did not wanr <o gu into the war those to sny this, that is all right with me. hut T don't think i>u<-h was the caw. Vietnam was an agonizing effort on the jart of our i-onntry to do th'- right thing and I think we did make error*-. increaAingly as we went along. T1we errors have com*11/ {* su<-ii tlial if w<- roiitinii*' them, irr,m'<nilily will result. [ grw with thix. hut f <io not think that we ought to trv to xhattM' or [nit don |M*oplc who lM'lic\-c otherwixe or indeed a whole su^x-vsion of American Icndi-rs wli/> wi-r* doing what thcv thought, with imperf^l judgment many tinu-s (he Utrf tluv 'ould. That ib tiu- only [mint I went to mak' tn you now and I think if is to liad for UK to n*# expn-snions like "to tnake 11 mistake,'' It i all right if you define fc'liat kind of mistake you are making, xur-h us xi'lainm;' wliat if mearth to have * prrat iiwcliaiii7/-<l foni> like tlw [ "uirrd Slate*, go into it country and destroy it. Surii a &trnirM is corrwi. I d' not ucvept mir *aving that tin- effort wi.-i wrong to ju.-iriiita.'ii a dcgrci- of utadilitv in thaf j-arf of tlie world when all the old Irulwurks of prtwrer n I itch kept the fieai'e Itad IKVII tom down i\fi I don't t h i n k we need to do *i in order fo rer/gniw that fuiw th<> ti/iir IIMW conn* t'i join in t'w effort to diwngage as f u i i Kly MH *>w>,iljle M ilh
36
or MWATOK ir \TFIKU' The Cn ATOMS. I woudor. since Swiator Hsitft-ld is here and he is eosonsor of fhis bill, if ne wouldn't wake his ststeme.it. TIen \ve idproofcd with ooestJons for batli of yon. Yon if you carp to. Senator MKJoveriu 1 think it on in remain tlwnc tl " \# orderly. We haie'three other witnesses and \w will Uxve to lcn with tin; bill. Sermlor Hatfield, would you proceed please. STATEMEIT OF HOW. XABX 0. HATFIELD, U.S. SEIATOE FEOlf OEEOOM Senator If ATni:!J>. Tliank you very tnnrli. Mr. Chairman nnd nwmhes'ii of the conroittce. Mr. Clininnan, die central question throughout ihe <vtntry and Iv.forv this 4fninitt1<! is whether we. sliould follow tin- direct iots set fortli liy t!u President, trusting liiin and hu. policy wliere -sjieîfirs liave. not l*n revealed. or wlie<her v should d(>i>f x le?is!ti\ e initinf'ne desicitfd to end tle -jrar. as the Amrrioor fxsipl*1 clenrly want like first to clarify the dtllVreiMvfi irt intention and likely iieiwveu tike policy of <) a<tminis<nUiou and tlte- i*^5" Iati\- propoi!al I am mapaiLSorintr v i -25 irthej- Senators, whidi is pending- liefore y >r )mrnitte.
OF V1ETNAMIZATIOV
The thnwt of the xdrnJnisrraJi'xi's jxjlicy has in^reasio/rly t-mplufiir, on the |rotmhili(v that nrfnitiatvfiii? will end the <-aflict. It hav turned instead to "ViPtnamizfltion"* xsthe solu(i<jn. Iîrk of rlnrity and arnhijpjify rhuraf-ter:^ tiw rtdniiiustration's :xplxr.ati<Mi of poli-y. In his tuidresn to tiie N"ali<m April 7. IflTl.the I'ttîdent
* * our fim\ It a tirtal Anwiknti iflidrnI front VtrtiMtn. WV mu vrlU n-ncti tluit B<m1 Tlir-mtli ..\ir iipttcmu >if VU-fuucniMlUvi If
Sti ive serHi ti lie foitunilte'I t i-'mt inning ^niiliial Trnp refl<-(i<iii;i until, jîu-zi tl* ritrht ''Oiulitions. Atiu-ri'iin irivolveiiMMit fan 1** !>rou(.'ht ton rlrtw. Uone\er. it is wit <-\rir wlwtlwr this iiH-ari^, <h<-. withdrawal of tilt to nu' that thi^; nmy 'jot in-vliidi- all <>f our air powrr liy that hu*eeiit" is ended. Furthi-r. the I'tv.iidetit vjjJ last Friday. April K'I, that w*- vill kee[> a rt**nlw\\ focw as well a* fur air fxwer in Vieiiiaijj until >! Vorth VMnao*"M reU-a-*- our iiri-^wrw of war. Ami finaily. driti>r thr virw interview. tl> f're/tident dntpd that o,ir u i i l i l n r y iiitoln-niriit w i l l onfimic as 1'iJijras:
luiviff.<n (it. tin-
37
This pattern of calculated ambiguity, this reluctance, to he candid with tl>e American {*ople, has seriously eroded confidence in the administration's ability to lead us out of this >var. It is I1 the more unfortunate because the President luw acknowledged the need for Americans to be fully informed alxrat tlte policy they re nskl to support. On November 3.1969, the President said:
Tic .Uueriein people aiuiot nd boaW be naked to sopport a policy which tbe orerrMing IMUOA of war and peace nnleti they know tbe truth
S. IT V IS DESIGNED TO rKOMOTE POLITIC A I. 8KTTLEMEXT
Tbe bill I am proposing (S. 376) presents an unequivocal determination to withdraw all U-i-i. forces. But more than that, it is designed as an initiative to end tit? war through a political settlement. By making certain that wo will remove all our foiros by the end of this year, we would create a new political environment for the negotiations and could exjKrct the following : (1) A cease fire might be established. This has been suggested by the. North Vietnamese and tle People's Revolutionary (lovevnmi-nt-N"LF if we set a reasonable, fmblic date for withdrawal. (*2j Authentic negotiations anting the various Vietnamese factions ou future political [>owtr in South Vietnam, and the means for its ffttablishmtnt, could take place. THesc negotiations would begin in earnest when the Thieu-K> goveninK'nt realizes it can no longer rely on continual American miliUr>- s?up[>ort to make up for the jioHtica] strength rl>a( it lacks from k.*oii per/pie. (3) Serious negcH iarions leading to llu- relrtse "f our prisoners of war wild beg in. The point is thai we uiiwt put our opjwnenls to the t<-st. W- never have, fid w never will lx>i:>btneni iutOi(iibmLioi>, Tin: thiv*t. and tlir use of our devastating uirpou-er tvill not obtain (or its a cease fire, a political ^tettk'ment among Hi*- Virtnaiueê or the rrkT<.' of our pri*iers. f\w nay to {Mjt prcsaijrc on the other side to netrot iate on t hese i.îK~i in to rf a date for our wit hdra waJ. Thus, this bill wouhl dwinivf !y and expvditioiifiiy i-onrludi- our mill tarj role in Vietnam. Hut more in)pfrtgiit. Mr. C'hairtnau. it K the. nioirf likely nlt<*native to promote a ]xlitica! setlllemetii and brinjr a true end to thi" war. topping tle fighting andldlling there. Why do l
n-i.li:\ V.?.r'Kfc AJtfJUf,AV OVER .1SIAX LSkV.
Tin- Hi-st MiidfiKMT coiii|w-)liiig rrawMi i.-> moral, i Iii .--. HUH* to believe that fuiulanti'iila 1 fo all i-lw, we niuat *ie our war policy xnd tt~ '-onvquericMt in moral tenrttf. And for thu iicwpei-tivf, the 'inont iiig a3|MK.-t <f tin- pulio we fierin coirimitte.d U> pun>ue IN that A liff ii> valu^l fur mo re than A><ian li(<*. 'llw anrtriNii'vtl inU'Ufuxi of llie "President / to n-duc* I'UKintllit'K aiwi this luth bei-n ûbritanrially H<voinplibli<*d. Haf eenifto U- little regHrd for Asian '-ajsualtirti. WhJl- rulm-i'ij: tljt1 dirwl iiivolvvawnt of Auu*ritan holdieni in /round 'oflilml. we i*ill pnnirietlw jfolicy.tberitrateg^.Tlx 1 money. Hie ffjuipnii nl. arwl the inlvnwv*-, dirw^. coriil.>ai Muj')rorr TO suatain tlw South VietiiDfiics; nîiiwnd<vmti;iii('tiMf
LaotUn operation well illustrates this. While in the techiucJil fiensft, there was no" direct American ground combat mvolwment m Laos, yrt T/.S. heficoptej-s and planes flew an incredible l.M,s:j" sorties in support of this venture. Amprirau casualties wen- light, According to the Pentagon, of those troops giving air support to the operation, .about 4."i were killed, W) wmtndrd, and *2S missing in action. In addition more than On 1T.S. _ . troops were kilted rn the ground Jn Smith Vietnam in conjunction w Itlt :~. _ Iâm Srn 710, the Laotian opeivt'on. Jiut Vietimmes.' casualties.on; -'.':." bot-h sidx; were o--imnomical. Official estin>at>s ('-{aimed alKt 1.445 .^ ARVN trrops died (sonn- press Tv'f)ort? stated AKVX di-aths far greater than official figures:) and an csrimatvd i:V3- enemv I dind, T\v a.S6uni|>tion is that, if we cnn. s\iipo!t the Thieu-Ky regiuw's continuing the war,J>ut haw fttver Amerir.iijrfd.te-, while Asian blood continues to lie si)!!!^. tlie.n thu> wsr is- Somehow hss <i rong. and moni toJcrabk-. 1 believe such policy fc morally uhpnvonAIifd. If this war is wrong-if it should not U- conrijmed. if it is not worth the cost, and if the human suffering it is causing canf l>e just-fied by any goals--tltL-it it must IK? hi ought to an.end. ft will not be i;dc uny more right Dimply Iiors.u<i4' we hv devisivl the s(rnt;gy for f-wiT Afjiot-icwis to die each month. 'Iliat. after all. rnake^- very little difference to the C. million refugees who continue to sulTvT in Indochina as tlie war jroe> on, or to the families of tin- thousands of ViKnamese. Mrldiers anl innocent civilians throughout Indochina w!i. wil) in t lie montlin ahead.
We mii^ taLe a itard look at w iat t]v 'imiiun rusts of tlic jK>lii-y we r(- pursuing wil! l*\ Hurmglhe tirst;'. muntii-> of this year 5^.1^ South Vi^tnamcA1 soldier- <iicd. according to thi- iMimat'^ of the JX-fens*' IV/artnynt. uiid 11,4^7 N"--rtli VK-tmmt~' and National liberation Fn>nt w>Idiers w-n killed Tlu-n- may In- retioii. of coarse, tn i!oult the :iMira'y of flu-.-* figun^K Imt IH u.i -<si in** ili.-it thi-y an- rel:ilii-ly \ali(|. I)nriiig th<-first -'! riionf hs >f tiiis y<ar. fighting ;ui<l iMMialiii^ wrre light id Janunrj'. moderntf iu Febrt.ary. and In-aiy in .\farvli Am- to the I-aolian ojvruf'uvn. If project froni Îje lf-vt-1 of cjy.uaItirs lust yi-:ir and dm ing flufif^t ijuarfer of this'year. :md !i(*umi' thai ^'il'tlIaIlJcs^ ra.-u.ilfij-- xiill n-niaiit aiK/iit the Mime utcrage Ien-1 as th- uargov.-<ri).tiicn fimin now until tinend of tlw s<-ar. over l<K.(xiO Vi"tiianieN- MIdi-j> i'f liki-iy (o <h". Frotu now lI^î! rliv crtd of 197^. ai many a- :i ijuarti-r of a million Mildiers <-/)ii!d die as tin- n-Milt of poiicio that continue tlie war. Acc'irdilJg fo "iirli |i!'i)jc.-tti olitnatcs. (In- j>;c|x)ii<l<TrtliJ J 4- 4if tlww death.-- arc, of i-oijrv. from (In ciu-mv Dinks. Some of (hose siill iJ^-H"! \silh <h- IKM!V count mntJility max t l i i t i k f l i H is -n--ounigiiig f/ir the 1 -tih'fVKnof our {xt.ii'v. I 'hink if i- iminorul.
Tiu-M [Toliiililc c~!^ in trrmi' of tuir/iiui life do m.t i,\'-\\i<]f c i i i l b n . H-|iich Hfc even jjjofv diff^'lllt to (iileiih.ie. The J'efiliM 1 }k' i n( iiUN xuid t h a t i( maker- lio 'hfininteh of rtvi'.ibll c
ftiact that I cannot comprehend, for jtslmwsfliiphn callous disregard for the'^niwn consequences of our po!ic)S - ,'" The ,:S*atci Subcommittee: on Rcfugnes estimate; that then Tvcrc 25.00Q civilians.tufted in South" Vietnam last vcar. which would be -.over &000 mom thiut the tot*lnumbfer,,of; South Vietnam^ soldiers In Laos, more sparsely populated than Vietnam but intensively "' bombed, the fxmimht**- reported that iO.OOO have died in the part, year - and a half. And, untold Hundreds 4f thousands have- l*en wounded '. " and made homeless throuplioutail of Indocliiua, -;r -' Bftcausi' uur firepoww, compared *o our o^poent s- is'so divr*wheliniiig, the majority of the civilian casualitucscorae as .thc-flon^ squenc6 of our mflkary action. '. Stnct- tlie beginning1 of the war,~we have d^"J>pe<l about 5.6 ruillittn tons of Jwnibs on Indochina,. About "2.5 itiDlion of these have fallen during the ptnisent adromistration's time in officr- The President has reiterated .his iotXMttioii to continue to relv on airpowex in tlic future. On Februar \-17 :he sa id he would place, no \ imits on the, use of a'i rpower. As euch Dombinjr .contmueis, alone with artillery. heUcoi,te,r jcoashipi tuid other firepower, thoosands mote civilun* wiltlx; killed, wounded and made ttonwlesfi as we nirjrsuc 'Vietoadizattrm." Tiu-A- human exr*t&, in my judginc'iit. cammf be justiiiixi, Tlu- Vietnam*ie people do not want their war- uVietnamized-T1 They want it: ended.
!*.)<. k(>Lf IV DCTEBXIMXC OiVTIV\na> FICHTfXC
Then- are those who suggest tiut we have no Tr>!f in detenninin: hf>tlter thv 5>out)i Vietnanteê continue to tight the North Vietnaim-^. I completely dtKacTM. ()ur refiiial to .sH a daU* for withdrawal, %nd our unyifldinr supporf of the Thieu-Ky repine-, niake a ne^nt-iatcd settlejnent to tnc <xwflJct inifMAKU^le. f iglitinp will continue as long a our forces arv roinmitted in fliat country and our policy id to suj>|x>rt that regiute, In oi-dcr to cud the fightirji. we must et the w'rthdrawii] date and .seek t h- <stal[isliuwnt of * erase fin-. At the twine tune, future political p*wivr in S<nifh ViHnain would haw to b- dctecniini-d. The revo!uti<jur\' <roi'errn?jit lias offeiwl an interim coalition pui'i that would conduct elntioris. We ml tlir >/>th Vietniiflic^ trestHl triUrriatuinnllv KufM-n'ided eWrlotw. 'Hjese diffi'rc'n/n.'K can w nefiiiuHd. in iny jnaj^neiit, auionpthi' VutiuiwH' . ft I.- IKK txir rwjMj\iili!ity to dirfxte or iiiijios- UK- termg of that witU-iM-nf. Hut. we must reioow our urfitrarv suj>joii of llw ThieuKy H'-jriiiH1. ffr<-jji|f it to rely only on its ov n inU-nnl streuîh, Jn that 4Himsfihere. a yettuiop M>4tk'nu*>it n-^-tin^ tli hl:(rn'e *f for'*! HI Vu'tjiarn '*;:ild I* oUaine<1. Tut'jioiTU it tlnt wt- do have -ontrf>l over wlu-tlier the i'unit- or -iuIs Tiidtfliina. Ki^J if we persist ill our jtoUcy th*
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If Wf adopt tht- h|>|'rdtt<rti <>f the Virtnarji IHse.ucapewient Art- we initiaif the iixurf na}jrtic of>jortnniL- for n iu*ofiatd end to J-f v/' fvlicve thai sfl l i f e - Aniaij grtd AniPri'au --iri wjnally valtja!)U-. Jlwii j i'imrt<if se<- !w>w Ihe liujnuo cutita ytf t curi rxili''V rim lie morally ju*lifi*d. J a<J\/xfd<'. an altcnutiri' toth.t m order t> avoid t}joe </*-- iu j/rd^;:1 i<' wive iiuuiiiu Jif*.
._.
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ooNsarauTioji mutciyo roe iôuor CHAVGB Tim aecood: .consideration arguing 3or a derisive change in policy is <x>nstitutioo4l. ~ .. . . v v -ThesjM ooiunderatkiosharc taken .OH an entirely new relev.^nce- and ..ense of urgency witw the. repeal <>F die Golf vof Tonkia Resolution inst December. I do ant understand what constitutional Iwtsis thertls for our involvement in Indochina since thaf time. -- -Yorr-eomniittce lias already had Jtc&rings i/n the question of war 'powers mnd tLe ^sponsibilittesi delegated 4ri the <?onre^s by tfw Ooustitutior for au Jiorizinir niiliUry adionl . . Furthennore, witli tlc -Jeadcrship of .your commiltw, OMigress [Asncd tlie Kafional Commitments nesqfuBou .lune^5,,199. As you . will recall, the finsl version. W that nrsr>Iution drafted' ârgely by Senator J. W. Fulbri^ht artd Senator Joli Sherman (!ooper
i. That M> national commltmrnt for the purpoi*vof thf nod (2> it |K tlwr'MMie of ttw Sciwtc tbat a natioual CumniUiMnLbr O^ United SfHCcs rrbtiltii'unlT from nflJnut{v<- action txbrti iy tbe rTwotlre aariM*wi ,-vf th*- r.S. GoveniaMiit by hioa^ of a treaty, utaiote. <r c<%ncurceat rwxAUtiwn of JxXK HOO^MI of C'tofrnui rp*riftclly ]irr1din|; for
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'Hiere is. of course. np-Cresty. uo Htatnte, and m> concurrent resolution roinniittiiic us to pulitar>- jnvolrcnu-nt in Vietnam. Wlwt lâl, oinstitutjonai basi docs the President liave for our involvement? Ilon-ard K. Smith nsked the President that question daring: theJr interview on -July 1 liist yenr. The President replied :
Thr I'ri-iM*-nt of thr CnlKÎ Ktar<f> liax tlje nouotirmlooa] rUtit uot <ilj *l>* rlgltt hat tlw- wponlllllty in prr-tw-t Amerl?*ti frmv* when tbey are jitHd in military 'arrloos. " -
Ulieii Mr. Smith ûrsutnl this question. uijcin>r the lejfal basiK of our involvement ou<:c ^t!5 Guif of Tonkin Resolution was thv. President stated
JK tr "tif j Imto glwu uiJ (liat )k tl of ttw Cdltwl Atiiter'>t<-ct rlu- llv<^< of . Tlmt IK tlr It-fit.} JuKTlflcMtiirf/
N*ov. Mr. Chairman, I afar* nviioieneM'rtedlv that the President bas IK* legal onatit.utianftl HHthority for proterfiiur our trooj*. And, lie certainly haK the constitutional utlionty to witfidr* w ( IH-JII. liut. (In- iHefiu* j^thst tlie I'nvident's'poli'-y includes fr more, tlian that,"He i* pursuing "Vit-trii.iji/4tion'' li<l"vvMhfs tn îve the W*naifx-sp "a fnir chanc*- 'o dujVnd thcrnselvt."" His [M)!ic.y. th4i, is 'oifjfjiiltcd to OK-military mip|>ort of tinffy govi'ninwnt. What miîit thwenlnil* i< will include the continual use of heavy Iximliiiifr Vj<?tnani. Tâos. nd Cambodia. It miffht inrlud*1 future iucur*.'iotr-; into I>HOK, liintcd u recently ly (ion. Creiphfon Abranw. Ifccotild includet.||p rHif-wi-dhonioitiôf North Viotuarn -And if wiil nteuci-coniiniw-d IV.H. rnilir'ury ofx-ratio/ih nd *ponil;nt nd' "firpj^nuT for ARVN" ojumhonw tlirou^hout South
we may agree or disagree with the policy of Vietnarawatjon. fit.t\jgrdlo!8s or<Hir preferences, I do not believe, the President haa -.*he-lepid, coiutfitMtional authority for pursuing the objectives and ; goals of that policy, .^ '"-" j" . Them is a decisive dlflejrwice between protecting <jur (mops and witkdjrawing theî from Vietnam, and pursuing Vietnamization. If wlthdrawa} is-onr only objective, that can be accomplished in a mutter of months. And, our troops can best be protected by setting & date lor completing our withdrawal and seeking a cease-fin:, Then is-Qo/ptefltion abouTthe President's constitutional authority to take these, stops. - .- ' : ! - - . But, tne President lias nude clear that we are committed for t least some tune into the future to supporting the South Vietnamese <]r0vernnjent by our military involvement. TTis authority to do so surely does not conic from his constitutional po -T.T as Commander in Chief to protect our troops in hattk. He IMS cited no other legal justification for.tltow policy goals. Ja my judgment there is none.
TOXSTITUn/MfAfc ASPECTS OOJCPW/ AOOPnOV (IF nElTifAJC DI6KNOAOEJCEVT ACT
If we sot aside all otlicr considerations, I believe that 1 he constitutiouai asjifccts of tliis problem alone compt-l tlx- adoption ni the Vietnam Disenânjeinent Act. EVMI if WPIV to wrin >me victory in Vit4uani. if the cost is rhc integrity of constitutional government tlicn the. price alone is far coo high/ Tbf res[>onsibility to redeem tlie viability of the f institution rests at this point solely with the Coupvss. In that resjiert, this bill is far more a challenge to tjie. Congress than to the President For <v>n8f it ut ionit I -rraôtis alo[u>. it 'IK iftif >onU i ve that ( Vrfiprr>i tuloj it soon: ieîislativemf-asurc jijârdinp or involvement in Indochina. The pfifxîl I HJII ip[K>rthj[fr corn-sf Mend's most closely witli tlie vishet? of Americans, and offers 'the O^st Ijope for an enduring oettfemenC to IbLs M-ar. It would revive tlv* constitutional dilemtnn that facos uw and end the 'vmflirt ht iacrodinpr (lie foundation!; of our Government. 'flu? cli-jtr iirfeur of the (Vw>litiitioi). in article I. srf-diou R. is to keep th* pfwTK of wr decisively in the hands of ('ongivtw and. thereby, the fMv>pl>. It was for tJiiK tvaw/n that appropriations for ani^ ajv the- only appropriations Kpwifirally JimUed to, . years by tJie l.'-onst itiuiosi. The fnurKTs of tlH- / 'onstitut ion did ins id this to insure a cont inued i) lyth tV/n^n?Ksoi>r any military ap|r>i>rifctioiiK. As jou know, tiw- Founding Falhf-rs consintvnt 1 v Ktre!ed the con] n'sfKHiwIulity for wunaaliin^r jowers. Maditton saw tli*1 danjfei's of ex-wii\v Kxw:utive jower in he <aid :
of fo tt'H THUrtlt liwIIH' ttl-J ran Jrf- COfKwIetf "r iliwiOta'd IK ttijrlt |r(K nd t xiHti /ium MY ulll Iwnt wjit |<arUcuhtr v)iiri: u/id JMT-JUV r)i>* Uxlf f>f 1lw> ifyAf nn- V-SH <-jij(i,U' '< judjcliif. an4 *!* 'lUMlt-r ib- iufljjUK* ( j.n-JwlUw. n tluil lirawii <if tlwir affair*, (lu of Jj'T, fVrtiaj*- i< in * uiilrirul trulli - 230 O 71
42
tint the JOM oK liberty at borne is tafeM&aroed elost4ancr, twtf from "
This is a Jrttcr-iio had written 1o. Thomas Jefferson on May !% 1789. I'ndtr (irtK'H, section S. Conpre^ is empowered -to the nonunion defense,'' *ttt declare war" and "raise and support . Commander i Chief, outlined in The President's powvra.as section 2 are to be conmnmdier over thoao f mies raisedijy C/onjjress and sent, into w ars which are deJared
As Alexander Hamilton îd, the Commander in Chiefs power . ;

Amounted to nottl.i'niiHuryfo*w.Jthe "v than the Suftreux' <V>mniaDd 4*1 direction of w i a n d Admiral."*. ?
The j>ower and ..rity lor d*.tf:nniiiiii<r the purjxwcs for wliicli hccx^î^êsthis</)Iltôl over t)k'trooj)cclear!y rests witli the Congress. the representatives of the peojde. 0\TEKin;XT' ABIL1TV TO MAINTAIN 1 FAI7II OF (XlV>3JVfD
1
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There is one final consideration, Mr. Chairman, that snunt vveirh hcaviiy on all Members of Congress and should, 1 U-lieve, ^nifK'l us to idcjrt ttie legislativf initial ivt-s outlined in this bill. Tf^t is the ability of this Goveiiiinent to maintain the faith of those whcftu it _ ~" ^ \\V would ail aprw, I liclieve. that tliis war, like no other event in our rwnt past. las undermined the belief of Aiwricans in the viabilit v of their political KVstt-ni. . ConfuH-iiof and trust in tl? pruoess of re|irt'Scntativ' rovennent, and in the Office of the I'n-sideiwy. art- all sufferiup as-th- casualt'w-s of this war. As I tali; with omstituciitK^rna people throughout the country. I arn constantly askwl what baste Uter*1 is for continued faith in our sj-Htem. ' I - People, say to iiie "thrw- quaittrj of our jieople want th' war oivr by the end of this year. Hut the Pr'i4j'Tjt <r<N>sn't listen ami Congress 4ix no^ ad." - '" _ Pailirularly in tiir j>at yr, sim-f thf >|M*pitions jjito <sm]Kxlia aiul i<s aftermath, tlw diwllu.sionnM-nt of jv^pVfrom ull walks oi life has jirown. And. I fv.ar f<r a country wlion1 jx-op!*- aiv losing fa^fli in 1 the words of iU Jesdei-n a->d tin dn*ain.sof its founders. it it> liard to kno*' whut tliis will ali 'wan for tli<- (l<-stiny of our liut of this w-i- can U- wrtain onr U<'|>n1i!ie"s most M-UTV liallviip'-iti to rerfon.' it ift'frrity in tin- eves of J IK .^jveriran jx-oplc. Tlat will takj- mu/-!i eff'irt, Jût it can fa'jrm if .Coiijrri-s takes tlwPeople wajit toN-IUse in AM-riraV ideals. TIn-v wa/it to have fnith in our sytein. Tlwv vnu;f to Jjave hoj- in our 4 Joici ijiif.iit'n abilit y to and lead. Let u-i.not (Ji^j/pînt them. !><- us pre>e;'Ne their n-new ourown .
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43
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OOXKEXDATIOX or WTTKISM* Thc On AIRMAX. That Is a very good statement. ' {Applause.] : It is an*icel]ent statement, Senator Halfield. :
lot]] on Senator Church. '' Senator CUCBCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to _ commend you. Senator Hatneld, for your statement and yon, :Senator Mdjovernj for the excellent testimony that you have given. I am, of coarse, in complete concurrence with your argument. It is a tremendously persuasive argument. I have been and am now a co sponsor of (fie. McGovern-Hatfiekl amendment: I have voted for it and intend to continue to give it my support.
KETEXTIOS.- OF RESIDUAL FORCE IX 8OCTH VTETNAK
I would like to focus, gen: men. on the crucial issue of total military withdrawal from Indodtiru. I gree tliat it remains far from clear that total withdrawal is the objective of American policy. There continues to be talk from Hie. highest quarters in die administration about a residual force bn South Vietnam, fhe size of which w a matter of ooujecturc. The length of timo that this residual force presumably is to remain in South Vietua-jti is also left unclear. We have had a residual force of American troops in Korea, ever since the. Korean war. Although it has been 15 or 16 year? since the war : ended and since the Chinese witlidrew tlieir forces from North Korea, there still remains a substantial American Army in South Korea. : In view of that fact, there is good reason to be concerned about the <:ur!iit talk of a residual force to be left behind in South Vietnam. Do cither of yo*: gentlemen see any long-term American objective that i.-ou!d he f*rve4by leaving a garrison of American troops for an indefinite jx-riod of years iu South Vietnam at iiie doorstep of China ? Senator HAtnajt. Mr Ch5ri>ian. I do not for tlirce reasons. One is as long as we have troops tn that an>a witjt this type of war that is being foiyrbt. namely, a guerrilla war action, llvese troops will be sI>jfct tn attack. This iniuHvlietely ]uts us in a situation of Juviugto take action to furtlter prof<r-thow- rrsidual forces by eitl>er bombing or by r>t?iec7uiUtary a^tioos '..'hioh could trigger again eiscalatory inVnJvemejit Hifc.kintl of invoh<'H*l -which w are trying to conclude. No, i, rince r<; h*xe liad a snulJ window opeiiing in this China. jiytithoo <.'-urt aiif, Ti -itKMiK to me this is the time to take all action. uot only the uuinediate goal of dipoigsgcment from Vicfitain, liut T/ui)itlng H bridge of mmuiimication in rile Far Kxst witli tlK- largest Thirdly, it iteejnx to me u^ fiavt- to look bftvixwl mit only ence of our n-hidua! forces in Korea I mi du^priHSJ^lity tiut exists e-veu beyojid d>osc Ho-oittcd rraiduul /on^-s in Vi**i)aai, fuimdy in Tltaiiand in eurrou' îiig an-t. Tht'w forcci- could -Ix xYrfifejiienily aod ' hd in military action in South S^t-Juuun
44
let me remind the committee, then- have been extensive Ixunbings and military actions coming from Thailand and from sea-based forces into the war zone off ndochina. So I frel for ihose reasons, it would nor serve our purjMise of either stabilizing a. South Vietnamese Government nor of ending tbi* vw Xo retain residual forces. -\ Senator CncBCii. .Senator McGovern. . ; Scuntor MrGbvutx. I agree with tlio* observation*. I would just add ' he point 1 made a while ago that I believe. the retention of American -forve-s in Soiirh Vietnam backed up presumablirby air power antl offshore nnval power also creates a whiation where it js very unlikely tiiat onrq>ri.soners ers wwild be released from Hanoi. I cannot ÔJKVIVP of. the other side agreeing" to the release, of -American -prisoners who. in n real sense are lining hold as hostages; so long as \\olriyt1 Amci'iww military -o|*^tjons in Wing in South Vietnam. Neitljcr *TU 1 sec any rchil end tu tho: killing" in South \Tu-tii>ui itself. You have-t situation somewhat dtiF^rent tiian W4: had in South "Ko*a. 1hei the .\JBiorican forces that iv-maiiiied in .ônth Koren \\ere in '....v rf-oojvrat'ion with the .rôiVrJi Korean (loveninienl. It hud JitHp or tut o]>|Mjsition from it? ov\-n jwople, that is froni ilie .South Korean ix-dple. Wiereas in outh Alotnjun vou Lste a major civil war in ]>ngre<s in which tlial goverunifciit is being clialleuged by a sizable ^rgnient of its own i>enj))e. <*) as long as .\ mcriran forces remain in Sfmtli Vietnam they arc going to I>e caught up not only in the. dialIf-nge from Hanoi but they are, being caught up in a very bloody civil war and \\e delay the day when that conflict ean I*1 brought to n end ,'iader riome kind of ;i cfiajitifin irovernnie.nl. r If.sTFiMJt, Senator ChiircJi. could I' add one posto:ri|t '.
Senator Cuntf n. Ves.

Senator H.\irJFi.r. It n\~f> ffîJi&esiigairi on this whole const it utioaiil JHPS* ion- --that iv- what jxjwer juid imder whai authority d<xrs t],v President h;uc to kv\> sucii ivwduitl loms t IK.- re when it i^< longer isstlie olijwtiie of jirotec.ting AiMC'Hcaii fon-ew. whieli i^ now his only <-onsiiti!iiom<| duty c< 1 sej' it for rliefomuiaridei in Chief. Senator CfHWti. V<*. I wuyl to get iiito that very aspect. J. -"'egurd file Argument you have n:idc in samuiaiT fornu though a^ HK>st }HT.utisi\e. In the lonf-terni mtere^.t of tin- Cnited Stiit*.v \\e should [early axoid establishing a jnilhsi'v fo<itliolil of our owii in Indoeliina aud ;ittemftirtg to justinta-ix it. 'Hi at Ijejn^sit. i( seeins to iff. that ilu fio-t ol>{ii;a(io!i of tlw ^Vmgress, p:ijticipatirigacj.-/>rding to itxron-.DJI^JOIIH! role as a i-itMpn] braii'-li of the Government, is to make if r-|i-:ir th;it tlteobji-cfive. of our poliev is- to coiue out of Indochina, not i'i-t ilh ground forvs. imt will) Jill fo.ree.s-- air. na'-I. logirtical. mid <5r<..iind combat of <he I.'nitcd StnteK. Semtloi If \TnKHi. Right. .Seirifor Cnirjefli- > nd the n-ed to do this i^ u> fitryaile/1 by the '4,-iitiiimng )>-t:itf-iiwjit>. tli-.it i I>\HI> from the jnliriini^tntfi'.ii. Lfci nw j cite .1 rj(i-.tiou ;in<l :.iii tiiiHV.fi titki-u from a pre>;- conference,
45
tarv of War. Mr. Laird. The ^nestion was put to him on April 13,
1971:
- ." ilj qu*stion is what, does Vtetnaiifizatton ami tbe Nixon Doctrine in -terms of T.S. air support, th* presence of U.S. air rapport in Indochina after
Meaning ground troops. Here is Secretary Laird's answer:

I would ?nvifdou that the L'ulteil States presence a* ttr an Asia i* concerned, as far ,i naval force* are concerned, as far as air force* re concerned, that this T*V.VI tc a part of the realistic deterrent wbfch we witi continue to "<"*{ ! in Arts.
It is statemen1 , of tbis kind and statements of the kind that the Pivsideut. himself msd*? in his interview of last Friday with the newspajjor editors that setm to me to mike it evident that the Congress must define the id objective of American policy. Let ine just go back, Senator Ilatfield. to what J-OH have testified to on the first page of your testimony. You say, "Further, the President -<! last Fnday, April 16, that we will ie.p a residual force as well asV.ur air povrw rin Vietnam until the Xorth Vietnamese release our . \.nd finally, during that same interview, the President stated that our military involvement will continue iu .South Vietnam as Jong as And you quote the President as saving"the. South Vietnamese have i.ot yH. developed the capacity to defend themselves to take over from us the defense of tlieir own country/" I don't ee how such qualificatior,s can Ixr reronciled with his statenwtJit-that total withdrawal isth<> Aroer'n-an objective. How long have we been tmng to ûijj the South Vietnamese to have a caparkv to defend tlêmselves without p^tive American participation? How long hfcs. it gone on. Senator MoCxoi'wji^ about 8 years now. and couldn't it go on indeS rately in t he huure ?
HOti;VTATIO>r ^F VIETNAMIZA71OX AS KEW POUCY <JCESnOSED
Senator McGovtjsy. Well, I think that is, th<; misleading thing about f.h- concept of Vietnamization is, tliat it has Ijef-n presented at> a uew policy wltîvas it is jjot. It is a rvturn to the jwjicy of iht' ]9(U)"s, which was HII wrtoil to assist the military forces in Soutli Vietnam to the jx>int wtifi'e they would bo capable of ranying on the major burden of v thoij- d>'iVu!H(>. \\ hcn that effort proved hojx-Jess. and we saw tlw South VietJiajjjes.1 militari' ftirws rnimMitig. it wa at that \x>\i\t that wAiucrirjtni/ed the iwr by sendiug in upwards of half a million America1! forws, Now, it Ai>ms to iu'1 we HIV returning to the old policy tliat in K\W lirfit !/ !/ years of the iOCo'sof again trying t r i n to \"ietnamiz? \"ie war. altiwugh tfjjstinw with ej-onuout-' American airpower and nsval KU{rpf>rt ami artillery ui)jxrt. S'liHtfjr ("UVKCH. Hadn't the French once, liavo a program to \'ieliiairii^tJH' war \vaiv JM-foivtliey wcrvfiuullydriivji oiilof Iikd<x'hina '. Srnator 5f(i<jmTJiK'. Yen; they did-'Iliey went through the same -.S.-natorf'nrft'if.'nu* ^'aâ^v Han. wasn't li '. Scn&tor M^JOVTAV. Tlu- wrf' jrattcrnK *' followed and with \\w
46
row ARKCXEXT rrw REMOVAL FORCT. Senator C:ifarn. The second matter I wanted to tourh upon is the argument that is bciug used that we have to leave forces in South Vietnam as long as there are American prisoners of war there. Isn't that a [>erfeot circle. As long as there are prisoners of war you have to leave American forces and you have to leave American force's as long as there are prisoners of war. That is a circle, or a wheel that keens rotating indefinitely. Yet, the past experience out there has leen that you get the prisoners of war bark when you agree to leave. This is what happened to the French. The release of prisoners does not precede, it follows, a commitment to withdraw. Hasn't that lieen the pusi history ? Senator HAITI H>. Not only the past history, Senator Church. but also it has been clearly stated by our opposition, the enemy, that if we will t this date certain they will make meaningful negotiations that relate to the prisoner-of-war release. So consequently we have had the statement made frequently. and that is why I said* in my testimony let's put them to the test. We really haven't jiui them to the test on this, and we are still in that sense on tli,* defensive. Let's take the offense on the prisoner-of-war problem. I urn concerned about the prisoners of war. The idea of .sending a man around die world asking other capitals is one tactic to assist us in tlie release. But let us deal directly with the issue by putting them to the test by stating it date <vrtain and then they are eit her going to have to put up or find themselves thrown in the focus of public opinion. So;>ator(xncTtoj.Of all the arguments that 'laveWn used In justify the >Tpetuatiun of our involvement in Vietnam the most offensive to me has Uvn the prisoner-of-war argument. In a sense, every Atneri can who is sent out there to fight is u prisoner of this war. and tinlonger we keep them out there, we are keeping them there as prisoners of rhi.s war. The only way we are going In get our prisoners of wur who arc located in North Vietnam or in surrounding ureas ba-k is with the consent of the North Vietnamese ("internment, Pa-t history makes it |>erfectly evident that that cnnst-m can lie olttained only after we. have reached an understanding with IV.-JH-K to AIIUT'K-HI: withdrawal. To use the prisoners of war. ;ui emotional i^sue. a.-. :m e.viM' for staving on seems to me t<i IK- fii<- iiio^t objt-ct ionalilc of nil the i:iany Differing arg'ii-ieists (hat Inive IM-CII iis-d over the year- tî jMTj this war.
OK 'VoNKTriTTlOMM. \\<ll*f
Finally, I want to get to the (question nf the constitutional vacuum. It is fr - iie then- H no statutoiv ssinction on the JMI-I of ^'ongress to authorize continuing Ai'X-riea'j [larlicipation in tin war ii> Southeast Asia. Siruv ilje n-j^-al of the Gulf of Tonkin n-îliitiou there is ;t j'onslitutional vacuum. HIH! I t h i n k t h a t it i-, tin- <iul v of fhis<'ongres^ to fill that varinmi. mid to fill it in -A vv;iy tliat ilcfin*'-; u joli<-y that will end (lie war forthe I'nited States. T would only ho|x- that we might try to do this in Niii-h u manner a> will give some Iio|x- for reunitiirg thr |>eople of the I'nitrd Stains. We fought this wir bitt4-rly divided. If n-iuain Iiilterly divided us a nution, the |>eiial<y we will pay will IK- MTV heiivy. Kvc:i thougli
47
it may not be possible for all of us to agree whether we should have fougJit the war in the first place or should have gone there in the first place., it mighf !*- possible for all of us to agree on a jolicy of coming out of tin- \vir. I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that tins committee in considering the various proposals would keep this objective in mind. If we could reunite the people, reunite the Congress, and join the Congres? and the President together in a common jolioy for coming out of the war. then we would have served the country well. We might avoid the soil of bitter recrimination in the aftermath of the vrar that genuinely concerns a great many jx,-ople. Thank yon very much for your testimony. Sei.-utor MrfiovFjr.v. Mr. Chairman, I am very late for another committee 'ipcearance that I am obligated to make this morning and I u under if I could be excused from further questioning. The Cn \II:M.\\ Certainly. Senator Case. I thought you had finished. I )o you h:i ve any quest ions ?
< '-M I.VrCATJOX <iX MiM. Of ENDING WAR KECOMHKNDEn
Ser.,.;.ii C\sn. First, I would like to Join Senator Church in his empliiiî- upon the desirability of avoiding the kind of division amoi:^ ili(wc who are now oniinced that tins war mii-i now lie brought i.> an ejjd. We. bhould not Jnell on llie origins of tlie. conflict and its inherent in- tjn-r immorality. I think it irf iin|<ortant for u^ to conceu(rnte on the goal of ending the war, and not IK? led astray by internal divisions on any matters irrelevant to that single objective. <'<>vsTnT"ii<v\i, Mr. Chuirman. at this point, if I might. I would like to ask unani-
in tin- .. The CM \ J I - M \ X . Without objection it is so ordered. Senator (Iw. Vert useful article which )>oiiits out that the Con;i;tiitionV dfsijriiation of the PrcMdent a.- Comm-ndcr in Chief of In- A r n i \ and N'ai v nie:in< o:tly t h a t no j i v a l coiiimandc'rin chief shall In- cM.ih)i-hcd and t h a t the Armed Kor<-c should h a \ c civilian con!roj. Tin-- i<f!ie t!ini.>< and the purpose of tlu .constitutional pro\ision. und it <-:m't lie i-\tende4J to <riv<- the President jKiveixto cîiidiict military o|M'r:dioii- unfettered bv < ongressiona) ntiirn}. I tliink it !; a ver\ -'Hiiii pK-ce of constitufioii.il doi-tritw.. and that t h i - article i^ wohhy of n:/ (.iri-'dtTHf ion iji thiM-onti'xt. 'The informafiori icferred to follows:)
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E>'D1VC X7ETXAM Vft.K < ^ ~
T PEACT.
<Tust one question. jf I mu .'!,"? ftst- of us who believe in the apprwh of I hv Vietnam Piw-npaônicnt Act have to nddl'ess t he jwbit t&aj the President- raised ngaju last njpht ryljen he said .if. is very easy 'to end
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The sjjftint is <a endttltc w*r in.SU^b a *'>* thn( tiifpcacv vnll bo pc^nan^M. I tiiiilh'we iiJivc an oblUfetion to denrifvnstrat* ;y; fai^xi} w^ i.'Mi'th^t Jliis TTotild t.v so. T wpnlu ue plad to Iwv> yonr corumehrs <m tint motpr. v- v , '- ' ScnWor Hjk-rrrr.r4>. ^nntor CasvT ihink. first îif alF. Ivwuld hacir to Tvsfx^^cbv saving -wo-^do not. liv^xin n-^rld -of T>rantvs. I ktowr of notli^ th<vf ,Vc ('ar.^do thai wouVi giidiiintei,' afeolutuly anything of tomorrow. I think hnt tlu> Prwqdont d*Id ppH'.fljB coa^d'Jx* "fterpnfttd ji^..cij-injr fc.^ft*"^! cnd.tiis vatr wiUi ivs|KJrt,ribilif'T a rf>?f.-<a.--" siblc kiruVirt nf lu^kntj-iiijt .,y"'&W bat?c acrl*?5t QCr -xAsia on toy Ume l*hKv'altH.uph scttln^-^ :lxfc'VrtiLirt as. s tiôL'^,.' pursuing w^Mattrf WtU<vpn r-|n^nt> tl^ F^-xt ijyporti^sjrv.^^r ;: fd do,-is tft-lnok al. '~/.-\ ^ _. , ... inv*&iri^t! andtfv ^ , if thcn\:riyjt;jy. frtr Vlîc we hare t\'r?dy cfot^. jh Hoirthwist > Aar 1 tTihvIc \*'^:iia(.v<> to IK>k at.ptfipr
wortli, wicjv wo talk .-vôiit a {lurwr^lt},- {K-rtcf , S<jothcaef, Asia as tfaft^Presidtftrt himself has s:i-'lt dt*-.s niKvj^.r?f]n' chewiest thiT^t to wofjd |aRc be-' f ?f Middle Eaj^ pj"&d that jrretfo.st throaf". ^,">'3n see. as. ^ woirfd TT>s|K>nd, I ica't know wlat we would Iiave in trrnw f jnaranr^ri"'!iar we arv yoiri|r t.j hcivficjii:!' nAvtrhTe. I don't know'ihat wi* hatt- ^riinrantfCM we will ,Iiiuv jn-wr-- iji irvv of our major i-itins'today or on ^vrv cnniims in this romifry. So I think wjuit wr- hiivi- to {o is to Jook at the whole picture nf toe,. world and wm-n? tin- r*1!it-?tt ttircat.s to |Hpa'-c an- and f tliink we ha^t1 ,'i have a. fiw[on-il>lc -xit frohi Vietnam. I do not exjx-^t nor do I lic.lieve this ili.snjrajrcnien: ,T-t repn-^-ntri :m irr<*sprriisib!.> art.rt)3t it would in any way minimize tlir- jn.>.-;il)ilitics of |ien<H'. '5 I think ther.- \A no IX-.T-V thi-re now nd th-^ I*sf <*hau^, we have is to let thf.ie jH>o|>le ivsolie their rivvi war diiryrnc-> ivjfh our interest. of roiirw. in the future as to cci>noniic >)i|>|>ort aud (ôuoniic aid. Th'<'n.viKJCAV. Senator Coojter, -Senator fooiTK. Senator Hatfidd. I think you have given a power" ul ftnd eloriuent sbitdn-Tif, It i* u statement *W!KS<- ohjfi-tive I thhik 'Jfctff>|i>rViVed oyallof u. 1 ".TIw: ti^'/rtioiw I !Kik an not intended t< In- rinffl! U-r-aiw I know ytnr .jiurpr>se and ,x;>tfr siMwrity, but yosir firoj/osojl f.;r ending the war kaK rsiiicd quc^tioh^ which I think we have to nddresx ourt^l ve.s to.
s-'f .Asia, \ '., "
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or AX KXD'TO THE rsirnxc ,., You spfnt a great .deal of time upon ^whui^jvu -btute was Uic ccrtainty of -wfc' fighting ftier w*. leave, that iûf least under the Xiixon ' proposal^ tV&at certainty is there of an entf-to the fight hij: in South; -. 'Sejiator RvTttixb. J&nator CVjoprr. as I outlined IK my testimony. , bv letting a'date for^njr trttlidrawal, we create tlK-^m'iroiitnent m which a. f ^fitical sctBement csn moxt likely occur to end all the
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-:\'- ' "In irir 'judpnwnf. ^tliUry - tiiid ",to South Fietnaai wpuW lie -' : drt^rmiaed on t,vr> %tes^ One: it wjyiJd I* dctrnnlncd on tltif ^sl :_/ ' of \vladt -kind of^ <^wisMiâs and ^>tsc of iwiiiical supjwn that ithcr Chfc yhicu-Ky orsfcrfna succea-^r ivjrhuf <wJd-dcvtlor> nmonpst ^ its ona_p*ople and. No; ândt?1 our proposal it vbtild bo ootebuined ; '^. ? , iy the Congress of thsae Lrnit;b! SWu1^, not by upifcitenil action by | he ^ ** :f*rîdeaw5it"prccommits u? ^nd.ôhrwi ns into tf wtiiHtJoa'of ha*ving i. then to iWifT tuat whtcK W Jiave not )md ft vof'viitdnternKnluii;." V\ ',&>-! would say that- fliis KI1 <Jes not;nili; 6ut-thc jxistdbitiiy of ..y^ ^fiitHre rrtilrtary aid of som^Jkind or ccoiwrrnic aid, Jml. our i>nt wtSat N: iîrtH- wûld oft policies .dctftrmhicd-Jiy'-^'i-. Cnagrfst- 3 wf- did m ;-.- C<K>j)*r^Cliarch: \VTuui you u>td_ jfciiator. Olij.trcTi introduced ~ yn\ie ^ ~ juiKindnimt it witomakeiIurCV>n/<reoa .iticiionsiibk* for 'rCaina<'tio)t there ancfthat i all rftv1 propOfle*.,toxl<i. It ^lo'-S'not tat (l->t -,jire forer.toain|f tlc tNVSSibility of rfutttrr "invoU'enunt'-of " soinc
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* * Sojurfieast Asia ii there is under tK> \ixou p.rojioal. ." Senator 1I^v>nEiJ. Se)>('>r Toofx-r, v?e-c0uld not, in :oy o j n i 1 could not^JfiÎosi' or yotiinj^ a fututv C<>nprtMf or evwithis on thftt jrfiloeef.-()ur (a&k.-(iCn< and our oI/M-ctiv*- is a pimpfeone. a dat' ra-jtauj and to IIHVVKO funds provi^td for couînh>kl3 ^\n anilitary sijj>port aft-r (F^rt- f inw. Now; wliîT.Uiat datviy^Pi^'und jirkl you will nvall at rtii^ last S'ssioi'oii- aiiirmlinciif projjowd x f l u - {xwwiliilify ;f iiriefly-t'it-i'iiding thai-date, w of < , . . Wiiat wfr:aiv. *ry\iiy in do is to cu../A this fn:iid orchis habit of ' f he J'rtîdf-ut a^kinfthi-M- coiiitnituwntn'tf/xl then t !* ('of.tn-sti liavinsr ,." to cntw w after th> fact with no voict- actiwlly U<rauw.v v aiv aln-ady . unnrj> TJ wmrniuWAi, AVD rn wrnox .Sc'ijator <f<x>r"J. f must ay I aprcc. wholly with tin: i'lwi whirh ninny of IIK hir.-ir utaO'.f in the past, and which JK'JU *Lifwl In-<* very c-li-arly. I d'jft'f .think t'^1 Pn-sidenl has any roust ftutional J^/<T to do iiion- in SoiiMi Vu'liiatn than to withdraw fora-H and profj-tt our forv a(^tin<4 itjinjinentdarjjr< r r au ttu-y withdraw,
. iK>int in ^!otr stt<nten) ;:&u teJk Aboat rout iiuutt ion of aid to 5 Victn'ttrn. -V<>* yoiir arrifTltdinmif f >*tia\t tie ffintinviati^p of i il to Sottf'i.Vfol&iini or voOid yon f^r^-Insr il? Itajtmio "xw stnder yonc projôsat tlitvinere ia thc-anirtci jxiîil/ility of r r n
THREE MATN PHIJTOSALS TO RX|> WAR
It decmb to mo them are three main projxjpals to end the war' which -been niado; yo'.irs a fixed dattîre,- President:s Vietnnruization, and Cbifti, a policy statement by I lit- (Vi^jress and subsequent action l>y ih<\( OIIJJTVSS whirh would cutoff fund? except for the withdrawal of forvis, and for tliefr^xîsctKrti against iiiiru'uent danger. Tliis proposal tjiould nut atrenipt 0>~set a.Jatf, and wonld^ttr tO-pn-s6rve. the constitutional Uisis of jur.t actions between <hi> President and the /Congress. '"'..'''. 'BiitThave argued w^tlr myself about your pmjxml. I l>ave thought . o n i s t h i T i v thinjrf..tliul,l)oUier nii;,;Fitt*, tlit-^FiaonTjs f-f war. Now w Oii-'fi' aoy morS ifaipriilct.' ujkdcr your propoaui that ou.- prisonorrf of "
k.ir.uii'L jL'V.u'jr-i*' , .xjcmiuw *f**ii^ 9 -T*V au*u- u .njiuc A^*', .tiJ. -.
~ coj.'ocrooy'witih'Sjcxiaior 0ûrli:fl<-ifiKf.df'h|^tiory of what happened C jiiih Vltf. FrtnV-iiLin thi-ir witlidrawal, aj)d t^B^fact, So. -2; that tin ^: ?-North VietflLmfî! hdve. frat^tSith', statfd this s a jinSn-xH'isitc to f. ^ v ./J>nf"-l5jIiiiVtrv^ tlijs poinfcîi^fiVycara of up^rotiaUog'iJiis Ht Paris $enriJ^ OOWR. Tou,kiiiM'the President ha.-, ^tatod that he.idH
follow th> h/$tory of risoDfr a tinuv

H i ^ ' O V WIJTrr\|, HfilTIJEMLNT
.SrnMor ix.^m^ My swOud-^'ntaim afwuf your-fiicinjr a (Lite, one wfiii-h if ?!f><ili' Hûl a few fww H*O. i that it wtents to leave ;io. basis l fur :i Ptr'tlrtiwiffof the war in .S'nith Vletiianj d Ind'n'Miia A'f.Jcli |H)I(fii'ftLK|li'niL'rit f hojTft ixfrer all tin's.: yeaw would IK- ouf h0'<t ' "- valii:il>r"JjrrCivt;nndiiU|'bsj;. ' - ~ ' ".'.' if lljii _ P, rfstdwif would pfale . w would withdrawal! ur fi-.rscE ;ix quickly ju^c could, it would /riw him the- cpjiorfuuiry HK n-tc>'i-t i-ffw-t iv; nôriutioiis uufbrwriy xnd prcwrit the powil/ility o/ oMnT fiiijn(rifK Muss willing; to i[itne!i' and hi'lp bring a!x>ul..:t tctrli-iiicnr I kuf by.tixia^ >i datt we niipht I.^- the ixîbil/ty lor. iimmjri'itf "r iuriiig:.or ^j'-ouruîii*; a |>oljriral xpttlcin'Tit iti.SoQlfi* vast Asia. Sfn;ifor ]\.\Tvir.w. Senator (VXJJHT, uâin J would n-Hfiftnd Mtnply fv tin- n-.T/ri{ 'f fL1* past, W- have \\\-wi\ f hut fur.J and fhut ob|w-'t i v < - ihnr^Ît our Piii'JH ne^<itintioiiM and fhrou^h othr fontaHs und ii IJUA lx>rni MO fruil whatw^-ver. und if has only cost "'
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~'4r>v* and casualties. Tht is why further it scents to mo that ?ipct.one p.UVy has -iieeii siio.h an utter failure ttvîoconiplish these goat1 Hat you ;tuiM>s}iatn> it is time ta thn wok a new 7>oHoy or a new approach. 7 This i wliyÎ f?l rouvinccd this proposal offeisthat jiew directiof; or that ise.w Kojx; for son*- kind of a |>olitical seftlyuenf as I outlined- \ - T:J my testi^nony. '" ' '
LFI7UT Of 5.
quest:
Senator COOPET. Tliere is notlmiir itt tliis resolution ut off fuCfUxgainsf any nftw^CUmocHliftn or Laotian o|rafiMi-dorin^ rliis year, . . " Sf-naior KATHKU. Tlmt is riplit. Tliis {tcop(i,j] only sets a date" (vrta'm. :inl lx;t\vMi lioiv AJ< that time, if this were enacted, lietwet'ii fin- date of vna-'tiiiPiit and.th<- tim" of its f-rffillmt'ct.. the Pivsidpnf wtftild luive the constitutional power to do what >voul<J IK; to whiero th \vith'niwal of forcts liy that - .srtTyt S<-n!itor Cooi'En. T arn not here to testify on my own views but. ^ think it is only fair ro recall that Hiere is a civil war in South WtHatn and that civil war could not IK- pursued, could not #> <w, without rlie active, supjiort of; Oi'ma and fiussia. So I don't think we should blame our country- alto^sther for v.hat has happened and vhu( is in Indix-liMm, ON rRF>u>rXTiAf, IH-IWFJW srk;rxr> But 1 think cwr object in t lie Senate i* to find the U-st States ran ^ctv/nt of Vietnam, and do so in a wuy that will hold, if we can, the proper Ualamv U-rwefin th<> Kx-cutiv and tiie ('onjrie^ and therein' wjt a standard for the future. Your bill lias troubled me somewlmt because while the President i." intrudintf on our rountitu(iorjal authority now Y I think yours would in some dejrree intrude on liis. ~:
i Senator HATFIKIJI. Senator Too|er. I would (free with you certainly tin you comment ah.ut the uliility to Miatain tlii.- uur :i-: fur afe th- tnemy is c.orji enuui with tbf assist .-inr-c f fhina and Huîa lint. by (he raifif token. I would add on<- further f.:<rr- uj>on which tlii.war i* able, to cjjMimiu as fur -.f the enemy itVôhcerned, and that i* thn-nuyort of I he coiuil ry-jide iyj.thin SouthVtdtiam, ffeni<:mber we have u/addLtiot! to the N'oLlh Vielnnmj-*, tlw 'Viel fj>nûJid lil>crfi(io;i foiVpH wjthin Soutf, Vi'^najnârt'lJ if(Hi?"wp1cit<w'd o. jlUmVti-r of i wolufroiiaiy tjulics and philosophy frorn ifsiO' bi-d Mao
KNKMV Hfl'Jl>nr IX WITM VICTVAll
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"- oiict1 oUUin'fil that guemJliT'tfar is only, ff lonjr LS ft >ût Jii'c n'tf the oountrj-sidr.inf have the'sOppoJt of
; J listwjrti ta.fI^',-C3tirmn of "tjtf Sjorot Chiefs f'liiefrf of'^ciltf of'^caif-J Adtaira} '^ . .' . ifixyrfer wl*o gs\t;a^lfctute at thr Sulgivyc Cluhtliciothf hu^ht and. .' ,\ ''. he w<ijtst<>uth yictnwncse :ii ihe-îdc of^'îiswu in .r. : : ~-,-' \i tho.fu.Ttln)r: qitri. v on ttwKJitrtf. of the Virtc^sr, at Dight.teiciaj^^t.fK'y ''v ~\'\ '.-' want to -' ;. ."^ to &Ofttht trimi^^:ô.Sot^viotL^yt^ôcu^ytî^îai . So not bccnr^blcta'Diohilrze c"en iiy own people fa sctaxtft. thru "ftvvsitfts} r " l~ . it' o '-T niilitarv and that is ^;h{ I f*l i'ON*sTiiTTioS".*r. REi-iTioxihfr
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f I would like t o also W . M r . C , Scnutor Ox^Jcr, has , raised rhis (jucstion. as hai r**-,rt raisw-d WoV> i my trstiwwvv jU>ut <.'.9jibtMo:al n?Ution?hip of the Comriniddcr Jn ffiit-ri p6.wrs ajwl tiwCwlijrh a iicld by _*he Congress, ind^ îtator C5jcr has .<yfojsml t^> on JirJe wriftwi m a jovvrnsl. I would oj fr-n?fei"tO' i-wrv>3nt:ti - . cainff analysis of h<ê <ftftHutionalottu^ô6-.tiU:lmvrb<'t-tu-wbi< li have a^"ircd a " i r c d in tlk Rocof J as of last vcftc, ^blcli inciuded a 'o<jiila'o<ji|ilation by nroiDJncnt lcpl s^hoturs and foncr (jom^tnifflt oflKiiAfi, "in's o f U w anl fornH'r us.-:istHat JtftoiTu-v> frtinT,al AD<! wl personnel, ,td I wnuhiHiu.foledkjT it for the com-. s's consideration at this rime Wrau*- 1 thjitfc it. w v>r>- el_oqu!t_ . not. from thr newpoini.of ju^t OHI- iut vrry niy . c u o f U'w. " The C'M\ncMAX Jt willfMj iiK-ludedm the n-i-ord; (The hifonnation nferrw1 fo
A<T. Jn-^rted ID tLe'KKCOKD by lion with tit? "Autt-nrtujent ^r - pr.uiiii>-iif . , rii frti May 13, 1370 In <'
ocwi/. Attorney, A'ew Yorx < f iy ; form* Jtulw. X^*- Vork r'.
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:, focaiw Attorney ^ Pa. n, Ati>nr. I' JJm Jonr. I'reildU. IVdfrtrdfrnxT A^NUiut AUorwy Oeneral Jolm \V. I3zJaK.f<rnH-f AwiKtant Attorney Or V f jniifai y , "A t torney , >V Vrk f\ i y. of . .. , t: 6/rrotT A'-' riil
A<wL*ant
*; 'j.<tr\: City.
<A-*
US*t0N
Senate
THE AMENDMENT TO E#i* THE >-:. THE CONSTITUTION At QUESTION i hUtoncal dXcriptkm of tbo _ May tJ, 107,0 '^ . po*-rr atkd a conei*e (tl*Husion. of C-. Mr. McGOVHU<Mr. Ftesldent..lhC efl*IaUv<;Uom whten hare been rc- two prof oundjMTet iavbiretf ut the to JustUr our po*ture ln^Soothe**t.Al*. With -ireipocv to. nor -amendruent. -it - amendments whleii -tave beon profcwed - to Itait OS. actim** in 8wiQ**t Atia. concludefthai,:;.-. . Piopoud rnitrlctir* "pri7rijil<xw (urn Hi* menu of wb**her ft t* politically. ai!*aacd by 4*uot UcOcrrm. Htfrauiil*eCy. or morali? nund for w to be *cusgrttd in that tenfliet wll) be debated <rol7 Itglitmif* nre^r M Coap**' a At 'lOnrtb. a they &* been debated lot .lntt 9 act <lflt; eft tofltctMr many" year*: Matt of as have xtronc our poUcy > tJJ*rdon IIIM-M- ,
The ottitf JMUC La* received lew atteu Uon. and for that reason alone It deserve* a jqnit Tocw. RCnI!cM of bo* An; Senator !- about the wisdom of our Invt>:vDRM)t. be bM oc<t eaw lor denp InterwiC In th* pMcJure through wljlrh it ha* -votw nbpn, and parrjcuiarljr in Ue cerfj iAt been cxprUMd >bout * truth "tbfc ortJC* Alr*<ly war U tft* .The atartpXaentary aAHUtaie&U' litrodiued .by Senator* CxtracM and John Dor. Kdfoal-3tujrvMant [ mysetf. and other fienatoa on Vietnam. OAS . . Cantbodi*. -and L*o. ar* practical atJohn W. Doafi*,, ttrtant. A)rtint Attoroer tempt* to auert proper conjtre*looal ' inrctBcnt-. In fa<t, ttier tue the-only V. Tort, veWchilimitation* on apendlof appro" otif>ted fuiKl-.Ui*t *e bare avaUable b>. cur. r>*c tw IkhcxX. toatat Attoruer ODrl American jntlitary pcwt^. abroad. Morer. A*(UQt 4tover, tt !* vrhlck *hlcb the founder* of .' our Kepi&lM^telk./td should be rigorlobrt V. ftanoj*. Atiortwy, Krw Tork City , , I - - . ruicr In uuc conp-vtion, M Peecldent. I woul/ Uu to make available tc ttae>Pul XT. forottr b^r* of UiflfltuM!an analyst* of tb* coo' (UtitUonal iMoe* broaeb^d by these M, ziouncnMc, rarmrt sttvndaint entitled "IndocWna-, Tb* v CottffUUtUonal CrM*/' il *uppUe> an exIn aodtUoo. Mr. iVe<lo>i.t. I wtvnt to
A by Hvctuer.
*ct!on V drconuuom . Mr. PrteMebC. d* authon ,of thto memorandom incinde -prominetjt Jvcal and fonoer tovernmnt--0ffl' I should like to read U(r n*aw*:. BKtal, RrortttflrflC!*', rJ* form+r
fcchvol.
(1) -IlMir leKJ4 c^rtlon vhicb lo^ xur* Ui Miftty ot our IDTCM and (2) BUT b OTrW<lr&
^ Vnr fort . T<rfc Cmtrt ( AppoU. XA*r. Tolr
39
10 pravld* for ci'/' ine ' Vc<.\*-ir UM- cotinoraridta dope br -<:>-'2 Ya> La* Scbocd ttuarou: u*vut "*Ay>k<--. Held L. rV4mMV Ctarjr PonUmu Tt* OmUtuu<- dow not wr Vraak KAciikcc GrtnM Hanwiwr. -hUM- UK nny"Tnj bv Mnit loto ttiJ n^we-rd O. Hunter Hi.Ct3i*topber Lun- *lwa Contra* bm aovMctand nur.\jr'U It -M*/. under W/ ctnaOMUjtoM -ôd tf -?r.i.-,. David )4*rki; Jvfftcp Orleans, Rn- îVx* dMMoa. -r^ tnutpnuae J> Ooo..oV. Sfcepard, Irit fftuar uul Jobn c.ltuuoa on ttai* potat. ft m ttr ptyl-to look XI. Tainuteng. .0 V\û munt of U> ma** ^nd tr fb anoctouodtne woijc on tills projof. OV men. aa flnc'put UM fc crtpiUff 'rfenonrtrttton ot ' rfotn* JnpofUnt, u*efuVand raifctmctive wort oa behalf of -the eloe rl*taf Cone tm cbe< p<rtrr to ; the >cux effort. -' . deeUt* war on Aofuet IT. 1717.* The cUuiv ottgtntKf .eoipomred Curiyeai "to ouke Sfcjv. deJeaUe ob>e4e4 ttt Utr mcmorantfuja to wblcl.'t h*e referred , !.-- >V hMikt 11* wtlh the exejU*. u R out be ori^teti in Iflt HKCO*D." -in rntUHut.1* Most of the Conotlon ead Th^re hrTrt Tin nfrjff(lofi, the ncn* flrmly of ^>e oplokm -tf^c rb power ebouM or>3duir. FI ordered to to* printed In U tta Ccocrea. tr^ Ut Uw rieeMeot boul4 b* the IWVM to dcfead (Uut thcR*coD. tt lollowt: , U4d>a jrtt*e, ^Je CObTenuon det-êa tu n: Tin. CotautiVHovti. "jiiMtt 'decide/ itrtklac out "iMlW *r, H\ dupiieJi or AoMrtoMl UoofM UMO O4m- Iee,rla( to the enecJOrr U>e power to nyti to bT ilu PrwKUAl, wttboot ipaclfic o- wdtftev *ece.The Rpnen a*l la mUMl ai*Uion of feucMoA*. The Freefdcat. n. 'UM Mwdtt>tloQ<l *JJooxion or Ono&uixier in (%U . w>* eb*rfed wltb tl>e o^k !> l*r!lU JX1 CMCUUT* oondiKt nf baetrUtle* Ttr v* UmJlj ^riaÛM. 1 w max tcniflctat tactor la tte" Mfua Be. VM 41M <>>p*cttf Uwy t<j tel* mowun* to rtpel *DJ kCtutl stteCk opon Uw UDttrt ' at ^ ÂO> o< irtian *y octh bcueh. Stale. u en loeldent at u euctram pop; TV j*>*r !4 CMttnitr Annrtott foren to Jlut -toe power to (otUMe boxtUtUe* KM ctekrtf aM*fli to be irre<t to UM Ooncreet. tor wttb. tti I<r<*Meiit.prUol(ie.tlnr l tbM uucn- Uuw octjr w tt i -few elcoMon ww neceMWT1 W oonpcteû Act of Ooofnee. Tbu*, tkt Prtiiteot, -wtUxtM* xto .<* ..... IHin. tnrcwd to or, tnct in. (***at o*utftecf to- W tie^ft* IMT. >'ropoii.nr.r before CoofrM* iorcfc* ID* The 1iuU<&d breoc* * !K> <jidck to <vn- ,. ^fxy p^rt.r M jvfi of awtfttnr ouowul Ifmt CoHfrtu flout an ttetvt tear 4ve/ uit bxiouiiAMc Wv. U Coocrcct otr- elude r>Uio opinion of UM Supreme- Court i!u< lit ntoMjr puwr to probibft tpvatte W n 1901tli jwiM cue. Ctotef Jiauo* Jobr. ^WH or tM tnttlA lore*, it wUl tMtuwt lu lftih*'> eoata4ed Cut tbe "vboto poven Jof.it <doruuut copcrlty OrmlT mo4 HUUUI<T orwkr" were "rMted la COOfree*,-" ' llm<t Ui pEMldmt'* W.1',y tr Tbere IM.J>. bowrrer, be boeUUtlee which fora** for ytupOMt WAleB Coofill tbon of requlrtae en tetiul <JeeJef*Uon - ' of ww. Ten yeeM ef tec UM tfopUf Of the or T X^wrUtuUou, the ni trouble between UM. t/nltod suite* And rrtaee which ItM btfuu under WMWOfton bKuoe'efr ecule tn*c Axaerfctn-iblpptnt-wM (reAtlf enrteogered." t)M COUUtutlOO Jtf* rrmrtdeot A4*au JJd to de<4de wfae to do In (ti T6 PrslKUnt Jj Aiexeodc r BeBUttOD edrtiea the edmlnUU> <-u4U<i Mtoutly power,' raid* ;lon ^[Ucut etittii vltlkout ConcreeiUoneJ '
C i. 1 3')4C il^gpftT|Qlffc pfWyj^ty^. ^^|^{ CibV
"lo M dViUcew CM*. 19 oit wtUOJ Involve* to idrtrtît crtuerukOt u UMt <rt wtr. joy opialof U ibtt no doubtfa] jiufborttjr ouftti to. b^ ekercteed by tbe Pleitdrot " (o AOMU decided' to. w*lt for Cbaicr***- to v t ovl to 4-' ad It'pMtcd Uw* Mttbrllar'bU& to promore tt*B ',(ro /rtn> il ft tect Aacrtaia cMnotere* SuniUrtf ju ietti PTeeUfeuv Jdtfereo * f*eed with boeUUtMv tv provlM ni JOAJQCtiH of. tbe fumufCoMt. ut fell bu i aovld ior urder oolj- deieaelre axxtfte-act
tbo Aanf utd Kvj, Lnd tooMOt of Ux
r.
60
. : f,tt two Umftd wctt < *!<* thr Vmtte* StMttt torn** ttj*l/. bet* Aifmi fji Jtfferttm htt flu mem* to order nttOmtory imautflatete Pcrk.M tome * Beet e*4 inM^BMKpri refMWTOT !* MM* property voeJd km bee* MMeT he* tAey done ro But boe* rkariy ftlt the* the e>rteton (o commit JraerKen /area vet not eo**titui<on*Jy tlutn to make, end ; /<Lred rte prcarrrarlon of the Couatuurtonal proene to the mrndt of temporary military aoTnantaer ^""""* W. MnrroeJcu. evrB-oncnrt or not WAI ow> 4. Vert eU UmUtd man in the nlnetccsth century If the President'* power to encage Amertcan force* in bortUltlet on hie own Inltuar* It "-"r1 to defenttft action by a ttrtct eonttructton of the Conttttutlon. the (joaetlon of the proper rote of Coucne* arteee. ConCtt clearly bat the power to *. the with the fl.eH.nt relueuntly aeeentttc may alto ratify after the Met bcatnitM begun by the Prealdam." Tlu neevtrrc brawn *ry early reoofwiieeT l)u tieliuivt putur o/ Coufrttt to declare wer. in the count of a dlepute with Spain hi ItO. PretMent J**ertou told Congne*: Coaooenng that Ouejgnet alone It eonttltutlonally Inverted with tat power of changing our poaioon fror peace to war. I have taougbt It my duty U> await their authority befora u*lat, force In any degree which could be eTotded." ' Similar deference to the tole power of Cooyrtw to mmttt 4.07 dwCiiioo to coffita-ii tê United Statet to war wa**ced by Pentdeut Jamet Monroe. Secretary of Stau John 4umcy AdaEi." and Secretary of State? Daniel Webtter.' . ta for 'msftimf it. In iMfl It had declared, after the fact, that a rtte of war exlned with Itesieo But the debate wa< HUer and thr war unpopular At the end of the war. thr Kouee of Miprem jag) -~ Preeident Wtlaon tent troop* Mexico In U in punuit of the Pancho Villa bandit*.* sine* 1B4I. the executive ha* regularly ueed military force e*fr"r4 a too) of diplomacy, Aatde from Indochina, the i*ete*c uee of American force we* In Kone. when eeverdl bundred thfrieand troop* wen committed w combat and major *tr"~<"n wen In* curred Then wa* neither formal declaratton of war. nor any other Tr-rtl- eaacm.tonal ruction for the Korean conflict.* Amerl4n force* wen tent Into the Pormotaa BMmlt , lt, , uoiaon In ItM. and mto tl** Prwttftlran Bwrpalrilc in IMft Tlw Kavy wrt iittd to bkrtSde Cuba dwlag the mtetf le crudt In l2. And. rrnm recently, naval .vtaaela wen <uepatched to the vtctoltf ^ Haiti ^^4 Trinidad In retpeaw* to inmto
During the nineteenth century, the tuc** breiK* ,*reoiratly recOf*b*< thr need ** canfr**antl urAorteaMon ett* Hmited military action*. In 1UT the SecneDd *"* **8UU " " " " * *hlp * * h*lp ^ Brltlth expedition In * fTtilna. became be ueked confreaoonal authority to do to." The ^.^ y,,, pntldent Buchanan pleaded with concrete for authority to protect traotn aero** the lethmui of Panama, but refuted to act without It." Kor In 117* would the fttau Department uee force to help American* in Mexico, beeaute It felt It lacked the power to A, ,0m At late at 1011 Preeident William Howard Taft felt that be had enough power to more troop* to the Mexican border, to be ready In caat Concnet told him to protect American U*ee and property endangered by *" solution there, but refuted to tend Uttm "*<"> authority gn*to*_?f_ j.** eonyreMtoncJ tew-m*U*t powerrntAelOtkcentury ^ *> ">' part of the twentieth century. I'l^"0.?. *?",?^"2f JES* ""L
KUon*
wtaloMl waolutlon. wen obuined by Che Preddent for the Formojan and Lewaoeee but both the talMltr i tho*trwjo'
A war unneceaMrtlr d UMOMtltuttoo. by the rtMtaf of U* Onl^ Amoo* the ConcreMnvrn wpportin, the amelmei.wM former Pte^dent John eerabo ha* considerable power, rtwrt
puvtM or action* ar.alaat prtCBttt**
61
prop:**. Fcnheraor*. th* United Ciatea did The lnolTetnnt of the Dnrted State* in n* h a sicnlfteant tanflin; army dunnr. Vietnam, th* comtnenoaBKnt of an air war pesc*Ums until after 1M*. and th Pr*st- In Lao*, and th* npwuton of UM (round mut was iim'.ted In the military action* that war into Camhodl* ham remitted almoM enhe could -*ke by UM aeed to approach Can- tirely from ttweatlM j*clilone and action*. arm \a ask lor any lncres.se in th* ala* of The execuuw branch of th* forcmnMnt ha* UM armed tomt. rod**. wttA e tWaeHdOU Jmtlfted lu action primarily on UM grounds mUttery maeiun* end modsnt transport ft of: (1) UM presidential pnrofaUr* to prohit mstudtefr tfii*ni*'. (4* rrtxidmt It tin- tect American security interests abroad by der flfiK wraetM*; pressure to srck eonfrtt- whatever means necessary. () UM 8CATO *IOM: othariMMo* /r ats tenant, *i4 treaty: and (*) th* Oulf of Tonkin Bewluthrr/or* 1* u vmJUwIp to seefc if imJcu tlon." JC oawiot b* *M tAt On reormt aeComprvM nuu<* that do so." titmt ty'tht txtcuttot in C*mftoCM or th* IT TMI Txcoamcu. BUB* ro cL*tnu. carUcr ectlraw in. bofA Vt*tn*m vtd Lew nusasarnAi. sano* er eltfrlf eomcrarv to tnt Conrtiiutton The theories oa which vanc.s Prcsldenta However, th rrpmvm o/ for war Imto Camhave rclld tor UM UN of military fore* bodia it the tettrt in loaf scru of tctt abroad without .-<ins,iesinnt approval 01*7 tuHuA, tnkn topctker, JUw mror^r strrrpti. b* divttM into Out* frxnl caUfortes- (t> Congrett o/ tt IMT fotetr. (1) riw fraUfnttul frercftiaf.Unthe >uddn> ctck thory; (3) UM n*utr>llty tntory. u>d O) UM coUacUra Mcnrtijr doubtedly, th* speed with which man. <U**lop la th* modem world ncirlu.c** a ncuu*e who can raspond quickly to (I) Tkr Budltn Attack TAcoryTIM suonc such rrl*. Th* need for a speedy reipoone. Pnctdnt the Cnlf liitcuUv* hM tb IA- UM need for Hcreey. UM aeed to protect bcrcat pocnrr ui defend tttc Mnoclfnty uid *a*flrir cttlzens and property abroad, and lni(pity of to natiaa luU cod to rwpood UM need to nrci*rt nnran aecttnty into ux crtaMd ftttick oa th urmary <tf to* terests U the f'f** o; power are a)I tued Cuiud StM> wttbout riqununc txxijim to Itfltlmlz* th* we by tn* e**euUv*. withtMAkl cppruv*] ror nunpl*. w* do not out confmalonal approval, of Amrrlfsn (jutntion UM ean*tituuon*l autnarlty of to armed forcra abroad. Recent United States Fwwi; to onlcr rauiutcry utk( ! actions, especially la. Korea and iBdoehin*. Ot *<nt of u> aiomle *tuek oa dM tnntory art cited to support great cteeuUw* dUcnuf UM DniMd ScÛi. la th tûtnci r.*n tton In th* *, of American mlJItary force krnwd atuci } AoMrlCBn tantory propir. abroad. The recent itrrs^po of Cambodia in* power or in* Prvidcnt u moc elOMly without prior oonfraulonaT approval or even eircuouenbcd.** nolle* is not without historical precedent (l)'r*< Ktutrfbly r/wory Alw known and not without JustlflcaUorj under a broad u 'inurpo>iuon.~ UM acutraUly tlMary M Interpretation ei the coOacttv* security dcvctopctf durlac Uw nincMcotb ecatury u theory.-* JU*UOCUOD for Aimrton mlljury involv*Kowtrer. th* real question u whether the mria tiQrd lo prouet Amcrtctn dUj*n* balane* has shifted too far la favor of UM ad property. Wnm American armed force* executive.* A war. such as UM COM In Indowere **nt Into * (orelfo nation, their pre- china, require* great sacrtflces on UM part cc wu tuppoeed u/ W "outnl" with re- of (rest numbers of tb American people; It spect to anr conflict* there TH* U difficult, 1' not Impossible, f prcrJVl to* tn caJaof twJi action, IMJ nrt ultimate outcome of any American interven"natang wer" (nil tntrtly duptteking trotrpi tion ConaeqiHentiy, .when there U a possifa act ftm*rtlti fUMft* /(' Annrtean cltt- bility >.< large seal* American in*olenM/it >< anj ffteir property TA reel di/llrvUy, and iim. a United risk of war. Confre** firefly imt tn rtmftntng ntntrtl r*4 *t>oi4- should pat* MI the deslrabiuty of American tuf nnfict military ae.ion.o 1 (i TA- Colteeittt tmrtiy TUttfy Since Tb* execM le Bas also placed reII*DC on l>tO. tne Umud 5t*U* UM entered into tn* powr of -be President as cnKf formulan.07 Mcunty treeiiM wiuj fortifa n'Joo. tor cf (orel<n policy and as Commander in Mai<r of f bw acreemenu have cliMM which Chlrf of the *rmed forces. Crtnttd tint thr lixllrau that the murlty of eaoh alfnaCory fretidtnt 4tj4t Av* prUiMvy rttponnbiltly 1* viui to UM security of each ottMr alcna- tn the rood*'* world (or tin HmjUutt of forKj<y. UnlUVrl preaUlcaUal aetloo under etgn voltey. /M thouU not fesi* tnt ttttxttftcM acreôenl* ma> b* JuettOed a* necee turn to tnUMi iter mi mn tnttrumtnl of forur/ f-ir Uw proteouon of Amencau McurUy tign policy. evrn vhûtfh th* oofinict may ante U>ouUM Commander in Chief provision j< oil>.i ffn American noret, but, of nr>s!I7. the Confutation Is an esprewlon of olviJ. to it* nlrmt, Hu coUflift jn eoovol our the military; It do** not (Iv* tit#ir\i LiouM juttltv *l*n>tt n uu> wsr pnrer to tne President" -,rrt<t4mttvl KM o/ nm*< /we* i2i 7W SfATO Trta(y.-n* Southeast Tttiut contrary to Conttuutiunal tltadmrdi. AiJk Tnaty OricanlaaUon l* on* of to* many v itu. ivrtnctnoiif rot uwiurnui. cucxr* multilateral ol>cuv* ascumy Ueatle* which a* UM Umied te4* has no*d. Neither fcuth
Vietnam nor Cambodia l signatory, but both c"ur tries are within "proioecl areas~ which U^ ilgnatarlea cnnsWIer to be vital to tnelr >n-ur*.t. Interests " Tb* terms of the treaty are amblguoua. end It 1* t Irmil questionable whether tb* United Sum was obligated by UM utou of the treaty to rone TO UM aid or South Vietnam." Kara importantly, the 8KATO agreement raiiiux help answer tb* constitutional queaUor. . became It apeetflcally stat** ttuit action by a signatory lo response to an attack on another signatory or a "protocol country" If 10 b mad* only after a decision made ftccorClng to the "owwtltuUonal prnrtnei" of the signatory . Tbe more relevant Issue 1* the power of the President to Involve American forcea la foreign combat on to* baau of a treaty The Con*tltUon require* that ths< Senate must gtv* lu advice and consent to any treaty before it can become effective" Once approved, the treaty b. at the name nature a< any other duly peieed law which the executive Is bound to execuc faithfully " If. bowever, the war power U a congressional prerofauve. the decMon* regarding the initiation of war should be made by both houses of Onngrsss and not Just the Senate " <3> The youths Gulf Jksolutfcm FjOowlag reported attack* on American naval eesel* la the OulT at Tonkin in Aofaat at 164. Coogrees punJ a Joint naolotton which gav* the Praaldent broad discretion to napoad *o "mneelon" tn South**** Aala** Coofrawaonal action which do** not amount to a formal declaration of war may be a valid I rmiramnn*! authorization of boauittlai.* and aom* commentator* think that the Tonkin Oulf Rwolutlon .1* an adequate eontreulonal authortzatlon for the Vixtnameee War" There are two factor*, however, which make the Tonkin Oulf Beeolutlon an Invalid bull for continued CongMwdonal inaction Flnt. It wa* paand with (re*t ipeed and In Ute heat of emotion that resulted from the reported attack on American naval v**atl* In the Tonkin Gulf." Secondly. th*r* were few American troop* In Vietnam In the American (round combat force* (her* " It tiu alio been argued that confr*ional Inaction acd fallur* to repeal th* Tonkin Oulf RrKJlu'-loc fire Implicit authorization to the IndocbUMM War The logical outcome of u'-h an argument 1* that the Preeldent can do r.tiatever be wube* and tb* Congrew hu tt>e anrmatl** duty to try to (top him. ThU Hiilu the prenunptlon of tb* rraour* In f*vor of congr**alonal control over w*rmaklnK and givei the initial and continued upper hand to th* executive " vi. TMJ orruervumu roa UAVXITK^M or covc*x*aionAi. rowjca Tb* puwer of ID* pun* 1* tb* Ia'. bation of ijpu;r c'nilrol of the fiernmrtol" Congrvw now ha* the oppr/rtunKf it, iu* tbl* puwer 1*1 rotor* th* r.on*tltutlunal balance by lifiudiuc in authorization an* any of
a number of rwnnctum* on th* ua* or American fund* and, 'orce* la Inrtnrhtna. More forcefully than a resolution of on* or both houan.x enacting ipeclflc reatrtcUoaa on the ua* of our military foreM In Indochina and directing their withdrawal wool* effective^ rt congreaalonal control of the limited war in which we arc now engaged Tnpo*d reatrtctlv* provMon* (*uch a* thoat advanced by Senator* McOovwm. Rataeld. Hughe*. Ooodrll and Cran*ton- an not only a legitimate cxerda* of Onngr***' money power, but poe* no Jamai' of mfterlhlllty oommltung our policy to a wairdoa* eaan* became (1) they Include exception* which Uuure the *af*ty of our force* and (2) they may be overridden by future <mngTlnnal action II eircumitanc** change. A. Speetfemttf rettncttuf thf tat to mUOarjr /oroa m*y be put it a Icgtttmitt txtreu* of eaufreutomil facer There I* no doubt that under th* Concututlon rnntrtm ha* complete control over governmental ua* of funds Huiorlcal precedent, textual 'analysl* of th* ConcUtutlon. the intent of th* Pram*n. and Judicial coutrurtlon unambiguously Indicate that tb* -nancy power may b* u**d to restrict tb* President's control of the armed force*. fmtt ooafresMomal neetu tn tkf rcstrlctio* of Tntbtmrg pallet tArovyk th* us* of f f r a f c vrorMoms i mousy *cti offtr$ comcttutve support for th* ItfUimtef of me* meuure to control tilt mUltmrf tcttont of the frenaent Bldcn and amendments on appropriation and authorisation act* traditionally ha* been a devlo* favored by Congress to restrict and to control executive action Tbe most recent example I* bectlon M3 of the Defense Appropriation Act for the current fiscal yar. paeset in ItcV. which states that -non* of th* fund* appropriated1 by this Act shall b* jatd to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos and Thailand " Lett yfffi rider fione tttvtt * etttr frrftthit for nmtter restriction* on use of force* or funds its Ctmbotlt* or tn Vietntm ititt/. An almost IsJeoUcal rattflctlon was enacted by Congrsas In tb* Selective Serrlc* and Training Act of 1MO wulch Included th* proviso that: "Persons Inducted into tb* land force* of tb* United States under this Act shall not b* employed beyond the limit* of tb* Western Hemisphere except In the Terrttorl** and posseesion* of tb* United But**, Including the Philippine Islands"" II *ppr*rs l>. . <n ttie put PrtMentt tin* *Iiroy< ecmplit* vtth iiten restrictions, rent iclien tti'y oriffintllf tzpreutn an tntfntlon to ignore them Compliance by the executive u in fact, clearly djrtated bj the Constitution The grn ' grant in the Prnldrnt of th* exfrutlve < - Is qualified by tb* admonition that uall take car* that tb* law* b* faithfully cuecuted"*1 The power* of Congress to ralav and appropriate revenue*, to rats* an dsupport armies, and u> provide and
t..n, n*\y. Air a:) iaw-makln*: powA* afWpnmUcak ndtr eMctMf mto In* rt mpoit < clear oMMitvt4O*Ml 06; 9r<'ju on tike rrejldnt to *bufct try it* p<ri'wio" In MUtUoa. it wjuW constitute p-o tan'o repeal of prerloui utaiut** frarttlrc uu> Pvtudcnt ducreUoa to uw ftutd* {or ml'lâry rni:poc*e. TA* Jr;<i*ti;'* power a* Cotcroandcr in Cn.rt O.K-I. D.,L fra* Him from enacUd raatnct,u;m. Tr> CcojrutuUoa AW granted lo Cooft^-i :ji* luidUfcoeutbi pover to cre&t* tn* bayed trjr Uie brancIHM o: tb* Tie CowwnOr m CAM/ cuw !i:t'i tht Pxiu/mt to <ft or inr *rrn* imi(j <UaWuftr6 by rfcr rrrmt t.io*c /ww. provided ili* llauu are Tli' I.rt.tliniri:.iiliJr.(xxT*nr of ti mocwjr frtxn lt> dtnnlntloo ot to plaar Utu power Ormljr u> UM FkriKuitf er wu takra to mmt-'^m ur.Arr con(rMool eootrol ttM luc >f funcu ior mllltarjr pvirpox*. u Indlot^Kl b> UM ei.nntit uuenki prorMIOD tb.t no moarjr o.*y b *pprop.-uved {or tic nny "fur ion* rr term tnu two ycwi." " Tb* ntltn1 :-< KI< allocation at power md by UM Fri&~i i..' UM Coiuuiu'lon U t**w to our oLirpt wf danocracr: that UK taflaUton. a* rpMntmf.TK nf the poopK. i&ould navt control <yr UK nation'* mouroat. Ut DMinejr power In mai tcrcr.* ' "Tim powvr OT*r iK* pjn< awty. In fact, b* r*Kr<ld aa tn mo*t eomplt an4 cBaetua] wapun with which any eotuututlon can arm th. immrduu rcprwcnutlrc* or tc p*opl< - " Tb* wlMlom of thl* (rant of power la born* ou; OT r*c*nt butory Tnc ettoduct of in* lodorhlna War baa prwlpltatvd t wld*aprud <ii>i:iulonmcnt witb tb* rutwrnuwnt. and atundant UM* of raapaet for Jaw // tht people itiroufli their reframtatlvtti. hv no mntrol oittt ihf commltnmt of th*ir rtlourrn to ifmr-mtlctHf, tht retulz u liuonttilrnt irttti :ht trmocrttie principlfi of tht Conttitiitum Tji Si.prrnrf Court pukc moat directly to in* Uiw In Ilir Sltcl Setiurf Cojr.i cxrtlci.idir.x Idai Uie powira </f UM prw)dm. tK-ll) a> Coinman4*r in Chief and In h> riwoutivr capacity. w*r not unllmltwd and c.>uld LX> rtrair.*d bv uioUxr branch ul tr>* Kov*riinvni ' Ai: uj* ju>cic* in tb* majority In4ica'.i><l Udt UM extent to which Conpawj had *x-t*d to control tb* action tak*c oy tb* rrmidrti! cUu/ of mual of in* nation'* (Tar; mull, wa* *I(nlflcani in dt*rn>lnlnc lh cuMtutionallty of hl actloj" Tb* <>;m,i'in. linp;y that W/i^n Congrtii iptfki on (':' yu'-'HOTi o/ ftt /orm mevtive Kn<>n mu> Cat.'. >ur pou.rr lo tct flout ai /A' P'nt.trnt may /it unW b< clrrumterLbft In ttM S( ffuurt Coif, th* Ju*< tic*. d-fer<*d on th* proper murpiwtaUoa of Coti^riM*' fiMr* (o act aa r*I*vaot Iafla> la'.Utc. lo cor.^wi. I/ Canfut tftcu t eltff
clear, cmtf prMU*m(Ml rower mould
locluilon o/ *Iqu*t exception* to r*tf rtrtKjt ox mttttmrr acllom ruxfc tt* m>.'itarp mottey mW rmwtit <UKMc Tb*r I*, o* ooora*. a paamlbtUty mat cbanc*d drcumatane** will fore* a tweoaaUteraucm of UM wiadom of oartala apaclfle llMltauon* But tb* **n1nci ot coop** aloaal eootrol by """^""f tb* propo**!! r*atneuoat manly ahtfta from UM rroldcnt to Coocno power o**c totura mtllu<T Jnvo]v*m*ct In TnilirrhlTift Tn* tVavtdeat would ntain th* power to euft|Ee la untnatttat* **lf-d*fca* usdar tne euoitlv* power to r*pel iudo>a attack*. In addtuon. xeepttoo* to Ul* rwrtrtcttooc of th* >CcC*rn - RaUUM - Bugoea - OoodeUCrar^ton propoaal permit full asei>U* fn*dool 10 protect our troop* and prlaooan durtnf withdrawal But m*for ttctotoiu vxnM be rttfvfA f<ir Comfnu. vMt*. it fullf ctpfbif of mtlanf au/or eVlciafoiu quickly end. competently. A*t by tuerttni tu fraper role ta ttctnon* Of wn*lcinf. Cotfrtu act to -c-etttbUiti tht trarfttMwl (im*J bfUnet. Tb* current unJlmiiad fniilmji enjo/xd by tb* **cut|T* to tugttCf In military action I* largely in* rtwult ot InacUoo by rmnuiaea* pat A* fiuprem* Court Juatlo* Jaekaoo ~W m< asy that power to I*f1alat* far *m*iy*nct*t betonfi in to* hand* of Oosfrea*. but only Concnw Itattf eta prevent power from allpntnr through tt*
rOOTHOTB*
tto^ ttmttat. t. Contnunf eonrrtaUnul control m*4. tht
of UM CnlUel !( Of America. Article 1 . \ \ . lint ArUcl* 2. 13. cl 1. /Me. Alllcl* 1. 13. Cl. 3. /bid', Art.cle J. (*. el. I /bf AtU.-l* 1. IS. cl 11. ' irnd ArtUS* 1. II. cl. 19 */S4 ArUcI* 1. II. cl . '/UU Artlcln 1. II. cl. 14. '/hi* Artirl* 1. 18. cl. U and el 14 ' r>x an hau*ll analfmU of UM blatorlcal d*v*Iopnwnt of tb* war power a** Uw arucl* by rrancU D WorauiU), Th* Vietnam War Tb* Preeldcat var*u* tb* Conttlluuon." on wbtcb UU* papar draw* heavily It la rcprioUd lii Falk. *d . Tht Vietnam r*v , rrtaortoa Oalvenlty "Juan Madlton. Holtt of Dtouttt to 'i rrtrrti Convention, Ohio Unlwratty fT* aiuon. iM A tranacrlpl of Madlaon'* not** on th* dbaU on to* war power 1* included In Ut* appendtc M uu paper. /M*t, ***.(* of Aufiwt 17, 1WT (ObM> diuou pec* 47O .
/(wi. Artifi* i. M. ci 10.
" In 1M1 Vawall art** tb* Uatted Btatea lor protecuon from Fraoor. aecxUrj of fcuie Dame! WelM refoaw* to bet?: 1 ba*e to ey tfcat the wWHeMklnf power new entirely wtfn Con>rwM and thai (be Ftwldcnt can tataortm beJUjereni opera. Uonc only In tbe ran* eipraetly provided for by the Cottvututlon and tbe law* By UMee BO power 1* gjytn to tbe KB*cirUe to oppoa* an attack by on* Independent nation on tb* poateieioo* of another." J B Moore. Difttt (>f lnter**tto*l Lt*. Of JO vol 7. p 183 wMi okw. JWtn coRcraw). )at Sratlon. pace to. January >. 1*W The Mexican War had been ptadpttatnd in lUt by Freldent Polk'* dupatcb of American troop* into a tmw*r wtuae pnamalon wa* dl.pul*! wltl Ittttao After hoatllUtai erupted. ConKrcai reluctantly declared tbat a state of war edited bitaiaea an "nlted fttate* and Mexico TtM resolution referred to wa ft vote of tbanks to Omeral Zetfbary Taylor, tbe Oon>nander of tbe *ueonaful Anwrlcan forcas. Tbe eliMUe oetwurlim tbe President was moved att u> amrndment to Uiat resoluUoa. Tbe aaaendrnent was adopted oo January "Dnautliorued by Wx CowiltuUon. vllb1. but wu dropped when tbe revolution came out the lanctloa of Outifmt. to ft> beyood tbe Ilnr of deiefiM. Uv >*Mel !wln( dirtied up fur a Baal v<rt For :t* ;7M leglilatlon. ** note It from txxnniltunf turUxt pr-jj)tlee. wai lib* er>t4 vlih tin oww Tbe Laflalafore will abort Coup all aulborlaid toe Frestdeat to uil4A wrxiUj*T. by auUiorlalrK m >/ (eTitnae alto, Uwy *lil place our act aalniit Tripoli In tbe Art of February (, 1(03 <3 S(t 1MI ou wi equal fo/xtnc vlth that of IW
/uf. renarks of Kr Sutler (we ani Foe a dlKtutton or Uw EnrJUh :I.* hMwr or power. uttl accurate ben the O<iiou!ini. wx wr'iwn. M? John Locli**. it .jfii r-vJt on Govrtntr,t < (VOOt cnapteri 12 and II. I }&. Mr Oerry remarked that he "ntvcr exported to bear in a nv .me ttw - to empower the Executive alone tu decUrr -r "Jinrf. uw mor-.n paned i(nc *utc* on. Vlauachusr- u ab*nt. <Me appendix). <-T*r AnurCj. 1 Crmnth it USl 1 <1M1) ChWI Jui:irr MsnhAlI T* "The wb\,i* powtrt erf war toelcf . by toe GunitUuuuri. rmtrd us Congress. the sjt nl inat bodp alone ran be resorted to a* a (ukfeft to thl< inquiry ' Tfc* atM Involved a ship wheat *e!WJre would hir bn Iet>: under the FresldcnV* pr:v:rin proclamation, but wtxMt Kizun thr Cttirt beM u ilJffal under tJx Unix uf U>r Art ct Coocm* whlcb utliarteMl tIM pr-v Vimtioa The pnrfttecr wu BUO* to pr cm'^t" to ttw *hlp' owner. ' After UM outbreak of tbe wir between Fr*n-: and tn&aA la IT92. American hipping ru molwwd t>y the blocIudjM oC boOl uUuiu Pmrtdcnt WJiIn>on DWC tlw cbmlIrnjr r:-.h hl funou* Nmirnllt? ProcUm*u<<n. wai' B kept tbe United Suiv out of tb* conflict. By I7M. bovriwr. frtoeh deprad> uc> no Atnenun eomnwron had Ucome ma*ckD( taat action WM nedid to protect It The <jue*tloa van vbetber rrx)itnt could do to cm bu own uihonijr or hp luwded UM JOUwsrity o( Coocrtw. A!nttndr Hamllvoa to Juae* McBcnrr. tbe Secretary at War. Majr 17. 17M (qooted in WormuUi. op Lit ) "ConCTM* aiupeaded commercial latercoun* wlUi France In UM Act of June 13. 1TM. au<m*ntrd by (he Act nl February . 1799 (1 SUt Mt. I Slat 1J| It drnouneed Uie Craatr irlth France In tbe Act f July 7. 17M (18ut 7). It created Uie Oepartment of tbe Wary bf the Act of April 77. 17M II Btat U3). fnl n ettabluhnd tbe Marine Owp* bf tbe Act of J-aj II, I7M (1 But A*i>. T2:c^-.>uTr*7 trJUi Frauce 1 dencribed in cot 17, aoorr The Bubarj Et*U. pkrucjlarly Tripoli. bad b*a mara-udiof Amerfcaa ablppto(. in an alXnpt to exact a parnent of tribute from the United Ot*lee When tbe pruolaed tribute *a uot paid, Tripoli declared m-ar oo UKI Ualtetl 8ttei Prnldeut Jtttmcm eent bin* to ibe MedlMrranean. but autborlaeJ tbem only ia defend tbetnariire* and otter Anrrlean ihlp* Tb Wary captured a Tripoli' wn nip, but r*)eaacd It
adtwiexlea" Tboma* Jefferaon. First Annoal December t. 1W>1. Mntapn *** Fcprrr o/ the frti*e*tt <I90 w I. 338. Art of June II. UI3 (1 f <X 1M) . "Act ot April 30. UM (JOB** 731), cootalnlnc the iiumatum to ipaln. tod UM Act or April . <*M 130 at. M4,. dvelartBg tbat a itate- war bal extate'i atnc* AprU M. - *t of May 13. ''- f *at ) . atd ACT or Auifun . ^-. (13 Btat, **). JTcnepn aiU Fcprrt o; tfte Frnde*tit. m>l I. p 3*. In 1CM Oc4ombto uotined Uw Pntte* Statci coat It m-aa tknatefied by Franc*, and aakad fur protection. Tbe Monroe Doctrtn* bad been announced tbe year baton, tout tb* adtalnlenatlon would not coairn.1t ruelf to defend Ootombta Fniliint Monroe wrote to Former Fretldent Mertlanfi thatTbe Executive baa no rlfht to ocnpromlt tbe nation in any queatlon of wr.Liviter of An(uet 3. 1(34. tpuxiA In WorttuUl. of. etf Three day* after Monroe'* letter to Matteon. Secretary of State Adam* f ormall} wrote to tbe Minuter of Colombia to tbe Unit*. Statet. -By tbe Constitution of tbe doited SUtea. the ultimate dedakw of thin queatlon betouft to the Lefialatlte DenartaBcot of (tie Jobo Qulncy Adam. t Jo*e Matla 6aJa*ar.
never n*fleo, IB 1890 tbe Ctntfffn ptmd an act. vblcb b*cime law wltbxit UM ftK'-^mf* *lgatur* authorizing UK J toco* to extract aa Indraimy Jor :be eelzur* oC a.irMrtran ahipn o(T vu*u*la. Act of JOB* IT. IMO i?< n:at. 7i). The indemnity we* aecured by arbitration. Secretary of $+ Lewi* Out wrott tb Brstuh Gowntner.b ...s": "Under the Cannltuuon of tlui United Stale*. UM executive branch or UU* Government 1* not UM war-making power. UM exercle* of that (rut attribute of *ovBTelgnty U vetd In Coagre**. nut UM President hM no authority to order aggnewive borOllUe* to be undertaken. . . . Military expedition* Into tbe Cnlnme territory cannot be undert-n without the authority of UM Rational I*tulatur." Moor*, op ctt, 0l. 7. p. 14. Mrrauilcnt Buchanan told Confrw* tbat: Tb cMCutlv* forrnmiit of tbu country In lu intweoun* with (orclfn aaOoni is United to diplomacy atao*. Wlwtn Ul XkUt it can go no rurttter It cannot ugittmauiy rporl to fore* without authority of CViiiya!. xcrpt in rMUttnc aad rap*Uinf bojute atS. p. 610: M4 -** of D*cambr . KM. ArOof Sacntv '.StAUBunttrwrour "Th* rntKtent k. -ot atithactjtrf to order .or appear* an act of war u a toatttrj with wblct. w arc at prao*. opt In atlf dfna. Tbl* U a paemianty of our form of fO*<n>m*ct. wblch at tlma* may b* incon*aal*iit. but which it MJ*y*d to t>kv prated and will la UM futarc b* found In UM looj run to to Wl* and cawntla) to UM public *Uar " tt'ictt. op. a. iol 7, p. 1(7. In LU Third Annual Mauag*. Pt*n*i>t Tb kuuniptlon by UM praai that I coutcnipi^te uiKrntM>n nn Mexican Soli to proMet AniTlsan lira cr propeny k of count CntultcTu, beuuM I irrloiuly -loulJl wbetlMr X havt aucb autkorUy under aay circuoicuncm, and V. I had I woald not excfciaf it wiiliout eiprwc con(r*jMioo) apv>roJ " Oe*|>iu pre^dentUI proUrtaUoo, to th* OMitfary. a diluted kut eusllar rceofnliteii of th* end for ConyeerWrmit approval of United ho*uUUe* lay behind the requeet* for tbe rormoia UeeoluUM of IBM. the Middle bet Reeoluuun of 1M7. ana UM Gulf of Tonkin R*r>;uiloe tt 10*4. See centrally. Re-ietey. TnatdenUa: WaronjAitutloual Pnro(atJ*e or D*urp*tk.DV" it V* -t. * 124>. iUT-U (1*4*). Ptediieut Wllaun cent American troop* Into Vtn. Cnu lo 1514 uo bl* own auUxwity. but h* had aikcd Coocree* for an eciabUOf act tr.t d*y before tr<* troop* w*re u**d. and tbe lay after UM landtag Concree* ratlfled ate
oj Ufcru a. in* ( sut. au>. Tore* **
. I.i :*. la it* con* T a dbpute over r^c bouadar; o.' Mala*. Caagree* authorized UK 'ic o-: rare* kgal'ist Imlutf in th* Act
See. -Congre**. TtM President and the Power to Commit Poree* to Combat." In ra Vttntm War end /murnetwmel L*. v 2 <elk ed IMV at dig. CM-IT Thla article originally appeared a* a Vote, in UM Harvard Law Bevfew. 11 U*rv. L. Kev 1771 UM|. Much of th* content and many of the axgumeatt in thla memortfUHrm bave. been drawn from thla Kot*. Barvtnafter It will be cited ** the "Barr. Kote" with peg* d(*tton* to the PUk collection. "See. MOOT. The National berutive and the Oat or Armed raro* Abroad," In Palk. aupra (n. U) at MO. n. Thi* we* originally an *<Vtr*ee given by Profeaior Iloore at the Kava> War CoUeg* on Oct. II. IMg (Senlnaftar cited a* "Moore Addre**" with page citation* to the PUk collection).; end eea Barv. Kote at dl? U.S. Department of State. "The Legality of United Sttu* Purttdpatlon In tbe Defente of Vlet-Kam." M Department, of State Bulletin 474 <UM). reprinted tn "BympoaUjn Legality of United State*. Pamdptto in the Viet Kam Conflict.- It Tale 1~. 10*1 (ItM). IKerrmarur eUed a* 0tate Department Memo.) A* precedent (or Vietnam, however, the majority of the nineteenth century naw of force do not aurrlv* do* eeniUny. Moet *er* minor undertaking*, deelgned b protect Amerkac cttiaaa* or property, or to renege a alight to -""r1 honor, and moat Involved no eombat. or even It* likelihood, with force* of another *tei To u*e fore* abroad on a aotaMe eoale, the PrekJem would of nafee etty have bad to requ*r rnngreai to i the atandlac army and nary. * 0e (eoaraUy. Bar*. Kot*. Be* gnmUf Mar. Kote at H. 1. la the mnt of an armed attack on the territory of UM Doited Mate* proper, there la little qoeeuon that tbe executive pooeeee* the power to rcepooo with an me*m at hi* dleyrted. rnngreartnnet approval of rach aettoB would probably be imoMOIate. When, oo the other hand, an attack la made on American pertdtu or property abroad then tbe nepoem abould centrally h<i prt<oorUco*J to the attack. Tbe recent 'TueMo Incident- 1* utrtkinf example of the fact that not every ue of force acainat tbe United Slate* to an aot which ptace* the eoontry at war and that a variety of factor* abould enter Into thf development of an appropriate r**ponat Boon of an attack which threaten* tlte life of the country, therefor*, K emme that the Prealdenf* power under UM (Udden attack theory U fairly limited. There le aia tire danger of provocation, either planned or afrtdntl. The mere pretence of AmerUian force* near a boetlli nation may provoke a ">ud4ui attack." Comlder, for InnfcfKK. UM C-3 Incident la 1MO, the vartUUM XtV-47 Incident*, then the TueWo Inddeot." If tbe reeponee to aucta an Muck I* not limited, (ben tbe country may become involved In a much larger aoofllct with littie or tto exeevtlve-legUlatlM oollaboratwn.
evder. enpra. m., at 1JM.
"8*p (rnmllj. KMT Hole r 1*7. irprn /n. 94) i iM. t_ nq; and Velrel. Tlv "War la Viet Men. DncoturtjtuUonml. Jd*ueta>>) Vfd Jart*JlcUonHy Attackable.- 1C Ku. L Her. 44* (MM;. (CM&i: ProC. VelveTa article to highly oueatded I Modem amaloffe* cf the "neutrality theory" were tb* landing cf troop* ta the Dominican Republic In 104A and tbe Moot dtepatcb of Amercan naval e***K to the around Raltt and Tttmdad. TIM rml problem with th* theory ta rematntTay, aeutnl. rXBtevpoxttton" mty eacUy had t* lottmaOoo.- aad th*
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Prwjldmt Booarvatt -iBoopapllilM* an actual ~mtervntt;i:' In Panama to M by "t.tarpo*in(~ American troop* then under ui **rutlw order ocUodbly to protect American pnfiertv and cttlxea*. bat e'umllf to *uppott * {rtcndSr jiniiiiiit. Hoei*r. *jnertn ettimn* who KM or o*n proptrry. >teMtf protablr boat* t ftkl* to xpKt MOM d(twi C ld QOOB thitr (orernmMt la Uia* of conflict. Sot If UM Pmulait IKU a unfrtMtd debt to nploy DM tracdeu atfluarj uywtwer t nruf to po>trt AaMrfeui proptny, our *>* >*ft withottt. ju ippanuBl^ * wrt lu lwt- And. in uny CM. tta* of dcptoynxM raf U v*Mtv UULO ttw cuki ol rMUatat BM yen*n>lly. StoM DûtoMDt Kcao; AlfoKI. Tb LHPCKf of AnMrtou MlUUrf XnroS*M0t tn Vl*t Item: A Brodr Mrfwctl**." Tata LJ. 1100 (;*M>: brv Hot* t (W7 t wq^ cf.. Mcmanadum of rvym* CcmmltM* on Aa>rlo>n FoUcy toward Vl*t Mu. fj Conf.Itec 3U3-M (Jtllr do W> , 1W). AloMt *nT ntttootl in tb* world b* tcmn clumiUd M frloMtlr. bocUU. or n*utnl. tod oonflleu wnleb waned minor fifty or hundred n now utlfo <i*d d*n Uwf und to upMt to* prceartou* world order and tmluie* of power OonMqiwatlf, Uw ld of AnwriOMi Meurity tuu erpanded gmtUj *o Uuu mn wnMd conflict in a Ur pwt of tb* world BUJT ppnr to tit threw. to U> Mcurltf of to* United flute* Iteetr. UnlUteral rmtdeoUel employpoetrt of mud foroe* ibroed. under tne oollectlre Meuntf theory b^. tnmfura, been juvtliUd oa mucb Uw name (round* * uUlMenl executive eUuo uitder tfa roddcfl ktteck tneorf. Tbe pUjr*lcI terrlurr of tbe United 6Ute* nujr be In no Lumedute. or ereo dlcunt, dancer. Tbei* mr be Ao Immertltte threw to American force*, ciuarae. or property, but a conflict ma; lemn to cndanfcr UM worldwide ec-urttr ymm of tne United State* Tbe aiguBVebt for freddeotial acttob uoder the oollectlvr aecurltjr Uvorr I* tnat tbe execut(t-e tniut have tb power to reapoud quickly n4 forcefully to attack* wulob are conaMercd Important, for a variety <* r*eon(. to the oialotenanoi at tbe btlanre Of power
Th ez*cx>tt*e acuon tn Indochlnk ha ben pmnlaMI Urgely on tb* collecmr aecurltr tb*orf. Th* Indocblnete War and other norm American military tcMonx Mne to lt>dlR*.tc that the neutrality th-ory le no kmar vlbU Jn a world which I* divided into rtJMUj., hoetlle. and neutral cooatrlee. moc. uroed oonfllct* will probably aOeet tM xiOln( order It I* d-Jlcult. If not- teiDOMtkle therefore, for Amrricui InMrvmtlon In >ucfa coanicu to nmair wboHy'nentral . , , . Th* notion that the United Stwe* po**e* > cxUaurrltorUt atcurltj Intnreet* 1* not Bore' Tht Monroe.Dorinnc of 1*33 U a clear tTfUjple. Bat ttu .proliferation of bilateral and muttflatentl *eeurttjr a(iement* alftce tke end cf World War n ha* widened American Mcurttjr Interest* to Include molt of the 3r(d. AcccpUnf tbe general pretnla* of tbe colK ctlv* necurity theory, tbe quettlon to: wha determine* when tbe eecuricy Intereat of the United fttaî I* threate.-Md. the PnMdent or Coojr*-*? And who determine* what reapanM ta 'a be taken to protect that Inrrertl 'See feneralljr. Stale Department Memo. ' fine Ten and note*, aupra. "If tbe balance fea* (timed loo far'In favnr of the executive, then Oopgraai mu*t hare the Mam* for It* failure to act In tbe pat la there any real concern or I* It coepteMe for -me FieaKent to bo** prUMr/ cMoooatbUlty for the us* of American force* abroad* There le certainly a trooz arromant la faeor A pvlnf ** executive tbe abOttr to nepond with epeed and fore* to ertae* whleb oonetitute a Areef threat to the atcurltr of th*. United Statee- rSae Barr. Mote at MO.) But. there are equally rtrooj;, U not *troo(*r, artnmenu in" favor of Increeaed cocupwi Monai control o*cr executlT* action* which may Involve the United ft-ate* in lenfthy eonOlct* that are ooctly b- no Ji taru* of live* "flee generally, Moore Irl<ra*. " Velve,. eupra (n. 411 at 467.- The full text of the SEATO Treaty may be found tn VJS. TraaUel 81; TIAM.. No. 1170; aoo UIT. Treatf Serle* ; and IWk. upra (n U) at 161 and **q The alfnotorie* were- Aunralla. Frarvce, New Zealand. PaklMea. PhlUppinee^Thatlaad, tb* United Klrdoxa, and tn* Onlted M*>te*. The Protocol to th* SKATO Treaty prortde* in pertinent part t bat: Th* partle* to tbe outbceet Ada Collective Defence Treaty unantmmiily tmlfnttt lot tbe purpoM* of Article tv of th* Tn*ty the ctatee of Cambodia and tan* and th* fiw* territory under tbe jurledlctlon of the (tate of Vlotoam " 0fl Treatle* 9i, TJJt*. No 1119; .* UJT. Treaty Kerte. J. ralk. jrupra (o. t at M4 tao* wa* removed from the "protocol area" by toe Oonera Accord* of 1963. tut. Protocol to tbe DKlamtlon on th* Neutrality of tao*,
67
V J Ai. M'O; ra.it. m^rs (no. i) at Ml. -~ Artiri* !V |ee to UM.ore of- the eolkcave "I. Hscri party recofnlaie that ty mewl* of armed attack m the treaty area against any of UM parti** or against r state or ttrrliory which UM paruen toy unanimous afcretment may henafur deslgnste. woulA endanger Ite own peso* and aafety. and a<rec* that it win In that event act to totri. UM roTAHKî dangar tn ecooroano* with lu <xmii uuoQMl prooeses*. Te>snres taken uadcr~tbU paragnph than a* Immediately report*! V> the Sacuruy Council of. the UtJUrfl Nsilon*. ~ "2. If. la ibe opinion of any of UM parties. the Ini-loUbtllty or UM Integrity * *h terrtMry.or the wvemgnty or political ladepcodenee of any party in UM treaty aiea or of aBfoiberjitaia or Urrltory to whK&^he provkwnv of paragraph I of tin* article from Unw to Um apply to threatened In any way other chaa by armed attack or U affccMd or tlucttcaad t>y any fact or r.twuioa whlfJi mstfil ntf-xêr tb pac of UM ana. t*i PartiM *titJl consult Imnudlau'.y In onter to ap-M on tne m*a*ur*)i wijtch inould tw takrn for th coinmca dcfaoa*. "3 It u understood that no action oa UM territory of any tat -doalfHaUd by unanl> uv>uf nftnciamt under pu-afrapb 1 of this vrtlclo on any Urrltory to amcnattd aball b* uikWi xpt at tne tnTttattos or -wttb tU ooiucat of UM fovaramatii conoanMd." "So* caatally. ralk. "International taw ana tb< Oalud atatw BoU In UM Vut Mam War.- 7 TaU LJ. (1MM): Palk. 7nMma> tlMtat Law and Uu Dolud StatorBol* in Vwt Kam: A lUaponn to Profavor Moor*." 7(1 Yal* L J. 10M (1007) ; but d. laoora, "Invnu'4ooal Lav and UM Unit** Stata* BoU v;nnam: A Boply." 7 TaU LJ. IM1 *Art. TV, II U 6CATO Tramty. fupra (a.
V
D.Art.3. I 3,d.3. Id. Art 3.11. However, tbe uvaty It rendered of no effect if It conflict* with subsequent legislation, slijce tne lawmaklng power of jOon* 4^<we Is equally a* potent a* the treaty power. "A treaty may auperfede a prior act of Oongrtcu. ar ! an aot of Congress may supersede * prior treeAy TTU Cherokee Tooeeoo, t VJf. Ml Wsll.) t. 3I (1*70); acoord. rifftm CotCo..Ml VJS 1M. 10 (10M); v. fnUctf ((<>, Ml VM. 41, tt (18*1). Ber Barr. Hoi* at Ml-4f Tbe possibility of giving the war power to UM Senate alone was epedttoatly considered and rejected by the Pramer*. >*, oo the debate In the OoxwUtu SuuthMet Aeta Beeolutloa. Auj. 10. 1M4, Public Law (a-MC ^mj. Be*. 1146;; 7f Mat. 3#<. Tb- BeMltUlon 1* aleo np,lMed la falk, . opinion of Obiei JiMdc* Maraball . leemM, TJJJ. (1 Or.) \, d, a* tonur >e*retary ejf D-
fenw UeNamara ha* amid. There hm* not bn a normal declaration of waranywnera'. In the world no* World War H." Addrie* to Amertfian Society f Mewapaper Bdlton, May II. IW. *n Tor* Ttwut, May 1*. 1M. p. C-ll. oo*. l Î.T edn4 at oo J. -See (eoenlly. Moore Arf~: AVortf. eupra, {. O); Moor* and -Mk ttdea. *op(nr4]. . Whether UM Tonkin BeaotuUon to aafflcni axthorltx.for ibe CaabodJan tnractoo and UM air action In Lao* na* not been oonJ*>rd by the lafal oowiTnenteton thu* far. but. the lanfuafe of the BeaolBtton. la *o broad that It oould. rfuably. aathorue almort any American action In UM WeeCern Padflc area. See. remark* of.8enaton Ptlndcbt -and Cooper durlnc defeat* on MM Xeaolutlon. 11 Cone. *. lUH-4m <UM). One ooeMMnfa tor. bj0wvar, dtie* that Cootreu bad ewfnoteot Information to lorm a reaaonable opinion about th poaelble onnaegnencee of the Beeolntlon. and that 11 wa* perhap* an nnfortnnatertout not unoonatttutlooal actiBon of reeponelWllty. See. afoon AiUreM at 3L. and aee (enerally. afoore and TJnderwood, "Tb Lawf olneaf of. ' Onlted Otate* AaUtano* to the Bepuhllc of Viet Mam." Ill Oonr *ee, MM. 14MO-C7, IMtU-M (dally dn, July 14, 1M I . "H 1* at.leaat ûeetlonable whether a resolution pa**ad in reeponee'to a relatively minor at tact on American warship* was nfflclent aolhoriaUon tor a war whlob na* wuHed li more American eaauattlat than aajr war exaept the Civil War and WorJl Wan I and fr. . it ha* aleft been arfued that Cuaffmf has given lu ImpUeel approral to UM Indochina** War becaom It ha* rrimil mffiury aathorHMIon Mil* for (Le .area. The arfttment beeed on enactment at military approprtajtlon* la*;Ulatlon 1* iperton*. Tne authorisation of xpcndltura* tut the support of the Midlers In (touthcaet A*la War neoearttated by tn* exectulve fait aooo*oe>ll In dispatching force* tber*. And. '1 the rramer* had thought that the money power by itself fr Oon(ress ruttcU.Tt control over the military. JAere wouid nave been no need to (rant Ooncres* the exp'iClt war power. 4ee (enerally. Karv. The power of the pure* wa* the weapon. used by UM English parliament to oombat the exerelas -Of .deapotlc power by CuarU<r and JTame* n. The Pramen of the Conetltutlon-were certainly aware of lt uuiny as a soaraotee of the powers and prlvtlege* of the MflAaiur* : ** The resolutions LOW before Congress, tb<>u(h ftfrylof important political Impict. would affect the eon^lttJUooalltf of *ubequent necutive actl)D.'lf,re*o)uUon we made before the JnitUttvd of hostilities, Presidential conunltment of American toree*or alfniaeant exneaaton of the war would be precluded bo*ue* the resolution would lie a-le*r assertion of the primacy of.Qnngrees U Uie oaUnf of war. ee Y^tnfiMfn glutt *V mp< 00. r, Umv, ,' Vf. m IIMH
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i-
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Vn> of Secuoa . Tb* porud. M iqulr*d by tb* Act. and acracd to dcly *cuon ID oeommodkM jOoocnex. And rter tb* ARtted, Scrvios Saboomuttt** et
(Jack-on. J . coneuTTtnc) . One* trnat Invoivr-t to combat tb* neotutton would prohibit eipaneCin .at ho*u!ltM*. Such netrtvtlon* ihould be dlrtlntuubrd from U *>-eaUd "feglalatm wto.~ which leeim* to rnnu" or on* of la component* tbe rtfUt to tletemiliie tlM ec'Ttal u*erof tba neirirtion by lutieeqmnt action falilnt; tnort of actual lejialaUon. tuck M dleap' prtwml by commute* action or a reeoluttoo of one or boU boa***. jri"l arguable HIM tbe Inctntfon of apectflc dat*> on. wbtcb theee nctrtetluc* take effect. ic tnmtoo cf the Inherent powcn of the PifxlAmi * Commander, in Chief. Accurdl&c tt>V rtjict enoKrucaon of the OcjwtltuUau. the Prwtdent* inherent power may b* Hmtted to the pawt/r to repel eadden attack* only by irrm<llt<r nid tumpteary action. Tb* expan.tion (4 hi* power-through iwjBttappoeedexcrue may be 4*t*nainaUv of tu oonmtutlimaUty 4M& Oonipcw dot* dot *eC but It any b United bf Coof Mlnnil cttuo. TlM liaporunt qnenlon Ii wtMOMO- the propaied Umltttfon U nMoucbl*. Sine* thm It no -HutloaHfm tbt onmpllwnr* with tbM* nttrlcunof "i not fully fMdblc. tb*ra li no ritni iiy UM wtU of. rnngrxi dMxdd aoc IH fwpcttf tja tbto IMIM. TIM Jithor tbut
-oally d*ai*d.. t opiT>*oo ni|.lojln( drtliuu, tb* FMldeos od. tb* DefiiBM IMpartBuot-foUoiMd M dtreenon* durlcc to* ttm* thac 4*T4 t*mined law. Carper. Tfcc Dcrcue-jlppraprto;no JlldVr (1MO) . . 'Tb rapooM of tb* ConiptroUff Oaaetal to-Ud* crtJto add* nptbar nppcct to tb* poitoon-of Coacnat.'A month after tka PrMidcnt bad wad* U* tbitaC.^ tb* Oomptretlar O*ncnl InforfiMd CtanjtnM that XW tbe fondaiMOtal ba*U that tt H' for CODfnm to >ay bow and onbat oonffi. Uotu poboe BMQlaf (boold be aptnt. tb* poatttoo of tb* OAO. a* tbe af*M -of Oontrte. tettst b. In tbJ aia* and alay, to. oconl faB effect to to* dear patnlrn *t an -n^mr- 'by tbt TaognB* a loaf aa tt leawtn* unebanfed bjr la(Ulatl*a tdttta aa4 . nntmi|ialrad by Judicial interpretation. M." ' ' Tt*T*Ian, b* coDdaded. wbtra & rtoUtton wan found to* would eMceta* bla power a* Comptroller General to dlaaUow- credit* In tbe acancie* tcanaU and bold tb* ofIJCt tb* TftUMBt. ^lUiTl*. Confrttitona Control of 44- ficer* penonally nabl* for tb* cort of tb* mim*tr*rw*. SU-315 <!*); 'Hiuar. ' iHetaS actlTUy. Id. JOboab. |M wa* an vamp)* of tb* oar of tbe :*fl*lau* veto, tt 4, an. aao, M <MT* a* a valid tndtcatton <rf rpMt*MxTtw ineliuioo of > phrM "in llo* wlta ecotlTc Tacponat to an ttneqlroeal rxtncUon, Uw MCpraiMd inwntkm of tb* ^mtdtnt of partlcalarty Unc* tb* ltltlatl** *to 1* open tta* -OuttM **t.- bat*rr tt* mln* M to poe*lbl* attack u a circomrenUon of to* lo-4lin 4*rlo for tbt nvMect. itctncu oooctltuUonally rrqulrad lawmalflm procaaf. 0^. Cunctltudon. Art II. 1 1. nut *t ui frum Ui* fate* of thl prcrtljo. Tb* ~VS. C<vietutJon, Art H. JJ. full tact of U>* oMndnur nwfe: "VA, CoMOOrUoo. Art I. fit. B. "la Ifo* *Uh tb* *xpt*Md lotootkn of E*en If tbe Treddent act* beyond tbe tb* Pt*<ldai( of tb* Onttctf MM**, aoo* at tb* rut** cpproprUM by !hl Act *b*U b* ooocUtutlonal lloUu of nl* poer*; ",Oo&"UKfl to'flauu* tt-> Introduction of AaMrt- (raar ha* not tnmfcy loct 1U io;* oonvfi (toitnd *oa>'j* troop* IIMO Lo* or (ttttttioaal autnoclCjr to make law* oiee* ary and proper to carry out the pow*r>> Act of ScptrmtMT M. I0 (M B*t. Mf ). veated by tke ConctltuUon In <.b* Ootem-" In IMS. for sutaaot. Coognm ^tt>pti~1 aatnt of tb* Catted State*, or any DepartA rtor. f M. to th* JM*BM Approprtatfoa ment of onerr thereof ." Yonnfttovn Tube Co. T. 5ate|r<r. M> TJi. . Act probibltlac u*t ( fund* pVfOprtc'vd (&*rio 'Tor tb dUpaMl or trMfr by-oatf* Whatever the merit* of the arcumenta tract or otbtrwl** of work tbu bM b**a . . . performed by elrJlua ptnooarl of tb* Dt- about the Prttidenf* power to Impound prtmit of O*f*ow nnltji ]iMUfld to tb* fund*, cucb practice* under which the eceeAppropriation* CommHr**'.*) .,.." 8Ut. uUde ea*rci** dlaowtlon wllMn the Umltl 131 (166). A tbreM to OMOW odwUtit- et by Cooncrea* In appropriation* aot* can b* tlonl powem ara** *tMn. Jn ~m*aBft to clearly dletlnpnabed from a more clearly noOoortn. ttM PrMU*bt tUtrd Umt OU WM on*Ututlonal breach by .the exacutt** of unonoctltuUoAil Hid rt*ilnm tn*t "to tb* . rertrlcUon* ou podtlv* aeUon, Bee. ff. ecubt Ui*t tbte Metioo MK* to tre to tb* ruhrr. ''Presidential luproundment of Appr?f>rlA3ott OootmltiUiei of tbe D>n*ti rund*.- t Gto. ?ra*b. L. Bev. 104. 1M nd to* Huw rt AepraxatAUrei MitborUf (IfOB); Oavl*. "Cooctttutlonkl TOmmr to to ru> prurrnt tx*ciittv tctoa. *ueb ecc- qolxe DefeflH jCcpradlture*," f) ftordbaa U Ui vurb* ropwtetf M'lavcJM by tU wcu brftocb of Ux vuvvrnoMat . . . urr > /n tbe.art-d* of /uvUot Bladri detonnliMd oy > oourt of ooaifi*"Tn,^ ConitjtuUon 1* neitbrr ' *Un4 nor ctwo,." 161 Con* lUe t(H(*-0. equivocal about t (ball make law* wWcb IQilt. Xth Ooo<.. >M.flMrton(July U, lS). tbe .Pneldeni- U to ntecute. , . . Tb* CcatttBut deeplM tbl**'{br*ti. .Uttc DrteaM O*- tutlon dot* not *ubject ibl* UrmaWnj power cunpltad la full vtth' te* provi- rf Ooneraa* to pr**MoU*J or eaiutary Miper-
vtatcu or control. . . . HM roooAun of tbte .NaUuUjttuttdUi*lanakUipov*rtota* "ttiVM.tlt.tmUO}. Oocana :on in, bota good and bad ttaMa." Yo*ngtlon,t>K*t A r>b* Co. . Sfttf*r. T* Comnunov or tmm don* ftraiM Ml tSS 679.OT-M (Utt). (Oawee related t*> 4W) OUwr jwndjLl proaottnocmeate' on tb* .__,_,' *âia* and Aipporf >"t aaprapciattbna ' -^ - ^ _ rTiiiiiii lii> nfinMruad Ttimi Tn jtr* oy,~ '.flection 1. AD ljHliMn aovnt pavnir ^0 ocAtroi *|*r oeattoa of niatary *jnt*d abaO b* v*jt*d ia > OOB^MH Kror. Oo* earty opinion *tat*d tbe area- OnH*d 8tatee .. . ;--.- icert raotlnctly: , fleottoa . Th* Ooncn** ihall -feat* Power - -Tb* po*r of oonffne* to rate aad amp- to toy aaa eollMt 1ta*i. OotiM. fiapoiu; "poet jemltt . . <ta otaar and urititputib)*. nd K*C*M>, ta prorld* for -tb* oa*T>fc lanfuafe wivd la tn* 'otna'titutton i& non.O*f*nocii .-^. ' ;oaklnp u paat of powtr i* to plala,ipiTVd*elai'Viac.4pBnt>*Mnof Ifarquaaad dWaad eompraonatU. a* u Mart no room oonuoitMd on tt* hlfb a***, and Offaaeai (or doubt or oootroramy. aa to wain tb* acainit tba Iv oTMananar njirâ*- control o**r tb* nuutary Con* of * d*eU* War, grant l*n*r of Marqo* aad . tiui ooe-trj nli1*i" . B*j>ri*aU and Btafe* nil** oono*ralitf Cap/ nt Ortoer. U Wl. 4. Ml <1*H). . - ton* oa Lead aatf Water -7 A*j**f court nai tat*d ib* imfli^nn "T ndM ad juppon Arml*. tat no Ap. iuor*acclui'j': propriatloa of Bonvy o -that. Ox âball b* *Ta* porpej* of tb* appropiUtlon*^ th* .for a loojtw t*rm than To yar;" ~ - ' ICITM and oaodntona undar waico Mid *p- ~- T provid* and arnlntarn a Karr. oroprlatloiu w*r* mad*, tf a mattr tn. ttM . 1K"n>alM-JBl** for ta* OonmsMnt and bond* of Contrail and B,4 tb* plain and gntt me of tair iand aid naval ftaro**; cipaett duty of tb* aootrtfti* teucb of ttw TV pii>*14*ibreatUng forth tb* Milltta ,.. pr-Mtummt to comply wlOttharanM.' Tto jcorM* for organltln*; annlnt. and <a>-' fftutdtng- w. Dotiflo* Attaffft Co, *0 y. otpliolng th* 1HUO*> ... ftora 0W. Ml (4D. Cat'IMC). attiaiad 1M To mat* an jw wMob ahall b n*ear. Id 4l (BUkCiz.iM0K .; ' *>ry and praov for earrylnf lato E*oaueo U4.CantMlMoa.Art.Lf>, . ' \ b* a^tioa j. n^'âeutlll wr rttfl to ( roumo.t AMCC no* . JTawiris', Ml '*for 'JitaM*. Juo rtaok&srtW '-* -'ii*1 to -^* * * Wm ^ of arono>. MMVtMJtOMBOl Of FMMdftttUl S>OVr WOUJd Mttan x Tn* Prvjlitaat *bn to Cam-
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. ~; <
spUddy * in Chlaf of tb* ArtBT^Bd Mary of B aufeorftr ia fomal r'r'r'r' IxiraMt *?rrl-r? *y ^~a* ** ib* ontj*d BUM*. ad of tb* .*nia of tn* luXTtti* to* tor. Out tb* Oomnj*ndr *gff j^T rSSi^tSf ^^ in CM* elauM^pport. -any rtMtdaDOal j2Tan;allbawôW>raod vritb b adotion, laurnal or atâal, InTolrtng tb* UM ^ aad oaniintof tb* SBaStTLafc*
.1
a>euu.tt>ranaatwq>etAiraUwryaad '^nStrCTBf"?^?^f^f TT'^< fM^ .. nrjj pcccumowt" M. et 64*. ^^ TT .^ . , ."111* oiBcn-aotaJ ooncurriac Optnion ( era*appropnaaoBioai*j iiMttem Jackion '*tat*d tb* propoaltfoa la amcKK x moredrUJl: i>tlnn . Ko OB*y aball b* 'Pr*ddotla> pown ar* not flx*d but tb* TIIUMJ, pot in mmnqnm fltjct.uAtr. d*pmdiac upon tb*ir dljûootloa *Kia4t*B* aMd* toy lav ~ r COD Junction vftfc tbow of Coofraai. . , . '-'" Vha tbc TnuMtot UkM *a<un* inoonTtn Da^n on na* W* Povro nr na pUb> ltb UM iipfMJid or implloA wtil *f <X-miauuuiM. OonmnoM Oun^rnx, bit povtr4 at it* )ovt *bb, . . , JVM*B M*dl*o*>'i ot**) Count coa MMtato tauivMi* pr*H<1Tiil -.ui., Mtt lit* < oajirol In >veb a * -WJr br <*!a*Wln|! (b* S;^..Cr^- - -
i^tts&tts&i sîSuTAn^îisns 2s^^ !ss?a ya ESsstpfiJasLSsr-.s'
<iiun claim to a powr at oau *o cooctu- JJJ^ ^^t*2!*u^*ptS^fl. Uv and pr*eloj<f* *UMt * eruitniMd with C^TfJ^ J bmlld m*aa bâ^Mi cautlou, tor. vnat 1 at 1 J( U tb qtUJb- zTT * ! ^ ' ** T??-^S_SlL^^ riurn t.!b1tab*fl by our eoorttuOonaJ y- JTT' " MjjpMiaui.
^g^ ' 'v*^^*^. Cxc^ptiofii broader ttiaa tbe** ar* aot tit A All^Cft* M 0> *
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tlou b*rVaMUi 1*tiiTi.<f>ta Mf^Âft.ta wvu 0vyc*w ABuiwvtp M.^H*^BMUBW*
U oouid auibonaw *K AC/ ttm* mjatvy"**?- mm\^ S?^ *F9 T?Tîi^r^^.J!.? .^Si'^ mûfvj V*|KV^H*^ i*^ ^w*, *>! Ov > A4f*%Bt*M> t* te>V *M*tfM*
70
Tb power will afctwltrtateniltm be cafe, aa at nome u to Jx cbarnd to pi taM <he amall ban their all at (take In uoh dancer. raaKdr pratanded. tram abroad." 1 CM*. well M the Ura* ataia*. It would ba Letter to Jaffaraoo. May IS. 11M. Taoiua JmBUOk: "Ooauldatlnf that atiurular for on* authority to make war. and Copwn aloaa It eoBstitutlonally ln another paa:. Mr. BTrrvXB. The objection* afalnet the with taa po4r of *""f -g o LctttUtor* 1M la ftea* decree afainct tha our vondinon trom paaee to war. I ha* aeoete. Br war for .vafUnc the-power in the thoufbt tt my doty to await tbalr autborlty FrevldeTtt. wfco will b*f all the requlatta for ualnc tore* In any dcraa which eould ba quallUecrvM win not make ar but whan avoided."Meaaaf* to Confnem. ~TT- t. 1MM. . .theKatlonwlM rapport tt. C Joaur aUaawux: rTha whole power* at war Mr tfwauw and M*. OawJT mored to In' ert "declare." etrtklnc oat -ma*- war beta*, by tot Coaatttntkm. *eatatf im Oolatrine to tb fiBKirttve tlM power to repel (nam, to* act* of that body aloaa aa ba *aauddcu attack*. ~ -;- ortad to aa our culdaa la tab) iBajutry.'* Mr. Sauaatair thought tt Wood OT wall. Opinion in DU 4aMlta. HOI. JoaOoa Oucun. P. f^-nir- "OoDcnai la emThe Enqutrtt ahould be aM* to repeal and not to eramerae war. -Mate- battar than pawatad to daclara a ganaral war.w Ootttraai etoclar*" tba latter narrovlaf tb* powar too nay wage a United war ttmltad t> atee*. la object, la tlma. U a cwoaral war at demuch. Mr. Ocaar nanr rp*rt1 to baar IB a ra- dared. Ita extent aad nperartoaw. tat only jruW'c a mouoo to-empower xt EucottT* reetrtcted and regulated by the flu Mat, : famine pan of (toe law of natloni; bwt lone to dadara war. llr. tmiwoerm. Tbar* t a notarial dlfltr- U a partial war U waged. Ma eateot and opce tHitwacn tba ca*a of BUklot <MT aad in*kinc_pe*ce. It bonM be more a*jr to jet OptnlOD In Bfi p. Ttefey, IBM. IXono. Wara; In the flnt'plaor. T out, of war Uian Into tt War alao tt a Upl and ovart dadanttoB. paac* ttani wtta cave to jay that :oe war ralna<r-yower Ut lotrtcata atxt taerat aacoUattooi. - tola doranunent -reata anttrelf with Oonr. Uuo -* cfhtoat (tTlng tb* powar freaa; and that tbe Pmtaant can aathartat of war to -tba Kuoutln. bacaoa* not aaf al j beHlfereat aparatloiu only la the ceaaa ax> to t truitatf" wttb tt; or to'tha.0aoat. ba- preaaly prortded lor by the OooatH MOD and, -eauae -not so eooatraotcd aa to ba anttUad The laws.'By theac no power la (Ivan to the to-it H wa for "t^fnc rataar tban ftelll- Kwutle .to oppbea .an attack by one " t*U< war: but (or facilitating paaoa. Ba independent nation go the poaaeeaton* of anotber..We art bound to rafard^bpth Praaea ' prnwrcd "OectM*" to "coaka." On Uw motion to Inaart declareIn place and Hawaii aa IndapendeBt atatee, and to m*Jff, tt wai apwJd to. equaUy Independent, and though the awnHA no. aral poUcjr of the Oo*emuat Blent lead K to take part wltb either In a uoanuierej Oc.abaant Cunt, no (On tba remark by Mr. Klnf tbat wffa the other, aim. If thia tnterferanoe be J's-jlc" war mlnt ba understood to "OOB- an act of hoa4U force. It u not wttfiln the diict" 1C. wnleti waa an Bneutlva function. eontututlooal poww of tb TreodaBt: aad Uf- ElUwonb i up bJa objaetlou. and the dull lea* to It within the power pf any aubo<* of Connecticut-waa -ehanfwa to/.> iirdinatxl aejeot of epêmosant, dvti or miliPa ay . tary "BKtemetit je7tV< Secretary or Btat*.Del f \UH. .. - lota Bvaiaiar. "The ececutlra fowrnUd ar - "~~ ment of thi* country -In It* Intercourat with - Va ajr ^ forrtfn nation* 1* limited VP the employ' NC. ar total of-dlplocaacy alone When thle fall* U - . ar Oeo. r. " - .can proceed no furtbe- If canno* laflbM/ rHnkncyf^ntotion to nrilu out tba mate-iy reaen to rare* w^hout the direct aubole clauie. ningrwifl to amoout call 01 toarJlf of fnatnu. exewpt In ntirU^g and repelUnf boetlle attack!. 1C would have-no authomy to enter the terrnorUb of Mloa.OOMMJCI'Tt. OK T7t tlfO rm to prermt the deatructlon -of UM tut f**uu>on IK JtaJT*r uandt and to jirotact the Una and property of our own citlan* on their paaajfa! It JUIM ftUbiaON "Tbamca(*iuu>t-cf -Air. U true that oo a nidden Miariwcy o( thli fjta r*lUcmc appear* to br -lha mtiat .MU> ebaracter ttw fn*Utat would ellraei aoy nÛbl* or atom* of til toe trura cooualUad arnted fwo in the vicinity to march So V t. (uvenuoeot, baeaua* tlwy can be oon- their -niltf. hut In dofc< thl< he WOKU act ~ -<niilff) dlc]Qaad In ruth paru aiul at cuch ujxxi.Ji owv rripnnittitilrj" M~am to ^ t-rj* M U1 beat eult particular *li. Concnen.-Xleoember0.lilM.... an! bnai>#itj< body of toe people are Ie*> awuwAK bococjtf "te* nv 6m atat* .-ev&M* nf judflnc. and arc more una>r wb*t I itrderfana-tc'he yuur ocalUoo, It U> Lcfinm jjf at*]ud!oea, oo tbat i( r.)t if it rhaU- Leômc o^jaaary *> repal of ttwlr aCaln, loan U- u>y aOu>r. lur/uioa, ae rrauaeat mtf. without vtoUlki of (be 0cuutit,i>jM oratf tb* Uo *JXI
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invite u, tenttorjr of another country. ma . u I -understand it. by tb* o)toriat m whallier ' icn necessity cxuu In anjr 'giTen, cif (he President 1* the vole Judge . . . and. lmpO7crlabin( tbcir peopto ic w-i. pre. . . AUate Ow PtKKteai to InrMie *lfb- tcnrttnir eenrU]r. U not Ir. :rt*t the boring i-i'Joa wtieuever be tbal! <M*m It food of toe people WM Uie object. TEA* out nrots*irr to repel *a kaviuIOD. n3 you kl- eonvez.Uon undentod to be to* mc<l oppntlow Lien to do 10 wtieotTcr be xsvtj CAOOM Sw o7 all kingly - opprtttlont. kad tby nto UT be at*na tt aeecMur lor ui pur- tolved to ia mta tne Contututlon that -oo paw. end you IMw him to nuke r t ti* o* man *tiould bold the power p>uure Study to tf. i; you cut fti. x>jr oppression upas us. But your itow Knitt. co til. povcr ia Uu r*<p*et, tfur b*T- tne wbole nuiiur. and place* our pretatent iog f.vtu hire a much potng * you pro- vhere klnji bave *!>/ stood."t*ttr to Herndon wblle in Coz>greM. Th provUioa ol lh* Cm^ttlutton firing ire wu-maklcc pown to
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Memorandum on tbc Ameudmeut To End The TV'ar" irop>rd by students of MK? Harvard L*w School under tl* dJrtvtVoo of-members of tlie Harvard I*w Revlt-w. Ina'rted In tbi- RECORD by Senator Cranston on May 19. 1#70. Faculty Advisers: Abrtrn Chaj-es. Pritfessor (^ Lav. Han-ard Law Sofaool. former K>cal adrtser to DKpsttmont of Stale: Frank Michrfman. I'rofeôr of LAW. Harvard Law School.
(Faculty Adrleer*: Alma Chayes. Professor of Law; Frank m-T.'-- Fiulsawjt of IAW. (Oeaenl Editors: Jerry fV'~". Joel Klein. (Contributor: "tulip Bakes. Jr., Bobcrt TJenham. Ed Glaser, Booert -Oordon, ftob~~ Hager. William Koiaaky. Frank Kramer. In' Lnpu. Jsxoet MeOlbboe. Mark Ifoakowttt. William Plcf Michael flrxlman.) the doctrine <tf the separation or powers wu adopted by the eonvcaUen of 1787. not to promote efleiencr but TO preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, DOC to avoid friction. but. by means of ctM Inevitable friction incident to the. distribution of the (overnmentai powers among three departments. to save lh people from autocracy." Jriw . fieited states, 313 TJJS 363. a <1W) (Brandels, J- dissenting). concrete can alone nlM armies; and may put them down, whenever they ehooee." 3 J. Story. Commentaries on the Constitution of tb Uniud 8tu. Mctloa 1187 (4tlid.l87I).
Term than two jrcan." It cannot, then, he contended that la eondlttoninc pprgprlatlOD* upon UM orderly withdrawal of American force* from a foreljn field. Cui'itruei would be acting beyond Tbe noope of Ita poweji un4er the Oonatttoon. The objection, if there !M one. mot rather br that for Confreo by this mean* to deny the Preeldent neonroai required fur the rapport of troop* In the field would be to encroach upon hie prerocattrea under Article H. eecUofl 1. a* "Commander In Chief of the Army and Mary of the United State*." The Contttatlon eeema to endow both branchee with aome relevant competence and mpoinbuity: the queebon la whether taflaUOv. appropriation! powen may prevail over executive powtn of military """">* when the pollde* of the two branenee are la confflot. It It poeatble to define, a eomewnat crudely. the reapecave apberee of aupfwnacy of Coccreea and the rrealdeocy In "i>mUre" laiini In terme. that la, of the leawa to be decided. The band of division .<pp*an to lif between, on the "con>ieialunal" aide, dedal one a* to whether a war to Justified and desirable mean* of pursidnf *ome Tni* memorandum cumlnf* t)w ooo*Utu- United States objective (or ff bow much tio&&1 bui4 for the AowsdnM&t to End tlM and what sort of war is to be wa>i1 la purW*r. Mot oontiitution*] debkto horctofon suit of what objectives) : and. on the "presitu* tooiMd OB UM FTMldntli *at*jrwy to dential- atd*. dedatons a* to bow those rent*(c AnMrtcaa troop* In noitUltMi *wo*d sources oocnmiued by Gonarsss to warmakvltacut ooofrawlonAl kpprov*).' We do not Inf ou(bt to be -nariaed eo an to achieve odnM tbi* quMtlon. B*thr. w addn the contemplated c>>ca. 13 Ufht of this Uw quuon of ooncraMloiuU pomr. R(>rd- analysis an explicit conaressloual dedalon taw of the Pnndcnf* povcr. Concnu xuy that no interests of the United fltaue jus' urcto* 1U Independent Judfment on UM ooaUntted American milltcrf activities ' . (-M of Amerioa fcrcee ttbroid. Indeed. It fau dnrhlna and that accordingly -we ' ûld wiUtdraw, oufht to prevail over a contrary a ob]l*>uon to do o. Tbera 1* no doubt tbt ConcreM bM UM eompeteno* and roponstMllty. tlioufb not A pMsnecuvi United to toe doctrlr* of acludTe of pnddenUal oompetencc nd ic- separation c<f powers, however, yields an U.ponilbtltty. to make decWon* recurdini; UM oomplete analysis of presidential and eon> commitment of U.S military force* In for- treeslmil prerocatlve and responsibility. The ftfu bottMUe* By Artie]* I. auction I. Coo- Constitution, while li sought to provide a (nat 1 (lan the power "To declare War." harmonious framework for Interaction, also "To nke Kul for tne OOMnuneot and aimed at a system of checks and balances Beculatlco of UM land and naval Fatotf." amonc the three branches of government. d To prorlde and maintain a Vary " Nor Underlying this doctrine of checks" and bal! there any doubt u. u> tne powr of Coo- ances Is the notion that each branch of the CneK to uae toe Approprtiitloiu prooea to (ovemment has suflcient power to crjck oarry out confrea*!aaI policy on matten the action* of the other branches that It wltnln toe concreuloru) Cbcnpetenoe and deems unwise. Tne Idea I* starkJr simple, mponMlb)]l(.y. Under jirUcle I. MCUon of and is to* purest rendition of the eonsututhe Constitution. Cfnitnu It empowered Uonal text, only the President may deploy "to lay and collect tan-id. . t, pay tne and command the troop*, rtolle only ConDeMi and provide for tt-- coaiir>r<n Ocfruoe crass nay appropriate the wnerewltbal for and fenecal Welfare ->f the Ucltott Ctat< their subsistence, equipage, aod transport. . . .", and H t* provided by Article I. oectkxi What the PreslJent eriooses not to' command, tbat "DO DVXuy (rbll br drawn from IfW Ooncres* cannot well buy: whtl Centres* Treatury lion in-Cw)eequMe of Approprli- cbooees not to buy. the PreaJderrt cannot tlow made by L*w . ." UorJW the link well .Amaia.od. betwoej rriRrwlofial reipma'bUIty Lo OvfCTire interplay of tbeer two contending powKmmllmriKt iOa er* lUuMrate* the wisdom of the framers Tie j-pro^r.ntiJi 1< coscmltment of men and treasure to extend' bj 'ftf provuson Hi A.rcci I "Jic*too *d rdreljm war is ttwr crsveat exaction a f w(i t!;t Ojrwrr thai) nv, prnvn '-.Co rI* eromeot nan make of 1U people. The ooarfftijfl >n^.-;rl ArmlM. bu,' ivj Apj/roprition. allocation of pavers Insures 'Uat if Motirv " lHv lTf IL^.-J: bf lor -wimt both brancft*--**>'uC' and
74
legislative-concur cut cueh an exacUon-be ing ablpc for UM navy. Tbl* attempt uiumaintained. mately failed.* however, and in 16*1 TarUament emphatically reaaaerted lu right to a of control over tbe ralring and Congressional power to enact the Amend- meaaure of armle* by outlawing Ship ment to End UM War must ultimately de- deploying Honey.* Chartea I wa beheaded abortly rive from the power* (ranted tb ;sglalallve tbereafter. branch by UM Constitution. The conflict over Tbe early year* of UM Bectoratlon montbe, xnsxltuUonallty of UM blU art** because be Constitution divides authority archy were rotorlou* for Cbarlea II' aecret wer military affair* between Congras and pact* with foreign power*. Parliament onre the President. Article n. section 2 denomi- again uad tbe moaey power to Invade tbli nates the President ai "Commander in Chief clceed policy-making proccat.' In 1866 Tarof the Am>7 and Navy " Arucle I. section 8, llament revived tbe technique of placing however, grants Congress UM power* to "pro- condlCoo* on It* eranU or revenue by makvide for UM onmrnon Defence." To declare ing a grant or 3MjOOO and peclfylng that Wax." "To raiM and support Armies.- and If the treasurer of the Navy diverted the "To make rules for the Government and grant to anything bat warn* of *eamei> be Regulation of UM land and naval Force* " mould forfeit treble tbe value of the money The pbra>e> on their face establish both a By I67g the technique of Impoelng mcrlcshared and divided power with exclusive Uoni on tbe grant* of revenue wa* aundard PresldenUal control oer troop* In the field. practice. In that year Charlea II eought freeand the larger area* of war policy declslou- dom to maintain or dlkband hli army la makmg falling within UM domain of Gun- Flanders a* he aaw at Parliament Insisted on reU'.nlnc general control over baalc military crew. T< original constitutional undertaking policy It responded with the Supply Act of did not occur lr. an hiitorlcal vacuum, but ]<7 which granted a sum of about C 303aeelnrt tbe backdrop of tbe 17th century 000 and specified that this sum must be apEorli*h druggie* between King and Parlia- plied to disbanding tbe Flanders forces and to ment Thete struggles were in large p*rt over no other purposes The Act even specified tbe power to conduct foreign relation*, moat tbe date Of dlsbandment. a date less than especially the power to tnilntsln and u*e a three monUis from tbe date of the act It standing urmy Detailed knowledge of thl* was. indeed. Parliament's Amendment to End hutory was put of the common Intellectual the War. berltaice of UM framers Tbe Founding Fathers were well awar of At the beginning of the 17th century po- this exercise of parliamentary power over litical men accepted almost without qur>tlon military declsK>nmoklng. Tbey were aluu UM doetrlue .that the conduct of fore/gn af- aware tnat Parliament's role In foreU" affairs. ar>d ubove all the making of peiec and fairs bad deteriorated just prior to the wnr. were myntrrle* of cute, tbe cclu*!ve American Resolution Alexander Hamilton re. business of the crown, By tbe end of -he cen- ported In Federalist No M thst American^ tury -a century of the Stuarts, UV Com- derived their Ideas about the control of the monwealth. the Restoration, and the' lion- military "from the nstlon from wli-_/m ui<out Revo' utlon all this bad changed "v- Inhabitant* of the** states bare In rtwrai llament had assmnsfl an Important role Ja sprunj"" tttn like Hamilton, a ur< nr nuvocate of executive power, and J*rnr* DIK Uw> policy-making prooee*. The devtee ParllanMnt developed for a>- were determined that the American CI-^TC er*4nr lu conuol wae tbe. power to vote would maintain the authority over warm**Ing that Parliament had once acnlneri but revenue Before 13 Parliament had In time of wu then In danger of losing' w>r, granted tbe King *ubldle wtthoui rrThe almnor the Can*tltutloiinl C"'ir."'" " ttricun a> U> buw tliey could be rpcul In In maklne tlit Prrxldent the Con--r,ur.ri-r in tne bubeldy Act of 1624 ' the Common* f"r Chief were two First, the Cunien'rn a/u>e dm time condiuoned tbe grunt The Hired tu conccntrvte in s single cl'.ill.'ii ' ! nM/nry Wk* to be cpeut only for drfrndinx :i>r tactical conl/i>l of armle<. rr.K."O .. tnr.'ixl and IreUr-:. ;.nancin< the Navy, and hûle But this war. no plenary yr >TH .( aiilliijC the Di.^tj Such retr)c'("iir. wrre not I/jrr to maintain troops In u [)jri,fni.ir yti ripe ftit cucceac. the Lords pr^tr'trd But theater of war once Congress had ilrocjed ' PurJikfoent did wring from King Jamei tl>e d:r^)iKKr" As Hiunllloii ll.tr,,>r<M'-d t i n prfimlM> Ui make nc treaty wl'-non: lu "ad- powrr. H "aniounted Uj nothing n.'-i' U xi, vice mid coAaent " Oiarlea 17 su-fetr/ir to the r.upreuie command aod dlre<-U'>n "[ -,Lr Juries I. tried to waxr war without Far>la- military furoi. ac Cr:4 Oei^-m: *r.4 Antrnt't ttf\p When nutiilntr wî vutrd fi<r w^r r/ural tit HIT ro'iJnlTHry fin . < '<<' < in IC'Jfi Ite XMRM to f)n4iire lilt pulley place* UM clvtluui President at tbe top of il* through forced loun But f.he Imrîulhilliy military corumaful. It contain* no grant of <S c. u.io.iloK ibe war withc/ut it pirlu>nt.(- power to define UM purpose* for which tbe ary rrnnl forced bltn to yield V* the Pr'.il.nn President, may exercise hi* command over of U!,:iit (I43t>. which dclarrd Illegal the UM troops <-<>!lecttun of taX*k without f > rlni;itrlilary Second. UM fraoMrs sought to transfer to i <iiiiit Tbe Uue a> again (or.tetixd over Footnote* at cud of article Ship Meaty, a tax on towru In Uru &f build-
UM PieaHiur a check OB an overly aurOal Mgttahoe *a a* *e taoore further egatnet or Brao]pMte ooBunt&BWBt of oar force*. TlMy naMeatMreCaU too B*a the very broad <M^M of i eeyunell.nl I j for warmaklng confemd by the Article* of Confadention . *>atog tor the propo, either the yiwjil.ut or A* iteooM !> (two vlM * veto *bjb**<** action, ataced UMt poo* end < Boat not b IB UM DM*; tf tkte If tro*. ud tbc Lajtoan aoto to alttMr to UM * Th vatbrno MMatlf* aar adnpoattloa of UM amf and nar
face ot their cmnrtnimia. Tbcr ere aoT'at Bbertir to e*t la the encutt** dertruocet permanent fund* far the up|)au ef en army. . . .- A deOaltlt. practical (km on UM tetea000* of UM conMUrttaoal fimnar* to pfcneed by UM earir rl*tWw.lilBi between n Hli.il i iT nnjiim' in
vwofloa dearly tedlcate fimt thing: wa* to be t**B olttmtte control over the waimaktog powai with a variety of mean* *t doKinaw, oonelder whether, by It* menanam to enforce It* view* At a mini- BMeeuiai of eeTea** aJeo. they win i mum the fnmen would hare viewed an force on an equal footing with that of Ito aypropriauoB reetrlcted to u** to dleband- advenarto*. I (inmmiratoet* aM material tatog an army and Bringing It home e* a proper tonaatloa on thto aubject, eaerebu of nniMjaw/hioel power Parliament erctoe of thto Important ft bad eordaed thto much power in U1B and by the Conautatfea to the < the eonedou* deelgn of the Canctttutton we* to give r ingiem more power over foreign a knowledge and eonatderaaon of every draCala and wacmaktog than rarll*mnt had nrmelanB* of weight.-* poaaawed. The OonetlUitJon. read in light of Again. In wjndlig how to reepoad to UM UM aletortcal context and the framerr fear potential apantoh threat hi Florida. Jefferof a military eatahltohment. thu* ettahntbe* eon aaked Confrem to take certato atefe. aethat the Prartd*a could command the tee- knowljdglng that "the oaun* to b* purmaj ttcal operaJon* of an are.* while engaged, will require command of rnejw* which tt feebut that Pringieei bad the power through long* to nnngraai ecclunvety to Ttoad or to approprlattoa* to piorld* an army, to die- deny." band 11. or to ijecogaga It from a particular jeOenon'* tumemon bf*dj*nB. theatet of operaOon*. aad even Jacfcao* all ackBowtodg* The reeding to ooaArmed by the dlacumton Uve rleference to the legw.le<iire oa < of UM raleraut oonrtttvUoaal provleloo* in of troop deployment and aimed b the FMeralut paper* The cotoalvte had eeen Indeed, the nineteenth oantory to general to how wvy U wa* f or a king, with a euadng replete with acknowledgment* of army at hi* dlapoml. to angig* hi* eubJeoU Xontl preemmancc Uaeotav for to fonega conflict*" Tbu* maay objected to wbea he wa. a member < thi* Oonmtulêi drafted at Phlladelpbl* "The provlatoa of the < beeeuat H tolled to prohibit a Mending the war making power to army * g-i'~- argued thatfuch problJM- dlcUted. a* I iiiidar*t*n< tt. by the MB ** innmeaMfj becauee UM CMUUUI- tog reaeon* Ktog* had alway* been tovolvtloo gave UM MgtotoUtre the power to check tog and ImpoverWhtog their people la wan. the President In hi* capacity Commander- pretending generally, if not alwar*. that the to-Chief through UM control over approprU- good of the people wa* the object. Thto. our Uoa* attendant on the power to r*l*. and Convention understood to be the moat opupport angle* The requirement, unlqu* to preealve of all Kingly nppreealon*; and they the Conetlt-jtioo Uu>t "no Appropriation of reeulred to go tram* the OooeOUrOon that afoney to that O*e atiall be for a Longer Trm no on* men *bou!d hold the power of brlagthan Two Teen" WL* dedgned to Uuur* re- tog oppceeMon upon u* " " view by each new Congree* of jM*io>0ueI V>*9tntr, Coagree* wa* aulefc to protect tt* exercli* of commard orer the armed force* war power* whenever the** wen challenged In tb* red*ll*t Mw M. MunWtn uid After fteridtnt Polk dUpatctMd aa army to "Tb Mguiauir* of Uv CniUd state* will tUtioo to "hot purautt" of an toradug ***be o(*fl*d. by tin* provWon (two-year appro- fc tote*, but wtthout go.m'.*a)uael apiirtetloDl. oo at to*M In vry two yean. font, the Houa* pamed a naolijUoa ataftog w deliberate upon the pro^r-rty of Harping that the war had been "iinniriiiarflyaBd a tfilllury force on foot, to come to BF uneotMKuUooally begun by the rraatfeeoiulion uo toe point, and to declare tt*1r **>' " MUM of '-b matter, by formal uu to ttx Tb* tweutleUi century, particularly dur-
76
um UM ertau. momenta of ihe Cold War. aaw Cumiw*. ba*e on- i incmsUic con^reaalonal acqateecence * to to eurcts*. detailed cor*ro,'aer (he'minOroaj preaMentlal aawjrrlneii of power. The ou* ef .executive;-*..^.- Z >lb-wa,ter mark of thlt tceod came when. Richard R F*nn<>. if, pitta*. Freaidn Truman committed troop* to-Korea ~Tb cnuclxc CD- ear Cor^teMrrrsairf lo without prior or aabeequenx approval by a *ped*xr and -de, >ia* taabloa^la t stock Concnex Thereafter Klaanhower ta 1M it. for dome the. owiy Utfnc *t can do 'te ef(ftrmou.)> and 1*57 (Lebaaoo>LKenaedjr fecutely aaaert IH influence gpeciAe* and la 1M2 (Gibs)** and fntinenn IM (Ton- detail* are UM Indlspeneablr TtnY'tc whle* kiBkl .* all couch* approval of military action Concreearaen me to work tajdoctrra:? toward ' by ein>Tawaenal reaoiutioon. Some member* broader luade of ovcnoght judgment* . . . ef CaBtTem bave hit UM lefkustne, -Die la ConcrcaiionaJ cootrol la ot w not appropriarc ineee CM** waa simply to raboer-atamp exec- la. UM context of UM realm** of legm! Mr* oue acuoo Benitnr Iforae. for emmpie. and executive *rrlr1iTnrr*fc'rt Tht- lefialaur viewed UM Tankka Gntt HeaottrUon a* a ought not to be crlUclxed for oatac; thow> cana blanche for pnetdcntlal dlMatOoa control* watch, are available to RUU ana Bat no one ha argued that ttus sort of wbich bl experience telle him ervoe; UM ' power. frcatnt Influence over raecutlvr i Kven when UMre IB need for rapid rwponae Supreme Coort JueUce Bobert Jackaon. icfÛwCabaxtmiaaUecnalsl.anacaamo- formerly- Attorney General to Franklin dauoD between the PreMdeni and Concrea* Booaevelt. leaniiuau plenary can be reached Co<Hpr.*a' rerponalWtty la -power over afreoprtaUoa*. with pertlcular t evaluate the eoiu *o4 pctorttMa of mill- reference to control of Che armed foroa* He tary brc1 Cjucma. can exercle* 5W wrote:" max MTK ft dedaleamakin( lTfK e/tr - "Conipo* alone control the ralalnf of tor rallla* -*-.uUve eammitmmt'haa been rrenue aad thetr approprlattona and may *ude at wcD a betort Tnrteed aoly then can determine la wfcat manner and by whei C-jOftmt gal poemnn of an U data rele- meana they abaO be spent for mtutary and na\ to the ooanaltmeot invoivec and make a naval procurement . . . While Cooereai caocvaluauon of it To altnr the not deprtfe Ue Prealdcat of the eoccmand ve peadc in military action of the army or navy, only Concrea* ran five I becauee be iemi It awmtial w> UM blot an krmy or a navy to comanad.I aacvncj even after Coogm."oc the I^M (enatal power of Oaiai'eei aver approi oc a tun evalKatlon of UM threat and prtations la reinforced by UM apednc rrfertb* oatt of matttng it, ha* ooncnided rnce to the approprlatloo* power w the Arti, la ( eareud OM PreetdeMa "de- cla I. aecuoa traat of power to Cootm* .Mnrer aijuond nmiutlon. The de- to "raise aad support Armiesr , t rr*'r'"t'T a war M illlTiient f-wn - There are numerous precedent* of carer oaf to aeeara a> war, tt Is nooerheleei within falljr placed Concreauoo*! reatnctlon* ofl cutcreiatoaet power. It Je the Uejalatnra a milirary appropriation* aanctlofirng th* UM nudirt neaa> check afamet unbrhlled of apprcprlatton a* a vehicle for achlcvinf ,' Ba>uiMa MUOb. auhaunuvt policy. In 1906. Pivudeni TbenIori>. the present lecliiatkm atUmpUnc dore Booanelt *cufbt or exarutlve order u to ectaboab. broad umetahtet of V3. with- reatrtet the UM of the Mann* Corp* to ond.i*J <s an appropctate way for Cooarea* to ahore beaee. apparently te an effort to ri,# rnfon* 1U pwlicy rafarduc national prtoo- UM moraie if the Kavy. CotraO dlnacrred tMe and *Jn rvmoval o< Of. military- pree- and aatifht to .force UM retention of the acce- firocn SouiMae* Ada. It I* a mandate Marine Corp*>on board bwttlofhtp* and cnu.t- of nation L wtU wtdcb the President aa Com- an. The House of Bapreaenutlvee* version of (Utnder la AM mast follow Oonfrawjlonal UM Kaval AppropnaUvn* 901 tt loa. M action will not ttxtrp UM Pnaldecf* power: 3*3M. aOth Con. 2nd gee* (IKWl. Included he may still dedds what la tactically the -UM fodowlof prorUC' and meet effective- way to withdraw -frtmttt. fjMt hereafter oaVer* -nd enHh p(rU u( the i iniiar iinT luted men ot the Marine Corpt ttuai wrrr tijiaw, will have -^rfT-^ us as heretofore on board all battiettBe . own paverc**** the war pokxy. bowvver. it >c drucrit^nu of not lev than elgbt p^rrx^lAs jnartlm one* the (fueauon f woop 'jlum tf the w*.nrth of the cniitd awn totmnnmutt formal!/ raised ^f th naty oo tiia veueu " ' Tt pririjo ms wr.i-M'C a* a C. tfnuf/no" rr>wia ;:ii u> c.w penaiiy fr executive i
vldee a parUcululf apt nt*tlT ot-Oc on been tr>T doubt ">K Caiie/aia has t^ power u> Hout evieutl>e actluo Chrujjiini,,n e' '** <Jbt focu*n on te Oi; >'K- '.." and -"jVi-. wxtnniiinK p-m .Sr^''.rs Lodî*. ('Lnus^ru and Borar. al. < p-^d :i^ pjrucuur co:->4;ti><n: a,->pr3pi t^'-' M9r*r under 3vi*f.K.>;i/>K ; ar tat; the ur>4 mete cr)t.ai touk
maniM eorp*. mak appropnatloiu for Ma pajr. bat proTld* that radb apptoprlaxlua aban not b* available vnlwa ta* martB* oorp* b* coploytd In aom* doltiMUd way. and I tbcr*for* an of tb* opinion tbat tbt pronaloa of tn* itatat* ta wtOeb you dlraet my attcottoa ta constitutional Tb* par^lll br to ta* Anwadaunt to but tb* War It o>nou. Conjrw would br urelalnt t'j, control orar xptaOU.-jnf to nforo* lla policy dedalont a* to wbrr troop* bould and should rwn be without dctalllnc Sam* flcoatora went cootldcrablT farther tLfflr nat by tne Commandjr ta C.it*; whU* In (MOalOf Concrete' power. Senator rufuo 'btrt ^nc>|etf. Coacrcn vould be txtrettinf wad: IT tuttonc aad coaatltattonal nualoa a a |Io dou&c . . . Goner*** ha* tb* power cback on t&* VMOUITCS power to *nf at* to ar ttat oncer abeuld m/t br *pend*d Anwrtcan rorcl la asajor coaflc: Kwoohtr MI Parian: of a parUealar corpi of tbr -vatf j war be r&ctrrtnac w%n tn* fnautaon r it-taould b* U-4ocxJ la particular tactical control o*r O coop* dnrtaf ih* ducafafcnt proccu -Acd a* cmpl* Act ti,nt UM rrtatdaat tt A moo nan/*- example ot Confranonal tfrM^t tMd MK>^ K ny tlMra would nof' effort* U> UM to* approprtaUon* power to prrrl^V Ccofmw) i.oci.f-'tti nrcMaf *- control military poUcy tm proridcd by tb* ot ordfttoc tt ra- *f- 70 Ajtnud bonb*r conflict. Tb* MOUM Arm*d 8*rfloi* CopU3l*-t*^v>atftf to inmir* if llo* btwta tbat tn* t*crrtarr'Df .Darcnat infflTid dUi power. 5ro- ralopment of a *up*nonlc manrxd lumber - ur'Pultoa eontlnmd: ln*t*d ot ntjjtf txcluatwly ou fvdJ taltv -I onoecd* that COOCTM* cannot ateolotelf fi'M Tn* ConmtlM** nnammtm,Oy airf*d control and f<,Ur U> ProMcnt. kut Ikat I* ta* power for Concr*** to n* approprutionc Unplj wtKn ( 3d vbL- )M act* a* rooimamt- nstricuonc to rcqnln afflnoatlr* poUcy d*r IB UM fialtf aAd tMa <jMrf4 of UM *- claion* by tn* et>U<rr < Ccrtal nlrtlx powwr m*pt * miUtKJ facet* and nutun of tbat to reoÛr* aOmatî* **cutit* action la ma . tJa**?vr that ptrtala tfistloctl? and p*cu- frtmMT than t* ncfatlv* power lmpU*d ta '*'*rtj to WMtfotiOTof a Commatcn- in Cblcf. an ap0ropr:alJn wnlcb merely rrrent* prior "^ thaw uutttrr b* U tuprnnc bin aftfr al* Pri4*nt4a: action ^ h U robordtnat* la all ea*tf t *uch rsta* A final, and moat relevant, mampl* of Cocand nfUaUob* a* CottfDi** atiall auk* ... (rww' cocdRlonlnf appropraUon* la order to IH|* u atÎUDf DOT* than any oUi*r com- affect military action la tta Defraa* ApJ.-Jmaoilrr In pofbi ot pawn, nernt Uiat b* I* prlauow Act of IftTO.'Tbc Actprorldw. -In Ua* wltb tn* en>mi intocuotf of UM uprwn* oncnnano>r. ... I* Ui propatM atorndnntt anjrtblBC aioi>- than ux- muornt of tb* Oeltctf StaU*. noo* or 1 rpf jUtloc It. u a ncuUUqn of tb* narf {n* funds KppropilcMd by tnl* Act aball a* *n< pA./i*i3o a to la vbat nuranvr tl<* uMd to Sovae tb* Introduction of AmarlKaH3<'"borp abkJI *trrt tB* rui:. vlwn c*n pouiid combat troop* Into Lao* or _ ( .It toairM plaa*ru bow 1004 Thailand." . at if*. -x wDfttxrlt ih Tboa frmpaw) na already u**d lu tpoprutlon* power wu UM *cqoi**o-io* of UJMo _i conditional approprtoCon paued Ft*>td*3t JTUoo. wno >icn*d its* Mil entftbocb hr-i cr CoafttM and va* part of Uw out corKlxrUanal objection, to revtnct pr*bin :r&Mj into law t>y rrrtldent BooMrelr ldnts*: KM -K mlUMry appfoprtaHow in a If u.* ^.a-.t*r bad OM no fartbvr. *c would way th*l (pttM* Conpewloaal policy jeh* oclr &mfim*' aid* of cb> p^ver jcruf jjftUnf tnt conduct or O Allltary intolv*. f I HOMVCS. U>* 3*<!r*tarj o^ Ux lUry took mrai m 0outbc*>;t AaU. UM prori*., i) UM Attonwjr Oracral Otntgf p. ccriex.ci<r far a ruling on 1U coniUtuMraben of Concjr^M fas* it* nlima doty bJd U>* fi! uuooal. of ffcutlatf tiethu' -so alMcatc fanber natiooal ret/urea* to t>M war in SouUr*tc A*i* Ve 4o cat *>fu bra on tn* wr:t*-oc' J.'. it,r^:or'?. In thr di:r.ar( of h; pow- tnat qu*e (bat 1* fur CoQfjaw to drm r.d du'xc r Conucandf >i Ctittl. UM cid* Wt>c we do argu* i tnat Conftmi bM r rn.-lTit <tti\r*r to dlrKt ttM Karirv O>rp* tbe pow^ru>o**d. dutyrxpreMy to \x> prform D7 'unction B!ch ft>!i )nolf mmfe* (bat wadatar. UM Tn CSooeUtoUoa ww *'* U-;'ii '( ririxl to align:* corerjutMawU power. Oner allocated, tbai power remain*. *r*B r/j.i" '.-.r " .-if to,'or r Mwuih irtnc oo-|an*i:; <v>opant. witlie -.p.. Ui* brnncl** orliciaaUy r*ertvla( f, TO* I/ j.i> i, h K Cjjr Ûc<l puwer a* Commaodrr tn >f n':t fj -r-_r a* ir -. to direct M Am*rie+f, irx^n U an- . tn *r.r. C'JT^> It tai fftrmrr fj crca'-r Ucin* In *fnpJorinc tl>o* '.roo^t- mar ot Ki**.
Coopm* power wa* a very Urnmt our 3t*Mr Bacon uked tbm whetbcr Coacm* <wu;0 ralfe to* President to rotor* tr,-x,jj fôji in* WstrlcC of Culmab:a after tb> Pnuoeai bad pUcvtf ibera tber*. Senator C-intnlu* and Ifcrtuwr Borah both ekjxric.*dced that Confreu bad tb* coniOtutlcoa1 yeanr to do ao; Msatcr Lodge *l*p. Admitted mat bt* objKfltne wtrt on policy no? on whether Ooncmc heft ttM power to to renrlct ta* va of ap-
78
, not have beta eBceeatve la recent time*; that tlone acta that condition the approprlauoa question > Irrelevant to this etady. What la upon a epadftc nee of the money panted relevADt Ix that nmtnet too. received war- Third. Confreai under the CcotUtuUon maklaf power, the power to determine when abould accord tiie President enough leeway and where the United States win commit lie as Commander to Chief to safeguard the arena* and Its ieaumu to a major conflict, withdrawal of American foreee leeway The Confutation also allocated duties, which the Amendment to End the War The President baa the duty of protecting carefully preserves. But It la for Congress to Amcnratt troops during an engagement. Be decide how nstrletlvely to curate the epmuet therefore be accorded by Coogrees a proprurjons power. certain leeway la controlling tactical dad- finally, it la Incumbent 1900 each mcmaton* effecting the safety or American sol- bet of drmejees to fulfill his oontUtutlooal eOers. The rVeeldtnt. howeter. also has the role by eierclemg the coogrettlnotl power to tfatr of maklnc sore that the laws are faith- determine the military poUey of the United ruQy executed. Be mast therefore accord to Statee. Onngnes the lawmakmg power that Is eon- in the twentieth century strong Presldcn-s msmoaany their* to aerdae. and be mtwt have eserdaad their powers to the fur it. napect any tmn'teeliwiil mandate oa the whu, omigrteett aO too often have qnletly aaofatlon of wittVan resources, acquiesced. That each power has sometimes The ppllcaMlKy of these eoaclnatons and lain dormant does not mean that It ha* been ef the it h and analysis upon whleb abandoned, for to the coastlutlonal scheme they an based, to the vartoue amendment* of thing* rnngTese cannot sba/idon It. The now baton Coagrea* eaa be (ncdnctly put a* power must always rest la Congress to decide toOows. when the ncUoa has had an the war that First. It Is entirely appropriate under the It can afford to endure. - Constitution for Coagress to denae the scope If Confess) does indeed wish to restore the nan objectives of commitment of military historic beltane between Coup ess as arbiter Soree* to combat abroad. It ha* acted accord- of American military policy and the Preslindy la the past two deud'f The ltd* Ito- nt as Cnnmiander la Chkf. It must vow tt-^t Ctsmnltment* Rrxo>auon ssseri* the *eek to Implement Its derisions by use of irnot C' HT *ote- thti no such cammli- the key tool K wee given for this purpose: Unit be made without espttctt con- the power to aOoeete money for natteoal Sccood. CXnijeai may eonetituuoniKy ef(*t lu poiley determination by app.-oprta-
79
coicriox or AXTi-G4>\Ticv>iKicr>niK>TE v
, Senator CoopFJj. T have on* rthtJsmstmn which interests1 mo, >>ry ji. I suppoau it ht vfrv, difficult^ fm- us to inow vrbat .the actual' " weigni.ôf, public opinion is .in support of the'vrkriu .South Vietnam, ; 5oif. I note tla* lastywtr Wtieii the Senate was elfif|efl that the "V3el,\' ;ri"hi*e pople votetl against the Government, They i&rtcdL no ûiti- : *. Government Senate:"?? tbt correct? ' ' -.-""- --""" ivMiutor H&rjKUt.-1 don^t recull what the majority was. Tb'eW'weiv " Menjberc H*eted to that-Seb*le't-Ivich -ha\-e.btiic'r viewpoint*!. C :- ;:" :-' ": -Senator COOJT*. An anti-Gcvsmnwnt slate won, which indicates rouc-y Arrot " In, theycncih8t-ire should i^ll out all our foniCif, and I'mnst say :> 1 tWnk vcha*c-ve,i' ilic. Presicteht says His policy of witbdniwinp forces v. s means that the. rnir^d States wiil p]i oit all forces. 1 tliink there '; is i-aotiier alfern.*tHS even iraft\ rt^niilitury vJevpoxnf^bcfc a^-iitnc we tib putt" cftii all of cur tw^fv* ia'thne-anv diftVrrrnce, would thcre.be~ an;.' rhang* in our public policy i*nd TOrpipri-jQcJity "aboi& jpvjrur i -iisiar.ee to countries, in Asia or elsewhere? Would thereLe.a distioe:-, . -on Ix-tween our poIic'V toward whatevereffort rljevi-wde toward thcii-^ own s-lf detennina'tion. it ikVruaeh abuswd word^tharv thoseVei ' al>out assisting Western European nations to' keep-., fJwir SenatorllAinrxo. Well, Senator Cooper "V Senator C^TOPEH. I sense a difference, I do. Sejator HATFIKU*. Yes, I a^rn-e tliere is a \-ery distinct diference. Senator COVPER. Tliere is an important difference. Senator HATKIKJJ>. I think the basic difference is the tbimz'hat led to this i-onimittee's sponsoring the national commitments resolution in which it K[>ecincally pointed out the fact that if there arc any commitments to which you refer in other parts of the world that they should !* leased upon such, based upon, treaty, statute or concurrent resolution of lx>tli houses of Congress specifically providing for such a coiiiinitiDent. Senator C'OOITJI. Senator Fuibright and I. since the language i ou^ understand it. S-nator HAITIKU>, Tliat is right. Senator COOPKK. Anrl I agree with you so far as any action under taken militarily, but I sense in manv of the statements that have been made that we will, and we have no further great concern in Indochina in our own interest, but this withdrawal of our involvement in Vietnam is quite a different situation from the interests we may have in othi-r countries. Senator H.tinKU>, Senator Cooper, I would not want to imply or leave the iipn-H.-*ion that I believe that we sl.ould get out ana have no further involvement or concern with Indochina, I think President Lyndon Johnxon made it very clear thaf he would offer even great rnassiie economic aid program to both North and South 'ifter this war wa^ ended. I think President N'ixon has iridsiuifcd very clearly
.'tiiis wjntr^s.SefiJTtL-lM hfclp.'n-build this part of -die "world, H i tJntkil}*fci Vre-mttters,thafr.slipuM he rnnstdbrcd irad determined A>r th*âf jCopgrff^faiioBae form x)f legislative process. -. ";&Brtiorôof^l,thirit^/F^ ti is tp get'out^Sjnicklj-^-l^seJWe, but in * way which wilj give 'rwsoat6<êrc6iuifrics,â*Tc,~tlie'rJN'.thii Asian countries, kncwing.thst vre are getting out, to step 'in and try to make political settlewT^Jit. ia SqutH*.aT. Asia. If we fail to^Jtt political agreement. 1 ,thtrik w^'will hu\-c lost A-carJ; nd years nU tent* of thousu-ds of !>. ;W.TnIlb^>J-tJwe<|<rtqf20.vcats: .. " l"he Citinocvx. Tho Senator from New York, - C Senator J^nrs. Senator Hatfield," I tr a cosponsor of this ,i. ap*l I wi*l lo>Wount-e that immwiiatcly. ' Scn.".f or HTHELO. \V* are rerv pro&d to have tour s^jpjwtf .^ ?*jiAfor Jjivrv^-Svtlien are no fa'jc colots in qiWstioiHitjr yotubut I <!< thliik some jyiints welr.^r<uît-oul. y , \ .' ^ . :^ J thmk : D^ Senator Cociper^ ix>V^ &*&> t*"ar i$ un -iustrurocril xf ^TS*nator..lAvrrj. Kx*f ly, ind tan' fjtfthat we end, tV- war In- "Ret- :>^. "ntinfdoestt^.iiK'antb'ai-wthawA*<i^jiht.'ortal|tfil^y.t*our imrtkrptt- . ~ . . s ;'i5ûtheaffaiof Aifia^doe^jL?,-. z > " -," ;; ' v -" >. ;-!ScnJiroF HATTTETJ). Eittcity.^1, ; - . . ? - ' --^-;A-:_ -7,"' >, wriwiTO/We just pwujfcitanothwway. .'". \ , ' " , i KLI>. Exaot'ly. - ' ' . - 1 " ' . " ' , ' . . ' ' ' ' ' ' , . -, .''."' ' i.Bcoaurfe w-t(fin<ithis iKilicyliigldy improper., - . " ^ That is the ^jurpwe of this whota rwoJutKm. "" : :.' i)inrEHEs;ci'jTtf rtacMbtxrt WITHORAWAI^ p>ucr I i i J.vvro.- yoy: the Iwiflic hirtoric ditfctvnce between us and the I'^wideirt is setting tKc <late for withdrawal. Tbt-n- is nothing ls^ >vKfuiidaniciitx] (!mt we ditTef on. The. President M\V. you quote him tm \i>ri\ 1, Vffl. "Our goal is totu! Anwriân witJidrawa) fpim ViAt:'' tint u our fr'nl. The only ijuettion is rfial! we act a datf or shall IfATnRi4>. I would disagreeSenator Javita." . Senator J.vvns; Plcaac. -v , / Scjiatur H.VTHKIJ/. Tin- ifs<rretfljenf 'nutiM U> Iwstd on a. furtlxcr 'otnmojii or ijuufr that I niad ntti'tbut>d to tluj Prwder.t anj tKst is in rflatinc this whot niatti'r|o'to likHibood fr the fossihihtv of l he Thiuu-Ky rtrfritni- to iiutmtntiii ifsi'lf. In *tl.'i-r words. I am nt the that.' the- I'nwwWt 1a= an jfddifJAiiuljor.nnirK^nr or an addiit I* TIiieti-R\ or t<oi(y>if(* pirn-, caHVrthan ju-t - -. . S-nittir JVvtTfc. V\VII/ir. VJKW of thV farf tJi th Frftjc*<imr >**!t no ifuf* 1 fit a If. ttwi\ auv i*oncHtir>ri.are inip'mpashi<fivtj.in the utlainnwrit of his i/oal.. You _ttCr.re*IJy jirorin^r niv poiijt. In other words, ; to ( jtoal wUhoiit'a /Ifif*i> to w t ILO ff/jj il all. h&'aiiyi' if i'MH h* ''
h*riiaiortiATrtsu.utn.vw!Wttu'y. -
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.'Senator JAVETF. Vice President ffyiells us tta.ti'tf could be 15 to .UO "yean*. Th*i. &Sifi ehconi'tsmd within Presidcnl^XixoTLSgoal. The goal x< totiirwithdowaUMvH it can be Attained in, 15 ta'^rt years. It . ." Senator... HATF:U>. Wefl, Senator 3avTl3. if 1 mighj. inject her*. again- .v would, tnme back to that questtoii as to whether or not the rtxîdo;)! is acting upon ft constitutional basis of commander in chief (>> a^hitsre thai pu)itj>l . goal or whether it is merely " to protect the
rent KEmsr, WITHDRAWAI, DATE

Senator .fAViTsr. In view of the 'fact thy: I am thr author of the war > ill. 1 would like to go into that constitutional question vritli . Hut finrt we havv to nail dowc ^by <lo wti set a datr. and I know that yoti have not ca vilcd about the'. ".Your date was much shorter uittil (x-ople like myself, and others of us -on the Foreign KeJarioiw (V>mmittee joined you. last year and tltcn you accepted a date which yon didn't carr for too much but. nouutheltse, to gHt the maximum sup porty6u want for the Dumber 31 date. ; .You mijrht jro for January 2; Chat isn't the oritjcal point. Th? l jw'tnt w, is it not, that you wanf.to fix, the whole eaeenoe of thi* Senator HsmKUi. That as far as ending the military involvemejit in \rictnam, yen. But H objective is also restoring again a balance between ti^ executive and the legislative. In my opinion, and discussing this (natter with dmtingnislied lawyers and. of course, I am not a lawyer. Therefore. I would be presumptions to come here and pose as a cirsitutiofial expert, but the point has* simply lieen made by very (ii.xtingiiixhcd menders of tlie profession that tf rhc Congress wants to g*- in a chivk nd balance action on thit j>ref nt war, we must enact ty/ip of I#^ri>lariqo- A dJarHtioj nf war powers is already a moot its hts* Vi*f IJAWI id concerned. ily place we have to move is atifft- jmrw rttine which is ;lcarly ' wrthiu the. cniisfif utional it^jKiui-ibjlity and I<OW<T erf the ( '-ongrcss, .So ro/iHeqmîlly. in additioî^tt* setting a date, it ha.-* as 'Us' objective. tl>? jtfcft of bricging the Coogn^s bark into a responsible mle in this H-lioIf iiiam-r of war. Senator JAVITJI. ( d/>n't think then* is any question a))out what you my i x.-i'jH that I Ix-fieve. UK lawyer, fhaf the power of the ('ngivj fo make ruW for ffie Antwd P'in* of the L'nifed States wuttld al*^ "jcti'nd hi-re. ,iud irn(trd miglif be a mon- Humniary power ev-n than flit {u>i\rr <vf rhe [iftcs* InH-niix*' if would make anv a'-tioii without cont'rvs*'irtiiftl tt{iprovtl to deploy tin- forre^ of the I'niU'd Mate* "nlawfijl. I would Uki- to jo,nf out thcfv have l^*it cwx of Jaw 01, the !xv>k* wJii-r*- wi- navy infiiliJN'd. for x.impw, Uw tiw of drafts* in given |<la'- ,r r.acii- 'rflter ivgulationH re|>e*Jin:th' Arnkfd Korccn. liirt juxt iik* >iiu fwk a ]orkger oat-, I took your coiirw 1^-aiw I think we have to &i thf rnaxifiMini amount of agrnor.icnt on it raj*>rially in the b*!! of n war fxwvr* bill 1 know vv an- vt-ry nMK'li for it and BO 'an1- nu>> W!K; an- with you. a&d I hop* we will altimo/4rly ger. a
But. the next point, so flits date is the- critical factor: is it not! Senator HATTIELD. Yes. it isSenator JAVTTB. The objection m.tde to a date by the President is that it telegraphs our punches to the other side, et cetera. Is it not a fact that the reason you want, the date is precisely because you want to notify the other side we are gt&ing out at a time certain and theivby do two 'things: One, put rhe South Vietnamese on their own where at long last it is they not we who have to negotiate if they exjtect to survive? Senator HATFIIXD. Exactly. Senator JAVITS. And. second, meet a condition which has heen established and which you apparently can't shake with any kind of an action acceptable to us. to wit, once it is clear you are going to get outthfj) other things will happen. Th>e are the two things.
UCPOBTAXCfc OF TEUKKAriUNG ASTOCtrAX F/.OPM:
.Senator H.rmno. Yea, those two things arc into. Let me advert to one other Urea, we ought to telegraph the American people. T think. first. and"f/>r? moifc, it is important to telegraph to the American people our specific .'^Lntefy Ijecause again KB the President stated very elo- quentty\beiore the platform committee of the Republican Convention .in l!)0*>, the .rohnsofWdnijni.stration had failed to take the American people into jta confidence on this whole-issue af. war and,j>eace and. therefore. tltp. pcoplf lost faith in the Johnson udminist ration. I !*li*'Y<t Cuodidate Sixott at that time was rigiii in his call forÂiidnr. afi I Jjclicvt- he was right uiicn he. licrfliac Pjvudent and agair. referred to the re{Kisih)lity of this gowrtfrnent to. arm llu\ Ameri people with (he troth and give, them tl candid -fa'^siôf rlw war.
Let me comment, if I' rould /urthvr, that- (/-If graphing the enemy about 'j. date Kperifir. is not quite as cliiir ciir u sittiation as it might imply, hncftiw;' first of H. thr liable objective of withdrawal h ly been felegraphed Jo them. Soft in nor as if * are givinguway . very " important trrrt or soim- great .itnUegic advantage tlmt wi. -Sol KrUrk vchcii Aay that- we telegraph to rhc,em>iny a date, it vf.>ntd trltrgrapli thi ineKMigi1. it tcjids to im|>ly ^tneho.v we ar*- giving awat n iniponuut jrarn iri our dMc, and I l-lievi- that irf ) ncrunttorvycul'xik^t the situation. J a^r.-pf flhtf. Srnator. and agrw wjfii you.
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ITir th-r t-hinjf f wmiM Rkr t<i axk yc-j alcr/ut irf tFii highly vexing i|U'S*ion of nationti] hotxu, Tlwn' in ulways wmi implicai'um ihal iho*- vt-|;f,K-ajjt tnk-nvi- Vidiiaiiittn. coniproiDi.tirigthfiia/tfiniti lionor, N'oH-, it thl'i, in yw jijdgjjK'tc. i- war it whHi the nctioral. honor of t.lu- r"n>td 6f ati'-s '<"- inv'ol u<l i j H ay"* sty i M^nnt/ir Jf \*nrjjr. N'n, S>ii&ti;r Javit^. f do uM ^-lii'V it is, F'in;! <rf ull. iinfiitul honor would tiau>. (< Ix- pr^liciitcd ii|x>n HOCK kifi'J
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.iI or-other kiii'l 0 ft t i r j c ^ r w r h i c r i tT*-P were violatingor v c . wVtIf \'f. bi*akirjand when-you tyyjk at w-har, our commitment id in Yietiwnuas* yon so well \avtvt t n\*rfttaHjnf history, tlnf this most w .outdsxywflû letter 'rit?nbyPitisicl(ini:,loliitinn1:n.Prcaid'n. Diem in- !bse;ir_ of a treaty ornu iffrwinent or somethinjr tlse. alid on that K>ti>r tho*. rhv emphasis .-ic&iiy statx-d was ryxwi i-Tononric aid-pred* ;rate,d upon reform:rwhiVh never rarne about.i :, : Therefore, i find -we have no :oiitcactuil retiôoship that we xmild IK-Yirtlatinir to }r>& on^nutioiutl hohor^':.' ^ -- > SLrr-ndly. 1 jhink apnin we, *an Joot to history. When thcâttlpôf I>i^j; lifi-ji Ph |W\dxl and Uy-thc way. at that 'pouit ihe French hud ^ .'. (o 1 kill rti<v irt .tlw-if JTa'vor, for those who.-have that litnd of nifutiility'to jiKlgc.JniHtary profrnims hy kilt ratios.-J-lwttcrf. one can !; ok at tin- iiationai-prert.!^ and Ihe mrierul world prestige of France, :i( riirtl riuH-, and I*j wliftii they l&ft Alj^ria. Instead of losing nafi'wwl honor they enhanced their iwtionnl honor in those cases. In the evvs o.f the world we ha* e- t:onrrvtcj irrcvocaWe evidence that we suffer rinhiy ir; tin- world's pnlilir opinion bermi* ojT otir continued involveiiK'iit in' \"i(naiii..Thfi wnrJdTa opinion is not pro-Unitt >iatcs, it is :(iiti-l'nitd States on tht nne<rtion. AVhcn we get out of Vietnam. rah> tlnui wntiiirte sulferinc in the loss of national prestige nnd imtionnl honor in the ryes of tTn> world we would gain national honor ntnd riarional ])rt-sHge. Alul, IrtstJy. I think at home thnt whifh has-divided and that which . lias rri'ntf<1 so much dissent in thixrountry, if we had this withdraw.-il fn>m Viffnanr onn; again I (libk we roiifd repiin our national honor arid iiatiofixl fiiitli within this country as well as in the world. .ScnHforJAtTiv. Ixn't it :t facf that oneof the tliing-s that is dragging u- down and that makes, for cx.unple. Knrojxr fhink we have ]<rst our Diari'If*" in terms of effectiieiiif>s as a naf iitn is the fact that xve do not '(Tii f< ] jil^.lc f/i >xtricatr oiir.'vlvi-s from tin- fiiiapnin- of Vietnam? Sen:rtr HATFIKIJI. Kxactly. As you lof>k lit it without any nspiralions :it nil Init usinjj the vernacular, when the- greatest nation, the iimst jx/wi-rful nation, in the world is tied down l>y a rinky-dinky oiiiktry liy measureiiifiit nf jKwer Or prefifige, any iiKSisnremenf we rivi- :i.- to [Hjwcrful or prestiyeous nations, this itst'lf givt-> a loss of li'iM'tr n> V"1. wi elfHjuently stated.
IJTtXTs nf Tilf. WAK iV f>. fxiJJKXnf StTl'ATfOX
S-n;i(<ir .f,\\rr.s. In ti-nn>i of tlw: domestic situation isn't the case nimlr l.y t i n - f:n-t t h a t Vietnam i-tiic Iwmc in tlie throat of this country for m-yf hinjr if iloo, frr ils halaniv of payments, for its production. f-<r flu- iiiofiintion of its youth, for the amount it 'pends on defenw:, fpr it-, ;il>ilit-y to rlis|Mi-K' its own influence and forces everywhere in t!if world, i-n'l then- lwai> the IKUU- fif Vietnam in if* throat? Senator HVIKIKIJI. Kxncily. S'liator .favits. you put your finger fin id'- MTV imp'irtHnl national insuc und n<it just an international issue. f M;I-> ntrHmir tiiis morjiiny w i t l i the Huildiiifrmid Trades f'oiincil of tin- On-gdii AFL f'[O. and their gn-at roru-ern and emphasis, of HJI. on jf.Ir, and economic problems they wen- sun*i;ring as rng men of f h i - country.and they were talking almiit various ways (ey l reili-i-iii t|ju( economif sifualion, | f i n u l l v snid t o them that
in my opinion tht * ? ** Oeorpe Meanvfl3$dother leadership of thf AKJ-r-CIO were shooting ~ri*ht on" as ut*stheV*r.9otoiprk. figumtm-ly apeaking. giving full support to ilw war polifjy. they in turn theuwottJ'd hv* to realize some of the implicit lona iuad nunificatioiw ind repercaasioni) Within die economic system due to that wr policjvThey could not hulivotoed. . -. - v WhW-yoo talk today to itmlrnfc* and their diShtchantraent. disillusioiinieot with the svtftem again, the bone of contention i VirfnnL Look at'lhe *cr))ojnoil proUtm tod*^ tlmf lias bec<mie the nttmbrr .^.,. r>u ^ v ... polky. lint we U(j'X dt^V^ntlt the eeoiogicil /prohlen; wffectirely in *hw country: w*aiv wi)y-ôinj to give nodM<L? trtjott aurgery i?do< Uxansepf the ov^r<iiunitojenl in Vietnam. ->f>, w-yofi wy. e\ery isaui.'. medtetne, hi5'T<!^, iood. education, all of tbcs^ slwiwl i'\x^ <i; this country, I think, 4re infentlatwi to; t bis cottntry*s policy m 'Indochina. , v
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Errtvr ov Twt or coMit-vsroot n . JAVITB. Koiy word about th leâl situation which I tried to deal wif.h. I )wve ttirays felt wlicu the fiulf of Tonkin resolution was repealed then lite, question was of origiotl constitutional [tower between the President and the Cojiprtw, that i where we stood. Notr. I would like to a*k you this (juîon. Do you feel, and is your case based upon, the fact that there U at least a serious doutit as to whether the^Miwer jf the CominatKU-r ID Cliic f extends to a continuance in \rietnan; bWd ujn cooditions whkii go beyond the security of tltc AtiM-n<.'x t roopd in tlu- condition of withdrawal \ S>utor HAtnrx. entor Javitt>, I n-ûll on the floor of the Senate yt/ur aritunM'Jrt ut. tlte time of the (iulf ; Tonkio rejN>al in which you mif ihwe. |x>intii, and I <vrtain!> i^rueti with you tltcn a I do today on that point. And the very'^.icart, ihc very theais, of my appixwJi today, besidtitlic moral quection. i^tjie. constitutional question. Tin- Pivsidrnt dM- h\v rlir ripht iu ( 'oninuinder in (,'hief to do everything netiiwar}- lo prrjtect thn; troops in an action of withdrawal. Hut miicn In- aildto that irrtflin ^litjcîl inil'li<'ations. Mich a#the support. f the Thicn-Ky n-jriiw until 5' cn,tskt? can- of itsrjf. or oibiT political involvement or other ofTk-miive military actions. I fr"1 h- lu-; tlici) ehcmfad hiri constitutional dutu-n jw Commander in Chief. rovoBWWiovAL AUTHonrrr TO KT ptat/r.rvr .Si!nti- JAVJT*, Ttareforc would it IMS fair to say an, tlie Pn-Mdnnt liab not aimc t*> UA tor a confinutit jun of authority ttiat vt* arc n/>' only art'ot^f in w.v to not ptf fundw. Imt * arc crwreicinfr our rtwwUtu-. riouai nirtlmrity. At )u> won't uk UM fc %. A'H-i'utiwi to i>xpre~ci>njrtvMionn] autlo>Atio;i for hi* <'i)djt;inat mir jiKJ^rrt-nJ :+)iaf we have Ifw fon?tifot4oii| jitfiii to Jurt w i t h ret-jx^-t lit M"tfii>jr a and that m- uiv c UYinV'Mif H and ^rii |j -the din-rtiofi that we <i". Sfnafir If.vrnr.1^, Kxot-tly, und |cf ;w <W ow yj)ii ey it. in ft 'linfabtv('i) t-fdii^ ru Itfil n!Mfit rurtinjL' off finuU ft/"
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thcW*;i*.-<tal. SMiteiicw we are undermining, vet- are pulling tbe /ut frmn nnder the lx>v* already in Vietnam not atthrir o\rn will but Stvauwf rh.ot>dt{3 of their Government. - , . ... I tut K-t UK point our the fact tt*t by settiug" this dU% nnj as you argued with u^hut year when we extended the date, vcegivttbe Prfcsi- ' <tent & muotufbir timr to accommodatr'th* withdrawal program in, oT that a|Mvific titlr. So we would not j>ufi the ragout fi orQ*jVf eri tlw indication of awcli. J rbiufc hu Li. tlic \ kd mmiav'o uidiUt* tlat tlrit is not <>nJy rcurstjtutipnal to joovr au. but it is aim a rreuonpUilr m.ie io irUrion io oiir Senator jJAvm. Tbank
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fOiTWcV IHOKWAI. At AX
My i<MC qu!tioii w thie, I Qk naturally so deeply nîwtful of tiwr vio of Senator C.'uopvr. He \v UA a*n alferpttivc. Tlut aheris if tKe Presideiit would HJwd birnsolf of \"u4n3iuzxtion. cndkioc. th- HOW condition, am! simply maki- a fiat rommitmpnt of whltdrawal. tbaf that.niigfat be a more thinjT than setttnjr a datt-. Inu't it a fart that that ut jtrt another aitcrtuUni: ( lit Ulirr rlut tht- 1'rwidwit's conditioned withdrawal is hi* WjJution: tiic date concc{t which is haded inwn pos?itiv valets whirh wr claim for it is an altprnmt i v- to that or tlte Pnîdt-nf. S'natwr ( 'ooju't's oiicefrf is in. alternative to bcth. It co!d <vtur<-ivably b- offrrrd us a (\ th Sjt' floor. bit in [i iixriplr, foo. it a<vvpfs thi authority wliioli w<> JISVP ami our rijrhl to jmrtin|>aUt in t!i<? war decision. Senator H.\Tnrxi*. Seumtor .ravitij. I think like many things in tbc Irgistatiu- [>njcf%. jx>Iitici. jri-u*-n<l!}'. a lot dcprnd* U|>on tmiinf. Witii all <(w rtHpcct and rppanl and fniltuSfctinn tfwif I lm\i> f>r Serwtor I would disajrrv*1 that \\ ri-pnat-itf^ a viubFe *Ircriiutiv<> 8t thix _ It wain to ffii that we !>Jtv^"laJ tmt niu'-h of ti irx Vieliii eiuniîatotl from tht- Whit* H'nut' 'u'0<f>?r two tfoto. i-Vv san'whar ha i*f'urfi M'lw?b f \u>, i . <iiiFi|i hut lU !'nim' ilcicloi*",' uiiikr tfur. J>hftK'r; wfni'mi^cififfir. I thiuk t'>1ay at l>a>4 K ym-n bv ti-rtsiu poli< t.'uit tlif 'fivdibittty nlri'ad> a major f aMor withOiin d(ii;iL!.-rt cat ion 34 it ri'la*^ t> I fhJJik, th^rvfort', f" Wrirfy of Senator wi/u!d 'itiin!y U- an (u/d^rxfn(l*Wi- ulf<T:wtivi- within (his within vn sreu of fH'opIc wlio Iiaw (ui;Mifll îfiijffi''f ii lint * an* not 'Ji'slnif with tliaf îirl^ in thr ntuation now a* n-laf^s to tb* Wliitr j|i>usf anl ilw [oj>U- in J.hw iusifrx'. A* f*r J thr PounJry ^nTally ip-wnHvnn*]. ami rtn \i<^ of tFw? Whittf H*- rii-.lio; i,{ t'nîibilii v *x a r^li*<t- /n', wbHluT A- s^ ffr'Hi ii iwl. TlM*fr''lv. WH}II' to hate - ; ''!* \\thi] \ i'ir- oh JartTKt a.sto v*a''liy wbai 'i dniH:il rttiirft \titti jii-4 putting it en jjcjw-n*) r vni.-. st-riaf/.r ,f \\ift>. I ilwroM^rlily ift-i.-jii wJiar ru -IM n'l I tifirik it fhc r.itjoii{f. If i* a ftftf nlwr h'mi-ii-r. tii*f ;( .St'rt'itor
Oh, yes. \ ." : <"->-r .Senator .Urn?. At least cojolntly with Che President" r ^;. Senator IJATfTEU*. Exactly; .-. " ' '*." ' . . " - -. '-]"' Senator Couwnr. TTonld th>. Senator yield then:. I-said liiat I :<Jid not bdieve the President hod nny constitutional power excepttu -with-draw thie troops, and to . ouly that power nca-ssMy to prot^t:tbttii againstinminent danger.Thi**yifw wouldruleout aiHhorily f^r the Cambodian and Laotianexpeditions. .-. ' ' l . - ' v . ' " ' -.' *-\ ' -i . rinrnvo OFF nrxua EXTTPT WTTHOHAWAC AXD PICOTECTIOX or IKOOPS ' " . -. ;.-' W)t I would propose would cut off funds nfept ro provide .for withdrawal of troops aiid to protect theoi againf cmmbt^tit dangerNo oUtf r funds could he used tx*pt for that piirpow. -'. .^ I ntisod thest'. questions with you t)dnyJ*Jiusc;I think it n>ight. better solv*? these questions. We would^lop^thc President^hcn would uppr. H \*A'w.y of complete withdrawal and that IIP would negotiate for a date which could bring about more sui-ely the release of our prisonerHthan jiftSKtiinjr a date and leaving. \*^ ; ; . .ind.Itjtink much tnorv important is an oplwrtunitj- to negotiate for A jtol^JrAt Hfittlemont for all thfe states involved h>- the war in. Soutlveaat Asia. That political aettlement is to me tlie mtvA important object)r<inext to fretting out. Other count rieswhirh now f di)ft"t believiare veryâipiimis to negotiate berauso tley don't know wlirfhcMr wu aiv " ever goin^ to leave or whrthrr wo. wil! have a rea'daal forc% if tl>ey know *c art not poinjr to htn'e a residual force, if -they know the only policy of <h United StateH is to ppt oirt it would tlnuj be *n oppor-\ tiinily Co Mjfûrap^' other countne* to enter to help make a s'ettleo^nL lliese third countries Alight Iw Me. to n*mvne soinelhin/r like the The qi.tinn I raised about nâtbp .Conditions favorable for an international settlement hns nivd o^c-îons in my wind abcrat your Amendment brtcaone I think it Iftsi\efthat issue KS well as tlm prison"!? cf *ar snd the question of-ÔDtinned hoxtilities unsettled ajnxt a* much a* the Yletiiamizatiori Approiwh. Jusl jnovj'tig out on * rwiain dHte.iriii not itwlf r*aiilvf fhow, question;-. Senator JJVITS Mf. ^J.-iinnaru ?f f may jurt any in re&pons^fo wluU -Sentitor. Ift1krtd and Stutator Cooper WK|, I consid^f Hie ][>n/JXM! Sejmlor C.'o>f*r has incu?ioned an alternnfjvc wirhi: -the j>r""" '!^ <ht tliie KcOovvn):Ha*fioId resolution <yt to uw*'rt. T' "" tbink it verj- itnportn.rf that a thinker Jibe S*>nator.C<x/{ i the Mine, concept, alth/m^rh \\K. I;H a different formula for cJea!i;r~ with jt. Tle < 'aA.nA>. Senator Pel). S*'j*(or I*W,T, Thank you, Mr. Chairman. J u[>fitojrixe for <if fdnff with yon throughout the mornirijr. I wa <rJ)nirhi>( an fxliwati/m Sulwurimittee licarinfr, ami I urn prwwtily <lsm'tic!illy managing ^ hill on (lie Floor,
wKi/vmK TO vrmtAKH tx ACPIBCTI: 1 v.anU'l. real I v. to mak*- a Matcmciit (o.wel<:orne the veterans* who re in thin rerun \iffnuw, I tliink. it i< the. veieraim wlio ran do more to hnlp rlmuj(K policy and to Iw-lp uffa-t puMir opinion than any )thi m tlte c/)unf ry. Tli* vrt*rli know what *ar in.
87
J fctioW.'I recall in piy own experience coming, back oit-ji hospital ship in World \Var II that one of the thinps which made rhe irer, to war was twin}? what if dil to thosti-ltocky <MIVS who iiact o;>iv lost limbs. who- had only Iwcn wounded, t.ot to mention thoM- of cr friend:. *'ha<iid nttf conw. fnck. I wns struck, too, at the statistics showing that in the Senate those f us who are rharartfri/ed ss. doves pentrtTtlly have a hijrtier perrtntngp of veterans amomi us titan those who are the hawks. : For hisf.Wv. b-2 pcnyrtf of the S[x>n5&rs of the C'oo[>er-ChHrcli >itiifnittf.'jr;t when ir was nrfed Irwt ifav, 197<\ were veterans, whereas only ',() A-n-ent in the innate n n whole ro veterans. Tin? (KJi)it I ;mi nnkui^ r is that you veterans who lave come, down lien- cvs 'lUp a jrfi-at deal all of us 'who hn lone: opi^^sed the war. This- Kir, ns vou.Vuow, , just as wron^r some yeare apb^s it is today. It \*i$ bvin^f <it>.~tji<; ron^ pn-niiso, ieain'/rnl [irc-fnise>> if you will. rert*/nljk laJ: fîiuKonal inttrftst. lack- of iTiiiwioiwaess of what our friii- riiterust* tfert 4 fir V yvsirs aj?>, Hut. at that tin>e. ptthlic opiniuu wan very rmich apainst us, and n jrreat delK is owefl to the c.fiainiA -J of (his conmiittir who a-f the hearings wliich j>nxiuced tlie chanirc <f climate iii our country, whit'li made jK-a<'4- no tonpor a dirty word. 1'iitil th:it time, jn-ace was confu.^-il with NYm>ns Nellies, with an iunlvJla'Mtiuich aiul a r*riety^f things. Senator Fiilhri^lit sliowr-d that J>efj>pU' n-ally lMlieved in jH\tce, that it was not a dftty word, hut a jrnod word, anij prohi<sfJ tin- c]imiitff Imf prodiiivd i'ivdh]i>nt>IfthM.s0fi*snlMJifaiiiin. . Tiicn-, is no partisan \<ui in thit statement Waiisc most of iis at (hut tu6- ftpre of th SUJJK> party as our I'nwlît. So I tiiJJik that the U't-ran.s ran do mon- to carry our nn-ssaî- fo (lie country in what they are doing lyre toilay than AJIV other Mnjrlc ^roup. I would ;t.itfhxt tli.- Jt-ss wrolfv the unifonu ih<> Jtiof*- effwtivt they an- in t!it* t>rof/n^nn<l i-xcn-isK1. fLfliiffhtvr..) But another [irofilt-m IHTK ^/Jft tlii.i I -would dtn-ct to th<is thr<|)ii-tion of ending tbe war.
KVH
\\V all know that any ti'cie this war was WXIITK! to I* ended in the hi rf f- \<-ars, a niajo. it v of yn in fii<- ^ 'or:yrf>s had tip 1 |IOWT to do^ it. \Vr DUs^-d tin- liiick to tin- President. ! In- a IVino'-ratii- or Kcpuldican rn-sidrnt. hut wr w-n- tln-oiie*-* who hud fh^ potter to do it and we . 1'ln- rcanon we d-c'-iM-d to a'<->4p^ that nsjxjji-iitjiHty was that the (iiftjorify of AmpricAM^ (Koujrlit this was a jrrt-af war tiutil a coupic of U7>r> nô an<{ \ alii afniid a lot of AIIHTIIMII*; iruv still a^n-f with ilirtf. f /! ti'ft know. Kven U" the majority of Congress annot trî; to ukr rlic l<it l*y the tit-th and terminute the war when the approach '^ a ^tcxl one. I t h i n k S-n;ifor ('oo|M>r's and Senator rchV aii[>riKtch is a jrood one. J would only hofie we could j;et a majority of t f u - Comrret*. So far we h a e ii'.f, and th* resjKin>-ihilj(y n-rttrt with us.
tffjtgnoy or ACTUAL PHTBICAL WITHDRAWAL In connection with withdrawal, while I lean a little bit toward Senator Cooper's approach, Senator Church, as opposed to yours, there is tli* question 01 Actual physical withdrawal. Has thought been given as to how long it would take to physically more oar people under nonfleeing conditions! Could we really do it in 8 'months, which is *vb*r yoa think, or would it take a little longer period of time?. : I read somewhere in the press that it would take 0 months. That, was the logifatic.nl .dement. J WAS wondering what your x-iew was with regard to that, Senator Hatfeld. Senator HATFIKLD. Well, Senator Pell. I again indicated a while ugo tint I did not come here as an expert in tlie field of constitutional law, even tfcoofh I have some views and have done some study. I -weald not pose hens as a military expert, either, but I cannot lielp but think back to Dunkirk, and I happened to be in World War II, also, and I remember that wlteu the will* tit* detenuillation and tlie derision hul been made to evacuate at Dunkirk, they found a way to do it. und ir was amazing the capacity that they demonstrated. (Applause.) I would certainly not want to sec us in that kind of a withdrawal, which was H frantic withdrawal, and I certainly only draw that analogy to illustrate the fact that the logistics can he accomplished if there isthe will and the decision. Secondly. I would refer you to various military experts such as <i*nenl (ravin and othere. wlo have written extensively on this subject, jtnd would indicate that withdrawal could be accomplislied.in a reuHonable time by moving the troojm to enclaves, by developing^'he water transportation, the air transprirtAtiont and all of the syweni e have- for that evacuation purpose. The question i\\\ comes to will and decision, . ; Senator Pxx Tltank you. Tlie CiiAiKiic.\y. Senator HatfieW. you have been very 1*1 pftil, indeed. The cominitte** appreciates it. W- have another witness, I would only like to underline one or two pointft. Ottc iti this question of the nxrtivee Uiat came uj> and which disturbed Senator Case. QiTjmov IM or pownrAL *TDCXBVT yor MOTI\TJI If do^ net seem to nu- that the tnotivetiof the person* initiating the turiotw niove* that started tlw war are the quention at all. It ..vac: a <|uc*ti*iji of ttieir jolitical judgment. I think tlteir nxn-i\V8 wer? nn in qurrdion, I do rtot think they arc now. Surely we do not. an iudiridim!n, tuinanw n Ntatr or an attitude of infallibility, and I do not know wliy the country should. I nevt-r have been able to HW how honoris involved in having made a [mliti'-af miHtakc. I d> not know anyone -iio Iian not made ony niiitak* in jtolitix-al lifr. I do not think H IK relevant (o the wcMKify of our ending the war DOW,
S9
KTTINK DATE XORE IMPORTANT TIIAX DATE ITSELF
The other thin was what came a/ with regard to this date. Experiemv would indicate that, as .Senator Javits stated, the date is not so inijtortant. Having one is ini|ort;int, l>ut not whether it is ! months or '. months or 10 mouths. The important tiling is the decision that you have incorjiorated in this legislation because the probabilities are that omv the date is set. negotiations would take place much sootier than the date. Senator II ATFIEUJ. That is right. Tin1 < 'II.VIJIX.YX. In fact, there is lurdly any reason whv they should no! U>în almost in the immediate future, once that decision is made. Then thr time of withdrawal is not ilic time from now until Dcivmhi-r. The a'Tangvments for the details of withdrawal would U> a matter of settlement, as was done in Geneva. It fronts to me the historical pat torn is very relevant to your bill, :uid the bill itself. I think, is quite relevant to flu- decision made bjr tli' p'lvnclt Assembly. Thank you very much for yur contribution. Senator HATFIKU>. Mnrhaimun,luav I thank you for the privilejrv of rominj: hen> today and for your hoJdinp these hearinpi. stormw OK rjnr>nKVP? NOT qnarnoxED I uant tor underline what yon have said in that I have at no tinie i-ver ipiestioiuHj the motives of either PivsMent Johiiaon or now with I'nîdent Niion. with whom I have disajrrced on this issue. I know at th Governors' Confen-iKv iup]N>rt Ptvsidcnt .Tohn.-on's war pr>Irj p y passed by A niarrin of !'. tf> 1. 1 wa> a.sk<'<i by 'vrtain iiK-mlM-i-s uf tlie press afterward when I i-ofi*] "No" whctht-ror ir.A I U-Iieved tliat President Johnson wa- insint-ere. I said.of coui-s*-. I do not. I do not (pK-stion his motives. I thin*, he iBsincen1, but niiw*-r-ly wronjf. I do not think |-<f.lc huppcn to U> sinr-i-n-Iy ripht al*ny/.,l think you < g an U- siwvp' anil Ix- wronjr. but it fak<-> inon- thai, -L:ivrity to resolve this problem, in my opinion. ^ ,'' 1'}>e f 'IIAIKMAN. It rcffainly ifii'it uii-Anii-riûii or nncoii'4-itiitioniil to (|U.-stiu thf judgment of any jiolilicul official: is it M II<I|M- it ha.not IH-C* ..wthat. S4-iiiitorIlATKiM.it. Tliankyoii very much. The C i i t i R M A N . Thank yon v ry rmicir. Si-n:for Hatfu-Id. (Ap . Will you pIi-a.H- limit your ei idenrr of uppl;nis<- iN-i-an^f we do
.êr w:-v4-.
Tin- nt'M wilin"<> } Senator Hartke. Si-nator Hartkr. will you takv (In- Kt;iml pleased STATEMEVT OF H0. VAVCE EAETKE. US. 8EIATOK FROM IIPIAJIA Senator HAHTK>. Mr. Chuirman. let nw :i\. fir>. it i* a iinoi for to>- To }M- H i M i yon, luit I would juM like in make one intro lll|i^";r/ reioark U-fo/e jroinj.' tn even a ijiinniury of rn\ prepare*!
71
90
RECOGNITION- or VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR Senator Pell did call attention to the fact that there arc in this room today a large number of veterans, and I think that fact should not go unnoticed in the record itself. I would like to call attention in the record also to the fact that they have been standing in an overflowing committee room for more than 2 hours now. This serious discussion is making us overlook another essential fact, and that is that we must get out of that war and get out now. Every day, even- minute that we stay in Vietnam we arr destroying, ourselves here at home, we are destroying our ability to dâl with drugs and poverty and housing and pollution and unemployment. Like the Roman Empire, our own leaders have been mesmerized at what goes on abroad, and we are falling apart here at home. Let me say that these young men in this room are not Vietnam drojKnits. They are not draftrard burners. Thev are patriotic Amerins who have come here to vote, to vote with tlieir bodies in the only way they know how to express themselves, that they want this war over now. Sow. they are saying it not alone with their limbs: rliey are saying it from their souls. They have been in military action in Vietnam. They expect this committee, this Congress, to gix-e them action, just as they have been in action in Vietnam. They are tired of words ami (tolitics. The actions they want simply are these: They want the Congress and this Senate to gfci on and end the war. and get on with th* unfinished business at home. Mr, Chairman. I welcome the opportunity to testify Ix-fon- thi ditinguished committee on behalf of Senate Resolution W5, which I had the honor to introduce on March 4.1971.
SENATE RX8Of,tT!OX f.r,
That resolution calls for the immediate withdrawal of nil I'.S. military forces from Indochina, conditioned only uj>on agreement on arrangements for the safe withdrawal of our force* and the release of our prisoners of war. It would end American involvement in the war at the earliest possiblerather than the earliest convenientdavit*. It is based on the proposition that no date i-too soon for extricating ourwives from what has htvn an unmitigated disaster from the outset, and that every day's delay serves only to waste lives ami Uxiics and treasure.
FVEXTH OrrCBKINt; MXT, 'XTROOIVTJO.V OK vF.X.m. KKxU.ITloX fin
III fiie nearly 7 weeks since I introduced Senate Resolution M. three events, or series of events. ha\e occurred to strengthen my conliction tliut Senate act ion i essential if we. are to stop thisiippulling wastage. TbewcvcntK wen-, first, the South Vietnamese delm-le >n Luos: second, my con vernations in Paris with representatives of ull four delegations to the Vietnam peace talks: und third. President Nixon's television N'at ion on April 1.
91
SOTTH VIETNAMESE INVASION OF IJIOS
Of the South Vietnamese invasion of I-aos and its abnijH conclusion, I shall say r only that it demonstrates the murderous futility of ~Victnarnization. And if "Vietnamizaiion" is the option we are asked to choose in preference to an early, fixed-date withdrawal, we are in effect l>eing offered no choice at all. That seems to me tol>e the principal lesson of }JLOS. WITNESS' DECISION TO HEAR FROM PARTIES TO PEACE TALKS The outcome of the Laos invasion was still very much in doubt when I decided, in mid-March, to po to Paris to hear from each of the parties to the peace talks their account of the status of the discussions md what, if any, pros|>ects they saw for a negotiated settlement of the war. I wts especially anxious to pet a first-hand explanation from the representatives of North Vietnam and the Provisional Kevoliition.iri (lovcmmcnt (that is. the [>oliti<-al arm of the Victcong) of the terms of the peace initiative put forward on Septemlier 17. 197*'. by Madame N'jruvcn Thi Itinh. Foreign Minister and Delegation Leader of the P.R.G. I thought it essential to have such an explanation because, contrary to what the administration had Uvn telling us of the ripid inflexibility and total refusal of the other side to engage in meaningful negotiation!;, we had legun to hear an increasing number of reports to the effect that the terms of Mine. Hinh's pro|>osal were at least worth considering as the basis for further negotiations. II\<-K<;RO( M> FOR ro.vvfKsYnoxIJcfore leaving for Paris on April J, I received a thorough brietinp from senior officials at the State iJeparfmcnt and had a full and useful (li.scusMou with Ambassador I)iem of the Republic of Vietnam. And on the afternoon of rny arrivil in Paris. April :i. I had the pleasure <f a lonjr talk with my old friend Amlaâdor David Hrmv. the head (if our own team of negotiator- at the jn-ai-etnlk.-. S< it wn-. w i t l t that bat-ktrround that \ ent<-red into conversation^ with ivprerientuf lies uf the otlnT -ide. Mr. N'pii^^'ii-Minh Vv. de[ufy lit-ad of tin- N'orth \ ietnamcse di-lepatirtn at Parir-. and MmC. Xjniyi-n Tin Hinl.. head of the I'lld delegation.
Nfji-'TIAHU. \NH NoN-XKHOTlABI-K HiISTK
I can ii-]>ort that 0111 <li.vu>sion-. lantint; four-and-a-half hours with tiie Vortli Vietnamem- an<l three-und-n-half hours w i t h PUG, were Itotli frank and cordial. I wu- i-^n-ciallv struck by 5fr. Vy'n refx-a^-d nisist4-ii-e on his owi'i fleleâtion'- flexibility. My di^finct iinpresion a- t h a t the only nonnepirfialile item- in ]'UCi |M-arc initiativ> uhidi. iif roiirse. (fatioi f u l l v -up|x>i1^ aie a firm withdrau-ul date for nil I'.S, military -fore*"- anil the cxclii-inn of President Thieit. \'ice t'te-idi-nt Kv. yiid Prime Minister Khi'-ni from any coalition .'oicrnnieiif in S<nith Vietnam. All otlier |x>iiif- an- negotiable. But most iiii|x)i1aiitlv. fiom our ^tun<i|K)int. tfie .setting of u mutualls bli- date for w i t h d r a w a l of our forces from Vietnam jh an
92
CONVERSATION'S CONCERNING CEASE FIRE
Both conversations centered on the two great issues of a ceasefire and the return of <-ur prisoners of war. Regarding the first, a PRG statement issued on December 10. 19"0, following its fonnal j>eace initiative of September 17, says:
A cent*-fire will t* otaerved between the South Vietnam i*-ople'tt Liberation Anaed Kurces nd tile troopa and military personnel of the 1'nited State* nd other foreign countries In the t'.S. camp Immediately after the Government of the I'.S. dccUres it will completely withdraw from South Vietnam its troojis and military in'roounel nod tbcme of the other foreign countries in the I'.S. cam]' by Juac 3f. I'j'l: the inrtieft will dlscusj) at owe: Tlie question of ensuring safety for tbe total withdrawal from South Vietnam of L'.S. troopx and thone of the other forehrn countries in the I'.S. camp and. the question of releasing captured militarymen.
I first asked Mr. Vy what the word "immediately" meant in this context. He replied tl ' it meant as soon as word could \>e got to the forces in the fielda u. ;r. he thought, of no more than 4* hours. As to the date of June .'JO, 171, specified in the PRG projxwal. Iwth he and Madam ftinh stated that that was their suggestion, but that if it wad unacceptable to us, we should propose an alternative. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that it was my distinct impression that thenwould be little or no problem in arriving at a mutually acceptable date. And whatever that date might prove to lie, lei me emphasize for then- has lieen confusion on this pointthere are no other condition*. The ceasefire Iwtwoen our forces and theirs coul<' go into effect within 4s hours of its announcement. The killing of Americans could IN- ended just that quickly.
fOXVKKS \TIO\S rONTERNIXO RFJ.KAfiE OK POw's
As to the release cf our prisoners of warcalled "ca[>tHred militarj'rnen" by lioth Hanoi and the I'RfJI attempted to get a* much clarification us |x>ssible on just how soon a f d r announcement of a withdrawal date we could ex|M-ct to have them returned. The language of tin- I'Hth ComniuniHt delegations n-fused to '(M-'-jf^ a fixed time [x-riod at the end of which all our prisoners would lc Iionie. They kept insisting that the setting of a withdrawal date i-edc >n!i-rfanti\c di.vu*ion> of the issue, and that il is only t XixonV intransigence that lias created the obstacle to AH i-arl\ --ttlenient ofthePOWijin-stion. IA-I rue go on to say. however, that loth Mr. Vy and Madam Biiih gu\e broad indications that the issue would ' resolu-d \ery s|M*edily once the Mithdrawu! date is n-t. Mr. Vv culled to my Htlenti.in the fact dial in r.."i|, at the coin lusioti of Vietnam'* war of indfjiendetice France, large imnilxTs of f'p'iich iirismers wi/e ivleasecl Ix-f In (relieve Conference -l'en con-ened. alitl tliaf once the formal IM-UIV inlk.-. did Itegin. the entire i-.-.uc was settled w i t h i n '.', weeks. AIvi. (lie two delegation* took considenille jiains to assure me that i h i - v h.ne no inten-st M-iiatever in kw-ping American [irinoners H day longrr th:in j, ijei'e^,ary. Mr. Vy pointed out t h a t our men are Iteing g i \ r i i .1 (<Knl ration ihrei- times HS large as t h u t of the average Vietii:iiiif-j mid that their living conditions generally an- more comfort-
93
able than the prevailing standard in North Vietnam. And Madam Binh said, uYour men are a burden to us. We want to be rid of them t he sooner the better." "I car. tell you," she added, "that if the American forces withdraw in .1 rapid and appropriate fashion, your captured luilitarymen will \te returned in a rapid and appropriate fashion." Let mo summarize what I learned on this very difficult issue by saying That there is now no doubt in my mind that all of our POW's would <v returned to us by the time our last troop contingent is withdrawn from Vietnam, and a sultniial number particularly the sick and Bounded would Iw on their way home within wccksof the setting of a date for final withdrawal. In this as in every otbrr war in human history, prisoners are exchanged when the war is over. For the. administration to continue to pretend that there is some other solution to ttie problem is to perpetuate a cruel hoax of its own devising on the families- of those men and on the American people generally. A.nd by the same token, prolonging the war only adds to the toll, not alone of prisoners but of dead and wounded as well, Let me now touch brief! v on some of the other significant issues that arose in my discussions in Paris. DISCTSSIOX6 coxooryiXG rosnjrrn> noimxc Ending American involvement in the war will not, in and of itself, end the Indochina war altogether. IV>t.h the Hxni and PRO delegations made it clear that they would continue fighting against the forces of South Vietnam so long as the Thieu-Ky-Khiem regime remains in power in Saigon. The Detjember 1" statement issued by the PRO says in paragraph 2 :
A <*aw-flre will fw ..ti-wrvcd ly tli*- rinath VMriam I'X-A.K. ami tin* fi.rf-wi .f tl- Kaiffoii A'iniiiiMtr*tl<'ii immediately aft-r the I'Hf, f tlw B8VX and a Kaljcn AilinlnlKtrxMoii without Tliu-u-Kv-Klil'-m. Iliaf Maiid* for jw-aif. indi-iH-ndciicp. urutrallty mid dcwixTJii-y. aeivc on tlu- foniuttiou of pnnihlurial K<>\ <Tiiai-nt nantf>nfd <>t tlin-*- MfSrujf-iitw with a rlt-w tu rir^miizf toii>. u iirn|M>MiI in th*- sVjit<jliil>T 17. 11*70 Htatwiw-nf ( the I'KO
The question of most immediate intt-rest to us in this conwvtion is wheflieriiny part of that paragraph would have to le imiilcmented U-fore ;i cca.sefuv with American fonvs and tin- return of Americuii jirisoners roulj take i<lu v. I can report that no Mwh condition would i>e inwi'.ved. Tlie killing of Anwricans could stop and the present Saigon regime could cm tiniic its own struggle for survival without jeopardizing American di-vngAgeiricnt, Mudaiin 1 Hinh told me, \HW.IT. that the TjiiU-d States would hav to ln-ar ri'.sjonibility for prolonging the war, even after all our own force- were goiu1, *<> long as we continued to .supjxirt the Thieu-KyKiiifin government. Tin- war can never l<e completely s-ttled. slie naid. until the T'nitj'd States withdruw sits Mi[ijK>rf fnxnthe j>ren-nt rcgiinc. ha|>| a|>|-iis, Miuluine Jiinli rejnarkcd.tli*' fulureof South Vietnam could !* sHtled by South Vietnamese organized in n proviniojinl 'onlifion government coiî.l ing of thrw clfiii'-nth: fl) "ix-rsîns" of tlu- I'|{O: ('2.\ "JK-ISOIIH" of t i n - Sai{;<in "Administnitiiin other than Tiii<-ii. Kv. or Khi'-m: and (''>) "pcrrtons" of all :vligioimnil |xilitii:al fii'rtion.-. in South Vietnam "standing for jx-ai-4'. in<|ej<'ii(Jeiir-e. m-ui ralily and di-mocracv."
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There are. two points worth iiotin*: in this connection. First, Mr. Vy of the Hanoi delegation wanted to lie certain I recognized, !i proof of his own government's flexibility, that they wcrx> n<> longer insistra<r on cither reunification with the North or on PRO domiimion of the prospective coalition government in Saigon. "I myself," he siid. "din a Soathcrncr and n Socialist. No poal is nearer my hearf than a unified and Socialist Vietnam. B\it we all recognize that*events of the. rwst !."> y.-ars have crcattsd dinVivnt social and,economic stnicturcs in the two parts of Vietnam, and these differences will .disappear only after a long period of tune and as the rr?ult of careful negotiations between the two governments. :; "But really, you must know,'T lie added, "'that even a unifie-d and Sociali Vietnam would not eonstl'litc a throat to tlui Unite*! States.'* 'flic second point to l>e noted in connection with the PJRG-proposal forx Vietnamese solution to Vw;tnajn*s problems appyais jn'-tlie text of thir SptcmU.T 17 statement and concerns tin' N'lxon admijuistm.tionVdiit- warnings of a "bloodbath"" that would allegedly follod- >x'ir witLdrawii]. ^ , "Tlic provisional coalition ô\vrnment will." it says, "prohibit alJ acts of terror. ivpri?al. and di?criiniiiati'm ajrain^ thos' .who have coIJalioiated with i-ither side. . , ." " . No doubl i( would lx- foolih to take any ôvfrinnent's'wordinI'lndhip 1 >nrown--at fw.v vn{iw. Kiit fc is= worth considering that^the coalition government eiivis'uuied in this document would include Buddhist aiu1 Roman Catholic leadt-rs ai? well as anti-Communist fiûros: of rlif stutoiv of <ii-n Xjniycji Van Minh; and I Io not. MI*. how_anyon<- ifiuld weriously .supj>ose that such a iroivmuienf would counrcjtautr a r>olicy of ( ommuiiist-ins|>iivd ivprisali.
(ITIOJC ISsrKs OK JXTKKRsT A.VD fO.NwC'EKV
^Wln-r irifiiics of inteivst and conccni arose out of my convei-sation with Ambassador Lam and Minister Phong of tli<- Itepul'Ik* of S^t.h Vietnam. The burden of their rejiiarks was that American opinion was ln-in^ mUIed i>y "fVuiimuiiist piopaânda, v esj)ecially in ivjrard to the Laos operation: thai the South \1ctnaiiiesc were U-in^ w-ivrely liujidifi'.jijx'd in their prosecution of the war by the "inferior eijuipiiwiit" vhich we have provide*! them mid by our continuul dift/losure of the uiifinv and extent of nil militnry ojM-ralions: that tliey foresaw no end l'i the fi^ht inland no ho[H- for negotiations: and that America" role us aiiti-Coiiuiiijiiist world leader oblitf-s us to continue pi-oi-j<}in^ South Vietnam witii Jmi perix-nt of its needs for carrying on the war. Some of the flavor of this nithei disiyun-ajrinir coiner.-<:ition may IK-eonieyeJ b\ &ii i'X<'h:in{!c I hud w i t h Miui-li-r Phony. Wlieli I st;itl that the American public wa.* U'comin^ ini-reasin^ly impatient .with the In-,.-, of our vounjr men in Vietnam. Mr. Phonjf replied u-ry he;i<c.dlv thai then yoiintf iiii-ii were dyiny too- Jo time.- us ucuiy a" ours, "Hut ii i-iuil .iiir'-oHiitry." I ^n\. And he replied, even more heatedly. "I'-ul yu :ire :i world leudei I ft is your resjxmsibility'"
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:}voy ?juiteâ|/aTt.fTorp. the misstatement of factit is certainly Hot . truf thar South Vietname^ losses have been 10 times :us hcsivy as our ^ 1 . o\ni-f rhink~wtr-mu<& all be dishcartwipd by the "success '-'two ad\ulhUitraWons "have had in convincing the Saigon rejrinie that their . survival continues to IK- nioi>> int[X>rtai>r to it? than it js to their,own people. 1 wonderhott many Americans autîdc the White .House and th'vPi>tita/>oniyontdsM)jbcnI)c to that disgraceful notion. . N .Jfu any ease, nothing! beard in my conversation with 'he South \~iet.iiHJnes*. dclejration w-ould incline, me urlieliovc-that they are well on their way*to assuming the burden and responsibility of < Itcirxtwn self-^x . defense after Jhese long ycare of American sacrifice. ' " _ - ^ . 0. coKcu'Bioys REsri;rrs TKOH COV\TRSATIOXS IN p.utis " ' -
Let-me no\v attempt to summarize in ix>int-l>j-point fashion the înclusions I reaclwd as a if suit cf those Itfri'fconversations-Jn P^ria ." witli the four delegations to the f<eare*-taUtS~Aiid with other-dftKplj; . -knowledpejiblc obseiTers of tlie Indochina conflict. Amonp.tlif 'afler " 'jvcrc the venern!iW"TIncJ^Xli*t Huah, official representative in Patili of-Mie. Unified liuddJiist (Church at Vietnam: Mr, Froment -Meuricc. licail ff{ ttic Asia desk pt'-the Flench ForeignMiuistrV: and a inunlx-r of dwiinîuisbt-d American anaEurcixjan journalists, anting them Mr. 1 Waller Lippinan. 1; Tlie setting of an agreed date for complete'T'.S. militriiT v^-jth- ; dramiJ from Vietnam is tn' absulutely indi^ppjisible first step toward a ncjrof istiefl c-tfiWi>fUJt o/tUio .vir on nil fronts. That date, in my judgjnt'nt. could be \inywljfrft from- ?A da^ from nowas my resolution \vould have it--i/>-the middle oT iOT^.Â date later riiantliat would of course lx> In-tter than none at all. but it would not, I think, produce the immediately desirable effects we all wantnamely, an "fajW'fijv and the early release of our prisoner? of war. 2. I't-o;! thcncttinfrof a date whhinthe.liiiic-frame Ihave a <rasi'lirc \vl w *vn Aiiu-ricaii and Communist foives couji] <ro info t-fft within 4 K hours. C)ur iv.iire.-vntatiws and tiifjrs would wrirk- out mutually ;i.-<vprj!>l' [inx-^lurc.-. for the sift withdrawal of our force*. Kven ii it . hc-n took us a yea) or rtion; to wjtlidraw comjiioffly. no more -ri'-diis wmild IK- killed or juaiim-d or taken priisoni-r. (v|)o" the x-ttin^ of the daft1, d wnioiis would Ix't'in "atonce"- i-drit \-rv day if wr -wi-.il--ivincerniniy the, n-lease of :\\\ our ra i>f war. I>ji.tl rial ion would very likely occur in *4;i<ri'-, with fhc r-i<-k and wounded U-injr n'iurned very i-Jpidly and-vll prisoner hoinr by the tiin*1 Oil. la.-J^forcis were withdrawn. 4. The ajrrecmentf- upon which our withdrawn-] would In*, nondifioned ur- fully M-If-jxîi-iiiir. For if at any time we found thi? ot|ior side not living U| to it-; commitmi'iitu. we could simply -"top, or r.w7i IVVMSC. tin- w i t h d r a w a l pr'x*hs. And indi-.-i in the 4\wni r <- />f thr- kind of aunvmenf in whichp we could ivpost M)iue"liicfi,de^Tei>-of ijnfidemv, rt'n w.)iild riot ei-i:uU n:in tfiut pr'xvss. . ^ ^ ". Fijtrhlint' :injon^ th- Vi'-tnume*- ihtJiiwlvc-^ will continjie nnUl (lie. TliH-ii Kv-Khl.'-iii {ro.eninu'uf i* f?f-\wpd by "a coalition Di'uj1-!, r;ou.-( 'oJnroii;i.-'t.iiiKlAHTi-C'(r fl'i'tiin-i' leadeivof the prrN-nt p.-jrimf.
, .. . , -, , v. --' . *, The Paris peace talks ace totally deadlocked. vwLatevn-"of.:cndiiig thoôfiflicf so long as the Ignited States, persists in refusing^.-* ifiscuss a^dato for the complete withdrawal of om-fofres. ^ -"".' -' . -. "^
CENTRAL FKATCEEK OF V&2&a*i3iT NIXOV'fi APRIL 7 SPKECII
V - ^ ' , -. JPinaJly, Mr. Chairman, I should like to discus* the <y>ptraj features C of PAiHent; Xi.von"s April 7 speech m the lijjh't of tJtfr-pivqe-ding 4ix , points and tffth ârCbrulAr-r^feivnnf to what it tells u?Uf thV fetwd^'tadopt one of the tijftjd-ujY^ resolutions now before this committee./ j .Let me begin by djsmissing1 {(j; ''almost, wholly irrelcvwit the vsry ".-.'uttOjSfet increase Mr. Nixon announced inTthc <roop withdrawal raU?. ~''Ev>h"l/-l< were to continue IhrougL 1fl"^-r-a>id, we have no assuranotf' that, it 'wiIJ-*Jcavuyj only a residual ^mund Toccc by x-lcction day, tlicnis still the l&elifcood of hary Ainerioun participation in au air war against North VietaJvK-se and PR'i forces. And > long as tltftt <y>iitinucs, tljerc will be no )>cace in Indo.>hina and no retni of our prisoners of war. Moreovt-jc, when our total troop strength drops io * certain level during the. withdrawal piwess. those remaining will be. tenibly vulnerable;to ^tt*rk:Ju;>po*i the otlier side launches such an attack and it smtvt><*is' in brcifiing'tbroii^li whatever <frfen*e Hrranjjenionts ha\-ej*m^>'iuad(i: wFal thcji-wiU we do? Will v.v pull out pre-. ci^rfJoTislyjand j}inonfuimsly. a la Dunkirk? Or wi'I we reescalatc to " *trfl'a w^/>Jciv^w rouitd of blocKllerting,this^'m<'i>o?!5MycvcI:l using. "nuclear- weapons \ , The President' gave no hint. Instead, as is increasingly his custfnn, 'lip.turtrsd the \oe\c of the situation uj>side domi and said thai lie could not (rive * firm date for total withdrawal U-cauw to do j-o wouMfnahlc <-nny commanders to plan just sudi an attat'k us I Imvi- l>cen jati/ig. Tlie really outrageous afcpwt of this upioV-dav;n lo^'w- ii> ibat Mr. Nixon knows full well that :i fundaiwntal |K>int In thither .side's pcaa- projK>sal in that diocusrtionbv;>i) ensyrnig the safely of -hir -departing: forcfcj would Ix-gin as 5OOft as a vrUhitraY'l date, in agrepd upon. And a$ I stressed in point- 4.'irM.!^ absence ff aji ugr/j.-H ]r<>(\exlure satisfactor)- to ourselves, w^'w^nld withdi-awuls. ' ;' ;\*. ' Mudi the AUIJC vynii:aKu of *n.- pri^îer of"^-.ir is^n-1 it* ftc cx;<1i>*"jur invohvpwnlîij Vivfimm. In nn cari>.<rj slrt^-) he i, y rjr'isojj camps. Aiui-oli AjiMl'T TiâwhtbHt to foir.-4jf>l wifljilriiVN-a:! woptciixMo fiimu' îwui^tli;- oiilv,'lItir<BM}tjJ;r I'ountf rlie has wifli wlwcfi ûdH*'.n tbe.ret-af* fjf Ol.'f .1" - Once again tJw* u}ii.J jc-d(Â^r U^ric. Oui n^.uu Hu"' "
do not even existis that yiV are le.ft .witJii absQluty no Jiint as to what his ultimate ohjectives^n Vietnam jniglit l>e. For my'part, 1 am forced to conclude A.'itchc does not in fact intend to briti^.tljc.war to an early *nd; had-he-wished to do so, the negotiating path jju^Parialay open ro him as>arl\ as. last Stpteml>er. But he chose not to take it.., He chosn. instead, to piiisuu the will-o'-the-wisp lie calte "Fietnamixation." And this. so far as I or any of my European friends can determine, amounts to nothing less than a desperate effort, to maintain a j>erm;ment American presence in South Vietnam through a residual military force, as in Korea, and H client regime m Saigon. If tlii* is indeed the purpose to which he, and Dr. Kissinger have :ommittod this Nation, then. I say, the American jx'Ople will riot tolerate it and we .who are their elected representatives mus-t not tolerate, it, . - " ..
CO.VCKESS HAS IWVER TO flUXCE WIHXF.XT POI.irv
W* have it in our power to fon-e a change in -this sbwkingly misguided policy. We '-AH adopt, a resolution such as mine, demanding an v end to the war at the earliest practicable dat\ And if the President chooses to ignore )t. we can enact legislation such as that offered by our distinguiBhed folk-agues from Oregon id Soutli Dakotsi, closing the. public. ur.v. d exjienditurvs toy carrying cut-fh- var after this w;ar_ K'ther'.or ,both would lijuv \\w effect of reclaiming for "tie .-.-_ '-AjyuTJcan people iJiat ultiiuiU.; ttutivl onr forc-ign policy which lias Fivrihc people tji^y,vion if;ri?ir President d/>c>.uor. tfiat we have , I'tayodH'jt* J(>vf* i/i'-'/fjetijajiV'SiniJ have bled too mii'*h and,have p<*rj)etntjcd too miuiy horrors \\v hqiv.sac.nfto'-d not.oniy (>uv men and wealth n;K W {rood landing uinon^ tlu? rivlti/>sl nations of the"world^. ._ JUVliJttrtHvH) oar own civLJdi'^n-iitU^'ViniUa] cxil" ;in<l tln-relty moil', * . N * .i *^~ N . * ^
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through this first derisivt'. st/:nCoward i>&w.

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Tin- f~)\ vift.u.;v. ThaiiL ycy..l-t.iy Ujucji, .-nthalor riflilfcfj. I rerlaiiily icfiii .vftH.fur.y<nr Hjitiii'tiiv it> iir*crri<>wing tlie re|)j-e--''4'Sh. -,V^<ri'ha^ve j'tougiit us SOUK^ very -*-ful, liisr^jaiS*
S")irl>,t H vjrrki.. Thank you. Senator,- ., ,_ - x ; ' TJii'X'ji-iUttAy 't'iti- ijcicf wj'.netw.'A Scu^;j,-( Vanston of <'alifonii*" : 1 -V Ki'Mawiv. ('iaii>-to.'j. wr are v<rv p.V'fiso'd t<> ha'/e you, f urn w/'Tj. f'.'C " " 1 ""tur -latrrii-vt o#;lliVJioui-. but this is' a ivn ii(ip<ct<iiiC t-ubjut aiic]\v*.r - - i !mj.r |;>tii Miniêvtrcntfly nit-juvitinj; ferflmony. ^'u-itd Oou pr<xp<H.'d. ";
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STATEMENT OF E09. A1AN CHAHSTOff. tJ.$. SEFATOB FEOM : -^ <5AIIFORHIA CBAXSTOK. Thwik you very- miK-h.Kr. Chairman; . It is a <rivst privilege lo bo with yoi. I first want to thank you and vour wmmittce for all that von are doinp. Your leadership has been simply tremendous in seeking to find a way to xlrsw tins war to an end as far as -American involvement is concerned, if we cannot end it far us in rolvoiwnt of Asians are concerned;
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The fact that you bare called this hearinp af his tune in an effort " tn-se<? how Congress can exe'rise its-responsibility in a way that, will <-nd oor inTOlmncnt. sin> rhc Presidi-rif dot* .not seem to he embarked upon a Bourse, that will end our involvement, is s most timely _ mow-. I am deliglited that present with us today are v^tpraiuf wlio IQIOTC _ jfirst-liand what tins war is doing to America.ioyoiinjr Americans, and owe" many obligations fo these younp: Anwi Wsiujj tJtis .war is something thaf_I think onrô.unti-v .nms>t--ncrf r ft*>;get. We owe theni'much "m terms of nwylical care i<t ^duj'-atipAal : poiiuuitics ariH job opportunifies^hat wfCam notpn'Sentfy./arîtf p;:f or aiKHr j>pf- ive caiLmovf' Torw-anl-aJsoConi that pjxJ>lfji> "" . I am -lie if primurilr1uAnjj[>or5 jrhc- IfictBaro Diaen^retiTcnrÂct of . of whidi I am ono tf the prime sponsoivr'G^jt'a.a'jJther piwses ejrislation hefo-tvvoti,i.avJj as Senator HaT^Jve's'wffirlt, VrhinJc. also c'naderation of this eoirnnifttavand its ~ ~
-1 Jx-t nift stf Jf vm-bricfij^r/rcxj>tcssmv Uiou^rhts to you, yt- ân oJid *tie-.kil:n^ 'wd ma5nv>njr oT AnjeriânsrrinA'j
.j>uby.*'/itttc jsert'iin** for American "" ! :r^~-H:t'_hicJ*iir tlia^wc-i^Rnof:-RfiJiiariIy forr-i^l^.K'.orth VirtaaeA-an3" ~ '>':: -. lnriytwn-?-t^>!giifi'-~~~. ' ' f r ~ _ - - - ' ^ - c V
\_ . _' "W# Jiavi-iutf-u Jrttnjf~rr>-do thisi f-y-^hr last K ycsujijmd: O^Jdt)-<- ._. "" - . fi&fv\ -."- , '. ~ ' . ; - - . . . .-.'" 1.- T . _ " " -'.. T" " -
Y;rOy.ftrtt, I beLw'w, *au rJ^-v Jrf'-^w/wjVded to "JJ;i*ii'r"^'imH*p7fl.JwaV,âfcier'toarnuj^>1ieu tieiijrbtinjf ha:- .h^)^(1t!i;Hrwnn^tV?l)f.rijtrri07irsl^{roii)^f>Ti^ . . i -" A (. i^jraijHv t-nuiut ^JH- to oblah' thi- n-l.TaSu.trf-Ajod ie3u.f*OW" j v-'hf .'Y f\{ft\: t>^ tiff ind)<-)iuoji-f)ii jO>j|"j;irt-ai;.UV ichwi *vtLj/laii tof^rifri^lfftit /:/.ifi/iilt.tW7'iut''ilv'j}nftut. ~ ". '. ~~- ~-- ~~ . ~
- iC'.u(7rx>j-i'jurpris')iic^c - . ^ " .__ . . - -_ _...--
. Pcesidect ICikpn fats failed to realize tHitAi'ocrican trofjj:jn*he South have "not sn ibs iwst and will not .in the future bnnjrîom't ' " " -. ûr fofcestwould vinspire tlwi^tuni of ourPQWfi .Opro&TcXiTT FOBCITC.VCE WTH reopi.E's RWGBUC . . " . ".. "" . . . "Mr^Cfiairman. I wouLi like to toucJv upon one other aspea-,of.this ~ v tbat inv-oU-es* different JSSQC, an i.ssue that know somewhat newr m a . -Tiew form, where the.ni:-ws a.newbpeain|r.anCI a new opportunity for p-ac>', pcjuse: tx>YOnd Tietnam. iM?aoo ck|i<j?h ina in terms of ^reductionof-ibc^danger of oonflirt-wiHL fh Cliinesc. Tliia is a tremendously imporfanr7xcWL*s^^ to tLe ^S^nam war.-I believe that only a paWic finipr4d>]'"foran American wjthdraiviii] is'capitble of finally convincing the rhuifcse-of >Vjtt<>rican good will and of the Aft that we do not - intowl to threaten Chiesciiati(mal security. of .the table tennis detejnte. we forget that tlie ChiIn the. euphoria -aw our: irivolvjement in Soirtlieast Asia as a threat to their r_-_V .__ j . _- "--t / - ^hincso-ma^nrjfy is tin- trigger .to Chinese, aggressiveness wt'-Tui'R iLTliei'0c-p,-rappnclK'nienf-intoaction, onr 15-man table fcn7is4em"s tiuirSl iu Ouna cannot ohsci^ the presence of 285-(K)0 Attviilcait <iops Jîjiin easy striking range of Xorth Victaikiii aijid _ _ . pzssagfcof thKJUfutfipfd-McGovcniljiHrthis year could the-ivorld tov.-anl:'"peac by LJ ingin^ aUiut a new era of timtuttb trust' IxM-wcfen the People's RtpiiWic uf.Cliina and the United Jptates^ Dfsplfo t^be-ijrcyuiis'm^ progress we've maiie in the last w'eraj .days. n<) Jastin^; ûiaers-taiidiiyr witJi China is possible while ounnVn^cbn isiMe to \>f engaged iB:hostiIineL dose to China's Boutliern borders. lit-lalion-r Ix-twewr mainland <'Jiina and the -iTjited, ft*tes "will M a!wai^J*ânjttic" " s-ifdpv-of duw'tinjlita^ confiVHJtat ion.so : ae A/ncri''aD.s.fijBrhT-Hi)d-lxnwlso Hose to ChTriesu ijorftefs; ' . f i4rcpe fc>rtruf Mwld {jetuê is totjp fdlfillwJ, tfie- iQfist ^x> jirkijr in th^-VorKl.-niust slojM'Hjraîng in Combat on the doorstep /> """
L^st of cJL Mr, Chftinoxn. thi' .tm^nfaii people will not be fooled-. t a withdrawal of Anny ai.id Marine for<'*s, in the i!r and .-ictenrjive Ajneriraf. air aiui naval Ixrtnbardpcwejn Viet-naaiorîurud <<3 Air^-ivan in " involvement " . -LhalV rfatVajf r.t tlist -our air and naval forces-will form. "-i"4.1J-tir di-h-rrent" aji^r Jlyvbisr_Aiij>ri'-aii solder leaves Vietnam. i iiot;th*vadU!ustratiou vlcarfy ;J/-*s u/^: intend' ' end Arneri. _. \-Tli- S'.f"ftaiy"s coouawits ou Ajril 1-i Wt-rv fallowed by the P-resi_ donJ's rfiufirfc wi April Jfi that v.-c- w i l l ais'mfahi farcr* in 'Vietnam Tinli.1fti-".F?OW.V.ar-e np-J'-scd. and untr! -tlif-Jv/urii.Victnanietic have
";
'
. loo
I have already diVnssspd the POWasypcl. On the other point, malting the.pat.e of American withdrawal contingent on the l>atile successes or failures of ri> South Vietnamese _ Ar/uy <-ould mean ooi.timiinir American air and ground casualties for months ahd,years to come. I notice-that Vi- I'resident K> said ju?r yeslerdav that they won't lx? r'iady to do th'- jol) th msolves for jxrliap? !" yeans or more. It L eltvir that the Xixon administration does not intend to end American involvement in the war the only way it <-an l>e truly ended: By publidy^hnouneed withdrawal of all Army, Marine, Air f-e. and Navy units from Vietnam and the Mirroundin<: waters.
. . In, the jrbsencv of Executive in'tiative and in the f*e of <rrowin<r p>->]u'ar n-vKleion with the war, tlu- (Vm^rcss must pliy the derisive
.*" "-,--"-, ' ^ - The time -li anivoii uhi^'tlit- CVm^j-ess. clof>si to the people and 7-fib-Ir, wishes ~a"nd doirfi and dteani*. jimift i^jxind to the wishes of t[ii> peopltr^hd set dah ft th^ eiiji of Ain^rioan involvement iu this , _ . Jir. -Chaimwn, wo j-<>um on yotit- <-i>nuHw to Lead u? in tliat ixftioji.. , "._ . * " " J think . voij, ~ ^ "
StAttVKST. OF RCXAJOB -AÂK CttiVS-
i^cat^d to .p[nrar U'for<- (1^- For4;iffD

. ---JJ!Briat.tije last tx'tssfon '<f Cunp-pi..-'. I Jolunl wifli sk Uufclu*..afta GoovJeJJ ift {K)aKirinc -Ute arucudu^-nt TH -ixTflif war .1 ma f>siIii-WJ-Hih'>i><>tai. '1'^ 'k.-^lrfliili'.'ii wlifcji, nviuid wt public Uu fr da- safe ucl ufxtfuuitu- "Tilrawal "f TH .Viuc.rl' c it "nj JtvffUi\u-f rj.1. ' ~ " . " " , , - " . - J "Iwlifvc nvran fuj Ujt: kiihlûiiJ WJtjljda'jt of XinrTjiajis l 3t%'talu irltltin a yc/ir. '.l>Ulu th*- rrfc-a*- of -nr -f'/>V"s vitl'iit >t i/iar *ii<t TJI -flit- riirt'at uf Ui *|M- KouUa-siKt -Asian Kttr icitiini / V<a/;-iJ' fb<- -t'-.myttr** . from. Y5c'tuan. ~, If' tJjT4- JK-fv^rM wJk'ii then- IK u";m!ilii-. "iLifr- vi-rt*jn"_iur A Ir Is dear llinf--*v iûii<.( jjiiinarJIy TV&v tli<- X-Jrtlr \lc<nm-v .m<l tin- VKt . -fJirt HM ivill lisvr all of unr ID'-JI .!it vf Imlc-'iliw b> n -, :izid wslrii'j; tLaf datn jiubli'-, <-.iii (- < (iins<'<' *!" V"ftti Virtiini'u-^c ii(<-'J lo-Jran-. . . -^ of or
fllllli V.'hilr UfTiKllfiiiK-i-- rflJ.'l L'''IK'"<. " UV /vrtaloly <ajiii^ Jmp<--t" <ilfj(ttJi-rlj' n-J<viH;' 1 is IKJ iiwtli'.ifl.'ii i-ii <i\ir i > j i t ;JK l/< tt'Ja. !! ' J>luij In li-ruiiiintr (ir military
101
President Nixon has failed to realize that American troops in the South have nof !n the itand will not in the future bring homo our POWs. A wjfUdrawal of our Jo-rces would insure the return of POWsnot their Mr -Chairman. only a jmMic timetable for an American withdraw*) if capable of 'Anally ccmvindug (lie Chinese -of American goodwill arid of the fact that we no longer intend to threaten Chinese national security. In the euphoria vt tlw table tennis dttente. we forget that tiw Chinese see oar iuvolvemuii in ^Southeast Aria ac a threat to their homeland. Chinese Insecurity Is the triggw to Chinese aggressiveness. Cntll ice turn the rhetoric or rainirochemt-nt into action, our lo-man taMe tennis tesru cauuot utacare the. presence of 283,000 American troojw within easy *trikiiig range of Xonh Vietnam and the Chinese mainland. I heueve that prtssage of the HatfltHd-McGovern hill Uu* year could move the world' toward peace by bringing about a new cm of mutual tnm lietween the People's Republic of Obita and the United State*. IJwipite the promising progress wXve made in the la>J. several days, no lasting uiidor&tauding '-with China is payable while our men continue to l*e engaged in liot.til Hies view? to Cli i na V southern border*. IWntioiw hetwefn mainland CiiJila and th I'.S. \vtll alwaj-K U- rm Uie razor'x edgv.of direct 'military coiifrontalio]i mi loiis ax Anx-ricans fight and bomt> so rlose to tlur Chinwe torden. .- Jf hfif>e for true rorld peare :Js to ooaif ftbout. tjie mOfrt iVfU--rfuI Nation in th<- vrorW uioirt jrtoj' *<Jâj:(DC la -comiiat on tlie d(.Hirsf<-ji of tlie Aiost populouK nntion In the world. - -_ Jjiirt of all, Mr. Cb-iltaao, the AjuerJcan )K*OIIK w-ill not (w fotdixl iut belk-ving thnt a vrithduu'al of Army and.Uarine turc^s in rhe midKt <>l contlnnlng and :xtire Ameriean **r and iwval iiornliardnx-nt nx*an jap in Vifjnain or an *!>} <(. AiuTJcnu involveiwntiri SoitUca>-t Axia. Sfiiâry laird's rttU-meut Uiat -ourswr and naval for<*s( will tonu a "realwtic cletrl" after the lart Awericac ttoldier J^VI-M Vietnam 1 proof that tbf AdmlaJHtraiion clearly does ao*. intend to ud AniejricOD inrolrntteot in the war 1 1 tliewrfufur-. - . - ' The Secretarj-'w ci>muu-D!i. oit' April 13 *</rf followed !>>' tlw President's reiijsrks aa Aiiril 1! that we sn'H mt-Jntahi force* In Vietiian* uttlil tmr I'OW'w are n-leatd >iJ until the S<iitth ViKnamest- Jw- J^velM*^ ttv 'ajAcitj to
ie jin<\" <.f Am^ri^-an Kiibdrawal cvrntingrnf ou Hie lattUf - '<r {alluri-.-j f tlie South VirtnaiiM"*- Armj rould uâti c/ijatinnln^ American iiir ami proprnl raKuaJtitti for uonitiKHîd }far.- u i-nnif. Ir |K -clear tbot t)- VJjcon. Adidni^ratiw) d'rf-N ;ioj intend to eud Ajiifrioiii i!iv(th ejiient in tiw war tin: /nr>~ur<l>-l( rîn ! tnily *dtMj : By ti piiMIdy an'jounf<xi withdrawn! >{ }\ Anwy. Mnriw. Air Kr<r-. .-inil Xav.v Tn thf- almwuv <<f Exwiitivc iniiiiliij-'j'.ii'I In lhw.-{i.': <>f tc nwMon with ihc war, tji- 1 Vi-jcn-<>t -tiia*^ :Jn> flw ilii'isivr i-l' lij '
of Vifi.nam with the <".i&jfr<_M< 'oTujfj-sti have jiuMHy a;id jirivad-ly a>.k*-d liiui tn d' w, Tl(c viiiw ha* iii-jJ^t-d MfJu-n tJu-^VijurK-sn nicrf r-'KtKnirt J tin- wifhen <>f thia dut- for tlw -nj of A
w rrs-j:-t.>
Tin' <'5iAii;f.A\, Thaiifc 'yoii/St'iiJifor ("rHiiston. I think lhaf -'in a ,vi v lfl|>ftil Atfifcj^Jit, I arrf Korry you were not al/lc tfl li 1 iiw-d ;x>f ''-il \ov, fU- I
102
y OF VETERANS Before we recess, I do wanv to join in commending the veterans of the war in Vietnam who were here this morning for their very fine tehavior. We are very pleased to have had <hem and I know they have a very deep interest in this. I think what they are doing will U* useful in influencing the attitude of many people in and out of the Government.
HEARING SCHEDULE
The liearings will continue in this room tomorrow morning at 10 a jn. The witnesses will be Senators Miller, Stevenson, Javits, Mondale. and Saxbe, and our former colleague, Senator Ernest Gruening. We hope that we can have tlie presence of many of the veterans at that hearing too: f t hey are able to be here. Tlie committee is adjourned. Thank you iery much. ^'Thereupon, at 12:55 pjn. the hearing was n><vssed, to reconvene tomorrow. Wednesday, April 21, 1971, at K) cm.)

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 1971
UNITED STATES SENATE. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington. D.C. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 ajn.. in room 4221. New Senate Ofice Building. Senator J. W. Fulbright (cliairman) presiding. Present: Senators Fulbright, Church. Symington, Aiken, Case, Cooper. J avits, Scott, and Pearson. The CHAIBMAN. The committee will come to order, please. WP sire very pleased this morning to have the distinguished senior Senator f rom'Xew York, Hon. Jacob Javite, who will testify on S. 376. STATEXEIT OF T J>1. JACOB . JAVITS, VS. SEVATOE FEOM HEW TOKK S*-' ia*or JAVITS. I thank my chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am very grateful to the Senators who preceded JIM- on tin- schedule of witnesses today for allowing me to proceed this morning. I shall lie brief. I do wish to establish my jwsition as a witne.ss. and w*. only as committee member but as a cosponsor of the Hatfrld-McGovern bill. PKESIDENT'S WITHDRAWAL POLICY President Xixon in his television address to the Xation of April 7 and in iiis remarks of April IB to the American Society of Xewgpaper Editors. hat- refused to establish a deadline for the withdrawal of all U.S. aniM-d for< from Vietnam. He has declared lii^ intention to the iuas.sj\<- U.S. air rriic in the fighting and to retain some ground forces until certain conditions are met. In t fie two conditions he has set for total T".S, withdrawal, Presi<k.nt Xixoo lias reaffirmed tlie veto of both Hanoi and Saigon over I'.S. dii^JigagHiient. In addition to the release of all POWs lield by S'ciih Vietnam, lie has established Vit4narnization as d precondition to l.".S. withdrawal, defiixyl a follows:
fix- î>lijt> of ihf Kouth ViHtiHjiWbf 1 dcv-li>ii tiic '.iijcitf to defend tfceoi>-(t!iJul ii <"imittiuni*ff iJito-nviT. m/f (lie -urc iajirit)-. Nut at Ii8t tlw
continues to I* <!n? lai?* of tlie President ' jv>Jicy. i*Mje is drawi Iictween withdrawal by a tinu- certain or an open
(J03;
104
commitment no nurttt - how troop strength is reduced. To show bow loaf this can take. Vice President Ky recently estimated it will take 15 to 2o years for Viernamization to succeed. I will yield to no one in my solicitude for American prisoners of war. but I do not believe the only way to rescue our prisoners is to continue*the war; the history of warfare teaches that prisoners are released when wars are ended. To insist on retaining substantial V'.S. troops in Vietnam to induce the release of the POWs could result in a stalemate on the POW issue, rather than their release. The key substantive issue to be decided is whether a "time certain7* should be established for the total withdrawal of U-S. Armed Forces from Vietnam. The President has opted for i policy of scaling down the level of U.S. involvement while leaving it open ended with respect to time. I feel such a policy is undesirable for a number of reasons related (o the Vietnam war itself and also to the unpostponable need to iw.Jer |~.S. priorities at home and in the world.
Dosresnc DECTRCCTIOX AND DIVISION

The scars in this country will not begin to heal until the t'nited States has fully disengaged rtaelf militarily from the fighting in Vitntm. What could our Nation possibly win in Vietnam that would 1* with the destruction and the divisioneconomic, social and in rrorale- which this war i inflicting OR our own N'ation '. To cite some examples. the Vietnam war has so weakened Inter'ition-J ciKifidence in the dollar that our world financial posit? .n i.s rieing j^-opmrdized. It has so erode.] the motivation of the American worker that our very productive and technological superiority our grrau** strength is threatened. It ha>:*o dismayed A .>rican youtli tha IO-JJP segments have losr faith in the essential effectiveness. decency and humanity of our society in <>ur culture and even in our credibility. It lias M> strained our resources a to bring on a grc-at in*Viou n<l a dangerous ero-=ion of i-onfiilen'-e in our economy resulting in serious uneinp!'<.inent. Along w i t h thi- we have the deep aggravation of our urban jirobIfttn- leading f< fiie near "bankni|fr:v~ of city goveninienfs acrrjiw America- and thr fleep x-ns<- of alienation arirl i>s..-.iiiiisni now so pn- 1 a lent in what i:s-d to U- know;i ^ the most ojrfimi.^ti' 1 N'ation in tlw world. Ami fin-re ui. tho-<- ."m/Kki American lives lost anrl the l jail<ift billion of treasure. " xrixi; IN \i.!t.)r.xTT\\';FXTi\i.Ti :'.. iNT>3{r>Tt IN Tii. \'^-tnani war ir. nov. an olso!rte st niggle as regards I'.S, irjterestf. in Asia, \\liatev* r justification tin-re may onci- have Mîneri to I*- for t'> infen fitt ion in what ha< alvuy- e.-.-rf-ntially lieen a civil f.tnij'gl*- ,n, . I I h a v e long regarde<| ;mv combat intervention a.-. ,ery imitrvi<.l.'rif i-otitinuin^ I'.S. m i l i t a r v itivohement in Vietnam would l- tangent u I. if rurf '-out i \ult'-torv.t'> tlw advancement "f I'.S. interest ^ in Aia. Th real iu -x of A-J.I in the \'.t~n\ and the lf>mV w i l l havt- little to f]o , t l i f.f >{ii>'-tii>n of who rule. Saigon. Jy way of reminder if
i.S c e r f a i T i l v toilav a Iliool i|i|.--f i - i l l whether f he "f " . i f l H l i I H i M " govern
of \\nzit~\x\ in ,'. more o[<[Krj-fl to the \>Hf\c |iriri''ipli r -> of our
Nation than the wiYitvry dictatorship in Greece. Tlie issues we shoald be. ronrentratinfr on are oar relations with China ami Japanand the shifting quadrilateral jower relationship in .isi* among the United States. Japan, Chii*. and lhe Soviet Union. The Vietnam war has done more to Complicate and strain our relations with both China and the Sonet Union in recent years than any other issue. Moreover, the domestic inflation produced % ibe Vietnam war is largely responsible for the protectionist claims which threaten a trade war with Japan. rj>. POSITION is OTHER AKEAR _^
The Anieriran obsession and preoccupation with Vietnam over the past deoade has led to the danger of 1-.S. policy being bypassed by. events in many parts of the globe. Vietnam has" contnoLT/-'! heavily -_, to the deterioration of the U.S. position iu Europe and in t& Mideast.'-' ' iV'e have been so disHicted and so ~Iorked-in" to t*.e struggle-ra Vietnam tliat we have lacked the energy, the resouro* asd the menUl , freedom to give onr Ust to the great cliallenges whw-ji have emerged in other parts of the globe. " \* ... "V . WEAKENING or UNITEI> STATER FROM UIUTARY vtEwroist. '' - '. "It is also time tnat we recognize that the Vietnam war has seriously weakened the U:ihed States from a purely military viewpoint. Tftis , TR A seldom iibMuar<{ aspect -of the question but it is one whttb'-! knoy.; to be ver>~ much on the minds 01 our militan' kadît Th VirtrHiift war has nndermined the morale of onr Armed Forces. It las loweretl the |tn>$tigp ind honor of the military profe-teion In thceyesijf mknj milhons of American*. Tlw vast and improperly fuc<Vd <ipedi- -. tures ot. the Vietnam war have led to a iitrooe n)trv. fsr cijor cats in the def-nr budget. An4. *rliile the Unit| States was devoti/i^. more than i?l'Kt billion to the Vietnam war and holding the JfMV'i |u?f on it* strategii- fonvs. the Soviet Unionrnnenrnmbered l,v^ lias brought its nuclear foros uji to stralegi<- parity, \i3ti itn ronvnttioiMtl forces in Knn>pt> anj larf ronrtrêd a. nat v whi^h now i-hallenges the U.S. fith Fleet for supremacy in the Mediterram-ur. ami wtlwr vital waterwa*^. .; \\iien vi i.ed against the jjRrsfjective of rompcting prjoritie^ "*t lionie and abroad. th*rv is nothing in my judgjjient w>iipl>^f .conij n-alisti< -illy ue*k or gain ifi Vietnam to justify an open-Hiicd bi ment in the Vietnam war. nrrABUfcHXKXT OK Ttur. TarrAiar ir* wrrw;<AWAf.
""
" The tiriie iian ronw for the Congresa to p^rabiisb by ofatuê a <vrtafr" for the tvhhdrawal nt all U.S. A.nrf-d Ynrae* from tlw- Vietdam war. Iloj^fuily. fli'm ran !M> a<v>mpll<<lied in r<x})c ration with the JV-sidt-nf. I wi not believe that Showdown con from at ion on tint i^ntje \*-l*wn tin- President and tlw <*ongrw would 1* in the intfrvstj". of rlw J'tt'h'iJent. tlie ( 'orgiww nr our V it ion. Like many other Sen:itn<. 1 ''iint*' relu'-tiinlly t/ \\\t-. view that the Congrey. ^/itl<t .ii*erf if- iiltirn^*' p/wer i\w r<\.r <f the purw--fo bring an eud to thu war which hxt done siwb v^f ami inraj'-tjlahje harm to ch h
/iir Xitf ton and it interewts at }nntf i^Kl througfiou. 'th- world.
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lioimîVrs, figl/torx, <t:ni IKM.-II^TS |tlu\v(i s.io ft iitassiv*' a,(i iiTttmat*''1,'. ^, rr!o in,{JiiiJ-otnh" VietnaJnts* proisnd clforC.*iiOeil lirt-'faflffy of" ', J iuh.'aii'"l^j. ^vririidnmal to jTrotiO'I-uorflj^"fjvxxjjji'--:W "C-ft. "îir.
T hf ( 'H.UBM.OT; Tlak yi -ry wo'; 'sorru-- of tli^n.mry.vj'iS'rtTiat }KI\-? 'l>wn ailvaiuvd. ft i>-n TV rap.miftl >t"iiii'iiirt:t.-J 'iar{J.-iilsr'_y, '-a'} -aftfifi<JJi to VO{JT s " ' -t .-K ^;iiii ii, \"ii:irirrt to inpvfy'juxy>pfjfit.*di invoKvurocf. fa tlt^ Viftinim war"-*iii1 y<jnr sra(^rn'Rt;il'w'-'ct-"-i tii^ That ^ u^ysiori U p J fuif{ 'I'tthiiiir witri tt'Iii.-L l-'cij^dhsurrf*; In ui'ir
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107
vT. a mistake, an error. in win- prVy. It is a kind of a ' \Wa<re|< <-verythinr you SAV, us I do. and I think most . n-a-Jlyvontr-s it. but they yw rcx'olted by tlie idea that '_ ^ -,-.; .'^{'iv^l.->u.ccMjf of this and yet for nn ^val Justifiable end. It bothers v .-' : > ' t V l e .
TESTIMONY or HARBI OREENTJEKt;
\\V Jcuj. ;lh<6v-tf{.. before^ I dona remember whether you were hero or Mi- i>nt Mfytvtvl^ytar tyn v had. I thought, a very perceptive, in feel-* fcwsl )rV>f(>;iiui, analysis of our situation and particularly the moral aajK'Cts. especially in the testimony of Rabbi Greenberg. Do \<ni n-iiu-mlwrthnt testimony I . Sfjrtr!:r,r^'nv,. I -ora^'hiuv-.- .T?j?-X^HAiKM AX I> think fliosf hearings may have been si year too S<XM. I think* .they wuiiVd"}iavc been more appro|>riatc today than they were th-?. hwjAjw*' rht- atmosphere arid the mood of the country and i^. '.-Vr^rrrs-: had not yet developed to the point where they realized >J*';tJjîirn*riKK?.> of this is. I wondered if you would help raff ha-îw sosue of the things that Uabbi fireenberg said. He said (hern -,Ho%tT<-l!. :iinl I ask. Mr. Rejiorter.That in order to jrive the background ui this lieariiithvi I&.^tajiiincjit^-xliich is relatively short, l inserted |n the n-c:rliiLtLlas-(fhk*-i order that anyone who rrads the record *ill KnoxViiatiK^ arc racking nbfjiit. ? follows:)
C" . -
tit rut bRi.fr, Cnrxmc. AKOCJATE Ptortftxt* or HIRTOBT. ^ 'ofwrHrv* l.'MVEMrrr

T.H.
the war in iu.:t,n('rc^rrfit t,K- rKtlizatk/n thit pulili.-? -Ufr In tin- primdry moral example 4ta'H! ttdn}. \VV lailF-tyra t'< ehTWinen auJ fb^jlfiglaiw in oine i .lltat ili^y t/p ! r^'w-JK'n'1 mid ntutp-nf* of ./>. ntoral qn<":tlon.. ~ttg* \ltfy havr ifttlf inrtct-'iiw firn|arKt to ib*- nxidcl tit jruWk1 life r 7ft tin- f'itrI Jii:^ trt;k- i N*< t<j' * I'lvrtdt-nt. tin- m^0iU>ri of ". i'iFtixn><. rji,- ju-l/rlar>,> f f.(*0'ra. Tli***- si'-rioo* and flif**- mfxH^ niv -s/it'l t-^-fjvii'lKTf fn the maw nili;i and ix>mniun!isition nviriun*ntaJlr ufluflxv tin- a-tlf' tlnrt\-tui<'li* >ind rlnoMti In AtmTlni reach u 'it tl>t~ fj'i^f rvu*-Ji<sJ i,f iffy;At.-tli>u f>f tin- I" H. Army r fjvh </f fin- Pnild-n' JJT" qn-<rim < ^>'ilij t:t> f fi-ui* 'its I{wji In j-ulillc llf- and th- warn.* thf ' tin. n-c 5 or <J ywirx fbp (k>roinant f('!- killine. HM- Ixxly 'ûjii, ch<- uw <>f
( tin- liumun tl'M 'rrili/Kicit ciriliurw wVc ftaur uji'vi luncc a ;irt of -xfcl f(illinK <f >ivf l^xjc. TIri I* whr / But iif MI.K j-a*>: MM- v>r>' ti^rmi of Ttw war in wljî'wrliijtV.'-f '<ui"ji'Tr-l^ Uw KiJ jn/puUtlon i * (/-nt
'Jrit**, , >JK.f'/ ^CÎOW ill till* . It WJW ?U H dwJKT D<r Jll-
rw'iuJ in:tH>n<-ti\ t>(
'!ror,llM|Kfo n^p<rf //r
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108
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nsi*is tr It down and CM; coer*.* ft. Xoi t.V )>ust I-ad morul ff I* n -~ irho staud in the mliWte-sml 5av.r t'h-rignitVan^vwithout cummti'ii^ : lint wbo*- RK>riI eiiinl>IUci* arc y^wixn; l>y It. And thi-.long l-OT^r " fi*fon> fflrtJutavw* afv id*nliflHl or ,l>rwtrctit*tl <>r -ven coo^Bji^.tJ iiiot;^- aa-l < f, sujar Csbivs. " ~ ' , - Tlif-*? n>ral-*ffotrt.s. fifiyrpft-r. nro I'j' jviw fnoly f^niilihr ! nil ' UM. ! w-itilit.-'. Ukf- t" 1>'iHl out >i>in*vnii>nil M'S-f<f'rtK wbiclj iir- l-^-< n->il--H<l t..-i an'Ji^tnfrf'hiS In jx-rsorj' liv^< arxi-cîitlniul iminr! r.,uillii-lK i-n-a'-t) Jifîiii li; Tlif>!*' bf *rv>nd>rjri vrtutt iln1} fntek a.f .xoc-~' "^ bli-ii(lit-^l< tl'/ty <\n- [/iIel morfilx-rs nt au attltimr i.{uy>? 'ir N It n->t p-jliy U'mu-i.- (rf thr "tin- MM.va "f tin- jVv/r unaliti- (< >;< t . tit swn-'i and Uic IQ i nr a-)ii<-n tl<- .tuditib- fe*J TR JHJutjU<-a unJ VVl;at t-t -tlift ffft,-<-t HE iuy <njiur-ty f.r .-J/Jii-t^r Jcilinwiit '<n |.ii|>b l.v'aff {ifltnarfij ÛJ'*' of lu- nffo^s at rtu-ir 'îv. rry U-JM-H I n.m'
.
Tin-TV an- u'.^tln- ftjuyili-jn ij>tfiMinrtMF^ i>tiil win/ rtal) l/K-lr rjirw.T* J <l^v<-to|ncfnt ir- -:ay lnôte<rr>i niki (inHr r-jjtei, >-xi-ui>>t ttirru'dlihoBsb tli>-> ar. onir rar.kjf ulanlfi'îrf 1>^ J/i-!"- :'iiiit; [pli- Aiiil'xlmf "f ' flf" t n ^-i'lo who fi--I UIP 'r x 'iijuft Luf iiuirxit bru>^ thâ^'lv*^ t <ai'f] jji t' it i sip**- nf tlwjr i-ir i-t fJif i^s.Ôr-n'-r^ .if !'.'. a/-!-*- -nrl tlwrrfriiv<< Ilkf niora.1 lira>Vi>'' Or >/.!! t-nioM-iuil c:><fv.'.>i IK-N i>.' <! " iijii-tr 1rix-n t-> !!< aiul -.-Jain. uriiv-rxaf 'liji;>-ti-:ri. r ti llnrv. *tl<l f**evr. <if t" Jail aft(.V"F'r'':"*J'Wl "tafU."- *'lil;i.- <utlllllr.>. irttxr-i I'jt-.'h irl.il - -tLtx- fffitt? AViat "f tii.-.?<i-ljj)K "f lai'k'.-of iwiir-tiui'dur hK-l sli i:K "!t tfi W"ji;it of tt- tli'jU.an<N <-f.-ftiiiiit<Tv fvjjf fill rl/i-ir jiriifi-s.i";i ili-iuiiudM in-ral V*Ji-/nv' *"Ju tlV'ft af' r u "ff rp(i/ -"H^rf:ciî>i|:<--nri'I u l m "f Hi-- Ifîllîiif'^ w,'.'i rfiiiAio >ileiit <ir iii' Tj'Lfln-t JJid jir>- -<.ii- i\'itli Ih"- 'tn.i;rfgail<in lint ?!
Vrt* it ill ;
-fliif f tln< -wj. .(..-I Mr. t'l.uJKJUiIJ. f !!"!< ^t jflirav- 1. J tin 1 jtiin^rni.lj /ii- ju^f o-jir Tlu- f"ii, Cta'.tr.ncKO I u.iiilrt )* Ijaci.y t'-rnfc<',lcir.f.jr. i.'itr(;<>Kr.Tuuuk7<fj 1( ji:uri! IvrrnliiJ '
u.. Jt jiiu.<f ! 'rj(|r<J, >:-jrr>" f Tlil- n:i
tin- lnTj']ht,'A <f l'Hilir|i:i. .Vt.'/ti.-r xJ'Ji- *-fT'"-t ? i h l * wnr ia- l-i n rri'l"'-i:'.'.n.< l.jntv in liuf Tii'-i1 < -'<. r i--r)if lj;k'' l<<i-n int<i|;<il f"r>Kir-< nmi Ii, !!> "iif-\I u K-rir. '.f "iiifidj^ n i-ri- n- <!i--'iiri..->lif|'* IIP .S',iirii Vlftriaai w i t h a '.'-uk "r if>Cf\i>ti-of jijf:ilar li.i-. 'J'J.'-) Ji.iv- tvii i.^-ij ni H;.- {i(i-nt f IM>!|||I-|I( figuri'k '.rlnj IvJti^jpv, F.'yli- !!!'! ii|iriii||i-ij "P Id flu- ifuaw <>f .1 Jn.In j (-ri-'-fn-r ir. (in- ,'ji-aJ n t f b - u f '"il --r nn-r/ > '/'li<- r---tiif Ifly I/HI- < t U ( t ' It}" -/""'urK'ii A i J l i ji [M-.r-y i-rr-'T Iii:<N f'i n ! ni:il "f rii- v;i;,<l .ii-i-jir n*i-\f Ami r' f.n-( dmt Mfi<(j>ti!!/ (Iw iii-rff c "f flji- tt.ir i'-i > ;'"''i li-.:*r r-jif.l.i- d. UK- /;-i-i|. "f y j/ ( (l n-i|>-in|irinfi :ii ij'in.i- !(./. " f i ' t ifijxr'ju'irfl ((^- il;itjm'tiri'itl^-r <lit ifl'if! il.i( !i rh,^ tv';r ii.i" fii'r'J'liI'1'11! til" "lir '.'i "f ;.*i"riiii'' wdlfii (ri*I> .oor/i.'ii)-. m-iin'i ;ir,ij I|T-H in
i f c . IlliTf i AV. l i - II" h^Jlltliy !-"<J> ]'lilic. Tll'i art.' f l o - Iif-!ll'iil 'if J
'.i / ftji.il* :i[,'j
taadeqaar* <dnca(on. broken f-alKr*> nd Uck of Adf-reapm. When t>, n>Hvt t-n* dbr 'Ktraordinary tat* of rf.-t.tv.ou. vin-trwnlc wirvciUaixv. training. tfclevrd 6y our nuI <<# .tud t<**<iiiulogT om- dnraras of tbrif <.M *UM& awd ID rnifiatbjr ? fret? iar own sufft-rrrx. Tbe jcUat in tU. aed"*f<!{carlirtj t^*** war"bn poverty ad tin- Indu-Curoa war hiiMkA to ioptfe t>tM^t vac raora! priorities. And **ry *tt-t,i >I<vper lnt</ tuU war Uftwufnt*! lb million" aroand tUr irorld trbo knowing Uw- rlU ud &*wo<-irt.vf tOisUt&rbin ^ntfciu. irlcliotn ronuzrU-lxin*. Iook4 t-> ihv . nut V*t r^t irf th-'.j*c;a* ito.-nl i*tb^wtuc to tror toclftr it it* rt-ri-:.T:k>ti of finr inbCUj' to 34l( ror, or fcovrft tbe traffic and ironic t*te~ njjr.lr Ii-utorj- o-wr dokv oct to M i"it wj dw fo*;: uwa. Let nx- mte clear thif >>u> Btlr-K/^?c Jewish irad;tVi>n ha* b./t l<vt>0 i/aflflst. !>* U ih* Mfltnf. tlir> pxxL But Ja4Um bad the mrocl ;iUa> (u ix-coffDize flat uadt-r <vrrBbtjinc*^ war i* & ni-^Twa ; otf JiwtlflabV1 irvil. , op^>fM;lif o( tlte war wa'd <fi *ll*o nrowd.'.r ih*- loora our intrrwntlun. V>,rjc 'r-ly oiif-i tlic roU- of of -imrr.-cjn rei<oa\i'li}U'r for the ivnrM ur>b.-r. Tfaeiv WA. a ptusr Lu w'r^'^jliiiBunlKt 'iliia-j. ij-n in ii tx>uimj> jwrlud wliidi wvnv'd to he cU>airTi"illi diRnrry of luâ. * X(n.><J"niHt an<l \<>rtb Vlrtnara as purrlj ,- .rlll(r. {u thl.i fjbaMe the ft*ur of BDOtbcr Mnoicb >u't tbf cnnrictlon * iwt M-ll <xit. or PC Jndiffrri-or lit W,rlrt \\'ar II n-j-a; itm-liU-'lfr''*! )t of Biai.y Hot !* flw pit,1 1**; UcU. of t-vciitu tirf fact)- auQ ^>mruf V Innate n-rcal<sj UK.' fUhv f war . nwoaU'tkiiw. fbcu our H:ioil a nit-rial bunion of n?nponilihhj oo n to <v>jEa:*i- onr >m>r n<l \f jJiodU /ucc- admtltM Ttm: OtronjunUt CMna vr n-at ioU>n>>Ir. thin N'rtii \'i^!Dini Litorlcjlfy souglit !( In*>pid:ncc frf-m C'tiiou. -i)ut the >k,ntli Vii-tnxm f> 'vcrnuw^t coaM DO* <rr wuuirt not oiaxtcr populur .*aif>vf!. Tbl :lk- Kiirv. JIT** .ind ClirKInax. alik<> havr tfU>Hy<l r. Snul, it nraa I>uv; trr-j:-r mi.*cak*<<. JM iij.'m- tras'c -ril thins*. Tli-ii *\*f wn* .Snul *f riifwd of tlw.-nr- anl lii ic<ist i'<.rrful c,ri:r,'tion (urn lln* U tlrf- fpj<- xtrenxtli wLii-h J ii>r.il trailer mnf. liavf. lal wa to^' IK- w.>uU nr;> rxrl'/naliz*- auJ j-jntlfy hN -rro. fwrtr rorrofrf* and )x in v,t iljlj nliuvnl. (>rilj fl.oH- wL admit ujlrtak^.t A(>d n.i>ît thr Irr/li; nud of rlw arn(itl'/iii> -iii] ! fnifitfl wlflj jHiticr wj iirlt:ihlj U^.-tr/>' OM- <,fU<-!> OfhT'l'. MV liavv u n;j>tia'i* -in ih>< t-inE liutuiliatM] or l- j< if ili4- Kr'j(-r liuoiiliiition In <> in i-rr.r an>i tin- ^n-at^nt L'f-ji In nut in i'urin gMi in *ll<.-n
Vjollll*.-' Jl'll l,'l !i(i f "lirjl-ltjKl f t l l K K <'f fflVff flljLl-
It ;. triii tli-r.- i <iM' irrfjt f-pi- f'r -'nitinuuit i)- v.ur If I- tin- ili-ntii -f n.-r I'H Auii-ri* jr.- uii'l many llo> fiiat iiwiiv Vii'(nam-- -iii-l irli-r '.? '!,< <irti! fliaf jiny t.ufjm:, ;n r)(|ir .'^ji f</r u,]-ink' r^ MI f t i u ' ('*.>*. tor t 111'*- :)^^ AJid pvki- farflii-r N--ritl.v ninl nl f r a ' t!.<,.i- u-|i li:ni- a-m<- x<.ir-. Shall m- u-.w jf> t.i tlt- ;. i ' . - n f II.-M! MI> . u<- i.avi- i-rr>-<j /u<'I your '-LiLIn i, li.tn- >]ii ( ";!; ik-si^n^l tn |Mirlib < w liintuii'l (INI nilrfiit Cailur-- "f in- i|ri| ii-ii i-fwf nu,\ tir-riln* in fh- i n l i - f j m . '!!/ jirM-li ;n "f n-(ii-ii(:irii i- i liiat tiii- ]*-r<'.r- *|;i. l,;i j-ndi- ;ilrny fi-l In- l..i B"'!'1 *i fur a>l ir ha>- ! - iiifi ti fl.i.r In- i-.uinni turn l>ii'-k i-f w- an- t"l'l '(urii .ii,<l I)-.. Tli-- mill j r i r u t - r i t'li- (i.-ifj.l --uniî- ! <-i-(if" ( tin- n m r . <if (J.<'N'li'l (!' c i>ii\ inf< rili'.ii- .ir.'l f i x - jin<l;ik<:li 4<>uriiii't"li' a ('I lli' J Z>'ti'Jtl"- ji.i ""!"'i-r., >'-l.|'l. ni"iiKi(--'J lli-'lr lx-l"i"<i n;ii'-' c)"ji(fi Anil Ji pN-u (' tlwiu, (lut If i-';)|j li-iirii trni,, i,ii" \fAn ftrt-r. ',( i-ni. li-iirn ( Jii'nlul;ifr lii- HM- i-f !(, :( vi..-in - i c.< fii.iruJ i x ..... |-li- "1 lunijirv ,i.- ..|ir,m i- ..r <iiTi-ui nli'-n- if i* f l u - milv I. ..(.<-' r;:in; l <)'> fiii-u j !,!-< ;(.([.! mil f r u i t - NI li;ir.- i|i--.| in i.nd T'H y "ill , > HIM" i -art . ,f id,- -iii-nli -\|ii. li i-r .ii/hf nii'-iif Iriiu'ili (- n-r ((>. r-'ii(r''i ( inlinii' (11 ikl,f|| mrlliT ttllld tl'il U l l d i K ' 1'lii*
no
heal tlw worM nnd It*rf. \l MU-tv 1 Jinr ton-awd i<ar*nt>< .t<V> pooÛwp"rM' >f |>/vi- otxl uitr * i^fjtKtfi/c anl a>:'vi--atnv triiirii Mjrli ovr.lff. Wr.<-uly )n>-k ttiM.Rii<rnl lMidpn>hi|i to havtr nj.ul-. bus tirvvr Mi tlk.r-iwirtyd<im r defeat I" tatrlnM<-fllly morally >a l>rtir tn rficiit'ifiiA-vM.fry Hut inability .to a^vpr rV trarlr. tin- inmlr. tinjfOs^Wlitj- of (uptake !Ml tsfynrr- ii. tir (y U-ry. t!ii -fully liooian ivrtmrw Mil* Is our aafiouui prnMctu. Maybe, ifcfs rtj>lu;ni. ur (i--k / fmiuifliy for il.f Bufferhue. ^.f>rl*v& *n*l defnit-d in >ur rtvr. e>tjr whffrfon- ofi-n <iuiilcuin tlu-ui to n-e!fir>-~*tfh'*ut ntK> eLarifj-. deprivation nltttûi lm[- an<l .vtutu.t tiitbout faitJi. '* friwt in Um. MayL*- 'p nrur tmttfrrriti.aiiil'pTi-ufDt dcf'Ht* In tlii -Aragzlf \>n>.TTiT'- i* "t;- la*t morn I d'at.c.T I K-int t>, pulnr-to ali>. Tlu-rc if tinfUiUj'-r 'Jit frfiu'lbf fruxtr-tlon ami ruilirulixatt'm nmf Ifuil tn n m-w llutli>nlm iinrt r"Jr.-Ti/:J ,f m<n->Minr iiari->iuil wi-Tlft'Kn l"r "rid IM-UII-. I l<cll-vr ihur tr U Un- -niun-tPO >( <nir r-;nn.** in a uiUtukfu an'n' n'nl tnittdtult-^ i-H that !**<!.< t> tlw wra)-<*i;il:c of our nv-lvi> t> h<-!i> tlin"*- u 1 .iiit fn li-lji< Uirf:]'lvf>. \\'< (-"i nrifj tin- fjsirnii-* f thont;lttIfH int-rrci ( tlr . nr total inv >[itii>'ilillity tiu-lr on ii -i[>trJ:>>- aaJ corijrfTjfii-n riltli all I>>iii><nt>i *!i (lit- \v/irl(l OK u cut lot In^TtUiI rapport f'/r mi-.tatm i-jux,-*. uh'-n- tiu-rr i.< no nmrnl f-inim or national Intercut \Vbui VIK u.^J )/i >ittr t!:ii- i- uut tU- iliisnunnin^ of |t>>\rcr lot gt>-at<-r s n't ri-al. r j/r-.-J^.ii., *l!I>ru'.'i-n.an'l j.pjjx-ritir.Tti-in In lfn u-*i^nvf IIH fr<'iii iuUi->ii4l uiornl iljMuotcr l< tin- r*-î-ii>- of million* "f ali kirxl* uim Imvr -|.k.-n ii|i. takvn rrs|H>fiVi)itllt> . iiunlr- ni<-nil ej-;r].int-- *.* riRli?. -nir wrnz The -oviTinjt uj of t-rr-r l*r jf'lnrizufi'iii. l-rv.n. . vm -u-izlriK U|H>II n--tuul aim.-.-* fo nr>mw ha'< . .ii niu oiUv rai.v Uu- rinli i>( iitoral Jt-cjt.-r. I'l.'il^^s u;/D i''fi N n-'.nt>tl t-> flicilclitlf- 1 lii,riire -if -.tful-r;i uij<l in r>>*i'irn- of imrit.K 'l' '= -r Idlml ilctni 1 t-m. Tl.i- 'xfn>tiort nf iin- wr i|irmfi; (/ i<vfr\vli>'lin tli- fruit il:L<r >if ninml -cn-rn arnf 3t<- inii>ii'aii^*<l ni'iral Irjtitrnuii r anil <1>-:no ralji- f'liM'iiû* Hi >.nr oonir.r. Tbii tl:iul i:irji: dlo-d-r luu-f U- i.r>. v. i.l^l All of n^ mul i-llnff i-;i.<rrn- r w l tl,i> iii-u. i- n/iiil. l< m.n nrui-iiM-d HI f.:ir mn d'"> o "niy )>r l<'<-i>i:ur;/ one >ni,u>iinll; IVri'4j"> . lsi lean:. aiiij^n' l:iiili>iil H<!I-I. fn rn '!'*! und ( M"U' uii"Ni if ItJi'l iinrwil 'Owo l f nitiuif f-ijc'*hi.T ti iu p w wu>.% *('. t'i 'ir^ri'^riM' tin- *-\jK ? tin 1 [.**.. i t^-Lr-v*- iliitf "(ity iu ilii** wui 'f w it f, ru ''i*w iiT*t\ jk>vi f*^ !( fv*-r.i*iK** iu p*cr *>''*,) 'and
I rraily ftrl th.-u hj- ! what lH>th-rr not only u> but tlu- I'-i-&i(l-nt.
n wji > tin- bi:iraiiatiiti fu lh- ^001:1, "y f-fttiljinjr an :*'i''Mi of tinkiiifl jtt3 3'ihjr''Ic.s.' (lian t'oiitpU-tc >. ic-torv. Tlii.-* fl'*'?1 <-r.'nl- u most tf/i|H'jt;riit hul UTV .îililU' {r.^t'lu/l'Jifii'uI lijiwk tu our f;iki;iir ili- art ion wliii'li .id of tii<- n-:i!<oiii \ou have ;.'! M-II af.il otlu-rn lliar h:iv>- IK-PII o;i; i'ii ii-lc W nil III il;ilir:it<- ir-iii tin 1 ififrli^f of our count IT, Scnsif'ir J \viro. Mr. I '\miriiw,. I Ji-unl Kaf>hi f/n-rnljcr^'. HP wn n-iy i'|iHju'iif. In- *|mkf fruiu tin- dc|>tli of ."i."'in vi'.'io- of /fcwinli xj'i-rii-i/'^- wliirli Irf-.iis in iiis K-iji, Hi- yjul. in I'rfct-r. Jlic hijrlif.it nioi:i!itv it '!) inoraliry rtin.-i; iro/irni/.-- a i/iist;iki-. Jfr sai<l von ri)i/;|'-u'i'J Mini iiiitLt- iijiini/iMl wliai ina; Icivi- IH'I-II moral, if yon |rtTM-t <iiil of -|>r->-r htilMinrdlirK.-i in :i |*>liry l n i l i hlllllllll ' 1 .i-|if J !i:i\c ilcuion-tnifi-d to In- ;i |>!i'-\ wlii.-h i-, dcstrii'-liu- ratlicr tli:in
COli-tl II.'IIH',
III' f"'. i ! Ii-<l to on i v i . - w tluif riif iii^||fi diit \ of in;in i- t hi 1 morn 1 it v -A a iiiHluk'.'. ul wlijrli in s-lf rurjvj'Moii mi'l 'If-
Ill
censorship. He beggpct us to get over the basest part of our morality which is persistence in error. Most people feel very deeply about Vietnam in terms of so many lives lost. \\ ho knows, many ether things may have come of it. Maybe even our own sensitivity to slipping into war and how dangerous it is not to realize what trar can do to a whole people. ow even we, with aU our strength, could lose our Nation in such a I think the point is, and I certainly subscribe to that fully myself, that tin* Itiirtiw morality is thai when you recognize th*, the time has coaw. seize* that time and don't out of stubbornness or human perversity ]*'rsist in a course which cannot then be justified only because it is a course which you undertook and pursued heretofore. I believe t hat was the message of the rabbi. VATTKE or THE XISTAXE The CIJAIBMAN. I will read in a moment, a few passages from his testimony. There is great difficulty here as to the nature of the mistake. It strikes me that the mistake was purely one of political judgment. It was not great evil moral motivation that led to this war. What bothers people is that they seem to feel that it would be the admission of a noral mistake, that u that there wa* something wrong with the motivation. This came up yesterday very cKarly about the motives of th<? Country or of our leaders back years ago when we first '.ecaroe involved :n this war, As long ago as 19.>o there are certain high points in the history of tlir development of our involvement beginning. I r/ould say, actually right after World War II in 1946, in our attitude toward this area and toward the development of Ho ("'hi Minh and the Viet Minh. I would Uke ifrlft, then J9.14. then 1961 and 1965. There were different periods when decisions were made. I don't consider any of those mistakes to have fieeii motivated hy anything other than a political judgment. Unless we anpirc >r presume to be infallible, this is nothing unusual in political judgment hy individuals who are Driven a responsibility for derision. It dia not involve, in my opinion, aiM great moral degradation on the part of the people of the I'liited St'ates or of the Congress or of the Kxecutive. Th y were simply political mistakes in judgment as u> tin- JJitentttn of tin ''.oiiiitry. whini every fount ry and every individual has made, and we need to disassociate that from a feeling of pjilf. I mean that in some way or other we are. UK a community, very tiilf y of mmm jtrreat ntonil la;js of wmic kind, I hgve a fex'ling thi v ia more imjwrtant than the psychology of makj-i-f thf dwiiiion, HiK-1. us you have urged and other* have urged, in a littU- ditferent 'v>ntexl than has hci>n rvcjoitM'/*-A. That is why I think it in worthwhile, ej>ecially with you h'ir, and your having been on thn rwmriHirr ut th<_- time, to fK>in> out a fi-w thingn RnUii OrwnU-rg Maid, if you will allow iw.. Jt won't take very long, and any time you wish to curmnent on it I would welcome it Ix-cause I don't think there L-; any one in the Senate more cnpghle of cotmnentinif on it j)i'f)jerly, Si-nnUr JAVITH. Thiink you,
112
MOBAL EFFECTS OF VIETNAM W.\B
The. CUAIBJCAN. I want to read a few passages. They will be- a littU" isrrwuuvtcd lx> aiwe I don't wish to n-td the whole thin^r. He said;Tbr ijcefrflou I nculd like. to- foriw on ther. ' jmblic lift- Dd \\ir nar tb*?. tnidvt pcdfleoKtif of America of thin generation. - , TfrH Tealixatton j>olntK up the moral dinaswr which is tbe art effect of UMtragic trrfrr of the Vietnam war. For th* pa*t 5 or 6 jvar* tlw dominant moral mcM.sn;;>> !m been tfw continual futile kilLtuic. thf body cminr. tlw PS* >f tuiailm and civilian destroying , projectiles. the 'k-nsltUuUoa of counties* Ani^rlcou faif* in VU'taaiu and i-"ant!<-ss people here to the human <iu:illtie* <-f the enemy and of the Jntiooent dvlHans who make up so large n jrt of tht-
I think tliut is> pertinent, especially in v'u-w of the testimony of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War which I loard last night. He poes ou, and says :
Another side effect of thin war IM* been a trvnirndnufi <>U>w to thf rrfpert tr j.alrioiisrn., Jt-ujixracr and fnreroatlunal rcpn<ili]llty. Without i-omtnUmour Co Micii cif>n<.flt*!. then- can '( 110 health} tdj |>ollr<i*. They art- tin- Ilfrblood tit a lr>*- Hocu'ty. But tbp.v ctiucejit* Lnvi- been IuvokH<l for yi-ars now 2n tfuiinti-xr 4>f upholding n s-rleA of ililfting niircsshv dictafi)r><bl|i^ lu v?ritb Vietiiaiu w i f l i wvak or uoncx latent [Kijiular tin*'. TUi-jr liavr riîi u*#& in tbroriii-xt of politlrulflfcur-<itried k4Bicarn, xtyle and imprlîml <ir In the Imuciof _u police <'-Llef KljiHHiujr A ciu-rrilla prUotier in ttrt- head itln>ut trial or uvffy Tii" n-Htilt i a treatendouii cynli-inui and a }>'* t faltli in arra.<< nblct ure Hleiilflmnt and wlilrli keep -MX'ii'lj iie. (Jullr liy aKfejrlaflnii with u poll"-)' error leads to A denial of the Inteicrlty of the valid 'oncrpt ItAtlf. And tlu* fan rimt KtalNtl'-ally tlie omre oncrewih'f HiipporterM of tlio war havp been Ira it re9pob)iivr to the oeedi of deuiocnii'y atld reileujitjcil af \iuttf iiflK only C'lOI(K'i'jnde<l the da mage.
MORAf. CLlkATT, OK F.ARLV HAYS Af IXTWHT.XTlfl.V
Vow I come to I think the most im[Kirtant part of it:

Kveii opponent* of the -r would d-> well to rrcrottp tbe nioral cllraaie of the eurly dayn of iur Interfentiod. WV can freely i-iriifenH tiw rol- of itlenllMii. Hie feeling of American re<{)")nil>llily for tlir M'rld "rd<*r. There wa> a pltas4in whlcli MI- wiw Touitnunlxr ('hinu. tliMi in it. rointuuije period wlil.-U to den> tLc clcaiculal die;jH> of ican. HA espaa.<ili>nit and N'< rfli Vlefiujo li'irely n ("biiieM- :itiJJite, In tliio |ihii- (tie fear iif another Miinlrh HIM! cfiniic(ii>n tliui we dare not -H mil nr If- imlirTereut lent Wurld War )I
IVAHJMTV TO AOMIT EKtlOK
TJiin is wiicri' j think lie pur sn veiJ the -n-or in jUfl^nuMif ar ifi fron: the i'leuliitin or pur[osv :
Hoi when the pirilpw lithi of Tty.t* aud fu<:u and crowing !. iflamii rc\caU'd (|M- faUity '>f ..ur H*uni|'ti.m. tiien HUT intrfit j.t. 1'iirileii of rei>poiiii|ljllli> mi n'j ! re-ofuixf "iir irror and wlfh'Jra* \V- fb'>ul<< hme iidmlrtii] th'if <'<>inoiiiriit Ciilim wa* renf int<'j-i,uHy. <h*r Xvrtli VW-tnaw lii-tt'iriciillj ixxjKht i(H inc(ej>etiileuce fr"m ''in1 J. tluif ! **'il|fli Vietnam Oovefli incut i-<,i,|(| nut <,r wiiiili) not rnuxfer jn^mlar Ktijiport. Tliln imil>Hitr !- admit 'trt ha-- lieen flic trn|(ic fi,r<-e f l m t hil drill ii U df-per Uil /ii-rjh-r Into tb* in IP- Jeu> a tul <'Urk(i;ii<-i alike Imie ld'/<-il /'uvid ,he Klutf "f Kllilinil fj>i' ;i HI-' etcriuil i))in'-l). UK uiicej>r>ir iff t i n - .M-T>'inl, J.-w|p|/ tradifi'M. i*>lii'.* r.ut hi-, prolecenwir. Wn'il. it u,i*. Jjv)ii nh ' 1 ei II (li)iiL'< Then w|,j M J . i Kmi) frlii['il nf tlu>
: i \ t / J - < ] ' ' i'.il-.l'l^ 1>!IVL'J o.llll) Tf'"fl,i/Jlll.ll <"llfc.^ l l , -
irmt: ini'l in limit pnHerfiil <nfiiri'l''U f n r t i fri-ut in. * u j ;ini| reilrcnw iiijij.fli.. Tl.j i- 'li- 1 ( r u e tp'iiîli w l i l ' l i n iH'itu' len-Jcr ""!' lime Xunl vm !. w.-ak in- Ht.nl.l ifiil> rjjil..fj:iti/j- mill j u r f i f ; ht i-rr-ii* r->wer r-nrrupf mid i iri.-vital>|r
w*
wfri admit *)i*Uli*> *u0 J>fpt UN frwiy and tragedy of rf AKp *s*npCJoBii cab V tnwbft Kith jm: <Xlier*Le. d# pow ttv oOim. Otl*-T*>-, ,we ! * " or nunltoe* r-fcWi placw cmtt <anJjiL<n5 t. uat beiof tauoUlatrtl or ju it (tot *re*iv* LuniBtatioo r* not to ttaxtrHits to fcr-r- M ovr up trn/r unt the *nwtt iteftat U cot In poarfn* faod Il and raK nuourer* (iftf a.-, -o-nUmiiar rwrify < fmtratkxi wtAlaffVxw lavt kKocfcoot. Sort* * eon,v|.tkm T lfU:>- Jtm t*it and rttrtUan tffeta ( pwrtr alike.
1 thtnif thsl describes what really is eating no so mahy people, an'f in vv way of doing what yonr re9outto wtnte us to d<x
ottnocA, or HCX4V jUCKincx so YAR It i* vn* Ut*tr ( on* <3* fonr /or contlnaiiu; iliv war. It I* tbe tfcatb of uf rfo H-pfKt tAl 5* nmmn *crtrf *r*n for mistaken cut* becoflw *roi ftc^ fr tb*r .** tp< crfoJMr further1 wcrtflct* twJ n*ii*^r-'Wf we l*n*r tlrfc* rfcakiri- BWI* beforr. Wiaii ice no* x^' to tbe (*reo?K of f b- 40.000 aod ir: '* lMv> TeI 1D<1 y<r (-UlWren have dta) (fl v(n? .Slwli all thl* l*trlirfi'u ml crffi<.- toHin aottriii*^ I raU;*v th^ f ..'-i ton.*; of till* dUrauuL . But (t*- cioljr vomtitK^MtiDK oitMftvr must lx- : Kfulll w rtiaderao innfhrr 10,<MO >Uc^rkun t>4 *n<itbr^ SO.OOu VIfAiiiMV to J*tb raUW-r tJwujiot admit? 71>>it xii rli" r^rni Vfrtkursi <rf a VietnMinttkf tar volley ttMlgood to pordraM tim* nl nK 4mir foiliiiv t Hi'-.ilffld ht>C ft*t many roor* llr<>s .o tbr latcrtm. The - pn-twrn c.f rlivortoc'.- J>ltt thr {cc<c whc han gone avtnf ft*l lie ban KIHW *> far ui.it H Iita.'o.xt m>" mnrfi that be ranuot him back. Yrt v are told "turn '
nil JiTC."
Tbi- ->!> aiifwrt iir t(K> moral eoontKr (o roo/ran to tin- urvlron of tbf dad fn*- x"o<[ im-i>Uons and fit* rnirtaluii aampti<nM aivt ti<e ff .liiw p*UloUa> nDi'-Ji luutUaU^ rlu-ij twlartd OOM* rttath. And a fit* to th*-m. that if *f CXH Icwru rr.ii/, Cbtx tnudr ftisrf. If we <aui U*rn to nvxloUtf Uw OK of power, tf '*v ran xrf tliv moral pffltn(le cf voluntary accepts ice c>f defeat when? it In UK; ocl>rKinic tiling t &>. then fix** p*>pW tr'JI *ruly not Iiarc dld In vain. Tber *U1 l*wr,fr i*rt of tbr MtcrUhv wlilcii krocslrt <ibout a dee]r intrrnatioiuI.nHira) rIT aurf'.i I'aitMl ffutrft tonpemt >or traiCKiy to u- !U resources - nubHw f:-f f.-al tln> world nd ttuplf. I W*-Te if twreavrd parent* add wur poarf* arti .A^-alil*-- <f th ri.tij!* of k>r- uwl ubftfi^'itiMliov nd i>t*no1 wMok ucli fl amfrvlû Kirfild Krok*- \Ve on!j Ui 1 'uini\ Irad^r-taJLt to bflfe if tna<]f Jn.^fHUi U' o-vcr Ml that uuirlyduai or dKwt IK lrilrio>1<itll> tu'-rsllj- *uprrt<r l rijjrtifunin rltor)'. But fnaWUty toacct-jK tb< tragic, tlrt) IriXtic. Ui*" JHJ*T}WTl:r (if .aiifTako aod failure I* to Ix- IPXX tliaa fnll) human. I'prbairt tliic I* or K"*1l^'i Muybe llil Jj'UIii.i our taok r.f <-ni-ail^ for tlw MiflVrlnK. awl drfthitcd In our own nucM}' wbon-for^ < oftMi condemn tttcni to N- without rnw> <iirlr>. <l^-ri ration without bojiv aod tato* vrftlK'fjt faith nr ''[i*f m ll'i-m. M/ixl*- ** nvd t ddiul'. frror tlxJ know dtî-at U-for* we can JMuiui'li ovrr poverty giwl nudm and liatrnl in our country by '-oufcMLn/t our }jac vTT"n niul |M-f(>t: drfft la this *trvucle to.
<>r rou/'iNu KBBI OKKTSBOICV ADVICE

. Tto-it i* a iprcal tlcal ni'/rv, but I think t h> *<m np Ijotter than any>nn hi vi- fivr huJ what rr!J> w> an- famj wif h t this particular \'WA- ;n <>-Jj ts.itTK. t^ * *'un jjK <ivrr (his aud folJow what I IwJiere I/, |,.v v-ry H-ih- nilvjlc, ffr,ra a yrt-at moral f(>di>r, * coulfl gvt b*r^k on tV ti-iirlc i.<hc piifsiiit I^l:-faditioji? und idwbiof thigmtnfry. ''-T.jrt/r JAVJT^- f am 'iv|ily :'\-/Jf <WjiI^>' iniprt-MVed. My rccollpv t i'* ** thju th'.f W& ft'Ijitt 1 h- Uaf>r>, ?.4xJ said, fin>hably U'ranse it i* 2 {jji)jnxoita) u-tfrliii;^ with which I httf^?ii'J arid am n^ IflHi thuruntfiiiy ln-li'4v iy it. It j<t fljp furrtivarion f,r'>lmh!y for rvc.r rtt ir I urn trviii^' <o rjo nfxmt <>.!> (irMli[-tt(f in Imtili'Tly I'lnbr*/ jy <<{!< ^^1^:^. i^n/j I only h^m arid jiiuy hate' iJic I: -spirit ir/fi do o -}M-II it. will dot hi- m
114
. The Cwaiai\y. If we don't do it, i can't see. anytliing very hope.ful inihefrrure. Senator JA.VITS. I agree. The CHATRMAX. I appreciate your coming,and I think both vun Ifebbi Greenlwrg have. made- a- great contribution to our thinking. <.' Senator JAVITS. Tiiank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pearson, do you wish to address any questions. ' , ' fijiatoc PKARSON, I h/trc \ud the fortunate opportunity through frktidrfip and association in the Senate, with the Seimtor from New York ti aorl of watch him reach this noint in the last few years: 901 haiv grtttt resjwct for his ttfatem^nt today.
WITHDRAWN Or AID AND -VAVAL fORCES
In your statement you nude the comment that we would continue to supply financial, material aid to South Vietnam to assist in their nHfd^feiist-, if necraary, togi^her wHKtlif. proposition tl*t all remaining U.S. militarj-iorceji in Vietnam be withdrawn. F/iXstiw Senator mwin b}- that that tut and naval forces would be withdrawn and l*ve only logistic and supply u>d matc-ridl f:oplp ? Senator JAYIT*.! Exactly rij/fct. I think that at thisrap" iiothingcl* will i\i>. T ps no jud^TTK'iil uixn the dispositions of Anterioiii na\'.l and othvr fon-xv throorhout tnp wc>-ld astju-y haw been disposed for it \onf time; V\rc will have to juil)f<r them on their merits, but I believe that under present (xmditions if we leave anythinfT el*- in Vietnam it will only result in the t ripwire j>|>ent ion, I never brliovrd that you can blafT *U)iii fiM'Se things. In other words, 'f yya iiavv a tripwire, and it trips, you arc in. Tlire is no fooling nbnirt it. Great nations can't bluff, and any )iu- wiu* thinks they ran t v^rv ilr-advised and thkt is my poinf. Whatever niay have brt>fi the situation liofore. now if you left any operabl* force, there of any kindartillery, air, groundif would l eftabliahing tripwire. V'ou mnrt exjMvt that yon mld U- drawn back in. tvnd M I don't want Out. I on't reromfr>end it. lint rnateriai Fupport. motley and .*> on. f iJiink wv should prr/vide Ijeravim- of our having brouvh't tiH'm. or at least joined iti bringing them, to their present pObture.
RKAMON* Mil! KZTf.VriU> IIATK
>Scnat*r PI.AKKOX. I)o I unilt-rxtand vnvtly that tJu- extcn-ied date that you profiose. \t in n'l'ojniitiou of the pnwtioi] probletn>r of withdrawing, togi-iher with giviiig tlic alinimtrdtion And Snigotr rftill nunv {'in* tog* it over w ith ? Senator .1 AVITX. All throe, but most importaritlv the hope that the tjme niiglit \n- found, n-ally tle time the I'n*i<J<fit himself has in mind and. Uierefon-. in eflWf, we will be doijiff this togptlier, <""ou^Îcring tlw eonwjiKiwvK of H-S. tro/ip withdrawn], und anything I'ati hapjK-n. Home of whirh could cuuxe great resentment in tltt' rountry, great diffirultie*., we nn't 1* afraid of it, but if we can avoid it by Charing tin- n*x|>oiiHibUitv fully w i t h the President then T think we ought to fry to nvoid it f fiat wa'y. i don't think that uji extra i', month* i*f<M> fiiiit'h to pnv for that, I think if iuwMhîrnble jf we huoiunfycan to yfr,-I,-!, oiinx'lM-jiiii tlfCongreNutoiiu'et the President half way ami f o ngrw wit h him in cffM-t tifxin a date.
115
Senator PKARSOX. Thank you. The CH MBX AN. Senator Aiken, do you have any questions! Senator AIIU.X. No, I am sorry I was delayed getting here, but unfortunately I had two committee meetings at the same time. nwautiurr or FKESIDEKT** AXXOCXCIXG COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL Hie President has announced withdrawing another hundred thousand troops by December 1. Do you think by December 1 he should be *l>)c to-xunounce a definite date for complete withdrawal ?
Senator JAVTTB. I think he should, but 1 see no promise, Senator Aiken. I *o no promise in the conditions that he has set that he will and almost that he cm. He has set conditions which take it out of his luuwij. and unless we take him off that spot, and it seems to me that the President would be anxious to have us join with him, bear the joint responsibility for so important a decision, but he has not, and unless we can take him off that spot I think ho is stuck with a formula that has just got liim bogged down in this quagmire for God knows how long.
PAUT PEACE AVIl AGREEMENT IN INDOCHINA
Senator AJKEV. I noted in his last TV taJk. to which I believe you have referrtJ. that \w did put emphasis on remaining tiiere at least with tin- Navy und t) . Air Fore* until such tune as the jKwple of that country arc able ti handle their own affairs, including their military affairs. lUve tic" - done that in the past? Has there been a time in the past when ttv '-eople of Indochina hare been completely peaceful and in agreeMcrt? Sw it *r .TAvm. In all modern times they have been cither under foreign tutelage or at war. ^ Tie CHAIRMAN. They were* colon}'. Senator JAWI*. As'l nay, under tutelage or under war, so thus is really a long, long-range objective. The Ainen-'aa iieople just can't do it. If we were the guiding power on earth. and able to keep order on earth, iti the tradition the Britinh did for 300 years, riavbe you would undertake it. Imf n if IB jiwf tearing our country apart. Senator AIJCEV. Do v 'i think it would Iw another hundred year* before they would be able to ? Senator JAVITH. Mr. Ky sap 15 or 20. S-nator AIKJTN. I am not urv tliKt Mr. Ky'n sUten^nt is going to Hhorten tin- jteriod. ( Tim article referred t'* follows:) ^
York TUM, Apr, 10. 1TII
Kr wi <*o Uotti T Hrjj'-IimtxBK Mt'T Hi S*T I'ACT or l'i LUOI.T rr I'.K I

.S, H'.i TM VirrsiW. Aj/r. I*. -V> I'n-nliMif Sxujfi-ti Can K> MW Hut it i>uld takr ).-> or 30 f**r* \w4mv Xo\ii\i Wftuim wan In; 1'wlf. I'lK In* uildMl HIM I lh rurivjit ;ixv i>f Atufrirau >r<>(ii T)M- out|x>lu>n former ulr vl'v uurxdul, *iîr^riwr at a Unj>rtu[Hn i>.v 'iHtvrwuv. <vtiw<l rlw Cnllwl Kful<- of *U|ij/l) IHK Mniifli VMlwiu writ)' >A*nArir lrcruft Iff ul*i njMilu- NKHliixt K>i; > ' < i r <j/rxe ilft/'ivt-ru. Jfc-WKrjt of 'uk-il* wli" )iu wMiidit )iif'riiuili"ii ilHitir cliiiri^K flmt Itw Vice
In i.|.|UOI
116
"Tt,f day b- routf* hew I will kirk blu out." Virr Pn*ident Ky Mid of XriiUlor MefJnrtrn. "He dww't uwd to ar, 'et oni of Vietnam.' will kick him out p*-non:iy." Senator Mi'îrrrn. * critic of the war. In UK- oaly formally announcrd ctndifor Kie Democratic uomfrwtion for Pmddeat in 1072. *-a: 'FOB WOUE.X' on aircraft xuppltal liy thr t.'niird Rt?tr*. h- rrVrn-d to tbc A -37 trainer aud swld.-Tbl* in for women." Tbe Vin> Prrnldent Mid he diet not want 4 cou'inuinjc Anwricnn -flllitary pr**eruf in South Vietnam for many years.nd slfliiKith lir mid that tli- rurrr>ut rate of I'niled Stairs Withdrawal n,a. tvaODal>l-. ho qiwt<tlotu-d the mfiiDliie nt ! Viftriamlwtkij pr<4rn>in. Hit- procmvi under whlrh t'niifd State* f<rv nn> trimrfrrrinjc c-miliat aud ilpfcnw rr*|M>n.il>lllty to tin- S-xilh VU-tnunu-w. v "Tbo VJKumlath>o plau i* nfrt 4mplftfd y-t." Ju- Raid. "* V Will have QUIU.T thlmoi to do nut only In rli<< ' military flfld but in otbcr flfld-'. -.So If Vtrtnamlxntinn aj-an.\ Snutb \ MuMtn ft rone, caimlil*- tx defend Itsrlf. ii III take IS or :5> mr' y*-r>< "Hat if VU-fMuiirjitlon m-ann only to allmv the ^\itbdrKMl .of you mil (lit- V-tnanilzatl<ni |ilap will 'nt i-omplotrd Ocst y
MAY MXK
I'i>-lifc'nt \ixon "aid Krlilay nlKht tliar Aiiit-rim would kwp onji- f-iivrs In S^.inh Vli-tiiuui until tin- S.iiitli Vlnnain*-*- lutd tln-mimoty ! <l-f.-inl tl-u).<<rlri-M Viiv l'rri>ilM>l Ky xW tltrr a a "K4M| |Ulllty." ttat lu- -nuuld ,rou fur tin- i>r>>i<lrrir) upiin-<t the iiiiiimlx'nt. Veuyt-n Vim ThU-n. in tb>* i-iii-lion in Tin- Vi<-- I'n-xidît t'M>l, fillt fr initiatlnic tli>> Viet naiuizat Ion and iiiil h*- uen-i-d with Mr \U<ni that Smitli \'ietnani"<' tr<Mijin ruld jt" i' a loll'1 in I lx- field. "If we are not iiipahle." he .111 id. "then the CommutilxtH will defeat tin" 11- xui'l T'lildil StiiteH Krounil trxip* could leave rum. l>tit that air *U|iport HUM Ktill needed He Mild thai bou lone the Rii|i|>rt would U- neetb^l di>|N-aded uri "how <|uli'k you ure fin it to Iwlji ui> liuvc .1 otrotix air frre to iirnvlJf our own tiieuno for nii|i|Mirtinic mir <-U-iiM-nl " "Alone u l t l i tin- e<)t)i|)tnent have nu." lu* wild, "we cannot fight North VietiDiin n l t h it 111<; UT" We ."ily hav,- ike older trainer, the A.-37. Till* for women. ThU 1* not H flehter plane."
l|)^^lBfr.r^v <>f Kfrrn,r.MK>'T TUitorii Do you tliink tin- prolili-ins ran IN- scttleii in I'aris or Cioru^'a '. Senator JAVIT-*. 'I lii-n- is a diKiici-. S-nator Aiki-i and it i one jiiiltrrrii-tit if they nn- nj apiinst tin- uwrl for iiiôtiatijijrtlwnisi'ln-?. :ind if tlirv liuvr to deal u'ilii tlii-ir own future and tlx'ir own skin*, tin- likelihood i.-< îvatrriiut they will try to n-'ike H M-tflenifiit irion- a p 'nj>tii!)lc tn the jxiwer itiutKiii as it *t:tnd* than if wv are around with all rl/i- (tower we li&f to pive them an tKtf H '
MrMPI.ni.
or A I K K X . Vo. I Itelirve, hnwevHT. tJiat you }JHUL dot n-'-oininendiHl and do nor nroiiitik.-nd roi;i)<)ete wifhdrHU'nl. almndoninen! of n hum- which HI- may have in SoothcM Asia or the SouH. ]'u'-iii>: \'ny would iwt advi*n witlMlraviujr from thrtt ate.i. S'Miit'it .L\up. 1 mrjvfe <-Ii."ar I wim .êkiriv' in.-f t<; I'êi-i ricfiirtfy und I'.'&pi'Hrnii'nr dei-iîoie: we miflit otherui** ncik*' ouir-ide of
117
Senator AIKCV. I am son yon have < vered the situation well. either in this ^totamettt or others you have- made, and I have no furtlier qnertwms, Senator J A vrra. I thank my colleague. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Javits. Senator J .\vrre. May I* thank again Senator Miller who was so gracious because he was first on the list. Tic CHAIKXAN. Senator Miller. 1 V> you lia ve a prepared statement. Senator MJlle~ i Senator MIUXK I do. Mr. Chairman, and it should be before the members of the committee. The CHAJEMAX. Will you proceed, please. STATEMEKT OF HOI. JACK MILLER, U J. SEIATOR F10M IOWA Senator MIUXK. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I pnreoicte this opportunity to apficar before the committee as fa conaiders various (tending legislative proposals relating to the war in Southeast Asia. S|>eeincal|y, I am here to urgv the committee's favorahlc consideration of my .proposal which is set forth in Senate Joint Resolution A2. In <*wew*. fhe. resolution calls for total withdrawal of all I".S. -military personnel in South Vietnam within [-2 months following completion of the exchange, under appropriate international supervision, of all prisoner? of war. A cardinal principle of the Charter of the United Nations is that of m-lf determination of peoples. The maintenance of that principle is reallv whv c an- in South Vietnam. I am certain it is why the U.S. Senate, by a vote of ft-2 to 1 ratified the SE.VTO Treaty on Februarj- 1, l!.*i." Keveral years l*efoiv I mine totlie Senate. NORTH vrrrvAMcse HEAD STABT Our Ix-st intelligence information indicates that since 1901 large numbers of \orth Vietnamese troops have infiltrated into South Vietnam, numbering it/. the hundreds of thousands. There is no evidence of South ViHnaii(5'.se troops iiifiltmting into Xonh Vu-tnain. Commencing whh tlwiJeneva Agrwment in 1954, North Vietnam wet on ac<nirw of <|i-t doping a tnng military power, while South Vietnam did not do K>. Thus North Vietnam had several yearn Itead start on South V id. urn in recruiting, training, and equipping HII urmy, so that by IWi't tin- prosfM-i-t of Uws of iu fr<NHiotn of w!Jf detennination by South Vietnam wax imminent. It is g<>ii>rall.v agreed. I U-licvi*, that without the buildup of I'.S. military forceH in Sr>uth Vietnam, that low would have oivurjvd, ntmi'iHjt or r.>.vw<T or WAM
of ( I w mfinberw of tlje r/MnmiMw will rwall that following my vinit to S^xith \ p ietnani in January of lOGti. f 1^-anw increadingVv l of th' wy '!* vi'ar was |**ijig conducted, J warned re()eatedi/ tltir fhi- prolorigwi *-jr stnittfy lir-iiig followi-d would lead to greater rajtuiiificK ûd greater pn>lleni*. And I publicly obwrvwl that if tln?reurre ^.11111*" tn-fftt reason for w-Jiditig our HM>H TO fight in that I* li-agucml i't'untry. with one hand tiwj In-hind tln-ir ba^'lcs, tlien we nhould IK- ' r M-n J them at till. My word* Wl on <Wf earn.
118
ADXIN'ISTRATIOy WITHDRAWAL POLICY
The Nixon administration inherited an extremely serious and traumotir war. After seeing this war jrrow hirrer and worse for nearly ."> years, witli almost 'iSO.Oflfl American military personnel in South Vietnam. I am thankful that the number has l>een practically cut in half and that scheduled withdrawals announced by the President for the omiiiii months are very suWantial. The reduction has coincided with our efforts to help the South Vietnamese catch up to the military power of North Vietnam, which has. of course, been sustained bv the financial and military assistance furnished by Red China and the Soviet I'nion. I am reasonably satisfied that hv Julv 1 of this year, jrround combat operation can ! handled by the South Vietnamese. It will take another year, however, to complete the job of enabling the South Vietnamescto operate and maintain their air force. Meanwhile, of course, our troop withdrawal* will undoubtedly continue. Our goal, as stated by the President, is complete withdrawal of all American military personnel. The timing of that jroal has not l*ec-n announced, but has been left indefinite dej>endinjr upon action of the North Vietnamese, including their willinjrness to enter into seriour negotiations in Parts. This indefiniteness troubles many of onr crfi/cnr and has laid a foundation for some wild assertions that we will IK- in volved there for years. Such assertions an- apparently premised on the idea that regardless of what the South Vietnamese fo to help themselves, we will remain .there. However, I have always assumed, and it is a reasonable assumption, that we would follow a time policy which would ffive South Vietnam only a "reasonable chance"" to catch up to North Vietnam and thus le able to defend itself and maintain its freedom of self-determination. I am satisfied that the "reasonable chance" will have Ijeen Driven by .Tulv 1 of thi- jvar insofar as jrround force operations are concerned: and bv July 1 of next year insofar as the more complicated air force operations are concerned.
raifioyr.RK OK WAR AVI> foMri.rvr WITHDRAW H.

There is one concern uppermost in th^ minds of most Americans, and that is the safe ret urn of our prirriers of war. No Nation with n conscience could dewrf the-*- brave and '.iisfifish inn. J're-idenf Nixon has stated that u "residunl force" wonl.i reniuin in Sxith Vietnum until they an- Kafelv returned. And if does not r<'"(iiL"e much iniajriii.ition to M-e that this residual forc^ would rout a in ûnVicnt airpower to muke it very costly to North Vietnam. However. I am troubled by the in.lefiniteneHs <>i such a policy. Likewise. I am troubled by the no-called "fim-d date" nnijifisuls. U-these prtn'^'ii on the HSni.rnu'ion t h a t North Vietnam '"in IKt/> ni'jrotinfe and Hnanjre tin- safe return n{ mir pri-toiii-p- b\ tin' fixed date. Hv its fla^nint violation of the (fene\n uj;reeiiieiit on tj-eatmerit of prisoner* of w a r . \ ^lIJrtfe.t that North Vietnam is not to I** trusted. It would In' cruel and inhuman to commit the fate of our prisoners to leaders of a country who have demonstrated that they can not U- trusted.
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At the same time, it is obvious that the concern uppermost in the minds of the leaders in Hanoi is that all American military personnel he withdrawn from South Vietnam. Accordingly, it seems to me there are sufficient inducements to enable both sides to get together: The inducement, on the one luuid. to make an exchange of prisoners of war in line with the projxjsal made by President Nixon in his address on peace in Indochina last October 7. And the inducement, on the other hand, that upon completion of such an exchange, all American military personnel will be withdrawn from South Vietnam within 12 months. It would be my earnest hope that such an exchange of prisoners would be completed by July 1 of this year. And. the complete withdrawal of all military personnefbv July 1 of 1972 would coincide with the "reasonable chance" proposition to which I have earlier referred for South Vietnam to go it alone aa far as military manpower is concerned. n.t\;ia> nxixriAL *VD MILITARY AIWISTAXCE NaL.-r' '1v, as long as Red China and tlie Soviet Union see fit to proVKU, 5na, ".I and military assistance to Xorth Vietnam, similar assistance would have to be provided South Vietnam if a military power balance is to be maintained.
d.J. KM. K2
I have offered SJf. Res. 82 in the hope that it can serve to bring men <>f good will together. It ran get our prisoners of war back safcl.v and sxum. It can get our military pei'sonnej out of South Vietnam according tn a fixed timetable which'will enable an orderly withdrawal of some 27'VW> nicn along with such equipment aa will be removed a logistics problem. I might add, which would require a great manv months in anv event. And it can give a ' reason able chance" to a fundamental principle of the charter of the United Nations to which <he United States has, along with most of the ether nations of the world, pledged its support. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. That completes my otatem<?nt. The ( 'HAIKU**. Thank you. Senator Miller.
KXCffANCM OF PKIKOXEB* OF W1B
Senator Miller, isn't it tlw usual rule in circumt4ancg such an this thai the exchange of prisoners fake* plan- after'he. mwafionof hostilities 01 an unniHtic.e rather than before? Senator \\tisjm. Well, Mr.*rhairniari, thin is lint a usual war. I am not at all certain that then- have not liwn exchanges of some prisoner* of war during other warn, <vrtainly insofar UK puttingtlwm in iieutral i-ouiif ri'-1 '> < onwnu-d. It in mv n-c/ilU'i-tiou that hapitcncd to a limited rxt-ut during World War II. but I don't think that we ought to bound ton Him-h lv prm-dmtH of pn-vioiu- wars IH-CUUW I think moot of UH rwognixi* tli;it thin in not a usual war at iill. and it not being a usual war I t h i n k it cull* fur unusual action, and I U-licn- that we have the imiiKviiirnts in my proposition here which would enable iin to move n ion- rapidlv. We are not moving at all n Park and it Is quifc evident that N'orth Vietnam wantmo have all of our troop* out of South Vietnam ; that JKthcir \o, 1 goal.
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It is also quite obvious that most of our j>eople want to have our I irisoners of war return safely, and the soonerthe tatter. So I offer here, n.-> I said, a means of bringing men of good will together, those who talk about a residual force until our prisoners are returned, and those who talk alxnit a fixed date. The trouble J h.ivc with that residual force is its indefiniteness. My proposition gives us a definite time period. Tlie sooner the prisoners of war an- exchanged the sooner all our American military personnel will be out. and I think that that would be an inducement for Xorth Vietnam to engage in serious negotiations in Paris. At least it is worth a tri, Mr. Chairman. HANOI'S AND XI.K'S rosrrmx The CHAIRMAN. Yesterday, Senator Haitke testified that he had recently been in Paris and talked to the representative* of. I think. loth Hanoi and the N'LF. He said, and I lielieve I quote correctly, "They ke|rf insisting that the setting of a withdrawal date must precede substantive dis-Missions of the prisoner of war issue." If you could accept that as U*ing their position, would this make any difference to you? Senator Miu.ni. Well, Mr. Chairman. I think we have found that positions change, and I would suggest that that would IK- the owning gambit, but if they are really interested in withdrawal of American forces, then we have a chip to offer them and, furthermore. I must say I am not at all impressed when the leaders of Hanoi Miggst to us that if we will only fix a date for withdrawal of all American (jersoiinel then they will talk aUut an < xchange of prisoners of war. I. for one, am not ready t<> commit the f a i t h of our American prisoners of war to jieople who cannot lie trusted. Now if they had demount rated their good faith bv living up to the Geneva Convention on the treatment of pri.-oncrs of war, that would be one thing. Thev Mil>scril>cd to that agreement, and by failing to live tip to it, and I t h i n k it is trcnerally rccogni/cd they have failed to do so. I .-uggest that they forfeited the right oj the privilege of U-ing trusted. The CIIUKXAV. I>o you feel that the others involved in the war have liied up to the ficncvn Con vent if.n' Senator Mn.r Mr. Well. Mr. Cli:.irman. you always hate ;i mixed liag in a war. But I hiven't syeii any news in (he new-.papers alxmt North Vietnam taking any action Mich -m we have taken when any violation* of the Ciciii-iu C< mention have occurm!. This of course is one big diffcreri'v Itf-twen a closed society and an OJHMI society, I t h i n k that mos' of IN would ruther lake our chance* at l>cing a prisoner of war "ii om side I Inn a prisoner of war on their side. The C H A I R M A N . Is that the principal reason why von suv they can not lie trusted^ Is there unv other reason why von t h i n k they cannot Ix-trusted? Senator Mir.i.ut. Well. \ t h i n k that thenare other reason*. Mr. Chairman. Hut the r.-ason I offer ties in Kjecific;illy w i t h the priKoncrso f - w u r i^.-iue, I sun UK! Caving they conl'i not IK- tni-ted in some areas, but I HIM interested in the |iriwmers of war, and thcv have demon si rated f h a f they can't Ix- trusted w i t h rei-jM-ct to the prisoner* of war. in,il ilifiefore. I suggest ,i iscniel mid iiiihiimuii to trust the:n and to c/irnmit the fiitcof our prisonci>,of war to them.
121
I-OSSIB1MTV OF NEGOTIATIONS W1THOCT TKPST
The C-UAiiiMAX. It seems to me if you cannot trust them, then there is no point in even contemplating negotiations. There is no i>ossibility of negot iutiuns with people you cannot trust at all. Senator MILIXR. I think that we can have negotiations with people we don't trust, Mr. Chairman. I think this coes on all the time. Wnat counts are the deeds 'hat follow the negotiation and that is why we are usually very careful to niokc sure that there is a quid pro quo in that deeds on one side are matched concurrently or very closely if not conciirrontly by the other side. I don'r for one moment suggest that because we don't trust the negotiators on the other side of the* table that we can't have negotiations and negotiations subject, of course, to deeds that match the words of the negotiated agreement. Tba CIIAIHHAN. Senator Church.
TIMING OF PRISONER EXCHANCK AND C.S. WITHDRAWAL
Senator CHCKCH. Regarding this quid pro quo, Senator Miller, is your projut-ul that they should give us our prisoners back now and we should end the war later 'i Senator MH.IJS. Well, not quite, Senator. My resolution calls for a rotujilete exchange of prisoner.-* of war as outlined by President Xixon in Ins statement to the Kation on peace in Indochina. Voii will recall. I think, rliat it was indicated at that tinjo that we ha\e about ^.".,iM>u of their prisoners, they have roughly 2,#K) of U.S. and allied prisoners. So it is about a 10 to 1 exchange. Frankly, I have never heard of such an exchange prop<sal, but we have apparently a greater regard for human life than they do, and so I suppose that a HI ti 1 ratio is to be expected. But they get their 25.000 back, we get our 2.".<0 back and when that happens", within 12 months we are out. Senator Citi'ucit. Then I was right when I said that your proposition is for us to receive, th. >ugh the exchange process, our prisoners now and then we would agree to end our participation in the war later. Senator Muxrjt. Well Senator ( 'fii'Kfjt. Is that right? Senator MILLEK. Within a fixed timetable of 12 raanths that is precisely correct.
SenatorCiimcic. Ve!.
If tlw;y made tliat offer to us. do you think we would accept it, especially after you Hiid they can't be trusted ? Senator Mirxnt. I think that defends u[>on how much tliey want to get the American troops out of South Vietnam. I think it is well under-
l v gooj joi> of swing tliu4 .-.urn a "uuhiiiKtion o)' legi.t|a.ii\e :md ive branch a<^tion i?s niafc'IiwJ by doeils. I don't think 1 \\ould h.nvc any rjiiHlin:-about it if I were in Hanoi. Senator C'nrwn. Von wouldn't. Scjialor MiuT.tc NVi, sir. S> iutt/>r' 'MOM a. ) ou think you could *!! that to tJm i>*^>ple of tlie (jovernment of North Vietnam I
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Senator &buB. WelL, Senator, you know that it isn't a. matter of scHing it to the people of North Vietnam in their type of society, it is a niattcrof selling it to their leaders. Senator OUCBCH. Then to their Jeaders.SenatorMiiXEK. That is right. Senator CHTBCH. Do you thiiik that could be sold to their leaders? Senator MDJLEE- I think it is worth, a try. We are not getting very far the way things are going.
INCREASE IX ntlSOXEBS AS CXITED STATES PKKSISTS
Senator CHCTCK. On this question of prisoners of war in wliich j-ou say you are principally interested; isn't it true that the number of our prisoners of war keeps on increasing the longer we participate in the war? For example, just, the last year of our paiticipation, the total number of our prisoners in their prison camps went up from an estimated 1.368 to l/ill. So, doesnt it follow that tlie longer we persist in the war, the larger the number cf prisoners of ours they will hold? Senator MIMJK. Well, it seems to be going tJiat way. 'Of course, I think that this is one reas*;a or. I think, that we could expect as we continue with our withdrawal of forces that the numbers will not increase appreciably, but as long as we maintain our operations, as long as they snoot some of our aircraft down I suppose wo could expect then.- will be some additional prisoners. Jusf an Joirg a* they persist in fight ing in South Vietnam I suppose they could exj>ect that their prisoners will inrrpase. too. It i.* all the more reason for trying to wind this tiling up and the sooner the better, and we are not getting very far on it.
EETTRX OF HUSOXKIB ATTEB WIXDIXC UP WAB
Senator Cm urn. Ti.'pre is a place tliat I agree with }ou, Senator Miller. Wlien we wind it up we will get the prisoners back quickly. That lias been the history of past wars, it has been the history of this war. It was the experience of the French in Indochina. I think that tliat will aiso be our own experience. Senator MIUJKK. Well. Senator, you have- tru^t and Confidence in the North Vietnamese leaders that I am sorry I do not share. Senator ("iirwH. It is not a question of trust and confident. TJier** it> just one tiling tliat the \orth Vietnamefie want and that is for uto Jcavo. TJiat- i>. what they wantû] wjjore tlie French w<>re 'oncenied, and when a final commitment was made for withdrawal, then it was -ay enough to arran^f- for tha release of the prisoners of war. That was the. Fiviifh exjH'rienw. I think that will DP our experience. History is the witness of mj prwiition. It BWUIP hard for rne to understand why the Xorth Vietnamese, Jiavingonly one leverage on u, the priso.'iers of war tlw-y bold, and having only one dpir where we re i-orirt-niiil, that in. the withdrawal of the United Stat't, from active partiiMpiuioii in the war. would agree to release prisoners until tliey get a commitment froin u* with respect to our derision to withdraw. That i* the <imd pro quo that makes senw;; and it is tlw only quid pro quothat makes HCJIW in thin sit nation. Senator MJU.KK. Well. Senator, may I rfHjxmd by nayinjr tliat while \n t h i n k w<> would vet our prihoru-iv of war back after tvc withdraw, h:U liaj|*ni>if yon think MTong?
^v-^(v.i.' Cmi.vH.. lu.iriy judgment. tht question is silly, T.- jriitmViii. rKit tle French wad<^ when they finally agiw-1 ti leave !< quieilv to au anwJiici)r. \rith rc^Mrt for the ;pr^sojiftrr. Tliat it not sidifficult "TO cudej-stand; is it ? Once the President of the I'nitwl Stutes A makes, clear iliJtr wt- ni-e going to Icayj; and lie negof.ia4<-= a fixed date for Jtio coinjih'tion of our witlidrsw>1.'it- VBI tlien be a coiupatntiT' ly easy qucitiou tn jKôtialetUcrpleascôf t lie prisonci1*,1 ; ^ -In the Fr-jjcli caac.-.tlip j>ri^>>i> weiv released -AS 1 ho tjok. l!iiC'-. "iV'i --(tuld insist ui>on tix-.iianic thing and, tliat. " Smite rlio ca UiC of your <xmccra, riamelv trust of tli-ni. Sucli au.arnwi:e- : inenr. woirii'J -p< :init the n-lcase of tJio iirisonors H* th.^ withdrawal ""ucCKvtis. and i s(* jio it> %smi why that i-honkl prwe.nl uny difliciihy. -flier- i* uothSujr in t)'<- -Jforth Vjefjiainoi' ]iosttion in .Fans tliat si^ri^ it \,\r<nld jirpac-iit aiiy diflicidtv. Tlir |tiid i>rc juo U a i-ohujiit\vitJ|i<cax\-. aiidto wiilidrawconj)letely. ." ; or MJMJJ::, And that is exactly wliat my tvsoluuoti jo-ox-ide? t<jf. - . . ' _ ' . s1 . ' ' ' .^ ' S..r. fits.. Si A KASJS
Si'Uiifir < ,'im.1' u. I'ut y~r rcaoJuiiort provide* gi-uiiig the j>f isonc'i-s iiixt. pulling wiUidrawal
rj^'Ji. I( L> im]ikelvv then, ^'h-eti most human to f-xêrt rliat that, .would jiir>Vj<Tc a vixMe lia^j!* for
'
V i ' . >i-ii:itol,w<- i i i ^ n u'uv t :i tr\'.
J iiiii-i .-ay tlii>. and I know my colleague fj-owi Jttalio wll iiio'}i<;h to kj'inv that tie is ciniiifiitly -in'vrc in iris opinions xnd v'Jjat hfrt-hinks jn-i ii?.I ;tnir:in(! w<- rpsjvwi each other for our view*-. Huf I ^ri'i lu-k to jy p.Ktjns;jiJoii. and that is <hat if !*! thinks wronjr wliar jjappcn-* t<> our priKoiiPi-s of war. If it is LiUsori or myaOii-u-ho ig a ]>ris<i!iiT<'f <iur ' x "-.. S-D;itir ( 'nrwn. Scna^H-. I think I have ajj-wered t'!ia(-.qiiesrio.'L. <-ifntinna)jr), Wr nn^'ht. t,i pel. them backfirt'b~S-ii:itrf'in i-.cn. I tfiinlc i anw<M<-dtliHt. Si-naMii' Mn.itJt. Wi'U, SîPiit<r yon talk alniut phafsiu^; out troops. u in ! v.i- }>!i:i^- tjie cxi-lian^- of prLioncixif war. Tf>if has some pcvi. bilifn-. J :im IKI i.'"in^ N> deny lhat, but just .v> ve make SUIT- timt t!i-<; ji liners , ( f M ; I P in S'oiili Vietnam :in- inai<'hwl by /<uffi';i?r.t
' IK. nut !<<'k."<l in on if, ( don't <'h'.it'i ') have a prciuiniii >n U'liat toiii' a l;i>u fur. i. iM'yotJat'<i M'ttlern/'nt. All f aiu s;i\ in^' i- i l i n r fin: way tiling ircôhi^' now. and thcwfixwd d;ii4- [.ivi|.(r.;il. pulling llie fat<- of our prj^ners of war on the whim". i'f \ortli X'ii'liianu'M' luiiderh. i*n't C"in{r Ui do anv IL'^KJ eiflirr ai-4 J am frying m nwli y niiuJk- fj'ounfDiciv which !ll lirinâll of uof
S-riaiorr/ii -WH. I IJUM- no niMicqur.-li'>i 'I'd*- TiMicmv, Scual/ir Aik'-n.
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- - w - - , . v .' , > . . . ^ v \ vcoXfiBEjsXE IN' sotjTir VLETNvatEffc oovmKHixr -. A > A l

:
Senator AIK^RV Senator Millet, yoa^niade it plda rbjfc^^'&jiyt^ >n-^--/l'.i!Wmûn Of Xoith:V.ieuiftia.^^l)o^'pub*ve>fv''Jk-xJrciîio5 South.\îeui*ia^ ,' -,; .;-",''" '' * " ^': ^" ' ; -' . v {/endwit i;)(V>u us for tilings. id mi litany Asastanc^, as X'oith \5 is'dependent<vi.t Cfed 0&.in* stod the Sovlfet Union f0^fin:meialand:ixiil. itary assj<*a.ct, that itiôfar *- the proposal that I karo 'i <joiflic-ned:: we Ucoi't ;_jjc'I tfrvxorw tslHût the ittTiade of ' :. Yott haw full .lonfidencc in tjio Govetnnaôt ox s 5oatii ViijlihiiU so loug as it is wbo.Uj dependent upoa tjie United v lStatesJ.;",. -'"-' ''-,;' ' ; >f - '- - ''. ^ . " ^- Senator MILLET- We'i, for parjx>9Pp #t vue resotntiotV, and t|>it ifi wh*t I am interoUxl ic^-tiiat is what Ivaai ^peai'ij^g before the xJomiifteeoK4î,ldo.-,.." - -. . ' v ' ~ -^ 3fow, I ini'tfiusay that I think uiost</f us u-ould fectiaueli better about #,#itu!ito^ ia Swfii Vkjtcwn if we had getxuiiK;!;; *tijwr\'isJ, intor^ tiomilly os]]!efvised, elections in Soath Yiettum. <J*t cdur^. thut Las.
have Aawrj'ctit i KationsacMip -tie jnfcbanus -xi thai. \1ye will^ ' ' nr sxrai ninxAjcj^wvTKxkvar- cirA3^,is Seiuttor ÂXKEV. Aflsu^Hng-ii the tlwdons wblck 1 believe, tliey pbva in (>Aobcr,~that ilr. iTk/or any k>f tiie otlwr wlliiiig candidates tbc Presidencyand rtiey liave Almost ?3 maay a^Tw'e have win the election aod tufr preaait txoVernniftntJte tda^d out of id-TL* oflice, (.v>uld we rtill-hAws ttj^r^nfedfence ha.viie GoînK-nr, tbw we <ic now^>r would * still haveib nin tliat OovenuntMT in confidence in i
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-i/f Whj.fJi I hayeji!ludcdinjc:y c?n^cte .williaye Ien Kftted.iis far . A3 grOJpnii >pp.f4tions"are '^MaHftivd by ^futy 1 of this y^!ir,%>io J,ir .as x;rned l>v f oly-1 of next year, nd t!i cr'soujitn' cpnc&rneil-lb fcierciite tlwir- fpêdoJu y}; /ninatir/n^prudenijy, and If the^" ase /it'-ro, throjr it awjy, lJj\, tij&t wv sHMiid "be" Ii6uad iiy-tfijif^t^lo not tliaifc that * b!l)ujd ixt bound to.rfay there for.ycaW"jU9(-lcaueir; the eri-":-ia "f *^^v<-^ <lwii jf Jfiolf -oeieniiiiiati^/n tJifty tb new it away, AaiaU/T Autr-v. Vuu ^ VKOuKl to-cond?ti< o t not want want_tocondition o u r Sojith T.eu>oj,n . , jptdvfrmrjeftt.wbich "rau entirely Krtjgf*('ry to-w. thw ? '~ '
125, . v. .-, ^ . ' ; ' . v r' '^ ; v ^ -" ; 'AimtftM-Y- a,, t ru x dp nc ow of ^ iue)nT*iS>f the/ScnÔj Senator .7 Aikea; who dons not foel tL vajvj t&n^'lhut tiiic ivfc.teca a policy C , ~;, î'-"-" y fMt tbe Seatjte, a * TP.hple,iBas ft^n.v5d apîn and.thjit:lvas^wi adv
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'v ~jC!>îi fot,Tlii.i.;e .never licMa-*J!iydisf(gr^m^tovrth*t"propositioi]f ( 0 , v. wiêl.bveJêtfflin.ti^SefliEC^, v>. ~ ^ ^S , . . , . --.-.'-. t r' - "*rerJD^vi.TTJie^tl^-lhfej^f>fo<)ltl^t-<xni^ ^; '.. , .S<*wit9*- ytpjufx.dfftHi, wt^tf yo>\ ^ coiftir^^teiGrtbusiness,.I do -_~:-^. ^&c& -bcb^re Uiat tJhe- pcopoation has T>eenp!it. quite in fhAt fTatnfe.; I ~ ~, : : tfutiic -src. 6 avc-sUtetuoad Aiwi^lear Uiat V^B treVill in* ^.'SuJts 'of ji;cttiuticj.v ;fr!Sc clooSotfji ufitler iateni*tiottal.^v.^--.>--""-" : - "viN)iit4>; ^wnaro. sSbJ^êopli^liavc pat it-up this wy;TVLel3, suppose -- . tii,c\\v^to fojfdio Viofcoiipr aad put-iJiera i control, au6^~otir answer ^Ser>nt<f AUKEN. T&e.va-y ^li^s arc going,.-hcxe. do you Ihink we -, <)t3>)3iJ^ {Laughter,j J^xt^t^rf~> oitidi^te'tQt'fa T^tnamthiinihey"voitr -qtKttjQ^ Ix>c%u8e I luire, T:thiolf'^dl of-sji? Imt^ t-eai in ojiuer madc.A little
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it buclrin our!} ^w jajggestojl.jpiJiÂps tiiujgs night b<> a-lirtte." : .<!j^MucajioaiiidXfeffJ^'ts^.Vt '-"-"!," . -'-'_,-' -\ '-t^vwMAV.Tto&rtfalorfroroX'cw Jersey. ' -.' '- C iH'iiWor OA>. I suppose *e could^faaVe CAlled Uw Seiiator 10 order ,";-; undff.Jhi- tTjIi-s-.uf ti? ôoat^ for his ^rattuto^s ccrtiuwent about joyc~ -> 'jiut<!tiert(>u><'.y, Il*avjoapoiojnwr-k)îakft foi:X*w Jertfcj'^ftoC'juiQ." ' i icr<f0 dftfoid' it E-will uke <-Ttc oniadft *it hiwin,djc past. 3Jo ;- tlUf^loiis,tijunkyou: . " i . - - ' \ ~ , " v . - :.
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ic ins<:/ffvr years.,T sec & mari.sittiis&ere who does deserve - - '--. iafiwirênator Gnienlng^vhicJ ?poko -ofit, wifli* few other - - i inflicts. Senate. " ( -__ . - --\ - --. :~ potmoiir, f. FOR REMaSE or
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i,L . ^ :,I uiitst'say,I"dofl<X.'sec tiiai any ofi-ihes^ proposals, wiicthor JHa .. : r : i ; - - ' > ' . " . yours ocHatfield-Mciiovvciittr Presideiif.' îx<vrt s,of fcepinjrV-tfis5d--['."-.'/';';. 3iaffop.;thtere.s.uitfl the pwsbners of war^re-retiirnrd; or u?î of \:
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\-\ -.; ^risoncr^ 6j 3rar. I 'tJiink Keôcfiitii politval jStttlni?iit fyi- $1 b'f ; v^'oiitilor^.Aya^ffet^th>fH^^>si>oct." . : - - " *>'-- ;.:^\T: "'. . '".. fp:*-<iflxth.oa-'vrtnV -îtheroct to Ithy s4niXî'^Ci'-a*''^1'aT"f<>nTOu^*,v"^r~~~ . '-^ <v Jlut that . n;a iiiii<r to" nrô. Lj .what^wr japans poas&lt1 tuat jria^noi-s of tti?J Jiiunanelv on tv'liate^cif slc, and 3 bolieve '
_,. tm'cil^w^^'DK'iit fa biJocliina.is tho only way 3ve are going to.&e L '" L ^ . ârvtirfd lîai tltf;.^ |->j p jôur\-)f-rtrar will lx roftmi^d. ^V ~ ". C " - - ' -'I -.' Soiai-H1 MjJJ".w:^Tjiaj|ifi Vitis. Souato/. J llaui; y ou Jvi'ViJC l.sJMtwvûr '; " ^- ._- " VK'vr:tlra.t"Th(r(|iibi;<'S( vox tofnd iliiVic a^-flu' ru^/^t^tiKSr.rabl0, TliLv ~j ?? anoffier-'riaia_.wLy I ant wn4^wjeJ";i|..'oil.f H-he so-rnlK^l h\ed date ob\fi(m-i 1f>:it
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. TKaukyoirrerv muck, Senator Miller. cMxjux: Thank you-Mr-'Cbainuaiif ^^Tho C'nAjR>ux-The aext witness jg-the Honorable Adlai Stevenson ^JSljiaiatfr^ncuiTenf Reaolriticm!17^ J" , ~" '. Svnator-J>teveii3on. we are vtry pleased to have you this morning. Will y o u ""
STATEifEHT OF HOJT. ADLAI E. STEVEHSOF III, U.S. SZHATOE ::r FEOH ILL150IS -.
T>in very jrcJa'Xid to you wr this oppommity t^4|pcf r beforethis t ' ~~ - '- '_ say it the outset itlws been a-^rery refresbinêxperiance for . 1 am ft w to tlw Scaitfr. It a}w vs struck mti from in/ fonnsr point that we )iPar<Lpeoplvf,i! -vry little, about tha morality of our actions in. South Tietasra. Most : .of ir:puW:c:offi<uls seftniecl to be omp.ied\wi{Ji Ixnly.oounts, with 'shfvn.keUM military and ilhiod-expjMaicies. an i .aat4icj-fore vfcrj'irfatiê'itojieai'.thi- words that TOO and Senator Jnnts c^djjunjrwl this irw'mvine alwut Uw moralitiTQf cnr actions "in " " uVs. MOTIVF^ u* OCTH As you saiJ. Mr. Oiainaan; .ur motives bi South VJptnamûw^ , rK.vnvv.il. Sliit-i- thi? vwy lHîitiuij.r we Jia.v'f juatiiiei! our ûnitary jri_ moral cffoi*.<o >>riu^-fi*edom and .voireini-nt in South VioHuun ai!_a ai *?]f-ddx'nninarifm to the "-people of that7i)ation.x ChJ\' *his month, haLaod Iquote: . ;"-,in lihftor>- Ira itwa ^j^lit forJ^ss selfish motives, not for not-Y^' jrlotr, but <>juV for rh&.Hgltof a people.f ar lUffty.to ooiietiif; kind nf^wt-rnmeat they want.*' Just aômeut *go Scji "" " ' ' f It s^msji-at jj^Âjsd.oyîr^tKi^-iJ^rthepwpleof Soiith Vietnam " ; in rfie.ii' sciirl: /or pfa^* uwl .fit*dom we -are instead 5itpj,0rtbi? ; a / "x _~j '*thu-fc5i! rom/y)iWe<1 to military victory-arid ta a prxKijroi. ar . . , ^ it w-^T"- r.* me. i iK*t to trtd tîe warlwfc .to^Jtijnie it as r !')fttwoe;i .isia,*>.. x v - '' . . "-'" m^r ;i that i ur [MjH-y I .f^-tr-lliat rie drain upon mir lirwj Mi u[X/n (iir tn'aciiry.;ui,">faj-iihal Ivv 5;i<.-.;i{.^^. *';{ u'. j,^,'!V_L'aV<'nisiif-forfSrjt}| Vietnam raj.3^f*nd"
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iiiu- th*> risk inherent in terminating our military involvement 1:1 Indochina -without a. negotiated settlement covering amnesty for the rwoplfrof South Vietnam, the withdrawaôfall foreign troops and the nuura of *ar prisoners from the Northfl suggest, .therefore, that we fasuat juonrsitCeutioirupoa the possibilities of a political settlement which, cuuld nor unly hasten our departure, but also leave behind i -luruble aud representative government which. oould depend for its >urvi raj upon die support oFthe people of South Vietnam and not the continued military involrement of the United States.
THBKATEXED C.S- JXYOLVEMEST Dn* SOUTH VIEIYAMESp ELECTIONS-
- Titc people of Sf uth Vietnam will elect a new House of Representative.* in August, to be followed by the election of a President in October. .. Because oar massive military presence enliancw? the power of those in ofb'oe, it throatais to involve as in .South Vfetnamisse electoral politxosr-if only by an apjxjarunce of support for the pjvsent regiine in the forthasmug elections. .The frequent visits to South Vietnam bv CfionietTjieinbers, Ambaasadur Bunkers-tours of the cotimrj-sideTvith Prcsidcnt'Thieu. the liieh visibjlity of U.S. material ûid'^rsonnel throughout the nation are .pfcrceiyed as ^xpj-essions-of iJJs. support for the rocleoGoaj of Preside-ill Tlvfeu, _"- . ____ There ;ls, -iaorQ\er/>Mr. Oikiruian, Teasoif t<> Co condoled that rjJi-supporrîjr Lhf- TLJ-Ky reginu- is as. real as it j* apparent. The "New YorkTidVS of February Ii rc-jjorf^'d. and I quote :
al wrvejs of Vjetiuiues<; public opiDlcm,. -Jj[,-li -fire. preptred and l>y Uic Cuitcd StaU'.- KJISKIOU {Ja Kttigon}, art' (t-iug-used to isjrt N'tfujcn >'*<(' -'f'x.'J- 1" li's ;*-Ji-tioH tt.:ul*)i^.i tJ>is y.-r
. Tjie purvevsi-ifrf red io &rc wijiducted by OOKDS monthly in all 44 jjrovbiCfcS^.ajidîfe' i'peult>i are tutiied over to lite Thi&u-Ky governaiiajt. TLc, quc'stionfaiit' made nvailable to the Xew York Time? con(rfir.v.d tJjr;e <nifs-tif.rti.-n relating !>rxK:ilicaIly to the. foithcoming elee^ cionK: wliich jjjeu are most jili<-Iy to ruiu what kind >>[ mun houiI Jx; elc.cu-d; and what ajv: i be deckiy*.1 i^w,4. 'i'o fri v .\fj'. Tliif u tin- au?w *T:fi i!i-v.- fjn<;5t)o)i>> iir t>j j.'.fon'Mifi1 iii solf-jxiritua<ioa rather tlian tîe Eat)icr lh7i< iôntli, our di.-îiiguisiifj <-<jlleugut:, Se called our aU<-)tj<j to l.'jiited Si,ut-e.- Jnfonnotiou Ajrcricy programs wlii'-U liavo Ji^ljrtf/1 ilii"' Sdut-!i \'i.ctji.'iin<;.1 Miii'';t-rj'.fjf Information Jissojjiiriiif* j.yv>y/vertiji)tj|t [^ropi^JwlA, Jn rvpKns iliîniriii.-hetJ 'h.ai(;niin;f tfjl? ...'/j.nmjtuje tin- seaior I'.SIA.ofi/obl vu ?Hx.iit;i . Vii'>nawrtail in Mareb. l^T-'. Ix-font'liiis; '-onamittw liiat Jt'.C;Li.j,.'ui ittonUii.'t^/J JXÎK in SoutL Viitnam prcHiuuibly to di'U:rlu'itu; \vjjf i,j.c tin- pmpugaiidii was hii<x'ws.ful m fostering more J>o.-iiti>x |iulli<- fijt jtudi-.-. tow>uvj thf Tiiie-K.v governffjwtt, TJjose lieariugB Jilvj JndiraUvd tliat tin- I'SIA has ust-fl ri^ i e-'jniisr in .South Vj;tiiunrj to affiot fh VjofjuaiJ-''^' (/'A i'ii;,' '
, 1 Jo Mrt ]*>]ic\f. .\fr. fh:iiriH!in, t h n t the I'niU'd States <.:an bp tine <<. it.- foirimitwu-rit f<; sflf-flft^-riiiiitatifin iu <fi<- woj-Jd nrnl also i T'j./lo ^'i v. "iila b*\K'Mrtr:*.'J[i voiilij ivp<Mt 'n;-.?.'i!>- of
pt$t. ft may be^tnat other jrovernawrtte view free elections in the third twrid as ifcc^nastcnt with their interests. But, I would certainly hope ".wet.believe-- "tfcatr'Tt ie 4*tter politics and morally right for the Caited States to alien itselfîUi not agtinst^Qie rights of sclfdeterminatfon we ourselves firet articulated as ft yaUbn. - , i;-S. support, aJ or apparent, for ti* reelection of President Thieu could discourage- the caaoidftcies of men committed in South Vietnam t<> * STttlfmentind oiciistoQce with ~S<xtk Vietnam. General Minh has sa ; < i us inydi pubiidy. It could distort the free expression of the popuJar will ta the Alorfions by inducing the electorate to vote for those in power oriuKtov-otpaftaJL tw.'.cox. BBS.' IT S; Con, -3lps. 17 reaffirms the mvats^&y^f the United States in the^ South Vietnamfise. elections, cAllff upon the Presldeat to implement a p>>LJcy of stciat neutrality, and creates a bipartisan, 10-member Congix-ssional Conlniission^snpporteci by a staff in South Vietnam throughout thf election campaign, to oversee U.S- policies an4 activities which might interfere wL tite-f.Ioctocal J7iftcesa.^3ie GomLusnon's preseace would help assuBRjthe iM^leof SoJ) Viettuuii t&atweasa Xalionare truly Mmmitfcxi to their righfc as a, fret,!fielf -governing peopk. ITie'ressiJution coes~a,~-step further "by ixpnsssinfr the sefcs&.of the Coiijrress tiiat we shall as a. X at ion wpjx>Lt only a. freely elected government and Miat therefore no U5. mihtary assistance will he available t/> any government whiii'acquires or retains power in South Vietnam : y llltalJ^ of a foufj'or otUer corrupt or coercive means. Tliis clear declaration of jx>licy is a. means of deteiting those who would seek power through corrupt or undemocratic means in the fortlicoming elc^-t-ions. TiiH Commission would consist of five members from the Senate and nvc from the House. In all probability, they will not hold identical vic'ws about our m-erall Indochina policv. But BO long as they endorse the principle of U.S. neutrality toward the forthcoming elections ami i kuow of no Member of Congress who does nottheir divergent
,- rccit-d al l.'-S. uivolrftBifjit in the elections, leaving it to the South Yirtnunx:* themftelves to decide whether it> invite foreign observers t<> jiioiiiror the nitire election proces*. Tli8 resolution, if adopted, would not..interfere with the internal affairs of South Vietnam. Ratlier, it :Z-AUM>> HK- [xtoplc of diat nation votwg and candidates alike Hit-tiff arr- fflT/;u*}K>utnotintfrferng. I had tjiou^t atfir>*<to inrludi* five addiiiona) PreKidential apr, (h
\'ftiiajji af -support ing the rele<*ion of Tljiju and Ky. tiidikfi- was fjpwi&l in fj* Soutli Vwtuanwiw.' p w.' press lart year as saying thar tlic f'iut*><J Stat^* aipporth tlje reeJeti/i of President Thiu in if?]. Tin- Ajjierican EjnJrHsy 5 Saigon denied thtatement attributed to Mr. junker, but (he fact remau. tluit it how our petition i* widely ITpk of South Vietnam.
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that the people of South Vietnam are also more likely to ivsjicct an expression of political neutrality if it comes from the elected representatives of the American people in their Congress than through a. commission appointed wholly or partially by the President. Giv 'MI the sensitivity of the South V ietnamese people to any interference in their domestic affairs by foreign governments, I am hopeful that tlu> commission would be welcomed, not only by the people, but also by the government of Soul'. ViePiaiu. and would 1* helped in its eflort to assure tin- noninvolvement of the United -States in the electoral politics of that nation.
INTENT OF 8. 'OV. KES. 17
The intent of this resolution is not to defeat Tliieii, but to neutralise rhf political advantage which our military involvement affords him. and t> Injure that tbU advantage fs not augmented by the activities. i vi \f or c.overt, ot representatives of the T'.S. (lorernment during the f'^rthx>min* election campaign in South Vietnam. By affirming our neutrality in the campaign, this resolution may eJl encourage more candidates to commit their selves to a negotiated yMli'Girnt of the war. And by lessening the advantage which oven tljc apj>ea ranee of I'.S. *iip]>i1 gives the exitl;c regime. this re-olntinij i ' a \ i-iirourage Pivsidenl Thiou to heed the desire of the }>eople ol South Vietnam for pi-ace and reconciliation. It i^- to lx> hoped that ;usy uiL-ii \\lio gain j.owt"- in tlie elections through a br>ad exi<re>>!on of jxip'.slar >iijij-ort would Ix- strengthened iu their dealings with the XLF and tde N'oiih. If. for the first time in il.. war. a Sînth \"ietnaiiies"" I'repident t/iok the onth of office v itli :i broa'I l-:i><' of jxipnlar .-tip|Ki1. 1 do not Iieliexe it w<(iild IK- unn<>ii i > ed by Hanoi.
K H M I I - i i M I M . I l l X J I i t V n-l: vdl'TM VU/I \ \ M
In I'lo-iiijr, Mr. ('liainnan, les me sii'jgi I tiiat the ffiiihcoiniug election in South V i e t n a m i i; anytiiing but a ]>eri[>her:i] i.-ue, Wlii-ii viewed from the -tand|>oiiit of I'.S. inlereM-i anl I'.S. noiicy. a fair election in Mit only \ii-tory we eari lio|>f' for. OIKV having :i'-)i!.Mel tliat victory, we will lc in t h f l n - t priîblB po-ition to carry riir the t \ \ i f t . total, and honirable withdravi'al of T".S. forces. For t!ie South Vietnamese. tl<e election is at least a cnicial. Tliey cannot withdraw- from a bind and a culture mutilated by a Barter fcnfnry of war. And llu-v h a \ e no a^-unui' , that the uar will end for l i i e n i v^hen our t roojp- HI i ! loine. It i< ii[> to t hi* South Viet names' îov-I i j i i > " i t -a< I're-iiliMit N'i \-OM IIH- often pointecj out to hammer out
i J i i ) i | l p - : i l .Dilution :i||i] brih<f jH-ai-e to lildor-l-ina.
\t i d : - ti mi- and from t l i i ^ -Ji-1ance. i( i- in(ji-;-ilili- to jiredict whom :h> > ' c i i l , Vi'-lnameê i l l e-iect (hi.- fall. l>!;t a f j t i elei-tion i;- ifiP l.e I : ! le for 1 1 aii-lonîli^ the det'ne of the fM-/i|)le of South Vietnam C-ii jeacr i n t o a mandate fop \wt\ for ihat rea'Jiii. a fair elect ion vi ill lie H |x>liti' il vict/)rv no matter whet win? a politic-il vj^>ry of iri '-:iter L i f t i n g Jmjwirtanc^ Ihaii all the real and imagined nni'tary victories '.vliich pnvede/1 it, Thank you. >f r. fhairman. ,Stmison"s full Bttement follows:)
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ST.III.UFNT nr SKSATOS Aram E. STEVESSO* IT! or ILLTSOW BCTOBB THE OoMMirncc OJT fames Bcunoxs, \VKDXECDAI; Ann. 21, 1971 F</r u docide we tare joeUfled oar military inrolvement in fc^Bth Vietnam as d effort to bring freedom and self -determination to die people of that nation. let it seeing that Instead of rapporting the people of South Vietnam la tlw-jr arch fw {nan* and freedom we are instead Up|>orting a regiTp which Is comnjitu-d to Yicfory and to a prolonged war at the expense at a war-weary people, Onr policy, it seems, irnot to end ifcv war. but to continue i1 as a proxy war between Asians, for so Ion? a that Muiain>, our policy the drain upon our lives and upon m:r Treasury will continue. Genera! Ky has said it will be 15 or 20 years Iwfore South Vietnam can defend itself. I support the withdrawal of all Amejiear force* by an announced date. I tliat such a more could start serious negotiations and ensure our disment. lint I recognizeall Americans must recognize the risk inherent in uK otjr military involvement in Indochina without a negotiated settlement covi-riru: amnesty for the people of Sooth Vietnam. the withdra*l of all foreicu irooj.-. and the return of our jirlKmers from the North. I euggtst, therefore, that we fasten more attention upon the instabilities of a political settlement which could not only ha sum our departure. hut also leave behind a durable and representative gmvrnment which could dejiend for ita survival npon the upi>ort of tht i>eople of South Vietnam and not npon the continned military involvement of the fnifed States. The jieojile of S<.uth Vietnam will elect a new Honoe of BepresentJiUve* in August to 1* followed by the election of a PreKident in Oetolier. is.iause i>ur ouuuve military preneuce enhanoes the power of those la office, it threatens to involve u in Bo^tb Vietaimeae electoral politic* If only by an ai'i"jriiure (,f su|ij.rt for the |>re*ent regime in the forthcoming election*. The fre|iie;.i visits tn South Vietnam by Cabinet member*. Aml<a>-had4>r Hunker's t^.iirs .if the rnuutrjMde with Pr'id-iit Tbien. the lush visibility of r.S. materiel ;nid |KT>-<rjif! tliroui;hout the nation are perceived ati expressions of U.S. support fr tlie re-eN-etion of I'residfnt Tlu'et:. '/'bere j-. i-i'ireiiver. reawiji IK IK? fwiwrwd iliat I" S. xiiiqirirt fr tin- TliifU-Ky rejfiuie IN HN jil as it is a | <)* re lit. The New 1'ork Times of iVbruary '2 report<<<l : \jiii.iinl -urvvys of Vietname^ iît-llc opinion, which are prepared and aun]y/*-d l>v the I'nited States miBslon [in Saicon], are being axed to arvist fftvidenf Nguyen Van 'Hileu in hi re-election campnitni this y^'ar." Tli.- oiirvfyjc referred to are <-onduct4-d liy COBJS montlily in all 44 provim-es, mid the r.'MiltK a:i- turned over to the Thieu-Ky fiorernment. Tl'e guextlonuain; luuilc avuiltilile in (lie New Tork Times coutained three qnct4)'>us relating *;*" ill.*!!)- TO tLe fnrtiK'omiDir elM.-tionf: nrhich uwn are most likely to run; what kind "f mu'j xliould be c-Ief-ted : acd what are the dacMve issues. To give Mr. Thien Uie nnswtTK t/> these auestlonn is to promote hhi ielf-perpetaatJon rather than the elf -determination of the people of Sooth Vietnam. Karlier r)ji ummli, inj dixt intralRiwd ti-illeatnw. Senator rourcb. called onr atTeiiiinn 1ruu;itinn Awney j.rffCraais which have bclpm] llie SnijTti VlHimini-M- Miniitiry of Information diKw-miiwte j>ro-jfovernment projutRinda In n+ixiw to ijue^tlont; froui the dlBtingnihlipd (Tiainnan of thiK- Comlulltii- li<- sciijor t'SJA oOViiil iu Soiilh Vietntim >.t:it<-ii in March. ]!<"< lefre lluK <^,minii!e(. llp;if I'KIA )i:id <<r^tMln.t<'d IK>HK in Sr>ulh Vu4n:uu I'-onmably t dfli-nujtjf uhi-lher tin- ]>rc/jiaaiulj vra* Mj<t*-s>ful iu f ogteri ne more fir>K|tive j.ul.lif jtiJtii*-- toward tlie Tli leu -Ky Koverutnent and that I'SIA ha* naed ita rewiTjKM-s in Kontli \'.<^M.'iiii Ic .iKKixt the VietnHi;u>w fowruiwiit in df-vj-Uiitint a nwiint- of (^mmunieniinir wltb the elct/rjie and 1/1 j>rovid<' t-ljnic!il and jiroTJu- I' luted Sr.'it.-t. e.-mrjot lu- true to iu (-..uiuiitinent to elf-d. termination (n tlw ~irl<1 niid abai KU[ijK<rt tbe el"!ii.ii of .me eumJidate nr jinotlicr. bwever cM.-rt li, in Souiii Vii'idMtn To do so w.ii!rt |M> r>n^. It wmiM ri'l'iit uiMa\u-* of ttic |i:i.<( It in:iy l>i tlitit "flier xii\'i-rini"-iil* \ i'-w frs- el<-. f mi*, in tlie third w m l d 11- iiii'.iiwiiti-iif v-i'b tlii'ir intfTef* Bi. I funiH Kul'init that it li> bett/r ff>IJti<'i', Sin! iiinr.il'y nzlil. l'.r (lie ( rulM *i.iii- f \ H}izn ifm-lf w i l b m>t ML r :iilik-t UK? I n^jr" - nf-t i ,!(< niiili:it'' Ii e i;r>eJi<-> firI :i 1 1 icul:i l.-d :i- :i n:i(n>ii I'.S <.'jii|mri. real <ir a|'j>aretrl. f ' < r 1J>e n'-'Iei-tinn <>( I'rewd* nt TJiieii eon Id diw iir;;i-< '5n- faiidnl.'ifieK f tii>Ti <->iinilrte4 In Knirth Vietnjini t<. .1 Hpftb-iiient mi ".-cvlw'i iii- u j t l i S'oplu Vi-<Tjaiii 'ii-nenil Mi li bac :ild mii'-Ji jnjMlrly. J* ru'il t<.' ""e frxr-etpFHiikii:!! if'i\u- \ n \ m \ u t vill In tlie electioim by lndiu> 1nif Hi"*-1"*1 ui '(U-l''r ilwittcin pew r or not ' t a l l
132
S Co.'i R-. 17 tvatflnn* :: -watmUty >{ :h<- T~ni:*<l Star*-* in UM Sî^h Wt>. its : rail* u;->n th* Prv-tifU-ot to iroilfwnt i;ilcy >f Wrlrr neujs-l !-?> '-uârrioa t'-n hwmU-r Cnasraffiniuil forr.njrîon. mpfxirt^l hj u uff in >-.ath Vi*-tna:turuui.v.ut thr portion campnisKVinT.-rx1* I"..* tmtmr* a.-vl .'.*. >:!.. wh.rii ailitit ln:rl>rv wiUi tu*- rlfotnrrtl ;>ro--*s. Tbe Cooun^wuiiD ;r>-.-ncr W-M'I! ii.-U' u-wnrv- ti* ;-ifrlr cf $m?h Vj^taam tfutt w* u :amir:l TO thfir risbtjj a< a frte, wlf-S'iWrnins ;*pii. Tl- Mr)lu.i<',i ?- 'tt firf hrr lj> x;tv*iag il>- *-aje of Ui- Con^rww that we .ha:! a i tw:ii <n|i|irr <rfi,> a frwiy fU-rti^l
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ii;c wt>i.-Ti -r<-:: tin'i-lQ'-ti .; l.<.->urj;:t> TLir !" .imt rcmmllialir-ii. :l }< t > i*'-t"i-ruil < \j.rr >;i-n I .ulur f.u;rf--,ri -A'.!!:-: : tr ---rf.'"i- NVrtli If f'/r ii"- :l!>' TV*/: ;'i U.>- o.ar s Siurb VU-toamr**- t'ivr'i!pi NN-.. ,ht- untb f-f .|Er- v.;-!' :i '.r.:i.I !:-<. of Ji:f>n-ir .-ili-J-'rt, if n-it.! rui i--.iitt'lit-u v;,-\v.-.' fn.ui y> ffandlnMUt it r S- Int^-rvi-v! awl P s*" fiolii-y,. t Tair ei-r^. n i- Tb-- -fjily TKti.rj .- van L<^^*- for Oni^ luirins actiVri rf,m w; a ji; i.-- iii tio U->i jMMt-ibv jiosltlou to early cut tl- xwift. u>ul. f K-->r r!.- S* ,--.;x Vietnam*:.'*. tLr elation ! nt li: as i-rucii'!. Tl.c? .-aui.'-r rci!lnir.':?. Jr-nu R land saU n ruliure w.jtilaf-l M j quarter -.vi'turr <.-f war. An'J t!..r L i . ' - ;,<va-sarni;f<!r that tti- irarrvill rr.il for thi nJi*-:> nr u>i. s-: '(,.!!.. 1' ;?. ii> r<> ft"- S.>urci \ i-rii3ai<-> cf''.-*T:i-sr a ^"i~ i iIi-M M\-ai !m fr<-n >- 'if.r"l '.iiC f-> IinnimT >Jtif * fH.ijtUit! "-nr4->;> ,^L>I l-rti;t f*wv ! A: '...* r.ru- ;in'.i frîi V! rn::':i-*- i'l iS'"-f f l u * frtil f'Uf it tn.r li-'fmi: t- fh- I* 'I i.-!i:/-i- f-T tr;>i;r-ni.iii.' :>.-lr t.-s."r- fiir j-a .* ii:n a :.i.i;idati- far ;*-.!-. KIT tl-.f r--n*"R. a JV.r !':<-|j'ir. v.ii. .: n j-.liMi.Ml TWIory !'' laatt-jT who u.ni^ :i Jrfliljril t t ' T f ^ y of iifKitir :.ii: ii.^ imiK-r'diu''* that. H tlx: n-ai fcti'l imaeif:if<1 D-...i'utl ~n:lf-fl' * vfc:-o'i-rK-;. : i f " ' , " . ' . '
Ti. C H - : K M A V . Thank oti vir
mvj-Iu SenuU^r Stev-n?on. J tiiii
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<*iii tn.:.^ I mi ;!'!> inf. Jf ;; rh< rn>-ci::ii:i'> <if ii><v a ?>viiauii- <*r ^ 'onifr:.-_sJii:u}. ii'ir.e of nimin I biion .-tisal: liir- Iatiriiage or are faxnilUr n.-tf li iK- { iôrtaiifw* ;uvolv!. really opcrau* to proraore a fair clcc_ * S.-aitor ;frr.VK>soN. Fiiwt. Mr. CKainnau. l..-t nw> fii-t njphuaiz f^cf I 'im not sug^totin^ F'tf^nTjion of rhe Xlctiiauieiic or thr v ''ir'li;c( by tii*. VirU::inw-sL- o/ f h c i r clr-ctioris. I aiu tiiiipiy siigfres-finij \\r; ovi-iô* our own in-i;.>!vt:itKin lit N>uth Vietttaiu to jruaraufw: f hut tin- <.>> >>iniii'-iit of the f.'iiJT.vl Saf<.>, doos not iu rhr course of the <-krt:'ri '-;s:if'-jiirr. <l.;:-i>rt tin: wtJf of i!,r jicf)[di>. It wrtiilii !/. far c;L-i:r for the. l".>. ^(iiit*1. t:i>- Houpi' of Hf ? j . < > . JiV- corrur.i.-.-';' TI icfin-.-^ntirit' *}. two JKÎJI-S. a:itaff of So'.fi. \ r i<'Tji:uui-c .-iti'iikin^ jifo;l-, or. t'/if grtwA in S)u<ii
Jip;-'l'f' 1 i X ^ ' l t l l l i i o i l . - *li-ivijriil 'J 0!J'(;v:n il> Vulvt-nifijlt ;>l -
af-'ir;!f;o- (' tit*.- [.<>j>i>- <if rrotiiii \'ictii;ifu tiiat - a.t:-' rva i;i 'in- t-!-i tK'J;-. Mi C'^.T fu'liuir from falkni^ with na.ft\ iow ii tli^t ;i {;: iiir:it'c,i of i'.>. .v i r t ; i i i r v HI (If clfîoo.- in hiinpfy Jn>t -no(i2lj. tliat It ntx.-r.Li Tiiyrt- t< iria!;- ir i.-k. It rwii-'li' jnorf fo ar>tiiii- tii>- jx'Ojj[: of S '. it M. HI,: <-f ii,r !KII L I ii/h-n. 'Jiiftt i.-t t] i- furpoH' of tL*. .jor J !</ J.-.T i.'i'V, '.'. !iu{ inorr we can do, ttirrH.tt.TZ or TAJSM.-JIN>; N T:.'- C'_tJ U.iMN. If it wtjj'j !) done. cmiry*., Our j.:i.:iii/;atlon f;ffort ti.'-ir. wi.ii-ii ii v<rv larye ,i'l on which we h a v e ^;jit & ^rcui d'-a' ',1 t:ioi;<-j , i.s dftigmxl t>y pfer.1-:. yLr: tl! pt-op); of South Vi-f tisci t>;
134
i. XLatb^l- v,, ttctual military opcrt- '. _. . oulfcuh m .a sh".>r tinte now to say vc did uwt Jf; w r, rv)t\'e are .utnil ail **: do iiwt-'iirc wiic-thsc tbcy sufJKUf; ' '~' '' " "" ' " 4> Ssu' r .>-t^vi.N3fi>i. I-iiLii. it- shou&l be tried. J[ dtirtk i ~~ ,.covjr] if. ITciv'7t'-speoiiIJcif tlwrv tlic . i J- -7 . .-. "assmaiiasi'vcri'Jiair , ^^ . . T. > frojtr c " .. If we:do notliin^ monr than eiprei"l*JttraIitT; J Os>pect it wwild be >erj?*liffir.hlt fertile people of South Vietniuu.t^/listin^xhiEi between tii/i Congress tod the *secutfvc biânch of tLe .GoyieruaKaiiLTtut i f (Jx-. nrauluti<)a drtibr^'itfe'l & coiigreinional cînnassion in -ôirth Virtaani. I rtould ctrtdaS- hojw and think thjuf-tt ttyfld be'ol-soflie bolp iuoc >nh* in oinrumdcribing.ibrt'lctih'Jtioj' /{' 17.S. aire)ics5'I>ut in cwi>initiaIJy assurfng thc-[>euplK;:loo;':OJf our real nuutrîtty. "I'liis ii {> thr more necc5Ary after wiwit liaJ! -alreaAy transpin-xl, after theelecuoneerinc uiC \re have donr.iAnd may atili h*rir,iatc oh be-iial; of ljjiîi tud Ky. I'crhaps this omoision couJd find out wbttt V]aiHy t^ " ' - - _ ' -' -" " " of the rwiul/vnw-nto of tne "rhsoluticn 5*. that [>eri<j Jicanj" to th Coitgrwt^ so if intf the t'oKgf&a'-fnuld. tkp {J|r6priat j The CfiAiicoN- Triut woula bt great oc'.'Omplisbiiierit because tlt^ .jwnaiiiUw has Attrmfjited. 17 gut the result* fft the poH5: which >xc ' irwutiot.vi. Vi>it jm-ntioin-cit tl;<? tjnrst'oii- Lit wt-n: i*uv<i;:tiMi to a-iM-^ T Presidv-ct Thieu. but up tiH-nov the evâtive bnm^L hx3 refiL'^cl ^> make tirt*sn polls availtWe-ô- the comuiinttc, Mayb: the cnriuiK^kfa w<>itld !vj" m'orp fit-nmao-ii-c oit tfe *rjcecutiv'vi 4>ranc. ;s{iOciff)]y if tlaiy i tim wirl^tFiejV-rwî '
f, I W(7uld li
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.,
J?enstorC;. Thank j'dît Sf.-iator.tbftuk yoi, tw. foryourtxiijtribtition Bi/i? foJ goggeatwm fhjch you hare skillfully present^." r wxcnov iv un*rr^"-r^. rtrioE iv c election in S to r/rv/>tjjl IM- coqnu*tl vn tt> r o t " * /jrl urv of lhfc:wiJI of _ . , 'J are.r>t b jt^>ncilh' very <:onrrn>j i i rithst PJI rt of ilu- w>r Jt!. ~- j: ". j<rari iJicy b/u>ii -i* dlflôuraffv'd <rf aay i!en--<e. ?>:jf f. thinif" is tuir, ronv^r f or tis xi |>ut upon an election In ScrcaJ^Ti^.njf fn ,t?e ;ciit and 'vilin- that v- /.'ivc MICW t' jAifnjron nlvf -i.Tv Jtor*. . ; 'Hiin lûJa iw Ursfate a <i*p><tori I Lavejuwj i Jrr>- nuiid /or a !on^_. r is-t^ whether w:.arcf1;rtlly'jirS'5h V'rfiiaoi,f.r th pjW.wy ~ ' , aa ' o
do Wh i& ttUUlJU'i*i O/ tllK WM?Id Wf.f'n1 th'.f
. .. I do .w* .tltiit it i tubfivjti*- ~ihil it Jf>^ iwvVr f.nG &>-1af tutor ' ibri one pitrpow-for bw/jjjf jSortfa, Vietnam^ it** teen to
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'*iictv'JE"'CTSaU VtjTieriiBV** utjsen >;e haw newt, closdy involved with ' '.Jrât Brititvn at tjc cjoôt World War II. fl> tln*.o:aintry w<.-uM f&yc snpsrestwi we stop
ri't r.Irvjtft-'-îid this jvalft- f* Îtfr'-wei^tt-of nij tvcrntthat we ought jfiiuip mking attioik wjs.tywik an? uncessarj -for our broad }>urj>ose jif, z*fntii Viet ruin Ix-cauje. thov actions: rr^v have the <w!iatoi:i{ ftlvct for the tfnw (c> 1* in Vj>rtrani>sfe <>6n a .vt-i-r tlKullufuI crfr^r-aiion. Senator
,,_
' jttfiw tlfc-jt thi-i v.x}--hw h-cn ch.isH:jr alf^r a purjxj^ fo^ a lone If tJi'rc ?s xny urnrfcliivô <-f fonrifaniy'i'ietvri^n aH tlie jUittifiâ' f:*Hfl firoe tp" rtflf* i*n uilvtrjuvd ?n sui>p*>rt of the wrr f i * - ; ^ l ; r c i l D a t t 3 ; - - - - ' - -<-iiiM'>r <'.V ;JF:i-n't it ixn'n Citl(.-r.fh:it If Wmld rt'rtaiilly not lit' Ol r Jaii for : J>, irfs if tl: Jfoorli.ViVhifrnfs.1 \v.tntU . , " of tlu-rui . Ves, ' . - - , - . 1 , I tliitik î-'iiuxv'-lio'rtpit o-ikHwri'iJiH' tor tlu-m their T.v'nTA'^S'..,Tthink ortt-nsibly w Jeasf tl jr>arposel..., .--^ynf: th'Uci a rJ^tf o,f w^-tictettiiinafJon.' TJ^ Prwident rcpwfed rr;i.- at K>^ff % mn-ntlf vî>ril r- Thi? bae tiot^bcfn our j/mptM"!; v v~- -)>-rfiaps-it.;shf<l aow utccjie'our fnt-p<>i aotoflly in South Vietnam '-->,r>ut nwre-awitraU; tlinxtgbout tb* woiW.
" : . < AVtSy.".: point ;J)rif VJM a ilisturtwnce froai the audinjc.)
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. . . _ 'jfArLXA>^Wl[ you TU'i^li.-trcpf flu- mefftiny? W? "annot li^ " " '" ' *.-" . jff not [a.-.-i haw?
cîv, S<rnfttor C'jirn. I wt'iul'l-Lk>^/' Uojj*1 ac.fl U-lii-vt' f-riJif fiif/ L^t/z otJLf" r>ur|**jiji| Jt Mvnir to.uj/* c"Jr (nirp"**^ j'^*i' "-li'/'il'? fi*,1 Vi''p'ir2n^41 fr'^rii js*>irtj. \ y.^.'iri/ii, i/jy rvtuiî of our r/rt^îfTv. I'^'j-iiiif iu'i ;ft ir-.HiHiir*'. I f^.r-S:^ ''oiir<y{oivv>>; of uniLir^ntl wif}i4r:ivi;i|. .^ -*'!i'j'iu->- tT1^ (*f| it tr Wu(nruxjiti.oji >_<r i'^flJ;ifix f'"<" ^ f'-'ar -fr w-h*f. fo t ;,. ri^.u/ij. c-roar |.rw/{l*r<. or t''>u Jigrtiw;icrit on,
130
The device of ejections in South Vietnam may be imperfect. It }s imperfect in this country, but it is tlte only device '.hat the people have i ir t- s pressing their wil l'. JL tlnrrcfore, believe that we should not distort it. We should not intf rf-re with it. We should do the best we can with an imperfect device. abiding by the expression vf popular will in the* elections. nârdinc a fnso election. and I hope that is what it is, as s fulfillment at lonjr In-t of rmr commitment which I Itelicve in. for self -deternination aiid frwdom for the jêoplc of South Vietnam, and then withdraw and th^n there will be a better chance for a political settlement for a â~{- fin-, amm^t v foi prii-anaa. JIM! rvium of onr prisoner*, and fora government which is able- to dq-x-nd HJXUI its survival and not our military support. It U not a. perfect nnsxv-r. and it certainly w not inconsistent with the vicvrs of others who support a terminal date for the withdrawal of nil Americans. S-pjifur (.*A*r. I do ?upix>rt tint . as t he Senator knows, and I undtrrst:nul fnxu your-itatemi-nt tiiat you do, too. S-iiaiorSrrvRSstfOf. I do, Seissror C.VSE. What I am question inp is whether yonr propoul wn'ilrf not inject add<*d difficulty and complications into a situation w iiich in nlivady coini>liratcd. Senator S-JT.VK vwîx. I hop*- it i:jK-.ht simpli fy if for as to jreJ dowii to ba.-'i-' prin'-iplesj lib- self-dftmnination. Si-uat'ir C.ISK. Thank you, The ( 'IIAIRM \.v. Senator r*cot,
r.. mi.rr-v <vxrn:yiNRM or FOKKJGX ^VTRJIMFXTS

Sfimfor S*'IIT. Scuauir Steveaon. I. first of all. have verj- broad ar.l t''"X'ral airreeim-nt with what concerns Scnttflr < 's: h^-re. I noD; 1'imii your :-t;ifi'i,t'jit thn( your rt-solution include the intent tht. ii-i 1".S. inilitary nsHJ^tar;' 1 !- would hrf- available to any jrnveninvnt M lii<-!i n'-'jiiin-.- or n-tiijx \ntvitr in South Vietnam by means of a coup That. I tnk- it. yon would b* willing to let stand as a condemnation of fii.- f[rt ion nf rlii" CiftVf-rittnf-itt in frivlnjr considerable ni.l and comfort ro f h" ovprtlirow of I'r!*id'>irf n>-m, L that wmethin^ which yon would co ' Vmn a.', * wroitirf ul act < ^.ruifor SI/ATNM.N. It my hove Itfen A f<olit;cal mitak'. It i- in fh>- p^.-..'. Tratikly !</ <iot know to what extent wcri' a party to thnf .{) ;. Von iuivv bi-m around Jwri; iongpr. Senator, than I linvo, SfMinior S OFT. I li, a istronp fpr-Iin^' timt we wvr a partr to if :ini} ] ttt'init- if w<r w-i/fjr. J think 'In- jmrt:ip)tnon of the (,'nif'Ml r:iti--> v, v. v. ff.it-/. WI'A'e-.f-r tb- South Viftrianicfv did i> H matter for t. bi:.t. I ^rn trying t'* get at th; !*irt of thinj you an. - >-:u-or ÔT;-VKV-.,%'.. Vi'ifli h i L-nefit ' > ( h i n d . ,i-: WKtuî .Tr. I jifA'iiot ?<m. thii-' has not lx*n al the heart of
if fi'-.r t.lt'i', .'i ir; <!-!>. ;,i'I. l ^ r i i ^ J / - U M f ' : i i t fif : i l l l l i j i / ou
w u{r jfj'iiEj". v,if}. unr-^Jl.-ir ;*cnrK'_ with n-pr < ll-.at forrx to ?'"*. '-ot'wWf sn'I r rrypt 1 jit, w* ^nould br t r v i n p to alim' us a r"--ulf of tin: x r -
137
st<>n of popular will and can enjoy and depend ujon popular support not om'y in Indoch ina bat elsewhevv in (he world. Srnator Scorr. That, if carried farenough, however, would have the effect of saying that we will aline ourselves only with governments with who*' form of government we agree: is that right? Senator STEVEXSOX. No, sir; we are committed to self- determination in the. world. It is a commitment this country made :2CO rears ago when we declared it was our purpose; as a Nation to set. men free. I think we have lost our wav. I would like to aee us get hack to that commitment we made to freedom and self-determination, to the rights of }>eo^le to stlf-yovt-rnment everywhere. Senator SCUT. Then we do have some obligation to take some putt in the struggle of people to be ft-te in every country whfre it day be going on: is that correct! ^ Senator STEYKXSOX. No, I would not want to generalize aliout that To the extent that I do generalize it wouid soem to IQP we should be trying to confine our support to those who do come to power peacefully, through democratic means, and do enjoy popular support and Arc progressive governments, and then try to help them be free and *lf-sustaining, not with our military support, not with military involwnwnt, but with economic and technical assistance.
l-OtKT OHJEXTATIOX O> FKOFOaOr COSCREitWOJCAL COK1OSBIOX
.Senator SCOTT. This (juestion may havf been asked, but, as yon know. it underlies the basis of my concern. In proposing five Senators an*! thv member* of tin- Hoattt to observe any TJ-S. mi'otvement in file ejections, would not the policy orientation of the persons aelcrted have a great deal to do with what they find? How can yon divorceaUitudcs about the basic pol icy from such a task! Senator STKVKXHON. J did add re* famt oanmentu to that knowing of Tour concern, Senator Scoti. _ Sciiator SfcoTT. I am sorry I waslate. Senator SrErewnojr, I think tlu?'rc it no difiagrccment, at Inxst I hop*" none, within the Congress abjv.it the principle here of nonhvoJvwtfnt in tlie intenul eJectorr.1 politics of .South Vietnam, flnd ihar to fh> extent the cofrmiwion was oompowd of rv>grpMien svd Sn r '10 did have different views about policy in SouMt Vietnam, he ojilp> und!rscore our eornniitment to that principfo of M>f*fI<tfrra>UtPtion.of American poJhica' neatrnUv in Kr>uth Vtetntun. Senator SOOTT. I have tJlke/l within th" last few dayn tt two .%Ht* ton* -vfjo have returned recently froto Vietnam. I sskt^l t?oiit of tlwirjudguMnt on f he recent T>aot incuraion. .. ' (h& wsignttid it a* a rcialiu 1 wn*u un<t tl* ofwr oatdeftignatal it a* a relati/e fnilurp, I'Ariiaps Mtir point of have ben governed by what they saw, r-hat thi-y *wtftto(d <>ff bv x/riw [rJiIcrti<^n which they took fo V|*tnam wi(b tii-v brought ba/i unimfmired. - -. \Voiildc-'t that U tii d>ftrulty with a fomîniont Homo viIt My i relativtlr good and othent will ?sy tin* j rrlafjrt'h' 'wfrtia. ot h^r w*nw, wouldn't wrb a coinmifcion *JKiftJy Mlect tKf prcj't N Lrtiorwof tJi people inroJved1 ' - \ Senator HrrrxKy^v, I do not tlojik so. I think the predilection c (!u cnw iii American polUcral.neutralHf, If tbare are
tz &<> -71 I'J L
*>'f ojirxixioii,\t*M JlarîtwiIivrO'Qrjto/' thai ? Tin?roinniU--Ln ' .' chc*jwj-icifll'* rvjiorfing ltefeto i.Vuijjrvw, w!iy!i .wmjd &.n'-W-<3ie tux) acJfft^r. Tite (Vmitntseipn woald'liavfj at r;jT t&at- would try 10 ai-are r -^ ' tfie p^n|^fc of oorVonunitfr.J.ftt hi the (/uh;rti>ii u n^ntralitv. a^d tbcrt>_ ^ ./;- -> . st(if>oM not l any <iisRr*wnAnt alxtt dwtf in il;o <MI'O( H|>ftr\'isinjC '' :" ' or ov-erswiuÂttfricar. n^tjvitjpA Tîould not. think tfiore a'tmld \M- . -' ' - an opport<c:Jtv for.*'-emit doal-^fdisajswrnu'iif-ov*j* iat oonstiliited sfiipjiorr fw tfi(S^ NvltHrtî /t Thicu ,>r some-body else, and ', ft >tORe nruwi nv co^sttspiov* I'KFJVXCF.' f y*fdr iudxKicnt, wfmld Ili* prfsr-.nc; in Vji'tnnm of mum holjtful fa thfr (fovortunrnt in power or t r STf.vtJf*fx. I rwifly drr not know. I talked *ritJ a %'err rl ftud prominent general in .South'Vfltfnum, lie illumed from ^y?"tfi,Viptn6J rwyikUy. nnd h* i:d tiiftt-'iA would thinjf any one oCtfyj^wirtifcM. iiH-kt'intf Pfesiflunt Thip-u. vould"welcome tixw Uk-ause ittl.*f>s afford tb_^n alltlie opport.imif-y vJ.wrt irit<>7>owi.rjtticoog1> ui " " Aftf-r t!iflt\i:js })ftfprtied<,thc ftnctj<5fnr candidate whoever if in.~'!udhir"Pr-Mid'jf Xhi'i, wlionrj"^ nuntcd xf^jfk'Aily- -isiipht f)r ul<r^3viu->d to rimkr'j.**.1*. Tt misfit -Itt: poweiNe" in a way that ,'f is >/ no'v.^> make pic' with thft'JK'inh., ...'_ '.'-./ lie, njso [tointrd wit that whooivr, incindinir IVrsidrnf' IWT aftr an el^tion fa^**/ A/wrieftti liav hi wr.ti . S'i 1 mo Fiw it J>iild ;Is*r l-iwf:f ifrotfifr wa\v ot.î" rands.\Jbili liis ?j*id IIH iiLti'-U- Jfi' liu* riprtf*J . jniWJpl a, r . '.UrtiVthfi Cf'Jifjpal.arfuby '/C ^><.'"ht>cfw.t in S . 1 \Vna. . lit lit fa>f. h*> lifcs indi'-nf^.d t|ii(f, 'li^hf* orjjof hf> ov<t> ^wii:* will depend opon thow "act 'u'ttwsnd also nfon *c7icthr or finp.*hi* Angne( elections jtre free of eorniptioo, and ^dicatc a fxwfrHiH o'f f iv* .>)<< ion* in " Ilc.cniiv * i-M'ttunigr*! t run f fliis "If r niit'hf erA>rfr*jrr ot!i*-r J^fiplc fo rmi, f o ro>xi>!fei,Qfe withtVNort{<. x ._ - , . f lo riof 1,'iv.n.. All I tikiw j f hnt U W IM nt ry nh<wW adr^n- (/>]. ,tnd I <at st^. wo ad v as a n"nlf-'of a firm c^)!riifnMnt by lh < r<:,n n nd < th. riphtg jf scljf ttovenumtf; of tlj* people 'uf South -Vtftnkm. "'-' ~ :' t - ' " ' [ an'. Ctf*. fnrf K*. iitwtilr| ]ir-)ti th- Fnisinw* of r,
T*fmt \if\y fr of nrvK. S'i^tif.I a S^/rrr. Ifivaiifw i^waa won<f >rio<if if ôa would i CVii/irnii'>u > exa i(y "f (hf vdf>)>. UV
13'J
OBTAIXIXO RCTUBX or rRiso.viots or WAR 1 wonder if you iiave commented on the primmer of war isue, as to how you think we might -jet tho prisoners of war back. ^ Sriiator STEVEN-SOX. Senator. I Iiave already expressed my support fur a terminal daU; because it not only iiwures our ditt-nâgKineni bat al HO serv es as a merjis of getting negotiations started. It is hard forme to believe tiiat if we announce publicly a terminal date it would be very hard to win in return the release of "our prisoners, although I wonld iivujiu.- that ivlwwe of the prisoners would be coordinated with withdrawal of all American troops*. I do not suppose it is very likely that all American soldiers would be released Ixjfore all American troops were withdrawn. Hut I at*) tried to indicate that AC a result of the free elections tho ]io<ibCliiif.3 for political settlement might very well be euhaiifed, and . that part of the |>olitical settlement we could expect would be the n-turu of t,\ir prisoners as well as other possibilities, a cease fire ana amnesty for jeople in South Vietnam, and hopcfu'ly an end to the war instead of. a.ut in the record the article on which I :i in.itix'jit apo of rVbnmry '2 in tlw Xew York Tin(? by lilori-i Kjiifi>wii n-^nlnif the sun <*.*. :iud an article by Ptrr .Ta> in tiip Warilijn^ton I'OK? i>( April iiO. andow from this nioniin^'s paf>r. ft Mt>ios tli ;a is oppo^'d. which is quite jutcrestinjf. ()iu: article SVM the - N'nvv 'oiiiiijuiid i* aU*>ut to dirwt an effort to garhtr iriformatfon. It i* a <;Ias*.r fication project. Jt MVS that one otiject is helping tjw Viet- jiamese ^ ! ice ; that :
, v 'Ilk; I'LiMd Sutv* Wrtjlil AevtJw n Infirnoatirm *j:-m for Kulapon'* Miaiti7 - <X IntMlortb* fiollcn ana wblctt crarfc* dowa ou nrlfd'i'r(inM>5ie nrfift and [ir*<>nrwlt/ monitor, ^ratoite and l<nirore tli lmp(*in<-ofuti(m of tb*- (woplet ^jrr>)tram. . . . The Utoi of orainlrsrtiiD, uuujK/wer. wmixfn*, n. uirf training of forci Inencli luailec information prr//xrairuJ ia to te*( attitudes, urvcya A'ouU IM- ri/ndfi'lJ roootUIy ja Vlt-tiunu fo
It i* (k v^ry.iitrejrfinjr devft'-jpirittit. Mr, KejKrter, we will fmt all - art Hcs in the n-f rd, you .ver^ much, Sen? toi',Sfvvn*îi, " j)rf you, Mr, (,'hainnan.
rh .> Vort Tlon>. F-L. '.'. I'.-' I.-.*.
. J ;fkcu! t0^vi<7 of VlrtMuww pwJrffc opln1-41, wlikb srr pr<firl cixt u*l/i*rt l>r UM* l'nlt*d Ktabm aiiMloa turf*,
In W
140
Tli'- in'tutUl* Mirvf1}*. known a* ili<- I'aoHU-atlun Attilmlc Annljl are takt/n In ill Uu* nation'* 4< province* by trained Vietnamese rcsonrcb team?. 1 he minxjw U to measure trtmlx in rural opinion and the reaction of Vietnamese 'o |<<^Cr ereuta. SlH-rf-ial iiuextion* In Ubc jurve>* arc now bring tsked to enable rr.-sMcnt Thlcu to im-imlirv' more rliiirly ln'n one u[[>-ul with VleUuimeM> voters. the i>O|rularttj of Ms colltlcat rival*, and what Issue* mint omceni tlie YielnHine.e. , Tbc aiwwer* to thes^ qucvtionn are made Available to t>ie Vietnamese Govern went. one UOJECT o Aawrkan.1 working 1:. tbt i<uclfitallon |<roffraui Mtterlj objm to f.**. wUldi in-, iii tliclr opinion, "ro!dUiis" In Vietnamcm? election*. A Bpokeamaii lt.it ih* Civil 0)*nitlfm und Uiinl I>erel'>i'mt :it Soi-i ';OKl>Hl, which rujKTrlm-B th*- urv-j-.. uiij In n^;ittill<lc for *ml iK'n.-lnjiojent progruu. Ill t^vutb V(<-tnnuj. Mild ID a tt*-uimt vunt flic qu<-iU'.tia -wrr not rrqmrMitJ l.f rrexi-Jeiit ThitTj or tltc Cio'i rurju-uf of Soutii Vu-fnam" "(rn Mfln^ Ofiii"O tl (><>ri-riicufiit of Hontli VU In '* ':J''(i ()i*y wouK! U- ini>-r-f>^l. ' tin- Ktatruifi giwatw/n* citi-tl wi-rt- UfVfh<tw<l ljr tl- >tACV [Military AimUtiiii> Virtaaui] Ci'Utl.'S Mnff. Th<-r <-rc lo< ludcrt to jlvi- a of polnlr jjult:nl-^ on un imjxjrtant upcuiine <-v-ut uhlch f. au lui(w<-t on the I'adJif-atJ'iii and i.VvÎo{itu<iJt iin/jfraui. for tlir M A< ' V -4 '4 KI>K and tor ( nlt^ Ktatw tuiMkm." .Ni-vcrtiK-U-'M. ti ^; jtiir-ojil ittiriQ.-uJxtu -.\<irk<^ who akv<l tiinl W- juini" r'J. Maid "wxji" <jf tin- *(fbil (jii'-MtU/ijn ID "I r*tt]ly object*ry rtronglytn tliJn bind of direct |rf>lilKxl l;i>rfrri-n if tllf AuMrtORB Ecl*iu<y In tlie^jKulnlnf election* h<T>-. e*J iflllj in llgl't of nil the American ctalma to the coiiinry." It* a'lded V" /Hi flttUit'U- of I l ' i - "Au- f w i i i i iiit' i d 11 iivi-. ' () AiiiiT; . i f i i-r-.ilii' > 'I ->.n l~'iZI>'!: tinlnti'>n of J'art A ^' 'iui-rioii! nj it nri-at r-Iior.-. Wiifli kirwl of \*'j:it iAMI>- Kill > "/O fi>u.)i1<<r Ui"f IU]XjTtant ib <J**>-idln ttJn t" ^M:l f',f ,i, IIM- i.flt election? Tix-y ncn- I'reli]ont Tifi-u. Vj<-i l'n->iijrl>; Nnu.v^j ' ' M I I K.' l"f rn; V.in lliiJ. ./ifjoxit^m onalor, Vu Vnn Mau. lnt*-r HereTran Vnu I/ix-iii'. n f-rim-r I'ri-nticr ;-il!i|. ni I'-adfr in -ntrui Vlftnaoi {fttt'.t: w A?II.*IM wvx.ii
A <',..) of iin^w r/i *m !:!> j;in-fi ilh tii- i-tlii-r tv o niji':ji., r .' '_( Viriii;. u . n- . . i t i n l ;!^<> r> (;i[ fi|! 11(1 i (IM I. ,T i,n-.u i'J*'l!rl le" > f i f f/ :[. i,.l J,i \ Ji *TI^ 11^*4. dnrt I'Ti'iJ HM* nji*^ j:ii >i(trvti"r)" li. 1 * !.i. - ln'7 -' rt'l" ut ! IK < 'i\ i\ * ^^ i'f.: i,.[i n& .1 "V
^ 1 . 'o !!* |irf'f'i^3 il'Iîi'''!* if: '/(<- urAi')v '"
>.--.;i llirii!' (Uini.uijf'i f"r ri . :. " :i rliM.'i'ii. iii'i-fjof ? if ' - - "_ ijiji- i4i. i M ' v f i ' i n v- irk* r 'n'l ('..<' IM li.i'l k^-iii '"Kl J.j .11," i u.|~ . i.m( 'i> ((:. V. n-riirnr HUTU-) J i u n f k i - i 'i.în i f l , n m! | iii II 'in t f . - r if
<'cj.l* of Ibr Mirrej-fi. DC fjtifHti' iititiiii'n In Kn^li'li afi' Ui.it'"<l "f.'"r ottl-'....' Tiw iiitr>iui U'ifi to mi t^tol^r, J'.'70, :trrr rtjro Hmt (!,! thri>p tr.an Vb-tov:
I l < ' i > ; i r I. (eSIUlu If"' ' K'lH'-ll bl II ,*il'l-ti-t>>rl <|l)''lollt.:nr< ' O ' l - I I S i K * > l l t n
HI
AttKKICAX
Th* resentment of one American workloe la a delta prorlnoe a* c. political /ffltt-r ami advir to * (.'irii Operation* dv_rf!<>f.au:rtt program led :m to rpirtjn Li jo} last f mr on tbf- irroanda Uiat aun-ey* fere Ixlug cwuliiuf d to rtrengtkvn 1'p-ldtfot Tultu politically. Ulclwrd \VOilw. who toft Vlrtaom rdy la Uweaiber. wruU in letter from Uw UnltrC Xmt'-ii v * /rieod la Vietnam : 'I bad r.;*-*?* sala I'd *tay In Vietnam with COBD8 Ire my own education as lot# I waw't PKpdmi. pan of my COttbS dttUe* to do anything directly harmful tu*ay Vietnam***." Mr. WltwUiw wrote that b* was Informed by two Xmeritms beadlnf tbe p-ney'a ~|w<Hnratlon rtsdlr* crouii** at * luocb last Kovenbtr la Salaoa that Tblfn tiiked Colby to aeod oat tb* t*DM to make a Madf d" th* i*o|>U:' fectlut tuwarii U- 1971 rrcyidcaUal tdcction o tbat Tblra would k.iow vbre kl Kfi.nfl; ]>lnu r>rr n^d t-Vfr bi-'ft tar* to trniacv M>meUiin( ljl!f|> qmckly r^fituttiiu nrn >.avuij wt'MHU would nutfc* sart- that b*'d c<an oat i.cntd in a cirra an.*." Mr. Wliw!o vwr<4r I* W* I^tfwv <hU>d Dc. 24., WTO: I o.kiMl. 'Y-.n owftra.. tt*- !'3. tMm <J**W*>4 to UMI It r^nurcM to assure ThfrtfTf r--.-noijV Til- ftwcr*>i t*. 1 hs hj dxrMfd at ttir it>4t TliK-uV ri-îcrtluo k *m*iUl w Ui oAttomU InvrfsC cf tê C.8.' He ato <lf*T;tit4 IB tb trtter IMM* be protected to tlur two atlttr "1 a*l<t. B'^, antl-TIiton frteodi who wr bopinz for ab hooctt Mctoral t*c-it jcar wouM jure be JMK* U tberfcn*-w*l>uut tbls " " Mr. WUitlo* Tbr f<iJj at aw of tn ro*attr>rt t, for CarUfi fc!. 4on'i ,tU tbea>r M Mr. \\r M'itmlor in wrote <C be ML i-~ica-/u>J tM^^Ne Oil ft )Nittttkl reporter r ilir .'irii <f*-rriou Awio b.- wa not rar whi-'lter tltv leformtCap li* a I -Hot Md I'X tl (toipm f^jrcruta*ot fur UK own (4>Utkt Hr jar.- |k*nnbMtnn for ht Mttnr in rjnotMi bjr Tw* Xvr 1'ort at tue lunch rt> mtli .'-Jd i>inc oar I*
TWO frtJtM a>
Ti kin:' "! iir'-)i ar lit-itju mndtft*^] Iij ll- ISI-IT.V In Viet num. fhr flr(t t.I-" t* mirv.'T for a f4ii(l }.<r(triiKw oolr. wade up n vi iff _?-i*.-.-Jmo 'oHltr> IT HvilUn Bdrlwrn in tbfft /ot hr d VKuimvv to Ihfonaed w './ w w -r, Attiiadi> AiulfNlx fr<>m (I'AAM) t-. i,'iVv, m>r:M:vlt} .-r<rr mîatti. / q IK-MIvti" irxi n*r arv bandlpil by Amrrlo-n <,(T>'),i',-t J'i ?*ifnj, Tlx- Vl<tiiiifi4-M> nue*tl>n*f4 at-- /idnl'n (x>tw<n the K4 '/ Is no-i .V,, . i;n flfi nrx dvll autiinrklM or nji'iulxrn -rf rrxnlar military for. Tl . ttt JâMtfU r*cnily
I'll' IflcOtloQ ktllditTI [>l til; [tr'tfl, 3U AlUl-riCUlI '-ttK-^Jl Worhfujf 1(1 flf
at air if .^n-rial '|Uctl(/n in thp iiit- r jn >nr f -t ii <>f lirr---tf TWt-u ray Jn offlrr. It will nuilu 'i,h*ti ji-w-f-f'ir ^t "v 'ilt with \tirnnr." IH* 'ai'l "I doi. t < Uow Tbii
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Kr A M TKM.: o* i|r r*ter A id i^rn*yUyi-~Vin- I'r^-M'-tit \Kiifi-i. < an, Kjr. v^|/;<ifia up -r / pfiiw tulnlntcr and !>- ifw H-.I/. aJ! t*n txiurlit atl."
142
bus been lioppltiir np all over Sooth Vietnam recently to make rtatemore notable fT their nhork value than for their lode or consistency. did nut mention Tblea by name* rabUe distinction that !-i Vietnamese ejn makes toe accusation of corraptlon k*r ha rub. It b? generally believed by Vietnameae and American politic] obwrvers here that K"' asdci are Intended MteJy to eatabllah the rice president an a nerloii.* contender in the ftrtnlier pifniilciitlnl election. Chances that Tnieu and Ky will again ran on the name ticket now appear virtually nooexUtrnt, althoncti on name occasion* Ky atm upeak* In conciliatory term*. At another appearance yptttrrday ?K> compared differences Between bim and Tblec to the onrtul quarrel* that occur between hunhand und wife in the 1C was fttao KOitw*W >frter*iy that Ky cbwe to Ure] riiarcen f fomiptlon x( Tbtn h divert Attention frum tlmlUr ecumtlooii made it him by Sen. Oeorjr<, 'In r*ctrt. (tayn. BTy han !#<> recelreVI beavy eTerare Jn th^Viefnamew pn-M fnr Jpjwrttnf a (lulltfcat silivMo/t fo the war a |HM(ittim In- ii> rukcn wlfl.u( nuidlf}fiv n eartl*^ Miuwt lo whU-h be atiSd lUftt tti Puri* tiM.'iitlstt.:ik wen' On. Ihlona* Tan ^BUC* Mlnh. with Tlileu ami Ky the only otlwr candlilnff wlUi WXnJfli.'ant t*rtdrur !" rted to -nter the rare, nald rwvnfly tint >K- furor* "entnclstrno" with Norfb t'ietnani hut Hm* not furor a coalition j(i>rernni<-cf witl> fte rojnftnintt. ' Kt liattjc 14 KCrnt^y Umt b^tcnr wltb Ulnli. Sln.f thr preliminary M*>rK* }n tlie f.renlrtcnllnl rpe l^nn. tjo vice prc-^ldem ha* fonjwl hlmM-lf on virtually every ponirfWe rfde <>f every IHMIP. T(efnaDwr!UF n^wnuen and politicians rrjilsin fill* errntlf iK-luiTk'r. alwurrt in Adi-rl<mn eye*. c*I<tilfl{l to ohow thi<t the rlc*- prt^ldcnt ! "f MfniH t" nejik hU mind "It reiilly dcwn'f matter what the lumen are." fine J'inniullf explained. 'Vfetmuuew don't <xrr. alxiat tluin." Ho wbile Mlnh ifts tn Mr Mnlirmi vlHa anil qnietl/ r*on<leni hl orclildx. mul Thlen mmM- **1My atxvnt ttte- <v>ntti7iiMe *lmklne lil flr * Ilnn-H and ttnnmtorlnc new 4erdo(taiet}t projtvt .. Ky (K Iilc-Ij- tn ki-eji ni;iJ,inz 'i""!-<'''" M.tfentMitf almut wfittever cnnirit Into !<! heart. <l'-*ii't The <:Jec<ioo rmi*lm. South Vietnftm'n "econd In Iti. l'n(r in oflleUlly ontl) fteptemher, bat In actuality It' we tinder wny.
irrntn rli" W*<-hlfi/lnn fia-t. Apnl II. 1MT1 I
C > tn Mo MI i* VICT At-fxiBA ITW Vrsr THRW. Yi NK* i By Vjr^rja. r. \Vll*u>ni \'lxn Mffiiln!v*r.ii<f>n I" lunru'lilnc A 'be (' fl. (f>TYfinwtt* Irirlkvt !n tin- ulTnlri* <>f VIi'ftiHiri fur f ?! jilniliilxirMtlon -lnii-nm S^.mli
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HTrt !< th.m Tli* midh* eflnf inr rf'fi*1 In ernirm an/1 fle VMr.riir lr>frMirini<itii-i>. Tlie prorrww at i*flfl<-t|nti wimld If mt-a--iiri4 liy "matlKWfltli-.il tn.^l-l" tv\ t^teiri"" <ui>l-r flu- term* '/f (lie iirf^x^cd rintm' r ( - meunlne <-)intry av*# erf|ii;r. >n* In |irlnr|flvi- li^mli-i* and i>Ian ivrrri-wl 'i> ni:ikTM In W ( :;;,t u- fidlT ouj'i l"<l f' r Kin li j r'k U<M1.- /if ilw |nw rtiiri<Iur(l^ -t liy th"
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Here la what tbo Xrj- ] inking tb4> rlrllUn research coatrartor to do under the contract jiropOMlnumbered X 00000 : Hamlet Evaloation Sjrvtnn Areas to be evaluated "are- at-carttjr, ewmy Infrantractare, Government of Vietnam (OVN) presence, edectircneioi of OVN program*. ecooomic activity and economic dereiopment . . ." Territorial Force* Meacore "Combat eAVctivene**" of Vietnam'* 500.000memiM>r territorial f.trce* and Identify "problem are** reqoirinf tbr attention of comma infers and theirflUff*. . ." - UeJjrtn* Vietnam'* potiee The United State* would derekn> an information jtu fvr t<aiam' Ministry of Interiorthe police arm wbl<*li crack* down on antl- government actlooii and perwtmel "to monitor, evaluate and improre the implementation of the People'* Rhelf-Drfenar Program . . . The Hutu of orgajilntion. manpower, wenuaaa, ammunition and tralHnc of force* in each hamlet.'' Tb Information would aim go to the t',8. UlUtarr AMt*tance Command <MACV> and the OOBD6 (Ciril OperatioM Ural Development System), both lo Vietnam. Hefngoen A T*trm deiritned to mmmiv "tb* prorr of tb* rt'ttlen>ent I>roirram" of Vietnam**** mid Camboillan ntntBt*. Attltwl*-" Poll* and *urrfj* wimlil lx> cnmlnctHd utonllilr In VlKnaw to dMi-rBlllM- Ittltack* of Die \Vtnafwiw \mtÂf. An tbe Nav/ Mid. imbr thin Iwvdlnx in <i* rirntrart (tuidf. "ModlflmrloiiA will be rwmlrid to provide more nof>IJ*tk-uiHl iw.vclKiOH'trx, iicli a* >trUtVcntii>n uuj rluMi-rtOK iif rex|Minwfi and rrufw-ralldatlon of (|Wjonn and rviônMdi Mtu" VlHmmK Infrantmcturp (Vn In wlnit KnaD<l* iikr c pr<>Krum to dorctull wtth the oontrmrerffiai Hmenlx program to eJlmiMtf th* VO infnnwruetnrp. the contract CM I In for a nynbtu u> r*-j>ort on "'J*f )o.iiii.>n, 1 ieiitlOcmtkiii and nrutrjililatlon of UMtnlMT* of UM- polkxl lulr3tru1nre--<K.' V(tl." A n*w feature -ould be <M<tI. as the npHclfl<-atlon]<V>-T.uitnit ftr : "Thin n> t<fn In (o >> rVî)tnl and in*rw to perutll tltf muk-hinf: of knon-n pMnomi to lwdeniM|> iHMtttotMi In tin- organized nbaoVrtr jtownuocnt t tarn? In a *{*iflc n4>h7alcal area. The prwnt ny*u-io onlj aciymnt* f-r VCJ wmtralized. Tti<- i new )rem will In- *da|<td t" inU-rfare wltii ttx.- N'aUonal police Criiiiluat \tl.nal rIU Vietnam Vatlonnl I'oHo- wjmld rvcpi'* ft wl<lr rungeof InfnrRprrice* frmu tbf I'nltMl fta<e*. Including "trn-'kioe nod Alsim\tittn of captured criminal*." I From tb* WuUoftM P<wt. r-b. Iff. jP7I I IXTTCM TO inr. (ÎTOBO* "IuT <'MASic mi I'iu(r is VJJTNAM" Hating r>-<vuMr worked la Vlcliumi In tin- I'.H |<ir|fl,-aij<,ri jir/Kranj. I Ilkf Ui rf>iiiuu-at on tb*> l-ttr fnitu lonorr AmUnui(1t>r }tliert W. Kouicr 11 1 rorKt-riiliuf Arltiur <'ni'iigiwt ruiiiijiu Kir-rf. %r<- i'>rtaiuly did Iwk TliU n "uliti xiri-uic n|'j>"rt" In I(M!7. f M. jjcnumjH-l oJnrJirtjt.|y did mrf IntiTTifx- on rtl> T>i tiinurH Tlilni'n vl<1arjr, loner- *ud uiddltÛ'vcl VMiiHiiiHi' >itU<-ial. >m "rl'ri> fntm l'Vc, c-toiK'tl In u w|ik> rarlrtf of balM-itiilBng U-chni'iu*1*. ax I* known by an; lVtnaiiM4w-ii|iiiikIng t'.t*. jnli-|iir wlx> tik<-*> Hi*- (rout<U- In k MrounU. Mtalf I*i-|>iirtiu-ut unVliiU t [.r-nii xwii dili"fil>. l.m rotli>-r "in/loncd wlmtlii w-rc n-<'Mur> TO jnnurc tlw fltytinu <>f il.dr Htx-nrxl. Mr Kirtuer'n <'lliu dial w<' aiv in/f iiiti-rve nine uti TMfU'o Ix-luilf lumIn lui|ilf wrmig A f-w day* before I rct.lsr| lr Vrn-fWtU-r, I w told fo M|-r!*. u I'M n|i>miu'r<^] Mirte) wlilrii. atu'i- <rflwr tliingi. wxil/J )M-||> ilt-tt rti*liuflu- j-/.|iU-' attif mlf* towanU tlw* (rwinnlltU** xriil IfwiU" In '! ii|'<>uilng VU-tnamt" |.n*llKUlnr cMiii|lgii Tin- I X iiHi/-lol nnw in dniriri' of lliin kind of nunri-) /or nil of VMiuiui told me (lia( (lw xurter'n 'lem. i.n the itrmlHeui^ ilM'l "rlill:if<-il In a lt<etilig (M'tWM n frenldenl TliM'U ami Auil'i|*M<l"r H'llll.rju f'll>> JJr Kidfter'n vunituuir Tl'n'. Ifruj^. MM- oftVinl uttUl. uer, |olgr.'"'i ! einnill/ t'. tell f'nJj|fn' Tlileu. fftr lilx "wn I l l l M M l l;f-ftt. Mluit l>u.iw < mi tit* jn'ojiU- nvt and wliU* |*lj'ir(lr.I I>|I|KW|I|OU eMiididfit*-'. ni-re rlw |ioft|lur Id ert) <if VUlmUl'* it |>rufiniY* *ml 1 ai|lrrtiiu"U <-ltp - Piu'Ii /'n Ml rlM> hltfhtirt l-ve|. futln wlrliln lfi> definition "f "ii|>|irt" ami liel.....I
144
and 1* c*iu^tflt witlt AaiUusador Honker's well-known (*,-ifoiial to President ThletL nt. Cmldent n,ti. Ilk* bit AoMrfcua counterpart, to tot "peace" and oaiy in *o far a* U*ce word* mean "complete Tietorr." Tne Tietcoantnji-rie 1 Uttered with offidaUr-epoosored slogans web as "CollUtm with the CvuHunoUta is nkidcr* <ud "Not <MM gone inch jt oar land for tit* CAmamnivta "' 8t<tjx Xhieu 1* vtterir opposed to abating any power whateTM wich UK- ConnnunitU, Uw* 1 rsitty oothlot: to he : etodated. Of Tonne, we caiuot -* Mn of wltt Mnu^ne like Oen. Minb woold. do, bat bla election to the prwVwcy " ' certalnl7 could not lenea Uie cbancut of v oecotlated political , Finally. tl^ bard to know-tor -rare what the trne dalancv of military power U to Jn'vvlitna. IVrtiapf ^lr. Krnaoj is tlht la (erilag tliat military vktorr /<>r the U.S. rn<l the BouUi VteCaaoMve Armrtf Forw 1* ju*t around Uie comer. Let u reoMTadvr, tbofifb, Uttt In late 1M7 and JapUAry 19**. It wag If r. Sotnrr to rr(i<tpHltr attnred as that tte CommanMs ,ven> lieaten nd that they uo.li>OK*r had UMC ct*bilUy of launching any ftifttiOcant asaaulta on the "pacUted" nation of Sc-oth Vietnam. Tbr-b came the faaiotu Tet Offensive." Siou! that time. I haw relied on aourtt* other than Mr, Comer for my Information on -Vietnam. I ri-.-ruuuend tua t otbfts do tlie same. 'J>. Ptci/toatio* Adritor, Vietnam.
-The CHAIRMAN. Tlte n-itt wjtuesd w tlie H>noral>le onJS.974.

OF TIKX
i: I-'vyji THK ACDIEVCX. Kxrusi' me, Senator Fulbrrffbt, I just to- inform you thai there k a joint treaty of peaw which has been tiatcd ami thnt w* c.n Jio iougpr ait ba*.-k and wait while ConcrMs <::mtintia to I* duplicitou Vith more of tlus going on. I would just like to tri vsyou tlti? The CKAIBMAN. Now listen, we are conducting,* hearing. J will h.-ivc to a>*k tit* fifliivr to HI*!IL- you U- quic-t. Arier tliis i over. I w i l l Vnift FK<IM Tilt: Anti.V'T. May I jut give you this, sir, and tha* is fim-. : The CKATRMAX. I win rm-ivc it nftcr t'.w mw.tingia oror, but we car i not n/lfrtr y')iito/ii.-i-ujiCoiiriii<ftiii^. St-nator Mondale. ITATEMOT OF KOH. WA1TEE F. XOWDALE, A UJ, fEVATOl FKOX KIVffEIOTA MONDAO. Sfr. Hiairman and dixtinguiahmi members of th* , I very nuioh aiiprwiate th op[>orturtfty to testify on F>ehalf of i in- ami-rulrtH-iit wfrji-li S-ntor H^xfi* 1 uiiri 1 introdiifMnl prohibiting T'.S. pfittii-ipation in HII ini'.iion of North Vietnam. A-; tru- rhainn.in {<uow>. S"ufor Snxlw 'was her*' and intended to fr l i f t j. F v i ' - u l i - . (nit In lio^l (u ]i".t\-i- tci make 12 o
iiL' ' i l > wi '^.!w w - ' i j l i l i- jfl n! <i(r.-! tfv !) an":'-*1!'"'1 'nKin T.'if < " i l M i : f \ N . HI- >iiiil Jic illicit >m b:a'k U-fofr;
S"ii:il"f }ffi\bH-.. fli- a.kf-il WIM. lioneivr. to |.oint oiU that hi- lias
diffTfii fritn t i n - niti' whi'-!i I u i i l ii|i|>nr1,
14.-.
'GOVERN AMEXDSOT foroBTEt) Mr. Chwrman, I vuit to emphasize at the outset thai I believe tta only wap out of the nightman, of this war is *o set a date Mid bring our'men*hvine. As one of its co-fippnsors, J strongly support the Ilatjfa}d-Mc&>vern Amendment to -rithdravr a]) Our forces from Lidochjnii by December 31. JThe |>assag of that legislation is the most lasie responsibility of tins Congress. ttaoR cnxouaetoXAL. ACTHOKIZATJOS TOR IXTACIOX f r XORTS VIETNAM But while we still hare a military presence in Indochina, it is dissolutely essential that even rtep be taken t/> prevent a wider war. Tliat is w&y Senator Saxlx and I have raised this crurJaJ question: Should the Prudent send our fur'* to carry out or support nn invasion of North Vietnam- -with all an invasion could imphwithout tlie prior .luthorization of the Congress ? 'J'hLs is not ft question of whether the President's past policies hare K^H right or wrong. WliaUn't-r one may think about the actions in Cambodit and Laos, an invasion of Vorfh Viefjiam is timply *n isBoc beyond any of the old differi-iiceti betxvecn the President and Ms cr'tica. The reason for that plain. AH of usincluding tin? President's own ailviersroust imow tha' an irvjwion of North Vietnam risks thf invuKcmenr of Communist China. And that prosjieot would carry implications, at home as wrH as aliroaJ, as <M-iou an v we have ever f.ii-nl iti luc nu<vieaftj.fe. I tiwl not: elal)onitp for this rommittee t!^ rle.ar historr<-al warning. W*.1 thouglit tiic Cliinefle. would tolerntf an invat-i'ui cf a Iwrder Stitte ÎIHFI our fnrifx ftwspft into N^rt'ii 'Hôn'a 2" ypur- apo. Tliey I\-ITP not Muffing. AVn-n l're>>i<I'ii( Kenni'dv fioiwdeml wndinc T.S. troop" intoT.nos in 1%1. tlp Chi new moved troops up to tlwir \AC*- WcW, whcn they JI-HH n'innintd. Win-it I'residi'iit .T'J<nson eyalutif] the air war again-1 North Viet-, nti 11 and moved niaw-i.-e Aineridin ground for<-i into South Vietnam ln*HtH>ii IWi nriJ JWW. ri0.fNl Chine. fr'Kifm rump into North Vietnam. 1'}\>-\ rt'jred only when we st/>jipfd die Ixmiliun:. It Sfcin" <jt ;rtt- (hat China's oovioiKâkf in North Vietnam defuic^ nil \ < > *.!rnv{^ (he proijte/-m of mi inxaMun of North Vu-fnam. Eifher1 it would IM; eiTeti\ely dffHatcrl fy North Vietnam -<T i< *onll I* - n ffi^ it-iit I v puni-hip.- to inviU- Chine**! intervention. Jn eit'u-r "ut oiiie. (inci-jta and ritks would lie enormous A dci-isiiiii to iiiiadc. (hen. i^ ntu- of (|KM- art jfn- wi n,oiiiîi{ou for tin- pint ion- *) >I'n'lowe<J liy the iirifrn-dicfnliU'- tlint tlie President > ;t:iii'if t:ikf i( al-iiif. 'I !:!( i-, of cfiiirw. x '/iiiijM-lliiig <>in.titiition:il nrirunu-nt for pri'if <![. s r'->iri.'! auihori/jiiutn for an inun-ion of Voilh Viftnam. If the N-naif uicl H'IUI- nfio;ild not take part in a dwj/ ion of ()ii r r' f'l.T*'- i- ( n t h notliiiii; l<.ft of our foreign fmlif-v ' "im-r- in
140
Yet tiie constitutional issue also reflects a basic political real it}*. A President who took such a step without prior congressional approval "on Id quite simply shatter our already fragile national unity.
PROVISIONS OK S. 74
And thai is what our bill is about. It does not exclude an invasion of North Vietnam. It does not prevent the President from defending our forces in South Vietnam. It does call upon the President to recognize the extraordinary gravity of an art ion which could widen imd prolong tliis war. And it brings him to share the great burden of decision as our nation's founders intended such burdens to be shared witli the elected representatives of tlte American |>eople. Thei* is no need here to speculate on the motives or intentions of the Administration. mKHiimjTr OF c.s. IVVM.VEMKNT ix INV\MO\ OF xoimf VIKTNAM Wliatever his reasons. the President has explicitly continued to l:oli| II(M-II tlit- jNi>iihilit\ nf C.S. iinohiMiit-nt in uii inva.-ion of North Vietnam. Ulien Senator Saxlie und I offered our amendment in late Fepruary, there wen> ruinerons OJM-U threats of invasion from tlie Saigon regime. Although those threats -and I he public concern t he\ iiroii.sed hsiie, now Hulwidi 1. we should remember tliat the ima.-ion* of ( ':uuiHtdiaand Laosc-umc in .similarly "quiet" moment?-. It has been argued that all the menacing talk alxtut an im:i.-ion of Xorth Vietnam war. only an elal*>rate bluff part of the Administration's totUiot of ambiguity. 1 would like to read to the committee portions of two letters* which suggest how periioulv fur these tactics can take us. The*e letters were written to a friend by an American officer olT the coast of North
i* dated Februar 7:
uvii (ii..y'r- iûrlnz tlx-ir xllly ma-v-ulinr. ut'Mrotlr war gtmr* tftln at our f\l-nw I wrutf >iu c HjH-nt iinml nt lunl iimutli in MIC vur Z"'if ; you will
llnfjrt' l>v flw l l i i < w i M K f'(llll|> 'lull We Jiri' tlltTH BlWill I IIUIV frl lillril'^l for
T>>lliri2 \-iii I lii*. if llict i iii II v iln ii-iixir nur nmll >lml v" ur>- :i lir"fln>r <>fti< >T >. lint Him i ttify iv iilanniiii! fr J * raid ."<O niili or MI north of tl- 1>MZ. >*iiiid* lik"ili;il niljflil (nil u lulu N'urili 'li-tiuui. iiutylw'r Well t i n - thouelit 1 .) [irp|MMtcru* wjtli t-tftftivncul trooiw let nltmt- trwn avu-. tluit '. ivfuw l KIV il aiy tt>-iilimi. Ncm-tlK.'li-iai. IU-}- ure (iInniUti|C it. mi'l 1 ( i i n ' t I'Vi-ii to IniM thf *.ho|i nnyiiiiiri- Im-num- I don't hart- a hifb [loiiclj i-li-armi"' . . So IIH I li:n.- to n-uil liookx. urilc Mtt-r, i|ti-n to eoixf iinioic. v r < ! u fi'itil nrlli
W l l l l I III' (IlilNi K i l l If t l l l - t <|i> ^ M I K - l l l I I l K III till' ^ H l t l l
'I "ii In' wrot" n j f . i i i i in \I:nvli II:

III I" V i l n l l l l.'i l i i l i o nf Mil- r./||.t. u <iri|;llX I'l till 1 lll|>'- < 'll|illllll fi-l lui|. |l ,i
\v > unit ri-tiirncil yr-'i-nliit Ourliit: (Iw linal nl.iî-i of the OJH r.ition. uc iii"V.-d
jn A i i i u n y H'- l'ln'-<l ti'luiiK jiiiiku ui unriior irh tlwir riff* >( Jii| I eiv.' <iu .ill ih, i|i-inil'' A '' iin|iiiiiy ruld IJJHIII Vlnh Alrll'-M . Jmi tuili- n if rin I'VI/, mill H i i i | > l i - '>f iijili-n inl.ind Iioii'i kfi" If llu'y CUT M-rimjMli >n . I I | M > - > | I . i n i n i l i in' ii- I. in (hi- hi-li' 1'iiii-r- rrlii-'irwil il.-illy uml n l!uxxi:ili ' r:i N-r ^ll,|.l .,\ . .y i|j Tli.it I>IM- (In- '':iuil>'-<liuii .ii"in- (il.iuil in 'l-i*- i-iin-i.'li f ' . r
III' . ' till ' K *
147
I certainly cannot confirm here the truth of these charges. Hut if they are true, the movements described in the letters are an ominous development As this committee well knows, it was such shortsighted and provocative tactics'' which may have created the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the wider war that followed that episode. We do not need another Gulf of Tonkin. The country has made it clear that it does not want a wider war. I hope this committee and other appropriate congressional committees will investigate the events alleged in these letters. The time has come to draw the line against these senseless secret maneuvers which have a way of escalating into full-sotle military opei-ationH. Surely the point is rlear liv now that an invasion of North Vietnam and behind it the siwctor of a conflict with China is not a "game" of feint and bluster. One noted authority said it very well in writing about political military strategy:
Tu make of ambiguity a prioriple of < .mluct I* to court dl.ji*Ur.
The authority is Dr. Henry CHOKE The choice the Congress faces in voting on our amendment is quite simple.
It the administration does not intend to invade North Vietnam. the ('onj.'tcss will only IN- eonhrmin<r the President's policy, :is we did in t li- pnva&i-of thef'hurr-h-CooppramendniMit.
Hut if ;ui invasion is a real prospert, the Congress has a responsibility to the country to record its lotion.
For tlie ui"ii it-tit, us I ?>aid eurlier. the iue?. raised l>y our amendment may not seem so urgent or pressing. The threats of invasion and public apprehension have disiipprurcd from the front pages. The grave pro*|icctN I have discussed may uovv seem improbable -as imnrolHilile u uri invasion of Cumbodiii seemed to u 1 jear ago. Hut if we ha/.' acted then- a.- we have a chance to art now I ' Mr-ve r4*ul<l liave prevented a wider war and further divinjon in our rount ry. I urt'e thix roriimittee (o iv|>orf our ainenkiment fa\f,raltly at the em !i<"4 [**wililt> date. In niiy event. I would hop- this <|iieutiuii comet to uii eudy vote in tin- Seimi**.
PITJ.I/- m mmr K* t-Mnit rnvi,niîov\i. \rjno\Af,

Mr. ( ''laiiiiiuri. tliert- hn been broad pulilic Hiip[x)tt for making an ini:i>ion of North Vietnam subje^ to prior rongrewional approval. Tlii- in -tiide* editorial t-"pjoi1 from tlie Wa-hinjrton I'ost, tlu- NVw V n i k '( n.ie-. t i n - St. I'unl Simdav Pioneer Pre.. the I'nnidejir-e i I.'|KM|.' l-ljnidi Journal 'lie l>es Moine-i l{ej.'i.-tfr. arid WVITB! C'nlif( ifii i.-i ;':i|M-r-. I ak |<ermi-Mon to itii-liuli- tln'M- :il (iici'uiirlii-ion of my The CH \ I K M ^ V. Without objection >'ri.i(ii \ I i . M . \ f . i . T h u n k von.
us
(The articles follows:)
(From tb Wmnlnjrton Font. Mar. 1. 1071] LAOS: THE END or THE List What arc we aupjKitfd. to make of the big talk from Saigon1* lenders about au invasion of North Vietnam? Nothing mnoii, ajiparently. If y-u accept the private rcnwiuraiice* of administration officials, the United State* is not going t invadeor even "Incurxe" with lt own trooj*. and the inrfonuance of thf Sooth Vietnam**- in Lao* no far does not argue for their trying it. even with American air ami loxlatlcal MU|ipurt. We are alo told, however, that there's LO point In relieving the enemy of all anxiety on thin count either : so that is why the Previdont p-.Ktedly loft that option wide often when the question <nie up .it hl lanf prptw conference and also why Dr. Klfurtnger. when IK- was asked about it by Bernard Kulli on tin- <'BS Morning New* the other day. would wiy no more than that "it's not Uie dominant probability at tin* tn'iinnt." In other ui>rds thin If au exercise in p-vhological warfare the theory bring that while till." invasion threat remain*. the North Vlctimiue*- cannot deploy their full r>*wnn>ti axainat the Mouth Vietnamese force* in southern Lao*. Well, it in a perfectly sound theory for a conventional war Mtuatlon and one would not want to deprive our !Je of the caiucity to engage iii feints nuil threatto kii-p the enemy off haliincp and In doubt. I'ul the furt of the matter l that thi I* not. and never Ins IHI-II. a conventional uar, eitlier in the nuuiner in wliii h it JIM Iwfii uojted. or iu the nay it Las been dealt with polilitully at home. Kroaj the very Ix-KlntiinR of our Involrenient. the ewience of the vtrategy has lM4-n f start uiall. v ;,llc talking bix: to profe to Ivf engaging in tri-tly lliniii-.l uieiinrc>. for lioiu Trout conMUuption. while holding out tin projection of n.-urlj llmltlexn meaaorp by wiiy of encouraging conciliation, or capittilirlon. |iy the enem:. Tbe Jouftwn admlnixt ration called It "graduated reyponao" and the uny II worked MH Unit the next steji alayn tM-gau ana bluff "|, the unxutnptioii tlist the lant torn of the thmuI'M-re . tlie uixt lufuxlon of Alnerlrfcn tnwiji* <ir ilii-p penetration of our Itotnl-ern in th- Vorth would d., tli<> lr:-k M'lu-n the iut turn didn't work, however, the bluff the logical m-xt turn of tin- vn-all too often lM*-aiu* tht reality. I liininteiy, ( ,-i,\ir*t: Die ,|i>liii>ori iidinlrilsl rut Ion run n'lt f ih'n^- it <-oni>! do t "^.Mdimte" our refc|M.rihe n-jthont taking unacceptnl-lc rlskf. either In term* of what tlw RuaKliinii or the Cti\iu'*f might do. or in N-rni- of a i'litiral uiiliem ji at boiue. The turniuc jxilnt. wlieii tlH' Jolinwui tratejty collajtMed <nuie early In 1O. when w? dnin't add the wxt re<|uefed lucreruelit of AnMTlcau tn>pM. and Mopped rnoMt of tii.- liriiiiiilng of tlw- North, and abandoned the w-Kn-h for the uliort cut that would bring the eneuiy to negotiate an ncceptjil.lc wttlcuieni ; tli.it i> when tlw nwitch to "Vietimujiuition" really liegau, when the progreni> withdrawal of Anvrirnn troopo Uxaiuie inevitable. We recite thli hiifort ul Koiue b'tigth In order to point up K h u t I- different unit what In the luiim- al.ont the Niton Htrategy. It in rightly < ulleil different in tiuit we are actually withdrawing our troop* und ucei-Ierating fi.e umiMfer "f rite war liurden to the Hoiith VlHnauji-*' : in thin wiix- tin war. fr n-'. K xhrinkIng. even while It pilln over Into < Hinl">dia and Ijios Hut it ix the aame in out- esM<utiaI eleiwiit. liecjiuite we un- (till <inplo>jng tli<< Hduie old thumliM-ren In M-nr h of the M'mrlt'ut- -the <iui>'k tlv. Not the least of the argument* made at the f'tue of Cambodia HUM thill thih oiild xliow the other "Idc Ui'it I'reHirtciit \ix<>i. was lougti and uiipre<ll>-iable: and th-n i-ine lji'*. out of the lilue. to ri'lii-nre tlte <'anihdlan opera 1 1 '.n An HdtnlnislrHiion that would Invade I/nox would do what wx 1 ? Invade North VieliiHtn. of ciir*e. or at leMf let tlw eu.-uij- think that it would : perhiil* thl would bring 'he North \'letiuiujeMe to their uriim-* and encourage them to negotiate We do not aay that liiumlon I- {'resident Nliou'o Intent ; we nu-rely note t h a t the progr>-wt]im from hi (T to HI t i m l l t j hHM I>>H the Hlr.ry of Vli-niMin nil along : if lv uii Inxld'OllH proix . In uliicli (lie tii'tl Hle|i. liov.es. r nt'VMIIited. !> VIT> liewrlv forced iifioti HK t 'th' f:>llnr' nf the l.-mt W lire olit M v.i-i'l hii|-l<<-ti li>iW In i-iiu*'- our ni ile I- v, i n i . i i i ^ anil I iic i hi in) 1- "ii tin- roj* - \'"1 ;i nywn;. it's nil differ/ PI imcauw now we ure getting out fiut we were toll) Unit In <>rtoi.er. I'.Xi'j, wheu the Koulli Vletiumie-u- were wliiriing and tlie < ni'iiiy'> raiiw a neier more forforn. and tic w^re lu>glnnlng to iu-her|iilp tlw w i t h d r a w n ! of nur mcii I'.ut it dl'ln'f woi. out t h a t wn.i In r*;.'I. In Note-ulier of tLut yeiir r>M-in wii" ' i i r f h r " u n und l l n > N'orlb Vletniiiriei. innu" 1 in lo i \]iln!t Hie n>'illlrit' |ililiriil '|nioi> ; In uluiowt ti'i lime (In K-il.itice ' fnr<- vilified <o the em In) Ir dl Itl't work
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out that viar in <iu,y ll**". when the first American combat unit*, l.-inded in South Vii-rnum atid we were toU not to worry: our troops were there to guard our airfield*, to free the South Vietnamese to flglit. to "buy time" for Saigon to mobilize. And ic dititi't work In Cambodia, which was supposed to l*> "de-Iir"; after Cambodia caijue Laos. So maybe It will work In Laos', although the Initial rotnrn are hardly encouraging. In any cast-. It IK not too noon to be 1. "kiiip for the next turn of rue thumbscrew, whijh In all logic would sn-em to i-e an Invasion nf North Vietnam. It may n,-wr fime tn t l m t . of <">ur-e. !>ut Unit, in .ur view. i< tin- Issue tlmt oucht to !> r"nvr-iin5 the :ir i-niic.-. of both pnrti-> in I'micn-**rather than n revival <>:' the Mcliovern-llatllcld resolution whli h f.nled lust year. Ijiter in the Trill-. when we can b>-tt<-r Juilo 1 the l,aoli:m gamble uml \\elgh tlie President's Bt-u *',iedulf of witlnlru\viil> nhidi i* title tu April. i\ill be Uiue enough [<> iirxQf "Ver i!f nxiiiK <>f touii- future <Jcuilliii>- f>r cniliut' tUc war. i'<>r u<>\\. I lie lirxt riJfr f Iiu->int.s i-unlit tu IN- lu^suc11 "f tin- Muinlul<- SuxU- rewilutiou \vliicli n-oiild f<irl)l>l uuy AwiTicnn |t>rtici]>utlc.ii of any sort In mi invasion': iin:ursiiii"iiii-x N'irtli Vii-tnaui. If 'lie udiiiiui:r:itii>ii hud m> such <lesien. II" {jn-dt hurni n'ill have lieen dune: we have, after ull. iini>--d other limit- on \\hat we an- larjiured t> d-> by way of trying tu |>eruailr the \nrth Vietuaue.e ti Kive. in. i>r eivc up <>r anuy. And ii tlie iidiulni.-tmliu actually harlxirs .mime +u<-h int'-utiDii. tiuit IN ull the mon- rea>n for I'-'Uitrcs- to build uj>ou the prece* dent of ia<f year's ("<>iM-r-<"hur(.-h auiendtucnt :ind Imi>ose yet another re>tralut. Not tinif.-int nf ilif lesons of Vietnam L that when yon are dealing with thumbthe t-uii-tatlon III \munt irreslntihle to trj i>ue more tui*t* at ever.ns r;-!.. lMv:iu*t: then- 1 alUH.VH tue h"I>e tlmt the next twist will In- the lust.
(From tU NVw Tork TlmMi. Mar D. IttTl]
Urrrrjti TO THE EDITORIr Kouiu VIETNAM IXVAM& Xourn VICTNAM

T< tlw Editor:
I'n-xld.-nr \ii)\>-n Van Thleu's repeated threats to invade North Vietnam and I'r.-MLlrm Kii-luri] Mxoirs ri-ruiuil ti- deny Aiueriuiu military involvement in "ii'-li iin iii.a-iu 'iiiiH-1 us to 11 Hk these quvtious; Is tlii-n-any reason to beliexê oi -TU;.J not ijcvte all it.M reMourcm to defeating xuch an iuvaxion? Should 'X f n i l . !- I'-'kiiiE'K iir."Ivrmrnt not inevitable? \Ve i|o int nii-d to laki- ijm.)l' exi>ll>-|t w .ruing* at face vjilue or rely n itii'-ri'reiiiiK I'-klns'i* inure auil<iicuous bUiii-ini-ntr.. WV nivil only recall <'/iinew iiit>-r\i-iiti>in lu. the Korean War ufler fw d.-iîl.-* of cuil wir u t . l foreign iuviilon and without any modern military power. Todny it 1 fu^hloniible to tjilk of ";uiuie filuii-" und "jxikcr jiluyer'n bluff" In \'A~M \Vailnnictoii thoneht I'cklnjc wax lilnflin^ ulicn it.uarui-d against our croMfidi; UP' Thirly-eiehlli I'aralb-I. Tlm-e ui -ntli* later lliou-andK of ilcml uiit<iuiii|Ml I uit.'J Stji'cs MurlneM provided trim i-ildi-nce to the contrary. time it Kijp-l.- in'HI lit- a bluff on our unit-, but >l Suii;"ii uiid VS'uHhiiôii on w l m t toil.i if jt ji culli-d'' I'reKident Kennedy <roniildered wndinj American troop* to I<aog In lflj. '..'h fopt-H mov>->I Into the two northern province* adjninin:: China'M border-, wbepllw.V llllVc r>'IJlBllleil ever Mllce VVahllitiet'itl tfot till- H'-rd UUd tliVed to (jeUl-VU
iii^t'Mnl iif tun larger war 1'ivnideut Johuvou emulated the air wur to N'orth Vietnam and mored mawire Auvrlcau xround fort* to Houtii Vietnam. In reHptow. I'hine*- unii* t-nter.'d N'ortJi Vietnam, romplete with regular uiiifonn-i an<l military omniunUaiflona which the? ktiew would IdeuUfy them to L'nlt'-d Sute* Iiitellleeuce jm the I'Jiile' LilK-ratlou A.->>-. Indudod lu I-,* 50.WW ^'hlw*- troop* tatioril In Vorth VlKnam from IflGfi to IMU wer two antiaircraft <Lvl>ton wlwMte rqrulur exchange* of fire with Atnrlcan iilrcmft drew caiHulUmi on both ildei M'Uen otir botoblnx d. tli-- inK/jm went liat'k iicrutw the border, but tU*-y can iwurn at any time i miij I'.-kluK find It ru>ce*Mry Thli in UIH "muttH'Ut of tnrUi" for any pollcr which ttvk* t/> "contain Chlni." Kltber we are wlllltjc to flfht ->r we wut A\f*"<l*lt> ournelrea completely from ituatlo/m tliut are Jkeljr to tritfer riiln' dtrff military lnolreniit Kncii i.iiuiM-iailim ! callHd for \>r an loeodjornt to th* forelcn-ald bill introduced by Heuntor Wul'-er V. Moudal**, dC) oc fund* for "an inva*k>n by f'nlted Bute* Kroutnl for<W ut North VUHnau a well n for "(.-i/ubiit air upj>ort" of any nurh
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There i no IciKtiuinj iu ax.'Miii^ war that rvsults from overcommitment. NikitH KhrtMbciit-v did just this in the Cuban uuissik- crisis without destroj iui; the credibility of Human reunion to revvlt or Invaxon in East KurojnAnd fur those who aorae an alternative court*- lies with nuclear weajiom a KM hurt. Cliinea* manjiower, one can i-nly submit th*-m to endless viewinj: of tini lie Hiroshima and Naxuîki fllnis una hope tlieir viuariou nighTmare* <>f suffering: euffice to prevent revisiting mankind with that horrible reality. [Editorial March 6.] AIAEV .S. WHITING l'rofe>*>r of 1'olitn-al Science r n i \ e r s i f j of Miehiiran Wnshingtnu. Mnrvh 4. J'.'Tl JVi torWer, aitffcor o/ "CAftw Crotici tKc Yato," icivet the State Department a Director of Fur Eott Racarch and Analyst.
iKfi.in <><< N.TI York l i i n - - . Mar. 11. I'.'TI I ' I I I N A I 'IJi i . < V\n:<>MATI<i\ . . .
Tli. r<- i prohtilily n lari.''' clnui-nl f ]>r|iiipiiiilu in hi^t uii-krinl'* liiylilv ]>nl>lii-ix<il tiisir i>f <'<>iiiiiiniiist 4'lilin-i- "fljcinls to \<>rt)i Vietnam. a> S<i-r -tar;. of Stale ItoKerx 1m H xu^<'st(>(l just us tli riii* u <lul>t a i-ou-nlcnililc >>{ hliilT iu ivci'iit Kouth VJ4-tuuiiii-.se threat * lo luvude N>>rtb Vjeituiin Bu: 11 would be daiueroiiH lo lenrr tLi waruiuK tliat lire Ix-hind tn-i-li I'loiuiH^. f Mi|>jM>rt for Huni. It i tar fruui ciinvinnnc tn nM-"-n. :i^ l'r>" : ileiii mid State I>i-|uninriil liuve iloiie. thill China hns Im rejiMJii to IM< I.IM-. i-in-d ulniiii Ili4- t-xjiuiidiiiK "Jir near ir. borders, ur I" ii-îinie rhut Hi" 1'inin'x- would not reni-t viror,ul> t" n fiirtln-r e.-u-ulatiou. Tlii1- i-ountrv'b oun H. r i - i t u i t y tri Soviet iniliur^ activities In the Caril>lt>aii urea hliunld enfud'-r ur lea--i Miinc uu<leriiuiiilin>: <>r I lie IrnlM liina situation us vieueil from 1'el.in^. 'J'lii- iii.iive Chiin-M- iiiii-i ii-iitinii in Korea in l!O<l in re-i-onM- in Gen ial M . K - A M I n i i s ;i|i|irotic )i in ilie ^:ilu I'.IInued uurniiiKs t-trikiiik'ly îniilar tn ili'ive t u a t urn emaiialiut tiMlay fro'*, Jl'Mioj ulid I'eklnK. Todny Hie AdJniiiiMrutinii':ini\eiiii-iii a /id threats in '^nithejisi Axm eaii only liutv an efTin-t din-t-tly contra rj in Mr. MxonV avowed K<ml. a* -xi>nr*-<cA Ip his State of the World Me<s.ii;e. i.f-iiii|ir.>iity^ ri-Iutionx i(li (%iiiiuiiiiiist Chiuu. Then- 1 11 n IK- little IM-IK nf riijii'n-hejiieiil with China ax k>n^ as I'ekinv lM>r..iv,.i an exjiandlnt' Aiiiericaii tli rent on tin bord*.Tn An e-M.-Dtiiil Ornt xieji toKurd lfUt<>\iliK thiK ohxtucle would he O firm diturwil by \\'u*lni\gt',n i,f in >i intinltim tn iniuili tin t'liim *i li'inli r n1ut< ii( \'>rtli \vtnuni, i,r tt> ijn'i niilil<iry nupiiort tij lUi'li tin inrti*i<m till tin fiovtH ll'rntu lln< \\IIIinnr \\Vi C.Qirnl Dully Trlliuur, Fl: 'i". Ji'Tl ' \\ AI: J'ifiHoxti. Ill (lie in -UK ri'luinijs of this i.i|e nf The Tril'iuii- is (lie item thin Mondale of UinneMiLu 'ins iutrduci-d u hill in tin- (' S. Senate tn |. iv.liil.it Amen'mi rr<-e>< from |iarli' i|nitiiiK in or Mjj'CortiiiK ui'f imat-loii of North Vietnuiu W i t h o u t enli^ressinliul HUlhorl/Utloll Tile ariiUlljel'f .-, he fUCK ( i KUsllliU I l l U t J'11'jx...il lire wlf evident, 'illexk eveii the i nUtresK Is U'ilit; fed U)> w i t h tile i"' alat|..l| nf l!i- ttlir -htll|-t.'d W i t h OUT forces ill Soljth Vit-Ulillu. tln-II |illltlcl|iulloli III i'alnl>"iliti. then I.iins jir^l no A Mltt'e.-lloiil. Ihul we extend it K t i l l further. And ill the lime lie. re and luore of our ho> K ufi- \H-ln% killed Her f l u i c iilnl ilie
.M'eklt t l . l l ,||KI> ri illU M l l i l l e > . n l a l i > fnr JM-JII I Jlid Ihnsi \ v j i n luiVC enlllr ill t!le ;olK'Ii)-lori that OUT
A.ir "n r there |i><s I j n l e nr in> jM^tiliculinn. u i l l u|>).lainl t.nr Senator for his I M I I U ^ I ' . I J . i i > l i n f i Thin one fnlli.uj- iinolhiT <jw]iir;iiii>n li.t u lieiulilioriuc MJIte .s. !..['. .r \lr l l > i ; > , t e r u v. ho ie,. n t l i MI id - llu-ie should In- u viift pull out by "i.r " ' " i i i i i > frmn t i n s "b.irlinrie jiml li.liunuin w u r . " T]ie -senator ills/, i-liurc'-'l tl.ai Ilie NiXon inliiiinihlraliou Iirfs In-en deiieiviiis: the Auii-ricuu j<eo(>le bnu'
I I I . l l i l u i l l o l l i if Jjlox
In the iiieuUlllue lleUiocratl' 1 Jw.li'') UjH l>cr ill the Ki-liutf tire ill iiiiuidllltf ;l M ! l l i i K i.'ilili c.t 'Oiii- f-.r the w i f h i l n i w a l of nil ( S J-nn-> In Iijijn-( 'liinii i 'i.nt' fo1" ihe Hilliclru n ,il mill l>> tin i ml "f I lie t his >enr \!l the . .(e|i~ lire lii-iiic liiki-ii to trj iirul oritii; t h i r Irani' u i n l nidi v. .r iiM'l >nr inl.Tirctl'.n in ii in an ml I. ut the ;ij it Innk- flu a.lui
,-.e > l | i i t . . i ( .'lelllioll u K l i :i|.J.|llUM' hill* 111 I udllcilj ill till- MillllCMrtU I/i-tfi
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lion if going tight ahead and involving ns more and more. The credibility gap Is vi-r wiiler aud on*- continues to contend that our people art; not being told tbe trulli of wliv wt> are there in tbe tint i-bu-eaiid there looms Uie big almighty doilar lik.- lu mort wars. So tin- \\<- pi** on and youth pays tbe price w.ith their lives and Uie public !>! iii- pritv in huge debt* ujion their lack*. Ju*<t like our good frieud Claude * fiMin \\ritlng in the Fairmont Sentinel xaid the other day "Hlftorj i>r/int.< out tl.at warn make no dense and nothing la gained that IK of lasting value." And ;o lliul "ii" might mid l>e<-auw U-liiml all uar tin-re is H-IU'MJIR-*.-* r material iiivtivutiottv
1 H-oni tbr St J'nul i Minn I Siimln) llinwr l'r<-*f. l'<-lt. JS J'.iTJ ) MoND.Mi. UlIJ- ON lX\AM".\ XjJ Im l'AFO>.ti.K
I'reMileiii Nixnti talk.s nf *fkiug "H generation .f jn-aiv." I>nt wore and iure iii- Itni'M iun:i uar policies point lu theojij>o.iiedin-<lioii. JH.-I :i-- I.di>n J'ilinion Ix-fun- liiiu. Xixou s<-<-ui>. reuctiiiiK fr iiiilitjiry kiilijiiuu''.i'ii of Xdrtli Vietnam inxtoxl "f 11 ni'icotialetl (uilitji-.'.l settlcit>'ijt. Tliero ii iv widv-l'ri-uJ fettra tliat an invasion of Xt.rtli Vietnam I'J the South \ ietimiuew .innv uuil Ihe L'.S. Air Konvi8Uud-rc-iiiiHidfrutJuu. Sm Ii un ndfetilare. ulniid- tlire:itee<l IM Initli rn-.-iik-nt Thiru and Vjre i'nîd. lit Ky. would iiimn-diali'ly nii^- tbe (irolniliility f lirincinz ^'biua into rlM- :ir I" ]>rotTt HiinoLKus.-ia alô luis cuiuultuieiiis to Xurtb Vietnaui uliU-h mttjirt U? dirt^-jairded. S4-nalor Waiter Muudale of MitifieMiUi mill J" other N-uatufs. iJeUKM-rut- :i!id n<-|>ul>liruii. have intriHlijciHl a I. ill to jirobibit Aiuerii-Jin funi-K from taking I'urt in or *iij>jK>rti>iK an> Invasion of Xorth Vietnam "without jirior aiid eX]i!idt coiicrcwfloiini authorization." Co-KitonHorini: the Mil i>. H moderate Hej.uMi. ;m. Sfii. Williain Saxbe of Ohio, who heretofore 1ms huj>iA>rti-d AdmiJiixtration polideJ. Moiidale Maid : "The I'reoicitnt IIUM jiul us on nUce tliat he intenda to kefp our uieu in tin- wvr lu(l<-linitel\ . and thai they will fly uiid die all over Indochin.i. itK-IiicUuic Nortla VicUuiDi. 1'ln- 1'reKidi-ut is widening thin war rather tliuii eudinx it. Without tbe Cooper-Church amendment we might well bare American tcrouud troo[M in Laos and Cauil>odla toduy. Coagtetm should uovr declare iUtelf tlriuly aKuiturt un iuvuelon of North Vietnam." rrecideflt Nixon aaJd in bin State of the World mexaage that "tlw- old diplracacj of inijiottlng peace by tlie fiat of great \>V,IT* does not work." Hut his nKTertiiut'iy itelligerent slatejiM-nl* and thrcutu ugaiuxt Xorth Vietnam are a direct contrailiction. \\ ItereB* earlier in hie AdutlniKtratlon be uid peace mnrt com* from political negotiations und wttktiMoit. . be now viwalu of wiliUiry rictorieH to force aucejrtuiK-e i { Aiiwriran u-riun. whicli now wnu to include prefenâtJon of tbe Thleo-Ky regime jiltn "friend ly KovermuenU" in Cambodia and jierhai* Lac*. While American infantry dea(l tia<v l-<-n held duwu to UKKIIHCC juiMi'- M-iitiiiicnt Ht lunar, va* nuiutiern <>f oirilian Lu Omhodla and IvaM bare tarn uhj.it.-d i<> American bombing. It lit e*Uuiate<5 Uiat more than * million Cambodian Iiit,aiitM bare bewuie war refagee in Uie [mat nine mouth*. Village* are wiped 'ill. [.r"*nirinl>ly "to have lliem " 'I'lii- AincrjcxD jTe-enre in ludin-hiiui haw brought d*"itli. dewtnu-tion, dlw/iiw and i unlxlimeiit for AKion \H*>\>\VX wlw> lived aafeiy Ix-fore. i'u'itie opinion all oter (! world ha turned uguliiht Aiwrim bf-aiiMOf Kl|l-|| n*VltM.
< Viiifrri-Ks hhould IwroHw I(K cffortx to fonv reulirjilion in the White Houw th;it Auwrl'-nnH want an etui to thin tfhawtly InvolFei/M-nf in Aiu. Tlw Coo[>ri'1'iiri'li wiMiTidiiierit |>rolnil>ly k<-;>* I' S Itifwritrj' out of CuiiilcHliu iiiul IJIOM TinH' bill mid |reveut an invjiwoji (it Xorf'j VMnmu unrl u powiil>b* t ion with China or UuHfia or both It f huuld l- iied.
I Priu 'In- I'rnrld* n<v lit I J Jiujruiil. Mnr X J K 7 I I AMU IIHt KJIOVT
Arinfl oiouutlng cougrtwuloual criUcixui of fldminlntration fK.llcy in SouthCH'.I AI-IJJ. Ken. Walter K. Moudale of Minuevirfa IUIH i;ilr/>diji<Hd H I'ill thut Hnld |.n icnr Aiiierlrnti fofvK from [mrtldjitJnf )/i or M(jp]">rfl"g an Invafl'ifi of XorMi Vietiiniii wltlioiif "prior a<i'l |dl' i lf" n u t 1 ,-'/jitIoii from tlu- Cmign'MH. f. \,.!i.|iini; cinnjiuiautMV'ii have ruiwyj fi>ur m- M tin- uili'xj that mi.-h x <-/Mi*l<lenif|iin cod that, wbwu ttu* ('.K. itithdrawal ba
IM-V:: i >M- i n* jiftittVufiitu I'/.r cMi.Tuhi; tl- war intA <\Mih>-.><'i;i eiu'-Xjt^. vr to lcitiic'.i'. l ^ > r4x;r:itii-iuii< > ]!ciruiv>ili;i^{b*-X'nrtli. .. . V li- i. -i i.r.t diiy.-vS-Airh Viff.fi-jaa'.i iiri^fiMil-NcnyisuVajj TLicU UK- V.vJi <{v*t.l i t" !li- i-fti-cl that It is "Uly a :mitt'Tj>f Unit- tn'iV'; tin. \\-ur !? "i rnitt4 i r^' tto iTui jc.r.iil-:! Aii'l nhii" lw <&iuu= i)- \v*^ iiiisqii'iU>. \\v .'iui>Ci^liu lyiuaiiii *M ih- laimJ.i iff Ajiifftan* as u lOicifuri van-lit J Vi;v_.Tnviili'l _ .V^nvc.-ijAU-j K?s oarlior sjilu'r rattling. '. J'fHidi-sit Nixon t>tatt1 nt a r<viit .irtvi oonffrcmv rit ni 'las'.-n^.^ T' S. forivs In ^^r*>-<i:;tl ura-.if:i. hut tin- imyMMSit; .f r.S.'alr ^ u .Sr-ntli v;-rniaci's.- Invnsiô \Cis nvi rulil oui nii'Us fcr wpjil. AiiKTicaiis Imx* 1 actfipti-d the I'reatdeat'a :i M->)m-l iiir-M; nl r ni-lm-vlit i: C.S M-rviii-im-n i'r->iu ' I n - tn-l- 1 a> !! S< âiiiitl Ma-ngili < .R^ûjm- full ri:>i"n.-il>illty t'r tnUltary . ri-.ii-tii>n ! tlit- 4'iiiiili>HliHU iiK-'iMlMji aba IT-J when ttt- j>romii.<l witluJrawal )i!:<i-c HC<-' inline i< *-l(wlnIi-. 'J'lu-rc -.va.-v iiniv uuU-ry viivn tin- Suir>'-: .tr*i>-< i-r-'-M-d ii:tn Iar. wiUi I." s iiji -'>:r. Aâiii. \:i'tttnii;</^tii'ii was jiifotai md Hi- c.MiiH-r-Churi-h Ani-)Kliu?M had iurt IM.--U violated. " . N'iiw frara ar>' growlnic Cllat .M-il'a^k-. in Lu"s und f'iuit>;>iJJ.i li;j.v !fa>l 10 <'l'iiinc y-f an->tti.-i' fnnit, liii<. ion- suBS"'tive,i'f such Tii^ M"iidct- [.ro[Hf.s:il accurately r<-Jwt* Uw public's mo<xJ as nearly as one i v uit k'uflt'.- ><ucli in;iiiKlWcs It MI-I.H ti> r"*Jr-i'C' ilw p-iy:<-r< -"J" CujisriL-s xvingv military d.-pl-iynn-iit is invm\i-il. t" nnp-'M* r'-s)raint.-> on couniiainli-rt-ln^'hlff wjj-i litu-f ri'-t"1'! nt tiiiu-s ft> tlnioyl) {,"iHRr>s WfT<- a n<>u-fun<-iiojijij;; aiiiH'JidatCe to tlic Said Si :iut-r >J.....l.i!<- in iutr'nlu -me In-, liill. "If tii.- I'.S. );> . bw-iuvolvi-J in any way ;u a>i rnva"'ii of X'>rtli Vii-iiunn- u I ;tj;lty ui'ii .iinl iuunt okiiiinUN Jiiiu-iisiiiii tn .Mir :ilg!itnuiri- in I.idiu-liiiiii lln-'i It '-sn oii'f !> dmn- u-iUi <'^|>Ui.it i-oiiirp-vsi,,rml uuilinrisuitioii Tliii !< n m>-i> ijuoMimi jC uiiisultutiun l>eti'rtji tin- Kxriiitlvv and fontfri s - -it i- a quc^tjou "f iiiustitmimml li-citinmry A. fr|. (if Hint Anility mnnut IK- tak<- in <'r <jjKTa'y willmijt tJu- atiUi>oittc' t rtf tbe AiuiTlc.,u jieojilc and tliolrelwled rif;irfcxentativi-<." ri'iniK ar>- i-ntiUnl t" a s*ura <.' Unit Mieir win. as fXj-:vs$l **. w i!I nut )f iKiioniiJ. . . . ,_ (From tb Df SToinw (Iowi Blstr. 31ar. *, ii< Ixx;ic Kt-iTeUrr of Ptate WiHlaiu I'. UW^K, !u tbf uaiue of tite Kb. '13 A'lmiiJftWtJon. IIBN urged (.'-oiKfrt-w not to ciuid u dati on us- uf L"aJU>ii han aut'i'HiZcd ri'i.û.tftd nJr r.'ild? ("prott*Uv- reaction"') Into North Vivttuun He ban mid i>iibU:]? tbat TUe "nudwHtsndinK" of Uf folmwii AdiulniHtraUou tiy wuiirli Auwriuft tttycpc"! Ixjtn'ffOK North Vietnam In off. a IK! tiwf 'lui-re * uo iVHtnUiits wuut*?v*r ouvw." Hvcr*-tAry Eogcr* WJIH jM-jiklux Iswr wrA" at & clci-fl 4w*fiiiy: of the Houw Foreign "Attaint OjioiuittAc. In Lbe H*-u*, Hxrn i *. r<îut*on ifltrrxSvcp^ 1>S S-atr Walter F Mmidjilc flviu.. Vliiiu. > uiid .viial'ir WiHix.u. K. Hxl Oblr/) which would bun r.S xrouiid foreign uu/1 Hdvjnt-ni fjom K>7rfl:~Vt< .l and al.-H Aui^ricunaid f'iraii Iura><'irm >iy h^m^biKly tlirf'. Hi - Tel a ry Unccrh did not want to r&kf (Kiniiimi on HIP Itiii |>u!fUi')y. fot . a/ ri-vii'lne antl-u-ar )duitjo;i. fl mild tlutt tjjc> AdaiiuijtiuVlîi baiuv) intuition (if lavajjj.tqf Nortb Vi-Kunia. Hut owî-'iK a lô' IB b; < u:nrr wbcewttrily cflrrUw * blot that Uw> AdmiuiKtratjon mixht rigb-to IIIVM<^- w Mut>f>ort au iuvuuJc/n, or kt Usat l*i> (li* tbrHat of Jajiuf xo ov.vr tlw twd /.^ Vort;i Virtrmin. S"ii;!i VV:nai.'i'~ |r">lil'.rit 'ii-S v)c'.-jir<-niijj Imrfr'UtC); litv*! rtikinif tib>>ut A n, I'rtvldît N'Jion RiM Mar- < rliat R*Hiib-- VifXjjun; "Jw*- to y" in ^ ; if i|<î rjv-. laWUf Xorin VMnum ti* t'o'il'* i WK? ' MIOIJ wl^^l Umt Uuu orl"i. ii<l bam "! U^-:i*ttni , Uu> Jd'x;u,lna tv.yr iw oti* war. Jt
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r to Sootfc Vlh*in Itsett i*d In l^cT<ndTOflite>dta-rA fl*^, (f. For lep b>H>" Vy ^he^dtrt lSt* tuu Laot-dwuitetwl fer n* itf tfuui^nlHee, tod tte -%fer haw Cittcrwl wajr like a
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Tit- *lU*d Sttlkt Isttc, CtadxtJlla, PitMeut Nirow add,-"!* a dectol^ mtrre, -Q* tbi<' aetloflîtoo {Mate tt> ony <m wanjlnt rt*r it It etraUtes while we An n<v. rt*-p^j- ep.""
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MotiUi I'irOwinV rrtnidniO: Ttilcu ;to a poai&te of Jwdi: Vletowa tmi4 "i>rMnpC PnetJdeot H to ThWu -ltakt <Tm paipy*Uja>r/ nt fl>* powt, pai ot lîmcti. cti tu. wifl
. . ot ibe war t* }cxtwMt"(m (be aroiUMI of protecting TTH .roepc Tn* n!/ ^*olt aantt tbrtr lc*fcr ^ttrtwe ia rwJofWn* frtuf^r from pt^tociiag
cajumt yiwj>ort 'H^cfb Vlrtawn wooid u*akv or dlflutroun. a w<nr* aj Vortb. Viettna n ifij ^raiJotU*H*. IWltîc U;'âlt?i both to Itrtottay^ to Cg^rtwi., ' -/. : , A.srro in Coafrts* arer tli*-poiiiwtlkf of tboâtaisdm t^ lt -4 Jlombcr of to nyoiiA^r ic^wIatlvB , w^Vdi irîld fort>!4 U0 "- "". -"' ~- f a >>U1 tv.bni use 'of T? air or ffroontf p^wrr U a~S*atU ve >wa urprtil ^f-torfc." rtTcrriaf to ;-)?. UoaUt nUoo- N'lvxp lias i*ot rofed oot '
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; lit (.'til: ot T a ôjo^ îf.iiiitip*' Ictroalott-ciC fi*,isortJj:-''>jJd'Ti to -fl^Mic till? \ wnl aeJfcc Lear 4ailJ*rt l' it* ; fci
. i:--uftjtl *{tC tt" driw j/Jjum for an AJB*fictn-<n.iwrtl JuratUw uf a
* cordinated i "S'r TUf ybua \fKMOMHtsy,>-<>nM t*l> *or *siwisiv?vAjierieiU.air siiMtort. ,jpriftifii*-S':Yt\aHl ot^r AiB*rfis>w <*kwlb have i*>im*ll>" ivfiwfvl ^ riij* euf ?
ir?kll frat It â* /'tocl.'wr wf-fetiier *-=tiant TUleu Is ensagw.1 in_ simtlur
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,.~ Mr. 'itv.îi i*r & .<Jlj>J'>ttwUc m>J"K-m;\fiii f< ' . Jjtli-r-Coiunait N . .-i .*--.. . OJupvj?t trv>j|i<t .Wi>uM Iwnait lo a.id XiJrtt* Vietiiiiia if it v.vre invadt-d, acivcâ^"^ .. .. ~j ; N >: 1 -, - . j'^WCLVrt^jMuy'âncUvn-iptftAur..^)^ , - - . ^ A" \"-,' '"^ --^t,! Ci. xv ^ - ' -M<>tl!.j-^jaMA- \vii-rt- twid N> liAVe i)fl-n.n>.'HV?'-^1r'-^r''tt<\Ia>'f)" ^"'.d.K-sJar. -^ ^ ft .^ ""," . ."Pt*^l<t<*(7t^fliivci'.t/tld J^K!.iI t*"a*L''r?i )tX?ilH Oiufrir iîirKli)0^ *ty i*r H'l^tKli t^"** ^ ^ ^ . ^, \' ' Jl ImirrU ,ti.iftl|_ v . . iv Oajj' ^ fJUittx^* J/f^ljyd/^tl'^Cftrvlî-^VtTIlJi*?!*! lltiWM^ûirV
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*IUI^ "li\ "Ij'V ,Vlt '^'Mc^llv* tH'.'Miw.^'Ju-siTinf- vPni i *!.nt nff. 'i'\'>yi v\i-ls, *iui |Vit'>^r.|o.)(v"
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*;':''Jrj,'_<# ^Jjl>iv^lV'- |v,t^ U"-,rrtj^ 'it f'l* llt.vJ'i^ - " t/ T -'"'' J fV*f;tT^*f-fi v..iM^î T >int "*)M-^*- ;^r< - * P U I I \ >4 r 'Htl^ ^ -_ Tfi ^^'-('f i;; ^-i) (fi;-^'-ftiij f -J t^'..2Ccr(ii TK*' 'S*J*Jj*l . ii*t'*f~!i-r'. v " -,_v.t,' '.,r-,l\ I, ,, , v.^; .--^.'Tl.-f^.iil'rSid I I . l'|""-il<-> ' ' 0 " i''"~ ''
LAOS: WHAT >"ntox l.t?P.Ti>. ApriL 1970,- A Senior Research AaMcUte of MTT, -wlierc be is -writing a Jbook cm tiio -
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is tfpwlal AElsniiattoUiaii>:UJitS*scr*Uiry ...._, rity Affairs. fcuA from SeptJiho.r. 1W5 to June. 1J4C7. be in tiu- 3LH-j*rtin.eiit of State ia^'uliuiDi. tic la4 six uiuutbb HK Special
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_ * tfae r-'. Vicv 4'rui4it Ky j><to;wl to" what.L-opM V* tlie nt- Sontb VJ-jtaauwaie ^ KTOfliKt.-><a-veK,"li^:hi<l, mi'iilil JiEVe ttt cro UielTtli i<aralW into XwUt VJetoaia. -, - H4V"r Nnin>l.^ lujw?* aborc.-J.^ l)MZ_Xc uns wi year* fciwce Son-.ii VU-Ic<im>
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ioflMU "tie Tffrtb. K>'a vianjinj:, >iocidius with the Jj.os.; iliiktd ib juKt; iTesect,' *nd fulurt o 'a fnadunwitallv tinof
l>rdis of X Krig.fr -tmÔiiT-elMnjiiry . li>7Ir *; US^mbtra and Iwlifor tte cst lini^ accompaiiyinji Kkwtli' Viânj-Mf or"citaid llê rg- -jcu, I^c. JtuerfeBnr^Ûrd t<><}-Otf nation ^ war." Hejidkrf: Tu tl ofluary;>"tor* rtxwt-
'"' " " . t)* c-rtritmrj-- * all can seewe 1m v^ wideuftd It SVljf? Wt^ and afii? Tiicr<- is. -jj truth, a arli<Ti! iiiv-r^loxin t>tn; iôliVy _ &U^-V.<-TK to lhw' <ju-MJ -u- J< j.s a j.^k- that hay p9ia)i-d for at least liiV' Uivat-ioii of Chiii- -and Iffj-otKJL ycrs-.inw fr "folJ i.f (I'll--- jid the ri* of
^ n.- ia-H !>i-U<ui. x!i</rtly liercflflcr, -ln3vw-.'i:-J.-> w.t flht. a-UwJ nar )a Ania with CK trp-urrf 'uu.riit! tro..n.- <-ifhrr. T>irif C'fNWii'*. (d.jrtius *!<b Truiii:inr uiurmsr .< ^J-.Urf/ Jxvsji LvulniJU< ilonijK *'n-lr trfiits an-1 JOSM-J tiw cliullcjjgt- ,,n to Huff 1 Xjion VK.m tcu.u.4 tr,-m wn'u^H to ii'iIJi Kulyun tJirouglTlili. fic.r.
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fr>-- ^li v. ill, tiiit in Jf.^ if ) v\ j iv 011 ilc- I' 6 ' JJ-i'.tft .TI. rrmkfclki. lie in. rJ'.'rinifcuc'l aot tci'u'-vt- lu kuffor-iV-uiii, It lu
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Tleataai jmmmoflrius away his snpr-orters <n the convention or from ' railing to his votrs-in the election. ("Whether the fears Chared hr \i\on Jn4 W ir*acp'or" of a threat from the rleht)kre hased r,n political reality. or on a p.ictT of Uwir'-rywn making. 1 not the issu* h*-rt. \Vbat matter* is that four of the In* five PrcsMcrntR hare felt coiapellMl to tske nv.ch a "threat seriontiy : v and Nixon ntill doe*.) . . , . . X* donht there lire ther and perhaps oven rtrftn?t-t Tn<i:lveR that inflncnr* Mr. -Nixon** choicer. hut rher point In the same direction. Thwe.1? rood evidence that t}''~P*'e=*;^nt K orn more than Ws predecessor-?. a "tnie l*eH<Tcr" In the cold wnrtttvini.-.".- *hey U chared. Inrludtnr that of the Importance of maintaining rs power In 'A.*'-'-*, showlnc nvrencth to the KnIc.ns nni ruineae. o<ntainlnp <-omrnnnImimonolithic or not-Hind voiding tlie r-rert>aring dan^jre <if -a rs fnllnre or htinrfllatlot). Witch of tliew- intinrt!< ! tht* rrous>r niorN-rs litlV- <n *h:< f-n^- *r r)-ev rHJnfnrc*1 ea<-1i otlwr In Vlo^najn p"Ho": Stie-jmnut not "fsli** ntcire nil. tio< tfMi wv>n or too <wldnlr. Thoi- -who FtrT'sir.t1 nflifrwi-i!'. who Mipposp that ?Ti.xnTi' views .on donieHo pf>Htl<^ oonfllfl' *"lth II'R .rotl^.t* if T",>. int<>r>-<;t t>r<1. r.n4-thst hln instlnots for politicall Arrival hu-xorablr urcre him toywird t'->t: withdrawal "nnninUer whft."nr*a'mf <.t nr"1.7 wr"ncr. TKirlnr 15R Hfnrr Klislnpr fiwiOfntlv ald la prit< tnlfc': tliflt. MM vprrri*!*" V\ of rj! pnllT fa* "dvnnt hitprvsl" tw-o to tUrt^ TI>AT* J^-w*>Ofl tlie.wKhdniiral "f U.P. troops and a C">tninonl<--T *aVw>vor in Vi^tr.j>jn. Tn tbut r-f*r. n sim o mod^t hil nlnK>f a m.l^-sl rine: no major pnlilti* fiznr*- in --fart, rtaw^l npenly to fndor^c it. Rut In Iftftfl. w!i^n Klslnzfr moved to thf \Vhite H<rc:j. W nHon took r.n a -Khn*>r nx^nlnc and m-w jsrcenoj*. it lîiiine not t .jconf jujf <t re<]Tiirement : sr;il the "Jnterral." it txvsme evident. eotiC ili>t./-i>d h>fre Vnwmher. W72. In it new. t/>tijrtipr form, the doctrine hart pra<1i<-l ImpHrsitlonn f.->r p<rlirT well hovont! 1!>72 In HTv*t. jt nv>tit a<-tinc immfdiatelT did orer th* *teitt iKrfTTil rer to'arhlve lintJi NII Inrt.'flnitc fl5itlne stalwnate in Vietnam and -nippoTt for ourh a utah-mate In thtt r.S. And that aim had imnJiwfltloin* for the yirAspwtx of renewed eoni^t-|on nf -the nir wr in Tn4'Hhina . To l>e*in vlth It was evident in Paris t>r "'<*. *I>r\t\e of i:2) *hat Hanoi and .he VT,F s(Wi/1 Ti'vt jK-rept icnn that would mfet Hi" Admini'.-rMtion'x need' for j"nrln)r r.Ôownmi1-'-' pontrol in Saie-mlhronjrli at least lft"2 t*'1'' 'fl'O'ild the R=Min lnt<Tfene to >u;hievA thl. ft Viron had hftjwrd. So tli* war had to ft. on. Totjii VieiTismlMtJon'9 f.S 'milttarr adrlxern held out no hope whatever that ftê-'.tr "fmld IK- i;^W witti *n.T awnranoe for <-*irri-.tr^. or eivn one jre^r. If o T* S mUttJirr iK-romiel remftlpl in &aorb VMnam Vo i'orepeah!' ImprnreIn ARW. or unwjnt of T'J? a'rt. inplndlnr diri wnrtK>rt. wonld pmi> up in tin- fnee of V"rth ViHnaniPw>.fcr.i e If all nj iroîw went t' fs troopH jnd alri^wnr ITTP n>fle<i. in siynMf am''ui:U. f'>r .
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Tn <'ft. tlirnn?h 1!*?f und ; f;tr n N known t><1ar. t1;<- liis!ii"-'t nilDf.jrr -3rv hrfe T!'-v"," <!lrtc<-.I nfflftnllv Mint tin- ji>li nf Imlillnx S&iC'1" < "iilil fuil.>n^. -i'li n-minnaMi* iiF-'iitHI'-'- Sli'J with ndi-nuatr- :ifi-tv f-.r r-inalnij,y TS tr<x.ii. itli f.îrrr than 2OO.O(n' milit.irv r'r-i'Mwl 1 tl'- minJry (> j<r.w;d(- rfjr ~ii|>iirf i L 'iti"i i'imniuuic:itii.ri< ltif rt l>irenr--. f-'lf-ili'f.-ii*- find "triti-xi iv^-n'". Ti.at f. ViTn i>r'liaI>K '|>lnk. mid -vit>i r^n-rfin I- irifliitcrl hii; tlii.-rr.i n- 1ia.it* tu tlio JoluJ <"liief fff Staff will ii-rtifv >m "ni ; litnr:lr af'r'tal>!c'" ant the lK'rn'anirtit minimntn r^y well turn -oil to he not mnrli iovror than JOO.Drtfl fw ihf <>nd <>t iVrîind nff-r H i" ni'r- lifci-lv < |rr.>x-trli.ii)i-r r iifni It r<-rtnlnlv nr4 Iw.le^t; tli^n t>;(f t h u t ,lur*-. lutiif aft-r H+7J U'i<|i flu""uii!tijir> Cwlt ^"'''"'v- Iw-twftî SO and 1W.Oft tro-^c. the <-i-illiis It. nitt-V fi'ii rerjr, miwb hli-'ht-r MU'* srrnt.-ffyv i.ttffjrc Tilf million I'H i r wux~f^ th P'ii:3i. ' jlw jrogl IIP dnflinxl in hl flivl w. -1; I.u frfU'-i- : he left tin- WMfr- ilotiw h\v tst-r gîin-d nf mjtrir tlitri^'4, lnr) w* of Jipinir tJifit< | f --loVnt. to \ i-o V>-r >jit pl|rr-'<"li wn: /iivi/invfr, onli- a iii". -. ; It ".iivfrt Piiit ' <*t fti \VliIt< TTon1"' AB woir'd Pflfonf !< T:<.;.l !ioli. Vixn ilrf*' !."imii"'dl*r~ *(.*> : T'S tn<>[< li-n-l* nnd inn>.t t' dunti. ntnl rnwitirtli'R. <1raft ^1I. .inil Tu-wf !* iniNt go down i-r^-n m/.rc -iLirpIr In fH' - t <-ti-jj !Vn.rt(K( triuiSH -<1]I fvili-e nil rntinr H T.flJ lis'i U' V i i - t r m m Hi t'lf on-i-t />f tlw Imfnliine- -rr.i^d he rti-d-ji f H.t)Ii t/i Mi*. i.nMd* or. tx'lfer, wv-n- n-r\ lnw iri'I"fd anl neww<irt}i>- V'irth It) Tnd'K'hlfta fllnifutt nnw-ttêTiT M "K"r/-n(i if>lu'l^>n." :. nffiriiilv. l.i'/'ii> to <!! il - ia"':iiiie i-Jp-^r: t-i nnjk'- f.id- Jiiua *n<r for an Ul'l* fl.nlt prf
InV
rs troopft or more .In South Vk-tnam. The .ey to a solution, Nlxc* and Kissinger concluded. WM to expand the. role of airpower, and hi particular, to restore awl increase tb* threat of bombing the North. Uow eJo. they reasoned, could Nixon ever compel successful negotiations? Bow could lie induce the Russians u use their leverage for a settlement. unless the Jftu*ians wen made to fear in Laos, aay, or in Haiphongthat they wovld become more diraeOy involved? How els* could Nixon deter ihe North Vietnamese forces, once they recovered from the 1SWS losses, from making embarrassing gain* at will in Lao?: or worse, from conilajc south to oven>ower ABVN : or wont of all, attacking the reduced US units, eltKr destroying them or forcing them bone? "Vitflamizition." If confined to the borders of South Vietnam and with the threat of escalation excluded, ha-". no persuasive Ioug-*uB answer to these thrvats.Thai, In te minds erf some in Washington, in view of tae unpromising prospects in Paris, was an argument for total, prompt US extrication from Vietnam. To Nixon and Kissinger, it meant instead that a credible bombing threat was esseuruil tu tlK-)r program. Tlif ])iPT tbey decided on was in many wy a fiuoiltar one, espedetUr for Be{>ub!iin-f. Jt* main ingn^'enxs were pntlselj taoce ppeacrihed twenty years *ff> by U*> "AsLi-flrsf riît-winx BepofaUcans in CoosresB Cor prevotinr the tail of China" and. later, by IfaeArtfcw and others, for winning "victory" to. tfot.eu Lbe tltreat and, if woMMarr, use of OS strategic airpower and allied "A^n troops under a CS-approved, authoritarian, and anti-cominnist rejtim*, flaaiiceJ >ind equipped by the I'S and ming American adristm and toeUttaal snd air Hoffpo^ (Vice President Nixon bad been willing to add Mtne US froond coenhut troops to that yttckuiif to MT North Vtetoam in 1994. before the fall of Dlenl'ienpliH. b*t UUs wag ctnwidered an afaerratSon^t Cue tlnte.) . If cot- adds tlte threat of sndear *pooa threat wed prirateir- Klxoa beJ/",-a. Jjj- Eisenhower to settle loo Korean War. and later nsed pvblielj by I>uUe to iiifluence the First Indochina Warone ha all the element* g L^nlW^'i doctrine of "nusvtre retaliatkm" and the "New Ixtok" detefwe po9f4ire of the Eiseunowor AxImlnistratloB. TWs was tbe policy ti*t enabled Il*-I>!tt>lk-ans tn comMne KfciTreRsive rlietroic with a limited def>Tne budget tlirotuUj'Mit ttt -y w n-ben Nixon was Vice President As an academic strategist during tUat jnerloii. Ueory Kisscr^cr dasttnted from this formula mainly by K'r(^-ir^: flip rob? of "fAi-tica!" iicclear weapons { in the book. y*wr irapow iU Foreign Foliey. whicti made hie rôtattoo). Bnt In Nixon's Administration, the threat -of noclesr w**iiij* in Indochina is notan yet. at leastan essential purt of tbe ktrniegr of Kiînger and Nixon {exrept. as nsnal, to deter Chinese intr-vw^B)ttwath they bare pointedly refused explicitly to foreclose their ne. Tip** uew *r,'tT*T dlfiVrt from the old matoijr in rriyiug o tiw strategic threat of. oun-bucWir tiwaliiur. But lirm- c<mW Wr->n in<J KIsenw beliere. afwr tbe exjterit-noe of the fflrtiei. that UittMtx uf oiafluire bontWwi ôold soJre tbir prMems in Indodiiiu ? Wbat scHiW new tbieat promise now. when *li*- practice of sustained tx-roWae noder JobuMrfi Iritd fa fact failed lo detrr or jihydcalif to prerenteven tbe T*tonVuirt Xucon'* a&n'er wa that the UenWrnts bad morod too cradnnllf and too pw<)H<abV. nod 1>a<J flêr tttreateoed or used Jwwr f*o*gk bomt>log. Tbis is wliat tiif Joint Chixf* Jjl IJMI MyinK all along. Ihongti Nixu had no neM to take Inittrisecloc) from thvta- He wim tutiag a langage he shares with the generals -he txpiuined after ihe-Oxnilx>dlan inrawiofl that, wbereas Jobnaon bad Tills A<rf>u iw a d*vUe sorrr^ ju><1 this action also pot the *<uy ou srsrnlug mt if It totfaUb* whiie we are tryiiig to deescnljitc, we will tuore dcirt>I; and What Jr. *'*t O)*> ti"Wening. ** he had done hefw* tti*- *5*rtt</fi. wan "d*cl^lvjf" uii'inf >< terjwv nlong proii'Mied br soow* l'% military fiw-fn wi flielr j*"!KiI i*>A<-w^k: fjUIpM>ng. 'mjlitary trrHK" in H Uir(.iiiflK,ut rid- Korth, tie d'L^. 'tlw- ininttnl<airt<i* wltfa
.|J'ICI,..L /"' *mt!i.l i i f l u n M-.i- ^ f'Tu: .inJ fl"!|i"rtn. VU-fimui : O]-t!'jn." K- ^ /-/, 1in<*. i>fr\.. 1ti>' jirr.A li>>. >yMlT full"1 tu takff -'.Vk'l *r NlK.M-1-nrp rxniirHli>>- "ICiriiU-" i>ir<c> fj Wljltr HbaiW fll'mT" t<4 I Si l"l'*J OU, riiirii; x^ '"rtftof f44-jititilbo t'X S ' i \ o n . ot to *Ki>lorp U^ vlr of fht-M* IKO uuHlîîi. I. </ vh-.i..~ u-fifil tmlli .)(!, (r(>n n n r l VJion In Irl^tilk uMi'ifrr |<<iiOfUkii>* Amtenr *!'! 'i>i>fi> i.'n r. Hftl^H.-Hit tnrltf i- r<-<1 i>r!l M>|.|inr.l>r TKJW, u* n-ôlam to --ii.l:.T Jit it
t>> T> O*H io4 Morton R Bntrxno. ""ntr T1-tW Can EiM^t* XUos.~
US
Second, ATron hf-Hoved the threat would In- nevly credible and effective became ht would demonstrate to Hanoi that it could be carried out withont destroyJot bi own political base or ability to govern the T'S. John-on had loxt ttis-. in Niroi/s riew, because be had combined inadequate air attacks wist -,;recpf-s,tv r..-ji!)f rs of ground troops, I'S caMialties, and draft calls. Once those numbers wore diuiinlKbed, Nixon believed. the America"*. public and its repivsenta lives in Congress would acwjn *," it wmi-ijeraianent acd geographically extended war. finan*d by America but witn direct Amc-rican coiahat action limited primarily to a!ri>ower. This discussion aweu a /reat deal to U>e Jiir.kin:: of these former colleacues, Halierm In particilnr though they are in no T7ay responsible for any of the Interpretations prex-uN-d her*-as It dues to a number of others with comparable govprmiipntal expcrii-in * who canmrt be mimfd. 'ill*- \ca- a !x>]d judgim-nt to m:ik> in 1WK1. Y(^t tho North Vi--tuamp-:e had to Io forod to accept thi judgment if Nixon's threat of bombbi; wore to rt-ter tin-in from fliall-m:iiijc a iri'tr;icUtl AJIKTICUII pre M-a<v. nr brinj; tln-m. ]ilin:::t<-ly, to acf^pv his tenns for a "just j>ca<v " < *rilv- cunvincitiK <t<Tn>in3trattfms ol lii* willln^nosx &nd ability locsi-ala'f omnj brins; that ubout. The notion of "warninK depî&^trjtl'/us" aai- thus IHH-?J <-oatra! to tl)p 'acti's of Niz<>n and EJU<sI:.pHr. and Jt i-vji!aln l'e w^m-ni-H of (H>Iiiii'al ibn-at<> and offt-n-i%c m-tlttos Ux-y hfltet-iK^n over flie lai-'t iwn yi-ar.-. .\:- <-arly as *he spring of Il*jl>. our Drri air utts'-U .> <';i-v odiaoot orticially u>j<>univ<l and little noi:e*-d in tho rK-TrWor*' MUUI f<>Ui>a-i-i. f>y a ".mrnias to liauoi which wan inserted in an r'tln-rwise iuudntlr î^-e'i liy Xiron < < Vi-rnam wtilt-ini-nt. At tb+- Mjue tiiiH* tb*- booibin^ t- Xiwridt*! in J-iox. and a s<-rie> of bouihinj; raid* \tf~K.i . <<>< .V'-rth Vietnam. AM tht-4- raid-. 'nntltiH'M. AdruinKl ration offl'-jalg gradually di>uiantlfd JolirHon"i JftfiK "';ii'It>r--turvdinc" which had ftrictly limited tJte jiis'ifioition for euch raldn Fin^^.v, IB Ju'x t-levisl iutt-rvic-w wiUs liif pr*-s on .l:muary !. 1071. Die I'reMoVfot .irt-uliy abandonfil lhl "under-tjindiiic"* l'ti- pi^gnd invl'm t <"anil-'Hlia tDfuf pia- e 1:1 îfrinfr. m7<.: iii the fall. tT"oj8 Iaudî iii Vortli Vie'nam; now we an? suiijK>rtin^ an invasion t-t IJIOK. In each fuse thp U'hite H"iiwp has mnveyed unnu-<Wiil')w wjiriiiiipt to Hanoi that more mire ari ion was to come. .Mi "f tbe-j- M<tl<iQ>> j-ould 1*. nd were, u^l'-nded n (Hv-tjr-. necei.Karv to ik-lny i-iji iin builil-upx IT -jw<jl" cjiejoj i>ff'-u-ivc<i. lnd'f<t, -.ill nf itienj jnay k>fji tii::ic /lujei'-r in Soutii Viotiiuni. ir t tin- *li"rt ru r i J'hey make <'ffi-Njp<. i-tiitc ilitfi'iilt bii^-nwTij fur tin- VortJi V!c{i:i:ne-.e. tlwtx delaying a liew off^-n1 . until Hnnol <iiui- ^'niii fa11"-? tin' jrn~f :i|i:ibl'< r.'iil Ti> U n i t e rhe ijife'.Karj -acrifi'-Hv Tln-\ ijn. in -in-rr. Imj tinw. wiih I S jurimwer Mul thiiM.md of Ashm Jivx-j< Tin- uin>"wer. -.|HM-in;ij } latixi, UM- of jinued liuliciiptfrs. >iii-.'!itute- fi-t ( S rr'ji. Tlic fi-w r AiinTnvsn *riH>i.i. in Vi*-tnum. ih<-jiiru ii'*<l for t"S airjH^wei* cliniuziiool jirJ..fi.:Tia, if rs "J.iv.s-iy .ire to do < tit :mrt ih-- \or(li Vietname- jirt'\nted from nf . .i,r- Tbj> rii''.v <rm be .rjiiiKeiiged (,s t.->--1i--:il zrotimLo ai welt, /ly i-xi>:iiid> iiu- rr.i. ,ir, the I'S .-..iu'j;iji;l<'r- an- biiiltiplyin^ il;<-ir vl-tu and <iimiiiiiting ilie:i-vc'v*~ tu proiRiriiil w:rr in tliri-c ccu/i'rn^. f"i niily liDiidsl tain* In IJK., for lULjuiipIf. {'< lirt.<-iiptT Jii--^-> aii'l Si-'.tfi Vi.-liJauwa 4 'n'tinltn-ii rimy tun; nut t'/ (.. f-btili!.' A rljrliT rt'iiii .ii|i-in:iy C >!!> -(.MI iiiti-rvi-nt)""*- n veîns: Hie iinl-r 'if i-n-iifv iii f'runlti(rti:i j t l ' 'niiL|')e\ n-in-rvu -ion-, ("fiily iiielinliiis xn tin r:i.-i,j Chnii'-M' "rini-at pr-'-j'in <. lii''l. v n!<l ..'Uioin.'!111"! 'ly i-tti-t- I'S niflear .u^tii.^n -s |i!:iii. ). I- (irj---<i'"j| f'.r *-,.ri-nl. i::(ir->i ff> tjie Secri-liirr '>f I>--f.T,-j-. if iK.f r.i t'u I'ri'-i'li'ti' Arj<! i.'.v- Tv.rfl< \' < n uiu-- 1 -!' >i;iY <-o[^ ,i| ( .-. K ; li'-!ibilif> . :ic in ^ uni.'nr:-. t-i ri-("irI t.-i cij^r iiimv.: ', iln linr-let r<-ir; In i-.nluri"fii liicir /<ii'rii"f ^J-i'^'.'li.-ri'
I'.-It ii v 'III' M'MIe IJ..I1M- p t i l t l t n r- -I'l- it..!'. iJH-Liif 111 l - H ' i . . i . irCll'lllit Te-llljr i u : i t ' . - f - Ttv r|..M. .(!< ri--!.--. iti t l i e i r in-w.. x- ti'.t u'ri-nt "it- ~. ' vi-n i-i t i n - <! / i r ' " i : i . i > t j ' ' - t Af'i-r ijti Jl'!!"t;>n!:ir iM-i'ii-iiJri/. ( ij : ^ <'iM-i-a:i'.n in ^ ' : i r : i l n l i " -linwi-rt * , \ i ..i. - - '! - f i j i - ' . i n iJi if r>i.' w-.ir < it. J..> r. <Vi'-~<J in vi-.iliil!fy w l i i l e i'vp;nnjiiijf .-, ..,! j i , , . ,!!j. -o ] . , : , - .,i, TS ^.-..riT.-l u n i t - .-i,-.. i.ot n.. uir,-,!
, r" r i f l t ' 'In^-ilr M p!.iti't< rt'lltt (Tv '.MT N o r t h V S I I M I M v l t h t r i ' p ' j n l * . .'' hj!.'/' ..'li"Uli ill T).' .Tu 1 '. - ) . ^ ' T l l 111 T ..... .'I ti ! i!.-JlU.rt ! > ' ' f I'M r, v 11 .. |. r.t -i. I n .- M I I I I I >if .; I i -;. t l i ' i t "if Hi. i . i Iti f" 'f fin I ' l u l i T . f n l i . M l i r .>-. II i...| '.ii.l.-r. >l .Mi'ii ihi i' ..... C.'TI- iCi,( l i . i ' i ' ":i u "
l.'lft
In fact. Uctical suocew 1? J'vt what these Initiatives are all about. Tiii-ir real liîiflfann.-, in every <3use. is that they are concrete vjm>nj7 to the Hanoi Ie*d-rs<liii>, and to their Soviet and Chinese alliesviolent warnings to back np. vorl'jil tureaW. 3'!* warn, flrst, of what Nixon i* willing to do and feel free to do without cM:iMiUii!j; CUBXTPW <>r leeling limited by Johnson's precedent Each one of the u<eii Mires liictvd .al>ove broke a restraint malnr-iined or eventually imposi-d by J-jndou Julinvon in Us campaign to bring ".pressure.* on Ilanm." There were, ificr all. -Jime goud realms for observing thoxe limitations, and many of those reason* an- till plausible. Niron'fe actions thus serve all the wore forcefully as d- liiwrute sirnals to bin opponents that be vrll) not be bound by earlier constraints. Hi- actions demonstrate, furthvr'uore. how far Nixon thinks he <,an g<> by <in2 liu- rationale of "protiytinc the Jives / American troops" and the formula -of "liiuiJi-d-durHtion micrdiclioii oj-rations. to ix-rruit continuation of the withdrawal of I" S. forces." Ttese term'sHanoi is meant to noticecould be imed ju-t .1- \\ell for tn>- "liinitiil" cp-umi inia.sin "f North Vietnam to <Ji-troy Je]H>t> uu<l !;!. alxne tt-e IM/i Iliat tins JM-I-H ini'iitit.ni-] by (Jrueral K>. Tin- -jnn|jii^'n:i^- n.uld ! US<H| to j^^t^fy ]) mining arid aerinl d'-stru<-ion of t i n jiori "f H:iii>lum^-: or full-*<-jl' attack* m: tin- land au>l w.tT Jinks to {'liina and frti "military xarjcet^' through-iut rlie N'orî in- VjilisK HanL All of rlii?>-e could l>e deM:ribed as"!imiitliri tiui-an<l -qia"-!'" in fU'-t.-each oin- of UI-M. io7.\-HS <-nuld IK- |.ft'^>iil.-il a-. :i l->î'"-l I>r"j;:-e>-.|oii jri a -<-ri4's irf "jnti-rdi'-ti-jn.'-" niiiiiins from south to north. jnt a; the preM-ut atuii-k'^ in fis "loî.-ally" fullmved the lo>in^ of the jH>rt in SiImii'ukviHi- by tin- l."ii Xl 2"\i.rnujerit aiil tlie imii-in f ''umbixlin I-û-h step <'ouM IKexplained i. "diTiiiE" a rfiiiuininc door In the '-hanriel f war uuiterifl t. North Vn tii:niiie:iiii] XI.K fnp-i's in S.utii A ietliulu T>- i- -jn-. nnii.- t,f ti.ii- -t.-p^ nniM r'li.itiiy .-IMM- off tii.it ueeeârjr tri-kl^ !' -ui-plii-. fruii. tlie Vorfh. -vi-n if they w-re all (jUi'ii t-.î-ilxT JJut S"i\ori h:ix IM-.-II Tolil :!u^.; 12:1 ii lh:il i- not w h a t .fli thri-at<-:i.-jl inoii- juv *!. T!iey point. r.-ijJ.i-r. tojiiiril tin- i-ncnim that tii- J'.S. Jornf Ch>'fit f Staff have urfed o/. rjf..^/ ( ;-/ </'//</, in tjp'_- absence of a peruiaueiit Atwi ar-<-ej>tab!c" settlement 1'. l l . n r - i : the lm;il ili-vtrti'-ti'-u of "(f><- wIU -m-J -a;>abilny of XinU Vietiuiui to H u p - w a r "or to Mirvni-. N'ir rh:it Xixnn IIOJM-R or iMt;>.'(-ls thi-< ultimate es.-alation will ! npoe-sary; !ns tlin-it" and oiniiiiTiDtiiiK m^k<* it i-outinîqit <> Xortli \'i > tiiuijie<- b<-liat]or Hi<:;"i'- l<-.nlcr-ij'|. ]. I.')'' io option* fur a\onlinz tiii- i>uiiiviiui<'iit It '-.'ilj Lie i'!( bui iM-rrîMu-iith.ifii-pt tliinj:--pr.'tty luiji Ii as tlicj iire in the Snulii. wjMj"in i.'iuiMiin^ IH M J\,.' ''oTnbat. or w i t h no jii-iri- t l u n can !* b'lijitilj' i-i,ntx'.iied by Snu.'li Vn'tnamcM- cround forces with I'.S air support The J^HT uould continue Irui i i i i l i t u r v acfin would IJIJ^T ff anil (' S (:i>>iiiM~' J e< wouU \irtually ciii-*-. or i-l-.. U>H-ii.K to the conclusion 'hat th- American jieople rill Kni>port a lowJi-n-i m- > i r i > ' > u i r u ; i r ind<'iiin(,-i\. an<| Hut lli- AMI'-Ij.-in |'r>'niiient will lucet wtiv .I'li-mpt l< u\Tt it t '.i lunii-<i-t *ur ty Imruiui Virtti Vu-tuatu li t(iv around, the- ILumi leader*- Ji *< k. to loudutle a format -cif)cinnt ou I'S.
I.TU:. .
r.s orti.vts.clio.j. f cjll T(,e nr.-t po--ibi!!ty a "Kon-Hn wlatloB*'Slujnjb'Jt iiiii^.W'si,': I-TUIUIH-U; nar ;iii_'l i nnunciir I , jnropi.raii.in> li:ius<'it i oini>nii\ra "jM-rtuneni I S pifwrn e if Ii KTJ l"'-\ I .s "H~ualti' i s Tin- M-I oiu] [IT.-.;. i n i i t k . l i n lj ( I t i i i n \ i \ o u v .jiui i,; Hjtmiri;.' a jti^f ]'.i--e." would ui-ir' t r u l y le .1 K'T-:tn sululioii ' -|.i-. . a l i \ in \i-'\\ ol N..in s rum |i-ij. ti I h . i t -j-ttlfiiii'iit in
K !'! V- l.U-d "II t l i > l l l l i ' . l ' '! I . I I J s . l M |...]L,l,|li^s j . l l l l l If I iMli-r p o - - . l l . l l l f >
PCIM.I! \ii"ii f o i l e i i j lur-'-^ i i i a < he liai.i Ji"s-tj a "i(i win" >-trat<-gy. >.. I'lu.V pn-M npii'iii. |iijll>. i Kirneil uround t'i v .\"ixofc\ J-^d- Not-.m;> ^li<l i i i e ' . o ; t riiti pioiii.-rn of loui-rin^ IS i:i>uu!ties durini; a ^wlnal and litnltt'ti r<ju< lion ,if .-irnîii--ili^ ptol-Ii ju T' 'vtlin^ ilii'.u^li "7^" i n v i t e a broudcuuc "' ih" lijtrr-^ruumi P ;fjclud'. the bnrd-r lia- and suppl> routco irj J>ioh tuiil ( ' j i i i i " " i i a . " 1 in inori"1 iinjioriiint. the i-nulii\i>'Ui of MJI-II *idci,iiiK111* i|i,ii,,-. 'i. , v., -in;: ..f f i i . n i n T - in dili.ni' >( ili/ui->-' pr./lc>.t and < o i i t r j r > ei;JH-Î i MU- - . ^ j s l,|,:.|i|i!> ~ l l l l ' i j to luai.lti^ i-relJiSli- NIXOII'K 'Tl|i (at TllP'Mt : to ' ii'l I t u - l.)lUl< Tii1l1ilJ 1" i>ll (I STi5 Vii-ili:til! t'rUj tUe lUnlUftlt IJlUt .-I|I.IV"'K'- oijKii'i- iifiiri'd tin ij. if U.'IK aliii.ist iiji'i liable t h a t the J M i i l i for u ,M| K'ir. :i" w o i i l i i bad ) ' . l'n-K>ilcnt to iiisiiiute a k-naot nd u tl.ird ' \ 11 'i. . i n " io u irn DM N o i i b l,c i oijlij i renTe a Ion r l l i
In LJI. ;'ne Administration Is giiitwin:; that It Una luurueil Its "lesson*, from Cajnl-niia " No American ride units in action. crowd r.C border* >r "Iiontiiur while cirt'it-se ntudcnts. No promlict, no bulletin*. no newa at Ml, in feet. Xo statement on ts> <!-TMflon by the President. distend. n the afternoon of the day the helicopter* aint *"ifncs moved acrow the border. Nixon wentj>*forr tU* TV cameras \vlth )>rj, { nK^wp,- n eixJopr. beginning tnccordUy; 'to jhe Whit* lion** pr**.H rv>fOt') : lu Ins Tragedy. UurAtr in the raUftdrvl. t S. Elliot. [*fc] wrote. \3e*n it* Ir. (Van tiit sky. Wakh the winL" lnVJ I lu\v j.ropontnl to the ConyreM a iroep.'u^ and comprehensive prorrnra p> do J'wt Muit, uud more to ml the plnuder at America'* natural heritage. Vu TV or newn photo* of Tin? invaxlon wrre permitted : nittrnmen wpn> barrrd ffi-u riiwliiiR what we aid onr nllles were doinc to the nutnral horlf tn >.t "-CJi.-ir at-t^SiM. (The Vletaamew were struck, a A'fic York Tiatrn ccon:it r* porti-d. hy.ll 1 Iiwhu'y* <>r U> yet uod^fiJIatiil jntislo tfc*y \vi-rr entt^nn?. > lQU-nd vlrivrc wvre offered plrtarvst of the tuoon and i tho '<JiKinc nrt-rtr ^t Kfn- Sanh: ian tmranny juxtaiwuitlon. the w^r-croatedroooD!cap-nonr the U.!^.T'<iui!i n'<tlne fr thn t< the in-'filr -if rjo? War is n.itf 111-1: in tiir nre drrelim soldiers r A:.iTlran SnNilt^r.K : .vet rliey ar- no " t> tiny niîf-t nf-att flw-M- In R ni"f anil terrible way. An In "u.nl>olia. tli>- llr.t n re in relatively nni">i>..[citiHl arf."-: and as In <*niliodla. the North r fiTt3 will ujt)>t llfcplv UtUr hni-k in mre heavily ;w>pul.itrrt loivlanrls t')li-*. jv.tii-rv ur tMttulwnt and annl lieluinpter!! will MH>k tliw -'. 1'JiVft. tin' ri-inc'* wUrcil'u*- -many of them from areasi wlwrv r!a.-r lmi> iiv.-d f<i- :''.ir.i lli the vicinity of f*3tli-t Ijio or JCi>r!h V|etnmn< w< ;ivip' -'O fhVTf(\tM. i-ii-'o'.nre m_ the out.klr(. of foxvns that uiv n<>t U-lnir Li/mhod, "'.'arlns rheir "We have It-arnrd one thine in Ijin* anil CamlxxJin." the rAiinnfl f-r Ui" nitly Snlw-oiuDiiricc |iints >iit. 'The nier-- iin-stew" of enemy forces <[<> L.,, ( ref"Sees BWITX- botrlex fl": TS ImmMuk" does." At) an essential jmr( .of Nixon'.. "wiEilinc down the war"* for Am.Timn irooj* In South Virtnani. Aroori'în jiilotM were vnl ti. Intlii-t ilu- :ir niif.i> )i--iuii\ i,r> fjjos nnd Cniubo<lia. In the f:ill of lf*".!>. nmre Hum tf(Ni sorties a dny WTt>'-.:iK Jlown over Ijios: fume of the heaviest hiontlit of boniblnz In the tvur ifnirp-d lu that year, and 4caln in 1I7>. Tin- nr.iN>r of w.xn-* in I.T'.M had already rinen <bnly In UBS. af'er American lictnl>er< wen1 Mhlfitil in l.tfMarch from -SVrti' Vlclnuniev In rat-In to arras l'i liotli R-nThern mitl .i'tlipr;i But In fh<* rtrt twelve month* of h' Nixon Administration, the number ft low OIIKUIIK n: leaxl 240.INN) ilu |wi|"ilflU.m t uiwier thi-ce million-. In the UTMt elKh'evn moiHl.n th*n- were at le.-i-t .".0/>m civitl/in <-.tMi3 l lli'j.. iii'-hnlin; n'Of" Mian !>.(V>0 killed. The number of n-ftigi-o roiiTirmeil In TIM- In 1!7: by the fall It wan aJnuMt thre time* the estimate for February, I'.'OK.' Tlit-:: in Novfi::!n-rof |:it yt-nr. t'S h'11-ilfinê.walnteil >h.irjd> in IJIOH. Whatever Uie Imimrt of reccut e\-entn on tin- tlieht oi1 \mt\i\i- within L-"'". It Is lik>-ly tum to be iniimlOed by the cff((.. of ojienitloiiK ttimilnr to th-i- in Cambodia. Wi're vrll nri'f n^milli'in rffuirecH havi- bi->>ti "p-iiT:itfd" ituri'ii: the In-f uin>* motitli* 'In a j>['iil:iti"ii of nlxmt i; 7 million*. Tli.Tr i n<> nv..;.:il.Ii. etIncite of theniimlM-r of elvillnn ilfatbo in C.iifitMxli:i y'tir-e l:i- K'>rinu'<< lir. .i-i-.n. HOW n-.any will die In FJKK-? What In Ulcbard Nixon'u brut rsilniiii." of the ;niinl>er of r.iotian p.-'i-I.' "f-ni-tny" and "non-enemy" tbul L'S flr'-pow, will kill in tin- next nv.-ivi.//< ilnri tint k*iw ait nttmntr. HP him nol acker] Hi-nr~ K.- '-r for o^."1. .ind Klv-wngi-r lino not ~ki the I'entacori-: mid noni- "f t i . i ^ t nlfi--f;k'' .. -n-r m-Ti nn iini*-i'r. in thin or imy 'iinit':ir:ilile IJMI- : on the i'\\*'<-\i-<\ liii|.:n-r ... war i-il:'-y '>n hnm.nn life. And nom- of ilieui /?,.if,x I', i h l n from lii^ |ir|i ...wor(S\ti-rii- n!i:ilynfs In flu- biireniirr.ii-y nuike t->t><nu!f< :i lx-t llwy '-:in of fri'-Jo;-* Jnd^tfl i*Ttlii'nf to (mllcy: "coi-t.." or "\u-tti-ttia." "inimfii" r >r "nitptit" 'f'lidiMt'is of "iion^'oiulnitniir |'ople" hnvi- rn-ver b''ri r'K'ir'lfiI by/tfliclnlH ii" !-vi;2 ri'lt-t.iri t" iitiy of t'.i->j-- I'nti-icorii'i' )
- [-, i'1-iin'li n.i iS-ii" r.-iini!" li> ltif>'rii;.t>" rruM'fn* ri.t.M" fl wlfli living***
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161
wopW: tejrvcr. have an atuwrr of some iwrt It other imttn of the it ttto"pr-i( or tlw public ban ever demanded one. Wet* It not tor th* Kfnnfd,\<3bcnt4c.,ttre? there would b* no over-all official culmlattoM of ?<nr (MHU.ilties \\t Vietnamwit even the uuderratiranted lent** that have been u;iil" uvallablr. Bnt a* rf.<Olt'J>f tbat qumttrnlng and flu- xabcommittiv'ti own Mirvt'.v* 11 nd analyses. we nou- -inotc that at leant 3110,000 rivillnn have luxvtt killed in South Vietnamuiottiv t<y Vs "rvpoflror- U-rwwi liNU ami 1970. nut of lit'- 1-3 ft oae million casuultiHt.' Cf the*:. the mibeominitttt's calculation* tmlfftt- tiiai about 50.000 civilian!* worc^ killed In Nixon's rtntt year in onVe v-.lx>i;t .Vi.OOC ID the drat half jffils neeontl. and more than that In tin? accond link. So rite war I* not "winding: down" for the people of South Vietnam any more tban fur Uivir i>KgWâo: a 'would b apparent to tb* Anivricau public if such tlcitrt-s. -rt--.' fld.stird or>.\ttte ovviilng TV n-w.i alone uitli I'S and "onouiy" the K^nixilv Siil>>i>(iiiuiMii> h:i mailc no i-fTort (> mli''iliit iltuThs nmi injiirii-H from Amrrt-ii' Ik.inMiiK In Ni>rfli Virtnnin : r to ollfil i-.4tlin;i( of fu t u r- t i.-Mms tlir.'iii;!i.it]t liit!iHiiiiii. Nor iin\i* (lit* IID-OM utul ti'li-vi.ilnn. Xor has ili--r iMi*n iiny ]iul>lic tlc-iiiiiiiil for this in(riiuiiin. Ir IH ajîin.vT tlii-i bjiokuniunil <>f tw.> <li-.inl.--i u f Aiu'-rinin .tl'n-ial nn-l i ul>lif Isiivriin.v nlH>ut~;iU'l iiulilT.Tcnv to mr im|m-t ujmti tli junipU? tit hidoi-hlnn tli.-.'-'>r,>- r.itist imilfryt.-iiiit il.>-fn.c u l t h whlrli tin* Ni\n Ailniiiiistmtion luif >ld iln- I'li.caji- "Thf war is ri-ndiiis Jt-wn." T nuivv witli that |>n>|.?(iiioiv- mid It i- v,.ir.-.-|j .|\i.^ti..|i<il -i-i in > fiur (! war" iiurniwl.v UK "uliat Ls trendinj; d-wi. "^(i.Su Kr>Mitul irii'-i. I'.S. n>ualtu-s. binJo-t oin. It l >in>i'ly ti> litnorc ih<->i.i-iiîv "f l l u - vir h:>t nri- "Irrtullui: ;": t.' S. iiir <ip>Tiill(int niirt Kniund lis'i:!;.s .^Rt-'.'i,'^!y>iitli Victnniu. Wul liir n-illHnt l-nlh -ind M-TWlti". jr.-JN.-.I. Tim; iir rjcTi-aiicl <':milHlla l(:it it ruiuiot rt-allr lx- Ntin'>-d |wr. <-|.iiii is .sl:u;>ly H hulluciiuôry trirk |>Iuy.il l>> Uic Ni\.>n Atliuliii.iLrutinii \ti t|..- jinlili.- Auu-i-^'aiK liiH<- lw.i>!i !tfn Hit- Iuil<M-liUia wnr this \\-y t' S military utll.iT* hn- riii-tiiui< |M-[IT at |-rii-ivinj: thiiit^ U'lir!}'. "AVftr [x killwi.' IN.|I|...~ a J'y.VXr ;liy*l<'l-t wan one* Innt rlMwJ by. Orm-ral furtl-xix-Ufty. , t-crv"' hiiii-v'n "ii-rntpl*: 4iiu|iltuVrs." "\Vli-ii you kill i-iH>uch |w<>p{H. the oUirr rtiU '-in;. " IS t! fh- in-w AiliulniKtn-.lioii i.-, al>nnd'>tiinx tlx* ITfVlinH i.Tn.a- Htratecy of jrr."i:,i! rniuii.it "utrriiinii." w i t h lf.< Mixvlv -minded i-al<iil>i* f "luidy onuntfl** and !.:rii<. iii.rflcU >( flu- l i r t l i mfi- of yoiirir vin-iny inn !>" tn U- UllUil in the ftiti.r. M..-t i>r th>- vi.-tiin- that tin- iu-w vrruii-ey kilN :i. :i n-.tUlt of ik<l>-iii->ii-.tr:iliii.-" I JIM.- mi [>luii' .11 buri'uU> rntic i-ali-ubtioiij.. l*lu- nauie is <>t il.- i.i-.t UUUI!NT> t N'<irtli Vi-Hi:iim-sc jM-.pIi- \\h..rr - liiti"Ti." Tin- pliin.- I"r .iir wur tli-.-iuiu'il by <>i-ii>-nil I*-.\lay uiay I|H-II ! . ii"rn 'I nut liy l- N'lxrt' Ailniiiii-tnilion .!-. [!! ,\l-"|'. v> n<>- n.lliluli linliiit; tin- "<tx>\ coiirnî1" of tin- I'lV-uicH' i>> IJ1" li;i-l (,...!, ili.-triliiiti-i! widely b) tin* \Vhito Ililf. \\r4ito M-v.Tal iluyx after v the I .-I-- mvini. ( ii "\* ,,( ii". Ki'-luii'l M. Nix. 'ii 1* l>rj:ii.iiiiic tn :i|>iar a.-i nm uf nr iwtfi-r x\ur ["<iileiit> " Tn- iii*iti- i u,- wnr ro*ldent elmm- t rerall to the /\tu>r. -jin pnopU* tliat llonj.iv aftfriii "' 'tif invaxi'in di>M n<it Imve to d w,ih nir jio^-Uou, or wiUi ;,iii 'nliiinrv iloiUciiieiir It -| -iik- '( iiiiinlcr It i>4 n .-lii.rns uf h.tr -<>r rh;iiill :i< inurder I1- In-itu' ilone. It. full view, at tin? \vlnlie* of a mlf r. fur reniWii* of itate. I'lmr tin- nr'. cli-im the tt.ti! trtnk the iciiv' ! take itone Jrum lime a..1* tenth th,-m. Tl" lunit if fvul. thr irttrr it foul, fiur lif.xti ant* oitrtrtrrt drfllrf leltli lilnoit.
.1 mil' 'if tilnnil h'ln lilinilfrt tnfl <!' ' , .
H'nr littir fan [ rrt r f r l t n n. In Ikf ntft fuli't irtifrti*? \.ijlit nt'ni with u*. tiny tun. htilil *rn*nn. lit tbi: d'ty mil C'imi; It-t I If tyring
nut f. il", . ('< t nxi',. iii/ijlrt til thr iln'i miri ilt r-i>ifli>.'>n IHtngi. unit ff
ttirm nil nmnurd
.1 !!. lil',i,il, IhniU'ili n i-urtnln 'if lnll.nij lil'ntilf I' ii;,l mil irith nnnlHing to hnp/it-n. . . . in ftfi ft.t 'i it n^t tiiw lit *jrii ' 1i>nrj. " / ' . ' ' / . - Ih'H it'int i,f li'- (hi- 11 ii-.t t,t t i i r f . l \H"-!H! i-tiTiiitji nfi ril iiml tfrf,fiy. . . . '} ti.-<j. !iu..< ;ire .ilnit iifilx-..rjilil>. for nn \n\?rlmn to n-.Tl, Jn fho rear 1071. i'f>T (. <ii||. r ve'ir-i If we iin- ever to rMflirn tn tl> fttl <|lllet wMj4ni( and Wf
^li AtlltTic.inK III'lHt l-xjli (ut O{rtif)D*,
. i\r*& atl ceo*. to KV wluMs l*lo< Ucn-iA tSwiruauw. uuu to to Us accuM'Hc-w. Tl^y must n^'tnir*-. and forctifbojC^firv-ji* and Frtr<tclit t& uct uijo, tb moral ^vtopositiwn tint Clti- L'S iiiuiu J<H.;ijlUup jvoplr I'rMndocliiiia ; Uuit ndthi-r tbttHve* wv h*vo1j. aftrtto Uvc* we fciive taken, Ktve tlic VS any vteUt u> <li>u>rnilnti Bre rl arinwrx<Jio hall Kot.-r"u' or
The Cir.uiiJAX. Than!; you v;ry much, Senator Mondalfev:

'
Nr. AVTHOIUTY TO INVADE XORTU wmcAic.

x
v,
lM you think the 1'ivsulont prfewnfly hj? local o thority tos-ml forces to invudo North Virtnam? Soniitor Moxi>UJw Jn my opinion, if the veqiiiroments foit'id in the Cotistituiion lu-L-f^sifutinfr a Confxtvss'uwal IXrlaration of War int-uix niiythiii". it- ivquiiTsmir involvement, lint that constitutional require-' nwnt, Jiiul > many of tin- functions \vhifii the Constitution cor.tomil:iU^ in tt'rin- of ;i sh:irvil !i i risionin:ikini in tin* Marniakin^ |Kwvt-s iH-twwii t'lc ICxooutivi; and the Con^rr-S'i. have I'K-onw so t-nxlffl that I t h i n k it is terribly im|>ortant that CWJTIVSS make clesu- it^ ii Thv CUAUIMAV. This is more than a resolution; is it not? It i> :i 1'unitaJJou upon tliccx|)imdituce of funds. SiMistor Hfoxiuij;. 'llrnt is<'.o?;rccL Tim < 'it \iKJfA\-. Tho jioint I r'untotl to nrnko is that vou nn- seeking to iiiK.tlu 1 power or rci>]>onsil)iHfy for the appropriation of funds to piiforwvlmt you bdicv^ to In- a roust it ill iona! resjxjnsihility, which hs mrf lx>ori follow -l. Is that rornvt ? S-niitor MONPMJ- Tliat is correct. I J:IH*;S it utnlei-siior' * my ln-lipf ulvout tin- ili'^rivo t> wliifli t'oiipivsiontil funrtioii in the vvsirninkin'r powers and in tJie dtÎiintl ion of war provisions have dctfrioratwl. I think it H poinjr to tnkc spveral yerirs of >tronp affirmative action by th'* C'onpir^s to correct the dama^fp that has been visited upon those poweix ox er t!ie last 20 or :;0 years. I:\TKXT OF WMinirnov OK KL'NIM Th" f'u M B M \ V . TWs your hil! prohibit the uc of any A iierir-aii fiifidv by tin- Sonth Vietiiiiniese if they wi-=li to invade Xortl, Vietnam ? SvnuiofMiiNDAi.r. It doi-tf not. It is limited to the uM-of funds cither for a I'.S. invasion or for I:.S. sup|M>rt in any way of a Sonth VietT l n - C r - \II:U\N. "What w n p f h a t In^t ? Senator Mnxi>\ij:. Or the use of T".?. futuls in supp<irt of a I'.S. euWt lo atisi>t a South Virtnunn'M- invasion, siii-h as tliut we f'.ivf in I.:io- vltere lielicopti-rs ami (>|ott''rs and tlie re-i| were iir4>d a few fyt f.tTfhi- jrrii'inil to support South Winamp*- troops in Ijir-i, This would prohibit any Kitch involvemr-nt by I'.S. troops. '] lie C'iiAii.'MAV. Do you In-lied- the South Vietnnni'-w -OIM! i n v a d e tiie \"iiiii without fhe-iip(>ort of the I'nited Stalei? S-n:ifor M - > v i > \ i . r . A\'ell. if then- crp .nny doubt? l><>Mt that 1 t''ink i n . i v l n - I.:- os settled them. J'.nt if then- is any sii'Ii rhanee thev ynio v\oiilil want to IM- tin fiippoil of our troops. T'.ut what this nmendmi-nt d'*-- i- to j't'iliil.it ( l i e l v : i i i t of I'.S. involveinriit t h a t -;iw in !/!'-. I'i the ('hiirrh-f.'ooiw-r :inir'ndnwnt we prohibited T'.S. ground
'cmbat tiooj uilaos, and they were able to circumvent that br the use of dv-m helicopter, closis-m tactical support for the South Viet'' " Xlnk>mendinent would prohibit any such Laotian tvpc D.S. sup]K)rt>i-ijth Vietnamese groit d troops should they invade North Vietna'ttii.'it keeps us but entirely. c ; .The CitiiRMAX. That is as far as. ita.orert support in the physical gens*. -What ttbout the supplying of money to finance the South Viet.-iiftmcsc Arnirt " ! . Senator MONDAIA It docs not go to thkt point The CuAiKJBN. It dors not go to thar point. Why shouldn't it* Senator MCXDAIJL Maylw it should. I would he'wiHing-to support thnt. Mo. "; Tiie CHAIRMAN-. Senator Symington. Ijfnattir SrMivutr>x, Tiiank you. T:tM sorry I was not abK> to be IM'IT Ik-forv. hut we have had two other hearings. Senator Mondale, it. is a privilege to see you. I-it year you presoiled a rmpp.r brfore a subcommittee which, in my opinion, resulted hi ,nvin^ jnany handn-d millions of dollars for tlw taxpayers, because. ;tht rTM..rtTfjil^t<Hlit~ ' f i n the debate ond nltinntc decision. , ", J[. as arv- \oiiit\aiii i-. am v-rv anxious ro *rci and do.owrything no-.*:iify-fnrth^st'ciii - of the 1'niu'd States. ; .MSArnsovAr. or VIETXAM WAR - -^ .; In. 'October 1367 I decided from every onple, that the Vietnam .girtif- wii.s '.\i~Jt worth the rnndle. Since tlien I have sctn nothing, to ?httnfr' jiir opinion. A\'ith f-hosc jn-cmisps. you have a resolution in with Senator Sazbe, and theru arc ether resolution*. It seem the people of the country 1m re now pretty well established the fact, they do not approve of this wur. T may lo wronjr. ''it that is what I gather from my mail.
Senator MOXDAU:. I agrw with you. Senator SvMiKirro.v. I>o you have the .same fee-ling about it? Senator MOVDAMU Yes". I do. Senator SVMIV;TOX. Not only from tin- polls but also from the mail, euiMvially the mail from people who iiave been ^-aaoncd in thede kinds o[ mutters. Arn:oii:iATioxs AS BJ>T MKAXS TO END WAB r J-m't tlir lieMt Wiiv to p-f :it this through aii|>n>|>riutions. I inc.in through inmiey? Wouldn't I n>S|>ect the resolmion, don't n isunderstand trif. hut can't w<> consider aiifiidmenta that will make it impossible from the standpoint of appropriations to continue something th:it tlic .Vini'riran pi-onlc urcairaiii.wt ? S<-nnfjr MOVIIAIJ-. First, of all. l-t rue say that I strongly support tiir Mrffowni-IIatflcM nmcndnifiif whirh would end tho involvement of American I TOOJK in (! war !.y tl end of this year. I think that is tlir rcntni! <|ij<-lion. In a i^n.e this amendment tries to deal with rftrainton onracfivifirs while we refrrrUitbl.v rermiin. so t h a t , '"t a ^-nsr-, if is a side issue, bif God forhid that thev wouldever trv.
164
Senator Srsnxcrroy. You understand I am not criticizing the amendment. Senator Movau.ru I know that, I understand it This amendment run* to the authority necessary for appropriations, and it prohibits any appropriations to be spent "for a I .S. invasion of Xorth Vietnam or'for the use of U.S. combat troops on or off the ground, in support of a South Vietnam** invasion. It keejw us out entirely, and so in that annac. while it is east in authority language it runs to'the use and the prohibition of such use in that way of appropriated funds. Senator SYMINGTON. We used to have an expression, "there arc more wars than one of skinning a cat.'* Senator MOXDVLK. Yes. Senator STSIIXMTON. After listening to and voting for nianv, if not most, of these resolutions, isn't tlic Iwst way to skin the cat from the standpoint of what we want, to amend the appropriation bill? I say that without the. slightest criticism of your amendment, or any other amendment. Senator Moxnux. Well, this is not a resolution, it Is a bill to enact a law t< prohibit appropriations to Lo used for that purpose. I think this particular committee is a little mon- receptive or at toast has proven to he somewhat receptive to this legislative authority approach, which is why I chose this course.
Senator SVMIXOTDK. In other words, your amendment goes to the qm~t ton of the money ? Senator ifosDAiJ-. That is cornrt. Iiccause if if xvere adopted as a matter of law, such appropriate funds could not U> used in the ways which we prescrilie. I think you know for all of the despair we have over the Cambodian invasion o'r the Laotian invasion. I think the Coojwr-Ohurch amendment did probably prexvnt a much wider I'.S. involvement than would )iav occurred if we had not adopted a law prohibiting the nae of appropriated funds, for U.S. ground combat troops, in I MO?. That!.; 107 personal opinion. I cannot prove it. Senator STMINOTOX. Jt me lw tin* first to approve the Cooperf'hmvh amendment us a magnificent demonstration of courageous indftpt-ndi-nt thinking. What I am getting at, liowevcr. is if you pass this amendment, fine. But it hat* to also Ix* approved by the House, aocs it not ? Senator MOXOAU:. 'Fliat is correct, ami igned by the President. S>n:itor Sruivomv. If mijrht !M> mnn> dillirult to jri-1 that ilonc than to put an amendment on in approitrintinn hill, miglit it not. hnscd on vnur knowledgi* of the pnrHaiiU'iil.i-ry prvxvsM>s in oiirfJovernment? fN-nator MOXDAI.K. Ypi sii'd earlier iliere nn> many wnys to kin a <-nt. and I would le willing f. skin it iitiy way that anyone ran think of. You have had far inon- rxj^riericc on that than I have. I<'t tin-re always problem of the rule which prohibits legislating on nn appropriations bill? Then- may IK- other ways of ..tying it. If tliat can I* <lonc. that is juf fitu- by me. Senator SviirvuTn.v. I think you ronhl g-t around that ^>oirjt of order, but I won't pnnnie it at thi* tinn-. S-nator MOVDALK. 1ft me MIV that i.s (inn bv me.
103
OP WTTNISS Senator SrMixerrox. Your previous paper was very tuftuoutml. Senator MOMMLC. Well, you are x'ery kind. Senator Symington. Jn this whole effort to try to win this tragic war and to n?orutjr American priorities', so that we can have a strong economy and a strong dollar and, more importantly, u you have put it so eluqueaitly, an American electorate which has an affection for its Government which, I am afraid, is being tlisajMited today, yon have been our Nation's leader, and I look to you. Senator STMIKGTOK. You too are very kind, aj>d I appreciate those undeserved kind remarks.
CliAXOK KROJ4 FOREIGN TO DuMl>TlC I'KOrUXXi
In tin- back of your mind, regardless of the Past, don't vou think it about time we stopped playing nursemaid, defending, babysitting, tlie rest of lite world, worrying so much nl>out the problems of the people of other nations who take a $100 million. a day that go out of this cuntry and begin thinking uul doing more with respect to the problems of our own farms and our owu cities, our own people, you might say \ We have, some U5 million people who arc below the poverty line in this country. I was over in (iermauy the other Jay. A young Missouri*!! on an Army base came up and said :
Why can't my wife get a jolt bvre on thin tat*? W> limre no moorf. I lurr iwu drafted. U'e bare no cbllil" ':. Kbe would likt to work, and will acatit Uu> r>inj;
I usked tlif uiiiiiiuii(liii<r gciiffiil to niiswcr him. :ind he ivpliinl thnt the ("Jerrr ...a won' Now, we have millions of people iiiicmployei] here. They not only ha\e no uncraploymcr.t in <ieiiii:iny, Init are importing 2.T(>'.OCN Spaniards, Italians, Yu^rosliivs. (inrks, Arabs, ct oêra, into that country* to work, TVx'Kn't ir swm b m'.rn] . if are over then- defending them, they should allow tlin! \\oniHii to work? Scniitur MOM>AU-. Alwolutely. Now, 1 think there U a very strong and healthy, hnmnnii<,rinn impuls>; in the American iH-ojtle. but I think we un> offending and frustrating that if we think uv c:in M-|| the uar in Vietii:im s :m ; t--t of hinniinity. and they rea<l in th-' iajH-r nltout the millions of dollurs of forvi<rn military ai<l thnt has gone to Pakistan, that is living used now in fhe face of a silent t'.S. <;<>. niiim-iit to slaughter thousands of East I'ukisfuriis. und they hux'e rcu'l alNxit 0111* iiiilitnn- aid going to support militnrv juntn rlm-wheif. And I think the American peni-lc tanil U-liind "Pood for IVare." I think th^y stand k'hind reasonahlieconomii* .*-.- isfaiHw and ot'-'-r kinds of technical assistance consistent with the nifdfc "four economy. I think they have a strong and sennibfe humanitarian desire to live rcMionsibly in this world. Hut wlmt H turning tliem off M tl>e feeliti'' we lime jinrt lost all of our M-M-' out here, and we HI*- spending the pillions in way* that cau-
,<>; Si- defended. ui ways whu-h <>uVt\d tLLs Nation's concept of humanity ami brpllieiliood and. at tlto same tinw, disrupting the Nation's evommiy, putting ;> million jx-ople out of work, to tin* point w I _-, itmong othrr thinp, 11 iicicrnt of tlu? kids returning from Vietnam? after risking tiwir liv for this tragic war. are standing mi the st >* looking for work and cannot find it. and we <r>mc up with *ueh things as $1 million pilot program to give them advice about the Gl bill in live cities. They mvwnartoiioitjrli to stv through tlinl and to srctli< immorality >f a |K>li.->- tljat visits that kind of human traywly iiiion Ainorit-ans. S-tiAtor" SvMixiiTox. Mr. Chairman. tl>c Senator from Minnesota h> wxiil in IIIDIV !>lo fashion what I tried to say. I congratulate him n lioth liis phiKtsophy and his|Kition i' - this matter. MOVKAIJ;. Thank yop \vn,- much. Senator .Symington. rsr.or irton ror. rr.\iT. rrxus txn MIIJTAHY ThcCiiMiiMvv. To put (lip nTonl straight. yotiaroawaro.of course. thnt u siilififuiitin! amount of FKM! fur lVa<-o funds aiv ns>d for military fiUl'INVM-S. Sviiutor MMXI>AIJ:. Vi>s. I served on tho Agrioiilturo Committee f.r 4 \irs. I worked my hfiirt out to use sonx1 of thoso T'.S.I.S. funds for t;itod work, for hospitals, for agri-Mi I tural di-velopment. for education, nnd -u on. so tin- rui *> and tin- ofhT I'.S. -owiu>d foivicn curn-nHes woulii lie diverted, and 1 guess we got Jjlifci million. Unknown to me^ T gius^s it is somctliing like $7<K) or SSi million of U.S. -owned foreign <! ivn'ies have gone for inilidry aid without my knowledge.. I did n| i-\oji know ulMiut it u n t i l I read about it. Th" CuvncjiAX. Si-iiatoi Coo|ter. .Hfriii:T Km: AMr.Miiir.xr Senator COOI-KI:. T inn glad l<> Ii'-ar SiMmtor Mondulc, and I s-up|>ort \onr iinii-ndmcnt. Titi- CJIAIKW \v. Vou ivuld iianlly ktvp from it. after all ymi did >n i In- ' 'iHi|N>r-('huie|i. [ IjUiightor.J SeiiiitorC^Mtrhi:. Tliiink you. Senator MOXIHI.I:. Tliunk \ou very rniu-Fi, Senator COOJMT. for ynur
Killdlir.-S.
Tin 1 CIIAIKMAV. Si'iMitoi' Pi-ar.-iOi'i, S<--iiitor T'KAIISOV. Mr. C'luiiminn. I likewise support this proposal. )..^.Ai.rri'oK n.'KMKKSTi u. A ritiv i\. \TIKO J n vrif-cn vrKTVAM If I understood you /-orrei-l ly. Senrôr 3l'HidaIe. i found imself in >w>nie disagreement when \oii nîwu.ded \n I he Chairmen's inoiiiry as to the Ii-gii'ity of the President's :i<:ling in relation to N'oilli \ ielnum. \ I'civill ii the ( 'iiiiilxHliiiii inl i nsi'iii and in the La'i*; DJH nilioii. it wu>< Hie |Kisiiiin of t i n - Department of Slate that it was a rle.ar po.-it if iiilcrii.'if ioiiiil law licit when one of 'wo rnnilnitants usj-d a neutral area, ilieniltiTcoiiiliiiinnl had :i right toocciipy thatureu.
I l i m e ||e\ff .unlerstfHHl how thilf applies to tlie I 'tilled Stales
forces. I cinilil iinderstiind how the iniericilionul iiiw |>rin<'''>le up|'*i"d
to the A1IVX forces. But could not that argument pertain to an opera: tion in North Vietnam as well f Senator MOKDJUX. WeB as I uhdnrMand thercoBstftatknal trspon- . ' sftn!itytodeHarewar -. - . ' _ - Senator PKAMOX. Mar I interrupt vocTlb say you hay* to put all those in a handle and add the powers of the Commander in .Chief and he jiower to protect American forces. : Senator MOMMKC. Sure. , Sonntor PTAJWON. Ye*. " " " ' . Senator MOND.VJLT. But the requirement to declare war, if it meaita anything. would bo required, in my opinion. if we invaded Xortli_ Vietnam Kvause^mlike Ijtos and Cambodia where the willingness of i he i-ecîvin^ eoaijtry to pcrniit our troops to be on their land wc unil.icuous. thorn ] no question, I tlm.li, tltat the Government, of " N'orth Vii-tnaiu does not i>rcfor i.s on \octii Vietnnm soil, <ind if the ix-quin'inents to declare war mean, aujthin^, it mpiius tliivt. St-imtor Ptxiwov. Purdon ntr. l.'*ut was true in ("ttuihodtik, but in T<a3 I imdriytood there was soino wit of a twhnicail official Ptaf*-ncnt hot j-ivinji (Hjnniasdoii to entei* upon their land. S'nutor MONDAI.E. That is correct. But whatever the ambiguity in Laos and Camlxxlia, there is none . at all with ivsppet to the> fiopemnwirf of Korth Vietnam, and o .if tliHt ]iov\cr nn'uiiH nvthiiijr resting upon us, I thiulc it would be ivquiml. Hut, power enjoy c diuac. And I think it is incumbent upon us to make clear our oppoiiition to eiUicj- invasion by our force* or the support of our forces on tlir ground or off tins prouiid of nil iuva-niou by South Virtnauiese fori'i-s. and maybe pn>hibi( U.S. fund* in support of a South Vit'tn.tiurso invasion as well. It is not iiu'lnded, but uitt\be tliac rJp>ulil be added. Senator PEAKWIV. In any event yon seek U> solv tlw problem or to (ln> question. MOXPAIJ- Yes. I think it is terribly uu|K>ctant. -
Senator Cranston. I think, t*tifip<l here yiwlei-day alout t \ i . of ominous t\gaf out of fliuia atxut what their reaction would lie.* shrnild we IK> involved in this way in North Vutnjun, at.d Iô not -- , _j thiiil; we nhould Uke it Iirltly and overlook the expmenr* tru Lad . :^ in Korea, J Senator PrAKwjv. I thank tlw Senator, The C'JIAIUMAN. Thank vou very tnuch, Seiatr Moiulaln. Senator MOVPAI.K. Thnriit yo vtry much, The C'liftuur AV. Tlu- next'witnriw IK Senator KnuwtOmciiin'!;, who is an <>!il friend of most, of us. fApjtlai:*.] Si-imUir. it in a well-de*rvcd tnbute and although it- violutg our niles. uud I will overlook it, I join in paying you tribute,
EUEBT <IEUilUt&t fOlMEK US. '

:
. MV. Chairman and: members of the committed, I . ghatl rpprt<3**.^tto-<^>portnitv to appear. "-.l want to aj^pwiftxw.oar, of the. Vietnam Disougageiueut Act, S. J^C, lbeMîorcr^JUtd^l4>Aet. if jiich tint* to got us avt of SoatiMttat s^jâlltmrinilKj^vût.Wt^ 'eutf of this year. Lthbik H is absalaiof*. Htteotbft that We enact su^h legislation bethi Congress dot* ot-i> &,;** are going to b* in Southeast Now, 1 woiBa Jik to empbasiro that |K>tnt because the only hohe of fr today tvitfs in the Congi-e*^ of th United States. Ther ' th" executive branch. There is no hope in the judicial Suprtpw (Vittrt !> ducked deciding the wsue of the A.(tJu war. f ApjibtLtc.] Tltfê is * distinction bet-ween approving of the ator and h,tf he t*av#, W$ taye to have ail orderly meeting. Therecinuui. iboif^yocr *pprrral or disa]>|>roval of the witneati* '' . . . - OEUTXI.NC. Lt^_ine pouit<fuhat ___ verbally even-body is in favor .* T- ' _* _ -^r%t *a-._*T.i*l. ..*" .* .
J
ntK&iMunrs PUIN TO EN> WAK otbjurJf 2i/i years when Richard Nixon was campaigning for y- He jvrotoiscd the American people that he had a way . of the twar. lJut he said he could not reveal it because hi* did h<^"wi{rt4oinl'*i fctti with t lie Paris Peace Tullca. "Welli ÎiEt a |rcty nrffcut problem. Our boys were dying in -cornfat, ifen35f:*-as to bn honed tliat he would take Uir JBrat opportunity o/tcp taking oiice to rvviv* this plan, maybe in his inaugnral address nv in bratfUusof the Union mescige. 5V> waited aionth after month Tle hoys continued to die in rombat, over 10,000 ii? the ensuing year, and many more wounded, and the nutni>r of rcfujecw was increasing. PrwTujfcnr^'ixon waited for 13 moritlis before he unveiled this plan, after 3 Wock>> of suHnensffnl pnblicity. -It wa hot until December 3. W&, that ho let. the Aiiicriran penle what hu plan wan. And what wa the plant It was not a plan ' tbe war. It was ti plan to perpetuate it. It was very obvious to who read tliat. M I did, and said so at tlic time.*And cxvnl* rfttly have proved it. .When Preident Nixon took oftlre we were fighting in only one country in Southeast Asia. Wo were only in Vietnam. Subsequently we have gone into IMM and Cambodia. !?ot only has Nixon not. rnded the war. He has widened and intensified it. 'Flic casualties continue. The only test of ending the war is when the raMualtieK stop. There is no other test. Under Nixon's policy our boys will continue to die, refugees will continue to increase in number, more and more thotimmdft of innorent people will be slaughtered, and th only hojM- r<s with the Congress.
Unix i- a great and stvlemn r*5ponsibilitr. and I turt h.sp'ful and I pray that t!i legislation or something similar wifl bev^nacted, tlt it will he enforced by the only method hy which esperiiwww ha* fthown it f*n he enforced, and that us by the Congress excising Hi power ov*r the purse ttf rings. mtrrarr or Decrrnos We have had no much of deceptionand this ia not a partisan statementdeception in this matter began beforethis administration: it is* of long standing, t ha* been a hirfory of dereptK-n, a deception whioh began even tafore the Tonkin <ialf incident, wljich we all now know was a ttpuriotw incident. The resolution which followed has been repealed, out the v~ar goes on. The deception continued,itit the rajwated a*iinuK-côf Lyndon Johnson during his campaign for the prenidency that he would not send American boys to fight a ground war on tbV continent of Asia, and all the time he was making those promises, the Pentagon was maturing plans to do jutt that; the-deception fii hi<? state of the I'nion meswipe of 1965 when he asked why are we there t and answered because a friendly nation h* aaked u$ to come in find help it rvpel aggression. The it-cord is alolutely btuv of any suet) requests. We asked ourselves in. It has IIK.-II a continuing story of deception. It is time w* stopped it, and only the CongretM can do it. rcrtitE u.n. I.VVOIAT.MEST IK VIKTKAK Now, it ia vciy obviousand the President and Secretary Laird I'ave already announced itthat their plan is to sta; in Southtaat Asia unC I such indefin ite time as the Soul h Vietnamese (ioxvrn nent is able to fend for itself. Well, President Thieu has said that would be 15 years, and we all fliould know that tliis mean& an indefinite, indeterminate prolongation of the war. Now, righr this morning I picked upI think the Chairman referred to this in the Washington Portthe afnrv headlined "U.S. to Monitor Viet Affaire for fie Next Three Years/' and it sty a:
The Nixon administration ia lannrlifng a iwrlflntton project which will keep tbe U.S. Govcrniofot Inrolvwi in tlie ffoLn of Vietnam for tlie nest 3 yearn.
And who is going to nm this program 1 The Navy, ji branch of tin: MiliUty Kstablishment. Ilio Navy is going to do ttii* and it. w going to upend fc'.l million a year for the next 3 years to do it. And whut aru some of the thing* it IK going to dot It in going to aid the police down there; it w going to do all kinds of things to perpctn_e the police state in Vietnam. We neglect our police forces here fit home, but we are going to'help the polio- force in South Vietnam, and the article hays we nn- going to help them stipprnw nubversi ve. Who an- the BiibverBiveh down there'( The suliv.-ntivm in Soutii Vietnam an> the people who have been *ightiiig fortlic fitvdom of their country for t)u> lnt >.:> years; they arc the onus that tlw Thiftu-Ky government wantK to suppreM, and our Navy plant) to help them do it. It is alwuf time that wu n-aK/e that thone \wrt\\e, down there are fighting for their freedom and we long ago nhould have been on tlieir side ujia not fighting to tuippreHg ttirm. ej JSO-TI12
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KECft TO UNU WAR AT HA*UI>r FOM4BLK MOMr.KT
It is high tune now, a&d I think the hour has arrived whon tins AitMTJcan people should bu fed up with inf any, with the loathoroeni>4B of this war, tlu> daughter of civilian*. Mylai was not an isolated incident. and Mylai. horrible as it was. is no'inore criminal than the per^teitml homb'iivfs front tin* air, which is an anonymous killing of civilians, >Id men, women and children, and that authorized from the liipluvd level of government. not by a second lieutenant. Is it any nohler to ktJI people whom you cannot see than to shoot mothers with tabu* in their n-.-m* that you do see? The result is the sanie. and I certainly hope that public sentiment will back this move to get out of this mess at tin- eaHtesr noasiMe mrment, to stay out, and to leave no loopholes that our military can .ip back. This is what ire wed iu order to salvage the conscience of our Nation and t< ire, AmerirA to Uw country that we once loved and admired and \vaiit to lore and admire again. Thxjik you. (Th<< prepared statement of Mr. (trueninp follows:!
Srvrr.xir.XT or Knxtf (Ui KMXU Mr. ("liatnuaii and uwtiilM>r f the luniulttr*-. i am uifx-ariiic In sapt>tt <>f S4-I..II.- lit 1 1 ."ill. i|;>- X'l-fn.iia li'-n(;^.nifiii Aft. wi>lt knn frum H* pMYi*>u i^rsiuni an the "MHtiiViTU-lluttlflil I'ill ti~|Nin-irtil ulm. l>y oilxT ><-ii:iU>r>-. It U <*MM*ntwI to end our tuittUtry lurl\'i-uif))l iu w>utlii-axt A.(M u! the varlirKt i>"gitiU moiurjit. to put au >-uiI to thf killing ml tiuiimlii); of ,\iu<'rl.-ii I'VM. mil ilw killlnc ni.il uiaimiuff "f ltii>uwiud ">f VirlnaiiHw. omny of Uum woura nd cbtlilrrn. Itm'Mvnt rldinin of th- f<illy ( 1'uibn) Stnt< military iinruxi'Ui<*nt in H-uul.-i.Ht A*la. ^luilf bill 3JII will do that. If llit* uar IM In !> luliil ami ruilitl il uiuxt IH-- fur (In- aki- nf nnr own moM-ifU'f and gmMl luiiuf ami fr nlbi*r r.ilitl .n-ax. >. If w i l l ) <Jnr onljr by >u in-! of <'uiiKrv.-. Anil It N jcrxtifrlnr tbut v 'oti Ut Cnojcnwi IK preinrrd by tin- tffiu* of thin btliUatlitn to ivvt-nw iu long tituo ltrtli-ii>oU<Hi aiul ui>\xirt >t our mlllUrjr lurulvriurnt. if It U to b dooe at all. It wnl be' (lone ouly by thtr I'îigrejut Fur it nr i-li-ar Unit tin- <luituiKlrull"ir njN-nlril jToiuiw-i ami jiluu in mil tin* uar ure
. l*'t drum- ilonbt th Li. b-t lui1 liri.-rty rm-li-w tlic f <:
nvi-r iwi) uuil LfW'-hulf ytiim u^n \vlu-u U'-luinl Nix.m \JH omijii2iiin^ for tlu* jin*idi-ury be tbl tin- Anwrl'-an pouplr tic hail a, i>lan to etut tlu> war. No doubt fill* proniilw* WHX u fni'lor In bl rUflioii. Kr I'tfli MM-II 'b>- Aim ri.:in I*HI|IIH virrif icruwliitf wi*ry of 'tur totally uniJb-iM. iiuju-rtlllublr. lllt>cnt. ami inri>'uiiixiy iii<in.->trri war. Mr. Nixon iiililrd tluit bi> mltl "ot rt-vi-al tin* plan :il tliat imii-u- |t HII|I| tnii-rCrn- w i l d (!. l'nri i-mi- IjilkIU-iiiii'* of idi- !iu|M>rtniii-f iiiul urc''U''y "f tin- liu:it|i>n. tit'' Ani-^rl. ati |Hiipl> tmtumlly IniiNtl Hint I'n-Aiib-iit Niv.ii wnubl n-vi>iil IIM |ilnn ui ijii' (ir-t j>.il)limtialiin. IVrhaiw in tun iiiauicarul r Malt* uf tli>- unlou II-MJIK>' 'i'lilo ua H > .itirul lioiw mi tiii-ir jiurt UIIIUM- mir !.>.< VM-II- iûi'iiulnc to ijii- or ) iiumuil ni,ij V'iclimuxw u-fr>> ltk.ru IK.' .Ijint an<l niiiiiuifl lii iiu p-a-inK II'.IUI|MT- iiml inon H i. d i,i/iri- of tJti-tn wen- l-lfiir ni,n|c h-xiu'lt:** rffnifrm. I'.ut ii uu tiiv; for T.'t months ni until I H-'Tjulw-r .">r>>. 1!E> -iiml !'r"W>'jir
NiXoO lirin 'Itll I) In |>Ui:
Aiul uliaf HBM lib |ilun? it uuu tmt a plan to rml (In- ur II uu* n |>;nn i [K>r|M'IUHtf II. T>>1 i lioi liiiul-l^lif ; n ii- iippnn-nl In HI.' <tiil:n I uui iidtito ri'.Tl IliU plun )3 tlit- riiornlnir uW'-papt-i- Siili<ni|u-ni .-U'lits iuiv>> \irnll. :i-il that Jiiik-in^nf, l'rîiil'ii' Niiun liiivtitit finbti tlur v.ar. Tin- only tvnl at wlii'lli'T n \\iir in cliUrd in wlirn (1^* ruauuItM-n xtop Not imly h:iv.' i In-) not ftitppcil. lint t i n * WHIM' of (In- Hiir IIIIH U'cti riiijnii-il and li VVIi.-n rr^-nldcnl Nlkiiii fo.k i,i'l,v M-I> wvrif. llzlitlm In <! rouiurjr of A -In Vii-inati; Mucc tbut tlui*> In- liu , i-ip(nb'd (In- vuir to tv><> otb.T cu
aad La<*. It In no hmcrr a war juat la VietnamIt to a *cr to Indo"Vuieu. Ami boMMac haa be** nnomcd to theat conatrfe* on a aeate and f * intently uiuaatehed la OBT military hUioiy. ' . Situ* that ttoe Pnabtent Nixon ha* made rkar that whtl* he propone wtthift wxn.- indefinite period to vjtbdraw owr crowd tnoya. h* trepan* To k*e o*r *lr iuid >*arU font* in Loutueait AIM. Thta tea ww been etearly vtaled by both rn-ttA-ot KlM and Secretary of Defcoaa, Ualria Laird. It la therefore a wn^vkar n^mnber 3. IMP. a perpetration of the war. So It to eaentlal that n v^w>t dot every tout aoldter. rmj man\r of dw ArmH aerrtcm Army. ~NB\T. Mr rrc* 0it Klaria* Curpaat tkr carllMC pallil mtmutpan tbon ^xi noU kwiitb*oc TUa Um-kat 8. S3* pcopoat* toacUvra. U t o> i.mcw nmvKar]r. I think, to (Irtrrtt* th folly of oar mlUtory raitaxanwttt in &rfuonxt Acfa and fu dbvatnua <mMrqnMieM both at bun* aad abroad. UV cnuM rxliami U UM> ndjpctlvrt; In Lbc rocabutarjr la the pronM. Nor to thKW any n- tu>* to BO Vack od BMTM and rrlU? tb btoia- and rmpomitblHty of trtiat Kn aappnkNi. TJio OMimttat tart Is -to frt ot no\ aneqahroraUjr. itrrroiblT. to do Ike brut TVI> c*a to aiuae for the |4ut and bring tola war to a uuijr b<! MM* l>i> frl a ri-rr much rvdorr1! notaber of Anterlouu that to withdraw a* Uiln k*cli>toth>u ptotimini. *i>fO MMtwKbbMC In the way of ti<Hflilt'iun and drfMt. Tbrr* ban brM talk that w mart trad U war with honor 1 ran tfciak 4 n.. umrr hmtorabto way of acnirvltur that objective than t<> xrt ou( iiud Mop any ftmtx* *arrlflcr nt Mm oar own. thiMr of the Vlctnaatw North and Konth lAothina. Camhodtonii. and to end thr drtMioratlnn and aVTixraeia at booke wblcU ore largely the conanqnejica of oar military In arblrrlae tbTf crrot *j4TtlT* If aeConrK enact* tato lefibdaUOA It wOt l*o he rramertlnK UM> iv-Minality of the trckatatlve btancb and tb ezecutlre bmn.-li In the ma kin? of fnrflfn pnlt>7. Tblf i^H>quaUty ba* been K*tdoalty yli>t<itti to the esrcntlrr Hth dlRmtrnoB nautta. Jt mnaC be recorrird. [t In ;mrtlctorly *flont>! to mnfcnrtaad that tha propoaed altemadr^ to aoeb rtlcn l.y the Ctmgn**, nanwl> toe adoption of PnaldVM Nixon's promun ieU ladrfiaiu> prolongation of Uw- war. ever dfappntnvr Inrolrnnient In Sontheam Anton affair*, and a prolongation of all ttt thr horrorx ar.j dlMntrooa neMtlts whl.-h the war ha broaffht to America and to ladocnlna. Tbto to what Vietnam tutfrm wnald be. It !> Mwcntlal that P turn liarfe not vnly to the^ronatltutlon. which ha* been *> Itorrantiy dinrujcnrdeU In tbto matter, to our n*p*-f fnr the inrtliy of trivtlr.. wlil.-h ha.H IlkpHl-*- Item dlnreicardMl Ulnl tuaK>- ftenln of Aim-lira a land of [M-are. hope, jOKtifUlilc pride and adbervtw* tf. UM: prlndiilni that we bare U.tit iirrifewipd IHII IUITI- In the (art decade rrrfMtUbly abandoned. \Vt- Ktand at pprhapa ** nuwt cruciAl hour in our bl*t<try, By <>uctlng |pgllallrtu of till* kind we wltl lie finog tint li retriiw mm-^vf wUnt we lure lout and M>I "n r ronntry an In on the i*th nf Aftxnej and bontv-. TIMTI- IK an Indlrldnil miponxlbltlty npon erery mcnttx>r <rt Conmvaii. If the iiia j.irliy fnU to lake ntcanumi micb a thin to Had tbto war. they will not eacape ttM oiniit for th<> blond of i-Ti-rr American boy and erry ViKnameae man. wuwian ixl <;lilld who die afl-r tb<* terminal date net.by.tkto leclKlatlon. Every menber 'f rru'icriiw Ktmald Iw mndo aware of the iwenome n^ponnltdUty that U Inhered. In tilK role. 1st UM prar fbnr WH act a<mrdluKly. and ( nr h-lovi>d.rottutrr baric on flic jmtli of rlKbtonytu-Mi. peace and honor.
The ('MAMMA*. Tliaiik you.S i naU)rflnwiUHff.'nialifittvery forceful stuff ineil tuul a gmtd ximmiury of wbat otliors tiavc fluid about tliis pro|>osuL k\j>.*i\iis. \frrr, ON Vx>vi:ux-iiATrif.Lu ACT ,As you know, wv v<7tid on an art winiliir to thw MoGornni-Hatfiold Act l;i'st Si'[tr.iiilx-r. T tlu'nk tli- voti> was 39 to S3. T)u y/ii huv ony aji'iniim UH In whether the \'ot4> on tbie. jrvmnnully wit liin < !> ni-xf ! or " ni'inHiB. -willlw any different >. Mr. 'Jiu-rvjv^;. Well. I ri'itli/i- tliat various plforttt at iii'-itt. nnrl vtti'iouM very M>iiud iriovci which the Chairman luu i
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in Ontario try to recapture tome put of the constitution^ tives of the Cong*.** at against the usurpation of the Kxeeutw, the* have not smxreded ma yet because pteUfe opinion was not r for f bom, and 1 think that the Congrea* reftodietUhat lack of .>admes:< on the part of the public opininn. -.But i hope that ha* changed now. . I think it feehfiftging rapidly. .I think people lure begun to realize that our engagement down there. waa c mistake from uc start, that it was fotty. that we should never have go*H in there, and that having pone in, we were mjvled into belienng that we had to ataj in. The Chairman has livcd'rhrragh all this. He knows what the problem it* been, and I think the time has come now when if the American people could be properly informedthe dUGralty has been Ij^t of information, or. rather, "a plethnm of mininforniation and. .VHUIPquendy, tDoat of our people nave Iwr^vi^ from the start, and son* of them still bclmr. that tnis was a noblf cnuad<\ tliat we wore dowii there for the worth ie* nf pnrpoMw, that, we wnr thrrv to blp a *malt nation determine tt* fntnre. that we wen- going to rwjcne thorn from opprMoioQ by a totalitarian 5ate. Well. 'ortuitatttK . u re l^2muin>; tn sw >>* that tins <-Wf*i-'r* we hav> Hupportfd and that wp ounwlveK have prailiiW thfttuue kiml of lotatitarian bruralitips that WF condemn hi omr advrtwmr*. This docv not excuse them or us; they have done it, and uccuaHy we have doo in thf last few years in \ letnaut what we unspurtcplc ormderoMd Hitler, Muawlini.' and Staliit for doing. Tbrtv wa* one Itamc difference. Hitler WMfntirelrainivre in belie vingthattlienurtec race, the Germans, should dominate alt other inferior races and exterminate what lie considered subhuman specie*. ., Mussolini undoubtedly felt that fascism was su|)urior to the reign o f liliertv. f'~ And Stalin no doubt was convinced that communism way th^ wave of tlie future. Wo do it in the name of freedom, and to we are adding hyjhvriiv. in all of onr otlicr sins. To say ' that all thone chanu-f ers we have mi|> down there arc apostlrs o'f freedom is grotesque, and we all know it. Yet we continue to support them, we continue to aid Utorn. and thi* prngnun announced Uere in tlie art'u-Ju in titis morningV 1'ont in X program to perpetuate them in onW. no matter what elw napjîiV We am not there to let the people of South Vietnam or Vietnam determine their future, but we are tlioiv to iwfxwe rulers nntor Coort-jt. I harp already paid my tribute to Senator/ Jf-iH'iim<r earlier U>4ay bwaujHe I remember his fortnight nr ' roiiragi>oiis jin-.-fjHv at tlie time of the vo( on Uio Tonkin Gulf re>*lutioii. You were only one of two in Ute whole rongn>w who voted apiiiist tlie reiiolution, no we welwjne .you here and appre'-iato everytliinp ycu say.
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J AAIR with v^ff. lite \\aAn to * out of .the war iu tfce moat r^s<v.'aJi>V**5ro^tJiik Praad*ntA*ixon>,*rot>p withdrawals w at Iraat brit^Jtouj tlfrf^rf tie pa* whew txyop \7erfe being 'ae&t io in ' Tut CILUKKA*. S*tor Peanoiu
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:vntor I*KAWX, I h\t jvo QUwtôs^ Mr. C^wnran. ejrcfjyr ti t*r it is a delight to sec. tta Senator tpa'm so vigorous nd fif. a lu'pria^r on a subject which he-lwlo so lr to Uj
' ' The CHAIRMAN. Scaiator GnwMinjr, I j\>in in tltc tribute "Ox> tJte r of your views ahd the way you have always teen so outapokpn. havt* n^vcr qulbi>ifd about what you thought about this or any o matter, t>o far as 1 can rnnu mtar.* You Lave n^de a jjrcat t-.ontnbu.ntti tootirpjcawxthcwiiâjidyouliavcinthepast. We ti>juik you wry wiicir for conîug \vtie and tf ivtng us the advwvtufi- of your thoughts. :
..fXMT.N'WTlO.V OF E; .OftTS TO ItBCO^WtCOXCMaKtoVALPOWOW
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,,>Ir. GBUB >o. Mr. ClHinan, I certainly want to ronjnwrul yo\tf j*>viiacnt efforts- to tr>- t -see that the Congress carries Out its <m>titutional role ittul that it kvonics a coequal branch *& the execUftvMuui the jwiiciarr. . !f tc-aliw Uie terrible handicaps tliat you face and tJKJ <*nrtatit resJiitancV of tlc Ktfcutive to tlioao veri-'desii'ablo and xvrrthy clTortA. An Administration that is <i|>psroutly dedicated to strictiiionstructiniii.sm whwj it rtMs> to apjv>intt,nr Justiccw of rtie Supreme, Court is not a strict const rueiiooiRt whwiil come to ite <>vy;ii relatiotiehlp io the ; . tliat ve lrtsl.:ot at !>' outwt when ^. uilowd hw nndo'-lan-d vtKf- 1/> be in nolntion of Article I. Soctwo % of the Coiwtitation, uttit (liat was only t'uc beginning, ana it hah beL*n going t. wish you tlie proHtt>st sum>.v> tit your pffon* btâusc this goes this inimcdintt trapic issue of tlw'w^r. It i a mM.ter of j*crrau-cfeJMty that we po h%;t to the wiwl'im of our f^fi'futners that our coverninftnt c-onsista of tlirw equal l>ranrhp. and tlu>.~ Congress, .whicli lUNi'wA njiif;h cloaer to m>,iespnrintf tin- 'woplc than ftitlur th I'wut'ivf or d- iudidary. is tiift branch tliMt.Uioiiltl move forward : and jwim'eritHolflpowcrs. ,. "Ti'.?*ik you verymfeih. Tl'!CiuinrAN.Tuiinir;..Hi very much, Senator Gtricnuig.
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WliUAJi B. SAXBE. U.S. SZMATOE FROM
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. you. Mr. Chitrrauw wild I .^tI nwCj^f to (tax- To hear .$ . n^^t^>n.îLît7<MA*,f |tUW;tdl(l donottJ) I'irtk t<v> depj*y."5t*or. flBv^v^n^tn^ jit the "thatcr."'
"Jr *^T'r>f" *T*ff? * .^^* .^^TF^-J^' ^ ^ *r>*r .
\fondalc's wi should
ijf fo* taist i
I. M of the
th*t
tt^ the, ndinniietjv(t. fnr talcitjr'.tlt* troty* I think iiiat this i jf.oin.' (O'o?q*intfc''Kin > it1\iia^:i? nf ^ .-Now. oof fi!K J lirliiv<. is tin- v*ry m:kJaii^n that Ut> in tlia-ont our trtuinlp.ii)trart3 tJw war iti s* jJiLer thot i he" South Viptiinintw: Wdrawinp from Lndoi:liiaa,ftlHJ I think x sWUiuificr if'tlicv:i^Tinr sonic inoasitrtf ttt^wotet'tiiidr'aiily, li tJu-y haro nt to (his tmie but t!u-y emisafi-r, tiidy liuxv. that will Ih-H fwl tiint tlwy cO invadr part-* ytf^yrtb V'trtiiani or Uat 'au;..'h -xp-<lit'n>h< of- v?.rrtis. tyjii'S info N'nitl' -.Vri'tnatu. " - " - / ^'{tcn-foiv, 1 thiiik (hat iiw-iuust :.!.-.- it pluin thnt we vvtll ii>-i<her pniticiimti* hir wiH'tCK ^nppott this (VJH- of inilit:y ^tion. and i think that the bill that we projios*- to i<r vffeciivc^n.i^ \v liniitfil to thu. and it must I** lsrd on tlir fact that no fii&fc Li 1m oxi ^ti'lcd ,,wh.T4>ot'vr in this typoof an effort. -^ .-""Now. Wf fjui p.tul a itn( irrafty otiiov- thine.? itv tJion- if wo t-x>k drt-p ftuMiîj, bio* I, in wi,c Uîission. rh my .afiivmi'nt with Si-Jiarr Moii(Jj(-. i^tut thj^ to Wt!ii"~*>nrp p.-^-ntia.!-" of u tjiM'iiH'rit of jMlicy bv t[iif C-on-frriw that v will not invoJxv'mirw'vi-M :fi :,n iiu'nsion of Xorth Vii'tntm either by support or dirrgily. 1 t h i n k it Wfiiilil have n setUin^'.e'rf'ci't w.riil wwiT:} adi'nim* our \>f\iti Paris aa well ,* oiir-VirltrirawaJ inônt'r Vietnam. V.'C.itor ^ftNiie. Si-nsttor Mondule did make a VITV , Jnu. ftp hirntioiied yo'ir prior cwiunitincot \vliiclj . <<K <*-d you ta k-a ve tcinpbra riiy . I ycndfer wluf ir{iph>**d you uf*ni von'1 nrwnt vixit that cjn^-s voi? to !*-.!'fevr. tht the wvfhdrit\vttl. nud tnsiunte ywi Weun iwuplete ithÎc.i^'nf. wjH U> HfMiner tlinii T think''. J u.lj that caprcinl? irj view of tbv m-iir-ln iir jhe morning. PS.JMT wjiii-li ->:\\:+ ll-.c %:: \ vt. (iuv niidertaV'uj.'1'* ,'*':i1jMixunt 'tsa "urte f'rtn .-if furucillnn<v nf the in-ojiliof' V;ietn;:ir. Ffow dors fiipf-Mt. wilh your view of rapid withdratvul or o1.. yfKi tUink /."or " -v'*fv* are -oom-r tlmti we t h i n k ? IH -MOIHT than w/rne f*oplu tliink {K-cuufie previoui f-el
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^.H,t,,r S.\xne. Xo; &'u not sat&factvry to utc-^'hopp that '-*.f , that we wilt haw all of our troops put of them!i:I. hope !w.t re trifl ' ^-ûr iair:ttpport toa bawniiajiniiur: . /* v^tuZc the tirt that logisticaJly aatoogrn* they are ^ u* *ritireJy, on our weapitt >vad ^jnmiutKvon, *e &a_ , rwmt logical mpjKjirt. Buf. I-wbula Kit* td-tbtnV^** w_^wa., jw f^taowe of tb^ rttaattt that h*r^ linjttd**bft-lwt; t '
, I bclif, tln4 this urgwacy is ^ _ . . ' " " ' '" " I;twlicvr. lLat The \rith!rKai i,* couyrTo fo spee^nd npiocauaa of rhe inct that 3 these tr<**ps tre~ ijîenpiirpd fljcy beeonw morr pf" '. fc'nw JU^v pcrftmal cxjierieuce ^ La Jtotimrc rpi2h*Jon* I wi nn orgfttmwroo tlmt is withdrawn f r: witad , tlatfc i* in trrcn, Usriimss & gmit deal ^ttoiTliJEcnk to nuinUint any kind Jfcf -wdcr- 1 tiink~rl>c.dfQ< proht^n. flwfveneKa! disease ChJblwn. the Jaw al unJcr pirJtifein hwxrfiii ftsatfc- jfn<l wilt.Knve-TO'bc hajidleil in. an enurrl <li&hMrt" inauiifir-titsititlws with a ~ .-wrfvmw' EXTEKIINCE OJT B<*VT
.. ^ . saw on vor rcwwit trip thAt-âuwd yea to htîcvc that withdraw*! will lie fiorf<T. What VRK rhul.f 1 am nrttaâre of it. SH-nRlor .SA* tsr.. Fvr o>* t hing; J raj tunazed nt the nomfccrof ttoops in rear oiva* and fhc snmU numlvrs it) contact. The'|4*iw that am made itt the present time for future conta<T. aiv 3tiivr completely hidI!P or \vi-n1 IP tnvxirfrnt. In other voivjs,.* In> witliitnm l has poiinitlWI the South Virtnamefln to take a frwfJiiw pogitton. Xuw. I am 9\9O ronviixyyl tlu? ouiiidty rrfort*. whtrfi I looked r vffhâjjtain^f^jtlt.," w' true. "We re now ftpproarliuic tlw "point w^rctfe -rasosltiM ar*. To 30 or 40^1 wftet. Tlw nmhftje oaûnlt iee.ftwiu Jt^Ji_as the . " . r yrti-'have troops in a foreign country; Totj^jvi going to: have u certain anioctct of h<v4.y trafia, you art froitiî/): banstii certain amount, of inrfrUitntJ, lon>hMij*H.ana hWiteûc4drf^:>w-rfrtiw*pr jjoinsr-to iUHiijilctfl^<fo aw^;.vith.Ik6sl5le rafh;{e*. ^ftut I trasim'.p'rrsBpd-hr ttuv 'ovr^J'-that it liak readied at thi^.tjoa1-' . r
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\ nm qfuii i.rhjT\trtgr>d % tti^t fa.-f thai t.lu mt
-Jfts Wi-n jucnian^d, atiJ I think will U< inrreaacd-aprui.

S mTHIOU .{(.. IXl'MTJK AI.T\; ' ^ H f H TILAi.
fOSi. Wlin jeoo sttA1 withdrawal, do^yoa iifiude the-ottier; ~ " . Vrs. I thin!., as" voy IUK?W, ttir TbnilamT !' air for'-w! HTU| 1 thitik dwt u"'n- po'rng to
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Senator Conrae. I tliink Senator Saxbt has rrsaKif' . kin amemlnMtat very clear, and Jt>a hare bceh j
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-vi.suiu tfic put >'iS iwve to pit****. I n not a jnilit&iy nwiirkit I ice. Von have had much more diiwf serticeiiittt 1 think w b such action in
ay, idt>-.picil<>f jwii. rn' forthright. ^ j ^von very much.
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of maii-etcl t^hJi^j \in numof (urn over tort -^y j t l i iticftfmt3n'<;f:h*p'4Uni: tlicjn. inaiiitiiiiiii^ \hcrn. . . 1 fhiii vim tivv>-..tft itkke into c<>n'ni<^reti..i the fact tha{ zt Abandon t}itt:^/><<raajciit. You it " snovi in Xo*t-jt tbuik that fli^
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y d<r "ot^think this tro'uld not br fm-ihere ? Wharkind of eijyij>Vi'I /e not lra\v.tli<'rp? .dfiiu't"br((;^t.hfairiic.!<]>< V'HU!."
. A-xK. Wisi ^ a*n thitikii;^: about is primarily electroni 'Icctronic. "roijjputr? > t'iftwi|IiiK(irai>'JUvîii>Hj<!nt.'wb(i;lt-f.iM'y vout to use jf. %: <iiil I'-aki- it .'twri'C tii iin-. <Hitro? f tiir
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^"' " '-?-;. /-tnmorpie Hvwitiny ai-fl-Mt" 3.0*..ti '\\wry wltQ~tK^ye\>ie!*iikmt& ":' ~'" f)f yi'-tiv/ri* vû-mn-' ^.i)C'flA>' -? !5jt' v-'î < .-ti*y tojui-fcoijiiiiirti-r-Tii : ; ' ' ^r>s."^Vl'jîM'âjtftju^JV^djoiirtK'Ji . ," - - " . . - . . / " ' - . . -" -(.V?i*?r&ii&n fJiPfii)j.'i'u>:i*-j:-van wwAifuvA uf tS:^~p'.tTj...-io't4>''<<i-
PROPOSALS DELATING TO THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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ST\TES Sex ATT," Con virrefc ov FOKEIOK I&XATIONS, D.C.
1
IV crtinnwttff:jiwtrT)uraj_i^ t<vioi iw. t 11 :Jr aan^ in Boom 1221, Office Ruildifa^%iuCto!- -T. W.. Fulhrifrht (Ghirnun) " - Fulbrigtti^.SvuiingT.chv Pell, Aiken, Cuae, and
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timuttittee will cotne to order.
remits hfartngs ou propnsiU r:n<r-m tho cnaiiifr or 5lw ^>iw3jcstt'' ' ' " ""' ' "' ijiir^êiH-;hwii1 t^timoii-7 froift SI: . h-Ibt-lwivp they dctscn-e to IxOiwtjî.^KW .liataaRd lot-fry tê Cou^. ^5 wij hykJw officialîn tlie ^xc^tHtv*1 li-kr^'afttJ ^ <|t.*d!jllic i^wrally. You have a-lxw[-; tiv 7j._.-.-4hat'those'In the OorfcUuiiîjf-jrH^-iimkeÛi XationVpolicy da not C" " ~->i'H'iv^ '^vft " and-T amûretJiityouf rt.tjaii>ny today will Us ' helpful to f mi tny'oirii'-j^cruiii'i'hiit t re^fref re
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the
. -,.>V{iret tbfttv. It WH'ftjs lo in*1, to beîut ayrrflwr itLjtttnr of an in' * vhe onsgir tiTwrts o^ tJu's u;#r upon our | H * > p c . \ _ - J x v "! "-'. -""7 " r .-^ v -'' '-'""' " I want 1sotor<^âfcuIi^fv;VfwK^rryvyoKftndyoira8iiociatÛf^ The r*;,str-inf -l^hat yHT-tavc^?b<;tiftt, jcpctaiuly iu-tJic hearing the oftier xlav _>'jwui i-rj<--i-'creft-^f^ftiûiaJ'jtio?.ôr fwo^Jjere. I think you in a. nuÂ cwkruwiLuit/x i^'yibic'r throupljouf fhiu
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1 personally don't j?iO.W''of nnv .group -which would ha> liotfc jt greater justification fordoinjr it 'd *te<> tnare. îrTirjM-e vifttv of iue f ff^t of the war. As you know, th hn-; prrnru 'up 'i tin* i.>wn_ki' feeling that it is extremely dUBoult to jrM.sK'curarc' in format iou aJkmr the war and J don*t k<va- Ijriler sourre thnv you and your as*ovki%>s. So vvc are wry p/M-*ed fo ha,v you and yoHr.a^v-iat^-ijax Krrvy. A( tho ttoginninc jf you ;would gir to tlu? n^p^T'cr yoiir fall nunic"and a brief l>iogmhy soi^rat the i\vard will slif^r avîo V<MI sre. .St-Jiator JAVITS. Mr. CîairrtiiijC J '? d("\vn {'"'tv t"fi th<- vp cnp Attilerdny nnd>aw tL> X<>v Vork t'rouiVsud I xvould like I am very piwul of Mio duporttopni HnJ^rcnprai artirudc of the r I I.>af' it tr<>iuiiiUFS. I Ii.tvd jomod in flio Iiart,n%?:')lution,i'u>i. As a lawyer J bop*' you will lind ir posaihlo tu ootriij^-_wi(h thn iirdk-r/oA-or: th<mir!i, likcuhfr diairaian. 1 am nhft}>fY :<l>oirt-tt. T tliinli it f* our ioli to .sf-<> tliat youiiro biiitjiMv >cf t:j> i L alt<iniMf iv^- ô tlinf you can d'> tt'hf you rauutTsfn' fn do. I Ar'ltvHjt;. the factrthtit vou nn\<* and what VMi am doiii^;\ ~ ' f Applause.] " .'": i ' ^ Thi'<*UAii;*\N. Von may jiiii-oil, Mr. Kerrjv , STATEKEMT OF JOBS K^BEY. VIETJTAM VETETIANS AGAINST '-: THEWA3 Nfv. KI-KKV. TJisiik'Anii virv" imicli. Senator FiiH>nfiht. S-v-ritoi^ aviN, S-nator Syiniiipton. S-iiator-PrJl, 1 \onld }iki-.l.o;^y for t3u' . atid aliio fi^r t^*-. mon ^*JTI<1 flip wlio are nlstr wenriusr the uniforms and '.ivr wAal*. ttiat it,v siftirj; IH-TV ;>; .vallv syin!M\lic.I ain not hero" as John KIMTY. if urn !-MMI> as one uiomlxT j the ^T'MifV of 1/HK), whWi i :i small rrprûitHfinn of n n-ry much Jrsrir g.rup of v-ii*r:iu'i in jlii? coiinti-y. and wrn- it [u^sibic for oil of Ihrtn TA iîc at t h i s tnjjjp thV-v would l>o )njrv.ai)d li\ p t> t-lw? sain;- I.'ind of Ivsrimoiiy. f would >i:ii|i)v li(i to syfo.'!!!* in ^p^v î-iiccnl t<>.niiri. I fl|>'>lojrizi' if my "-tati'm^-iit i* ?'cii<-yn{ l'.-ar'^- I ri-n-ivi'd notificntion t.-Murda; you would hi-ar ii and 1 .ini nfra'td Ixv.mso of tlic injniictjon I w:ii ii[J inosr of thf. jiiphl itad 'flavin "t ha<! a. j^r^nf don! of cli.iiirf t-o pivparf.
I would like to talk, ivjrtvwiitiflir all dK^ Vf-fi-nniiR, and fv no In jMroit. w* Inid.VUf iiiiv-sti^nlirtn-Hf which r>ililv disdi"aty:d nnd nviiiy v^-ry hi^'lj'y d--.ivr:i)pd v i ' i ' - . <j war rritues ff>iwmttttl it; !>(niit lii'avt Asia, ticrf imlatfd ;'n'ikd on dsv-t^ -da v ba.-j.f wit<j tJ' fII ?i w:tnJt is impcw-vliri' to dfscrilfc t"ii in it. t.fo t-'fnoH<r>s in ilw>.ro<im. <lic Wliiifr- of t!i<' men who \vcr<v .r^jiviujf iht-ir f-xjxîi'fU'r 1 ? -;?i ViHiiam. 1>U' T)ICV did. Tltcv ri/livt-ii fho :il>oint/ Iviri'or of whf.ti>j^ 'y>Mntrv. JH a ft-Ji 1 * 1 . >ii:uic them [. TJlfV (/>ld t'u- rtoni-" ft* t'lnc? they f'^cf -fH-rcrtrn'lv nif>"d. f>il oif nf off licndi;. tn]^'l wir<-- /rin portftbl'- f<'lr;.l|on<';- to !iin;i:i!i i6c'-: smd MjpviJ nn llir j^v.i-r. /'Hi oil' limlH. lilowri U[> o"!}'!)1!*. îlv ^1">I a't rivjl'n.*. ra/-d i'ilJa;vs in f.i-iliion n-ininivnt fif i'r<{ J> ha.'i. .-ciioi fi.tllc urid ''"/x for fun. [K>ioiii'd food '-toi-l; -. : ind p-tic.';i)]v i-:ivu{i_<J tJi>' V(.i<n.r> ride of Soiitlj Vii-liufd jfi >i'WJjio>, to
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the iiunanl rnvR^r f>)' war. and the normal and very particular ravaging wltU-li is C!MO by the Applied bombing power of this countrv. We call this "investigation the "Winter i-Soldier fnve>iiiration.r *The term ^Yi.itcr Soldier" is a play on words of Thomas Paine in 1770 *rHni hft"pokr of the Sunshine. Patriot and summertime soldiers who .deserted at Valley Forge l>ecause the going was rough. "-TVi1 who have, come here to Washington have oi>me here because we |VpI we have to le winter soldiers now. We could come hack to this country: wo could be ouie.t: we could hold our silence: we could not tell wi'uir went on in \ ietnam, but we feel because of what threatens t!ii< country, the fact that the crimes threaten it, not reds, and not rtlcoats hut the. crimes which we are committing that threaten it, that w<- li.ivo to speak our. FKEUXCS or MKN rowixo BACK FROK TIETXAX T would like to talk to you a little hit about what the result w of the foelinjrs thfsp men CMITV "with them after oomine hack from Vietnam. 'Hiei-'innf ry doesn't know it vet. but it hasrrejUcd a tnonstw, a monster in r|t> fonn of millions of men who have "been taught to deal atwl to tirad'o in violftnr. and who are giêji the *-hanoe to die for the bigpwt jiOtTiinr in history :ineu who have reinrned with a sense of angw and* *MI^-' of iM-tniyal wliidi no one ha3 yet.grasped, A ft veteran and one who feels this anger, I would like totalk about if. We arc angry IxvAiise we ff^] we liave been used in the worst fashion by the tulniinis<raHminf thisiwnntrv. ' T:i 1079 at We!f Point. Vice President Ajrnew said "some glamorize the rr'miinal misfits of society while our !vst men die in Asian rv* [cidtlies to presen-e tlw fre<xlom -which m<t of those mi-efits abuse." fin.1 rhis wfl8UKi>d ass rallying point foronr effort in Vietnam. J?nf for us. as Iw-vS in Asia whom the count ry was suppowd to support, his statement i a terrible rlisrortion from which we can only draw :i very ?<*[> wn*c <>f rcvjilsion. Hence tlip anger of some of the men who are Men* in Washington today. Tt i*. a dislortion localise we in no way CMn-fdrr 011. wH'e. Iic IK-.I* men of this country, l*ause, those he calls i/i-t.-tit'- won? KtaiK'iing up for us in u way that nol>oH v else in this coun,r\ tl:irrl tfi. ix'r;iii>^ pd many who have died would have returned to t : (ji utir.trv tu Joii: f l i o ini-sfit.-; in their efforts to a.k for an immediate y. :ii.Imwa1 fivmi Sl.nitli Vietnam. l<e<-3ii-ie *> niMiiy of tlrose lest men l(.n'- rf-fiinpH a^<juadriplcgics :md nmpnfees,anf| they lie forgotten in Vfff'iMtis" Adiuinitr:ition lîspitali in tlii-* i-onntry whi<-h fly the flag -n-liii-ii -in niaftv have cliosin as their own jvrvrti:il -yml>o1. And we cantioi iii-'idpr oiir-^-lw-s AnV'rir-n'.K Ite.jf roni wlien we ore ahamivlof and !iM!f-.l wh:i. we were called on I do in Sot:iheat Aia. IM our opini'iu. :iiul from 'uir experience, then* i< nothing in South Viei: urn. nothing W!IK!I '-oul^ hnppen that reali<-li'-:il1y threatens the I'li'lf-l Sfjfj-s iif Anjfrif. AiiiHo attempt to jiiiCtifv the loss of one A i i i ' - r n - a i i !tfr in ^"f^t^>:lllJ. fiunltoclisr, oj- T>q/r= by linking sucli lows t/> t'.ic iiir^-rv-îion of fm-ilom. ;< hicli tjio^- misfit-"iipposi-dly abuse, is in 'i- HiHiV'igbf nf i-r'uii'inl hyif^'ri-y. !iul it Istlrit kind fif hypo, risv -.\'i '"li-i-i 1 fii-1 h.'i^ton; iliiiivj!!jitryapart. \\'f 11 :v fji-i;-lj;i.l'H" i'T-ir|i tnon ;irigr than lhaf and I don't want to go irii i'.. f*ivitfM |i'ilic\ ;i-|-rU U-cati-ii- I am outclassed lcre. T Imow UM! l! uf yu t u l k u l n n i f rvery jfi-.'i!>le alternative of getting out of
Victiiant. We understand that. "~e know yon have considered -faf serionsnfes xf the a^XHrta to tlie utmost level "and I am not going to try to dwell OH hat, but I want; to relate to you the feeling that many.pf'the men \vlio ha.ye retu rned to t his country express because we smftrobRlnj^ o airiest About all th)t we were told about Vietnam and aoout the -1 vr against communism. ',
\V HAT 'AS FOirXD AND UUKNiU IX VIETNAM
We found that not only was it a dvi^waiS an e&K.t;tv. avjx*>jTi.fc w_ho had fur years been secJiing their liberation from any colonial Influence whatsoever, but alô TVC found tlhtt the Vietnamese whom we had cnthusiattJcally molded after our own image wore hard put to ta!:j up the tight agaVti'st. th."- thrc-at-wi- ere supfK^-dly sjivin^thcm from. We fomid most. iK)pU- didn'l PVWI know the differc-are ix-t ween comlaiinisni "nil democracy. Tlicy only wjuit4>d to work ii riv paddies witiiout jx>ptei-s W.rafinp t<hcn> /ind t>oinbs witJi napalm burning their nltMîis and tearing; their country apart. They wanted everythi>; to do with the. war. particularly with this foreign presence of t he United Sta^s of America, to leave tliein alone in peace. :i -1 py pracfi^-d the nrt of suri'ival by hiding with whichever in tmw was present t particular tin?", be it Vieteong. Xordi Vii ...lese, or American. tt'e foiiud also tlmt all too of feu American men were dyiiifr in those. fira paddi& for want of sup JX) it from their allies. We. saw lirst li:ind riow money from Ajrierican tuxes ws used for a corrupt dictatorial regime. We saw that many people in this country had a one-sided idea of who was kept free bv our flag, as blacks provided the highest (K.Toentagc of casua.lties. We saw Vrietnaru ravaged equally by Amenon !>nili>:in well as by -arch and destroy nii.sion>, as well as bv Vieiconr terrorism, and yet we listened while this country tried t^ blame all of the havoc on tlie Vietcong. We rationalized destroying villages in order t^- .a-ve. tlieju. We SMW America lose her>ejiheof nwirality a-* slie a'<-ept4'l vcrj'cooMy a My Lai and refused to give up the image of American .soldiers who huud out rli'H-olsite Itnrs and chewing gum. We learned the meaning of free fire zones, shooting anythin:r th:it moves, and we watched while America placed u cheapness on the lives of orientals. \Ve wiilehfld the IT.S. faKitiâtion of Ixxly connis. in fact the glorification of iody counts. W<- Ii-*en4-<l while month after month we were fold the lack of theeiicim WH.- about toln't-:ik. We f<mghf using veapon.- ag;iiii>t ""rii-iita! liuriuin Ix-ing^." w i t h i|iinl;il inn marl;^ :iroun<l t h a t . We foiiglit u-iiig weapon.- against tlio^ 1 [ii-opli- w hich I do not l,c. l i e v e t l i i - iHiiii j-y would dream of n-iiig wi-re \\e f i j j h t ' n g in the KiU'oIM- in theater or let us wiv H lion t h i r d - w o r l d jn-oph- I heater, and -o we watclip<l while men chargt-J up Iiills I>ef;iu-<e a general .-aid t i n t h i l l lias to !K- taken, and after lo-ing one platoon or two platoon.- t l u - v nian-hed away to leave the high for the reocciipation I\ the N'<mli Victnamc^- derail.-*- we watched jiride allow the mo.-t u n i m p o r t a n t of battle- to IM- blown intoint. And ^ then- were Hamburger H i l l s an-l Kin- Snnhs and Hill >>^1V and Tire Has- t/.-, ;in.'J so m a n y olheis.
1S3
VKTffAJOZATION
Now we are told that the men who fought there must watch quietly while American lives are lost so that we can exercise the incredible arrogance of Viflfrim""g $h^ Vietnamese {Applause.] The CHAIKKAX. I hope you wont interrupt. He is making a very . significant statement. Let him proceed. Air.. KKKCY. Each dav to fiwilitate tlie process by wliirn the \ faited States washes her hands of Vietnam someone has to give up his life so that the I7nited States doesn't have to admit something that the entire world already knows, so that we can't say that we have made a mistake. Someone has to die so that President X ixon won't be, and these arc liis words. *tLe first President to lose a war."1 We are asking Americans to think about that because how do you ask a man to be the last, man to die in Vietnam} How do yon ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake? But we are trying to do that, and we are doing it with thousands of rationalizations, and if yon read carefully the President a last speech to the people of this country, you can see that he says, and says clearly :
"~' Dut tot ttmic, pfltitt)dir the wnw? ovDuuniiUUi. sod 01^ QQGKMO is Wanner or mat we iriU leave that country to the Commonlsu or whether or not we wfU try to (ire it hope to be a free people.
But the point is they are not a free people now under us. They are not a free people, and we cannot- fight communism all over the world, and I think we should hare learned that lesson by now.
KETUBVIXO VETKRAVS ABE VOT BEAULT WAVTH)
But the problem of veterans goes beyond this personal problem, because you tiiink about a poster in this country with a picture of Uncle Sam and the picture says '"I want you." And a voting man comes out of high scliool and sivs, "That is'fine, I am going to serve my country." And he goes to Vietnam and he shoots and he kills and he does his job or maybe he doesn't kill, maybe he just goes and IK- comes bark, and when he gets ba/:k to this 'country he finds that he isn't really wanted, because the largest unemployment figure in the country it* varies depending on who you get it from, the VA Administration 15 percent, various other sources 22 percent. But the largest mrp f nrifiuploycd in thi.s country arc veterans of this war, and of those veterans 33 percent of the unemployed are black. That means 1 out of even' 10 of the Nation's unemployed is a veteran of Vietnam. The hospitaL LC row tlie country won't, or cant mei-t their demands. It is not a question of not frying. Tliey don't havetlie appropriations. A man recently died after he had a tracheotomy in California, not he/'Hune of tlie operation but because tliere weren't, enough personnel to r-lean the mucous out of his tube and he suffocated to desth. Another young man juRt died in a Vew York VA hospital tlie other iLiy. A friend of mine wa Iving in a U-d two IMV|K ar.ay and tried t'i Iielp him, but lie couldn't. lie ruujru Ijell and tlien* wasjiolwxiy (lie re to ju-rriw that man and HO In- died of convulsions, I understand 57 percent of all lh/w entering tlie VA hospitals talk about ftji'-ide. Some ^7 jviccnt hu\e trh-d, nd they try because they
184
come back to this country ajul they have to face v.nat they did in Vietnam, and then they coou- :>ack and find tho- indlfferwice 01^ country that dofsnt really Vam^that doesn't realiy care. , - i
LACK OF MOEALiSBWXATrOXis'CXrreD STAJES - ~" /
Suddwiiy wo are faced with a very sickening situation in this coun- _ try, : ^canse there is no moral indignation and, if there is, it comes from people who arc almost exhausted by their past indignations, and I know that many of diem arc sitting 'in front of me. The country seems to hare lain down and shrugged off something as serious as Laos, just, as we calmly shrugged off the loss of 700,000 Jives in Pakistanf&e so-called greatest disaster of all times. Bat we -Are here as veterans to say we think we are in the midst o: the greatest disaster of all times now because they are still dyin" over therc. and not just Americans, Viebuur<ese, and we are rationalizing leaving that country so that those people can go on killing each other for ye^rsto come. Americans seem to have accepted the idea that the war JA winding down, at least for Americans, and they have *lso allowed the bodies .which were once used- by a President for statistics to pcoye that we" were winning tha* war," to be used as evidence against * -man .who followed orders and who interpreted those orders no differently than hundreds of other men in Vietnam. ..:./: We veterans can only look with amazement on the fact that this countrv hats been unable to eee there is absolutely no difference between "rounJ troops and a helicopter crew, and yet people hare accepted a- : differentiation fed them by the administration. No ground troops are "in Laos, so it is all right to kill "Laotians by remote control. But believe meJhe helicoi>ter crewj fill the. same body bags and then- wrwk the same kind of damage on the Vietnamese and Laotian countryside as anybody else, and the President is talking about allowing that to go on for many years to come.. One can only ask if u-e Kill really be satisfied only when the troops march into Hanoi. taxtn.fr FOB ACTION* nr OOVCRESS We are asking here in Washington for some action, action from the Congress of the I 'ntted States of America which has the power to raise and maintain armies, and which by tlie Constitution also has tlie power to declare war. We hare comn here, not to the President, bcoa.u;*' we believe that fliis txxly can \>e reK}>oiwve to the will of the ]>eople. and we believe that the will of tlie jjeople says that we should be out of Vietnam now. F.XTEKT or twtauFM or nmiAif WAH Wp n< } liere in WasJiiuû also to say that the problem of thia w* is not jast u. ({uettlion of war and diploioacv. It is part and parcel oi everything: that we are trying as human Ijeiiig* to coflimunicate to jHioplf in tliis r/>untry. the question of nu-Min, which in rampant in tJu.' military, uul su ninny other qiwrtioiis alxn, tfie use of wcajmns, t]i<- hyjHKTiHy in our iaking umbrage in th Gev. C>jnventwmK aiul tliat ut jutftification for a continuation of this war, wlieii we
wjcejjuilty than *ikyr.otlxer body oi:riuhitwn& of

. m the uSeofcfrue re yxnics. harasjnMT.t intecdvetiottjfircv th? boinbJ&^^}ie4or>urp of j>i4abncr>t,' . . , _ _ . t !; killing of prisaiwrK,-acciptod jiolicy iâany units in South Vietnaui. .That is what w are -trying, to say. It Is part and parcel of everything. . ,_ .. . _. ->. _ " : An A/nericau Indian f riruwi of mine, who li vs in rhfl lliduui Nation of Afcaf-rsz j>ut it to me ycrj- succinctly. I le told in< itow as lx>v on an Indian rc*n-attoii Ju; had wato-hed television and IH used to clu*r jvbcn ihfty ftw in a'id shot 4 IM>- Indians, ajid tJwji .iud^ . y Lc. stoppixl in Yio*,uani and Jio said "3fy God, 1 am doiujr *o tlh-dc ]x>o|>]f tht'YCJT same thing that was .done to my people." And h? som*-iL And that is,:hat ivt- an* trying to say, thatêifeirilc this thine nas to end. "~ -:~ -.^ ~_
~ 1VHKKF. IS TUB LK^mXSHIl'? * -
- We are also h*-iv.44> aak, and we aic ]wn TO sk -colieiitt'tjtl arc tin- loadc'ni "I, our couittrj-JJ Whiro i#Afej leadf^sljifj ?"W to ask.vi'lu-R.1 ani'MoXamanu Kfi3t/i-,Jiiiiidy..<i{patf: and >o many others. Where an- thv now" that WP, tlie luui \v]>oin they sicnt olF to war. nan1 jv'unifd? Tliix :ij'e coiuinandi'J'b .wlio have ditvrt'ii thoir t C(M|~. ^:uJ ThtTt1 i^ io mot* serious orinic iw'tho ia^rof warrThp Army -;: if- 1 1;:- y >ii m *'-r 'c:\f lh;r wounded. _ The Manias sav Jhey IH-VIT l<-avv even tlu-ir i-ad. ThcBe'lufin.iiav* left nil I lie <-nnu-ii(ie .tiiJ retivjit^l behind a pious sh'u-ld of public r-:-i;:;i:i-.l'.'. 'J" : .i'V 'lav^ 1 U'ft l!ie r.-ol <ii(l' <f tlirir reputift iirti? bleaching'ix-liiiid i!i;-ni in tlifsiiJi iji this country.
AliilJM-TIIATIONV vrrKMlT Tl
! v, t]li^ ;uirniiiisU'aJ ion hn>-done UH tlirflimate dishonor. They i.'iiijrtwl l<>di:<ovn TIS and the sari'iiuY1 weuiadi' fortJiisrounOy. bhjjdn.'.-âud fear (ItcvlintL 1 tried lodojiytliat wp*r-- veteraup or that ix'e wrveij m Xauu iVe do it ntvd their (wrtimony. Onr own w;ir.-. ami stmujK of limta are wihiessrp enough for <itlta-rs ard for ')ii[>*'ivpp; " . ~.-j'~~ V.'P v.isli tliat a me.jv-.iful God <x)ul1 -jfi uwa\- our own nu-Jttofk* if (h:if wrvicj- :IH easily us Jliw adiuinistratujii lias wiped their jnfctjiorit-.-< of ii,. Hut ^11 thai they have, done^nd all that thry fMido by this dcni:il is lu ni.ike more I'leartlmn e ver our own detennnntt ion to undertk.- inn- l.-i.vt mi.-!!MiiK to search old ud destroy tJw last. w-!>tiL> of 4îw hprlinr ic war. t" |ai'ify our own lirarts. to coii'juer tlu? hstv and the fi-jir thai have ilf'uMi this .Dmitry fliew last JO vtârs and uton, and o wiii-ii. in "1(1 years from now, our brother* jro down ilie tftreet withuuf H !>%;, niUtout ;i;i urin. or a fart^ and small IXJVB ask why, we will IK* ;il>lc in say "Vietnam*" and not nw*n mdeseit. not a filUiy ohsceue rjwi[i'ry luittiu-au instead llie pJaw wljpn- AJIMTW-JI finally liirapd and wlw:e .-.oldieis lila- us l^Jfied it in IJw turninit. Thank you. | A{JilaiJ*'.] 'I'lfi- C I I \ MMKM>.\TION
OK
- >-c~-.'-" V. i s,sKt yon wished to comriiunicate. 1 can't imagine anyone comc-^'. " nmim-atmj: more eloquHuitlr .Cbxh\you did. I think it is extremely ?-/-'' - ''lielpfn' and''beiieTfcial'16'-n>ti"Coiiiniittff'- ^nd the country to have you , " . " . " make >ijrh _a^tati'iiHMi(. - .< Ijeeli awake all >>i<r|it. 1 run see ttiat you SJMMII tliat indv<l. | Iâiuriiter.} . Periiaps tliat was the fn'tteV part, l*ettt-r tliat you shoiod l>e awake than otherwise.
* l l > ItKM'ICK 'OMM'TTK>:
(hat the iiiifstion U-fon- thiscouiinitttv uinl tW<'oiiw to -nu tlf.i\var-~T!n' ivsolntious -.lUuit which -b\,- U-fiilitsiriiii.' li'stihiuiu linfili^ tLf |i:ist M-MTU! t\:i\<. llu 1 S-JMHISOIS of .vhirh :in- soini- inrjiSiprs of t l n > i-oliii;iitltf. :uv x-rkin;.' Jlu 1 most "j)ru-tic:il way that wo can t'i:il and. I In-lk-vc. to <lo it ai tli<- -arlirst o|ijHrtnnitA that wv CHII. Thai i> the piirjiosr. <ji't!i<'s' iu-arin^s and lli:v> inw-Hvyou vM'ii-iiroiiÎit IK-IV. \tMiJ;,tve U-*1!! vt-i'y 'ln|t-ut :ilKut flu- n-ason^ wliy wi- should |>ro(.n-cJ as ijiiickly as |Ksvih1r. Alt- you f:iinili;ir w i t h some of (litfHxt>o-:aI-i 4iefiMv this c*m.iiiH'< Mr. KI.KKY. Yos. I Hin.'Sriiafor The l"jiAiu-\\. l>oyou sii|i|M>i1 or do you have any partirnlar views fllxnif Mtiyonc of tin-in you wisli to irixe rhee<ntiniillee'. .\fr. Krjuir. My feeling. Spnatoi. !< undoulrfi-dly this Con-rn-ss. ane-iriiiiistii-. i>ut I do not lH-lie\e that thisConpivvsi K'ill. in fai-t. end the war a> we would like to. w h i c h is iniiiiedinMv tiitd imiiateralli and, therefore, if L were (o|i4-iik 1 would say \vt> voiild s*>t a date und the dale i>!>viotis!\ wui:!d ! tlie earlH-1 |K>Nsililp dale. Hut I would like to sav. in an.-\verinjr tliat. that I do u,>t U-Iieve il i-s riMU-.-âr\ to .1ail an\ loner. I h a \ e U-eii to 1'aris. I hav<" talked willi hoth ilele^'atioiiK t the jMac<- talks, that is to say the Ife-ni'N-iali' 1 I>e|>nhlii' of \'iefii:itn ;uid the I'roVHioiml IJcvolutifMiarv *io\erf.tui'irf an<! of all eijHit of Madam liinh'.s |iint.sit haslx'tii staferl time and time a;ruin. and was stated hy Senator Vance Hartke vrheu lie returned from I'ari*. and it has IMH-II stated l>v many other oflii-iaIs f this <I\vrwneHt. if tjie I'nited States were to wt :i date for with drawn) the prisoners of war would l>e returned. I f h i n k this negate.-, very elearly tiie nrffimenl of the I're-i'lent t h a t we have to maintain a invseniv in Vietnam, to me as a ne<fotialitu'~ llcck for the ri-tnni rf thoM- priso. -. The rttiiir of ;i date \ \ i l l i < i'C(iiu>' l i.-h t h a t . A - ' f ^ i / h e , irmnefit eonceniin^ flu* danî-r to our tro<ii>- A ere \M-IO wiflitlr-!i .-^"Matc t h a t we wonhi. f'tey h q \ c al-i-i Niid maiix time-, in '.orniiU'lft'!!! \ . ' t ! i that -itateiiient t h a t nil of our troop-', the ninineMl we set :i d>tti, xviTl !M' -_'i\en <;i(t- eoridnel out of Vietnam. The o n l \ - olhi-r
i l l i | " ' ? 1 . l t l l puilll I - t h i l l V'.r : | l | f > the >i|i|'l| V )i<t ) f i ! i i i ' < 4 ' ) M ' l i ( i | | 1 -
t i ' i ' i i M i n - t ' l i - i r own f'llni'e und t h a t >i-!i-iitll>K 'K w l i a t > l i a i c \* : (ij'litiriL' fur a n v w a i . I w ' d ' i l - l . t h e r e f o i " . - n l n i i i f t ! f ; i t i n - t n . , - ~ [ f-Mu-dier-t Tin':i!ir of ^"'H in;' oni >( >-mi!i V i e i ' i HIi w o u l d ! IMC i f i r J ' l i - i d c n t 'if ti;<- I ' l i i t c d .<ta'n-; l'< 'I ! : i i i ' > IVM-J' vi r. I "i -*n|i t l i 1 - Mi i id . o i i i i n i 1 mi'iil < .1 i c ' l a t f ;i i a I : e ^ l l i i i ' . l i - e Tllii-M K \ K h l e m I" L'l'':'-. .ii'Ci'pt :| n ' l S l t ion l<-^' l i n t ' V. 11 i t ' l l
=OJ
>^WQuM wipjresettt.ahihe poliucnl foixvsof the country which is in fact what fc-represuitative government is supposed to doand ^vlncli is in i.-" faet^rh&t this Government here in, this. country purports to do. and
. poH the troops out without losing ^ne more American, and still fnrtherjcitiiout JOfiug t he Scut h Vietnamese. " .- . ' .- >;','
DESIRE TO IttSKNtUCK KROM V1KTN AX
\x. You seem to/wl that there fa still some doul>t alx>ut the desire to disengage. I^dwt believe that is true" I believe then- has taen a tremendous change in the attitude of the iieople. As reflected in the. Congress, they do wiyh to- i'sengage and to bring the war to ar. wad ttisoor. as we can. Qi-nmox is now TO DISKXC-VOK The question Ufore us is how (o do it. What is the best means that is most effective, taking into consideratioM the circumstances with which all governments alv Ivjirdened'. We have a pncedeut in this same country. The French hftd rui exjMTM-nce. perha|)s not traumatic " as otifs'has Uvn. but ncvcitheleas they did make up .heir minds in : the spring of li>54 ai>d within a few weeks did bring it to a dose. >MHiie of us have thought that this i. a precedent, from which we could learn, for ending Midi a war. I have |>ersoiul!y advocated that th's Ls the best procedure. It is a traditional rattier classic pirordiint of how to end a r that could IK- called .a staleirute. that neither side apparently has the cajiaeity to end by militai-v victorv. aiid which apparently is going to go on for a long time. Shaking only for myelf, this seems the more re .û.'bl procedure. I vtV'at yuu want it imme\{uUelv. bat I think that procedure was about as imVucdiate as any In- which a country has ever succeeded. , coding such a conflict or a srinilar conflict. Would that not. api*t'&l to Mr. KT.KRY. Well. .Senator, frankly it does nrrf apfN>al to me if A ican men have, to continue to die when they don't have to. particularly when it seems the (rover.iment of ihis country is more concernetl with the legality of when* uu-n slivp than it is with the legality of wh-.'re they drop fjombs. | Applttuse.] 'the ^*HAOtM>x. In tin- case of the FnMieh wLvn they made uj> tlieir iLiiid to taki' tin- matter up at tbt- itmf^naw. in Oencva. they <li<l. Tlw tint t:\i\np fi,.-\ .ltd WUK to arrange ft o^sejire and the killing did cease. Tiu-ii it. tookonhvl tlinik. two or .three weekKtotidy up all the details rejfardin;; the wifhdrawHl. Actually wiieii they modi- up th<*i> mind to 4op i-lte war. tlu\v did have H tvaxetire which is- what you are ree/wiiinend'uiK ax the f\rnt srtep. Mr. KtMit . Yen. *ir : tliut IK i > frn > ct. Tittj'.l'iiAHtMtN. It did not. dra^' on. Tlwy didn't continue t/> fight. Tlwy stojipi'd 1 1 ic t"/!itin^ bv ajfri*MiietU when they wi'iit to (iriiiT>i and all tin- 'Wintri.-.- tlien dii>i-ily inv.itvcd fiaftic; pitted in tlmt I do.i't uiwh l" pie.-is ton on the .let.iils. It i> for the iTinmiitei> to d'-terwiiii" the IxtJ irc-avrx. but you Ituve ffhvii ni(4 iJrM|uently th>t nuiwHis why we tin ,ilu prociî I H* early '..* * -nn. That ix. of the purjKtJc of the- I
'
1S8
Mr. KKB*vtM'nator, if 1 nry inierjoet, I think that what we are trims: to say fe we do have a method. We t*licve. we do have a plan, and t i,a? ^h-.a 13 that if this hodcvrcte by some moans cither to p*hmr a shtvhil referendum in this country so that the country itself uiipht divide and therefore avoid this recrimination which people constantly in fi-r 10 or if they couldn't Ho that, at l-ast do it through immediate legislation which would state there xvoiild he an immediate ceasefire ami s. ; woukl IM> willing to undertake negotiations for a coal'tion ovvri:mcnt. Hut at the present moment that is not going to happen, MI \\v un* talking about men contm'iing lodie for nothing and I think there is a. tiemendotis mo nil question here which the Congress of the I'nitot'l S::ifr: is ign>: ing. Tiic^ V'HAII.-MAN. Tin- I'ongrci.. csuu..>: dir?etlv under our system iii>gi>!iittc :i rc.i.-M'-Hiv or anything of this kiml. Vnder our constitution:! I -.yvlcm c i-:in hdvise tlie 1'n-si.lcnr. W.> have to jHrsuade the I*r4 >iilritt r>f rlif iirp-in-y >f taking rhU ut'iinu. Now we have certain \v:u> in vv!ii<-h tirfe<'f.- appropriations \vii!-li i- ili> most eoi-.i'tx'te positi\i- wav the Con^n'.ss ran express .it-lf. Hut Cuiiyivss Isa< no ruparity mulcr our >yMi-in to jro o\\t ,'iij neîtfi:ii.' a eeasr-Sre. \V"e have to pcrSuadi- the Kxcniti\T to ilo tlii? for
tii." rilimt ;_. .
KXTi:\tii:j\.\i:v i:t>.iv>\r. HKMAM>W> nv RxntAoiaiivAKV QFKSTIOV Mr. Ki-JT^. Mr. Chainimn. I n^Ym- thai full well as a <r\\dy of |M>lhiral wienw. I realix? tiiat > rai;not negotiate treaties and I t.-ali/e that ^ven my visits in I > ari^. pivri-rlriifs had hwn set by Senator 5M*rthy and others, in a j-ns an- on the Ixirdrrline of private Lri<Th,'ilii'^snôtiatiu<r. tt ivtcrn. I ninlfi-stand tlirsethinp<. Hut what I ;im KU'in? is that J U-liovc that :!ic;-" is a mood iri this rountrj--; i'.i''li I Irnow you are aware of arid you ha\v ln-oii 'rie of the strongest ritir^ nf this war for the longest time. Hut I think if wo can talk ri tili.-. li-îslatii-p |KX!\- aliout iililtusffrinjr for porklwrn-l proprnms. tli ii wi- sliould start now to talk alKHit tililni-steriitjr for the saving of lj u -s a nd it f our country, f A pplause.J Aiid this. M.r. Chuinnan, is what we are tryinp to convey. I un lerstand. I reuiiy am r.wmv that then are n tn-mendous niirnIMT of dMVicultiefi in trying to (tersuadc the Kxerutivc to move at this time. 1 U'l'cve they arc cx>mmitted. I don't believe we ran. But I hoj>e lliut we ar?not pn<; t" have to wait u n t i l l'.7'_' to liave this tlec.'wion niadr. Ajid w.'tnt I am bug^crting is that I think this is an extraordinary enough iv'estion s/i ths( if dejnamls an extraordinan* n-nponne, unrl if we 4'an't r*-.-(Knd extraonJinnrily t<" this problem then I doubt very seriously as inn, on i-.u-h that we will Ix- able to respond to tlie other H^rioiiH (|iieKtion<4 whi<-h fare us. I think we hate to Mart to con.-idiT tliHt. Tliis i< what I am trvinj: to xay. If tliin body could j^rhajm call for a referendum in the country or if we roiild |>erha|>H move now for a vote in ;{ wwkw, F think'the people of this country would rise up and back tiuit. I am not Haying A vote Tint ion wide, I am talking about a voU> here in Concretm to cut off the fundtf. and a vote 10 |>erha[>fi IM a resolution calling on the Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of tlte war, and to do
ISO
the things that uphold th -V things which wt pretend to be. That is what we. arc asking. I don't vûik we can torn our backs on that any loncer, Senator. The Cn AIKXAN-. Senator Symington ! wmnww' RRUVK'K nmmA-noxs Senator SvMixniox. Thank you, Jlr. Chairman. Mr. Kerry, please move your microphone. You hare a Silver Star; 1m vo you not if . Mr. KKKUV. Yes, I do. Senator Si uiNintix. Aiul a I'urpJe. Heart? Mr. Knn:r. Yes. I do. Senator S\w '. r-v. How many clusters? Mr. KKKUV. Two rl'is'crs. . Senator SVSIIXUTOX. S<> you have been wounded three times. Mr. KKKKV. Yes, sir. Senator SraixuroN. I have, no further questions, Mr. Chairman. TheC'ii.HKMAX. Senator Aikea. [Applause.]
NOKTII VIKTXAMKSK AKI> W ATT1TUI>K TOWARD PEPIKITK WIYill'ttSWAI, DATB
Senator AIKKX. Mr. Kerry. t'ic Defense Department seems to feel that if we sot a definite datp for withdrawal when our forces get lou-n to a certain level, they would ht seriously in danger by tlic North Vietnamese and the Yiefronp. Do you believe that flic tforth Yirtnanu-sc would undertake to prevent our withdrawal from the country and attnck the troops thai remain there? Mr. KKKKV. Well. Senator, if I may answer you dir.-iily. I lielievc we an nmniu^ that danger witii the [>resent course of withdrawal liecause th ['resident has nejilected to atatc to this country exactly what his res|M>f,sc will lie when we have reached the point that we do have, let _tw wiy,1, 0/XX) su(|>ort troops in Vietnam. Senator A IKK.V. I am not telling you what I think. I am telling you what the D.-partment a\*. Mr. K KW ;Y. Yes, si r ; i uiulersf and that. St>nator AIKKX. Do you U-lievi- the N'orth Vietnamese would M-riously uiu'i-rtake to imfiede our complete withdrawal? Mr. K uitr. N'o, I do not U>lievu that th' North Vietnamese wmild and i Ins IMVII cU>nrly indicntexi at the Fari /eiuv talks they would not. Scmtor AIKKX. Do you think they mijrht heljt oarry the Imp- finusf ITAuirJiter.] Mr. Knw\. I would MIV they would Li> niore ]>nuie to do that than tl.f Army of Jjie Sou' It {'ietniimi'^'. (Iâutriiter.j f Appiiiusc.J AIKKV. I think your answer is ahead of my <|iut>ti<),i. *(:<>% I wns pMiiif to attk you next what tlu* attitude of thf Saifr.i, ^ itietit. would IN> if we aniioun***! tliat we were going to witlnlruw our <rrw|M. wiy. l>y OcUjln-r 1st. ami lx> foniiflefely out of (lu-r*- --air. ne/i. Iniul (Mviiifr thfiii on tlM-ir own. What, do you think would U- liu? attitude of tlie Saigon jrovernnu-nl under thoiie
I'.H)
Mr. KKKKV. Well, I think if we were to repluix- the Thicu-Ky-Khieni ivfrtnio unit offer thuso nun saM.-tnary $oniwltorw. which I think this Oovi-mment. has an obligation to do sinro wo created that government and Mip|K>rTod it nil along. I think them would not ho any problems. Tin' niimhor two man at the Saigon talks to Atnltasuidor Ijun was nskril hy tin* ("uncorned Ijynii-!i. who "visited with them in 1'aris lust inuiiili. how |onr they felt they couUI sur\ivo if the I'niled Sta.es woulil pull tint and his answer wns 1 week. So 1 think clearly we do ha vc t face this question. Hut I think, having done what we have done in thai country, we have an obligation to otfer sanctuary to the perhajis j.tNMt. ..KiO tioople who might face, and ohxioiisly they would, we understand Ir-'l. might faiv political assassination o>- something else. Itut my filing is that those :;.(KH) who may h:i\o to leave that country-- A rrirt i;v. OK f,n TII VICTX.-.>IIJ*K .virt.v AM rmii.f. iow.\i:i) WITIIIH: \\VAI. Si-nutor AIKKN. I t h i n k yiur :i.^ti> estimate rni^ht IN- a little low lt.'.-:uiM- we kid to hel|i MMl.tHKi lind sanctuary from Xorfli VietnaM nfi4M the Fivifh lost ut DieJilueiiphu. Hut uûmiu^ tliut wo ivs-ttlo. I In- UK inU-rs of the Saigon p\rriilncnt. who would iindoiilite<ily !M> in <l:nitr<T. in soinf irfhor urea, wliat do you t h i n k \\i>nld U> thentfitiide.of (In- larê. well anninl South Vietiiame.M- army :uul (he South Vietiiaiin>ti |H-O|I|I^ Would they U- happy to have us M'ilhdraiv or wl at? Mr. KiJHtY. U\ If. Senator, this ol>\iiu.-ly is the most tliffirul; >| ICHt iM) Ta II. but 1 t h i n k thai at this IHI'IMI tin- I'nitcd States is not really ;n : |M>silioii to ciMiMder the lia|j>ilif>.> of I [HIM- |M'ople as |>ertuiiis to tin- :>nn\ in our u i t h d r a u a l . \Ve havi- to consider the happiness of the )N-ot>1c as (H-rtaiiis to the life which they will U< able to lead in the next fi * years. If we don't uithdraw. if we maintain a Korean -tyjM' |>reseiice in Simtli Vietimm. say ."><).IMM) triMps or sinned ':ij;, with strategic liombin^' raid> from (iiiam and from Japan and from Thailand dropping tin"* i:,.(MK) iMiiin.l f raiment ali.n Wnil^mi them.et cetera, in the n-sl feu \r:irs. th'>iv what vnii will 'iave is a |>eirp!e who are continually upjf'-cssed. wlto are i-ont'u.nally at warfun 1 . ami whotrf* problems will nut HI all lie solved U-cause they will not have any kind of ri-|>iv.cntatS<i. Tiie war w i l l continue. So what T am saying i.tliat yes. then* will IN- Mme recrimination but far. far less than the -JOO/MY) a year who air imifilered bv the I'nitfd Stales of America, and we can't po around- I'roiilent Kennedy wild this many times. He said that the t'nititl Sr:ito .-imply can't rijrht evry wronir. tha.1 -^'e can't *>lvc(!>f problems -.,( tlic other 01 (N't-cciil of mankind. We didn't <> into Ka* 'l*ak'ixtuii: uc 'li'ln': (To into C/ei-hn-tlovakia. Why tlun .-honld we feel tlnit we n. i li:i\<- the [MrMer to vlie the internal poPiral KlruÎes of this We have to IH them solve their problems while we solve mr< and liclji "ili-T people in an ullrni-.(ic fa>hion ciriiimeri.->nrate with oiirctt( j a c i i . Idit \\i- h a t e extended ( h a t capacity ; we havi- exhausted that .<ri;icii\.Sen.iior. So I tliiuktlief|iie^tion i* re'illy ni'Nrf. Senator A f K f . s ' , I mijrht say I linked those questions several vejirn :,^'o. rather iiieffectivclv. Hut w h a t I would live to kii""-- MOW 'IK ;f we, . we complete our withdrawal ami. ay. f.'et down to JO.IKIO,
191
30.000 or even 50,000 troops tliere, would there be any effort on the part, of die South Vietnamese government or the South Vietnamese annv, iu yourownion. to impede their withdrawal * ifr. KERRY. N o; I don't think so, Seaator. Senator AIKKN. I don't see why North Vietnam should object. Mr. KKRRT. I don't for the simple reason, I used to talk with officers alMIt theirwe fcikod them, and one officer took great pleasure in playing with me in the sense that he would say. "Well, you know you - Americans, you conu- over here for 1 year and you can afford, vou know, you go to Hong Kong for It. & R. and if you are a good boy you get another R. & R. or something you know. You can afford to chargu bunkers, but I have to try and be hen- for :W years and stay -alive." And I think that that rwlly_ is the governing ppnciple by .-which those people are now living and have been allouvd to live iiecause of our mistake. So that when we in fact state. let us &ty. that - < we will have a ceasefire or have a coalition government. nv.>t of the - ~2 million men you often hear quoted tinder amis, must of whom are regional popular reconnaissance forces, which is to say militia, and it very prior militia at that, will simply Inv down their arms, if the}' haven't done so already, and not fight. And I think vou will find thev will respond to whatever government evolves which answers their needs, and those needs quite simply an- to Iv fed. to bun* their dead in plots where t'icir ancestors lived, to be allowed to extend their culture, to try aii>l i-xUt us liumun beings. And I think that is what will hap|ien.' I ran cite many, many instances, sir. as in combat when these men refused to fight with us. wlu a tiy shot with tlieir guns over tin this area like this and their heads turned facing the other way. When we were t.tkcn under tire we Americans, supjMWedly fighting with tiiem, and pinned down in a flitch, -md I was in the Navy and this was pretty unconventional, but when wi- were pinned down in a ditch recovering liodicd or something and they refused to come in and help us. point hlunk refused. I don't believe they want to fight, sir. onuiiATiuv TO rvKMMi wnsoMir AWUKTANXT Senator AIKKV. Do you think we are under obligation to furnish them with extensive economic.assistance? Mr. KKKUV. Yes. sir. 1 think we have a very definite obligation to make extensive reparationstotlte |>eop1eof Indochina. Senator AIKKV. I think thaf i-'all. As the witness, knows. T have a very high fersnna| n>gard for him MIK! |IO|M> lN>forehis life n-iwls lie will lit-a -olleague of ours in thin body.
The CIIAIUX\y. Senator Pell. Senator VKIJ- lliank you. Mr. Chairman.
i-Mtvmi or f>ntiirruv TD WAB

Tliis w.ir HOK really just as wrong, immoral, and unrelated fo our n;itio(iul interest^ * yearn ago us it is today, and I must xav I agree w i t h you. f think it is rather poor tflHte for th* architects of Miin war it, uow be sittittc us they are in quite Kucrosunct intellectual glass
lJ2
I think th-t this eommittec, and particularlv Chairman FuU'right, deserve i hnjre debt of ;rratittide from you aiul everyone of your men who an- liciv because when In- conducted hcaKn<rs some years ago when we were fighting in Vietnam. A* that tune the word "'pence" was a dirt.y word. It was tied in with uapjeast.>iJient" mid N'crvons N'ellies and that sort of thin;:. Chairman Fnlbri-'ht and thiseonurittce rvaliv took public opinion at that t ime and turned it anmnd and made "peav * a rc<|>cctablc \vinil and prodiuvd the climate that produwd President Joliifeon's aUlication. The problem is that the majority of the jn-oiiU' in tire Conjures* still don't asree ivilli thu vii-w that yon and \v- liavi-. A.- tlu^ flia'unian pointed out. and us yon know as a student of political s<-ic:iv. \vhciii\or \\v \vaiit4*<l to i-iul this war. we I'unld have endi>d this war if the majority of us li:i<l nx-d the ponefof the purse sti-in^f. That was ju>( :i.s I nit- ." \eai> :ij;ii us il i> hxlay. I doii't tliiiiL it is :i <|iiestion of ^rvit.-. We didn't have tin- desire !<> do that a:iJ I am not sure the majority has the desire to do (hat yet. Whenever we want to as a ('on^res.-.. \u could do it. We can't r-tatt an art ion. but we can force an action with tlic|>urs'Strinjrs. Ithink it is wonderful von vclcr.in* have come doxvn here as a cutting e-l^>- of ,.ublic oj)inion In-caiw yon a-rain make iliis l m \ e II^MI- rcs|vet and 1 IIOJK* yon .stuveitl and [ire\ail o:t tin- ncijority of the ('otisjre.-.-. IP vrn:i:.\vs AXI *i>xu.m:\x> SV-XCKKVIXI; V I I T X A M w\i: If. is interest inj;. sjcakinr of veterans nd sjwjkin^ of statistics, thai (he prc.v* has net. r picked u|> ami concentrated on ignite interesting voles in the pas', fir those vote.-, vou tind the majority of hawks were usually nonvctcrans and the majority >f doves iver iiyially veterans. Sjiecifieally. of (luist> who voted in f.ivor of ilie HatliehlMctlnvent eml-the-war i mendmcnt in the lust session of the Congress ?!> |Mr-ent were veterans with actual military service. Of those votinj; apiinst theamendniiMil.<Fiily ''.fi [MTcent wereieteran^. N'otv on the spoiisorvof I'M- ( 'IH>JMT-< 'hnreh amendment yon will tiiid very much the same statistics. Kijrhfy-two percent were veterans as compared to 71 jMrrvent of the S-nale as a wlio'e IM-'III" leterans. So 1 would hope what yon an- doin^ will \\;\\v an effect on the (fijjre>s.
0111.|l,.\TIOX T>> Nil Til V I K T V A M f > K Al.f.IO
I h a \ e tno i|iiestiou> I would like to ask you. Kit^t. I was very much struck by vour concern with :isylmn bcr-an^- now I see [nibli.opinion start in:; to -.win<r and Conjrre^< pa-'-'in^ leîxhition. lii'fore tliev wouldn't ;ret onf nt n i l : now thev are inlkit*^ ul*ont f."-ttiu^ out
\vstef41-iy. .When il come* to lo(' 'n^ nft'r the Jieople who Would Inkilled if we 11-ft or b i l i l l v ruined. I u o l l l ' l lin|e ion uoiild ilevelop your
t h i n k i n g at l i t t l e Kit to make Mire licit Amertciiu public opinion, which ii'iw a n t < to î-t out, ii I so U'lH1'- in mind thiit when we dep:m He have all olili^jil ion to tliese penjile. I hojie you u i l l ki'ep to lll.lt (Miint.
1U3
ACTIONS OK I.IKITKXAXT '.\I.U:V
Finally, in connection with Lieutenant <"alley, which is a very emotional issue in this country. 1 was struck l>y your passing ivft-rence to t'.mt incident. Wouldn't you ajrree with me though that wliat lie did in herding: <>Id men. women and children into a trench and then shooting them was :i little bit Iteyond the jierimetcr of even what !ias lieen jro5nr on in this war ami 'iat that net ion should lie discouraged. There are other actions not that extreme that have pone on and have lieen |>ennittexl. If we had nor taken action or cognizance of it. it would have Ijeen even worst*. It would have indicated wo encouraged this kind of net ion. Mr. KIUIKV. Mv feeliiijr. Senator, on Lieutenant <"alley is what he did tjiiite obviously wits a horrible, horrihle. liorril.le tiling and I have no lone to |tick with the fact that he was prosecuted. Hut I think that i:i fhi.s question you have to separate jrudt from res|onsibility. and I think "'learly the re|oiisibiilly for what ha* hu|i(iciicd then- lies elsewhere. I think it lies with tinmen who ileMjrned free tin* zones. I think it lies w i t h tiie men who eiici>ura<2ed liody counts. 1 think it lies in liirire part w i t h this country, which allows a young child liefore he reaches the nee of I! to see l'J.."i<Mi deaths on television .which glorifies the .lolin Wayne syndrome, which puts out fighting man comic lMM>ks mi the stands, which allows us in t n r n i n g to do enlist denies to four omits, on the fourth roii"t of wlii.-li we stand up and shout "kill" in unison, whi'-h h:i> i-o-iti" in !:irruek? in this country wit'i a crucified VietluiiiH'.-.-. MIMH! OK -111111, and underneath it siys "kill the jrook." and I tl-'ijk that clearly the resjonsihility for all of this is wJ'.:U has produced this.. TiMf-jlilictatinn. Now. ! tliink if vim are piinir to irv 1/ieuteiiant ("alley then you must at the ..-nil time, if this country is ôin^ to demand rcsjtcct for t)u- |:IM. \ou initnt at the same link- try all those other people who have responsibility, and any aversion that \\e may luive to the verdict as vetenni> i?> not to MIV tliat ('alley should U frtnHl. >\ot to say that he is innocent. Imt to say that \oiifjn't jiM take him ulonc. and that would lie in\ if-|MnSi'tolli:it. S'ii:it<r I'KI r. I n^rce with you. The (inilt is shared hy many, niunv. mutiy of u-i. iiH'liiilinjr tin* leaders of the p-t-out-now scln>ol. Hnt in tliis regard if ue had not tried him. I t h i n k ue would lie much more critiei/ed mid should IN- .-rilli-i/j..!. 1 would t h i n k the smne fate wouhl prolrtlily Iit*f;il( him as iN-fell either Ser-rennt or Lieutenant Schwar/. of UVst Virginia who win. ti'ii'd for life for llu* sanu1 otfense and is out on a '.' months rommule.l >ntenee. I'.y (lie same token f would hojte rl." ijiialily of mercy would In- exercised in this regard for a yunnjf man wlio wu> not ei|iiip|icd for the jol> and ran amuck. lint I t h i n k |"il-li<- opiinion should t h i n k t h i n through. UV who have taken t l i i - ji-i-'iMiei find onrs<-lvcs MTV niiich in tin- rninoritv. Mr. lvit:(:>. I understand that. Senator, I HI! I think it is a \t-ry dtfli 'nil f i l i n g for die pnlilic to t h i n k tliron^h f:ie>-i] with ll'e fiu-ts. 1'hc fiM'l f l i n t 1 s other peoplf iudic|c(| for the icrv SJIIIIP crime wen- freed
1U4
:n ill 11 it- fact union;; thoM* uviv jp>nerals ami eolonels. I mean this simply is not justice. Tliut \* all. It is just not just iv. Senator I'm, I nu\v it is the oUI revolutionary aI:if?. When you MV tin- whites of their eves you are more guilty. Tliis svms to U- our morality as has I HI-it | >o m ted nut. If you drop n lioiiilt fn>in a plane, you <lou't stv tin- whites of their eyes. f sijjixv with you with tin- !MM|\- roiuil. It is like a Scottish uol>lni.'in .:iyin{r, "How nuiiiv jrrouse were caught on t i n - moor." Four or live years ago tliOM- ! u.v vho critic.! zed were nion* frit it '/<!. Thank you for living here ami I wish you all sin >s. J A|j>lausp.] Tin- ("n VIKJIA v. Sriialor from N'ovv .Irrx-y. Scii:iti>r('.vs^ 'I'lutnk von. Mr. Chairman. -n;.\T.<;ir I M T I H .\rii>r.> > urrx.ot \>'.\i: Mr. Kerry, t h a n k 1011 tuo fcir .-oiii'ii^. ^"011 haiv in:t<Ic mon> tli:ii\ .-Ii-ar M>mrthiii" tlint j| t h i n k aluays h:t IMTII tnu-: that thf \\:tr ncvt-r hail any jn>tilii-ation in terms of Inilix-hiiia its4-lf. I wish you \\ouid tal<<- ihi.4 i[iii><tion a l i t t l r fuiihcr ami loiiHt on the larî-r- str.iteîi' )ni|ili'-!iii>iis. Ii !. in tln-M* larger -tnili-î.- inîlii'ations. if jinyw'nriv. t lint m.iyho fnund jii^tilicniion for our inxolxi-mcnt. As you km\\. tin1'i'oiili-iil said I he other day that ii is e: y to p-l out and to end tho \\:it iiiimeilintely. Tin' "mention is to î-t out ami ie;ne a le.-isotiuhle I'lianre for lasting IN-II-V \Ve ha*'e to |IM>|< at thi." UVUIIM- the .\merieaii jn'oj|e are jroin^1 to v<- (lie is>ue in the terms he h:i< delined if. I would IN- L'lad to h a v e your rommeiit on llii- mattx-r. allli<iii-:li I uon't [IT.-V- you to di.--u>--it U-i-aii-ie in n sense yon have already >aid this is not your area. Mr. IVCKKY. I do uniil to. I want to wry imi'-li. Senator f\\sK. Ami I would IK- vvrv jrlml to have \on do it. Mr. Kr.t:i:v. Thank you. sir. I would like to very much. fit my opinion, uhat \\eare t r v i n ^ t o . * the ('resident talks alnmf êttin^r out v \ i t h it M-mlilain-c of lioiior is simplv wliilewrishinir ourselvi-s. On the ijiiestion of jretlin^ out with fon.e seinli!:inre fr>r peaee. as a man M)IO has fought (here. I am trvitij.' lo.-ay that tliis |o|i'-y has DO 'i.iii'-r for {NMi-e. Yn'i dmi'l hat'c :i i-Iciir'e for |'are vvhcii you arm the |xf >ple of another countrv and tell them they i-an tiylif n uiU', 'I hat >s not (H'acc; tliat i> lij.'litiiir a vuif: :ha( i- cuni inning a AVHC. That i^ even criminal in the .te/i.M- that lhi> ci.unfry. if wo are really worried altonf recnminatioti. i- t'"i"i.' to haii- tn >otue day face up fi tin 1 fa<-t that Me eoni inced a celtaif tinmlN'r of peoiile. |H'rli.i|- hllinlreil- of flioiis^nds. (N-rhups then* "ill !>* si-wral million, ( h a t they eoiild stand up to -vKiiii'lliin^' whicli they couldn't and ultimately viill f:u'.- the ivcriniinalion i,( (In- fact t h a t their live-, in addition l.r all the !i\r-i at this poinr. will ! on our cun^-ici,,-!-. I don't t h i n k it it a i|U>>Ntron of (ware at I1. Wluil we lire d'inp i- very, very IiyjioiTitieul in our w i t h dr:iu.il.:inil c really should faci- i i i i t n t l i . i l . Senator Cvif. Jfuy I pi-c.^s yon jiHf u little further or at lea-t i ii-e llic i|i|i'-l lull nfi Viliicl) f wmilda^k von tocotiiinelit,
Mr. KKIII:V. I K i-Ii \ I H I would, plea*-.
INDOCHINA AND Ql'ESTION OF \VOKU PKAfK
S-nutor CASK. I think your answer was related still to the iiuestion of Tudocliutu. but 1 think tiic President has tried to tic in Indochina with the (jiiostitHi of world jteaiv. Mr. KKUUV. I would like to discus that. It i> my opinion that the I'nited Suues is still reacting in verv much the 1S)4." mood ami postwar cold-war period, when wo reaped to the forco? \v;ji-h weiv ut work in \Vorld War 11 aiul came out of it with this mrinuia aUnil the Itiixnians and how the world was iroinir i< Udi\iuci up U'twcen flu- sii|H'r (towers, and the foreign |>olioy of John Kilter l>tilles which was resjK>usible for the creation of the SKATO livaSy. whirh xva-;. in fnct.adireil reaction to this so-called Commuii'-t monolith. Ami 1 iliink x\e are reacting under o>hl-"a. prea>ls whifli an- no louder uppliruldf. -I *iy that UN-.IA' M> Ion;; u.s we have the kind of strike force vo h:iv\ and I am IIH fvrty tt> the *^-ret !4ti>lifS whi'h you êi'tlenioii h-ive hoiv. Itut :us lun^ n we- have the jtnes which xve of the puhlu- know w>> haw. I think we liuve a strike force of Mich capability and I think we have- a .strike force simply in our Polaris submarines, in the <">_' or some 'Polaris xiihtnariiu-s, wnioh are constantly nKiminjr around tiiuW tlw ffa. And I know as a Narv Man that underwater detection is the hardest kind in the ivur'd. :ini{ they have nirf iK^'fectird it, that we have the ability to destroy the hiimaii nun'. Why do we have to, therefore, cousidurand keep consideriu<; tii reatsi At any time tlint an actual ilnvai is |Nise<l to this i-ountrv or to the st'tMirity and freedont I will IN- one of the first people to pic); up a pun and i!ftV:u| it. but. ri*rht no\\ ; an- renctinp with paranoia to this nuestion of |H?U<V and the [M-opIc tukiii<; over tlie wori<l. I thiitk if we *re I-V.T fftnut! to tret down to the question of dropping those U>ml me*l of us in my generation simply donY want to Iw alive afterxvanU U-.-aum- of the kinJ of world that it would U- with mutulioiis and the gunelir pnibabilitieôf frcaksuudeverythinêl.^'. Therefore. I think it 'm ridiculous to assume we have to play this |MWIH- pMiie based on total warfare. I think there will !* guerrilla wur iji'l J t4iink we nui^t hove a cA'pabilitv to tijrht those. And we may liuvc to fight, them somewlicrr- based on ((ritimatc tlm-iit". but we must learn, in tliiz country, how to define those threats and that i.-1. hnt I would HV to this question of world jx-acc. I think it is IVIKIIS. t>::ilty artificial. There is no threat. The CoiiniinntKts are not alout to take over oar McDonaJd iLaenburjferjUiU'.rfy.-ffjnujrhtpr. j ^H.'t!utf>rrl wilt nay thix I thinlc that politically, historically. I he one 'binit{lull pcoj>U'-tcy to do. that siH-iHy is structured on ns a wliole. limn ktti>tii]>t tosatiîy their felt neecN.und yoti can satisfy tlio^- nei-ds with U|IH>M aiu kind of political strncnm-, (rivinir it one mime or the other. In thi uaiw it is ilvmoci-atic: in olltcrv. it is coiiiitiiMiism: in or.h^rs it i.-- beiieKilenl tlictiilorsliip. As lonjj i* thost- neel< nre >afi-fied.thal slrilctucc will exist. Hut when you start to neglect lho.-e needs. jM-ople will start to <]> maii'I a iu<w stntcfitre. niid .thur. to me. is the only threat th;il this c.oiutf ry faces iu>w, IH-CUIIM- we are not ri'spotidin^' to (he needs and we
19G
air not responding to thorn because we work on those old cold-war : precepts and because we have not woken up to realizing what is hap| pening in the United States of America. , " Senator CASE. I thank you wry much. I wanted you to have a chance. \ to respond to liic question of Indochina ma largo context, , ' J Mr. Chairman, I have just one further thing to do. Senator .lavite liad to go -to the floor on important business, nnd lie asked nit io ex"i press Ins regret that lie couldn't sta^r and also that if he had stayed >-,.] he would hare Kmitcd his participation to agreement with ereryth'iiuj '- " ' . , Senator Symington said. [Applause.] -' * .
rxo OK VIETNAM WAR

The CHAIRMAN'. Mr. Kerry. I have one other as|icrt of this I would like to exploit* for a moment. I recognize you and your associates, putting it on a personal point of view, fettling the seriousness and tlio tragedy of the experience in Vietnam. But I am disturbed very much bv the' {feasibility that your generation may become or is j'terhnj* already in the process of becoming disillusioned with our whole country. with our system of governmed. There was much said about it. You didnt jwy it^but otlieiv have said this. I wonder if we could explore for a moment the background of this war. Ft IKI.X wemej to mo rh.-i' its oritrin \\n# cMscntiitlly a mistake in judgment. lieginnmg witli our mi[>[>orf of the Frencli as colonial power,
which. 1 Jtcliovc. is the only time our country has ever done that. Always our symtthi<w luu> U^-n with the rolonv. If you will reeall,
we iirjn-d (he JirilLsh to vi't out of Kgyirf and India, and we urged. ninny tiiongtit too vigorously, tlie Piitch prematurely to get out of Indonesia. I tliink the:? was much crituvwn that we acted prematurely in urging the Ifolgiun* to gt out of the Congo. In any case, the support of (he French to maintain tlieir jowtr was a depart urn from our traditional attikrde toward colonial jwiwers btvxuse of our own hutorr. It Carted ' relatively small way by our support of the Frencti. Tln-ti on- tlii J to aj)pcjr. Hut thecc were not dnrtcions, I believe. :/rft invot'--a ..I motivxv. Tiiey wern f^>litiril judgments which at thn'r tiidf wcm jiitrfificd by the condition* in the world. You have already j>frrrod to the fact that-, ,after World War II there wac great apinvlirtirtion, and I think properlv. The apprehension was justified bv the events, rafxfially from StntinV rrgimo. There was app.pchen-MIO>) that he would be'iible, and if he could he would, impose hi* n-^'iiiif by fnrre on nil of Went'cn Europe, whudi could have created on eKin-mely difficult situation which would amount to what yog Mid a moment iigo. You raid if our country win rea-lly threiUened, you would ha ve no he.sitaufy in taking up a gun. So I think. n trying to enituat* tin- j-onrw of our iiivofvement in this war, we have tttak0 *lf of this into 'ori-.idiTration, It was tuit H sign of any moral dfgradtuion or of lut'l motives. They were, H imply |M>iitical judgment* as to where mtr int cn-st f.villy was. In n>( rHpec| I (Jiiiik we can tmy tlmt our iritnt was not in support' wj rh" 1'n'iidi. that it uot in infrrvefting,ori, Imt to get :i {(ci-hperltve nf our -prvwrif. Kitimfiou, and iiofx-fijUy >< help, if I
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ran. you uml others not to IK- 100 disillusioned and not to lost- fnitli in tin; Capacity of our institutions to respond to the public welfare. I Mkvv whafyou and your associates arc doing today certainly coufributtt: to tliaUby the* foot that you have taken the trouble to" think these tliinpt through. and to conic hero. I know it is not very plca>ant to il> 'Jie ttijnpj you hu ve done. \Vhik- 1 wouldn't presume to compare mv own ex[>erience, 1 have taken a great deal of criticism since 1 myself in 19fi: tnok i*ue with the thiMi ^'resident .Johnson over hi$ policies. I did what 1 could within my particular role i" the (iovemruriit to {torsiiade lx>th President John.-">n and s;il>sei|uent |>olitie:il loaders that thus wns not in the intenets of our country. 1 did thU. not In-catiro I thought thcv weiv evil men inherently or they wen* morally misguided, luil thp)r political jni lenient v.-> WIIHI^. All of us. nfronisc, know that us f:illil>!c Iniinuii all make errors of jtuliruiem. iiii.irr i>r MAK^VI* i \>. IXI-TITI TII>\S \V<I:K Kri'MTiVKi.v it i.s lu'Ijifiil [< try to [>iii it in (h-i--.(Hvlive'a;id not Inse cortfid'Mirc in the h:isical!v PK! inotr.'i-s and tjur|iusis of tliis con f. try. I Ivlii-ve in the possih'dity of inakiii/ our institntioiui work effectiivjy. I f l u n k tlii'v ran be made n>s|x>!isive to tlie welfarv of the ncuplc and t propel judpnci-.ts. I only throw this out because I have a feeling tjiiit ln-raii^' oftlie minimal horror thnt 1m'. devi-lopcd frotu tliis war too many (xtQpIc- may IOA- .ontiden f in our fysfcnva-'". A hole. I i.now of no iict'icr system for ;i itnmtrv us Isirt'e as lltis, will. 3to : pfii:>njilllon>< of pc<>pU. No otlii-r country <tm{aiullc to if in liLstory.lieverjnade u di'dimTali* 1 sy.iirni work. " : ----- They have all Itccouu dictatortihi|4 whfn they have nrhi^vwl ! this M7jt> and compk-xity of thi* i-ountn-. Only smaHer countries really have made n democratic system work at tvli. _ . ,- ~ So I only H-iii to" throw it out \nt\*fn]]y that, in itpitu ofrhc Jntgic nxiN'rietu'tM of you and so iniinv 'other jtooplp and tin* ctûths'-uf tto many people, this MSIeiii i^ nof bryond recall and witli the :i>.<i.-;tan<v> of [Kfjple like yonivi-ir uud flu* yxmnêr generation w> can jM h-.ick on I he t racJi.-a.utt run make diissj'^teiuojHrrrtiecltcctLvp.ly, f fcnovv jJat the idoj of working li'itliin th s.stem luw bwn ii*'cl HO miiclr. aiL'J many (N.-ople Jiavc |<wt. conlidciKi' that JJ can U> done. XV' v wi>h io ]ftn>y tlie sy.u>iu, -tt start all over, Imj I rfon'f think in ifx- history of himitui cx.|M-|-icjic4' Ijiut flioft^ di'Htrucuojw of systems work, Tliv) ii.>iiiilly Jertroy evvrv rluntr &**[ ftrf well a>>~had. and ynr ,ui Hvvful lot of do'ui^ to rccn-.'ilc I hi- fjood part. !] tot *ro.t aja. , - r.. - .So I am vei^ hoiH'fiil that the yoiinjrcr ê/ier*JJon and I itni ctT-lirinly p-ljin^ at I he end of my ^rjieration k-miw 1 have U-en her? ;ui ;iwfully lony l i m y - hut t h a t you ynuirjrer peoplf f.iii find it. JK<S:|F!C d, ;!;(,. 1. 1. t i l l - .->.-! I'lrl U l l i j ILV t" IfialiC II work i*;CJlllf!( I CM!) f tlf
Hi'1 f;iiiinrrii tl:iul; <if a U-tter <sw. t'lve.'i (lit- i-or/diiion.^ licit vvi j i a t t ' i i i liiit I'onnti'v :iini ihi- '.'leut.coii.^jexity and divKHiK. I rvalh ' w l i i - k i - 'f we can slop ||jis wnr j <vrUiinTy e\/vt .: do rMiTviinii^ f c:i". f ha\i- dour all I i';in wilh all )ny limitations, I :im Mice ,'M : I(I< |-o[>|<- !i:ivr (iiniiîif J )utr| do \n'<lt-i; \>\it j did nil tii.il I v;i-. /Mj-aMi- .ff dinii<;:iiid whai wiMioiii I inay >irtvTi.is U-en Hpj'Jicd
IMS
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t o i l . I hop<-that you and your colleagues w i l l feel the same w.tv or at lea-r you w i l l accept the structure of the system and try to make it work. 1 can >>*; no hcttur alternative to offer in its place. If I thought there was one. 1 would certainly pro|*we it or try.
\X UAMt' M'STT.V HK M.\I>K TO WOBK ?
HUM- you yutirs>>lf arrived t the. point whetv you Mieve that basic, .-trucrural changes mutf !* brought alx>ut in our system or do you Wiciv il am lie inadeto work ^ ' M-. Ka:v. I don't think I would IK- hen- if 1 didn't lolievc thnt it ran" IK- made to work, but I would Imve to sav. and oiie of the if rm *.vnerHriou now is that peopli- don't p^vtend to sjvnk -pr other |:-!>|ilc lit it, ;md I can only s|>e:tk as :m individual about it, (nit 1 -ay that f liuvr ivrtuiulv (NVII fnistrateci in rhe ^*.-4l. iiKinths, TV st-riously fru< nit-d. I have <>iti> to busitie&ouen all over thw for money for fers. hiid met with a varying ranjre of iii^ fiom "\'nr ran't K-U war riinH'-s"* t<, "War crimes un- H :Im. ui ilu< market" r to "vell, yoq know \\v arft tired noxv. we nave" uii ; d,V r iMn't"firanytli'm^." So t li.ive vriiiivAnoiiiivT-in>M#'"OH I innti-ial question tii tbiscouniry. I sivtin iinwilltnpitss-on the part uf KK uiruiv of thf HU'tufn of ihis Imdy to ivs{x>nd. to t.il>' jrutay fi -nltis i faiv <|ue.stion^ timer tlmn I heir own n-eleHioii. to nm.ke.-a. iirojtle of cuum|!P. and I urn- -although >till with faith vorv. very, very fu!Laf_<{(>Hhl..iiul Laut not ^roinjr l<juit. Jtuf I ihinlcthitt iudi.su we raii:-rtspoiiJ :ifi as _a jrfi-itt > <|iu"i ion M.- the war. J .^-i-ionsly -A|iie*oii iio>rwi an- jioin.' ofiiul Uie kind of resfion.se needed to mfet X|'in'siiiiiRsiirii ax jmveitv and hnuir-r and i|msitiinr; sndi birth i'ontril atid sf> niatiy of tile -tHUyrs* that fni'iMiiir.-uKMetyrtoday from liw income luiusin^ to schonlitii;. to iv^vnJ rcKi'tioii t< t'ic Siijin-inp Court's vlll say that J r!iink we arc ^'ii!^ to Uei-piryifijr. I also a^niwiili-yoii. A-niii^r. I don't w anorlu-r sistnii other t h a n I>iii<NT:iry. but deinreracv has to remain rej-jion.tive. W.'irn it does riot, you create thi- ftDM.ibilttur.s for all kind* of other system> to Mii|>|>l:int it. and tbat very .(K>ibility, Ilhiuk. ia Ijcginnirifr toexifl i.u tlnsruitntry. The ( 'IIAIKMAV. Thftt is why I ask you (hat. The feeling that it ean(to: >x.i muAf ri!M|>oiltiive <-f>ii\cn not m> much from what you have s;iid -bul from nuny-differrjit wninvH. I ran assure von f Iave Urn fni;<tritted to>. We bav<v!ost"niortof our major effort*. That is we liaw'îoi MWt-<eilrid in ^tt;n^ enough votett. bul there has UTII .verv marked increflfte. I think. -in t]w rculizution of the seriousness if th' war. I think you liave to ki*{) in (>orHjX'>rivo. ;tx J say, 1 lie t>i/e am\ complexity if the' country itxelf and rite dJflu-ultiw of communication. This war in MI f.r removed. The vecy fft. OH vou laie Miid. you do jio| lielievc xrhatl.iH(i[)c.,'V( thrtv to IK* in tlw vttnl ititenytn of f hi>f roiintry.liwn from tJiR !'"rJu,ui>ji: ttiu^-d ipany [*ooph: toiliitik it tviiwi't xo ini{Mjrtant._ .iKV/j/>i'ynw'.c OK roNrwjy AIHIT Vfrrx.\M III tlic Iieilining, hurk in the fime that I mentioned when we (tn4 v ;U|>pnr^'d t,$it*- French and throughout the 1'XiO'x up unlit the I'MV)'*, t-iua who].- matter WHA not.very much on the mind* of anyliod;' in the. ^"'ijn'JW^W^ny/eiu/Hv j)rwMjupied with what wa going on in Wert-
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major t.ij^.' Then the ( unjri'ftuS^ abnut tlu*'.significance of thbw'jr was really not lie fore I'.XJV the , ...escalation. Jl \\!osw \>ry minor sideshow Lu ull rue tiling in which this "ciMiutirrwas involveûntil Febniary of tlMv IT.at was when it became a iru-ittto; that, you nvi^fiirsav, warranfeti aim Compelled the attenti'Mi of tlitcountc\~ It has IHVII ^nifltial development of our n>alixatioti of jn.it Wlial \3-ewere into. ' '\" T ,^ ^'-, As I said rvofore. I think fCis cniealKut nof Ijecaiiseof dad motives but by i cry .-c.rjonsprrors in 'political jnd^ment as to wheiv our interest Jie.s and what shopfci lMv-/Lcne aliom tt^- > - 4^;iin <iuly sayin-rnti^'1io|n'fullv lo.at ieast try to enlist your conH<it<m(i<'Hr. of the view (hal in :< >-<)K>trv of !li.- kind I don't lielieie
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then- is [ii-tter alti-niii'tiê from a stvucftiRitpnin! of \iexv. I think To j.'o liat-ii'tr* sny own Statr ivrtninly. l-aviii^-mt now the war. its .ttFrji.rs :n- l>'iiiy"\\fll managed. Tin- jM-ojiK- are, as you iua> say. niaylv tiH-j.i;ii[iteii-tit I'; Uii^. itr7l\H!i;v. Ax ii UHM ii Mas>uu'ljiis.-tts.too. 'l'lu!.C-n V I I S M A N . I li:i\i- offen"lhi'iijrlitjfh-y wviv too indiiTeivm t it, Iiiit ti)i>v Litxc nîM'inIi'd to llir :irîiiiici"ils ,'iirrt wlici'i' our iiit< rest lies i|iiil- well, at li-ii--t from my jK-r*oiial ex|M.>r'h>n>v. Otlienvise I would ' of lliis. \. UITH JK\I IM; wrm
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I \\\-n fvl :Iiat if we rnld finish S\\ war eoinftletely within (he ivasoiial>ly iiou' fiiiun*, as irojih! of the pro|HisaI.s liefore this lumimittrc v. are dciîtcd In do if Me can jiiuv, ilu-m. 1 tliink the coimlry ran rirhf itKelf and to-t ha'/lcim tin- ini-'k. in :i rca.sonalily quick time. deal iiifr w-ilh tin- jirolilenis yviLi.rii:i>"i'>ruvl. We an- aware and conscious of all of them. The- tiling that !ia> inhiliilcfl us in doin^ tliinpt aUtut what vnu nii-iiliuii Ii;i.-, IMM-II the war: It lia,vlH-eii the principal ol>staeh- 1> dealing tilth thc,-e uiher proMi-m^ uith whi<-h \mi are very 'mireriieil. a>. I think. ho Conre.-n i*. A I way* wv.a/v f:n-iij wih (he ileniand. of tlu> ivar ilsi-lf. flu you ri'ali/c that tlii^ roniifrv has put ui-ll mer *|,IMN) liillioti intoiiiillryiiiraii>siiie4> World War II '. I t h i n k it now ap|'r<M''he* SI J">iMi liillion. It i-. a Mini *> tar^c no one 'an r-ouiprchetid it. Init I don't think outside of this war isîje theiv is uiiylliiiitr finidi""eiitally wronjr with the system that cannot lie righted. iff we can p\\\ our rcsoin^'s to those developinentK. I don't have any doubt in VST) f thai it i-an IN- done. Whether if will U> done or not is a innlter of will. It is matter of conviction of the lariou* |r.,jtle who a iv iinolxed. including the younger generation. In that eotmectioii. ( may say. (he recent enactment of the T^ltt of all jM-ople from I* years up U* vole in at least a Ktcj> in the diivctioti whcri-yoii and your generation can hove an effect, I hojie that yo'i won't los<> fcilli in it. I |IO|H- you will use your tuletit* nftfi- the wur'is over, and it MI rely will le over, fo (lieu attack UWKB othiT prolilems find lo moke Ute nvKtcm work.
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I be. ! re it can lie made to work. I )o you have anything else you would like to sav If MV.'KKRRY. Would you like to respond at all, sir ? The ( 'IIAIBMAX. If you care to. Mr. KERKY. Well, *my foeling is that if you arc talking about the ideal structure of this count rv as it is written down in the Constitution. then you or I would not di&er at all. Yes, that is an ideal structure.
nKVKUUTIKXTS IX fMTKD STATES KKUTIKINC >X'NDA11CNT.U. CHANGES
What has developed in this country. however, at this point is something quite different nnd that docs require some fundamental change*. I do agree with you that what happened in Vietnam was not the product of evil men seeking evil pools. It was misguided principles And judgments and other things. However, at some ;>oiiit yon have ;<> stop playing the game. At some |M>int you have to say, "All right *re did make a mistake." At some point the basic hunlitn values have to come Dock into this system and at tlii. moment we are so built up within it by these outside structures, Bother intengts. for instance. government by vested power which, in fact, you and I really know it is. When a minority body comes down hen* to Washington with a bill, those bodies wjiich have the funds and the ability to lobby an- those which generally get it passed. If you wanted to pass ft health rare medical bill, which we ha.-e finally 'rhu|is gotten to this year, we may, but in past yars the AMA has en able to come down heir and squash tliem. The American Legion has siuwssfully prevented jieople like Vietnam Veterans against the War front getting their programs through the Veterans' Administration. Those bodies in existence have tremendous jx>wer. There is one other Ixxty that has tremendous power in this country, which is a favorite topic of Vice President Vgnew and I would take some agreement with him. That would be the fourth estate. The press. I think the. very reason that we veterans are here today is Uie result partially of our inability to get our story out through the legitimate channels. That is to say, for instance, I held a nrcsM conference here in Washin-ton. I).C., some weeks ago with General Shoup, with General Hester, with tltc motlier of a prisoner of war, the wife of a man who was killed, the mother of a soldier who was killed, and with a bilateral ainiiiit'-e. all representing the so-culled silent majority, the silent socalled majority which the. President used to jterpctuate tl war, and Lwcaus* it was a prcxe eonfen'tiu; and an antiwar conference and jieople simply exposing ideas we liad no electronic media there. I called thnu>dia afterward and asked them why and the answer was. from one of the networks, it doesn't have to be identified, "because. h.ir, new* bnsituiM is really paitly entertainment business visuullv, .'on Hit'. :ind a press confereiicc like that is not visual." ( )f < -ii-sis we don't have tlje position of jM>wpr to gt our ideas out. f sjiul. 'If I lake some crippled veterans down to the White Iloiw ehuin ounu-lvis to the gates, will we get coverage?'' "Oh. yes, f .ill c/)n-r tHt." Si> you are re^Jinv*! to a j>witioii when- the only wuy you can get j.i(i iil'vixout is to nfiige events. l;aiu^ hud v.e i.ot rfaged 'he, etKiifi>. wiih all due reitfwt. Senafor, ami T really appreciate tin- fu't that I
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ran lien obviously, and I know^vou are committed to this, but with kit V . due rvsi*** [ probably wouldn't & ^ttifej at this table. You ace this Li " the problem. " ^c: ; It gora beyond that. We really 1m ve a eWiaiitulional crisis in this country right-a^tc. TV.Constkution under test, and * an failing. We ar failing clearly bûae the power of the Exmitivtf k$ become exorbitant, because C^t/was has not wanted to exercise Us jien;pow*r, and so Unit is going to rea/in: aomftvery fundamental changes. Si) the system itself on paper; no, it fs a question of making it work, and in that I would agree with you. and. I think that tilings arc changing in a sense. I think the victory of the. AttM was a tremendous boost. The. CHAIRMAN. SST. Mr. KKititr. SST, excuse me. The CIIAIBUAN. I ho()ethe ABM. Mr. KKjtisv. \Vrongsydtem. I think the fact, that certain individuals an in Congres Unlav, particularly in the. House, who several years ago could never have Iwen. I would ciu< UepreîMitative Dellums and Congrcsswomnn Abzug and CVngni<smnn i^rinan and people like this. I think this is a trribly enroiiraging tti^n, and I think if nothing raore, and this is really ad jxx-tif justice, if nothing more, this war when it is over, will ultimately pndrably have done more to awaken the consfienrc of this country than any <itluT similar thing. It may in fnet be the thing that will set us on the ri^lit road. I earnestly hope so mid I join you in that. Hut meanwhile, I think we trtill need that extraordinary response to tho pn^>lctn that exists and I hope that we will get it.
IMPA4T Or VimCAM WAK AKD OTMKJW OX rOXTITVTlOVAL IU1.AXCK
Tlie C'IIAIBMAV. I am glad to hear you say that.. I have the same feeling. B'lt you must remenilr we have been through nearly 30 vears of warfare >>r cold war or critics which I think have uj>fiet the balance, as you sry, in our constitutional system. Senator Javit; rtas introduced a b ill wftli regard *o tlie wnr powers in an effort to n>eub]ish what we believe to b tlie constitutional system in which you say you have 'onfidence. I introdoced and we passed a commitiiientn resolution. There are a niunlier of others. I won t relate them nil, but they arc all d -signed to ft v to bring (rack into proper relationship the various elements in our (*iovermnent. This effort is Iwing iiuuli* I think tlw culprit is the war itnelf. The fact wr hud Ifcn at war. not just. the Vietnam war but other* too. divert* il *he attention of our iNtoph: from our domes! i<- coiitvriH itnd certinly enxled tlu> role of the Congress, I'nder the. im|ci of th'm und uther wars we have, allowed thiu distortion to develop. If we cjin i-nd the wr, there i* no n-.ison why it fuiiturt
Vm nu-nlioned *m<? new fncen in the ('<>iign-s. After all. :ill flics.people êt licfe Ui'uiue of the Hiij>|H>rf la<'k hoini1. us VJMI know. Tlicy un- simply rBpifsentative of their roiiHtilin-utf, You do tti-ivpt thiil. I IM-III-VC. Mr. Knutr. I'urtiall y. not totally,
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J02 The CiiAtKMAX. Why not '. Mr. KKKIIV. As someone who ntn for office forilU; wvek#, I am aware of many of the problems involved, and in many places, you fan tako certain districts in Now York City, the structmv is such that {teople can't- ivnlly run and repivaenf- ufcctvaarily tlie |teople. People often don't rare. Tlu1 apathy is so great tiiat they believe they an- being represented when in fart the} are not. I think that you and I could run Through a list of, rx-ople in this Inidy itself and find many who arc there through tin* powers of the oflice itself as opposed lo the fact they aiv truly representing the iteoplo. It is very easy to give the illusion of representing the. jieople through the frank privileges which allow you tii rend l>:ii-k what \ < > u are doing here in Congress. Congressman iuseit sit often. You know, they gave a spi-ti-h for the 1'olisli and they gave :i sjieeeh for tii- Irish ami they tf.ive S|H-IS'}I for this, .ind artually handed the ;>:I|HT in to the clerk :inmil> it for tEie reoiiil ,'ind a copy of the record goes home and |>eoples:iy, "Hey. lie really isdotn soiiietliing for int." Hut h. i-.ii"t. The ('n.xiifMAv. \V'll Mr. Knucr. Senator. also know prior to this past year (he Hou?e u^-'l to meet iii flic ('oininiltef of the \Viiole and the Committee of the AVhoIe would nni'ci- the voles, and Mites not of record and |Hi>plr would tile through, ami im|ortant legi.-lation \va> deciiled then, and after the vote ciiine out and 4Tier pi>ople made their hacks and cuts, and the |N*rkl:irivl came out. the \ote was rejutrted ai;d gave them an easy out ami they could >ay "U'-ll. I voted against this." And actually they voted for it all the time in the committee. Some of us know that this is going on. So I would say thrie. are proMeins with it. Again 1 come hack and >ay they are not tn>ohil>U.
TIll'V (MM Iw M > l v e l . l i l l f f l i e l c:in < i r ' l \ lie . - I v i ! |i\ i|e||ialldll:g leader-
slii]*. the same kind of leadership that we have seen in xxne countrieduring war time. That seems to be the few times we get it. If we mind get Ih:if kind l>ecan><> I think we are in a constant war pgainst ourselves and I would like to see that comethey should demand it of each other if we cun demaml it of jieople. The Cn \IIEMAN. Take the two c:ws of what goes on in the House ahoiit the sterel votes. That is not a structural asjtcct of our (Joverninent. That is a regulation or whatever you call it of the procedure* in the House itself.
XWIU--ITV UK IM'oltMM* M.MToUVH
Fundamentally you said that the |>eople can ImmUtozle their constituents: they can fool them. Of course, that is quite true of any system of a repres-i>tafive niitnre. The srdution to that is to inform the electorate itself to the extent that they recognize a fraud or u phony M hen they lime one. Tin- is not easy lo do. l>ul it is fundamental in a democracy. If you Ix-licve in u democratic system, the electorate who elect the representatives have to have sufficient capacity for discrimination. They have to lie ttlile to tell the difference Itcfwcen u phony, someone who simply puts pieces in .the record, a/id someone who iictmtUy docs t/unctlnng, so that they can recognize it ii> an election, if they are interested.
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Xoff-Ttttltey &w> apathetic, its you say they arc apathetic, and don't care,- than democracy cannot work if they continue to bin apathetic: and don't care. w)o represents UwntThisconHjs IwcT: to a fundamental question of education throruch nlf d':ffwwit naouitca. not only the
g of tV* lecto.rate.; do^Vil*--,T,hat is jiofca '^tpicbirel defiit our ijystewL- You are .doft&ig ~iiQw-.with ijbc ^deficiencies of humaa natuj-e, ij^fanure;^f tii^^<tion arultêtr capacity for discriimmition IB the sfelftotkm of rh<rir reprcfiftnt*u\vcs^. % I .rvcujruiaj tlite & Jli&cidt. Alt countries tta-vt -had this same problem and -jn }<>ngji& t}iey have a n|>reseiitat.ivfr s\-stcoi this has to be met . But them is no reason why it can not her nict. -; A structural cltunî' does not affect the capacity of t he, electorate tochoo*' good representatives: doos it? .\
* '
"
%1
, no,<lr: exvjic for tlu fad tl> to run for in any jiopiikXvd aira wt ahout $TiO'.'>rtO. Many l>ftoplc ly don't "iva\e tiiafav-uilahle, and in order to Ret rt itK-v)tftt>iy wind |> with tlieJr hands tied. ^ v. ,;-"-" 'J"ie ( 'u. MKitiTf. Tliaf is a coiiuuoiuuU>nieut,lwt vv had an examj>W during tliis last year of a man hein>r elected hi-cauae Ki> walked throuid,t .'Fl'H'ida with n nxinimmn of money. As he Itecatne ux^mctivc to Un* <fkeo)>k> hi: inay httvw received more, but he started iothout money^ Vouiiiv fanuliKrwitJiMr.C'hile^. -^ ' Mr. KKIIKV. Wn. I am familiar. I nndeivinndit. ':.-' The ^ 'HAIIIMAV. (know in my own sJatiôurGo^-ernorJitarT^ without itny money or Vith juut hiinxelf ai^<:ume from jrw>Hy:e-aiid di'feiitcd a liixtkefeller. S< it is n^ tme ikvt you liave to hav* lot of nio^py t/> get eledXxL I^you have the other tliinp* tliat it (itkf4r pprtKHurTily. tlie deleniiinitiun and the intcltr^ffuce. it is rfill jM^siUv. Tliere wen; otfer exanipleji, -Jjwt those >uv well kin>^j. 1 don't think it is form* to toy you have tîmvc . lot of money. If lui|s. of enure. It makes it ewjiM ewjiM11 and all lliaf, hut it isn't k-ssentUI.-! k-ssentUI.-! think thi you can " . many extutijvtt? uiwiv tlat lAtrue. _ . .'_
VH>*Ti(K WIIJ- UK RTtiPOKHF, TO VJKTN'AK X S K I E
j-. KKIUIT*. Sv-njîM'. I wi*uld IwKicrflly ajrn* with what vou aiv sayjn<; taul ot;vioui-ty KTC* e/iuld find ekwq/tions to JJJJ!B of evory<hjnntial quetl'>n is going to if tin- ckMi> to tin- 'Iftdit* of Vietnam. '-;_ -XAV. I .i^nf with that, I can assure you tjrnt this roniv' iad. r4rtainly, I jf0"1^ to do everything we can. Tiiat is what iiriiip4 an* al*>ut. It is just \>\ roincidenre you canie to Wiishluilu* very in'idfi of tJii-in. We only;^;cMU'd these Jjearinp* on Tuesday ofthis wwk. I |>erw>nalltv Ix-lieve-tût the great nuk^Mity of all the. pro/vie of this country are in atwrd ith your desire, arid c<-rtaiuly mine, to (jet tle war over at Hu.* earliettt-du^wihle moment. All we arc eoiujeriund with at the mojncut in tlic lx>t "jirocedure to brinjf that
&b>nU Ync jiuij^xlure tO'tM-iMWdc tbe1Pr<*ddtfiit to take ihc rftepStSuxtvill brirî thaitfbuiit."I foj one have iiciiv-liope now than t lutd Ht any time in ti^ list 6 year- !>etttt:sc ofticve.nrltliinjfs you iiave'jiK'iiilkiK'.'d. F ; think there ixa vcn- cond '.'IwinH! thM ft'-willlie brti:ht atiout. in the
l- V1KT'M VETKll'.N's ,\AINST HIK WAR
' ' . '
. I think you and your **Mird;U<!M hive, contributed * great dea' it the His you have taken; As jL**id in. tfic beginning, the fact that you , MiQwn tioth frn-sif. ocmviuttou *nrf patience ab(rtti this matter and ei Mii> wiiu^ tbhi r/xjuiiifti-d ycmr.vlf ni the most oommemlabic manner lias [vet! life mont t'tfcx-tivc dohion^trafton. if I may u<ic that word. .Ml1ichjr|) you ha*- tloiHuitstratixl ;n Ue oflcse Uiat has be>me disa[^rovcl f in WMIW i-ircb's. I think you hipvc- dtrftjoristptted iti f he most
v iiaKn-ned, thai the yoimger peneretion has lost fa,ith in oijr.J; em. I dorvt thtiti; it is'rornvt. I jhink the ptiraiiivi^ to-Mihirli you " hasvUv;i tme. It arose at a tiine when ilu-ruân .nrftstfh'for it u of timing is cMtwt. .Km J I'oiijjralulai*1 you amKhanlc^vou very-""'' 'Senator Symington wouldMik- to a.-k n qtu-stion. Seiiatcr ,Sv\i i virrrix. Vt>j*. M r. Ker/y, I loid l<> Icav*uiiirkia^' up tin- .selective .serv'uv nill in tlie Aruu-1 .S lint I.K'iil "
of iineKtions here, four i>f .grliicli I tt'ouhl ask." ' ( )\-j:r the yt-pnt nii-irilK-rs of this nupifutt.T who^pkiôiit in Aftfw^tf icm t< t-Iie wtr vviiv t/ftin ai^ciisti 1 of #tii\i\ni\y, our Iwyx ii; th<: bar-Ir.AVhAL' ' jri.yoiir njiiiiiiw, is îiA'uttitu'-ii* of Hervjcttnieii in VictntUD,fl$but .:ooL , ^ - . XIr Kfj:i:r. If I roiild ^Kfwer tl'af. it k very /j:$ri(ir.['&enaior. !. ,y,^M-| Jii^ know. t:tr\'-t':fot tojret intotJic guwt- :rf Hiving I rejreslrt.r<-ej-ytindy over flien-, l>ut let me try tit iy us ntniijrfitforw^njly . . a*"F ^fft'we liatl :in aclverti^fCKeiit. niu-fi.Jl [M^V. to show j-'i: what t]n--, '' tr<iiis rw!. {.< tin iirl'hykoy und tii^revj^Hw to if uTthti' Twn-.iiid v a luilf \ve<4> frofn Victii;nii js K'HMir^H;ij.(-i-. \\\- nvUvi fu-irislli aUiut .V t'o hO letteiva <fjLy ft>ij m)|> .V-ftlv. IrVe nnv r'-.'.r'hvO^hoiU-'J'1 letter* :t ihi.v.-fr'Jiii tr.N|rt nrrli-injf ar un l N<'. Votk (if1\f'r<r %>')&*' nf <j;tM<. | (II-PK :n.id_f w;in'e't l^J>riti^ -<U'; ff>xtn. I illdn'-f >J.''VA nj H-'H^'rrj^ t-i Iv Ti-*itif>iiij' f.!uvj:>t;t '"' iH'ih*'1 M*ef.j.tiii{|ifA to yoii :.r-' n-ry, \' fy ûoviiij.'. -myiJ- ofT)'io>t y/fin^'ii J.rr Vii-ffkti! r.vJrtîiii-ii on jSiiiiiv. --f: r3---i:i'ti ri^jt-^'t ^rf-rJj-.wh^vh wy. von !:nnvi'.*f>cf u^ .
.(..Ill iif lieie." "Vo :iri f i n 1 on!\ I t - t i n - vv^- l,:nP t'ot"' " Vfi' !:;:*<' r ' l<: J.M '.!.< l>;ick : it ' r|:i/-/." \\'.- n-rt.'Hi-:l jCiTSif' 1 : t! " (?.(;>! r j of Jl'cJ' J|. A i l l . ' i f T w - --i"'i|.(l i^, :,-. >,;;c Ictfcf T''rt{*>';OK'l|lhi'r-. from :t-l:e|if/,{rn|. . . .
"'. I t h i l l l . t l n a .Id' ivvpifr-'.-Tit^. .r'i[c i^riju;-. ffViiii/v, ..oliilHfil V- H J t J i It.;.
?o . fccltfoy at* fci^ ., . . _ . x -,.,-_tamost-bf tleiu the muizmisn ofthocrtlptiuceis, th hollywui :t . i?_ _f ri-L ;*' 'j? '^-* t-r- 1 ." . ! .-"i^ ^ î ijr-Ji J?
, jiroblnni.Swuttx>rSrMiôTOSf.T^4iikyojv. / - -* V - ' 7: r - Has thr fact Coaprnss &"5 mvor passed *rtcc!l*ra.tiyhof;_. ... mined thc:ibvr^ ofÛ^.-apn-i<M!U'in.yiet&an. to tlw.fi-^tf^pif.your - .-/%
IX VISTTXAX
of wic
I I$t ru-tck aiB thc^rowlfi ot tiixt iroUem wa* oxftijn*rd -on iotvjpifofpti>i>leinthei{>i;itar>-.How-5ciripns:U.^ty.5>ruI>lcai .^-~:-r.^
_.if<; ICnutvi;.:TJij prbWcw Is Jr-ktreoifely sejtwas.1 It is"f-?ri<w:JD r. . -ftjtt\' <lifffcrciit"Knys. 1 Ij^fipv^ ttvo.CoiuiitJwJiwn s today lm>kca . Jt cJbrJ tirnicmliCT tlieir muiics. Tl^.'ce "ww- .'5/XiO -r awis-; f"a?T Iiecofrt . . lî probk-ia esiste for A .nniftfopr of rcaôas, n^t the w (lie twypfcess. It Js.thn *nly wiy to jî Umn^h i. A Jqi- of-gu v, )0, ftO pcrwiiit stay rf<nod 24 hours * 4ay jugt^ttt gp-'f :flir<up:)i the Yipfu*h)- W ,".. .'!-:^'- ...-.* : " : ". :' ', -' - . , - , - - Mr. :Kjnnr, Sist^' to^fiO pciwrfrt, w.thfe.fijruw! uaeA that try wiacf.Uiiig; -let's ty. >h one pfttnt.^f.that. . J. woM.fi t give yim figure plhat&uA)' Jtl's sav. of pot, acJ yrfAJnly coul^nt h^finxiff say y :irc luti-d draic^Jicisv^tit I do know tljj?Mjio problem for tire umg Vetpjow i <niif^>cr*us we have^ let^s ty, *. vÛ'-rwi, PKt ii}> s Îjf'Iubit iin Aiyra^L .He VOHIW bick Ur^liis'wxiatry (Uirt'tltf |jtfêi off an nirjdtra- tM *" h<4)U- corf* him flotrw $90 U itttfc tîc4tct of tiif (nainoiny, ttt: raij'r pet a )ol>. He docur/i . Ke tHm* ctiiai&Al or jiwt find." hw norotJ souro* 3|itatioii of (he war^tht prnptiiitSB of }i#ck ajid forU), J' com.VJ adîa to this. I'ljcw w n real dru-jr wlheV/ ' itl - in. Xir - - City - Juts 30'fads altwatw! for Ufitg York JIJTII luv ftn : Kc railing lixtj ;vd f ir.aIJy ' don't know -wJiat . And joHt fi-opiitfytlH' aamo hof*|nUil jrat'c throe ntvfTR to Ncv York iiKt*hiit y for witcQwh.fMirfJOfhV It 4 vry, .*vrv .wjcEc^[ccad. tt i u ycrjf seriot,^ f>robln. J thinV that i>; roufffWH Htwjrf't .uiufcrtwlw to irtvcflfiâte the soun'4* f*c*iwe I inany:iwi{>n(>twtts oM4iun Ky imd ^rfh^ni being invoked hi (ru/fic Jittd f think flwre are w>mp s-eryjwiint* things !ip? xt ainke,
uanuvwn* ;Einorson. in.aa cdse-dic Stated s
ront rnUahk' in that country ?" Si r.iiuir jjvMiNuTos. It.isn't, quiff-Mutf, QJieiy in tins country:, do \<ui think i ' - - . ' ^. " " Mr KKRI:V. It flcpeiifj^ on w}ier' vou are. f Applause. 1 S's::itor.SvttiMi-iox. V,V are t;ilktu; about ha'o'm, not |ai.or l^SO. - .Ntr. RV..MIV. I midersUrd that, hut if you walk up HUtli Street in :i I nui Îln srimi'lMMix 0:111 help vou out pretty fast. (Xausrhter.]
.\i?i IK-U'V <F INVUKM \tlov TiU:uLl.H OITU'IAF. MHJTAUV
\Si-ii:ittii' S'."MrvTn\vMr. KI-HT, from ywrr ex]Hri'nro in ^' <lo i f i n r i i i u k it i.< jxvrilili- for the Pivsidciit ort'outrress to it aivur:iu> and ujtdistoitod iiifmiiiiitioti tliroii^li ofli.Mal military chaniu-ls. rS'houtsoJ-'Xo" ffmn tlir.audicnfe.) -. .. >?T. Kiaun'. rloii"t know-.- ^'iiator SVMIVCTOS. am hofiinninir to tlJjik you liaiv- r^jtn -up)v-rT>-r-s here. '" ^ - Mr. Krjutr. I tJ>ii't know wjier? tlwy <'jnrt-fnmi.sir. i t h:ui 'jiiv^ ; f- i xj'ru i ;)f^ wirii rtua. S'Mutor, I nail w i t h that ami I i-w iVo,UI often iu|itt<; ht-bw snot re|Hrts wK:di w>-v nfte.r i-ii )u.r"iioif, :uul i ' -ever ri vi'M,. Ain't I often tmd athuU'niy <>iu Mtissioi>:^ in tlif--!>taiv.and ,_ Stripes anrNlu- vt-'-y mission we liad Itwii'.te had IMI iobf>]ed hi nf.v UHSandtrijiIedin fijo'J^n. " - .- . Th</ iitel1tjceiic.'e in'-îoiis thiMnselvc*? HI*:' TKIHCC! ou v^-rv. verv f\iiii!vy in/ftniiatioii. S'ver-T? frHMiils of niitu* v>ij'.i:iteHij*>iti'''e ofTuws ai'i f . irtiiik you slu>iild have them in soii'UJ:u- fofesiify. <*niv iaSjiijror; t. iv friend of n\wc nnl hf ^rJre me u '-û
.if .you, ^zv}- i j
L al: j * thiiriii ijp'-iriii tlie military, sir. ui- i-i'>n. n mniiv jrf . '? f^pon an^.iw- BLhM.tiuH' h:iv<- ,\ ^(ideii<y,fi>mol1 ylwv-'l i vi-iifr Stvretyrr L:i:n{ i:\nv- tt> <ion for !''m. ^V'!|ftlJ.fl' oiji-e ati-1 rhAy îin; I /C (!' :;* Hnjjr'r^Ki, if iva-jJij'
ji t\ti' 1'fTtJjif
g lw an*- T kflui/.yrrse >t 3il
out iJ ni'l !*
l l-.-foJv ni lrl ii<>< run
/!i)l huve a
the :
tljink you bnVft- fitHêtt^^crtow certainly from J~;p,rvii.iju! awteto*u~adrniVttJ:i.tijny last days in the I vas îndmrjiedv-MHl 1 nave sivii eweUy what tlie reis np tlitH-cholon, thr chain of ^rtniniiiul, and h*oVthi;*s pet - i ' d and ^xxmlc say toltie man al>ovc liiiu'ii'hat'is uei-dcd to Itc wid. to kivp cvorj'iKHly nappy, and so T don't i think trio oitthc tliinp -is listoiiva. - - . * r IT w'juctH rambling answer. s .^M'jiator .SrMixuroN. How do you Uiink tliis could lc oJiaii^d? Mr. JvfJuiY. I Iiavc nevftr reaily pivcn that spcct of it all that niui-h it. \ wish -I had this ititflJigenco officer with nvv. Ifo i a very voting num.
KWOKT1XU <IP Vin-KAX WAK IX THK FBf>S
Senrtor SVMI xerox. Tlicn- has Iwn mnsidei-ahl^ critu-i.siu of tlu war's n'|K>rt iiifj i>y the {>rcss and news inwlia. What urr your thonjrhf* on Hnil^ Mr, K^mv. On tliaf I could definitely comment. I think the ]>tess INWU i-jttreiiMily neîpnt L iti tepottlug. At <NU; |M>iut and at the time they iuive not been able. to report because the (iowmntrnt s eimntry has uot altawwithom to. I wejrf to Saiipiii to try to lY^V*1 we.rfc-ruaniiip misKiojia In tlu- Mrkonj; IVita. We were ninna^ iifidrt ljrna^h_tlif^tivt>is on an o(K>ralibu called SaiJord Mtul we tkouijGlrt>w "'
Admiral ZiitriM-uli t !OHown tin** rivvi>k
. Y/V Siitfou aufJ.toW ilut"î* fwmbc*- of

fxio!r^&ti Tiave'eot <^' <fJJ the AJIWWWI people thii* .!-*s,^Vell; f an't rite tliat kuidjo^JUip. 1. <tt*t rriUfi/>JJwt iUtJ> btTjjiise jf I du I would hw tffj'fltftfreJiiati.'VL, ttrt<l we, fwve t< Int. wry vatY{ul.alx>iit juitt b<jw mudt we-Wy -a'nd wbin** We -ar<V)MlWyj it {tvo.r ^m/^rftttv today. w 0: .nuttier of 1a?t, itt tlw Xuti.'Miid Pr HiiJUlin^- rt might in- Jjoin^ on at tliih-iiiiuutv -iu w-Jiir'Ji fniMif inf'/wtjftfiou oflker* -|u> niv-iiiembefx >f onr tfroup. *nd f(niM*r Armv cK^>rtew an- tfoiup to testify to <iire<-T orders of fu-uxriiij' J >'fi'f'ii they liad to fuke out I'ertuin |<JCÛ;VK, phrase* ili*^1 fMit<Jirtiw<1 *ud w i>i!. down tiu^ juu> und, in aet, the infoncwtion they tfmc tii'M'Kiiteh ttiul diiwiioii* llwy tiu\r neM'xiitf'Ji wfn>n at ion WHH <foiu(f on wlurti the iniliinry didn't want tin-
v >-'---..
"Xv,<-
on what was going oh rhc;, jvoidd -offer them transiiortatkin to iro someplace else, there id stnuctiung else happened and they would fly a guy <r>'' miles from where the. operation -A'as. So the war has not-been - rajuHTXid correctly. . ' - " " . .. kXiow from a reporter of Timeshowed tbe massacre of 150 Oanv
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'"-
2CS
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here...So it "Is a terrible problem, and I think that really it is a quftstiou of t-lio. Government allowing free ideas to be exchanged and if it is going to fight a war then fight it correctly. The only people who can prevc.it My Lais arc the press and if there is something to hide perhaps we. shouldn't be there in the first place. Senator J-YMJXCTOX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. - [Applausc.j
KKgCKST KlK I.ETTKKS SKST TO VIETNAM VETKIt.VSs AGAINST V.\K
Tin- OiiAiBM\x. With regard to the letters you have mentioned. I wondered alvnit them. I have revived a great many letters, but usually pai-tii-ularly in those from Vietnam, the men would say-that they would not like me to use tliem or use their names for fear of retaliation. Of course, 1 resisted their request. If you h\'e those letters, it might !H> interesting, if you would like to, nnd if the writer lias no objection, f ûbmii them for the n-cotd which would be for the in' . o "f 01 .XGIXG HOOD OF TizdMfi; ix VJKTKAM Mr. K>I:KY. *iuitor, ] wmld like to a'd A comment on that. You A* the mwid i: changing over there and P search :md destroy mission r iA a WHceh MII avrtid mission, and trooj* don'tyou know, like tliat rtr.>hi th>t to k pkce, tliAt wa? mentioned in-the New York Times whiyi thev re used to go in after a pirco of dwtd roachineiy. because it didn't havf any value. They are making tlieir own judgments. There i|$ * ii i 'movement Jn tins country now an well u over there, und soon tlu $e jvoplc, tiesfe ntn, who are prescribing wars for these young men (t light arc going to find out they are going to have to find HOIUC otiter u ten to fight them 4jecauae we are going to change prescription*. They arx- going to h*re to duttige doctors, because we are not g<iing-to fig U for them, Tliat is what thtv tre going to rpftlixe. Tlwre is. now a mi re niilitaut .tttitude eveii within tle. military itself, among thew soldier eejijenced In'.tlj*- adi-prtiaements recently in the'New York Tiihes in whi/-h- n^mlxTB -of the Firet Air Cm.vlrj" publicly jsignnd MJI jind said. fcWe would inardi on tlie 24th if we could ne there, but we ean't U-fause we are in Vietnam." TJiosc men ate. mtyert, obviously to gome kind of discipline, but jieople. are beginning to be willing tt> siil'iDJt to that. And I would jiut f *; ym. I would like to enter the letters in testimony when I. can get ht<d of them nd f tliink you are jruingtoweethis wifl Uâr/Hitiniiingthtng, -.(An of the date of publication llic iufurntttrkui referred to had nof Ttu- CIIAIKMAV, If you would like to we ' iwor[xrat Home of in tfieivroj-d.
KXTrrun "THE SELLING OF TIDE HFJCTAGOX*' Thi* s inspired by your reply to the Senator from Missouri's question. Did YOU liappen to see a documentary called, "The Soiling of the Pentagon*? ' Mr. KERRV. Yea. 3 did. I thought it was the most powerful and persuasive! and helpful documentary in recent years. The CHAIRMAN- wut you know what happened* to CBS? They have been pilloried by the Mr. KERKY. They are doing all right. The.C'iLMKjiAN." Yon thin! they can defend themscl vest Mr. KKi:ur. I think they have r'yes, sir. 1 think the public opinion in thin country Iwliflves that. uTlie* Selling of the Pentagon." I was public information officer lieforo I went to Vietnam, and I know thai those things wen- just- the way they said l>eoiusc I conducted several of those tours on a ship, and 1 have seeu my own men wait hours until jK-ople got away, and I liave seen cooks put on special uniforms for tliein. I have seen good food come out for the \-isitors and everything else. It really happens. The CHAIRMAN. Tlie Senator from New York has returned. World he rare to ask a question ?
KKMU.ITIOK OON'CKBNIXC VIKnTAJT MTTEttAXS' KXCAMPMKST
StMiator JAVTW. I don't want io delay either the witness or the mimitfw. Senator Case was tied up on the floor on your resolution on the encampment and the oxi*ctea ocvurred, of course. It has pone to the mlendar. Senator SvMJSforoN-. If you will yield. Senator. J have to preside. at 1 o'clock. I thank you for yourtesttuiony. Mr. KKKKV. Tliank vou. Senator, f Aj'^'iuse. J Senator jAvmi. It has gone to the ralendar but I think the point ha been very well made by, I think, the total number of sensors. Tliere were wmie -~ Senators. Senator Case wax kind enough to o*pre*f my view. I wish to associate myuelf with tlic sUtt-ntent Senator Syn>iiigtr>n nude when I wan here as to your credential*. That w what we always tliink about whh a witness and your credent;iah< couldn't be higher. - The moral and morale \aau- you have raised will have to ix finally artd uron by the romviitfcc. I think it always firefl ins to a dee|M'r e,nne of etnergenry nd dedication wJien we hi*ar from a young man like yourwlf in what we know to \n: t\\v rdteetion of tlie attitude of so iuiaay others who hav Nerved in a way which the Atiieritîu jjcople *o clearly luidentand. It ix not AS, cffettive unletM you liuve thotte eredctitialK.Tlie kind vou have, Tlie only otluT tfiing I would like to add in I his :
210
KVAIA'ATIOX OF T&.T1MOVV
I hope you will understand me and I think you \vill agree with me. Your testimony about what you know and wluit you sec, how von feej and liow vour colleagues feel, is entitled to tlie highest standing and iority. When it comes to the hits and pieces of information, you low, like you heard that Madam Ky is associated with the sale of narcotics or some other guv got a good ineal, I bojie you will undcrst.ind &o Senators and evafuators of testimony we Itavo to take tltat in the context of many other things, but I oouldnt think of anyIxjdy whose testimony I would rather liavc and act on from the |toim of view of what tliis is doing to our young men wt, are sending over there, how they feel altout it. what the impact is on the conscience of a countrv, what the impact is on even the future of the military services from the point of view of the men who served, than your own. Thank you very much. Mr. KEKKV. Thank you. Senator. [Applause.] The CHAIKMAX. Mr. Kerry, I am sure you can scJise Hie committee members appreciate very much your coming. Do you have anything f urtlier tn say In-fore we recess I Kxn:sio.v OK AHPKWIATIHX
Mr. Knoiv. No, sir: J would just like to suy on lxhalf of the Vietnain Veterans Aguinst the War that we do appivHatv the efforts made by the. Senators to put that resolution on the. floor, to help us. help us in their office* in the event we were am-sti-d a'nd particularly fr thi<:hance to ex]jress tJc thoughts that 1 have put forward today. I appreciate it. The CuAitiiAV. You iiave certainly done a remarkable job oi it. I nui't imagine their having selorll a U'tter representative or sjK>kesniai>. Tltankyou very much. [Applause.] <Wiereupon. at 1 p.r*i, tlie committee was adjounied subjwt to tine call of the Chair.)
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE WAR IX SOUTHEAST ASIA

WEDNESDAY, APKH. 28, 1971
UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOUEIGN RELATIONS, Wtuhvngtom, D.C. Tiie committee. met, jmrsutuii to notice, at 10 n.m., in room 4221, New Semite Office Building, Senator J. W. Fi'lbright (chairman) Present: Senators Fulbright, Pell, McGee, Aiken, Javits, viul Scott. The CHMUMAN. The <-oramiU^' will <-ome to order, please.
Oi'ENING STATEMENT
The committee is meeting Kwlay to continui* heariitgs on jR'iiding ion rotating to the war in Southeast AMU. The C'oiniiiittei' on Foreign Kclulioii* hu> >itv\ay.s ttttouijtti'd to ucroniiixnlutc citix.cn^ \\lio \\i.-li<-efort- it. W<- havt- tri'.l to provide an opportunity for all ]>oint> of view to Ix- cxpn'.t.scd IHTMUM* niciiil>4-t> o{ tlii.- mmmittfc Ix-Urn' that Uio constitutional riglit of cilixx-ns to jx-tition their government should tx-.inorf than * right in theon'. h i'lould he u working doL-trine, particular!)' or: matters as vital a* :-r and {N*are. It is in this M>irit that tlie committee ha> given rejireentatives of Students and Voutii for a People's l*e*ce lliL ojjH>rtunity toexer'ine tli4-ir c-on>titutioi)l right to jwtiiion their goveniment for redretw of grievaiMVs. The witneHM'n for the group this inoniing are John Scagliotli, Susan Gregory, Jay (Vv.>n, (,1iip Mondial), and KatJ ( y SinUT. Would each' of vou please identify yourM-lf for t he reporter. Who will i>egin? Mr. CUAVEN. I will Ix'gin. The CHAIUMAK, Aie you Mr. Craven? Mr. CKAVEV Ye-, Mr, The ('HAIUWA*. AN each of you make* your statement, give the reporter your full name. V/iu may proceed, Mr. (.Yawn.
sTATurarr OF JAY CIAVEH. STUDEITB AVD YOUTH FOE A

PEOPLE'S PEACE Mr. < 'UAVKV. We might intnxlti.v ourselves Ix-fon- we tx-gin. The CHAIUMAN. All right. Mr. CttnvKK. Thin is Chin Marshall from Senttle, Wash.; John Scu<_'li'>tli fnxn \ashua, N'.il.; Susan Cregnry fnm Washington, U.C.;mid K athy Sister froi
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We wore hoping that we would speak, all make our statements l>efore being asked questions and we would answer the questions as we felt \ve could deal with it. The CHAIRMAN. All right, you may jjroceod. GROUND IXVASION INTO IAOS Mr. OiiAvrx. On February 6,-1921^-lhe United -States and Saigon forces invaded Jâos. The American {x>o|>lc were not Informed of ihis invasion. A press blackout prevailed over new snwn in Southeast- A.-na, and instead of talking about tiie situation in Jjuos on -t'eliruary C, Richard N'ixon, instead talktvi-about eeul>gy in Anii-rica. He began by sayiig "In his tragedy, 'Murder in the'Cathedral,' T. S. Eliot wrote, vli-an the air, clean the t&y, wash the wind'." The President continued to say "I propose to Uie Congress a sweeping and .comprehensive prrjrram to do just tliat and more fo end this plunder of America'*, natural heritage." This kind of statement is iromc in the face of aground invasion injho I,IK*,. It is ironic as President Nixon talk> about ending the plunder of Aiueii-A's natural heritage at a time when the country of Laos is bein dcstroyeil more intensively and ui a more protracted aerial bomlmrdm'Uit than any country in the history of civilization. It is ironic too to examine T. S. Eliot's poem as it goes on saying in fact:
'.'Ir.an thf air, clean the nky, wmMi the wind, Tttkf nton<- from ytonr anJ wasj them. This land i foul, the water if foul, our IxvsU and oursclve* drfikd with blood. A rain of blood lias Winded my vy(i>. How, how can I i''cr rctnni to the *oft quiet tWMon., NilChtM Htny with nx. Stop HUD, bold tMsvon, Ic4 the day not come, let the spring not come. Can I look again today at coni.aon thinK* and (MJP thcJn all 0mtred with Mood through a curtain of falling blood. We did not u .-"li anything to hupjx u. In liff ilvrc j* not ";ine to urievc, but thin, tbi* i.< out of life. This u out of time, and an intiint eternity of evil wroan. BOllBiyO OF LAOS
The irony continues as on February' 8, most Americans became aware for the firet time of any Amerumn involvement in Lav whaUoever. When in fact Amenc^tn involvement in IMM began in the 1950'a, with CIA intervention in Iâotian affain*. Bombing of IMO began in May of 1964, before the bombing of N'orth Vietnam. It is interesting tluit tlie Sta. Department has referred to the activity in Ijaos in liie |mst a a "uecret war," that Deputy Secretary of State William Sullivan haK re<-entlv called the air war in northern Jâos, "The other war." The bombardment of northern Iâos, an area totally unrelated to the wtiviik-K in South Vietijum, the bombing of northern Iâos, with the civilian popubuion cx)iitrIlcd by the Pathet ljiu>, an area that has been de-ifroyed through the use of inU'imive bonibardinût and (lie tiuuiunjf'*! Imttlcf^ld; thix kii.-d of warfare being employed with n authorization from CongreM, no explanation from the iJuvcnuncni, the (Jovernmcnt in fact lying under oath in testimony wiien iuiit M-verai weeks iigo A>*ibtanl Socretary of Defefiiu* Doolin stated tliat Americans uere IM>I bombing civilian area in
213
1.4105. When in fact the reality of the situation is that the automated battlefield' Avith electronic sensors scattered throughout the coHntryside of Laos, where swisors pick up sound or heat of animals or people n areas. onil in bombing strikes, laser guided bombing strikes, are launched against the civilian areas in Laos. This* is called the loran sensor exstem. . flii*. U.S. Government is now engaged ir developing advanced techniques in the automated battlefield, with the P&ve-Lanec missile system , which. will aU<m' ground tareeUng tlirough hand held laser beams which c&n target are'us and rail in bombing strikes from above. As we sit here tliis morning more than 100 tons of bombs will be " dropped on L*OH forevery hour that we are here. We have a situation whmi- tayers of Aircraft oifSiintlv hover over Laos; light spotter plants al .'2.000 f-t ; A-l~, A-2G, t-28 prop bpmlwrs, A-47, AC-ISO gunshtps, flare ships, anil rescue gunship helicopters at 5,000 fe<U; A-119 gunships which are capable of firing 36,000 rounds of amiaunitiuu a minute, enough ammunition to put a bullet in PV.MTV square foot over an area the size of a football field; F-4 and F-105 jet reconnaisbancc, and jet fighters at 10,000 feet: KC-135 supertankers at 20,000 f4*t; B-52 bombers at 30,000 feet, EC -130 commAnd and c-ontrol uircTaft at 35,000 feet. Tnese bomberK.drop napalm and white phosphorous which burns 'iviliuns dive, 50Q-pound Iwuibs which burv p(*ople alive, anujv-rsounel bombs and frugment&tiou bombs which cut people to shreds. One bombing sorties by n plane dropping a full load of antij>ersonnel bombs disperses 250,000 sterl riel'cts. We all know thnt aitipvrsonnel bombs, the use of antipersonnel bc^nbs, is <nuiawed by international law.
RJTfATJOS CUEA.TED IK LAOS
. We turn- created a situation in Laos where the jx?oj)le in the civilian areas have literally had to take refuge in underground tunnels ami in. -eaves, an agonizing exix-rience as only sonic are able to come out only - t night to do small vegetable farming and > -nail rice fanning. Several weeks ago Laotian women, met ii. Caritula at a coi.i rcnce for Indoctunew and Ajnerican women, and the women from tlie Pat he t Lao were taUdng: aU>iU, anuirig other thingx, a need for medical assistance. We are talking about how children were being born who were never able to come out in the sunlight and were suffering vitamin deticicju-ie*- talking about how children ere suffering pneumonia, at early ages because of the dampnetw in the caves in which they were forced to live, In responding to the situation the U.S. Government, according to the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, his hvui. using 5,000-, 10,000-, and 15,000-|>ouud bombs against l.n< , bombs tiiat literitlly vibrmte people to death even when they are taku.'g refuge in cave* or in tunnels.
LACK OP COHOttE JIONAL AUTUOttlZATIOli AVO JKFOBMAT1OV
'f*h! question tiat arWH, given Uie information of an automated war machine in L*OM, an automated war ujacbine that General Westmoreland calli* * quiet revolution in ground warfftre MM be calls for a ooUnu*tJoo of that revolution by further exploitation of our tech-
214 nologv, tlie question that ariso is \i by has the Senate, the Congress of the United States, not nuthori/.cd or even Iweii consulted in this activity. Why is it that the Congress has nul authorized this \\lion in fact "t he Ambassador to I **)* authorizes every single target that is used }>y the American railit-ary in flying bombing sorties over Iâos? And why is it that mo-*! American people heard for the -first tiaie in February of 1971, of 1'nited States activity in Lays; that the first information about bombing in Laos was revealed in MaitJi J970, 6 year? after bombing began? Why is it that the American people were not giv<<n information of this kind of activity?
I N C R K A S I N G lEf.PEUATJ<j\ OK SITTATIOX t\ IMMX'mXA" .
The situation in Indochina, i* becoming increasingly desjerate a* e.ach day gwson. Al it time when fhe bombardment is ex-alaim;*, wheir civilian population^ r- being destroyed, when ihe entire society of tlie Plain, of Jar* ha> bee.n destroyed; uhen American?- an- engaged in de-hide over whcthtT-Saiguii or Anirrican ground troops are being u.M-d in l:i(; at a tiuie when the automated battle niuchine wa.-> functioning no ground troops were ux-d at Hiroshima, Nagasaki, or Oif-jlen. Xo ground troops nave b4--n ne.c^xsary during the protracted air war over LHOS. bi >jite of the withdrawal of Saigon troop>, ihe bombing c-ominucs, bombing that averages brtvvci-n 500 to 100 soilies u ?IHV. Hombing which, according to the New York Time-., reached it ]>ruk of I ,>00 4laih *ortie> during the \M incurMoii. Why is it that when we .-peak (if deft>ndirig the people of South Vielnum, tin- rculiiy of the Mlualioii i- tin;! jwojilc till over South Vietnam, boll) r. the countr\side and in the cities, are ri-iiiir up against the Aiucricuii involvement in t h a t country, and we do not understand that it i a repudiation of U>. military prepuce in S<,,itli Vietnam. Kxamples of this could IN* seen during a I -week |>criod beginning Augiifti HO last summer when on AuguM 2'-\ a \\onmn and her daugliUT were rajied, a ra|e lhat reniilteil in death, by an Aniericnn (II. 'i heir funeral literally turned inio a riot t h a t \venl from tin* funeral to American ba*c.-, where rniiiiury cur^ were burned and destroyed. An Ann rii-aii soldier '.I davs hiter i.m over a sho<-shine Ixiy in Saigon killing h';u, >hoe*hiue fx*ys ]>ojed their money to give him a funeral and hi* fuiK-ral al>o iiirned into an lull-American riot. Siuo'eifis meeting at ihe I'niver-iiy at Suigoii on August ill, I9/". were talking alxmt trying to .-i<>|) ipul'-ory military training mid recriiitmenl on their eumjiu, inlKing iilxjin trying to get Thieu's ^'ret |u|ice o/F their cuinpn-. They hail their meeting invade*] by ihe Saigon jolice, \\here 117 .-indent.-, were urrehted and *enl to the 'J'iger < 'nge> at .' 'on NM (The fi.Uouin;: infonnaiioii u.-i- -.iil^-ijurnily supplied:;
Th' -tuH'-iii- -nirTi'<) l>riii;i| IMMUNE ::n(| itidTmu'iii'tii lull- In |>ri-":i Tin-* liui" tli" -I'.iiiif ilni-i |K:I!IHI:- v. inn I In | .in ifivin n |ii' -iif.ilivi- nwi uilli
I l l ' r i l Ml > I I U H ' I III 111 Cl I l l l n ' l
It .'. > 'iini'mh i uriiilii. ili'in n< Innt'T - I n k ' - liv ATIII-II'':III -luil'-til- ;iinj \ i- "ii. . ' . > - . Ihrii'iîi'iul .--.-.ili \ i - : i nn 1'i.it lli< if\>r,-~ii>r. f im|>ii-i>iifii -:n<J'':il i 'Ir.i'm'i < - ' \ -.ml Iti ir ri l> 'i i.n.itli iu;i'|i- |'(^--il-I'
V-i .|I I." I- . ' il< "J !<'i:. I. ir<- .il'ij i < \i >'i iln.'iii \IMIII mi r< C'l'iinit I m> I ' . . ; ' - . \;ilu- \ i"l1' '(in < ' i :ii|. . r. ,. ,ii'. .in m-;i! 'I ji.nrli >i-r :i;:ii| Ann lie. Mi lili.''ili^ pil'il li> !i, : i \'ir'!i X i . ' l i i . - i ' . w i l d v. limn HI HP- rnii'-i ttn 'i.
215
i I*EOPLE*S FEACE TREATT
ll is from this emerging dynamic iu Vietnam that the People's Peace Treaty addwses itself to. The People's Peace Treaty first dcclares that me Anicrican and the Vietnamese people air not enemies. In a war that we am not even being informed of, in a war in which the Government, tre executive administration of this Governnvuit, c* lying under oath, we feel as if this war cannot be conducted iu our* name. We. have entered into discussions with studenU from Saigon, from North Vietnam, and from the National IJheration Froot of South Vietnam, to agree wjwn common conditions for peace. CThe treaty refern-d to follows:)
JUNT TuK.Tr.of |>KACK.|}>:Tu-r.KVTtti:l'K(fiJ: 'nt> THK I'MTKII ST.VTKS AXD Tin: '.PI-.OPM; <r SOI-TII ViKf-KAM AXD NUKTK VII.TN \u Bf it known thai the American and Virtimmi-bP pcnplf uri- nut rin-iiii<.i. 'Ttk>* war if carried out in thr uami* of l.ic pfu|ilc of thr I iiii<<d Sl.tti-* and South \Vtiuun but uittuiut oiir rou-niit. ft dmirox* tin- land nixt |<iil; trfO'irt.narii. It drains Anujrira of it." n-sourcfs, it. youth and it* donor. Wo hcri-by aicnv-to <-nd t hi-, war on itie follow ini? (CCIIIH, >o that l>nih - '-:--_ -j^[4w^ UvMiiHiT<h'-i(i\^'iJu)i'|'litloiic4-iuidi'aJidi'Vo : ! "' ; - î fyiil({iri{f a f<Kn<'iy lukvd or 1iiiiun)i cqiialit\ and rif-ixft for t i n : _* . "In'rrjr&inic ltJ Aur, \v.- nls/> rvjtrt all finn> of racism tind dfu ' agaiiMt ]x-o|>l>- on iti<' lo.-r> of color, c'ut, -x, na.'ionoJ nrr groupinr wnitiico!isii.ut* i aniiiti < Rr' oft)icar [.'ilii'i*^ pr-sanit and IMMI, of tin- I'ni^-d Stut'-n. 1. Tin1 AfiiiTirnii* iicrf' in itniii''Uuit" î>d tutnl uillidr.tunl from Vii'f'iaiu :ind (Hililirly tn .! tin- di tr l>y uhirh nil Arurriciui frn> will !' n-movi-d. Thi* Vii-inaiin-Mi* pltrdt'*- (hat *," S<M>II a thf C.S. (iovcrnnifnt [iiililicly wts a dU- fur tot id MithdrxMal: ?.. Tbt;y will iiK'r-Juifii.-iiHiinin to nccnn* thi- n-fc-iuM' of all Aim-ricar. |iriôiu;r includtUK pilots cu|jti:r>il wluli- iMxnhing North \ h-l uain. .'I. TlnTi- will IM- an inuii'iiiat'- eititp-fw >*'irvii-n I'.S. forri-t awl (lioli'd li\' the Provisional it*v)iitntiiiry floviTiitnrtif of Soul n V id nain. 4. 1'lit-y will i-nUT dJ.M'ik-sion.t of (Ur proi:i-dnro U> Riioniti:^- the Nifr-ty of all withdrawing tro|Mi. .". The AuifrU-uiix pl'-djp- lo >-nd l!if iin[iivilioiv of TluMi-K> -Klii'-in n lb' [-<>\i\>of Soiiih Vii-tntttn in order lo inx'irr tln'ir riitlit to .-i-lf-di'iiTi)iiii:it|.m and HO that all i>oliticl jirinoniTH can ! n'I-a.J-d. 0. Tlu- \intiiutnr-"' pU'diC' to form provisional roulition icoviTnnx-iit to dfinmratir It-ctioiw. All |r:ifs UKI'II' t'i n-iji't il>r fniiltsi i>' in nlnrh itll rio<:Ui \ 'irt iiaiiicsM1 ran ]purtiri|iul<- fnt-i\ willioul t|i>of ant fort-ici' trfwjw. 7. Tlw South \ i>* Hiitwu' pl>*diC" (o r'-r dH>'ii<u<ioii nf |>r-'>n 'iiiri-. to Kor.in* lo<- llic mtfnty and poll Ural fni-doni of (hi^x- Soui.li \ H-IIII IIK-.-U- ulio li:ivoUalmru'J-J I4illi tlii- I'.S. or u i t i i Ih" 1 l'.S.-.siip;>iirii-il ri-Ki'm*. H. Tlw AUKTH'IUI- und Vi'(ruliii"w ii^n'r li> r.|MTi th - ind''!!''!!^'!!!1'1, jx'M''1 ;uid neutrality of IJUK ajid f'uinlio'iijt in nrrord i'h ill" \'.t't4 :id \W("fM'Vii roll1.' ,ii,.>., Hiid not to inli'rf' f in ih>> iiil'TiinI :4)TAir- of lh' ^f lun rounlrii" . y I '|o'. thi-n" jioini- of ai:i iii' il il, in ;>l''d^' ' :'! l l i f u;r uinl r nil nlh> r >|i|>'iM inin t i n - -.,11,11 n! 'l(-<i"!i-riiiiii;i:ioif und iii'Mi.:)! r> , ( f"i t'l- ii,J-(7iJi'iiri' :ii"J, ;,-ilii 'jj fn-i'd 1111 of tli'- j >;! of V n/r>4:ii> I nd :l I' iiiJ Slat".. . Uy rut fviiiic tli>- :i&i'< rin-in. >. in".J."' in i i i k > - wh.i'i-i-r urln>n jri- :ipjrri>|n ;!>:- 'o liiii'li'li "ni t i n ' I' rln- of ||ii~ jonil 'Ji.'.ilv ami lir i i i - ' i r r \'\-> :n n |,f.ilir.' l. lh' fn\i riuiK'i ' of t! I niii 'I Si;i!"-
VVi' IIP- ri*N|iniiili(iir lt> :i\>[n'n\i fl<-'Jj l l u > liulorliinoi' |M-H| ! llijil c u l l fur Minlmm-il nfiJ r i H i c i i i i i u l r i j urinil'. at Mil* J I - M H I , io inn-i- DMiii inlmiiii-(riili"li In n ,>!>'n'.-li n llnil M i l l I-IH! t i n - w n r . )" >J ii wild./ t i n - ( 'oiipv^v IIKU iiul IIMIIIIC<| itr. rfn|)uii^)t/ilif>-, ju n
210
situation where analysts from the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington spt-culatf that it is questionable whether Congress could even he effective in oivinjr to end this war, we ourselves we taking netioti to ratify and Catideiucnl the (n-act- treaty. The city courti-il in Detroit, Mich., last night ratified the People's Peace Treaty miVi declared that their implementation procedure was beginning In he planned and that it would involve levying war tuxes on all war materials being shipj>ed from or through the eitv of Detroit. The peace treaty has IMMMI presented as a resolution to the House of Representatives. Hundreds of college* across the country have ratified the ;ioaee treaty, prii-sU, women/ working jieople, students and Members of Congress have ratified the pcwe treaty in an attempt to demand an end to tl.c wur, to recogni/.e conditions for peace and to stop manipulation h\ the Nixon administration of an unwilling p*Hjle who have declureil their op|Misitioii to the war.
ItEI-KAs;: AM> TREATMENT OK IMUSONKKS OK WAB
To end the kind <>f manipulation that comes when Richard Nixon talks abi.ut American troops remaining in Vietnam milil all prisoners of ,vur are relrased when in fact historv shows the prisoners have never hci-ii reli'aM'ti before- cessation of hostilities. To eiul tin- kind of nanipulutiini that rxUts as v\e an* forced to Ix-licvi- that the N'<>rth Vietnamese people uiul (jovenimciit are barbaric in their t r c u t n u n t of prisoners, prlsoiiei.-: who ure held in North Vietnam all of whom are Ixunbinf: pilil.-, hii havi* illegullv tioun as many as .10 or 00 lnMuliinj; mi>sion> uyainst North Vietnam and been resiM>n>iblf for the deaths of thousamls of civilian:., have destroyed lumpitals, schiMiU. and civilian turrets. Our own American chunvitiism has hlinded us to the fact that those pilots arc. considered war criminals. Nobody tnlks ul>oiii the treulmi-nt of ^rixxier-i hc'ul in South Vieli':mi for which tit.- I'.S. (jovernnieiii is re>,)oiisil)le. Nobody hi-rds information (hut conies from people like (i'-orp- Sruilli, a captain in the Go-en B4-ret?. who uas captured on November 'J2, 11MJ3, by the National hiberadon Front in South Vieimuii. When (t-orci- Smith wit, captured he s|eak.s about how lie was never physically mistreated during hi.- captivity with ihe Vieicoiift. He talks uboilt ho'A he was feil iideijuuteiy, llov, he received muil n-pilurlv. He tulk> about in fa>-i ili.x-iiîi)ii>. that lie w>is able to have, en>ul ilis<'iiHsio:is, with his >rminis; he talkn about b'.-fore Cl.ristmus beinc iLskcd what he wanted for ('hristir.iis dinner and answering i-hicken arv.1 bread. Vieti'img uurd.s wnt a courier son.c 20 miles nn f<jo( to briiijL' <-!ncken and breiul for (Jeoftfe Smith's ami tin* other American jirisoneis' dinner. Smith talked about .-.ort of celling up the nexr morning and saying to the cuurd, "\Vell, you know, ('hristmaA IN not the only lioliduv we have in America. We have Thank.-civiii^ and Labor Day mid Fourth of July, my unnh.-r.-urv and my bitthday." And the Victi-on^ heeded this and âve hjN-cial liinners on tlu-M- occa>ioiii. He talks about how Lieutenant Caimiclio, who HU* beinjr held with him in prUon, eru-ajx-d from that particular pri>on in l'Jo4 at><l was reiiirne'l to the United Sinter to lie made a hero. L\ndon Jol'iiwni flew to bin hoiiM' at San AnUiriio, Tex., and |>reM<nU-d him with it medul. Life Mtt^ra/.ine did an article on CwiiMcho Miying C'anuwho
217
was the first American escaping from the enemy since World War II. how George Smith helped him to escape by diverting the attention of the Vietcong, who was also a hero. Smith goes ou to explain that in 1965 he was released by the Vietcong in exchange for the life of Norman Morrison, an American who immolated himself in front of the Pentagon to protest the war. The Liberation Front had said that George Smith was being returned to the Americans so that Vietnam may live. When Smith was released to the Australians at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, he held a press conference and the first question he was asked at the press conference was what be would do when he returned to the United States. He said he was going u> explain to -the peace movement in the United States that he had been exchanged for the life of Norman Morrison. He said he was going to try to explain to the American people how he felt the war was vrong, how the National Liberation Front in fact was defending the people of the countryside of South VieUiain. Smith was court martialed after that press confereni*. imprisoned in Okinawa where he went through a course of heating and interrogation and was denied an honorable discharge by the U.S. military, all of this happening at a time when we are calling the North Vietnamese barbarians in their treatment of prisoners when prisoner* themselves who have returned to the United States' have spoken of the treatment they have received which has been good.
ATTITUDE Or VIETNAMESE PEOPLE
A fact we have to understand is that the (teople of VieUMin, both overall of South Vietnam and North Vietnam, explain they are not at uar with the American people, that they distinguish the American people and the American Government, that in fact they understand that no |>eo|>le could wage the kind of genorid:d war against them that U currently being waged. In Au even for the Congress of the United Stau?.>, the Congress estimate- *i ~e are not at war with the Vietnamese j*eople. We ore being told a silent majority backs the undeclared war, a war that neither the Senate or the Ilouso, have declared.
DESIRES Or AUEUrCAX PEOPLfc
What American |>c,o)>le are rising up to KUV ut this point is that they are nut at war with the Vietnamese |MM>p|p and tliat tltey are continuing to take actions to end the war. We understand that the Nixon atlminisrrfcUoi. will not respond to the kind of demands, moratorium^ pnrtet*, petiuoiitf, lobbying, draft resisting, and other act* of niii'ari<v a d diftobedienw that we have engage/1 in. We are taking action that will i.ulmiriiiU- thi spring, following the activity of I'H- vr>UTHii, u mu-sj* nillv, and a people* lobby, in rmuîve dvil dii><ii>i>dien<j to \>u luunc'uuf Ix-giunin? MI Kl Monday where biidjre,* nti'l "tiv.-N will IN; blocked nonviolently. Nonviolent civil di*olx'<<ien<: ti.'i "ill iiierully uv thai this \vur lius got to end, tli.it we cun no longi " listen |j MIL* kind of deceiving uiid inuiiipulaling lie* t h u t r f.nintr.' from tltii lulniinintri'' on when u inujority of ihi- Aincrii-in p<jj>l'' uiv dcitmuding mi en .1 (his war ulien war crime* investigation- urn literally being Jidd in lie.- offices of (,'ongre*, when par-
218
ticipalbry democracy has totally failed and collapsed in response to the American people's desires to end technological genocide against a relatively defenseless people in Indochina. We could go into more detail as we answer questions. Susan Gregory will be tho next - peakcr. The CHAiruiAN. Miss Gregory. STATEKEHT OF SUSAH GKEOOEY, WASHHGTOV, L.C. Miss GREGORY. I would like to begin by reading a message to all of us from Madame Binh who is the chief nego*:ator at the Paris |>eace talks in Paris, France. What she says is expressive of what we have corao to learn *bout the Vietnamese people and their desire to end this war which is as great as our own desire. These hearings are called to find a way to end tinwar, and yd on September 17, 1970, when Madame Binh presented her eight-point proposal in Paris it was ignored by the President, it was ignored by the Congress, ignored by the media and consequently by tho |>eople of this country who have not been able to kr.ow what its content is.
MESSAGE FROM MADAME BINH
American friends. I wish to extend my warmest KrcHinpt to U American friertj< of all social position.*, |ntlilic.il tendencies, and religion* lielief* ,>iuticipating in thir\[ring Off 'iisive. ( >nce again you luive gathered in Washington, New York, Sun FrutxHsco. r id many other big cities to [X>ak up tin- voice of genuine America, the pca-VM"d'>d and justice-minded America, dcmaiidiiiic that your government end the ViK<m wur. Mure than fei'er, an end tor the war ban become a pressing di-numd of the people of our two couuvri'*, go that the Vietnaincw people jimv live frti- from sufferings and mourning*, nvonstruct tliejr devic-tated hotiieluiid. and bcal the sentimental wounds if each of \heir heart*, mid o that th- American Jx-oplr's wi-altb and power may h>> KriiollyNlevoUid to the irrgenl demands of j)i(l>lic life. -Yet., in his April 7tKJ-< ch, l'riid-nl Nixon nhowi-d no conwru lx>ut the nspimtiunx of tlw I iitiuuyiw: und the Ameiirali |wo|>ln. To our UJ-%.:'..j of on cnti to the wur, Mr. Nixon niiwer tlint he will continue his |wilii-y of "V ii-tnaniizatiiit;.'' i.e., the prolongation and exi^MiHion of the war. To pli-ad for this police, Mr. Ix'ixon l>oittfiillv Kpcalni of its imaginary *u not only in South Vietnam, CaiiMîdia but also in ljut*. depile tin: glarin if the C,,S. iinti .aigon troop* in ' lir Sanh area of .SoulI) jetnaui and in Southern
Jjl,!4. \
We dtMiknd tliat Mr, Nivon net 11 i--;i.oiml,|.' date for the 'olal withdrawal irf American iroojwt o we mav have a râ*" (in* l-t ween the liberation armeri forcnt und the I'.S. forc*, and to dint IHC the i;iie<tiioii of emuinnic >.ifi-1y fir tlic witbdrawing troops and the >iuic'n>n of releawnK military men captured in tlu- Viet' iiani :ir. Yet, Mi. Nixon deiilx-rately 'u'.ii'>i'* thin flexili[e pri>)Mmal of tlw PUG 'PeopleV Ilrvoliif ionary fiovernment) on tin/ mutter, p<n forth on Septemliir 17, I'J"'I and l>efetiit>er 10, l!70. !)< Khninelnwly deo'iveit tue Ainernun jn-oplr, urguinK' I'n1 u'l I ing a deadline for (lie withdraw al x ould \- tantamount to ''throwing awav his nrinciual bargnining counti-r lo win the release of I'.S. prisoncru" and would 'TiaiuixT tiie Hecurily of Anirjraii iinojrt. To the South Vi-'tnumese people'^ d"nu<nd for A repri-Mentut! -e ndminiBirution Bluii/liriit for peace, indeiH-nd'-nce and neutrnlity, Mr. Nixon iim*<-r thnl li will uot n HIM.nre liis ''friendn." il|e wurlike and cjtrni|it fio Thien-Ky-Khietii that iir wuitln t.o imiKMi- on (Jic South VietnumeHi- |>ei>| Je. And in order to soothe the Ameriraii |.'-(i;i|' 'H di>-<utisfuctioti at hinrfpeech, he displuyn a pn/'inion of rhtitoricul talks alioiil \MW, fpi'doin and fntitiml r>'i-|"'cl. Jnfnt't, t!i" only pl;ni:iiion po^-<iM: of Mr \, Jon's at tjlude i* la- m-willinitti''-* lo -l<ip the wur bfid lo wiihdraw till the Atn'ri<in troop* Irntt r>uth Vv'fnuni, in iitt-T ili--i'iy> d of II,'- inoiitniiig' and deviislution^ snfTrred In the ôiilh \n-ltiauiew- people and tli" twinge of t^xitci'-'iiue fek by the American peopl*1 >n tuce
219
of the inomtrou!* crime* committed by the U.S. Amy in South Vietnam, in the name of the United StaU* people. Dene American friend* of all -grouping*, the youth. *tudeni. women, working p:on(e, inleiivctuata, Congremuueu, clergy UK n, bulni-*MiHti, writers, uttUU and I with to tod yvi that we. South Vietnam^*: tnsi|U-. ardmitlv cherish peace and fmidom, Uiat wrttaare maintaining friendly ivjbtion- nith the American pvoplc. In thin npirit, we arc' ijo'fciiiK on appropriate political ?olution to the Soutj Vietnam prubt-m to end thw ntr>ictmlt> war and swt up ni-xv relationship between our two couf.trioi. But the lJjf; Kuvcrnruint, striving fot- military victory and domination of our pt-ople. ha* nbowu no inv-^t for negotiation.*. All our reasonable and logical proposals concerning Uv vithdrawal of all t'.g. trueiM. the cokx-tirr between thr South Vietnam t. a armed ' >rcs uud I lie {j.l>. forced, tbr rd'aksr of raptured military tr,.-n, jiid a ju<t . " -inciil of tin- polittial quotion < in South Vietnam have been l>larki, d out l>y : tir I'.S. government and annot widrJy known to American puldie. liawevcr. the American people of all walk.-) of life are quite different from their government. Through tlie n-cuiit trial of Lt. William (.'alley, they have better nrtliied Uie bruUl natun: of the VictnAm war. Ttioy linvc realized that I'.S. honor docs not rnrinUt iu pursuing that immoral and iio]n>lc^ war but in reapccting other people's freedom, justice, and dignity. Thi-refnre, Aiiu-rican* of various Mtci'J trata, including ConjcrrMamen, an- participating in g.i twing numl>er in aiiti-war activities throughout the country. They an.- renolulvly voicing their legitimate ayyifktium, demanding that tbc I. JR. Ciovusninu-ntiîid Uw war and an wt a date tinir limit for UH- rapid withdrawal of nil the GIV from South Vietnam. I wuth cr.'at succetoes to your Spring Offensive and ho|if that different groiipn of Uie I..S. *iiti-vrar niovemeut will come to still (tetter coordum'Jon in takinK more eff<vlive nctiou* to demand that the Nison Administration aerioualy ncgutiaU- a political *)lution so that the war may IK- cndrd and peace tx> rr-torud in Vietnam. With cordial grc. tings and MIICVJV wiIu-v fur frii-ndiiliip nd iôlidarity, Nguyen Tl.i Umh.
Yii:tuaiU VftiYMU ...
This N ilat^d April 19, 1971.

I'KK.SIDEXT'ii KPKfjT't OK APHIL 7, 1971
I would lik- to rrfrr buck for a moment to Presiilont Nixon's .HIH-^JI on April 7, 1971. B<>niu.M.> of hi- niiliiiiiii-d and ulnix-d atr^s.to the iiirdiu. what Mr. Nixon suys i> assuinc'd lo Iw- true. Aftor ufl why would a President lie lo the people unli>.s of course ! could not have (In; |M'.>plc kii-Av the t r u t l i iiad knou- the rmlity Ix-liind his u-ord.-i? I're-jiueiil Vixoii *:i\'a !ii ^'u.;! i. f"ll wilfi.lj uw/il. and yet he will not set date to Achieve t h a t '/mil. and I lie stipulation is that all the privitHT* Ix- home before ull l l u - troops can be home, nnd now he luu* added another Mmiilatiuii, uhicli i Hint tlie 'l'!)ieu-K\-Kliieni repute reiuain in power. The regime i- clearly and evidently de-iplêd by th |>oople of Son ill X'iclnktn becaiist! they an- litrrallv piipjM-,s literally impjiet,-, of PreMiIci I. N'Koi) and our military. \ViMi tho two "tipulntioii.- it in iui|>oHibli- that the troop- will <-r come h " and the only way for nn to ê! the pri.-oiicr- home is t/> wl the ,,au>. The l'U(i ha* forced \u immedintely di-*fu>~ t i n - release of pri.-*onej> after the ii^frenii-lil of u -et dilte fu' lolul M jl li<lr:iU nl ii made. lii J'.>.r4. ft/ '. 1'ie Kreneh agreed to cea-si- ho-tililies the prioii<>ra Iield by ( l i e \'l'| niiirir , Here relea.-ed u j l l i i n (i Week.s. We have no rriu-oii to doubt their uurd (w.-ni^ 1 i [trw(\i-f the\ have kept it. Another falhie; of IVe.îdent N'ixoi- > -iwech j- i f m t he culllUil Met the dale berniix- it will serve the enemy bv throwing away the I'.S. hni'piinin;.' coitntrr to win reli-a-- of tr.S. prisoner-, ,,f war. When we we t h a t the only Hay l-o have | lie (iriMdii-is returned to u in by
M-ttill^ U IJflL'',
220
or MUSONEM or WAR
In reference to the prisoners of war, Prcsideat Nixon, the Pentagon, ami a few rich men, in the most manipulative and dishonest way, have spent, literally millions of dollars on a campaign to whip up public opinion. 'I'hev have cruelly raised the hopes of the wives and (amities. President Nixon anc his friends iiave created through propaganda, a public call for the release of prisoners when lie bim,:elf is the only one who holds in bis power th ability to bring the prisoners home. All of his invading Cambodia and invadinfe-Laos, thrcateiiiug to invade North Vietnam and bombing North Vietnam; ail of his violent extensions of the war to supposedly assure the' safety of the prisoners of war will only create more prisoners of war. Instead of negotiating for the security of the POWs. Nixon uses military force. Continuation o that policy will never work. Our President is deceiving us. The American public and the Congress must understand that it is Nixon and I<airu who arc blwking efforts to free. tiie prisoner* of war, by attempting to discredit the very |eople who tire most vocal in trying to nd the war the peace movement. We are saying if Nixon sets the date, the prisoners car> / ome home. Therefore, it is President Nixon himself who has blocked tin: way to solving the prisoner-of-war problem.
WOMEN IK AMERICA
In America, women have no voice in the policy of this Government; 51 percent of the people in this country are \vomen. Women have not made the policy of this war and yet pre made the pawns of it. We women all over the country are, linally realising Unit a xvar which is killing children and women android jK-onle, ami birds and trees and ducks and crops in Vietnam is a griiocidul/biocidul war. We will have no part of it, and work until we t.p it. When President Nixon goes on television and telU us everything is fine; the troops are coming home: he i- pursuing un honest and honorable policyin fact, he is doing the opposite. It is very difficult for the [icople of America, e|>eeiiLlly women, to stir ibem.ielves hemiiê in fact we have bneii paejfte.d. We feel lo'.M-rlrsH. H,i\ oppressed jM'opls1 M'tout of tlieir ;owerle.s-ne>-*. Ami .* women IH-JHII to get together und make ehanges in our live. vVe will have child cre for our children so we can go into rhe. street.- to ulk w i t h people of President Nixun' to end the war -along I he line- of the Peoples' IYee Treaty and the night-pînt proposal of Madame Hinh. Hi.i nifusul to do ilinri> forriiig tlte women of this I'oimtry to take stand* we normally would m.i ulie. ( h u t ue in fuel didn't, even want to take. The bubble of I he Anieriritn dream h:i Ix-'-n split wide open mid cvjry wctor of the popiiluiio. > -all people, ' liiernlly know tiuii in the.r own liven they huve fewi*. jobi uvuiluble utid not enough money if) meet tlicir needs.
r i W K V V iK MTI
In mliliU"ii lo w l i n i i In' nur i- doin^ (/> t'li.T country, ue Ix-îu to ,rcali//. tJirongh the unr erinier. irihnuul Mini the Uviinidiiv of the (if* about the alroci(ie they Imve i-oininiileil ( tluii we huve been puri/icd
221
into beinjr F>od Germans. We must begin At this moment,"in ny way that situation. traffic dw know what to do. Ni*>n L* lorcinp the country into a mrftit'itii.tml iirisis. So, in every \vny possible, people are creating and initiating new ways to impress upon the Congress to forcn the Presideni, who wilt then force tin- military to etui the war. Tlien we will hot nwil to Lave a war crimes tribunal iu JO yean, u tlte Germans tiki after tin* genocide of the Jews in World War II. And we and U": Vietnamese people together can forge a common victor}' iiiul a \>mmoii peace.
- IXFLCENfE OF WOMEX ON U.S. POLICY
The CHAIRMAN. Could I a>k one question at this point. I didn't understand. Did you say wor"ii have no influence on-(lie luliry f fhU country? " ML-.S (JuEfioiiY. Vcri, I did. T!ic (.'IUIKMAN. Why uot? They vote; don't they? They.could elect any-mi- they like if I hey \vo_rv interested; couldn't they? : -_ Miss GKKROKY. You don't nndcrstun<l women's oppression. TheCHAUiMAN. \\1irtt? MK-. (iur.uouY. Women are oppre&êd in this countrj', p*ycholofjieally, ei-onoinicully. uiul socinlly. We a;c swi.-iiizird into rcrtain roU^t In live in our homo ni>d n'ljiport our hiishamia, lo rnM- our '-ItildrHi to fijrht in Ntîiuui nnd u^rce with :hc I'rcMdent und the Congress. But I lii-lievir th whole ron<:upt of WOIIUMI bein^ pns>ive uu/ Mtpportjiiff' men in building a dciit!i c.ulture is ruin^'throii^h whut we might cnll u 'lurnovi-r." Whilr men IIMVI: jrn.\\n to think ill mililnry lenn^ U-.MIICII somehow hu\'<- Dot doru- (hitt. And it i> th.r spirit of iife and the Immunity llnit we IIUM-. i;oin!>iri'd with our i!ct>>rniinntioit r whicii uc will now try to UM- in uire<-(inr th- couix1 of lhi-> country. Hut iLis utmost jtnpo^.-ililo in .1 room full of men to do that, and .-o \voincn will have lo ilo it t-r/ether. Senator AIKKX. Mr. ('hnirmnrt. nmy I >k if ther" were inst one rnitii in the room, would the women havr uny 'tifinenue? You any thi-y don't huve. any ij-fluetuv in >i roor,i full of men. N'i*-> (IKKCOUY. Is is very difficiilt for women to \n> heiird at all l)'i; ui ;i room full of wonn-ti uiili one mini, I think we CHII tnke enre of him. iiir.hiiiinj: I'p-idi-nt Nixon. .vnutor A I K K N . Uiil v.u rvi-r lie:tr of Mr.-. l''iil!riir!it? (l,:iiiirhter| T!ie < ' I I \ I I . . M * \ . Mr. Sni-jiotti. Thi- j.- .foh-i N--di<iifi, lie in fri>m
Vrv. H i i r t i > hir' I'.liii 11 foriilT Ilir-llilier of t l i e - t l n i e t i l M'UJlte of tlie
I'niver-iiv if New Iluiiiji^hire. i'n/i'.-ivl.
STATEMEHT OF JOHN SCAGLIOTTI, NASHUA, .H.

\fr. -^ w,r."icri. f -o-;|.I lil-:.-1< ( r-jul :i r-.-ijile <-f ;!',:' :lnif n hi'.'hly ri- j i.--{ ^|.'i|.f<tu:i'i "f i lie iiMitufiri'jr ji'ijMilrtr o;i(ui-.i:i>in in the .Sipii reirniH- h.i- eiiii-rî-il in tlje |ier-iin i.f \j.'i> ('riiiir Dii" 1 , i l e j i u i v in t i n H. i l i t : - i ' l :i-,liif)Iv f t . i i n \'|itl| ]',!(ilj j i r u s iiice. !'';ir frmn IH-HI^ pin' i i i i . t , M r . D u e \i ; l . elei-ir,! i n J % 7 , , n > \ . pro-Tiii>ru, pro-war
-"-*
- 222-='
. A wealthy Mta landowner, he sneaks HS iv aieiulnT of .a*-: Hiul is a lealii:g Catholic layman aiut editor of. ilu l;daily paper, Tiu Sang. * - '': \ " " " ^ *t at a press ronfcs^nce in Paris m September^!, 4iix country7* survival Due dp-monded , ii uumodjatc oiul t'. immediate withdrawal of all American troupe And a peace setdcnuMit' nuirh lik! that if (lie PKG initiative. _ _ Topi'ther with -Duo, the South Vietnamese [ooplo know- onlv too woll that Nixon'* "VietnamiM-lion" nicans total ~>ontmpt for U life in UicK\laml. f iv their upri.-Mnps against Fhicu-lvy-KiuVni. they their ,-lwiou for life noitieath. -.;",. .
:
STATKMESTS Of XOO \'OXG I>CC
iviui-tlm following |M>rtioii-of ^[r. Due's

Tin- fvmtli Vifinafiu-.-A* jwoplr aspire currently, uiorc than over, .to p >un<i!inv, mid a life worthy of. hitman (wing.*. Tbt-K a(>iraU'HU arc ulA i il&.tiErH-'-ikupapiiLitinii'af South Vietnam i. car<rl>f v|> i ono'of thr most io.-< '.f ;wor<. P'llitk-al, econ'unic and îltural lifc tlimiiimU-d by furaUncrs. - - j'" llw- Aijtrrfeait politir.tKiud cnmomic aJni* have-coinptotvly nltcn-il Ukrimtur*-" "^ ' of "Vii'tfiain.-yicocicty. With" ibcir money the Americana a*tr rttfnic .cmnrounitie* L din- anotiifr, and on* den. roving a'l lJu:ir rradilional ikpiriutoi jiid piural . Tlii.- nunibor of |>r<xiUtnt>~* in-rraj<o daily. More tttan <IOO,Oi>0 ViMuamrflf jn- rurivntly .-iiKap.-d in this wrotoWd and hiiniiliaLiuc prnfavian. Thr irj- ulso (r/ to pruinoti-- tîrrtipli'â a<> m to u.ic their iircotui-liciM in puro'iln; ifitirialint. aJia iniioutb Vietnam. >n'\hr cultural Jt-vcl. th<- Ur.iu-d StnU-> M-kx t tramrfonn South Vietnam into % an \jm riesi-ty[H: orii-ty In' ftWivpinR uay all tht- positive aî^ds of tlit- V'iet- v.-ar-iil/l ih"lclivad'> nut RI> t-> srlu>.>[ but U'.nd ltntTalr<i. work ir> rice li>Jd( niiiij* -If>--. and -C'D nowitpaiKT*. Ariu-riran p'llify in South Vji.-iujini tiium ut Aniu.-;-' t^triuiiiK ttio Vii-inumo^. iH-.opli-. tr-umfoni>iii> tin: \i<:Uiaui>-ac into fon:iiCiicn> in Un-ir own wtunlri -iiilo IftCK-ajiisiijiy iKRcnkut cruaturof tiii>i>fd uf ult dignity.' JV MEN'1." AXy
f>u*un broii^lit .ui) somi'thiiiK iJmt I fvl \vry clos-i' to, that i C'oinjr<-i.>. t.ljr uu-iiLlx-rs of thir Oovrrnnivii:-. n IIIIMI, tlmt wn t;tnl' > i*sitii:i| thul ii)-;i have IH-.-D >ociiili/,(vl in our r<i.'.ir(y u> lluiik in 11 very iiiliuumn wuv. (liink a Su:m siiys. inilitiurily, to tJiink in \lic pi-il>i!iiy if liuriihi'iiir tliuu-fiiinlvof Vii-luiHiKsr! people, ti' p'poi'itle of I !i<- war, tli.'U vvhti)'- iiruu.lFoi! th:if has i!t:vcl<|ii-<l m Vi.'limni <-<>n((l only ! i'nrn>'i\ on ly nin. J nouli like to r.wl a. Xi-vs1 York Tinto:, ilHrtVil S,.|(|j.|,ilw.r 26, 1!70, pull about Mir V;an:iiii nr. UK title ii* ";t Un Man's Wr."
If thf \>:t'.- on wiLl).|f;n*.J fr.m Vii'tnam \\. -IT kft to rn*-n nf i*w nation jvfuirly rv<-ii '|KI~K>:I iif |iiiitn wnulfj [ t''?nf<li'.<\r- WifJi Lh" voli- <;f "ur>:r-ri i fijurUi'd til.- -,.,))-:,:. Li|i|'fJ(]r.irij;itiC'j)H Mif/iV'>n f jlhijr (H:il. ';:il[li;j fuiilid t|i:il Woim-li f:i-iiri>i| K' 'liuj; out of (In- u.ir t>y ihiM'iid i>f J'lTI try (hi.- ruflu f morr than t'AO U> inif Thu i* tin- yin- il-i<t difTt'f''i>c<; iH-twwirll-c imlr! and ihu fi-tu.ib* opinion rrCdilrd on ;itiy n iii'in:il i-s^n- in Mi>>
There HP- uilii'r p'-ll.-; tlmt. htivr l>ccit tnlc/'.n tn'ttui :irni i.rm. One pull n-iuJ.> (hut 7-} juTir'-iii of WIHIIHH, jf onliT***! t<> h<-ti>U'<îri tin1- iniifl on that f lulli-A- WHJ. in tit \fy l>i, w.MjM liuvi- n;fus<*<l. kill iil virlim* v/liil'- only 21 JR'MCIIL f dui!.';- would, f think thi* tin- lionirinlii'ii'in in our wi-ty. The i>jpn"!-rnii jtto ihiil who ;in; jj'iin;: ov<-r to Virt.ri.'ini ii ul.-u Mi luii in l-hft
223
iist..eeitty chance our attitudes, especially die mwi of. Congress who v ritittiimrtiwi suow for the U.S._ _ Government. Very few of the women , vxiiuld Kaye, voted no to tiu"s> war are in power, and we must realize UuVthaX'we, U.c |>eople at pear* city haw realize*! this, that TVC. arc camped out around tlie city, and \vc realize thai if the. war ue have to e.hange ourselves, that we must realize that men have to be humanized. t'ntt the training of military men to kill is so ridiculous, it w insane that sooner or later wo voting peopk* who are realizing this nil! bring forth a jc-w feeling and new humanity, thai men can relate as human Ix-inpj unit stop the inhumanity tha' U going on in ttii* world. .The CKAIUUAX. Arc you through? ___ "r Mr. ScAOUorn. Yes, 1 am. ' . The CHAfHiUN. Thi* Is Chip Nfanhall, who is a graduate^ of ContU Uiiivers-itv in 1907. He }\sa worked for VISTA and w a former hati-urnl olRi:or (if*SDSjSludents for a DeniiH-ratic Siwirtv). Mr. Marshall. "^~ " * : STATEHEHT OF CHIP MAESHALL, SEATTLE, WASH.1
Mr. MltnsjTAU.. I am spnrtkinjr ns a roj ! tative of tli* W*y Day inovcjncat and |u<rhapa a you said in the beginning, Senator r'ulbright. tJi"u-> <;ould bo .wn as it unique opportunity ticcMUflc to my kiiwle<i:e this is probably the first licue, that ;-,.pl^ who coniuder tlieniMilviia Hutixvur iictivisu, revolutionaries, have suddenly appeared before the Foreign Relations CoimnittVc: und we might determine fro'su. this rhat thi^ ia some sort of cnux: for great joy and thtft the dtunorratic sy>'.m is working and that we are making
OK F!10GKES IN ESDfXC WAU
But unforLUiiaU-ly, I don't see it that way und I would like to tiXpUin why. B'<-3U.v. you my la>t year at this very time in I l>e beginning of May, when rhe invasion of Cambolia 4-ame thon>ands of \oimg people throughout t(je country took to the htrccts and thousands more, came ln'iv in the fir!*t week of May bent upon trying to close down the (jover.'irneiit, and at ( h u t point the arg inieiil wu.-. laid out to tiiHn "Mop. wait. Yon have friend* in Oonirnvw. The Hat field-McGo vent M-I will save, you ami '' act now, to do ituything more strongly than t h a t , will meuii fh.'il 'liat r..-( \\ill be in jcojr.mly ond Vou will be hurling llu; eUM> of |>e:ure." An awful lot of us believed that, and we went b;iek to c.ainpiiM'> am) to coiinnnnilies, and we waited, und the trouble is that we have hivn waiting und waiting tin<l waiting and waiting for yean-. Moj-t of u>. even though we are voung, have ln-en turootrh hundred.- of ilemonstration.- und believe it or not most of U-- l|.ui even viritten Jetleis ji few years ij-ô In our Cii!i:ref,-nien and Tinitiii.- htiying "do -mnelliini; nboiit MII.H uiir." Si imw we ore pa.* "f t | , N (ii"emeiii wliich i> dillril the Mny Day movement, m-d Nlu\ Day i a good mime not bi-raiiM- of the linii- of year, bill beeuiiv ir is i l u - itiiiTnutioriiil .sL'i'iil for Jinti-''^, and we feel und want to coniinunfjil/ 1 to to vou vou (e (he xenst; of o denpi-ralion, enpi-ralon, whieh we Inix nix eonii* over thf moviTii'Tit, wliidi bus t'.ntw over not ju-tl u MIIH|| group <rf i>i-ople, but I.IIB mujority of tin* pe.opli; of thu r-ountry, !M*:UIIM<' lor tlie nrst
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tiae clearly in tJtLs country, tbo majority of the people of tijis country want ot and they-âui out now, hut thcv feel, ami 'lit* mood w comimKkirttrd in th jeaiv march teajaveV, that there rrally isn't innch hope, thtt the people who hare real power in this country turn i Jf ear to thorn, pay no attention to them. . So w<* haw beeu foree,d in many ways o lake matters into ottr own. hancte end that is exactly what tne |eople's j>oac' tr-nty it.
ABDICATION OF RBSrONsymtUTT BY COSGKES?
1 know wben 1 wan prowinp up am) Uok first prude, M-vond prade, tbird erode civic*, clasps we learned that (beCousTejw and the Senate hnd the power to make war and had the powi>r to inuk*1 treaties, and yet the ConpreKM ami the Senate have ti.tally aMi<-atv. that restponbiNiliiy, lient ind-r <h- prcôum of NLxon and done lUilliinsr. S> the l>eoplr of tlw Unitei Stales Jjavw been forced in theniielves tt tnkn mat tors into thfir own hands, and Juy and sonic otherg had to g to Vietnam theuisctvrt and do your joh for you ^-raiisi" you were JM-ing irresponsiMr. and I think thnt that even include* in many res|MTt^ simje of the Senators who eanie. to he niitiwar Si-nators. i knot*-, for tnstanee, 5nnator Fiilbripht and Mr. Atkm. >H>th i you have, for a lon<; I inn1 ln-en known to u< ns friends of the nntiwur movement, nd yet you liavc to understand how (his fominittee it^-lf luis ftinetuined, *itocjiit<4> what this rominiUcr iuis dne M> often t> antiwar prote>iK i> that it hus jriven an csen|>e vnlve and you have done tln> dirty work i>f the udinitii.îriitinii in n rcrluin WIL-M- \>\ j>p*'iiriiif.' tr> !M> ilj- Ii-îtiiiii/.in<; factor nnd jwnplr rim ^n\ "iixtk, hold it, yonnir [x-opU-. riirht ov-r tin-re is the Fon-i^n Ki-lutiun* Cominiitiv, ri;rlif nvi-r there is.Mr. Fulbri^hi, Mr. Aikfii. pj-oplc who nr: for pence, Jel tln:m ilv ii for yiMI, let them net fur \ oil." But the fuct of the ami ter i> (lint it i; (inn- tlmt liUNpii.êd (hut tune. Vu LU-e we tiiunv- 4 us** li-i s (mr.illf! ..f 'îx>d Cieriiinn^ hui I lliiak it i* really athnVn-iif :.iru:iiiuri iira'.i>'>, in f u r l , \vlmi tin- (.ii-nmiii |-'-j!c did. llicir r-ilii-rli\ r </uili un.- iri-iii'-iiilnii^, !>.>( I fed in irniny wu\.- it ilotj-Ily difren~>li( tlllifl tin- I : itite<: Stale's liermix- the (ierillllll people in IMHIIV wnj.s didn't know whu-l wiu- în<r mi w i l i i flu- Jeus, hut i-vrrjd u \ , every ilny nl f> o'clock you cii turn mi ymir 'l"\', mid y<;ii can sec it. [iiJHuMi- niiI iiiiltion.s nf |iei>plf i-ini v>- it.
VrU '-ull hcc lulkidiT ulxilit ex<ii!>uio|i. l.ljl you know vv!,;it l l i u l IiJ<-Uil.- Alt'! ttlml lul.- l|il|ipe.lli'd. I l l r i l . k . Ui'h tl>L- < u l l ' l n i l l r c i-. l l i t l l Mill |ii(\<< Mcip(e4i tin' Minir kinil of j i i . r y !i.u.-ri-.nl nnd (|t\orre|i)fiir I roll i Jculily. whieh |nu* ruliii-iiViJ* ( h i . ttlmle |ieni)|e Hlul vvhielt we hiiVe
tj> utiutt'-r through. Tlii-, coiiiruittee, 1 jin Mire, ii'.fl-in:' ue conid ii II u ii it!>oiit Liu- war iu\ !!hum, you ilon't k n o w , j ntn MIH- f i M ' t u u l l v . !< hnie/illy. yn k;mw 10 f i d w nr- nii)i'li H^ Jiny one ff us. Voii |ir>i(ftil>ly know J.I lir:e. us much idî'it the hi-inry. I?ut vie J.novv M-\em! tiling uml they :il': very siniifle. .li)^l like t i n - il;i/i;r-> f l i a t tlir- .f-w- fm:ed in (ierniiiiiy viere fuirly Ml'iple. tl.nl tin- \'iefli;iln. .-.e peojilc h j i v c :i ri-.-hl In freednin. ::Ild tliut V.I' life ileliyili). lli:tt freedr>ti), lU:i| n l l \ kiln) of <lol|t>ic Inlk cn!lllol ili-ii.) t i i ' i i . Vmi kitoM ( l n U . Vnii lu-iird ji. Y oil know (he hirp>r "toi!'-^, Ijut die )>i^'.(-,* horror -'<>r\ i.-i iioi j/vilfy u h r ! i- l'ii|i|-inn: iri Vi<-!::m:i.
Ik K ic&ivt is-happeninîn the Senate because hero vou have jxsople w4io "know u'hnHs happening and 3 ot although they talk a good jîu they 'c dune much about it. And.. that is why in many sehsM,' I .view the" Senate arid the Bouse now as illegitimate, because this country Vtufmiudjd'upon the. belief that the people had cb& right to govern, and \vt tho people, although. 73 jiercentofthom favor immediate withdrawal, arc ignored and, in faftt, I think the place at the real scat of government, the real moral concerns of this thing, is no longer Li the Foreign Relations Committee but is down there in a little dty in West 1'oUMnuL. Park whu* thtre are maybe 500 to 5 thousand demonstrators. But every day it is growing; every day there are inoie and more, people coming in who are saving that "We represent the American ieoji!c; we :trt' iho people bent on ;>cace; and we are uu longer going to talk about it; we are goin^ to do sometliing."
iSlTUATIOXS WHEN* PEOPLE CAM NO I/OVGKU AKFOUD -TO WAIT
Nnw accain, you oan say, and 1 am s-ure you \vill, "but Un't tbis going to hurt your cause. Aren't thcs: demonstrations going to hurt your raiiao? \u- are coining here with the intention next xveek of down Washingt>n. Wait again." But f think y->'i have to rcalbw, an^ thu wo* the principle tbat Utis country wa^ founded u[i<>u, that there ar*> i^rtain aituatioiia which ore i-risc*. There are (Attain situations when people can no longer afford to wait and what I think Susan was talking about and John wu> talking about U that many |>coplc in the Senate talk about things, but that uur la-'i^niup; h:is become &o divorwd from the suffering that people fo4-e we don't really reali/^> it. \\u don't really realize that strategic baiidet means the sa;ne thing a* concentration cumj). \Yi; talk about ex-ulatioii. We talk about strikes, but in fact what. that menus is people dying, and what that means U people in this country l>cing lorn apart, because you have disillusionment that. U .to great iti this country, that. I doubt very seriously without a major restructuring of tin- fundamental principles of this country (Lat this country is going to ever be at peace. That. i.-> what we hnve to aim for.
CASE OF LIEUTEXANT CAU.Et
\<iw, tiic tiling I*, and you know, that this country wus (lirowti into tt gr-'ut crisis just r..-rcnlly over the (.'alley curie. Vet J think in your li'Miria, ii* \*oii are hoiiei f you know that Cal'.ev,. nl'lniu^li what l,e did w;i-K!-s};iciible, wus inen-Iy un inirumi'ril,<'afli!y \\SL-, merely H IHT*>I\. \\ti.> liml IH-I-JI brought up in si -ysUm Unit Inul been perverted by its li'i'ie ami cnrricd out Miiiietlijtig which n-ally wasn't a mUtake. Tltiit really I he difference between a mnii standing tliereu-t In- did and s'lo.ii'tng i-r,plc in dilclics i> very little different, than s4iiiieboily standin'/ .".n.iM'-i feet nlioi.' i In- '.rrouixl ami dropping bomb.-, on i!iow sumo pe pli-. iiiul ii i, vi-n l i t t l e different from iei,ple Siting iii Congrc< l u l f ^ i f i g iiboiit jMMir tilid yet doing very little.
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F1LLBUSTKB SUGGESTED
\ o- there an> thing* right now, immediately, that you can do that you x>iild do to join, I think, the legitimate |>eople now, the people who are ramping thorc and who represent the aspirations of the Anierican |>cople. If you were sincere, hgbt o\v, tomorrow, you could go into the Senate anrf begin a filibuster, begin filibustering and spying "wo art: going to talk for |>cace," continue talking for jfearo and allow no appropriations to go through, because in the p-vst the filibirster has Jwavs been used, and it u an honored Senate tactic, has been used itaiit4t the people, but now the people want peace, and it can be used for die people. NEXT WEEK'S DEMONSTRATIONS So you really face a crisis next, week. But I don't foci that we have rotne here to hare you iwk questions of UA. I believu that we actually have the right to ask cûc^tions of you. ami that you arc the people who are really on thu h.ie right now. \Vi> arc coining to Washington next week and we irttund to stoj business as usual. We intend t* be nonviolent aHhoujjh the violence-, ihtit this Govr;\in<wt perpetuates certainly justiuw4.he right, of |Mop)e t< defend themselves, ami yet. we show incredible- nvtniint, incredible restraint by saving that, we won't IK that. We show incredible restraint by showing we hare IH intention next week of. attacking (xilicetncn or breaking windows ttlthmigh policemen just yestfcfdar, 14 of theu, broke into our hou*;. smaslied diwn our door without v warrant, huru-^d j)eoj.Ie, thr'-w iheni down tin* blimps and (hen MUI[- J WC are lo.kiti<; f.ir jujople." by turninjj over, vou know, vurjiMi.i !mrea:is. This is the kina of thin<; we fiwe every day, ainl this i.-> the kimi of thin;; that L- ^nit:^ t't *iop. iiu.iines* n* tisiuil in this country is dirty buMiies* at tlu> tirtu- titid we Mnren;!/, not in a rlH'tijrirnl way, a>k y<m to coinr. join u-> if you :ire siiuu-re. . If vou really bclirvi;-that tliH country was f.niittlcd on th<> ri^ht. of st-'f-dricriiiitmtion utid on the ri^ht of frrnlimi, we think th.tt y>u slmuld not only Ii>tcn to us, but you *hoiild Kiipjiori u-. in thmsc deinoniia iii-xl wuck und titkf |>.M'i in ilicru.
And a fitrtht-r strp we fn-l is t l m t you. if you nn- sifn-i-n-, niu join tlii: Alllcjii.'iill |M'0|)lc who h-JVc ô;u- !ihr:i(.l of Von. v. ho luivr tnkcll Ht<-()- ahcud of you who htivr bivotnr thf luu lilukiT- n!lil s-ipliici) (()* I'coplc'H I'l-ucj- Tn-uty which i- t i n - ino-.t fi-uli-lic und lb- only n-id I'liii.'cc ili:it u' cuti luivc peal c i.i this roiintn' [npjilnii^'j. 'I'lnuik you. The C M M K M A V . Tin- in-xt uitue** i- Mi-> ICutiiy Sifter.
STATEKEHT OF KATHT 8I8TZB, SEATTLE, WASH.

Mi<- S'IHTKH. 1 think our -tru(/'/le hre i-i il'illu nil im-l tl is rr j*ulnlc. Th'-ri' i* no jii'i ~->in O|H-II wurfjirc \*> briii;; us ull (>2rtliiT We i nn i-\i-l îiliout. I'ofi.stiifitly P'î-.iin[: untile* ijf Vii'tn < 'oinfori und tin- sunny rhoicj-i we li:iv- i-uu-^' ouc ii'ptiruiion ilti- coiifitiy. On MI Imîr uti is.mii> n> I lie >-l(/|i|inp' of the- JinJorliiim vvtir
\vc have allowed ourselves to be factionalizcd. Our struggle unwt be of another kind. Given these comparable luxuries and freedoms that some of us have from not alwavs fearing for our lives, we must form tics with OIT sisters and brothers ui.d woik harder than we ever have before.
MEAN'S OF PROTEST HAVE TO CHANGE
Americans have attempted legislation, demonstrated, thrown bricks, changed slogans, but this hasn't ended the. slaughter. We now realise that even when more than 500,000 gather here in Washington, as we did last Saturday, th.it marching iUu-lf cannot have the effectiveness that we seek. For otters to understand how serious pur intent U, we must show our strength much more visibly. That is why this time when ive come to the Capital or take action anywhere such as the students' strike on May 5 our means of proti st-* have to change. Our impatience and our frustration about not being able to do something becomes so great that we realize the ini|>ortancc of breaking ou. of factions, and of jVmhtg together to combat it all. And the inure we realize this, the clearer our heads become about what to do. We. may not all choose the exact same -actions but the intent behind what we do becomes more and more the same, to stop t' use actions of our Government, our [>coplc, which we know are wrong.
ICF.ALIZINC AM) CHANGING MISTItUST AND UNDEUbTANDIXG
The youth culture )m* been known for its resentment of hyiwcrisy. In l>eing together in West I'otomar Park or wherever we see that due to our upbringing, due to the country we live in, hvpocrisy is part of our life style too. That though we fcnow we shoufd love each other there is misiru.-t mid misunderstatrding. In West I'oloiuac Park we have seen this. Every vet's head has been in wine waj' warjied by the fighting they have done. So they feel like animals unable to shuke off the tyrannical jwwer that romcs from wcarinu fatigues and carrying guns; toy OIM-S or not. When working their shifts on security at that park, the tendency remains to coldly pulrol, My, t'-c medical tents, the food Mjpplie-; which we have there. Out of a hurt I ai>nsc of dutv that come* instead of protecting them, protecting the people, out of cure and understanding of the need for that. The vets and iimny other- carn|>ed in 'he park find it difficult to relate to those who are nol like themselves,. The gay brother* have been made fun of, chastised, made to fed iininiporltiMt. Women, loo, liave been mude to fee) inferior mid they felt dominated. Some guys have attempt'<l rape, lm\> tiûmed that iinyone they uni to be with will oblige. Tin- gentle cure of the guy In-other- and siter.% Inu In-en both mi-read unit misinterpreted, but some change-, have happened in the sh'>rt time ( h a t we Imve been here in the park. We nil now realize the miMiiuicr-.fiiiidiir/.- and tin- leurnitig more ami more from each other every iliiy, in.-teud of ignoring and putting down, that which U different. As soon u- we see tlie diffcri'iiced, lljp hypucrisy, ( now niut deal with it iiiiiiii:iliul4'ly and let others knou how we feel -o e can underI'tiuid. if niir piirp'iA", tli'- purponc of Congrens, of the American (wople, IA U> changi- what <.'xi>l, to right tli wrongs, we cannot ignore even tin; lightst il'vAiiiUitiuu.*, let uloiw the gro-sc*t OUCH.
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There is no easy WAT. We *U must struggle, do everything, everything, we can, to end the atrocities and inhumanities for the world to be fit to live in. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Miss Sister. Do you wish to have some questions now? Mr. Craven, do you have anything further you would like to say? Mr. CHAVEV. Well PUBLIC'S DESIBE TO END WAR The CHAIRMAN. I could suggest one or two things if you would Uke. You have all made it very clear that you disagree with the war. You have made it clear that the polls at least indicate a sizeable majority of the people think that the war should be eiuled at the earliest possible data. I think the Gallup poll showed 73 percent who said the war should be ended bv the end of this year. I think it was phrased in the context of the Mcftovern-HatnYld resolution, as I recall. That is one of the proposals that is before this committee. What the committee is examining in these hearings is the best way to end the war and various proposal*there are about four or fiveare before the committee.
WOBKIKO OF DEMOCRATIC 6VSTK.U
I delect that some of you, esjiecially, I believe, Mr. Marshall, have li>t ronfidenre that this system ran-work. It is slow about working. All .systems, at least of a democratic character involving large countrie-. work ratlin- slowly. That la they don't respond immediately. But |wr*mally, I have found no other system that has been attempted by a comparable society, certainly a large one, that has worked any better. Most of them have no remnant of u democratic system left. They have ail become almost completely authoritarian systems, in which protests t>uch as this would not be tolerated, if you were in the uîial authoritarian government, you would all be in jail long sincu. But that is'no real or final answer to your efforts or anyone's efforts in trying to moke this one more responsive and better, so I don't contend for that. We all function in a different way, but when you say that women have no influence,, I think this is an overstatement. If the women duti't care to exercise, their influence., th fault it tccm.t to me i> in the women. They have had the right to vote for quiu? a long time now. They can vote ami in some places they do vot< jmd, of course, us you know we have mime women in the Congrerw. Political life i*n'f one of the mol attractive lives apparent4y to women. Maybe that reflects th-ir HU|wrior judgment. 1 don't know. They find other way.-., which are more attractive to them, and I don't blame them at nil. But there u nothing in our system, at least, that prohibits them. Whii! u wrong, it Necins to inn, not only he.re, but in rnuny o'her places, if, the level of education and undetandip: axul Uw r(^|onivetiH**. of the iiulividuulH who make up the community, certainly in those txjtnmunitiet* which have a medianiftin by which a majority can dcterjnini tlieir own ilc:.tiny. It u still that kin-1 of a system, uiile>M you are stating that our system in NO corrupt that voles are not countud, that
229
people have no real opportunity to register their voices, and none of you have said that. If that is what you mean, maybe then we can have a better understanding. I personally do not believe that.
MAJORITY OPPOSITION TO WAB IS BXCBNT
As a matter of fact, I do not believe that the majority of the people of this country, iinlil very recently, had made up their minds they were positively against this war. I think a majority had not taken it very seriously, probably had not bothered to do anything other than to say, "vtell, we fpUow our leader; he must know better." This is the usual way. I think it is only very recently that a majority of the people of the country have decided this war is not in their interests^ They had an opportunity last fall to register their views in an election in ever>- single district in every State in the United States. They will have another opportunity in less than 2 years to register it again.
f
DIFFICULTY OF FILIBUSTERING AGAINST WAB
I agroo with much of what you are saying. I think the war is a great tragedy, the greatest tragedy we have had since the CSvfl War. You say get up and filibuster the war. This, is easily said, but it is very- difficult to do. It is very difficult to do that effectively against anvthing. Mr. MARSHALL. Several of us would like to respond. The OUAIHMAN. Von said you would like to ask a question. Go ahead.
TOLERANCE OF PROTEST QUESTIONED
Mr. MARSHALL. Well, first, I would like to, just speaking personally, say that I don't think you really are aware of what in happening in this country when you HRV we live in a repnic where tropic, where protest is tolerated. I feel very personally nl>out thw because I simply am faring 10 years right now for my antiprotests plus a year for contempt of court.. There are a great number of people we have, we would like to have here testifving, Bobby Seale, r'ntlier Berrigan, and Angela Davis, who had the courage, to speuk out and are m jail at this moment. I think what v/e arc suyui? i-. what we have HI this country U ati iliunio.i of democracy because in fact if you begin to question the basic assumptions which thin system works UJK>M, if you hVjrin to challenge those, you will find very quickly that the iron heel falls in this country.
O.tt. SYSTEM QUJBbTIOVED
Secondly, we live in a country which is not defined merely by the bouuduricrf of tin- United State*, ami I think what you Hay, what iu happening in Virtimm in terms of democracy nhoWH quite clearly ti> in" tlmf thit country i in every way an brutal an any totalitarian regime imaginiilile. I Jnn't think we are here to diû** particularly what *rt of wv-tciii that we wunt. I don't agree at all that this nyteni which liu>ii iiliy ofM-rutc* on |woj)l" corupeting with each otlwr, which l>ui>ic.ully i/]icrateii on exploitation of foreign market*, which opcraU'4 on profit before need in the Ix-nt yt<Tii at all, and I uU think that it i
230
naive, and if you think alx>ut it, to assume that the electoral really oven deals with the major jxnver decisions. People have no right to vote on things like tin* war in Vietnam. People have no right to vote on cor|K>rate decisions vvhicli eventually lead to war in Vietnam Itccause we have to protect our foreign interests and tho*e interests are not the interests of the, people hut a tinv minority. The fact of tin; matter is that there i u small promt of people in this country who have |>ower. There/ore, just if Susan had a hundred of her friends who were women in here and we. all had the right to tulk oquallv it wouldn't mean we had equal ac-ccss to jKw'er, and there is a small minority of |>eopl in this country' whose interests the war in Vietnam are in and thox* |x-ople have power anil we don't, and that is what we arc talking about. '1 hat is why we say tin- *ystcrn has to be revamjM-il and that is why we are saying present methods are inadequate and, furthermore, whether or not you an; a revolutionary or not, I think even ju>t being a lilvral we could share the common assumption we do not have tin- time to wait for Mr. Hart's resolution or Mr. Hath'eld's resolution, that we must do something right now because the American jicople, if you ju>t extrapolate tliat 73 percent, which sounds sort of abstract, that means lot) million people, who are against tin; wnr. Now 1 will tell you if, ( talked to your ii.-v.iM nut yesterday, if 150 million |eoplc, it taken (hat many jM-ople to come down and surround (he CongrcM, you Ix-t that t i n - war would end tomorrow, and we are planning to have t!i<ni>uii(l> surrounding tin- Congress next week, ami if it docMi't net thi-ti, next month we uill IN- back again and the month after that until they ad, Itecause you have (he jjower to act, and we are saying right now that a people'* lobby i> going to start which Is going to force \ on to ac.t. You can't go on your time schedule uiiy more. Tlie culm, orderly time schedule allows |>coplc to IN; brutalized and murdcnid and that ha* to be |nyiUul up.
is HK>T
The C H A I U M A N . While yii h u v e the microphone, grunted that our syMcm isn't |>crfcci. iiml 1 think e\i-rybiNly uill, \\liidi -ysU-in, a-> it fxi-,t-i today in the \\orld, do you think i> thi- U'M one? \Vhii-h one <|IN;S serve, the people belter t hull ours? Mr. MAKMIAI.U Well. I think there !. no Hv-tem, no advano-il country yet h:^ (he kind of >.v,ieiii (hey w m i t . 1 con.MdcT m.VM'lf u revolutionary mid MH-iuli-t. I think lliut in (lie iiii(lcn|i'\rlo[).'<l coiintrie*. North Vietiinin lei- f i \ < ' lime llie freedom lliut South V i f i n u m dot*-. ('ul)a hits inoie of I lie freedom i linn uny oihcr undrrdrvclo|>cd country in Luliii Amrriru. lint the niuiii jioint ! not lo ilicu>- right now what item-. If you u u i i i to inviic n- nl>oui tin- >y-i< i in. out of Mgltt. Right HUM r uoiili! like to iulk n l x m t how ue -oilppo^-dly -hnri 1 ;i common goal. <-im g-l logetln-r to end (In- war in Vietnam -mil we believe the People's I'i'iii-e Tn-iltV i^ Mimelhing (In.t r.nt ;i|>|>ciil to |M-op|e \ \ h o u r e not JU--I fiiiniii' ;il ri". oliiiioiuifii-' but |>ri,jilr. i-\ rrviiii- iii ihi-. ruuiitry, i: ini'Ui-i^ nil I lie (jin'-iion-. (luit pcupji- I M I I . nml it Jin-rr> ihi>m in an adr<|ili|tc UnV ;iin| ' )IO|M- llinl llii-i colillllil ti-e, Vlhirh h;i the |)oUiT lt> report mil the J'l-opli-'s I'eur-e Tivjiiy, mid Iwgin* acting u|wn thai i i i i i i i i - i l i n l i ' l . i vMniliI like other pcopL- to MII>VMT.
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Mr. CEAVEN*. I \\nn1s. t\\*t in response tct the question alout countries having any freedom .. .' lite CHAIRMAN. Shall we allow Senator Aiken to ask a question, unless you wish to make a comment on the previous question? -;-_ .Mr. "CKAVEX. I wish to make a coir.meni:on the previous qoestacn. Ti,e CUAIRMAK. Proceed.
31TCATIOS OF WOMEN' INVOLVED JX Vtkft
Mr. CRAVEN*. First of all, involving the situation of women in this country, the situation of women asîl involves the war, it is very ini|>ortant to understand the Indochiiu^' women who suffer a major burden l>ccause of thin war. That in fact evidence that was presented to the World Conference of Scientists at Paris on December 23 substantially concludes that women living in chemically affected areas of South Vietnam need only to drink one quart of waters day in order to >Und substantial |>osihiliiv of giving birth to genetic monsters. Li favt this possibility goes u* high us six times the probability of giving birth to genetically deformed children as women who suffered radiation at Hiroshima. I think ii is ini|K>rtant to understand that the women that Ngo Cong Due talks about who become- prostitutes 111 Saigon, become prostitute in the cities, many of them have children pimping for them on the streets so that their families can be fed. Veterans in the winter soldier testimony, which was inserted in the Congressional- fiecord, talk about the fact that women are being injected with silicons shots to enlarge th'or breasts, are having eye o|N!riuions |>erfor ned on thwu to make ti>em more suitable objects to the American GI's so their jMmsibilities of raising enougli money to sustain their families may be a little bit greater. I think what we'are talking about, when we sjwak about women, is a gioieral atlitudi: that allows American soldiers to go over there and treat South Vietnamese womeii as if they were objects, objects there for their pleasure or hatred. Soldiers at the winter soldier investigation also talk about going into villages and raping women in front of their families l>efore massacring t hem in the middle of villages in in.<>tanc.cs like Mv J-ai that hap|M>ned utntinually. I think that the kind of plea that the Iâotian women made iu Canada, with tears in their eye>, talking about their children who were suffering vitamin deficifiicic* because they could not live oiitxidr, not under the sun, they could not get vitamin C from tin 1 nn iM^'aitse ixunbs started falling at 5 o'clock in the morning and went all day long. What kind of nation U it that Mibjects |M*O|>|K tt this agony? 1 mean ulntt we are talking about i- u Mituation when- life? has IH-CII matle different in JudiK-hina, when- the iâoliaJi |>eoi)h-, 1 million Laotian |M-oj)|f, living in the rotmrrvstde l>eing allai-ked by bomber* don't know who An.irri^ i>. Tlu'v don't know uln-re America is. All they know u that- moiisU>i coiiir frn/ii the i>ky every day, to destroy their hind and jM'oplc.
O1I1GIX OF PfVUfLK'ti fKM'K TJIKlTV
1 t h i n k in l^Tiii", in rrpoiis<- (j> the qijf>ti(ii liljoiil freedom, itiul il in int|>iiriiitit to undei>luiid llmt the ^wiu-c treaty represent*roiiinc! w i t h the -tiideiith in Saigon. Thut in ftu-t us mir dci'-'gutioii was pluiming to go to >!ii'în 1 ecaiiH'.lhe ideu of lh( JN-UIV t.iviy iniliutrd frou: Saigon, the ,>iii^'(ii government deni/'d u>-vra.s Ui go I-IUTC. -
Tlmt one member '.of. the. delegation had U\ Iff. sncuked th'roiigh to get Vrthere. Tiit )teacc ;r<iaty;had to te worked out iu prfvutr. ___- . ": It hed. U> be sniaggfcd out 01 the ;/oui(.ry and ti1te.iv the Saqjoii V. ...povcrmnent tflW tfcc Saigon treaty }<! Joft Saigtm-;>jKj when D>m '-'.: > "il'isfcttcr, who"uftS,jiroMut>oi' f onr:ipleKfttii>n arrived i Lans t^-fotv i ." :> ftwcifc -inu VUitnsni, cighi I motion aocrvt iolioe l>nko in iitul .sacked '. life "twionriiijts .nd tried u wnfismte tht- j>t?a'i' treul-y aiid triri to x >toj> tlie Vietnamese ^M-ople* ftoni ap<'iikin2 out uliuut ikirir feivlinp<. 8ini* the i>eticfi U'ety lias b'NMi eiîed by lfi lulent>; ii^VtudtMts in Î IJAVO been itnpruwnwl UMÛSO >f t!ieir.oi)|>.sitiun J<t tû; nitor AiKtV. Ntr, ('liairmuti, first l e t m e tate HS s' .. . . Miss Ou.BôuY. Mr. (7lwirntan, could 1 ri.,|!(>iul? St'iiotor S:OTT. Let s .be 'entitled to-JJie. saiin* a the
STATCS-UF U.S. VlfOMKV
AIKES. This boliuHnjr of the - Aiiîojin wotnon J? A disslioulon't Wve any wwni>n witries.î b<%fonr us if y.'iiaj you Sii.V'.ia-' tnu-. American womanhood ]>la\'s H trc-moJi'loiis part IKJCJMIJ*- of u-jjjvt fiood it does for u.- in tlus cotnjtry. But vchy flu- boll do you suty hen: iTtliere arc other countries thrtt &ro so much fwttor? Th;U.js what I won't' k> knou-. Tlierc is no law aptinjit your ii'ircing tlie Uniuid Stales any tuii^\vou want to. V\V0 (>t letters; from idfUlier> Irom all ot'ftr thctfUitfry. They would not only want u* U> !cKik>trer their Iwys w Iu. \vt-re lost in X^'-Jlnain, but who .er>* killed. We pt-t l^t<rs from wonw.n tvfio want to find out where thfir -daughters are and \v:e van't tell thi-ni. .Srire we luivc U{r.Miulame Bm<laraike Ix-eatise sln has Utopia over tlurj. PoNiilily OJvIon would l>e a gi.wd pliuv Ui inlpruti- w at this time. Wti don't cvenâve Goldu Mtr, .who is doing it. jn-tiy gt^..l job, I would say. But wliy belittle American womaidio<j<l when every inrniber of this coniuu<c knows tin*. irtfliiemv they imve? 1 n-fftrrwl to Mrs. Fulbrifrfib. SJie ua* influei>c^ wrtb me auii I think she <k^> with nur cliaii'tunc too, MU* GK^/JOEY. SIu- shoiiM'tie hittiiif: up iher.-. SfQ&Ujf AiiHiS. Slie hu-i a pood inirni. She iiaun honot irtiinl nud is a }Xo<>.-< Amexicr.H und sb<- is the kind of womuti ue like to have. You folk- have not lived up- 10 your reputation yet. You lunvn't s'T,amed a( il*. I> that eoininfr "f have you been t>M not U> WCM)i ttt u.-? i understatvl you h \ e corii>>lH.' in.-truetioti!- for the next f.' day<4 and whetber they s-houlo b^.;;iwtt nuttier cif th" re-Cord I don't know.
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OK?
Why do you mil (he f 'HJDJ) Alfron<|iiJD? (i>;K<;oj{V. 1 would like to respond. tor A I K K X . Why would you mll.it < Alj.'O)Kjiiin? Mi>-> (inB(;oi(. Jf you would rexiuM-t u-lnu J HIM IM >juyni{; >juyni{; -----SuJiatoj A I K K N . W-hy do you mil it 'C Camp Algonquin? We Iwc it camp-in Vx'nnorit. - . Mirts Gicx;(;uv. We idll anw<-r i'. in otie'n:oinrnl.
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WOMEN .
Benatbv^tqbi.Tes. bui (don't belittle Aiteencan womanhood if you &vWct to &ave ny influence with us youratlf . ., ; -'Mm QjusrnouY. The (kgrw? to which you expressed a feigned ci^nprtLnce of women's powon&ne$s in this country is the degirw to : itinch sexism Js embedded m thj* society, as i dlaetea in the Congress. JvJ. your rudeness in raterruj>iing nif UK an efcatnule. -'"r. -~ "Women w-"g>c-en the vot* inl 4he vote has become me*nin^. Wocêo's influehoe "should not be through mea. WomeiCs influwice courts, from within ourselves. : . \
. , DXftUE 18 TO CHANOl! CKIllD STATES
We'. Jon' t leave this countrj' because we love-tte people, *n<i vre u.counlove thotuatrF itoajf . We h*ve no intention of ver leaîn* tJu.c try. Our. dexire is oitlyto fhngo it, and them " SenaJor AIKEN. To what? Miss OJUBOOKT. Continuing) To change it into Senator AIKXV. To what? . MiflaOaiWWrr. Ttf dbatê it into a peaceful eotaoeoco. streggliag . nation. . " Sf nator AIKCN. We have nothing to fear from any &ker eounlry? ;. Mitfs GHEOOKY. WluTe people sh&rc what tiiey hare;- where don't try Co compete with each other, where ro*n and +'OKta to tnrb other w niutum bcingu, not fteu relating to women
KAMIXG 0V AIXfONOUiK JTCACX C1TT
Aicoaqum Pe#rc City i>* .tMnuxi ftv the Algonquin iffl ^yHtcinat-Ha11y ,destroyl us Uie VieummeHO an bei byilu; A.tfldr*a X3ovmnieut . Pacifying Indians by driving die m onto' rc<Tvutionn, in tijf saine st> patifving the VKtnaujo' into tb/4r hainl4>u>. Wci4ôxl \ibfatior?.t> from thÎndi&tis, and are trying \<\ in too* h witli ihe sîrif of timw pnpple in the naine ww ve tr>~ Ut Un tou'l> itij U;e Bjsrit of liie Vw-itijauw-x*? fwojilf who will not w MW US. Gov^mawutîO misti fhwn n&.nin1.UT what it dtxw and no inui^r how many Txax&s it p^tinv'on:Uic HOPE or COCNTBT J i>*ibv- hoixs, literally tin- loj)e, of ildti , aol ray ,<JeefMiHt Jove u -for. *omen. Www n rr g<-tting
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l<>ng w ve^nire ju^rnutled only to vr>t*v UK long a ueix;<r oar hutJuauiK >- wiwi, jn fa<:t. ran't cr, in fact, wru>. rwd t ^llr and u-hat UP tn.do'jn a'ycry' Joving *id /Li'TwineJ way, u to mnjtrt into t*ociety fcwn *ait*?-o{ Kunttnity, socio Hence of love, rMuig i>ftmr'.-amp Algouxjuin? " Miss GKEGOUV. Because Uic AJgopquui Indians lived in llock \~ . Crock Park, where \v originally wore going to gatltw. ' -. ^ " :^vv^;n.AiKEN. Du you know who is Joui all the high sul \i-ork -'*u }his comitn,- today, particularly in. uie northwitf '
said tiling that arc obviously :.'" . - " SsAftir&r AJKEX. Do you call your opposition th? Iroquoii>? -\ ' .-^JixiOREGORiV Hwg your pardon? ~ . S<-JiaJr Auuii!. Doj'ou vjill. \vur>u)ifiofiitiou the Iro>)uow7 Tbf->' natural enpjies eneroies <?f4Jic-AI}i4>.:iluui-\ <?f4J \ ^>' ^ " ^ -" " Mr. M AttfiH-m.. Mr. Cua'inban, we acr not really heie to d^-btje the question. " . ' > ' ." L "-^ ^Kdnauj>r SCOTT.- The leader h>: >ugge*ted that only une persoti talk ,-*t'ji tinM'Wd I hope th^y would do that. .
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Seoftt/r AijffiK.^ Can you tanftiv* of any situation uodr War w< mid bt> j'uHtifiable? "-." .Mir- M.*ttsUAix. What die Vi^tnameê are doin* to the UJS. forces
SJfCMJI.D EXITED BTATES MAIXTAfV UEFEV8E KOECE3?
<<uulnr AIKEN'. Do you think we huld luniijtiuo any a^ all? K KKOM Af uifcvcE. DuffiiM? apakiKt what ? , MAKKBALL. Y'fts, 1 think we should have, tu> th/> ve-teranx say if ajtvoiu' ivit* tbw 4-4>untr>' fine. But I don't lie** thf VietJjjtmoe over in their MmpuHis aiul inradin^ UK. , Jf w diiwin iwn>ul?uly, <-*n you think f auy tht would und^rtak* U> huriuw or iuvade us ic-r H-? f;n you think of any x-ountry that .would try to do thatT . <-B/IVE. N'o otiwr "cotmiry ui the world t* fiigajruin in tceno'-idc atuu*t ttirf*- natiotw ij SenaNr Aiicev. \o otiwr <-4<uft(ry would ut<<-k the United S \fr. MiU^wvLL. Vanjc Uw fount ry that will. SciuiHir AiKfcv. I u-kr-d you. Mr, MAUBiiAi/rA What counify i wjû>rij; in
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^\(.,^-^-^^^liiysvt^â^:'fm'âo'p\K *rt fuijped -Ur"tftt^^w^(p^.$i3^ftni-"-.'.^<^ ] '1 -s^ witiait; it isjk>U'6iiWlhi:ir from^ttyôutsklt-KdijOHrf ua, ijtôu will '";.".. j v c "" ,:iioticc, are {ef>|jlo ittiib outaute fifcir-Country. "Tfae maj-rtitj- f tbcsf , ^ : --3 \.; <|i<^ple-arc cmii)r'(o_J>e fon-txi .to^Ttakc inattorsûto thwr,o*ni-bander:: j
S-'. tinliMA f>\ij iMi^risrmiiit iMViirnH^ rf"crw: tM^^nîuvwilA. " -.,"'
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Mr. CtcA\f?. llif -tffftALi arc rAittpc4 wiMfts at Algonquin tV:i;* . - --; lv. TbH'art'>ur bruthfi'H fatipbuwrt." .- .;. - / -.- ' - > Cil.
, ff *v <an't hav-e onler, mg H! U. -.-- Wr? sj'iK "asfc the aud-U(* u U? cjniet bwûsf we ^, liwr t4i> 'iusu-frs. If you inUirrujrt. tuu) <.-lttj> *il the tiin^. ,v<rti BttUify itw Iwnriijg:. Just be <juiet > <iit wv <-u b"*r what * witiu-.--i>>i "jwy, nud t-tu*y. c-ati IKMU* tti* queîuus. Senator ^coU. " - to toi uw ffrt '. Von utft-berc. i lliink j'oii art- t-nljtkvi to. .Senator JAVITS. i l i a vi< ^crrMî lu. . AH nHitSt'OTT iCiMllUJtiilli:); Willi tin- ItnlulKrnrc of tlw Ul'l would like: 1o j>nK'**?<i. . .
VITVRMiEs' MtJKTIVOS WITH kMMMF, ;JV
li">t rrmt dii ft;)|wul frojji Mttdanw JJjnh tl^tel- Af^rij :l9,'Kl lit liki? f<> iitqukc whrtlii-r-jtuv nf.v<MLJ*.y irmM.'_ iwi-c; tnlkml iulH ^t.MiHwuu'' Jfitib iir I'an. " : . f IIHV ulkf/i uidi M mi Kin*- Uiuh hi I'uris. Srnr. 1 Mwvr Hfintli- i>au WMU . No; fw n* uo-l, -
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'Senator Sc0T? $|ia^;oay :o$er -persons- wfri vorc ^'-|at of this v v !a^'iBi^r.'W.:^>ur knowledge, on. oô- occasions Binh? "' , Mr. CRAVEN. I met with Madame Binh. ~ ,: Senator SCOTT. Yosiinci'with Madame BinR.
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Hartie Tnet with Mfl4r.we Binh, several i^^f pawtiirt^wutfli^ jta4"'fct<ltB fejra ell rov<r'ihejCnit*d SUfcas .arc goinj: to meet ' witli tfeft ^4oniainejc > try:<it Cat! .out *iiat th^.rwil story is, to toy "-' "~ " . * - . ' " ;'" alcnifc- r-- '.' bd'it the prJ50t.cn of war. lot aitout nlibustenug lysre iu particular1/ ; to ii>3k itis &! of jiH uurxwt*nt w jbder*twul that tevoIutioDAnrf .Sjut4i "V&tJiacr which" is: n>yTl<'d in owr 50 couutriw 111 tliis of &uUi Vit- truun. tof SCOTT. Sfo* is a r^nwutjitive o/ HIUKW; is she not? bttiVEN'. Shfr is not-* re|>rc-*iitative of Hanoi; she is a --**hTJtUalthe N^.acrtuJl^bfrration Frout of Sowth " e. Front for th lihe-ftticni of South Vietnam. ii. Wixich rlie maiority f t}s j>eopl* in South Vie fftl <}icy.<uui work vn\b; ^Â sipuifKp*ut jmiut of iuf<mti*-(ife/act tkat U>fh f 'atitolic ul Buddhist lejulcrs who have -tuity bcvî in wij>jK)rt of ttie war wid have held o)jj; auti.(.kmiuiuuiv -positiiins bvc uow corny out publicly uiduduip the flir1ibLj|)jrof tlu Crtladii: (^hurdi âUbfr fr a wtiliuon govfefpnwnt (mitûulu mdu<k UMJ provisional r^v'oJdiU'tuuygou-niwcut in Sou4h ! in l Iiwve all of South. Vietnam ^<>gfjjtr. . .. SfiTT. I tun awnrt- of that. My jUfttW)n ix did eiti^rx>f you ii}i 3klu<JaiJU5 Biiib tJw pltuuiiug of lJii âtueriug *DtI*tU*.i lie U8nd ? <>r h f t vc coniiuurtirtl-r ucliyiuco to tb<* World - <>ojt>ciJ iu^wiû; v have ôiuruunicatxî our acrivi u ihV JnUTdutumal Uiiiiiti of hkulfaU in /5etJwx*lovkia wjtji niat/i office* iu (Ju'lu>i(lovkii; w hai'c O'ftiiuuiik'ated 'ir tu:tit-iuew u> tin- au itt Saigon uiul Ktudintx in Saigon hav îdb-d fur hU)>pon ilfiooJttnkv plut-c,Muj 2 tfial. liavt- hmi ulf/r*x] l^y 21 VVt; have al*u iufr>uniraU!d our jK(ivitv-<< lo Jjjc i-*. ti> I he V'it't iiuftii-n*; (x^pb*. virttr <<iiU HUifority; it
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Mr, t'uAV;. W^ un- wirfi all of UM; VicUuun/w JxojiJc(
.. "T.ata^fcingyou.io teu tfa6 truiii. Did yo^4is<:uSs>5rili i , tli* pUnniog of ti>^c*therin*3n Washington? 11 ia,a/tdaj_ ', Xod don't iwcd-to kunch ini& stories of studeats. Just tell ^no the answeryesorno. '- : : '-;' ' ' - X X ' ' .' - . ' " ' ' ' Mr, CBA\-isjr: I said we have cpratnunictedxwith her/Madame Binh did not.take place in plamiinp ^rtrategy'or tactics. Wo 1iav . . oaununicated our 6tans to all signatories oWic Pooiiles' Pfcace Treaty. ^ ^.Setiator ScdTrV^Did shHot cxpr<>ifl her approVal, of;th.B strfttegy?. - ~^Îr. Ciuvevr5h<>-naa expressed apjvovatof all antiwar aotiviuw^-; - 8v>. dcinoiistratiaii ucW last Saturday:' V' - ; .;.'''/" . > <-'';/'' "Senator Sqprr. Including this ou. ItiA thr pf,yba . Mad>de Binh a suggestion froini 'her ----'----'"*-- ^ pubac official in tlus Unitrd^tat^s? -i . Mr. GiAVifX. Aitsplateiy'uot. -.: . '*'.''. '' - Souotor^ScoTT. Did,you not later/at another nwxMing have a.vota
^ftf\ t \\\i, -trt^t\ ' ^ ' " * 1 *tr^t R^f ^r _l^l^4n A^v>*k%i *-i^. *i*Uts ftff^jt* Alt?*
;V' - ' - ' . '.\ .^^X' -rf;-';<^ D^VQsmsy^'vpai'TtLaAXX jaxH / x -"" . V? ^ : .-...- . . - . - . , - ' ' . . .->i'':' ' . ' -' x>,' " ''- ^''-' - ' ' -"^' ' X x ' - ' Senator SCOTT. Ko one queajtJoas your sncenty. Y,o<art'.*tprfri' ,,.; ;. .xj . -X, "' ' '-*--' as people Vho tetl the truth''HW>^*cccpt-lt-4iut /;
Mr,X;k.\VBJ.v,AJi.-olutd[y oot ... / .; , Senator Scprt. VOH *re all prepared losay it did ft't happen. ' , . Mr, CEATEN. It tiitlnot hftjipen. ' , . Miss GREGORY. Senator .Scott, I think you are paranoid. {Applause,}
HAJfOl's K>3JTtOJ," OV PJUBOXEftS OF VAR '.-'';*./.<
' -<?fcntor SCOTT. Dui tiiat not occur? '
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iwoator SCOTT, I have listened to jnny vcitotxoc*, and I vsnioniit, SiiiaJi, that have had more years to judge pfttanola ti>sn you. I ana sure that I detect traces of paranoia in dome of the testimony of some of you. So that let me finiKlil I am asking the questions." What U the reuson ly JUarioi refuflfc to make anj' stateineut ou Uie release of pjfwowrs of war except on tin? <^>iiiitioo vf tbc fixing of * terminal dat for thf withdrawal of Ui>. forcos? -..''.-. Mr.: CKAVEK. The taon, you a*kod why the pruoncn; would not b rBl?a*c4 before tta rfcrujjual date of irifjidjitwul of U^>. forcts?^ Scorr, Ves. What rei*ou Hanoi does give for not doing \r. Cju^Bif. Okay. The nawon w very .f\fMt. The United iitatea i 2K wpwute >erk of bombing rxisl* aver Vbtnuui &nu- the be^njiiny; of t1tu year. That is an avwitf<' of once every 4 ilays. TJê men held in North Vieinjiai are being Lvld th/ê because tiny have partiapftUxJ in that lx>ml>ing. Tbny volu:it^*rd for tlww; tuifi.sionai. T ho)' are Ke^n, and arc- in fact, by inUTDudomiJ hiw ** war cruninali<. S'niitor SroTT, Do you jwMjfy the vrithl>oldiu^ of our prisoners of w*r by J-Linoi? Mr. CKAVKN. \tiy I explain tiii jui.1 a little fait 'urtlior? Sonafoj' SWJTT. ttY"'J "f'iifjd to juy answer tomewiiw* in your replv, j would tfjmi'w;iat^ it; ye*. &U-. CKAVKV. Thi* ViciiututMe -nill explain to any people^ intd'j/lJHg Governiuent, Uiat uiicn the piloU are in tLe lur and
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bombing their country they are \var eriminals. When they are on the ground or in prison they are human beings. We saw films that this commitU** could arrange to sec, of situations, aettial situations when Tortieal fighter bombers arc hanging in the air and Jiving and bombing villages with napalm, the villages are in flames ami people, men and women, are standing around trying to shoot that plane out of the air so it will not destroy their homes anil kill their family. Everybod}- is diooling a', the plane. Senator SCOTT. If I can't get an answer to it, let me ask another question. Mr. OKA VEX. I want to finish what I am sating. TV fact of the matter is when that plane was hit and the pilot ejected nobody shoots m the jlot. The Vietnamese have a ense that t'i<? pilots should be treated it* b.uFnan beings, onee they arc not destroying their land.
' . i. OKFEK.S TO EXCHANGE PKISOXBKS Of WAR
Senator Sri TT. \Vc ha^-e stsveral thins offeml t< release all prisoners of wni- h(-ld * the south in rxehnnge for prisoners of war from t.he -Mi. CIUVEN. There is m> prw*<lent to tht in history. There is no nrw-edcni to releasing priwniersi f>ef(re huMJIhies Jiave eeax-il. S-nu.t<ir ftJcoiT. 1'hwe haw indeed Uv-n preeeder.U and Korea is one of them, but 1 assure y<m you have not an>weroxl tiifc question. \Vouid you favnr Un- 'j-e^w^1 of all Americans if we reiejise all of the Hanoi prisoners f VAI-'! ^tr, OBAVKN'. 1 would f\rcir ail rfK-uH1- of prisoju';-!- ouee a dsite li>r uf tr>ip i& tset. >x OTT, lii otli".r word>, you would rather hitvv the d.tie of i uriruwi and debated while peip!- <lie rather than have j'.ie p- of is'ivr released on lniih >id*--i. You jii!>l .vtid tiial. Mr. MiJj.sn ^LL,. Mr. SeuJ-t, 1 have N tilijiH.'t.rXeu-^! im- for H se<;und,
- -\f, Mr. v' A "- r JIUAV -.t<" 'i>bjeet to the cvniejrl use. of, iiri>ciiier-< of *T bv vou :
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.-' . Senator SfoiT. Mr. Cbuinn:iii, d the Seo^tm^ Mho are in this lu:ring liav**. nv' it^lû> ut jitl? If >>, will y<>u rule on them? TV*. <'iLuuM.is'. \Vu1 jtu lk; it <- at u time wh-n he vJ** a *4U'.-tJou.. Vijy hluuiiJii't ji!U>iTiii'i .vij.ni. he ;* tulkin^. , S-Jr. 5tAUr.KA(.!i. W/'U, o.thci- ^cfijili' cati >UL-wcr. Wf are luM one peisou. Otlu-r p-o^!;-cnii wisv.i-rtm.i t tli'mk-.-"Tiie .CHAJBMA'S. ^V'e should havj- tin orderly meeling. Yoii i-u't
/Si:iittttjr-S(.-o1T. Sll>an sj"u^>lje \vill L:i.ki- r;ire of jl.
M;?yi<Jiii.:<;itY, W'ill you i>l-a~e ri-T.Ui.ir yoij|-(jiu-s-tiou.

'jf; or
i > r r . My îiciinif i- iii:il you \MW ;i|> .iiTjt ii<:i:i!j;iiioii-- -for t i n - inliug <>i t i n - wjir MIHV ii is iiol iiit'!'".I n:i:l; in'.!--i j d tt -.luj'.jlil (>< i-inlrxJ - VOM tumid be opj;o*<-] fn tui'4tmliil/; of the prJMjiiers of wwr In-Ill in I In- w>utli ;id
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tbo prisoners of war held in the north. Since you speak so strongly of humane feelings, is that your position and how <io you justify it?
Miss GRKGORT. You t*id why do wo prefer to have. Senator SCOTT. I stated my question. You don't need to restate it, Susan. If you wish you may answer it. Mis? GREGORY.; I would like to do it my way. Senator SCOTT. We pray you will answer it. Mian GBEOOBT. You said why do wr> want this government to set a date and begin discussions about setting the date while the fate of prisoners of war are at stake. Senator SCOTT. That is right. Mi* GRCOOBT. And what I woultl like to say is that by setting a date the Vietnamese have {dedged to begin discussions immediately, ^ release the prisoners of war. That after the French did the same thing, the prisoners of war were released within C weeks. This will be the only and the fastest way to have the prisoners of war come home. If Mr. Nixon and if the military insist on invading Cambodia in ordei- to Imug the prisoners home, on invading Ijaos to bring thr prisoner:; honrx*: in bombing the north to brine the prisoners Jtorae and on invading prisoner of war camps, that wul lesult only in more prisoners of war in those camps. I want to quote from Mr. K'ixon's speech. He says "that it is time for Hanoi to end the barbaric use of our prisoners as negotiating pawns." Vet that is exactly what Mr. \ixon is doing, while Baying the Vietnamese are. Mr. Nixjn cmild get the prisoners of war buck in 3 months at the longest -I am saying that just to indicate an outride period of !imeif he would set the daterightnow Senator Scott. All ri^ht. MI<w GBEUOBT (continuing). Reuse let me finislu Stoator STOTT. All right. Mis GKKOOHY (continuing). Ami that Spnal^r SCOTT. YJU are a better fi'.ibustt'ivr than any of us. Miss GRKOOUY. I really don't care for your patronizing remarks. Senator SCOTT. That is'all riplil, too. MLss GUKCOUY. But that Mr. Nixon Senator SCOTT. You are free to answer the question, Susan. MIM GUKUOBY (eontiiminK). But Mr. \ixon, in fact, is the om- who is blo<;kiiig tue way to solving the prisoner of wur question, arid tliat the hiiuple agreefiu'iit of /ood fiutJi and iuU-Jitioii to set. a daN- for total troop uiUulraual would tlieii briu^ from lite Vieliiumene at> a^n:iiu'ut to rcle*e the pnîiuTn, sjiuedily aiul safely b^'k home. Senator ST<'.T. fiow, Suium - Mist (juKfMU\ (<'X)U(ijiuui(r). !>! me M*V oru' more tliiiiL'. it really is j'j-1 so liard to talk al*oul it INU-HUS<- ii i~, so horrible a lliii'fr * * * that the woi'tcii who i'ave brother* and sous ujul iiu>buiuJs iu \ i/'Iiium wlio are priisoiu-rs re l*eiui; i'.an^lciJ on a *triu<: by tlu- I're.-ideot iMM-ause lh<jsc iiu-ii eoiihj be liome. We could all huve those men Jiouu- if we .i-oiild M-I 4he duU-. Mr. N'iviii liu- jut tunied the whole ing u|ide dowi , .vith your hiijiport, and IK haying that lie won't intr the t roopNOJl r o o N O J l unu: the priôner priônerb ure home, when in fuel tlw j>rih<)ib-rs can never e/mu- houe u lonjr as there i-. n/it an ajjivu-ment to withdraw totally every -AuwxicjMi from Vietnam. Krorr. Now, Suxuii, may I continue with uriofiier question?
240
POSSIBILITY OF EXECUTIONS
Senator SCOTT. You spoke of the fact that the French prisoners of war wore released within 6 weeks after an Agreement between the governments. Would YOU like to comment on the execution of over 100.000 people by Vietnam after the French left? That of course is what we fear right here. Do vou fear the execution -if any number of people, a? the 100,000 were killed, after the release of prisoners of war* Miss GREGORY. -Tav will respond. Mr. CRAVEN, 'i he Vietnamese have a very proud liistory of struggling against aggressors in their country who have dominated them for tliree quarters of their history. They have a very historic* background. In 1284 when Kubla Khan who hud conquered Asia and Europe aud was defeated in Vietnam in three succ<-ssive attacks. Senator SCOTT. That is when they were called the Shampa, ye*. Mr. CRAVEN. On the third successive attack the entire naval fleet was di-stroved; his soldiers were standing on the shores wondering wlmt was happening next and we are lold about how the VietnaSenator SCOTT. How about the executions? Don't go back to Kubla Khan. Mr. CRAVEN. This is what the Vietnamese say is the reason for the bloodbath and the figure you have given of 100,000 given by the Vietnamese, I presume you uv>an the N'orth Vietnamese is that what you are saving? >iMiat<r SCOTT. By the Vietnamese. Mr. CRAVEN. In fart there were 195,000 j>eople executed by the Vietnamese after 1954, 175,000 by Diem in the south, 20,000 were killed in the north by local cadres in villages during the local land reform program. These people acted not under a directive from the g<>V"niment. The central ml ministration from the North Vietnamese Government took immediate action to stop it and the government assumed re|X>nsibility for its having taken place. They were local guerrilla cudres who were very clearly acting with u liat the Vietnamese tiii'inselves bay was an overcnthusiastic revolutionary fervor at that point having just exjwlled the French. Senator SCOTT. Ovi-reuthusuistic revolutionary fervor means killing people; doesn't it? Mr. CUAVEK. 1 said that when President Diejjfi uwk power in the south after having six-nt several years in the United States Senator Srorr. in course, 1 don't take your figures because they reproent a. very thorough hriiinuuhing job. Mr. CKAVKS. All right, in that case 1 would submit for tlc record a copy of the book, "The Indo-China Story," by the Concerned Asian Scholar* which document* it. N'liator AIKKV. I would like to jxiint out that Ujen BUMI Phu i*> in tli- IK. nh. I thought the Jiirure WHS HKJ.O.M). If you WJ y it i* 195,000, I \ \ i i l aceejit tli;it figiin- l)ui thp L'niu-il Stuie.-. funiishe/J shi|>.^ to mve SOli.OdU or a million ix-ople out of the north to keep them from being t'Xei'uled. That i why I nay l l w t in the -Jieginniug we did have & ri'VHMi-iblity for iheir welfare aflvr we Lad moved them to South
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Mr. CBAVEN. Would you like to know the actual explanation of that incident? Senator AIKEX. I am not asking an j questions. I am simply making a statement for Senator Scott. The executions did take place in the north and we bad to help more nearly a million of them out of the north.
FILLING JAILS AND DETENTION FACILITIES WITH DEUONSTBATOKS
Senator SCOTT. Let me call your attention to your own May Day tactical manual and ask of y>u approve of this sentence: "It greatly enhances our tactical position if the jails and detention facilities are filled with demonstrators." Do you agree with that statement? Mr. MARSHALL. If it is necessa / to fill the ja<ls to give peace, then we will do it because the point is thnt what we urc saying is that the Senate and particularly your kind of resjwnscs about (K-ace are so cynical that people are forced to go to jail. No one wants to, but in fact if that is what is necessary we will do it. 1 mean the way you handled the prisoner-of-war issue to me seems the height of opportunism. ( 'au . you impn<> for a second suppose people were coining and bombing the United States and a few of those planes were shot lown and then we held those jx> pie, and we held them, I am sure since 1 have been in Federal prison, no better than the Vietnamese, and then someone said -Senator SCOTT. You qualify as an e\jH-rt I grant you that. Mr. MAICSHALL. All right. Senator Scon. On prison. Mr. MAUSHALL. If somebody t-aid to u>, "well why don't you jn>i release tin1.-.*; prisoner.-, we will coi'.tinue l>omhin<! your cour.iry" I think ii would be pretty realistic to .say we vvill collider releii.sir.g tin**: prisoners one* you Mopped the lioiiihing. And I would JIIM mnke one uggf>tion if you are ; s<> concerned about the- prisoner* of \\;ir rulher than using it H.-I H politied f >olbnll, you and Vlr. Nixon frnditliein.M'lvi's for the pilots and you v over there u;id li-l ihem roan* home and Ixr free. [Ajplau>.".] Tlie CHAIIIMAN'. \\<; will have order, plciue.
WITXExÊ.i' tf fOJITS AHE COCN'TEIiPlMbCCTIVE
SeiiHM>r SCO-IT. I am enlitled \ reply to aiiytliinj: wlii<-h i- il.-li!;rniU'Iy provocative and anything ujiich is in.-iiltin<r f !iich_ i- IP**1 j)urpose of this gentleman, nd t<> any to him ihni 1 rerogfli/ it--' 1 l m \ e Jin s|M'cc5i Uj iiinkf l)oijt i:iv own niiiiiiirv .-j-rvi.-c, or :il>nnt yours. J IIMVC only th' 1 right t<> obM-rve tht yur r>n,1iiet here i- <>( the ly|e which 9 yfoup nf scientist-, ni'-eiing ye-u-rday refciTi-d i<> in |)niiiti:i^' nut how i.uej-e.--.rullv yti him- \ v \ n r w i \ ihe vi-rv sin/r- of I he \uriiiO- Seniitjir-^ My office WM.-. full of ^ympiiihi/cer-i v.ith ^ h u . you were ti vin^ \t> <lo ;ni u n1t i l yi:sl*'rdiiy. I don't t h i n k you will Jim one now. i think ll.ur i- true of rno-f of th' Seiiaie oliir^s. ' think tliul what you a,rc' doiii!.' i- w holly eip'inlerJ>rodi|eliv<. 1 tliihk v/|m! Voil lire gnil!r U.t do J.-- \n undo the etlect of ihe g"od 'ûy.- did la;1 wi-k i. il.ink you ure goijjg \u t u r n tlie
. you.
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I think that is your purj:os* and having said thatMr. MARSHALL. We don't want sympathy. We want action. I don't care if you hate us; we want you to do something about the Mar. Senator SCOTT. You want a revolution and you have been good enough and honest enough to day NO. The CHAIUUAN. The Senator from Rhode Island.
CHASM I? NOT BETWEEN* OBJECTIVES
Senator PELL. I have very few questions, just a note of sadness bociiusc coiuddorably before you were probably even thinking about the Vietnam war, tome of us on this committee, particularly the chairman, I think, did turn the country around and make peace a decent won!. If you think buck when you were younger, 6 year-. . ;*o, peace was equated \\ith appeasement and was almost a dirty word This i> no longer the case. It has become respectable. The men like u who believe in it don't go as far as you, and 1 get very s&d when I see people here who are leaders, the president of your college, at Hoston College, men of tremendous ability, girls of tremendous intelligence, whom J respect, but somehow we are just I don't think uc are all that different in our objective.-, and yet the chasm between us is huge and I am just sad is all I can say.
CIVIL msOBEDIK.NCE
Mi>.- GBEGOBY. Is it possible that I could read from a commentary in r<sj>onsc to what Senator Scott said that what we arc doing is hurting our cauc? . The CHAIUMVV. If it isn't too long. W<- have oneotherwilnet.fi, but go alieml. Put it nil ill the record if you like and read what part 3-011 would like. Makv ii short. Miss GKEUOKY. This i-. \ick Von Hoffman in ine Washington Pot on April 1(\. writing uliout civil disobe-diance:
f'ivil diMilx-dience can lw friKbt'.-iiiiii! <\i\fi. KVCII when it N non-violent at it i ciippri.itfi to IN- it Ids off \iolriil und wild forces, nuu-s mti>, counlrrvjolmcfi, the II-I- "f troops und thrpo-yiliility tlu>4 they may dffurt to tin- j>rot<-tcj-nsjd<: and tli rri-c- thai rimld t>rinK on. Tln-n1 will \- insis'-ixv nvriiiiiiiuli'iiiH, you arc only hurting your own CUIHC, von ur<- lunnni: (wuplc au.iiiiKt u*. vou are tiirdeiiujR the Rovnuriiriii in it* ]>re>ent cvmr-rf'. U'hal tin-*- [<co|>l- ovrrlnuk if thf \ftr\\Ai: iniriiln-r of [M'r-onx, our own soldier- ^tJ otlirr^. who will lx- kill'ld while Nixon twjnpu hi" :iy down the calr-ndur toward hin ni>Uijc:U withdrawal when oi'ly l\tr Iwinlx-iK will l>e Je/l. iOven I In- ('oiiKrevionuI purtv arguiuc for I>ewinl>er 31 cut'>ff date are l>i-iii? iHiokkci-pcn-h v if ull wur<- nui^t tenriiual^ at the^-ur 1 of tlw (itrîj yer. AH Hi'--e rnotith^ of death l:iv attend wlwii the v r run t<>p tomorruw nioniinic t <:()(( o'dfM-fc with our pri-micn ri't.iiru-d und a wun- fin- jirol^-tinic our Koldi<T while tlirv park up our p-nr nd net ouf. We can havn tiat cifiM- lire whejwver we watii ii <r m- cjiu havi- 1 he J'eijplcV Pi-arc Tn-ut v, a drw-Ljnent i/f accord workl out I'v North and South \ ii'tnaiiiew nnd Atnericati .Sludi-iil^,
And In1 got'-: mi. Wlisit f want to rny i- t l m l , ye-, dr-mocrwy j n < > \ c - \i-ry Moujy, but wlieii tlic Prexulcnt w i i n t - lo Ixijith :nul wmits In move I ''oojirJ-for M'urcli und dfp-troy mi.-ioiis lie I H O M - > \-i-ry, VCIA s w i f t l y ttn-l ther" i-, MIIIJI* k i i n l of coiitrudiclion t h a t rjiiniol lw rc-nlvi-i) by llii- kiiul of iii.-.'-u---iciii. It iiioiti- tlmt we Imvc to iw i, tiinl u<* liuw to liilk to every (Jnve.riiIIUMH cjnployw, mill we Jiuve tî t;jlk tî every jxTson in tli mutiiry,
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243
'".--.."."
*nd-tf~we *aniiot Jalk to verronet- then we want |o tell then; *&*." t don't goîoTwrki You dm'ir:i3c^tte whct-:you -ur^*-foKig, yît-s^' ~ikdp-; iug the war go oirafi<l.*>Ve.*n>. sj-fclu^ pojplc tt_Sate<ii iiolidajfcfla^'-' - "Alonday and Tucssdxyvaiid students all over the country will strike on "May 5, to dramatize Ch'e despair that we feel. The,CHAIBM.^N. Tle Senator fn>m >"ew York. " J;-.; Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to join with Senator . '. PU in a sense to softer, the tragedy of the inability to bring minds together which the young lady,;fdm't know her wr-U enough tonsil-'-, bar. Susan, has just, expressed. ... ." / "'" '-' "' -\\':V - ''
'"'MCTOAi-EXCHANGE OK PRISONERS WITHOUT CONDITIONS
I bave been persuaded before; I am ready to be persuaded again. Tactics will not tbroxv me, butt do aJc you this quejtTura: I-detects ; in your an^ r j- to Senator Scott in respect f conditions by which- , -, peace coulu be. brought aboui almost a tone of your negotiating. You ,-nate one,' is doing in this particular mat.tar, huniaoitarianisra. What do, you say about Uiat? Iux)Uw voids, here are the North Vietnamese setting a. condition. Oka\, that is their privilege. The United States is not meeting that condition. That is its privilege. You are tryiug to persuade the American soc:?ty that it should meet that condition. That is your prfvticfje. . .- . Bit on moral grounds, wouldn't you reaily bciiir'a mutual exrhng of prisoners without am conditions by anybody, strictly as * tfeceut young persoa with a big heart who isn't,anxious to see people incarcerated and held in jeopardy and wants whatever little chink of light cfM break through in this vale of tears? Mie OBCOOBY. I would like to answer this question, but I would like other people to res|>ond as wi:ii. ' Tlie Vietnamese people have set this condition w[n<b, in factr is _rwhat Uie American [>cuple are aakuig fir: for the U.S. Government to set a date. ThfV have net this condition because theyand I believe iaost pt-opleco nt have faitlt in misting th word of our Government. I Oft not brlicve tlmt our Government will leave Vietnam if we . have a mutual exchange of prisoners. Nothing ilial thib Govertinieri^. luu done has led me to believe it* word in the sense of genuinely tTying to end the war. In otlwr uord>, if we exchange prisoners the I. nitcd States still remains, wliii'h has the affect of legiU'iii/.ing its existence tWe in the first plinr. Anu the o>>inUMice of the. U/iited Stutes in Indochina is not legitimate, now or then. Therefore, tlie V ietimmcae cannot exchange, priarmers without an agreement l>e..'orelutnd that nil troops will be-witiuiriLwn. fNsuafor'JAVj:/?. C^vou uilt jut-t allow me to re*[>on<I. 1 am biireyû wilt.flgre with mi- that you .-ljoiiliJi''t join ir. in your own conclusions of what jou tnuy think alwml the t"..S. (tuvmtmrnt. MiiwUKJCOOUT. 1 beg your "union. Senator f/AVi*3s. 1 ay I hope yoi; would ijot join iw in your own ronclu*ion*. I u?n ver>* :Ii ol>lf to <|>cak foj'jTty'lf, u*, I tununn: knot)'. So \iit't leavt.' uvrouliA it.
244
XUTXJAL PRISONER EXCHANGE WITHOC'i CONDITIONS
But I suii Jo feel, if you'are deciding what as a matter of po'Jcy oc-jrht to be done in this ca>, rather than speaking from the dictates of your own heart and I think I know a little bit about your kind of thinking and attitude toward life and it does have an overlay wherever wo could let In a chink of tight, !ikc the release, mutual release of prisoners we should, rather than havo you contend for a particular political condition or a particular political position which happens to.be that of the other side. Could Vj wear from MisavGrvgory if she wishes? Miss CREGOBT. 1 really would like other pr iple to harc with me in answering the questions. The CHAIRMAN. All right. Senator JAVTTS. Go ahead. Mr. ORAYEV. Mr. Javit*. we are mox\"d to actually going and sitting in st roots, something which v.v arc not at all sure will resiull in our own safety, something which we feel is a necessary step at this jwint as civil disobedience has proven in times in the pafct has proven an effective tool to stop the war or to move a nation's conscience. We are moved by humanitarian coneern. we are moved by humatutariait concern bVcau-c- when you talk aK.ut Vietnamese shooting at Americans it is true, but they don't have any helicopter gunshijfs that fire 3fi,OOQ -.hots a minute.'They don't have B-52 bombers or tactical or strati-pie fighter bomlvrs that are bombing the Uniu-d States, that are destroying civilian populations; they dnn't have Hie. steals thai/ are having our sisters, women of our country, giving birth to gem-lie monsters with horror, with horror who drink one quart of water f Hay, otic. quart of water a day. Humanitarian eoiuvri1--! We nre not talking about massive relocation nnd torture in the pri>nti at Cori Son. the Tiii'-r ('ages, where studi'tit-i \\Lo have signed our peiurc tre.aty IniVibeen incarcerated and held witlioul trial by the Thicii-Ky-Khietu goveniment. The United .SaU-< is responsiKle for the treatment of those prUon'-rs, the 500 prisoners arrested la>t wc"k at Minh Maiig University because 'hi-y held .^^nirl'.ooks in which they were Miijrit.:; for j>f!M.-e in their destroyed -/)imtry. Further they \v-re denied tlieir votinff privilep-s i:i nlecting a president in their stnlent university. The firi^mers nrc of cinr-/-ni to an awful lot of American.-. es;ie<-i<jl!y thow v. lio-e fiiiiiitlc- are hur by (!< fuel they are Maturated frurn the men of their family wh > are Ii-Id. The facl of tii>- inaticr ! ;ii"Mr rLvi!!'!!;. In-ill'.' lieli) iii \\irlli \ lei/'iiin are safer limn prisftncr- Iw-ing eld by Sotirh Vi'-inaiiiCM-, St u t l : Victiiitne-c people frmu Ssijj.'"!! Ivinir held i;i pri.-nn. They are >.-ifer in lho.r |>ri>oiiii i Vorth Vie', nutii t h a i i they would !> in ;!<e (ielil in Smith Vietiiniii. The only ilnii'/er t h a t thi-y f:i(X i? f!.e i-iiti'iiined U.S. buiubi'ig c f Ntn.'li N'ieljialil. T'lere have lec:i :-ifie [n < ;Miiir > r> refnrncd tn flii-; riiiiiilry, re;e:rv,| -by l i j ' ' \Mrtli Vi'l!ian.'M'. K*i-ry -isr/Ie me nf IU-KI hn> s-pok'-n of l i u f f M ' i i i u r i t t i i ' rent nient. Three of tlietu six-ciliculiy icilitnry nnn Hei/inild, Overly. ;.:'! Fl -I-miH 1 l:i\e 'Illl':'.''-'! (l-eir vit,rie- uftej 1 i-,!tl '
C(.'ii!'rv. We arc l i i l k n i ' / :il:itir I c i i i r i i ' i i t ^ r i a i i iii-ciTii !y ' iet::,iine.e w'i' l e - j i e i I iiiiinii.. life, v\ h't me -lni/>'^ bi'i'ai,.-.!- t ' l i ' V n-.jtecl. 1, ill .ia
245
life uuJ understand human life being a motivating force despite the most vbletil technology ever to come down in the history of the world and civilization; that u the answer. cxaiator JA.ITS. I understand your answer to he question. It is not an answer, but iii any cade you have made it.
PAST AND PRESENT CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
I would like to ask Miss Gregory if she would respond to one other thing that troubles me. The traditional civil rights, civil disobedience syndrome, has been a civil disobedience lo violate a law \vliich those who participated in the demonstration considered to be unconstitutional. That is why there were sit-ins at the soda fountains and the restaurants, that is why Martin Luther King rime with his little package under Ids arm and marched from a church to a square, and knelt ui the square and sang, et cetera, because the law which be was protesting, he fell/ was unconstitutional, and the courts would overturn it. He was perfectly willing to go to jail in order to prove it wad unconstitutional This is a different kind of civil disobedience and that is what I would like to ask you about. This is a civil disobedience \vliich coerces in order to make people do wliat you want them to do. You don't say that it is unlawful to remove you from the middle of the r>ridge where it is alleged that you are going to sit. As a matter of fact, it is perfectly lawful to remove you from there tud you know you are violating the law. and you would have no objection to the law which says that you shall not sit en a bridge. What you have objection to is that a Government worker is going to work and in your opinion contribute to the war effort. So you thiiuc that by keeping him from that work, in his car or in his home, will coerce him and the .American |>eople into believing the way you believe. Do you think that is the essence of a free society, and that we should not allow our affairs to be run by the choice of what our people whom they elect, how they wi*h to operate, et cetera, but that they should run it according to what you gentlemen and ladies want or you will make them do it by coercing them? Do you think that that is the kind of an egalitarian, humane, just society in which I gather it is the a*j iration of young iwople to live? Mr. MARSHALL. I don't think you really stated what the uim u because I don't sec that what we're doing w fundamentally different from what Martin Luther King did at all bwuuse, in fact, what we are saving we don't want to immobili/^ society or tJ American people-. We fucj that the American people fWl the majority of the ]>uople feel immobilized by the inaction of the Congress and the Houw, by the Congress of the. people who theoretically are supposed to be irspuiisive t- thorn, bring the action of UIP j>e.opl who theoretically tire supposed to inak'1 peace and, therefore,we feel if, U our obligation and ourduty to make tins. We are trying to do tlii in a u ay whie't cannot be misread as some sort of violent attack aiiti I really object to some of the coinmenu tlmt [N-<>ple have made.
246
PUUPOSE OK PRESKXT DEMONSTRATIONS
For instance, Senator IV-ll, you Mtid you have a groat, sad new, and I think, you know, wn all have * great sadness. ami I know 1 grow up in the S*tate you mine from and I would love for instance just to spend, you know this next summer at Newport Milling like I us^d to, nil right, and u lot of us would like to do :.u's, and the fact we may Mtem a litcle nind nt, and Mr. Scott fed:* ..e are just here to disrupt or something, I think you had betterrealizeSenator SI.-OTT. 1 don't think you outfit to put words in my mouth. Mr. MAIISIIAM,. That is what you said 1 am here to muse trouble. Senator Srorr. I said I know what your purpose is au I you yourself have said it is to disrupt.
Mr. MAUSIIAM,. \o, I didn't.

S-nator STOTT. Well, one (<f yon have siiid that. Mr. MAKSIIALI.. No, you said it. Senator SroTT. You swid you were oinj; to MOI the (joviriinieiit or stop tinwar. Mr. MAIWWALL. Well, die point L> I think it ia very diuir that Iho kind of rape tlmt wr feel i> leplitnatc. It i> in f art possible for people to o be cnrH^fi). Thai is ;> hiiniun emotion and when you see this kind of Milteri'if; then von hare to u>k, and ivhut we an- asloti^ l>y this action, i> it renily in u M:IIX die olilesl Amerii-mi tradition, i that kind of a-t ion wi: are hoping \ pilvunixe you nnd your ron.vienre to do Mr. l''ul)vri<;lit f you said ihtil (In- tililcister H<ild IN- ditfienli. I um sun- ilmt timiliiuir _\oti di> will l>e diilietili. The-n- nre dillindl 'inn's, HIH! it it time lo slcike out of nnTcI\ a kitnl of vinui:iir.s-.l)C<:au5!e you have In admit tinil yoi>n<; peopli- ,1111^.1 fn-I u l i t t l e hit suspicious of jicople talking and lu-ilri'ii;; eroeiulile Ic.irs. What we tire sttyiti^r is ri^hl nou' in si i-risi^ if \ < r i rlaim to IH- lfrd.-r> and claim to lie jM-ople (lint y.liould respond ineu you hiive to .Me Miniethin^. If you are reallx vriou>U thinking yon e-iiild start tomorrow, IH*ranê idreuily the cimniry i^ iM^rniiuni: to 'r;Ivjini/.e aûin>t the war, a h'lil>M-fer, mi.1 ] think ( h u t uoiiM pick up I reincndou* support and I think the ihoiiMinds of |H>op|e who iifeôin-; to strikeout llie country, uhu are îiin^1 to \u> ;;n> m;' re ^niji^ to le w i t h Xi:. and I t h i n k the kind nf niomeni JHI c.mKI in- lnuli tip M> Mr. N'i\on and Mr. Scott who really mv a miiioiily in t h i s cminlr 1 . liul tire dK/ether, they could IH' forced t M C I , und >"ti would iie .-nrj)iiM>,| tn \ < n i r n\\n ioMcr, Ix-cunx'
V.'e i u i \ i ' :i ]i!inine "potter t" l i t e pep|e." Ihul \ou lire liffiillii I lie (M'l.ple
now, Iwhind them. The pcuplc lia'c ulr.-iuh IM-ÎIII to niote. and they tire ^<>iri',' to continue to nto\e. iitii! if you Iniin tojuive uny leîtitnncv or erediltilitv it is i;p In \ni| liul to fee) -.Mill. <>s necHUsf We nil feel ,-*<!. Kvenone feel- snd. Ji i> up t yon to ,)o so'ii-'i iiii;L', not do it. nevl month IMII do it Mtiriin;.' tomorrow. ' Seji. tiir,( \vrr-- Mr. < 'hiiiriiinii, I liave t i n - Hour /uui f Mnîhl like to compl'-le 'ny ~- ' " " The ( ' l U . K l M . S . We H i l l hlil'e Dl'def. The .S't.ntoJ frojn \lÛ' Vork is recount/led.
Seuiiior N ' I M J Will you yield for j n ^ t one i Seinilof .1 \ t i T s . All u^lit.
247
*XBT PROPOSALS FOR CEASE FIRE
Senator SfKHT. I would just like to coiiiiuent on the provocative state.me.nu*. The gentleman Isn't aware that IS months ago I was tlus Senator who projxwed a unilateral cease fire, I think, before, anyone else. When that got nowhctv at the next election I pro|>oscd a multilateral or bilateral ccasc-firo. So it would l>e tetter if you were belter informed, which I regret to say you are not. Mr. MARSHALL. \Ve want immediate withdrawal, Mr. Scott, immediate, withdrawal is what we are asking for not a cease-tire. The CHAIRMAN*. The Senator from New York.
TACTICS OF WITNESSES
Senator JAVITS. Obviously you gentlemen and ladie> have your o\vn piec to say and you are saying it. I think we have ours- too, und 1 hope and pray that we will tiot lx> turned agaiu>f an end to this war by tactics of which we disapprove. Those tactic;* are daiicynms. -in my judgment, and could easily destroy the very society which f warit ami I think most young |>coplc want, to wit, a society where there is a rule of la\\ not a rule of men's pa>sious. But I \\ill tell you one thing. You will not intimidate me and I ho|x- and pray you will not intimidate any Member of Congress in his honest conviction by immobilization of the Government or any other thing you will try, tl'rtt yon will l>e treated correctly, IK- Americans .should be trebled, but with a full understanding that no citizen, in out country, has the right to overwean the judgment of any oilier citizen or rcprc.tcniative by coercion. I believe that on the whole, give or take the usual 10 percent, but on the whole, people of this country Imve the ability and the means, and the. organs to express their will in the .Senate, in the House, through the President, through the press through the radio, television, churches, and the multifold wavs. They do il belter ami come to a more mature judgment than you wftl who try to force us. 1 beg you only in lhesilv.: ind secret recede:, of your own hear! to think about whether !.' Kind of a soci'-ty which uill submit to this kind of terror or force or coercion will not he a much vvor.-c society for you and the ret of us than in this imjxTfcct society in which \\e arc iryinsr to live [applause]. Senator SCOTT. I agree, f v\oiild like the record lo show 1 agree entirely w i t h Seruilor Javils' very <ompa.-ionate and reusoiu-d
>tll|j'lllTlt.
Senaur I'KM.. Mr. < 'iiainnan, i would like to rcxpond to my fonner fellow Khodc Inlander, if I can. The CHAIICMAK. Is the Scjiuior from \ew York through? Tjie Senator from Khodc Island.
FKOBI-K1I OK M I N U K I T V VJF.W
Semttor PF.U-. The problem I think i- thai your view i very much in th! mjiiority. The vp-w of iiii i-ommittee with regard to ihe nar i hiill u nJnorfiy view in thr Nation. When a imijorjiy of the Nation want* to bring Uii* war lo u coiichthioii, tin- majority of the ('o
24S
will want to and the war will be brought to a .conclusion. The tactics you are following now, or which you plan to follow next week, make the job of leadership of those of us who believe and have believed this war is wrong, ill-based and has nothing to do with our national interests more difficult. Mr. MjufHALL. I would like to yield to Susan foe a second. The CHAIBUAX. That is a statement. You were not asking any question; were you? Senator PELL. It was a response. The CHAIRMAV. We have another witness I want to go on to, but I will allow you to tnwke a comment.
INTENT OP DEMONSTRATED
Miss GUEGOKV. All right. Senator Javits, if what you were saying is true. I would not necessarily disagree with you. But what I see, Las Impi>ened because of the dynamic that has been set up here today. You do not understand what pur intention is, and I would like to try to explain why people are coming to Washington and what we want to do. 11tis week we are having a jMjople's lobby. v A people s lobby does not mean that we coerce and it does not mean that xve force, but it means ; are trying to talk to the people who work in the Government. We are taking the People's Peace Treat}- to them and we are describing what the conditions aio in the peace treaty, how it came about. We feel that we are speaking for a lot of American people, not for a minority, but for a maj'ritv, anil the way tvc go about it Ls to just come a* people, and say, "We îave thi* peace treaty. You may not have heard about it and we would like to show it to you and a*!: you to discuss it, sign it, ask you to vote on it." Then people can be informed about what the peace treaty really is about ami vote on it. If by the end of this week we have not reached all the Government employersand we can't even get in the Justice Departmentwe then Lave decided that the l>est way to do this is to go to the street* and the roads where the Government employee* drive to work, and to try to say, "Stop, we want to talk to you." We are going to take coffee and orange juire and doughnuts out to them. We are going to talk with them about the peace treaty. It t a nonviolent tactic, ft u tiiurli in I In- same vein as Martin Luther King. It ha* no intention to coerce or fore*-, and I really mu*t. have you understand that is what we are trying to do rather than having you define what we are trving to do. 'Kev. Ralph Abernathy of SCIX'. NWRO (the National Welfare Kuchts Organization) the farmworkers organization, and all tin' many jmrifUu und religion* groups a wll as Îndents ull over the country, young iwople. freaki>, and women an* going to come and try to do that. That w our intention and that U what we plan to do. Senator JAVITS. Well, Mi** Gregory, you ha t- e stated what you plan, and you have complete freedom and I have, too. I think the two tttKternenu are pro|>erly jiixiaiK>ed. I have given you how I feel from the depth of my heart, and I think. I don't know how you feel :<hon; u, hut I think, you feel I certainly don'l have had motives. If yo'i do -.ink I have von an* quite wrong and let u see. lint I hope you will lake what 1 have uid to henrt. u i will take ujml \<>u have biiiJ t. \
Mr. MAR9HALL. I would just like to con>ment on oiuoftiiig that you said we should consider because when you say to us and"at*he end -of your statement you talk about coercion aim tenor, and the-.iqping to give the image that somehow or otfier e were goin to force peopb mto something awful, and the thing that I think you nave to consider when you talk about that is look at tilings in terms of the way they really are, because the abstract term -terror and violence is always thrown upon the movement. But when you consider the king, of violence that counter perpetuates.**very day in Vietnam, when you consider the terror that Jay and Susan have talked about, then I think you have to wonder who was coercing, because I think the fact of the matter is that war in Vietnam itself is coercing people. The war in Vietnam itself has forced people to these kinds of motives, and the war in Vietnam is trving, threaten* to destroy this society. We bavu no intention, we do nut want to destroy this country. We want to m>ke this country into something beautiful but what we are saying is that right now there are madmen in power and that the Senate is playing, whether it has a smile on iu face or tears in it* eyes, pupi>ets to those madmen and we want to stop that kind of charade and bring reality back to this country.
Senator JAVTTS. And yon will accommodate the right of society to stop you if it thinks what you arc Irvine to do u to destroy its highest values. That is all the c&wnr* of life. We have heard you; you have heard us. Thank you. Mis* GRECOBV. Genocide is not a high value. [Applause.] .Senator JAVITS. No one has said that.
SUMMARY OF DIFTEBJCKCES
The CHAIUX AN*. We think we had better move on to another wancM. I think it has been a most interesting hearing. If I could summarize at least the differences, as I sue it. You don't need to accept my view as to what your views arc, but it striken me that Senator Javits in this last exchange has brought out a vory critical issue and that is whether there is an effort to pcnuade or an effort to coerce. I think the judgment that Mr. Marshall indicated when IIP. said he was a revolutionary leaves the feeling that he intends or talicves in the use of force to ujwct and destroy the existing system of government. I recognize, the differences and I share inuny of your views about the Vietnam war. 1 have already said and I won't reiterate what a tragedy it u and bow it threaten* our government and our society also. I think if it does continue, it will ever increasingly threaten. But whether you intend it or not, Susan, if the actions of the demonstrators result in physical intervention, there is no question but that tlie govurniiient lUelf has fhn power to control this kind of intervention. I do think that this would sot back and xeriojudy hinder the effort* of th'w.- who arc trving within the structure to end the war. Purely as a matter of political judgment, when you consider tlie [lower tiint is at the disposal of fhe existing government of thU country, you are challenging it by force and vou are bound to fail. Not only will a challenge by for"? tmmediatefy fail, it ix very likely (o create reaction* which would be very detrimental to the achievement of the |Mir|w*c>* whirl you have in mind with regard to the war,
Vl-Vtt- -11 17
250:
This has been ~n dilemma of all those who have h**n interested in this matter for some years. So, AS a- matter of judgment, I share Senator Javits concern that if this does go to the point of physical conflict and the Government 4s interfered with physically, whether you intend it or not, it is likely to react adversely to our interests.
COMMENDATION OK WITNESS* COXCEBJf
I appreciate your coming. 1 think'it haft been very interesting. I be.licve you have succeeded very welt in ifiving your point of view to the committee and to the country. It is a vorv important matter. The alienation or .disaffection of the yoiuig jwople has been a matter of urcAt concern to eveiybody who is interested in the future of the country. You are one segment of it. We have had others. I am not so sad about the fact that you arc concerned. On the contrary', while I mny question your political judgment aa to how. you express it, the fact that YOU are coucwned about the inbumanitv of man toman and particularly our purl iiuit is not a .matter for beuip sad, I think it is encouraging that |>eopte of your age are interested in important matteni. \V hen I was your age, I am bound to confess41 never occurred to me to be interested in matters of this significance. They were not critical at that time. It was a different period. I often think of the react "on of the young (wopln in Germany when (hat countrv was doing much the same as we are doing. I am not really an .:uthority on what the young people really did, but it was not Drought to uiy attention they were interested in the basic values of human existence as you evidently are. So in one sense the fact you are interested is encouraging in that the foniing generation may be more humane and have greater concern for the values tlinn in the past. The very nature of the atrocities having been much better publicized now than in the past may account for that. Actually what is being done is only being done on a greater scale. You mentioned the Indians. I think it is comparable. Actually it is very comparable Co what we did to the Filipinos at the turn of the century. It is very comparable to what every other big countrv has done at one time or another in its history. It is not unique witfj this 'on n try and always in I hoe questions you have to take into consideration flie possibility of what human iiatunv v. lint human beings can achieve. I regret I cunnot agree with you that we have to destroy the existing Ktruct tire in order to make progress. I think most of the revolutions which have destroyed every tiling usually have to t,tart all over again. They rarely achieve the degree of pngeHii which they destroy. It ha been very unusual cakes in which thitt has occurred. So I do disagree with your tactic* and some of your views H> to how to achieve your purpose, but the purpose of ending (he wur I entirely share and will do it with my limited wuy H well s
1 Cllll.
Thank you very much, Mr. SU'phens in being heard ut the request of Senator Beall of Mnryliiiul abd Senator Aiken, a ranking minority tm-in\>i-r of this committee.
251
Senate* SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, before you call the wiUieas could I just read about three lines in the record in this. The CuAnuuN. Certainly. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
STATEMENT FBOM MAT DAY TACTICAX MAXUAfc
Senator SCOTT. The May Day Tactical Manual contain* this statement:
We will b* disobedient which means no matter what any one sayg, no matter -Lat laws weixiak, we am going to reach <snr action t*rg.-r, th road;, bridge* tud traffic circle-, loding in to the federal JIIX-OH of Washington, and we will not leave our aetlon tnrgt-ts -unt" we have sucfavded in our target objccl'u e or oiitti i; an amsttd.
The CHAIHMAN. As I have stated, Mr. Melville f>. Stephens who is a former, 1 saa informed, lieutenant in the Xavv, has K'en in\itd at the request of Senator Bcall of Maiyland and Senator Aik<>n. Mr, Stephens, will you proceed. . __ C ___^_ ______
SIATEMERT OF MELTHLE L. vftxatam, EX JAVy LXEUTEVA1T
Mr. STEPHEN'S. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief because 1 know it uriate. I would like to thank you and the other members of the committee for the opportunity to be here. I particularly appreciate the opportunity to sjyC.dc because I know that iny vieus are Hot very popular thwte day*. However, my conviction* arc vt-rv ntrong and bused on my own experience and what I believe is a realistic sense of the situation and the feelings of the Vietnamese people,
TVITNB3S' EXPEBIEVCE IX SOUTHEAST ASIA
^
I was in the\Vavy from June of 19C7 until SapU>u>bf>r of ltu>t \VJIT and spent nearly 34 months in the Soutbeust Asia coinbut zone. Thi< nrnrly 3-ycar period included 10 mouths aboard a cntisrr of the 7th Fleet in a gunfire supfjort role, during which tinu> I had an OPJKMI unity to visit various arbat> of I Corp; and almovt 2 years in Vietnamese incouutr)' U>un. I worked e.Mc-nsi\-cIy with tlie U.S. 9th Infantry Division and various units oi the South Victnunicx.i' tinned forces including the Vietnamese N'nvy, the Vietnamese Marine Corjw, the Vietnanif^c Anuy, thu regional and (wpûlar forw*, and llie irregular defense groujM. During my lust tour, which ended in Muv of last year, I had an opportunity to travel extensively througliout the <*>untry of ViuUiauj, and vj^w Urtliaud the \>roctit* of Amencan withdrawal and Uie Vietnamese forces moving in to take over the combat role, During this time 1 fel vary fortunate to have ouuli- a great many friend* among the Vietnam*1*; |>eo|>le. I cannot sjieak more highly of my personal regard and ttffwtion for these fieople, both OH frjcndi* and as <wmra<les. My ccujwni and the reason that I awkcd to Kjn-ok loijay, is to ak you to consider carefully your course, ô that \Mwv-far Amnrieaus doe* not eome at the cot of additional swrific^, for thro
52
ARGUMENTS FOB IMUIDUTP. T> TO WAR QUESTIONED
It se^nw. that since I returned to the States last spring, that the cries for unconditional withdrawal and (be sotting of MI immediate date for ending American sup|K>rt have become very loud, and I know Ihut you on the committee have listened very carefully. I believe that these arguments have two principal weaknesses. FirM. they are (>a*ed on questions which certainly should have been a>ked in the oarly 19GOV. but which were not. Wr are tlicre; we have Ix-eii there for a Ion}; time. The questions of legality and sjxscific strategy which wore valid 10 years ago aro no longer the relevant one*. Sfviitul, the von- t.nuh that- all war is terrible and brutal is especially true of t hi* one in which the civilian imputation M so intimatclv involvi-tl. Only I ho-*g of us who have been there and fought and lived with th<? Vietnuuie&c* people ean know how verv t.rue. this is. I certainly agree that this WHV hn> gone on too long and must come to an end. Bui J a.sk you-fai".consider carefully the manner in whieh you intend to end it. . . .
U.S. UCsrd*N'R[lilUTT TO stumf VIKTNV3WE.SE PEOPLE
to assure you. that after my nearlv 3 years in Vietnam I am convinced thai the ovcrm'helming majority of the Vietnamese jH-oplf nre opposed to the t'nmintmisK. A. great tnany of them 'nayc taken thi-ir stand hprnuse of I he American commitment to the GM> of V'u'tuuin. ( would like TO think that you and I and the people have a re.sjxmHibiIiiy to tluse Vietiijun'*c to have fuith in .* in the past, and have naked .1 heir lives fnr soinHhitig rtiey l>elie\rf in. Peace t<>r us mu>t not come at the cost- of their iivcj A^ I Ixk urtnind Washington today, and last w>ek, I am verj' olf-rtded to Wf. Americans carrying the flag of the. VC, I few that rxuvi Ameriraiw, jjt thir |m4oi) for peace, have mwle heroes of the YiMeoiig. Ix!t me asuure you, Mr. Kulbright, (hut in South Vietnam, the VieU'.ing arc not hero*-.*. -' I Iv'urd a great dual about atrocities last wet*k{ jmrticulurly from my fellov Viiftufttn vcf*rwi>t wlio were. here. I c-rf andy lo i >t deny tliat tffiiac of Uiem tok plow. But tliere t alw^ anot.lii-r .-iJ^- which should be heard wort: often, f would like to tell yuu about iwo particular inci' dents, which I am personally aware of. In the spring of 1969 near (Jan Tho in the i^<iithe.rn part of tne delta 1 was unfortunate enough to be* a witneng to the grcnadmg of a Vietnamcue lichool bus, which wan clearly marked as a school bus, by the Viftcong. Two of the children were killed outright; nevcral were wounded H<> Mtverely that I doubt that they could jHtwjbly have survived; and three othept were maimed in the, mot grotesque manner that you could imagine, Earlier in mv tour i became very cUw- friendu with voung VitUoiaeMe boy of 1 1 uamed Trail who had been orphaned by the Vietcoujr. Tran told me that in the fall of 1907 hU father had Ixu-n elected to a locid village office and Tran had hern *ei/c.d by the \'icUung in the area and had had hi* left arm cut off with a macheta H* an example to hitf father. His father Inn I rcfuwul to resign cvcii at thiu, but lu-, along with hitf mother, were killed in tlu; Tel offensive, of
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Senator, as I*ay, I speak fnrtn persona! experience. I s|)eak of only a few incidents like thin, but anyone who has spent any time in Vietnam will assure vou of the jrutalitv and the terror of the Communists.They, the Communists themselvfts, have been quite blunt in stating that terror and maas execution am their principal strategy. The South Vietnr.iuese I lived with .know this. They know that thsy take, their Kreii in ~thvir luinds when they support the Government of Vietnam and.*) they depend upon us for the support which we have promisedJ think 1 understand >ns well asâuy the passion of all of us in this, country fur 'an wid lo the war, but it- w my firm conviction that i>eac* - at the "price <f -these -Vip.tuimtese people is too expensive, and it -U i peace rhut I could not live with. .- . ' - . . I want to tefl yw from my own ~isetis*f from my own poiMnml rsip.'riv4tii.-.e .frfrtr. nearly C years in Vietnam, that the Belting of ait arbitrary :diUeforAim'ricû withdrawn! can wljMiurt the ratine of the South Vii:tiiBtiies6 pcopjft, and 'thai I am firmly convinced that (lu-oitnutiX proviui\. which I w-'as a part of; and which Lh:ivc \vauriiod iwo I left., is nn pnÔKshe utnt nmlntbtis.** I believe the '" " conid permit. . : U r heii-_I-Kp!*k-tf JRV-fear 6.r^he Vieua:6e-iK'-oplef-I _. don't, jpeak of tltc^ peiWals .uud lue~iidmiral:s, ijt (he. jsiph ranking 'official*. 1'VuidcIv, 1 am quite sui* that in a situntioti th'-y ei> |::IIH||A " their.ae'.ves. I tfo refer to the junior officers and the trooj* who..!, knew. U> the :>ter<:]:a!:ts and to the fnrir.ers and to the locat o0ic(:iUr those \\iio Mould ealltUe. averape citi/ens of I he country, 1 think, sii. iliat the issue of eJidinz Ihis war is nol I he Issut/ vn <Mir saving fwc; out the Lxiit>.' of our loepoiuibiliiy, u nation ui'd as indiviiJuuts. to these cJti/j.-Ms of South Vietnam. Munv of ihcm have corr.roitU'il lh:mselve<1'" Ix'faiisie we ver\' Iit;rally asked UM-ni lo. I lioju.- anJ nr<:c that in our ur^-encj* ft r j>cace that AV do not l.-iJil<n them. That i> all I have, Mr. Fulbrijrht, thank you vei-y aiin-h. The CtiAKuiA*. Th.'idk \vu vsry mw\>. Lieutenant Stephens. Does the. Senator from Jlliode Ulund have any qtieiioii:>? ewwrr OK SITH-IKG SPECIFIC HATE Senator PKLL. I wtu st-ruck with the force and oiiuvrilv of u>ur reniurka. 1 would dino^ree concerning the wttiujr of u K|>ccific duic. It woulil s.-ji\ to me that only by etling a hpcciiii-. duU- will uc bring enough prfbiire on the South Vietnamese to develoj) a government Umt might be able to hold the line aft<;r our departure. Uiilen. we do that, they wilt know that we will indefinitely *horc them up und they will not make their own chungc* that they should lx-cau.se you know u* well u I tlmt the Cjovenimeiit that is tfwri' is not really reflective of the majoriu forces within that uulmppy hulf-country, Mr, STBPHESb, Senau>r Fell, I think y>u arc very rigbt. There U need for more reform within the Victnajncnc Government, r'rom the titne 1 wiih there 1 thitik 1 saw a pnrat dea). Hut to the iK.intof M-tliiigu jwci(ii- lnU-; liiu South Vivtnumeiie will not be helped but will be victimi/x'd by the jtropapHndu that the North Vietnamese couM tuke fntm tfiHt, i mean in uii cnviroiiriu-nt of combat wliere thr- jriiici|)le are terror and execution, if the North Victuumc*c CUM say
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"the Americans have said they are going to leave on such and such a date, we have your names, and we know. What arc you going to do after .they leave? 1 am not putting it very well, but I can't see what anybody has to gain by setting a specific date when it seems obvious to me that although it hasn't been said, there is a date in mind. Senator PELL. I see the point you are driving at. We just disagree I sav the improvements wfll not be made and the Government wilt not Vcome reflective until the Damocles sword of a date is hanging over them.
BESPO.VelBILITT TO SOUTH VIETXAUESE ALLIES
The other point I would like to make is that manv of the vicious plans that are before us for withdrawal and particularly those with which I have been associated include the right of asylum for those citizens who feel their lives would bo endangered. I agree this is a rather open door but I think it is part of the responsibility we have. One oi the things thai has disturbed me is whereas we were on one edge a few years ago in wanting to get out now public opinion is whisking alo'ng and in a few more months or a year we may want to get out and pay no attention to the South Vietnamese. I note your message concerning our resjwnsibility to those people who would have their throats cut because they have been identified with us whether for reasons of cupidity or patriotism doesn't matter. We have an obligation for that and I wouhi ho|K> we in the Congress would not escape tliut responsibility. Mr. STEPHEN'S. I spent considerable time with the veterans on the mall and when you talk to them as individuals, it is remarkable how iuiilar our goals arc. Certainly an end to the war is the aim for all of us. Although I ho country is very polarized with the arguments- right now their convictions are in reality identical. The CHAIRMAN. Senator from Pennsylvania.
COMME.VDATIOX OF WITNESS
Senator SCOTT. IJeutcnant Stephens, yours is a culm, quiet voice, and yet it is ju-a a> important surely that your views and your voice be heard in the media, on television and on radio. It is more difficult for you to druw the cameras tct you because you ure speaking rationally and reasonably and out of a verv deep concern. The luck of rationality of course is shown by the behavior of the audiencr, the hissing and the rer-t of it here. So I arn very unxiou.- that the other point of view foe Leord us well.
MAJOUITY PK.VTIMfcNT or VETEUANS Of VIKTN'AU WAB
We were fair. We were desirous of hearing the*- concerned and Hinccrc young |eople who have no fault (hut Ltn'f (Common with many \oiitli. That is I lie inspiration of int.ant and MJjwrior knowledge and we ull recognize that. J>ut you huve talked to other veterans. By various estimate*, approximately 1,500 veteran* were here. There have been ov*r 2..r> nullion who have served in Southeast Asia, and you have, "f rourwv, talked with niuny of them, is it your opinion that you are reflec.ling a general sentiment or a inajoritv sentininnt of thoite veterans with whom you are familiar and with whom vou have served?
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Mr. STEPHENS. Mr. Scott, even among the 1,500 veterans here last week in die protest, there were very tew who did not have very dose Vietnamese friends whom they hofi verr dearly and when they think about the issue objectively, they know that we have ft responsibility to them, and they look for an answer which will not abandon them. I can understand that from war develops a passion for peace, but that passion sometimes makes people less than objective, and I feel that I speak for the majority of the peopleno, I don't, I don't want to presume to speak for the majority or for anyone else except myself, but my sense of being there and being with other Americans uid South Vietnamese, is that there is a lot of respect for the South Vietnamese and a .commitment to them. SENATE'S DESIRE TO END WAR Senator SCOTT. I hope that you accept what previous witnesses have been unwilling to accept. That is that there are no prewar Senators. Certainly there are no prowar Senators left. The Reader's Digest accurately expressed my opinion 2 weeks ago when. I said there are no hawks in the Senate and for this I am very very glad. I have gone as far as I felt I justifiably could, in advocating; an early end to the war. I would favor ait even faster deescalation if we cau manage it and justify it. I would favor the'earliest possible aiding of this war. I think rav views are fairly well known in Washington, and I believe that, by and large, the Senate of the United Stale* is anxious to proceed along every possible line to persuade the mind of the only person who can act, the commander in chief, the President, of the general war weariness and of the genera] desire for peace. I think a great majority of the members of the Senate have served in oue or more wars. They have the same detestation for wur and its horrors which you have expressed and I would like us to find our way oui.
TESTIMONY AND ACTIONS OF PBEVIOUB WITXE8SE8
I was htrurk by the fact that none of the previous witnesses expressed the slightest condemnation of the action of the enemy. None of them wut.e willing to admit the brutality or the cruelty of the entmy. None of them found fault with the enemy. None of them found fault with anyone except Americans, To my mind this is at least a lack of any jcripheral vision. These young people haw a tumid vision growing out of their concern and their companion. But. I certainly commend you for having s)M>ken and for having expressed a willinjmewi to appear. That is truly a form of courage in a land where coercion is iwpular in some areas, I arn <rja<l that you have appeared, ft ij refreshing, I think if (Nioplr were indulging in pressure tactics generally it would be easy to bring u thousand or a hundred thousand veterans here to affirm wiiat you have mid. But what gains the popular attention, what attract* the news, is the revolutionary type ol fellow wtu> wears his hair a la Indian or tlie dialectic exjx'rt*, the people like that, ft in a great pity because what this Nation is crying for is some objective analysis of what is going on. I do want to assure you, as Senator JaviU says, that this Government will continue to function.
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It will be in business on Monday and Tuesday, and the foreseeable days thereafter. We will be attending to our business -without being intimidated or : terrorized. What these young people ia their mistaken zeal are accomplishing is to retard and to delay a w>.Il developing move to find a quicker way out of the war. You hare added a note of sanity to this and I want to thank you again. (Applause.)
PREPARATION" OF WITNESS* STATEMENT
AVoire FROM ACIMEKCE. "Who wrote his speecji? Senator SCOTT. May I comment on that. I happen to know that Lieutenant Stephens requested the opportunity of taing here. He makes his own stmoment vithout its having been written by anylnxly. Some such detectable comment as tlic volunteer offered in the back of the room is beneath contempt. WITNESS'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN VJETXAM The CHAIRMAN'. Mr. Stephens, w Appreciate very much your coming. There is one thing that intcrrMcd me. You say 3*011 are a lieutenant in the Navy. Mr. STEPHENS. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN'. Did you spend much of your time on land? Mr. STEPHEN'S. Yes, sir, I Hid. The CHAIRMAN. What wen- your responsibilities in Vietnam? Mr. STEPHEN'S. Well, I spent two full tours in-country. I spent over a full year with a river n.HMiult division which worked with the U-S. Oth Infantry Division fa-fore they left and then with various unite of Vietnamese forces, as I have said. I returned for a second tour in various staff billets throughout Vietnam, particularly in Saigon and Can Tho, and had a chance to work very closely and live with the Vietnamese people. The CHAIRMAN, What were you doing? Mr. STEPHENS. If you nre unfamilia* with the activities of the river assault divisions, I will go into it. The CIIMRMAN. \o, you mean on the Mekong River, That was on a boat. Mr. STEPHEN'S. That is correct, sir. The CHAIRMAN'. I understand (hat, but il was the ccond tour. What were you doing living with the |M-opl<-? Jut wlat was your rote is all I am asking you. What did you do? Mr. STEPHEN*. Well, I returned to work a an aide to the naval commander in the southern part of tin- delta, and then Max transferred to Saigon to wrvc on Un* staff of the L'.S. Naval Forcj>- in Vieinum. Si'iwtor Srorr. May I note that, Mr. ChairniHii, if you will The CHAIRMAN, The Senator ha* the floor if In- wi<-lie to WITSBKH'I* HWOKATIONS S-natr S/:orr ^continuing). I was only going to ak the lii-iitenant if he would HtHte the dee^raliotio he lias. I noliej- a I'urplc Ilearl mnl th<; Silver Star. Will you stule your d<r.oratioru? I know it may embarraiw you, but I would appreciate it.
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Mr. STEPHENS. Mv. Scott, I think they are obvious. Senator SCOTT. They are obvious; are they not? Mr. STEPHENS. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Is the Senator Uirough? Senator SCOTT. I am Uirough. NATURE or WITNESS'S BOLE IN VIETNAM The CHAIRMAN. I simply wished to ask you the nature of your role while you were there. You* were there altogether 4 yean? Mr. STEPHENS. No. I was there 34 months. The CHAIRUAN. How much of that time did you spend in Saigon on the staff? ' Mr. STEPHENS. Four months. The CHAIRMAN. Four months. Did you ever participate in a search and destroy mueton? Mr. STEPHENS. I carried trooj which participated in such missions. TUCHAIBMAN. You carried troops? Mr. STEPHENS. That is correct, sir. Tho CHAIRMAN. On a boat or in an airplane? Mr. STEPHENS. No, on a river assault boat. .. The CHAIRMAN. On a river boat. Where did you become HO iutimate with the Vietnamese people? Was it in Saigon or ID the boat? Mr. STEPHENS. Well, in both. I lived in a compound with Vietnamese in Saigon and in Can Tho in the southern part of the delta. I lived with them on the Ixiat and we worked with them extensively. The CHAIRMAN. Do you speak Vietnamese? Mr. STEPHENS. I regret that I do not. The CHAIUMAN. Did you communicate with them through interpreters? Mr. STEPHENS. It is an unfortunate thing about this war that Americans did not learn Vietnamese because so many of the Vietnamese are so fluent in English.
PERCENTAGE OF VIETNAMESE FLUENT IN ENGLISH
The CHAIUUAK. So very many of the Vietnamese are fluent in Elfish? Mr. STEPHENS. Thai i* correct, Mr. The CHAIKWAX. Tell us about that. That i iriUTeittiiig. What percentage are? Mr. STEPIIENH. Well, of the ones ] worked w i t h aud those of coiir*; are the ones which worked with American unit*, I would say I lint very eldom diil I have nny difficulty finding MHIICOIIC among the group who volunteered and *|>okc Kngli*li uhich I hud n<> trouble uiidcrMunding. The(?iiAiKUAV. And the*- were (hellish official* in the government. Mr. STKKHKVM. That is not mrrcci, sir. Tli" ' ' H M K W A X . Who wi-re iliey? I i>k you lo Htate them. Mr. STKIMIENH. They were the younji junior oftici.T> u a rule. S<nie <f them wi-re the interpreiert* which went with the groups who worki.*d with th' Airi-rii-Hi) n\t\H>n nnils. The CIIAIKMAV. So a high percentuge of the Viclnuiiu-w jwojjle
ttjM'.ikKui'li'th?
Mr. STKPHKKH, N'o, hir, I didn't *uy that.
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The CHAIRMAN. A high percentage Mr. STEPHEN'S. With the people I dealt with in the field. The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Those with whom you associated s|M)kc English? Mr. STEPHENS. I said I never had any difficulty finding someone to communicate with, or that I seldom found it difficult.
RELEVANCY OF ENEMY'S CHUEJ.TV
The CHAIRMAN-. Is it your impression that the cruelty of the em-my and their atrocities is an excuse for our actions? Mr. STEPHENS. It is not, sir. The CHAIKMAX. Why did you think that was so relevant? Mr. STEPHENS. Because I have been here all week and heard of nothing but American atrocities and I think they tend to sway people and make people emotional when the truth of the matter is that war is an atrocious thine and that both sides are guilty of atrocities. The CHAIRMAN. That is right. Of course, our responsibility here is with our own actions and what our own Government does. Isn't it quite ritural to think and talk about our actions rather than the enemy's. No one denies the cruelty or the inh"*n?fy of the enemy in either this or any other war. Mr. STEPHENS. My reason for bringing it up was, Senator, to try to bring to you my sense that Vietnamese people are overwhelmingly against the Communists.
VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD WAS
The CHAIRMAN, I would think that is probably so. They are also overwhelmingly against the war; aren't they. Mr. STEPHENS. They are, except for the fact that war has becofoe a very normal thing for them. The CHAIRMAN. It is what? Mr. STEPHENS. It is a very normal thing for them. It is discouraging to be there to see how normal life goes on in the midst of this war. They have just been with it too long. The CHAIRMAN. Then you are saying it is acwptable and they are not eager to end the war; is that right. How do I umierstand that? Mr. STEPHENS. I think UK- grrut majority have only one de*ire and that is to cultivate on their farm land and to Iw active in the community and to live without wr. I don't think that there U an overwhelming Miff on cither side to fight the ConiinunisU or uny other particular issue.
IDEOLOGY OK VIETNAMESE PEASANTS
Tlw CHAIKMAK. In your exjjerieiHv were the peasants in the countrywide ideologically motivated? Did they talk to you about the t heory of Marxism ? Mr. STEPHKVH. X, they did not. The ( 'IIAIKMAV. Ar<- they aware of it, in your opinion? Mr. STEPJIEVM. Jf they are I urn unaware of jt.
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The CHAIRMAN. What makes you believe they are opposed to Marxism? ; Mr. STEPHENS. Well, I have, as I say, I have several very close Vietnamese friends, a couple of lieutenants who I dealt very closely with. ; Hie CHAIRMAN. Are they officers in the army? Mr. STEPHENS. That is right, junior officers who had similar rolec to those that I had. I got to know what their thoughts are. The CHAIRMAN. I would think they were. Most farmers in Asia are not particularly conscious of the theory of citi'er communism or democracy; arc they? Mr. STEPHEN'S. That is right, Senator. I don't think to them it is a question of theories, but it is a question of an enemy who uses terror and execution as bis tactics. The CHAIRMAN. That is right, and they certainly don't like that. Neither do 1. Nobody does. ^*
VICE PBSf'-SDENT KY f S VIEWS ON U.S. WITHDRAWAL
Vice president-K> WAS here recently. He appeared at a meeting at which 1 was present and he stated unequivocally that he thought thai the* bet thing we could do would be to remove ourselves from Vietnam. Mr. STEPHEN'S. I certainly agree and as soon as is feasible, but I ask you to be ('(ireful bow you do it so that you don't abandon the commitment to those |>eople who have committed themselves because of us.
DOMESTIC EFFECT OF VIETNAM WAR
The CHAIRMAN. When you look at Vietnam by itself, I think it is quite |)os>il)lc to conclude as von have. I think 1 would share your view except for one thing and thai is the effect of the war in this country. It seems to me the effect is wry, very deep in this country. I believe it is much deeper than anything since our own Civil War more than a hundred years ago. It seems a* an American citizen that this should bo even more important than what happens t</ at least that class of Vietnamese to whom you refer. You feel we arc cnininitted tn some of tl Vietnamese and I asquint1 you mân thaw in tlw military who were vour friends. I share that. J think they should he provided for certainty. Hut what it is doing to this miintrv is what :H uppermost in my maid. I represent (he people of Arkansas and not the imople of Vietnam. Mr. STEPHEN*. Senator, I wrtainly understand. The CHAIRMAN, And I tliink thcy'shoiild CMIIC first )vpplauc]. Mr. STEPHENS. Ax I nay. Senator, I t^rttiinly untlfMtand t\ut urgency of thi; Anteri<'an pttople, and of those, in this room pa-tirularly, frr H quick end to the war. 1 mean it has gone a long time for u- also. But the reason I cjimc lure to Hjx-nk today is because I am afmul Uiat in tiuK urgency that we wiJI lose ourobjecUvity, and we wiil fitrgirt th cominitment which we made in the jiiut and uhii'h llw V de|wnd upon.
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vs WAP. A.NU robnu^sa OSMGATIOX TO-ES'I>VN'GEKED VIETKAII^SE - The CHAIRVA.V. I can't qisfo pet in my mind how you visualize an od to Uie war that would guarantee the *e.<;urH.y of particularly thoM; to \vhoovyoii ore personally obligated and to xvjiom you fefcl our Government is obligated, which consists primarily of tlw wn-mfacrs of fho Govemmcitt who would be endangered, I suppose. What do you exivct us to do, to stay thwe itidefiniu-iy? Mr. STEPHENS. I>1 rn say, Senator, that my c/itux-rn s I said is not for the high ranking officials or for the military generals because I an; sure we are i>otli aware they will be able to take eure of themselves in any situation, but it i., for ihe little guy anl it is for the merchants who huve dealt with the South Victnaiiicm* (invvninuiut and uith us, the people who have support^! u> itt any way thai I fwl a conwrn. A^ I say, I uiuierstaiul. I think that since I returmni I feel, myself, a much morn aciiU> need to pet out of Vietnam, hut ] also fwl very >tronjfly my convietion ihut ilie VietnaiDcsf jx'oijli- >till rt*quirc some support uud that the rei:-*>tt many of tlic.ni have eoniinittod tlic'itis-iv.^ <jni- wuy or another in tin-, war in Soutli Vietnam is Ixra'iso 4if coiuuiiuuejit we mode to tlut South Vuauaine^- Govcriunvut think \v>- hax'c a res(K>nsihility to lire tip to that
TO VIKTX*MESK V K U S f S DOMKSTIC COMMITMENT
T'ne CHAIRMAN. Do you eon>i<ler ll' coinmitnient is to the Government or the jK'ople a- a \vhoie or i tin-re any iH^tinction in vour mind? Mr. STEPHEN*. \Vi-!!t I ron.-,ii'rr the ''ounni'.iiifnt to tl-.r-Viflnaiiicse. ptviplc, sir. Tli" CifAIUUAS. Vieliiainex- people. Mr. STEPHENS. I e^msider it a per.ional coiiiMiitiintit by niy being there. The f'HAlBVAX. What about my roiiirriiuneut to tl^r people of Arkna-as? - - "- Mr. STKPHEVS. I hope that yu live up to rJw.tTin'if 'uAiiMiAX. U I be-Iieve, a* t <\o IHi/'i'e, thr-i v;zirt* th.- -s> ability of the welfare of :ny osvn eoumrv m\ ti^ w.r|far >f Uie people f roja'f"itf how can f ree.oncil*; tJiat In' b*ing indf-fiu('ly in Vietnam? - - . . , . Hlr. S.TBPKJEJIS_. fWloinly-f ranttot spak for flic pwib*.>r Arkaniiw, foil i. -I ^pfjsk from a dei>p MMISU rf vitixj; bou( my wrt Ta>fHznibiJit.y lout IjowTt fw-l un<l not IH>U/. ,/t/ody eJsr's. . -Thr fiiAtKM+.v, Bui iittfcrJunatvIv, or fortouat^-ly. wJtatftVtT-wsy you Gkr it, f do n-jinît nn-ylx: 2 million people. .Mr. &-TKPMEVO. Ki^ltt. " 'n.-'< < 'iuiKttA%'. ,Vnd 1 urn -quite 'sun- that f ': 'u^for.? uvuiW be wrv'%{-ly *-G*lJrr^ Ilie >f;tr in the very n^nr fut>ire m *piU' of ui/iy iiKj'jjt-n U^r'. I tîiiik there i very lit*Je to jiL-.uf iln-iv would be any yti^tft binorlliiith thun i-i now <ukinic pfe, uieuu it jw Ka<J now. Voii IrnvA *b*-aily de*mbeil, and yon iiewl not iN-mt^, how -brui if U now. f ean'tiniajaiu. 1 if would !>e munh Mi i-tr-|'KKVx. Si-naJnr, I fhink .Von ^w e.;rtnitdy culifjed f/> ilu-v lnivi btien Jjvinjr th^re in-ur iln- < 'iiiiu-s*:, for 2,0fn) yuArt. Tluy
havp it ninth .loBgisr.Jrttfiwy tjwift.tfoo jiot^le of lhe:I|mtod They luiAf !w a .rpwJSWtsL-owuHUKH*:- nnui longer 'and f - - very grave snspiciw tbit tlu'v wmiM fcok-ftfter themselves .- _ ~ tinui we r*u |tx* af&y theixr f raiikiy ill tho sc-ivlrsncnt of tlicir internal
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, all I ?&u sy ii tlm.1 you *;crtainly re ; "- v ujtiiW-to Vftttfr opiajuo, iHir-reason -I, cuk*>e here tod&y- is bôaiue " " 1 -rfî^pt'inljictuly 3 VCUTA jh<ve and f^wftuftl to let you kno>v |u\v "- 1 it4i Ii'tHii uiv iierxjiiftl ii-ijwat'iii-e and fi'ir.you to feiko thai into _ 'flic CHAJMJ\\. ?-:wlimt yi>n ti*\v >pt'f ^hut lime ihwc. J think ou intial rcriuhily fwl w lire vt>r^v p . uitici'i art- nt subject U> hcir!<r prrtvftl iikt- uii ox|KTU:u-nl in a iuboniuiry. 'If J-" s*. iilfcreniv of opim-m, n:i lu>ncst UifTi'iviirc of Q|Hi<Ki*i ft.* to wlml in ii; tile inU'tv^t of UIK <Miuilry lit'st nd f<>re::M.^t f tl'iji'l Tiirwi to Uuply \\w ilffi>n t. In- *'i' 1 n:tu i M 1 ir- a niaMrr > ibNiuiciMiJeruiiuii. ! is s ivlaUvv muiu-r n> to x\ hcilu-r \l\e\e wch'urc is !.; i.iJci' iw^'tU'iifi' (v'i.-r '.<ar
FiUf. ALT* KNiKVUKHKH VIKTN'AUESK
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Take" all tbo-.c V"u-tn>uiux ulmici you fi-d an1 ciulaiigtirvU i their -livt'iv^ WouLI'vou }iJi"ru'u.tt: tliut \\'i* )Hi** A ^JM.>(lal la>^" > that they Cau all come, to tlii-i (.lUtJi.i-y, u.- va^ !of in tin- -<*ast> t)f tin- f'ubaiis? Mr. SrtVHKVs. Xu. -ir: 5 v.i.iilif noi. Thi S'11--' VipiniuiM.se jeu|)le aro a vitry Jiuliynaiistic |M;O[I!O uiij they 'ovc their country tuid they wtul<ln'{ \\ ni^^> leave. . 'I'bc C\tiiMAX. Bui a&sriiriiii}; they tlid want t <-<>mi to thi* finijitry, 'i<> you idvocnu> that < ojit-n i>ur-iiuorsand a>vt!|t them all? It is for ili'-ni tt> dfi-j<l', titft yii. whctiicr tJi*-y wajit t< c'>ni- or not. Mr. SsT-Ei-HESs. That it TheCHaiKMAX. What? Mr. STWHBSh. I rcrlainU u^rt-i- with \ < m , .S'jialir. ThcCuAlUMAV. What <li yi.u a:r'c Mr. STEPHKVSJ, I tign-^ it i, their c Tlu- CHAIJCMAN. If llwy chynv: to conic liriv, would you (hut w<- ojn-n tlM' dt a, r-, id u!l <if tlifiii who wi.-.h to come tare? Mr. STEPIIKV*. If I fr-!t thnt wt- v.-r- ahurnhniiiig our commitment to thorn uiid they n.skol foi HUIU- .s'>rt uf n-fuê I wrtaiiilv would ltd will in jc to Hi-l'-oiiw rhi-in. 71ii;C'jj\tr.MAX OIC. Tiju'ik yû vi-ry much.
Sl'uTI. \ist> 1 Jink a IJ'U'
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Mr. Sb-jili'Mi.-. w i l l ) r&/)ir<l lo uh;ii may luipiH-n af(4*rviBcd I uouM iiio1 in j-'" Ivfk t:i John Domic uiiil Iiir, u-.'li known IT murk uliuvii no man hriiifMiii i-lnnl wln-ii i!ic hi-U !<i!l-. We hmv hiul nlmi.v-,ioM- |HT j>f]fiv (hui x i'i:licr J(H)/Min or 19"i.(Mii; |K'H[!I' in Vic-tnuin u-jv *i;mghI tic mii'Mi-'.fnl t.'ofiTniii'*n; iimJ"r Ho ('}ii Mini) uinl andr i:f 'is wh v.u- ;n jiiuî-. Ai IIM-I Scimur Aik:ti uinini"ntcd tlut JtjiVHiO ^f tlicrtw.- riîiiiliji-j, cjiwm "* u r'-'ult of wtion of iii<-
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Would yoii,antk-ij>at that if we withdraw too precipitously that there would gain we <acectJtions, not just- of government; buV'offanners. merchants, the little people, the average people, iii. South Vieinam? Are they in dkngor of iimssarrc and slaughter if they do not leave an anny there capable of defending: tie country? " Mr. STEPHEN'S. WclU Swiator. the only answer I can give you', .is that ihi- North Vietnamese have pubUrJy boastt^l that 1 hey exftcut^d ovr-r 3.000 dvilians in Hue during the 25-day Tct offeusixre in.l%S. v ; Setiaior SCOTT. In.Hue. . ' :" W I " -Mr. STEPHENS. And that is ray worry, that that typo of slaughter will omir througiiout tbe countn-. îvnator SCOTT. I tliink we ought to give some ncern to blood- . thirsty people of the north. ^ _ T ;lm ghtd we have had some opportunity to consider their atro- <atio?, although iio atrocity can be jiistifie*! anywhere. 1 am-'one <>f thitee who has marie no comment on the. ('alley decision in any way." Thank you. The CIXAIUUAX. Thank you very much, .Mr. -Stephens. ; : The committee w'adjournwl. (\VitereUp'n," at 1 p7m., the cx)nmiittee was Sdjoimiod. subject to >[ l l j < > hair.) . ' . %
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LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS E L A r T O ; THE; Wl -^ SOBTHîST ASIA

, JCA.Y 3, 1971
GKITEI; STEATES SEK^TI, OV FOBEJGN " Tlie committee met, pursuant to rec36, fit, 10 &û., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator 3. W: FuHaifît (cbatroun) presiding. Prcsent: S\fttors FulbrigLt, "Sparkmim, Syrainglon, Pdl, Cane, Javits, and ScoU. TLe Chairman. The committee will come to order.
OPEK1NO 6T4.TEMEJ.IT
committee is meeting this morning to continue its hearings on s legislative propoeau relating to the war in Southeast Asia, and odpedaUy on how that war mav be brought to an efed. The ttitoess toda^r is Mr. John N. Irwin II, the Under Secretary of State. He is, I take it, representing the Secretary of State, aa ve have requested the Secretary to appear. 1 assume that you are representing the Secretary of State and peaking for him. We wiMild be vary intoreBtod to get an explanation from the executive branch of what their view is aa to how the war can be ended, It Hatt never been clear, at least, to meit may be to others as to y&aiiy what ia the procedure by which the adminwtration hopes to bring tbfl u'ar to an end. - Al*o iu that wnec(ioD I would hope that the Secretary had an : opportuiiily to oe the latent Hani* poll reported in this morni&g'f paper. Did you nee that, Mr. Secretary? ffTATEXEIT OF HOI. JOHX V. IETIV H, U1DE1 gEClETAiY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED IT WILLIAM H. ttTLUVAM, DEFDTT ASWSTAJrriECTAIT P02 EAST AHAM AMD PACIFIC AWAIM Mr, Itf*(,v. No, J did nut. The CnAifcXAif , It > a great ibaroe. You kniivr, j think whit I 6a not agree that UMM are AiL "Vfiyi j(o jud^f M^nUuxmt. al. k-aat I Uiink the fvtate Departor- (ho 6BOJtii' briuwi ouekt not to xciude tliew, poilft, i a time rhon ttiey thought |K>UM wire kiiportant, I liopo yoti.wiU take the occiwum to look at tfaero for whatever they
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; .- lu any case, Mr. Senf-tary, you may proceed and we will discuss '' the poll later. . ', ^ '-..,. We are very pleased to have you. I might say I ' very glad that Ibe Slate Department is wilting to appear in op-ion. It ia hot of <en we bkve the privilege of either the Sea. . <>r the rUnder Swwtary in open session. '' Mr. IKWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As vow know, Secretary Rogers, is in tite Middle East on a irip. Tito CHAIHUAV. Yes, I read that he was there. Mr. IBWIN. He naked me to appear in his place in response to yourIcl tr of April 8. This opening statement will review briefly the administration's jHiIicy on bringing the U.S. participation in the war in Vietnam to an eml and on the repatriation of American prisoners of war. I v.-uuld also ogre? on the ini|KKtauce of polk ami that we should"!*aware of them, and only because of this morning'* special activity I have- not yet had a chance to see today's paper and the poll.
CHOICES FACtSC KEW ADMINI8TE-1T1OJJ
When the administration ramc into office it found over a half million troop* in YiUwm. Tlie issue was not whether to commit U.S. fomw to the defejjsc of South Vietnam; it was bow to provide the South Vietnam^*1 a reasonable chance to defend themselves without the participation of U.S. troops. As the President has said, be had two c.hoices: wh<thpr to order the immediate withdrawal of all American forces su<i, in effect, to blame the result on his predecessors, or to bring our men out in a way which would leave the South Vietnamese a reasonably clumce to determine then* own future. The President explained the consequences of immedkte withdraw*! in his recent foreign policy report to the Congress in the following words:
, . . I have r[*:*tUy 'XfiUinod w-hy I cotmider tbi * dittstroue path: For be South \>,Uim<! pMX>pt. who would have loot tbftir eoUacrtve politte*! choice mnd runtlc* iodividiul livi*. For otbif non-Communist touotriet, opectatly in Aj-ik, mooc wtioin not Hinglc Icjidrr recommended Much a poJicy. For -the giobl r<îibUiiy of the L'J?. word. For thow> Airericni who bad oud Kiicb fauvy criftotw. And for tbc iuteipitjr of Americas society in the potVi-'t-Naiu r*.
It in fw these reasons that tlic administration believe* that its courw* of gradual disengagement warranU Uu> contined support of the Oongre** and the American pe/>ple. The iSnjiHWtratio'> preferred wnj- to ac-hierc its goal is to briug an cud (hrougfa negotiations to American partu-ipfttion in the war in \'ieli\ti.m and U> tlu- war ite-lf &nd to by the basis for ft stable )e0c in Pre<tdeiit Nixon lius mode far-reucbuig propoftila to this goal.
COVCEHXIXO XEGOTJATED RTTLBMEST
Oru/ixr 7 of bti*t year Uj Prenident called (w an xtill (u-UM-lin- tJiroiigjtout 4;idiM;hina, JLwl thix ijiittative becu ud by Uu' ("<rfiimuiiii(. wide, the wur would already have rhl lo iiu e/id.
3V RrfiideBt mde it^dear that lie is prepared to set a date for thdc*VL'd of lL'<iqrô*c8 from South Vietnam if Hanoi would da ;jhe game for its frfow. He has-suggested 42 Months as ab appropriate - " which should reflect the exiting balance of ijotitioal farces; 'in that oottntfjvOttr uide at the talks has suggested free election* orcaoued ty ixxonuAaons which would include twreseDtativfc> of the <5>mrou- luirf, side as ti means to arrive at a (wr poUticat settlemwit. At the same time u-e have indicated that We could-aooejit any ether ajrrangMneui ' a<x*ptsble ui ê Soutfc Vietnaaiesc'ptwrto. ; ' ' -: ' The President called for immediate reiease of alt prisoners of war hold througHaut Indochuia, irreepectiw of ftogKsa toward ajjreemont on any-other items. Had this proposal beeii accepted by t be other aide, our men could be home now, and the Vietnamese prisoners 'held difoughour Indochina could al*tv h home. The President called for ft Indodiina peace cînferenro t discuss those j rut UTS. At the saipe tune, he said we wotdd pursue peace ti&mgk Ike ensdiog negotiating forym in Paris until a ider coo&fcnoe eouM he convmed. As -e have since emplMwized, UP are prepared to join any uegotiating forum which offnv the pro&ixxt of progress toward pca<. The administration holieves that this program for peace is far reaching, reasonable, and flexible. Our Government ha* made clear that we are prepared u> engage without preconditi(MU, in serious diecuasaor^ on these proposals and aiiv "thera -which die Communist ride m%ht advance. ihf administraUoii has erophaiUied that it will take a positive and realistic approach m any iMtch discuttdons, and that it cocoders everything negotiable except the baac right of the South Vietnaoieie to dtenofne their own future .
ATTITUDE OF THE OTHEH SIDE
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To date, all efforts to induce the other de to engage in serious negotiations have been fruitless. The other aide ha refu**d i-veo to heJDa until we accede to two far-reaching preconditions. One is a coaumUnent on our part to fotil UJS. withdrawal by what they consider a "reaaonable" date, without any commitment on HAOM'* part with re>pect to its forces. The oth<-r u removal of Ut three top leaders of South Vietnam and replacement of the pretfcn t coDtftiiuti>nalJy elected government of that country by a govvranufDtaatisfact'jry to Hanoi. There it ao indication that tlie attitude of the other *.u!<- IK likely to fiuuige. W trill c/rtitinue l<xkuig for Mi* of any fhmipc. W Kou!<1 wl'Wiu- it mid will remain prepared t' nepotute *eriiu*ly if it cotnc.
FOLJCV OK
Iii tlw fnw of i\w other tide'* ri'fijf'ul to inovt1 toward au M'ttlcnifiil, tlu Prto.ul'!i' i |>uri*uiij<; th j>olu;y "f wli<-li if (li'hjgnM to rwJu** ami evcntuiUly 'IiniijiHl^ Anwrican |)uitjcij<alion in the war in u way which letive* IJic Soutli
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a reasonable chance to survive as a free people. The rate of withdrawal of our wen has been determined on the L vas of the criteria announced increasing tht-ir own defense. To measure the accomplishments of this policy one must start by remembering the situation the President found when he took office 2 years ago: Tlit-re wore some 549,000 American troop* in Vietnam. More than 265,000 have now been withdrawn. By December 1 of this year, another 100,(KK) will be brought home, and, as the President indicated last Thursday evening, before that date he \\ill announce his plans for further withdrawals. Approximately 300 Americans were bring los-t every week. This year that figure has been reduced to an aviu-ago of les than GO. The ratio of South Vietnamese- forces to American forces in Vietnam wa> less than 2 to 1 . Today it is more than 31 2 to 1 . Thus, the President could announce on April 7: "The American involvement in Vietnam is coming to an end. The dav the South Virl namese can take over their own defense is in sight. Our goal is a total American withdrawal from Vietnam. We can and we wUl reach thMl goal.* * *" Victnamfcation is not simply a program of U.S. withdrawal. It eneonijmsse? significant accomplLsumeuts bv the X'ietuamese, mililurilv, politically, and economic"" most of \vhirh were outlined in the President's foreign policy n . ' -e Ck>nfre8 in February. The South Vietnam se Army _ > -d in experience and in selfcoufideace and now accounts to . Bowing bulk of the combat The security of the rural j>opulaUon lias increased markedly in the lust year. Ixx-al participation in self-government and self-defense has been increase<l. Elwtioris for village, municipal and [Kovinrial councils and for onehalf the Senate HeaU* took place throu<;hout the country in 1970. Ix>wer HOUM- and Presidential elections ure scheduled later in 1971. Ijegislatiou to enact a svmepinn: laud reform program was past>cd last year, and distribution of land uudt-r the program i* underway. Tiu Govmimi'iit of Viduuiu undertook strong liwul and ntonetan' aclioiiv to limit indulion in ihi* fall mid ;ij.'nin in March. I'ricos, uhich risf,'>0 jjpri.-unt in the 12 monlliD uj< t<j mid-1970, hav<- \trfii ; rfbly slahl*- MIJIV fhat time. Jn sum, the Vii'iiittinizaliuji jin^nun \n\ produrcd jK)-i(ivr to due- in foTHN (if the Pn-shh-ntV two objci'liv<->- nujijij: lr.S. iiivoUviiicnl in thr v\ur and provi>liiifr 'h<- Stiili VidiiuuK-M-a n'ax>nIJ<- chillier- tu determine lh<-ir < n - u future. Tin* jolij)i[)itrwliun cuniinufA in lciii'\c t i i u t ilic Viriiiuini/ation jro<;r;jni <i/fci> the Ivxt nn i un f f><> lotitc H the nihrr -side refuws to . in hring the Anp-riejin p:ir i<-ijmiin in ih<- u a r i i i Indochfiib <l l< uh I'lwl.
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ANNOUNCEMENT OP KIXED DATE FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OPPOSED
You have before you a number of resolutions which suggest a diff<>rfcul way to end our involvementby announcing now a fixed J'.e for the"total withdrawal of all our forces. In (he circumstances 01 a long and costly war, it is easy to understand how a specified date for au early withdrawal could appear u>_ be attractive. A* the President stated on Thursday night, wr have listened, and listened seriously, to the many sincere critics of the war and our involvement in it, some of wKoiu now argue for this course of action. Everyone in government lias deep concern about Vietnam and wishes to see the conflict ended. However, the administration believes strongly that such an announcement \\ould not serve the interests of securing an orderly cad to American involvement in the war or an e.jriy release of our prisoners. To announce a fixed <late for withdrawal would remove one of-the few bargaining counters we have to bring about a negotiated settlement-If anoi's uncertainty about the precise withdrawal timetable for the considerable American force still in South Vietnam and about the size and nature of any continuing American role.-It would put Hanoi on notice that our forces will be out of Vietnam by a given duK- and enable Hanoi to plan its military activities with full knowledge of what our force levels will be. So long as Hanoi doe> not know our precise withdrawal plans, their own planning proccai is more difficult. The argument has been made that if we would .ody eel a "reasonable" date for our total withdrawal, the North Vietnamese would be willing to cease firing against U.S. troops and to release our POW's. This argument ignores several important points. First as long as the ceasefire was not universal, our men would Mill be exjwsed to enemy fire because of their support' for the South Vietnamese forces. So far, the President's call for a total ceasefire has been refused by the other side. Second, in all their statements, including those made at the most recent ^ssion of the Paris talks on April 29, the other side has limited itself to a commitment to discuss the release of our prisoners if we announce a reasonable withdrawal date. They have continually linked actual release of our prwoners of war, as opposed <o mere discussion of the question, with the settlement of the war on the basis of their iwlitical demands. The clearest enunciation of this position was made by chief North Vietnamese negotiator Xuan Thuy aa recently as April 15th. Recalling North Vietnamese demands for (1) announcement of a withdrawal date, (2) cesbation of "encroacfiinenltt o"ereignly" of North Vietnam, and (3) removal of the \w -,on Governineul, he t.aid, ''/f you give a resfHinse rapidly at.^ jxisitively lo tlje*e three
-ft i tx> nettle the pro!il<'Ui of the conation of tlic war," and that
be U.S. Government should rapidly Withdraw Ame.ican troops and renounce the Thieu .gox-crnment so that captured American military personnel could go back rapidly to their homes. " --Tbese statements by the 5.'orth Vietnamese and their southern supjwrters, plus their steadfast refusal to gire any interlocutor & commitment to do more than discuss Uifi POW question if we announce a withdrawal date, suggest that announcement of sucr- a date on oui1 part would be ine-t with de.inaJids for further concessions **t4ier than -the j*Jea>e of our ineni " ' _ \ ;-.. -"--" -'. AJaurNisT'riox EFFORTS TO HEACH AGREEMENT FOB KELEASE or ~- " " pow's These somber conclusions about the attitude of the other side with regard to negotiations do not mean th,t the administration has given up <in efforts to rearh an agreeme-.nt for the release of our men. Both our Government nnd tile Sontlx Victuasticw Govenimeut have re|>cat^ny n-iteratwl our proposals fn- iniiif<3i*t^ exchange of all prisoners without- awaiting agreement on other matters. We have offered t<> repatriate all sick and wounded prisoners of war. We have suggested internment in a third country of t-ick and wounded prisoners as wel 1 as those long held.
ADMIMSTKATIOK KH.1_<:V PKOVIDF.S BEaT PHOSPECT
Tlic udiniiustration c<nliiiues t-o believe <iat the jiolicy of withdrawing our form; as the South Vietnamese become wore capable of assuming Uie burden of tiifir ouii defeat, together with the IV^ktani/x sutemetit that all our forces uill not be withdrawn until our men, ftr* released, provide the best pros[H-t of bringing ail our nn'ii, in prtM>n or in the field, out of Victual^ in a way that gives the .Siiilh Vietnamese a reasonable chance to survive as a itw |H*ople. The CifAiKMAV. Thank you, Mr. Se(
COVCEPT Of A KBJBB J'KOPI,E
I wonder if you tviHiId dex'ribc your coneepl of a free jx-opli-. You us<ul that j>h'a?>e several lime*. It UM-d loin 1 "self-determintit n." Is then- MOiiie'tijH'fUil signifirtince to the phniM- ''u free jxvipie"? Mr. JHWIV. 1 think .vlf-detenuiiHiiioii ]< a good definition of ii, Mr. Chainnun. . : Tin-CHAIKMAX. W h a i i * t l m i ? ~ Mr. IHWIN. I ilijiik^rrclf-detemiiiiiiiioij i* a p . definition of ik-l;i-i-i for H \VAt\i\i' ilia' are free. Yon nia\ Jiuve scif-deii iininaiioii and nliinuiN-ly UK> -jiave ilic pi-i.jtic- f r t e , but 1 ihink thui i>. one f
The CKilJfM.V.v / !!- "nl\ ii->kill^ fo! etiijgJiteniiienl. J \ \ t i n IJul .vckill^ to -[vf-3'^y ." delinili"!!. Von l i u \ e l . M - d nn several itf i jijijM!>, f.lii' vMinj- "rert? (liiilile e l u i l i i e In s U I V U e j,- n free (><'>>j;le.''.\ l l u i l pljl'iine. jl ll-.cd In. l>e. Ill II J l U l n l w T i>f J'lic! i.Kcrt! liiiliri'-lli.'r ot l l i o
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people to fnsdy *lect- The CH4.i6iii.w. What is a free people? What does the administration view a the requisites of the bee people? Law faying to grasp what you redly have in mind that you are creating in South Vietnam and what is '.he policy of the administration regarding those dements. i wonder if you would describe it a little more fully. Mr. IitwiN. Yea. I think self-determination by the South Vietnamese, choosing their form of government free of imposition of the pKHtatermined concepts of the North -Vietnamese or North Vietnam, would be one of those elements; so would the right to engage in free elections, not only initially but over time, as their electoral process calls for, and the right to certain basic civil liberties such as we expedience in the United States, these are not always universal, and there are governments, I suppose, in the world, that have one or the other of these aspects of esftefitial freedoms, which do not have perfection in all, but this, in general, 1 think, is what we would seek. " Basically it would be the initial right of the South Vietnamese to determine their own fnture by vote without the pressures of or the . control of the North Vietnamese or the local Vietcong, supported by the N'oith Vietnamese troops. The CHAI&KAN. Is it a part of our policy tout we are committed to using our Arnjud Forces to 'assure people that we tire interested in their having an election similar -to our jwn? Is this uiiat you mean by a free people? Mr. IftWTtf. Not necessarily, Mr. Chairman. But over the past decade or longer the United States has t een engaged in South Vietnam. The war was going on when President Nixon came to office in 1969. As I said in my statement, Hu chofe was not wheilier we could go in and make an initial entry iin > VVtnam in order to determine certain event* or to establish free ei<. 'J.ms; it was a chuice of bow best l-o withdraw American forces, and this is what be has been So it u not the proportion of wbirli you speak, sir.
CHAVGEft IN ADMIVigTBATIOV PHRASEOLOGY
The CIIAIBMAM. You said the President's choice was immediate withdrawal of all forces or* in the alternative, bringing them out and firing the Vietnamese a reasonable chance to determine their own future. Thedi you shift to "survive as a free j>eople." There are very few |>eople in the world who are free people under & svs!*-rn of government like our*; isn't tiiat o? We have NO many otiw-f ysle;/iH, Tliix u not lite jAiraseolo<;y tlutt the previous auffltiutLraUon used to expiaut why wi- Ix^-tune involved in Vrieinm. We originally were involved becaune it H'M* alk-ged our force* had boejj att<;ked, and we were protecting our Anmxl Forces. loiter it J lifted. Of course, it hut i>t^n Mltinx peri/xlically. Every time we join ixsue with .the preceding u(liuinif>trattfn or tlii one, they ''.<jin<- MJ) with M iww reatM^n tw to why we are there.
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CHANGE FROM "SELF-DETERMINATION" TO "A FREE PEOPLE1'
That is why I wondered why you changed from self-determination to a free people. I thought maybe you had a new concept. Mr. IRWIN. There is no magic at all in the use of the words "iree people". We might have said a reasonable chance to have the right of self-determination. The CHAIRMAN. What you say is the American people should continue to wage this war and pay, what did you say, 50 lives a week Senator SCOTT. He said less than 60. Mr. IRWIN. Something under that. The CHAIRMAN. Something less than 60 American lives and in the neighborhood of 200 or 300 casualties a week Is a cost of the war in order to give a people who have never bad our system of electoral government an opportunity to liave that system. Is that what you are really saying to the American people? Mr. IRWIN. The President has spoken of two objectives before our withdrawal. One is to give the South Vietnamese a reasonable chance t<j survive and, two is to TJif CHAIRMAN. Mr. Irwin, I do not want to be contentious. Vou have u*ed that language. All I am trying to do is draw vou out to explain so we can understand what you mean about this. This official rhetoric- is so opaque that I really dp not know what you mean. I really do not know what the administration means, and I find its h}>okesmen not very forthcoming in elaborating. I had one of your Deputy Secretaries here the other day, trying t<> draw him put about Pakistan. They had an election in PakiMaii. The election did not go accorpiug to our boys' idea of t he w ay it would po, and we take no interest in that. That is an internal matter. They have slaughtered thousands of people in Dacca and in Kast Pakistan, am' we say tliti is an internal matter; it is not for us to be concerned about. We asked tlien for the re-pom from the field. They declined to give them to us. Put this together with what you are saying about our objective here, and I think the Senate*, at least thU committee, and the public ought to hau, a little dearer idea of just what you have in mind. The repetition of the same rhetoric docs not enlighten me any. I really want you to put it in plain language. A free jieople can mean anything. I think Uie Russian., think they arc free; the Spanish, o far a* I know, think they are frue. Do you think the Spanish are free jtexiple? Mr. luwiK. No, sir; they are under a dictatorship. The CHAIRITA w. But they do not w*eiu to be fretting very much about it, ouuide of a few divider) t-. Do you think the Greek jMjople are free jx*pl'p? Mr. IKWIV. I am trying to p*l away from the nord* ''free jwoj'le" bcciiijsc I would say it doc- menu the right of scIf-determinHtion in a The <'',,UKkUv. All right. Shift it. Tljey do not huve the right of ("IfiJetermination in Spain; do they'/ Vou are not advocating w jdo anything about it. 1 ceituuily am not. 1 think they liave tlje kind of government that xujt* their particular genju better than our*.
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c Sir. JBiartat.-llthink the principal difference is, Mr. Chairman, that this adniinislratiuih found ttself tn a situation in which the war. .had going on for * deowifl or more, and so it Is *n entirely different situation From any other country. *-: .'--.'-'. r-^''
PROPOSALS SETOKJC COMU1TTKK
The CHAIJIMAX. I agreo^with that> Mr. Secretary. :Xfanv havc.uggestd IB tlie past t*-at this ura one reason why die President . need not make it his own war and why he should conclude it. That was sugeosuyi 2 years aô. Hat tlie war continues! Now we have these resolutions before this committee asking ite to tafe> action to slop" the .-war. , .. , '-.. We do not question the administration'* dâire to getout, but there 1 . are-some very ^wiiive proiKMuds before Uur committee: I take it, although you ditl :><>t deal directly with it, that you disapprove of all of then), that y<-u Jo not want the committee to approve any of the propuSttU before the committee. That is correct : is it not? Xir. IBWIK. That, is correct, Mr. Chairm&o. The CBAIRMA.V. You do not want us to do anything. You Van t us
or ADMINISTRATION POUCr HEQCESTED
we arc trying to do is to find pi.t *vhn.t v<iu really have in mind nnd what all this beautiful rhetoric means. t)oos it mean thnt yoft^Wieve that i* is worthwhile for our c istititeiiL'* to <ntinur (> pend an estimated $12 billion or $14 billirti? That is not the \vJi. History because the existence of the war creates an alrtuwphinv ihtt makes it, impossible for us, up to now, to curtail iti? overall niilitury ezpenditums: Anar; atleaHtJhri fulmin^lration's ftHjue>t is. The fact that we <\o have |eu|t)jL' fighting ill the field do<v> influetu-' the whole atmosphere touan! .'vyuij: tliaf , to pve these jteople tui opportunity t<> have on system similar u> uurs, if they v.arit it, a ytcm which they have never had before, i* worth the cos! w> tiwi cjfunk.V. This is what I am trying M develop. In that the c-quiviJ^t of \\'ht>( you are saying? If not, nul you rej)hrac it so that 1 t-eai utdJcrttunii what you are sayinp? I ain only looking for a -k'ar afiks at tiw> <-.<*( to iw wc'tfdu*d against the |x*eiM<c a<<.hie\'eiui..> u/ crmtihuutiou of the war. A^ buinew people we priilw ouivdves <rrj beine gd.-xf buîneî [wojilp .. we can determine vWtlu-r or not. we t4iiiflc <ntinuing tfw war i>xv/rthwhpe, whether or not w<* tiiirik it t n givi bnrpH-io front thu initiofial iuUvest |xnt-of view. This i* why I think you vhuiild help u> at ioiut uuuVrvtiuid tb- ^dministratii'ii^ pf)lu*y. We understand j'ou think it is jjood bargtun, but we want to know what the teiniirreally are in yrur mind. I wonder if you would have anf ther K<> at it, aiuj sus* if you cati make it a little clearer to me, Mr. IBWIV. We would be s^yinic, in ÂWt, tlw twue (hint; tlitit your coimntlU-e woul-1 IK- âyinK it tlury adopted * withdrawal du ; by ac/^pting n'liatt'Vcr thow costs uiê until tliyl withdrawal d>.
l272
Tht- administration is saying that il thinks, it can eud the war or - e;.d American participation in the war und give the South Vietnamese people- * niasoaabi^ i&uncr to defend themselves, livc the rid. of UIIUA} sulfAl^nftinaUoh within thr jxiri'vi of time that it takes to tl> American iorco* under the program that th- 1'resJ.iejit lias adopted, -at th<~same time giving the South Viet- namese A reasonable chance to ;be. able to defend themselves and to lio!d their owu election:*. ,vr " So wo arc nqt.saying anything essentially different as to tto acceptRJI-. c of the wwtat that none of us want to boar, than we would be .-spying by adopting a parti-ular uate at the end of -the year or the -\cjid-ol ic'Xt year or halfway through n'-xt year. We are saying that we Miuvf it i>'Vti'adv*iila{Teous to give a dnte becaus. that might imkf rnore.cHrt>cultttwtexarromplL-<hra(<nt of the proprani as the Prvident ^n\-isage it;
^ . , V- ... :
CONGRESSIONAL PARTICTPATIOX SUGCEKTEJ
The CHAIRMAN*. Mr. Secretary, let .me put it this way: There are a numlx-r <>f the sponsors of these resolutions who have'al.oady testified. I (hink it is fair to >ay thaf many of them l>elifeve if we could set a date The date that hksijeen mentioned more often than any other is fhe end of ihis year.such action would result in a -lep.rtiation very inu'h so-jiier fhaii that date, the ))n>babilitv if a i-euM'-fire a:'d no jrotiaij')!)^, ItKtkinp: N>'-A'unl the release of the prisoners. Tin- administration has had 2 rears tir do as it ptcn-îl about Vietriuin with vt-rj-, very limited n-siiltj. Th'Te are not as muuy casualties a* (hi-re v;ere. aiul that, is very worthwhile, but il is wrtatnly a long way fc-trii ending the war. The war, in fart, has geographically expanded, and while our casualties are less, the Vietnamese casualties are not !<;. Yoii hayff two other countries involved. The South Vietnamese. hav,-, [ ihink, 1,100,000 mm uinlt-r arms, whom we have armed au.l thcr" coin.s tliU time when the dcrUioii im-st he made. I( -!trikf< me as not. unreasonable for the O^ntrress to sucxest an h. YOII liuvehiul your chanw. Yon hud 2 years in which there i'ii, \ think, 0,0(K) or S 000 more deaths and tens of thousands more euiimltfcs. Isn't, that If n^ enough? Why tot try our viiv? Von t,a.\- our objw.lives are tlie same. The rmj,' .!iHf''nMiiv< uri- flu: mercn.-.ia attiiin them. \mi liHve hiifl your /'bane* 'Jt ti.-c your means. Why not let the sptm-iori-of tl\f S<-uiii< try? I think tlfi-re were H9 Senal^)rs who voted for t !ii\ sjjj>ri>o'') f*i year, mid f wimld hop*- f ht-n- an- many more thU yt'ur. .
BK'-tT.r* Of H A K U l I'Ul.l,
_ Jiu-i-Ii-iiaHv. 1 fJiink Ui<: poij orjdht tobupiitjti
273
(TIM Waddaftoa Fwt. Us) V Itnl
Tiir. HARMS SUKTETTIDK or PVBUC OTINIOK TURKS DECUUVEI.Y :; TIE WA J" (By Louis Harris) Tb 'id- of American public opinion has now turned decisively sxain<(t tho war in Indochina. This latest shift of puWic opinion against the war was triggered by the feeling. 45 to 24 per era>-, tht the recmt South Vietnamese move into Laos was "failure." Here are some of the signs of the (it-dine of public Hupport for the war and the now rapidly growing feeling that the United Sum ibouid net out of Vietnam as quickly as potîblc. For'the first time, by a nswow plurality of 42 to 39 pur cent, most Americans would agree to a "coalition government in Saiiron whii;h included thr Cc'uniunlê in it," if that course wre "the only way we could gcl'pe(.ee in Vietnam.'* In late 1%'J, thr< public opposed such a coalition government by a margin of 4!> ^'
per Cf.nl. " \-: '.
By 00 to ?6 pe* wnt, a majority of fhe jxiblic uow would Invar withdrawal of Atjwican troops from Vieton>, "cvnt. if the govimtncnt of South Vietnam
"f)o you feel the r*?:ent South V;ctna;ii move into Law wn* a slice*** Or a siliJ'c?" -. . . "^ ->- '
Total PMie
I'trenl
Succesi' ....... ____ ., _______ .......... ;_____________. .. ............ Failure ....... ___ i'~-. ....... . ................ _____ ---- .......... Xi-iihcr ...... ................. ..................... ..........
Notsuro.. ,.:
.................
.......................
; ............ 2tf
24^ 4-> . '',
By iiL-arl>- a 2-to-l margin, jM^pU; fu-l that th<- Lao- incursion *tm a failur<' In turn, vtlii has led to grave daut.-tt on the part of the AtnciUân p.-.)i;l- tt^k Ittv rnlir-jiolicy of VietnAJiiizati-m p'. callable of working- I'eoj'l*' wvrc tmkifl: /:If the t:J>. withdraw rJt its ci)nibat troofc* from Vii-tnam. do you frcl tlw South Vii'tnaiin-w arniy *"ill be capuble of kc<;i)iii)( the- C'omiiiuiii.*i-> from raking OVT South \Vtuam or not?" - Total Public Cupsbk ...................... ..Cr.... .......... ........ " ...... 24 Not cupabl>-____. ....... ..._____.si ........................... "C Not wiri:_______+.'... .................. ................. Ill v .... Jii.<t a month before this laKvt jt-vll. Ivtwcn Marrfi- 1C and 'vf^rtb 2{, thipublic 'AIM. .ik<d alxiut Ihr ability of tin- South VirUiaii'if i.rin;, to hold it.n own against th>* North Viftnsiii'iw and rnot jx'O|>l'', 4ii-t-o 27 IT c---it. thoiiKl't '!" could. Ttrftt tin- precipitous wit-biiruwul of South Vietnam'-**; 'tsKi;" from LanH took pbu'f nnd public, opinion dramatically f-viT-"1*!. ~V Tlw (l''^'J luJDHtioti of th>' AnnTicun jo-oplc tt Iiqiiidutr \'..>. ]>ai.(irij)Ul.ii>n in l)i" war can tx- siitn mix'- (i^trlr iu the- quo-tiou: "If thi' reduction* of "L'.K, tro*( uiwi'.inii'ii tti Mi/* pr'-^-nt r^f and the cf \'n'tnarn coUapx>>.tit would you favor or oppone contitîinc rm;7"
, - . I'frtf'li
I'attnt
' f.iihrjrawal of IT.8. troops ................. Opfrfw i-ontinucd trirbffrAWml... .............. JCui sun-. ...... -. ............. ____ I.____.
J! ........... ............ ..... .............. ., ...
BO 2fr H
274
The other utriking change emerged when for the first time the Karris Survey ri-cordcd more Americans in favur ttin opposed to * coalition government in "Suppose the only way we could get peace iD.-VSctaam Were to agree to a . trtaliUon government which included the Conuni>nit8 in it. Would you favor fir opiKwe such a coalition in Saigon?"
The cro!cclion WM a*ked:
OMM*
Njlwmndt By radon: Cut Stvth *....
1K>2>
!<.
MM?*
S .
42
~*
, ^
-a!*--U
*-=>!
: -21 43 3ft
4?
,-*-
37 31 41 47
J7
n
1C
i<
14 U
K (o 49 JO 1*4 o BIT '. ft'jc.

B -iKonff \ Un4*f JJ 5W
,if . . ^.
3*
3t 37
It
'
. ,..
-.-
*| 4J
30
44
4V 45
40
2* 17 24 20 It U
^ 09 1** it yyt tx.-jdiiur>

tl5.'K!ir>de(
'
32
.
40 K S7
will mention the lii^lilirht^ of it, Tiic Harris uoll of (liis inoniinj: 'fe l> on the question, "Do joii feel the rctu-nt South " ito I>aos wa.-: a suciu-ss or failure?" 24 JMTCJ-III said a siirrca.-.; J") iicnK-nt a failure. That i* nearly two to one. Another question says, "Jf t'he United Stales withdraws all its <uiii>l>l troops in Vie.innin, <lo you feel the South Vietiiaine.se Army wjij fwcHjmlije of keepinp tije (ôirimuni.-t.o from taking t.vrr Soulli Viernnni or no:?" ('a|>al>lc is 24 penrent; iiir-ap.-ible is 57 (RTcent That is better than Jwotoone.
IXIiKKlXITKXKS!'* OF ADUIMSTKATIOX
So tin' i/iiblir. for whut<-vcr ft i-t worth, <]<><!> not think if w>> withiiraw the South Victnami-*- mti niuiiitiiin thrir iridi-fw-iuh-nci-. T'tis nu-uns, of iirx1, nudiT the lulniitiist rat ion's {(riiidplrs., xvn will s-tay thrrw iii.ttl they run. This i.s u hut is sn iuii.-ntiit' 1 al>oiit tin* |>rojo-al of tin: luJinLiMtration. I r look us if if. iu u fonmilB which coulil n-MjIt in our lx*ii.^ tliL-n-, in i In- word- of Vim- IVfHiilctit Ky, for 15 to 20 years. I do not believe yon Miiij iiiiyl-hing that uould negative thut this morning. All I am trying to I'lui-j-lnU 1 from yon ut thin point i-* what you really mean. Do you iiriv(it the |)ro|osiil thai, if the South Vieinunie^ are not Bhle to iiiiiTriliiin tli<-ir itjilr-jM-nileju-c n i t h o u t our hein-r there, then we will >-t;iy there? Thut ji win. t f think is reasonuMe interpretation of yourtat<!inent. We will htuy there indefinitely: 5, JO, or 1.'yearn, Tn tliore rtiiything linit you or the JVideiit luivc Hiid tnul woi/ld neûtivc thttt
275
Mr. IRWIN. I would say the events that negative it. Mr. Chairman, are the record of the administration over the past 2 years especially in the troop withdrawal program. The fact that the President has met all of the troop withdrawal dates that he has specified, the fact that he has specified, is specifying, another goal for December, the fact that he has stated that he would declare another withdrawal in November; and the fact that he said last Thursday night- we have a very good idea when the South Vietnamese will b? *M* tf defend themselves. All of these, I think, point to a move toward the conclusion of American participation in tin war under a better program, in the judgment of the administration, than if the goal is sought by setting a definite date for withdrawal, as the bills before you suggest. SENATE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN DECISIONS The CHAIRMAN*. What you suggest to me is that the administration feels that the Senate has no business at till prying into these matters, what the President going to do is secret, and we ought not to be asking questions. This has also been supported by the attitude of the department in refusing to make available to the Senate, to this committee, simple information as to what is going on in Pakistan. Now her*; you say the President has a date which i his secret and we ought not to inquire about it. We ought to be satisified. We ought to take it ou faith. The iwoplo of -,iis country have taken it on faith for 2 years, I the jK)lls would certainly indicate their patience is running out; tli..y do not um'pt it. The j>olls clearly are against the proposal of the administration. That docs not mean it is determinative, but I submit the Sonata dot's have some constitutional rieht to participate in these decisions. I do not accept the view which is implicit in the iidininistrationX attitude that it L really none of our business, and we huve no business inquiring about these matter*, nor making moves to chanfT" them. fake this mm tor of the clrance to Mirvive. Who in going to d<v.ide whether South Vietnam has a chance to survive its a free jieople? Who makes that decision, the President? Mr. JIHVIX. Well, his view would be "a largo factor in the judgment. But I would think consultation would be broader than thai, and I would think there would be. consul tat ion witU this* committee, Mr. Clmirniun. I think thatI do not have the record in front of me but. 1 understandthe -Secretary hag been up considerably Ix-fore th committee in the pant year. The ('HAIKU AS, The Secretary ha* been Here lc than any Secretary in hc history of .the country,.! think. I believe he bus Iwen here in oiien session once or t vr arid i|t executive se*ioii two or three times, lie docs not like to come. When odnmiLstrutiim U'itiieasett do come they do not like to say anything. " J told you tliHt. t the meeting on Friditi; they poîvly reje<M-d t!ic ulen itial, we are entitled t/ knou what wu in the rejMirts ivjrurdinjr what-in ôinp on in Pakistan. --_-_ The-GAp, which is. itn b$f?wy of the Con^rrenti, va.- requt(j'<J by this committee f> oiniply K<V^_IJS a report on I lie situation in Berlin, thj expenditure* of fu.idk, how much ve are j. ven, nnd * ~nn. Th'j Mute DrpHrtinent refugt-d to give the C'AO the bni<: data. Never
276
before, certainly to my knowledge, has any administration p.me so far in declining to gfve information to this conimittee. This concerninp idea that the President has n time in mind, you never say jvher,h*r it is next }-ear or 10 years and you seem to have the attitude it is none of our business. You make no effort to tell anybody or even to engage in serious discussion of whether or not what he has in mind is n reasonable period. I do not know what the Senate wi'l do. A number of Members nnd 1 have committed ourselves publicly to support one or another of these resolutions and I think we are entitled to know what you really have in mind before the final vote comes. I do not understand why you arc not more forthcoming in what yoa really have in mind about ending the war. It is so vague to .-ny the President has a date in mind, but cannot tell us. I do not know what In- has told the South Vietnamese. Maybe he has told tliem. Clearly, Mr. Ky, thinks the South Vietnamese, have a voice in determining whether or not they are capable of resisting the North Vietnamese without our presence. One could well assume thai this IHisition thhl your administration lias taken is that we will stay there until the South Vietnamese are perfectly satisfied that they can maintain their inde|H'iu]cnce. When vou suy South Vietnamese, that is the present Govenmicnt of South Vietnam, I take it. Is it correct that the South Vietnamese would be consulted as to whether or not they urn able to maintain their indeiK?n('.'nce.? Mr. IKWIX. I think basically the decision would be a U.S. division. I think 'hey would be consulted AS time goes on, but I do not think it \umld be dependent u|xm 1111 attitude within that governmentSIGNIFICANCE OF Pl'BLIC OPINION
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it U significant that this morning's, poll shows th:it the majority of the American jn-oplc now Iwlieve that we ought to clo>c this war even though it may be necessary to ac'-ept a coalition government witli Communist in it? The last question in the poll was, "Supi>osc the only way we could get peace in Vietnam was to agree on a coalition government which included the Otmniiniists in it. Would you favor or oppose such u coalition government in Saigon?" Forty-two percent aid thev would favor it; 39 wen1 opposed, niuj 19 not Hure. It i-, (he first time they have gone that far. it suctiis to me (hut both the adminislraiion und the Semite li:i\'c some res|H>titfibi':ty i> hike into iic<v>iinl the cnllivjtive wi|(ini nf in' pijlilic. I do nd think l iny one given time we c:ui jurnji acconliu^ fo the poll.-, but Ilii-. hns Ix'cii building ii|i. Certniiily in the Seimi<there liu-i Ix-en a very ulron** ehange of view,
KXI'KfTK'* A r i l l K V K M K V T f AM_ COST** OF roNTlM'INO WAH
The origiiitil f|iie-iinii MH-. !>w you Imbiiice off the c<.(.- ngniii.-f K h u i you Neck to i.cliie 1 .e. I i l l - not i l i i u k it tin- been properly <-!:icidttieil. I (!/i not t h i n k you Imvc mmle u very cloir iutemeiit in die
MJlri||e.-l |io!-il>|c lunjrillige of u i i i i l it i- fîul V"U eXJX'ct to ni'lii'-ve
HO : l i n t we can M-e it niiiE M'C l i n t ii i- going- to cost to do it. I think it i your re-poiMbility, n n repre^-nialive of tlje J>c|mrlrnenl, to do tlnM.
277
Wlial do you estimate it is going to cost to pursue the war one more year? How many dead and wounded? How many dollars? What do you expect"to achieve in I year or 2 yean? It strikes me that you ougbt to seek to help u make that decision. Do you think it will cause 5,000 deaths for 12 more mouths of war or 1,000, or what would you guess? Mr. IRWIN*. I think it is hard to give an estimate, Mr. Chairman, because as the number of American troops withdraw, and as they move more and more away from a combat role there wiU i>e much greater saving in lite. There will be less casualties. How to judge that is hard to any. In the past 2 years we have had a 50 percent drop in number of personnel and, perhaps, a fivefold or more savings in casualties, that dunn- a period of acvcre combat at times. Now, when we go into a period of withdrawal of more combat forces 'and increasingly are playing a supporting rather than combat role, then 1 think, the casualties would be considerably less. I understand that from 1968 to date the cost of the war has almost dropped in half from about $29 billion to something $15 billion per year. The cost will continue to drop as out force* are withdrawn, but I would hesitate to give an estimate.
DESTBUCTlOSf OF HUMAN LIFE IS INDOCHINA
The CHAIRMAN. Just for the record bow many overall deaths of rvnrybodr in Indochina occurred this vear as compared to the tirst quarter of last year? 1 mean Laotians, Cambodians, North and South ^ iclnatnese, and Americans? I want to gel some idea of the magnitude of the destruction of human life that nas taken place in Indochina, civilians as well tut military. Senator AIKCK. Mr. Chairman, could they carry tliat comparison back lo 1968, as,well? Mr. IEWIK. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have tlie right to get you that figure. The ChAiEMAJf. You htv the one for last year; have you not? You can sup.'ilv the others. Mr. Jnwix. We do uot have it for all of Southeast Asia, iw I M-I- it. Tlie CHAIKMAS. Can you give, me an estimate? You arc famniar with this general area; are you not? Mr. Iitwi.v. I would hesitate to give an M'iiimte, Mr. Chairman. Tiie ('UAIKMAV. Could you generalize a* to the point of whether it i* in'>re or le<M? Can you say that? Mr. lnwitl. Well, ui military deaths in South Vietnam, not nciu-Ah-xily the ôutli VietnaiixMe, but American*, .South Vietntuneiie, {n-e unrld for<vj ami N'ortli Victnaniewc and V'ifUxniz, the figure in 1%S w*.nu-l\uny over 181,000, and in 1970 it uas 10:j,000-pliitt, Tin- ('HAIHUAV. Did that include Mr. luwiv. I bng yrur pardon, lint, that is only the et\nmy figure. Wi> do not have U/hiU, but vrrv (|uu:ldy then; wan' tionK'whcn; around 4.l>,(lO() of American, Soulli îclnuin 'and fnui world forccu o/mlmt dcutha in I9IIH, ana '>inclliiU)r over, 30,000 in 1970. Vow, if you add thow to tlu! IH1,000 of fliu'my JeaUiit in 19uSyou comu up to something ovt-r 22tt,OOU toUtl, and in 1970 it would \>v MMUUIUIUIC over about 133,000. So a total dinVreiu* in thowt 2 years of 226^)00 133,000, but those are rather qu'ttkly palled togMtlier figures.
278
The CHAIRMAN-. I w.mder if on*- of y>ur aides Mr. fnwix. I beg your panioit, this is Ambassador Sullivan. The CHAIRMAN. I "know Ambassador SoHivan. Either he or one of the others coold put the figures in the record. (The information leferred to follows:) UM
UoMSMe SMUVrtMOMM - - - fWT
un
4.221 23.34* 3.M3 2.532
704
7i>
133 7.S04 1070 112 10.201 4.7II
1C
14, Ml
-_
.K7 21.131
M
27.I1S 4.317 '....
tit
. 3.107
4 7 . 1 5 2 3 5 .M S 3 3 ,H I 113.402 1(7.111 152,151 741.254 203.013 I*. 037
TMrtCMMMkt.
i iKMn U**. CMMi*. ri Scrtk V r irtr M*. hCMM CMktt MMtrtr wta witt dM BMMM qto, n( <>tr 4Mtkt in MflMf Omi DM HMltafn MOfBfff (vf V9 VMf > 1*70 Iran MMk U OHMfk 0>/11. r*rw t* r**ti4 JytMCiatHiiii IxMo %n< IM rf IriMbr Fm* H np*rti4 kr M . > licMnW. HVA, PL. *id bMibodiM CMIMMM Ftn. < lncMM 41.127 U 1*70 M4 f,14( < 1J7I MA riiiaH ty tkt CjntKm Mi: TM rariety if UM MMolici fra Canted* and LN ctmi( kt MrakM4. Tlr art "lot waltaM*" %vr*s ptmndcd br UMM jiniiU,
Civiuxjf WAX CASUALTiea

80OTU rtETSAM
In the eourae of the pat three ycmra the war bjw nj >ved steadily out of and a*-y from the populated VCM of South Vietpmm. As i resii,1'. there have f-**n, u illiutrated below, demonetrably fewer civiliui eisualtie* ,'ue to military operation*. At the MOIA time, the treatment of eivilia > wounded hu !mprovod greatly, tacause bcMpiUl facilitie* have expanded, and the GVN kid U8 capabilities to brine civilian caualtie* to bospilalu have incrcaoed ub>ta.itially. There nave been varioux effort* to vet figures on civilian death* in Vi/*n-.. by fxtrapolating from information ucb M ACatistics on hocpital adniiwiott.-t of civilianii. We regard that method an unreliable. To ascertain the traid of civilian ca.iualtif.1, we believe that the1 beat figures that will verve a* reaionably reliable indicators are tbo<i on bospib ! aduiiMion of war-wounded civilians. Tbe*e are a* follows:
1MI
JMMry KOI... FirM wirtrf Ufjf , ..., , j j . , ,, .,,,. ,.,
S.(M K.MS
INI
4,331 5.132
1171
3,t23
3, (31 .. 4,132 ..
1171
7,777
,J3
M2
7(4
15,720
7*1
1,M1
11 ttt .
417
431 .
US. mMHi***M**tnt * VmnxnntinfaBtuMfcm; jtnwy
'1(2
FiVUI\t<MM i (win irt Nt r *mMI In f+tiitrf tut Mtit* mi. LAOM
2,100
2.7H
1,400 ,
Bccaux- of the dinioiwtrativr problems in f/doi, civilian 'cMualtiet ar very difficult to iKtlmaU-, Howcvt-r, L'HAIj>.lloyft) Jâo Ooverofneut hovpital adnii*ion* affain 'xbibit the trendin tliu 'case a ri*iu( on^ rflecting the Xortb v/Patuet Lao thru*)* afainKt- toe Moo in the Plain of Jan area and atfio*l (ho towns in riouth f/ou*.
279
Can
2JU _
CAMBODIA
u
X47
am nnnuittr>
S.J 50(lici>liU).
The Cambodian Government reported 276 civilian death* due" to combat in 1970 and 79 in the fint quarter of 1971.
U.S. POUCT Itt SOUTHEAST ASfA.
Is it the policy of the Government that so lone as Americans are not being killed they are not concerned about now many Southeast Asians are killed. That is Indochinese, whether they be Laotians, Cambodians, or Vietnamese? Mr. IBWIK. No; that is not correct, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIBUAN. What is the policy? Mr. IRWIS-. The policy is to try to brine the war to an end, and that is the purpose of the President's policy of Vietnamizationto leave the South Vietnamese iu a situation where they can defend themselves. If they are able to defend themselves, then they will have a chance to have a stalemate and that could mean the end of the war. If the North Vietnamese were willing to negotiate we could negotiate a settlement more quickly. That would be the desire of both the South Vietnamese and ourselves. The CHAIBUAN. One of the points that is usually made is our casualties have gone down. If it turns out (hat the casualties of everybody have not gone down, if they are as high as ever, would this make any difference? If the figures would show that to you, do ycu think it might influence your judgment. Yours is not an argument that is very valid if the total deaths and casualties have not gone down? Mr. IRWIN. Casual ties would be a matter of concern, Mr. Chairman, obviously. The CHAJKWAS. I was not sure. It did Hot concern you much about the casualties in Pakwtan. I do not know why it would concern yon much about the casualties in o:>utheast Asia. Mr. IBWT.V. I think that is not a fair statement, Mr, Chairman. I think everyone is deeply concerned.
' ~ KEPOttT OK PAKISTAN
The ^HAIKMAV, You were iiot concerned enough to give thi* committee the re|>ort of it. I do not understand yet \vliy ., ju would not do that. Could you Ktatr now why you uvuld not do it? Is vour new policy that we ar not entitled to report* from the field? Mr, IKWIV. I umlenttand that tltc issue wan the internal rejwrtt, and working wjxtnK that came from the f-ld. The CHAIJIMA.V. That u right. A simple report from our consul in Duccu la what I ruque*tc.d. Mr, IKIVJV, AmJ I dlxo utiderHtaud that it IIHH not bex'ii the pmctic/^ " in I in- pHKt \*i make available, the internal working paiwr*. That t* Um purpose of a iiearing d that is why Mr, Van Holli'-ii rauut up and t<,'ti/)i-() to provide the information.
The CHAJRMAX. Whenever it suits the administration's policy they make them available. It is only when it does not seeiu to fit their viexvs that it is not made available. But vou do take the position that the Senate and Congress are not entitle*! to reports from embassies and consulates unless you choose. Is that your jwsttion? Mr. IKWIN. No, sir. I think you arc entitled to a report any time you ask someone from the State Department to come up. The CIIAIKUAN. We did ask for it Friday. Mr. Iitwix. I understood he came up. Tin* ( 'UAHIMAS. He declined to give us the report. All he would give us was his version of the re|tort, which is a very different thing. , Vou understand there has been some difference of view developing as to "whether or not we are told the truth; don't you? All we wanted to do wit.- to sec the report. It has nothing to do with military oj>erations or Anything else. I find it utterly inexcusable. It was not u matter of intelligence reporting; it was a simple statement- of what happened in Dacca and he said "No." He would not 14*11 us. If they won't give that, they won't give anything. There could not be anything less tainted with security or classification than Xhat kind of a fj>or;.
DEATHS IX INDOCHINA
Mr. Sullivan, I wish to turn the qusi inning over to Senator Sparkman, but would you make that ndrubuiuu of all the deaths during the first quarter of last year and this year and Also if you have it back to 19GH? Mr. SULLIVAV. Ye, sir. We will have to submit it for the record, The CHAIRMAN. Vou cannot do it now? Mr. Si'LbiVAX. I do not haw. it broken ilnu-n by quarters. The CHAIUMAX. Obviously, then, this a matter which really is not . of much concern to the Department. They are not aware of it; they have to do research. Mr. Sri.uv'A.v, We have the figure'.-, but I do not imve them with UK*. We have tlumi on an annual ba*i, but nof a quarterly batiis. (See it. 27*.) The CHAIUMAV, I undcrdtand. I wish U> put in the record an article dated Tuesday morning. April 0, 1971, in the Washington Post by George C. Wtls'ou cutiUed "U.S. Lack* Civilian Toll Study." (The information referred to follow*:)
i VuA. Apt, \ IV7JJ
VM. LACK* CiviLUK Tou. (By G<">rgc C. WiUrm)
Hri;rr
Tli' l>i>fi!im>; Hupartmciit ho* IH-VIT uii/ic a slJirtj of tlic Miiuim-r of taatK woii'idcd nr killird l>y \H>nfnt> military opcrationx nr tin; Vu>Uiu wrr, In ri'Hp'Jiiw IK a qiK-ry qiK-ry ftoin Uf VViikliJHKi'Mi I out, th>> I h-feiwmud it linn (mi conducli'd i>urb a niudy nor hiu it ikcd oy autmck: wiiiey to do fif. Tlic riidi'IiMurir totiifM nl a tin*: when KM- Iiul'JL-liina war M iindi.'r iU hetvu-nltttu.'k ya on unrl (croundu a* I'tititliHit S'num resdio hi* VtrMMH upcticli (>ir tutiiurruw iii^bt lu tke liet rrf pubbr. r*fw'j to Uic dAU-y verdict,
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SCD. Mark Halfidd (R.-Ore.). for example, yi-u-rdav stepped up his attack on the general 'immorality" of the war by inserting in the Congressional Record 900 page* of informal statements about atrocities from Vietnam war veterans, given in Detroit. Uailicld said lie put the testimony on the public record because "it give* us another dimciiion'' on the war. To the disclosure that the Pentagon nag not made anv study of noncombatant casualties from the war, Hatfidd responded: "I iWt conceive of any official agency being so utterly insensitive to human lift- How can we talk about kfll ratios and body count* without separating the civilian victims from the combatant** I would think that at some time during this kind of bloody review we would have studied what we were doing to noucoiubutant Hatfield'.- view* worn shared by a IcadtT of Vietnam Vetrnuui Against the War, a group mobilizing for a si-ring offensive of protest in Washington. The d'-nions' rations will be conducted thr wwk of April 18. John F. Kerry, a fortniT Army lieutenant, said in au intrrview that tht lack of Plantation Miidy on nonrombatani casualti^ illustrate* the government's "failure tti hav-_- zn awarene" of what it is doinn to civilians in .the war. Hi- said his group will try to dramatize tliat |>omt two week* hence by such demonstration* as platoon* conducting mock warch-and-d<*troy missions in Washington. Kerry |;;edioied tliat about 5.IXK) Vietnam veu-rans would come hwo to protest. Th-y plan to rnni|> on the mall, Cotigr>*, the Supreme Court, the White Uouse and the National Press liuilding are all -clu-diiled to !> picketed by Vietnam vets-ran* dressed in jungle fatigue-* and In-decked with combat ribbons. The pn-.< did not report the. dark side of the war fully enough, in thr organizations view. Kerr> said t lie linale will IK- a symbolic "joint m^sion of Oongpjss" outside tin- Capii-il where th'- veterans will turn in the medaU (hey won for combat in An-tiiain .Sunn- sehedule'l to dumonstrati-, Kerry said, lost arms and legs in Vii-inaiu. "Tin- lEoveninient lia.< Ix-i-n cowardly in not facing up to itn n-^pon.'ibilitiqf. as deliniid in the (Geneva C')ir.riitn>ii.," K'-rrv mud. "Al no t-ituu have WK had the KUL* to admit" Jut Vietnam war policies kill nonooiiihaUiiitK. On the iui- of iionronibaUiut caûallie.-, th^ was the Washington Post'.t qupstion and the Pentagon's nntten respond,*: "Q. Ha:' the Ivfcti*' I )e[>artment ronductd any tudie*' of tiie iiumbLTS of n')iir/>ni>>atnnu wounded or ldllij from American military operations since JIMij r uny IMTM'! in Indochina? If HH, \\lial Mere the (Hidings for fCoutli X'kvlium, N'orth Vii.-tnuin, Laos and Cambodia? . . . Haw the IMense Depurtinent eontracted for aii.MMiu i>utMdir tin- PenUmmi t make surh studies.? . . ." "A. I)e|i.irtnient of Hefenê haf not cinulurt<'d a study of iinc.oml>iitant casu:illu-f imr lias it ftintrurli-d for uch a sMidv. .Since IQt'iG, 1)O1> has ojic-niid its military lii>*|<it.-il- to r.ivibans uho have ti\tt>Ti-il war related injuries. A recent >lj:dy of \'u'tii;iiiH-K- Ministry of Health Im-pilaU iiidicat>-d that admissions of |>;iti'-ntj. uith V.-HI ivl.'iud injuries made up alm.it .*> percent of their total admissinii- ixi all 'aii-ies. War related i'u-'ii.iltirs have- ijecri'Xoed due to a louer level of cijinltut iketiviti . Mlforu continue to \- rntidt.- to rare for all tiamialtie* of the war." Sen. I ' d u a i d \I. Kennedy i'|).-Maj, cliainnan of the S<:nale Judu'iury ul>enrnoiitt/'e on refinjeei. has studied the noiic'iinbutunt< toll in a .-wriitt of hbariiiKs Hiiri lia- ei>r:ic up uilh an esiiinal<- for Siiith Vietnam nlone of 1.0'id/XK) civilians, nic'liidnii; ail-nit .J'.'.'i.OIMi killed . > Kfimedi lia- ar>;iu-d that it i- mitU'/idim: t cstimat*' civilian war cauaJ tics by mif> 'lie l'< ii!!.K"ii', .') \>Ktwi\\. \\\t\\K, D'-uthn d-i nut *liow up in that figure nor .'.lie tfi'- S-xitti Vu'LiiiiinrM: hoxpital xtiilistiiH dei.-med reliable in the first pluci-. Tlif Kennedy t>iil:>i>u(>i:ttec currently i .-tiuJYiiiK civilian war death in \M< t. It lian madeji'i e.siiinutfK for Cambodia or N'orth Vietnam and roiirerjo' itc l.djiire.-, on Sfiutli \'(etnum ar- for from prec-iM-. Tinii': wi^'-j oilier di:veloj>iiii'nt- >">terday in u(Kunrc of PrewuJent Nixon's
W'-dll<:K>ljV V^fir K(X'ee|i:
A'ti. MTjUiiun Pr'ix;:ilr' M)-WiN i, iîyinK boinbmit in S'liiflieaxt Ama may l:av rort nil Mi'n'lr ;u W) Killinn, prop'Mi'd n reHolution r.alhuK on Prewidi-ikl. N'lxon to "ronuni-înn ifniiiudiaij;Iy" an impartial (-tudy of the. "trm; cot-it, imd eff' c-iivene-x" i,f the liurnhifig. S/-i,ut<; Miij-irii.i Iîider Mike Mmmfirld (D-Mont.) oppovd tli- 1 re*o|titinn, tutifif : "We iiitvu U> g-f o'ltout. We don't need to look back; we don't m-eii an i HIM jri'T-it
ey- 25071 J
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Sen. Adlai E. Stevensou (D-IU.) proposed creating lO-member Congressional commission to make sure the U.S. Government keeps out of the South Viulnameae presidential election campaign. ChafRinn IT.S. pfficiaU arc nonhelping the Thieu-Kv ticket behind the scenes, Stevenson said America iuu.it kevp baud* off to show a commitment "to self-determination in the world." Strcate Republican Leader Hugh Scott (R-I'a.) opposed the Stevenson proposal. declaring a Congressional commission would act either to "undermine the present government or maintain it, according to the composition of the Conttnwliunal overseers." He said it probably would amount to a "repudiation of the goveruiueitt of South Victuam.'
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman. Senator SPA&CMAN. Mr. Chairman, I shall be rather brief. Let me sijv Mr. Secretary, I have supported the President', idea against naV" <t definite date. There arc some things, however, that I think coulii Have bee>: done.
INFORMATION' OX PAKISTAN SITUATION
Mav I say I agree with the chairman with reference to this Pakistan situation. I cannot see anv reason for that information not l>eing given to this committee. This committee doirs have a responsibility in connection with what is occurring in all parts of the world and it serins to me that our request was entirely reasonable. The CHAIRMAN. Our arms did a lot of it, too. They used our anus in killing. Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.
U.S. TfRSDOWN OF LATENT NORTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATING PHOPOaAL,
I saw an editorial a few days ago in one of the Washington papers that was somewhat critical of the turndovn immediately made to the last proposal from the North Vietnamese that there be a negotiation on certain terras. Of course, we all know those terms were.not acceptable, but the attitude the editorial took was that we would naturally assuim- the other party would put some terms in that we could not agree to. The editorial said that we made *. mistake in just turning it dowti out of hand without anything other than to say there wa nothing new in it, that it is btill the same old stuff. The point w a thai- certainly we .-jumld have been patient enough : i*..'J" with them lill further in the hope that there might wine >me kim of breakthrough. I)id you ev that ediu.riul by any en aw*"? Mr. IKWIN. Yes, rir; I di'I, Svjjii.ior f îrlirntat. Sf<riHU>r Si'Aiik'MAN, f beJU'Vf; it vitkn in tlui KviMiin^Slxr; wnrfu't it? Mr. IKWIV. I rund CMI\I\H ul i-UiU rwJf lli>( >[lce t<'> thb' \nAn\ f ' ami f do iu>t renwrnber whWi t)r.<j it wa?i. S^Muit'ir SCAKKMAV. I ijiink it MUX in ""' "f tin- uf.u-niocn Mr. iitwjv. J would -;iy tw> i-hiitg*, Sefitil:r Sfiarkrnnu: Jf*ir-l, Aji)btft-itMl(ir Itituv di'*it t-ry l.o nx\>\<>fi- uiivyHirtfiblp l n ihe uiher n^KojuitfJij.''^^ .<fe-r< In 'he û' in ilie -.taU;Rt. i>i April 20 in the nrg<<iiutM>. f the ju'vvsjutjw'r rej'n/rtiiijt wit* wim wjml lit odd?, with wliht n'-IUiiUy i.vjjwd (o lu^f Ix'eit fcaiit ill the- mcflinjj. \'<w, I UHJ ;jit cpftttjii whul t|jp N'ortli \Tt'tuiriif>* m'goiiiit.-ir*' saM. Jn u [)r/ihs wui//ir<!n'_-*ft'1rw'ttrl, but j the Eiigli>h ti-xi that (< tin-.juv** on Aj/rit 2'J l>y * the North V
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Tb*r Provisional Revolutionary Government of the republic of South Vietnam has staled that in ea*e the United States announces its acceptance of total troop withdrawal proposed ubove, discussion* will be immediately held on a question of inauriuK safety for the withdrawing troops and on the question of releasing captured servicemen.
I think that, at least, the editorial which I read spoke of different \\ord* bohip used and that, perhaps, now the North Vietnamese were him in:: that they would agree to do more than just,say they would diM'iii-g the PO\Y question. In the actual text as made public, all they say is discussions will be immediately held. Senator SPARKUVN. I know that trying to Mr. IRWIX. But, on the first |x>int, I would stress again if there is anything t> l>e explored, the American negotiating team would explore it. They would not turn it down offhand. The statement* I made are Mated to what the North Vietnamese actually said, and to avoid misunderstandings caused by the way it mar have been reported ia the press. Senator SHARKUAN. I know the President lias emphasized rcpeat^Jly the im|K>rtunce of the Paris |>eace talks and I was pleased when he started putting that emphasis on them and when he showed greater interest. I huve long felt that the ultimate settlement of Southeast Asia's >itUHti<>n will come, if it comes at all, ;il the |>eace conference, at the table. I think that even though it is difficult and tedious and, at tinie, hard in every respect, I thitik we ought to work at it very hard. Mr. IiiKix. i would fully agree uti.li you, Senator Sparkiuan. I might add that on that same day of April 29 Madam Binh, sneaking for the Vietcong negotiating team, ia effrcv reiterated what the North Vietnamese negotiator hail said. She said:
In the immediate it is up to the American Government to agree to the deadline of June 30, 1971 for the withdrawal of all American troops to that a ceasefire can immediately come about as well a* the discussion by the parties of the question of the release of captured military personnel.
Senator SPARKMAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN', Senator Aiken.
ATllOCITJES COMMITTED DURING INTERNAL COXFUCTtf
Senator AIKEV, Mr. Secretary, I agree with my colleague* In their belief that if the atrocities committed during the internal affair* conflicts of other countries could all be made available to us, so far a* that, is concerned to the whole world, it might have a very helpful effect on the whole. However, 1 recall that three or four years ago there was civil conflict in Indonesia. So far as I know, we never did know the number of cuMialiiu-* in that internal affair. So far as I know, ;ve never asked for it from tiie administration then in power. It was estimate)1 that not lest, than 500,000 men, women and children were killed in Indonesia at that time; we do not know how many more. That wu- not an internal affair with Indonesia. I think it a.*o;uc ec/Miomjc interest from the ouf*id<; that was interested arid, of c, Pakistan, you might *ay, i* a somewhat similar situation.
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\\f have regrets. We are sorry for the people of East Pakistan, and we wish we could stop the killing and the conflict, but I do not know as we can.
POSSIBILITY OF EXECUTIONS AfTER QUICK XJ.S. WITHDRAWAL
However, that is not my question. The question is this: When (he French evacuated Dienbienpnu, and the North Vietnamese took the country over, there was an exceptionally heavy number of executions. If I remember correctly, I suggested the other day 100,000, and one of our anti-Government witnesses raided it to 195,000. The United State*, in order to prevent very heavy executions and punishments, sent ships over there to transport people from North Vietnam down to the South. It is estimated somewhere in the neighborhood of 800,000 to a .million were transported to the south Mr. Sullivan probably knows; that figure is about right. The question is if we withdraw quickly from South Vietnam, do you anticipate there would IK- a similar situation there with very heavy executions among the South VictnamcM- people or do you think that everything: would go along more peacefully than it did af.'er the French left the North? Mr. IRWIN. I think there would be ninny reprisal* tnken by the North or by the Vietcong against the present structure, of South Virlmim. Senator AIKKX. But do you think ibai u million *i:p[edly well urn led South Vietnamese would not br able to prevent UIOM- reprisals uliich we assume would IN' committed by approximately one-third that numlH-r of well armed troop* under the direction of the North Vietnamese Gox'ernmcnt and the Vietcong? The question arises in my mind, if they rould not prevent tho*e rcprii-id* iin.: , ulu-n could they. Do you tliiuk that there would be a breakup or .vvoll among the military in South Vietnam or what i the rrn-on thai a million men could not prevent atrocities by 300,000? I do noi menn individual ntrocitier.. I menu wholesale atrocities. Mr. luwts. 1 think if we pn-.-uiuc that the South Vietnamese Government siirvivi-i as a government, and >i> 11 government would oppone atrocities, yes, I think so. Hut I think in -uni tliat might IN- tin- Mime u^ continuing tiie struggle against the Vietcong and the North Viet nam4'M-. On the other bund, if we |>ostulate that there might be a government controlled by the Communist* then I think the fact then; hail been that nutnlNT of men under nrm* would not neceârily prevent re|>ri-Hl<>. I am not ijuile certain, Senator Aiken.
CMCIHII.ITl OK C(>MML'Ml<TS TO VOTK IN tK'TOUKU KLEfTI.JS'S
SCUM i or A i K K s . 1- tliere not ojijuîtion t-o t i n - t'ommunitt^ voting in tle eleriion next Oclolwr in South Vietnam? Mr. JKWIV. May I a>k Mr, Sullivuti, who i more fumiliur with t h a t . >rnntor A I K K N . Ve-. Mr. SCI.MVAN. Our position Ilun iwcn Senntc/r. ( b u t so fur u HH tire riH'd, we v\oul<l like t-o ee eviryoiip in SoUtb Vi'-tmiHi voU-. ,\<>.'.. 'he < 'orumuiiists tbem.elve>. bme ^:iid Mint they would boycott. i lie e!-diins. The Government in South Vietnam has indiruuul that tlu-y <i mlil rcgiitt^r und vot^ as oidinur}' citizens if they M
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; \1
Senator AIEEN. The Communists will be permitted to vote in the elections? Mr. SULUVAN. As individuals; yes, sir. Senator AIKEN. They have the assurance of the South Vietnamese Government that they can do so if they wish? Mr. SULLIVAN. I think there is a difference between submitting a slate of candidates or voting or running, but so far as voting they can vote if they wish. Senator AIKEK. They can nominate a par*:" candidate in the United States; can't they? Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir; they do. Senator AIKEK. I wondered why we were more concerned with their voting in other countries than we are with their voting in the United Suites. Mr. SULLIVAN. So far as we are concerned, I think Government |>olicy would be that they are perfectly eligible and so far as the South Vietnamese Government is concerned," they welcome their voting.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE ABILITY TO PROTECT THEMSELVES
Senator AIKEN. I WUH just wondering. I notice the President did ameliorate this statement in regard to withdrawal of our troops souiewlul the other night by saying that we will withdraw when the South Vietnamese have a reasonable chance to run their own affairs and protect themselves. I was wondering when vou would estimate that reasonable chance would show up. It struck me that after they have a million well armed tn>op (hut they should be in a (wsition to protect themselves i^tUMht a third that number from other countries. The CHAIUMAN. Senator Scott. Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Cliairman. WITNESS' POSITION* REGARDING u.s. WITHDRAWAL I take it that in effect,. Mr. c-creUjry, your position with regard to withdrawal is a choice between various sugp tions before the Senate thai we get out in 7 months regardless of whether the South Vietnamese can defend themselves or not and your suggestion or the administration position that we get out as soon as Hits South Vietnamese have a reasonable chance to survive. In other words, the Tireument is between a specific date sel. on the calendar and * certain /bite conditioned upon certain iiap(>enings. In that not true? Mr. IKWI.V. That would be correct; yes, air.
INVOLVEMENT OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA
.-Wmlor STOTT. I want to explore your comments with regard to what iiuii btM'ii done during the past two yearv, and in reference to tlie widening of the war by involririg two other couiitriev. These two countries Lno- tind f'uinbodiu, have elwayM been und^-r enemy domination or threat of.dominatioi) during all this period; have they not? lu other words, in \\\* wur widening or are we uuuplv going in where the enemy has Ijeen or tu been rajmbla of going oil this tinw? Mr. IRWIV. Ttte enemy hn been in every place that we have gone in, Mr, Senator.
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DIRECTION OF FOLL QUESTIONS
Senator Scon'. Let me go into this question of the poUs because God forbid that the security of this country should hinge upon Lou Harris or George Gallup, t am one who is prepared to resist the Pavlorian effect of polls. I notice that the poll questions are directed to the war weariness of tlic country- and to emotional reactions and almost never to objective analyses of what has actually been done. I will give you some examples. Have you seen any poll which at any time inquired whether the people of this country would have believed that the Cambodian ibrces, following Sihanouk's departure, would l>e capable of a fivefold increase through the volunteer system in their military strikes? Would you not agree with me if such a [K>11 had been taken the American people overwhelmingly would Jiave said first, they would not go; and second, they cannot get a fivefold increase in 2 or 3 months? Mr. IBWIX. Yes, sir; I would agree. Senator SCOTT. Have you ever seer, any poll which inquired in advance as to whether or not the Cambodian* would be capable of making a strong defense of their own country in their own right? Mr. FKWIX. No. Senator SCOTT. Have you ever seen a poll uhich asks in advance \\ln-l!,er a 60-day or any ollu-r incursion into Cambodia would or would not be useful? You have not swn sucli a poll; have you? Mr. IKWIS. \o; f have not. Senator SCOTT. Have you ever seen anything in the polls which
fi>K-*> II* oi> iia.i*V V >*'**.! *t i*t'iii*.*l" mi j)t*ji'** o* !*]. ^t*îi!I*Ji i.J JrC"" T
disapprove of the President's withdrawal of two-thirds of fix- American Forces? Mr. IUWIN. N'o. Senator SCOTT. You have not seen tliat; have you; Mr. IICWIN N'o, sir. Senator SCOTT. Have you ever wen any question in the polls- as to whether Richitrd Nixon is doing better in the handling of the war than his two predecessors:' Mr. IKWIS. No; I have not. Senator SCOTT. Have you ever wen any poll which ak< whether you would or would not favor the abandonment of the prisoners of war? Mr. Iitwi.v. No, sir. S*-niitjir SroTT. So much for Ix>u Harris and George Gallup. Senator AlKKV. Would the Senator vii-ld? I w a n t to >uy on the w o r t h of ihi'M- poll* taken, (hi-- rornmilfw wni polled on all tlioMiûe*, Init dint, wu- lx-fire yon hccarne a mernlwr. Si'iiiiinr Sco'rr. The comniii'^'e nmy Imve lx-;n pulled, but the AnnTiciin |N>ople have not. Si-iintiir A I K K V . Ve->; tin- i-ojiiinil fi't- Ij*-. !:en pollcil. Si-iiiitor Sf:orr. Therefore, I -u'*i, Mr. Sei-relary, t l u i i it would le fziiul to the necurity of thi> country to rely upon enritioiial re;irtjr.n> to a rijrijed M-ri'-t of f|ije.-.tion-.. I do not nicun iiniau fully r'ty.^'-'. or intend lo question uhetfjer it U proper or ii[roper; b u t , nen-i'iiirlfss they ure ;i run-fully conditioned ^-rii's of que-(i'nir< uhieh iii tli-ni-rf>lve<lf> iirt how whether tiu- American (M'ople supj)ori or do not -iipport lli overall uitiulniwul of Ann'rietui t'nrw.*. I mn perfectly
287
convinced if the America!* jMKtple were asked a fair question, the squurc question, "Do you approve of the President getting these trouiis out?", they would say, "Yes." If they were asked if they approve of getting the Navy out of the Rivenne forces, they would say yes. If you asked if they approve of getting the Marine Corps out of Indochina, as is now happening, they would say "Yes." If you asked if they are in favor of the withdrawal of the Air Cavalry, which is in process, they would say "Yes." But they certainly would not vote, if 1 know the American people, to abandon the prisoners of war. We heard the testimony of Lieutenant Stephens the other day. He was in the same area as 1-aeulena.nt Kerry and others waiting to testify, and he said the American veterans of the Vietnam War were in DO sense unanimous when he discussed immediate withdrawal from the war or even withdrawal by the end of the year with them. When he diseased giving the Vietnamese a reasonable chance to survive, inuny of these veterans said that v.'as right. I imagine Lou Harris or George Gallup would have gotten about a 90 percent poll at the campsite. But one lone Navy lieutenant, who loved his country, got a different poll.
EXECUTION'S DUBTSG PRESIDENT DIElt'S ADUIM3TBA.TION
I want tbf record to show something c\an. I talked to the Ambassador of South Vietnam, who was there nearly a decade ago, and I asked him about a statement of one of these antigovemnieut witnesses about 195,000 executions and 175,000 of them by Diem. Ho .fas there during President Dii-m's administration and h<* snid he knew of oulv one execution ordered by President Diem, although there may well have bwn a few more, and that was of a river pirate. Even then be had been pleading with the river pirate and said, "If you do not do it again, we will nnt execute you." The fellow laughed at him and was executed. The Ambassador said he believed there were perhaps as many as 10,000 executed in fratricidal strife among the villagers, and that was about it as far as he knew. But he did know about the execution of over 100,000 by the Ho Chi Minn Government after the French left. These are not questions so much as a chance to get certain things into the record. But let me ask you this. Would you not like to see a poll which embodied some of the kind of fair and objective question* that I have raised? Mr. IB WIN, It would be most nit-cresting. Senator SCOTT. I agrw. Thank you. The CHAIBMAN. The Senator from N'ew York.
PRESIDENT*!* CON'STlTtTlONAL AITIIOHH V KtJH ACTION' I.V V I K T K A U
Senator JAVITK. Mr. Secretary, we have been diacusMiijj at c.nnbideruhle length in our committee t i n - con-tiiiitiorml ue>tiona rvpiii|;ii<,' uiir |i;u-er.- uiuj 1 would like t<> t-k \u io testate ..hat h> the legal or constitutional basis for (he J'residcm's action in South Vietnam i*ml whut, if uny, doe-, he consider U> he the limits of that authority? Mr. Iitwis*. J lliink there re f*o fin-Nil--, Senator >Tuvits. Ki| B t U the coming to oilier t ilie time of un exi-.iinj; wwr, unij taking on ihut
2s?
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wur, mid having die responsibility of withdrawing from it. I thii\k I hen bis constitutional powers ns.Qoraiitari&r in (tyief, and in the field of foreign policy provide. him. authority to earn* oil a war that he iidu-rited, as he isIoiiip with (he objective <>f temuunUn:: -iflicricnu, participation in it. Now, to answer the second part of your que&tiou, Mr. Javits just wjjat the extent of those rjwwers is: thipvttrtllVithiu the broad.. range, of the powers of the Commander in Cliicf and those given to the PresidcDl on foreign |xHcy. anil. T hesitate to try to spell out what the liiuiU niijrht be. . ' . Senator JAVITS. Well, what would be your comment. t<> the fact that rh whlt- matter of waiting until Vietnamization lias been achieved raises a very serious constitutional question?. .Granted rhnt ilie Frcjjdent niisrht have tlie constitutional authority to Hquiiltite the war, I find it extremely difficult Ut have that ei-conipa^s Un ilio concept of a readinc^ of the South Vietnamese forces to lute over. It i one Uiiu{r lf> extricate our people. If is qiiiu- :i djffereiu thiuj: to wait urouttd tliere for Vietnanuzation. Viw rresilent Ky is quoted at. suyinp on April 19,
So if Vietnamijation mcn* South Wmiini ntnuig, ca|>tttil<: to defend it will take 15 or 20 more yearn. The Praiitent u quoted as mtjring, "UV nn- coiK to cud it m u way tliat will, ~e believe, jdv<" South Vi^tnaKi a. chance, not to guaruiitu; it. to (i-fcnd it against the Com
I am very troublci whether the Pn>jden( has, without any <-.mcuirence of the ('HIÎV>S> whi-h he ilite.i not have now any conMitmioiiul atitliority to CII^HJ:<- th<> f.inyv-. of ili<- Unitcil State-, to thnt extent, <M>nideriii}<: the fort thut he alleges that he ban power ro liquidate the |x>wcr of war and. extricnte our |>e<tple from Vienuiiii What Would you say about that? Does tlie President or the Slate Dcpnrtnient have any petition on Ujat score? Mr. IUWIN. I iitiderbtand Strretary Roger*, is coming before the committee in eurl\ May tu dincifes the ww poweis. and .nink tiiut w>iilpro|>ritite lime, Senator Javil. Ni nddren^ thi ix'iiii. But j ibiiik wilbin the l>cil jMiwers of the Presidency, h nnd having iidterited the v\ar thaf wa> goiis? uti for :i j>:i>.f during wljiiJi time \\c had been tiyin^ !t> preve/iJ-Ihe South Viet frouj bcinjr uverrun by the Xonh, itinl it i* not uiueaônubJe for the Preiidej)t in lit-, vvithdrawti! of American force* u> lak<.- info what hap|>eris \<> the country nhich tin- L'niled .*t.:ilcs hns to defend for the piust JO year*. Seimfor jAvrrh. I do nui know- M'hal the ('(/ifrrt-.is miî.t do with u lUfiwurrent retioiutir>n in which ihe^Preniilent W4iij!d M>ek aui-hority for his Viettnuirixati/jii f>r any other jxilicy. It ini^ht vrv well jius, notwithnlandinf wbnt nur chairman ny* abrnit the iiiimoer of ni'-m* ber who are #ouig over to (he idea of M-ilinpu withdrawul date. But I am beûinitic to ucrutiiercorrviii'MNl tlml it i- fsM-JiUul to the futi.ui- of Miia C4untry that the Con^re** have hiich uti op|H>rfunity, mid t h a t it U very utm;h i<> the intercut of \\u- udmiMistration t concur in it that oppurtijfiily. -Id to Senator Aiken.
OK - UUtAllV TO KXTEW) COMMITMENT

:J think tho Senator from Nw York has raised .AH ; . there. Assuming that we might fird we had Jto keep: ihecv.fbr 10 or 15 years, according to Ky and 'oth^^ the n'-is'doesi,* President .without a treaty or an ngrecmcrit har.right to commit oar Government-beyond his own term of office. . TLt, it roems to me, is rather important: Without a.; -treaty or n agreemenT approved by jhe Congress, I do not ;seevho>-,:lie -eouM possibly commit vsjbeyond Ks own term. I doubt if he intends 'to -because I think he JnU>nds to strafehfin -Jdiiri'gs. <ut before the .end ~ of his>:term, or "some Sny first^ k-rm. We at " """ " do not^tnow anyUuiijj " "' y, hope so. he ccrtaiply shoild dehta bficaii^ one Congrcj-is ceiiAot-,comnut~thc 'ne3rt:.Congre^; out a tivaty or agreemenr.-'Phk^siU. I-
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Senatol- JAVIJJS. I-riôk mvjoy league Would you. like to' any <:MUwnt <m, tliisi ofshtfll r^ ' Air. IsVivV Flâse prxêd.
ADMINISTRATION POLICY KESPiiCTii'Cr VIETNAM WAfi
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. Senator JAVITS. I'n'iw dw-pU- interested because one, looks for definitive crypt jtli/stj^Hi of ^'ie'*'. The very last paragraph of your statement starts withc - /
The scfmljiirtratioo (sontiimeg to tielicve. . ~~ -\--~
I as&ujniV.-Mr. Secretary, lluit this is.n very authoritative 4ttLtinentr ai'<J u> i uiiaiyxe it, Anierican jxjlir.y todny w composed of Uiree-parte. I jijn going to as* only your woU, and uw others; ,;. . -'
. 'conuiiues to h"iU-vi (1) iltiiT *4ic policy of *UUdrwing our ioreet until tb South Vjcttuiumtie I>cc<>fuc nioiv Miiutbk: of MKtiiiicnc ib burden of their own
Siiu. i, that is a correiHtion of LLS. witlulrawai and the outhVwiDaî/^ capability.
f o)ct, 2. All our force* will not IK- withdrawn until our men, PCtH'rg. arc " '
That is point 2. ft is very clear.

poiut 3. The l*t (jrorpc'Ct. of bringing all our iuta\ io pri>o or in the fudd out of VicUuuo in A way tfjst givo the Soutli Vietnam*-*: ft ri>uabl survive An a fdug
So item 3 would be
A rc*mible chn, *ive tiu; Mouth Vieta unete fPMOiutijIe rtuutce, to ur\'iv IM a frw people.
Sou, are thohe three jwiinff, an authoritative thtenieut that the Uelutions i '-onunitU'e can iux*ept ax the policy of tUx adi rc*>|x>cti()g tlif; Vietrmrn War?
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\f r. IHWIX. Yes, sir, it is. I would like to supplement than. Referring to the President's press conference of Thursday night (April 29) in which he made two points which 1 should like
In other irorda, if the North Vietnamese are so barbaric that they continue to U4hL0ur>POW* K-gitrdleM of what we do -with regard to withdrawal, then we are goln to -keep a residual form 'no matter how lone K takoa. - - Kecood, however, with reamed to the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend . - ttuuhttlvcfi concerned, * hive a very good idea when that wfli occur and aa - 8*x>c as that .eventuality occur* we wiH be ablo to move on that. So I think I "_ JUJQ answeriuK yoor question by spying, in effect, that the two .arc xeparable. One will occur -before ths other unto* the North Vietna_aic*e do move or. the
pow>. -. -.- -'-"/
Senator 'JAVI-K.X Vfeli, accepting what you said there, it is these five j>oints, altiiougo I tio not think there is any modification from those you read frunj wfeat you stated is .the administration's position, we . *rc to_tak&4* lhej*t uvr points are "the policy of this administration reapocting jtiie "VieHwra wr. . . "Mr. IBWINV Well, the policy of the administration, Senator Jay-its, is t<tscck aJi-^nd^to the M-ar and seek the witltdrawal of the American . forces 4>y_tiie4>olicy of VietnamizaUon. These are the objectives of that pphcy: one, rtJitf ^withdrawal of the troops; two, tfao releasing of prisoners of war; and three, hopefully in a way that will give the _ -South Vietnamese a chance to defend
COSSTITOTlOKAt AUTHORITT FOB ADUIKISTBATTON POUCV
Senator JAVITB. Mr. Secretary, I would Uke to tie what you have -jut said to your prc\-ious response to the constitutional L in?, and to request when the Secretary appear*, or if the Department prefers sooner by way of a memorandum in niipert of your testimony, that it . address itaelf to tltf constitutional authority this adininistration feels . it has, \viUiout c<^n<rres.<>ional concurreucf1, to proceed with that policy .as particularized. (The information referred to follows:)
Co**TrrcnO!iiAr> AvrmyiUTf FOR rut.t-toKxr'* Poutv is VIITKAM l\)c* AHTMM^T This uu-moriMMiuui rkacriUa tht caiiKtitutional authority of tiw; Presiditit to ca,-rj o'lt thf. policy u' ^-^- troop withdrawal* from South Vietnam in a way which will protect thu a/ety of Auw>riuui forccn in tttc- field, brim; about the njraxe nf our prjioiu;r of v,af, Kitd provid<; the South Vwtii/uiae with a rerwona!-l- 4-tianci; to Tlu- nirwt ulii-iit fact c'JHcr-rtiiiiK tlit pKoiidrnt? cnnntitutiooai authority if Umt lb* wr in Vw-Lnaiii wan long' underway and the t'nitcd Htatcs military f>uildij[/ in Umt wur had alffady ix:currrd whrn 1'n-judcnt Nixon tcKk ittfio: <n Juiiuury J'XJV. I >u*-uie tui: period front (%.*> U^ IMtiK, Prwidcut <<>ha*o coininitu-d ovt-i* libU* inillioD (.'nitnd KtaU'x (JWIJHI to tbi1 huctilitim tn VkiUiiuii. A leical autli'mty for hi action*, tlu- PrcKidcut relied upon bin own rouHtitutifwinJ autliority, Ui- lvjijtbci<t Anta (>>li>Ttivi- Dcfftinf' Trent'- rjid llw Tonkin Gulf Jlecolutiou, Frmklût Nixon ductdni \>mi a [(olicy of endinic ' 'niti-d rtiiU:f involvwjw-fit in tlw war and Mtil>uji-c<i upoi, ilw HiUidrnw| </f CniWsd Ktaun forcvi* from (vjuUj VirUinm. At Uw I'tuM Vin-ttiijur wu Vietnam. Ui Cnited fit*te but offered to wîHiatc tin- ruiupVtc JtLdr *l of Ami-rican forcen in UK- ronU*xt of at> 4/vrriifJ Dcttlcnu-rit, utid iiM j<r'/{Kjsod ft t'..>-I\v>uionth 1 tin;UJ>k for tl* total nithrtra&ul <>f nil onuul*' fi/rri'>. l'n North VitrUmowiK hiive itiown no if<>nt in rKtiafjnK u romitii-U- witlidrawal of for:v. In tb* aiJWHico of nt(cotit<'d ilUt'uu'ut, MVP J'rciufJ-iit hai, throuKli th proci>M of Vietoaruication, withdrawn (rv'-r '/<i.';,000 I'dU'xl rluten tnx>p from fiotti Vi^tnaio and ha* announced tbe witudruwal of an additioual 100,1)00 troop* by Deo-aiber 1, 171.
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OP nx women am* usoumov
At the time Cougress was considering repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the Administration expressed Hs views on the subject in two letten from tbt Oepart<octtf State to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. On March 1L1970, this Department stated that it Lettber advocated nor opposed repeal of the Tonkin Golf Remlttaon sinee the Administration did not ielr upon or refer to that Resolution u upport for its Vietnam policy: , "In abort, as a functional matter, {the Ana} Resolutions have no eontrjumg significance in the foreign policy formulation {voces*, aad it is for Congress to determine whether they should be terminated or simply allowed to lade away." On April 14, 1970. the Department amplified the point made in its earlier letter: "The oentrul fact, so far as the President'* legal authority is concerned, is that the war in Vietnam was long underway when this A**"*'""*"*'"" took office. The President hasiteen doing his best to bring it to an end. "Putting anide the question of the President's general authority under the Constitution to deploy troops abroad, wo consider that the President certainly ban the constitutional authority to take all reasonable efforts to protect the troop* once they have been eommittod and to bring aboit their withdrawal under circumstances that contribute to a durable peaee. This, in essence, is the policy of the Administration." It was on the basis of this understanding, namely that the continued rristenre of the Tonkin Gob* Resolution was not necessary to President Nixon's constitutional authority to carry out the poUey of withdrawal from Vietnam, that the Adminixtration did not object to the repeal of the Tonkin Outf Resolution. Pub. L. No. 91-87?, f 12 (Jan. 12, 1971). The repeal did not and was not intended to undermine President Nixon's authority to carry out his program of disengagement.
LEGAL AOTBOBITT AS COMMAMDBS IS CBTCT AMD CBIET CXECUTirE
The President's policy of withdrawal does not depend upon any utatent'oii of "general" or "inherent1' authority to initiate hostilities without copSMssional authorization. Such a contention raises separate constitutional questions which wr addresaed in the testimony of the Secretary of StaU U/ore the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 14, 1971. Constitutional authority for President Nixon's Vietnam policy is based squarely ca bis specific <xm attritions! authority as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive. UJS. Const, art II, if 1-3. The President's authority as Commnnder-in-Chief include* the power to command the armed forces and conduct campaign*. Ex Part* Mittigan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1806); Fleming v. Page. 50 U.S. (9 How) 603 (1850); III W. Willougbby, The Constitution of the United States f 1031 (2d ed. 182V). From this grant of power in derived the President's authority to protect the live* sod safety of American force* in the field. Thi* would, of course, include authority to bring about the rrleaxe of our prisoner* of war. AM Chief Kxeeutive, the Pn-*ident has broad constitutional power* over the conduct of foreign relation*. Under the Cnnntitution, the Confje** ulito has power* relating to the nation's foreign relations. Cf. <Jetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, at 302 (191K); Bukrr v. Corr, :t60 r.fc. 1H6, at 211-15 (1962). See, e.e., E. Corwio, The President: Office snd Powers 1781-194H, at 20ft (3rd rev. ed. 1948); Q. Wright, The Control of Ann.Tiesii Foreiwj Relation* 149 (1922); ReUtm<-nt (Sc-eond) of Fomcn Relations {{ 121, 132, 148, 163 (1965), The Coontitution confers eertuiu specifie powers affecting foreign relation* upon the President, thetienaU-and the C^ngreM, UX. Const, arts I, f | 7-9 end II, If 1-3, from which arc inferred their respective rolm in the sphere of foreign relations. Ktv, e.g., United Ktats v. Bcltnont, 301 U.&. 924 <\Vrf); AHntan it Co. v. United HfJiU-K, V'l U.S. 5H3 (1912); Fotia Yur Ting v, L'nittd Matm, 149 U.H. mn (W.K);Jaut* v. [TnitwJ Htatw, 137 U.K. 202 (1K90); Durand v. Holiiot, 8 F. Cat*. Ill <Xo. 41M 'CCriD XV 1HGO).
COMCtOMOK
which was uuderwar when he awmucd office in wny which will protect the liven aud safety of American troops as they ar withdrawn and bring about th rwlMW of our prisoner* of war. This eonsututirnal authority also empowers the President to bring about the withdrawal of Anerieaa forces wittto th- framework of a foreign policy destgaed to eoatribuU) to the seeuritr of the United fttats*
President'* rxniHtituUouaJ uuthoritv a Coiu;nurid<>r-i/i-<;iii'if and Chief " a.rnple l^gal ba<> riid United KiaU'i iuvolveineMt in it wjtr
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and to international peaee and security. It in for this reason thnt the President has determined that an integral part of our disengagement |>olicy must b? to afford (lie South Vietnamese a reasonable chance to defend thetnsdve*. In this connection, Prendent Nixon, on April 7, 1971 said, "The day ibe .South Vietnamese can take over their own defense is in sight." The validity of the foregoing conclusions i not affected by the repeal of the Tonkin Calf Resolution. To state othftrwi.it; i-i to argue that the President has no authority a* Commandcr-in-Chkf or Chief Executive in the aiva of foreign relations unles* Congress affirmatively authoring his every art. The- hitter proposition is clearly unbound as a matter of constitutional law . A> shown above, federal power over foreign relation!! in shared by Congre^ aiid tbv President. The absence of Congresswonal authorisation rannot diminish or impitir thi; constitutional authority of the President a,* Commandr;r-in-C'liief and Chief Executive.
ENEUY REACTION* TO C.S. WTTHUHAW ALS TO DAT
Senator JAVITS. Xow, just one or two other question^ Mr. Swivlary. I notice uith great interest constant reference to the fact that we caimot fix a date for our withdrawal. In your statement you saj':
So Ijiig a* Hanoi doc* not know our preci.sc wit Udrawal plan* Iheir owu planning j>roce-;.H is more difficult.
Earlier in your statement you say:

There were wxne .*>49,000 American troops in Vietnam. More than 265,000 have now been withdrawn. By December 1 of this year another 100,000 will be brought :>omc and, as the Prerident indicated btn. Ihursday evening, Iwfore that day he will announce his platto for fnrthr withdrawal.
Have there been any added jiros>ure,- by Hanoi, any particularized attacks taking advantage of the fact that we are making those large uitJidrawals which give evidence to support tl:<- .trgunnMit that we cannot fix. a date because they wiU tiien ]>articularlv zero in on whatever that date implied. We have had -mine eX|N*nence now, we have (irau-n down and will have drawn down half our troojw. What is our experience on that scure as it bi-ar> on the que.-tion of announcing date? Mr. IBWIV. The uncertain factor in it. Senator Javit*, i to what degree the Ijam Sjn oj>era(ion may have disrupted plan* of the North Vietnamese for greater offensives than they have conducted in the present drv season. I do not know the atiwer ijx'cUically <x> your question, I do not know specifically of anything directed to the reduction. Senator JAVITK. Thnt in your comjdete answer? - Mr. lawiK. Yea. Senator JAVITU. Could you endeavor to find out, and let u> know whether there U anytliing which we ean be told, either publicly or in executive session, about our ex|>eriej)<v with wilhdrawak to date, and in nwiM^'t to the enemy reaction a to uhelher i\vy were able to t>r ti'ul take advantage in any way of every tiling that we liave announced about withdrawals. Would you *upj>lv that Jor tlw record? Mr. luwiv. I would be glad to kuppiy it for th<- record. Senator JA.VITA. I ask that that be includ'-d, Mr. Chairman. <The information referred In follows:)
ACTION DCJUVO VJi. WrrHOBiWAW (l)t.r \H-rutxr or In tUf! period before tbe UH/BVNAF joijt operation itit/j l\u- Cauibodian anAtuaiiM, M auum U.B. uuiu in Uie vouUiMii part of South V'wtu!i, were mJepiojring to the UM,, four enemy dlvuiunn Hiiidi had \nxu opuraUug for yiutn in NuliUrjr ftapoo III of South Vtetoaoi, concentrated iti th Cacubodiaw wutctuary area,'1)ieb (a placw ' only ttiirtj luile* from Haigon, They had cached la
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that arr weapon* and stores of supplies sufficient for sustained major operations. These, djviyioua, poised iu *ancturay, were not only a major threat to Skigou and1 tiie rest of the southern part of South Vietnam, where two-thirds of the country'* people live, but to the diminished U.S. forces, stQl remaning in that area. The four enemy division* had already cleared the nearby Cambodian territory of Cambodian force*. Their operational intention* were dearly designed to take advantage- of the reduced C.S. presence and contemplated redeployumut from Militarv Region III. In removing tbi- threat, our sancturay operation, in coo(ieratiou with the RVXAF, prevented the enemy from taking advantage of our mithdrawaltt, and it ensured maintenance of the subsequent pare of the withdrawals.
U.S. NEUTRALITY CONCERNING COMING SOVTH VIETNAMESE ELECTION
Senator JAVIT. The liiiul thing I would like to a&k yoi:, Mr. Secretary, is the question of political commit incut. There arciiis tu Iw* a popular idea that in cite WHY or another there is some |M>iiii-i>I commit ment by tin- I'.S. t<. Thicu and Ky. Our position, of rmin-o, is that we are neutral in respect. of thin coming Vietnumct-e prc.-iuVi.tial election on Oetolicr'J. I would like to ask you, (]), are we neutiul m-iL (2), if ><i. Itoxv an- we expressing or implementing that neutrality. Mr. luwtx. V<>, sir; u- ure neutral. We have expreswd it in iY .itrui-Ui/us to the Emba.-^y to <-oudu<-t themselves and to imve ail Ameiiraiiis eonduti themselves in sueh a way that they are neutral in the election. Senator .1 A VITS. Is tin- adniiiiistratioii considering the appoimruert of any nfM'cial gnnip like Prenidi-nt Lyndon Johnson ap}H>inted. .-onie couKi)is>ii>n n^|x'clin{r the election? Vfr- JMVJV. \ know that President Tlieii MHIU- time ago JDH! >aid tiiul )) \\ould urlroine any d'-iegution tiat cani" oii(. I know there have Ix'cn l)j]l> ixith in the 'louse and the Senate suggesting a delegation. The ndimni>tratmn \\.r..l(f he happy to have a gr*>up go out nrni tin it, hut an.-\veriii it specif jr:>lly, f do not know that there has i>eer<. a suggestion ;nr xr \>y the udiriirii^tniiioii to or^miixi- a gnni[). Senator JAVJT-;, Have 'ho:.e !>ilU hu<l the uual State J)epartinent cojunent and analysis as yet? Mr. JKWIK. I think not. Senator Jnvits. Senatr JAViTh. <'ould you eheck into that, Mr. Seeretary, becuiiM* we are beginning to think, and the time i.- running. |M'rhaps it would be desirable to awjfnile tin* opinion on that seore. The In>t question 1 have relate.- to tlw MHW subject. Mr. SecjvUry. if the Tliw-u-Ky regime of the ThL-u-Ky ticket Ls elex-tl, will that ereale sarnie new commitment to sUiy with them until tli<-jr new lerm exjwtes? In other wordi-. will it Iw n jmrt of Vietr,nii/;itinu thut they, fx-ing ill*- iieuly elected pi'esi-lent aJid Vice Pre>id<-nt ol' South Vji-inain. if this should hajj>ej., that ii it itn|>lied that \ve n. going lo Mny w i t l i them for the duration "f their tu-u urrn. in term-. of our prepuce in South Vietnam'' Mr. Juwis. \o, "ir: not on iliui l)tî^. . Seiiulor .lAvrrf. Noi t all. Well, tliiink you. Mr. ('liiiirriiiin. There ure other things but J think we have IsiLeji us nni'-h - 1 ilewri'e. u ii(oi:cn roi: Aiiut^wmnimi I'ou^y IN Tin
1
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M;. ^jci.ji-y, if I i-mt! I j)::;-,ijc one f j i i e . t j r . ' .
oil i-.jiid I!.. I tJie . ViTeliiry ! ilivil4>d In CO.'jie lo sjH-iik nboul W ; i r
^. Th'it i" r e l a t i v e to die J r ! \ i t bill, rtliich i- n<i\\ ti different
294
matter. It is not related to this question at all. If I recall correctly. Senator Javits' bill is not intended to cover the present controversy in South Vietnam. Is that not correct, Senator Javits? Senator JAVITS. That is correct, except it would cover extensions of it. But I gather from the Secretary that he felt that the Secretary of State would testify about all legal questions and constitutional authority. Mr. IKWIV. If you would prefer we would be glad to try to send something for this record. Senator JAVITS. I would prefer that, with the Chair's concurrence. (See p. 290.) The CHAIRMAN. I do. The Secretary is a very distinguislied lawyer in his own right. Your question prompts me to ask a further question. The President stud that going into IJMA and Cambodia was to protect our troops. As I recall it, the principal justification was that it was part of the program to protect our troops. This is what I mentioned earlier, the. shifting rationalizations of our continued action there. He seems now t<> be saying that he has a constitutional right to insure the South Vietnamese a chance to survive as a free people. What constitutional authority does he have to assure eittier the South Vietnamese or anybody else a chance to survive as a free people? This is a concept of constitutional authority that escapes me. I do not understand that. You are a von' pood lawyer. How do you explain that? That lias nothing to do with Senator Javits' bill. What is the President'B present constitutional authority to guarantee or to assure these people or any oilier people a chance to survive an a fre peo|ile? It is not a principle I know of in the Constitution, that as Commanderin-Chief, or any other function, he has a right to insure other people. I agree that lu* i> Mipjx>sed to haw .->ome responsibility to insure the American people the continuation of our Constitution, and he agrees in his oath of <ffi<* to execute iiio laws of the United States. But I am bound to say that I find no constitutional jii-tjfication for this announced purjose, to srive a jn-ople a reasonable ehajiw to survive as a free people. Mr. IEWIV. K.-.wntially, Mr. Chairman, I liuvc nothing to add to what I said to Senator .fuvils. *TheCsAJHinv, You did noi say anything. Mr. IBWIW. The President inherited t uur tliuf Inid been going on for 10 year* or more. It sturteil originally in effeci to protect iti one way or another South Vietnam, and when President Nixon and Jii* administration a*ujiu*d offiw they came in with desire u> end that war. As part of j-nding tliat war they t<ok aivoimt of the rem-on* that had originally motivated our entering -oinbai. N'ovv, the |MIW<T are the powers of tlie Coininuiidrr-in-Cliief and the |>o\ven> witii refcjiwt to foreign \xAv:v. Senator JAVITS. Mr. dinirjua.ii, I ttrn TK>I Miti-fied u i t l i that evnla.oa.Uon, I have nuowle ihu.'. very ejeur, HIIV more t h n t'u* Chair i, but I underwtarid that the uitne-"- HOM will |>n>|iu-^ io îjoniit un authoritative Htatx'inent MS ui hnt thev rluiui in In- I he HUlhoritv.
IMPLICATION* OT LVHEEITEO WAI. - '.." v ._]_ The CHAIBUAN'. This inheritance of a war is getting to where it is expanded and expanded. Docs this imply that tliis President did not approve of this war in the beginning? I thought he always had been la favor of the war, long before he was President. There seems to be \aa ttajdj.cxtkjn -in. this that he- inherited something that he was strongly against aiuiwiw iif i-? trying îHtijuida*e it. I caunot.see how you can draw that implication trotQ vh>r I ti&vk I have hcnr<tin the past. Before he was President, in fact, he is rejK'i'fed to liVftt. own one of those who urged President Eisenhower Yo enter into this War long ago, back in 1954. :. (The following information was submitted for inclusion in the ^transcript.)
The following is PrcriVnt Niroi-'s j*x<a-d on Vietnam firiqi 1954 through the efectionof l'.t6Ks reported in thfNVw VorkTiiiv^. iFot-MH'wrivêpeQoe President Nixon's rwcord i lifted by the date of mentiou in the Times.") . ^ .~~ :
1954
"
: '" ~ ' - .
r. 17-1K, Nixon advocte L'.S. troop* be lent to Vietnam to replace
Mar. IS, Nixon . :inu; 1,".^. -c-i'l m6c^ >M^.^>ev Cbintxie nggrtMttioti with atomic " "" *~ Julv 4, Wurn.s Aitian ueutraU U.S. Iju-ia ympi<iy for UHtlofis Huding uo moral distmctiop lx;twei U.S. tuid coramunisni ; 1957-19CI SKATO wu" foruod aud Dulles wa.s quite aggresiuve nhout Iudocbiu. N'ilOQ supported .S1CA.TO aad UuUea' HawltLsh pohcie-. very vigoroualy.
196!
Feb. 1C, Nixon barku Kenucdy Hawkish [)<>liri<;

196.1
Oct.. 2.", 'Ili-fcrriug to Dir'u Ooveriimeut) : L'.S. niustkaro to live with u governnieut it nrj'lx uoMatixfiictory; N'o\f. 7, i'boiw.s Ulan. \hu alx>ut refusal of U.S. Consulate to uruut aaylmii to nne of IUT do** rKlativHit niter coup; \ote. -Hy 194)4 \'it-ti>iuu Wr wu.s t>einK q'le.xtioued by tuany \foericaort and Nium Uu-aiiK; chinf npolf.<inaa for the Huwks;
f'cli. 1;:;, in r<>iiuu'>utinj( ou Johu-KJii Bpeech in wliirh JoUu*ou Haid Vietnam War i- priiiiunly Vii'tiuuiu;*; doiuerftic rj>otest, Xixoa dtjcLirud Joluwon'* Attitude prfpiir'"- iiinTicu for "ri'truaf. or d^fiat"; ILir. ^, Niinu upoLr. out i*ziu-il the 'iw!iitr>diztioii" of Viotuiiu ^t many were Apr. -'. ' 'nt:i-[/j-d pant I'ornpnjiiii-w- in \Wluani; laudi-d McN'ainiira'-i Hawk l.iticu; b"|-- Vii'Miatu won't Ix.-rofnr i-ti-ci.uin mil'1, Apr 4, I 'net" utore *\<i. luv* \t>- will tiialu' UK- wur un n^w. in ctu]>u)(u (*oe A^r. X
206
Apr. 8, Oiticiaes Administration for not being aggressive enough; Apr. 10, Urges extension of War to North Vietnam; Apr. 17. Urges military strike? by 1T.S. against Laos and North Vietnam: Apr. 19, Nixon nmses importance of UJv victory in Vietnam: hacks War extension; , Apr. 24, Johnson comments with exasperation on Xixon'g pressure for escalation. of the War; May 3. Nixon again urges U.S. to extend war to K. Vietnam; Jane 5, Says atomic weapon* would be detriment to over-all VS. policy (see Mar. 1S/W55) (1964 is an election year); July 27 CReview of Reader's DigeVt article). Again urges U. to go into N.Vietnam; Aug. 5, Nixon applauds Johnson"? decision, after Gulf of Tonkin 'incident", to bomb North Vietnam; Oct. 3, Charge* Jobnpon Administration with indecision, not escalating fart. enough; Oct. S, South Vietnam will be lost within a year and all of Southeast Asia in three rears unless UJS. policy is more aggnawMve: Oct. 11, Administration policy on Vietnam will lead to fall of South Vietnam in Oct. 21, -Charges Administration will withdraw after election: y<>v. 2, Say* Pentagon wan warned of Biechoa attack two days before it happened; " (Btvnhoa wan widely publicized defeat for Allies) ; Dec. 3, Nixon again urges bombing of N. Vietnam;
IMS
Jan. 27. U.S. will lose in I year unless USN and USAF attack in N. Vietnam and
Lao*;
Feb. K, Again urges support for retaliatory action* against N. Vietnam; Feb. 11, Again demand* day arid night raids atzaiint N. Vietnam; Feb. 12, Urges continued attack* on N. Vietnam even though he admits that "average" American favor* di-wngagt-iucut : Feb. 27, Contend* UJi. too weak to enter iiuKOtiatiomi; N.Y. Time* dinputta bin position; Apr. 3. Approve* Johnson uv- of non-lethal ga* but criticize" the way Jolw-ob handled questions about it: in general, he defended John?un on war: Apr. 16, Johnnon should U; nupported on negotiation* so long a& "aggrewsion U not rewarded"; (tee Feb. 27) June 4, Backs Jofaneon on U.8. forces engaging in combat; July 11, Backn U.S. Ktepped up policy; Aug. 11, Back* Adminintratiou but urges i-tepped.up attackn on N". V'ietuam; Aug. 2U, lleiternUi* uppon. for Administration ; Sr-pt. 0, Oppr>>te negutatioiu uulenn N*. \'tetuatn withdraw ^ from South; if there AUK- '?* Agaitift negotiatjon; claifu<< conxtant talk of. negotiation convince,-ConiuiijnixtM of m-eakne**; credit* N'ationalixt China with keeping lied China from ioUTvcujng; fwe Apr. Ifi) Sept 6LOp|xmi negotatioiw UII^-HK N. Vk-tuam withdraw* from South; if there are any coaeenriouit be will make \irliuua insue in coming election*; critieizot Fulbright peace fcekm and "noft line" ; i**x utt early end to war; back* inrreaned military cpunuiUoeot; (** Apr. Ifi) Sept. K, \. V. TimeH Mcore* Nixon Sept. 6 ittatemcnt: liei>l. I'A, \'k-torr will take 3-4 yean, wgr* iianoi Iwuibiug; blockade of Ilaipboug: criticize* necol iattonn and involvetiMWi on L'.N.; (jejit. l.'i, KepuUicaoit will regard aa election iuue any negotiated cttU-uwut that leadji to Ufutral or eoalhiuii Kverninent; backi* Johnnon but HV further itupport will depend fm b>iw Previdelit jwpoud* to Gjtiiinuuii't prei*ure; back* commitment tit U.tl. tnôpc; Ke(>t. Hi. Niton nay Ufb'vvmK frecdi/ui in Vietnam meaiu cvenhanded justice at liicul Ji-vi-l; Sepi. '^4, Jy"tter (</ Kditor of N.Y. Titin- HCJWH NixonV inrb'xiblf Ktauc' : Ot-i. ITi, Afu>r trip to Vietnam, lie reports IK- found huk(iof) murh ijii'/fovcd; Ort. 17, ( 'rwt total einhurgoruforcv-d by wit [x/wr-r, to cut off upjdv fihtpment* to North \u~liiaui; Oct. ^.'> Vov. .", Nixon ftifr. diiUMjîon of HIJIJCTH iuclrnflor who cxpreiMed urldiirulioij for ViftOnig; {>(tci fji> otin1/-r; Nov. 'ii, NT< H'uriu iiiujnr iriij< j in KMiKcU'ctKiiiH, iirKo inU-rn>i(u'd irik<'>- ugainkt S. VMiluaiu, n\>\*wt d<Tlarttttou of Hr on N. '
297
Nov. 23, Dfso^lj" V. rejection of 1964 offer of X. Vietnamese and Vfct Cong to negotiate; Nov. 2o, O(uxw* fcrnial dt)l*rmtk>u of war; Nov. 29, Out of 104 signa-Uuic* of petition urging supporters of war to "shout" their support; Dee. 4, Demands stepped-up air and sea attacks;
J/MI. 30, Urges bntfa fiolitind parties t lotiiain silent during peace negotiation*; ., - lA-mucms in trouble H "War still on in November, 1 906 Hoctions: v'Jfcu. 31, Warns that Republic-nns witt make \ss\if of Democrats who tjikc "apjn e' _-inetit" lint;; t'wer Jan. 30 aboxv; Aw. 17, Nitim favors stepped upvanipaign to win war; ' .May t, Warm Mcainft Fulhright "ajipttwenjcnt" line; Jfay 7, Urice* Democratic oppoucut* of war to halt criticism, repeats call "for ste|>-up in bombing in N. Vietnam; May 27, ivotv* Johnson for not '-xpanding liointiing: June 6, Oir(^> auotbfr 8p<w>rh ajptinKt Kutgtini instructor. July 30. Siuti {7.8. goals in'V'ictnatti uot und<.T.ft(M>d l>y Kur. all its AUK. iit, S.'aua lor reprisals against any foreign shipper carrj-iug eupplics to HoipboAg; Sept. I. ftws war laatiite at least ." mon- JVAITI; opposes reconvening Geneva conVMitiote but backs ail-Asiaa <y>itfrrenc/.-: Sept. 12, Fran Johnson will "go <iverlH>nrd'' r>i: rpanding War and make Vietnam U.S. dffpendaBcy: holds ''rjitt''' in Democratic Party is chief fear to peace; face the dozen* of dtimandri for war expansion before and after thii 'Year that J4ihiinuii will go ov<\rbi>ard on rxpaiuriou of the war); Sept. 14, Calls '-r tttffiîing of military potttiire in Vkrtnara; (HM; Sept. 12 alxix-e) ; Sept. 14- (coot.), W trt-us that JohiLMOii will iiicreaoe troo[>-i after election; back : 25^ tocri-a*- but not to 600,000 or 7(10,000; .Sept. 17, Republican* can iirovifo ''U-adi-rchip in war"; Oc-t. 2, Si-ys Congrfi.vHioiial k-aden- think Johuitoii playing politic* with World1 Peace in going to Mauilar Oct. 26. Criticize* ilKK, syins; ho rutwiuderstood imrpow; iu boiubiiiK N. Vie! uaiu ; Oct. 2V, &>-< tragedy and diMatttcr for L'.S. if war rmitiuitoa Uiroujcii 1'JGS UTUBC weak, "bvsty noliiti'Hin not MTVIUK |>eac" niicUl result froi i dt'Miv to wiu election; ste.ti Cbin uucli-ar capability a<< KJUUJII tj> ha."t<<-ii eno l.-o, {*< 6cj>t. I, IttCC}; Oct. 14, Seen Lk-inocratic party iiplit over Wur; Oct. 2K, Sid;1ep <juu*tion on support of Hatfield who hu* oppoiuiig view ou War. Nov. 1, Nixor proposes that repn-wutalivej* <jf both parti' * uw-et with Johuran after 19C6 eledwn,' to develop "Strategy For Victory iu '07" bi-cauw IwV afraid f-*ce oetitiuieiit in 19flC election* may drive licpiiblkuuiH into Nov. .(, Cttllx for "economic offen/uve" to end war; say* Jobuson trip to Far 1'jbit utirful because it gave him chauc-e to meet with Allie; Nov. 4, Nixon couei out againKt mutual withdrawal; Nov. "-, Johnson calls Nixou "chroiuc campaignor" %'in-. :>, N'ixoti exploit* Johuiou attack ou hiuj_; rep<tat he will nujiport Admioibtra' tioii if no "rt-'ard for aftgneHJo/i"; (we Nov. 4) Nov. JO, Hayti iit-w Congrcwi will have xtrouger "no re-ward for aiign-awion" policy; Nov. 7, Wautx Jobniou to stop liidttiug "kind of war CouiuiuriiiitM want"; Nov. 3-, l.'rtKn C'.K. bar aid to any nations trading with or aiding N. Vk'tnaai;
1907
Jau. 21, CriticijwM Franotr and Great Britain for trading with N. Vietnam; (jtne July W, 1UW) Mar. C, i)it\MKtr* Ki'-nuedy plan to halt bombing, backv Johnuon; Mar. 20, IJaeltii Jobuctoii agaiut Kenutidy; A|>r. H, l>i'\>lttrn Eurujmui* who think I'.H. VK-tnuin involviiwn/ i* a miKtake; ('.H credibility will IM- deittroycd in Kurope if itV di-*lntyivl in V Wtiunu (Laird iiaid iti Mar. Itt, I'MXi TJUK-M tlmt a State J'l-puttUK'iit 'dwu/ui-nl HUKK>''<tii>g pri>M-iil 'IWKl; AduuniMtratiMij iwrely fiilltilJiiiK urevioun roniiiutiiuMitM lii^tory) i<>n K-jit. 'Jtl. I'MHj'. ' t'.rrM ' Kuril, uril, Mdvui Laird and < '' </(>-y(JiKj| kuirt JoluiKOH HU in error for gcMmx u-< 'limply involvml iu Apr. I'/. J5m:k.-. Johnoon pew.- teri/u; flS iSoTJ - 20
298
Apr. 18, Back* Johnson'* sharp rise in war effort (see Apr. 15 above Comnmnitt defeat "inevitable"; Says officials in Saigon see no negotiated settlement; chants those who oppose war prolong it; Apr. 2;-, Criticize* Admin, efforts for peace (aee Apr. 15,) May 28, Hatfleld MVS Republicans ahould choose candidate to get VS. out of War and Nixon doesn't qualify; Aug. 22, Urge* "massive pressure" to shorten war (short of nuclear); (is be remembering Goldwater and '64T) Sept. 13, U.S. in Vietnam because vital national interests are at stake (In Times, Mar. 16, 1906 Laird aaid that State Department document suggesting present (1966) Administration merely fubilling previous commitment* was distorting history) (On Sept. 20, 1966 the Times reported that Gerald Ford, Mdviu Laird and Charles Goodell said Johnson was in error for getting us deeply involved in Vietnam); Sept. 17, War bought time for governments trying to "moderuiie"; warns any Republican! awayJroin running on "peace at any price'*; Oct. 13, UdaU admits bf made mistake in supporting U.8. policy in Vietnam; says Nixon bad candidate for peace; Oct. 2S. \JS. must see war through to "successful'" conclusion or risk World War HI; Communist victory would constitute "reward for aggression"; U.S. there far strategic necessity; (See Laird, Ford, and Goodell comments under Sept. 13 tinting) ; Must not give N. Vietnamese impression they'd get better deal after elections; Oct. 29, Goldwater supports Nixon policy; Nov. 19; Times sees Nixon benefitting by peace candidacy of Stasnen; Nov. 30, Eisenhower says go into N. Vietnam; Nixon says Eisenhower right from military point of view but questions political timing of attack on North Vietnam; Dec. 12, Javits says Nixon in actually moderate and will change his tough Vietnam stand; Dec. 15, ILS. should retaliate on China if planet bt sed in China are used on us; Feb. 0, (Just after Tet Offensive) Says U-S. was wrong in restraining bombing just before Tet offensive iii attempt to get peace talks started; Feb. 12, Says no quick and easy solution to war; Feb. 13, U.S. commitment is '"'cork in bottle" stopping Chinese expansion in Note: During remainder of Feb. other candidates commented on Nixon's position on Vietnam or lack of same; Mar. 6, Says doesn't favor withdrawal but, on tbe other band, shouldn't over emphasize role f military; U.S. cbould use leverage to get t'SSR. on side of peace ''Note; if Communism i beuig hurt by our actions in Vietnam why do we have to urge itu-Mian Communist* to ice* on tbe *ide of (>aceT) Mar. 21, Nixon aide> upset over claim Nixou claimed to have "plan" to end war; they nay he jut feels new Adiuiu. could have better chance for peace; Mar. Z5, Hatficld urges Nixon change ix>r.jtion on War: Mar. 27, Aide nays Niton will soon t<>l] how Kutsia could be enlisted on side of peace; Apr. 2, Won't diiUMjrfK war for_2--3 woekv to give peace efforts chance to succeed; June 18, No alternative t<> c<intiauiiig war, mutrt end in victory; June 21, Uatfield tsudotmn Nixnn, convinced he can end war convinced be ha* changed view* (HOC June IK ab^vc): June 30, Nixon reM'oU beinK nailed cUtMiic military hawk; July 7, Soores Admin, for eitcaJaUng war by stealth decrie* "guat and butter"; (urn doz"iu of tiuws he urged escalation f war); Aug. 2, Dovish natenvtnt: phaamg out of U.S. troopg; ivôtiate netUemcni; muni tx; ended "faonoralplv ; UKW strategy with fewer meu aud lew cu*t; reject* wilitarv escijatjou; (see June 14) AUK- 4, Nixun and fUxikeft-ller trv to get |:ac plank for Ilepiiblicaa platform; , Uockfeller aid, dra/U neicotiu(''d ^tUeiacnt plank) ; Aug. 7, Kay* he'* more duvii*b but utill tbiuk wur is ble; Aug. U, Hy Hill make end <jf war Li firnt priori ty . be'>) not tiwj to >-trnt iA post; Ai>-(. 10, Johusofi pbooe cull thanks Nixou for huiguaiW! of Vjutnum pia.uk; (A OX- 10, Aguew oppose* easy *)luUou, suys pnU'iitinJ dm/toes whi> are anti-war junt di/ii't want Ui go, JMJI idcljw);
299
11, Gallop Poll ahowB 46% tor .Republican plan to de-Amerioaniae War: Aug. 11, New leadership will end war mud pit-cent new Vietnam*;' won't * ' ' ' ' . ' . . . Auav2fll Bucks JuhnaoB, "no man de-cteaiat*>a until N. Vktnaarodake* mow"; Aug. 21, Nixon, Uaddox back Johnson; x '4fepc j. jtcport that establishment mSigon barta Jfixon; \ 'fcpi-fcScore* Admin, on var; <>e Aug. 20, 21) ' . Sept. 17, WaradoiuVon'<hojibtet'ba*fe*~\ 1 isept. 21, Afww ay Nixon-Agnew wait for right. moment to reveal Vietnam * \nian: Admin. mfrmnage war potitteaUy; : .- . - ; . 8opC2i Agnew ays Nixon bat; iw pUn because ** doesn't fcavt Miougu informatkm- (aCfiSept. 21 abo\T5); -- - &pt.. fc^Tioies not Nixon ' r>6cnition that amê tatemem. that htll briny peaêp*tr better reaction titan another rtinnu on otiicr rtbjaou; - Sept. 35, Jauea ftetrton note? tht Nixoa now t*Uc peace instocid of ww; - -Sept. 26, He can make peaeo betyi thaa Humphrey can; : - ' 29, Hatfidd expn-aacs doubts about Nixco bnnginK peaee~(a*e.J(4Ae 21 5<iS, ' Sept. 3QfS. yiet. ^Seial ay Kixou.riominatioa helpod S. V*-Uam ecnnomy IM,- cm*: now they fcnow U^>. wUt be-then; lor aiv-bae; Oct. 1, Adiocatea Uaiuing abd equipping <f S. Vietaamewi; Oct. 2, Trumv> cl ia bootbinghalt; ~ 1 Oct. 2, Agnew aya liumphrey lioabing bait propneaUi trencthcn Hanoi's hand; Oct. 4, Ditagms wrtli LeMajr ixivocacj of Nucfen* bomb* Cremcmberinc ^Goldwater, '64, againT) ' Oct. 8, Won't accept coalition, auy aettiemcnt jouafe. provide tor political and -''icrriUjrial int^^rity of S. \>tn*Bi; \lctConx~oaa participate H -tftey ncept 5 dt-mocratic procew; opposes U.S withdrawal bwauce would impair VS. credibility; no bombing bait uuluw laves H. iivu; ' ' Oct. 10, He van make peace better than. Humphrey; (* Oct. 8); Oct. 14, Johnfon correct in not accepting "falae peaee"; Oct. 21, Wimld favor tndtuuon in 8. -Vietnamew Gnymuucnt <>f alt grocps that rt-j..ct violet'-':: ,"> . ' Oct. 28, Acainst coalition gov't. (K* Get. 21); says AnWicitn poww WM applied "
Tbr CHAIRMAN The idea th&t in some way becuutws)ic oilwitcd the war irti Ls A rigtit to go on forever or iiidctmitely from ] to lit) or 30 more yar> weeins lo iu<: a ver>- luo^tintcrpre'tttiuii <f the ( "ini.stitutiuii.; I do not underst Kiiii d.e Constitution to tw tlil kiiu! uf an insinmuMit at all. li/.> ym iliink it i? Tht-rc is 110 limit ti u? ^ Mr. IKWIX. 1 would iiot be <jualifiei to cotuuiciit < ttuit jmrticiilar questjoii, Mr. CliairuIaJi. ' . '. The CHAIKMAN. Wbut? Mr. lirtux. ( tbtnk on tbat, us to the Prcsdticni's uttftu'Uo on it, I would n&f.rxuument, sir. But we w'jH furnish a staU'im-nt, as I
~, ^ .ACTUOtcr/ATlUN OF PttKVIOL'ii ADUIKtfltUATi;vN
The CBAtkiiAV. Even the uuthoriz&'ion that the previous d . 'ration obtained by falw /'eprcneniatiort did uot authorize iiwuring a people a chaw? to surt'v^ as u free people. IU basir, ibrutt was to lUi/Lotiec the President to ropoi figpres*ion, which he AiicgcC hud been crv,aif>A again:,:- our own form*. It is more or iew tu^'orjary.tljot we . d<M^t if there has t>wn a actual aggretitiion against our force*. . no iniiic kiion even itt the previous udraii>irtriiw Then* K c*rtIc.k ' were und/uiukiiiR to.guarajju-'' thrsir nglit to ûrvivc an & free that-*'i(> people. TUere is 'i'o titttti'luni really ny which you chn jodg'' who arc A fre'i people. Doyou think that everybody who doe JUH havo our kh>;| of jtoveru;/j<int i UOL a f-ee j>cople? " , :; Not at -iJI, sir.
The Cil.viiuiAN-1 do not citlier. It is a concept that is much too vague to have any meaning t ail^ it seems to me, in a serious ducus*ion of constitutional hworionsttiutjonal restrictions upon the various branches of our Government. ; . --.-INCREASE IN POn^S AXp
There- Ls ono .iher thing I would lilci* to know in eumiccRon with thos requests for the deaths and casualties lut occurred in tic* first 3 months of this year. Is it not a fact thai -there tiro more POW's now tlian there were 2 years *o?~-The POW!i> have- not decreased. They - Jiave bwjn increasing ; have;U'y not? ' . -Mr. ;lKWijr. Yis, sir. -"' . The CHAIRMAN. Thcrthtit, been a substantial increase in nuking in action and POVV's. This idea tliut by* prolonjîu}; the \vir wir are in aoine wny doing the POW's a favor. doe=> wit ncvm to irti. to be very valid.. Ai'c there not more? Would you include along with the other information how many POW's then* HTt> now as compared to last year? Mr. luv-ifi. Vesjwcuill. T (The infoftaation referred to foilowv:)
'
:
US. WISONCre ft DTAR AND MlSSIWC IN ACflON IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Mittm in Kino
Mir 1.1)71
Ft ntimtat
ar
440
42t
rot,,
1 r.J
0*c.?l.lt70. DM 31 IW D 31 INI
1.170 I.OJ7 1 ff.t
i-yc
32/
1 317
Sagrct- 000 AJ0klyrt90rt. i -. COMP^RtSiOV OF.MlUTAJtY CASL'ALTV Gl'KE.S
The CHAIUMA*. Ha\\; you liad : clmncv to rnuJ-'r- a rulriilation, , Iflr. Suilivuti, wlijl' w.t- MW pursiiiiij: I'ICSM- otiic-r qiu-tioft? - Mr.. SLLLIVAN.. Wi..1 Iwvc .-onic. fifiirfh tlat w<? hjvi'j'i^-i'iveil,, >ir. . - Tlu-y do not iiu-ludu figuri-s OIL oviliau ciimiiiliics. The fipircs fur .L",S. killi-d in action for 19"d fit the first quurtcr un J,17is. und for Uwlirî qartfr>f 1971,633. . ;.v.. Tl- C'HAIKMAX. Go ahead. Mr. SriuvAN. Tin- "free world forfi**;," tliimtor Aikrn alô uiJnnl for (lit- rompniison* witJi' J%S. ^n !%>, it wiw 4,Mi9 for the 1'niU-d .Stnte> f*-- thr fir>.t quarter, ;i<J &fij for Ui- "Irtm worUJ forw.*." "The Siiuth VifiiiitrueM- killed in uctioii ii; the fir>t qiinr^r was; W.S, J 0,500; 1970. 4.>5; und 197J-, ,1WI. Unr:inr eonibul d r u t h x were: I9US, 72,4.rj.'i; I97U. 2K.3W; ulid )'J71, 37.717, ' ^ The ('(uiitMAh, In it fiir Ic- .<uv, u i i l i Lhv^' rutluT ini-i>iu\>\<-i Unit t!n p i-c hu-> IHU-II n shift? Tin-re is /, .iijb-I.ii,li.:! i in ili<- noii-C.S. rat.t;iUtii-' bclwren l'J70 ami J V 7 l , lirl
;;\
301
" '' \ :" Mr. ucwiv. 1970 to 1971, yes. sir. The L-iiAiKM-vx. So u;it Ims hapix-iiud is that vvliilo the America1. casual ii<4>jo down thosti Vf l>oth our allies and enemies go up. Is Mint correct? Mr. liiwi.v. That I- \ \ h n t bus hap|cned in tin' first quarter, Mr. Ch.-iirmuu, although licit may huvo fa-en affected by the Laos o]H*rati<iu which was prii'iurilv <-i>iu;uricd by die South Vietnaincso Tin- CK.MKMAV I wonder if I could ask you to calculate till ot the casualty (iûn-. v o ' i have mul make u compiiriMin of tin- numlM-r'of death* of cveryl)odv involved; th:M i>, lKlh (he American* and their v allii-i- ;uil the enemy and aU<> the civilian ca>uallios. Mr. !itvvi\. We will give you the bc>l figures we have, Mr. Chairman. '!"* p. 27.v> Tli-' H.MK..IAN. I tliiak tiic (>xi>rnmnit ought tn l>e concerned nb->ut t i n - f:ict 1 1 m I alili'>ii<;h I lie xvur i> stiid :<> \H- winding down, at I lie ^niiii* time n:ir en>uultie> ô doxvn, this i* nut true for our allies uml t i i e i i t h i - r neop'.e, t h n i i, the civilian* <>f thew t \vncoiin I rie>. Tlwy annot fl'-iirly ullic^. l)n you <-i>iîilcr ( 'nmhodiu mid Luo.s as nllii** in ' t i n - -J-'nr <>r how do you cliiiracti-ri/.c (hem? I d<> not know \\liut to call the civiiuiiis? , Mr. luvvt.v. \Ve do noi h a v e a commitment to < 'aiiilnxliu. .The < ' K A I I : M A \ . J \\a> n liltlr |iiix./.le<l. ivfr. I K W I N . And Lao.- and i- in the.>r\ a neiitial government uhich wf woidil Mi|>|Mrl :r i n M i i r n l pivernmcnt. IJ'il it ha.- I ent ir.viuli-d by tlti- North Vietiniini-e.
A \ \ r . < L At:Tin>Ki/.4.rio\ TO INSUKK KKKMM; OK HK.sH>xiHii.n v Tli-- < ' i r \ [ u \ i > \ . ]>ffoi<- I tiirn you o\ ( -r i. the othi-r meml>et>, I \\niilil like 'I ' I)i-|i:iri mi-ill lo rnii>i((tT a prcpuMil for amending our j>ri-rf-iii |>rneiii-e b\ Imviir/ ilii> coiurniiire and th- .-i.ati- auihorixi* :inutial!\ die H|)|ro|)iinli'"ii^ foe t i n - I)<-|>:H (iin'ht </f S l u l c til a Minilar i lii" VMI\ :i[|>rojiriaiioii> for (lie l)<-fen.M> J)e;itirlmi-ni are. . it x'l-niT, to me the * ude of tie Slate Department (hut !hey do in>! lu-i-d to rentxiiid fo Uir S-uaCe fr inforiûlii'ii may b<> inilucnceil In i lii.- fm-tur. I am umli-r the im|>n-.>sion thai v\hen the S-nuU* or I he .N-iinte ( 'ommit.lee on Armed Service- u>k.- the Depart ment of Defense f|il>--tiol)s, tiiey pit ;tli>vu-4-., ul.il thul olie of (lie rcufolis is the ('ollluiitiei- on 'Armed Service^ auihorixes tuinuuJly tin 1 appropriation* fur (In- D'-fenv Department. Do you not think it would he mucli more orderly if our prwtice were the same, cv>*n to the fame manner, *o llii-p- A'oiild IN* (hi 1 -umr fee,ljn<; of re.->poii-ibiljiy of the StiiU* De|iarf> ini-nt lo tin- (oiipn-f* t}mt, the Fen la-Ton hus? Mr. IUWIN. Mr. < 'iiuirnmii. the Depnrtineiit hu u B4>iiM).</f ri-.|Kii)Mbilit ,' ioi\ard the miiiniii !<<, nn<l one or the imjiortunt (vuii-c.tit, that uc. lur.f ir to work v. if li the rmiiiiiii !<(. 1 think the qiut-timi you (toint L.-i- iioi thai the f>i-[inrt iiK-iii if niiv\illiii(r to ijive any nf hWi-ror testify. I/in tin- jn.ini J a.,-.;inii- you have in mind i.- the qucNtion of f nrnihhing of inu-rmd diM-umen( n , and MI J undcrMand the thrust of what you urc sayiiij: wi'li renju-i t .in documents but I do feel that, we h'ave miswri'd mi'! ulwavo do Mish Ni wiinwi-r and coo|>craU' w i t h (hi; commit I'je.
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.INTERNAL DOCUMtNTS
The CHAIRMAN. What fa your definition of an internal document? What do you mean by an internal document? Mr. .< 'wr-v. Well, "a document that is definitely opened and worked -on wif'jin the Department or is between the embassies and the Department. The CHAIRMAN. Then you included even-thing in internal docuno^nts. Every bit of information that comes from an Embassy you Consider an internal document and we have no right u> have access to it. Is that correct? Mr. IRWIK. Well, that has been my understanding of what has happened in the past, Senator Fulbright. The CHAIRMAN. Is it vour understanding that the Defense Department will not answer the Armed Services Committee's request for estimates, contingency plans or anything else that goes on in the Department? Mr. IRWIN. I am not familiar, sir, with who* the Depalthsnt of Defense does. But my point is it is not a question of not answering the ouestion or not furnishing information. It is a question, I understand from your point, of furnishing a particular document.
COMMITTEE BEQUEST FOB REPORT OF U.S. CONSUL IN DACCA
The CHAIRMAN". Mr. Secretary, there is a very simple question. We requested to sec in executive session tire rfr|>.vrt of the consul in Dacra, just last week L believe. And they refused u> give it to u*. Aii the witness would give was his version of ', his interpretation, his summary. He was unwilling for us to see it. I cannot imagine un example of a document less sensitive or one to which this ommitt>e ought to be entitled. We had a request for this from oiiUiile people; that is, we had information about it based II|MM private information that actually come from a constitute t to the Senator from Rhode Island. All we said is that we would like to see this report, and touch to my amazement the witnett* said, "No, you ninnot nee it." If that is an internal document of the kind you are talking about then anything is. In other word*, we lire not entitled to haw u..y of what you might c'dl btsic re[>ort from the field, from people whom in many cases wn are 4cked to confirm. You have at; Amba*s: dor come here, and we go through the formula of confirming him. I think the general public thinks we also haye a right to know whtvt that Amba.s.-inW report* to this Government wlien he goes out representing u. But vour yiewH differ. Vou At- not think we do. What we arc supposed t Ue natinfied with is <>tir. of your >prcentaf fven wming und *urmnri/,ui and giving tin bis intnrpretelion of whut the^t* ttungs ay. I do tit tliink it U vr y satifactor>'.
DENIAL OF KTATE DKPAKTMEX'T KKCOHf't TO UKNEKAL ACCOL'VflNC OFFICE
Then; iiaj>jM;ri to b a number of other caw*. One that me wan the rr-fu>!tl of the .Stab; Department to xllow the Office to miik" a Himp!" ''oijitiluiiun of
303
or not oiir forces in Berlin are twine reimbursed fully. It U a very simple proposal. Our forces are maintained in Berlin under the agreements with the four powers, including Germany, and are to be reimbursed for their costs. All that the GAO ivas instructed to do was to find out whether that is being lived up to, whether or not we are actually being reimbursed. I really do not understand whv the Slutc Department savs, "Xo, we refuse to allow the GAO to Iwk at the records. Just take our word for it." I submit this whole ronMitutioiuil question is based upon the assumption that we arc not supposed to take on faith the Executive's word for. this or anything: else. There are supposed to be constitutional procedure* by which we abide. I do not think the State Department is respecting the constitutional function of the Senate. This committee is st'aply a representative of the Semite :i!id has been delegated this responsibility to get, information. I think you are taking a very cavalier attitude that it is none of our business and it is none of GAO's business. I do not think that is acceptable in an orderly government.
INSTBU'TIOX OF AMBASSADORS NOT TO ANSWER QUESTIONS
I could cite many other instances, but there is no use burdening vou. We had last year several cases in executive session where the Department had instructed Ambassador* not to answer questions. In those cases I do not talieve we were specifically asking for documents. We were asking the Ambassador to, I think, Thailand. I will have to refresh tny memory. Anyway, there were a c-ouple of cases in which the Department had instructed the Ambassador not to answer the questions.
AMX4-X.L V. AUTHOUIZATION OF
v
~ATK UEPABTMEN'T BCIÊT
I think this nullifies the wliole function of the Senate and this committee, and I do not think it i* arccptable. I arn considering in view of thin offering an aniriulwfiit at the pro|>er time to require annual authorizations. May IK- if we authorize the State Department's budget annually, you would feel a greater resjwnrability to make available .basic documents simply is that we ran know what we are doing. ] think I will offer such an amendment, and I will ask your opinion of it, whether you approve it or not, in due time. You fan be thinking aboul it anyway. Mr. THWIV. I would only say, once again, Mr. Cliuinnati, UK; Depttrltncnt does have a deep wn.ie of responsibility to the committee. It has a difference of view on particular case*. (}n I he documentary bide yon ineidioned, the difference is not an indication of a cavalier attitude, sir. The riiAFKUAV. You have a very unusual way of showing that from Hh/de Island, I'KI,', . I would like 10 defer for n inoiin'iit, n-, 1 am pulling my thoiightri together, ro the Sefiat<r from \ew Jerwv. 'The CHAIRMAN-. TJu- Senator ^f"fn -V-w Jewy; he 1'jokn jiri*|iarcl. Senator CASK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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USE OF THAI TBOOPS IN LAOS :
Mr. Secretary, I would like to direct my questions to you to a particular phase: (he mat tor of the use or Thai troops in Laos. I have written the Secretary of State asking certain questions about the extent to which Thai" troops ore being used and how \\r are financing: them. I expect I shall be hearing from him in due course, bin I would like now to ask you some of these questions. In the Christian Science Monitor of April 17, George Ashworth reported it was well known tin-re were between 4,000 nnd 6,000 T!iai tr<v>ps paid by the United States in Laos. Is that collect? Mr. IRWIN. Senator Case, I know you lia\v written to the Secretary, and there will bo a reply to that letter. I understand that there was a briefing in executive session of this committee on all t i n - aspects of I In- Thni and Laotian troops, an I I have really neither I he knowledge nor do I have anything to add to whrt was h"en in executive session. Any discussion of the Thai troops w.nild be pro|Mr fo'r an executive session, sir, and 1 would request that. Senator CASK. \Vliv? Is it not something tht't the North Vietnamese know about? We are not, surprising them. \Ve are not keeping anything from rhe enemy in this matter. What is tin- reason for not disclosing it t<> the American jn-ople. who an- paying for it. if indeed they are? Mr. IKVP.'. Well, if I may, sir; I would still prefer to defer it to an executive session. . Tht: CHAIRMAN'. May I interrupt? I do nf recall being bnefed on thU. When was this? Senator CA&E. 1 did not recall myself and 1 thought |>crluips I had missed a session to which I was not invited. Does tin- Secret:try know when this was? Mr. IRVIX. That wa my understanding. I( w:is> not by the Stiite Department. Senator CAK, You mean by Mr. Helms? Mr. IHWIN. it wus not by the State Department, but I understood the committee had a briefing but not bv the State Department. Senator CAKE. Was this the one by Director Helms? Mr. fuv/lV. It e-oiild have le.cu. The CHAIBMA.V. When was thi*? Sc>nator CAKK. Mr. Helms has ujtiwureil U-fore the 1:011111111 tee. 1 am not (u-rtaiu exactly when. I would want, to check the nu'onl because I do nov want \<> say something was not discussed, t-iiiuu 1 was not able to lx there during the whole time lie testified. He. may have included tliis, this ptut s|ring in hi general review, but I do not recall. That siiggolh, does it not, that if we are involved in this matter, it is an involvement, through the C.l\. I shall look forward to gutting the answer tn this letu-r. Mr. fiiufv. W. ,ir. .V'ii;i''ir ('\.-rK. ('mild you coHKn'-Dl mi |||^ question in 11 Iiypotheiieui v,y? \ji-i n siip|M)*c that the L'nitt;<! Siaie-, (iovenimefit |H financing Thai troop* fighting in Liu>, FurUu'rmore, sijppow, the Thais are fighting up in ilie north in the I'luin of Jur^, Would you My tha< . thU WHS in conformity w i t h the Cooper-Chun:!! j>rovis//, xigne'1 into luw by the HreMdent. wliicli ban fnndn to foreign troopw in tjtu>* or Cambodia excc|t Ui protect tlie safe a'ul orderly withdrawal of
305
American riH|)s from South YieUiam r ti> aid.in the release of our prisoners. Would you comment on thai on ft 1iyjx>tlieti<*.al basis? Mr. IKWIV. Yes, I rer.lly would prefer not to ^peculate on it, Senator Cade, aitil there will be an answer coming to your letter, sir... Senator CiSE. I draw to your ut tent inn again that 1 am not asking alniut the Ho Chi Minh Trail area. Mr. IKWIX. 1 understand. Senator C\SE. But ratlu-r t-he fighting in the north of Laos. Mr. IKWIN. Ye>\sir;I uiiderstaiid. Senator CASK. 1 expect this is related to the survival of the Iâotiau regime.
. U"Ot;U> A<;i:EEUENT TO FIVANCR THAI TltOOP* COME BEKOKB SENATE*
May 1 a>k y>si again hypothciie.tlly, if thc<e Thai troojis are being funded '>y the UnJU-d States, where is the money coming from? Mr. Ashworth rejwrts that an agreement has been made with the Thai Government. Could 1 ask you, along with the other question, should that M>rt of agreement come before the Senate for ratification? After all, v;e would be furnishing funds and perhaps other things to Thais, so th'at thev would fight in Laoa? Mr. luvviv. Well Senator CASE. Would that agreement be one xlitrli ought to come before lliis committee and the Senate for ad via; and consent? Mr. IKWIN. 1 am not fainiiif r with tlu; detail::, S-nstor Case. 1 told you earlier that the information via* iN-ing collected. I am not fi iniliar eb'jugh to try to îiivuiare. Senator CASE. Would you not have an opinion on that in a hypothetical way? Mr, luwis'. Well, the opinion I would have is that the Government is acting according to ami tiviug up to whatever re>trictioiii Congn-ss has put on. Senator CASK, f am sony, I could not quite hear you. Mr. luwiv. I sa'ui my opinion would be that the Government U ni4!utiug restrictions that, the Congre.s hub placed on c.vDvnditure of fun-la. Sfnitttor < 'ASE. la the AdminiMration meeting the constitutional provision in regard to sharing responsibility with the S-iifile? Mr. IHWJ.V,, And any rest rid ion> on ilic u- of funds the Congress has placed on tlu? Executive. SeJiator CASE. We have conic to I he questions of whether there is all agreement or, if there i ngreetnetit for u to finance Thai troops, whethci such an agreement would have lo ctinu- before the Senate for ratification. Mr, IUWIN. Well, I asiiitme that would all depend on the ty|v of agreement, sir, I think, tljcn; are a. variety of ways that oiu; ciui give furujh u> u country -and we (yjn stxjculate- -without the necx.-iw.it> of agreement and without the iiornml military nihtunce ,igrec.mnt. Senator CA8E. There, ai'e, of course, various wuv. Mr. Iitwis,-, If you are uoelling out w<ty in which there could be different agreemenu, tiien I think you itould npell out term* wlierehy t'lere would be a need for an agreement. Senator CARE, J,et UK a^.urne that the e>w!inu' of the agreement u that we are hiring Tliai troopv to fight in Lao*.,
306
Mr. IRWIN. Well, I would prefer not to ^Htculote in this area, Senator Case. It is an ana that I would prefer to handle by answering your letter so we can get specific answers. C Senator CASE. I do not press you to say anything which you do not think you should. -BASIS FOR CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION COXCELNtKO .PA.Y1CENT OF THAI TROO*S '
The CHAIRMAN. Vfiil the Senator yield for a question on that point? Would you say what is the basis for classification of information about oar paying Thai troops to serve in Laps? I assume you are saying this is classified. Why would that be classified? Mr. IBWIN. It couIJ be classified because of the situation within Thailand or the attitude of Thailand. It could be classified for reasons bevond just the question of the United States assisting a country. The CHAIRMAN. The fact that we pay the Korean tioops to fight the) - is public knowledge. There are 50,000 of them and very 1 ajjjc amot nfs are paid. Why would Thailand be classified? It seems to me th<* Senator from New Jersey is quite right. This is information that t le people who pay for it ought to know about. It is not the tyjie < f thing that ought to be secret. beratorUASE. It certainly does bear upon the subject of this mon. va broad inquiry, Mr Chairman. T.i JHAIRMAN. Of course, it docs. Senator CASE, It bears upon what legislation we can or ought to consider in dealing with the whole question of Southeast AMa find the activities, restrictions or regulation of our Government's activities in that area. This is certaitdy a very important kind of activity, if it does involve the hiring of mercenaries to fight. The f'HAiBMAV. That is right. It it is part of Vietnamization that ua wr wifhdi-flu' we arc going to employ a lot of Thai troops or Burmese troops or MnlnVhisiii trô{M to do the fighting, I think we ought to know about it and it ought to be a policy hich we ougiit to approve or disapprove. We ought to have some, knowledge. Senator CAMS. ft has jwlicy ramifications going far beyond tb money *[>eiit, although tile money itself is not an inconsiderable factor and one in which thi |>eople and the Congress ought to be involved.
LKVKL or C.K. AIK ACTIVITT IV XOBTHEhl." LAOS
Have we iiicT'-ast-il our air activity during the pa*f year in the northern part of \MH, B-."2 actinty, for example? Mr. Srf4.lVA>f. The answer. Senator, i* the overall use of military air over the northern part <>f Lao* over the but year has decreased over t!ie previous year. Stniat/r C'AKK. I am sorry; I have the tng end of a wld'ond T only ( :iUrh thing* that are of rather high de/;ibel. Mr. SULLIVAN. I understood your quetion wiu wJiether the levd of IT.S, air activity over Xortbern IJ&IM incretwed over the pa*t< year. The aimwer u no, it has decreased thiH year with rwpeet to the level thnt <-xite<i lout year,
307
Senator CASE. Are B-52 strikes in Northern Laos greater this year iiu they were last vear? Mr. SULMVAX. I do not have any particular information on B-52's. Senator CASK. What were yon talking about? Mr. SULUTAH. Overall U.S. sorties, sorties of U.S. aircraft. Senator- CASE. You mean you give equal weigh to one B-52 sortie and to one helicopter sortie? Mr. SULLIVAN. :I assume you mean strike aircraft, that is to say, botubcrs. Senator CARE. But I am talking about B-52's. Do you have that l>rkeu down before you? With you? Mr. SULLIVAN. No, I do not. Senator CASE. Does anybody in your statf A-fao is hero with you? Mr- IRWIN. We will furnish it. Senator CASE. Does anyone have it here, Mr. Secretary? Mr. IKWIN. No, sir. S*-j;atr>r CASE. No on> has tliis information, Does no one know r it u> a mutter of general knowledge in this whole troop of people who have come .-with you? No one Chows any answer to this? This is terribly iiiij>ortant., 1 think, I cannot believe that knowledgeable - peoples including the Under Secretary of Stale, do not know the 'answer to this Question in general terms. I do not mean the number of alrik?*, I)iit I nm talking about in general terms B-52 air activity fn northern Laos. Mr. Inwiv. We liave overall (onnugc, sir, but .re do not have B-52 broken out. Sfj.aUir Cist-. I know you aivj looking at u uock. I arn talking to .-.the top of your htowl, Mr. Secretary. : Mr. IRWIN. No, ^sir; I rrgrot to say I do not know the answer to th.it [iiutifiiltir qu'-stioii. St-nntor (^'ASE. Aiul the Mirnr i> true of your U.I&M -iatfs-here. You <lo not know, Mr. SU.LIVAV. Not broken out by individmJ aircraft tyjH-h, no, sir. or CASK. All rijrlit, in pom-rid, B-52's arc H partiuuhir . . Mr. SULLIVAN. Tlu-y an- u^<l aiul a>n?idi:n;d us tiwticid airrrnft and they nrr. jm;(- liuupft.1 in uith tin* tot-aj. S.-natiw CAHB. Vou do not, know whether thi-n- is more atrtivity by B n2V in Korthcrn Lro1 this ythr than year ago? Mr. SIM.UVAS. J liavt not i\v fijpin-i od tliat, no, sir. STuiur CASE. You what, sir? - . Mr. Sci-LiVAN. J do not finvc UH- (igun^s on that, but. we can get ~yr:; that. Sftj.-itor CASE. Do you know in urni-mi. not tfio jirucio* figures? ^Jr. M'I.LIVAN. No. t-if, I do not nsally know. I cun g.-t the iigurs ( 'ASB. J urn .ur- von i-un mul I would lik/; to Iiavv thurii for tlw n^-ord, luf 1 am niulfy nom'.'whut ui'ia/x-d that the UM Iovi-1 of -nt of SUiU- would nut, know the answer to this bro;ul tiori. I Imvfl tn ttay that. referral t/ follow *:>
m
B-52 SoraKft RAT>: IK NORTH tôs (DKPABTMKNT or STATK) The B-52 sorties rmte in North Laos was higher iu the lint quarter of 1970 thau in the first quarter of 1971.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to renew my notes here but I Jo not want to delay others. The CHAIRMAN. We will conic back to that. Senator Pell? Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr.'Ohstirman. Mr. Secretary, I think there is general consensus that the President is trying to wind down this war. The coivflict bet ween our Executive and this committee, I guess, is we sec the residual force remaining there for a longer period than I think the President would indicate to the public are bis present intentions.
PROBLEM Or ASYLUM
In view of the fact that our mistaken intervention in this Vietnamese war is winding down, I have two general questions. One concerns the roblem of asylum. Many of us who followed this conflict for some years ave been very much concerned what happens to those South Vietnamese who, wIietlHT for reasons of cujmlit y or patriotism or whatever, would hare their throats cut if we left. I think we owe these people some form of asylum. Are there any contingency plans or is anv t'tc-Î.t- being giv>n to some fonn of help for those South Vietnamese xvho would find themselves in that position if. nft-r we withdrew, their government WHS not able t'i hold jff Hanoi. Mr. IRWIM. I know of no specific plans. Senator Pell Senator PELL. !><> you think ihe Department would be uMling to consider their admiwion to the United State*, for instance, or finding alternative asylum for them in some oth<r country? Mr. IKWIN. I think it certainly should consider their weH-iwin-.', ye*, sir Senator PELL. Tins is a problem thai could arise.
c.s. Acrivrrr IN LAOS AND CAMBOIMA AFTEH VIKIXAM WITHDRAWAL Another question u- we wind down is in Lxos und (Cambodia whTe we Ijave a fair degree of activity now. When uc have wound down in Vietnam, and I trust have pulled out, even if there were a residual force, but no participation by our men in combat activities, would we continue u> curry on our present mililnry support lo Cambodiu :md our nrexent air activity in I Mini Mr. IHWJN. President Nixoit linn sjoken of the, oneness of liulo-. china, and part of his program of Vietnumi/ntion and moving out the troo|> and negotiating in J'uris is the attempt (o t>nT'^ pcoi-r to the whole area! Vietnami/iilion, ofnnjr^ 1 , I!IH-S not de|H?ii'l </n w h a t <"'cui>> in C'ainbodia or I>aos. We have no commitment i., '..'..^jlioditi und Laos is in thein,', us I iiul'ciitcil x-in-li'-r, neu'rtil en'uiiry n<l we liojw fhut this neiili-iility lll be pres-rvei!. At the moment, u.- y->u know, (he Soviets have an Kmbunoy t,i Ijoth LHJH> und (Jambodiu. Senator PKU.. In the definitjon of fndochiiiu. 'I'lmilmid, formerly not included: \ that Mr. JHWJV, That is correct.
Senator PEU.. So, I would preMime we would have relationship with her as a SEATO ally and not a protocol state. Mr. IKWIX. That in-true. Senator Pcix. I do appreciate your hting uere and getting into munv problems in \vhicJi you have noi been intimately concerned. but 1 would like to touch for u moment on another subject if it would IK* in order, Mr. Chairman. That' >fould le (Jreere. Tito CiiAiicMAV I have no objection.
USE F II-52'S IX SOUTHERN' '-AOS
Senator CASE. I have no objection either. I would like very much to liettr your inquiry alviut that subject, but may I ask one question on Vietnam before \oii do thai? Senator PEUL. Pfea.se do. Senr. tor CASE. It is brought to my attention welmx'e not asked a simple question. Have our B f)2's U-cn used in the fijrhtinp: in Northern L:i' by the udmiiiiMralion? Mr. IHWIN. Ye--, sir. . Senator CASE. They have been?
Mr. IRWIV. Yes, sir.
.Senator C-.SB. J had not rralfred thai that was not on the ro'^rd :t:u! i unjiriM ilc your putting it on (he record. Thank you. Tlir CHAIICM\\. To roiilinue t h u t , eoiieernin'r the simple question a* t whether or not the rule of boinbin;; raids by B-S2's is higher in the first .'( month;, of tliU year coiitixired to last year, do you want, to leuve the n-'-ord that you do not know whether they are hi<rlier in the first 3 months of this year or last year? Mr. Iiwiv. Y-s. >ir; I do not know. Mr. Chairman, as to breaking jniit flic :8~?2'-. As Ainlussii<l/jr Sullivan said, he had u figure on the overall activity, but I do not know mvself. The CiiuKMA.v. For your infonijatiijn, maybe it i.-. i;iy d u l v to tell yon tliiil our infonnntioii I" that it i* siil^tf.nlirdly hf^her tliis year than it UJK lost ycur. Maylx- you oiijrlil lo look into it. T^be rabies thai we received .cttjiie through your Department. I ass;iitfed you read f i n - i n . Some|M>,ly in the Department doe<. But 1:0 ahead. C\SK. Thank you, Mr. Chnirmna. . _
r.s. VJKW o^ nir^KN'T f.ur.r.K

\'Kili~ I wa concerned' .heruiise when Si-eretary Stfti>s v/as m Atl.cn- iifwuit. I" days nô. he madt* w>mc Matenients them uhic-h have _ not re-ally "been comniHiled on, pjirli/'i'lai'ly in the exenjthv. l>rul:ch. The Seerelary praised the "senx; of nw'urity" of the Amerietin invj-sfni'Mits there, unr) then, rjirn'inp letter fom the President, qnoled tltr President, Hs oarieil ill the New York TilJK-- ln'tween r|ii^t.iiiir murk*. >i- -ayinjc, "J/es.L wishes for the e.ontiiiiied welfare uri'! jro.perity of the peotilc of Tireeiv," Mr. Slims also eSkpie-s^d'thr1 Preideni'-, "warm rejrmvj for the jH*o[ite of (in-ere for the wonrforful way in wiiii-h Greece Jjus kc.pl its e^niirjiitrnîJiN to NATO and for th<imy in which the'two caunlrie-; are working fawt-licr." Tli'' baii: I'niiuiiiiriir'iilK to \ATO eiime from I he treamble which, - y^n know, makes smrie refer/'jiu 1 lo I he /oiiimoirlierilapii of t'ivi-
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, j>eoplcs founded OH the principles of diwowacy, individual liberty, nnd the rule of law. To putAiuorican policy back in perspcc-tive. And in DO way trying to embarrass you, for the public record could y<> gire us your i<lca of what our view is of the preterit Greek Government? I think one of the things that is necessary is for our public and. through- our public and the media, the Greek public to be aware of \vlint I kn<>v is our view of the Greek Government. But so far our viiMy has alwax>. liecn expressed rather qufctlv, and I think that not only thfe Greek Junta should be aware of (fin fact the\ are rather disapproved of within our Government, but the Greek people also .should foe aware of that. If I ain mistaken, ihou my new should l>e corrected. I would be very grateful if you could comment on that . Mr. IRWIN. As you know, Senator Pell, Greece is a member of NATO and in. therefore, an ally through the XATO agreement. WitKn^-x''1 to .the present Government of Greece we have bceu âppointed they have not carried out the reforms that at one iiinc tlw\ .-aid tbev were going to. Secretary Suns was there ou a commercial niL-snn, and whatever lie sjHjcifir.all}- .said he was shaking in term* of eii<: uraging b'.isiiio.-s, but that Is not to say in any way that we approve of the withholding of civil liberties in Greece. Senator PELL. Dili the Department f Slate, which \\u s'bility for the ondi|i:t of our relation;) with foreign go have an opportunity" to '-tair the S*ans âtcniMit or H|RMay Ixj yuu can submit that answer for (he record. Mr. IKWJ.V. I will do that. . Senator PELL. Thank you. (The information referred to follows:)
OJTOBTUXJTT O'- ST*TK DCFAKTICKKT To RKVICW SK-KETAKT STAK' SPKKCH IK ATHEKS (Dr-fAUTVErr or ST>TK) A a matter of courtesy, Secretary SUns gave tb<: Oepurtruent of Su'f the opportunity to review the draft of tatemenU be planned to make in Atht-u*. Thr draft did not, of course, include Mr. Ktani extmporncou* remarks.
Senator PELL. No further questions, and thank you. Mr. luwiv. Thank you, Senator Pell. The (.-HAIBMAN*. Did I ak j'ou in those figures to give us ;ludvilian cavalries, top? Mr. IKWIJ., Ves, sir, you did,
DOE* V SIT El) STATES BOMB VILLAGES IV X JKTHEKV LAOS?
Tlu- t'HAiKMAV. One further thought lx>ut ihe question that the Senalor from New JPFKKV raised about the u; of B-52'tr in North'-rn Jâos. Tliis w t'unl in, of wurac, with the question of. tli* civilian casualties that I mentioned a moment ago. I saw a piece in the puper suyinjr M-C. lia^J taken the fKwifujn that we did not bomb village* in N'orthern IâoH un<\ we had not created refuge/*. Is that a fact? Mr. Jwiv. There have bcn very careful rules to seek to avoid bombing of village*. The rHAJKMAV. What do they bomb in Northern JAO*, if it jh not village*? Mr. IKWIV. They are seeking to bomb enemy troop formation* un<! linen.
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The CHAIRMAN. Which enemy is that? Are those the Chinese people on the road or what an they? Mr. IRWIN. The North Vietnamese. The CHAIRMAN. North Vietnamese troops in the forests? Mr. IRWIN. In North Laos. The CHAIRMAN. You have not bombed villages in North Laos. You g*y "seeking to." I was asking what you really did and not your purposes. Haveyou bombed villages? Mr. IRVON. Well, one figure I have seen, Mr. Chairman, is that there have been over the years some 300,000 refugees created in Laos. Of those 300,000 some 20,000 come from the areas in which there has been bombing. But if I may ask Mr. Sullivan to speak on this to Air. SCLUVAX. The total number of refugees in the past 10 years is about 700,000, and out of that 700,000 about 20,000 have come from areas which have been in regions which have been bombed by U.S. aircraft. Of those 20,000 we are not sure how many were in areas that actually saw or experienced bombing. Many of them said they left because of their fear of bombing, but they were in areas where there was ground combat as well as air sweeping through their villages. But to answer your specific question, Mr. Chairman, the rules in IMS are such that if the Air Force wishes to conduct a strike, it has to get a clearance first from the Embassy that there is no civilian habitation in the area in which it is striking. The Embassy reviews these requests in relationship tot only to photographic but other information that they have wiuch gives them the assurance before they authorize such a request. The CHAJRMAX. The American Kmbassv approves or passes judgment upon the bombing bv Amen -an planes. That would include theB-52's? Mr. SBLUVAV. Yes, sir.
LAO AIR FORCE AN'D ARMY
The CHMRMAV. What about the Ijao Government? Can we control tho bombing by the IAO Air Force? Mr. SCU.IVAV. Xo, sir; we do not have a control over what their actual operations entail, but they generally observe the same rules in that they do not bomb areas that are inhabited by civilians. But we cannot and we do not control their operations. 'Die CHAIRMAN*. All their equipment and pilot* have been trained by us, have they not? They have no equipment that we have not furnished. Mr. SULUVAV. That is correct, sir. 'Die CHAIRMAN. We built that up substantially in the last year or two, did we not? Mr. SfLLiVAX. Yes, sir; we have. The CHAUIMA v. Is this also, Mr. Secretary, a part of Vietnaroizatioii that we in/Tease very substantially the Iâo Government'* Anny ai:d Air Force'/ Mr. luwiv. No, sir; that would not be a part of Vietnami/ation in the sense of our withdrawal from Vietnam.
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VIET.VAIUZATION CONCEPT AS APPLIED TO LAOS AND CAMBOUIA The CHAIKUAN. I <lii not quite get it. Is it or is it not a pan of the Yietnamizatinn concept to greatly increase the Air Force and Army of the La Government? Mr. IKWIX. It can bo n |mrt of a broad Vietnamization concept to increa.se the Lao strength so that they may defend themselves over lime \vithout support from the United States. Mr. CHAIRMAN. I that also considered part of the Xixon doctrine? Mr. IK\V(\. in the sense that a> one can withdraw American forces and one increases the strength of local forces it could ho so considered. The CHAIRMAN. Do we consider that we have an obligation under the Vietnamizatioii concept to insure a reasonable chance to survive H--. H free jjtcoplc to the Laotian |M*opIe also? Mr. IKWIX. N'o, sir. Tin- CHAIRMAN. Why not? Why do yni distinguish between them und the Vietnamese? Mr. IKWIN. Well, the Laoiiun (iovcnmieiit. its 1 have said, is a neutral government. After the Geneva Accords in I9('2 thr North Vietnamese kept s.iH'_> of their forces in Laos. The Royal Lay Govcrniiicnt has at times requested support from the United States, and we have IKVII sup|>orling Lao forces. But there is no obligation The CHAIKMAX. If we withdraw are they 114.1 as likely to he -.nbjeeied to the same ri>k> of llnl U-ing n free JM*O|I|C MS. (he South Vi<-liiHiiie4-?Sup}Mt>ing we takeout the ('I A, Anny.and (he Thai troop.-, if th'-re are any there, are they tint likely to le subjected to whatever niuy hu|)|)en to the South Vietnamese? Mr. IKWIV. If we should withdraw what support we do give, that is possible. On the other hand, there ure values to a neutral government, as you know, in IMO*. As I mentioned earlier, some of the Communist Male-, have emhuaaic* in Vientiane and it may IK* that Laos will contrive to hnvc a neutral government even if we would withdraw completely the support we give. The CHAIRMAN'. In t h a t connection, do you feel thi> same concept applies to Cambodia? We could not withdraw our -upport to Cambodia until we are a.viircd they have u reasonable chance to survive us H free people? Mr. fuwiv. We huve no commitment to Cumhodi:i, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIUMAV. What < > ommitment do you have to South Vietnam that is so different? Mr. IIIWJN. Well, we have The CiiAiicMAN', Why do you dicriniiuaU' between the South Vietnamenc and the Cambodians? Mr. Juwix. Well, in Cambodia, we have no troops. We are giving military a>M.>tanc^. The CiiAMiMAN. You huvf given them a great deal of money. Mr. IIEYUK. We IIHVC given military n>.-.i>funcc, but we huvc no troop-, and ue have no i^roblem of wirhdrautil from Cumboiiiu. The C i i A i u U A V , You h a v e increased your KinhuwV too, I expect. Wliut i-'Jt, about H. 10(1 now? It wu.- le> limn 10 before the invasion; wa it not'' It i- about 100 or more now; \-> it not? Mr. Sfi,uvAV. A l i t t l e |es- iluui a hundred, I ihink K0oineihing the hut figure I saw.
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OKIOIN OF PRESENT COMMITMENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM
The CHAIRMAN. Where did the commitment to five South Vietnam a chance to survi\-e as a free people arise? What is the origin of that commitment? ^ Mr. IRWIN. I think it is in the origin of haxing been in there fighting for 10 years, Mr. Chairman. ; The CHAIRMAN. There is no commitment other than our fighting presence? Mr. IRWIN. 1 knotv of no written commitment. The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean. Mr. Irwin. Do you wish to speak to that? The CHAIRMAN. It i very difficult for me to find IP your policy any theme of, well, any p >licv, as a matter of fact. It is^n ltd hoc action to a particular situation, It seems in manv cases. As Mr. Pell indicated in Greece we are not committed to a free government at all, even though they are allies under NATO. We assume no resjKmsibility there to give them a chance to survive as a free people; do we?
PURPOSE OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY QUESTIONED
This is what bothers me very much and <"^,'*o doubt upon the serioujJiess of your announced purpose ofr giving them i reasonable chance to survive as a free jvjople. It is ve y difficult to sex- why you are so much more concerned about the Scuth Vietnamese being a free jeople than you arc the Greeks or the Pakistanis or any of theie other people with whom we are associated. Thi* bothers us as to what really is the policy and, as I said a moment agt, not just in this administration, but in the previous one. The rationt lization for the continuation of the war seems to shift all the time. It shifts from one doctrine to another and leaves us with a feeling that we do not '!> understand the purpose of this administration or its predecessor; and frankly, leaves some jx'oplc with the belief that you really are not serious about withdrawing from Southeast Asia. I wish we could be more convinced of it. Jf there Is anvthing you could do Mr Iitwis. Well, 1 think the most convincing argument, Mr. Cliairman. is tin; fart of the number of troops ( h u t have been withdrawn, the ftu-l that the President hus met hi* withdrawal schedule each time he ha btaU-tJ, und the fact that he ha* rontinued to have additional withdrawals. TJie {'HAIKMAV. Von nii-= tlie |>oint I am trying to mukc. It i not the pliVMeul withdrawals of our soldie.r>>, although he Im.-> never made a commit inent to withdraw all soldiers. Jt wus only the rombtit soliheix The President has never .-aid thenwould be no, a* he railed it, residual fonvs, hut uiuit is happening, of cour.M-, i (his dear buildup of otlier forcj'.-i. Tliev Imve alretuiy built up and ure su];j>orting und paying mi iiffny of. 1 believe the lust figure 1 heard wu* 1,HXJ,(K)0 South Vi'-fnaHii;*.!. Now we are building uji an anuy and an uii1 forw: in Liio ut great- cost. We jire u|>|irtiiig very large army with money HinJ arm.*. J Ix-Iieve the army in CumbrMliu hu.-. hern inrrcuMid from around .''.S.IXW to 210,000. ]> that not the present goal for v.hirh we are paying aiul bU]>plying (licni? it leuve*. \ery etjuivocnl lliU /.ituution of ure w<- withdrawing or Minply going to ^tuy there by |roxy and
W-2.W-71 21
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main tain a skeleton residual force to protect the Air Force and Xavv. We still have a large Xavy offsliore then-. We have the base* in Thailand. The President never said he was oiii to withdraw from the bases in Thailand. I do not think I recall any withdrawal of troops in Thailand. Has there been a withdrawal in Thailand? Mr. IRWIN. Then- hnve lee.n some withdrawals from Thailand. The CHMKMAN. How many men do we have in Thailand now? Mr. SULLIVAN. Bv July 1 of this rear we will have about 32,000. We will have withdrawn 1.0(>0. The CHAIKUAX. What did we have at the peak in Thailand? Mr.SnuvAX. 4X.OOO. The CHAIKMAX. We w ill be down to 32.0JX). Mr. SrixiVAX. Yes. sir. The CIIAIUMAX. The President has never said he was goim; to wit luiraw from Thailand; has he, Mr. Secretary? Mr. IKWIN. No, Mr. The CHAIICMAX. There L- no comtnitment to 4(0 t h a t ? Mr. IKWIX. N<>, sir. Tin- CHAIICUAN. So it lea\e* up in the air the question of whether there i any real inUuiUoa on the part of die administration to w i t h draw completely our physical forces from this area niiil have only normal, we will say, embassies. Is there at all? I think it is still amhivalent : is it not? It is an ambiguous situation. Mr. luwix. The withdrawal program has been directed to the t roops in Viet num ; yes. sir.
COXCKPT OK NbfTIUL V I E T N A M OU I MM" I I I X A
Is there any consideration Ix-in^ <nven in the I)i-|i:trtment for the concept of a neutral Vietnam or neutral Indochina? 1 do not care which. I inettii either or both. Mr. luwix. Well, if this were the way the :>iulli Vietnam (Jovenimcni wished to o we would approve. This i what we ho|M'i would be accomplished in IAOS in the eary rly Mxtic* nnd we are tyrinj: t< preserve thiit iK-ijirulity. The ClJA'.tMA.V. ^ ou rnilcmlxT seteral years aô the coinmiltre commi--.î>ned MHIIC very < > onijict< > nt j>coplc in various institutions. I'riin-cUii). primarily. I liclievc to study t.i' 1 poîbilitics of ncutri'li/.atiot) us , policy t h a t we could buck that mi-rlil promote a iicjroliatcd M-t (lenient. Are \oii fnmiliur w i t h tlmt study? Mr. IHWIS. No, I am not. sir. Tin' (.'HAIKMAX. You are not. We would be <;lad to ffive you u copy sometime. Nfr. I n w i x . Thank sou. Th<' ( , ' H A I K M A N . It is a very iiil'Teniing one. Mr. iitwix. I would appreciiitc iiaviu<; one,
' 'fcPT OK V I K T X A M 1 7 . \ r fox I . K A I H M ; TO I > J S K X ' ; \ < ; K M K X T (|fi;.STIOXei)
h<- ('iiAiitMAV. It mjjrlil h<-|p. Tin- id'-ii was tlutl we could disuê from bcin^ t i n - putron of an> of llicM- govern men IP. and n^ there w i t h u Itirî- jtr'-M-nce. 1 nm frank lo MI\ I urn not at ,i!l r that Vi'-tnumi/ulioii, MS such, roiilînplute* t h a i kind of w i t h -
315
drawal. It seems to me it is quit* possible that it is designed not to get our military forces out of either iâos or Thailand or completely out of South Vietnam, or that wo will not continue to be the principal foreign power in those countries. " :s has gone on and you have been very patient. All I can sav is 1 ho|>. you understand we are not at all critical of you as individuals, but we have great difficulty in following the policy, or understanding it. I think I am not the only one who is bothered by the thought, us I have been for a long time, that the concept of Vietnamization doc* not lead and is not calculated to lead to our disengagement from Laos or Indochina, certainly not Southeast Asia. I suppose there art- those who tlunk that we should not consider this and who consider those who think we should, to be as they now call them. neoisolationists. If that is true we were neoisolationists for a long time because we did not usvi to IK- in such force in any of Indochiua. Before we can really make a pood judgment of whether it is wise or not, we have to understand what the jK)licy amounts w. Frankly, I say it docs not seem to ine it has very mm-ii depth; nor is it calculated to bring a!>out what is the sometimes announced purj>osc.
HAS PUKMIlENT COMMITTED HIUSKLK TO COMPLETE WITHDBAWAL?
I am not sure that I could say the President has ever committed himself to a complete military withdrawal. I do not mean not have diplomatic relations or anything of that kind, but a complete withdrawal. Do you consider that the President has committed himself to a coinpleJft withdrawal from Indochina? Mr. IKWIN. No, if you mean by withdrawal that tiic United States would furnish no more military*supplies, no mere military uid, no more of anything. I think these would continue. The CHAJHMAN. He has not committed to do that? Mr. IKWIN. But I think he has spoken of total withdrawal of American forces, combat forces. The CHAIUUAN. Combat forces. Mr. luwiv. American forces. The CIIAIKMAV. Would that include^ Air Force? Mr. IKWIN. I think it would The CHAIUUAN. We have had this difficulty with term*. It used lt> be ground c-owbal force* wlien we were talking about (>Kj>er('liurcli. Tin-re is this hifting of terminology all the time. Thiink you very much, Mr. Secretary. 1 regret that there is not better communication between the executive and the Senate in foreign policy, but I would hojw thut you would look at the record of tin* various bearing* in which we have IM-CII denied the kind of information to which many of IK think we ure entitled. Mr. IHWIV. Ves, Mr, ('liuiriuan, may I a<ld just one lu>i sentence in I hut q(ic->tioii of wilhfiniwul? In the President's ntalcnieiil- of April -!*, !)' suiiI and I quou-: "The Americans are coming home and we will nchieve our {;oul of u totul withdriiwul." The < 'HAIIIMAN. l)<n-> thut H||)!y only to Yie.titum? Nfr I K U I N . That iiicuiin N'iclinun; yen.
The C I I V I K M A V . Do von think il mean* all kind of force*?
Mr. IBVIK. I think it means forces, but I would put in the word an pport. support. .^ ,; Tlif (.'HAiRHANvAdviscrs? Mr. IRWIN. Pardon? C - ;' The CBAIUIIAN; Adrii*crs and inuiiKiTi uitl t^Jicbers? .--- . Mr. luwiNv-WcU, I do not really wi^h to get into all thai tlctail bet-aus4 Jf.rses jny not mean atUcJrfa aiul td\Tscrs or jt could. It dfjiond-s on what you mean by U.S. forces. Now, we do <>. sjicak of ha\-in UuS. forces in areas whcTt *6 liave a MAAG or atUiciies or advisers. \.\. ; .V The C&IIKUAX. Would yoiiandude i*r forces? Mr. IKWIN. Air force t A fjrcc, yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. AA ^>urt of forces. Thank you vvry much. The committee Li recessed^- " Mr. IUWIN. Tb&nk câ, Air. Chainnaii. (Whereupon, X-12^41? p.m., the heariiig WAS adjourned subjj^ct to the call of the chair!) -.
PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

'-. " TUESDAY, KAY ,11, 1971 -
'7.C' .-;"'
. .v'-J-.^" ': .;.-,-;'
. UJJVJ^D STATES SENATE, c " V- -,' CtJmirrTEE <j>- FOKDON RELATIONS, -> Wiu&ingtonfD.C. r :r 7
The;C'>mrnittee met. pursuant to notice, at 10.-0.'niî:.in room 422!( New 'ik>iiat Office UyiWi.6, Senator J. W. Fylfai^bt (chairmnn) preniding. .. . X _--l'rft*eiit: Senatws fulbrigbt, Church, Synungton, Spong, Case, - ^xwr, JawtSj-wui-PeainBon. V -"'-' Tlie CHAiRWA!f.:TiM:~conjmtt*^ v.^ come to orderj N ^
OPEJ.MS'} Sl'ATEMEXT
The comniittee is mfctuig thi^ morning ^. continue heanii^- on ziiiuig legislation reJatii^ î the war in &iurt?jca>t Asiu. . J^ Tljifust witness is our -c-oUiugue, Seiu.or, 'lliomas. F. Ktijj^toiu i nn.k)r Kuêton vewnriv rctiirntxl from .itu in]>cction dip to South i t Asia. .'."-' J am vrry sj,rc your obtiervstcohsC will be of gre&ljuterest to us. . Do yiu \fcave a pre[wrei utatenwnt?. ; . 8TATEXE8T OF HOM. THOKAS F. EAOLETOH, VS. 8E5ATOE FROM " ; J0880UW
âiî to be an utftatal Indochina i;?cpetT because >f mf recent tnyi i* Vu^tnam and Ooibr>dia. ^. - . _ " . " ' - . -..'"J-ndeed, Mr/(:tuurmii!i, tltre are m> ex[ert* t Instant or oil onv this lonp mud compkx wur."":' Howe\'*r, my obwrvationa wliilt- in Souttfrftht Ania kave-fi more cu<nvinc'J tliat the M/'ftovcrn-ffaJfjcId bill seuine a f;vui tiimi and [>uOilc date for withdraMal from Irulochinu in buib and
:\tr. i-hfiiniiaiL, 1 mm Iwk.fr^rii Indochinn ."v/nvin.^! tLat ihfi I^Kjdeni. f<nwe an iudiifiittt^.tJ.K preMcnci1 .'MI Vietnam to inur' tic HijmviJ <>f &. friendly SdigoJi rn^fbne, I cum* }>df from Jiidortiina îivirir*d that th" Prrxident prtuliy of tb/fW U.S. troojr4Uf< t"hiiid o!i an ovcrfj o
''
318
assessment of South Vietnamese capabilities, and in an unfounded hoje that the North Vietnamese will be inactive. 1 came back from Indochina convinced thai the President has taken a risk, by allowing American soldiers and -prestige to be held hostile to Saigon's survival a risk that is neither wise nor aurpUible in view of what can be. gained. I would like briefiv to elaborate on these observations. First, despite public announcements that eventually there will le a total Aificnran troop \vithdrwK-&l from South Vietnam, none is currently plnniu-d, and n:x unit-finite ffXTcnsion of U.:>. ir and logistical support is assumed. Recent comments by Sir Rol>ert Thompson t President Nixon's British Southeast Asia adviser, are, in my judgment, an accurate reflocjiim of the administration policy as I discerned it in briefing after - bricting, as u-pll ew in privU> conversation. Thornton describes the April 7 troop drawdown., wtifch will lenve Hvi.OOUÂjwyican troops in Vietnam next December, at "just right," uml iiouiuiils that "* * * -the South" Vietnamese will \. ready to stanil "' jne SMKWI with only Kritic and air support from the Americans." According to an article by A! vin Shuster in yesterday's New York Tirn*-, Ambassador Ellswort-b Bunker apparently agreed with nr" re&jittg of U.S. intvtttioax. The a Hid'' s;*tHl:
. ' lli- [Bunker] foresaw the notl (or American dvivn< in Vietnam for several year* more od for AtuoricM air power for at Icuxt two or tbrw woru year*.
I ask uunimous consent, Mr. Chainnan, that tlie. full Shuster article be printed iu the "record at the conclusion of my prepared statement. The CirArau.iv. Without objwtinn so orderwl. infonnation referred to follows:)
IThr tint Vurk Tim-*. Uy 10. IM7IJ R C K K K U AliSM'K VlKTNAM VhXBiS
<Uy AJvin Sinifti-p u, May '.*. - Atnl>a? ûflor J-Ul"'<>rtli liunkr-r h:in jiint romplcti''i liix fourth ycur in Anu-riraV rno.-t crucial ditJonuttic pot, couwiou^ 'if -pn-jt riii-taki'K hcr<-. proud of tin- jiroyi:>-, confident <fi tin- future- but aw an- ol ththat Hr> ftik-bnttrM !.< 77th hirthduv tomorrow, fwliiiK phyiirally fit hut r-a(Jy to move to otlwr dutii-it. He do?M no! , :i> In- K:I> f, "rhoos*- Ui nm for u four-yr.'ir t>Tw," und (he i-x|M>.ctation i>- thai h<- wiU he leaving xhortly aftwr the South VietiiaiiM'x- prenifleriti.-J irbiclioi!" in OcUilwr. A îiiii man wlio looks talli-r thun !ii (> f-'d '^ inclies UTHIIW of bin erect t-arinK, Mr. Bunker ha" H-m?il hi-re longer ihitn any <f W prpd'i;MHor, pn-Hidinic an the Hiijin-iin 1 Awu-rinau inflinaiw lu-r- a* AniHririiii trooin- [mured in and now, H pull out. Me wan Ix-bJml tlic pnllry of ex|>:ni:ioii of Pwifont Johnxon, who iiii;i h-fi-. aud ln-i- a. .-tasrrh -tipjiorler <f the withdrawn! polii'y of Pn'-iili-nt Ni who woli'f Id III i ii )io. Sitting iu Mi ciixy rl'air in l.i~ <Mf-t', ;imi<J thi- iiii'icire* :ind meUkenloM rei-.-illiti^ u ir cunv-r that ln-K^tJ '^J years' KO, after 'J." yf:ir>< n u *ij|bir-indiiniry exeruiive, Mr. Bunker nurkt-d tlw tu.rt of his linul rnriiith-i in of'ire w i t h a rare au/i Mide-riiiiKi'iK interiww. He fon'wiw th" iiM-d for Ar;ieric:>n ndvi^-r in Vieticnu for severnl Vi-ars monanrl for Ameriruu :iir |<nwi-r for at |e-vt two or three more >/<-ur<<. 1ft: wi4 th:U Aiii'TJ 'HTI trtxi\< MrejiicMi, nnw nhout .MMVtf, <doulo drop Ui niût liMI,(MXt t>y n>-x.' Xi.'iv 1. J'riMid'Mil \ixon ha aiinoiiiir^ri (hut the tro/<p k-vd would df-cliiw to lK4,(K(Ohy Ikf.. 1.
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^ "I thought from the bcguming tht if we stayed with it, it would cume out all rifht." Mr. Bunker svd. "Now my only doubts are whether we are going to stay wkt.lt, not because of the situation here, but because of the situation at Lome. I've never had any douot that if we have the determination, the patience and the will, we would achieve reasonable success here." Ou the political ride, Mr. Bunker said that he thought the constitutional government in South Vietnam bait worked "remarkably welL" On the military Hide, be laid that there had been' "very great progress. v But Mr. Booker abo acknowledged some past errors that helped feed the antiwar feeling and that in torn rai*od hut own doubts about the determination of the United States to ttay the oune iu Vietnam. "I think we talked too much in the early days,',' he said. "I think that many of our mistakes were compounded by overoptimism as to how the situation w* developing and how it could develop. My theory has been that the facts speak for themselves." Because of the restr tment at home over the war, Mr. Bunker emerged over bis four years here as two men. One is the Bunker teen by the war's critics at bom*, a vfllaut who has been responsible for the mistake* and miscalculations of American policy, who has restated dramatic rhauge* to bring about political accommodation and who has been overly protective of President Nguyen Van Thieu. The other Bunker is the one *eco in Savon., a charming host, a courtly and skilled diplomat, an efficient administrator,"and *n nvoy who aide* say is more respooxive to, than -responsible for Washington policy, of which be undoubtedly approves. Rarely does one hear a critical personal remark again/4 Mr. Banker here, even from those outside the -embassy who'disagree with him And think ttir American involvement has been a disaster.
A KET MAN FOB XIXOV
"lie's one of the three or four nice President Nixon listen* to when he's got an -. important decision to make about this country," one embassy official said. "But he is war out here and obviously those closer to the White House probably have a better chance of being heard. Another embassy aide said: "Bunker in probably important in shaping policy, . if not in making it." Mr. Biinki-r him held hi* public word-i to a minimum, reflecting the caution and tact that endear an envoy in sensitive powt to hi* colleague* iu Washington. A few wronK words from Mr. Bunker could not only Ur the critics at bom? but alto iipaet the clone reUUou*hi|t he ha* developed with tbe Saigon Government. In liia interview, Mr. Bunker mud that be wan frankly worried about tbe economic future of South Vietnam, that "difbnilt economic problem*" lie ahead beeaiiM* of the departure of American troops and tbut "economic aiMixtancv on a major Hcalr" would be neeeiwar> from tb? I'jihli-d State* for a couxideraMe period at time. "I ihiuk thut the economy trill |M> n greater concern than the military situation," be continued, "The Vietnafuif: nave confidenct.- uow in tbuir aliiltty tohaadk-tbc* njUrLir>' Ntualion." Mr. Bunker, who s c\ut-( of the I'nitcd Slatt-x iniiixiuu bcic- outronkn On, Crpigbtoii W. Abraiuit, t-be tnilitary coniniaiuier, alo ruadt! thf following points: ÂmoriK the inirtakcH of tbe f/ant wun; ibu lurJc of jSicijJ uuderntunduig of the type of war being fought here, u lute realization tluit ttw t'uJU"! States could not fmii train the rtouth Vivtaamem- to'Âke ov< i. and tbe ttndtficy to ovrnwU progren^ here. ^ "We rcully didu't >imiertiuid tbe kind of wur we were erjteamed in," br aid. "rio it wa difficult, it took t-inv- to Itini aud \\u-ft4w ))cnj>le fotcaiue impatient wiili the wur. Then, at the hjiie time, otbe.' [WotÂ," urotn; at bonu-pro4>leiuii of HR citiex, racial prol>l<>nii<> |K>llutiou, all of thene crowded iu aud dttnianded attention. So tbe fet-ling devtJojted, undertaiidul.ly, that dotrientir protJrtnK j i.riority." I IT a political nettl*m"ju uiuy improve aftrr iiif Houtb Vk-Ui; JIM-HIHfftiou* iNteauw.1 Hanoi limy dilute tt> jw-Kotiate wiou*4v (*iteu it a riipuje that "will l>e in powv here for tlw ut-xt four yM*." liauoi 0iay wait to HC' tin; outcome of tin.* Ar/ierifau tfkection m-xt year, he tuud, but lif did uot rule out the possibility of au evcntixsl outcome twn,- of uo M>tU(tueut, iw peace aitd no war.
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* While, the recent allied thrust into La^s "had some effect,", it wa still too curly to judge bow much it succeeded in curbing Hanoi's efforts to supply the Indochina war. The operation showed that tin- South Vietnamese iieodcd to develop better coordination in command. '. Pri^sideiit Thicu is a man of "considerable intcilectual ability" who has grown iti his job. But the United States will take sio side* in Uie forthcoming political campaign here, although ''we hope to see fair, honest rlt-ctiun.i." It would again be a "good idea" if observers from other countries, including the United States, came for the elections. 51>-spite the view of ruany war critu-s at home that President Thieu stands in the w ay of a sett jmciit, it is not up to the United States to see that he is removed. The- iVMith Vietnamese "have a constitutional system."
KHLAT1ONS WTTll YHIKU
Thx relationship of Mr. Bunker to President Thieu, who rose to power during the Bunkei yeare, has often been a subject of controversy among critics of the war. Some of the.arubassador's associates say that he represent* "a father figure*' to President Tbieu and that Mr. Bunker triexto "persuade rather than push" him. According to an aide of President Thiei:. "Tbifii and Bunker are ojx-n and frank with each other and like each other, but when Thieu says he doesn't like ' something and wants Bunker to ask Nixoii about it. Bunker just sit* there and nods and 'C never quite know what he's thinking. He never tips his hand.'' A* Mr. Bunker noted in the interview, American leverage on the S;iigoii Government is not what it was when lutlf a million American troop- were in the country. B'lt Mr. Bunker tid it would remain considerable he-can-*; of the economic aid that Saigon will ni.-ed. The two men miret frequently, sometimes two or three times a week, deluding upon the burning i>ue-t. They (Jicu*s, often with General Abram> on hand, the *I>ccilic areas from which American troop-* would withdraw, the question of financial support, and Uist yerk, American proposal* for an intensified campaign by the South Vietnamese to <:tirb the alanning flow of drugs to American men. Outside the top levels of the Saigon Government, Mr. Buuker, a might be expected, has kept his contacts with the Vietnamese to a minimum. For example, he haj. never had more flian a oci:il conversation with Gen. Duong Van Minh, whu i> likely to ! President Thieu's challenger in the election. _ Accordingly, Mr. Bunker seems a distant, forbidding figure to UK- South Vietnamese who have had no contact with him. The loctil pre-s ha*- nicknamed him Ong Gia Tu Lrinh or "Mr. Refrigerator." Sometimes the paper- call him "the governor" of South Vietnam. For the Ambassador tu avoid Allowing partiality in the election-' ^ x.-iffe ill thf diplomatic skill he demonstrated a a trouble-shooter in tL- I'.tG't Dominican crii-<, where he supervised th- transition to eon<titut,ional govenuuent, and earlier :i!-><igrimem> in which he n.ediuted thi- di-pute- U-tween Indonesia and tlje Vetburkutdi* over DuU-h Xe^' Guinea and between J'jtypt at d Syria over Yemen. Virtually every uml>;if-udori:j| acta vi j it to the p:il:uv, 11 trip to a ceremony wiMi the Presidentwill lie wi-en by opixiiwiiti of the CJovernmi.'nt a new gesturei* of Atiierican approval ->f Mr. Thieu.
CU>-,K TfK WITH A H K A U s
Apart from tlii'rI<wrcIatioriHhi]> w i t h President Tliie'i, Mr. Bunker liac di>v-Jv ed nn effective and friendly partnershiji w i t h General Abmum, the "political general" who nud'-r^land* thnt military actions of this wnr miMt often l< governed hv political c'iii(.iderntioiiK. Wh'vi Gi-neral Alirams succeeded tli- outppokeii (ii-ii, William (.', W> Klmorcluiid, Mr. Hunker advined him against doing "no Jinyh talking t>oiit d-vlo|>[m>tith liere ar.il jiint t>->- how it uorked," "1 '.ieep him thoroughly in l/ji|ch w i l d poliljr.ij di'Velopmeuts ,ind he keeps me thwouchlv briefed on the military *hnation," Mr. Bunk'T explaified, Jnnide tie cfnhftHMV itiu-lf, Mr. Hunker hnH earned the resperi nd adrniration of his iitaff, althougli Noine of the younger nuTiilx-rn i>metjiu'> cumpluiii that their VI/-MS are tint listened to in th" higher councils and t h a i , (i<*[iite public caution aj;i>ui evefju ul tlie lop, they ur'- etjiectj-d to accent-mte the positive in their Mr. fiiniker tid lii-t wife, Carol ('. I,aiw, who iw Aiiib:i>i:idor to Vepal, Jtwu * farm in Vermont. He xuid he would like lo i;o bnck (here for wlii!" when UIM
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alignment ends, but indicated he would not object to returning to his old job as * Iroubli'-shooUaT with antlMSsauorial rank"It givra you a little more frodoni." Askod what his advice would be to his successor, Mr. Bunker replied: "Stand fast. And lot the facto apeak for themselves."
Senator EAOLETON. The South Vietnamese Army has become so "Americanized" that it no longer feels it can fight without sophisticated logistical and air support although the enemy can and does. There are no administration plans to Vietnamize Vietnamization<o force the South Vietnam^ Army to fight within the limits of its tedaiiieal capabilities.
IMPLICATIONS OF INDEFINITE NVOLVEMENT
What are the implications of an indefinite involvement? For our prisoners of war, it means indefinite imprisonment. The North Vietnamese are not going to release them while American plants and American helicopters continue to kill North Vietnamese. For pilots and support personnel left behind, it means continued hazards in a discredit**! cause. For our country, it means continued division.
PRODUCTION OF MYTHS BV BIIIEFIXO AND PUBLIC RELATIONS SVtfTEU
My second observation deals with the men who run the war on a day to day biisis. To alu-r Senator Fulbright's phrase, they seem concerned with "new myths" but overlook or disregard "old realities" that an' nonetheless real. Anyone familiar with sr>me of the great phrases or not so great phrases of the last decades such as "Diem's jwpularity," the "capabilities of specially trained U.S. advisers to deal with counterinsurgency," the j)tcntialitie <>f "strategic hamlets," ' hind reform" and "free elections" for winning "the hearts and minds of the j>cople," all of the slogans of the decades of the 1960's, recognizes that reality if often -.ttcriiiced on the alter of the easy phrase. Myths aren't created by accident. They are produce<l by briefing and public relations *yrsUm tliat puts a premium on progress, and optimism. In every sense of tin- word Vietnam briefing!) are pngress r|>ortsemphasizing progress while downplaying setbacks * * * ciiip}ia.-i;ciiig statistics rather than trying to understand what they nu'un. If wn were won in briefing rooms, this 0114- would Iiave ended long ago. During a week of briefing in Vietnam and Cambodia I watched a new and dangerous myth in the making: Tlw myth of Victnamizatior., Viei naxni/>ation i* the way a sloe L.S. withdrawal leaving only u retinal force to supply air and logistic sufiport is rationalized^ Under Victjiuriibsation the eiu-iuy will be defeat*-/! and our rîdual for/* will be protected. During a week of bii'iings, I was U>!d that;
* * * OK \M-rcetit of thf Koutb \'ietujuu<!w we "|>ac]Iied," safe to travel, u/e to live, urid cafe to work; * " * "Vi"fiutiuiztion" in a nuccvwto Kiwccmful. ju {art, tUut Huuth Vji-tniini'iHi' in>i>|.H nrv finliliUK ""' o'aly iu Xoutb ViKimin, but iu Cairbodi* and Lin.*
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* * over one millii>u Smith Vietnamese in the regular army, four million in tin- rural and popular force*, and OIK- hundred thousand in the national jiolicr arc :ifl eager to do liatile with tJi.- slighth more than J(K),lHKl North Vietnamese and Viet Cong believed to be ojxYatinc in South \ietnam; * * * the economy of South Vietnam is making rapid strides, w i t h inflation down and unemployment Ion: * recent op<Tations in Camldia and Iôs have serioiisly disrupted enemy supplies and the staggering numlx'rs of enemy dead h:i swollen their Ilk-year toll in human lives to 739.XU7; .* * the South Vietnamese anny is learning to II-N- the modem tools of war fura more rapidly than aniirip.tt< > d: * * bombing alr-2d\ '_"; times as heavy as tlie total I'.S. effort during \VrJd War II continues against a rag-tag enemy tliat has neither air power or sophist iralcd logistic.*.
Indeed, Mr. Chairman, never has so much been done by so many for f*o lon<r, to so few. By every statistical measure the enemy is near the and of hit r<|>e. And yet the war continues to continue. South Vietnam is probably bettor off today than it was a year ago. But, Mr. Chairman, Victnamizatior is oversold. Hi<rh enemy casualty figures are constantly cited as accurate measures of jtrogrc^s. Yi-t in nrivAU, almost wiry general I talked U> apri^d tliat the N'orth Vietnamese hold their lives in low regard. Suicide squads of SHJIJMTS continue to attack in the fac<* of wiiherinp firejiowe/r And m(re sifrnific^ntly, lx>th rej>orters and generals apreed thai there was no diminution in the enemy's will to fight despite heavy cas-ualties. Similarly, "time l>ou<:ht" and supplies destroyed are always cite*!. But time i far more ini|ortaiit to an impatient, war-wcarv jx'ople than to men who have pursued a cau-w- in which they Iwlieveo! for over .'!0 years. While supplies are essential to our heavily mechanized army fur from home, how im|M>rtaiit are they to a <ru<-rrilla, livin<; off the lam] an.! bcul on u-rmr?
NOw, how diH-s the briefing s\ii<ln>iiie v.ork. During mv visit to IV <'or|)s. the delta shmu-usc i'! the ptu-jiicaiion ]>ro<rrujn, i wa.- )<>ld thu(:
* * the A U V N li;ui taken oi-r full n i -|inN-il>ilil> for H-ciiniy iu llie rcKiii: * * * nw production w;^ up and tliat enemv activity w:i down. * * * tlili fortner ViH I'onic ylroiiKhifld Ha-'.(K fHTtviit If.icilieil. * * * now llw A1JVS' :i- -u -Ir-niK thai i' rmild tlliiullaneon-ly inludc the Muili Forest la Vv-t Mmh :uid Viel CUMK sirotiKlmld xmre I'.M'i) while m H'VriaJ din-ion^- in ('uinl><>di:i. * * * enemy xiipjilnî'iiterinK HCor\"f rum ('ami>r>dia were treatlyt
UCUM.II for optimism? Ve-. until fun her questioiiinjj dev<'ln|N-d some other fiw-ts. On qiK'Nljoiiinjr. <-!OM- qiii'i-tioiiin<r. I discovered;
* * * W,M*i I'mt/'d Stale--'jidiiier-" were -till in IV.t'nr\i~. only 4.IMMJ fewer tliuii in l)i-cj-iiilwr I'MV.I. * * * MIIW the Lao- invasion U-KUH 40 IVf'-ir|i- oulpo-tx or waK'Moner>. hwJ Iwi'U overrun nx I'ouipari-d In only fi'.'i Kimiinr incident. for (lie entire l<ri'(vilinu year; * * * al jnoMt (VI jjerwnt of IV i''ir\'!- H:I>- >-afe in drive ut iiijchl. * * * four out <;f titt* lielicopt^TH iis.<d in Mmh iiiiiiKii/n >^f ihiri Mun'hund April <TC AiruTifun, floini liy Anwriraiik.
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* * * most of the IV Corps helicopter support is supplied Uy U.S. pilot* flying more U.S. helicopters than the South Vietnamese are programed to eventually grt. for thf ciitin; country: * * * t ho nurmllas had broken down into smal1 units capatilo of supplying their own food and needing little ammunition to conduct terrorism
Instead of taking the optimistic briefing picture with me from IV Corps. I left with a different persjHsetive. Ilie delta may not literally be up for grabs. but it is far from pacified, computer ratings notwithstanding. Over 30,000 enemy troops, mostly indigenous Viet Cong, control the level of fighting and engage in terrorism which the Saigon Government cannot prevent. 1 doift U-lieve there is any longer a danger that the Pentagon's interpretations will sell the public on an unwise jxdicy. The real danger is t hat t he military \\ ill believe its own propaganda and act accordingly. The ultimate <langer is that the President of the United Slate-, will commit Ul* |>ower and stake his pivatigeoM thc>e biased interpretations.
KXAUPLE OF LAU SON 719 THK LAOS INVASION
President Nixon did so during Jjun Sou 719 the Laos invasion. Lain S>n 719 revealed tiie way significant decisions are made, explained, curried out, and analyzed. President Thieu, in a classic understatement, de>cril>ed the ojH-ra" lion as "limited in time and scope." A> originally c-onceived, the ARVX would have thrust further west after quickly taking Tchepone, would have "blocked" the major arterii-, of tlic Ho Chi Minh trail in an nUempt to cut the "supply line jugular," would have stayed mini .ipprovimately May 1 and would have cleared new territory, exiling by a different and newroute on the way out. That was the original plan and estimate In execution, the AUVN did not go Iwvoiid Tche|>onc- which il-u-lf ua>. taken 2 weeks later after ma.->ive B 52 >trike.-. completely destroyed the area, annihilating any pos^ble oji|Hitioir. temporarily disrupted some trails but failed l<> even touch the "juguliir" tuui n-treat^] more than a month early without clearing any new territory a- they exited. Chart> showing high enemy lxdy c'>uijt* und de>lroyed Piiemy Mjpplien were ulie^-W out, a>. uUul, to deinonMrat*^ .-iiJc<'e.s.-. Ajid<^ven this tyjM- of ">u<-<-e>" was whicved -niilv' Vi<(h liuly massive -I ntfsi mu->Mve American air U|)j>orl and with WUMH.1 Airi'Tuuin ground irix^j> and 4-vcn inon* nir !-u)j>ofl ucrov*. ii;c border in Sri>j(ii Vi to ju'oiect 1 Corps. I'lii-" limited siiixvsi war. 'mrliwlly offset by .i)rj>id<Tulle \'ii'iiiume-se cuhLUiitic.-, efjMvitilly froci severnl of their Ix-M unit;., and u njrijjory of retreat that cun only huunt tlu- AKVN in the future. The L'niled Stater, lost almost one-sixtlj of ijie hel^-oplers itrvolved and iniiiiy more were disabled. Other uj;piii-i. were al.>o Wt. The nior-i tlmi r-n reswjjiaMy b*- rlaiuied for i^juji Son TJ9 i* tluit Suuih VieUniUHw- <rouii<i forco, u i t h muîve Aiaeiican jiir jwmer aiui w i t h m&Ksivc Amejlcjin gtound biw-kup JU-M-.S the bonier, maintained, for n fit'irl )HTII J of time, :t nieuF-u/'e of HU<U-/-H against N'orlh VictiiaiiieM* ground fon-e^ in I>JWJK. \Vliul went wrong? When (icttfi-nl Vgt bri<' fed .this r'iiiini(l4i' on Jûjn Son 7i'.< on Keliruurx !* ~u>id 1 fhf^-k<id the Iruth ->f thi NJMV
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cifically during an extensive briefing on Iâm Son 719 when I was in Danang the enemy capability in the area, the enemy troop movement toward the invading force and the intention of the North Vietnamese to fight all of these things were weU known. General Vogt's expressions of confidence in the attrinabuity of Lam Son 719 objectives on February 9 were another example of the briefing syndrome, with exaggerated estimates of South Vietnamese capabilities and/or underestimated enemy capabilities. Lam Sou 719 was either a blunder of major proportion or General Vogt's testimony widened the gap in candor between the President and Congress. The President acd the Pentagon predictably hailed lûu Son as a master stroke. Sadly, Mr. Chairman, Lam Son is not unique. All the classic faults that liavo. jilagufd our Vietnam decisions were there, overstating our capabilities, understating the enemy's and rationalizing tlie outcome. As we enter a politically volatile year here at home, fewer U.S. troops in Viotn&m Hill Itc more dependent on the South Vietnamese for protection from likely North Vietnamese at lacks. Tin- North Vietnamese, es|Nv;iaIly in 1972, will be able to call most of the shots in the war. SOUTH VIETNAM'S IVTEVTIOVS - WJwt are North Vietnam's intentions? Tlic onlj- rertainty is that neitlier \f>rtti Vietnam's leaders nor *oldiers have lost their desire to keep fighting. Intiee.il, that is tlw only statement on which journalists and military men in Vietnam seem to unanimously agree, and it if ext n-mely hn|>ortant when juxtaposed against our war weariness. Tlie North Vietnamese well nwognizp the depth of American disillusionment over the war from the left wid the more posM 'alley disillisionment of the right. They well realize the volatility of the 1T.S. electoral process wluch begin- in New Hampshire in March 14, It's- than 10 months away; and the N'orth Vietnamese well realize the influence of their action-, on both American public opinion and politic*. I suspect that the North Vietnamese will stage sometlu'ng dramatic by the spring or summer of 1972. This dramatic endeavor need not be u> massive a Tet in 1968. It might lie an assault on Plinorn Penh or jMThaps even Vientiane. It rnigijt be. several syHtemjUir aH*aultd on Amenca.n-fnatuied installations or a hwacp ihrougli oeveral "fire baseV or tuwns in an attempt to exact sizeal>le American casualties. Or il iii^ht be a terrorist blitz in Saigon. \Vhii '"ver the mode, the intent would IN; to force, the war back on page 1 and at the taunt- time fore President Nixon to act. An enemy offensive depending on il* nature, could force President Nixrxi U> take caKtLitory action, send in U.S. troops or heavy air support, resume bombing of tlu; \ortlj, or simply stop wiAdra'u-ing solaierx. Or, and I admit far IKHH likely, it could force, him totally to withdraw Dunkirk-Mtyie. Th/'w are the dangers and tiiew; are the risk* of our pmteut policy.
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CONTINUED SCPPOBT TOR SAIGON REGIME QUESTIONED
And this, Mr. Chairman, leads me to my Uiird and final point. Wh.it can possibly be gained by allowing American soldiers and American prestige to be held hostage to the Saigon regime's survival. Very few people in Vietnam talk about this anymore. Is it to show Europe that we honor our commitments? Do they really think that after 17 years, $135 billion, 55,000 lives, 300,000 casualties and bitter and deep domestic division, do they really believe we are wise to continue to support a regime whose survival means so little to U.S. security? Is. it to prove to other countries that we can handle CnmmunUtinspired wars of "national lil>erati<>n"? And if so, Mr. Chairman, does any country anywhere in the world believe that after Vietnam the United StU>s will soon engage again in so foolish u venture? Is it to stop an expansionist China? I doubt even Dean Rusk believes that any more. President Nixon has said that we have fought ''not for conquest, not for glory, but only for the right of a |H-oplc far away to choose the kind of government they want." Well, to me a war between one M>oplr in one country over who governs is a form of self-determination ike our own Civil War. I agree with President N'ixon that the VietnaincM- should determine their own future. That is, in essence, tluit the MrGovern-IIalfield bill would jiennit. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIKUAN. Thank you very much, Senator Eagkton. I think that if a very forceful statement and sine* it is bailed U|xm your most intimate and recent observation* in the field, 1 think it is very |ieruaive.
roXfTITL'TIOXALITY OK roXTINtriX WAK FOlt I'KKSEXT PUKPO.-E
Vo'"- |u.st qucMion prompt* a <juc->tion and obvrvation from you a> u lawyer and a> one int4T<>.-<ted in our constitutional system. We were toid, tl you will recall, thai the invnaion of Cambodia and 'i NT of Lao* was to protect our sol liers and the President maintained lii> constitutional role wn> to protect our soldiers. He did not luvd u declaratinii of war or any authorization whatever from the Congress to protect our soldiers in the field. But you noted in your statement thdt ue are now fighting not primurily lo jjrotcct our soldiers but to give the South Vii'lnnnicM- jx>ople mi op|xrlunity to chooxe th<- kind of government they want. To me, ilii* ruiM-h \<-ry serious question?uix'Ui the coiistilini/iiitil jiintificuiion for our waging u war of tlu> kind in ihe abM-uer of any milliority from (he Congre^. Sciinior K\OLf;To\. Mr. Chairman, althougii fny jxtsition is not uiiunir!io>j-K -.hnrcd, J Ix-lieye lhal v hen the (julf of Tonkin resolution waft re|K-jiled in MM- lust c.sioii of Congress, the comiessjonal authori/tiiioji | 4 i continue our luililtuv cndeuvor^ in JvjulLeast AMU u\^> expired. Coiiîilulirdiully ^M-uking, without ihe Ciulf of Tonkin {.'solution, the ]'re.-i(]ent iiuh onlv one duty to perform, the r>uift, kafe i-xirtu lion ni American form-i- f*rom llu- tîtaliiy of Southoit.1 AMU. Currenily ih<' President hus no cînxtilutiontil uutiiority to mmntiiin the Atnerjr-feii mililury prwncc in S<ulh<'aM AHU.
326
I well realize that Attorney General Mitchell and other lawyers relv on this so-called inherent Commander in Chief authority and some vague ''inherent" authority to protec* t i n - free world, or "inherent" authority to do nil kind* of inherent things. Hut I do not find thi authority in the U.S. Constitution, and certainly Madison and Humikoii didn't find it \vheii they drafted (he .section i>crtaining to the warninking powers. The CHAIKMAN. UV all aequiescod at least "in the assertion that the President had a right to protect soldiers in the lield as ho said he found them there. That was given as the reason, but now, as you say. we have shifted. There M-eins to me a very serioi.* question of any justification for continuing the war for this purnose. Senator EACJI.ETON. There L- no authorization whatsoever. N'o one ran claim there is authorization to remain in Vietnam for the pur|Mse t h u t President N'ixmi staU-d lo stay there as long a> it will be necensary for the South Vietnamese to choose wliat kind of government tli^y want. The CHAIRMAN'. I don't recall that even the Attorney (ieneral or anyone has allegexl that he has an inherent |x>v\er to p> alxmt the Horlil to give foreign |H*o|>le> the kind of government that they clums^<ir that we wouM like them t< have. He d<H-s liave a res.jnsiliH'ly !< proleet our system. l>ut this i* Ix'yoinl any theory of inherent |XI\UT t h u l I 1 1 live seen. The inherent |MI\\<T they a>MTted uus to protwt the soldier-, or to protect the livo of our o\vn jieoplc in the field and to make their exit a.-, cafe u> ]Hîllc. S-nutor KAULKTUN. Safe :ni<l e\|>etliiiou.-. uml not over a ]H-ri<Ml of a year. The ( 'luimiAN. Tlii hhifling of the liaî- a l w u \ > confront.- u w i t l i u great difficulty.
V's (JIJJKCIIVK IN V J K 1 \ \ M
1 \\nlider if you \\ould ehd>or:ile ugnin nhoii! the real objective of the administration in Vietnam. Tlii- i^ \ l i u l ilie\ :i.--.eried to IN- their oiijective. ]>o \oii find any otln-r objective from \ o u r con\eisutioii and ob>ervalioiift? \Vlia I is v our nun feeling about their feeling? You evidently do no) believe t h e \ intend l o u j i l n l f M U in t lie near future.
."w-lltitol 1 K MJJ.KTuN. I believe \ \ i - u i l l In- itl\'olvcd ill I m l n U 'hjliu
iiidcfinilely under the l're-i<lent'> |ii:m." j )m^- ( h i - ns^-rijon on everv briefing t h a t 1 received. Mr. Chairman, uml in Vietnam you tire briefed morning, luncheon, and dinner mid if yon nre si ill breathing lifter dinner, by numer-on* geiieruU, endle colonels nd a few majors bringing ill coffee ami cigarette,. I'lujniliioil-lv . the-w- gentlemen, lljr^c niililai'y men, (old me t h a t the ])l:ni-. undei' \\liicli lliry were îpcniiini; called fr a le-ujmil foire for an mdeliiiile jM-riod i n t o the fndire and even fur n umre pn>tr:icied indeiinitc i i . i n the f u t u r e
Ii, --,!', i- A l l i c r i c i i l l :JII' j i ' . u c l !);i-,r',I j|l I I x l o c l i j l i t i , billed ill Tllllillllld H I M ! i ill -.n I ill ( )kl!l;iu a
The C J I M J : M \ \ . I I w l l e v e lliei'e wa- i ; l i iiccniinl in the pnjxT J'ece:il|\ l l n i l t l i e l ' . > . \ a v \ l i a i i executed u contract /or IJ-yeur |ieri"<J
327
for sifpplies, et cetera, indie itinp that their actual plans arc -for a lonjtfi; ixuriod in contract to tlv ts-atemeuts as to what 'heir intentions ' are." x : -. :
. ''. BKIEFJXGS OX LAM SOX 719 - / "
I don't wish (o delay this too lonr. First I want to ^y we asked the State Department to sanitize and declassify the briefing on the Lam Son 719 operation by General Yopt and SWr^tary Rogers and. t boy refused to do that. 1 take it from your slatrmebt you wen? eiven.-tc .. fairly extensive and I ho-x- accurate statement al*>ut the plans oil;. l>m non 719 while you were in Danans. Is thvl correct? ": Senator EAXJLETOX. Mi. Cliainnan. l>efore ^cui^ to Vietnam and c, to Dtimujc I was jK'niiiHed to read in the room of the Foreign Kelattoii-J ^Commiitee the tesbmony of General Vnî on the lâos invasion! 1 read it ver>' <-4ircfil!y and I reread it and 1 reread it a third time: Because of its secret. ciass^licat:on, I will uot p<\ into detail bout whai I r?ad, but 1 will tell y*u" when I wen Mo DSUHH*:, the briefinjr that I rewived in Bauanji ws >.) different from the iiri<rinal ^ parameters of that I-jtog, invasion-as '-described by GenerAi Vopt More your fommittei^ that von,would thmK t{iey were (alkiii-z about 1-wo different undertnkinjps..^ .tlien asked was"t'f".-re hriyone prc.scji.MH "- ther<K)mthis is in liagjtnjmown-ho was fnvm- mBit*ry ioteUige.iK'e. A-litlle jrny way in the !nvk ru\: of a hi? HMHII tnlwl with dozens o(\ military f>mecrs, .->aid he WHSJ froni military intelligoni'i'. I .-t&id wa* Anyone in the .-oom familiar vvif'i what General Vogt told thte SenaU' ~For>J2u Itfimions I'ommitUi 1 . N'.one of them W*MH . whictj U p<!rh>ips undKrstKiidahle. I -tlicii sort of'Jawyerlike ?tyle said "Is "wceryne hTi- cleured for top *\Trt?" and they sn'ui they'all were. The ijlry oue -they were suspicion.-. o<' .vas >ue of toy assistants. (I^nu^hti-r) ;. And I said: -.''
tin: Wvll. if I, '.'".rir to KIVC ran a"p':n"ral di'M-riptiou of wh:it upj *t.--liGod to ln.-furc SiMi.tlr Yori'i/'i !l<:l:itioii (\ 'rnnitttv I nmild iifce to liuvu vour
. , on i>.
I then d'M-rii^(i tin: Vitfrt . ftunoiiv mid what h> thoutdit would be achieved by. I Jam SMI 71ft in lir- t'-MinjiJliy <f KeJmisir.y' 9 and .they all shook tlu'ir lieiuls ami ^.-ti'l "Wi-.nre not hep- to dUajcree ' General Vojrl bill vve can ie.H ff'ii M-I- never opcrfiUjd, w iK-v<r vi.-ioned. the invuMoii-uvVtm df-scrifc'd \t\ '
" ;>' W A J t
t ' n A i H M A N . W i t h fi^w'd to tin: prrsoêrA lis-Ji i a vt-ry int-r<'-.triiir aciiclc tiij> iiiiftst'n<^ iu c l u ' i'o>t. whii-li J lli'mt would bi- jr'd for ilw n-i'iFr^l. Jt i- entitled ''A Le*>ji l-'rom t'te French." ft is Minjily n n p *ii a l ,f ln>w H)i- Fjviirb i-ntled the wur tunj how tin; jrixner were ji!l delivered t il/ai- linn1. You *'vl in your tli.it mil' 1 > * lit pitjiiti- uu riid-r-o t h i - wur th 1 an- n- lik'ly to bi- r< U-s.-J ,mv time bi-f<H-f (linl. I vUl wit in -fh*-p-cnrd iliii "urticle by Mr. Munkii:w'.-/. and Mr. IJcml.-1;!, wi;iii ' I know i accurate fp>w 'ithcr fi/ijrcc?>, but they usually are 'Th'j informal ion P'fcn.-d I o follow %:> -
Tin-
*y ll. li!
A Lesflos FROM T&I: FRENCH
- ;_
(By Frank- Mdnkiewic* and Tom Bradrnl "TV. uli, t'tr wouiidcdtM eoitrv a lot of thorn nrt- already in Mu-my e, ub, fttrunc pointy h*w fallra." "V.5., oldirfend." ' .,. "So J'U try to keep li tlutt utdcr tuy command." . * "So tlw wft arc. I may try to teir-phnue you again >cforp iih. before the end. Gojdbvx-, OumaL" "iloodhyp, old friend." _ Ho run* the last recorded" .*4'phoor convrrsatioti between General de Castries, commanding; at Dirtidienphu. and 'jrnej1*] Cojpiy at French headquarters in Hanoi. A hHrhoun later, IQ.ilQO Frenrh prisoners of wir do Castries among them W.TI- on toe .TiarchUwkord the Tonkin camps iiudcr the n'atcWuJ cy.?8 nt (tan-rat Oii{>Vl,bck-pwjafial nit-n. It WM OQ/ot-Ctu fcreattst dvtfi ever suffcrt-d )>y a colonial powiu-, i|maUing thr oud of w 'eijijJJv, and the LM-îonlng of the cod of a iv, public, bill it was not an end for t!> {.risoncnc Within a few months, they had hct'n-rrb'iuicd and n-patriat4>d. Tbt'f^ *'M uo ar}OJniTit ai>oiit it. Tbr French aniu'incwl it. y were* leaving Yictu*m. Gent-nU Ciapaaid iDHTi-ct, "Takoyour prisou^r? uitb you " 'A. tru WM declared btivccn Utc oniiio*. Two g't;ral met. formed a couiuii*oion and sipued dorunioxa aprvcion U> haniitif; adm'nmtrative problc-aut. A Frcjibh coIooc-1 ewxMted Vietatiah priionctv acrinu tbr b;i<lge* Mid into Hanoi A Vietminh colonel escorted French 4>riM>oets to the -dock*- ISieJigktiag was o\*cr. The priooen writt iiou. V-j -doubt the PrcnGrutt of the Knlted State* ha a duty and rut]x>niubility to nrakP certain that whoa American tnK>p# leave Vietnam American prisoiu-ra will .l>e f-i pruniptty nicmwd. Mr. NIXOD'S coubtryoura have a right to expect thi. .But wtftt Xlr Nixon is riiking^ts that (Jicy will taq,TCt more- than tin*. He U leading ' 'icn. to expi-ct th^t Uu-y will get all tfc* prn-oncn* back aofcly while the war goes on. This i* ckiidy mort- than they have right to expect, and wore thati tbev arc tikdy to get. For, r-onnidor hoc Mr. Niton's proM i-onfvi>o rtinnrku niut urund to thf cnr'oy. He nuid r e would leave vietuaiu whra nur prisonent ro relrajed and *hm Uic S>uth \ ictnaiurw; govyniDultt uo a reuoiiitbU! chmnw 'to survive. But be Ktuîoiuly a voided .nayini; bnt meant by "|<:avirr Virtnmui." Do* be meau we shall rtannvv ptmud runibat troop* but continue Li Inid air support? Doen he mean f Kliall pull our srntv out Nut continue t<> bomb th<* enemy from th* ocmuK and I Tom our l)*c. in Tliailund? On thU ftoir.l ibe remarks of lirun ^'ktional Chninnan Ivdbcrt O'lle of KAnnan are more r^pliciL Uian tlioae of whru Aii^jictio faHjullien tia*.'<- lx:cn "rrduned to-thp [xiiiil. . , . ttiis MO'ild bt; a. virtual end to tli<> vvt," even if l'.S. J>ocabiDg 5r'?ttb'r iJiMioi nor thc~Nutinu!.IJivruti(>n FriFirf if likely t/i uiyv*- W.tb thin mtrodurtion of thi- "nu>rv g'H>k" ruk- into th<' rculin of diploniacy And I)O!I-'H reirixrts reveal how totally irreronfilubd' are Mr. N'ison'.i two uljjcrtiw*. Chi tlw OIK' hand, Uu- Prir<<idcut surely cnna <t expert thit HHHUJ will lontl ov<>r our priwTMTn while Aru^riean fioinlvr" are ovnlwud. On tlv otb.T hund, h<; .'ajinot iîxMrt that South V'iotntuu will havr a rcaMmubb- cbaftrr u> r-urvivu ouii^ Anicrtrun .supplitf iind heleopu>rii tuid airputtvr iff. at H* serviw. Olio- attain tlw Prraideut lux xtAUi-d the incvitabk.- donjcxtie dct-i.iun: W'Ju'n e iwt orit of Vi^toum do we nwun "01 1" an tin- Fn-nch >nHut "out"? Or d<> we nuvn in(c in i/id profipiiiK up u rviitiniiution i/f Hie wur by the South Slowly, inMtorabfv, -that qui-xtinn i coniinK ti tli fore. If Mr. Nixxm cn;i "out" it* th>' Fn-nfh nwaiit it, w<* * can have our priwi_rr biu-k>Bl't it u not "lily tuWoiyjji.^-- it in downriKlit daiifC'roui* to mimcehl to Anii-riruns t'.'Ut there i? c: oll;r way.
EAOJXTON. WID-JI'I il afl^r tlii- I)i'ii liicn J'lm and tlw f-'fUcui''iii tJu- (irififr>- wcr- rrli'r.wij williiii 2 lo .'> ttc'k>>? '/.'J'' ^'MAHIVAV. Thnf i fnrrivf. It HM^ n vm - *nn\>li- imii lli<'V juHtlc uj llwir /niinl U M/i|> llu- war. Il WK-* it very Jri' I (hint, Jew* I huii G wc/'kn, in uhj/-li aft flu- rloiuilK were in
229
ASIAN' RKSPECT KOK HUMAN UHE
i<a.o(iy, there U >no statement that recurs in many statements. It is the old statement th:i( in some wav of other tlie Asians don't value lifi' us mucli as we do. I get a lit tie, disturbed by hearing I he rr|H-litioii of that. Is thcn> anything that you observed there that cuusc* you in believe that tin* me: ami women who live in Vietnam or Asia have los* respect for their own lives, that they cure nothing about their lives? Senator EA.GLETON. Ye>, I will give you one instance, Mr. Chairuian, and muyl>o one iii>UMirc doesn't make or prove a rule. \Ve were scheduled to go to Ben Hot. Ben Hel was on our preplan itinerary and U near Fire Ba.se G which wns under siege. So the general, ;irojerlyt General Wear said we couldn't go to that |HV|>liuH!c<! .Ic.-tinatioii. I said "(Jcrneral, couhl we just iti of tty around it." He said, Senavor, it might U> your life, but it would definitely U- my career." So we didn't go. \Ve went to a lire ba>e Ix'low that, tliat wa- not under s,iege. When we returned to Pleik'i, where \ve Iwd sivvd llie night before, daily re|H>rtx w:r f-oming in on tin- Ben Hel, ctpi-ratior* ail one caine in limt ilay of a VC or Norili Victnunicsc soldier who had strapiH-il around him a necklace of hand grenades, mid in order to (wtietrale Fire. Base (i which has pcruiietvrs of barbed wire, M'veral of them, would run uf to the barbed wire and pull otic of the grenades whi li would uigger off the whole iii-cklai-c of gnsiude:. nroimd liim, blasting a hole in tiie barbed wire and, of course, olditeraling him Kamikaze style. This napix-iieil on moiv tlnui one o<'cu>ion. Whether i h n t proves u lower threshold of iifi"c< lion for huimm life, I v\ill let you draw your own conrlunions. It is suniething that I woiilil not do, even under onlers. The CiiAiUMAN'. Do you think it is reluted to the motivation uhich inspiro the |n:o|)le7 Senator KAGI.KTON'. I think it is directly n-hUcd to t!ic motixntioii, the /.t-iil, the undani|M-ned /.oil, (lie undimini>hfi! /cal, of tin- N'orth -Vietnamese to pursue their goal as long as tlim- is one l i \ i n g North Vietnamese. Tin CiiAir.Mtv. DIHJS that mean they lime less regard for Uicir livi--< or ll:at Miey simjily fi'.c| they are fighting in n jusl- cause,-oilwith winch they thcm-rf-lvcs, (lirir family and their country are projierly idciititied. .NMiutor KACI,KTO\. I think their wu\ is Mjch tlnit tlu'ir value of human survival us an individual is mi.di secondary to th<*ir ardor, and L'.eir determinatinii to pursue their cause. It subverts what might he the tiadittonal and customary huiuiiii appreciutiori for one's own life. 'IV (;iiAii'MAv. Thi- puxx.les me very much. Jn VVoriil War JI l!;re wa in-jtieiiduii-i slaughter of Russians by the Oennans. It has be-on estiiiittUul 20 million flus.Muiis were killed in that war. J)o<-s that meat) tin- liiiNiiuiH don't cure Hlxiut life and their hves are of no value to them. Senator KAIM/KTO.V. Well, there was an enormous slaughN-r of many [M'oplc in many wars. 'Hie ( ' I I A I K M A N . l)<t yiiu remember the pictures of the waves of tronji-i at Vcr-Jun' The French and iirilish loht. H gencrution, J can't see vvrv much difference IM-IWCC-M tlwir getting oul of their Inm-lm* and walking into (he barrage in nnurhim- gun fire and having a necklace of grenade*). 02 aw*It 22
330
EFFECT OP ILLUSION THAT ASIANS ION*T CARE ABOUT LIKE
The point f am trying to make is that I thinK wo emphasize this illusion rliat they don't ran* about lift-, which makes it much easier >n vir conscience to slaughter them without ~ iv restraint. If, is perfectly all rijrht to bomb thorn with those i.tipalm l>ombs or auti|orsouncl Iwmbs with thoi'saiids of names in thorn (localise these people really don't care about their lives. Therefore, then* is nothing to lx concerned ulxnit. Senator EAGLKTOV. I kww you are not construing that sta>inont in my testimony to sanctify thf* bombinir activity. Tlio THAIKMAX. Wouldn't it have tliat effort"? Wouldn't that be why il has been and is pcr|>otuatcd by t!io>e \\ho defend the war that nftcr nil My I.aU and occasions of this kin.l shouldn't ho taken seriously because those people do not rare alx>tit these lives ami it is not important to them? Isn't that the implication .tf . saying that they ihri't cure nhoiit their lives? Senator KAGLKTOV. I think that tiianv American-, |M>ihaps I, at least piirliully by ymir questioning; have frillcn into the trap. i/et me il]ii*lnite this >viiilroiue by a >|M'ri(ic incident. Every hu*e that I visited 1 would ask 20 to 2~> Missouri (ils that I would talk with, U-iir in mind, Mr. ( 'Imininm, that my vi>it to Vietnant v/u-. very swiftly in the wake of the ('alley decision and hence the lusl qucMion \i is .-il< y> on the Cirlloy case. I mi^lit add |-drenlheriiTi!l;.% ahuost ly. thox- \\lio >poke ii]> were of the opinion (hut ('alley &>( H bum mj, to ux' their One ot the.-e fellow.-., 1 believe from N'eo^ho, Senator ij\ IllillgCoil knows it. a -mull town in ..oiithuvM Mi>-,ouri. 'Hie ( ^ I I A I I C M A N . I know it very well. It i> alnui-l iieiu- ArkmiMtN. Sniiator K\c,i.y:n>\. \eo-.ho, Mo., w.-i pretty iinli^niiiit. He was an enli-tcd man. a .eremii, three->t riper, and I u:is -riviiifr him the rationale of the Nuremberg trial-, the (Jenc-.u ('onvi-n'ion, t'nifonn (Joile of Military Jil>tire. Me did believe there were bounds |M>\ ullfl wlii'-h ii ôldier or tin ollicer oiiM not j:<), but he mine back to me thi.way, "well, Senn.!or, you ^-in't undcr.<i:md. Von really <lon't understutid." lie -uid, "i lii-. i--ii'l, a wur in Kuro(ie, thi.-. JMI'I :i civil wtir in the I'liit'-d State-, uiiiou^ u>." IlcMiid "we are nil over here, ami these aren't people."
OK1ICMANIZAT10V OK fcNKMV I t U U I N O WA11K
The ( ' H A I K U * ' . . Tliut ninke^ it i.-nidi eu:-icj. I, in J ui>h to point out this i> not unique w i l d ibi^ w a r . 1 t h i n k in all r*, people try to dehlllliullixe the elieJnV to Illiike it ftl-l'T lo ejj^npin w h a t they ln'Ijevi- lo lie lifers ir;, 'i nehii-ve VJetOfV, iJidfi'l He really do the -time t i l i n g w i t h the I l i i i i - in World Wiir J? W.i-n'i I IN- pnipH^tindu here i hut the Jiini-; iii v^tne v\y ur other
Were !>., l l c i l i h u i n i i i l ?
Seiintor K\r,i.r.rn\. I wn.- bom in l'J'2'J,

Tiie < - l i A I K M A N "oil H C f J \.Wi yoijfltf. )Ltt'Jt;iltef.| / W n l i l tn liuil-.i- II e|c;if (hut till- |I'i)(ii^tiltilu l-ii'l (jni')Ui' Ullli All.i'l'-
ir;iu-. 'J'lii- i- 11 ' . ' f v ciiijiniiiii elnirm'O'i'irtiie of all \>fi>\<\r. Bui iii rhis
eM*;, il i- -i^nilieidii, J l l i i l l k t leiiKt to nwhll il here, beojij-e ill tJir; nb-w-HCf ,f M,|JH- nllier rulioliul obje/ t j v e of l l i r w u | idljl(rill^ ill lljeSi-
331
kinds of myths which have been carried on through the ages makes it much more, difficult fur us to arrive at tlie conclusion of whether or not it is in our national interest to continue this effort. This is one of the small elements that enter into it. If we can convey the idea we are really not fighting human beings, that th"s<> are something less than human lieings, it reallv doesn't matter very much if we slaughter them all. 1 think it is something about which \vo at least ought to clarify our views.
ASIAN' IXTEUEST IX LIKE
I look at the inr(ures of these Asian women and children struggling to survive. You lih < seen many of these pictures. You sec them going through tin- rivers seeking to 4->ca|ie, to protect their children. 1 am unable to come to the --.oncliision they are not jut as interested in life a anyone else. While there may l>e more of them and they have :t hardet time, [ huve never sect) in my own State (hat ill poor (>eo|)le in my State an- any le.-v interested in life than th<* rich dies. Tlnit seem* the distinction. Seiiutur EA(;I.KTO\. 1 believe we are on coiniiioii ground. Mr. Chairman. I assume any mortal being is just a* interested in his human life j- any or her. However, the zeal, tl-e. unbelievable, incredible xeal of the North VicliiHiiic&i: lo pursue mv-i to persist in this endeavor is Mieli that it makes their own live? secondary to them. The (Ji AIHII AN. In their zeal any greater t h a n George Washington's troopa at Valley Forge? Didn't they have the saine kind of ''/cal? Senator EAGLE i'"*. Well now the/e are some mixed reports about Valley Forge in'-lui.iiig Oeorge Wnsliinglon expense account* and there were lime [liiu'ghter] when tlii'l'e were a lot of people at Valley Forge who wiuiti-.l to throw in t'*e lowel. We have always pictured Washington crowing the Delaware ^landing up in (he boat. I would like (o .M-c llnil pulled otf some dtfy. We liave llie cherry tree mill we have a lot of old myth* we like lo iin-nleate into <.nir yo(:tli, and sirme of the jieeounts o f Valley Korgi1, nnd Senator Spong is mi expert Iii--i4>ritiii, it n-ii'i all "go get them, chief, we nr<- w i t h yon nil I he way," n^ it lit!-. I- en niuiie out to be in the lii--t.ory books. The (ji \ii.\i.iX. IJul they pi-r.-i-.ted agujiist the sophisticated urniy of ( h a t day. Senator KAUI.KTON. Ye?; they were the giterrillaj,, (jeorge Wu.thington Ha-ilif jruerrilla. Tiie CMAIIIUA.N. J had br>(U;r not Tight the Revolutionary War. I yield t>< the>eiiator from Idaho. Seiir t'lirKirii. Thunk you, Mr. (.'haimtan,
11-TIVAT1O\ OK VlKtrotH A XI' VOtlTH Vfbr.V Mlt.>K
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'!'<>in. nmi'l \ ilii>n eXI-ls ill Vietnuin I lie -!.A-Jn^ jxr-v;',- "f the \'i'( i.'nngnlid llje \nllli \"ln\ rmiJIi'.-i' JIM-* trreiH /leai (n do v.ith flu- drvjjv lo drive, the foreigner from tJje lui'il'.' < ^ i ! i t i - i |>.i.r! ffiirn .Mijiht-iii-'leil \'\i't>\n'!\\ vvfiicll cnujd (II''U,K l i ' l l e '' l l l l ' i - i a t ' 1 pi-:i^t;i|K, H n - n ' l )' \ \ i \ - /ert| \, t ri'l V i e l l t i l l l l 'if furfi^ner- l i ' v. " l l i e t l r r v j f ^ r f'irci-, bo'!) wild fegii'-.! In the French iriif] !,'!, \ \ i \ ' j-îi:-<] in A/nerii- ; iris? W M - J ' I ii i j i i - <i-î:'e lo eiul furi'i-jt; rnle. ur.,J :. i|;iw ilii' f'."ei^t,er out.''
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Don't you think that is what account* fur the x.onl (hut is pcrennhilly demonstrated out. there? Senator EA<;I.ETOX. -Senator, you rtmldn'i U- more correct. In sutMantial measure it/L- the hatred of the xvhite man the oiit.>uVr. We want to bo loveu: that is ingrained in the American [isvctir; cverylkxly Iiv\s u.; xvc. hax-e got to le loved. Bui xxc Imvo replaced I lie French in Indochina. We look pretty much, like the French. Except fur stri|ey the \V and UKNorth Vietniuni's*', Imt we are iw.it nttich loved l,y the South Vielnttinof'C. Ifl me make that clear.' I told one of Ambassador Bunker's deputies, I hud 2 hours free the In&t day ! was there before, catching my pltui", ttu'.l \ wmtld like to visit the University of Saipon. It is the "Harvard, lue Uniwrstly of Arkansas, the University of Michi^n, all rolled into ouo, on t.he outskirts of Saigon. They oalloil bick in alraul 10 miuutcs mid said I would not be permitted to go to the University* of SLI^H. I didn't want to give a s:>eec'i. 1 jusi wanted to walk around tl.fc place aird Ambassador Bunker's deputy told inc. that my life mid most definitely the life of my military escort would be in danger if 1 got near the campus of the University of Saigon. Thi> myth that everylxdy loves us over there is ju.-:!- (hat --a tfWnl coucoclcd myth. We tire not loved. I wa.^ not even pcttiiiltcd (o walk from the Caravelle Hotel to (he (lencnd Asseintjly or* to r-he ('oiifjueiil.it Hotel by myself nlthontrli they are us close together its my olBce is from this room. 1 had on >lacks And H t-|Hirt shirt, ci-rlninly intl u I'.S, S-nutor si<rn, and I said "whv can'l I walk alone" mid (hey replied iliut th.-y liave to protect politiciai^. They irct demoted if one of n got killed - -dr;|eudiiijr on which Senator got killed, maybe we can jv't promoted. . Hut lie tliul a> it niiiv, wi' are riot loved. Their /.eal !o gel the foreigner out, wheilier British, French, or Ainerieaii, i> ingrained ihioiighout Indochinn.
SAICOS" UOVM(VUKM''s JJ>KN'I IFC'ATIUN \V1TJI FOJtKHiN" Sl'I'I'OHT
Si-iiutdr ( ' i i r m i i . HOI-I-U'I il follow (lien, Tom, lluil (he greale-,1 single disubiliiy ( h u t the Suigon (i.ivemmeiit must .suffer ifs n> total ideiititifiiiion w i t h for<-ii:ii -.ujiporr.' Il i> ue|| known to the VnMnajjir.-o (!iu( ortr muvive c.oiitribiition of money. mnK-riel, uud an American Army in the field ha* \n-cn iiulis|MMiMible lo (he ijiiiiiilcimncj' of ihin (joveriimenl Torn numlx-rof yeurs ami, Ihu-s, I wi.iild think Mint in the eves of the people the govemiiK'.ii uoulil lx> looked upon us u kind of puppet of the foreign power und, then-fore, unworthy of legiilny und Mipport. Don't you dunk (hi* Im* (wcii u nio-ii .scrioiH di.subilily llinl Int.-. nffected Saigon duriii/ the v<!urs of o;ir mtivive iw.ii\)ui'nin <>( our counlry? ,S<Mial/r FvA(ji-KTi;v. I would (vrluuilv think it was in the mix. If you curry that utw*i'nn\ furi.hcr (o make the penultimate predii'tion ihul President Tbieu and \"u-i- IVfbideiit Ky would be defeated if they run for eluelifiH, and J wouldn'l make rliat prediction, even though in some wind* they are tin- buughl., paid for, and kept (jovenimeiit of Ajueiicu -bo'ighl with the Ammom lurgfusf of W,fi billion, llff.un*n with tJje yovii-r that fim:* wilh ifieiunlM'iiey, with the power that gde* with getting your uar/ut in the. pajrtir in u controlled jjn-na, with the
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power that comes from ging around the country, in building all the s-.hools and ditches, and bear in mind President Thieu is an adroit politician, like him or respect him or not, and with all our money, he bes a powerful clout going into the October elections. So I don't think the fact he is bought and sold and owned by us is enough to bring him down in the elections.
AMOUNT OF TIME TO COMPLETE V1ETKAMUATIOK
Senator CHUKCH. Just recently, Vice President Ky, who will figure prominently in this upcoming election, was quoted in the New York Times regarding, the Nixon Vietnamization plan. He is reported to have said:
The \>tnaniization plan is not completed yet so we still have many things to do not only in toe military field but in other fields, socially, politically and economically. So if Vietnattiixation means South Vietnam strong, capable to defend itsulf, it will take '3 or 20 more years. B'lt if Vietnamiration means only to allow the wiUid-nval. American troops then y%*u can see that the Vietnamization plan could be completed next year.
From your testimony, I gather you believe that Vietnamizatiou might list 15 or 20 years if its objective, as explained by the President, is to establish a viable and self sustaining government in Saigon l' it can carry on without further dependence on outside aid. Is that the thrust of vour testimony? Senator EAGLKTOX. Ye*, it is. Thfc diplomatic and military L>tie.rs I talked with there believe there wOi have to he an indefinite residual ground presence ami a massive American air presence as hereiofondescribed. And Ambassador Bunker told me it would take -i continuing 5 years of economic aid at the present levels, and then for the ensuing r> thereafter diminishing levels. That means economic aid in the billions uii<l billions at least through the decade of the 1970s.
<;ON'CKEt>.s' DUTY TO LEGISLATE COXCEKVJXU U.S. :,NVGLVEHEXT
Senator CHITUCH. i)..n'r you think (xmgre&r* has a duty^ to I a definition for Vietnajm/.arion that .clearly commi'.s tlus counuy t the total ;md ômpleu? withdrawal of American forces not only on the ground Irit aerirl and naval forces as weU so that we can put an end u the continuing American involvement in"this war. >>cnator KAGLKTOV. I think legislation, setting not only a definition but H date, r date for the total termination of American military pnx^ncc is necessary. I would be. willing, and I think many other Senators would be willing, for continuing economic aid for a |>cri *i, and I wouldn't jiut now u dtite on that. I would In1 willing to wait tiri'l M-e. Hut the America.i military presence, lnd, >>ea and air, must conic oul a-, of u <late (M-rlain McC-overn-lluttield ftyle. Senator VUVUVH, Don't you al.*o think that this it not only m'ces.-iiry !><( ui..sc of our re>>]>onil>ility to define ualionai policy, but a)jo to fill the constitutional vucuum that tiow exiU? Seimfor KAMLETOV. Most definitely, and I won't belalx^r the coinmil \w, I will just cite for reference my U'tuiiony Mnrv this committee u few weeks a(.'o on my wur |Mjv-er= reoolutioii. Senator CiiL'Ucn. I am in full agreement with your jioiiition, tor.mid I commend you for it. P<!W*on,
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ESTIMATE OF yiLITARY COURSE IF HATFIELI>-M'GOVEnjf ACT PASSES
Senator PEAKSOX. Mr. Chairman, I think the Senator's report L :iio*t valuable l<: the committee and to the country. I have a jjreat deal of res|>ect for flu* Sensi tor's powers of analysis and expres.-io.li. ijot 1110 ask this: If the Hatfehl-McGovern Act tr soniPthinj: like "it were passed nnd implemented, in view of the Senator's analysis of the Vioii'niijj and the North Vietnamese capabilities mid intentions in the Mimmeror spring of 1972, what would you estimate to in- the military course? " Senator KA,ETOX. Well, in a nice way, Senator, wh.-it yon are asking me isnm Thieu-Ky survive after December 31, 1071. Senator RCAKSOX. That is the political part which 1 iuu-nded to "jet to. J am seekiii',; to try t<> .online it to the military. Senator EA<;LKTOV. \\VII, I would pues there is a 50-50 rhiiice tlint a non-Xort!i Vietnamese, non-VC, non-Ked povenimeni conhl r eventually survive. I cnn't <rnarmtce that they can liax-k it on thc-ir own. No'oiif can. I oiu :rniirj'iite that a& Ionr as we nre there we w ill nexvr know \vhether they can. They will nevT nsMime the burdens of the hnli<u*i)',er!> and of the scnsr>rs and of all of the other sophisticated weaponry that "s fheiv nnle-;s th^y have U do it. If I ciiri ^Mii:ie a tnrden for you in thr Scnnle, do some chores for yon, [;<nke life u little easier for you, you will be L'liio to let me do the work, ami (he snme is true I here, and the l>c*t o.lils 1 can quote you up.-50-50. _'>.enator FKAKSOX. Given your estimate <;f the po>>ible IvjH 1 ot' fnihiury o|Hratioiis, which I n-rrcc are most feasible, do I take it if we impV.-icrl Nic(Jovirii-Hatfield tiie.n in your judgment there js a 50-5(1 chu'Te that the ARVX forces can survive? Seiinior KACI.KTOV. That i the l>est I could quote on il, yes.
POUTir--.t. V A U I F I f A T I O V S IK A I C V S f'AVXOT sf.-TAlX TIIKIK I'OSITIOS
S'iniii>r PKAKMJV. If they are not able to hiirwv, and voiirie-tiIiiony cxpre-.M-d s<ilne \~erv }irii\e i|oilbl> Senator KALK'to\'. Vi-s. Sj>iia<or J'KAU-OV. There U ti lartre volume of opinion, J Uiink today "ili/./najuriiy view, to lluit ci'fec'. U'hiil would be in your i^timule the [1'iliiical nuni'icaiioii^ of t h a t ? >enn!or K*r;t,KJo\. Doiii' 1 -)'icully in lh<' Cnited Stale*, or in Soiithen^t A.-IJI? Senator PKAKSIIV. \<>, in Sonih \'ietnam. Seiinior KA<;I,K'ION. \Vell, the politim! raiiiilicniion*. if the. AHVS', M hoe\ er i> comnniiulinu' Senaior I'KMIMIN. ('amiot .ii^.tniii their pocition. Senaior KAOI.KIOV (coniinuinj:;, Cjinnoi -u-iain their po.-iiioii. would be a takeover by either ihe N'LF or ii'or4- likely -onie form of I'onifirolniit 1 would emerge. Someday we are ôinjr to hu\'e to bite llio! bullet, Senator. Smiieilay we are jroin^ to have to take a chance add xei- uhellier tlii- investment of 17 yean-, we cmi <f11 IS, we can ','.<> I'.l, we cmi j;o 20, we <-an <ro ,'{7 years, bill a day is jroiti;r \ti mine .vhcn somewhere, I hop/ 1 in my lifetime, when we are jroin^ to have in take II cliuiicc and see if they can inu'k it.
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Senator PKAJÔX. I nmUriMand ami I agree with you. I just \\ant to .say that tht* level of frr.jtVvtioii ami futility and ,de<ire for >ome iiinuift'suuiim of tiiiality to ttil- war i> rfachiiip now heights \\ith my yii < !titin'n'y;"< l v i ii in Dodf*v-f."ity there. But I wiistt to imder>tan.! what the unifications an- a* best you iiUi-rjret thorn.
VI.VMIIJTY OK C.OXT:XVEI> KCOXOMH' AM IK NLF TAKE* oVfr
Do yo'r tieJievi; that ills.- Congress or the American |M-o|iIe wJild find <-i,Mtimird orr>:ionii<: aid viul>li> if the NLF diil cm-ei-ed in ijtkin: over Si.*n'n Vietnam? EACLETOV. Alolm-lv not. I)c>|>ii<* what I'lvs-Mrm Jnhnpnnnis<-<J as a \n-\\ Mnr^luill I'!i:i fitr A>iu, in MDC of his jr thr t'ooiiskin H"inc" sj^vrlii-!.. H<- talk-<l lx>iit hiiliuli* for all <>f Soiitlii-ast \u. b>it f S<î[;iti.r, yoti kiiovv, and thi> r^nnuilt) 1 *' kiio\\> Ix-itcr thai) anv otiu-f >;ro:i|) in Congress, that foreign itic) î*ntTullv is in 1'nat twil^ht X.un- of puhu<- lix-ndiaDiiiu-iit, ami if thf XLr v took OVT in S*ijrn. tin- rliann^ umilil U- s<. uiinirnal as to not be <(iioirilile for fun-ipi rconomii- aid to the NLF.
CHANCE KOM- : N'ATIQN'AL L'XITV IN USITEH STATES
Senator PEARSON'. It is so |H*riilativi. I don't know whether it is fair to |mt tlie <|iii l >tiii. Hut yon and I l)oth have a <vmir'ioii goal -Mid that is to provide MIIII>' unity for thr (rvvptc of o(ir isxintn, and tinwr is a ^creut source of division. If MeCJoveni-HatfU-ld w:rt' ini|)lciiii')ited arid I he ARVX were n<ii,. nhle to riDviitain ttteiiiM-l^s, and self-drbTiiiinatioii hroii^ht alxmt a Conuniinisi jrovcniuictit it! South Viet num. <! you think out of thnt eolldttion we e<iuld tjll arhjrvr sonii' seli-^- of ilnilv 4H nr eodlitry? S-nator KAf;i.ET>\. I will MIV thi>, Senator. l-niji-r th<^ i>reM-; |>oti<-ii-.- there i> not a M*inl>Iuiiee of a ehaiii-e for national unity. Von noii-tl what is poinjr on in Dodi'i' ('ity, I <-an t-ll you uimt i?- even p-inir on in "hawkish" ar<'a.>in my State like S|irin<dirldr Mo., uh.Ti* 2 \vaiv uô if I hud reuul thi> stutement I would hiivu hcen run out of town, f uullld h a v e tirîve it on the run. Today befor*1 the Rotary Club in S|irin<rfield I will ret sorm* attention and a few poliu- a(>plaiise. I will not <;ef run out of town. There will IM- no unity in tlii-- eouritry n lout: > tlii^ Vii-liiam nightmare ((.iitiinii'-,. It may Ix-i-onu- .1 (wo-iiufTerin in>t<';i<l of a three-hutTerhi ni'/liimure, but it will >lill Iw n ni'^liimure. If we embark on i> new.nijrhlmure, if the AHVN fell and the N'LF look over a new Joe McCarthy limy try to ak who loM IndiM-hinu. J don't know who he is poinjr to In-, but there will jirobably IN- xnnroiic who vull co uround this eoiintry trying to, a* Senator Joseph NM'arlhy did, point blame perhapi at me or Senator Fulbrifrht or you or Senator Symington. But I ttu.'ik the Aineriean [>uMic, having end'.red thi> nijililtjiiire, are riot trnintr to listen n> intentlv us the Aineriean [>ublie listened in the early ]'JM'* txj Joe Mi<'iirihy. Senator I'KAIIKOV. I thank you. The rniKMAs, The x-iiior Seiiutor from Mi*.M>uri. Senator SVMIJKOTON-, Thank you, Nfr. Chuinnun.
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PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL Senator, I congratulate vou on a fine, constructive statement. President Nixon said, when lie campaigned, that he had a plan t-j get us out of this wcr. He now says he would like to gel out of it. I personally believe In intends to get the Army out, but am becoming increaoihgly doubtful that he really wants to get Air out, at least for an indefinite period. At one time the President said he was only staying to protect the men who were leaving. That became increasingly difficult to sell to the American people, especially as the wav this was explained practically was to invade two more countries. Now we have seemed to have changed t he line, you might say, to the problem of prisoners of war, how to get out so as to help the prisoners of war, to obtain their release.
EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL DATE ON RELEASE OF POW'lS
In the transcript of the discussion in Paris the Congressman quoted the North Vietnamese, sjwkesman, Nguyen Thanh Lc regarding the POW"'. ''TVe have no intention of holding them." The Vit'icotg spokesman at the same time, Nguyen Van Tien is also quoted ns saying,''We will agree to release the POW's if an appropriate with-lrawal date L, set." Then lie stated. "The problem of the capture of military men is a problem i-onnected with the war itself. It Ls a problem to be dealt with is an ttfternmth of the war. Generally speaking it is only solved after the war is over. But in onbr to s-how our go<nl will we have stated that the L'.S. Government needs only to declare an appropriate; date for the total withdrawal of it.s troops from South Vietnam. Then \vc are ready inmicdiate.lv to enter into talks on procedure.-; and wavs to release thi 1 eapturcd men. Tin1 discussions will \tr-. on how to rc!e.nse the nu-ji. Tin; question is not on whether we will release them or not. We will uirree to release the men. The discussion would IK; on procedures to expedite the releas-e." Wouldn't you say this is another good reason for establishing a definite tUte for withdrawal? Senator EACLETOV. AI>solutely, Senator. I said in the bod;' of my testimony that until such time as we do cstnblish such a dak- any talk Hlxmt the release of the prisoners I think is jiM that, talk. Enrlif'.r, Senator Fulhright put a eolumn into then-cord that, recited the liistoriejil incidents of the release of the French prisoners after fJii'iihienphu. X. one ( absolutely guarantee they will be released, but I firmly Mlcvi- that if we set a date for withdrawn!, and live up to if, tire prisoners W/'M be released. Senator SvMjvcToy. In that regard, I would read chapter IV, "Prisotirr- of War and Civilian InUTHMw," of the Geneva a<:cord, , nr(Hc21:
Tlic lil'i-rutj'm and r )j;itriaUoii of ull |>ruo(i>T of wjtr and civilmn d'-triiri"-*! hv rcli of tli<- two j'Ujrtii:* :>l tlii' rr^njiiiK inUj forw- of the \if<-M:nl Ai(rjMfiil cKilI In- runted out under the folIouitiK ronilitlotn' () all \>ri*mu-r of war ~Mt(l civilmti inNTiiceii of Vietnam, Frchcti aird oilier antioiifra|itui*Hiiir fi caturcd - Mje ItcxinttHiit i>t Iio-UJit.R-K in Vii-tnftiii during military ojx-riitioiin or in ny other
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circumstances of war and in abypnrt of the territory of Vietnam, shall be liberated within *. period of thirty (30) Jay after the dau when the cease lire bucome* effect ivo in -each theater. ' -' .
If they are anxious for us to get out of their count ry_ so they can resume normal life, do you see any reason why, if -wo did move out, tbrv would not be willing to sign "the same kind of an agreement or make the same kind of *gre:inmt in 1371 they made with th* French in 1954? " '-" Senator EAGLETON*. I think they would make the same general type of agreement with the same cud result. The prisoners, the American FOW's, would be returned after a withdrawal date had been met. '
..COMMENDATION OF WJTSJfiSS
Senator SvuisoTos'. I congratulate my colleague, Mr. Chairman, <M making this trip. I turned against this war ir> the fall of 1907 after six trip;* U> Vietnam, and congratulate you on the position you have held >inc vou came to the Senate. Senate>rEAGLETOX. Thank yo, i, Senator. Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. ChairnM.i. The CHAIRMAN". The Senator from Virginia. Senator SPOXG. Thank volt, Jx'iintvr Eaglet^n, for giving the committee your statem --'it mid yur firsthutm r>bM>rvitiinis frcj,h from your trip. 1 have two iunt(er on which I wild ask you to comment. Vou h:ivc mentioned the Luotiutt invaMon, and yo;ir ntialyM.- <if the ( view of the military in Vietnam toward tli!.~
A B V N OPKUATIUN, "TOTAL VirTOKV J/"l"
Alxiut the sutiv time tlml was latti^hM, the AHVN aiinlher invasion, un operation in (':iinlxnlh>, -known -> Tolul Vir-unj' 1/71. I wonder if the 'brmtfogs <liirii;}r your vi--.it int-iiidoj u:iy information on this and if vu would give us Mime appraUal of the pteM-ut status. '"-.. - - .v . Seuau>r EAGLETOX. Only on the pmplirry, S>naU>r S|miig. Bwaii*; fjf time I had to f<x:ijs, my riti^diuii during the l)ri-h'tiir in order k>^{H vjiue mowers in areas tiuit 1 u'atifed t<> fiM-us on. So to be qiitex cuildid with you we only j;ot on 'he periphery of Toan Thalig. Senator Spox. 1 Ui4-d U>tl lir/J^ry !>crau.-e I ran'; proiioum-e the other. Senator EAKI.KTUN. May I a>k uiiuiiinioiis e<ruu'n( to jmt in the record an article of the Tuesday, Mny 11, 1971, Wa^hitigion po>t, wiiich diMîiHM'd Unit matter in * dej>lh. Senator SPONX;. That nrticle itiMiired the qm-tion. I u,n Ijapjiy that you lire puMing it in the record. Senator EACI.ETOV. Hut to directly nnswer you, I can't tuukc any meaiiiiiû! coiiitiiciiiarv on tin- r,u<rc*r., failure, of t\\rur' I that puriiciilur O|>eration T{IC('HAIKMAX. Without objection, uc \viil iiflude tlie article, t'j'fu- infoniiutioii referred to follow*:}
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[From Tb*WvMn*to POM. My 11. 19711
15,000 S. VIITS STALLED IN CAMDODIA (By Peter OSBQS) WtthlOftoa rat Focrifn Senior
SAIOOS, May 10 The South Vietnamese drix-c into oastern Ciunbodia, now nwv than thrco months old, is rtill stalled far short of the ambitious goals that were set OH/, for it when the operation began. The main combat units of a force numlx-ring 1S,000 according to the South Vietnunufw command, arc situated along Highway 7 west of Kompong Cliani where they nave been since early Mmrrh. These troops mow no more than two or throe miles from thejr bate camps and ihir activities wore drsrrilxxl by one U.S. military source today in a derisive tone a- ''loeal road security and limited reconnaissance." Meanwhile, U.S. military sources said, fresh~ memy troops and supplies are l>eing brought into the Communist staging areas north of the highway that were to have l>een the objectives of the Camlxxiian drive. Some of tliexe reinforcements are believed to be in and around the massive Cbnp rubN-r [Jantation, an important mtuny stronghold that was the scene of lieaw fighting ut the start of the operation. Chup has long l,*>on atuuidoned by thi- South Vietnamese i-xwpt, U.S. sourci-s raid, for forays into the southeast corner of the plantation. None of the other CoiiimunLit Manet uarics hf been luriously challenged since the South Vietnamese p'ulM back Feb. 2fi from C^hhlong on Highm-ay 7.">. "The rrale of the fighting has dropped markedly, arroiding to South Vietnamese casualty tipitj'rt. For the (x-riod of March 9 to April !'{, 2,243 enemy were reported killed, along with l.i;> South Vietnamese. For the (Htriod of April 14 up to today, the ,mm^>rr of enemy killed is placed at 749 and South Vietnamese dead at 66. I'.S n> litar>- sources confirmed tb<Te had Lx'i-ii few significant cngagenurnts in recent f]t*. _ A month ago, however, these sourer* .iad predict**! stome concerted South Vietnamese action. ( Jen. N'guven \'*r iifinli, command'T of the operatiou, had 'an are up bis sleevv." one offio-r r jd. Today, the officer, u'hose jo1 it i. to monitor the Camlrtdian drive, said, "Y, Gen. Minh had SJIP- r ,,jans . . . but the Itent laid plans of mirt and men go aftrav." H" did not e)->. >orate. Minh took owr the ('ambodian o|>eraiioii after the accidental death FHi. 2-1 of Oen. Do Cao Tri, the dashing commander who envitioi>ed the drive as an allSouth Vietnamese sweep through the old Communist bordnr sanctuaries into en'-my-held areas ax far north ai Kratie. Th" aim of the thru*! uax to rrippie cn-'iny supply lin into the Saigon region, (he .\frkouit delta and i-Mlward into C*n>bQ<iia, much the same reason given for J**t \na'f Catnbodiaxi drive. Tli" area of the activity u- ni-o roughly the j-nni'- ax il was in Mr.y and June of 1970, itlth'iugh it was initially fhifte/j northward* <<> Chhlong and rejiiaiiiis as far wi~>t i Kompffng <'ham. ultout 40 tnili- from (h>- South \ ictii:irin-w l.order. Wh'ii llM- campaign slowed offer Trr' d'-uih, '".S. and South Viet;innie luilitaryineii ajd a lime of read;u->tn>>-nt wa.- nec"!>sury in any cliange of romuinnd duniiic a major o|MTaUoti. S>-m'or iiulilar.v ÎIHJV *l* now acknowledge that time has _ "It jii-t luuiii't worked out lli'- war it wax mtpfiowd lo," aid one ranking I'.S. offiriaJ. - ' At brtefinc* one month ago and two mouths ago, I'.S. Military sources xaid Uie S'nijFj VietiiAinnw were being "refitted and na>rganisi>d". Tb* reorgani/atwn <>l (he tu..k forms ban now IK-CD completed, with the addition of a new fore/; of 3..1HII uwii. The Soi-tli Viid(ttiw-e-ii|,|,[ied I'd ul of 1K.OOO liu'ii in t'je i>|*eratioii : "i,IHH) !<- tlmii the maximum of 2'.',.t#Ht romnnried itt fix- start. Ijr-feiiiu- Kern>tury Melvifi Ijurd uut/'d ill Hie time that there were more Soul]) Vietr.Biiies!- f:iririK more winy tr'x>p< in Cninbwlia itiuri there wen- in the n'-nly beicun inva-nni of [jio- and ('omiriunii>t -upply lines tliere. I'.S. MiureeH uid today thai enemy Htrengtli wa still around 25,(KNJ men of the \<irli V'ii-tiiaineM- ."<t!i, Tlh, niid ttlh J)i*iioii>. Tlw -o'lrf^ iuid tlm'. finr-i- the ojierufioti -kiioun ofTirially a* Twin TliunK J'7l . . bp^Mii, I here have lieun MO ludirutionn of divisioii'sizi' enemy i-lerm-nts bark into South Vietnam from C'aml>odia,
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Another American, a senior civilian with a military background, mid the drive bod th' positive effect of tieinfc up major portions of throe enemy dirixioas for must n' the dry season, now coming; to ft dose. Throi:r';uut Toan Thang 1,71, the bouth Vietnamese have nharcd air activity with Anii-rican units to a f ar greater extent than Uwy did in the Laotian campaign. N<rveri '.1'as, a U.S. spokesman said that some 23,000 helicopter sorties baa taen flowji in support of the operation, with 19 choppers lost. U.S. K-si* have hit targets in Cambodia Hit dirty* since Toan Thang bca*n.
Senator SPOXO. You are in general agreement with what the article says? Senator EAGLETON. Yw, based on. as I say, this periphery questioning that onlv got into that subject collaterally as opposed to Lam Son 719 direct.
FORTHCOMING ELECTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Senator SPONC. You mentioned in re>|>onse to Senator Church your forecast of the forthcoming political elections. Senator EAGLETON. Yes, the Eaglcton poll. Senator SPONG. This committee, as part of these hearing, has before it Senator Stevenson's joint resolution, Senate Concurrent Resolution 17. That is designed to )u>lp assure free, elections in South Vietnam. I woiiJfT if, as a result of your trip, vou would care to comment on the need for such legislation or what, if anything, you saw that would indicate American intervention in the election. Senator EAGLETON. The [x-ople who are hung up abott Vietnamese elections are not the Vietnamese. We are the ones that are hung up. Pogo once said "we have met the enemy and they arc us." We have had elections for almost 200 years and we have a verv sophisticated electoral process. We have a highly educated electoral*1 and we think they ought to have what we have. The Vietnamese, are not as excited at all alxntt these elections as we are. You get more yawning than eagerness, even from Vietnamese Senators. We are the oiu* who waul Uii very unsophisticated nation with no democratic ancestry as a nationa nation that had either been enslaved by the French, the Japanese, or the ChiiicM.1a nation that now is our bought and kept pawn, to have an election in the good old American tradition. Frankly f urn not a enamoured by a Vietnamese election a* maybe other f>coplc are. Now to direc.lly answer your question, [only found one overt act of American inUTVcution. Ambu.*<sador Bunker did commi.viion one or more public opinion iy|c polls to be taken on issues, you knou, the ii>Hal Qiiayle tyin- |o|f. They were. Mi||lied txi President Tliieu for hi* iwrvjiml edification. I menfionetj to him that f thought it uns inipr|H>r, but he didn't nay whether he thought it uux or no(. S-nator Spo\;. \o reflection on Mr. tûuvle, but if they are no more accurate than in this coiinlry and in firilaJn p-cently I don't know whet her he it doing him * favor or not. 1 thank you very much. The CHAIKMAV. Thank you very much, Senator.
BfiTWKKV NOUTH A V I ) K<M"fH VIKTXAMErtK HUlMlti UKE HtU
in make one last otMcrvation that linger^ in my mind. Vou HuiiJ almoht every general you talked to agrwdthe North Vietnamese bold tlwir lives in low regard. It didn't HCCUJ lt> me that tlu*
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Suiiih Vietnamese in their eagerness to exit on our helicopters evidenced the same lack of regard for their lives. How do the generals "xplain the difference between the North and the South Vietnamese with regard to their lives. Senator EAGLETOX. Senator, I ain going to ask leave of the committee to restructure a couple of paragraphs of my original presentation. I think I have perhaps inadvertently created an impro|>er impression. The CHAIRMAX. No, vou attributed this to the generals. Senator EAGLETOX. What I mean to say and will stick with is that the North Vietnamese dedication and zeal to pursue their cause to eliminate the intruding Americansthe very ugly intruding Americansis such that they can subvert the normal human desdre to exist. Their zeal is such that the kind of things that you and I would do to stuv alive they are willing to forgo. The CHAIRMAN*. The question is not really their concern for their lives. It is that one has a motivation and the other doesn't; isn't it. Senator EAGLETOX. Yes. The CIIAIUMAX. Is sliere any difference, rvrii nnn>ng thr gonci>d> who gave you thU s-fafeiiicnt, iti their estimate of one ruling for hi? lift- inn) another riot? Senator EALKTOX. It grt- !>uk to dedication uiid motivation. Tin1 CIIAIKMAV. What they an- s-aying i.- one \* n:otivutrd and the other i* not; i.- thai it? Senator EACI.ETOX. That i* u good apt .-nminarj. The CHAIKMAX. Tliunk yn! MTA much.
Semitor SVMIVCTUX. May 1 n*k one more jUcM ion. Mr. ( 'hairmun.
WAR tx i.Af Senator, the real war going mi over then- now, |*-rhitps t i n - r-al danger over then- now, i- not in South Vjctiinni or ('aiiilxxlia, l>ut in Luo>. Tli<- xvur r ri>iii'T on in Laos, the number of ix>ofile coiiiifigin from ('hiiiii, amount of Mork > tin- p u t t i n g in thrn 1 . T IMC, Lao i.- getting to }, you rniglit ay "tin- Big Story" of (liU :viiithea.-t A.-iu ojwratioti. We are pretty lieavily involved. I)id you get lri f'd on \\hut is going on iii Luo>, niid, if MI, whui do \<>u think ulx'iit it? Si-imtor EAI.ETOX. Ni. I did nm. We lid g t to Hmoni I't-uh. We wep 1 not >ch''du|ed to go to Lao*. I ua> not briefed .-[M-(ifii-ulU 0:1 IMH-. I would tigree wiih \oii that ' t .>rliH|* the next md nnd ugly -tory of thi. (rilhininsr ugly >tory i.- the fhajiler !hat will be rnllrd
L.HOS.
S-nator SVMI VOTOK. Thank you, Mr. < 'hainnan, thatik you, Senator. The CHAIKMIV Tliunk you very tnueh, Senator. Onr wxt witrii-s* U Mr. Gardner. Will you come forward. Before f introduce the next witness, I wioli to announce that tiov. Terry Satiford, president of Duke U/iivepiity, who \HU\ lxn s to testify today vcu unable to com? because of an unavoidable problem. He is sending a stuU-inei t for the hearing m-ord.
JXTIWMtTTHX OF WITMiKK
Our m-xt witiutM is John W. Oardwr, who i* chairman of Common . Mr. Gardner has had e long and distinguislwd career in public and e4lucation.
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After service as a marine with the OSS in World War II, he joined the Carnegie Corp., where he served us president from 1-955 to 1965.
ft . _._ . " _ I t? _ . . _ _ _ _ _ __. __ t fY_..l*l. tV I.. .A_ ..-..I ^17_~lf-. _- I...
nttd, in October 1970, chairman of Common Cause, one of the most Iio]K-fuI movements of our day. We are pluasKti indeed, Mr. Gardner, that you are \\illini; to take the time to vi.-it with Us this morning and we welcome your statement. STATEMENT OF JOHH W. OAEDHER, CHAIEKAH, COMMON CAUSE,
WASHDTOTOV, D.C.
Mr. GVXEK. Mr. Chairman, one item you left out of my biography is that I \vas horn in 1912 and I will IK- pi ad to discuss the First World War wilh you if it is relevant. The CHAIUUAN. All right. (Laughter.)
COMMENDATION' OF COMMITTEE
Mr. (JAUi>\ER. Mr. Chairman, it U a great honor for me to apjH-ar In-fore thi. eotnmittee today. As you know, there have bwn times when I have been somewhat critical of the way Congress has functioned, l>iil I must give credit in all sincerity to the work of this commit U-e. It has IIP- . ided a forum for national debate on the Vietnam war at a time when there wa> no comparable forum. Tin- |M>wer and influence of Congress vis-a-vis the executive branch niii.il be reasserted, and no one has stated the case for that reassert ion more (-((gently, r<or labored more diligently to that end, limn the distitiKuislnui <Jiairman of this committee. I U'lieve that we are already >cein^ the Ix-piniiifi^b. of a shift. In rca-nl deciulo the people lix)kcd to the President for the p*eut changes in national j>ohcy wliich Uiey cared most deeply, ln.t they are now turnni}; to esks. When the hi.tforicaJ record i written, I believe it will .show that the n;l>irlli of con^re>sional inHueiK-c wus mo^t vividly foreshadowed by the vigorous and indejH-ndent functioning of this committee. In my loiiiiiony imluy, J ^hall limit myx-lf to the situation in uliii-li we find niir^'ivc- ill ihi- inoment, and to thi--e a-.pe-l- t h a t Ix'ur
ll|o--l directly oil the dcci-jn]]-. vve |i|i].-.| Ilillkc 1 1 " i M . FCULJI (II'IMUS ro.M'KltNIMJ V f K T X A M WAI'.
The liii'^t iilarinin^ feiiiure of our prf.wnl --ilnulioi! j^ j h u t e ure enîêil iii n war wlucli u miijurity <f the Ainericmi jxeojile d<>'>. noi -n|i|iori. In .fjinuiiry of I 0 7 J , I he (uillu| J'oll re[i.irti-d t l n i t TA [M-rcent of crifiiiir. u u i i l nil !r<Mi;i- u i i ' i d n i w n fn-iu N'leiniim l^-fun- (lie end of ll,i.- Veaf. l.i J-'elirmiry, ( j u l l u p M>jH>rled l l m ! Ai lericun-., by inure ( l i n n n U to J
I J i l i n . t l i l l i k I he I ' l l i l e d ^ l ; i , e , - , l j | ) | l l e ( l i l i V J i - . j i i i i uf ],:n>, ly llie
SMII|I \'iei:ijiiiie^- u u i i l d leii'/ihcij niMier t h i E i i -liorir-i the v.r ThiM I I ^ nl :i lime w h e n the I'lv-idenl VMI- -ayin*/jii-t the nj/j/n-ile
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Also in February, the GaC'ip Poll reports! that seven out of io persons intemevved believe the Unit***! States Government s no telling the American j>eople all they should know about the Vietnam war. in April the Harris Poll repotted that 5* jK?rcent of the American people believe it is morally wrung: for the United Slates to be fighting in \ ictnam. (Only 29 |ercent believe*! it morally right; 13 jK-rcent wen- not sure.) The>e are only a few of the many indications of a massive swing in public opinion. One need only recall the disciplined but eloquent demons! ration by Vietnam Veterans in \Vahington to know that something unprecedented has happened in altitude?- toward this war. All American* who opjHi-M- the war ilo not oppose it for the same reason.-. Sonic believe the war is immoral. Some Ix-lu-vc that it has Itccii a .li.-u-.trou> mistake in both political and military tenns, and tlnii <>ur ilccp cntuiiglcmcnt in Southeast Asia has diverted ti> frmn nmre ini|>orlaiit national security objectives. .-They argue that the .Soviet Union must !* jdcascd to have u- mired ho|>elcsslr in Indochina and neglect ing our inlen-t> in other place-. Others fear tliat if we toy long eiin igh w i t h the explosive danger of >ucc4>ive militarv adventures Mich a- ('HinlnHliit nnd I>ao-, MMMUT or later we will *iuinl>le into the ultimate tragely of nuclrar war. Finally, then- arc ilio-,c txho believe that the wur is progri's-ively but inexorably dc>irovinp: the XM-JH! fabric that holiU u> together as OIK; iH>o[)lc. The fact that American public opinion has turned against the war Icave^ us with a tragic and explosive contradiction on our hand? nnd our conscience^. We continue to send our young people to fight ami die in a war which many of them huvc alway* oppocd, and in which we a> odult> no longer believe. That is Mx'ial dynamite. In Viet mini one see> the coli;U*quellce> in the deterioration of di-ci|rlinc and morale among our military force.- in Vietnam. At home one see* the con-<H|ucnc>> in bitu-rne^, disillusionment and --a* the (Klls -how a gro.ving incapacity to believe or tru.-t their own President. Xo rcsjMmsible American, however opjHisetl he mu.V \*' to the Pn^si'leiit'n |nlicv, CUM take comfort in the socially diainl^cgraiivc consequence.-, of ihat policy. Widespread disaffection, demoralization, mid coiit<-mpl for the office of the President these are dark orneiis for ail of Us. But one must judge from the President's actions that thU awesome fact of contemporary American life is somehow unreal to him. It io in evidence nil around him. yet he seems to rcgurd il as somehow lens consequential thsin the abstraction of U.S. prestige in Indochina. He seems not to understand ( h u t it i more real, and potentially more diûMrou-. titan uny curren/ militant' reality of the battlefield. O.uilc a-ide from the question of uheihcr he should be responsive to the opinion <-f the Aineriruti [wojile, the fjict of a nni*sjvc los of oupporl severely limits his options. He mu.-i surely reulize that given the pre-eni stale of American opinion, lie cannot risk military uciio> ihul woi|l<l cx-iilntc (he Wur. HIJ-.'.JKKVJS Airruonm TO '-ONTINCK VIKINAM WAU nv
The wfvirjd strikijig fealure of ocr sitijiiiioii is i h u l thr- qijesiion of the President's legal tind <:ori!iiij(iomil uuliiority io curry on the wur i- i;i doubt. In \W't, the Siuie JJepurttneni u-eried that '(he legal
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basis for the administration's involvement in Southeast Asia was the Tonkin Gulf resolution. In 1969 the Senate repealed the Tonkin Gulf resolution by a Urge vote. Yet, the war goes on. The U.S. Constitution asserts that the jwwer to determine when and where we go to war rests with Congress, not the President. While {Jie President's powers to conduct a war in progress are hroatl indeed, it is clear that the Constitution envisages a sharing of th power to make war. We must return to the wisdom and balance of the Constitution. Congress cannot allow continuance of a war from which it has explicitly withdrawn its authorizing sup|>ort. It must enact into legislation the desire of the American |>eople for a complete military withdrawal from Indochina and it should fix a date l>v which that process must lie completed. Only this step can eiii merican involvement in the war, free our prisoners, and ienuil ll:f\ irinamesc to determine their own future.
U.S. HALK-1X HALF-OCT POSTL'KE
The third striking feature <f our present j'uation is the exceedingly dangerou* half-in, half-out poature ip which we now find ourselves.. The President has said we an- no longer fighting the war to, win. He has halt] total withdrawal is the goal. But he persist?, u. j.roliBilging the half-ill, half-out situation. As long as we retain U.S. force.- in Indochina, we will \x- under count ant j>reure from the South Viet name*- Government to help them achieve military victory, and we will almost certainly respond in some mea>ure to that premure. But in the past, this lias consistently resulted in widening and lengthening the war. We* are ;iow :M a good situation, militarily speaking, to announce a total '.nhdrawal d.'te with vmie dignity and even to gain credit for tuki'.g the initiative A.*, our trooj levels, drop, however, there is no guaranty that we Wx'l not find ourselves in a worsening militury siti.r.ijon- -in which safety of o;,r remaining forces are in jeopardy and in which further vulhdrawu will look like disorderly retreat. The Prc'jdent ha- U-en .-on-istcntly enigmatic concerning hi.intciitioiia. He ha- si-id tbii total withdrawal is hi.- goal, hut he has never said when. He lia.- promised further withdrawals of American troop- hut he has not jircdicted the rate lieyond l)wt'in\mr of thi> year. He hu aid vie will remain until the South Vietnamese have a "reasonable" chance to Mirvive, and cmplia*i/es that he hah a pretty gowJ idea of when that will le-~bijt ugaifl he refum-n to lie !-J)ecifii-. Such umhiguitv is very hard for intelligent American*, to stomach. They feel that tfiey have an enormous, stake in tl>ov future events over which the President ha- <iruwn a curtain of amliiguity. How many troop- iji--, he intend in leave in Vietnam? For how long? What will they lie doin<r? A Ions: - they ure (here in any cnparily, <n the ground or in helicopN-rx. hovering aliove the ground, or a.- military ativi-^'ix, or n.- jiilot- \>t>m\>\nx from aircraft carrier* or bae in Thaihmd, there i n<> likelihood t l i u t wi- will gel our pri-own. buck or end the war. No iliinking Amerioin cun be (vjurforicd by the ofl-iv-jM-nteiJ a.-.urance- of so--ij||ed rcjili-i. ilint the Prc.-iiL-ni i> t-oo njimri u ioliiiciun to let the wir coniintie through VXTL. (Seimtor Hobert (irJilin. fresh froi u briefing by the President, suid t h a t "in a {iruciicul *WJIM-" the
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tragedies that we have witnesses. I have not dwelt at any length on the erosion of spirit that has occurred among our citizenry. I have not spoken of the grave domestic problems that must go unsolved until we extricate ourselves from this war.
CHANGE IN BOUt Of CO3GHC88
V V i
Bu before I close I want to return to a xhotut 1 Joucbed on at the openi jjr of my testimony. I said earlier that * vwsw alrsady seeing the l-egmniugs of a change in the role of Con^mss. ,You, MX. Chairman, have called for it. It may be happening before <>.ur eyes. . v Consider the House of Representatives; th^; Hou.sc has in recfeot years avoided any serious examination of the Vietnam war Luoe. To this day, the elders in the House are uuSling to schedule hearings ou the question. ^ But now something dramatic is afoot*-and opponents nf ilic war are so much in the habit of writing off the House that tty*y are totally unaware of the turn of events. They had better wtffcevNup, .because House action is essential for any legislated end to theifir. What has happened is that a few weeks ago a grcnip IM t^mrageous and determined Congressmen, four Dcmonratii and iiwi Republicans, issued what they called statements >f purpose calling foran **ifcl to the *rar and withdrawal of atl troops by December 31, 1471. The Democratic statement was sponsored by Thorny * ''Tip." O'Xefll (Massachusetts), Hudi Carey (New York), Jantw Corman <Califoniia) and Danny îstrnkowski (Illinoi-,). Thtr ii-puWw-an Mntenmu was s>|>onsor4ii by diarie Mctsher (Ohk>^ Iâwiviuv O>ughfin (Ppiinsylrania), Marvin Esch (Michigan). Gilbert Gudv (Man'land), and Brad Morae (Mastwchusetta). The sjHmsors wrote to each of their colleapm-s asking th-ui ia *^J. Contmon Cau;>e, which had worked with the sjxajsors from the beginning, also urged us many Members ** potable to sign. To d&tf, Mr. Chairman, there are i:iO ignaturf>i -ilO I)i-m<KTatic and 20 Republican. Bear in inind that if and when 128 Democrats sign they will constitute a majority of D<>iuo<-,ru(s in the Housp. We ur*> only IS sf jrirtt-urefcMWjiy froiu ilui todai'.' Mr. C'hjitirniM), ronûU'ring the pu>t record of Hotiv indif[>Td\<-v tu lhi> H-ui-j'tJiJi"1 )) naiofii^hingdfivlopmi'nf. Tlt* ^Jiiuiuliv. jfiirpos*.1 <>f tlii1 >ignaturr:> olruur**' i.- t< rrt'utv Hie rlinuit/* f Mj|.))nrt tfmt v.iJJ -venmlly bring ubuut a iegi><laiiv<> result. That Jegi-lativp^*!j^Jf. may be IU-WIT than i think. There i* winifl indu-aiion that one cr inrr m*-inU>rs <f the Kou.-r ArniMl Scn-W O>iuiuitu-c may offer KII a.iifndjiicnt to tin- defense authorizetioti bill utlling for u tcruiiiuti duU'.. Tbut auiendituMit will he uUiatsd jrain when thcconiniilUv bill i,-, rt'|x>rl<id to the floor. - If by fhut tiiHi* tfi<- nmnlx-r of MJgnnlun** on iL<- "inU-iarnl* of po-i' ]}::.- ri'ifhed uii iuipreîvc figun-, lh aintMiduicnl mi^Lt ] S MI- ur<- moving touurd a <lru)iiuiin. I linvr <;m}>!i.'i the innasivc sliift iii (nii)lij- opini'iii. ]| i-, Jitiiii^' iliu.1 <Joii(rri'^"- Înnild Lx* tli'- dr-t to Mf-iiM' mid f.-jtorul to tlitit opinion IKI unthinkingly, not in |iunii-, hut * i t h iln- (p- tlni tx-fii- u ^ri-ui dcJTIirrativc hoiiy. UV nuiv see in the wry m-iir future, Mr, (*huinu:iii, i-onrln-ivi- t-t of thi- isuc tht ha* ."riM-n bctwn the JM;OJ!P jinl their i'n'-idi-iu. Tltnnk you verj- inm-h, Mr CfiainnaH.
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terminal date was election day of 1972.) To hie the idea that the President \vould coolly allow the killing to go on until his political purposes arc served is just too shocking t<> contemplate.
BENEFIT OF CONTINUED U.S. PRESENCE QUESTIONED
No doubt some Americans sincerely believe that by our continued presence in Indochina, we will insure a postwar situation in that part of the world that will somehow be better than if we were nof; there. But the evidence that we can improve the situation by remaining there any longer is exceedingly tenuou <. We have been there for many, many years. We liave not been able to resolve the conflict, either by fore* or diplomacy, and we have added, intentionally or not, to the sum total of human suffering in that unhappy land. What is there in the record to suggest that if we are in there for months or years longer things will somehow i>e better? We have trained the South Vietnamese fones for 17 years. There is nothing to indicate that their capacity for self-defense will be enhanced by a few more months or years of our help and training.
PKOPOSEI* TOTAL WITHDRAWAL
There is nothing Midden about a pro|>osed total withdrawal. Surelyresponsible South Vietnamese leaders must have seen it coming as early us March 1908, when President Johnson announced he was not a candidate for reelection. They must have known it even more clearly when Mr. N'ixon campaigned in 19t>S on the promise that he would end the war. We have given over 50,000 American lives, more than $100 billion and many years of intensive national efforf. When we depart from South Vietnam we will leave behind over a million well-armed, welltrained South Vietnamese soldiers confronting an enemv with less than a quarter as many men under arms. We have discharged any commitment ui- may liave had to South Vietnam, ft is time for the South Vietnamese to shoulder rcsfMtiisibility for their own fr.ture, politiciilly us well as militarily.
ISSUE Of KELEA&E OF I'KIM>NKU OF WAH
Tiie i>*ur of the release of our prLsonerr- of wnr in, of course c/'iitrai to any < insider at ion of withdrawal. The I'n*idiiit has haul llmt u public unnouiiwnu'iit of total withdrawal would "throw away our principal bargaining counter to win the release of American prisoner* of wur." In reality, niu-h uii approach would noi. "throw away*' our principal Ktrptining count-cr, bill would place it carefully on the table. The c:c'M.ry first iip would \n> private negotiations with Hu/ioi. ' 'turim-i*' would be to exchange our projxj.sed aniiounc*>mt.'nt i i-olal witrn. 'J by a ..jwciiieil date for aurft(UM- of n-lurn of our pri-onei> iid ^ rt f)ic\,, n-u^' fir<- or pru'.cciion of oiir iroop during th- withdruwal proci".. If die tigreeiimnt were rciu-lied niid w jnude the public initiouiKU'inenl, we uould pfevijunibly pliant; (ro<rp withdruuuls w i t h prisoner relen-er M) fhul the go<xl fuitli of em-h "'uit> would be continuously dcunnisirHt*''!. Our rotul withdruwul would of cour^ have to be win lingi-n I U]<ii I heir udlxTftjrw (.<> (lie M-h^luli-.
Mr. dmiriiiuii, J 11iivi' not nt 1^:111 ji'^d t-o <-.ovvr uli of the ground in tlii-> bi'jef ti'.-iiinony. J Imve not tvw'tftl upon the un.peukuble
346
GROWTH AND SUCCESS OF COMMON' CAUSE
- The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Gardner. I think that is a very concise and impressive statement. I thought it would be useful, since it is so current, to insert in (he record an article tliis morning by Miss Flora Ixwis e.ntitled,"Growth and Success of Common Cause Is Noted by the Politicians." it elaborates upon some of the things you said. I will not read it all, but f think it is worth nut tine in the record. (The information rcferrea to follows:)
I From Th Wwhlnjfiai Part. ll*y II. 1771]
GARDNKR AGRKI.-S WITH Ntvov TM^T "IVnpi.i: ARK FKI> IVUBOVTH AXI> SrccKss or COMMON C*;. NOTED hr POLITICIANS By Flora Ix-wist John Omrdncr agrL-es with President Nixon's judgment earlier this year that "the. people an; fed up" with llu: way govi.-nniH.-ot isn't working. And he doesn't agree with the nkcptic.i who *ay nothing can be done about it, or the cynic* who any moA Americans CAn't b<- botliered. liix evidence is- thi- 130.000 who have joined Common Cauxe since he orgnuized it an a "citizcni< lobby" lnt August and thoe who continue to join at the rate of l.OOU a day (annual membership fee*!"). And his. evidence is- the defeat of Si5T H*hieh Common Came helped -tight, tho partial success of efforts to rcvta the congressional seniority system and the reversal of the White HOIJM- stand on limiting campaign upending. Common CHUM; js alô Iol>IiyiiifC intensively now for Jit^L-JaUoK to bring all American troops out of Vietnam (>y ItoucmlHT '-II this year. But iu main focus is |ire*Mn3 for liv, to forr- rhanitc- in-the way tin- Americ:ui political system ojxTaU-< ?o it will l>e bl/- to do what i needed. Cardrter, an urinnu? .'jS-year-old who lutu \ivfn iu the cal>inet (Mr. Johnson's S;crrt;*ry of Health, f>iui-jitioii and U'cJfarc), hfadod u lg foundation and d<-difR'<l na appoint nu-ul to lill IColx-rt Kfiiiu'^lj''.- MSII in the S>-uale, bu-s *amr. cl'-ar idi!a!> U>tit how jMliticul JK>U-T tt built iu tbis country a:id *'tiV the bulk of the pco[ii<- are shut out.! "'HHTK ure SKUX- who th nk |xt'er ii lying around in the tivrt* and if you net enoiiK1! people out there lookinii tbf.-y'll [iick it uji." he say*. "but it iû't ft'x in the u'uy our iiiititutioas hVL* coau- In I*-, orxanized, the iuV-K they fulluwlik'- M'liiority in Coiiicre**, tli<- lnopluJei' u the canipaixn lau>. lluitV bom' thi puiv is wau <>r lust, bv diKKi'iK in and KI-UIHK down tn details." Ilf K>VI-N an eitiiiiiple of a Conunon Cuiixe tight in Culorado aKaJont a rate riw in pul/lic utilities His trin found that tlu- dcudJiue for ciUzj-n inlen'trutimi in lu'orinK1* "ii a ruIiiiK u- M;ircli l!o wid the dat/.- tet for publication of fact* ix-a-sary t4> cliall^nKi- (h<- power coinpuiiy wus Marc.b .'A. "Tbut wasn't un at't-idi-ii). Sii>e smart Kuy worked h out that way MI the public couldn't do mirtb^mc. Wf intervened ajiyu'y, nd w</n. "Peoplf have 11 wli.(IJv ni)ri':ilirtin noiioii of tht.- (Xitecr iff the I're'ident or of uny i-Iirfed official. If yij ri-|<ijc'-d 10 per cent of I In- official* with the U-xt peopli- iu th>- couii'ry, urliieli n<mld cliutiK'' u J"1/ and K<>t the be-l ponib]e 1'renidewt. it would "till mak- KTV !(! dfffi-reua- t^wurd (IKIUK U>e thi/jK* thai are UToni/,. fiy llu- time diey lire elt-rted, they've bad t make itwir dc-alx and the man I- /fiojfj(;(l to tjw ity^li-m." fi,, <;ur<Jiier' jdcu i tbut "to Mukf the Kyû-m wrk, yoij've K"1 <<> b<- a littboul>i:le. jt-for u )!<% piirpo-*.- "tî reviulizc .criiment" an ]> I>M(I> ii. T!U' nU-ady #n>wth of O>mnjn f âu-ie h:u< bciciiti in worry polii .11411* muneuveriiiK for I'.^7-'. fl in>( only |/rovc- how |*-np|i- w di>:iti>lu^l mlU |i"l)(H'x and prrpurt'd In do MiiiwtljjriK uiM>ut. it, it ir H new ('"HHfilueiiry on ' H'n which could in- funu'd intu a fourth parly. Jiiil I hut in the oppixit/- irf bi^ K"al, Gardner m;--". "We :ne already ^>> fruKd, tuodividcd. A fourth |>;iriy uotild ii'a'l to u I'fib, and u sixth, aud splinter . Our purpoie i> to iiik.c the mujor pariu-o hup<- up."
347
His lobby w, in effect, identifying and exploiting the dissatisfaction with government that h so widespread in the country, just as George Wallace has been doing, "It's dangerous, he admits; 'it can be turned Into a power play itself with demagoguery. But it can also lie turned into opening up our institutions so they can work, and regaining the popular confidence which is all that institution* really stand on anyway." It isn't overwhelming anybody yet, and its victories have been modest, but it continues -to grow. One of the utoct impressive aspect* is that it find* almost an much strength in the West, in small states in parti of the Midwest a* in the Nortbwt. An Gardner says, "It isn't only the young, the poor attd the black who an.- angry that government isn't serving their needs. All kinds of people -feel they've been had, and they're willing to do something." And that is the way the American system is really supposed to work; the idea behind it all in 1776. If Garouer is right, it could mean that the country's coining 200th -birthday won't look like senility after all. Anyway, it's heartening to nee a calm, tmfranlic movement here working to improve American politics, nut to destroy it or f rpfrxe it. Beside our daily dose of l>ad news, the momentum Common Cause is gaining is good news indeed.
The CHAIBUAS. I appreciate very much your statement about titib .committee. As you know the committee's action hasn't always been viewed in this light by some of the members* of the Government. Mr. GABDXER. I am aware of that. PRESIDENT'S POWEK TO CONDUCT VIETNAM WAR The CHAIBMAS. One thing caught my eye in your statement. I believe you state that the President's power to conduct the war is in doubt. I personally don't think there is much doubt that h* has not the constitutional power to conduct it. He is conducting it all right, but it is not constitutional, especially in view of the recent shift in the rationale by the administration itself. Under Secretary Irwin before this committee last week reiterated what I have stated, that the main objective now is to give the Sooth Vietnamese a free government. I find no authority whatever to justify the President's waging the war for Mich an objective. If thai is the purpose, I don't believe there is any real doubt. Mr. GAitDMEit. No, The ('HAiBitAK. And that seems to be the announced present fHirpoae.
HOCSE OY BErSESE.VTATIVES ACTIVITY
I must say I am very impressed by (he optimism you have with regard to the House of Representatives. I Had noticed uuu! of the thing* you mentioned in the jm;**, but you rnakc it more positive than I had thought and I am very encouraged by that. I am very gratified to have that report.
HTATEMEVTK IV 198 PKEKIDEXTIAL
i* OIJP olb*r subject you mention witti regard H t}*e signifiof the 'uuipaitrii in 190H, when the President camuuigncd on the promise t<> fiwi tru* war. tirwuth Mr. EninwL John Hugfjex, utu at taw twv was M very cloiw awwM-int^ of President Kiticnhowpr, %'rote a lihort ortielc dWuMiiti^ MKIJC of thi'M* matter*. 1 tiiink J would put it into tlw nwrd, Mr. Jicport''^ i> wnijdy more hptvifically recall *omr. of tlw btaU'iiii-ntis \iuu\e- m \ he cl/vtion tA 196S. (Tlw i
34.3
[Fran TU Nv York Ttaf*. jr 7, WTI1
WHAT WENT Wmovo? (By Emmet John Hughext "A new Republican Administration will arm the American people with the truth. 'Richard Nixon, 1968. "I do not ask you to lake what I say CM faith."Richard Nixon, 1971. Wh*t went wrong* The Nixon Adiuiu'^l ration, in its pained and persistent quest for national credibility, ha* been a study in frustration that Deems, in itself, scarcely credible. No <nir in Washington in more aware than President Nixon that the political life of hi> prvdecesor ended with his loss of jxipular credence. No White House in American hiht >ry, moreover, has been as populated as today's with veU-rnm of the wars of public relations, all trained to polish images and powder hlc-miîiea. \Vliy shouid such an array of tcrhnical talent find itself in inich disarray? The riddle chaHencc-" any st udcnt of the Presidency. Any definitive answers may - be impOKStblr, but a few clues nccni clearly probabk:. .\nd--MUnkinidy-~-ihcy all have to do with noitlu-r .-.tafl" nor strategy, but only with the man iu question. (1) The Ueprfwn'atioii of Self. Although there i: something personally appealing in the true-life picture <>f Mr. Nixon bending over his yellow lefcal pads us be drafts bis own 1110*1 seit.-iti\v~|>o]iUcal spei-ches. the result has often proved to br political!} appalliiiii;. Such was the case a year aK", for example, with his address to the nation ainmum-inK the Cambodian invasion. Whatever the. merits or the follies of the venture, he could hardly have prepared a worse case for it. The President s]>unt :i lung, quiet weekend at Camp l>nvtfi carefully framing big argument, untrmi Jed l>v counsellors or crilicisiiL-. Ci) The I*rft<-nse of Candor. Thi.- has beenlite an itch or a ticsomething that has hhgKed Mr. Nixon through almost, all his political life. Ac a politically neutral veteran of liis ]>n-AS conferences recently remarked to me: "We have learned. As soon :i lie says. 'Let UK- make one tiling jwrfectly dear,' all reporters reach for their as-iua~ki " So it Deenic-d ti> KO, in any CMM-, with hi> Intect (and eirfitli) rejMirt IK t'w lotion ou Vietnam. Tlie jpra\ely avuned purpose was "to lay all the |>ertinent fwts before you." Perhaps the moot obvious and "pertinent'' queation in any listener's mind was: Why hud South Vietnamese battalions fled from their Laos <--xrun)ionor 'incursion"more than u month earlier than the American military !)ad wanted or expected? But tin* question was not even men* tiotw-d, uiueh les-< an-iHered. (.'{) The Jiimd.ncof Word". Mr. Nixon hn re|x-:itedly recalled hi- J9CS "pledse" to end the Vietnatii w:irwithout rcxtntmjc exjictly v.-luit lie proiui-w.-ti. In ihat year'n New Ihunp-liire primary, for exuinple. he soiiiided qmtf nxplirft: "It i* enai-ntial thut wi- end tinwar. and en-1 i; (juiekly.'- And it wem- MTV doubtf"! that many American voter-, h>-:iri:)ic thiit (ierlarati'iii. undersiood the n^-xt I'reideat really to lir âvini;' "li i' <->..cntL>J tt)::l < end tlii- w:ir ... or rnosl of it . . . sometime in tli'' ii"Xt four v< :ir- . . . nnvv-iv. before lli' 17U enm|iail'Ji," (4) Tlw W.vbimc of Hand-. All President-fnnii u Wil-on sind :i Jloosi-vell to a Joli'i-on nnd a Nixon :i: quire :i juiliticul kn.tck for re.vi- iiilx-nui; r forgettin^, an prîdi-ni-e ilr-i:it-. Y-t innt-- i-in quiii- 'natch t l i r - p.-irtieulxr I're-.idcnt in lij.fondii'-i- for 1 v nli- of -e|f-:i'>-'>lulio!i. Aim -( iip-e l:i- inuusjuriii n, lu 1 \\:\* f\n\.f\\ 'if th< Vifliiam uar 11- >i kjml of < rue I i.fiieru.mec from n rerkli<Tjiti'- oai'. In f;et, of (iir-e, it WH- no -ui'ti :iben li-jj.'u'i : it u:* :i conttiet Kt Mil''. ]irii- ; 'i-i;i|[,n 'n- Itaij fcr'.enitv :iilxi-.iii'<l tliniiiKboul lite cjl, v. ni(L'eil. it i- In- in :t -|M-CI:I| :i.': .1- Inn 1 . :it" ''- I'*"*. !>' UTKed t i n rrniiiiutiiu 'it of Ainerir:>n ^r'CM'l fur'-i"- t'i Mil- n-rv if-n:'. In l'.>71, t l x - ii'>u;t i* not y.'lu'IliT >li'jl, i'o'iii"'l Mnoiinted ' wni.- ':' noii-j-iix 1 . Tip 1 |.<jinl i.- Lluit tins Prir-nli-nt l..-!s eompi-ilei] to l:iIU a- if In- b:i'l nevr i oieeii any call for preri-i-lv the militarv bui|rl-iei lh'i< he no proini^-. to l.r.-i.'^ (J'mn. All tlii i- \n )>ii.:l :i!iki- for Tin 1 I'P -I'lrni :ni<l fur il- n:Ljion. To ri'verxe hihit/'nl rlvt-tine, (in V i r ! : i . i r , i ;,r J-. in tiie |>rr>i', nf i-li'JllrH Iiu1 in>lily, but iii'-iiul',." It e-i:iiii>t be ' i i h ' r u i - j - . Th<- :;7Ui I'reiifji-nt -lei'iM h i v e h;i'l H- on'- 'if Ii|. foun-ellorii on fiublU 1 opinion -tb"- sallv Vi-.v Jjial iti'J p'nl>i-op!ier ol ill' 1 I'.illi ra-ntiir, who sn >:niniilv -ainfjitii'i}. lu men null to PP-I'|I l i t - ' "i^ny vil.:i! you h.ive t-i -a-., not wh:it j o i j o u j c t i t .
Af)t t r u t h H l w l l e l t h . i l i in.-ll.e.lH-licVC. '
Tin- i ' i i \ I U M \ V . The Scnui4ir fr(iuj.MLsytiri. i vuvf/rov. Tliiuik you, Mr. Ci-itunutui. Thiuik you, Mr,
349
ECONOMIC ISSCE OF VIETNAM WAS
Mr. Gardner, there art- few people in this land for whom I h*ve more respect, based <n the \\nrk you have boon doing in recent years. It is a privilege, therefore, to road this constructive statement you presented to the conunittee this morning. You covered the moral issue in superb fashion. But OIK- issue which also worries some of as is Uxe economic issue. I remcriiljcr Imck !.. 1005, in Switzerland, the Swiss bankers were pessimistic about the amount of money going out of our country. At that time I was more favorable toward this Vietnam operation thun now. 1 tried to present my findings, but they refused to accept them. They said no nation can continue indefinitely with this type ainI chunuitcr of operation and remain a solvent nation under the capitalistic svstem. They predicted What, could happen. It is fair to say it could be happening now, in Europe. You don't cover that much in your st-ateme(iU Military, political, social, and moral values would be better don't y.u think, e>ijyially us the administration is preventing us from doing all those things which, for so many years, we felt we should do to help t his country .move ahead. Mr. GABUNKK. Then* i no question about It, Senator, and I am particularly irritated hy those voices which &ay tiat without war we will not have prosjH-rily. that we need war-m order to continue a decent rate of economic growth. I don't think anyone who has1 looked seriously at the tasks ahead of u- in this country can doubt that we can take that portion of our pross national product which we are using on explos-iivs and dc-tniction, and plow it into th^ rebuilding of physical America ar>d all of the other social tasks which rotild be frnormoiislv g< iterative economically in terms of jobs and in terms of th<- prowi h und development of this country and Continue a very hi-uJrhy siiiiution in thU country. Jt stainis to reavm th;it if you take a very substantial chunk of your pros*-national product und throw it away you simply canni (iru.sper, and you can't get the jobs done, the building jobs Uua luivc t.i !>< done in this country, the mas* transportation, housinp, ho kinds <>f activity that urn econoiujcally pem-raiive tliat will pn>r""le jobs for lots of Americans. This isn't beinir done. We are iiegle4'tinp our future. Senator Si MIVGTON', Tliank you.
l
MILITABY, JSikCSTKIAL, rSilVEBSITV COMPLEX
At timi-p. ilii-re K ron-jiiciôiii c.ri(icL>m of the military, included in the so-i'idled miliiury, in Itis'ri.-il - and univcjvitii.> is a \vurd that should !ic fjililcd c"(nfili'x. I* ha> liccn my esfx-rienr^- thai the presuii--. { continue u i t h lliL i^nnjJex, coordmui<.-d w i t h the |/rufit jn'.'tvi' urrivc.-, tit a poin! whcri- they inilunir*'. Uiiivrr.-jiy -ar at jru-,!, 11, iiroiii: m the fo;-mu!i.:i<.ri of public opinion us this military. WnliJ V4ni In- inclined t^> aprci-? Mr. (j\iij\i.i(. J iliink ilui' i' is a complex <f forcr-i :Iut in ^<juuai-i-.-, if I m\ MI\ so, include^ conpreionul elcuicn!.-, aiuj (hew foi'-e- are very hunl in .vit o u i . It i, very hard to ilecide where th*1 intjT".N of t!i" cli:iinjnin of i IK- ffoii*c* Aniji'd Srrviu-^ Committee off and the inter'1.?!* of military or iinJu-trial pr-opl/- {n*piii,
350
but somehow the unanimity within those circles does not include the great bulk of the American "people today, and I myself find it a rather exhilarating thing to see that this war, if it is stopped, will be stopped bj- the force of public opinion. Senator SYMINGTON. Around election time I have been heavily pressured by people who want weapons systems I don't think are needed for our security. Because of the nature and degree of that pressure, I find a lot of retired military, who really aren't military when thej* retire any more than you and I, an- hiced into the boards of directors x>f various companies. Tlicse companies in turn are laced into the advisory committees in tho Pentagon, whereas the chain of command people, U n t r u e military, ar really out of the heavy pressures incident to policy decisions, many unwarranted from the standpoint of ntional security. Would you Ije inclined to ugroe? Mr. GARDNER. Absolutelv: absolutely, and I think one of rhe most. constructive things we could do would be lo develop plans for i-conomic conversion and mncern for those plans at the highest level, beginning with the White House and congressional committees, that would lay Inifore the industry of this country the kind of silk-mate vision of how they could function to make this a bettor country, because the ]>os.sit>ilitir* arc there. Senator SYMINGTON. We had two. you might say, amjcus curiac witnesses who were pro- ABM, and two who were ariti. All were supposed to give an objective opinion. One of them was head of a laboratory which make* weapons ; the second was head of a research laboratory. We a>kd about hi- backgnuirid mid ho gave it. Later on it was jxiinU-d out he was the head of a service ant {ballistic missile Army .advisory committee. If we urc going to have that tyjw and character of indejK-ndciU objective testimony, I don't see how we are ever going U) get out of tins bu-iness of creating wcaj>o;is which, when they are distributed, create more opportunities for more wars. Mr GARDNER. Well, tin-re i> :ui niJ proverb, Mr. Chairman, that you sh( uld never r-'.-nd a c.nt for the creuir. Tin- CHAIUUAV. To do w h a t ? F didn't h c u r t l i . '. JN'Hator SVMISTOTON. Out1 worth rejx'ijtin'jr. Mr, GAUUNHH. You ^lonld never .eiu] n cat for the cream. Senator SVUJXGTOV. A coiiDlc in. ire *ji:ptiun*. PUBLIC'S itiuiiT TO KVOW <O.-T OF WAJI IN NOUTHEIIN LAOS ]) you believe, the Auifrieuii jx-opji- up' entiiltiil to know the t r u t h about just bow much the -wi-n-i v.nr in Northern Luif I iiM>[i;in;i the word "Northern" iujvi.-edly--i- co-ting tlie .Vuierw-aJi ;j-njle? J>o you yo'jrself h u . e miy ide;i of Jio* ujii'h ii i- C4jitjn? Mr. GiUuvKic. I lime no id'M whtiMver. J <Jo M'uw that they slionl'J know it, I believe their need und ri/jdil to infonuution goe.far, far1 beyond t l i u t . 1It gm'r. to ibe very Ijing'iug' 1 t h a t the 1'cnlugon iii* -' uiil tJie WJiil* Hoii~e UM>- tti -jj.-een it:, renl motive*. Tliff |>lirase, suHi UK incursion. KI<-!I UK rniliturj' efjuijiinenr delivery lcW.ix, and M> foj-ili, diinini-li t!ie <;ija<jly for the publi'* to guiii informal i(.ii k I think is a very seriou., thing.
35i
Scanhir SnJiNOTON. What do you think Ue vffcî of these expeusivo *Mcrc\, ware is having or: American -pubGc opinion, s the fncfc. rslowly begiu u> aiip out, in spito of till these effort!* to keep it from the public? Mr. GAKDXEH. Well, th fact that th< }Hdls phou* the Aiumcau jvwplt- Iwlk'iv 2 to 1 that tliL'y are not b*in tnUi aU the; should know about the v, ar is a^t-ouishing:, alarming evidojuv of what you arc tailting uhout. 1 think then* cuii'l lie aJi\thirt tuon- (^vasutfng for tJio iicaltli -of a <-ouutry than for du- IM-OJI!*' u)\>s<' ruitiiticiitv in {linr siiiuwri itf infoniiatjoji, f)iirti:ii!uri\ thoir goviTtaiwutal siiuix-os of jiifonnation. -.Senator SVMINOTON. 11ml is (ho Gallup jx>H y>u ar-^ rif'rrinp to wl-n yuu say seven out of 10 jxs>f>l<.'? Mr. (I.VKDXKH. Tljai is n^lii.
DAS'OEH OF t^X'UI^Tr JX Cr<>VCa\UEXT
Senator SYMINGTON. Wu'ild \ nu <-utntii-n( , iu ^nvral, on tlw of nil tiiis .st-vn-ry in ^(ivcnnncDi. thut luis iw*1!! U< > v< J<>iiug in Mr. G.iUDNtK, Wuii, Mr,* It art'-iaHT U*<- uhiiit! jjiu,jM>bc uf Oni- is MWC-.^, rh< ^'<-K<| is ri ilifx : ami !1 ihri-i- of ilicuv art- r:TJf>u.vh tuuifn-iit liv S>-CTM-V. M-j ijii'i' ><Tf"-v, U is virtually imp:.ihl'' f<r tho j'<ij-,l<' U> have , tu I hi1 k.ul of i:tff>rijiii<tii Jliî u-i'd. I( i-; iinjxis.-jhlt* tj<'\|M'<;t r'M[)ii>iifiii-ie. iw" Iiti(.-Hii rui-> if tlwy cn c-oi)4-<'il il.i-ir H vi-il of v<-ivcy, UMIJ it i-cpr(flTiiK ini|K'"w*il!< > ( IiolH (J<ni Tlic Lcalih of I hi- public pcoi'csi iv* buiii on a ha**' of o|M.'ii inforiiinlioii. Scnt4ir SVMJN<JT<>\. I am wry <rralcfuj to h<;ar you sy tht. I haw Ix-c'ii a incinlM-r of the Scnnt<- Ann<-<l St-rviccs ( 'njiiujiucc siud (lii <-oniTiiitU'i> for mum- years; Mircly tln-M- two couiiiiiittN'ii hav<; x>nietlun<r ti do uitli lnth foreifrn |ioli-y .md our armed servie*-*. But every time MMIII* of us on ihoM- iwo 4 > <-iinniit4T N pu-lied to find &muetliin^ <ut u\nmt, <lie nev development in w<'|xniry, wv were told nucli information could onlv l>e piven to the J<iint Alotnte Knerjiy <'oinuiii !<. Sf-.'intor Piihtore hnpjresU'd we j;o to Kurji' for 5 day* and I f<'nii'<l niore .tljoul the liaMCA incident to our nuclear tetralogy in thox; 'i da\>> about many important II>JM'/:IS of our national MTijjiiy than iii I he jiirvioiir* yearn on tfieM- 'oini'uitt'N's. '/oil ap- rijiht. If we tloij'l stari {rcttincrinforjfutli"); out to the |M'<I|>)<' ( oilier ty|K-> and chiirwtej> oi fujt|j/rili<rt we h&Vc Ix-eu talking aix>ul ui!l (K> nblc f<> thwart the will of the jwoplr throii<rii llu- execution of .-j--reey. Would you ucrree? Mr, <i.iM>M::j. Oh.yes, abwdulely, HB i J K K ABOUT K*TKW:V i\ COVKUXMBVT? >YMIV<;TOV. What do you think we can do about it? jj'liul \~ m> fhiuIqivMjon. Mr GAIMSM{. \VeIl, 1 think llmi Jiuvc o. ioijjr hardru/io with rcMi-M'i. <o wjine of li*.ufiti>4(i'fo'-.yuii1.1!* 'i'ly*^' Jirfv.* b*x-n ^;<ihic on frr bo lon^ an,j up'-.o<;'<lwnly pnit^-4'tecl it Ltn'oinjr pj to lake u a lonjc tifM:
.- -V,
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to open the doors and windows. But there is a whole range of tilings that the public can do. The Fntsdom of Information Act was a veiy effective statute. We need that kind of statute in every State in this country. It is virtually impossible to get any information out of the State legislature. I believe that campftign-spendin": statutes, lobby control statutes, can do a great deal to diminish the, >hesiveness of these insiders' gaincs. I think the insiders' games are 'built out of the looseness that \ve. haw permitted in campaign spending and lobbying. INSIDERS' CAUES Senator SYMINGTON'. This is fascinating. Would you define insiders' games? Mr. GAKONEK.Yes, fir. They an- nothing new mid they are not pci uliarlyc' -iracteriMicof this ocmiry. I am certain Mtiee ?'ie dawn nf hiMurt very huniun institution has tended toward I>ee.oming an Haiders' game, which simply means that power lend* '< gravitate to an inner clique and ' h u t iui|>euet ruble bnrrie:>. gel M-I up to prevent. outsider* from inlliirtiring tin- significant dcci-joiis. It lias gone on in chur-Jie>, it lius gone on in corporations, it hn> gone on in osir Govornment agencies. You run ce it in ninM of the Stt- governments in this country. You i-i.n we it vividly in many of the cities. The tragic t h i n g i> thttt though it look.- like n very realistic guine fir the insider* involved, it j s i n fuel n very impractii id wy tn keep an instil nlion :dive a ild \ i t n l . llie\iif:i!i|\ I he time mil ii-^ \\ lien I In- ili-idel> cnr'l -!M e ''\cli tliem.-wlvei. And they don't know w h y . And lli'y can't fii - e tjic fai-t t h a i ilicv | I H \ C rldwd tln'iiiM'lve-. nif front t i n - kiiul of <lUx*nt n n < ) iTli:rj^ni und fiv-l) hlomj uiid iif\v iiji-n-. t h a t could 1'i'jilM'linlc the infill t n j i in. Wind von have In doi" to <>jcn the doors and w i n d . i w ^ und v i ' i d i t x b\ !t<-ing di'iih w i t h in the Inu-k looj-i. J <'nu jur-t yri^ 1 ' .VnU Hinpi.er Mini \er-i- iloivn throii^li t i n - State li-gi^luture-, cit \ ron.'i< il,
fegultt'iil \ Hifenrje-., mid -n oil.
I'M penple i l l . YoU JlttVi.' to iipen I l | > l i p ' 1 pfoi'i- i". l l l . l t !l:Uc lo-l nil
Si MI\<;TIV Tlmnk vn, Mr. (iardti'T. Thank Von, Mr.

The < ' H A I K U 4\. Sclldlor froln N'ew Jer.-e.V.
SV-initor CASK. Thimk you, Mr. ('lii'.iniiti!i. J join my ulleajrnes in wel^jining you u i n l e\j'i-.-i;i'.' \i-ry '/iv'nt p|e>i>nre uinl *iiii.-fueli"i' at your Hjijwarunre liere tihiy mid n!-o fot t i n - joli you un- lioin^r in êix-ral. \Tirrci>K \i\' WM: cuni'- AI: \IN.--T j i.<ji-i.\'rn'V -i< J.N i w \n
1 d i i n ' l tlijnl; 1 !IH\' | P \ i - r v I ' l i j i - h In J u l i l to \v!i!i! !i:i-. Ix'en di- 1 n~sed iilr.-nds . I would Iw ' / f i i t e f u l , IK/HI". '! , if \ o i i i-ouM -/i\i u- .-.onn- in.-i^l 1 1 on i lie stiii^- of i i i i n * i of >.onie ol die vii nii;ri'-t m id m i _ | M - ! - i - i e t i i erjli' 11 - of t i l l - w in . It si -i-i 1 1- t !:;! i-Vel V I n i K ' we < i o[|-idrl' u me!i-.iije like jJ:i!iic|i!-Me(jou-in w!.i-!i would end l ! - c \mr, t ' l i ' S walk u w u y . Whv ? J ill- 1 'ml tiill.in^' Iihdlll MeinlieC- of llie N ' l i n l e j U I I I t u l k l l l g uboilt irjl-idi- \'oi<'''-. Von l.i.ow '.oi:ie of l l ' i - j i i . J inn - u t e . Mr. ( i \ i : : > \ K i ! . YOU menu h'-emi-*1 tl.ev t l i i n k it i" t<o es'i. >'! S-ni'ior < \-r.. J don't know why. They >.iiy ll.e I'r"-ideut w i l l lose flexibility; his lumd- will in- tied. 1 don't know, J)oec it meun lliey don't
353
really believe we ought to withdraw. Docs it mean they think in spite of the fact ttiat most Americans want to pet out, it is our duty to stay.
You suggest something of that point of view when you speak about some Americans thinking that in Southeast Asia and elsewhere it would b* better if we do stay for a, bit. Mr. GARDNER. I think there are varied reasons. I think there is a fairly small pro[>ortion who still hold the new fantasy, I would call it that somehow our beneficent, finger in that pie will make things better. Tim longer we stay the longer things will be better. The for that has just diminished 1o the vanishing point. I think others, many Americans, have, a kind of a natural impulse to support, their President and leave it to him. I think they Inflate, ami jH'rhapa right!} so, to take that final move that places the decision in other li'im is. But they must reflect on the fact that the founders of liii> country bought that question tlirouglj very carefully and if they had ihbUgiu you should afwavs leave things to the President they would not in fact liave created other bodies. They would not have conferred .vu-h large jK)wer> on Congress in the making of war and pcac. But I think the average American hasn't thought this through. 1 think there arc still others who believe there will I* a backlash. Senator CAS-K. Ye-;, I understand that jx>int of new. I think what you just said before that is quite important. People are gradually around to the view that the. President ought not l>e allowed to run thf show a* completely HS we have in the past permitted and eneoi. raged him to do x>. In spite of the fact we are coining to realize, that i- not so absolutely wiv, they s'jll when they an- pdt to the crunch and !iav<- to choon- l>elwe.cn the Pre.sidcnt and I'ongres* they go for the President every time and you look around and find your support has dissolved. It is a very interesting phenomenon. Sir. GU:\EB. I wish they would read the early history of this country. Senator TASK. I wish so, too. Mr. G ^ K U V K K . Ami read t h a i part of tin* hi-.iory linit tn>k place w h e n liie Founding Fulhrrs were Mill alive tind rniild comment on event-, nlnl ti> see the extent Uj ulljch (lley evjH-'-led lluil the Senatea;il ilif HIXIV; would l>e very jiou-erfnl element* in the go \erning of thi* eijimtry.
VK -iUUT IN' IM'ftUr
N'nvv there is one nilu-r jiint, mid J think many people have not fijlly :i>-iinil<ler| yet, the nia^îie .-.Jlifl of (i|ijliiiiii. Tl'i- U u \-Jt'\, V'-ry îrikiiiK thing, not only in th" poll.-, bin ihe f.n-t tluit virtuuliy fVi-rvoiii- in V HT-inrie-. lli.-il. u hanjlieiujed re:ili-t will jret Us out be2'iff t!ie e|eeli<,ii of 1<J~'^. I 'jiii;lJ-.l in i;iv te-ii;ii<iin , one e,om::i<-nt Iii iji.'i! rlr. <). un<J lj> me, n- I -,iid in my l < l i m ' i n \ , liii- i- M-tiii<lnloii- tliiiij; \Vlnit ijje ienli-i> who -jK'iil-' -d rrimplii<-4-iill\ :ilie|| î-ning u- out h\ < > l4- < tin|i dtiv C.<7'.' me - i i \ i n g i - . "I^-i t l > e killui^ i i > n uml lei Amem uii- and A>i;m go uii i; lii^ until . |>oli;i' :ill; r a i f - ' i i a l c i j ijjile ;illi\ <.->. Thru Ix 1 for jM'H'-.-''' Tiinl jiir>( i^n'i goml eiioiigh. und I rl.m'l t h i n k ill' 1 American people v\i)l fujgi-l ilio^- win. June r<'fu-ed to -.in:id uji MI. thj.- l i t i i e . Jecniij- vjii-i. _\oii n;e t . i l k i n g in the 70-perc/-iit range you arc no I talking ul>oijt a fringe group, jou
Jl -i -el: is In ine new j- I lie l i l i j c fur Jin I: !i> - l i ' l i d '!(' Mul le end II led,
354
are talking about the silent majority, you are talking about the great central body of the American people. Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thenk you, Mr. Gardner. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper. Senator COOPER. I yield to Senator Pearson. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pearson, if you wish. Senator PEARSON. I thank Mr. Gardner for his contribution today. Let me add one more dimension to that shift in opinion which I agree is taking place, and that is the hawks. They are not going to fight to triii. We are not going to win, so they want to stop. They are a Urge number in these polls that have shown up todaj . It is a different constituency that makes up these polls.
RESISTANCE TO DATE CERTAIN' IDEA
I want to ask you one thing and it touches upon what Senator Case asked you. What is the great resistance to the date certain idea? I think it relates to what you said about this inherent feeling that they want to support the President and the flag and the country. We made such a big investment, as you cited here. Given the competitive feeling of the American people, I think the citation from thfe highest sources of losing the first war, becoming a second class nation, gets to people. If you would accept for purposes of argument that there is validitv to a conditional withdrawal, baaed on the level of violence from tlie north and the capability of the foives of the south, do you know of any way or tiny manifestation that c >uld denote fitiality other than tl.e date certain cutoff, the art of Congress to cut off funds? Is there ar.v other way? Mr. GARDNER. I don't think there L> any other way. I really don't think there is any other way if wi intend to get out. Now there is a good deal of evidence, as has been said *arlu-r txday, that the President and others really may envibajie, a residual force that Mays on and on and m. If thai i what they envisage then tb. da1 certain i not a boJulion they HIV jroing to go for. Jvuai.or P'EARMJS. I thank the chninnan. I thank Mr. Gardner.
TW t ' l J A I E K A V . Srciatur CoojMT.
Senator COOPF.U. FirM, Mr. Gardner, may I *y I am horry I WHS not here to hear all your U-M iinony, but 1 have rend your staU'Joent . J ap|imiau' very mu<:li tlw restraint you haiv ns-d 1:1 talking about tin* })roblrin>i, In-fore us. You have cotisidi'Ted the issues in, I tliink, a v<>ry r^jiKotiable and rcotruJncd vcay, iayiii" out how difficult and emotional tlw (irobU-m is.
PKOBLKUH OF A riXEJ/ WITHOBAWAL 'MTE
I have bflfn oric of those who are opnow-d to a fixed da1<* at at ibiii point I am op]MM*d ;o a (ixcd oatf , U ''U.UN- I don't hclievf it i the only or the b<*t way i<> g<'t out of thV *:!. I think that a fixed offers mini' problem*, but I think it should hw <vj*id/Ted, You ajv ''nu-^nifd, and everyfwidy u ^>n<nwvl, about not only the v'vAfiu-s that in otrurring now in Vietnam, the oVjitiis of our own men and women, but l*o t!w vjoU-ik* uod deathw that arc oiruiring oiruirin amon among the \*>i>\>\ who live there,
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355
Oiifc j>rfJ>Vm I sec with n fixed date, particularly the one of December 31V, Is that it offers no atu-mpt to stop the violence when we withdraw. I don't ve any way to stop the violence there, with anv assuitt'ir.e, until there is some kind of a negotiated seltlemeut, ft smns u> me if \.o march out on December 31, such an action without un effort to gel i negotiated Httlem?nt will problably remove the possibility ofî*ctt ; ?ment which may stop the wur out 'here. There, would still ho "fighting after xre leave. I tJiitik you know I v*m to .stop the war, and I um againsG itl Ho\ would \o\i re.-poiiv1 to rbi' ;.>.-. ot a negotiated settlement? You know f support. y>ur purposes ;und objectives, luit in your stilt/wot you sy, "if apivnu-nt wejv coac-hi-d and \\-f- tnadt- the public amiowna'trt.^.;, we- xvould pre-st-urnaUy phase troop withdrawals with {irisoiw-r roli'tuic.- v> {tia! the gwd faifh of each sWe would le Goniiniiou%ly..di^nonfCr.tt><l. Our total ivithdrawal wiuld, of course, have t l: c.uttJ)icfUt. j|Kiti "tlu-ir adheroncc to the schodine." Do you ruca;> that? It ivouM M-em to nn- that is a rctttrudictimi of your jx>Mli<o vf-i"il '-viilidrawal. You mean n say if they should refuse itiîifitimtuUNly rrloas*- i)ri^[ier.-> s*o would stop our withdrawal? Mr. CiAnri.vF.K.'-! (iiink ii wi.t:l.-J U- virtiwlly inpos*ibl' |x/litically <r f t (h*Ttt-is (<n y J*r."iiii-in l o r n n t R i u c i f tli'4>Ur#idi- back.-d dox\u on its a'^rrmcnT. ari'l i ss-ripi ro ir.^ lhar \vr c-nlf| phnfv th< 1 v/irhdruwals ii(i n-lt'iiSi' of [>riMinr(.- ill strh a way thnl m-ithiTMtiv l'ftl to ({I'l'T'-rui <ii thi'- îr-ii-fnith of tin- ot'if-r l:t \vi.-ul<'I iviofi:tiii>t:>ly drauai(raf<- is* <r<'.ii fuitti. Tiii T bv noi niii-nijUfi} i-Vt-o t<f work :IK(. S,-'!>wi'ii- < 'toj'KK. UVll. if >!ir- mmitrj' (!<:ndrs ujjiist n polny of uit!i.!r.:v.a! ji jr. :-i: iirc..-!-î!,!i il'firii>:-.. 't\V .t.i.ii! t-,t CH-. ii\c ,tt* n jiiitjiiciil niiitt-r in't r>i wii.!n:r.-t. My <nvn ;hfiikii>^ i- tli)i nSiotJit-r /iiiK'inliii.'jii Mi^li! ].-'ii-r ul!:ii:i :> jiniiiicul M i -tu* iiLt-iii mni ii r'-W.?*'if AniiTifafi pn-f.-nct-. N.rii.r.ir M:tr. f'n Ul, i;; ^ vj.o-.<l! <ll^l <|iur:lit o t t i i - r i i i i x . - : i i j : ir ilidii'! li.-ij. u-,dhii.iii i!:r n-ltH.-rnf [:r5>-<:iiffs li\ 'onrir.iiiiiL'tin fl'.i'iiii: iii-.:i l\ i:..\ii.L' :;!( jn~<.Jir,> (t;k-i!. 4 My '.\v;i t h i n k i n g : - 'lu-.i if '!" 1'n Mu-'i:! s-iii>nl<! mr ni,"t|i:i\<i'Jiilv tin,; ii ;- (li:- ;.'i!ii". ..*':!:. l ' n i t . , 1 1 s::i(<- ;-.. Mi!u!u-.v. <ri]nr!\ w i t h !i-> rc-iil'inf f"!'--. .::>! :ii: l! ( . i i j d v l Si/it*.-- .-Jmlt ri;i.T toj|r.;. t i'. norrow, i:i"! c\.-c; v !:_. u, . -r (;i(iii- rli<- w iil'i'r.-iv.^l n- t>-rr r <~ \\ i t h i i i t sloppiri/. iil.il [Jtr i.iil; i i - i i i - i l i u ; : i.r.nd t i n - j,:;rc uf v, i; Iitir.'iv.j;! f i ilffi-ii-iv :!--||i.li In {;:'! ',\n- v.; i i.t-rji".::!- l!'"<l ::;:: i'l.-l J-'.Trr j]ru.-.|.' :live ij:i;i;i'i- ^>:i ::;;.iii' ; I'lm-.J!:":!! flj-u^'rr, jf Mi-.- I'rj'.-Tricj:! v.cidjl niiiki- -il-'ii it .->,;ti li-.i'iii < ! i/'i ih'-r- r;:i^hl.lf l!ir JM--.-.Hiiiiy of i>M:< r 'mii-'ri'--. ;-^-i.^:!iir';; in IM t;-.,i;ili< ;i- \u.jcj: -oulii Ii:ir^ i.J;nit :i J>*i)J!i'';t] .scTi|--!iii-ii' in S-rii(!i'':i.-i As:t i:!n! .1 .-:o|."* i - l l clr1 djrhiii;^ ili'.-r<-. Tii'- iuip'iîriiî (>)' t'-- i l - r - ' rm:!'l -ini-." f,'p-:i' ii'iiini \\Li-thi-r ur.y-of" tlin-r- r'lxi jjijpji'r-j'-. i - '-u!tl !>! -J-. ':n p <l.
'<.fr. (,i:i>\i;. >'.i'-. ;. n! jii'il I Imvj- \n-(-ii o \ e r tin- frroun'd.

Si'lutior (''ooFKlt. / k l i ' i w v . r ) : : < v .
\^r. fj\t:\Ki<. Asul i ' i T i u i t i l y j'^-pi-ci your \ i r w t i m t soiri'-how /In 1 <liiiui->'-. of violi-:i'- Ix-iri'/ tluniiii-licd will ii- fnLuin-r-iJ hj- our Ix-iri^ tin;.-!1 (>\U ll;f rrrnr.! <? fi-"'!!! yi-urn Si-nuUjr .'<orh:i. If i m.fy jiitcrpjpl tlji-r* 1 , I don't thirrk you ar "lutiiit; rny jioîiioii. I d'm't (liink ih'.- vjolrsu-* 1 in Vjcliuuji if K"!"? to l>i' rc'Jii'-iul hy In'ijifj.ifi'n 1 . I ihi'ik ii J- jroin; to ^t/;J^ v-lu'ii w- jri-' out, hijt. / votj'lij Ifr : to i-i-c ~otj:f M-Mli-metit thut uould B.ûn- it
.
Me. GXBDXEB. T 966.
. 356
Senator COOPER. You go shead. Mr. GARDXEH. No, that is the end of my comment The CHAIRMAN. Is -the Senator through? Nioator COOPER. Y<*. The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from New York. . . -. ; .Senator JAVTH. Tfaank you. ' " * Ac. Gardner, n number of things about your testimony interest m* greatly. -
First, in your testimony you say, "We ore now in a good situation, militarily sneaking, Jo announce a total withdrawal dote with some dignity aad even to gain credit for taking'ibe imiative." I-j there anything you would wish to quantify- or qualify nbout the wonU "a good situation"? Is thei-e somettng yon havt-n't told us that i? in your mind? . ? Ir. GAKDXEK. No, I am simply saying that it does not take a. particularly morbid turn of mind to envisage a .situation arisingas our continued withdrawals occur in which our departure couM iiok very mu'.ii like & disorderly retreat, which it would ut look nour. We are in . a p i>iikn where we can say we arc going to withdraw. .vn;iia.U>r JAVITS. We have done ovivylhing that an^ pow?r in all of hi>''*ry has ever dreamed of doing for a small nov,-; is that tpie? Mr. OAUONEU. Right, yes.
WITHDRAWAL AVD POW KEt,EA*E AND nXEl> I>.\tt
J.VVJTS. T think I know what Sf nrtti>r Cooper v.-s jroUing *'.. m] it in, I think, very interesting quf-sf ion. I tin coinir t<> ev{>lain. <.'<i:|^r (laHjditer] which he has d'/Jif* for HIP Iwfyrr. I might uy. V<ia way in jrojir dtntemcnt, "In reality such an upproiuJi would n<r*. tlirc>u' uway itr j)rini-i} l horguining niMtitcr, hut would place it carefjiify oit-lhc table." (Ûi^tHtn; \Iitrbt that be construed u.-'iîi urguntent atraiil a date? I'nJ^r-rhe tnutTurtiofi, ôiiteinplated by tb.c O.-n^K-r-C'liurch upproach. tL- rcstj.'nt would he stripp*-'! of hrs (xrliry f Vii-rwutni/li<m arid tt>\V evJiange. If h appt.-, u direction to .witjjijriiw t tli- mrliiivt iM>siM.- time roiiaiiient with tlie sfeiwiritj" i-f thr "font's, wouldn't you tJi ex:w.nl your id'.vi mid would tlwtnot mntrndi'.'l. v.'hat-yvu ;md Fund '-r t> o.lhcl >< here ailviicati' rg^DL:lig the scrimp ^f n dale? OIUVF.R. I uiu a>ham'!tl to iity thnt. I lu^l. rr JAVIT.-<. Well, lt me try * at '
V,u *-tiy in yrur i*t:ileiri>rnt that It wr -'. down privaMy with thrX-i-J.h \'ii.'tijani'v and nr-ôtiaUu! li d;al l_y \Uii'-li tin: Vrrtiblwtt %-i>'ilil t;ivfl UWMJI u d;<-, they wv.ul.1 give n.- u -<-hnluK p . Now thut. /^>iit<>iap'iaU> ni* public dwtej no Icgti.-iiil:vl dutj'. 'J1u;r'fin!f if w<- pu.s*t Senator Conner i* talking about - -a resolution whi"h bu- iu> iluUM'hlch Htrij>s the Preuident of his p:lic-y of Vii'lnarntzution^ aixi
357
of keening trot>| in Vietnam until the POWs :,re releasedaivn't we re.'vliy doing what you think ought to be a lir.-t stepV While fixing no date, we try to strip him of the things which i:upe!e that kind of a negotiation. Mr. GARDNER. No Senator J.VVTTS. Isn't that inconsistent \viili what you and I udvocutcthat we fix a date by resolution? As I say, 1 am being the devil's advocate. Mr. GUIDNEK. No, I uui saying we fix a date. We have conversations witli Hanoi in which wo agree to public announcement, and we will puhhVly announce the date of withdrawal, : >ul we trill also iwve worked out a schedule whereby the withdrawals, are phased \Mt.h prisoner roles-sea. They have already made the first statement c..ueerning that. They have already made the iir.-t offerings and we have never fully explored the iiieehanics by \vhii-l: we could go r brunch & month-, .if pliaaed withdrawalphased, that i-, with release i.f the primers. Senator JAVITS. I yield to the Senator.
KKFICAC-V OF DATE CKItTAIN APPROACH QUESTIONED
. r Senator COOPKK. Tlml r.-iist-^ a point which I didn't discuss ns well .- Squalor Javils, but which I did adiln_; myaelf to. I usk you again about your -tuleiiicnt U-iirsc I think your expresMrd vie*v j-. ini-oiiMsti-ni w i t h I!IK idi-ji r,f tt > riuin duu*. Vuu know I am svmpxiii'-tic in i-vi-rv \my to your nbji-i:ti\- and J admire your ',:ivat effortr>|"liit if you hx a dale by irjrNlaiioii, you then IOM- whuU-virr burgjiuing p":v.cr livi:i;j 11 daio niiîit have hud i jrettin^ a %cttlnui'iit with Hu:i<"i. 'I'iu iv i-- nothing to bargain with. 'i'hi'11 iri y-ur .^latciniT.l yu MIV that in the event th -y <Un.ot r<-i-;i>e tin' p[-i<.: t ;ii-r- il'cu our tnl.d uitliilruunl ivoulil of eour-e }j&ve TI> IH; eiiiiiif^r ui upon tl:-ir euiryiir. out tliei ngrei'iiii-iit. We ha\e t< i:i'.'c il one way or tin- oilier. If we have U. liave. a date, hike all li:<- ii-L-i that 'jo willi it. jiiul of eourn 1 I know (he jrr> J ali->l ^MM! that, will <.- me out of it. whieli is a i'rrilily iiuportaiil tiling, :ittd if it is adhered t.> l.-y tiie l're>idi-m, if he l/'-lii-Mv- t h a i t i n - C'o>ii!iea }. a rijrlit to limit 'urn in lliat vviiy, 'hi-n our forces VOM!.! In: out. I will have to give \ou 'tiie ri-:i-nli- I iloiil)! l'ic eilicm-yof a <la(e cerlliUl it]>prou( h. One, i!ie i're-iileiil could -,ny, nr. hi* 'uighl S-HV to a'.ivtliiug \s.- i!o to i-iiii (lie \\>f in VjrtM.im. dial (his is u liniilntion upip;i !u> wi -;iiiitiouiit jinv.i-r, iluii (lie ( Viir.'re. \IK* no ri'^lit U > t i x u iifit- bivmi-e - i x l i -ar-tjoii iimv e- over into I lie iiivjt of the pn-rogalhe^ of the Prcs-idei' 1 >. ('olii'iiiilnler of (lie Arini-d I'orii'-,. Hi: Jili^lil reji-cl I lie alllendllleii! ulid ur -|>.'ii! MIC -.iiiiuiiiT on a :iiK-.ioii which vvoiilil certainly l.:,w- an iiillii'-nc>- ( i;i jiulilie (ijiinioii bur \\>- iiii-_'iii c:<d HJI withoul u I:".1, io
I'llii t i l l 1 1\ Mf.
Two. ihci'e i iio:l.i:i^ j;i the :.|i]eln!llle(,I which would prfVe:;i ' \-.iI'l-r,!'!'(,! ::n!ii i- i.-ni-.ti-:in'/ other Luolian iiinl (.'tijnh-nlijiji ojM-ii.'ii'iif.
W l i i ' - l i v:n[ i i r l e e l l v l i ; i \ e -o <.|l(>ox-r|, Jfl f;!/1!. iJiCtV j- ItOtllllC' ' Ue|V
!_ jife-'iut _ ,t j i-; Jn:,i^'t._sav anything ai :t!l wboin it. Ti:ir.l. { '',.(:/:. too, inn] >ui hiive had 11 iliiilin.' wild Sei'j.tor Jii.!' < hii-I. Tcu'ly jndii'.iiir- t|;i:re i-> no f,irî!iiiiii;j: iioint i i f ( lr i-iiiier e\i-'iiin^'- of |ri--or)<-r-or n poliiieui Hetrk'-Gi-'iil for ju.l of SouiI^-Ji-rt.
358
In saying all this I -loa't know that there is any assurance, in any othor route cither. I have said I would like this amendment to hafe die importunity to be roled upon. But J really tl.ii.k it leaves out the .idea of what, will he happening in Indochina. oven if we do withdraw. There is not much ]K>ssibility fir any negotiated settlement and the fi^htinz will continue, mid for that reason I would prefer to make one last effort to si-e if there is soin- way of joining the Conjîss and the executive, and in tliat way help cure the iiiviMvenc& in this counMy and also have some precedent which mizht serve us in good stead in the future. Mr. GAKDNEU. If I really Iwlioved that these rather complex moves that have to !>e iiui-le as we mine down the homestretch were the crucial issues, I would love to deimf them at great length, but the e vide we m>Wj* that the President cnir -rnplaU'a a continued presence iu Southeast Asia for a long, lo'iu Limi; to num.-, though perhaps not with ground troops. IJ'it llie question :i( io.ne j'.-iilly ii he'ueen --on the one Mile^-lhost; uljn fc<-l us I do, fiat U'.-îrist fret iMt. thai. Mir preswii'i- then; is wjoi>-_', tlmt it is (lamaîu^'iis ~ n peojile. th.H it is dainatriii'.; ihaf. ptrt -i" ihe wirrtd. Mini ois the nther side those xvlio rnjierc Uiut sfini'h->w niir ri.is'.iimt-l pre.^'nci- I'li-n-, hvnu .ir.-raf c^mT, from Tluiilti;i'l, sj:nehow will produce :i lieiter <iitfo..iC', that. siirii',!ii\v- we cuji play piilscivniitt 'j<'f{.-..-ifilly. 1 ju-' !o"i iielieve we can.-nnil -1 thiid: Ih'at i-i the i>yje. The otiser tliicjr-v ar<- details that 'we -a ovi-r hut '!!'> are iini the -.nlient p'>i>it. S-nator C'<j-ij>t;i:. { iiiiir{,: s;iy 1 nui not i:i shut îrorid p;r(.iii V i m de^.-riheii. . Mr. ( i A J I D N K l l . I k'low. -
KfFECT OF rHAXKD JKi:.MlHBXll.M, PoUCV ON' XECEftSITV OK J)ATK CKliTAI.V Senator JAVI J.i. Mr. (iar.iner, 1 . 'wijiild iiki- i< 1 ( i i i i i k - ^ K :ire ire!tj;ivj vunewlnTc. ls.-i !( -<( if I interpret your iii."iAi i r''fn)rly. JA''> pc.'ol:i!i< tl;:ii. tii: JV'.-i.ifi:! -:howrti iTV'idein-e to ' -d;1, ( '*jii'/ii'\^ 'hu.i !:' \v-j.-. .sd.-'jjiin^ 11 n-H' (r-iiity, f'< w i t . Mie policy of. -.vRfnii-iuMit nhiM'd>>iiiu^ hi- |<.-!ii y <f \;' : i'iiiai)i'Xiit.i<)ii :wi'l -if s-tnyiug in Vji'.'i.'ura iifiii! 'In- I'OW-' rd'M-w Thi-u be .-airf t :ie. {'tu;ie.^. ;. J'Jiu fi.'-, J'iu in flii- wjiOijiiilpflity ">f ;i paiif/ 'if Ai!^>lruv. l ul Ai-'l J J-;11 ifC_'tilo ii. i rix i:u o'l'i'. I fi> :i-.|p, ;.'i i I am ii-.'i >;'>iiiir t' .-<: -viy tin1/ nru rvady. V\"jtli jvy having huUli'. w<>uid ike 1-' year-. 1 ',n :?.<>(. ^liriif V'i hold -IV l ^ >:> ikiTi- nii'.i' r'j-y r':Ii';i.v tit,- PO'tV*. { ulit of iliai. ff"c -^f l/'iJi c.>ijtlifi'V>- f Jin iconic ('> \vitliiJraw, < tho.se crrciwi'-'T :<!'>, t.''.niltl y,/i;r u'litii-ii- he dilf< r-'i;i Mr, , '/AHK.VKU. . . "If !- verc v.flliti-; ti. uelrn 1 w l i u f In- im-enl l>y w i f l i drtt-Mi, jf -.viUnlraw not oi.ly r>f m'otitul oiutiar tro'-i'! li.it hi iic<>[.t<Trt atiil eoi>v;ii|>]nli-d uir ojii-ira'.J'Mi.-'U^;!* < ani-/.-, froni !.>J<>c.-. j;; Ttiiolar.d. It wouM iriai(>ly wifin jny aitit.uie jT ^ knew v.l;-.-t. }:: -pewit by ::idrl. . - . " _ , j/ill. f r.iill iV/iuNj JmVc '.'pvit MiJiirii|i\ if | ,o:;li| liCAt-j p ))etru>eia/ n /ui JIN rHlnjidar. Five ;/-;r -7_'fei- i ii\.*r'-. T'.vo ^.-inV.' hill îve> me sifeni iii|f Cvi-iy. e.-pi ( iidly V.;i"j> } h'-jo1 ll',,'i',<\n r, ,/f tt.'ifi)ini*trnlioii"fiiiik:fiTiA.ire r -t'-reiii-e- lo Ivor-i* n> mi
359
Senator J.vyiTs. .So the real iss-uc is one of oolicy,ci* it uot t and if the President is willing to share the responsiUlily with the Congress and change his policy, theu vuu c.an t-alk business wiUi him on no *laU:? But you are testifying that the exigencies of the Nation and the : world <]<Hiuu^l A date, _ . Mr.,(ixui>XER. Right. Senator JATITS, Kow that ,^ I think, is very inx|>ortaiit. We, like you, haw onnrnious respect -for John Cooper aud Frank Church. So I thiiLk it vesy iniportaut Uiat we have this point ol view sharply on : " QUESTION OF u.s. PIUOKITIE
" Thir only other question I had, Mr. Chairman, was about the question of priorities iu our country, also a subject of coiivern \s loimnou Catiai*. *Pli<- Library of Congress budpet annlysist show? ' 'roughly. 4<> |h*rci:iit of the budge.t, \v!u>n you im-Iitde. veU"j-ans,"jcO tioiial defend. Uoup:hly^34 pTceJit, omiiVMcd cf about 23 JH , lUinaii res>ouroes. aiitl 1 1 J percent physical resources, funds ull otuer tbines usid*' from intejx>st on the debt, administration, and so forth. This iiicliuli-h ucfi \iiy\t priority area^ as <-ducatuu:, ina:ii>owcr, iiealth, income, and smirity. (Tlie inr<rinalioi> n-fcrn-d to follows:) .s. avi muini BUOGC i OUTUYS OK int FEDERAL FUNDS BASIS FOR FISCAL YEARS 'u>a n
pcllar 1.1 mil)<ora|
of IWI
AmxifR
0' OUt
(tout
S77.VW
'.i n
7 T
22. *J
JJ MS *H4
J2.
H Iff J.1.H
|5.'3I3
HWIK
~7 4V 7.113
1.370
*; i JJ 143
4.~7V
in
11.41
710
1C '*U"
1.17
ItCM
4 7W J.Crt 3 li>.
II.M
4 4(
20.1(3
47
3.19 1 fc)
339 I )
2 34 11 II 2 II
.') 4 0)1 3 IM
3Jf 2 44 3 11 2 44
ti m
3 "A8 3 6M
JUf j .<". *i' A.* j r
1U3 74')
n <
1 u<
3 3M
n n 7.7
> V
; 02
t 30 U U
I 71
Wj
l.W
i-n
ii. M
iy.ui
- 8 .1'Urt !i U &
164 US
i>n. no
\'MV, i|i ymi luite ttfiy f("'lin<; about jriirilu'4 and, if M, wlini IM it mid dt> yu huvi- if in Icrin* of j . "\pniwd a Mr. <jî:i\Kk. 'N'*', v\c JIHVC mil u* nn vi'W on lln.-i. 'I'lu1 url;ari ruaiili");, us ymi L.IOW, , iiirnditi'' i> <J a rwunlcr. biii!p-i I <ln not Iinvr jh(>M- <iyiire- iu iniinl uttd J uui uo longer au
.300
;;;x
officer of the coalition., but the pitsitfon that we would, take is tha,tv tin- military budget must be subjected livt.be sajne exlrvniely ri-iunms scrutiny Ih'al other Federal u^partinenis^re. It- has not been subject to tliat'kiod'of scrutiny in the past u:ul the rwaltsÛmv it. I am s:>v if HEW orwiy other Vrderal department h.td ln-ea subjected to ihf largesse that" tin: Pni-i\*un, lias been siibjWred to, there would .be the sain- in^tamî of nu.v*pehuii; and wuslv ami sy o^n. It is in the ntfurcsof human institution*. It is my belief wv ure ijrtihsr to have to In- y*ry tii^li on llie. Peiitairon with fisperr t<j their Icêl of exjKMiiiUitx-s amnn far( I don't believe they :ire sjoins to !>o on! f troui>le with the American people until they mariuie. \joroel\n\v *o bring that level of cxpc-Rilituriv} down. ^ , ,. WHAT SHOULD REPUBLICAN' VAFT DO A'IOFT vnrrvAM AVITS. I ma coinc to ask y*.u d five uuil please dul't- answer u if y"i iiou't fee! like it. \Vhnu {i> you tliiiik-ui pttrty terrns Republie:iu>oud'f to<i<. uJ^mr tlii-v.iCi>ituatiii[i? Mr G.virtiN'KR. I tliink 4hey outrijt t" ir*^ o'tf iu^tHnflyri am very murli fit odrla -ith a<r<ioil in'uny i:ii i >iilifrs :>f the puiiy on tbi>. Tliere an> ru.-ijjbi.'i'^ f>f 'h<- jinriy wli belie.v/- i h a t . a n v Uopirblican who 5>eri)'i^ly wtint^ to -<iiii - e ( J^ f rôlcuix of-tliih rii<ititry.fr liilnirc for tlie ln't-UT lay of tin- ;nv<i'i" <if UiL> rtiiiry_iA"not 'T<- f it liff'iblii'AJi ; ! i," only n. nominul lit pitblieaii. t;v>li'iri. thi-rn art! llu*-.M'liu wr,. ofU nf UK- iJir'\ lin- fi>r.i.ir<J jooking xvJKfrîf lli^\n rty >md J '/li ri'f l^' iH'-riA <it.j. : - . . '^ ' .."" 'n i l i t \vry.Vcli uik. the [IJIK! in
( t i \v;rr
jxishii.iH.(<; d a:."iiperl;ju>fii.'or % -w'heu Itr" Hi to d' CXiirlfy thilt. ' ' , V. ^. SH-JiaPii' JAVJT.-'. Vd'j Jiii\vii'J î-en up 01; fiuii y-l . IKI\O yi>u? Mr. Gi'yfv.VEit; f h^v-e jm-t rth<i(. ^l-.vu 'i,i 'tîe hoiion ilia' Mr. Ni\"n will i'lo'.v on ihi-.. \\ur Miitatioo xiUiont/if.i.: %trrn<r [ivûre ijf C"nn:;ri'>> a'tul p'ibJte opJujDij f Mii.*ve'iliui Jir ;u!l, -v\hrn J ( r i A.XTiiiiir2 'J'.vr. In a r.iwhttirirjf.'Mi.uo iihoiil. tls-tuiU. 1 thjnk s'l"'n ! '.<' ' h''1 i- H'cu nuil iv<;i^Mi nf "..n>_rj'"v.-ioniil opinion it iv.'ll Jr-mi him to re>r.e>- h:. jîîtjou. S'imi'r JAITIS. W* hJy< in .~;i<>w t h a t ;,o- IIUVK '.he heaviest l);>U;>fi.ill s In Voiir jud'f'in'Ml, Wf-r:iin >JlnV- ib.'il l'-t. nil it re-o|il!i(~'fl ' "" Mr. (iAHiixt.it..Th.ii > i<- ri^bl. Si-nuLop JAVJI\ Thyiik in vi' y iutii;b f Mr
UOliT OK VIKTVAM WAJt
'I'b'!CIIIIKM vs. M . tiardii-r,"l ihiitk y<m it-jvi- jiiii-inly /i;i-i vi;lli-;u ii'.jniiiini. a.'nj 1 ap|>r"ciali* it ery tiii:'li. 'I I'<MV ar*1 uiie or l>'.o ro-.j, iif ;hi' v, iir. 1 ri".i-t\i\v n;.k< - i! llv Ofiic.'>if \Iiiiiii!r''n"ii :i:nl l'u<l'."'f f'tr d-iiii i.n lie- '.\>'r.i[l c.iv( -if i h < * L i , i r 'I ii' 1 p-pli from I'mi oi'.ii c -ni'! ((;(' hi'i-ti M-.I- 'if ill' 1 pi"l>I>'M: '*t' n tint a'in;; j>'in I ' > ( , HIM I i <jn<i!i>', ' N"
. word:;, neither thi'cxecuuve bcauux nor (be Congress knows what this war iiirnJlv costing th taxpayers. I am s]H-iikUi now iu rfijHar.-*, cot iu. lives. or moral costs, or imythiug cU. ', -"-, . GkV<>M,mvte has been uuwlc is hifh as 5750 billion by .ftwfwssor Mwdlw of ConwJl. 1 wish, Mr. Bc{Kirter, to lUst-rl thft leliar-froia Mr: ^Y^nl>^*:<;r, Deputy Oimrtor of lw Oflirt.1 of MatmgepieN wl ttjtl the article by Prof. Dennis; Mueller for tho rworii. It iirmiifiil, imt it is rutl.er mtenMin<r. The exwiitive branch 1ms no eolimulr f tlio r>st. 1 *up]ose it would br very cniiiarrnssiiur if they iit(. i^:oroiatioti n'^'rroi! to follows:) . Omci: or TUB
K OK M \\AGKVK.NT AND BtOCKT,
"
'
Otainuat, Comii-itl^f on Fureiyn Relation* U.S. Senate, ' i . 1>JC. Sf.NATOR'-Fcrjir.if.ur: Thii i" in reply to your lotler of April 5, 15*71, on the iiibj^cl of nh ov-r.UI totnl for the wmt of the war in Southeast, Asia. A wealth of (inuncijil datA about Krd.-ral program.-' is available, Imt none of tbfBt- du.Ut clfndy di.jtingin^ti outlays in --tut>ix>n. of !)oiit.b('3t A-ia from oxpf'rulitnriy' whirl) Mii>[vort nthu activitim. Without such accouuti:i^ Mipjwrt, war corttA inuxt IH- f^tinuitfKl. At tliU point, liowrvi-r, omr cnci>itntfr the dax-sic prohli-m of joiiit cost-.. Much of the >U)bli)mirnt" which support.- tin.- di-ftn>*o of .Sc>i|'.liâ>t A.-"ia L^ nb-o ri-ij'urirf to support ottnTd',-f''ii>c hnd iut<;niuUo<uJ progr.iinx. A.- can ho rxp^ct'ij, thi- ri-<uliii(>cc^(iiimt- of Jli - cost of tin- nr van- -sniioly &-p3itimx upon how th(; costs of joint- itciivitiw. arf all'>ratI betwwni war rd;it-d uncl ot:;t-r aclivitiiv. tSinc^ wch "KiKv^tinuit'^" .ir>' mi.- I'-odinc a- a wnsLiurr of thf: biirlgt-t roiisriiui'riws of thn v.'kT. 110 oflirial i^tiiuati-M ha\e Ix.t:n JiiaJ*.- l;y lh<: Oflivr of Maiuiiiv im-iit and J[ wlf~t. H -JWIVT, the quf^tinn of w:ir co^tt ha.- |M-<.-H diACti^^d lv 7J< % [firtnifnJ of Dif-nu-in ofbd.il-1 in (.c-tinioriv r-forr tho Ifoiî; Appr'^-njiUfin- 4jof(innlli-f> iu 1'vforuary and Aiarch I'.rTO. More rvr>udy. in a l-tk-r in S>>tiaTor Mi-ilox*'ru whicli w.vi publ.shfi ofi"i>aBi S4477-7!* f tlw f'(>iigrit*-ror.:il J''-ri>ni <tf Ar>nl 1. 1U71, A.-<i<taiit. fM-crfU^ry of JJtf<iw. Roh'.Tt C. Moot, ;jfovia-d ion (>ri vur fo-> ful wi naltif'. t!u." iufor:;j:ttiuii will hi lirlpful I > jou. iiuvn-l*',
Hos. J. W. Kci
C'.i"rAn VV,
Tut <>vv' or Tj>.~tt'jja (By Prfjf. bm,

if\c'f*'t of !io ViVtn.-iii) Wsir in (in ('jiit'tt .*.! if ." Tlii- i.' nr xilJc <;'i~M'itr b>fi/i>W-r: tlxrc i^ W' y-> or iluii'i <' tn- 1 'niKtl itjt.-f< jiar.irirj;i|j.or; in 'Uorld Vt.-f If! 'I'd.' m-r*< tltp-ut ,!! In U'r-. of oourw. lli<- IIM-II and oî.!'riitl tfi;il *)!'. iit<-tl iii liwililiii ill-- Hit. Tin- in'ii-i ijiw-.'.-! iv!i>-lii warf lli>: d'-fvnt of N'x/iain. An Uidu/'ir!-V'-l wu- lli<- L.imcjiInt! -Jf III' 1 I'oM Wir, f.hl^'li i'V*'iitii;illv VK| -*o Kor<', Mi<''a^!ition ( i>c:!>itioi, f <l(-fi'iri> i-t|'n-r'dfliiri-< in <h" '.VlV ;in4 'Wl'^. .ina l ; ;u)Mv \<> \ieti\Mn i!.-J-if. < ii-a;iy. <li. fi. vi i,i) ,ty rh:i tlii-i- l'Ji(it- mid i-iutu r.ttli rof(i>ntiiij AI Iii;i-rr.nj< i.lil) i"'.'i|il''K ,-irc rhi: ftiiiiifiruiion*. KI" jm <-.nji f f llii-* otatini'U'I*' tiyii >' r^li'il I'vi-ii jm-îlili' l ij<-f<viiiiii'- I In- -(KM -<f Hi"ir ;.i'i ..nipicl on ini'Tira (!. K)i'.i!i--r f/nr puriri'iiiii'io'i in W'.'fl'l Wf II wu. fi ''c.j'>fl" Mi-ii. or ii'>i /, |rt :i(
362
The Maine is true for Vietnam. While there u rhsiriy a cou-en'is now that A'ietnnm was a bad idi-a (just a* there wan tliat our participation iu W orld W'nr II was a Rood one). aâiti it is not easy to predict all the ramification* of this event. Perhaps Vietnam will Iw the limited war to end all limitiii wars AS far a? tbc U.S. is concerned, not because w<- Mjceev-fnlly rcsisti-d "communist aggre-îon" in Southeast Asia, but boui-<: the American people nill no longer support an expensive limilJ'd war like Vietnam. Heiire, the ravinp* in not celling involved in fi:t lire military involvements may beau indin.-cC benefit of the Vietnam disaster. There may aUo, be un additioiml indirect ca-t In the future we ntay rt-fus- to intervene- in seme l.>c'il war, in which ;<ome citizen* fex-1 we should partieipj i: mr\c.r OF WAK DF.riM CAWI.LATION Knot:i;h biw been said to illu.-trate the point. The inipuct of Vietnam is so, fdir-iiiUc and diffu-e tl at no adr<jL.ite calculation of all the political, sociological, * and economic crxts can IK- made. The most important effect* (on the prolmbility of f.iiun- limited wars, on the probability: of Wortd War HI, i-tc.1, are also thV> lea-.t riU'trtillable. I ili,-a i-urn to iiw direct rale1 ilat ions of the eo.-t> of the War. Wliilc I rotiridf-r thr-<- .'ici'"'* a Kfo-s >,nder-ri:prerentat:on. of t he tnie.co.-t of the war, they can perhn|>- -scrvr to inJt rhe i.vnj' in -I, sue perspective1. Wliilv the i'niletj Skui-< h:u l>een supplying nieti and materinl itt *lw Pouth Vji-l:in!:n-.c since the ir.id-K.Vr.". t'-.e .-'il)>tantial build up of military oijwjidiuiros in ihts arci reallv unit- Ix-tcaii ' )wrd the kttier part of 1UWIV. ."inre tl:n, our exp -::dit:ires luive ave;aefi between $^5 .-md &) billion a year, or rouichly ^ of o-.jr tuijl def.-;i- out la v>-. For exatiipli-. in IW.t, roiiiiiilv $^7 hillioi: out of the total *S billion d"ff-ii-j- buds"' wa- <|K?nt tiRlifin^ the n:ir in SotitlK-ast A>u>. Thi can be C'j:ni>.ittil with $-lil..1 -billion ."i^nt on voii-M-rvation, hou-ing, nd community .'.ml hi'alth hi'alth L-rmilijiusI, or to th<- S.'iT.-t r>iUiu J fntit on -on.il v:c'iriry. Th:i. HOCKI! xi-cufity p:i> inetits could have l*iti exf-anded by nearly 64J' f or (!ie iruiin compoiH-nt- of itv domestic program hou^'iiif. ed:icution, con*,-rv:/ri')ii am) h>*:ilth cn>:l'i hav>- IXSTI doiibl'<d if the fund- u-efl to light tinwar had Ix- -:i available for oUt'-r iw.. fivi'ii mori- direetlv, evTy American coidd liavc Jiu( t< l'>ok at the immediate ''out of ptieket" costs of Vietnam jtrov-ly undere--.lim.ilf?- its w economic imjict, however, eên if we limit oun-eivi* t<> a dolLir und ernr- in -:i.>iir< of COV.T. Two oth'-rexp'-Ddituri-s rein In- directly tnired t.-> tli Vietnam War. Fir-L, Ic-caiu-i1 the iiiilial <'\p-an-<i')ii of (he \\ar u.i-. einiilncli-d liv an uii-'lraiion th-it atdjinpu-d to havi- both nulitnr-. iictor>~ abroad :md niajor l imprrivemeiii at. hviii-s a l.irw [lortion of tip- \i*-tiiam ex|M-nditiirc ineren.o - nt th; eeniw of oth-r Jiefi'iie iJ-'p.irtnieM program.-. Tin*" curtailmnitu were regarded I>v the military lc.-ider a.- t.-iii|)ran' cud they can be j-xpertcd to put ;>n---'ire on I lie l'riî'ii"it to f*xpand (he uoi. \ ietnam coniponiit.- ( defi n.se x|>.-i(fli!nri~. yii'.|'iliivii)t!v a.- fund- are "o-l.-j-cil" tliroi::h the tvindiitic down of the !*j\r. Iis'ii-ed, (In- non-Vii-Lnam expali-iuu ha- aln-ad\ ln-eiin di take plaee. T!ie Ti.in-Vii'ir.niii portion (if the 11(70 defene hudset wa- up by more than KtT "?' tt> >>' bilhon'i over the tn-f.il year f I'.tii'.t.
IIIO(,1.:.T 1JIW/ HAS Vf.T TO Bl fAJU ret-ejv:J fril- Iliedil'Jll -"TV'CIV w i t h til'- filiuiit iwd Hi 'ijthl III \'ietli:UIl.
A a'rdiiil tit'-.l <>( future i)ildK'!.irv ocpaliMon^ tliiil can IM- traced dire-tly to the Vi'efti.ir.r War eomes in the area of veij-nn^ iM-nef'ifs. Hetiirmni; f/.l.'s are i'.nisi\l in ib-trtnfiiil uov<-niiiH-iil a.'i-f;nce in iicriniiiiK higher ednrution under the G.I. liitl of riht. Mediral otltlu 1 -- for i'i.\. \eti-rnii" f-te;n f : ir bcyoiiri the ciif: .-it ivln'rh .-Lctiiiil cnmoat linally ''ii'l->. Th<* widow*- mid d>>(-iidentH of Holdu'rw killed in Vu'tll.'jTd ui-ai reeeil-e |>:iMileli('< far into tile future thai lniJ-1 b' reft:r'ti-'i 11- an iiddiiionii.1 r<,^t nf i)i<- war. \\fi.L- the>->- future COF-IJ. are hard to 1 eHiifiiivTe. in The jjiti-t Mjev have In en rouahlv live timethe outlays for th* wiir itN-lf, M"iire. by far tin- luVw-i bill on tl^ 1 VV'/ir lav- \i-l (o \- |iaid. A)fii< i( should be ^!reHd t f i u t these dollar e.(jiliiili ypfAy undi-re>itiiirit4'lie rfitf i".fl* of Hie 1 war. The iin'diml jiaywi:nt> nfid other riiiiipeilratton paid d-i ii'it i-eallv <n(-:ii"jr/. tlu- valiu- of a. Iot le^ or hurbriD'l. Heiir*-, UK- eol in [niiii >iii3 iiiffi .) i( cti'.ffl by (Jiiw p:irtirij):iliriv in tj- u-ar far exived Hi*.1 conii-iH;i. lioti- twf> n\ ttiiH payitu; fur i(. Aii'/iher ">l- of the wur i- burin 1 direetlv | ( y oie nt i he "oldii-r1- f'Khtinic it in (!i- f'irni /if llur inriitiii-, < fij^\iu> tit add fn-'-'loni f'rj;o,- m having had to MTV*: invil-ifji jnly id the iirtni'd ftirr-t. This is n di/'ii''ilt >-( tu I'jilc'il.'iU-, but i* wini'jii'i;ii/\ ei|uji| to the ilifffiviH 1 /- in what a xoldi'-r ii inii'iK in Vietnam atid whfit he wimM ivfjiiif UN u frthiry to indiiw dim lo M-r\e ju Vietnam voluni'inlv. For
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example, if a soldier is earning $3000 per vtr in income and other benefits and if fiit* tf>e cfto'cihe would only *erve in Vietnam if hfo par were $25,000, then for this -soldier the real cost of the war J* $2u,OQU. This is essentially a Ux the country Irvte* on him when it drafts him and ncadt) him to Vietnam. If be were left nt home bit would presumably take a job which provided him with a level of iueonw 'monetary and psychic) roughly equal to what be would obtain by working in Vietnam at such a high salary.
cwr.\vtt> MONur AKO WASTKD UVE

Some soldier* hear no tar of thia type (tho*e wlto would volunteer for service in Vietnam under pteaent pay Kale*.) Others licar a very large one. Some indication of the magnitude of tout figure can be obtained by looking at the putimales of tLc cost*) of alial'uhing the draft etiUnely and attracting the DeccMary level of manpaia-f into the army by .higher wage*. The additional costs of a fully volunteer annr of 3,0(10,000 have torn estimated a* running any where from $4 to $20 billion. per year, with * 6gur<: between $12 and $16 billion termed mot realistic. Tbfxr figure* have to V'-adjiMted in -two ways to make them relevant to the Vietnam IMUC. Fir*t, at most V ietnam has absoriwvd only about one sixth of our total manpower in the aimed force* at any ope point in time. Hence, a direct proportional allocation of the co*U of-* voluntary Array would indicate a hidden COM. of Vietnam of from tZ to $3 bilb'ou. Secondly, the above estimates are based on <rulc> 'atipa* made for a peace tiioe army. Clearly the amount one might hnvp to pay u typical draftee to coax him into serving in We*t -Germany or fiawaii in likely to be far less tb*n the amount hu will require before be will volunteer to go to 'Vietnam. How much k, no one can >vally tell. Perhapn, a doubling of the above proj>ortionai enticittti>, *ay, to $5 billion., would not be a Iwd fittutv. Beyond UIM uoc can make further, butCsveo more questionable, rcxrt cstiinatc* of tho %ar- What dfHM the countr>- loot? in the way of further economic production from the roughlv 600,000 eaixialties it ban HiiftVred? If wo 3*'inv; that a typical oldkT wunld earn on awrugr $10,000 (in 1070 dr>UinJ o\vr hi s lifetime, then each of the 4U,(XH dead G.L's in VieLnam ha.t cort Ihi." country approximately $200,000 in discounted future production. A total IOM of over $3 billion. To tfain'ngure one etutid add tho ruduo;d produet.ivitien of the ->.V).0 aft- real costs of UK- war, they an; v.ucl> cynical undcre0tiiuat-v* of the true cowt.i of these tragislios that I do not include- them in the finiii fitvim.
<;ORT or VICTXAM WAB APPKOAC
To *<>mmarir.'*: Ttie lr.,v ha* probably prut mljout $l">0 billion fighting the >'iftnani wnr. (t has ineuro-d obligatiotm 1 1 pay tip to aiioth' r $750 billion over future yeont AM a direct conw.tjiyne" of thi- war. Thcw- tiKuriti lnn (tniouiit to roughly tin- (iriMw N'ational Product for lhi ouiiir>' in 190U, Hence, every American alive in l9(i!J trill t-ix-'iid approximately am: year of his lift1 working to pay for ill'- cijnt uf the Vietnam War, Since inoft of the real eott.-i <>f the War are incurred in the future tiie young will have to pay mon* than tin.' old. IK sriTF. or OIOAVTIC OI;TI,AT THK rovr> r.<W e ;i< time ciMt* are, they would no>t he nuif: so diniurl>iiiic if it itppenrrd thai W<; liiwl actually l>ought Konirthing for them, if peace |>j<are<l lit. le clocer, il future warn und miliiury buildups uould not In* it^cary io<rijw of tins pant giant expeUN':. Such doot not w^rn to be the care, tiimevtr.-Ciim.'iiily, (be Vii.'iuam War I'M only about o/Ji'-foiirtb of HIP total defence budget. A oun)l>er of eapo|j| proiriiiiH Imv been Uuticberl whir-h will tscalate in r.mt j& they ni<>v from rofa/r.h b> dcvjopiuent and then to productirN;. .Vniong (bOM* ulreitdy in t|y; pn)ducti'i htaK': ore the foUawiiift: ' BUUtu Minn final) III miMMlo.., ..... ............ _ ..... . ......... .. ${ Knfpguurd ABM ................... : . ... ....... V-U Navy J.tfhtrt- plune .................................. J F- l.'i oir-tf>-jir wnilxii tighter for i Jw Air Forw ..... . ____ . . .......... ---- . Nuclear mtutJi curri'-ri ....... , ................... , ., ... ...... IJ-ii
M> Ux JutfU i;(i':iu- f.'m>inl(;* In Kuvrtalx of I bf Cfurlo 1. Ikuwt << ttw IttMKift .
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Aniont tbose in the ptonrfng aud d-'-rlopincnt phase include: '_.-. AMSA (advanced nHn>ikl ,trwsic aircraft 1 , . $10 New battle tank.. ^/, _.... : L-v --- 1> Now advanced ini>ul<. irnni|**i<-hard jiJos. i" . .i New Air Force attack aircraft ':". ' Major reconversion of c !*' number of Navy veaÎ*. -' New contiiiMita! air ccf'n* iiiuTceptor ,.
New uud<-rvvati r UaV:;ic mis.-il
; in iuii)-};Ui3t who :wntnal cost uf a rcapoos program u on average more than 3 time* ",\it- original estimate*, arid the abovefigure.-*are only c*rly esum.iti-*, we an- dfarly jugncd up for an expensive and loug coUauing flow of military nporopri.ifion- i-ven after Vietnam is over. - In closini. lot am rriteratp the following point- While the ctwt of Vietnam in dollar^ and ceuLs is lai K>- (roughly u vents' ftal production in tire United States) it i-i '\.jrfed by the iioaqiuuiufbblo eoiuwo.ueue.ea of tlie war on future bi and U> tlie livr'w of tb: many i^-njilc din-cUy ; >r indirectly affcc.'ed by it Ifctubuny-r Hill to'^Ty IM to Ker: State). Thiware tlw most ocpenjive JL. of Uif uar and tliov should not be dwarfird by tlir .prie- of a bomt> or a liayoitet. The y'iettiuin XVai-cvost.s are also o\*i'r-<(.julow-d by the remainder of th mi!itry b>idKn^ and Ua- ivintinual iniT-i-'i-s of drjf<:he^mtli^'s that are. bilterent in tbf anu-< me'' "defensM" i<tmt:Ky." This piTp<ni!al"d'>veloj>niit nd piifclut^ if weapon* cotttinuc* aiH thrrtit<-ii*.to accpk-ratd It is* thi> buildup tliat irprVMtiti' tli- (triatcnt ol>tich-. ff> our countryV Ixanft abl<- to fre>- yutficiout re*ourcr< to ^)lw it* domestic problems. Aud it L hrt(; thij^rfcre, that nvvt public i rnui IN-foc>i:Md in thr-future. -_ ";" YKOBLEU <>F iSBCRBCT I" "
The CiiATitUA.v. On- other thint; J wanted <j a^k-about and vcrj1 intejx-sicd in i-s your emphasis 4i|>on the sifîficance of ace*'*!' to information. I believe you said that secn-cr is one of tf-e jjreaujst dangers or jrreute.-t ob>fa<-I<s to the j>rojxT functioning: of our democratic >yffrn. George Recd.r, who is a vm* jtxpriM)<;cd witaeds in 'IK- field. a-> you know, both in his bôk and in his t^timony, I-think ajn-i's exactly th.-ii si-rrecy t, as f believe hej)Ut>i it, the luisic most fu'iduincutul |)robli*m that, we have to solce. We. nin into (his every day in our bearing-. Even on relatively nonc/mtroveisinl subjects there htK^rown up a luibit of a kind of an almost automatic response. If it dot*!>irt snit Jind isn't completely in accord with the executive jiolicy. j|n-y Miy it !> fla.ificd. Then- nre no wi-II defturd, ns fit-r us I can see, criteria by which you can nut it W8-* pro|x-rK'or improperly dmsilied. This ]>u//.lr me, J have jrjviit difliciijiy in kn\viri!r what to do about it. I have tried to solve it in my own mind. Should we try to take, this to court? Should I Mibpoenu .-oue of these matters and have n court scîon? This i>uy,/.li-s run because then in-teud of the substance of the vintrover>y ih-in^ the focus of attention, it is the conf/rovorsy itself. That i.s the effort to make (Iv executive respond to 'he requirement* of a reoucnt for information. 1 li;i\i- inrroijiiiu'd a bill vvliid; will t:ikc u lontr tlnm. n- ii>inil. It Jii> jrori- to the Juiliri-.iry i'ommittee and tliep' will be ln-jiriiii.'!-. ll i> on execiitivr privilege. The Si-nati>r from New York hi.-' introduced >i very i'Mere^tin-/ bill nn the unr j>owcn. All of fl.ew un-.: the direction, but none of thejp Imve wiv pro'pf'cl of finii-h imnif.'(h;ite relief frriiu tlje oiu--.ij.iti f hot knouini; ^jmt !>. {.'OIMJ; MI. 1 liiink your te-ijmoiiy pv)lencc- ilijs- unJ>?ûity yutj havtr uboul what they really h/ivc iii mini'. v -
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Of course, I am reminded <*f the origin of the war when, in my own view, the executive very clearly and blatantly deceived the Congress at the time of the presentation of the Gulf of Tonkin incident. It just wasn't that way. The facts were not in accord with their statements. The question then comes what does the Congres> do about this and it nuzzles me very, much. Air.-- GARDNER." 1 think, Mr. Chairman, that you hcx-e been gravely handicapped by the lack of vigorous public opinion that demands the kind of openness that you are concerned with, and the plain truth is we have no one but ourselves to blame for this. We have neglected our governmental institutions, cad we have lived with far less access and responsiveness and account ability than we could demand of our institutions. One of the purpo>es of <\>mmon Cau^c is to rehabilitate dial attitude on (lie part of citizens. and remind them that the instruments of self-government are their instruments, and if they don't look after them nobody will. If you have that kind of opinion backing you, you are going to have an easier time getting at these things.
SJHFT IX POSITION OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS QUESTIONED
The Oil URUAK. I certainty agree with yoitr feelinz about the significance of Common Cause aud that it is moving in the right direction, It is a long-term program. I mean you hax-e already made remarkable |>rogress with it. but the translation of this public opinion into the Congress you 'nave already noted it. Von have eited these clear indications of a great shift in public opinion, but you have not cited any comparable shift in the jvtsilion of the Members of Congress yet. I am not *>are whether there has yet been such a shift. It is still very questionable in your own statement. Mr. GAKDX'ER. I think it is coming. The CHAIRMAN, You think it is coming. You really <i. T certainly hope you are. right- The most eiuvniraging thing* are Mi<-h>isLMnents, although we have loxton most of our vote*, in thi> urea. \Ve have U-eu unuble to win.
KEA0\~ FOR POWEK TIlANsFER FKOM LF.CiI.-LATJVE TO EXKCl'TIVE
T!iU prompt* me al&o to ak a'out This qn^llon nf <5\cciitivc power. Isn't it a fact that th.< war ilvlf L, thf principal rciiMtii why ilierc is a tru:?f<!f of pt^wer from the legUlutivf to tin: exivntix'i'? J)reMi't this al\vuy-i hujipen in liinr ->f v.nr ik-i"iig ^ w^r is goiiigon? Mr, (i.U'.bMiit. It doe^., but there have IMTII niwi ouie iiiexjttienble bhifu of powi-v -between {'oi:gre=-> and th* Ev-utive iit ine hilory of our M>(iiury. Tlu-r?; in lwny* a i>n-\i anil pull of j/iAVer -un iinhnlance and then u ruinvctniv' of the buJaii'r. 1 'hink now the direction in which the balance hu.- U l>e corfM/U'd ia jM'ifeclly cleni',
CONBTITOTIOKAUTY OF IfcGOVKKK-KATFIKLO ACT
The ^'HAHIMAX, I think it ha Ui In-, hni I inn m>i -'inwe cmi make ri'.urlt piogr>u< until we g<-f the war over b<-< -jiu-" -there arc v tnncy people vlio ^till uy, "jle is the r(rtjimaniJ<:r in <:hi*-f. You hLriuldn'l jnterfffe with htm." Questions are now rub-ed about the
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McGovern-Hatfield Art on the ground it is unconstitutional. Do you see any constitutional question at all if we should adopt the UalfieldMcGoveni amendment? Mr. GARUVER. No, sir, but I am not a constitutional lawyer. The CHAIRMAN'. Is there any theorv which you have ever heard or read, which indicates it could be considered unconstitutional? I find it very difficult to see that it is. One the contrary, we mentioned secrecy i moment ago. It strikes me the deception of'the Congress, a subversion of the function of the Congress in making decisions such as warmaking, is sort of the ultimate treason to the system and I feel it has gone very far. If (here is nnvbody guilty of subversion of our system, ' ' those who did deceive the Senate and the Congress. !r. IxiUDNER. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, you have gained some i. from the kinds of evidence that I am finding around the country of H vi ry, very widespread concern to make our institutions more responsive. I don't really think it is an accident that Gmimon Cause is gaining 5,000 members a week. I was quite astonished when we first began to discover tlint this surge of membership wus not in fact a re-.pon.se to the substantive problems that we w*n- tackling, but a ru.-poij!<e to our stand that we must revitalize our own political and governmental institutions. Thrr; is a riiTrent moving and I think it -will serve the ends that conwTii you most.
MEMBERSHIP OF COMMON CA1TSB
Tie CHAIKUA.V. That i> very int*-rcc.ling. You say you arc gaining *>,OuO member* week. How many do you have now? Mr. GAIIDXKK. Just to give you a lough figure, I think we have 152.340. Tluj CHAIMMAX. I.r,2,:<40? Mr. GAUDNKK. That i> ju>t rough. The C H A I H M \ X . And the\- arc incn'tising at the ruu? of about "),(HIO it week? Mr. G uuiVKK. It varies sonn1 fmni week to ,\v<-k; it is 4,00u to ."j,ff)i) each week. TIii' CfMi'tUAX. Tlwl i*5 very encouraging. Mr (JAUDXKK. 2.'KJO \cMerday. Tlio CHAIRMAN. *JT000 \<-itrr:iay. Tliat is in
HOW IH>K* O-v'Ii HMctP A FltKMfllKXT Of
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(!<i us hi'. plrtLHc*.
.st-niiior JAVITK. Mr. Clmirinun, would t lie C.'hiiir yield? The CJKAIICMAV. I wuiitwl In Jiave you explain i(. Yiw, Jilo. Si-nufor JAVJTK l/-t tin- mnk<' clrar what / hu<l in mind. J WH* lending lift i*> whuf Mr. Gardner'* aiiwr jirobiilily wn*, that no one CUM *irij> tlw FrcKidrnl of (lower. Therefore il in only if the President r* with UK thut hi* policy etui be; changed.
367
HATF1ELD-HC GOVERN ACT SUPPORTED
The^?HAiRsiAN\ That is what I was coming to, but it was not quite clear. pro; that lion between that And the prp|>osal Uiat were. enacted it would simply cut off the funds and that is a perfectly constitutional procedure." The President doesn't happen to nave any Constitutional power in this area. I don't know how he would pet the money, unless he raided the Treasurv physically and I don't exject him to do that. There is not much left in it anyway. It is already well obligated to the Germans and others, hut to pet effective action, it seems to me, to be credible I will use that word. It is :i very bad word the** days. It has lost its pristine glory because ot overuse. As I see it, the passage of the Hatfield-McGovern Act, setting a date, would not actually rut off the funds. It would if it were pushed to the ultimate, but if there is anything that can be pMrsuasive on the President, a clear vote in fav>r of that legislation would be it. First it would be credible because the Congress has the authority 'o cut off funds. It would be credible not only to the people as a whole. It would be credible to the President. It would bo credible to the opposition, to the enemy, to everyone. If Congress could make up its mind to actually pass such a piece of legislation, it in all probability would never have to proceed to the point of implementation. It would MI itself, if anything can, persuade the President to move to n negotiation. That is the way I new it. Mr. GAKDNEE. It is precisely my view, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIIIHAX. Is that the way \'ou view it? Mr. CAUDVKH. Yes. The CJJAIHMAN. The question ulxnit its lakinir effect or: December 31 or June or anv other date seems to me quite subsidiary (o the question of a vehicle for tin- regiin>tioii of the sentiment of the Congress DOW. If it were registered now within the next C weeks, as ihey utifjupute it may have n chance to be, then it would \>c the signal and the President very likely would proceed lo negotiation* long before the end of the year Ixrause he would then have seen what the sentiment of the Congress is. This is the way il ccins to me it would work, if the Congn-Kr. <le<-litic> to do t h a t , then noihing hiia changed and it goes on and on. Is thai the way ymi * it? Mr. GAUXINEU. Yes. TIM; I 'HAIKMAX. I thank yon very much.
VJF.W> OF t'OLLJJOE COMMCVITV
I do wujtl t*> j)ul into the record here n letter oigned by some i/00 student i>f>dv pnvitlerilr* and1 newspaper editors, wliicin wa recently wnt to tin- Prtindeut. The* flfe uie Ir-atler.-, in other words, of thie (M>IJeee r.ornniumrr. I <hik the letter Hhoulrl If j>uJ in the record tdgetlier with an arti^J.". concerning il and uuoilrer irriicie regarding Uje vi/'Ww of \\u> White tit u**1 < '^Hiference on Youth. (The information rcfcjred to follows;)
368
STUDENT GOVTOXIIKNT OmcK, UNIVEESITT or DELAVAKE, STCDJ;NT Cf NVE*,
A'cworfc, Dd. Tar. PRESIDENT, TV IFASr Houtf, WaiMngto*, D.C. ME. PRESIDENT: The Administration seriously misinterp-eta the mood of both the campus and the countryside. While our campuses have not been the KCDC of highly visible political activity so far this year, It is incorrect to infer that this surface calm implies that students .have accepted or support Administration policies. On the contrary, students continue to search for moans and methods of changing disastrous policies. The aftermath of the intense political organising of the 19GO-1970 acadn&ie year lias required a re-examination of our assumptions about American society and its openness to change. We have had to deal personally with the lesson of the tragic events of last Maythat American students black and white, like our Czechoslovakia!], Hungarian, and Mexican peers, undertake political protest at the risk of liberty, personal safety, and even our lives. It also must l>c recognized that as students'oiir activity takes plaee in f he context of the larger community. Until recently, the. false dichotomy established bv your Kov. 3, 1069 speech between antiwar students and the "silent majority bad târated us from older jtfJi.Tations of American* whose d'sirc for peace is every bit as intense as our own. The "Viptnamization" policy enjoyed a temporary mt-aaure of public support because Americans hoped it would end our involvement and bring peace to Vietnam. From our participation in the affairs of the larger community, it is obx-ious that public support for Vietnamizatipn is rapidly trading. An happened gradually during the Johnson Administration, the wide distance lx'tw?n official rhetoric and A iinn reality undermines the credibility of the Administration. There is again a mounting crisis in public confidence and trust. Ls.it spring public response to the escalation of the WIT in Cambodia was iimti'-diate and widespread. The American people made it very dear that tliey did not want the war expanded. It is appalling tlial the only lesson thr Administration It-arm-d from that extension of the war was one of public relationsthat escalations of American military activity should be- bedg<*i, doi<*J, spread out, enveloped in Pentagon'-se double talk, unaccompanied by Presidential addresses, and olisc'ircd by news blackouts. Itegardles* of this attMJipU-d obfuscat-ion, the recent, policy change* which have deep -ned American involvement have not been camouflaged* the resumption of the bombing of N'ortb Vietnam the increased military aid to the Cambodian government tin; indefinite operation of !outh Vi-tnaiu'-se soldiirn innidf Cambodia tlii! me of American air jM>wer to provid'- close combat support for South Viet names'^ ground troops operating inside Cambodia aud Laos the escalatiou of the air war to the highest Im-el yet ib>: invasion of a politically delicate- Laos tli&\. borders ou Konb Vietnam IIIKJ Cliina 111'' cuniiilativr itnphft of tLrw recent e.sciUations is now taking root. The Anu-rionn {.euplc uri: l.-K>'iuing to reject the logic of u policy that purports to cud a war in one country by \MuA\n\r. (wo mid l>onibing thr>:. /î-spiti- HII abundance <rf rlwturir surrounding Viet namization, the Administration ha* not foi'j-d the baxic policy (|iK:Htions. Will not the iricrrawd hombing noccsnitaVi-d by \ U-t iiaiiiization have ibe itanie -Tecti< ait pri-vioijx i>ouibiu|C Ckutpoignit depriving repl,iceiibl<.- mipplk-s U'bilc strenxtb"iiiiit( ttw> rmojvc 'A tbe North Vietnamese to fight on? How in the aJiwrfe of n politkal ttk > tii> i nt will tlii-ôuth Virtiifimene lie able to achii-ve the stability and security they could u>K aciueve w(>ile Aided by half a million Anierjcau troop*? How will Rirengtlieiiing tb*1 narrow uncl niicorn|ir')uiiniiig 'JliM-u-Ky r^giinc lead to the reconciliation of political and !-Ui':iry f:irtio:i within Somli Vwtiiaru? How in tli v> ab<( nee of a puli:ical rm i.i ur<|>risuni-r- of war to tn< exdungMfi? Criit^.4 tin H: ixmifk ur.- re^>lvi-(J, \ ictna'nization will> eiMititiue to be f'llilf. l'/Jrn beyof.d llii, h<>n.-v..'/, thi.- irioruJ coiiH(K4'J< iice of Vw(numiza<Mu are ri'i/Micn.Mhle uiid ri'j.ugiiiin:. '!'!<' Mar i i Vii>liiuiii if not m-nunyiliou* witti Arnerir-ni ei.'i.iliif^ Niipultn in-art \cll'>w rtrch a <nrf|y ut it d'*1^ wbit>- My Lai'n are infb r i< '1 r< murderouitly by tt~'V as tb-y are by M-10V Aîon fanultf* suffer from
369
the low of their loved ones, homes, and villape*. Asian mothers and wives mourn for their dead and long for the ret urn of P.O. Vf.'t every bit as much as American mothers and wives do. As long ai our Asians, supplied, combat -supported and paid for by the United States, tight other Asian.-, the suffering and death remains an Ameriraa res;>->'isibility. Changing the color of the corpses dors not end the war. Yet it is appareu t that our policy waters have never considered the cost in Asian live!) of the policies they puraiie. Those of us, old and young, who oppose the war have no alternative l.ut to Organize uur opi>osition as. vigorously and effectively as we can. The Administration that ignortw the American [x-ople's desire for an end to the war doe* <o at the rfck of terrible consequences. It should not )to necessary to say this to President whosii prodecfor was driven from otlice for precisely these reasons. But far iuor- is at" stake than the political careers of one or two Chief Executives. Mr. PreMdent, you must reverse futile and immoral policies and u< yoiir authority to end the bloodshed in Vietnam. If tio, you will have to take n.î,onsibility for an intensification of public divisivetwss and disunity which will furlhor weaken the already torn moral and ^fX'Uil fabric of American life. The outrage and the j>urpi.>>ffiilue ' einerîac front t>eiie:iih the surface despair on our campuses, wheii it is coupled with the widespread los^ of p<iblic contideace in your administration, cannot be dcnVcted or contained. Sincerely, Mark Me(,'lireny, MuiS<.'tt Body Prr.ii- Micha<-l Bauth, SBJ', Car/oll <".1ollf(;e dent,1 L'luveisiry of Delawsinr' t'A'ise) Kent Adams, lijilor, J'>bn>on Stat- SaU Avi-riett, U, Editor ' Mitchell Abidoi, liditor, Kmgsborough Fred Ax.-lroI, KiJJtor, Haiiiili.nii C)'Iege Community Colh-Ke 'N.Y.) (\Y^ Mik<- Adaui^. SBP, Pikcvillu College (jury BalK)ck, SBP, Brown L"imT>ity Ky.) " J )\'id B:ickov.toli, SBP, Col!,-/.- i hike Alida Amabile, SUP, Merry College County I lit) (N.Y.* I)7>orah Bin^hMti, 1-Mitor, B:>rri.T*''tn Pet.-r AL-k.-.-indrowicz. Editor, SL'NY, ColIeK.- i It.I.i Frudomu Kenuetli Bleaklv. Jr., SEP, Uollsn- I '.]Gn-pg Alliuson, Editor, Las-eu Culleg*l,Xe. (HH) f f;.-Ujf.) J.-niine Blum. KJitcr, I-.'iiiii.:rnui 1 Ctolr Anthony IS:ul:iI>icco, Editor, Yankton \>-un "Ma--) College fS.!>.; Il-h:ir'l Blum, SUP. ("niversity of Ten1,'iun-nce Ari'li-r.-. SBI', North O-iiLrul ne-si-i- at Cli:iilaii.>oi:a ' Michigan (.'ujl'-pUi!ii:nii lierurdi, Eiliior, \V:.-!ir>ut'>n >5ti'|iheii Aiiil'-r.-oti, Editor, <Jr:ic- Bible ("iiiv>-r.-<iiv -Mo.i lu-t. 'N.-V If.irf.ml l'.i-.-r, J-;i!ii/r. CJi-or^c; \Va-liTainun Anfler-on, E'iil^r, II.-iiv.-lii": iliKtjn t"ni\-r..,(;- IJ..C.' I'liix-r-if. . M m n i T'ifi .Bi-:^. SJ51'. f'-:',\w "f !>'! J':>^'' TiniMihy Aii'Jerson, SBJ', Bo -ami ColJll> II-KIJ->lin Hilliu^", Edit.".-, Jlii):in Colli-gi.S. JVrtker An-tMin, >BP, ^J:l>:L!.-!er -.!>.> f'llif-ge XI inn i B-irliar.-' Mr-iM^litoi 1 , >!/!'. J'niv. o; KyJe-j; Ari.-n.i.-, II, >BP. K:rl.u<xd CoinA'hl.uid (jornin. '.'ullr-u.iiiiiini;, Cfiili-ee Clowi) Jirn I'.ruwti, ,-|{|'r ( J . t r J . i - i .-t.'it" Jr. Sii-jin K:". \-lilaiid, l-.tlif.r, Nijnh Iowa C-iH' ,-< ' A l i > An-a C'>ii:[ii. fiiljei"' M'iriVifel ]{r<i\Mi. VM.'or, Lork Ji;c.<'ii Lyndon A"horth, .^J'i', Bn-v:ir>i (''ASt,-iiJ- Colley- 'J'n '\-Vf Vr i -...TI itni-kl, >!!!', Nortl.eni iiimois Jo-M-ph B-ike-, Editor, Scion llall t'lii\ ' M \ - i-n v \<T-ity ' N . I ' ^ U<iTi:iM [!i-%.Tt, Editor, Keeni- .^'ute Win ton" U.ir.Uy, .sBP, IH.L!..- I'f.i( '.ill. - w - ' N.li.i \'T->itv M uirire JS-iok'-r, Editor, Paine Collie
Fri '! Br:r-k ll. -UP. A!'|I.>I.:I!I!:I|| M'lte -I in i
I'liivr if. -\ C ' B.-l,.,ri|, !5.(ki;u., Sivit flurk' r. .ÎJ)'. Til- Cnlor-nlij ( Iol!i--e ( :.,lje- ' X V.)
,-BP.
Ski'ltuoP
C-,tiiy Birl., SBP, >'. M:i"'- Coll.-*- H""/li B/iiim-ii). I l l , Editor, C.'i,it.i find; rniv<-r-il'.' .Ohio, Phillip Burton. Editor, U.iti- & Elkiri- M.-ir^ .I;m.. Br<-i'!i;ii, Editor, Jvl!/i Coil-V ''VV. V.-i.i Coll.-t-- 'Mi-. l JJoM.i- P,.t i:>nn, .-BP, Kinc'" fV/JJi-K" K'.'i) Bn'i.n.-i, Editor, 'juilford (.'<!!.>;) Vr.i ''N.r,
1
Oflkci *n(J (cL>ooIk llif-il fur Id'-ntlflrutluu only,
370
Steve Bright, SBP, University of Ken- Carolyn Cos, SBP, Agnes Scott College turky " (Ga) Critic Brocfcenbrough, Editor, Stratford Jack Crisp, SBP, Boston University
College (Va.) David Buckman, SBP, Quincy Jr. Collegu fMaM.) Sister Lynn Thomas Bum*, D.C., SBP, Mariliac College Nancy Burrows, Editor, Cal Western U.S. Intl. University " Robert Batch, SBP, SUXY, Cobteskill Thomas Butler, Editor, Allentown Colh-gf (Pa.) TV'nru<;r Buxton, SBP, Jackson State Collcpe <Mi*j.) S. M. Colhoun, SBP, Juneau County CoUw (Ww) " Brian Callajchan, Editor, St. Xjrbeit Collt-gi- (Wi.<) Kot.in Bronnm, Editor, Russell Sage CoU.-K<- (NY) Siiruin Brookcr, SBP, St. Mary's College of M.in'land Robert Carnahan, SBP, Mt. Hood Comiiiiiiiitv College i'Ore) Itolx-rt Carroll, Editor, Vationai College of MticHtion (111) Myrin Chennaiilt, SBP, Manrbesitcr Cojk-xi- (Ind) Ii-w-in Chusid, Editor, I'nivi-rsity of Bridgfiiort (Conn) " Jx- <'if-plak, SB1', Universijy of Vew Mavcn T'-onn) ^(irhw! Ciiu-.lli, Editor, IMaftaru S'tat* C'Alllgf* Clarf-iiPi- Campbell, Editor El Ctntro Colt-ite (Tex) Ki-vin Cart-ton, ICditor, .StonhiU Col)<' M.-u-s) Ji-tln-y OMIIIO/, SBP, Xiaîra Co. C'ofKin. Oillcge 'N"i"; Marv Oji'firiinc, I-xliUjr, Momiiie SideCoJL-jttr ;lowa) John Cok, Editor, Wangc-r CoUcgf ( NT/ BiU (V>uu, SUP, L'niv. of North CnnJina, &>h*-vi|faFrunk C-K>t>, )IJ, Kdilvr, r'nivr-wity of KrniiiciO', J/'XiPilon ' llarv :orrjK.m, J-idKor, i!t. St. Marv ' hMii* Hark, SBP, Ito-u Spring!' (UjUc-p1 ff. -.-!, .-lxjji Clancy, SUP, Wilr-y <'>fj-|t^ ' Dennis Cuddihcc, SBP, Cardinal Glennon College (Mo) Dan Cumiuings, Editor. University of Illinois Chicago Circle David Dalby, SBP, Solano College (Cal) Tom Daprano. SBP, Oxford College of Emory Univ. (Ga) Mike D'Archy, SBP, University of Dayton Margaret Davies, SBP, Webster College (Mo) Charlm Dane;, SBP, Marietta College (Ohio) Dan D-, Editor, Mansfield State College* (Pa) Michael C. 1K-1 O.Uiano, SBP, Kollin.H CollfK- (Ha) Cathv IVtniun, Editor, LaxMclle Jr. O^lpgi- (Ma**) Dennis I)e Smm, SBP, Syracu-'c University BR Dmii, Editor, ColpM* t'nivi-nsity <XY) Chiirjl Donovan, rs'BP, St. John College of <;ii'\viand David DuubUsday. SBP, Poinifrta Col!:&, (Cul) Jiint Dowjing, SBP, ,LouiiiUM T*h. ^ Ili^l^'^t^ Jf*ncy DnboMi, ;UuJ-ivt fccjy Pn-si(liia\ (')J<-'' <>f St. B-ni;iJil'' Jrx' l>njin, SBP, Hjraui ftcolt (.Xcb) Tom Duulap, SBP, Winorna State Co!J<-c<,- (Minn) Bn>, Michael IK- Trmple, O.P., SBP, St. Su-phciiV Collirse (Ma--) Saiiiin-l I>-twiJer, Editor, OtUm-n Uni%'crsity iKan.-iai-i Mark l)rv*ney, SBP. Barton County Coriim. Jr. C-olIrSf (Kn) Levin DiFHice. Kditor, C'abrini Colkyc (pa) J. |J. Karno, Fxlitor, r'nK-, of North f'rolinia, U'llininctoti Thomas l)xon, SBP. FwikJin Pi*-rce ' Jim 1 'ouaJdHott, Mil'jr, Wtka 'X'Yt H-WIT J)uri-n, nBP. Adiro(.d.iclc miitiity Ctjb-yr -'NV->
n t r iii- Kritli Jj'jrkiti, SBP, T y (|i.f:.) 'N.M.i '<.'<Hi'M, Eriitur, St.'XV, Put Thoma Divinaii, SBP, Ko
<inll. ic i(; (x<Ur)Ji'. (i, uiCflV
L"fjnard ('n;ii|it<)iiv Elixir, AnrhoruK'* K'li ^j^'tlU', ^BP, 1'njvtiwiiy of Oro I'ulrii-k f 'niiitf'udy, Kdit<fr, .Vla-ka Sur;ib I/mjw Kfl'Lior SBP. Portland Mftfindcf-t I "iiiviT'itv Ktatr 1 ';uv*'rj( y J 'mid f'dwiui, SBP. \\M\Mirt f Bounty AU'i (>ii-I<'tfjft, ' (XY> City (1<>
371
Eddie Edraitndg, Editor, Knoxville College (Tena) Tommy Edward*, SBP, Prebnyterifta Colicge (S.C.) Richard Eichen, Editor, Western New &i|dand College (Mans) KonaW Eirxiger, Editor, Brooklyn Lav School Barry Klkm, SBP, Brande* V~i vcrsity Pegjtv K!li-s, SBP, Beloit College <W) Atuw> Ellwaugcr, Editor, Converse Collogo uS.O.) Tcrrj- Fuffu^, Editor, Wilmington Collego (Ohio) .Jospby Farley, Editor, La Vrm; Collego (Cal) Andrew Feinsteiu, lilitor, Wt*dyan Univcrsiv.v (Conn) Gloan Forrcll, SBP, Warnitt Wiboo, ColleKc (X.C.) Michael Fowier, SBP, University of Chf-4M:o Edward Fox, Jr., Editor, La Saile Cui)<> i Pa, Fox, SBP, Wagner College ( N V) Klt-.-rsi, SBP, Univ. <f Alah.-., hcra Kfidand, Editor, Golden Gat/> t ThfxJopeal ThfxJopeal S'in. Hajjt . Bnn,i- KKlfr, MiUr, University of Jilni-v-, Fanuingtwi OTctza tX'al';rr Editor, Ix-Myn Colkc ^W) Jiin Kvant, SBP, Pw*rviU.i C'tJli-Rci'l) Paula Fl,iio, F/litor, Syracu-v I'niwrwtv Kilti-n Friar-, SBP, Simmons tVJlcge CMa-w) Mii <;nbris, Edit>r. .l<ej- Cti. Cou>inuiiity ( '4,ll>-tt.<- (X Y) J-xl < iaIIaKLi-r. J?BP, St. Thomas CiiUi-gc i Minn I Tirn Ourri-m, Edit-ir, Uni.m OXI:(f<fN'i:l>; St(.-|tlien Ganey, l-xJil.r, Iuer C:<>l.iml.ia C.Jlege < Wa-h) JiAn <;aveitta, SBP, \anderliilt T.'niv<T-ity It'.nald l-'iii.i3;i, SBP, W.-J.UTO Michinai I 'ni'.erii{> U.'tiui- <;i->r K e, SBP, Pvnn s:tut<-, Del. John Green, SBP, Creighton University . (Neb) Ron G remote, SBP, Indiana St. Universify Richard Griggs, Editor, Mesa College (Colorado) Kurt Gripentctmw, SBP, Cabrillo Collego (Cal) Paul Gru*., Editor, Concordia Sr. Colleg* find) Howard Ginsberg, Editor, Unity College (Maine) Mazie Glover, SBP, Claflin College (S.C.) Anthony GodlmUtt, SBP, Bcthum;C'uoknian Coll?*? <Fla) Chsd'ui Gold. Editor, Pa- College (XV) L* Goodytcin, iBl. Worth Country {'laini. ColV-^c (K>") Phil Good-toin, SBP, ^lark Hopkins College (Vt> \ickk; GonehfJ-, Editor, Anna Maria College ' M;i.^> SU-VP Gurta/rion, SBP, TribitY College ( 111) ThornaK ('. HaU, I-kijM>r, Vniwrsity of Loui.-<vfllJ>w Hancock, SBP, Iticx Univc-rsity iTricuO ILoln-rt HanM>n, Editor, Mixouri Valk-y CoKi'tsr Murifij: Httrdirk, Ivditor, AuKii-Oana frtltrfie 'X.IO . Thonwn ilan ilan, SBP, Loola Loyola Universitv of Cliiraga Suit- Have*, Witor, Martin Coliene ,'Tuinn Bill Grahaiii, SBP, Wu.-hiucton TbeoloKiraJ <'-oahtioii .J.C.) Louig Heldiimn. l->ljtor, Ohio Sattn Cniv .. Colutnliti, Sta^h IfeijiiH-rt, J->litr, I'niv. of Minn., Mc>rn Joe Henderxoii. Tdii^r, Central ] lorida Jr. CnilfCc HoJi-Tt li-u!tU-ii.. Kditor, T.-xcInT- CnlI.-K>- 'lilt C'hri*iw Hej-oi t> l.'.ditor. |,nre Sl;it- ('oilcpr ij-'ii} Gl. -u \\ -mi rx SBH, U'hitwort h t 'olleM. Wa.olutiKt'M t Tb'iinai H."'.V. IuU>rliwl ji-rrity, Edjt<r, S.I .C., r r < - (j,.r,,j,i Itoiixh, SUP, Clitn-oii I'ui-
David Gibviii, IxJjto^t.'uyahoKaCruiiMi. Ciiili-xi', Woti-rti Cariii>ui>, Ohio St.-y.-i; Gill<-y, Ixlitor, MiMUjiiri WeÛrni C.jlcni' Sr.,tt </i!li.-, SBP, lud.-Puriiiu- T'fiiv-rifi<-. Ft. Vi'ayiMAtilr.-w Geller, J'-dit-.r, **hiva I ;vi-r-ity fAiv-rv GrMvi, hMP, ( mvcr-gty ./ -
I{,.IH.(.,..; HiiJ/lil", Kditor, St. J. <'oll<-ii' M'irrux JI'i>)Ji-> . Jr., Kijitx CoJVgc r j u d i J>,,uaW Jld-Mii:in, SBJ', Tiio.tia" Sfltt>,ri TVilw-jt.- -Olii.., J> U M,J Mu.-y, j:.:;t<>r, Wi-ti-n L'iiiv<T..!t'v MK-ti'* hirtcMi. Kifiu/r, St'X V.
372
Pct^r Hoffman, SBP, Drew University Jim Kniekman, Editor, Fordharn Uni(XJ.) verritv IJxvid HolU..der, Editor, Harvard Uni- Elfc-n Knop, SBP, Mt. St. Agnes CoHcRfr vrj*itv (Md) John lloman, Editor, Wfesteho-ctvr Ron Knowlos, SBP, LouisLina St. Univ., Coritfu. O>Ho>;c (XY) New Orleans Reginald Holnu-s, SBP, Florida Junior Mary Koc, Editor, Ohio Dominican Collrgc, Jacksonville Coll*-gp Daw Iluntquist, SBP, Cypress Jr. Col- E. Gratwu Kerani, Editor, University II-KC CC.il) of Oxtsgon Andrew Hupine. Jr, SBP, South Caro- LOM Krupnick, Editor, Univ. of Abu, liu- Suu College rtimtsvtlle Sara Hurut, SBP, University of South- Lillian LJFrtaoe, Editor, Bristol Coracm California Munity CuUuge (Ma*0 Psna Impcrato. Editor, Comra. Collrgc Edward's". LaFrenier, Editor, Univerof IMaware Co. (Pa) ty of Maine Su3ap_lonn, Sbp, Marymount College Thonm;' E. Lamourûx, SBP, Everett of Knnao,-* Cuiumunity Colli-nt- (Wn."h> Bill Isk-y, SBP, Idaho State I'niversity Scott Lano-'lot, SBP, University of J.m-ph Jêk'son, SBP, Colfcce of the Dfnvcr Mainlsiid (Tcs) Ch-:ry\ R. Ijwipiirand. Editor, SonthArlaa Hoist, SBP, Sheridan College o<tern Ma-xijichuwtts I.'. (Wyo) David Kra*Loa, SBP, I'nivcrrfty of Betsy Holt. Editor, f?impou College N'otre Danw find] 'low a) Andrra KrochrJis, Editor. Hollins ColLarrv Jt-tt, Editor, Cotnpton College \,ff <'\'rf (Cal) ~" Jolm M. McGomio, Editor, University flrurt- J<-,hMwn. Editor, f -ntwrnty of of Pcnnxjlvania "" Wtt<h.. S-attkC.i MclJoaald, SBP, VUla Julie p-irri-l Ju'm^'jii. SBP, i,nivcrity of /.\fdi Vuf.fl S-nnid f%s>0i. " i>an M(-l>onn.-U, SBP, Ouincy Mark Jiihnso* , Editor, Seattle Pacific fill) <-"H<*'r AL-n MrFarl:i:id, SBP, Laf.-iytt... Coln-ivton Jones, Kdiior. Principia Col- i,.p. (p a ) I'-K- "in Chni*-* McGinnw, .SBPV BaJ'lwin Miki- J.-Lliin.-iti, SJJP, Lniversity of Wi- j:ir4. Colli-Ko '()hio> c.ni-ifi, Madion David B. Laiakkn, Kdit-jr. M j-a! Evu Ji-lTi-rw-ni, SBP, North wt*Tn I ai(.UA\,f<- (Miun) vr:r.- 'Ill) Maud- A. Luslio, r>litor, J. W. Kcllen. Jr . SBP. Fu!kriv ^l.ite C<JI,^ (Oa^ CoU.*r ) > All>.-rl B. U^-n, Editor, U<-fr<.it Cplt-M-at Kcrr. ?BI . .Soiithcrfi Mi-*ionry Ii.t:i> <îf Law r.,Jii-Kf Tfii'H H,im- J^.t,jb-<.-h.T, Ldil-.r, Jinim;.- Kil(-Jor-. >BP. > sitv fA?3) Ji.iin L-ary. SBP, S'.. Jf.-.-p!i'* fV.!U-?J atir.- KiFi^nifr, EdiXor. II-.-ton l.ol- rj> a ) ll<i-ard B. I/-ilxiw;t/. Kditr.r, liich, ' W J'" .. ,,r Mi(- V. M.-^nu,,.. jjjjj-; Florida J.-tf J..r,c-. !-l',l'. I n i v r r - i t v U f-x iAtlantic Tnivuivitv S.,TIV> J , - i . - , E.Jif'.r. I. iiu.r'ity of | l!C11,.| p . M - l M v w ' IvJit-.r, Vai.- 1'uiI/.ii.-ull. . " v.-rsjtvj,,ur J S.:|.'ii-fi J..fi..-. .-itl . K-i.f :i- I tii. j{ri;tll p MrK.-iifu, SUP, Or rnfdd . , . M."|,:L... h -i -In, -in. l.ilitor, !:...- \.. It j |',,lTt Mi-l.au J'ftii. Siif, \Vi--t f in -r-,f I!" <.--.
(.,11. i - . \ \ V r l A - . ' f ''r' . '' - ''*" >""" A l . - . KI-..-T, htl'; hn-nnd Toll-w ^.J^f^.v'/M.t.-r, All/^ny Cofr,1 ' ' inuiMy O>1I'-K- r
,,.^M!j,_ x,,rth..n,
373
Michael Malone, Editor, University of Charies Pickering, Editor, -Slat* CclICcvudit *t La* Vegas lege (Mf) - " . -^ Tboma* F. Mmlone,^BP, Lowell State Lonnic Fidel, Editor, Univt-naiy of College (Musi) M.-vryUid, Baltimore Kevin L. Manuix, SBP, Uiaversitj- of Michael Olson, " Viiaini* -SBP. , - Ken McNcii. Editor; Westminster (X&Concwdia College (Mil) / W5c(Mfi} ' " " - = - ' - - Gall Otfinosiki, " Jlrdeack J. :M.pfeewon JI~^BP,. . Kditor.^ . t'ftiversitv ofMiunfrsOt* . < " Xipod Couiisd ColU-gc (NY) Tun 3AuurU>.r,.SBPtT*rt. Junior CoHcgf John Ou> - 'VCD ' - -Kdilor, "' ^ ---Stfwe ^bni-oc. 1-xfitor. ttf*rt CoHjye r^stern Mcntiunitc ColU-po l"b(ihs J. ifdopev-, SHP/TcwjUi: f/'iii- Stephen i'arrj , vcfrth (Pa) .SBP. T --iCarifV C. M.iojfe, Cdttoc;X uiversity of OccidrnUl CoHope i.Cal) Kurth.CvoiruA.'JLirocjuIxiro -' Steve. Pastcruaek, ^lirJn<Ucr'Murant Editor, l)an-illc Junior " . Maa."on,'.SBP, Fifck Uniwnity Rojjer Pertulu.-r, ) . ; 1-^ditor. Cwgory . , T. " ^larquisc, Editor, , Sit. ileed College i'On>> >Bciad*: Colfcff; i.Vt> Hy Patter And Mart fii-Ji , Jo!/tt -f . Muutou, Kdiux, lUce UniLdiUK, . " wrxitr (T0 ' Si. Msufi-'a-ofthf WeodsColk-gednd) IJrniMi; Ai^titv. SJJP, CoUfô of New Frnk i'rworx-. David Kada, Editor. Baltutjnre CoJlt-Ke bt
', Rwae)l Mwriu Jr., Editxw, DavidSuie
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. Editor,
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AuVdov*Michi-
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"Wtrriot'ir^. Area <"onu'mniy C->Uce
y Editor, Rîd Lkti:' ~ " . AJau Itao-;' Mewjek', Jxjiwr^
IJtwuaJU "A:-. fitter, SUP, Anliorh BociitaU'r Kn.-iM.-.-Iiittili': - C'otk'K'' f f'lii') - Jo>- i!u-Jjiurii-j[). - "Juliij U. _ <)'li.-H.u. J-JdJ<'>r,X<'>Ik'gc flf Mt. Ki. Hruc: il' - 4. >{, *B1', U(>Mtt'k Jr. ;'o
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'VMi'iMt C.I' X.Y.
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ffWiiiiWj Editor, riw\ "dLviitWhi, KBP, ifyrift*. jbJ/r CoUi'Kr; .< i.;Li '" Willm-d A N:i-i-ro, iSW, C,uu*\i\t 'Joli-- ' N Y; -" l.n<- IJ N'--l..>n, *B1', I'wvi.n4ty ,rf NV .\l/-x>ro . .. . - - N'loli-^, 'loi-^ r ^ 'iJ..a-rÛH, MiL'wviUiSial'' (.'riU,vp- (I'j/ " J->!m J'hillii^, Slii', I ui.vi-Mty.of \i-r^ ujoiii d.i J'mtt. SJJl', Indiwiu Ciiivi-rxiiv, '
. T-mr ltoiwi. - *?WP,' . v UiJivsiwtr -if TP,,.<}.- Mai-d Ed 'ISt.-wuMMi-r, . >M. IM(VJV (VJV C'>Ury.c i N Y ^ liirk Jf-Jd. IvJrf'/r. '.'u-if"ii A 'N l ) P'^T i*aJ/.'j.
374
: Jaincantori, ; Mtehari Sotxw, SBP, Baltimore College '- Editor. . " ' "of Commerce ~ Stout State UntveMty Wdii) ' . Sttnff SoraMco, Editor, "Luther College Kwcb ScuUler, ^ (Ind) SBP, Jack Spnwer, SBP, Vmvendty of BalV.C.L.A. -. umore William Schoettetttt!, Watar Spencer, SBP, Union College SBP, OTV) Uuix'cnuty of Evansx-iBe Edward A. Sutherland, SBP, Eastern Caroline Sx&omp, Baptist CoUfge *Pa) Editor, <5ary Svoboda, SBP, University f ; Ctamnont College (C*I) Colorado Rjuidy Sclion, Thorna* *E~. Sweeney, SBP, DuquesneEditor. UnrvMntty (fm) Lake Kcpon Jr. College (N.D.) Burton Ruaell Swope, Editor, Frcata Hector Kodrtquez, SBP, Obbte CoUcge S<te CoUegr (Cal) of tbo Southwest (.Tr*) Jack Ti, Editor, RmoMebrr PoJvlliciiard UoUison, EdiU>r, Ctwden tcchnif In^f . WV) Cûntv CoUec (NJ) Norm* Tawniy, BP. N'ewton College; ?Iarrv RutU, Editor, Community CoJ- of SwrH Heart k-gc of Monrotniilc (Pa) Kurt Stakeuuui, SBP, Fumaan UoiverJudv Rousuek, Rlitar, W*ilft>v College ilj' <5.C,) Skip Audyitwki.SBP, Butler Umversity Mary Anne Steefe, :Bditor1 (Ind) , CoBegc ;Cal) Lintx-th lluix, Editor, Kiagra. Univcnoty Itoburt Stein, Editor, Ohio ( N' Y) Jen* L. Hiomis, Editor, Mary Joanc Scbulte, Editor, Kent State Cotk^r (Mixx) Scott Scbnltx, SBP, Wirieonao State Lynoe E. TbompMn, SBP, ScrippeL'nivemity College (Cal) Frnk Senter, SBP, Univereity of Wia- Strvwi A. TbarapOD, SBP, Strayr cottxin, Milwaukee CoUe0c (Wa^ I>XX) WiUiam Sttto, Editor, Scwtbweiami at David X. Thurmond, Student Body Memphis Prcsideut, Beitermiitc College (KV) Jean-Mark- Sucoalla, Editor, Skidmore Biilv TfU-, SB1', Olive-Harvey CoUegc CoUcge t V V ) (111) Ohahcttr f*fmd, SBP, Bard College Michael Tartar, KBP, L^noir Commao(NY) Hy CoUege (KX5.) John IUi.<H, tBP, Hanjpden-Sydney Ted TUrûH, 6BP, Rhode Wand; Cotfep- (Va) College Tif;n5Mi Rn>*n, Editor, Purdue North Jim Walton, Editor, Livingston LmverCttitriJ find) nitv (Ala) B->>ecM SbcTrill, Editor, LaOraoge Michael A. Wainwrigbt, SBP, nortb('oU*-p- (fia) aot fouixiaiia Ilnitvwity Tboiiuu< P. Hhibilki, BP, North Ceo- Eru- Wailman, HBP, Lnivcrwty of iral iWh. lot*. (Vfixl Cliforn)a, Berkeley Brtire Alira S.oo1:( Editor, Anoc I>ran M, WaroV, BBP, EnIrood Arundcl Cojwwwity O>l. iMd) Cliff* CoJkê (XJ.) Adou-, SB1', Jtwary CoUegc Caady TJ*roy, SBP College of H. ' Cuthc-rinr (KjO filter, 8W, DiMninieaa CJ- Uwrenw TomcM*, SB?, Cte-ebaxl al)""--. Htate UnivfTnit;' Sf-H, Kt$tf>T, (Joivenity of Tina Tffrgrimnon, Editor, tTnivnyitv of J, Orwo "Hj Mnntnna , KaoaM State Tc*cb HuUlj Trov<i, SBP, Duk Uoh-iTsrfy -"Ooiuild Tim^r, Editor, Central BibJ
Naxareac KitmHf A. Twilfey Iff, Wet Tejtaii KtK_ florid* Mwxw?tiiuiBn,8B?f Bluffton CoUegi> f;. V'orth H'uriajt, Jr., j Hullivoo, SBP, St. IXHIU Univw- UoJvrt W. IV'siwn, HBP, L'uik'eri4fy of it y ~ MinnmoUi t Morri* ~ A! irt- j*rriitli, Kdrtor, tfdttut CottV^r Fn-d H'HMirix, Editor, (V.f.) )*lal* Cvltrw- cj Jl ^/iiafl. >!BP, CaiUM-on Sta<^ iMvW H. UVurtci, Editor, Pratt fnCol. (OK)
375
Aric-nc \\VissKmn, SBP, Beaver College Robert Zirlin, Editor, Lafayctt College (Pa.) (Pa) Diane Wilkinv, Editor, Lebanon Valley Jcrrv Williams, SBP, Wwt Libertv St. -. CoHop- (Pa) Col. (W. Va.) David Sbcituy Williams, Editor, Uni- Joshua William.*, Editor, Goddard Colwwitv of TcmuiMee lege (V't) David 1C. CniutuHer, Editor, Bcnudjr Diane Wolfe. Editor, University of State Collqc.* (Minn) Cotamdo t Denver Lawrtnre Cppermau, SBP, KittrcH Nathaniel Wordcll. SBP, Harrington Junior Coto'jte (K.C.) &*.# (IU.) Paul YaMOnrcllo*, -5BP, Southeastern Eric Yoffie, SBP, Hebrew Union ColMa.-waclmselt.-iU: . lejjp ( K Y ) Ktby Wolff, Editor, Goucber ColleJW Eleanor Zsriask}-, SBP, Alvernia ColEdvrard WOVUWMX, SBP, Springfield lege <Pa) Tech. Coiiiui. Col. (ilsss) ~ HOD Yuungcnuan, Editor, Midland L-itberan Coll-ge (XeO)
ADDEXDA
Jon Alexander, SBP, Transylvania Uuivtu>ity (Ky) David Allen, Editor. Suffolk County Coinmuuity Col. (S\*) Amy, SBP. Virginia Union Uuivernity David Anderson, SBP, WitUmburg Ihiiveryitr (<cttito) John AjT7i*1-roii, liiitor, Saiigamou Stat<1'uiVLTnity (111)
William Creh, Editor, CaUwt*. College (X.C.) David Curtis, SBP, Whitman Collins: (Wjs) Frederick Cusick, Editor/ Bowdoin BoUr.gc (Me) ]>a\id Danjanovicb, Editor, Hihbinp Stat*- Junior Col. ( Minn) Judy Doueiko, SBP, L'nivernty uf
Conneticut
Lrruif Artii'ur, Editor, Wittcnburg Uni"veniity (Ohio) . ItonaM ' 1Aui-r, SBP, Columbia Basin ColIi'P iWa-}il Rit lilonif, I'ditor, L"iiivfnily of Hou.-U>u L.nin;- Brau-ckJfiii, SBP, Columbia Col'U-KI- fMo> Edwrd l*r.-kUi, SBP, M-*bJ Sute Junior Cotii-iti- (Minn) Janv* ttreuasm, SBP, Auburn l r nivifnity (Ala)
Mark EsU^, SBP, Otlowa Uuivenuty (KA) Ilouald Field.-, SBP, Loyola Uuivtixity of Isn Angi-J<- <Jein- Fislwr, KBP, Campbell College (X.C.) Alfred Fk>h, SBP, Monmouth (111) Oi-rald Harvey, Editor, aing<iN'J) Sawdy Haul borne, SBP, Virginia Pol;. tecliftical In.<t.
CrcjC'>r>' BuK-lu-r, Editor, GrinniJJ Col- Cookw ilidbling, SBP, Fouttwnw (*<Jk'ge i Iowa) leip* Barbara Bunn, SBP, f>Jynific CoUrgi; On-jjory Hojjpb-, SBP, Wiwteru MaryHartal OVT!., Editor, St. Olaf's Col- Mark Hut-klebrid^c, Editor, Pc(u!# (Miitn) L:ivwrwtv (On-) David Hank-, fxlitor, WilUauixport (;ry KJÎMT, Editor, Bridgcwater ClCainiiiuriity Cirf. (P) ! (,v'a) '-, SBP, I/o Aw(tJ<* Harbor Jaw Kjtcb, ICditor, Dn-jt<J Jaru-t Burton, SBP, Imperial Valley WilUam Freibofcr, SBP, AUaulJc O r<tlI<-K<- iCûl) ' tuuiiiiy CulIi-KH 'NJ) CharU-s Itt^lw. ^xliu>r, l.'niversil.v of lititn-n Vick CauKln'y. SBP, Luwll Soutii ('arolitm Tcj-bitiral In-t. (.\Ia>*) <'hil> ffcj-Ui. J'>JiU>r, t'uiviTfitv of Pi-tcr Crad, hditon ( V X Y Jh-uv-r "CarroU <;rifi, SBP, 'utfm I'n Mai-yunn Bir'i, I'yJjfir, TnaiUw St;tf^ 'T<ii> CoUre 'i'Jl' " ^'"^ Hal-<!k, I'Jdit'^r, llmilorci JoSij CluM^, Jiditor, (.'UIVTHJIJ- uf i V u ) Akron 'OliMil 'iarv (Jurl^- Hwut, SBP, Pi-ufj Tiifrinw f'liurrv, KBJ', Oranitf- (,"(i*t ('iiivcoity-Shi'UUiKu VaJ. t'r>Ili-K- (Cult J>'iald Joljn^.011, SB1*, Cart liutic <'o)l''K'> :\Vj WinifA'o- U^frt'Xi, SKf, CMw uf Si'l!wu ^''iuk, Jxlilor, I'liivvMii of Willmfn fid Nffi" ' \ a l. SBP, I'rlin Stutc l.'.Alu\nlo'
Paul ('"larulli, ^Bl', Holwrt ^V*il<-*'Wi.;
376
Madison Jones, SBP, University of Murytead " Uiam- McGrew, Editor, Douglass Col, li-sf (NJ) David McKeuzie, SBP, LaSallc College (Pa) Browsing Mcree. Editor, Presbyterian College (S.C.) Torn Medrano, SBP, Ilio Uoudo College (Cal) Jan** Millard, Editor, Transylvania UiiiwTsity (Ky) ~ Craig Morgan, i>BP, Kent State Univcr-ity ' Uolxrt 'Naehsluu, SBP, Bucknell Ur.ivi:re:ty (Pa) Tern.- 'Newton, SBP, Kvunesaw Jr. C">H'K (Cal) ^Dan-l Nickel. SBP, Bethel OMê (Ka) Kd Pinto, .SUP, University of Ulinoia Verunn Pitt-, liditor, Mount St. Clare (Iiva) rjf.-iini-* Plante, SBP, Auitru. College (Ill> John L. "Prentish, Editor, Columbia C-uMe (Cal) Jolui Ilîades, SBP, H'horton County jiitiior Col. (Tex) Lynu Ilaimuy, Editor, S".mthern Oregon "t'-iillfge " Patnciu Ilohiux.n, Lkiitor, Indiana Univeit> (Pa) Joseph Xoonan, SBP, Divinr Word Cidiê (Iowa) WalU-r North, SBP, l.awrom* UuivTiiy fWis) Danii-l "i'f.radv, SBP, TobmtinuCollt-fie (111) " John J'accfMfuini, SBP, liolxirt M'urrif Junior C-ol. iIU) Michaci Palu:-. J-xliUjr, MtTopolitau Mat<- Junior CA>\. (Minn) Christopher Pencfi, Ivditor, Whitinau <.V>lk-c; (Wix) I-xiwiu Pierc'-, Ivditor, JiJTerson Cominufi'f.v Cul, ( N Y ) S<<-ph:i'ii<! Saltt-r, Editor, Purdue T.'nivi.-r-iiy find; ScanJim, 1'Xibir, Peiin StaU Susan Schoenwald, Editor, Fresno City College Carl Schwartz, Editor, University of Illinois Martha Scott, Editor, Randolph Macon (Va) William Scotl, SBP, Texas Technical University Martha Shirk, Editor, Svrarthmore College Rich Silvennan, SBP, University of Washington Emma Simpson. SBP, Iowa WcJeyau Christopher Siiow, SBP, Monteray Peninsula College (Cal) Lawrence Stephey, Editor, Alma Col!<>ge (Mich) CyuthU Struby, Editor, Furman UniVereity <SCj Donald Throu, SBP, Treasure Valley Comna. Col. <'<.)reg) Linda Tb-iyer, Editor, California State at Hav-wood Michael' Uttnick, SBP, Texas Christian University E. Patil \-anValkenburg, SBP, Alma College < Mich) Ilfbeee I'otkniMi, SBP, Orveo Mouulain Colt-ge fV't) Joliu Wagner, SBP, Pratt Community College Richard Warren, SBP, Metropolitan State Jr. Col. f Minn) Steve Watkins, SBP, California Inst. of Tech. Mari Wb<-lau, SBP, Clarke CoUege riowai Lar.-y Welxfr, SUP, Northern State Collrgp 'Sl>) Irving William*, SBP, St. John* Col!& fMd) Anne Wjl.->ou, Editor, Simtnoni Collpge (Mantl Km- Wo>-tek, Editor, Texas Lutheran College Rolyrt Yearcin, Editor, BeUermiueC'rîiline College (Ky) David York, Editw,' Mohawk Valley Coiuin. Coll. > N Y >
(TlM Vfw fork TloM*. Apr. 2. li'l }
.'jf. Lr.u>..u> C'^KIXUV W.MI Pon<;r is LiwtJi TO Nixos (By John Kifner)
Mop- ttian 4(Kl r-l-jfl'-nl pp'Hidcnt* arjd i-olli-gi- ditorc hafc niafd ati O|-n ICIUT r-o 1'rfniiji-nt Nixon 'uud'-miiifig hi- polirii-^ jji \n-ti.-itn aud rhurianx that. tin- Adriiiuinirati'Ki "w:rL>riiJy uii>inUT|>ri-' th*- inood of imi'u ih'- cjini(>u and tin' '"
Tin- I'-tt'T, wliirh wa.- ^.iîi'-ii l>y s.ttrd-iii i"adi r- ul linth protigiou- and kiiomi coJIi'K'-t', H t i u c L n tli" ppvidi-iit'i- "Vi'-iiia!n!uii'ii" luAiry, rouN-nding thut "(Iruii-.llig (ln'i''il'ir of l \ n - <;i>ri>nt, (J'M-Mjot i-lid llvW.'ir." " Y-l t i" a|i]i;iri-fil that. oi:r iioIiryiunLt'r^ have JJI-I-T r'isid-fi '1 tin- rant in A - i a n livi-c 'jf t i n ; pulifii-- t|ji'_i; \><ir<tw," tljr I<-iN-r -anj
377
The statement, to be released in Washington today, w signed by the largest iinmbcr of student leaders to sign such a protest against the war. In December, I960, 100 student leader* tent an open letter to Fresideut Johnson expressing anxiety and doubts over the war. In the spring of 1997, 200 student lessen signed similar letter, and in April, 1969, 253 student presidents and editors signed a statement oaring that they would go to jail rather than be drafted "as long a* the war in Vietnam continues." Organiten of the cutrat drive said yesterday afternoon that they bad 448 signatures and hoped to have 500 tomorrow. The letter calk *m the President to "reverse futile and immoral policies and use yonr authority to end the bloodshed in Vietnam." "If not," the letter goes on, "you win have to take responsibility for an intensification of public diviaveness and disunity which wiB further weaken the already torn moral and social fabric of American life. "The outrage and the purposefulnen emerging from beneath the vurfaee despair on our eamp'it**, when it is coupled with the widespread long of public confidence in your Administration, cannot ue deflected or contained." The signers of the letter represent *choob a* disparate as Harvard and Grace Bible Institute; Berkeley and West Texas State.; Dartmouth and Central Bible College in Misouri, and Duke University and Alaska Methodist University. Among the other schools represented are: Brown University, U.C.L.A., University of Colorado, Louisiana Tech, Syracuse, O "orr-town, Boston College. University of Iowa, University of Texas, Indiana fltaie, Clemsoa, Riee, Ohio State, Sheridan College in Wyoming, Vanderbnt, Brandew aad Pawson College in CJendive, Minn, And tljerr were three chooi where students have bent slain ia campo* demon* ^rations: Kent State University, Jacboo State College and South Carolina Slate in Orangeburg. The campaign was organised by David Hawk, one of the organiser* of last year's Moratorium and Dennis Riordan, a former .student president at Colgate Uni~ vr*ity. The young men, both draft reswtert who *r now ntwdyiag at Union Theological Seminary, began drawing up the letter soon after the invasion of Laos in February. (The Washlaftoa PMC Apr. 22, OT1J
YOUTH CoxrEBEXcK REJECTS VICTKAHIHTTOM, Asts 1971 Ptrux>cr (By Eric Wentwortfa) EHTF.K PARK, Colo., April 21. A 4-to-l majority of the delegates to the White lion*.- Conference on Youth voted tonitclit that the United Mate* bhoitld halt military operations in ludochifut at ouce~aud withdraw all troops bv Dec. 31.1 The di'lexates' resolution aluo xud that mot-ling the yeareiul puilout 'VM '"* "will )>et inure the reieaxe of all priiouerx of war M we aee no relationship betu-<-eii military pressure and the rdeatt at American prwoners." The vote was 4:>0to I5.r>. On the same baliot. they rejertd, 339 to 246, another ruolution essentially sijpportifig President S'iiou'* policies on troop withdrawal* and Vietuitniisation. Tbirty-wren dtiejottot in <*jieh of the two voteu lintd th<*m>>veii &* undecided. Other dlegt4^ of the mtimated 1,25<) here late today failed to vote. The tatty lumped youth and adult delegate*' votes together. Ttif di.4e(ate aiv> votd by hcavv majoriticn to legalize tuarijuaua, grant full K(.iti>-|jo<>d right to the District of Columbia and to demand iuuiuxfiate re*igiitiofi of FBI Director J Edgar Hoover >>aed oti ttieir "ouiplH<> a>/horence and rcpuliiwi with ite unwarranted political Kiirveillanee" \ty the FBI on American citizcu*. TliH di-kiu.iv* voted on tbete and H.-vcrl ottuy proposalii after roughly five hourx of nrpnrt,!! and debate* in the four-day coufurunco wind up general en*iou tbi nfu-nxxwj. ij. _bin>b ou I In1 %iwt*\ >wMi<>ii bullet wore oly M few of tlv Aotfu* of reoomiiMTidiitioijM aud r"j.<jjul ioiiM that t\v Id tak lorw* and at lea*t a score of special i*tt thrnntwd out in uuruthou tiKivtiuK Lwl lu'xht aud early today. oz -25071 M
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' ".Senior:C.t&. More or loss generally 1 WuKl leave ihnt matter to j| iJ^^rKttualifrU on * rase-by-case basis, i. That i* com-oA. Senator',Ci.sE. Ami you-wouM not rule <HJ< American senpower in .Suuiheust ifcd'u r-sws? Vou wt>ui} ;K>I require tbatSw w^thtirftw aH our svipcnviT and'jusl patrol the AtlmitU' awj; Pacific within "a fc\v thito oil our. shori1? This is.noi your inrriosc^ . - . ~ " "SsEji. Xo. My. j ;jr|tosc is t< ^fct s out of _ *>i<nation ami l>riri!i us U> a situath> where He C4tn: .ourwatH....' _ _.,.__,"_,_..-. _.,...,.._,. TO -~.- -,-. "tivv tif <nw ivt>r|(i.>!it(iat4ou, and -jiK- be wira! hopelessly iu nastAJcen war. . - "..-._-. "" . ' -" -..- , "'SctiswwrOiSE. Tbank-yvit.'ccry iiiuch. (did vrttnt TO brin^ lhai out. " .The Cff.upM\s. Than* you vVry rau<:fi, Mr. Gard.ir. it \un fcoett a v<-n- iuitjrwtiiijr moraing. "' ".-: , at: 12:40 p.m.f ti coRuaittee adjourned, *ubj*cl to
XAY is, 1071

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE OK FoBEHJN RELATIONS, . Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbrighl (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Aiken, and Case. v The CHAIRMAN. Tlie committee will come to order.
OFEKIMO STATEMENT
The committee is meeting this morning to continue bearings on legislative proposals relating to ending the war in Southeast >4a. Today the bearings will focus on the effect of the war on our national priorities and the economy. Ma/or Carl Stokes of Cleveland had been scheduled to testify on the impact of die war on the cities this morning, but we received word from bis office only this morning that due to an urgent development involving his city finances he is unable to come. I assume maybe we are sharing some revenues with him, or maybe lie is afraid they won't share revenues with hiiu. In any case he is not coming. His prepared statement is being submitted for printing in the liearing record. But we are very pleaded to liave a* the vther witnesses Mr. dward Cuilstliorpe, fvnadeut and chief executive officer of the Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., of Fallertoii, Calif. Hunt-Wenwm Foods is one of the largest food processing and distributing companies in this country with wiles approaching the half billioo dollar mark aud with 21 manufacturing and diktributing plants thrirngfiout the country. Prior to joining Hunt-Wesson Foods, V*r. Odstiiorpe was for 5 year* president ol the Ocean Spray Cranberry Corp. A recent DAWS article cuwieruing Mr. Geltuon*'s attitude of buiaiiewi' r*ltioo*hips to society a* a whole quoted him as Maying, "Anieru-an busuwKOnen are just bfginnuig t*i rer-ognize the reponMbfliltfi*social, moral and liurawi ren|xnKJbJUue6they have, and 1'ifl fiphlmp to make our cnmfwny and mhers like us realize nvponbili<4/^ i<> the Nation tut a H|U|<- M <!! u to btorkliolders and employees"
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I think this country needs businessmen who feel this way. I lutve felt for a long time that the businessmen of his country have neglected to either recognize or to sj>eak out about what the war is doing to business. So, Mr. Gelsthorpe, as a representative of one of the most successful business enterprises in this country, we are rery happy to have you this morning and you may |>roced in your own way. STATEMENT OF EDWARD GELSTHOBPE, PRESIDED!, HUOT-WESSOV FOODS, IHC., FULLERTOV. CALIF. Mr. GELSTHORPE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will read from some prepared statements that I hare initially. So many Americans who disagree with tlie administration's Vietnam jxilicy have spoken so eloque-ntly in the recent past that I am afraid the best I can do is to underline some of those (mints that have already been made by many Americans of all ages, in all parts of the country, at ever}* level of income and education, in l>oth public M-rvicc and private enterprise, management and, hopefully, to an increasing dcgrne, lal>or, and by every j>olitical and religious group. Ijikc man}* of us who now s|>eak with such candor and conviction regarding our abhorrence of the Vietnam involvement, I, too, in the early days trus-ted my Government and believed with the majority of Americans in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and the early eonssequenres th;it resulted from that congressional action. I held to this belief until about 5 years ago. !t is iiou difficult (o remember that in December 19<il, Sp4c. Janien Davis of Ijivingston, Tenn., was killed by the Vietcong. It if. even more difficult in today's environment to understand the words of President Johnson who later said of James Davis, "the first American to- fall in the defense <>f freedom in Vietnam." Tills conflict is now 10 years old, the longest war in our history and, in my opinion, a c-ompletelv destructive one (o our Nation. If lo date it ha> had redeeming qualities, my limited view protiibits me from nwjgiiizing them. The tragic lo.s* in combat of 50,OOfl American lives, b<>iiie. 270,(MM American wounded tiitd the even greater number killed or injurod in war related acfideiitn r^preMMitii only the very top of this indcftrrihably tragic ireljerg. \A>{ Us, then, look at some of the factors > uork in our Nation today largely as the ivsull of ihi^ war which may, for our Nation's future, (raiJMvnd our military dead and wounded.
BEKCJ,TK OF HKFITSAI, TO ADMIT MISTAKE
I held ill; 1 it is not honorable to refu-v (/ admit a mistake*, f i>oli<'Ve the majority of Amerioiii^ bi-lii>vi> our Vietnam involvemeiit lo IM- a JiMMaite rej-ent jMilU hiipfxtrt lhi. inevitably i-oniideiire will IKlo.-l in tin individual, an i n M J i u t i o i i , or a imtutii wliicli n-fuM-r- (o admit H tuMultr. Thi> loss of roniidi-nrc ill be u i t h i u the entity iiwlf and be r-imred by thov v^lio vie* the eiilily. 1^-t me muke a ivrv him|l liiiMiie-,. uiialogy. In my indu-lry new iiroiiuris ure rmitiiiually Ix'iug intr)ilijed. In fuj-t, new product uiu) x-mce- m-e the lifeblood of eierj AlJU'riculi iiljiine^. Ill i>pile of reêal'c.li ulld develo|)menl, cod-
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sutner research, test markotin^. and the evaluation and reevaluaCion of this work, when a product is finally distributcxi nationallv, it sometimes fails. Theoretical and test Icnov.Jedge said^ the product would succeed, but in the real woHd of the marketplace., the product failed it achieved retailer distributioi.. but the consumer simply would not buy it iu sufficient quantities to make it a siif..;ess. Betw wn thft productV first inception and its final appearance, some ini|X.rta)il test evidence may have been missed and many factors may have changed competitive forces consumer attitude, et ceteru. If n company refuses to admit this product failure und continues to push its Vale* force to selj it, the retailers to stock it, and the consumer to buv it, a brcak. down of confidence will occur in its employees and .with, the retailer on whom the company is so dependent. ^ !f 'he product dots not live up ro the premise tt.e promotion efforts make t<- the consumer, ho too los-s conhdencn in the cmpanv. Thus, th'1 next liine thore is a new product to sell, the job is tougher both internally acd esternally. Couijietitors atv- a.bie to take ndvnntage of this mistake to a far greaU.: degree than-they would have luul the mistake been admitted promptly >! the product withdrawn from the market. ImjKirtiintly too, :uirty nit>fiiition of t product mistake results us a reduced expenditure of funds .and ouergy ort-tliis failure. Thus, coqmrate .rujyttrces lire cnwrvHi which both protects the share. holder's iotftj-eNts and raaintuitis his confident! in tltf company and The atOlogy, i believe, is appropriate. America has made n mistake in FndiK-hiiift.. (ô.itrnry to wtrnt many Americans once believed, I tluuk w<* mm- know v.c cannot aii'.\ should not {rolirc. 'In- world with <iur political \-\r.\'.: if i- both arrogant and JiuproctieoL We have, in Viettitisri, involved ourselves in vvliat F bclici'e to l>e,ba>.i<-ally ati intenial conflict. Our own Revolutionary War w-.vs n mtvi'tial c.<>:jflict U'tweeri th>.' crown colonies '\\ Amcrica itiiJ England. France was sympathetic 1-*t u*, not bccH*iM- sLp cjireil y> deeply for our iivdejûcleiHr1, iut ' >! wi.s'iec] in hurt Er:gKn<l.
Ixiokiti^ afrain nl hisUx'y, i' is uriic<l thiif if we uclinit our in VieMiam. we lose fai-< t-i tho.-* ninny nntion> in tb* 1 w^rltJ K]I may I<Nik >o us for ifuidutu'e /nl al-o WP wiK r.f .i4mmed of ourarlvi-s--thu.-. flii- plirase. ''h'rt:or&b|i> |W'a<v." ' -: " " Fraii'' (irc.t \WSIH iovolviil in Vidiiam with JVH'iCcuJ in tin- late. I f i t h ivniTiry: S),,- <-iiuq>u-rti! Vii-tmcm in J*K{ ur,^ vfd'r tcin|K?rn!y Iiriltfr Vi-tunj to .T:i]Kin dnnii^ World \Vn'r If, .h; ironiplet-oly'witn"./"(H from Vic!iirr/ u iO.Vj iii.^r Difubii-iip'jrj. S i r b w t i c n i . \ i r flint ',,, uTiol under til.- Ii1ftf!ii:'-fu{. tf l)i. OmjK<v Fririfc ;nr internal jkriinli-js'-iurstl Ltb ,k many wmt]<J ~oiu'i i <|>>tfvvt ifiis .ii> ri"fi''v :i<-ii-.fi-;i Kraiii'i- in jii-l'ii-vi'is ^'rifr iiitema(L.?-r"- (J ri'-rwct t!i>ii>^'i> I ml fur many y.Mir~ ;njoyed. ^ I Iwlicvc t.h-1 plfK-ftM 1 "hoiior.thli- |iejM - r'f~nio 'ntplicw lurfior for Arix.-riruDn who. 1mvc di/'>i in Vi<-t-;i:im. Ariti'ric-ii honor-?.lu,e fm-t1. jirtw ;i',i<J i i L u n v - - -Aill w i t h it- hiph*1--! nJMTJ uml iJic'd'-.-ilh -jf y<-f fi;n)v .VjM-rii-T( rin-i:.ciiiiriot iiiiiki- sl'ii* iiltjtr li^hi o/-> rilii'c for OIK-'* tinv" IwijTlit' 1 !'. /' i^ ulri'a'lv ini-imil'vni.
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DAHA.GE TO U.S. CIVILIAN AND U1UTA.RY MORALE
I would hold too that no tuition, no institution, uor'nny individual cau bV strong if its morale is joor. Our admiiuVratio'i's failure to admit a mistake is severely damaging America's morale both civilian anu\ military. The polarisation of our population caused by Vietnam and encouraged by some officers of this administration manifesto itself in a number o( wayseach of th*na destructive to our Nation's well bdug. First; the profound disillusionment of young people is now affecting ninny of us aud I am not, referring If. just the radical left but to thoughtful moderates as well We may all ask the question, ''if fhi* unvielding position of our administration on Vietnam is what .our political oci<v<>e,ononiic yst*m leads to, then, in fact, shouldn't the system1 itself be ciuofioned?" The ifiicstioning of Aineriea by ouivclvrs u? goot when it is done in a deliberate and thoughtful faghiou; the questioning wt are now doing with our passions inflamed by the war is not s constructive. It leads to excess^ and they may be vi-ry destru-.live. - Secondly, oix. morale is damaged brcau^ we. know annot doinf,' all we can and should do within Anirrira for our i-iu-rgic^ both emoiioiml nd economic an- simply too strained by ten years of wa^t^ful wur. Another simple analosry; if & company is administcrrd in sit' h a way as to itan.se it& employrcs to *>e sharply <liviiii>d ovi>r if?* policies and the wuy in which th<- romiittny's" re>oiirct-s are being vsod, the. -ompany will not-make the progri-ss it should.
VIBTNAM W.\tt IS U.\l> KOB BCSINESS
Third, the wnr is bad for bii>incM>. One -jin't ab>olnU-!y quantify whut, role the war has played in inflation. Xor, can one say with certainty what rol; the ar has played in the fact that corporate profits as a percent of Mile* have been steadily declining. Roth of thews fiief.^rs are vcrv hunnful lo our wonomy uiid bcnf<fift no one. Kor. c:m one say with abvolute certainly uht the role of the *nr !iu.-> MC< n in 11 lo->S ot" ivjILsiliner confidence which Ims In-en reileMed in decre-ed cotîuiiiTspi'iiiiiiiK which, in turn, hu contrib>ite<l along with intlalbn aiMfiowering corjx>rf.e profits to the unemployment problem. So. too, hu.> the war, through inflntioii. increased the balance of pajmciit .ptoMcm and weakened our world market competitive position both " in cvporlcduud imported products. A iriilhury budcrei of Mpproximately $78 billion with x>me 30 perci'M going U> Soil11/"ii.-1 Asia i> a misallocation oT our resource; and, it i:u(hf< ! major contributor to our pnvcnt eeonomi<- probjem>. In !|if,fe- of some positive wonornic indi<-utoi>, I iM-Iieve our economy i in itsprecurioijK ituutionit ha* been stretched too far for too long. I *ould hope that when thin waremN, courageous congrcM-jonal action ran drcp'n'-w, and better control our milifarj' l>udgi t. Of course, j* it -true ttiaC our f^'ial and ifMimn'u: domeoti; probtentn w ill not iji^Hpjwtir with (he rj>i/irji)i/ of the Vietnam war, but the fact fl/uf we will Iw in 11 f.êtter positioti to deal with every problem v,e hnvi if the Vietnam war cc:iscii to exiift cannot fo denied. The njûmeiit, thn> the Vietnurn nur in w^ting u* 3 |>ere-nt of our y,n>.^> national produ<:l und that we are H rich enough nation to
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. stand lh*t economic drJMt 'causes iio. to ruakty u iv~sine$s analogy. If 'n"py American corporation unwisely spends 3 percent/ oj[ its safes dollars for rcnr long, it is headed Cj,r real trouble from within, froi its slum-holder., and from. Us competitors.
MltlTAit STRENGTH (IAS BEEN' WSACCNED
Fourth; I believe our military strength has been weakened by the war. In a sena* this stems to roe to bo an interesting paradox. One might if he were a militarist call this war a "test" war. Vietiitup i^ a land mass about 20 percent in size of my state of California with a population of 39 million, just about twice that of Californid.lt is a sruail "test" in terms of a nation our size, notwithstanding the financial aud military assistana being given North Vietnam by Red China mid Russia. However, because in increasing numbers our population has Totally rejected this war, our military has been weakened through sJnvr lack of emotional and intellectual support both from civilians and then from many of the men who have or are doing the lighting. Tiie result is that the respect from many of our senior military officers hits l>cei, eroded. In the ranks we hare been experiencing a substantial loss of discipline, an increase in fragging, a real problem with drug*. killing and bombing civilians of all ages and both sexes, destroying villages, and relocating some millions of Vietnamese, CamlMV <lan. and Laotian citizens. These acts are inconsistent with our military traditions and our conduct of war which we ourselves set in the WAT trials which followed World War II. Many veterans of Vietnam come home not proud of their service but ashamed of what the policies of i!:"ir country have asked them to do. How severe thi& psychological damage iu"y be long term, nobody knows. . .- If men in; }:>,:> to Ixs asked to kill and risk being killed, they must above all else believe fn .the reasons behind this most supreme of all human disciplines. If I correctly pftrceivn bow niau^ Americans presently see our Armed For' e* and how many men. who areft i ring or have served in the Armf4 Forces stjf. thfinsflve^, then this is fngiiteniog nvJdeoce of another fn>n ion or the Xat ion's deteriorating morale"ar:d :;i fart of th Nationjd niilitury Stroitgtli. , . - JJlsTKU hT K TRVTKFi'LN^S OF LEADERS
Fifth, morale, of l}& N'ntion is ttdver>oly affected by distrust in the -r wh*f would .seem to bo truthfulness of many of its r many -of us the Victiion war has been a suc<^ssion" of fhrw different prc*i<Jetils. Wii-huut ln|iborjng <!w> past, to me the -nt problem, of credilrtlitv is tbi \iord, Vintnamizatum, wlnftU mplies an ability fr>r the Saffron GortTiiriift:)* to 8ebi\-c near sclfj-ulfb icnry r>d jitjliticm !tclf-dc>i<>rniLta;ioi]; it bwonted ou excuse for continued Auif.ricnn iijvolvci.Wit of iiuictenuirittte lengtfi and f. -IM ':orrc<-tly iiit4-rprcul Sprretary C the Annv KfsorV fasTr week, lie WB^ warning tvLwhflt many of t; liu\v stisfor s>< long and tiat L* tin; possibility of tije failure of Victnamn when he rpforre. I t-r> tlie fa<^. tbnt time for Vi^tnamizafKHi wa* runninj.' hb'/rt. A very real part of the <lwair of tlus Vwitunra war
regardle-* ofhoxv soon if niw etuis, is loss cfcppfioXiCCin"our Govenimem by many bccatup of <,wo phrases, honorable [. âce, and Vict'*n>. i&ition, and *e siubboni deathly fcctroiitf foij'hich .there ha.vo. boe-ir -
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ALTEitXATivEs FACING UNITED STATES
. The alternatives, I believe we arc faerd-with,'are ch'ar; one is to continue fighting while_reducing levels on the ground ant! ar nukiiown levels in the air until ciur prisoners have been released and this nebulous Yietnttmizaiirrfi has bcvn effected. The other is to set a known date for withdrawal,' end all military operations iouiiediataly, and then proceed with tbe-negotintioD for prisoner release aud the safety of the South Vietnamese and provide, if the Congress deems if. Appropriate, assist aiuv to the. Republic A South Vietnam. The risks mbprent in either alternative are necessarily substantial. There is no way to extricate & nation from such a debacle without risks. I believe in the second altenuitrvc jaid I bclicvr that witli proper exposure tJiisi will be endorsed hy majority of Americans. I do not beiirve the Viet Cong will reni?pe on their expreased .wi'riiifnesa |o release our prwontrjv afur hostUitie.H reasc; they kej:l their word in 1954 with the French hi this regard. Furthefrpore, I lielievc the. Viet Cong must be (fred of killing and bi-uig ]t\\M and thu,.physical safety for the South Vietnamese, if thai, is whAt they desire, can be a reality. ,' - - -. - ^ - - ,,- - . " - The first alternative, to fight on <he"ground ai redwed levels while
withdrawing and maintaining, or i)muuw bf> foK'ed to accelerate our bombing, which in total tons of bonm-i dntf^K-'if already
our activity in World 1Var U. and fJten lo hoj>e --e n' genc.rully out by Novemuer ^972 and hope a tokbu 'force rcmuiimijr is sufficient to cave in the Viet Công and cause d,fin to release our prisoners, is simply illopcjtl to me; itTs luckwards; it guarantees longer inuirirration and further rt-ks the liyc>> of our prisoners; it ix>rntits more pri '<>i)e.i> be cuptun'd and ?i>ilanpcc_ the lives of flu; remaining ever.-stw.T- ;;" nutnjx'r of Anu-ritan troojw. It gnavantecs more Ârnuntxu vcK .* _ . .
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ESDr*rr VIET3CAM
W4K is t'P TO CuyaK&iH
\fr. (Miuinnah, I am pIcavHl and ibiten'd to npprar bffor? 3*011. .But, in a very rea.1 nnnse I am ciitotionaliy and intlb f c*uidly dUtruiight lliut t4J4- situation still cwitinm-h whii'h HinJces hertp itcurin^s nccesury.x J am embanus*il jxjr juy /"ouotn1. M**u.V "vljouglitful Aowricaiu t.t ^tiffi-rviy:. uot only from Alvin TofflerV 'Future -Shock-'- b u t . frota pp'xcni shock ax well" A n/ajor pttrt of thK hock it wt diinuy Htth tbj- Ini-rf-diblu nr, -ft is tearing oiAny <'ilix<.'us. (unii\i>'*, aruj insfitii. :ii>n> of iliis Nntim lo ti<>ooj)ik> nnd c/rj(vti'rial f4c-r<M. The eiccutiv*.* bra;K'i) ^f the GfnvrnijKMtf "-III not iov' /( i-nourf) for wrhÎ I fx>!if>ii- fan U1 a msjority of AtD^ri*-^!!^ nuj for nhu-t I belj.-v*' to b^ iln- wt'JJ-being of ifii \itjt'ii. / i-. up to lh- SfUMte tful the1 floijw, UXA wh'h Ji l -lute JIM bu-n w (JiU'.orv'. -lo k'nd ibii NNMUII oui of war. Obviii-, tfu.- Coujcrc^!. raJj du it fij- ir crxitrok thirfui)d of war. . _ !i:c WI'IKS*' vii-xy- fIlf>v.>.v
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EinirBTos, Ciur.-v'ATuJahKntjJputrti^ComniunirtdoctriD:hoJd*that \- i >: ajiythirn is tn&i tkat-fuHIwts;the cause of. OmluiuniinB. 1 Uwik Antricaa bfl*ni-i J>y d Jargp, lu*dhcU*imLlar doctrine." . x C . ,^ / . " _ , .f'"^
.-dawning iu '^Liuerican Irt.sincss, an era. in which .cnnccnM hcyocd the pr*tfi motlvt i . wilt &t\iK new importance. . ' .- C >__ . " ~ '" '" ';__ ,-' "Aiueria*^. b'iinw<rtnc.i are jiut-bcjinniafltb reoognixe the nHponitbi^tiM Mcial, ciorai; iuiuan re9ponVUVHi-^^h/ have, and Tor fighting to maY our ~ ca-mts^y and other* like u rcatr* responsibilities to'Ui^wmmunity aod to the
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v - (ielsthorji*? look^ like a t>-pJil meoibor of the luin>. RstM)hnxrnt,a>t he riU '- ^comfoT-tably/rn on tAiiy-Aniericau chair at a table t. bw i'.'wir otfiee, Vofing Aon- .' ' trtftediV-oti Tija pi[v, a handkcrhief tucked eaiually into thrt breast pocket of hit* s dark wise. '-: vX"- " " ' ' . . ; ' ' . Onceb*û WtaDr-J-sloirly-, d>tibcrately,philiophically--;thimajteHoickly fadvfMjd the macViudivid<i*Bfy^nêxpM).-"-. "^ ~ '.-'-.' :," - '. "I MippoMcl am a iM-yrbcr of tlwi,.Eft.t)liAnient, whatever that i^'îi^-hegln*. "If the BftAbliAnx ^t4 droned a* those people in poeitioft* (/yower anil author-; .: it>Vih*n yes, I'd baye to be claadfited a* a meniber. -But-tf'itV alw> defined as^ '> - thutê who AIT 'rtti^H-d >ith Tho htat-ua qtto. then 'count ute-ou^^beeauar there's uO* ' '' question that I am e\treni<*ly conetrr>c4 about tbr dinrctioatbi country"B taking " *,;'
"My fnodaroâ*1 thraV u expIaiiA, Is thai American bUNioem hiM'njatry "" ('.ad 'ooly'jru^mi'jor goal tn'itAût^ryA inimarjs jruai^hrt lw*w ycrridde&vatf j>ibrr <!-u4Jcrativ>ni< of coniûeace-^-AT'l that i^tomake a ptjot^-Bat J>uno 'today havr >o rera)biii<> that proGi-makinic is only part of rler job.H liey-Jcouid . accept tbitf idt-a, th*> wonldw.t in avery different Kin'u^t. : - _ ' . ' "A brisintrtH CAJJ Ik-, in t-hc'couventifKialdeAfiitioirof honevty v^rstx dii4lWMfy, md tbir rtc i accepted---.If it increajvft profit."That attitude esplainM Ihe'hvpoc' >v, the- rtil-Jcadinr tdveitigng, toe lack of tro;iaeru/or the foounUwHy vtftatk bjtve ' alwul the msHusionnV'nV peopk-haw." f . -i .1 ^-.*it t* l l _ LT K. J * ^ _ t'* what the Kalph Kadr*ft ^_ and Virginia Knaoors an Ûinj; ausicMr\ Tfiat " tbiry can n>> iougw fir i cliibooMt a* they have been iCK- pt, tâi whtttier *r admit \c or aot, tbt>- have believed they could I* diAonwt and net away with it." ^ - - ' - , ' J-.-'1. ' \- ' s ". flir i csperiatly hi|(h on -Ralph Nader, Vbo xoatftlmat fitef to artreflW bir ^ jKitliing i ever ai'otiipli>4i<-d without jtoni)fto exUcnte*," AAd hr bclievii* ItadW " ha? secured it plc< for hlmautf in Amij.cao hiUtry ''as oiw (rf fie major contritFti-tont to' hcJpif* AtmricAu bumncmt TMlirtrct iu effort io Audiag a- uew rauon d'etre K. ftoui profit." ' - * ' . " - - . ; " ... 1 fiiirt Asktiran divum w^ the da-mo Af frrvdom," too -*pUtn-d. "H dcwxhjrf ;B20 and broitifdit the first infiut of iuuniKrant<r'U> }bi COUHUJ^ jijpli: *kiit* frfidom froui tlw c*t cyu-jn and ( earn reKâos pcmtfutluu. The . drpr of fivrdwm |-'u-4 till ab- ut IV^)-, al>out the tint* of the Induatr' ' rlt:vol>>' . T ' ' drran, th^ draiw of ma<4riali<n, took o*'er. to UU' frwdcmj for grants*. Tile ovt^rriding oWr of the jieople in Che (J.^f and of t !i.->*.- >-a)iuratinic Ji?rc VIM not to gaiu iredi'm anymore but to ntk Uu-jr 1 fortune*. tune*. T-hat'- whû'thf ^rcut productive *atifi-CMtiability of America befao rq. iuv-ff nd diirinr thai prriod American t;*>ineMi vcn'^d the American drraor nohly. ., ly." ' ' ''" x* (ncriritn. DUnirK'-'' hw ton tint KM! vtfving that druiti^ prt itn liW, turwevrr, <'Lthorp.' frd, ' TUcre'ii b<vn * fondamentiil change 16 **te buying pvycltotoxt' of Ami-rtrKui," h^ pointed out, "and itV Ixwir onv of tL*- niajor eontribiitorii TO th<- riirri i>( clowrlirwn ii> thvc^miooiv. . "It b<t:iiii to tL(> b'l() licii..k Hi)r.>fftntiu| KTonp. heKfl-IUt>(ii|c u/wbh rhr 1 y'm'iir p^M !'' *LT>- /vviic ^nd rrlir/-r) t liat t Jiin trri.t Anirricaii rfrâni of mttiTiilij*m. of (hln^'c lia-n't liemiicbf l* tin- kind of bnj))jiii<v we hmild "bavi-. Tlu-rf -rr -(ill (H-o^l-r killtuK people, tn^rr are nliilrnau- w>d poverty and KiwJjM.n in ' '
' 'v'-VThe third "Ar teru*a drcdtr:, which started 'o evolve in 1 ** 1 9W, ii-concerncd with tl\tug'of the spirit. And it'i all a result Qf^'utejairg Is- our chililre.'-, who wore l ) f t t h v , i l J n - i n u B * ' i i t r ' a i t l l r . ' ' 1 ! " ..v-erUiinthchavcis.not . . . . ... i -. -.. . '" .vJpJ^tborp*, 49, quick to admit that his' business philosophy, and much of hi* current *wenos were influenced prjmari'.'' byfcLtw ol(W, #ons, now 24 and. '21; who poded questions tobitnthat hecorldn't .rswi-vUhfactda* they were .
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SRESS RISING A*OVE rrtOflT MOTIVE
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"F un to realize, that if ia fact the .ijnVri',a.u rnxtpU Are going to seek real ~ s \_ - -KOftU other than ntatcrialiam, other thin [.'oftis tbcu American business will lj>ve tc adj'ist Ib sifb*^ acconiirgly, to ba iu *nnr->i\ b whit Uie people wanr>" h6-**id. -. , ~"We oitt'tîxloRctive if all we v-^ftt aru.protit*. \ - ' ' :'. \ - -\ ' Convin'cinK O'-hers that x;"t thiu>gt arV L.cce-.t^r.. .won't. Jbe vAiy, ic idtmud. ; . . HH 4-i^jnv f-X)l .himself into thiulciug niany corporate estwuiives will n^rec with Uiu f[UicX!y, and K/>i.not q>ut>: sure whut reacuocw< tlnjr disa^Cjfuvfiit will Coke. But lib. p. siirii thiit vlMnê will occur. " -.' .-' . . (_. \".*is *OOQ as a couipanv's poctccthook b^giiii ro-SuflVr bec-in^p it's adflrcîng .itwlf july to profit, it'll ohiftite motiv<* in n burrv-," Ccl.ithonw: predicted. "The . , . tirw'-W'UCiminirwlj*'!) pwplt! won't buy just products they'll buy the (xiutoaoifis A - ttAtr ra-iaKftcture.- thox*- prodi>c(i>. Tlii.T won't buy & company or it* product*, if , tht-y rlou'tlrke thf con*i/anyV>ttit<id'j. J ''We're not.JH that point bv H-lnfiK *hot, however tbu bnyiiiK philckwjpby U ju.tr. A. t5limme- at CiU point hut it s fvming. aud iiV coming fn*t<J became of the ^ con u;r3fl-raove:irent. v 1^' >r .' .3'j*ifir^j!'. the *>nly i.isf ttitloivJpft with a riiiiicu to wrad people to a new vitw of >ff, IM. Ct>ntimioil.""lf bdfcibws.ooc^ti't do it, it's not goinit to get dam- Other ^ >iiM>(.uCoui> iiJigioiu,, educci'il aud political hve.\U tried uud faik.-d.n ,'. _-.;~ Oni; of thd Jjpif<luih5<"ixi<'a<.*< r.n*lo. G'J"thorp<b.J-i{(tertod, i* to rid ita*Jf of '- ],' ^\)^li>\.^\ntxn'xlii>n\^jlfnhy( napat-ortaîitoA. l\5Jy buri>3Ucratic structure). v " ''W-fct f to Ljjdvf^liiitkiatc: do5<," hf- irxplkincd, "j* ' o BSSIMUI: Uiat if lj-e mc-rchanInn it-itJf is -U riehtt >vtrvtliiug will c>iuo out s." riipjt. But it losis -tight of the fact uft vdu >v 11 riglrt unle*4 nonjc-body ha-< ideot;, aod ha* a chance for ' to bft hf.trd. ' '!Mv tni>rre3pOD*ibiliV- {i 'tr.cr* ilng thin cnmrmny )* to pro\-idc uvirniiint Tfvi'fridenii can flourish,- ;:\v'jr U\.v can be bfukril quickly and i:tcd upon rwdily. Oth;r lLsfiu:M an iiufp'thniêlv^s a lot, if tlwv trv to ti|r down tin; Ktriicture* they've bewi rftUod on afirt rf|'iiti&. tV"u *if'h .what -I hope we're achieving here an aUuOijpbore closer to A university t'*an to a hutim**. '.' We eseit LHVC t accept, oiir roles m thf, cocapany an bîDg ,jotL tencher* and jt*.-.M''-,}ob . , ii to teach oiy popl<^->îii*. 1 know iiid to learn from t lic-u. what t Vy>tio\v, Xjuc reason business bus gotten Off tlu: track; i that it'b ' so ea.-.y fr>r the oo>io U\-iOiirav;al iMotation. >'ot tjiJougk top ckccf.tive roll up their *Jwvt-4 and ." ^f^t thuirhandii dirty in tin: wholuorîinib of ibccoinpauy.*' .- " '- GKJ<;t borp noted t'ikl. hi* phDovjphy Of brciKitm down tructure awl fciniplifx11 " chunnels oTuomVnuiuc.ilio^ han caused aoinc unseat unwug raiddlc-".clirlou
iiio a|.Kfrb->ij iu'l
icJuri- rul tulkx Jin.-rUv t>> tt; IUMI who c^n help him right away/' Ivc |<fei.it^d out. "Itiit ulii-n a complaint bu> o go thriixh fiiunwh, it cuki ttr iv<'!ij< ifld month? N*f'ire a.i)'tlii jR^ts d>>iio, ai;d Vu-i iLjiy cr >t h a .oul ii/~tft; prop :s."/ - . - - " > . - ' .,G*i(WQr\to biM been tryiuK tot'oid c-niMhi:i(C "uls nin _ July.. !#*', !! he 1 -W (ac^rwiflent of theiSI,M)iUiokfubidi;irj jf \onni Simarj, luc-,, 5.'tw York. Hrtjiud o-ork^d for BrivtoI-Myori- aud <.ViJfcw, ',^!,-it,L; ov.-r a*, pri-iidetrtji " IsprWj- C.'ru,il>d/(^B for fiv; yean, before jmiiitiit IJ'jn'.- Wt*in. ; tIi.-L>i>. Hpufit jr'icjj of Ujc panttbr^yviirH ai.ikrr,<( ilib-rrnil chi'nês iu t t>v, bitt hin <ocii.<tjn':iiU.Uoii hui gnn- [ u'JiV in tl>- pft^t vi-ar r .o. Hn Iir..V|nilWr-v,r.rvLr ->ruiovn>ii, c'ltitled ' WVU Hi-lp yo? Hake It,'' ^to indlv/diju!)> 4>:ridir>K in . . . .''%*ji', wV im;ori)or:it("l Hmit-W.:HHm j)rodiict in. thi; ri-eifvw., f>tit they weren't piJI..-d In nut of loft liejtl. 'Jlwy rr* itrj/^ that oui fx- "'"d;. ind an voiui .'iiiow* vo'u tltrtijf hhvt. fi; m!-tlij'bc wr'J KUJftCivC'id but uijlj- f.b' itr>i"i<w If. . Ji. "'flu' ni.ijor bfiiy/It, of tfi- Bjeun proifrajn is rjist i pr6'ir|- i* real ncrv.f' to 'poj(U:. f.id it lu^f, t.1nirl"*ur reputation, riihcr. Th'-re w> pn/bnUv #
uLtiio- pr-sp-km. Thfcre was jonioe.irly opposition within the coinpimy tKias: it took money airay from brand promotion, but the faults have- more ?,haa justified on'r anticipations." *" . " " ' . " ' " lu aiiollK-r puWio-orif ntctTbi't-nnti-trndi' .ott,irtovc, Ilukt-Wc-'son jan full-page i *dn last yevr jibqjtljr ifter-g9iisg''Wiiii i5.'\ irf;-Jt.8> l>ov. T*efc . dessert*; to fcxplsia/ how to open Uw'îWa.i&'iv, '-"VVf &*! ôtwin st lot of Vwmptaint.-: tlmt chilitoij --rp cuttiiiH. thi :(n*Jvrf 'an the lid*." < k-Nthorpr tvcplatikufl.V'.Gcrirnttly, n prsnufjcturer doesn't Adroit lie's puiltv or that hi-'* donv aaythiui; Wrorwt.'We coulti have ij;r,ored JI tin.e'oinpbiuitK bt-cuu*.- the Snack Pvk tiiix^twas wjri'jtiing'tiirouKb t:.c. calling, brtt~v.v felt w bboi.'ld answer them." ' - ' ." . - " . ; . , WO, ]IiU-\Veon la>inch<:(l ft ono-ycar cx{ioicnt -in conjiajction '' with Kafph* Cn>o<!ry C*. to* Antjirk's, o ln-lj^poorcr conimt-rs''n get the higfx*rt Joo4'va)uM f or their liinsr<;d income*. Hnnt-Wljwon paid tbij cw*t of hirinp ar>d trubytiic n:rt<- lilftck wotnrn su> iOofp-t guidi-?, who . vre . *îlph9 inn'u" ju ^"avix * liml<-. to tbrw.' Hui[V>)IVvan funi>-d a pôjcrarT in NovvjirbjlCJ." . jc^nr iigo aioir-d at making inn--r-riry Martland HriKpitai jni>re ai tractive to "Mack Rh-tto resident* -ho !uui> ^ nejfit ivr'vii-w of the in.t.itutii>n. G':L*thorjK: -aid hi* company had *p-nt $2Ti.O(KI on 'K- projrram, orgaiiizinic th<; blacV JTrwideiitH thrmArlvc.-t to sicll the hoepiul in i,. jch>ir<.'i<( pcwti-rr. and u-U.A-wiou nndtvlio apoU>, uinc tl- l.ing',m)ic of tlie gU-tto. TJw f>r:piirimrii. of -U.-alth, Kdtira\Lon and WVIfni* mouitorcd the- proprmu aJid fia.< fulled .it .iino> M>iuU\VessoD dropped out, (Ji.-lKtborpe raid. Ilntjt-\Ve?.ioii' nstii"- v/n-" tuj\irr in\tI\v T in the pro.eruni, \it* addod. 1't- company'* Intcst socially-orwntod promotion involvi-s tlio pluntinn of trros, In connection with Hitnt-WcA-on'n n;w BJK John'x R'an* 'n Fixing. ^Whciwwr you introduce a prodMit, yon no-d ornothint; to build up i-xcitc-nioiit,'* <JcLsihor|'u 'A> didn't wniit snythin typiciU, however, tike * siauccpaii or a pot bolder prctr.i'im. \Vr ^cn- I(vjkin(rf.>r i*om<ahiri that would lie of n.-ul U-iwtit, something that watiW lif u.w:ful !>nt still |)r,)!itol>Kv ' "Oiu- of bin- i!cn|)loyi-> caiijc up wllli ;li<- iV.oa of i>Iantinit a t.rM; for every coupon rct-irti>:ri to tti..- i-ompany. Uc worked tin- whole thing out with the U.S. Forest Scrvici; and w- kiokrd off tlu- promotioi, iu February." A proitrasn to livlp var-rui* charitir- -..ill ho inntitiiu'-d in OctoU-r in conjunction with an existing pro<lnr . ,V.-w promotion? ar<: likr-ly to fall into tti. public wrvico The publicity Ifiint-Wwim add O<?l3(Jn>rj>e rocvlvp for t-oc'ial /vmeern.* i* not always positive. VVbeii Ge.I.*thorj>e i-icêd te- n<un< L^rl >>:ar ti u felUr pulilL-heii by ill'.- IJiiMirwsH Kx.-cativcN M^vi-menl for VK.tnsJu TV-ace of which he is fcnttmhcr, tbo wrjith <ifjcviTl veteran*'jprocps fi-JI on him. tin;i to j>lni->' eiiipi./'îiark T'xclr con(:iiirer.-< in id lid< int.i u trash tun. It it junt a Tiuill finoR, lnit it. will bejp to k"1!' 'ir r>iiiutry freo fri)i liiuir." In th-Iet.n-r, Gv-J-i:hor|H slated iiiiiii-U*i<m>Q "in Iiiriim will not diirriininuU1 aK.iin*t veti-raiiK wlm receive ! !*-tli/ii'-!ioii'>r.il>hn Ji5rhr(K-* or reii-t//r who have wrv-'d (jrin t'-nns fur th'-ir morn) IUHMJ^'.U'II tj fhf war/ -^ Sh'irfjv afl'r the lettj-r upp>îr<'d in in-ttpa|<er>jn ttnuiKf- ('w '"< M hatii of wvs inf'injj'.'J iiv fh: loiMJ-AnM-ricrin L'CiOti ^hapiH" ihatMiif idvaw "VH-MJ contjiliijtiiiii (>> <|ie iJiiv.'iilnL of dixoplili" in the '. litid SHit'v" )ii> .eculli He K ^till ii'O.-'inK ffjM.1 rime lu liiiie r.itliTl'" I^-^prm niid HIP r itxnni/:iiif>iis A!)U l;nv> tlirraii-/,( d tu putilici/i- hi* position in IIOJHI; of M;irtiii|t ft txKcott of ' ~ Hunt-W*ivMij>rodiictf, lie mild "Out of tht t*o inott[ iinjiOrlini' i-.-ne^ hnusc.u* todhV in pIrirjiM"Q, thir iurreiiK intoleruni'i- for another ni:inV point '/ viV;i," r;e|sti,orj I'SpIuined "Tin- otfuT in t||i immoiiiltti of rlit.- '.<. uiiiii w-î, nhn-ti in ot-^nrh roiiiufiUi'iice
tll.'tl V,t ll.'Jnt iXtro^t .)'iri'J\ M f f i l f l l )' If f'Mllrkly -I* Me full."
TL'- iVi:n(i:ii;y hju "rirfiiiiitei>-'.( -fisn, iiu-<t:ik'H cntlel--?ti from tl c oMiej" j|''K.-|'.I rXfJ'ejne Ud ll|t rrl|Jl iif {t'l reeclmV I l l ' l i l U t i ' i l ;ruKDH;i uf M1TVCJ i|>J{ tU'J'''t l/'ll-
-.tudeit fiii i-dll'V euruptjM', "Mini;. M<l'ient t fi.-t-i(:'r< pûu-d lii JJ.^L. IJiilji; th*
. u O ' in Ji rend-, in imrc " \'ij'i nmy havi- !l''d tlm* riiiDt-SS'i-i'viu Ku'xji- IK owfH<f) !>. u IU;LII friim 'f'i.-x i* i,'in.-l llonJ, Ji\ nut HO lluf,l-V,'> r-^/m f'uoriv in locat"! in Culifi<r!ii:i. A)*4i\*)i;iKlrii , , . , We nav mitLilii; to tin u'ith *r:V oilier Jlui'il/'
'/'lie pHtTM)-1" '/f ill'' WtlllK' 1 r f i r V I J ' . . . '![-! ll'/rj"- WllJ, IH 10 (lllfj Olll VtiRit tl)<V'"'lj ."T' 'J'llll.I.-lK Il'I'I linn A f l l ' i i r j l i Ini.-flll . l-Oll ber.t M.Tl'- t h i l l a'Jtrilx M>l] -
ftenj-
'If.ey're imi tindkni;; the f-nvi' 'Jiiii^* wi {h*";!^!* wlu'O we wjr<- Cijeir
.!!, '!: -at.-t ''If wfu-ani tostsvy curreut, v, I.a-x^ t >:nov ntuit th .'.i ! -A-JIH.' th'-y'll hiij M we can nntic5pst> thej.i in formula*'.no: our i .r-!.i't'.r|r_' dot-fii'l expect today's youth t> rgufomi r.t i>rher :'f>n' "!':a f.i:;v!j;Vi-d their chAngr* in attitudes arc -i:a- r. I tl-mjt \bi \ 'II i:;au.iajii tl.nr fj-vr'-rni* for tho. world jiro.md ilwi'i tli'iwjioiir their Ji\e."
w. '' .- ' *
KC:vT-WtG>''s HCM.VC5.-t
Kdnard GeUlkorpo is a Hcpubliea and former naval officer who beuVvc the JJrrembp.rg principle of individual responsibility applic.* to corporate rjcer-utived a* weir an to government leaden. Gtbthorpe i* prcîd i\t of A $500 Bullion corporation, Huut-We*<oa Foodi>, the ketchup-and-nalad-oil Mibaidiary of Norton Simon. Inc. Nothing that Hunt-Wr*ion makes could remotely U> rla*-ificd an a military u capon, #o Gelstborpt- could claim corporate ncmrvsponiibility for Indochina. 'But to GeUthorpuV way of thinking, washing oneV hand* of direct complicity is not permiMihle for major corporate executives; thyj should go further and aVti\Tly support tao*e who rv*it tl.< Jiar. Modt large businc.i*^, vngag>td in dcirn*' work or not, indirectly aid the wur effort bv refusing to hire draft renters or /vtrranx with less than houorabU 4ichargt.4. For the military, tola corporate co3 jft>ontion 1 Mnployment practices serves a* a disciplinary tool. GU are reminded thut if they miîebave or don't fit in, they can be given a bad dUcharge that mill cause them hardship for the rr*t of their lives. Several fortn* of undc.-iral>le dlwârge can be iarjed administratively without even the modicum of due procew afforded by court-martial. In recent months the miliu-n hu^ leaned Iwavily OH the adminiKtrative disctiargr as a way -of dealing -ith disfideot oldient, avoiding the adverse puKCcUy that triabt often g? &rate. (On April 12, however, vbe .Army dimicd five triargei agaimtt Lt^Loui* P. Foot, a Wrst Point honor graduate who bad aougbt CO atatuit; it gave him aa honorabie ducuarge.) " " Ijtft IJeconbcr, O*Jthorp announced that Hunt-Wesson would not discrinuunU- in hiring agninyt veu-rami who rcceivd lenb than honorable dKcnWttM Ix-caiii.of their oppiwition to OIF Vietnam war, or auiinsl draft re.-<U'rs-<i.ho"bnd M-rvcd their prison terra.*. Some M other outhera California tiraw made a limifcir pledge (the idia had been initiated by the Los Angeles chapter of Business xe<nitiv a Move for Peace), but Hunt-Wwon was far and away the largest and, by virtue of its lopCion in. the hart of Orange County, one of those most directly tacpowd to jiiif.oist retaliation. Shortly afur the rtory of Hunt-W<xon'.-t pledge appeared in the Sknta Ana /^M/'r/Gfldthorpe reo.-tved an angry telegram from Andrew Callanan, a loot! wheel in the American Legion. Callanan laid he wv notifying everj' virt>ran'i organization in- California of fluiit-tt'e*^n' policy and ur,3ng tlieni to boycott itx product*. The ^"grain wax MlloH'ed by a vinit from the other veteran."' group fn[irtionrxr"x. who ni^Hc* a "iinilar threat. In January, muie n. onc-âitmo' Later froui J! irl^'rt-1*. FiMiiwMer, National Corutitaidcr-in-Cbief of the \Vu-rann of " A'xr^r' It J';equated that you tutiMui*. a fi<t of ;JI ppxIncU produod, i or nuukeud by your company." ... ~ rirpv rep<>iid>id by taking a more outupokci <iarui, ll^îfkwi for and was grant"! an opport<inity to peuk at u K''U<-r/l nx-rting of the ComlNiixl Vr.t<Taai Organization* of.Orunge <'^Mintv, ui. ^jibrelu* n**ocmtiou cvv>Ting evr-rythmg from i IIP , Ajjpfica/i l/'gion to the ('.Old .Slur Mother*. For m&rly three Fiourt Gi>UUi>/pVv)k>>^rtn>r''fo tlus b*)MtU<>gittli>>ring whv In-felt th fbdoehiit/i ridvmtlire KA* rvolluirdy, iimnonil and dtr<')-vii>K of ever>* patnof'-* di^fmor. Ttwn ht: wrote u thfVc-p.fg''. l"(l'T to rW Comitiaiid'<r lininu-jjU*, agjm ritiri^ the .uiiiioralitv of Uje war ind refe/ripc tv J . N^rembrrg prec<-di.-rit. ; other Urge rnrpar/iiô*-^ will follow /'
, COMUKVUATTOV OK
Tin-CHA/BMAV, Tlittrik yon vi-n jnin-h, Mr. (*f\*t\u';\'. I tlnil i> HII fXUvmriy.e-.'-.KiiM'M arid wvll <-x.|<^>M'tl îMU-nina of u (iiiin'H jxiint <f vi f u witl, n-jrurd l thih u'wr. ihink yMir Hinilojjiis u i f h itunti<m>. in-fHWUK-ff in- t'cry apprntf. \V'! nil I<x<k ui tFu-i^ niul(Tu from our own <'xjx.TH'iuv, and J think it i vny hripful tohuveymir ^tjU;,u-jit about jl.
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. -ADMISSION OF MISTAKE
If I liaJcrsiatnl it corrvctly, one *>r the (.vtitra! |uiijts voc mnkc is din? js n business matter mUtakf!' arft made. HMT Aroistuk;*'-was jûute *nd it is not o?ll -not dijjhonorsjbK", it is v?rv foolish not1 to -Admit i i . 1 t is a fact of fife, and if w; Imd cnuHgU j ujjgment to udkait it w niiirtsifa,' and to rectify it, yott sot* no implications that in uiy WK.- would undermine ivur image or o'ir reputation in the *y of the world but would cnhtucc it. . K that counxit?
*'-Mr. GcLSTHORrK. Th*t is correct.

f,S.
INFLUENCE FN EUROPE
The CUAIKU AS. This morning's paper has a right interesting artide by Mr. Anatole Shub on page 12 of the Post which says "Waahin^ton's Influence in Europe Shrinking Like, the Dollar" which I will put in the record, ll points out how, aside from the actual economic aspects of our relation* with Europe, there U a growing loss of respect for our judgment as a great community. This makes tlic Europeans apprebcnai^ e and this is one of the reason* they are seeking now in a more positive way t* draw ,'ogether, to vre&te a European community and to disengage iroin the Unitd States which, I tîidk, is quite connisênt *itli vwnr view. They aiv auestiouitig tbu political judgment of tiiij country. Would you agrw with that? Mr. GELSTHOHPE. Very definitely, I would certAinly agree with that. (The uifonnU'>u referred- to ôlfows:) . - ^. ; ;\v ; {TbrWrnUactvu r<<M. W^danday. Mar 12. 1071) i'B Ivrut'ttfcr. IN ECJCOTK HHRIVUIK: LIKE THE I)O(XAK-c" (By Ariatole Shuh) - 'v My 1 1 Twcol y-u'x yean ago this fpong, an American oldter could buy anything in prmU'ate Europe (or it candy \>u, can at Spam or -a pack of rortiincA werc'Aill l>et4 tnadc on Korlak Urowiiieira' the Mar* xball llan in J947 undertook to supply bungrr Europe lacking cpit*J with the doUari wvdt'd to tevfvr. ' . *r |Ktitict leader* in Wotern Europe were raid}' ta approve almoft Hi .or 1.1 ycAT Mgo, u.*,tlM; Earofnaiti recovery moveu from the motor to fbc nrUu *i*X', rvcry West CitropMUk eo<tnlry. contained prominent or dominant "Atlantic" Wiity, dcdicaind l-o tu/> pri^cmiUoi] that- Anu>ric*a "te*d-rhhj|" wa ciixeutUl- to r^ci>(xun progru*>. . ' Any hint tfr^r the U.H. might di-inRW iu wine wy from Europe produa-d ajarm, the Atmriiciui dollur reuiainui tti>.- kMigpfo of t,b" world vciuotuy, aod Europukii countries outbid me iiotbcj' for oljtxriing A/nt-rican inVMlnieuU. Today, Aiiu.neai) toiiri*( inn>Ot Wi-'rt Kuropivnj ccKiiitri^ trc having difficulty t-vî jn i><cban(9ni( thir dollar traveler* dKictn. -V/<Mt (JermAny aiid three ucigli>x>r>. hiivi-Aclcd unilaterally UK alter tht ratoi of occticj^ of their current} , Morcuv*-i, >^-i-u tlioiw lMiroj>cai>* critical .of iûch. tOMiun'ii agrcrt 'eventfully. tbut the r'D', ->f the trouble U a crini* of coiifi/Jicu rn the Amvrinftii dadur usd its Hi;* ro*i)fmcfit unib! otbrnriv feudine Frencb nud <>rniaa ^;r. aJ wi'U us <4w Htin fiVrnDieut and it* donuartit O{>po<itiort, , -ftTjrforf Uie current WKJ, ilw' !*< Karl Ble4iig, fwfflef Iwo<t .vf flo man Crc.trol Bank, publicly ciq^feMed rcgrnt th.it be had rvor let JiAia J,1 f/y, foMn<-r IT.S. Jiid. Coiini'wio/Hr in f/crujony. (wrKUad^ him to f/roruiwr lo try to rîb <lor)ln Inf^ oW, McCloy had mllrfr'dlj' 'treUyu>d that, iictt a )>rotni<-, Anit-rjcari frooym inigiit bpv<^ t/> tw withdrairtt from
' . '
.. i or .-vcn fivi! )Var< *, j)iililifl*tjon of *uti remark*) b BU^wing wouM.tav IN .lie prr.VAjliu$ cufim^ of "Atlantic; n-Vudarity,"
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Tbi current disenchantment with Washington RIM beyond the monotary <jitt;tiv '>. S'~"ly but percept iMy, the a-ntimcnt is gaining icround in London and bonn a? weil a in Pari , that-Jthj.,Kuropcans in Jcfunse ateuMl the vagaries of American politics* must overeonife Oieir own dixMirwu^Jit* to create u-lijit the luu- Gen. dc Gaulle Jied to call a *'Kuroptiin Europe.": Uc GiuUe'a successor, Geori%3 Pompidou, hits *uv**W . European nion^tnn." arid economic union, who*- ultimate aim would In- . aiujde European currency atronc enough to end the ''hegemony" of the dollar, in world commerce. To \>c sure, there a.* acute difference* among Eompeans M to how to arrive at such an aiiu, with advocates of fret-market liberalism and government intervcr.tionisin reprraenU'd nearly- everywhere. Europeans havi- lost ihi- lutbit ot iiid'-iwiul'-jvcc, atid not y>:f- acquirod tli;' ahtt of -ulnh'-Tging natimial \aiiifii7s to pun>u<- common vi>ion>. Ncvi-rtlit'li.-s.H. Frttich ni'tM^ tbL- WIX.-IL to raj.- [!)' tifRtii;ii(>ii. on BriUin'.* cnr<Tuig tbo Common .Market uuiy tx- symptomatic ( tin 1 Ix-jdnning.- of rhangi-. Much will di-pcnd on the ui'^tinz ii'it WK-k lM't\riv..i Pompidou and Briliih Prime Mini.it'-r Heath, whifh coulu again doom a 'Mvjra|H-an Iviropc" or juvo it n-ru inip>-tu.. Vri. <-vcn if the Kuro|H:aii dt-it-iigagi-iaiTnl from Washington moves at a crawling pa<'f, thcpj can \>c no nu-faking i\w broader fnistration with U.S. iJolicti-s. The div.m-hantmciit hit Ni-n gradual, but thr landmarks nlon^ the wav hav li.-n clear, from tt-diJib-ratc in.lg;.-t deficit.- of tlie Kenmidy adniifiitnaion and the jou of^tbe Vietnam <. ar .Imarui-d by the printing pr.-^-) u>idi.-r John^n ro ^ the recent di-i.ions )/y Pnidi*jit Nixon to "reflate" ihu Aiui-rit-n econyniv Ufa']*'- domestic inflation would l>u ]>IiticiUIy I-s* into'eruble than high unemployment. European ;M>litiriaii understand Nixoti's policies in domo-tic terms, but rovut their liaviiijc to pity the price for them imniedimU;ly. "Thr KIXOH Dwimir.,'' mid one 'uro|M-ai> lien- !>ittcrly thU wiit-k, ' nuuiii!- that -v<jry one. hould take- car of liinisdf. That i* what we ar doing now." Wh.nt remain; to be m-cn if whether, dii-piu,- ccxnmon irritation with the L'nitcd Mat>. Iiriton.1, Krnichtnen and (jerinan.- r:tn le.irn s6Jii eur-njdi to act u.< or r, rather than cxntinile liglittiij; itach other wluli: 1-MVUtf .bu L'mU'.d .SCaU* uii|xjturbcd.
Tin- CffAiKMAs;. I t h i n k this nr-idc- in v;ry r- voalirijr bt'catiM* it n-liiicj to wlint \ii~- Ix'i-n l):i|t|wntn^ in I)K- fiimiH-ial nrcu in Europe.
DIKFKKKVT BKASOVS GIVB.V FOR V/BTXAM WAR
, Frotii tin 1 iM'jniuiin;: lli.-rc Imvc U-cu ruuny clilfi-rcnl rr ftir.tfiH vvur. Oi.r wjs l.i contain <'liina; to contain roniinnnibin. 'Hits '>tirtir.ulrly wus, I liiiuk, th<- l.lir<j>t of Sjicn-iary Kick's \icw. Mnr' rc'':Mitly tin- vit ws Jjiivt: iv>n>r nroimJ that the purpuw' of ihc1- wr irf iio'7 lo jyvc ibt Siiinh Vjctiisiiii.'sc u rlmmv to liuvc :i free MKJcty. Viii- i- die rn!r<- cwnt \>\\nw. h used to < si:If-<K'ie.nniriu{iriti. 1 uiii n/~l *!< tii'-n.- F* any iIiirM-<'ji'.'<o J ijon's know ivlmi tht- /JiflWt'm-c J.-5, l>nl ihis- U'/MI|(|- v'.c;n (u lw fJu- luf^>,t VTr-jolj of v. IjsiL *v r(1 -1""^jtiuinj; ilin war for. AI^; impljnt in this jjj tlic r's.train( of (lir; spread of <:<;jiiinnii-iii. -' , v.vDEKMi\'i.vr; of covrKfT or >v:t I woulJ liku vonr foinnieiit on (he propostil llu* tlicrei* iwlliiup: tliut ifii: K(i>,iiAn>f oi' tl)i' Chiiifx- curt do iw us tliut woul<{ uiuiorinitie t h e . pr;stij;e, tf,e rnl îrrnprh of ln; coiircpf of privi*!^ eM^rpri-*!. 'J'ljcru is nothing fiiev <'-u-n do to li'jrt u~ UK inucli us we iu'C, doin^ to oiirM-lvt-i* liy^HirMiiiix (his war, Mr, (/F:r>TltOKr'K. ll) ly view, tlif! louder We ronfillUdJ tliU wur lll -fri>n;i<-;- t!i- fjiie-iioiiiujj; of tin; worM, MS iinlierii'd in tlie jtrlide vvhii-Ji you q.iio(^!t' 'r<iiu loduy.Th*.1 rjueli(njrijrof tfiefnu- wojJd, tin- i.trojijjT
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that becomes. I think it Is very well documented that, generally: speaking, the free world has been, is wondering why we continue,, believing themselves that we have made a mistake. The longer the xrur continues the more we question ourselves and lose confidence in ourselves, the more we stretch the economic machinery of this free enterprise system, which I do believe is being stretched and hits been for sometime. Generally then we weaken the country, aud as we weaken the country, economically and perhaps even militarily, as I indicated in my comments, then, in my opinion, the easier prey we are for communismphilosophically as well as militarily. I think that there is nothing that plays into the hands of those who would like to see us falter more successfully and painlessly and re*Uy at very- little expense of either eiiergy or people, auv kind of resources, thnn the continuation of the policy we have been following.
INCOXSISTENCY IS U.S. ATTITUDE
The CHAIRMAN*. It seems that way to me. There is growing more apparent every day what. I would call an inherent inconsistency or ambivalence in our attitude. Here, as I say, the reason traditionally has been expressed in different ways, but the general thrust was to prevent the spread of communism. It was different versions of that. Mr. GKXSTHOBPE. No question about it. The CHAIRMAN'. Now the administration with the approval of the country has made a very gentle but significant gesture 01 reconciliation towfcnl China and we arc engaging in SALT talks. I mean all of this is indicative of a desire, at least, to try to approach some agreements in different areas. To be continuing to fight a war, on the one hand, and on the other hand, making gestures, at least designed to bring about some relaxation of tensions, seems to me to l>e inherently inconsistent. Do you agree with that? Does it strike you (hat way? Mr, GELSTHOBPE. Of course, what we now appear to bea rapidly. opening door to Red China Just underlines this inconsistency. The CBAIBUAV. So this only underlines more, clearly what you #aid about the war's being an internal civil war, a struggle between two faction* within the same, country ** to who u going to run it. This occurs time and again. We bad it in our own cat* and it was a vftry terrible thing, but nearly every country sooner or later ha* a civil war. It would strike me as most inappropriate for us to say faction A is going to rule, the country and not faction B. It u up to th.-m to . determine it. That would be real self-determination,
ACaTBALlA* SALE OF HARVEST F-QUIPMEXT TO CUBA
One last question before- I auk rny colleagues. I WAS interested in reading tbU morning about Australia, nun of our ><awnelt<^>t ullich, in the word* of President Lyndon Johnnon, He invited their Prime Minister time and Again bex-au*" their Prime MimWer w& *) eloquent in the praise of Presijent .Johiis/jn, They i*'re '/or ^reat allies. We even gave thm Htibrfidiex forûgar produrtiun, whjeJi they di<In'f riitwl newly a mtirh UK NVw yf>rk City iiecdu n sulwidy for removal of garl/Htre. But in &\}V case we did jdve it to \\w\a. Tfoi* inoniing wo dl-M'^veredat leuut die prent* did that Australia, our fellow participant in tlte vr&r, has now rniulo a deul to elf several millwn dollars
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worth of equipment to Cuba to harvest sugar. The article sa}^ the Stat*- Department is not pleased. Thisi laud of cither inconsistency or hyixx-risyI am rtot sure which is the right, wordis what is so distressing ulx>ut our present iH>Kcy. I think if. is why so many people, including the military, have lost confidence in our jwlitical judgment. Did you hear about the Australian deal? Mr. GELSTHOHPE. I did nut hear about it. Tlie CTIAIKMA.V. Isn't that ironic? Mr. GELSTHORPE. It is terribly ironic. The CHAIRMAN. The Australians made a token contribution to the effort in Vietnam. That is all it was. But^ their Prime Minister was most eloquent in his praise of th<> great United States and President Johnson as the savior of the free world against communism. Xow they are. doing g*xt business with Cuba. Mr. GELSTHORPE. Of course, this is a continuation really of oven a graver or a inure dramatic instance vis-a-vis allies v. .rich we know have been. shij>ping poods to X/Ui Vietnam. The CHAiBMAiC. Oh, v.. Mr. GELSTHORPE. I mean that has beta going on for a number of years. The CILUHMAJ.'- It lias always interested me that Canada, our closest and dearest ally and biggest trading partner, has always had the good judgment to sell her wheat to China while we give ours away to nearly anybody. Sfr. GELSTHOKPE. Right. Tlie CHAIKMA.V. Senator Sparkman.
EFFECTIVENESS OF VIETVAMIZAT1OX PBOGKAM
Senator SPAUCMAV. Let me t,&y (hat L enjoyed very much your statement and your approach. Tiifcrc -ire a few things I want to' ask you about (hough. First, you say that the Vietnamization program is a complete failure* or something to that effect. Of i.-ourse, I know there Imvi1 i>een conflicting xtatements mude by different people who have been in Vietnam aiid who have Ix-en cjnnetted with the oroeram. WJiat makes you so certain thut it is a failure? Mr. GELSTHOKPE. I am not certain it is a failure. It is my owji interpretation of what I have tried to glean from all of the sources F can explore. Jt does M-eru to me, however, that there are. a number of indicHijis whu-h suy that South Vtutnam will notU>at the Saigou <>o vitrnnieiit will riot - -be n \ iabli; entity u it-houl nuu-îvc support from H*. "I think it ^ ..mid win to t{-at. the kind of military *upport we have been askfij to give or volunteer to gUv JIM to maintain utmost a iiUU- of equilibrium over ihorvif that, in fact, ?s what it uwould juxlii-uU' ihut if we /uttU'iiully reduce our support, I don't know wliatis going to be tin* balance of power for them. Now, that is a very AwcoiiruR^tijj and dUmaving thing. For i-ver>' JHTHOII i .South Vietnam, asNijriitr)gVi' > timiiU'.atu>n JOCK fail, Mhomukt xerve und'Tfl government tliut they don't with to. I uf\if, ju>t ** I liiink if I had lived during the ("ivil \Var, I would have <;bed for < wry wuthcriu'r. But, on the other hand, f don't think we cttti ôrilinu*' the kiii>l of investment we hav<: iii Vietrixru to any longer jini/ihie with tlw possibility of Vurtiiomi/jitioji, I trulv holu tluit we munt ulmndon Uic phruê. We Lave got to extricut>) ou;>:lvo aiid leave that nation u> wuK- iu own probU-uio
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ESTABLISHMENT OF DEriMTE DATE FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL
Senator SPARKHAN. I am not certain that I fully understand your proposal for extricating ourselves. Arc you recommending that a definite date for complete withdrawal be established? Mr. GELSTHOHPE. Yes, I am. Senator SPARKMAK. What date would that be? Mr. GELSTHORFE. I think December 31 would be very satisfactory. Senator SPARKUAN. Of this year? Mr. GELSTHOEFI. Of this year. I think we could announce, and perhaps I am being terribly uaiveI think we could announce it tomorrow and I think hostilities would cease the day after tomorrow, as they have really in"all wars once the announcement has been made. I don't believe, and,of course, I underlineI said in my prepared statement that the risk is enormous-the risk either way is enormous. I can't believe, ii we say the fighting stops, we are going to be attacked as we withdraw. I can't believe oar prisoners arc going to be any more poorly treated, more poorly treated. Nor can I believe that our prisoners are. going to be further oppressed or even killed. Bather, I think that- gives greater odds in getting the prisoners home safely. I think it give* greater odds in getting our own troops home safely. T hold further, Senator, too, thatand again I certainly can beheld to be naivebut I believe very strongly that we simply can't continue to drop these thousands of tons of bombs on what are reported to be, in many instances, essentially defenseless situations and forever continue to krok at ourselves in the mirror. I think that is part of the trauma that is taking place among many men in this country today. Senator SPARKUAV Would your proposal constitute in your opinion an admission on our part.of defeat in Vietnam? Mr. <iL3THOBPE. It would constitute on our part an admission of a mistakethat we made a mistake. Therefore we are withdrawing. I dm't think it is either a defeat or a victorv. I don't think we have Maid we can't win if we want to win nor do f think we have said that we have Jost. Senator CFABJCMAK. Let me ask you this. When you apeak of a complete withdrawal by December 31 of this year, do you include the Air Force and the logistics support that, as I understand, under the President's program will continue [wrhaps beyond the time that all of our men come away from the fighting front? Mr. GELSTHORPE, Yes; I do. Senator SPABKMAV. You mean everything. Mr. GEUWHOBFE, Everything, Now it r.ould be, as I mentioned if the Cougreiw deems it proper, certainly financial, economic support to the Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. Buf I don't think we have extricated ourselves if we keep our bombers there, for then we arc in fact saving if the North Vietnamese continue to move forward we arc going" t<; support the South Vietnamese by air, and tlwt in just another wav of fighting a war. Senator SPABKHAV. By the way, would our withdrawal be without anv rtifniiur withdrawal on the pan of the North Vietnamese? Mr. GEL*THOKPE. No; it would be concurrent with the withdrawal on the part of the North Vietnamese. We would JMilb draw back, f would vinujili/e, beyond ome point north of itomething, the South VteMiuhiesc *outh of somethingadd we then would extricate our' *. What liappeiiK the day after we leave, Sen*U>r Spademan
396
TOOLATERAI. TJ.S. WITHDRAWAL
Senator SPARKMAN'. Wait & minute. I can understand the drawing back for a cease-fire, but you say we would extricate ourselves. What assurance would VHI have that the North Vietnamese would extricate themselves? Mr. GELSTHOKPE. None. Senator SPAKKMAX. You are willing to tlo it unilaterally without insisting that they withdraw at the same time. Mr. GELSTHORPE. I would be, because I don't think we really have any assurance if we continue to fight, keeping only air su|>|H>rt, a> has been suggested, that there is any ho|e that the situation will change. Therefore, we will be in a |>osition of air sup|>ort forcvr. Senator SPARKMAN. I want you to understand Mr. GELSTHOKPE. I agree with you. I see the |>oiiit you are making and I understand what I am saying. Senator SPAUKMAN. It is a real problem; isn't it? Mr. GELSTHOKPE, It i> a hideous problem. Senator SPARKMAN. There is room for difference of opinion and I assume you would admit that. No one is more eager than I am for u* to get out of there, but I have felt all along that the President has mil forward about as reasonable a program and schedule for withdrawal as we could hoj>e for.
PARIS PEACE TALCS
Do you have any confidence in the |>eace talks at Pariswhat thcv May be able to accomplish? Mr. GELSTHOKPE. Very frai.klv, based on tin: last few jvars, I don't have very inucli confidence in them. I mean there se,eius to IM* one absolutely iii!>urniouiitablu problem. If 1 underbtaiid them correctly, the fundamental problem is that we hold the peace talks can't reully go on in a meaningful fashion until we stop fightingexcuse me, until the North Vietnamese r<-!> .,*; our prisoners, and they hold that no meaningful [x-ao; talks < L on until we stop fighting. That sccuis to me to he an impasse which we are trying to bn-ak by ever accelerating our bombing, hoping thai we are going to exhaust them *> and bring them tit their knees, so now: they hay "We can't go ou aiiv longer so we will talk to you about releasing your prisoners before tut- fighting stops." Jiut I believe their resource's are such, Senator, that the^- can go for a long, long time.
LO.VO-BA.VCE PUOGBAM FOR INUOCHINA
ScuaUjr Si'ARKMAN. Have you given any thought to a long-ranp' program over (here? I don't iipjx>^' you would KJIV that we uuglit to withdraw and juM KUV we have, no inlercr.1 in \ \ i u l part <>f the the world; ( h u t ue are not inlerer.(cd along w i t h other nations of the world in seeing some ki(ul of long-range jx'accful and coiihirurl.ive arrangement worked out. Have you given any (bought (o (he longrange program, jH'rliaps some kind of inlernntional Ixrjy, to exerciMmore or Ie huperviion over not just Vietnam bill ull three of (he French Indochina *((<>, neiitrulixing jx-rhups n greut portion of if. if not all, and also having a program of reronslrnclion?
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You mentioned something about economic aid. I suppose you would go along with the idea of our helping reconstruct the whole area. Mr. GELSTHORPE. Yes; but again I believe that the kind of reconstruction should be assistance to whatever government ends up prevailing. I mean if we are truly concerned about helping the country, and I believe we arc and should be, then we arc goin; to help whatever government ends up being in power rather than tryivg, as wo are now, it swius to me, to legislate the government which i& going to be in power, to legislate bv force. I simply don't believe we can do it.
ADMINISTRATION STATEMENTS CON'CEttNlVG FREE ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Senator SPARKUAX. Hasn't our Government, through the President or the Secretary of State, said repeatedly that we would be satisfied with whatever government the people in free elections should choose? Mr. GEI^THORPE. Yos. Senator SI-AUK MAX. Don't vou In-lievc they mean that? Mr. GKU5THOHPE. Yes; I Jo believe it but Senator SPAKCMAN. Don't you think it is a worthy objective? Mr. GELSTHOUPE. 1 do. But I don't see how we can effect a free cltM-iion, Senator. Senator SPAUKMAN. We shouldn't hold the elections, but I think we certjiinlv would be interested in knowing that they are free elections with a free electorate. Mr. GEUSTHOHPE. Yes. Senator SPABKMAN. We have a lot of problems ahead yet; haven't We? Mr. GELKTHOHPE. We sure do. Senator SPAKKMAN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAK.MAN. Senator Aiken. Senator AIKEV. Mr. Gfl&thorjMj, we don't liave too many businessmen come before us as witnesses. Most of the witiie.>>M;s we get are teachers of one kind or another. That is why we are glad to get your viewpoint, this morning, particularly where one of the greatest developments of all time, I think, is the wav that international economics, and trade, and industry are dominating international poliiica today. You have, as the chairman has |K>inU-d out, one meaner of where the almighty dollar overcame the opposition to comniuni-m from one country. I up|H>se it is tlu: dollar. I think the dollur ntill i the currency most desired around the world.
HI7Vl-WE*iSOV JOODS, ISC.
J wu> wondering wjmething about your own indu&try. Do you

lieul i;i foods only?
Mr. GKI-HTHOKPE. Yfi, primarily. Semitor AIKKV. You haven't gone- into other lines of business, us ino-t of them have? Mr. fJEUTtfoiiFE. N'o, we have not. M-imtor AIKEV. You do business on en international scale.
Mr. GELSTHORPE. Uniquely enough I am the poorest qualified businessman you could find to testify on international monetary policy for our business is 99 |>ercent domestic. In that respeci \ve are very unusual for a major food company. Senator AIKEN. I think we all agree you are unique then in that category. Mr. GELSTHORPE. Yes, we are. Senator AIKEN'. Most businesses have spread over the world. Mr. GELSTHORPE. Yes. Senator AIKEN. I was going to ask you in what countries you do Business, what vou imjKtrf from other countries, what you tell to other countries, "but you arc 99 j>erccnt national. Mr. GELHTHOHPE. Currently we have a very small business whic-b we have recently started in the United Kingdom. Senator AIKEN. That just about spoiled my series of questions. Mr. GELSTHORPE. Well, I am afraid I am the wrong fellow to be here. Senator AIKEN. You would probably do business with other countries if there were a good opportunity and a chain* to do a good business (hough. Mr. GELSTHORPE. Yes. Senator AIKEN. You brought my question! ig to a sudden end. Mr. GELSTHOHPE. I am sorry. Senator AIKEN. We wilt wait and get some other businessman before us then because when I realize the effect that international btisMie&s and mergers of companies has had on world politics it is alino!t unbelievable. We are wondering now u h u t hapj>ei^ if England joins the Common Market where our coni|>eti(ion comes from |>rtic.ularly. You use a lot of agricultural products, I presume. Mr. GELSTHOKPE. Yw, we do. Senator AIKBV. That i> where most food originates from the farm? Mr. GELSTHOUPE. Correct. Senator AIKKV. So it j* very very im|>ortant. I don't like to have mergers, go on. 1 don't like to have tntTgcn. of a dozen nmall farm. I don't know how to stop it I hough because many of tliein couldn't stay if they didn't mergt>. I also pas* up any rnon> question*. b<it I had a i>eautiful net ready for him. Mr. GELKTHOUPE. Sorry (hat I am not. qualified. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ca^-. Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry tlml I a not ^ble to b<j heiv to hear ail of your statement. I had Ut join my rollwi.gue from \cv York and New Jer-y tt-btifying ou \\w projwiMi!, which is terribly irn|mrtant to us. Mr. GKLSTHOKPE. Certainly.
fAME IN ro.VTi\r;i\r;
ScijjiJor CA*B. Our prwtice here i to havi- thn j fwariugf ynwji <i\\ 1 ui (lie siunc tirri' xi tlm' a tiinii cuii't |xi-hil>lv ilo hi- duty. I don't know vdiul tri i\ti uhdllt jl. I cHiiiiot diMijrrve with unything you uy. I Mould tiik:*1 III' I'xrviilioij to u:rtain ntiainv^ mid âTfaili ini-lhod;. of i, I wiinli' pnl IC.OM c-iiiphtisN on the mutter 'h' ^<' NhonM it wi> intuit- a nii"(k'-. I don't regard if M a mistake alt iniliji. It
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come to be one as we have continued this war. But I do not say that \vc should not have tried to stabilize conditions in that part of the world at any time, I think we should have. That is a detail and I mention it only because I think it is fairly important to make this clear in the record, at least for some people.
FCTCBB CJ- INTEBEST IN WORLD STABILITY
The reason I make this point, sir, is that I am concerned about the implications of our action with respect to our policy in the future. If you take the view we have no interest in the stability of the world anywhere outside cur own borders, this could be very bad. I don't think that is the position that you would like to have us take. Mr. GELSTHORFE. I would not. Senator CASE. While I agree that we should not police the world, this does not mean we have no interest in the world or even that we have no interest in trying to use our military strength in proper situations where our interest is involved and where the interest of peace is involved. I say that only to illustrate that while I agree with your basic thrust, there are some little things that bother me a bit about it and that was one. If I seem to be haggling about this, I am not. Mr. GELSTHOBFE. (Jh, no; I think it is a fair distinction. USE OF "DISILLUSIONMENT" WITH EESPECT TO YOUTH QUESTIONED Senator CASE. The other is die use of a single word, "disillusionment," in respect to our youth. It troubles me a little bit to use that word because it suggests what youth originally believed in was an illusion. Mr. GELSTHOBFE. Yes. Senator CASE. And I don't think it should be considered thai. I think belief in this country is not an illusion. The greatness of thin country and all it stands for w not an illusion and, therefore, I think it is rather unfortunate to use the word. I know that many of us use words without thinking about their possible meaning and effect. If you will accept my two minor, somewhat niggling, *uggetftins, I would like to accept your whole thrust of your statement. Mr. GELBTHOKPC. T will accept them both because I agree with you. Senator CAKE. Thank you.
SIMrLABJTV OF WITN'EKri' RECOMMENDED PEOCEDCRE TO 8F.TTLEMfcVT FRET
Tlie CHAIRMAN. 'r. Gelstborpe, if I under*: f nod you convetly :n answering Senator Spademan, you believe thitf the naming of a uptfific dot. a i* provided in one of t)u< fifuponitls before the x-oraniitu-e, would in ilwlf bring about oihr <'ti<?ns *u a* prftgMt* in the PJTJ* wiK-e talk* tottird a solution of thi* mutter. Ttrtt 'i J un<Jent(<x>d you in *v iu \ir. Sj . Mr, GKumKmpf!. \eir. The CjftiKMAV. J }> understood frori vur de^'ripfion <f Ihr way you tlj'iuglit tirforenau thind/'VcJoprrKfif that it would b
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to ibe way it devel<i}>ed with th,*1 -French. The Fivnch sottlfint-iu in the Geneva Accbrdsin 1954 did provide for the withdrawal offerees on sort of a separation but of die various contending forces preparatory to'vlections which would ik-tarmitiv the futnro of the country. That probably would hav- been iipl>vnvemed had it not been for our iutorvt?nth>u in support of Diem. I Think-that is a fair statement. &I tin; procedure thut you are recommending would be very similar af least, with, variations-of deUit n -to that which the Fivneh took in 19">4, if I understand vou correctly. Mr. GELSTHORFE, "i'cs, sir, the 'precedent aft, I believe. The CHAIRMAN! Yes.
MLSTiKE IX POLITICAL JnXJEMEXT
I hare already meirticmod it, bin tbo Senator fn>n N<*w" JITWV I>roiniits me- to sav K word i>r two about itio nmcepi that ?% wv have rnadi'a rni>thk\ *To m<1 i( i> a mistake in |*>lilical judgment. T don't qvrsriun ihf motives of the leaders of this counny in ihe Iwjn'mung \vlejj wo âvi- aid Ui Kraniv to inainluiti her cuutrol of *he ctiloiiy, b:U i* was i> deparrun- fr/mi all our tradition?. 1 know nf no otlier <:a^ jp v.-KieU this coimln- took The? part of the raioiiin) p\ver and-îiive f-'-t -ywis of rnulcri.-l and rtjîiti.rin', uiora! a> H<-JI as niat-rijil. to inuiix'iun it...All throughout our histe.rj" since we our^lves relx-lkd from .]\o British, \vp liaxi'lMim'bynipiiiiit'tic to t?i i colonial jireas-. J lhi:ik Jiis is not a irt<ral question, that we were mistaken in that. 1 s think it was bad political jndjrnrs)t. What bothers me about tin? insis<.eiir that we shoultl not say it is .a mUlake is a kind of an assumption of infallibility. Thi* is the "controversy Mt the very core of the problem today bothering: ^he Catholic Churdi, the /|ue>tioijintr of Inn principle of infallibilitv of the Pope. I don't wish to pet into that except to say it is a difficult problem to <ieal with and is causing and lias enured gi-ea.t |)robleni& within the Catholic Church. Senator CAPE. Mr. Chairman, if the chairman would permit. The CHAIHMAV. I was trying to develop a thought. Senator CASK. I am so sorry. I just wondered if the chairman was making a dUlinctioii between the Cbuvh of England c.nd the ('atholic Church in this regard. The Church of England was never wrong Tin- CHAIRMAN*. I urn not an expert on thp internal problems of the Catholic Church i-swpt it |;>, be.en widely reporte.-I HI ihc press t!iut UA a consequence of one of the POJXJ'S AiirycliraU -tiiere has Ixmn considerable di-M-iit within the <-hur<'h on the problem of infallibility, that it is iuijioible for tue Vicar of Chri-'t to ipake a niis>'uke in juJgmeat. 1 ,v'- problems in the r**fu.al t^t suy thai we are capable of a j>olitical misinfcc. I think of the Wt t-hn-e Pretideutv who u-wl to be Senators. \Vliet) they W'^re isci;atorn, no one lU-nibuU^l infitllibiliiy ti ihem. After they move to llXK) I'eunsylvaiiia Avenue b\ the chance, of jKifirji-.,, wf-Htv-epi the Lieu -th*l we jusl cannot. Iwjnjr ourbivc io io\mi\ ft mi~)nke. Ir seems ttj .KJ^ it i> c!<!rly u politii-rtl im'ulakc. 7t due* .not mean that they >m morally bad, Th<y re limited in their juilgnjent.
It strike iuc.it would not onlv be jroi>er, but -It would be good for u* to &dmit that wo Arc capable of mistake* just as oUtcr people '-.arc-.l don't rhirik there is any;iuslif>*ai*\.i for the idea that because we 'are a. big country this gives u* an aura of infallibility. 'I think -iliat it would be good for us, if it -jesJIy was a mistake,- to admit it. At least it is a legitimate subject ior discussion, and I like to think it was & political mistake rattier t'mn.that we are inherently evil people or ib&t we are morally bad. The : noral aspeft of it is another matuvr. However much T'in*y Lave criticized President Johnson's judgment, 1 have never sai4 and do not now believe that he was inspired by any evil design.*. He simply nuidc ft political mistake in judgment as to where tho interests of this country were. That is past. ' OF NORTH- VIETNAMESE LIVIXC UP TO AGRKEMENT Of course, that iu only relevant to the historical question. It seems to me this vouuw on down to Another line of your qii^tioiis about thtae <let*ils. What ast*uran<a> do 3'ou have, in ans\ver to Senator Spademan's ijues'ion, Umt tbc North \ltnniiiese would do everything that they1ftgreod to do aboui withdrawal or whatever it may be? Of oourso, tlie-r* is no al>solutc assurance. But human nature unJ ordinury judpmciit, it seuni^to m<>, wou.Ul itn)u-4it* that. th>y,would like Uiis'Aar to be over. We are destroying tJ.eir coimrjr. Jf then- is 'n condition to wlu'c-h they ugrw-, they would do i' in oroVr (o.g.-t Um was- over. Why bliouM we Jw so coiu^nuwl thut. they ivouJij not do it aoy ,inor than thr would Iw- concerned we u~/>u]d not, do it if w> aJrreMl? . I? you had a negotiation, the {:obafniitu<s an; tint' Wfli îdes would agiw. I donV. know how you <HU cnu^r inU> any iiecotiauons and as.siinV' i-"1 this^br-giniiujg tijorc i an absoJul^. guaraiilci; thf.othrr side will ;livt- "P<<> iti pfomu<. Thrt-^ may not be au)' alôjufc guarantee wt< u oui({ live up to (belli cither. I' is the same for both. lief" aCrtin there is a certain HSMumption that arc good proplo and thty.oafrht to n-Jy on whitl w" .say in negotiation, bui tht-y ai* probnWj' bad [x-oplfa and w< mik't rf ly on them. If this i !/he &hs.umptio.',i thftii no negotiation i^posMbl*;, ^Jr OKi*THoKPt. iVoquuKiiou ai>otit it. 'I'ht; CHAIBVAN. By that kind of mi nz,imtpti(ai you arc. outlawing aiiythlngcxcc.pt for.'H.i in/inn it just stf.}s' you mu'l make nn agrw)ticojt. Fuinlatiiontully u-hat I tliink lias iuliibit^d any agreeuu-nct; at SALT uiid fiay n^nvm^nt^ even" in the pi>tii> the asMimption tlm* w c.n't Jiiukc Jii agr/wnu'iit Hitih the Ku^wn* 'be*uuh- tltt-y -are bud pecrpli; and we tfiv. good jieoplc and we, c*n'l ugr'X! on th<:ir taking tu obij^rutiou whu'h they would live u]> to unlcst we urc givun an ul>si>lute fo^{>r(X)f pro^raiflof iri>j>t;ctioij,j>fjt}uituc' can go set everytljing thy d o . .."-." . . ' - - - _ . Wh'vti f 'iiK-'rnplate how rnueh m.tr (iovernnwnl trie.-; tx? nrvrent f/*c f'onjzre-* fmin knowing what L-* ûing on, lhi_ di>e rjut a(peal to-jni' \ejy rritich, hecauv they still '^'.to liw serf <it<fs| liuu> tî pp'vwif. this winmi.t r and tli Senate frooi knowing -^;laf is going on {"day, ftifl the -ivvjoiis a(]jriiniJtrnrim:ji5rju>it < bid,, S.- j -dini'i hk*- and, 1 df-n't ef^ with the *p;imifrtioH that you just \'ttu'i tru'tt Uiern if you g into a negot'aijyji.-'i'JM; truth til (he
-*02
fnattr Is -their ovu :"lf-interest. They have a greater self-interest in getting: the war ovw Uu>n we do. While it is bad for us, it is certainly wors* for them; isn't it. ~ '- Mr. GELSTHOBPE. Absolutely. The CHAIRMAN*. We aj e not doing them any good by continuing to flump these bombs evr.y day, these enormous raids with these big planes, divmping ions >( explosives. ' ^ Br. vhat I aiu Coining to is weighing whether we should designate a <kie. to get out, whirh you agree ar.d I certainly agree would promote ' negotiation. JF.t is a fundamental requirement for the negotiating of .o-jW things.
ALTERNATIVE OF CO.VTIS13NO WAR UXPERUIS'ES ECONOMY
What .is persuasive to me is toe alternative if we don't do it nnd w hat the war is continuing to do to our country. The signifir-aiire of your ustirnotif to J'u.> is that as an important businessman, intiraate];aesocimuvJ wjth the ooiKiitions within our <vu)itaiisf-ie economy, you f the war is uiidenuining tlit> economy. To me this is extremely " f see no way to ûestiui that. I think it is true. The fact, that you, as a great businessman and the. bead of a fine, company, think so too, nwkert it all the more persuasive that we are ourselves undermining our own strength by the continuation of a policy based upon n ,x>liticai mistake. I can't imagine that it is worthwhile, for us to continue to undermine, our <vopom>, both in a financial and in a social and political sense, for an objective which seems to nw to be of relatively ininor-importance t4i us. If we could have everything we would like in the world, as a matter of choice, we would like to set up a government that suit* us in Souti Vietnam, but & between that choice and something: tful is lw* to .>ur liking, if you com|>are. that to what ihe war i* doing ,to our country here at home, I sec hardly any reasonable doiibt-alxxit what we ought to do. Mr. <>:U7THoarE. I doiv't. Mtber. The majorto me it is a very simple--kiiid'-of <2'E.D.---lhi'' major probU-m in the economy today in this ojuritrv i* Inflation. I c*n't lu-Ip but bt-li/'ve tJiat the major contrilnuor to uifjatmti in <hU c-otintry today JH the Vietnam war. The ("HAiKMAV; That is right. . , , AJr. GwîTHOKPi;. Th- whofc i>y>t;tn we o|'rt mi is with juptifiablc prklc in our economic viubiliiy, aiul if we continue pushing goods info Vietnam which never i-ycli* bar:k into th<- econoiny. and that is !>n}i]Xtm with the defcriM- budget ohvioii-ly ami particularly a war liudget. I dou'f w any way to top inflalujn unk-s you <yaiit 1<" lacfcic fCf-fnicj- lontrols. CA>B. Will the < 'hainnaii pcruiit a , Sure.
WAJ:
1 J
AIU
I agri " uit.ii you about <lu- cffwt of tlie w, I am .|ii( ' follow your dUtinction b"tMu>n tlu- c/wt of th*1 war JS:n iiid in m*\nv.t to it
' 1 Ji'T
403
Mr. GELSTBORPE. Yes. i think there is a distinction in -that theoretically, ut least, foreign aid buflds the .economy of the country being aided aud, -therefore, there is an opportunity to do business with that country that has been strengtiiened through our foreign aid program. SeuaW CASE. This in a sense is ait investment w * customer. Mr. GEUSTHOBFE. Absolutely. It is through foreign aid you i>uQd a covnlry. That country could then become a customer for your wtaat or whatever, fruit. OF JOBS Senator CASE. Recently I attended a State AFL-CIO meeting in Jersey which was Addressed by a. Washington staff person ou the whole u.iii?tJon of export of joiw. There are people who think this can br rjirn.'d too far. You are not in that hue of work yourself. Mr. GELSTHOHPE. No, I think there is no question that it can be carried too far. & nator CASE. This occurs when American firms do abroad most or all of their manufacturing for our domestic market. Mr. GEUSTHORPE. Yes. Well, of course, that gets into the basic philosophy of whether w really can ever get to one world, whether we CAII equalize the standards of living and the pay, the cost of doing business dite nation with another bo that there can be some equilibrium. Senator ( 'ASE. Thank you. Mr. GeLfiiiuuFE. Currefltly there is
DISRUPTIVE EFTFCTS OF
The Ch.UBUAX. 1 wish you would say a word more about inflation. You arc sjniikinfc of iu cIVct on business. It L very difficult for busiuess. In addition to that doesn't inflation hare great disruptive effects upon. |xx>ple who art n rt directly ui busine( such peojAe as - hos<> who are on soria] securit ,-, pentooas, ^rerythaig that is tied in a. scase to a rather stable dollar \
\ir. GKI^THOBPE. Ab*olu(-!y. The <?C:A(.BUAW. This jôm^ts me again U>- Mr. Gfci^.THOKPE. Excuse mv for intcrrupling, Mr. Chairman. '
Tile CBAtKMAV, YcB.
Mr. GL;-THOBPE. 1 think it has aiVU'i don't think enough attrition hf* bwn paid to corjx>ra'e profit* &* a pcr<nt <*f HIeH. It is true (hit 'orpprations each day report record sales < earuinp*. Mjtny corporation? do. HuH'ewr, U]M\ d<Acr -tualvbi* you will 6ud tlieM' cwrnui^ as a ]>ermt of Milt1* are tlvcr&uiiip. (V course, Ml *omf pomt that bet'omeh dangrrouw. The icnniMiiate nact'<*t to thai., {rcncrallv {>**sking, is tlutt i.i xrdcr to gl eaniinpi back 1^ wliiU the Miarchoidi-r *wcl* thr>c ^-uniitis* to bf tlu1 cx^rjJOfttT^fi doe* the Cr.t t5iiiii ji rm *]i> tbf fn4U>i mid lh*4 to.kyt off jRu*jle. So that i a ruat/'ri.il <liiinttjjtf Uiut inflalii;!! do^^ twaiJM: obvtoiiiuy 10 get those u<rjK>ri(<' profits ba/-k a:-; * jwrmit of i*Ktiu%*,-ie\udi the 4-xiqurHt^*a Jx-Ucrv it huuld Irftvw u> kwji Ui.ir<4ul<^r j-mCd^c*-, i* Uys -off jH"pl', and in layinpr off fnujjik' it uinginJics tin- " if rLi* ififlatimi wen- in ouic coiilrulbbU* stale alul harportit carniup,
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as a percent of sales decreasing. Therefore, I-do not believe that you would find what you see today and that is some vary healthy corporations laving off people. The CHAIRMAN. So the inflation has a direct relation .to the percent of unemployment. Mr. GELSTHORPE. In my view it does. The CHAIRMAN. And the unemployment is continuing very high in this country; isn't it? Mr. GELSTHORPE. It is. And of course the inflationary problem wiv'i respect to people on fixed incomes wliich you touched upon is simpl} enormous. The CHAIRMAN. I m;p.lit comment on that. Already i-here are proposals being made to increase the period of payment for unemployment compensation. It was* discussed vesterday, and there are proposals being Trade. It is a kind of a vicious circle. I mean the more the inflatiof Mr. GELSTHORPE. You mean you will be eligible for The CHAIRMAN. For a longer period. Mr. GELSTHORPL. For a longer period of time, than in the past. The CHAIRMAN. There have been these very distressing accounts of the oxtraordiJiarily high unemployment for these returning veterans. It is a great tragedy that the men who have, been in the war and have been in Vietnam come l>ack and cannot get jobs. I think the testimony was that there is about twice as high a percentage of unemployment among veterans as among the population at large.. I believe the testimony wa something like 10 or 11 percent. Mr. GELSTHORPE. I wouldn't question that ai all. The CHAIRMAN. A terrible, and tragic aspect of the war was in the^ paper this morning. I think an article estimated there were 30,000 heroin addicts. This frightens people and I can see how they are apprfhemaVc about it for fear that they might become involved in this. We know so littl* about addiction in this country. It i* such a new and dreadful problem that it create.* undo apprehension. But that is another aspect of the unemployment problem.
MEAVIVG OF PRESENT D>iILT,T-SIO"JEj.'T
I want to pursue one other"thought about, this disillusionment. These are very ulippery and difficult r-ni5ejti to dea1 with. Whoi we and some of the students and others say we are disillusioned with pur country now, I think it is a different way of baying we are disillusioned about the policies we are following. It is a liUle different way of saying that we object arid think the policies we are following are wrong. It doesn't iAcan we have no eonfideJic/- in the future of the country if our pclicie* are corm-ted, Jf ue. fun htop the war and get back to doing what we traditionally did wjlh regard It) the programs for the improvement of the jUality of life of all of our people, I think this idea of dUhfunK.nirwnt would evniwratf. ] think that w auo&cr wy of Kaying, "I don't approve n,' tlw preiv-nt poliry,' it HP ^ a lîe u-rf) of \/ordi-, Hliirh wc'liave great diflic'uliy ditfic-ijl u i i h in e (v 'Kvery Une of activity th0->e duyx. We hnve thin semantic dift wily, ail Uie way from protective rjAdion trik/'i* to Vietnarnixa-
do the" /words mean? I dunV ihirtk that trieim theyhay^ given up n|ilfta[y and. finally- They are saying that, this is u &&- astrous course for "us to .follow. At feist, if 1 usmr-tha.i, word thjii; &_ " the way "I meant it. 1 don't approve- ;ofwh at we .arc<Iu*-ncwv It doesn't mean I think there ts no hope for the co'iiitfy: 'Senator .CASE. And it doesn't jiiean that you once had an illusion that what w* were doing waafl^fet either. The Ce /UKUAK. No, it doesn't mean that was the illusion.
Sena tor ÂSL. When we agree in substance, as we do, Mr. Chairman, I amvot going to quarrel with you about words. However, I dui't think that that really -is fair to young people to suggest that tmvv were oner under a happyillusion and now they are diaiUusionfcd. In both cases you are putting them down. . The CHAIRMAN. They grew up to bolieve, as I did, that this country was a fiberal country derated to the welfare of the individual. Senator CASE. So it is. ". ~ -..-
The CH.-.muAif. Now with the' impact of this war there has been ". great restriction upon many of those liberties. I mean this growth of internal surveillance by Ihe Army. Whoever thought that we would find the Army of the United Statea around supervising and .snooping on [teople who were engaging in puWic meetings to discuss public affa<rs. This is the kind of small thing that is dusfllusiomug. I never was brought up ou that. Then then, is the reaction to jwopie who sjKaik ftbout the public affairs. TUt-y ejcpress their honest opinion about the policies of this Government, and then have the Vice President of the Uuitod States denounce them as traitors. This is unAuirru-4U in the way I was brought up to think of as the land of freedom "to .wbjrfa iwe K.-ndd live. It is )-cry~ disillusioniug to find this kinrl-af reaction to a war eituation. '
CONVECTION BETWEEN VJKTNAM w/ji AKO DOMESTIC

lu't at'-tiviUnri whirl) all of u believe, if W could stop tlte war, w<> <xjuM ovwauui. I inwui \-az vcfr is, tUe t^notio'ud ba<-kground for nil f Uic -e acUviiit^, wiii'h I am sure the Senator from Ne:*' Ji-r*j'V'~diwip|>rovV's of-hâu-ierl have heard lii.ro 1lk about all thfse ttUTs^ The f!*usnl wnin-tio)i Ix'lwwn thr war and our ilbu*x* U Very difficult for jwopl*-. to pcrcvivt. Take th*'lVsln&ailUHi A^!*o:iatk>j* who WM- h*r yctit^rdav. Tlwir foi vry mveirsary money (o wrviw t-heir ]n-o|ili- 4i Ixvn cut in half. For im- U> ?ft uji :u>d >tay. "Woil, look one of the Uur priuci[>al rt-tttxHis yon can't ^'l. \\A* riiotH'V," bixtoiue tlwy un-d to get it, "is li- war," tht-y thijik I'wn wit of evadutg ih problfrn. Tjicy think 11 1 niKfd tt >lo w < to the ApjfOj^rialionit { oramifl^- aiul iii4st they ih<- {fuuK-y. Thib is on? ITMJU I am Mjrrj' tluit Mr. Carl Stokes uruihli* to rîrji- iJ.<s moniiiig JM-CHUK- of tlii* quelion <f U>e *. Why i- it.:;!u:t \:w York Ciy. which they u*fcd u> cnll the .-iiy in tl^ wnrlil. i* *<> hard pp-smui i-hat Uwy arp having to !M irwfrt fuaJauiûljt' polrfw wtfvuW/ i ilit- ujir, wlarli (ii tlu- inili.nl ri-a.-nii, Uw iri to llicir luck of fuinio. t 4-MitM' it iia draiiu-d off all ,y-ur, -I |j*:|jcv<' tin- ljil>rury of (Vwijfi-wi til, around^ a four liuuurf hi nolxxly cuii conc<*ivi' of it.
--
,'
* dol'ars that "an-' Europe .uow result jroni the tUTort 6f: Presin toj^tUTrôa.the war.uittiouf text's by finntreji luonex printer!. lox1uVanrc die", war. ix Mt. "' ' " " ihat upl--<ime.t;.*
_. . ... v fl-k.CHAi'iiAN. ThK Isîiit'.orijrin of jt, h^.1 it is harrl to ,aiake io ^ telttid.lo tiit fort .-that.-tbc wrftrbat.ctt'atetia^coiuiihas iatuif ft imj>o*al>U> fur t- "ojn;s.f f a n o o n a y ., ox-en to jwcf cut .such' AU idiotic"-project as -Uie-ABM'. Why om't w<vp"t . j vo! o>iio i4op tii jkiiiti of a luntiasiic project *-Lich is not w>yiy at ' '" It Is because the war i? tue-.c-jvotional background agaiust u"hich people jjetKHutted. .. . Mr. GJCLSTHOBPE. I agree. But I "-think the ABM wa* a very' historical wwneiit for tbeCongress forit-\vm- really the first time that Oongnrss or, .l.tidie-ve, iu my mind, that the Congress got tough in really investigating. " . SenatcyCASE. The SST. ~ Mr. GEUSTHOHKE. No,ou the ABXI. The CHAIBMAA-. The ABM. Mr. GELSTHOfirE. ABM" and, pcrhau* uiy history is jiot- correct, but to my Imowledgr it is the first time the. Cotigro-s went very deeply into a major defense installation ajwl questioned it at great ienfii 4id eame eJose to licking it. The ('HAIKUAN. I agree. Mr. GELSTHOBPE. I mean that was the beginning of a new sens*of. <xmgressionai respoitdbility xi^-a-vis the whole defense budget
Sciutor CASE. J <^)uldn't agrtn; more arid I was on that tiide. I think tli4>rc imvc L^j-ii a good many otJwr int.taix.-es lately illutitruiiw of i>.. Si'uator CAS^. Vlui. SST is one of them. Another is Senaior Mon^lal^'si and my effort to Rtop ^MiKtriictioii of a IR-W nurjoar carrier. Mr. GELTHOKPE. Xo quention a|out it. Senator CASE. And many other kinds of ex|M*nditure<> liav<" be*-n t-ut back.
EMOTIONAL ATTITUDE CKEATED B) VIETNAM WAB
Mr. GELKTHOBfE. Xo uitt-kifon about it.
But f thixik the uar rreati-w an înotknud attitude. The- uu-ii arc out fighting and dying and aitylhjng reiootdy relutt-d to t (; military in Mu'roanct Urause of the war going on, I think if you <v>uld g<-t llw war over, the CongreiK wouki !* much mor<- //bjcrtive and much nu>fv i-ffwiivc in qu^stitMiing such Jiings u>. ABM. Therean* ollifjv. I ijic-an thi> rili<-u\n* K - 1 H , You aw the oticr day that they are grounded again. ,Vlr. (jKi^THDhi'E. \f*, I Haw that. uinl et tljcy arc <-outinuing to buy tlii.i sjllv thing, ft hti tx-^ti going vand you <-.an'l t > t o i t U^-auvit iKnulittiry. It just |KM-il>ly on forv-fiuvand t>topit mi^lif ! ij-cful >rf)ni'- way orofht'r in Vietnam. It in't iiM'fitl. Tlc-y don'i <1un- UK*- the F 1 J j' They tof/lc them over urid tlwy f<-|l like flic'u i u J - t h e v <juit trying to UN- them. They even fell in i'olifornia the other liny. They ground them and yet they are continuing to buy tliem.
Tln-( 'HtnraAV. . 1 ..AMI nd w>inHhinggroiiiuIi-d. . Thev rcxst ^>10 million
H"tvs';>:Xdioti<: k^.hard to bulfevc- that a count !-y,Avpuld do it. Hou *nyb;'fdy <fauld say our country isu't capable of snfettdcite when you looV-ut what-^theyNwe doing vwth tiny!1-!!! and with the ABM is incredible. Why J-fit that only this particular inis'-akf in judgment mWi not he adJitalied? Thai- wc-niust. -insist that \V" were right is be-" .yor.fl my eompreh&naion. ".. ; v : Xfr-^GjExsThOBftE.- Well, I agiv withy<*u Y-ompleiflT:1 und tbat i> ike <x>int;J tncd _t>vjtake, thjiMxiueh of -the evaluation", \a&\ the kind of ^ . we ttfrv doing now of things-- >wh ;as thtis*1 ivhicli you have of
..
.
\ C.vrr. GEi>srTJ|<.ttPe.".AgaiD miîiia^fry: Wlien it busim-ss L* in trouble you" invariably inakc tbc uToi^"lât4<ms. You \vurk jiist as har<l to m.iko det-rîon?, b^r invariably tlicy arx> rho wroiigrnlec-jsions. T-hfr CiiAiitMAX. It is flu; saiiw \vaj*-w.ith.!*iia.*..Tlic day before yc.siT(]y, I bftiiovt', a Hl-tJe 77 judhoa *rseiî^ fdl into toe ocean. .Nobody tôniVd to rare about it. Yd. velujvevsin jjwfwl .time veuiup a luouev; a--. I say. fur^tho &ural EWtrin' cation . AsôciatJo;, : _?]<wtririty U> ivrat. jxôplc. They don't ha vc.tlie, money. The ent hli-s iinp'Hjndod^^ million out of huixirejl mijlion dollars whicli was apitri^jtriaUtd tor wwrr and wat<?r.jwojn-Hi>,. I{ isim]>oundcd.. That U . less' lltftii this littl<? pa<l?et tliiU Ml in the o^-cali, N'obo^y seente-t*> -car* .-Tiwy are ffait" to do if aûin. TJ*ey.aUv'ayv have-tu'o of x matter how bad it i, they .{m-vo lo havx two of ' -. flrie^ failexl on Utr-juoon bupyy j-est^nlay. lliwe was a u ouderf til picture iu
GftOWTH OF MILITARY
Mr. GELSCUOKPE." It L-; intre.slju: of the top fiv*-, and inv fai-tsare not. abw>lnu-lv tururau- in terms oFbeins blc 1< quote die sjMjfifk buisuie*'iC!>. tt*h'ii you think abmt jf it is very idinple, but when xvti firsi ri-nd it it wax shiH'kino; to nx:, in u-rniit of measuring the ourjMit overHlu- la.< 10 years of tb^.'uidrod fasu?-t gmwiitg indus,triei in tliis thrw out of the fcp live., nrl I raii't jji^c yu llieir rwuV order I don't r<>'-4ili thciu, ure all niilitJtry but>irufiKi>. lxT OIK-, I <1o rnneinix'.r, >% t?inall anu> aijd amiJiuniiion. lwr Jljr', I do miifmlxT, u'a*- <irdnaiice and l)t>4ivv anjinunici tht titles', was anoilif-r IHIIIIJ unit ion jrn r^'at<uJ industry. X u|)pa]Jii)g to nu-, and \ run undrtu(i(i diîllusioiiziM-Jit in even the proper **-n*' of the vôrd t'n* Senator (^'ae u.ed it, if a vounj; ha-> IHUMI IjroiiÎtl up ii beliexe tlU is e?*<Mi<Jally a ptwe-Invinjj In find thai kind "f a Mtîaiimi ])revailin^ no*'. ObivioiiKly the Vieuium wwi JJ i *'a>y 1^1 ui-'d"r!.taiKJ. Bn< it suys th< w)fni-ihin<; ha* jjoin- HUTV, in my opinion, in the. whil<- i-thjc iluit we an- bcliavjnfj by. But that doenii'f t*ny, Seimlor, that tt-i- u ill for- v-r remove oiir^li'1'nfroTii HIIV iiiN-rnationaJ involveiijcut -Ah'T' 1 nnii" urc inndved. I don't bi-lii-vc ny <>f n^ would rerojjinicnd t h a t Iwûusi- weran'l fon-M-*- tonv>rrovv wlu'i'e wMiietfaiiipnuy Iw required. SeiuM/ir ( "A.-K Tlii* mini, our '.'hiiu'ruaii. if a ven t<jdi fellow. He. jji>ii , 'ip<in niir not only H^n-i'iu^ uiili him in kub-taiic^, but a'î in hi>- mental proo-wii-*. I caji iniderLund that IMVMIJM* h<- is < highly
408
educa-ted fellow. One person, the President of the United States, referred to that on occasion many, many vears ago. The CHAIRMAN. Now, now. I don't think you ought to endorse his war of describing it. (laughter.) Senator CASE. No, it isn't proper for me, in view of the age which the Chairman and I grew up in, to re(>eat that over the public address system, but we all know just exactly uhat was said. I am only kidding him because he is so damned persistent that I accept his formulation. l/httvt to go and and I just did want to get it on the record that I love him dearly, I agree with him in substance, and if he would just lay off this insistence that I take the oath every morning when I come into this committee room we would get along better. The CHAIRMAN. Neither would L Mr. GEJ-STHOUPE. Thank you. The CttAiBUAN. I appreciate the Senator's coming here aud lending his prestige to tiie meeting. Senator CASE. Thank you. The CaArBMAV. Mr. Gelsthorpe, you liave beeu. vcrv patient. Let me see if I have anything else. There are a few thiags 1 would like to get into the record.
C.H. SECC8ITY IF iHUTAHV SFEVtHKG WEHE BEDVCRD
The Joint Economic Committee has estimated that the spending for nation*! security purposes ia tiie 1971 fiscal year will be $106 billion compared with $72 biffon in 1465. This amount* to approximately two-iTiroVof the entire budget, excluding spendmg^from tlie trust funds. lx you think thitt. the citizens of this country- woiTu fc^l any leîs secure Jf spending for military pui poses were reduced substantially i nd the fnnds used instead to meet, some of nur pressing domeKtic . Mr. XjrELSTaroBPE. No, 1 do not. The OBAJBUAV. Tlifere was a pro]osal jjending, I ieliev, rf cutting by fowcring tlie" ceiling rather tfaafl by spe<'ifi<: weapons *yst ,'ms. I think this lOonuug'ri pnjter aid $7 billiwu' I would t3te it {rotn your answer you would appro\-ft of that and you would not feel yourself or the <'j>untry less secure if that were doue. Mr, CHetSTHOttPE. I wûld not. Tii CHAJBMAV. JSVither would (. (Table prepared by Joint Economic Committee follows :)
409
TMLE SL-MTIOMM. SEOtntr vnea

(!
IKS
UH 1172 Auo U7D (alteiti) (atiMli) Utt
MM*. wUUiy iniOnci tod ddum . 000*Ur"

Atpmic mcrfy Spct itMtfCD ind ttctmolaty . . US.AmtCoitralMdDiaraiMM*! A(ttcy . (MffotutiM Baaed Halioul Swiity CttiMil Stockpilei.
SttoCtlH MTWCe
4*. 173 77,373 2.4O 1.237 2.S2S 4.721 5.0)3
77. ITT 1.3SS 2,49ft 4.247
77.1S8 UK 24S3 3.J4S

11
4 1
73.370 123 2.27S 3. 3d

10 4 2 27 -1(7 75 10 -271
74.7S 1.V27 2.311 3.151

1 2 30 -24 .
77.CSJ 2.W2 3.270

> 2 30 7* -Kl
EMfgMcy pttpandnta. . DMluctoiu tot gfltfttinf Mctipti Subtotal. ..... Piyventi lor pin win nd 4dnti praftM. Vftttnt bCMMt .. lotvmt' . : StMadl Froiixoi lusttfwd oa (roandtol fûoial hDPiCtod Aru idi9ol lid ' Subtodl .
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j.
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24 544
25 409
2SJ 2(3 SIC
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29 492
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no
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JOt.Oli
107. (57
1C7.C01
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000 Miifttry ttOutta. 000 civil wttan which toUM $1^00,000.000 INS. m000.<0J IKI: JI.JOO.OOO.IMO in IKt. IlÛ.aOv.COD HI 1*70. Il.400.0grj.000 n 1171 (tH<f<C ll.MO.000.000 m !*72(tiilt). urf n.40w.0,W6 tn DMT tfctlwn( wrxxily o< 197Z. 1 IntliKlM mtliUrj auitunc* profraa (1*^). wpo<1i*t uUne. crtdil ulc. Md ptrt ( * faod-<M-pette p<rwi iddc4 oullrn far miliunr auRtMC* ctpoMC <**dd tkiMfl) DM DtPWtBt* ol Mrntl ' IfcUtrfU 7& (WKint ol UM (KO^rMi < Poficm c< (iiociunt edMr HIMttWMli((*d. kv b*H imUM n tk* PM n tuintirf to nn*l MOK*. iwtati UM <IM<1 MMM UighMy SritMi, th btptrt potf*. 4 ott*. f k* CMuMtti i*Kdi to lurtMI iniljCM IM
ioutc*. UuMl*d ham ti&attxVZ. Bait*, moot r**ri. fiEXJMENT OF SOCIErV HIT HAtU>E*" BV
Then*- are r.JtJ. Thf, ttfe not vfr\' r.uixn-taijt, hut I tliink they would 1) intfresting in the record. Whttt s<grnenti of our economy, our biiMiR-ns, and o>ir wciely, do you tliink are hardeuL it'll by iiiflntioii? We toudud on thin, but didu't tuake it vm" c\vta. Who are (he p-eaU-^l wafftTe.h from inflation? Mr. (iELnTHoitPK. Thcrt- ir> no qwstion tjiat tlw p-eatflKt suflTcren*in i> of iii(iivi<iuid s^mwits of our wx-iHy, firxt, tire those Hlio a^ a lt of inflation ILH.VC Uvii. iwd off. Now UitU IA rwovrnlil, but l tj-nn tln-y an- .uHmiiC tli io-t, 'J'hat i>- not to Day ttwt aU the luyolf.-> nr- HS u ri*nult of inflalioii ol*vuuiJv. S<'j<(txJly, 1 Kotild jruew. tliow oil lixwl ]jic/ni, tlw aged j>runarily. 'ilnrdly, prnimbiy Uir^- in th i>o-<-ttuYil wliilt <v>!Jar i;iululc inanttrnu.'iit leveU nliere, hy un<! Itir^c, llu-ir innunc hai> not kvpt up MK Hr'< - tii''Iy ith lias tlw income of fitljer M>or or /nore M-JJIO" iiiaimjfcnjcni. WJiMV the iiu'iifw <>f inni'f W'tiior HIM! higher manêriu'iit ha mil kcj>i u|>. t]j/-y olmouhly hvc. ^rcaU>r ritn^' (/< lnunih- tli/ 1 infiitt4n ii;i'b]cniH unyhow M> I would tr^y in term* of the jx|Hilu.tion UU>M
410
But, you know, you can go on endlessly because if inflation is damaging business, as you ]Kiintd out earlier, then those j>eo|>le who are m greatest need, the disadvantaged are suffering from inflation. Nobody gains dial I know from inflation.
ENDING WAR AND RETURN TO NORMAL PRIORITIES SUGGESTED
The CHAIRMAN. This is what bothers me so much about the way ue l<xk at our problems. l>ast year and again this year the President and the administration generally put great effort Ix-hind a new approach to social security, a new program to help the aged particularly, aged and unemployed and disadvantaged. 1 couldn't help but think all the time when we were talking about that that really what would help them more han that bill would l>e if we *topj>ecl the war and ix-gaii to ;}o the thing* we normally would do; woiiidift you agree? 'Mr. GELSTR.OKPK. AbttilnteK The C'HAIKUAN. But we allow fhi> war (<> go on. This is like taking 10 extra a>piriii-> without getting ii ilic real evil thai is uudermjm'ng the economy. Mr. GELSTHOKPE. I think unfortunately many of the citizens.of our country view it, and I think they do new it this way; I maV-be wrong. I think they view tin- Federal budget really &< an iniinite tiling thai-can go on forever and, of.eoiirse/thxt ia encouraged somewhat by talk of deficit *]>cnding and deficit budget?-, and so forth. But lite, fact of the mutter i> no ccoiiomic entity-i- infinite. It l>u.- an end, and the fart that it has an cud stty> riiat at wlmJever |M>inl thai end is if you are >.|>endiiig this much doing something whicJi js unproductive, that j the war, it. i raking moucy away from sonwthi..g uJiich could U- productive or U> belter the quality of life. But I don't think really our ]>cople uixlerMaiKl this. I think they believe that somc.liow from soincw' "J'o and ilii'V bc<'4>me a/u-uxionied to Mich Taxation over a jx-riod of yeiwv. Of <ioursfi, a major problem with the economy of the country if corporate profitb:as a jK-n-ent of net sales fall, ami lhi< is pretax, the lux that accrues to.tirt; v G/ivernnient U leM'iie<i as a (K-rc^nt of the volume, that Lusinons docs, IMH! that luts a very negative effect on rnakiiig mojity available arid is 'a part of inflation. The CH VIKUA-V. So the Federal /jJovernnMMit sources are dn'ing up. Mr. GELKrifoitpK. Abnolulely. .^ - The CHAIHMAV, They talk ubout revenue;Blaring. Tlmt- terî haii 1 such nicJ Mirt of feel about it, . : ^'. .
Mr. GEI>THOKP. \i--.
The (.'HAIKUAv. Tt;eiv is <hi>* feeJing"we are'gomg to siitire with cveryl/ody. We will have ii, the neighborhood of tf $2.r. billion diîcit; isn't that runvt-t? . Mr. Ct;i,:rti:oi(i'K. Ai/x'lulefy. 'J'he ('WAI*MA\. It JN an imrfi<!U>1e irratinnajity. \ don't know how else Ui de-M-rilx-it. _ ." - , Mr. GKi..vrHo.'(CK. Thai- is the Ji^lhisioritiH-nt in the M-nsc ihut Senator Caw.iihtyj ii. ? ' - - " >
The < 1 MAII{M*V..- Vou <Jlfce. t('i.,(jlic>;tioll of <lit- Mew |H\ej-1y program. Thoôf.iit* who Imve abxjij'A' j>rof4-sMvi MIJ iirUTc.-t in onr fellow u-RU aj'e under gfe^l jrr.^sure, { c.Mild hardly vote JÛJJJKI it and yef
^ k4 fcrling tliis {; run the ria! iiciv.rr to tin- question. This i-> a ptUliamV. The n-al answer is stop l-tie nr.r. Mop tho military ]M'iiliii;, Ap*i k'-.riiL to u-e one irspuf;o to Uo.ctuiH' iliinj?* wlbicH a-oufci'mnkt Mxial Miairity or [HMisiotts or
OK
S fo~arp clinic a! it, it wvins l-> >, in ti- -hopclcs.-. muniifr. Ff i'. ii'fis-ou, aâm .' c-omo Imfk TO 'ho first ttiinyr you suiiL thii.i'- ili'-ipuHl i?i!li'niiinc-ark(J ifi^tmy w.lwt * litii think of a:, die fnr*--rttri>ri.M Mr OKiivr.t Th- (..'r^rCMAN. Wi' *ill liavr t> :' ti u >-in >nfnrf[:t r-v>:<-iii if w- <-oiirinu/- thisktii.J irf jx Mr. <J:iJ*ToPK. Thai is wh.it t.y.niri'T i.. Th*-"< .' \IUM IN. I Mr. fifc
.
-<Mn- mil in tiii ab-nrilit;. mt*l i!'i> i> lianl U. :.-;li. li .- vi-ry 5itu>I Jo-M'li t.i tli<- : I. J nifitn for m.- . t*Si tLi-tu "N>r. W'' IIHVC to jiir^Tj:c war \ < r lir.-t." I'lifty think \o an- pluyiif*; wbli i&-m. And Cftj> i-. of -. fiiniTajii. ntaJ. I >upjjnsi' you ivmti>1 <y this Ls r'p.-' jiun"inn of a
_\fr. (iKI^THOKPK. Of ('(rHn-H. *V UP- ^<>i[|J>. t / H i . you f
V,iu it I'-rriitli' tnv'iioruhm- prohltMtr-ivu. I think fc'i^viii-r-lii !CJI.WIIÎV ^r'itUT jroL|:^j. vi>-n-vU IOH: ^tr ruipK'y th<t<-riii. \Vi- huv<- ni'vi-r ha<! u wnr wiini {mvn-in- bt</>'>if ai^v proportion whi-n ihi-n- liu->i^ Infri a> n ri-ûli nf rir>vw.'jir a prut >m ^ ii'initii'l. S iln-n- w nic rs-\ --there w*ii** M riul need f"r
*Vhat i- fin- ]hsi(i.n of l)Hvii(,-> for fhc r<-ti;ftip -\vfi-ran? Thl'oi'l\* *n\ husifuss cm. ri'*lly, yiitil tho i-i-oiioniv vnnti'ri>i!lv >(urt-,uKr\'ciV forwunl. -<> [iln.ii>'. v uw to<rnon n\rrtirni> nn.l trfHii-iiJoiiâixvi'trutioii of proilijrlioli. 'I'hf t.'ih' Way c'huf tnMHi>* ra.. i-inp!o\ l'ii--j' iiit'H 'U-Mii; bii/'fc froju thi* > -fvirt' ! iii do ii .-irnjit) njt --f t i n - "(jiniiK-Sn f liicir nr.irt^ I ilirfi'f fjh >ir to iniiki' tiiu* .oiard fif ctioi>^ J -lh:rtlA îviiijr tin-in pr(i't prolli-n,s or fo |i-t SMIII- of 'hrir n^'il/if <-Bipi'>rji<-li to t i - , roimn-y uhirli ;-i. îtr'fd liy many lni%in'ij-.. nipi i.nforiiniiitcly, f Miink. you \vj|| fl-jd in muJiy in-tariri-^ ihrir i-tforis .trr vi'aninvr. Iiu- lr<-ii t^- ivlioli- l>n. i>i-i> ii.*rrjif'''yin'.; tfi<* ;;i-il f/>rti' p .' jiîtin. n^ n t --ulr of inf[a.f?'n, i!ji."-4'<'ir!pl:>\jiiuuf i^r.-.iii- whirli nmny c'.rirnijiii'- !iv'. fti I'HipIoyinjr fJi'; di-<, ur<- -isinjiiir to jr > ll"1 ii-t.-,r<;, Tln-n- i-n'i SJHHK.V to ;!'> it ;ifi;> lii.iiliiniii |ir'>jiinbl!il \ , iui'1 1)1:11 li:u-. n /t'-ut di-ul fo <!i| wit.li i'.. I IIH-II:I fii.-itic.^ niM-il tuki- t. îviit rr(> -o-j''iliiy for lio'li. f for ifii- di-nrivuti'ii^'*'!. tli'^-f vlio Inui- i'in * ran ^1-! idi' ii'unoiny ^''.'Jii^ iiîiiri fhc/i 1 J>ii nrr'i'f fafnK lo Ji. iii- (i. \ci-iiriu-;. (. fiiriln-oiindv.'liL-i'ii:i-ifl^(ii.ir t a i l vvlvjrti { HIMI fi'i-J I- '-OH'".^', llj4'V pcoi-tf cofilillK la'k ulw^VX i>rrvioll.|v . Vo llliTr i- Mil !U'"jJ,-
412
DjvPKNUENCE OF PUBLIC PROGRAMS OS CORPORATE TAXES
The CHAIRMAN. You prompt me to emphasize a jn>int. You have,
many hnsineii&ncn have, properly expressed that profitability issuing down and -iho profits will inn be sufficient to satisfy tin- stoekholders Whai'l waht to emphasize is thai, approximately half of the**- profits, a> you say, go tii the F"deral Government in taxes. I* is not just thai pome pf.i|le have sort of a distant feeling about big business aud say, "It is ti.it my affair; it is just those shareholders," but everyone of lioxr prvrani> that affect them direetly are dependent U[H>II the taxes (laid by The corporations of which you are sptvkmg. Is that not so? Mr; GELSTUOKTE. You i-an figure a rule of thumb that probably s.;.nVuher; in the tieighhorlhxxi, h. tally, of 70 pereent of a c<r|ioralions
'
Th;< 'HAiHMAX.'&'vent.y pereeiit? Mr. (icLSTHoxPR. Fifty-two jM-rceni to tlie Federal Goveniment. The CHAIRMAN'. I w a* sayinjr I lw Fede.ru1 Government. Mr. GKL.STK>>RI>B. Thi-u you Iiave got Stan-, rounty, city. The CHAIRMAN'. What i am tryiiij: to emphasixe L- tnul the projile \vio lix>k toward lwse prop-urns, whether it !* us.sL.taiuv to the Kiivlrifi'-iitioii A-cxniatiou or to urban renewal or whether it be tiioy annot di.-int^'n'sti'd in what happen-, to the
You arr- absolut4-Iy ri^lit. TJie 1'fiA.iKUAN-. Hnl many jM-opIe for^'t it. Tliey liear profits aitr liovti and they tliitik, "ThoM- rii-h >Jo<-khoIdrrs, so what, they ran afford it." They do not make the. vonneeiion ln-lwi-en tlie^- |>roâm ii- v.'iit h ittt-y lip- iniT<->(ed. \Vlwtlu k r they IK- farmer, or <-tty tlwelk-rs, ltn-y are juL > int < ri i >f4'd. fn fa>-l they j;et a bi^p-r take of a total jnvemie of the, riir;M>riilioii than d(t the sKvkliolders. ! thni not ><i? .Mi. (jKusTHoiii'i;. Mijrh liifsriT. T'>w <-'n \iuvi>.s. Tiiey don't re<-iûi/>- it.
\Jr. <rK,l_-THaj'K. No. thev don't. This U a whole
Tin- I ' I I A I K M A V . I rarrly fienr anyone in tlie-- oilier area.- roiiujir^'-nui and xjvn:j.imr auy i-oi:i-ern ulront tlie heulth of the i-orjxrutibuîn'w- Mr. <Kf>'rHiti'K f think tlx- otily tin)'1, and, ihii i-> H. ;reut fiiiliip- of our edifatianal *yJe.ta Mill resjjerl U> busine.v^'s. i|>e only time y>'i Iw.'iir jK'<>|)lr U-Hjjr < "i' erued alM>ut the well lei,i;r of l)ij-i/n'v-> i-. whcjj eui/iluyiiifnt i.H involved. Well, that i.- a part of ii. But a.- yo.i hau.- ]>!.>( Jiointed oul, th'1 taxes, the ability of all bll->(i>e->-, to pay uv-. is aiioiiier junior KXiiriliiiiiun busni'-- make?.
all of tl:<- <.rovernifii. > nfx mid p:ir(icul-irlj iln- Federal (juterinnenl.
E OF D<;i.r,Ak.A rMFHcrur IN
The
< ' j l A I H M A S , 'UW tiiKe^, of ru'ir.*'. UP 1 ill' 1 VefV - l d > - t a l l i e of
J > i f vi. -I i-): to roniflK'Hf :it itU U J H U I the .ipiUiealiee if thi> P'eent di!iii:iiii''v in Europe w'uli rernnr"{*/ flie dolliir? The JHI|HT- len\c the inq>i?^--l<'H or -'>llie i o||]HWIiliil"ir-> /lo l l j u t AlU'Tirim-. nenl not be im c-OU'il ,rlii!jl l l i i - . 'J'lij- J- il mi;ller dentils;; ofdy w j l l l the '-J;leri<
* - h i f ( f!i' 1 ( i e l l i i ' i t i - . ,iic ôiliL' I" i i i : ^ " 1 '" I n i - J ' tli' 1 prire uf tlirjr !lti^
((''.tiiii.i.n <t r iiiiiTii;iiiini)i! i'-x<'lniii(ri< ntul wh;ii if i' ^'lin^: in tnean iim-'iii''- nii'i <iili'-r 'Mi';;- i'd H i- MC' ;^niir t<; hur' u- >iny l.)i >'i
413
have any comment at all to make upon the significance of * Development in'xvbich the Europeans have, in effect, devalued the dollar aiid said the dollar is Dot wort 11 what it was? Do you have any comiin tit AS a businessman? Mr. GELSTUOEPE. I think il is very significant of wlwt i( says regardless of how it effects the individual in imported X'ttrs or our . exporting goods. Regardlet^ of what it may do U> our interest rates, what it !*ay> fundamenrjilly is that the rest <f the world does not, rjc-w our economy and our management of our business affairs with th*s same kind of confidence that we believe they had in us or that we have.in ouiselves. It says essentially "you ar not as hot as you think y<,iu are. Therefore, vour money is not worth as much as you think U is worth." And I think that is very significant. Vhe CUAIKMAS. I don't want to belabor the point. I am prompted to say that the end of tbe war would do more *han any other single thing '.n restore that confidence. ^t^. (iRL^THORPE. Absolutely, alwolutt-ly. The CHAIRMAK. S there is a connetrtion. Tliere is an article on this^ sithjec.t in Time Magazine of May 17, in which this sentence otvuirs. It says, "Still, there arc actions that would staunch the dollar drain would be dc<jirable on other grounds as well. An end to the Vietnam war is the iimst obvious." Mr. (iELSTHoRpE. Absolutely. The <'HAIKUAX. I will put the article in for pur|M>se:> of the r< o'-rd. iiiformalion referred to follows:)
[Tram Tlatx Wjrwlnr. Hr 17, 1171! . DOU.IK Ccisis: FLOAI.XQ Ton iiu> Ri:runuv h.. th usual HI'KDSthe si- o the tidul nnrm^ of rooit-v acrrj-x natirm.il trixT-i. the roufiHion of touri^tr* caught milli firrciicy that n>> 0110 would taki-. tli<- UIIMOII nt ill'- M\vtit<-i\f\ luffting of finunw mini-tT-JjK wi--k' int<:'national iriQn-fn' rri>t.* wn. nertuinly tli"1 woM nniv World Kvi-ti .o, jl~< Cm*- Kravity i-uld i not N- n'iK'*i by tbon.- factors nlonc. .!> f-cri,iafi Kronomio Mini'-l r Karl Srlulk-r in order t<F î Kur.>ix-an on i.'-w rri'M.t-tarv iucn.MtrH, ! ni>Ii(ii\.nl nt fiol xîri'xl artjtuortl umi contnvcd. B'll it rt'UBkly Iveaiiic a [wi;tl revolt aEuinst the ir..S. dollar, th f-:ii(J:iliou .<lO!i<' of th'1 *'hol': tyl>-)n :<f W7tTli liriano1. For Mte !ir-t timr, iniirh of th world, nt I'ff'vl, tut.* a-kin?. aixjiit Itio dollar tli<-T)ii<i<tiif ilitit ;irrou.int Aiii<rinin tourist' ">rni-tiiiio tiJ; nb*"4l otti'jf cnrn-uii<>>: "How ruiirh f* that vu>nt. in r'ni
r tîin-k Prni-t. \(~wu>-k's <n'll.3 parfial II:-WIT IKT;UII tn 'nii-rn i- lb1 di<lL4r vitl IK Wf/rrh frwi-r If-nt-M-h' 1 murk-, \'i<trj:n> srljilliu^:iiid .^R'Nt fr-'mi ". ^' n if:<^<; 1 d)i\'-l'iiitt ni'oiinic in- JJni* "'!'' on atiir<i.iy. i.lie lmtiu<'>' tnmisfjTx of itu- -ix hn1 fnjwii:i {'IHIII.V n M. irk"i riiiUon- r'-l'iotrinilv r<*:(fiii-d 14 iMii.ur'iiiitx . Th"' uni!ii>ri/1 i:ii-ffilj- r nation' !> Ji-: tl if nirri'iirii- ' i!(>-.l"- -ri-y- .r l.ilj : price. d-'i luj mi -iniJ'. .i:-J rji-i/uii'J \*niii'i ri-rl.-iin ln;iiiri -.lum- or Ix-lovi lli.'ir >'.itfj v.-thi" f' ;i:."l H)III'-> c'-rfiMn fti.'iL t!i"" w-i.ild pruni^llv ti.', On Sijiid-ij' tin1 W--1 (;-r,u 11. t'jlHH'-i. rii'-i a'"! d*'r.'l'-<l ;."rnLii fl'/.-trunc.if ll>i-:ii.'rlc. S fi)IJ'<^--',' r' -.il'i.i'-.'.r,. Tin-.- riiii'n>-' ir.nl'- ..:> ii/-.ivil.'' tv'li 'i"r:)iJiii> i t r v ifw-v i-'itmot all'i'A I ' I F - ,M! ;i .,f tij'-ir iiKiin -. TJJ ir.-l neirli >.mi ! liu \vilh lii.il "f ' If i'..irk. Ti:r: f'.- r-<,.''>,i iiuin-ii r- miiuv:i no WoH- in f'i:>'ni|<'. lli<- f'.S. for i l ' s r di1' 'inna. .".' lr-iii-li hiii;iin M;iii*i r V^l.'r.' Sn'iird <J'l^':iii>K : lvtr-i|rf- m II.K.H.X i ; v f.ir l!i"' I' . |>'ln-;, 4 tMwtJ- and f'lll i.-iri(il>i'. in-nf." Sc-u.l^-r :M ..; ti--. .-J.rvr "Ttji; T.S. il iinl" nt ;iay. 'it> can iw Jonn'-r In I'/ii-rpf'-d with lK-ri:ii. !.'] : " |li< 'n-rti-' irj rri-j.- Ix'/'ifi TT,I. ii -on>c r'-inurkn !.- ScJifJli-r lei] new;. y;<-Tiiutrin( fi i!! T. i|i..[ 'i. rnuii whftd .'ion r:i;j.t .! ofliri.-j v.'O'iiof ihr Murk JII/'.-M- if j.n--i t i JT .'r ^f.i oilnt'>r" iiu!ii.-fjiMt'-l'. .'nrf^-ij KÛiiiii d^lur* fnr nmrk-, li"|ui;K
|IK>lH-<. '"
to i''|.if.ir o])y'tioii, Ch- -<|<i''.-'iliVr-i :tr- not
'
utnl!iiritiv>v.ll-<tirporatitif,*, -man'. AnwrirMi.. At imy <X<f time they fc'd hup* O.-intitii'jfif vsrwr moiiev*. n-:d tlH-v:n'tfivcr) U only prudent to' shift. fund*. mi of n t-iirn>uey tfmt took* *.> if u r.t f*/''iK vlur into ooo Uiaf (Kt^nw UMy to '' . . . li!*- hii|isrl. Once llw .[(euiiuUm tj*-Kan, it turned into a ,lami*le
::\ fpu i ho J.l);ii. iind CJWurd not <ml\ th.- iiarJi ln:t rx*v 'ocJH-r gtrunij; rurf jfr <iKH, Korrit?i"r> poun-d an urihcJx-vuhli- Sl.UUinu into (ioruiun.v la *. ""ir ITU W-rtu--cd.*v,.aod xr.hiij)vd vtti'-r iuat sum* nf iiollttr> for ^mldef*. jr- and i*wi front"-. Kvov the Japani** jvii lx-rmr m hawii. Tokyo."cun:u.-rri.U bailie liotduiir J.llnr> nuld $340 imlli'vi <>( f hem to the Bank of Jupan ft-r-'en on Tiitmday al'iiio.' . By n>idw--k, ovurt-nriK- lv tli<- onslaught. *4)- <vntrtl dank- r>f (Vnnnny, ThN\'V jljurf-<, Autiria. (i-'luinni aiuf Swil-a^Midrf*'<-i<li-du> na-io-od mi <JciiIiii)tii in dU:ii>. Tlia' left tn-x- cuuntno-' -iti/<-ii. friv ti Imv dHarM af w liatcvT j>riv. iln-y thoiikhl the (J>. cnm*iitr> 'di worth in^lc':il nioin-v .Vrit.'ordain b'Jl*-!!!)' f-. Z'irich railwiv r(.-rk." nn-1 Itdiiu liank.-r i-iilu-r w>'ilf)- 'ni'n ftcc-pl dollam fppi C.S (<>Hfv4sif nil or ut>iilJ-\rha-ij(' '"nly. limited i|iiiniitj<^ at UiMVlul*- IL-I nr.ioh a.* XI':,. ivlovt thi- iloltnr 'tl!i<-irtl value, I'Xen in Africa tlio dollar lnTjtifii<-a ~|i. !! S nnuiinti'd funuv iiimif\ . Th>- Itnnk of Kciiâ -t'>j>|B'<t lm\inKdIUu'ii ith K-i\:ii: ^hillniK1*, .iod Nir<il>i n>n>ni>-rrial Imiiti-r- r>, t-s'i] <ii.jlj lrvi4T'.H fiii Iv l i i r u n y urn-Hint, lartft-r than $H'f >. \\liiL- Kut.ija'afigowriiiwiii ofliriul- |iltiii?i-d iii<<>ariiiiul'ifhiUv<iki:lit nHi-fiite. 4 , Wr.\ v nrx,i->tl nuntituiiwd au aliumi iini- :ur of Ji-larlii-ri -nlm. N'iTrtii \iliuini-irnti>M,-i > firiuli(did offer uiiii- nvfullv iuiid<-i|iiui<- lii-lji tn |-Jir'ifM-n.r> ronutrii-K -trugjilir-p. K>tul> Llvdi-l'iuf ofdiillar^. h'-ir vnlii|>l<-. Ihrj I'P't-O-'-'d 1-i.tHon uiiy country ito: liatv. !> nU-irli ii)iu:uit'-il iMliir- to iini- lhi:m in li'iuli iiiti-n-y'-Sfc-jirriiK ' T.r.-.Tnr> i--iiri!|i - lint Vl:i*liiHKtiin |BTi*''d it> "di'^rjliirft l!ir rrriH a V!urrt|tf-<in (>n>l>|fii Hint Uu- l'.'ir"| :m itHii*Mi* ciuiUl v.-!4i< if tlurv iiiu:<( Ui -amply !. innrkitii; nji ili-ir mrn-iici' vahu A.- T Mi'irv S-cri't:ir\' Jf{ii ('aniislly U)Id [ii ~u:-ii ' Th.il i^ :i iPkulti-i f"t~ i|i< 111 '> >! !'!. u? I" 'A IK Itirf r i\tiL 'ii<^\ wmit to 'J'ii:i' ultmuii- ri-iiiv^-ni* :i iiii-n.-nliiii; n( l,olh the ilrj.tli and nariin- of Ihr fn-..H'Mii'i^ 'i" -i . n i ^ i i ' ri il'..ifi'i ' n n:itul-r of 111:1.01 l,nr.>]*':in riirri'nru--j H- i- 'I.Hd|i i)Ufi :;,. in, IIM iljjit"' iTi-i-. |iri-~iinru>lt ) 1'iilulnr- wjll lni.i- ttmr jiiKt'.v Mini (!.. ir ni;t Fi'it ii runn'it -"ilvi- 'In li^jc |r"M'-in' tli- a> p kii"<H of tiniliiiLi' -ind tic- iiriviil:il.li' iin|>;ti-t nf itiat wi-:ikn/"ir un i In- Mi>-rcuit>onul iii'im lry -A>ii-i.i Tin- 'lll.-ir- << uirnl r>ili in tfl >]>:il liii:iii<'-- >- -;.vl<li-li.-d .it th>'. Hretlon \\"'1 . N.ll , iimik'-l.iri f>nd n iii->- in l''H. lii''li vl up (he Oiriviif iiitrrn.-itiuiiiil t i i ' M - ':u; -trui'tiiri . Tlmi < t i i i i - f <ir.-, ijnforl.iiiinti.-lr, ridh-il^ u world I hat iioliiiiiu-r i-\. ti. t A: :li.- rl.i.1' of \\'nrld \V.ir II. tl- I '.S war. U:- nl* ii|i.T|nn-r. liiiunciullv :i- u.-i( - inililariK In |F:ir' ir 'lUr. >i li< 1I in Ivirl Kinx .'it'', of Ihi- tt(M' gold. .>. ii ..... ncrl ii.lv n.ttiir-il ih:i \Vu-<lu'>i;toii -li'MitJ innl-rt;ik.- l-i nurh-rf ll:c uorld ,i.'ii ; > ~ ' > in !. ;.l'-')i;iiii; fr Inr. I'.'irl.. nf r i i ^ n v l . .'. .TV il.,ll:ir tli:i' flowed 'ill f< t t , i I .-' f<r i;olo HI :i lf\i ii "^ iff _.{ S.'i.'i :||| *niiii!'. (lltu."' Litii>ri^ ^'i:ir:tfitei-ii to t:\ "!li< i.il \ r f l > i > > f'r i f i i - i r eiiiri'iH :nu! '<> f f f f t i - i i ' th" ;>rn - ' <>f lli-ir inoiicvi fr i::i \..f. in;', riinf ili.ni I' . fniiii '!) dxrd \':ilm- ifl 'ifi"'lii:i:il (r:idiriK. * Irnf UTiitlv, III- ->l!i> i.il v.il.r - i n- -iiji;i-r'l >> 1- litrd l.i tfold. I' 1 ' 1 (In-. -oii r;une r<i Ui , < i i V i J in "I'.Iliir-. -innlli.. <|'itl ir. in ttluil hu- Ii (n- : fan. .HI- rjicii-1' oflU'rW I ....... . w ; i - (lionchl to l lit- r.illt u jj.iod j- told. Tlr.- dll:ir t i i u - iH'raiix- tin
-I n . . | i l - l "f \:l|li' :i^.llli-: u l l l i t l ;ill o l l u r Iliolw; - III MM- lioli-f'oli'fi.'il'lit Xlofld ii !.':: iiri il.
\i J .;! < \> 'I IK- l l i < uri 1 1'-.. I I i.i I- f'ir 'In- il'ill ir <l'<i:iii>:inr>- ILL* 1'JHX -Hire !*' : > - m l r d I W m l ..... f {' > li:ilviii- of [. i , m i - H i - dct.i';'- l<i.j\ i;a'. e 'cmri'd I!..-, 'l-.II.ir- iiil-i fiiri-ii'n i i ^ i n i i - Mini. !).. . 1 / i i n l l i i i u l'r> i - ^ r iroii) lock lion ) ! ' < ! . . x|| lull - i i , in.iri. i .111 >'. IT \V-' i li-riii-'iiii u l i t i n nou li j |:J- :in i -tin . - f . i l >.1''i LilJiii.. in I,- <|.ll.ir-. .1 ..... yli ! i-l.uni / ! ; . .i. ( i,iiof K.ild Mi.it ;h.I d.i I f f i . mid M.. ii ...UK- Ii. f.i.-i, 'h-i.-jli ii'>r > ! 111 t l i i - i i i v v t i n - do!l;ir liui l n ' - i i ' . i ii. > i i d r i r i . r r i r' |>:t|>-T f i i r r ' dr> . i..irk<-i| old; I/ 1 , t lie ."iii,(n I i l l \ > -rr>-ii^(h -t iMi- I ^ ' ( ' I . P I I I . l l i ' i l . i - i ^ . : i i - l , 1 ' l Ii.l I. ! .1 |.rnf,,.,i,,i , ff. .'I n, I'm fix ;,- i-t.'ill.u- o f l . n r w .(.i .: i . i . I.M i. r-. l > - i . I . I - - I I K :i i i < l i:o-.i r f . r > i . - ' i ll- i i! . w l i - i i.'i i-ii.Kef r< /nr/l fli..(->!! ir / ' i . i w | i ' n i- ... : l . - i - l i . i i r-.m,;,,r,-.!.|- |. i-l,.il i-u- il I f ' , t m l l - I.' ^ , v !'.') , . --i;,. in. j . i r f i ' i / < ' , ! ij'ill.n il.r. ",;*(. I'- f n i ' . i i n - i i j - d ' " l i < i ' - ^- Mie - . - . ] i . r doll.ir in f-.f. i;". . 1. 1 ii( r i. 1- /IT.- f i i i .-i <l i In ! i'i;ni. I. :! j-.n.-ii ' , . .].,!! .( IN il..i... .-. ,11.1.-,. IH j-,1.- '., ilin;. r..i,v i ( - i .
. '
.-
415 \* - >
mm.iicv, in term* of dollar*, rise*. In x>fdc*- to prevent |>ricv* from fluctuating nV>r< thM the rule* of the *y*tcin allow, foreign central bank* muxt then li.tr uj>, thf Aiirpiu.* dollars-with their owu cummtia.. . '- -.. ,\" _.- Nonpartisiui Xondmlancv. After a apHrof worry abou- the talaneo of piyth>> IU60M, VVa<hirtKtna!< attitude U -tttied Into smug nonp*rti*n ' . HoUi lleimbHcui'and !V.tuocruc <>eoiii>iuist-. have argued oprply that the U.S. iK-od not worry about it international deficits. GOVMTUHCO- officials h*w taken tbr> lin. that any foreign nation unhappy ahAut nhtKirbinjc dollar!! cau pimply lucrett.V" Jhr -#tKo.l van*- of itc own cUrroncv, fcCtjnn*ny did in '196U, thus r?li-viiiu n<v.lf of-hiLvitig u> buy up quite *o~maiiv dollar?. -' fiach forei;pi- nrvjittuUon amounts to n partial devaluating <jf llw* dollar,, which liuriK Amcrirtn conMuuier*. If Ihw- dollar is worth fowt-r nuirkân A'QHîcuu hx to pnv jMiiv dnllar to buy I>cor4ii Hi-irtelUTfrîr Votkf'a|t'j) it hbini*. But r.-xnlitatioii.-i i>( fiinipi curr'-ikcio M\i I'.S. inilusiihy, ixriiu' tb*^' 4uvr thn .V iw 'rf Anivric;u Rood.-s cxpix<M>(xi in forriipi c'lrronry, jo/i niHRfr ilu-in more <^Mnprtitiv<; ubriind. CTC" " IM~\. w>i-k'- rrlti- Ki^'s pmfn^'d Funipân rrbfllirai at(inst thin iiiiiuitural l Aiiu-rienn Jonunnntv, and ind< d aKuiint tin- iuti-riuttinnl monetary CVMU-III it-Hf. TJxi oirtluvnL n>v |>ni\i- to IM* what i? rcquin'd otiittuilly to brinic on tth- I'tng-ni't-di-d ovrrlw\4 of iln- ylvm, fiul. In the i>hart tTtu, it could ftroducr th.ioi iii tin- world financial coiutnuu.i\. iiavi- lone r.-rnti-d the t'.S, jittiuwlc .toward iU deficit- (liirli (ill'n-iul^ cundi.1!v fliaractcrix*- lu* "UtJijCO 'liidrcf".i. ijirc<'nnnl nrc|H>i furor,*' for I IK- -UIIIP- ri-a,i<>ii-> Unit tln-.v pCnun- ^Vn.->hiui(lt>ii: they ho r->n.[t<-Uu\v 1r.lMiiaU S l!' n-vnluinp imtionV fcottorny. A (li-nunii irti, fur in-itatin . rui-i"* th'- price of (.erniau pnid- ti<)v-only iu 4olLiiv bul in franr-,. n-uW'-r-. :in<Mirr. :iuU uuikes th<v<c good- Iwrdi-r to x-ll in nil tiuirket*. Ttu- -jlt'-rualu.'. l:y,n^ up nil d'Jl.irx th;il tuni up ill foreijii-ixclmne offiii->. iiifuriaTi'-, Kur'i|iea:i .vm nior'1. Tlir\ conipliuu tliat thcv an* in i-ffect iii.;-noiiK t'-1*. fon-iKii |Milirn-> at u-inuli th-\" Ji<np[>r<>v< abov** nil, the Vi.-t Na:n War- :md footing I In- lull for V.S. conr:it- takfo\;R*of Kuropi'm) industry. Aim ri<.-!in 'n-ilii.'iry .(n-nrlinic mid fon-:tcn -iiiv*.tiiiif H^| dftint. nird tIiT-< W luiniijcrwf iinwunt*1*! dollar* that foreign lo 4'iilrha>r. ' r.v'oprjui n-A-nliiM'jit II.T tiinu-d to ulurrn ovi-r 1tin- pa-t >VHT. d- The l'.r. lUa !/'< iff iJUJimits KHintg frurn leinixnurv KnqjluM ^ dry oiw DU'axirc) in uttd lUtjtt lo tiif l/i^ne-l dctitf ever in 1'1'u i.vr- <-/iar/, ;i. '*'>). The Jiriinary 'X <iie "*inx wsi" tlu- dcrlilie '>f ifit-fi'l rate" ill UM- t"J*. a. they ro**- in Ku 'rnif,p<tiiK C..S. rupitul to )ltt in Kar|- HI wjircfi of ;> jiixlifr rciuru. In the f;nr<>l>i-n:i H'W^ ."tl>- t'.S. wu nut* f%|oroii>t^rs inll(ji)ii Uiri'ijib tlio lialuuo- 'f (>:n iiM-i/i- d.-lj'.'ii. Wlvu U'i-i (iennuii; '. lliiixl(;^l;HnV. for inîitticir, Jivjy. _ivUarit KiUi nmrLx. ^r |><iur rnf>e> i n f o lt- (iennitn inidkiiiK \v-tvui. nît. ;nf>ni-y-ill Hov. into t i n - r|ji ei4n.K ln-iui', tt-iiii iiitlarKmnry "ffi'i-t-<. unlt-r* I lie Iii;n<le-<(wnk n-trnir dir_-w Imitk Iniffinc. \ViuIe hr -ruti- >( inttuti'Mi > Mil>>difii{ in flu l>.~ . i' i1- r^-niK in KrJj>e. l,iirD|-ii fcuverninenti- <io not -MM- liw they e:in tiglit \inH;iiri>n (_Ti. I'tr.fly if h.iiu- l-.S. J"lirit.-> -mul (lie diterutioii" of Ifii inoiielxry >i'refn force i..-ui fi> j.nui|j u.it ni'ir<- :n<rne> than fld-v jiUrt tfl Jif xafi*. Ku-rJ Si-ltilli-r lni lonx fe|f il.ar :iiioiln-r HTIIIJII rr''lu'i-K:l> K'flmirj tx- firiVi'-Mry, :nui II.T iNt-n tr:itiic to (/r-n^l.- 'I'.lwr Muro|i.-uii imtin- ('/jo,n, fii-tlioi; uuwtu-re, he i.lllkr.^1,' A-tVirtt t'i (nn-i- ll ITI'M. At the !urt f l;b>l H'eek. IJVe < ierilkHU .i 'Mi'i'ific ji>iiliif.> '/i-Ii-.t-H/i iti'lh". (oyr px>*)iiiiiu (ideil H'OtinK the mark ulid flu- [ififi iiiiintt' .irtv iiriitjij ! irjt>liv-/t-l'mi>'ri' t<ft,[l|er â the rfj>'jri!- liefi>rfi! i Hen- utii>'>i|iv!>'ri. rrii)i/j-<t trti' f'j- ir nn|M.*t u-fujM 1^ anii coul'l IIAVI 'i-^-J lo iiilKu'in:.- n> IIA\. tlu-rn iitned 'Jotf.ii (n.teud. IK- |>nMlrl> m-lfoim'ij Hie re/o^rt-< u-' ';.' ii-wf'il i-'ii^ni'Hii'Mi tif (lie di-iifttr" even Ui'Mi^tj ( mir li;iv.- Uri'ju'n U'rf -ic'i a >-tiiieiiieiii woiil.l faille -(n'l'iij^fur- ' lm\ nii>rtin e*|;r'utii;i if n i j u K k ij.- in tlii-ir ' ulii". . > >ln>nr|f.u-i> u. Krn-I". Fur frmu iinifriui: |!urnpe mi in.)iie'nrv .<(.r>j*rjx\ . IJOHe,.j. M-lnlii-r e/-ii>. t;i li:u Jirmf'iei-tf jjri jier r'ltifii-ioi-^ll.uu; '-Ver. C.vi'u IU lh n.i'f t -if iri-i-. <;.<r(imi>y i-onld i'ti>i w iji >igii<c(iii iiLon y'iri^.-L/'il f >ir<;|x'HH re\.il'..<ti>iii Afn ' 'e nnd. >j( % :>ri .vii;rnii M.-iik.-t cjiiiilriv' ln:ile j-Ji-jr llieir., <>;i|/-..:(nn t.i tr-vnliuitj HI. .'>i'i)llv/' *"pii>piw;(l l'i It-' l|>e mask, fl'tul r;m fnlu's'idi',-. 1 i'l nM" ii>|i^r.if:.ii ( wi'Niii |>w ,( H-IV<TDI.I' ui , \l u tViiii-lciii.' <!" 'ini. ^11-11, .' li'in [>r/f r 4' r "Mirf'. ul.fli a. !> / ( fc|'/(iiei-lii;i* iuUv<'>'.; tinr K[I (. -H-, f-{ in. Market', -is .... jfl.i-r ii.iVK>i>*. l)un>j> -li:if.k I'" "><l' i nl- -'Kari
relj'jr VVliJ', Hrjl.'lh'* h">u^' I<1 I I I " i e[|i| In Vfc f'-l-liult ( H'llll'. l'ore(J(H ^ w l . >rl<e- ( -iriflie/l ttn.t H li''UMl V l i f l l k " n'lllt 1n il <l\> I K' < '.tlnlii'Ml
tJcnnany should instead damp on tifclit f rcbanpi: rcmtroj* ; orrtfr to stop tfKi ..rtrtow ( imvcaiitfd dollar*. Tb? Kovi-rniivuil could, ,f<W. nipli-, forbid eUix:a-< lo borrow nfc-nad uid, order /-onmuTrial bwnfcs nut to., pay intt-roL on dolla- dopohiu. ,.-' ; -. ~ ' ' '.'-' Schiller Qx-vvrUit'tu^ won n cotwn':i;*u for his' position, ami- HI U>! Cmwou V~ Mi<T-vt uu-f tins Saturday unp-d * concerted flo*O>y tiic six iijLtiOos. The FwtiiJi,, " .-' rris.u-ff. largely out rf di-sirrta p'werve tin- Mnrktt'*farui.pricr-eUpporT j;^x-in; ^ tbi-y ccfuH'd Hund--l>Hj>k Prosi<l--n1 Kla-H'n'/ Argument thai excbwijt'1 controls iroiild IK- pn-fvrnUr. W liat hnllr came out wa< a compromise; Mfcikcl >MH shut t-V-iC" rtinvnru-* it thry fi.-i-l t o*tcnual. Bur ttWv-rs lirtd-non vliauM ; 'V U> pn-Hrrvc the rau-s *.t \*'hitl,-sv. limrV* and htk.nef.citi) (*? nxch>>iiK*ti fv>r vAch othr, evvii * tlir mart'* rat ?>uiiKt tlx; dollar nv> .KU.-T.I ciisii r to leu- thn to attain. Th- ilurkct oatiOtM IUAV tiwUtuUr xom-1 exchange otyiUols too. ,.- t ~~: , ' ; ' " ' ' iWitiiMt the RiiUs. Tlio Li-y qiitUi>u lur thw '**k is whutlxieltu* pA*Kf. '"3I. . <-von tci/itorarily :<top ^tH-c-iJationatwiivM tin- dol{ir, <ir nicroly ccnreiifnj'^l'/iu .\ . franc, fr cxann>lf. SvK% ^;rieuiL> iinvc *aid tlcil tlii-y:. ill ti^vr (('wit tboir cUrri'iic^j but. tbJ if Uorrnan;. I'.ottf thumurk thii?wJ!<(*Inujc ' uty U - formally, rrvaliuti. ron>"vaIiiatiiHi of our ci'trchcy after - iiiidcT erivit condition,-" cotild Krm'n.U- er>'t<k$, Cinjfiivloii u-iT wtisf 3117' #'irri-TU-y war wortb: it could Frrtd, U*ir:tiralh% l<? n. ji-irab-i*'H i)f .world wad*1 Hiid' t. Jn ary .A-^, !*: wt.tk'.* dctdoniîiU: Ivglu 4>';>iicft revinon of thi; and BdRiai) franc, bwrtnd !''J ViWi(:n lr-m '.hr otfic-wl Vnluv Inti-nîtiofiaJ MonHary Fund nilis, , . Tti i\ t-vrji el't>:r thf ri'rf''''1 crii. Mridr, no patchwork ôlnUMv i< UK^lv to \(i\>i nuimUtii. nn intcrniitiotijil inoiiKary sxMi'rn.ba-^-d oii ilwj ny ukr>(xf doll n-. Tin- lr.>. ol;vi'>Nfly nti'd-. to lUvngUxtt i'1* eiimsiw, liil hoWrftn il doî? TiM^n; an.- niftiiv. cD/urrt.' of ai-tion '>}ifii to rhc'-.Khf-w AdiKiriLtraiion, rKirspwral luivc fiK.ir i>n v''îtwfjarkjf. ' . V. - ^ .' -._. , X:n Dc-ttoD U'r>-id. A i>hi*rp i-tiilMuil, in C'i. milftar>-'>|>:ratioiiMliro<t would nKJiift- /Hf :>'irflo\v of rfpliary, mt. it v>-J.d fnithK-r riowjj- of ( In; very nnUoiH b;it |f-"il.rj kmrnttn "l9lliir iPip^'jrmlUrt(!'-tiiiillrfy Orili'uny. which d-v! tlmt Uunrw-t.s- i>f l.'.i>. UOOL~ i>ti it" ninl-J*. niV'.s-CirN' until fUi-rt- is * Soviet fri/ii J-Jv-li'iTi. H'.'r'[x-. fivi'v&iiitiui:' tb' tlfiltl-iuniMy |-J'i^ y.nd ->i rn<i'-> ot'l'VK'K *ini I>fy WJ'iUI liv^l> tl.ivlliifii.' of p>iyiin-ii^, i>n(. woil , i'.S. rt-civi'ty ft(>i>i hiif. yi.-sirV r-r^s>i'>fj jidv/ thn> rnm.y ii'ori- Aii'> riwu;. our of. . ^ -" ' ' . ~ .;rU rlicrv- nrv Awtioii-< th-it -A'.*!!!!! *t:indi tl.-c <li il!-.ir drain Mid_wy(H I*1 ijc-i>-i">li: ' r r xrii'iC.'!' .(.<. vn.-H. An <-n'I i Vu- \ > r Nani \Vur (: ti^- m-i. '. .liityii, V.ualh, '^ Nixon Ajmiiiir^rutiutt r.mld try "t<> .-(ipfit uiit.-JfXi ti> i~-i<ina; iii*-.- for uewpia'd*' l:i> Wi<> .|>iV'" irci-v-.'". i'?i'V fits>m-V(i-n fiiiMtl.r I'ji, 1.1 .-v//'i|.'l .'Jli-h iiu "i < 'f:>nii-'~polk'v'." a>iii fiuve f;>n*, î.il! >n il.'1 . (i/wtlv tx-^nii'-f 1 of W.vdi.i^t'.n'- finK'ti; r. imvJ tl*^r tlviri'.. < fi)<-' < iviTii. r>'liic.(r :i- liiMi<-tIy >u< it jinn .!>! i>:l (.ijiiiri'Jitij,; tli< r initi;i-y <-ii|>ci.> >tt"l Tin- I'.*,, civvi'wr. i" 'i . u - . l f . l'i-rifj|.. I t n - IUf-1 lfi]|Hirl:>Jit. (c. ."^ Hi' th" I L. J* - tj>vt 1ll>;il>'-i:ifi l . in --H . l^lI^'.Mr^!l^ n'.i-l rritsturjl; , tin- f|;r.-. of iu-' p h^lfc.i'f/''l ' ',.*. drir:..e!:irii-c -if t"hc iii-t 'rl'J fi,"i iv.cr. A iu>ca/iil i-ii-'illif. -i:' (l'.u f).'\-i'I..j.!i-:iJ jj iiii iiirv . t i u f l i M i - -trii.l'l I/.- li '),'. i-yii'-f ij f< Clu-f Jli' tw-A r< .lit* .
/ill'' - t i l i l ' ' I ' . l . l ' t f H ' M I - .-jl'illl'i < i| 'Ifrc'.'' t'.;it .(!, r*rj^,'il. l-i,,' mi it. Jnm. ~ ".lll.il'.uli.
f ifni'v Hi-t|'fi f 't;rJL ll.ir r/ il'r- |'.;i -., <-r r l-u '.:. in '-Ifi cC. /:!! .'J 'or a ' O'.ij.I I'r"1-')'! W rtwW' iv-ttf.'i -no- "I.* iiC.I'1-v ' " " * ' v-<Jt'/H' " ' - - . 4 ' f ( i i -..T1, fvrtri. -rx'li (i C'.Miri p i< r ^- f(i'iK{ i^fiNj/i-iiIii' -.gli,.-. i;f- .^j.i^rijrv '!(;!'-, in :i i>i.;. nUi < ,iJt'.-i-'[;!i-Ti . f '.n.-li ;K'i 'i,.i'... 'nf.i- iiii|< -n > -inl <j j;')i'.C.'1 a'lj'i"!.r - i ' T - .: Ki'ii>'.^.r:uli(i/ ru!. - Mil.- idmJ'j ,y t'i w .!.. i j . i - liuir'i.ji.'.i.iu* '!' ''" ! li' ' i.r.i" tt:"' ("MiV. :il liVi1-. ' / u : - . |-c.-i^J. (r'îjr- :i i l - 1 fr.iln 1.1 ("pi*- .-'>! I* / 'i '.' -lliinv f>r I*-!".1 '.r\". -i|,|lr.i' ;i-" w i-'. |K"-i -liV'ilii". *. l.'ii'. (l-.il (Jii- !>.'. !;ii(f. l"i, li> i niii ..ii^r. :ili<!('- ;niJ ;i !. !<: r.l rri^ . HI'-.M'! fit' .-. .i'ilii|}/i r ,' ' .' - . . ; I '.. -i-'n-i-." i ? n r . i i r ' . i f i l . ' ii .!!. f.'ivi- r-n'iV! (d'.^t''. 1} i^<.\rli-tu fi/r . ' . v.i.iil-l -I'.iri- (In .:i-nn-)l r-,!c .i.r.M'j'i' r. ||.-\-i- W'TI! l'ci-.tM-<
sucti a> ^hfl .Special Drawing Rights tfcat tti* W bapm. auin to 1970 with otviniuiy innd<H)uat eff*et. There to ft won,-likely candidate: the unlttcd currencythat ihi'Omaion Market nation* iakHM-to ornate, ansutatntf that iMortn* such ax last wfctjkV crL<i.i do n\X fnutriu,-their plans. The wtrld nvtidt astcood cucmicv that nation* could use, along with '.hoi dollar, to bold in rwwrvw aa& aHtle-triU* with -cn other. .,"' ' ' ' _ '"' V&l>r l>ranrait>t' tlobvrt Triflin, a" leading international finanrjal expert and a . mcnbcr of Tt' Board of Economists, has observed that ixnxeMry international moDiHnrr reform* eoniK about only a a. result of criMS. 5vow -that th* world bat littd ttic ci'L-M-i, it w time for lhj rrlonu. The chbiaic coudiuoriJ- of lut trecjc, if l>rolnng.d or ri-pratfd, p<v* a grave threat to intcrnat.i/>p*I stability. The prc.iat monetary ny-U'rn servtid thf global ecouomy ircirtoriuiiny.ytaw ao(f hQlptxi to promote no fnomiou^ postwkrpxpanitou of world trndt-. But Huancial itiyUtii like aii\ olhrr, f.iM stay hoalthy only if they change with tic world urotuid
SAM, SPKNOTHKIIT BA.NKKH banker is a thn-at to Xbc financial stability of hi< cominunily .lufl emniwimity is th- m'koV bou-Ccrniiiiuidst wi>rtd. In many t'w t'.S^has .ylopu-d tin- role of (doJ)dlbaitkcr: it iMtwsa the cuntncy ( J'jiJari) tliat otlT nation* UK: to pny thîr bill* ami irtor- up thr.tr .ttivinu (in tiv form of official PI-KT^-C.*). I'nfortiuitttcly, IKIWKVUT, tho U.S. >hji dWeiopfd (H-rî-ctciiHy profliKutc h%>>its, jirmring out tnoro c'lrrcney UISH its cliVntj* ne<;d or want, of'tiic 43 'i hillioii C.S, dollaro an> now, in the wor'da of one Concra>!<riiin, : Vi<lo-.liinr around Iht- w6rld." The dollar* hitviT Iwva pumjK-d out. by tl,c U.S. balatieir of paymcnU dciicit--a ti-rii> tliit y^'jnjj forjni'Lti'ly ^ chnieul >>Ul in quiu* (i'lipl*1 in roiio-pt. Tbc l.nlanw J pimin-nt.s ix'thc'isaknd UiiiU of money that AnnTicaii* Ann.-ipti< from foreign MHin-*-* A oVdcit ot'C'it- wfai-n rnon- inom.iy.xo out of tlnr t".y. than cow* into it.. ; Tîi.- tin.* ]i.'ij'[>-in'0 HI *!Vi-n of the past k-n yrar-, ami lately -the jmp U-tnt;ii I'.S. inl< notional îx'iiilum tui iaroujp ba-< rrnrlvd Urnil)tK proi><7rtii>n. Jji.'t y.-ar tin- I"..-5. sp-m a wcord &10.7 bilhyn nioff-thon it too1* in, find Jiy <m' <-Mlwnl<- tin- tit"1^ -' '.i-tifc'd $" biJIiuii d'lrinit jn%t tin- lirnt iiutrior of t'JTI. Aroon^ tin- n-jvoht; - ' ' . . ' - . Til.- I >. niiltiar>' roU- io tip world iwa :i>iitin'.wd to gfow, hiji-iK>>~{M''!r if ffi- AiDvrU'un.i-Vonouiy, n-tafivi* to thn* rv$t of th<! w^rld, liif <iv.'iidl-"d; l".S, inilitury xjx'iwliitn'' < Klinwd cnntributi'd an uvvriw $2.t ltii!ii.n a war to b;ilM.u- nf pa> writ* d<-tic>t. in I'HiOHM, tiijt l.-<t yoar ttKr drain! watt $3.4 ' 'Chr V*i<:( N.aiif.. War .aliHK- hiphon. d o>;t aroitnd *t.5 billlou.ii> 'l'J/0, . : t ..S. u,ijr;:rt:i 'HO' (.(icn/i HJ fi>u(.b nbroaJ us llic Pruuicuu. dtfit. ii.iir<i?, a rrlniivoly :i>ipjr irmt/if ii> the ;iirlv f<.-i(rar j-of,;bav; Iritrr^jvd in i-vi-.rv vi-&r>iiiu<' W*C". tir ' JWWt ttw !iw! yuar for whii-Ji ' ' iol-vl . . 1 ry ji.iiinii out m<7icy to tupunci operkliunt* ovw*^^.. The nt-t i/n(,f!'>w of Au:rii-aii vvpiiul t) tKr r>t of UK- world ret<e frori -I9C<>-64 average cA f4.:> bUlion i),\wli> to Sfi.4 billioti IUM, yor. More tbn> lialf tlist (<l{rc, *,'{. b'llii>ti, (vpr'.-.wDli'Cr .uoitJonitc hivmlmîiia id forciip) f>buit/4 fti d (aciliUc*. Th* by. M)cb itctivitk-K )* th).|iirrha>i' ol fon.-i^n tWki> " ' \"J. I/'.S. of g'.tfid< aird'.v.-rdia's to Jiv. t^^'i hliriokintc iii.i iJitfi n< lonn'T puv fo-- <t much of tlw nijiitary *urf jurist >-|x-fdi:(< iuul ror|>ont(^ iiiv.-sUwnt abroutV n y. itnr>;' Jid. Fnu W.5 hiiiion in I%4, fin.- >TdH vji-plu* j;!iuiimi-d to-fl.V billion ijj l9G9,"Tbr~nurjiU/ roc. tor SJ.O Cjtlliod in I'J70,- Iiut that- iuifo-aw i* Ion <Mic/jiiru(tiii; .Uian. H lofllM. iitportu rftsrrlc-'t .iii'I JUipocfi^ hclij.up tnortr Ihu'i -tb:y brtvt i;i ('a*'- r<:cruion i'<^TK--an . indjniiji.il ihsf. t'.S, itidu^try i-toyitii; if. roojp4'iitlvt irtr<uiKtJi. _ . ,: it niiii, Aftu-rii-'iwifbavc K'H1i-lni yx-ndinf, JnvMfjw)jsjin<J-*W';r.ine abriuj OK if the niii ii>n *r//t- (il! rut over* MIIUIIK HwtKjitne ;inwi-f thftl -ft - Jruuiiuliailuly *fi!r \VdtM ^Var (I. J-''>r JHXJI.V yit-iri 'ir-j({jMr> Vl^v^d L7.K. uw-urm'1^. tlist IbV litlniiRf of py;nf[jU (I<-fic;i would v; hrc)uKlit"uridtrl'09(>(J><'t. Tlvy nq.l'itii(îio a i; ! My^r duiiiiiti Abnui Mi" r^porjii>il.i> irf -U.S. 'CI-OMIU/P Ix-iuivjor Ii^vu t-unwd ' " ' " ' '
TESTIMONY <JF HR. TBuMJUj'j. .WATSON,- JR..
Tin* CnA.ntsfANV Viu livt bivu> <ry onU|iolnii klmut war nnd I linvt- just .ji' roiiph- of qu*1 Tiuh\ One thiujf-îniiiiptvd im> R whil*' Ci XVMI-II someone a^kfii VMI did vou Jo intonuttiutiul business uud vVu aid net. VV- dii him-. Mr. VVatsori, l'd of IBM, 'hn. 1 4-x|Hr:V.iflM. -is s wiiloly distributed an itiicniaCinnaJ bu.siiiri* .- tiny could* IN*. Jj{ jvar'Sfr AVntwm testified on (his jp-nr.rnl subject HIM! f (.hink tin* llinisf ir( hU (stiiiioiiv wns llic MIIIIC ns \ours. I mru us d tho i:Jfvi on Ikxi.MUi'M. If I p'rjill bis bu.iiiifss.d'.M'S biisiui1!^ in 100 rf>unlriivs. li is -{ri'Kd all ovrr the xv4rld. . . Mr. GtwrniMCPK. Ii. isij
ISSI'IIIATION FOU WTfNKS>" TAKING PCUU' rISITIi.V
" . . ; -
Tin- < V A I R X I A N . fl \<>u don't i-nrr to, don't <-iinmrn(, biul llif^ lM':'nii> it is of rntlifT a |M>i'viiinl uuturc. -./-"-.vuuditr u K n t O rn r-cl i Jut reîmiisilhliiy i* biisi.Mi'sstiniir mul l/> iiki a ilioii uiuf-f-f) it w-.is; i \oiir-v> > :fMj(Hib(lil-v \>j t idle, and sjxink out IMTUIW HiiHix bu>i(ii->.<inch h)c\v !)<"'ii v'c i'y'.rfliicljiin. \Vi>' linvr iiniloi a nundx-r " w i n * hiU'e -Mid i(:i", didn't T<'cl (Jmt (lu-y \M'if i'uin|H-icMi or fur mil- n-jixHi or uiiiiilnT dccliocd i<\ - ( im i In-foi'i- the fikiiiitiitifi*. U'httl ih--[iir< > d ynu to (ulcc it puMir |)oM(ioii'.' Mr. (*KL-rin;ici'K. . VX''lj, m f l u - "CJH-^SC of M-einin^ tiiiot.io:.iil iibo'.it ii jn ( it sctixi of |iiilrjoti*rn. f fiv-I it U :t p'^potisihiUt v for. in mv f>(yililott. t(|c \\liolc l)U-i)i|i^> of rorpor.-Llr fôocl V tllX<-T>^l!|> D'.i'iiHî l>ii-:iii--^rn-fi lining d? 'ii-iii>'>in''ii lull H'VO .-. rifi/,cu> imd In injj i-oiii i'r:i'-l about l l u - thin;:^ llm! up 1 i)iilic:il(liy lor thi.->. Nwtio'i 1 dunk i>in> of ili.'-dKjIliisioiiinciii- :tiioii( !)ii>iiit>v-. iryitu v.urif i. ]jt!k df -ili'l-indliu u<. rt;iiiii, tin<.licfh |!ic f;wl lii:i( t/:i.-.f)ii-v;rii.-[i liaVt- riiiiilcli bi'tiiiid I lie |tot>Uiiin<.\ tf..'_v t(iuyl<*is> uifli tlicii'ntstJHriH-*. Tlwy liiiVv lji'll !i l.i liiiid uTin 7^:1! tin y t:n/i ^M-jik out for tlctt implii-^ {iiut. they urn'juutiiif: >-(rj;f pri-'.-iin- on tln-ir r(n;ilo\i4',-. \ d-i-l t i n - >utmAV;IV Tltv .xnvt-lttVi >vrk ii;.i;n iviiôjt.-' n liv buxuir^siiEi-ii t\im't -^n-ak <iiii_ .A_-ff)ir/f ri'-ii.-rfiit -W - li\ iniiiiy liî-dii'.^-iin'ii ilii:"l >(M'jik mil -is In cmi.^1 lll'-i 'loiv't unill In ifjriir l.llir '.viallj ;>f tl)r fi'i\CJ1ilu;-tit. l>r.;i>.'l * -|LfV
fi'.'-l ilic'\(jcivi'nnii<-i' tun ->rrFki' buok'niie! x-. <lH"riiii' > .n{ikl- fu ili-ir
_ (ir>(. I'.vui y.\\' *\\'liiii i^ llm'.' . , Air. \CiM. vnuMirK. f t.Jiiifc iiw^ Jjr-i t.^ .i.r Jir-t _ , .. ..
1
l iiu> t ( U w y
kjtoh f|l.tt [fci- 1 tills -TjiV; iui) .-:fo|r bi|yi|l"mv fit'TifH' >...'" All'} >< iijpl,
niu.iiv -litiitJu'.-r'iJiMi 'fi'i-i if tlii-- -jifjilt i.tif t.lu-jr i'ftvjilr>yi'i; \\tU fa-i . idi'iicl <{cj|'t .-fuirc tli' ^li-k/lili"'. T|K- J*;,.-., ')<, >it' t \\\>> In j;/-j( imol ill Jii-in. ; p4i( "F<Jlt'l jlijuk "fllJii-r </f !)(i^'"-l!ilMKl "" n f:i''l. f ditfi'l llil'i.L' ruy firr];{/[V <!;. li^V".-i'i rliurr my sii--'. lir-(.. .ndd H-K.IH{. ;{ think >* Jj'i.M 1 :;(" ôiiu-h'ow build in ilii-. \iniuji .t{,K ,tiiio.'jli''iv sî j-.'|i|i' ''an iJi-.tiyrri1 but. -till f w \ o n r t (i-iifjtiicf-. " " . . , - ' . " ' '
' U L f N K ' . - . - f i - I K.'.Il r- OOi-KllMrKNT JtK'l A J . I . '
TJif' r*ii.\H(MAN w Vu'j"."nfd --fin- third w'u^ fiOir _of tiJjudi'ii, '.- " .- '
Mi. I'lt'Af-'riuiM'v. I HIM >-ur<' ili | -i
410
flif CHAIBMAX. Bu* you>aid yon didrrY tluiik thai smountol to jutytlunjr. . . ... , .' Mr. OBLSTitbuwtJ. I think Umf- is in speeitli: businesses. 1 tliinlc
itn\s ttticrru^c^tvitlti 'ifill .'lisilft if tlti*t* ufutk<l >n\ 'uti.l **.* i*v tftil* 1.
ait' .UejH'nilont A4>on .tJl^^ Oovcniroi-nr fi/r busJiifA* r for <l-d>io.< which -ran'liolp the b'J'ihus.A, I thiuk ftuy ^>u>iuosiiKHi f<Nrl (-hcv il-ni't want to inriir thai vvr*t)... .-' . , <:" . Tfao ("iiAiiufAX.>lii your husimsw of fool von my not f4 it i^ lrcvaJ;ui, l>nt lake tjtv pt-tnlinjf.ii.ta,of <!'BS, llo.r Ls one of the thr^f jjiv^r .netuxyrks.. TLey duwni to ru:. a iloeumeutarv whirJi is fu^tun'Iy with regard U> Mr J^'iikinV inU'rviexv, JT urn not ÛHliliH!:to sny.-bul vcrj1' flcarty Uiu. Gc>yeninu-M IUTV lius iiisj>irc(l u n-.la!ilQry~M-tioii. the ('i.iiiric;^ iiful ihroiigh (In; Ft'C. J think J iv-atl y<st:ri?uy tlijit th.-FCC' lia^.t'tthnroidiTOtl1 them to prixlne*' dflfiuovntff orKv r>nu--bjcfort1 ' tlj<;n. I hiM' foni'Ht.'Jii vxliirh. "Hi^y threati'iuut ilium. This "I would 7 vull vi-ry tii.-illuoi)intj if I uw itl buMins. . \Mr. CtKLSTKOuVft. XVa-y flefmiivly.. Thi'.C!nNJK.H.<.y."I urn very snnpiitljetir U (-B.S. I w a - w t rtii- (ii v^r- yro'irl Ujut lic-ci' J^_MW! a tu<tivork that jlarfet to |>uLlUii a i -cloi'.i/mcni.s'rvjn th [tublic inUrrpiit. , . f of your ouKpoki-ii vut\\'-* iJn , .. Mi.'.(ct.sTOKi'E. Mr. (juiiriiittH. I liud vwy iiitfr ny iook a - p n i Hcfy stnlcd'j.'Oj-iJjoii liiui 11 -\vo(iliuoa . to t?K<~V(*:Umtii iir ritlir siirwd jail .-oiM^m'^ or uc*vpt>-il" )*>>. tliuffun Ji('JK)fnll^ (lisflim'jc/^frit.'ji tL'C 'r/nl AV'J r-s, (FisLf IMMII^ 'bt . or . Aiul ii i:s nui'lf [x-rfci'f.ly !;: lliii <iid (tot uic-'uiic ilmff 'U'il jii>t.u into Cannija, pi'opli1 .uhu iiuol l r frltrtr i.ijoHV-, -t'lurHVH IwunlK.'--!*'^ ,^0 -f*r(.h. fl iik^liul*-!! tJiiw-fiicU -^lio li"ir HKjr^l op{>o>>i(ii>r.-<o Jjif, Vi^tmifn u';xr innl J.UHX] iip
llli'll pliirl Ul r J>^(l|(.l'''*:- '
.,. i a l o u l of I (ml poi'tlion't'lifTv Wi/jc suiiif imlic-itJolj^ ffiiiti' i:i-rHUi .yi!l<-rifi3 -nriitiizn*'nw t l u i t they uoaht jri-tjiirati- Ivy fjoycolljiitc our i?;- tiJvT) >)<', I hiivv.'IiJUJ a is- ;/J;s o/tl> iri'.ii<-:itioii -iluri . . ffrtni"- , v "-....- V. Tbri'aff.miii hoyriiK of yoor Thi: i'ittii r inHn. Tlu'-t is fjriL .in l<i- fiui-itioii, l>nl then* .u~ u piic^J boy oil /if Fir<"-tofic if tlu-y buili pliini in liumitiiut wxoi- yt' 11 uo! - " N f r fiKi..s-jijoTii',K. ^'i^ -Thi; ('n'.iKMA'.. fl L vrry ^ml Lllill-: lllftt H 'vliffi-jfliW- of VM-W _ r- of Jii- iruj/oflmi'-c i-iui hi- -.
Mr.
420
HESPON'SIBIUTT OF BUSINESS
Mr. (iKLSTOORPE. Jf business is irni>ortaiit to this country, how can it refuse to ttand up-mul bf counted publicly on great uitti&s? ' The CHAIRMAN, l^ftgret- with th u t ^nd I congratulate you. I cwyou mid Mr.. Watsur.. just as I do C'BS.. I th'ink if t>OS all nvs> itself, or any others, to be intimidated then they completely. -Abuudoii what their real justih'ctuion for being is. l>ccause their justifi uti-îv to do e.xnctly what they did in the cnwr of Miat document arv. AH ivf tl:-io ought to be di'ifipxi<K-unietitarics of -this kind and 1 would luijH' they u'onld do so. .;"' ' " - , ilr. (rEUTUOKPE.Businew must, \vc ixjjicve, un-jppl, just to amplify n little, ik n*[<ottiabilixy Ix-yoiid that which is just making & profifc, Tfiv prime rcSr|H>nsibility of Auvricati business is to umkc a profit, bttt" ' ' itLso ImVf a reiM visibility wilji res|Ms-l to social and human anl you can't re.-dly hitve that re-pr.nsibiHry, .*'"u ttrr not thai rt^[kinsiL>ility if you xvoii't fske-u. ]KK!t(ioii on thmi. V-. . " . KNJUM:.UKNT OK oovr.KNMKXi'a POWKK bn COXTIXVATION OK . ( V.Riinf? lnu-k to lri! vxtviiL of thf |Kiuvr <jf the Federal Government over tin 1 ivoiioiny-aiiii frt-iTrbusiufc^-'it i gre.rl\' eiilian<vi by ibcvoutiiiM'urion if thr n-ar: LI 5l noiV - v MJ. ffKi^Tiioun.. Al>solutyly. . ._ Tlir-CHAn'.MA.N. i)f coursff, from our |n>int ~of view, us a lc<ri>lature, il i.> [M-rfertiy clcur (fi:ii t l u - v.;tr iiiiilcnniiio the iiiileix'rideiice of the |i'ir'-l:i:ivi' brunch <>f (he ^nVfrnnifiii. ft <i<M'.-. in ail kinds uf war. \V<; hu\>- iii-.î tnlkiiii; ttindit ilii.s at length. In fuel, hill-- have been inlntd:ire;l, [ hwVe iiltroiilli-ed *'inu: 'J'here ]* always n telldenrV (o di-leûU; more 11 in) more jKiweriî (he i-xceutiv'/ brnnrfi in every country during war.-, und i-erttiuily t)ni.tltn!> t liken place in thi- country. Mr. (iKLsruuKVK It certainly lni.
Tin- ( 'n V I K M A V . So in I his XMIM: the Senate juid the Ifjdâl lire .-:lireu the .)i|fie_fnl<: us basilies-s?
Mr. ^jfcUsTHOKPK. Yes.
ThrCiiAJKMAN. \Ve an; iii (hut poohion today.

KTATKMENT IV MAVOK OK MILWAOCitE
'J'liere i one other liiifig tliax, J[ want to put into Ih'1 record. The mayor of Milwaukee, Mr, Henry Maier. in a rco-.nt stalenwnt to the //i/if<jence on ueoiioinic ronverbioji oncerninj: the need;of the fitii's und (tie |M>op1e who live in them, said as follows:
.> Ti.'i'-c an r<-al, ba.<ic ii'-i-dw, IMI! tlieru are wi Kiarkrlf Ix-irausttr Ihi.- luwi'-y is not H'tu'h-''! i. 'J'lie iN'Opli! H'!II> baiv tlir- nrufj.t <j<j not. havi: fbr money, I !n- 1'itn HiuL liaVi- !) m-i-di A-t nui have Uu<
4) .hu.yi> the entire Malvmenf |irinted in thv recoril for the infnnution of fny colleuK'lc>. (Tlie information. reft-rn-d to follows:;
421
or HrxicY W. M.MKU, MAYOR or MIUTACKKF, FOUTHK NATIONAL I.KAGCE of Crrtu AND U.S. CcjjrrRMtsct or MvYGtta
Foe many \vars now -I have bwa going up end down the land pleading the cause of a rt-ullocatton of our national TMOUWes to help thccntral ci tits of America. I have brvn KoiueUiinK tike the younn preacher who kepC talking Sunday after Sunday ou tb- ubjl of baptism. _ .- ' FiiuiUy. the church officers thought they had heard l>noti|rh about this mhj^x't, vt thr-v told him they wanted him to .preach the next Sunday on the subject of pOly Tht'.v figured theft- could be no connection belwevn p:Ua and Imptiim. So. ilic in-xt Sunday, Uic prwuor told hi* congregation, "Tlii* moruing 1 have IXSMI :i*ked to prvaeh'on the subject of pills" "ToeJV art-, hf smid, all kinds of pilN: big pilL and little pilb, rod pill* and town pllU, bitter pill* and sweet pills, clu>ap pilb and expensive (Hlls. Another pill i* t!> KOHptll iuid that gKrf mo to my rual ûl>j*:ct baptism." Ai)d durioK thtf<o yosws no mattor wiuit they have a.skcd m; to talk about my real 3Utj'*ct tuu* IH>-D rpHiMirci*^. Wlwui tiUk atiout housine Wf >iavi> to talk alxtict Ksourcc^. U'hon w<: talk about criiui. w Juivr to talk aboM nnoiirwt. Wb<*n *'< talk utKHil fiidiiiK-Ou-* pollution of ou wtrr and air we* hav<- to talk ubout rtr.ourco. WliL-ti wv t.ilk al)Oiit t.h> uri>fin erinte in (funeral * art- tulkiug alut w?inirr(^. It i* to iiftfii rtvcrlooki.'d that tho ctntral problem -of WIT ccutral ciSic.-* i.< tinluiHiio.il proiHftn That iM-rmciitiw every' prNcrt>m. Our tiniuicinl !<ito.tlion nffei-W our ilr-wlopiaonl in th.- forial ort-.-i, in tin- i.vonornic jvrf.i, in tlif-ptryHircil iireu. Xo.v, the :uuoj t-iwji jicy \vh>-u A>- (dink of tlu-.-^ thiiifc* !< t" Moment ttfin, to roimdtr flwm niirolt/-d, Imt th<..' *"- "Hted and ihw arc all rolatnd to the Jmt ohe wvuk ii;o tb<: uiii>>ri <>( o'tr Ijtrj.ot tit.irs ui-n- in thi.t town to t:>ko tln-ir I-U^L- for -niiiru IwJp to tin- lMder.t of CoiuTL'i.* iuid lb>- 1'reside.lit of tin: '."luted Mat'-.. T!u-y nir-t in vuriorix foniui> iuid when tlb'> lHlkel tlit-y *\mke of urt>:in w>c csniiil t>> i.inytLiiiK 'hat r.iiue vui-nf the- r.jral l x\i.-rty jvrc;i.- of UK- rk'jire i.ni. Iii'lifrt. inj (-mlel o-t-.il> .'.i; thjl in in-:.. rs.p<rcl^, tin- er.filral city w clw dut bow] ii( t lie -event :<-.. IIi'ii: we lih'J a'fo"- of {iê-J t.o^ joil '/ih 'In- llul'.: of f.lur u't-allh to the -uti^rii-. Here ivi- Inul :tn i - r>ii>n f hnin.m !'<"' IILC--, <> J-IIIK flronebt of tux ri-vnin--, ami lli- il-ej. milli'-- "f |")\erfy. "" Sin. ill Homier ilu.t tU>- m:iy<ir< i^j.-iv d< -ej-tul on W:i^l\ini;i'in like ("<>vy' Arm' Ariij whiTi they mine her', --:i. thev >lii{ I.u>! ni-i-k. nnJ us iliey will ett'iu- :iy..iin ymi r.H.i fi.4. in i: or irf Nj-ft' VHIK i:iyi.i>;: "In Neiv N nrfc w<- linv.- .1 rle.ieil '.rf tJ'is j-r;il (MM-.- liijii.Jr, ,j u.illini. d'lil.ir- a.id fiiri' :i drl'f:T tn'M. _v.r uf oo" Ijrllioi..' \ti'J Mi'. .1 lii/id^'iy :M!-|-I. "(-'ri'ikl 1 '. i-ien will: hcl|< in \\ ;i-iii>ctoii. I'm i,iit Mire v. e...,i |.nll mil ->f i l u - iirli.iii irri- 1- in Tinif "
,411.1 liel- !i:ivef!ii- ||i;l'.(ir ->f \'i-W:irk - IMIIK' "V'.e !l.iVi- u."<l llllll:>in <! lii'it
oul at ! x^'(M) iti'lliou Ins Iv.-i. \\V li-n-i- t!i" v.or-'. inf ml murtalilv, [n:tt<-nnL ;. miirtuliiy :i.-i| l i e n - r.il' in in- I ' - m n l r y . Jri .1 <-iiv -i! fteir li'imiivij 'Irn ,;iii'I -itl v-iunc I,"fi-< ni. I'l.iek. l.i-ii |i'Ti"ni y,i .IU*|I--IH r.liiiiK 'ind Mijrt;. p:riv(j v.liiti- h:i'.'' ei.-\i.|i (x-rc'-i-.l iiuejn|i!'f,i;ij inn! iiMi)l"T Mnrli,-hv<; th"U^;iip) Mrifl'-ieuii'lo 1 . '!. If w in- .1 liiii>"iiii |I|.II;IIM n S<-Aiirli . eri li.wjy w wild tr\ ' j lie||i, lm( " r- .il):, And ' !" \ I , i t nr or N'en < irje^ti-; -.,n -. W'"i 1> t:tXi 'J e : -.'iT-.ii.i'it; i!i--! -t:il)i|~ - f i l l , ulid if uir- Jlinm ln-m - n^-ini, e l'i\ 'luil t - > ('H It'll II'. i' *! 'Juli'l IlikVe rn'Mlull lli'JIi>-y tu rflnnld, We ilo.i'l Illive i'liuui;ll I ) Kiv things ! new i-na! nf [Mini 'I In- inn.'ir <t C.'li.'vokiiij r.-pori- "W'r're o|<Taimt,' "Ji lwen>-five nnHi'iii d'lll-M* ! '- 'l.ti m ni"<l. Wi-'ve I'm] to Inv 'rtT (ifti'.-n liiuuifd |-i.[,l,-. mid 1^.1 111lnu> p ir ' nlfii'e i>'.' fori.k' |"r<'ent. iiiir roiniini/iit'. rela'KX.' :irlivilH-< IIIIM- tn-'ii wi['d mil mid <><: row >[ iiijiui; sicfy |-ri'<'[it >rf oui l/udK>'l on ilie pulici nmj
4>
TV.*- major of Detroit re|r>H: .1 doticit of t \\euty-tlirei' million' dollar* and ! will liitvi- 1<> .ifx-tid fort v-lhrti- million dollar* (hi- xvar- -ju.fi to iiuuntuin a level of *TXII-.- trhie.li i* nduulUtilv iii*d<-{ittfe Five hundred arid ihirty-miK* city >-ui|iUmv have lt-n Uud off with two lt|ou.>ajid position* remaining uiifilli-d. In inv tiHWrv we jiirf. d.ni'f liavc. l"".>uiployiiriit is almve Ruii>>iul avrrujci '>" 'Hr tir-t tuiu- ui many >:>!>., and out property tax if among tl.<- i'li^M-t in tlic nation. Still uv an: faced with demand* for higher wag** from 'In- ;tlif- who thrraleii H M-'-OIM) Mnki- tlui Yt-ur. In'.ljti.itt UIK! uneinplovmeiit. aii- Liu- twin ei-uiiuiuii* .ti*.-otn-s lh( haunt iriony tif diir iviitrul ritu-. And nut ja-t IIM- br({i-r citu-t- lii- Newark, nd iM' Album :u>d S-UU- Mil inallt>r ruii"> likv \Vifhit< Kwi-yi.-. H rv uf jji t M- ivMill of tin. hnvniK cijun cr-i'i.i policy. In U'li-liitn. Kmi-;i-, tin- impact <vf il*-fr Ti'.-r'I.iU-d i-xin<(.(iit_tuv.<? on l\\ri-r>. >:if. .iniiiuiil>-d loniii- llnMi-uiiil d'>l(:ir-fnrcv< rv |x-r.-on in I'iviliun work f'trre. Tuij1.."! . "dlv lift \ -1111,1- [-ri-i-nt <>f tin- i.rfcT.- i-iiipl-tnij !i \var HJO in tin- njrrnifl. ;n:Ii:-n- .m \v<irmi; ii> Idnt induîri. "I'll.- uiictn|iloyinr(it rule of the Wichita ai'-a .- <i\t-i t-n ;>i-rcvnt - - i l .< f'ir |u-rf<-nt in Janii.-iry, a .n-urae"Tjiink \\lnit tin- inraii-. from ih- \Vn-liila may.rrV view ulni'h-t tu.-ntvlli'.M-.'.i;:) |HM>|I|I- ni^-iiii'l'nifi , . tinli** id ri-Vc-niu- t<> Ut- i'il\ t h e inuUility ln I'MMiii- i-M-ntial i-rii*f---!lii' Hildcd ili'inand- on tin- 'it} for K-ru<v->. And I mislii note. Hint oni- .>( Mil- iroiii'- / modern urlxtn life i? th.it i/uvvrty r i i - l - iiioiii \. In ll'x- 1 1 l.i of Miluauk.ec. we ertmiati: Uiut (tie rivals of our poverty liuki-ii 'i [\in-t, ,td>l aii uddilii>iiul Oiin>-iHie niilii-in dolhu1* :> year litirden on Ihe liK'al [r.)|Tt\- t:ix|î\i-r, and r>inre tin- jir'>jn-n> tax i--> re>yT-iw. I In- pour riilly pay for their own >". 1 --i\>v.-. So Ui! vouu; liacL to tlu- qijt^tum of conversion. l'oovi:r^'>ii for wba-l? . l'orli:i|>- uh.il of tin (.iKr.-tl run nri- n-<-kuiK i Mkpl.^ u coir.i'riioii |MTiod. A convi-r.io[i in coin,- m<-r (hi> c-iiinlrv hki- (he convrrîDii that IMIIH- on :i O-rtain Saul <>f Tar-u* ni, the ro.nl to a rilv named I )HUia.-ru.. .Saul tta- tin: icr.-ar unlx-h'-ver - liilt after hi- ot knocked off hi> horsi'. J> saw Ihc hull I and from ihen on be farrii-d >h> ine.-sii(>-. U !i:it wi- of tin- <i:nir:il ntie> ale >:!> IHK i- that there should !* a convr-ion in inr u.iii.iu:il t l i i n k n i M (o |i';' (.[) eeniruj rilw * lir^l. Thi-re <hould U- a iiaiiouid mminitiix nt t i n t reroxiiia-" the proWcin- of Hi< ntr:il ritie* arc > nuinlier o'n- dome-tic priority . hi i>vi rv civilization m the hi-torv o( the world, the my ha- lieen tne >-K>r\ of *h- n. it inn. T'idy 'ir cifie* ure !.!* *lniii>e of \iiH-rim V\. -|>ii ! t,'ir nati'iniil ii-o-irre- to II \ o:<-r i h - i u . carvi- Mirouidi lln-m -Ailli ^|.ri -K.\;H ,_ lunlrf Ix-'Jr.Kiiu -Mlnirli- w i i h K I I A -'ili-idn"- -o \OM <loii'i. have tn ^l!ly m ;!n- '-idf- iivermVlit. ulid ue >-%clude IOH mrolii'- \inn-iiiii fr-iiii tin 1 -tllmrlr' yo Jib.. i lti<- poor mu'l IH- p>Tfj>-tu:dl-. ronlim-d to lh<- n-nir:il cil v \i>'l \el tlii- concent rat ion ol (lie poor r:iu IH li'iil'llii^ iiil-i a -OCL-I! iituni t.-irnl) i'i:i' c:i i-tplorle M: mnt line- wi'ti fallo'it uliu'li Hill r.'i fui' l->/i)'I tlf t"ril'-r- of i l r - i.'nirij i-tlv il.i-lf. l'i-rli:ip- on<- of lli<- irruiioniliii<-> of our np-ide down pri'ir;ti.-- i- Mi;it v>< ha.%'
f'Vti' ') li .-.11111111011 Uliere llM'fe up- tli:<-<J.- W l ' h o ' l l IIiBrket- Hlld luuCiUL-t* without
I <ir "Xa:n[le: the e-liinji. i| retail dollar*. .-:ile* <>f d<f and cal food 10 '('7(1 tvi*" mi' liillum, i,in- Imiidn-d and -isf, uiillio'i dollar- -up from ont^ Irijlion, forty nirlliof) >|oll.'>r> in I'.Hi'l. A true growth i'id-i-lf>. Vi: I'otil'i pjolialili n.dlv'- u \' more dote tid cu< foi>>l. or uc rould maintain fii.j.loMn.'iif liv iii:u(il;nniii/ DM- M.atu-<|>io inaknix ro:id~, rori,.'(-, K'"i-> und Tn:i*i'"orn". . Hi, i In- other hand. He have need for -IK hundred tliou-und uii'f* of low n'nt I'nidi-r.id nifi>:if h'fi-iiiK each >-.ir the ininimiim Koal --l li\ Hie HO'IMIIK Art f k-'i-f. iip tilth t i n - hoii-iliK renuifeiiii-iil of our expanding populii.ti<>ii. ne wo'itd li.i'. f > luiil'l lit/' <|UiVftl'-iil of Ix-w fit '. of 'J.Vl.lHN) IHT---III '-;n'li inolitli for now lllit'l Hie i-nd ill tin 1 relilliri 1 We UDIl'r Uiuke il' Arcorilinc t liv iJepuriinenl of Tran-poriariott i|,rn. i-,a n,-ed f > r r l u e i i | t to l l i i r t t l';!li.>n il'ill.i/- Iv pr% id- ffi-rtm- irai)-por':iiion ^rvii'' 1 in Inn-! Ani'Tioin
Cl, !< W. U ' H i ' l fllll'l' (ill ll'--d.
W/ ()< d iv-r i'li \. n |iilh-n dollar-, to m*derrti/.i- our pudln- ,'iud privet'- mmpr>.M h'epilal-. und ullno-l xeveu l>(llln dollar- 1<t liinld t V. onm. U'e it i>i i'iij'<- i M'H *iifnir!i:iii editor- need ho-piiaN.
We need nioir doctors, more therapeutic center* for emotional iltoea*, better school-, more family counselling ce.ntvrs, more children in Head Start prograiuii. more day CAD- program*, and public works in our cities amounting to billion* of dollar-. The*: an- real, baiic need.*, but then* arc no market* because the money is not ult ached tot b: im*!*. Thv people who haw the need* do not "have the moticy, the eitiey that haw the ui*d< do not hav the money. Tin- |X-<>|.>U- who d-> have the money and the governmental units that have the money are sending it elsewhere, or not sj>ending it at all a* in now the case where the President won't spend money Congress ha already appropriatfcd. Put tin- money rherv the need w, sjwtid the necotnary money in the cities, and industry mill convert itself. After all, isn't this the way the glorious, maguiticcat, productive, exalted free* enterprise -ysn'in really works? I'm sure the repreyentatix'cs of the National As.iOciu.tiou of Manufacturers and the United State* Cluunlxrr of Commerce will agree if they an; here! Tlieiv lire -(>me who argue that We as a nation arc not prepared technically to cou\i rt 1.1 -living oiir citkit, then, the qu<:stion L-< -hore it the research inooey Looking :it the otimated obligations for 1972, it certainly isn't going toward solvinK the cities' problems. If I'D ll<~<e:irch and Development i> rut bark thr<t- million dollar^, OKO (which wa- to Ix-conu- rirse;irc-li ageiicy) is cut sixteen rniUiou dollars. IT we. add thi- one hundred and thirty-one million doUar increase for all of HRW ile>i-arch und Devirlopment, and this fifty-one million dollar iiicrea-**- for urban mass tratfit research und de'.i'lopnient, 1972 would see a net gain of only one hundred and sixty-three million dollars. Military re- -.troll and dt-velopiru-nt will increase by nine hundred Mid line million doll-ir-. Itot^ceu IU7O-7I, it Hwrt-awed onlv sixty-two uiilliou doUars. Hl'D get> fony-tiiui' million dollars, a lo^s o^ threi- inillinn dollars. iJvfennc gets eight billion, three hundred nine million dollars a niue buudred and nine million jump. Add Defence, N'ASA, and the AI''C, and we |x:nd twelve billion, seve.n hundred and fihty-fi\i- million dollar:. a six hundred and ninety-six million dollar increase. for rcviirch u<i devi.-lopiiieot alone while Hl'I) gets t-ut tlirirc million dollars. Ixxjk at res<:arrh and development for agriculture from three hundred mid tweju to thiee hundrivi And twentv-one million dollar*. At u time when there an- prohnKly more slum dwellers than there :irc farmtTs we |>ciMi six and a half time* more for r>:.-iirrh on form prolilems tluiu we sjx'nd on research for the cities. And con-idcr this our i*>lr research will triple from ten million dollars to thirty million do|Uti>, tu\ii we're going to increax: our oreanograjthir research ship nperuti-Jii!- and fAfiiitiVs from eight to fourteen million dollars while Hl'I) is cut llreo million dol'ar-. Wore mrf{i-y l explore oceans wlien wi; probal>Iy already know more about t!w fid of the ^- than we know about the human tides that rise and fall, conr.lan:ly eliaagiiiK tile f :!(< of tlie city. A fi'w inonii-nts HK<) [ said tlur nation nu-di-d a conversion like that which rarii'- over Suiil of Taru. You uill recull that after Hul war. blinded by tlie light, he beard a voice that 'aid, "< jet up and go into the city wherr; i ou will Jx' told wlutt to do." A.- n naiiori, we in'<-<J to sue l\v, light. 1'bon get up and go into the city and we'll nee wliulV '.O be done. Tluijk you. DKMAVD FOB BASIC HEEDS
Tli<A C H A I K M A N . This U lh*- tv|M- of tiling tliat I luuJ ho|H;il l/i JH i;i f mi 1 1 tin- ma yor of < Me velmul who WUM unnhlc U> In- here. I tlur. H.S u liiiiiii*v^ uittii you run coiiiriifiit on tliis. It rAiiU-* to tlii question of ronviTM'iii. Von iiii-ntioiied the mu'ilrt a nioiiiiMit tt<;o und I did not follow it ii|i. TJicrc i- no jwnt tip ilîiiunii, I think you stiid, for confiiniiT yn}\\-, \ would Iik' \'t lnkf thai K lilll further. There in u very jrreut pent up demand for Mich thine* a* a dia^ tritiiNportHlion ny'<-ni, sewer uii'l wuU'r nVi.U'H. J know thin to IM- true in niy oun
Mr. </Ki.vn/*BpK. Ahwhit^ly,
424
TLr CHAIRMAN. There is a great d*al of this type of need which is demanding to be fulfilled, but for hick of money we are not doing it. Mr. GELSTHOSPE. Absolutely. The CHAIRMAN. So it wouldn't be the case if the war is stopped, there is nothing to be done. There would be a difficult transition |x?riod to 'get into these activities dealing with the more basic needs of the country. Mr. GELSTHORPE. And too, to be even more accurate, wo should say there is an enormous ]>ent up consumer demand for consumer good* from the disadvantage*!, nut so long as the war continues our opportunity to truly aid the disadvantagcd, not just from relief but building their ability to become educated and then get jobs, we disallow, we prevent that consumer need from ever being able to be fulfilled. Il is there. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. But there are people who l>elicve that if the war comes to an end, there will be tremendous unemployment and that business wilt be bad. You know that. This is a belief shared by many jieople. M'r. GELSTHOKPE. Yes; I don't share it. The CHAIRMAN. I don't share it. Mr. GELCTHOKPK. I believe when the war is over there will l>e a great Mgh of relief in this* country and |>eople will start moving again. The CHAIKMAS. I do, tixi, and while there may l>o. a short jwriod of adjustment, on the whole it will l* a great stimulus to hiiMiiess. You have been extremely patient and very informative. We, are deeply in vour debt for roming here to share w i t h us your experience ami your knowledge of huMiu-s*. Do you have anything further that o viirs to you you would like to sa y '! Mr. (IKI.STHOKPK. No. I don't. I ju*t thank yon. The C H A I U M A N . I know we have <'\|Ki*ed yon (o criticism. I am Mire there will In- jii>o]ile who >uy you are thi> and (lm(. Kvery time J ojR-n my month 1 g<t iln-Miinc thing. Mr. ((Ki.-i'iioKi'K. I inn Mire of it. Tlif ( 'iiAiiciiAN. Si 1 HIM more innri-il lo it inti\l>e limn hii.-ini'sincii r l/ut we do u|<|ircci!iii- \onr coming.
IIKAKINT. M IIKDI'I.K
T"iii"iTnw rii'irninjr ihe Miino^-s will ! J)r. (iendil Hickey of tin< 'orji. uiio hus hri-ii in Saigon, Mr. f)mnl<l Lii'-c nf (hr \VorIil <'oiin-il of 'hun-he-. who lui^ hem in Siugin, ml Mr. Itoher: Shuplen, rejiorii-r of the New Yorker nm^'a/ine, who liu.i written !><>ok> >mil i> q u i t ' ' nn inidioniy on Soulh' n^( A --in. Tin' i-.iiiiiiiilti'i- > iiiljoiirin-ij until luninrrnu nt 10 o'clitrk.
'U'ljri'Mijioii, n| 1 1 :4-ri 11.111., the cniiiliiidci' wui rei-nrive,ii- HI Id U.ILI.. Thurxliix , Mn> \'A. \\l7l.t uiljoiiriiei), lo

THUB8DAY, KAY 13. 1071
UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, />.<?. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in Boom 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. \V. Fulbright (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Fulbright, Symington, Pell, McGco, Muskie, Sponfj, Aiken, Cast-, and Pearson. Tin- CHAIRMAN. The wnmn'ttee, will come to order.
OPENING STATEMENT
Tin- Committee on Foreign Relations is meeting this, morning to continue hearings on j>ending legislation relative Lo endint; the war in Sou I hea.-.t A>ia. We UIT i)lcuso<l Ui hav- as wittK-.-sos thrw mn wbo have had nxt i nhivi- cxiii-ii'Micf in tluit an-a.
KACK(iIlOrM> Of WITSKHSIW
Dr. (Jrralil <.'. Hii-fci-v ! uu n[illir<ip<>l(i2(st who ha- been uîtyiaU'd w i t l i l l i c Kami (,'orjKinitiori >inc4- I'.Mil. lli lir-1 arrivi'il in S)ii^,,u J"> \<;urs ajfn >iud sinrc t h r u hr Inir. r.oinc Jo !> nâr.lcd, a Ni-WnWwik put it rcrciilh, H- "oiu of tin- nusi tlioiijihtftil ami iiifonm-il 1T.>. olî-rvor> nf t i n - Vietnam s<-ein-." Hi- Inujk, "Villajre in VietiiHin."i-.eon-JiJcn-cl l.o tx> ;i clanMc in il> Helij. He i- llje uiilliur of many uioiio^rapiH on \ ielinidi for tinKainl < Vr|Nirutto!i. Mr. /Jon Iîiri1 i.-> an ajrriiniliurul e/vinoiui-J wlxi fiivt weul. lo Vietnam in IH.'H, with (lie IiiN'niHiiftnal Volunturv Scrvici- j)rn^ram. lif wu-. ii|;[)()iii(x'il din1! u>r of I.V.S. proiirwii". i:i Vii'iimiu in I'.Hii, lieailiiic a K''"'J|' '^ 1M voliniU-e.rs wurkinjc tlinni^hoiit Vn-l-uniii in aj;rieultuiv. r-dueiiiiiiii. refu'/e*-. ami cithnr MX'iiil <l< l v'jojiiiu-iit Work. {It; eain' bn.-k i<i I he t'niu-il Slai^-s in 1%7. lull ivturne.d u Vielnam In JiWW a-, n free ItuKv joiiniali-l. Hi- j'niriialiitu- i-n(*v[tri < hu-* now reinlUui in his \n-\ivf. rspfllwl frmn the rnunlry hy the rxiijth Vu'trmnicsr Oi.vernnK'iit. Mr. Lum- ix ihe HuUior of th. lxxk, ''The Unheard V'oiw!*." *n5fJ"fiini; thim|ia/:t of the Har wiiifr in formal ion periaiu* u> Dr. Ilickey and Mr, Luc*-:)
4,'G
(Froa Kew*k. Jfmjr 3. 1VT1]
"THK
WAK i> INDOCHI.VA" nrrARTiNc WORDS
A cjuiet, xrfadariy-lookiug man. Gerald liickry arrived in Saigon fifteen voars 54(i>. hince then, hi' lubt con* to be regarded a* <4ie uf the nuwt tbonjcbtfui mod informed U.S. observers of the Vietnam *ccue. Fii>t as an academic (his "Village in Vietnam" wax a landmark study) and now a.-> researcher for the Itaud Cx>n>. think tank, the 4^-yi-jir-old Hickey ha* gained a depth and duration of experience in Vietnam matched by few American*. Now, after all these years, Hickc--- is preparing t<> return home, and la.*x week lie reviewed hi.i years ici Vietnam with NKW-'WI.KK'S Kevin Buckley in his book-lined apartment in Saigou. Below, excerpt.-. ThiT*' lok.* an- haunting. You l.iok at the old bookn and niasarinc* and read alxmt the -MM-mllr-d in>w stmtî<'S. One ha.* (Fn.-nrh Ci-n. Jarqui>>) ]j>-d>;Tc saying thai IK- i-i building A new Vietnamese Anny, and there are picture* of |>ei>|>lc training in Da Lit and in Haimi. The MIIM* of d>ju ru IK ov<Twhi:IuiinK. It's tlie Bailie war. ttw sa'iio old war. The French f<mKht and left. And the Amerinui* fought and are leavingbut the war KIH vti. The Frejich had their pariiirntion program.*, and wr have had our pacification program.*. But tlx' \i--t OMIK infraxtnictun* i- --till tlwre, and [the ('oiniiiiinixUiJ slhiw all the "JKII- of Ix-inn cajmlilc <>f r.-viviuK th< [u>clv<-?<. Through the yi-ars<, tb- *anii- !tratL-gie!< have btvti tl^*d with tlifforent nanu-n but the same old ini^takes have been made. Tuniover: U'h\ liave th\-^ mi*takey Ix^-n re|H!ated? Fur one IhiiiK. there i a lack <>f iti-lituti<iiial meinr>ry in the Anu-ncan organization in Vietnam. Any ies.s<fii. Ii-arned here have nut l**-n transmitted to pc<iple who followed the )*ople who learned thr I^MHI- Ttu.* i.~ due priiuarilx to tlie r>hort tour? of duty, the rapid turnover of i-u\Ae. Tlio -ffji'-year Uiiire*|K-cuilly for peoj>lf in coininnttd jl^ <ir running programslias Ixvn di*a.*trou*. A pernon onnes in, work* hard for a year Irttves. pivmcUu- job loônuiowelse noi-xi>eric'nc-. Mit noneelse with noexih'ri conn- t<j \'iet n with no tirr-lliuinl experience li--re anu wunl to do a good job. They set aJKMjc inventing fir-- and inventing, the wiv*! and making all rx'irtK of new dJHToveriiVT. B> the time, they have Iciinnxl enough to >i" &>w H'od, it in tune in
lejive.
Ariilier uiajor n-awm fr>r thi: r^(K*Uui nii.*t<iki> i.* a built-in proclivity, alnunt deleriuiuuiioli. to ein^ba.-ize the jMi.îlive inr iniilter How bad flic- IM-W". I ran't (lintk of any time it ha.* becti admitted that ;>o;iiethiiie went wrong. Tht- ii* due in Urge part Hi the official reporting sysOfu. Tin- report* are called pnigriMs report*. 8., you report. \aittffi-Mt. Pjirt of tU'.MyJfof thi- wbf4e American effort here hji* Ix-en in Juive an n)itiiiii*tif posture. Tli'-reMilt i* that yii do not admit lliata |>rogrm IK tioiiurfi-ring. What biij-ix-n.- is fimt \x-o\k- gi-t rewarded for not ti'Uing ttw truth. .V(>*nd)ciit: Tin- roeitleujiiil t tue <noii1aiuiurd.-< i* u ''la^ric- exatnple of a program thy I ha failed before' (lit- fiTivd reloralu-n "f people mto lurger M^tticuu-ut.4 jlh"iit regard for i\v uwit-. *nd de.*in-< of llu- p-i>jrte tlj-ni-4'|v-> Ntiiwhow tlierI'M a uotôn that flu.- i.* ra good thing1<> put people under Kou-rniiuiit control. Bur. thi" vieM' iKi'<>r'> !t> -m-ial dii-ri|irjrm, the d^l)>orli2atu>n of the pi-opli- oxid .r/ealiou of a li4l<^-. nv<wiican( metitahly. If the plan continue*, the lii will<-f/d up *< tit) jmpri.wriHUi'd pt-oj(I<; living on tlie friug<-of V'u-tnanu' l;fcj: <-!. o{ Lbe vii/rt i-xanijil>'* ^ Aificricun litdian*. 'A* f'<r \ wûairiirjitiou, it IF Marion* |o argue "iv* +'\A>' or tlu- ollvr. Tb<-re m 4-vidr-un- miJiUir>' lAn over if* "lioiiWer and wy* do Arnericiufi* there. U'ticn then: urc no Jh're. th> u we wiU know if V ii-tiiainuatudi can work.
I From fbr hVw Vwk TItum, A^r 2H, jyTl J
To Lnv
\M-(nam, April 27 I')K Koiilh Vjet-nameiie <><>veni'neiit v i'-u Luee, M~yi-uf-<M American writer, to }eve the country tti,
427
The. Mini-try of Interior id In 'fc*ttcrthat Mr. Luce mu.< lt?\f far a "*qeriAl reason." Mr. Luce said that the sptodal reason was hit {art in di*ri<>$mg the iwe f the tfo-collpd tiger cafRH at Coo Km prison. Thtfte -er*nall sfaw ootupartmeat* where hundred* of prtaonrm wcfv confined under wretehud condition*. La.-* October Mr. .Loot; wms'-mfonned by. the National Pro** Guutrr, winch is rua by thr South Vfctnfeutrê, tb*t hi*. pro** credential* would tiot -be renewc-d |y.ftuW> (if bi trip-to Coo Son, an Mand nff South Vietnam. Mr. -Luce is !<cbVdilcdtf> Uglify on May W hefoiv the SeoaV Foreign Ketatten* Committee, the effects of the' war in Vwtoaav. tie ha* lived in South Vietnam for 12 years. Since 196'J, tfaff uT the World Council << Churches, Mr, LUCP ban 'bom. writing for its Kctununical Press S.T\-i: .< )! a.1- doiuR r3<(!rch. "1 am going and I buff ddd*d not to corn* back to South Vietnam until there i pacv.'' bt- *id today. "Vietnam i~ brtUr off without any (orvtgMra. If I do oinw bttck h, -ill only h>- to visit." Mr. Luee VA.H ablo to enter the "tigi-r rage*'' Uk>t July with Repnventatix'*; Anpistus F. Hawkiuv. lX-nvcrat ^'California, }Ce)in^ntAtivr William It. Ande*.ti, Uwnocrat of Tcnu*<s-r and Thomas H. Harkin, a Oonfcreiwiunal aid*. -b" jibotographcd stmir of the nw>Tln-y wt-rt- nnt Ulmjily shown to the American \-u<itors and tbt- United Stales EnibA.y IM'TK w.^ displvawd with Mr. I ure for having made it (Mnwibk* for the Conj^revothPn t<v *& Ibi'iii. Sulix-qucnt p'lWicitr about the pri<m "^mdition.* irat* behoved to lie ettbsuri.'sinic for too cinha^sy sifirc there i? an A.u<:ricstt advvuicy proftnun for prinhnst M South \~klnaui. Mr \A,cf hived tiit hu aould lx- forced to leave the country last February, *>ut ihc ijiH-r\.viitii>ii of m-vrral CnngrrMUncu, and >Qic indtûation an.ottg Aoi'TK-ftn cnrrtvpidruUt in HaiRon, helped him get a tcraporan* vsfcn>U' of hi' vij*. - ""This month I wan tiJd at tho Miniftn;' "* Fomnn Affairs that I oouW xUy4n Victiiaui if I Minuted ttu? Thicu d'ox-ernniMit and changed iy polick-s," Mr. IJMI- Kaid. Lie idiii-d that an ufflcial at the ruiiiis<_rr oaruiMi Phaiu l>inh Tan told hi thin on Aj*ril 'il. Mr. l.uvc IULI UvD-routrovcruil fieun- iu South Vietnamfor both American and V"iof4ia44Ko officials since J067 wbj be nMigncd a>* direeto- 'X the lutwuiriiatml V'olimtarj' Scrviw--; in Vw>toaiD. Thw agency has VOUUK, - tnaiuet. MptiAkinK AiuvrirariH ht-Jpinic in acrieulturt-, ru>cial work, ;ommiuiit> '"' elopuitmt and rchabilitMt iou pro>< ctx. TV- rc-'iKiiatuin wjiijthi to provxl thf: I'niU-d Stattv pr<>tcrari of defoliation in Vurtnaui, tUr jtolicini tlitt nituic refugee and tU*^ bombing <if North and South
(Ki'iW Uir XCK york tlsnt. M-iy I. M7JI VKTB . CttlTJC
i-vicUou urdt-r to lôn Luce, 34- ivar-ijd AnhTicun .-/x-ial Work'i" corrt-*}*ort-nt, i* a MOK at th*- riit erf 'tin- Atmu'icsrii iji-apl*- to IcnoM-.lce truth aix/ut u conflict iu wliich tUfr Gwvr'un-ttf - vtill I'tjiciidinic ljv<? niid r<T'iurc<- t u prodiiciouM mu-. .. XicM- y<iirs a* a Vlfi_urjj.-w-*|)uai.uii: '-grtcifJtucJ -xUia*lbri worfcfr' 7or " f u* ''rnationiJ V'Juotary Scrviov in Victim./) #uv fxni Liu> an mnicn-tjuwlit/K of tlmt co<mtr\' thb> i." nintrhi-J by ftv urwru;tta. Wbot i]*- roiidx'd M'tnani dJri-rtpr<f J.V.S. in UK7, Mr. Lurj- Y,I.KJ:-JI, apjnizf<\}"ttfj to Proidi'fif /obun d^'uiliiiK lii-1 ol)jfrtioii! 1> a v+r whu-U \n. -id "liod Ix-ronu- ' ovcrwixinuiiK atrwil v." Smw tbai, a porr^poit'i'sjt m Vicujarn for Kcuruntical Pr>-Wviw. lt<- Iwif. contioitud to xiif>-*: the jnîiuiify arid by|x>cni>y nf tjj*- AJJIP/UTUJI -*<Tort 10 luuui-uii th- pow^r uf th- tuiiiinry r< ictro'''iii Su:jr.ou. . - ' " for Mr. Liii1*-'- f^'n-liiKi ap|ur<-ul4> wft law j.iiUT|irf>M' in
. The <ixpi'riciici' j^'JiH-d TO r<MivT* Hcf^'j^rrtaUv.c H'iUiiiiu h. AtHLjivon of ft Sv> lwo, uiU orx> of.th* ww'i> UMKt rtfixlivc uitio. Mr. IAIC*" app<!Mr roJjymd to <>cp^rtioju Ijtdiv4r ! f:>>.-' ''I l*>Jn-v it i tiimfor nicitfi'l hi) f-jrcreii^ry 4n Imv VjKonin." But n- lou^j- I'niU-d Slatcx forc-i ri-miuii ii> the kliid of [vfo-|/tjv'- mid Hf-)M <i-\tt\wt thai tlx* TLicu f-Rjw otio- UKM/I tuu '-ought to >-trf5^. Th4<iru of tlu pf*1 iiiv'olvr'd in !> Liwv- ou-f -r order r<-g>jirt'jt \>\ ibi:
428 WITNESSES' BACKGKOUNP Mr. Robert Shaplcn's experience in Asia dates fiom sendee there is a war contspondwu in World War II. Following the war he wa.s Tar East, bureau chief for Xewswepk. Since 1962, Mr. Sh union has covered the war in Vietnam for the New Yorker magazine. His many article** -on. 'SoutiMutt Asia over the years chronicle in graphic terms the. many intsUikes in judgment t.nat led th> United States to wlira it is tixlav- He is also the autho- of two books on the. war, "The Ixt Revolution" and 'The Road from War: Vietnam W65-I970." ; I kuow that the committee will bemefiT. greatJy from the testimony of'nifn with such i>road and extensive experienw in Vietnam. After so many yitars of fuM-hund oh&rvation. each has a jKrspe.cUve lacking botli in iK>liyo^rern in Wasliington, including Seumtors, ind in our tiiililjtrx and civilian (NTsonnel whos*-rve in Vietnam only for rolatrwly short jK-riodi . f wjah to xi.rrss the i-omniittec's thanks to Dr. IJJckey, Mr. Luce. and Mr. Sluijilei' for t!ieir willingne.>s to >liare their knowledge vilh 'the coiutiu'tu-e and the time und trouble it- liaa co.-t them U> do so. In order to aimiilify tli<> proceedings and make the dis<;ussi>'in more inferesting, 1 naK. that each \vitne>s give hLs prepared statement and members can then direct questions to one or all of them. We will tnrin w i t h Dr. Ilk-key. Mr. I>uc.c hn> Miine {)e.rnoiwU 4iifiiriilti4*j> *nd 1 utulcratiul uill be u linle ialc. but we. will dike him when he comes. Dr. Hirkey. will you proceed plea.~<.'f sir. STATEMENT OF DR. GEBAID C. HJCKEY, SOCIAL SCICTCE DEPAETMF 2, THE BAHD COEP.
Dr. HyKKV. Tin- vi'w? aijil coi!clij>iuii^ that 1 am pri'êniinjr u><iit*. 'e uiy o\v;i nnd ^honid not !>< intt-rprcJed a.-- n-priv-t'jilint: llirt.-tf os'
I al-<> JVIJMC-I pcrmi!nii l-o rc\ iev fjiv testimony bcforf-.it j>. Tin- < ' f f v i v u s . Thiii. ii Mi-.iJV.rlh. :,!! righi,.
rJMJCA m i:K ir" V J E r V k M W A . l t
I>r. J l f h f . V . Prim' In,/^[b-i-iji;* my vi.-u mi iio.v t i n - i .mlli.-.' in Vii-tiiiiHi Iiliî't be bli.iugh' 1" ;-.n end. 1 \\-oilld Ilk' 1 to JiiAe -iilin'
Iii nt\ npiiHdii \vi* (>:i\r iir\i-;- i!i]iji-r-tiind t t i ( i iini'iii- nf tin- wi-r in
t ic'lluim llllli Jlr.-Jl'l-i' of t i l l - V,:' ll:He emplnyi-d t i l e wruli;.' Mriil--^\ (n iind 1-. \viiv i" end tiii- wjtr. 11'.^ri-1 u i i h iliK-^' >clif<liir- and :Mii!y-.t-. whfu'hurin'tcrize tlje pre^-m ;-'iiiflj<;t KI (hi 1 lsi(e_-.i ji{ u. lung -j-rfi1-. nf revul'itimix tlnu In.vi- inken |ilm-i' (hr'iiigboul Vi/'iHRIIII-J- I i i t n r \ . ilevii|iiiinn~fi>i' the VJeijinnwv IUL-. H|W;'.V-. been v. l/'îiiinuie wt\ nf r.ehiei'ing poiili'-K] power: r-n Vletfiniiiec_J'iKt<>ry ha> b'-cu mi>rk<-d by an e\'er-rei-urrig pKtiern of iirnih'd struggle w i t h ^nily i'i'l'-,ti\elv -Imrt /x-riixls of {H'tuv und un:ry <f .iuy JciiuJ. 'Hie >rar fhr.l i> going iin uiv\ hu.s l>t'eri g-Jitjg <>n fur n\iT'l?) yeuTh. \uiiifKjtftd event*- have changed, but the
429
is th* sdnwfirst it &** bettwott-the Ffich and'.th* Tlf* "Minh (whuî. ut one/time iiwiudtxl many nationalist Joreca), ^fcnd uoit is ..tta'yjotcoug or JNl-F, aided .Ijy'thn North, Yirtoameac. against tlir-tiitpn Goycnuncht Httditir prij\clpHl.a!ly,.IIc \jnil6d States./ . "As t.frv!riuiiotmiy>iruggh', ttic. present wnflirtmvolveJi;*tt aspects
Mtir<; population. "Uttf must be mtdcrsUxxl wh*n. planning iiuv" program nr s}trjitk>y deaUu^wilVfluit conflict. It- $'* very mtiltll itiintioo *nd no qno dimension. can be Lsokt-wi ajid apkrl front tlie otliw :<lh.ucnBii>ru, bwAue thex; all are M; for example, a dwiswii concerning tlt militarv' (lirumstioa IJK- ititu W4)\uit it*!<>fffc*t y the social. fn,tliti(.il, and '' ~
N'fcflATIVK A-SiCT.< RBJVJLTING K8O V.S. STIUTEOY
hi 1965 wo failed to <1< this* when w* uiiuie the diicUion t> md Anirrifaii omil>at nixits u> V'ietnam. We focused on tin, rnilitary i{iu*:rJh>n t iho>xivlii!<tuii of the otlwT diiw*nsiwfe. Jn many nyjtwt* 'ANC eKtfAl .- ' nijrti' Yieliuiiripse ux:ji>ty did juit exist at all.'Tljcn: wan w war f/i IK fi.n;lil, and we bnmpht to Iw/ir our (nilitary might in a m the Kotvaji wr. Ily empl<yngr 'W1* Mrnu^/y wv d<-tinod thic \vr in valid. -Soinc r>f the ncirutive a-spwi-. <>{ tle. sii-ua|ion resulted from Ail u^ "fti'ii H. fannor i' afield bvfne "Iho foeniy'" bocAUiW'hit in an 'un'ii thut we liad d'.lar'l (<> !M> a. "free (fr*4 //int." Tli5s is really a device for creating {rontliin's in n war thjvt ii<vt~ 'not A viliiiftc kv.unift * ''fnemy villô" ({ ttw targi-.t iif our U.S. HJivjufl h;ul dr-it fir* froi if.. A favorite inrtw <>f Vi-tip bj th liighiands uts ani fttilJ is to ?nl?t & nliupn und m. {J.$. mnTafr *> (lint llnv U.S. ixunlvrs will come wwi '.f. f,)ur dcMnu'tivi?. rvnM&p (* tlw 1%S Tet - in addition, w<;fl<KiiiedV'iftrmiueTie ci(3 iuil (owtis with U.S. *nd aUir.il rroojw niul vast nurnlxM's.of Ani<!ii<nn, Filipino, and Korean <-Mliaii confrfK'l worker^, Lar$;(! nuini*crs of Vitlnmnehe l^ft the unlry-id<' t< î-k better employrnent. with tho AnwiricariH in the urban ttH'us ij as he war iuu'>uii<ij they went jwiv1 by w vj> iiunibfT of refujrtyw. liy 1S70, Vi*tnafn<Mi.' cicfy it> [Kipulutiun hd |R<<H> predonmnuii ty rural and it now had p/cdoiriinaiitly urban. The urban c^fit^rij lud \teeu\tw cj-owdfid, dirty, ' ' ' '' ' 'np black utarkolj.. bar ' ' ' " af H!M> ha :orrnj>tirijr had Our sSrrf'i.fjry hind ifmul at cjuiuij; tl i''Uiri'..Oip An<fi'ti >itH*rl t<lil- < in DecwrilMM* 19f<i thai "ii yemV vv/1 will IIKVCI killed M^ ijibjiv uf ih*4 ific-niy (hat Hft will be.-T. in {97'l, an ' :If'i;o*a on.
' ' -
430 ,-
-&& or POLITICAL ACCOUMODJLTJOX. T. Tlr rinlH.!t can only bcr ended by the vatnmrsi' thcbk.^phv--. I liw felt for A long Ji.-nVthaf. th> mo#'t îki;ly wiv for Jhom to do thU
i. .overuinrril Ui'ar would include tlx- M.K. Anumi: .tinViorijiuiip.se Tu.H:<,>niiiJc>dHti<>n plays -AI) important "ro!i- iii.tfuvjuiu' of. lif*1 and tlioy jJl knoxv ilit1 ruli1?-. KsKcnuaHy it ii>v"lvi>i. a priMX-si* of bui-paiiiinj; bi'.twcx-ij tw<> p^nji-s whop-in. i]wy niakr mutual 'r .-io>.s î rt t^ iwriv- at n ajrAiiW!iif. from whk'li .both Milo U-iw-fit. Many >xmiiJ<is of <)icli u<vomm<>d:t(iou Wfwi-j'ii rh< iiivii>rf U.'>S. fmve'-.'-hm rh<- typo of jir(Mm7)iodution t4> wli'n-'li f n-fcr Jioro i> <m 41m Ttatjoifui tcvI. : .';A ihc pp'scnt .tii-io jmlitiful {><>ycr-i>..v<Jv tinvfi 'iix tho linml." of ^(> Virt!iu!iii'<> niiftiary nnl * luii a.^ ^lii- < tln> -av lu- Xl^F wilt ;ii.'vT. aia-*1 n> |ntrni*ijiff> in nny o|x-. will Iifi\c 10 lf a sliift in <b<' tmUiuv t r nii'tit und OIK' '\ tills i.-oiiM U- doi )<!> UrîfUjclt (;rtni.>oJuti<iiis I)'t'o/Ji. tlie pivvriuiontfuiiil tlu- iion-Kfl. (KiiiUoU jp-irU]^. TlK^\\jfniliJ lx> tlic jcroiiîs tli: fiiuciioii us .vijiWi; |m,hMfal.inv'iu i nti-r I)iirtir's \dtli folliixviiii; in -i.hf rurrtl and,or urlmti urrasi. Amoup jht'in would U- sMrfiii* of i In- Mr utiotiali>t jmrtU-s. s'voral nt-w |ui-tic-. uiul x>ii)<> of tho |x>lili<>/il inuvciiK-iils 'hut Imvc, diirintr thi- |M>1 tIi-.<-;i<c. t-nicr^ti <uix>ii); tlir religions grni)"> (Bu'idliUt*, C'urhuiu^. Him HUM, wid X'fv> [>tii-.t>i and t-vni ainoiij: the (.MuriiHîcirds. C.Mib-ii). uixl Ivlinicn. ". SHIH- wuysnf niakiii<rsiirli acr<innn<> in ;vi-i-nl ûr^. Fi>llouin<; llir ilownfull /if \o\cintx')- H*i>:',. iln'i'i- \MV- u Miiikot t r <ii'-ninii'ii(-. in nilowiii'jr nil of the |iujitii'itl irrtj(>- to wiily and |mrticiji:U<- in the Hi'i-tion- of liWMj aiwl 1<H\7. Alo tlicfr Iiuvc In-rii *|M>rilir afi'iifiiniiKJiitiorin; fir cxiuri])lf. in I'.G I'n'iJidT Xûyn C:io K\ Inul (întiii'Tiiblc 'inilwt rtitb UvuJf^ of <Ii< Ho:i Hiin ^-i-f niid. Millionth it iu'Vi-r liu-i )>i'<-n made '-xj>)ii-ii ulnit kind of tttrn-j-iiMif iviis r<'urli<>il. tli<! Hoa Hiui ircr*- friviM 1 jiiyuU-riiuthoniy iii tin- |>r(K'inci's wlu'iv ihov irr |)n'd<iiiiiniuit. During i!iiTiui'' thTc wen- iniinv .^ >j\ Him IJju> pnivinii- rliicfs in lln- u^^tcrn ii-/ion und t\if ri'Kiiliinfr Host HIUI Mjp|Miri of iJn- trovi-ninicnt fim!i- tJii-< t l n r niot MM-iiro nrca in Siiulli Vic'ininii. -" '!') \' ; Knanwî- lender.* ICTIOW wlii'-h <;po!i|-'. ur<- worth drnlinjr willi und wlicic- ( I n - lorn-i of prjn'-r i in iwli jn'ouj*. Wliib- lh>- difft-n-iii izrotijt- w i l f w n i n diifiTfjil-tliin'r- of ill'4' 2o\ cnmicntrii i--?ncvii:iM<' Unit u!l of. tlirin w i l l wrnrt -oirn- *li:ir..' iti'-poliui'iil ]nicr,'i>ot oiili on t i n - lornl I*-;*1!. l'il in lh<- i-i-ntrul <ro\rrnrii''ni n. m-il. Tliiv-.-.Ji:iriii',r of [ou<-r i- ffwiii\ mid ii \t\ii~i \n- r.-id. tv-nUhi;; in ;t mil:?ijry r i \ i l i n n
< - O u f i t i l U I . . O l h l \ ' \ \ l t i - f . Ûi'tj i^^llifl ill !}( l.i't4;ll|<T <lf |HrW-(V'l|H- t ; i k < f l l
^l.-ur will tliftVI.F \i-\v i be îi mi t ion u*. nnu'ttn\ili- tn iln-ir fii'rt'i'ijiii'iiiK :n I In- |i<li(f'-h1 jiro<----.. Tlu- (inul - t < - \ i vûnld lw mi in-i-uinriiJrtlfiii'Xi Iviw/'i.-n tliiy jii-\v ccyliijifir pivcrninciif iiiiii-'.fic S'LF.
XBCESSITY OF COMPROMISE
' "
I can only outline the axraiuodatu>n and coalition appro&cl) in a -very P'l-eral wy luw. Thon^&re nilnUTCiis coiisidcrntitriis Mirlx as* -if-jv** (invjI'iarauUir.- for all purtitrs ronrvrvjsl, removal of u^lcdaiul &orrt Yiciiiunesc troops.. and whether 'here, should be elwtîite. but Tr<. and other spudGrs \v:U hn^- to br worked out by the Vietna,nicfl Mi-ni>*lv<'.-. The ini|rUuit thiiic h- for alj of tho parties w<.Tru-l to , }Uuk<; roru promises. If they d'>o the Wmflu-t will end, bulSfj for n'lmiever n"tooiis; they aro unvi.illinp t.> .do ô, UK- \VAF, like tiisuiu) liu ,m">i*Tyv^ n;ns<M>ii rain . ivill fjo '.-cm anI <'n. Ti, , C'HAIKÛV. Tbn'tk \ \ vi*ry jntwji, D,. Hickcy. Mr. .Sâploo, V)ulsl youvlk*: ttt p EOBEE1 SHAPLEH, THE JTEW YpEKER MAGAZINE Mr. Sv\i.'Kv. 'Ir. ClmiOii.Pv^'fJ- jcujif>bL'>. of 4 \ \ < .Ht-li < tl: tik y lor yoij- itlvit'uttou i-o^trsiiry ^t 1-hayj- ^M a iiuTnf^r of tP" New V'rkcT ^f. siiuc< F-ftf Ka.-tvn -rdiTts-iwiiili-: t of tlj' ftmjif'ziiit' fir tlic \>u-*l <J xvjij'x hui I 4i.rn|i|N-ut'û^ ! ' Uxliiy on u jiriv-wt*-1!.;^!.*. My cxjt niul ^mt'ti.'tf.. A-: t diU<-s bn.-k in ly^-l;- My Ursi \7,,a lo i ntiiii WH:- JVi Jinu> I94t>, I vus i bor* mur r-i-'j'My, and b> l/i s and C'amTvoditi, in Min'di and April >( tJti> y<-r. I mi <lu- ut.tbbr 'nf "Tin.- 1,u.l ll'-v..hiii<,ii." "Tinn- Out of Hand." nd 'Tin- Houd From Wsir." . I >-lJI a<lrfiiv-< iqy-rlf ff'sf i<j ifif Victnani \vr, ^j^'i-iJicvsJly in llu1 iulijf^-i ;if tli<-ii> ii<>n'rinâ IIKW i<<-cui! ii and ilwn .to iffi- prolM-niA of Suihi-!ixt A>i. in fp'iipral. Kiulin^r fli* wur ,> r>omi as. poMsioIr is. "ii\. 'a iii-'-fss-iry firî -.N-JI -N> jlcjiliu^ w i l b llii- '.tul cjin-s our wjiuli- fnr( > i!OiCpi r> li r> xi:>kint; jrivo<, iot . M int to )1n- r^\ L>f ibwivoricf as u-Il. "
rf STATES HA* KlMXHl'. tt liON't; KI.VU OF W Ml
\i\ own |xi-ki(inii on U- Vii'lrui.u wjirli.i.- l>i'<'jMisfilliiVk>; I belie jti iln- <>r(<dtuil Virtjiunt <-j>fiiiiuiiii<riii, Jia.J vdiUr A think bv.j ii.iiiii rjlii.-v-ir.'U?. iiJuk>K MU<-<-. VL- ln'-<-au- iu-roh'i-d iti tjml J ^riiiiiLlliui-k t > lf.*4'> 4>, but >ir> ^ in u- , vpr'-.>itfi jvrid HiJplc/wtHtiuft.'to a Miilhuni[ illicit u;trfurc nn-l!i<M)--,)irii| In }<t\'i^rini>nf ivoKornii' IM! ui-l. I'll*1 ''iiiitiiiiuili'rii of (h'?j' projciiini-, ^dlci lj\-.-f\ , slniiiid tv^-ii pr'<Li<"ifc<{ lu i J u - i;iiii'iiiii and siibi'laiir*- .f poliiirnl nnd r'.jiiniartl- ,ind vur nlioul jif:v"wrt\, JJfiifl oiiro. iiuuli'ri! jl ^ j- <JilticiiI? inure Livolvi'ii. Hiitdsi^lii
f v> it tr.:iuir t I In- h'-lDlfjll 1 ^ of N.ril( \ |i ( f u u i i ;ili<J ( I n - m i "<''iH lrlll of Ali-'i-n'-tMl- folvi--. ill i h ' - X u l ' T b . )l i~ JirnFirtlih jr'lr, linVK'Vi-r, i.ii lj^.1 jJ rn>( btvn-fnr tin- nninl" i'.n( Arij^rinin 'tr<o|/>. in i ]'j(',.~, am) KHrfi. il ViOiild li;iv<- Jw-n mi in iu<>, fi.^-j ih. {- l<v l l u - ciiii-l. ulid ii)n,l nf l|ti ijijlltiTIi fi.-ilf of Sniiib \"ti;\nmn
>.'i\<l !i;itf fullcn l u l l ' " OijiiiiiMiri'-u' Jim fi<-r tjji. -.[
432
and iuo.tJc.illv, wo continued to rely far loo mu^h on 6rejxwer and . nirpowcr, including indidcriminata bombing. If wt lielpod s&ve a smes tf unpopular governments, we increasingly altenat-*! millions of South Vitflijiaru.'se by oiir overpowering but invariably ineffective or inconclusive military actions, doMjiik. thy fa^t timt '" killed .a'VcTal hundred thousAiid North Vietnainejio ai^l vtctcopg. Siniulta.vKmsly, wo tried l> uHH'liorate the destruction we r.au.sed IP constantly shift iu<r propane of so-called .pacification. 'Real social and woroinic reform, jndibting land reform, should have been far Lett*-- tx>nce<vod and Implemented far soon"r. Mo"^ iniportantiy, the r*.-k of traitiii^' the Vietnamese to fijiht alojjr, with modem wjions induding M-16; riH'b, should have bot>n undortakt-n muneâtcly afior tho niilitancrutis of JlMiS-Wi, mt sovi-rat vv;r later, ._ happi-ncil, aftT-the-I9fiS Ti-t off isivc. S'or'/'-'ay*. 'f>\\r beltttcd efforts to bring alwut ifnprove>cnts in fccitiiiy MJIO dcvo)aimi(;i.t, and^tjîiiw tlur war ovor tuiHnH-s^, tiv.all pi>t of what s M'.- t-ail Vi'tiianu/juJou. Bwaii^ of ibc Iwritape of coufu-don and j'xji^rjjn mutation, Vietiiiui/jti'U n'miiin^ H floudy iv>uV-litically ~i Uiifjk our I'lForttf hav< also i.i'-yi iiu>(fci'tiv> 'he VJBtnaui<'si wi'^torii-v.yi IIKHTJU-J" fur too ijiiioklj. In-foiv tlicir oilitulious were alU to it.~_W< sc/Mjld )..tvi> slatted Tfaiing: the condilions foi '.iittJ viHap." dv'tjioxTaey, luicizonially from \\w youiu'uji,of iiinw>->iu<:^ti ^ no\\' !>\>tcm veiiii-Uy. from ih'c top down. It i;- |mri!yj>r thi reason d bts-aiiM: of ihv phy-inii daruhfi^ >'< wrouijU that fjn- ôcj w- have drum socially md ^c<"oiiilvlly habt-i-ii ih-ort- thurv oif^t hy ){n-lTail,ThTii 'n>nn polificu(<ujhcMri ;ud not "utiti^h fAiflipri'liffiraoii îvl motiviitioii forbot-ial aud w;ouoBiir'hwn!s to biv-oiiii1 -iuflicji-iitiy jm'-hriinjrfiil. Tls do*^ not IU'.'KJI tlitt wi- will -leave Vjetiiarii without sonje iniiiroveintviiu and hojx-n for Ifii^fctun-, ijul for xvhat we. put in we are comiiisr out vtitk very l i t l l r , iin-fulinj!; *catit knowledge of the Hiirakc9 we"Xado_ JKcv." Sf-^nis liavi' IMH-JI
. _ ,
H~ of (li> putt v<"ur,-)iatjieJy, the iitva-iou of the 'titnctiiarw-x .mxl tht- incuj-.-aon into l^to>>, have ri<,t ronpoiiivc resuJts fo wanwfit-.iii<> rw-âtive oner.- of ut ijs Jure jimduro lakyi/, t.lje iiiilinlive tn furiiiT widening whiri hn we tt'*iild 4iv<r dour far jo Mwk in snjicl ntrie.s and. thr H<iX 1i; Miul^Frail UI^P* nmrh iin li>>7 nud l%s, p.>rhnpn i-\rcn uiia\r riHfe*'d lilm'kiulin^thc i l/niphonj: aod Sihanouk viH'*. i/ist.-u<l of bombing: iw r;or<h tfought liie wro'r' kind of wr iu <T-.wraI *'a\-i. \Vehftve-conijnued, >ill n)on<r, to irach lh- South Vii-tnBtiwM 1 to /ijiht a eorivniiioiiaj wr tn,u-rni of a ]i<'ijil*'n war of <-<iiijjlTiri>.Mr;jeiicy. 'J'hj, j>, niKdh-r n-a^.m I remain >.kcj)ti<-ii] abniii the Mjcrr-.s of Viel/jatni/Jilion- '1'hr onfy n'{ and practical wthjiioii in VicinuMi i" ou<- of politjtal wvtiiun*iltn'urit. I -<h!j come b(,k to t hut latci . li.v
1
'.jfKHTt'>%' i^\ri;iNfvhe VM>;' iiinj il'(iiiiin'f
433
oonnnUmen.'s in the future, jwrtlv hy limiting the pn'-rogatives mid IIOVKHV of Uif. Pre^Meut and reaffirming the oldigaiions of Conereds*. There h.> UUHI considerable debate about establishing cutoff date* thai i.s,-.dkt<:* for (ho total removal of nil American forces in Vietnam. I an readily understand Uic overwhelming desire. of the AnieruMin poopk in <<t out of Vietnam as HXJII as |Kssihlc. However, ii is far fttsier c<o full into a quagmire tlutu to get out of one. It is not simply a question of prolonging thfrugonj. ours and theirs. Tin* basic qucîtion, o\ MI .-Jiis. M t l i hour of our misbegotten involvement, is how to get out in uch a. way a_to preserve whatever ciiancc there may IK for tbe ViwtHitme*- to reach (wliueal acttJf>iueiit among themselves without either |N*nuit ti? tj: the. conunuiusts to take over me country or ha^n<r the wr Continue imlefinjtdy. Tliv )Monlo of South Vietnam, for tli' mol part, are eaper to have us .leave, liut- whatever iie niisiîicfs of Uui past, uiost of the Vietnatiifv-, like inost of the remaining Americans in Vietnam, also fe*l dull the st-licxiule of tot i! uithdranul >iiould and eannot IK' too i>rc<-i|)iiniely advanr/sl. Iirunocal and fii^tast^ful as the war ha> \tcw>rne, U4- i-auno' get oil I , lock. Mwk, and barrel ovniifjlit. ll Is uot ju>t a nitttter of mlmittinjr <xir l-k of succ<s?. gra<x*fulh'. of atoning fur di^jjraccful My htu*. of of on u in jj our looses. Beyond U-ing; jljysi<'AJly inipDssibie, oveniijrnt withdrawal would create 'oiuplfie. C'JAOJ. in Vietnam. It wotild drop our preMi};> in tbe re>t of Aia, An well ilvrwheru in Uir world, lo a new low. Jîite it or not, u caniiot OHJH>G *. rcrttJn iimount of n-nuiant r*s|>onihili(y, including (4ie n-s|x>)>-Jbiliiy to rt-jmir a^ iim<-h of tbe 4larjmjrc we liuve done H--. jtossible, fxttli
I'UK<IJ>ENT'.- H I T H U K A W . ^ L TOU^V
Odr may siili n>k, however, if the pa-j- of W J l l i i l r u u a l raitnot I*' fjlMer U i u l . i f a fCHMHUlblc rilUilF dal<- raimol Jlo'V In- >*'(. VVl)il<- I h:Uc i.'iv-li crilLltl 'if (.In- < ':UI]|IIM)IH|I and J.uoi^ ojjcrntjoll-*, I ftvl th|. by 11(11! liiiijiy l'fi'-id'l Nixon'> niibdrawai |>ii'-> *> fur bn-> i>nMi rea-iiiuible. JJui il ^siii t llii- juncture I* 1 Mi-ppcd up afd h .-Innild lxmore i i-arSv dnJiiir-il. Altlio'Jtib tin- nm-t dil*- forces in the \Vtnani<--v
ilRuy -'lifiTni wMTr l<i-si'> j;i [lie J.iids ujTtlo;;. veil of (be jl
\ iciiiudii-rf- iJi\jM;fij-. !< i-iir!i-nil\ nil*1'! ôol <>r (-ti<'i' In iiir i<>|i Anti':'i< tin i r i l i i n r v exjM-j'i->. l i m i n g IMVII t.iuîji \t> \ \ v \ \ \ i h ' wrou^ vv.-iy. Jln-} n- Hi II-HS) IK^VS lt.-_'innii>i: (o u'trbi ibe vv-ujt; win ri'.:hi. thu! i- it. i\-. cciiiveiiijiiniiily or <j>ia-i-'-oij[''iiioii!lv Tbr- nciy not ! J i i ' f l i , i.ijl ii i-- nit ive oui dfi ni (hi-; lîlc il;;!i- VVIn'iber ib<- \ idll:i;iir-' i-;r|J -|lJill-(,'e IltUT I- U\i tir t h e m <v-fl;iillh 1J1' ^<<l I l l M J u r i l y of '-m HillliiiM c-litlilt-Ln<'!>! !I:L- piiriei! It'-cli i l i f a p t f b l c <if ( biiri'_'ii.;_' ll s l\i<-i,n,---. ;.||i| Iili-:)irnl <(f J i u l r n - l r i l i i i f l i . f i .
"t-li^ l'ie~id Jit li;<-^ rec'fn-fv .iiin'mri-- 1 '-'! jumtli'-i n-ri'i< linn uf ]n 'tint
l ! u - : i . l > i l t v / i | i < ; tbe t r i l n l !" j^4.l>(l,l t.i Iw.K'i- if< Vl**'liii.'li 1'V ] ) i v i - t i d > r r I . t ' ' 7 l i f - l i u - c.onliu>jfd I n lilik llic (..:<! lifi't < 4 t u i i i i H i l b i i i : i A : v ! v. ii li i ! i > ' pri-ci'iT i - ^ i n - ii'i'i !' l ' , i ^ '.:iil ihu'. .('t'- "*t\w\<".n\ . n x i p v . i l l I C I I . H : I ( iii V i i - t i u i i n nni.l '!i<- |iri--f>i.:ej - j i . c M:i'O V"hrle ! bnn - f i , - il iii -i -i ii ilii'c l'i.: I'linipl'"^ tti'fidrii^ftJ, en .((,< ^((,i:.>- ( l i ; j i l i i j - , iV"i.lii plin , n l i i Hniici'-. Ji,rni-. ji liii- b'-flu tti'b'iv ,i^-:!.fu('(t;ti..'tt tin !< v. jl! t.c \n, tiun-c t l m j i abni.it li'i,nui <; r ;i(.0/i(l h'luipih TI rUj '.'jj'ttii,ni liv Una I'.iTL-' <r cj-rininly by (!)<- t i m ^ uf i,\,? jirc-'i'.lfft'itvt 'I'/i-fion-.
434
\\7iutc\vr moral justification there is (o the position we have taken on prisoners, vk'e cannot move Hanoi by pleading or threatening or i>y inilitKry action, such as (ho Son Tay raid, lo change it> attitude on this matter. Hanoi continues to maintain that the prisoner issue, like others, has to be prt of overall negotiations to end the war and muM he preceded hv ojr total withdrawal. But on occaôn, Hanoi has indicated a w:llinjie.ss to accept, the "principle" of complete withdrawal, in oilier words, an announced M-hcdinV pointing to a cutoff date. I think it if illusory to sup|xsr that we can Mrike a bargain with Hunoj about mutual troop withdrawals, preceded hy ceasefires. \Vhuf I have de.M.-rihed elsewhere as the mirage of ''the wonderful world of cea-e-iire" was based on my convict\i\ that, even if there -honld be a formal halt <o the fi<rlitjn<j, violence at varying level-, will inc\it:il)ly continue in iitdochiim for year- to come, and in. one -v\ ill ever collect all the frun> there mid put them in nice little heaps. They will \H- huried for u-e another day, 4i.- they were in 1954. It i<also ill>i-w'ry to believe that the Communist* do not *rill want to dominate all rif Vicrnnm, and most of I^tos and (.'amhiidta, either throiiich force or throiih polî<v>l s.ubvfj-sion. FunlM'rin<vre."/faii(i knows pretty M'eJI i)- niitntx'i'of lroop>, more or loss we exj)e<-'i to JIH\- in Viefiuui ^v iiiid-WJi.-It i-- hard *ecreis in Amcric-i. Therefore, ( ftel ihat the President could more sharply define hi* x-tu-dule of Mi'lhd r n u u l HI lln> point without irhir.sr (on much away. Or ho could moie wi-rcilv io dead w i t h Hanoi on !his>jji(jcct;ud w i t h the privmor i.--ue \'ery nîdi i;> mind. I'erhajis he has already tried to do ihi-. I do not think fluit, l prsM'iit.h uould iiiuN'ii;iily help nnÛT" for C'onjin-^ t.i ini erf "re w i t h the IV-ident's aclivitie- in tlii- re.-pert. 1 would. limu-Yi-r, fa\r it fi'v.iluiji.ii i allinir iijton him to move in tbut direction :i> fu^t ji- j-^,-jli<- and reqije-.tin<j him to consult at refjjilar"iiiten-jl> and in coiilidi'i<'e with < 'oiifire-.-, on a bipartisan fn-i^.
TK.f> WAKhM'.K \ V I > I''J--tlHMTY OK \'( O M M < l l > A T I < > \
\'irin;im w.Hr, nlwav-.^'*''iiiiaHy u polxicul on<-, i^ rapidly ir ji.oii- |xili(ieal. It v,>- aU- at lli* inonicjit rea.Mjniii^ t l u ^liiijn' iiiid .ub-iance of a <;i]errillj oiifli'-l, jaii of w l ' i i t fl:e '.'oiiiIIIUMI-T-. r!l ppiiriK-i<-i| warfare. iin ludiii-^ military. pii!i r icul niid
dlploliltdic uclioii. The N'orlh \ ielli;ime-e ,illd the \"|i-t ('oil'.' troop-,
-itli -.oinV iy s ..intini e\c. pijoji-, ;ire Inv.'ikin;.'d"U n into ^mnll imil.f ) i ^ < - to .10 I l i c U Tlie ord'T- h:ne ;ol|i' ol|l Io "Ir-ûlj/t-" ;it l<-.-|-l v 5"
|K'i.i-ii' of ili - ir polniciil i-ndr'-N I'uiJ i-, Jo h.vie (heiii v\ork ili'-o\\.-iy ihl.i i l l " /ov<vli!Hi-n< -\iteJii. irtrltlilJIi'^ llli- local -j-If def. fl-w f'irrc-. imd t" In i- openlv w l ' : ; !-i.ilJ di'nliti^covertly wif li uu- -'JjH'rior, <<n it ' - i t v liloi'k o, in it r ' l i n l h i i i i i l c f . For the in-i'ii'-!^ :i> , > v ; i v . i'mioj In-- de!iTinin>'d ! -ulu'-r* and l o n t i o l ihe .-.oiiil:, <; 11- much <,f ii a.[.., :'-'. '>v iln-,1- -Invicr i:ii'i!i.id-. iil'lioirjii cv , i t M a l ! v v!i,ii i- .i'!i-il 1\i ' '_'''(|i-|iil i l j ' l l - l l r / ,'Jlni "I '.'ell'1!,'!! i'ir'li-;.e. >^ll''il si- w- ii< .< iri|)l<-<J Dim t u i ' i - ' l , d i i r i n / '{'<! l'('i v , l|i-i\ "îilll \:>\'.i- pliio-. '^'t\(- e(|ip||ii-i.iin(- mure i~ i'H ci'ii.iit -tric/i.'!1'. \.-ii u liili- i lie riiisii -..'rij^'tfli' .i'--o roiillll'i' , I :IMI hv nn ir.i'.'in-. -nuX'" 1 ' iiboiil'ih' 1 [ro-|wcl- of pi'ii<:': in Ind'i I l l l i a A filril'Ui:: île-MfL: v. if UlH\ \ < - | \ *\e|| . ( .||l|tili'' l n < r c e l i the - ullil ill' 1 liiiMoiiuii-t-s J'MliT ;iftej v , i ' ure ;'/iiic. a-lid
Laos i.s somewhat different bceAitse the framework for reestablishing a coalition government exists there, under the 1962 Cieiicva formula. However, \vliili' we have alwavs undere-stimated Hanoi's threshold of painthe i~aos ineursion ant) the eurrent level of ae,tiviiy on the part of the CVunninnists in South Vietnam are the latest examplesit is aUo true that the Xorth Vietnamese are v.ean of tliis wur and that they have faeed, and are now faciii", by their own admission, some ra.\r enmoinii;. management, ami morale problems. They. too. are scra|iu<: the bottom of the luatiptmer barrel--7O l>e.r<-eni of those now working in the fields of North Vietnam are \i onion. Ilierefore, I feel that Hanoi may in time welcome at least a hiatus, or a truce, which might, muter t\t>- best conditions, lead tn a proce>s (f accommodation iii :hc South. This would not negate the j>rotiHctl V.U.K theory, but it f>n\<\ alt<T its <-oiiMMjii-nc<'>. IVci-aiiM* of that |os>ibili;v. i U'lieve tlint the fewest numler of troop> w<> le.v<- in Vietnam ih- -umnest. the tx-ttcr it will lie. A Miiall roiitinjrcnt of American fon-e> shoiild remain lonjr <-n<iu<di to (iroleci (lie number of American* \vho >tay in Vietnam in nwi-ssiiry tei-lmieal and advisory role-, and to >-crvc u-, ;v re)i:ibilitati<m and n-con^tnictioti <-r|>s. )>nt ] see ii.i oci-d f<r American cornt>n.t forces beyond (lie end of thi ye;ir; basic coinbal sii||Hirt elements a^ \s<-ll should lie reduce<i by then to mi ub-oluto minimum. jerha|H to H fow battalions. By the emi jof 1'J72. or nirl\ 1973. m nmre limn a fe\v thousand voluntet-r adviser-, uiid (4-e|inii'i:in aii(l rehubilitatioii (x-rsoum-l should remain the former will In- nei-4-s-.ary tl<'t<' the tak of i<-a<-hiii}: tinVieinanie-rf 1 tij><> i t i f t l by that linn- Miiiu'tlnntr mure \\ill huve U-en learned about IVople's iV^r l":ir inon* Vietnamese oU'1- < than most 4if ( I n - Aini'ricnii military establishment U|I|M>M-> .< IKIW readv, uitliutr mid enjrer to rerrir:ini/x' and -lim down fhr-ir annynnd auxiliary forces in uiiuM llic demand^ of I'cojilcV Win-. If itccoiiiniodalion t.nd politiciil >i>'riiij(iii-. don't work, thai w i l l be the only un\ the South \'iciii)uncs<' i-jin tijlit fi>r their snrxivul. Ho\\e\cr. jiroperly ^'xe^Mited. sij( 1 ii rcnr<iHiiix,]ition could in lime become purl of (he iLcconii'i"iiil l u l l |ir(.ce-.s. to include V j e t . It cull Msil'l :>t ill" t u p . w i l l l :ili :il'reeiiienl b e l v e e n tli'' 'uii.'oli ( ioiei l i i r e l ' t ;llnl tl.e |iro\i-im><i1 r e M > l > i ( | n l i : i r \ ro'.erriliu-Til of ( l i e ( '"iiini:i1ij-t-. lo rl Pi I i"/ll;ill"_' '( c i i i i , ,!ILI .^11'ii i Id. I.' 1 ])leei-ilei| I iv ;i êniois l i l t en I III f>\ u l - : ' l i ' \ <! >lii^<Hl ri'L'ilile i- III |i"V.el In ;.ccni|Jlliii'lji>e U il ll l l i e h e i e l..f.,[i' u e < - i e i li'i) e l e i i . c l i l - in \ |H iciil'e-J- x i c j c l s l l i e {''lillllli-l -. (lie I l i i l i i ' / ' i - < . f l l i e i ' . i o J ) n i i : j u ! I I ii;i J i j i d -fit,. 1,1,i! t i n - s l i > I , t ; i ^ l i - d l < l - , \< 1-; It ( j ' / e l l i e i i i > n : j i r i - v u n c i i o r j l v < !' ll:e - | > n i i i loli Tin 1 -e at i- thin-', ue -.hoijlil hii", e in .'!' I f o r u l u l U l"li^ fi/o. :i|iplvili'_' i . i i r |il/(ic:i! |e\ern;re. i l . - I < - ; n l of ,-illijilv jioiiliii'.' :ii<l i . . l i f \ |i I l i u m i i l i c f i i n l i l i . - i i i l l v | - l u n i l i i .n!i' tin! 1 Iii-Iiew i n ;iji| v , ' l l i o n l -tiill'jU M ( ! i T ( I ' . i i u ( l l c t i l n - l . i l i c r ' , jji'i'l in < i T 1 i ; i i i plucr,. Inn \ ' l c l l i ; i l , ' u;" dot I ' M - ..f l l t e j i i \\r in 'i.i.'rer hn'.e i l j i i c l i lever.i'.'e !ef I, |ju! v\e c:ill ; - l l | l !|V li:e ;!( of per-!luMn Inure .i|l,l|\ nl nil level- I<i-.)<'u 4 ] uf
436
totting ]teople in Independence Palace in Saigon, whomever they mar be, bow well they are doing and what else, they ought to do, and then rvtiring, amid noddings 01 Vietnamese and American heads, to the embassy, believing we have accomplished our objective*. Tliis is part of the. whole American myth of diplomacy In Vietnam that has led us to wear blinkers for 15 years. Considering how long we have i>eeu there, we io not understand much about the Vietnamese. One year or IS month tours of duty are not conducive to acquiring knowledge or fostering patience. Accommodation can also take place at the village level, which I consider most important. There is no doubt that life for many Vietnamese in the delta, for example, has unproved materially in the pant 2 y*rs ay I have siid, not everything we have done, not all asj>ects of pacification, hz>'. c been bad. Canals and roads are oj>eti, markets are huy, bee.a'jse .security iu most places has iutunmui. But t h a t doesn't mejin most of the population snp|>ort the. government of President Xguyen Van Thieu. My own bcoreeard would still read jro(.V>nununi.4t 15 to 2(1 percent, pro-Tbieu 15 to 20 percent., and the nsf, yem-rally i)ut if the government, does somrJiiin;; iilvout the everlanUng ' t ver more dcoyiJy ijiiU^ldoxi <vimjptiin anti iiriplernents Uud reform {r'j>erl\'T whicli so far is not the cav, and if it really sees to it licit lioiu^t elections are held at all levels, then a*-c>miuodaUoii LHVH;U<N pi^sihlc, Iwth w i t h tle umviiuniitte.vl and iviih those leiral < x iiinim:nUt <:adrcs wh< begin to S<T that lif- <>n the n'in-C<oimii<iui:*t side of th j fencfjs, l>t!'ter f-,r \\vni snai their fu.ijiiiic-.. But ill*! uill take lime, tid it is a Vietname.-*- problem, m.i our.-,, ihoiiuh wn hmecerLuiiily alx-iti-d </.rriij)tio)j. HOVVIMIT, it furni-lm.- .tnothi-r reason for our get line out u> "iiickly a?. |HMhte ami li-tting the Vw-lnajm-M- Milve their own [M-oiIcrws in their imn wy.
FOKTHi O M I N C KW.rtltt\< l\ soIJTII VIKTVtM
While ihc CViiPinuniM^ have ivfiwd ' |inrt!<-i|M(e ojM-iily in tit*VietliMiniê eli:ctioli. thai have IHMMJ fu-1'1 in |.]x> [i:^, i.tnl mi- scii'-duicj lo lie lii-ld tiii> MiniiiiiT >iiid f:ill. fur it iii'U hoiiv of rc|iri'vMii;iii\c^ in August and for the I'n'-idcncy in esirly Oi tober, they u||| n i i douhtcdlv parlicjp'ii^'co'.crllj . Thi-y v\'iil 'ry to g<-1 iheir :.yrnij|lii/ci into tli.' house and. if he run-., 'hev viill tno-t liki-ly ''o;<- for tienerul Duong Van Minh fur IVc-jileiii, eu-n tlimj^h he hu-. itbjiir<*d tr.ejii and >>]Kjken out j-r:iin-.i <-oiii;iii.n go-. cniim-ni lmi in 1'aMii of pi^-'c, Olivjou-ls . t l n - < '-omnium :- uoiili! f.'ivor Uir-irou'jW! 1 -! piMi'i^'ainiidiiii'. I oulJ like to f\pre-s inv :iji|>n>.;il f ilie ri'.Miluiinii ju!rij.!u<-<ril by N'Dutor >ii-\eii!-.<in 01 for u .-miiijir 'er-'n.n, (< t i n - i->tiil>!i-ii!neni of mi Aiiu-rica.'i iiM-i viiijdii -/roiip from < 'ongn-s.-'. i hi-. y-jn i.-ir i-u/iv
M i j / l u - l j i al< j ii ulli] k l i n U lcdj:i'ul)lc f j i a l l the '^Vinjji^ l!i:i( -î. < (II -uli's" u l < l i - ' i l the cli-ciioii, of I'll.*; uli'l J'.AuT. \VI>:i( ir. |-i-(ji|i|-.Ml i- iu,l o n l j r-oiigi'i- -iiniul oh-j-i \ ;it ion but .-on ii' Uiii'^h |>n>fe~-ioiiiii j' ( '. ] uii'l puracjpMtioif Ji v. ill -,tjl! Jw iiiij(n--.j!)lc io nu>ii IM>HU- liî.'iii^. bill al leaM tlilr- e:ni lie r^liii^'d 'J'/i inspect llif /']i-,'l Jon- |i|4iperi.V M o u l d n-xjiiire teuin- <<f i-xjwi-i-, in ihe jii'o'.iiir^, d m \ i i lo the vjlljigc l e v e l cith M l i d e r l n k l i i ^ . f i n l liiiMU^' -.(MMit ;l^ much :i- i'. " him' n l l c m l v in V J i ' l l i u i ) ' . J lliilik '-tv me J i l - l i f i r i j jij f.nuilli^ up u j l | | '.mije ' |, of o^r OYMI, |IOV\/'HT, iiiMimiii'.-ie ilioiigli ihrs iu:iy
437
bo. If wo cun obtain evidence of rigging, tlun wo \\i!l know how and whv we have fniled in prematurely forcing democracy on Vietnam. If Thiou is reeWtad and the election is judged reasonably fair, then Hanoi's position in refusing to deal with the Sigon regime is less twutble. and the force of world opinion, including Moscow's if not Peking's assumes now perspective. If Thieu Is defeated, by Mmh or by Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, the sume \vould be true.
POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS
There are *orne recent signs that the Communists mav favor neg' Ations> next year, |>erhaj)s even late this year, though there is also doubt about how serious they would want to bo. But there is talk in Pari>, as well as ejsewhere, or n new Geneva-type confereive The derision in Hanoi to eliminate candidates previously chosen from the Soulli. in the election* held in North Vietnam in ApriJ of this \-ear for a ?iew national assembly, was presaged o 2 Luin? to allow the provisional revolutionary government in the South more leeway to talk with members of the Saigon Government, ilunoi would certainly maintain its domination of the P.R.G. but even the semblance of independence, and the indefinite postponement of the issue of unification of the North and South, would help. There is aome continuing evidence ( h a t , despite their adamant public stand, thei'omniuniM> inigiit talk >ecretly with Thieu, if he if reflected, probably with Minh, and even with Vice President Ky, who often tends to. ily like u huwk but al>o to <<*> like a dove Ail of thin is further proof thai the Vioinumone, all of them, are tired of the big war and again underline- the advisability of our getting out as s<ion as feasible. Tlii< does not contradict my ftsar that violent* will continue, for the \iciiiHiiiOiip soern to have a x?If-de-itnictive .-iv-ik in lliein >i-hich <!e(i'. We-tern conipreheiision though we re self- -Inactive enough in our OK P ways too. The North Vietnamese are like nulilry lemmings, willing in die to ho lnt man down the trail; tlie South Vietnamex ure (t(.;iiictil iejuming-, Mêmingly iriciipabie of gejijng target her and i'.' u truly repre^ju alive government . They iniglit Jtuve clone iM-ttej- if \\e littd left them alone in ihi- i;ard n<J not inip<iNej| our We-iern >- upon them, thereby inhibiting w h a t might linve <>een it uii.rc i i i i i i i n i l |xiliti<'ul, even revolutionary development in the South, iin-linljii^ pHriicularly the einergeiwe of civilinn ratber thati military Ic.-uli-r- Vet <ic>| >it<- tiiis lemmingL concept, OIK- must admit \}m[ lli<' \ iei:i:'iin'-j- IIHVC t.reuieiidour. eapw'ty for survival, c4titrmlK-^*r>' u- i!iis juuy vii:i:d. Victiimii i-. full of >nch c<>nira<iicii<.r)> in 'jiiy ei-eiit, I do not think wo will eu.-.ily strike * tmrgshj îth Jiunoi l)a-j-<l <i(i the tJ/H^j> uilftdrawal <jue>li<n alone. It is better to -<'i u iirnier timetable of our oun and then waif and flee, and liop", l^fiiiig internal political developments and (lie a<votiim>da1iov<T(nn<'!i( r/iuld -I ill tlien shift (<> ai^-eptaiice of a mixed electoral i <i)iii(i)--io[i jn the Soinii MJiirh would be t tint amount 10 H-jiij>orHry ionl):ioii, if iUi fi H <-oiii(in-<ioii v\eie given broad q<in.-,i-|c<ri-)nth'c poui-i-s to !(!. I'liiinc, for cxjuiijili', i)ie boiia liden of )Hiiilii-y| par(ii'.%, .Midudnig I lie < 'ommuni>t J'rt>. I do not t h i n k we should ..-"iictTii iiiir-cUc-. M i i l i ilii- (jiii--iion, ai.d nimihir iine^, \n-\tiin\ l.he u^- of
;..--_.
:-
j*ewuasio onc^ tveifave nepotiauxi our own war out of Vietnam anj ilie pris*JHeri*stf.i- 1 think Hanoi means what 5t says alkiiii the s -(hat. once w* arc 'definite in saving wheii'w will leave., issue .<* be Negotiated^ before others. -This would then bv .a parallel "approach to the natural but slower accommodation pixx.-.e&s i n tlie South. : - ' ' ' : I doubt timt-a residue of -Aiuprir-an ad visors and teobJuV.iaiisJV'ould be a ^tumbling block. uot so Km<r as Pelting and Moscow eontiuue'to play b jch n"i! obvious ro!r in North Viet nam. Tlir- quc^tiun <f ourroiitimied use of air pi>\wr !nst be se.ulcd, howpvw. Her-,:I iJiink we must be i?s furo â- >ve can lx- i: milking rlear that o intîjd Uj stoji the bombing Artvxrhi-iiMinrl pv<Tywlicre. The VieMiaiiuê Air For<-e has improved ca.|>r<ily.-tli<ugh it has so far proved itself inrapablc of waging: sophislira^'d helii.-optor w.arfup:. It, too. must, lie left to tiijhl on its own, if ijw.<S!ijirv, including puar<.> part^ Bui tin- imnibint; by Aineru-aiis of all area's. of Vit^-aain, while iT ?ui- slaved vfi dffaul Ivw nfN'j thno Uu'uh tJi<- ye.srs, has-lxx-otMO one of our priiir.iiml uulioiiaf dtSizracw. Ulliiuate defeat in wt ext^Julcd jruerrilla t-onttiei will never lx- avoided that way, no ma tier how nwny Xorf h V'ietnaine&f w<- kill, oj' how many S6uii> tliaiitjwv-ideiilaliy. The^poradic fKdiibinôf X-orth V:l^ -this Ja-o dale, in. rcpriMtl fnr TtfU-ks <m nf/TniuiihS3iuv ;iiane.s or otlir pretexts, SKUIS; >, very iif tl< and uiiely stiffi'ii* morale in tJi further " ' - -. -,( I'HUKXT SITTATiOS' IN
. your^^^HirrrlaJl hs a.-k?d ru* to speak atKiiU thr ftirr/'iit situation in NoutlieaM Asia and (he probabU* -(HMirw-queJicex <>f various jioliry alt^'riitt^vcs. f think \u; .should do ul! u'<* <:-an in lûo^ in furliiur (lie I'xiîitii lilies of jwstabli^hjnji the l'Mi'2 c/jalition and lo brin<ra-n etui to liie h<'|rani(<' war t h a t is ^K'inir wa<rc(i in t h a t nufortuna(<' cxiuntry. There :ir<' increasiu'T Mttn-* that lh<' Noilh Vietnamese want to <-oloni/^ ul Jeast the 4-asUni half <f Laos. The nation V de farlo partition under i. <:>ulition froveriiineiil iii Vientiane is probably both inevitable* and " desirable. îv(>u the rir<-u(ii>lai!i < e>, und it. MIMUS doubtful lhat the N'ortl- Vjetnaiiiev tviil withdraw tli'-ir trooi)- from tlie<-ounin' Ije/ore some .-n>:1 <jf iur<!;jtmUor> g<-t underway. They are now dendloekud - Prime Mini-tcr "ôuvanua Phouinu demand^ ûrh u witJilir-it, and (4i<- J'uthet Lao and the North Vietiii-nieM- are equally in deiuuiiilfu^ <4>s->ntion f AmcricHii. lû>, uii(J Thai bofiibi^ Tlie \H>in\>'n\x i nortJje.ni lô- should be Mapped <-vc'i lliiiHi it ivoufd muloubtiwUy iiîd to MIIIII- furllier military expun-iou JAJUJ conM>li(jntioii bv t h e l 'ommimist^. boili in tlie north und ,-outli, tiix><ind tlie ji(iliijlij-itl'Htn'e<-Mpi(:il i)f \'jefitiune i> well us theroyul r.ljiitid of LiJillilT' und the entire, ureu of tlie iiolovcits i'lateau in the Mulh, îrtiiuJiyC ijiiiiiiuni-i eoiiLroIled. lint if t-onld probably be < 011jilid Jieîtialioil- cjioli) then almost surely take )>lii<-e. The |.ir 'flejvd jj(xd offire-. of the LrUriiutioiiul Control t'onumsnioji Jiave tx'i'ii nil lint n-j(.v U-d, hul ilx-re remuiiis a chuiure tljiU they mi^hl nt 11 i r m - i u l uioiiieiil IK- u>^<l. A Hew </ejieui-ly|n' I'onferenre thai d''u|t w i t u l l u - 1 i*0hjiic>.ljon til^l J.'nufd jiussjlily pave the \\a_V f or u Vietfinm
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439
Ct ! HKEXT SITUATION -IN <'AUB<rU
, ';$. 'arntwha; i> more dJc-.vlly a part f tin- Vietnam imr. f" ;Hltt3'al n-JtJution is {MVSM'MC thrtf too, though if* ftttcv-r tlimt wt {/d>r>. "Cli*- Cambodian* can uct onimmi&U- tv'lh Mint ti in<-ludo ill'- native ( 'ainUrdian t 'oinnumuis but ;'nt tin* rfihiuiii.ukixt*. At U-asi our surh attempt' \vas -TiiAur a. f- *' ii; in tin? jmijilpf of PnrsHt Prpviiwt," bm it failed -whe;i tttt.%V':J C'oiinmmfcr'- .c-JcineaJs mrarbr .rûliiaj: in llu of !: fivj- jr>\ cnimciil n-iHV^-iitali^^si. Altliouzrh 1 " tin- iiit u*iin, -:ir rolt- in (.VoVlM>ti toelny i^jtistified, it.s-{a>; to itir'. in that c lU'i- li''lpi.!tj th' < 'ui:|KK(isOs ht'lp tlfWUM-lurs fiifoujjfi A pK>^rriuii.>f /tfiUfan- -*nl vonoiuir -ussiûitrK ftnvvt-vi-r, lh-ro nr<sii;tis tnm>r "slu.f uv will U;ui>" th.* s:<' ![ii>tjtk<-^ \M- fluhf11 iw Victaaoi -in cmittiiini/Jrip i-ci> futiotn*! rather than i>n<-on\-fHtiiH,>tl " riU'tlttM-Ji of warfare nit>l ii> (uvt uî'jt <"ir l.'Wi-rapi' >F ii lo nl f>r HI Ivasl liiK.it, thi* it:i?i>tmt of curtriiAihi^-.i'orrupdrvu ptt>i tv cnrotirrt^<- A (juickcr jmri<_>f fsolf.aut rirorsaui/utimi unj j>roj;rrtv-i '11 tli- /riiiuiii>rt -,f ai> I'rfirh'Ht yv.p>iWicat) form \tf îivcn;irn>nt. Tin- illiMV- of Priiri, -^'l. obvioiiJy rnjn-luWc, iifviTLhcIi^ "* ^rT<-f tlu- yoimj;if more far-M-t-jiiw politira) rli-mi-fifs wi.d Ii.iiv IKV" i,-rii<f.'. it is foo MMH; to f<41 if (lir n'\\ -abim*t. eii ju.->t wfi-k i- Miffi'-ii'iitty rrpcfsi-fli.liv% but ii w-oudi not
HUOJCCANVK UK SOtTHEAJ-T A.-IA -1O I VITKI> riTATf>>: C H I X A
VVl'.-it t> (hi- ini|>yrtiuicf <if Southeast AMU to the (."mini St Thi*. uf coii[->, i-> Mrtiifthiii^ we have to determine v'^l'fral Uc inn IK* >|)<vjti'' ubout uro^ratns anil |>olii'i>:. TJief an* nn(.v |iriuri* |.'M(i(> in the uonJ ami < I-HD:HII be equ.iUv <*onrernei| oboyt nil uf v'u'in, or IK' u jM-liceniHii wll o\er tin- ^lolw. 1 luin- u l u a \ > (uOHhlereÎ SoiiU;eii.-( A<tix, fjon<r w i t h tin- Miiiille Ka>f anil Geriiiiiny, Mi IK-. three toil rnii'-nl jrru-. for !)>, us Anieri<-nii>. Ii i-, part of our fu!R<nii<-ruJ hi*>iorie Ui - ."iv- nu-fii in Aia, \\liii-h is ami shouM to lie <-onrenie<| wifii i'tiiiiu, fin-! ninl foremost. The r'--'iiitn IJiiJl". uf ifli; H reliixutioll of < 'Illllll'x lio>tile u l l j t U i l e UC'1 I'lTl lljllly
a^Ki^, ltinni^!i 1 do not think we xir>.vli| >|e|iti|r o'irM-Ue^ and -u.rvfiJJy ^-Ji-i-te|ior><i"f.i- Ii, < 'luna ON [.'.niili'il diijr-.. th>- ( 'liini-v Icoi- i_'uni'-l u linri'lrnl iniliir.: ilijlur- uorih i'f (nil'lii-ily. err more One >-h<iiili| r.f| i rnin--ii> ituii. ln;( H reumiii'- to IM- M-i-n luiv. tii'ii ti fiirliu-i tlu-y 'Ail! _(. unii it renniii>
In ( ....(( u l i e t h r - r V.e \> |({ liru lie iv iHlli 1 /, - ' -iliollM l l i l \ e )n % e|i
b.'f/ire, to w-|i .iinie ( 'liiiui iiito ( h < - I iiiti . Nuiioii^ anil to vi i irk
Inualil -<>I|[" 'JiH (or>|e|ll ( h u t u t i f releûl*- i f u - TiUU lltlew (Ji; f .. nili;-||t !ii ii ner.-i-iiri si'i odiljtl \. role Jtklli n H v r l o i i l i - l n ' - . I^HI- llll I'ei o^lii/.lli^ i(- -|^li! fo ;i -ent ifi liii' <iftiTiI A--.-/'i(ibl\ . OiH-iiiiif nji I ri|e r- ihi-Ii-vi-r j u i r t uf the <'r|iiniion TS :ill I I I H V \ (TV Wi II Ml 1'ie l i l t l i r e Iw JHir' of -lli^J- < 'llll. II. M-. liol(> Tni|>'l uiid l''ilinr nnttnlitin. li.iii!>/h Uiev i i u t i i r n l l y i.;>iroin h ihe '|Ni--l|i,ti frii.-ii .hlfi-rcMt \ jr'.\ |u/liif -i Til.- <--.M-iiiiul fur! Id^/ii,.- M;il < 'lilll.i | ,i irf-iit l>:i(lon ninl llu- < 'Iiiii.-Hj' u)-c n Diii'îillji eul -'iil'- who
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4-annot bo ostracized or igr.ored, no matter what form of they have. If this is true of tite Russians, it is equally true of thu Chinese, and it ims taken us far too long to admit this Wunt fact to ourselves.
C.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN AXD OTHEH ASIAN' COrXTKlES
Our relationship with Japan in next in imfxtruuuw. The Japanese economic thrust into Southeast A.HW today K comparable to its military thrust .'{0 years ago. Tokyo's relationship to Poking remains idnioyt tts un<i<*finrl as ours. Our military alliance with the Japanese i In the prooi-ss of tenuous readjustment. These arc all factors that will have A tearing on events in Southeast Asia in the years ahead. The N'ixniL Doctrine, by itself, i not clear enough to serve us a JXTmanrnt ruideliiu- to policy. It t< all w<-ll und PKM! to say that we will h*!p those natioii thai help f.hemselveM. Then- an- many uiwertiun factors and jx>îbiliti-.i that, rcniaiit. VVhnt sort of jx'rmtm-nt t-V'tcni of bases are \ve êkiiifj. if any. on the- Asian mainlnne, or clo- iii it? \Vlijti sort of nnval wrecn do w<* Mut to maintain? Is there a need to niaitituin a floating foree of Marines or to keep elements stationed in >.>r /-low to Asia which can b*v " -'! i" enwraen.-ies iw Fresident K-arieily di in 'JTiiIanl 10 vears gn? T!ie Kem^-dy jiloy worked at that lime and >oi*rlit work again under similar ciicunit--, hut < cantint. for^N-H. Tliut hrin$rs ii|> (lie ticklish qii'-stio'i of p-ney. Wlu-n dues iiiMirpeii'-\ reai-li d level definable a= inva>ii(i? H*- N'ortli Vietnam or t'hina dei-ide> |.i civ- inun' >np(>or( tif tli.hiii ('-"r:inniiii.-.r J!iMU2''H(->, now increa>in<; their Miiu!i|><>x putteni of rf->i.tance throughout Timilnnd. We uill then te up agahmt iaiudifTirtilfc fiecisioits. Probably ne will mnintaiti uur a^reenu-nts with 1'hatUnd affonliu'/ a (he u>e of the >iir buses we built in iht't finntry as wdl &$ retain our option-, in the Philippines. But if ill' 1 nnmlx-p of in-sarp-nUiin Tljailaiul doublt-*, mil inel')d<'s elements of oihi-r nation-, do we pui tlie hase-i to use Benin mid (-tart }>r(riibinpr the rein-Is? Then\A liotliinj in the N'ixitn Doiirim- tlmt indieales the UII.MI.T*. \VIiul it comfH down Nt, hiuntly, is sthetin-r u>> will decide t h a t n -ijwtific iiwtion i>. ''worth >aviiifr" in it.- own ricln. und wheiju-- to a< t or n<tis j:i our National iriteret-t. { iH-r.-otialiy fvl th.t. in wlittii>n t<i -u our iliplomatic jH.liu< l m ur:d < oiiiitnic ^;iu! [xi^tiip.'. we -hoiild in ?oni(< sort of military shield in and around A-ia. lo include ihe ?1)jli|ipim-i \\\A Tl .iiiitud In riir- int'T^'f- ' ^.iiniiiiiiin^ ! i:nprov- oijr relatiifiis <\it.h Chiuu, ( '.hinl: we 4i.rulr| \\-iih>iraw fn.i nur militun iHilin in Taiwan. 1/ut iiuiiiiljtirt +wu' liny .! fnrcrs in l.'u .viijtti ''iniia S-H Our i-iiiitir-iiin^ purtnership V.HH Au-ir!i.i i.-.-eii(i;i|. ()>ir reltttioi.u TV jt!> !:><!; iit'-in, v i i J - L vnji'pri*'- li'iif 'smithn i ' . i - r v . in cunri-rl w i t h ci^lii. oilier jiitri-rn-of il-t- iiorld. j-:jrtii-'.'n"rfv , Jini.r. ha.- bcrti u -i/liifii'.-nil ci'iiU'ii'-liinii Ui S/MlhciiHt A-ij'- oeli IH-III^. The stxlijii'v uf (ni|>irii-iin / n u v weU d-ferrij'nc the -'.uin|il v of the ie,t of (In- p-jciori. m.iij :i> iiiuny r'--^^ cu'- fi> luii'-îit hold-* !bIf''}' to fmollitl I lnrjH'f ill lull wilii'll j;+ Jifoi'<>f-,. l Httf, I'llM'i'. s!i'.l !'iV. ' -
FfOATtOX -OF POUCVMAKLNC! ifct^KQO? 4\T> SCOPE .-Jh POTEXTUL .,
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ff TV** cianot definitely -predict vv. !k3', in Sti'tiiheas't Asia or elsewhere, AW JKUI UN>J strps to clarify our .-'" .'.""-"' *: - pojicvmstviiij: methods and the scope of -our iit<itial.- actions. I ~d<v ' .-" -r 1 iv.t think 'lie President 'shftud:- can or should be tiftrl SoJinny that&e ' - ' '^l hi eiuprg^nîcs \ritIwv-t_Coii5rwsinnaf "'
fV*-thc jjoy? relationship lierwertn \vluuh fc> ru-qair <J aûerrilla warfare character o its bVi*. _ limn* is irenirndotV itictj to redefine 11- "role of various ae.icie.< in th*~ 1 -. .' . . -* ~. -Tv^-^ .'
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If.tlio .*<tut Depiftnu^.-'inould nift(ce and 0-xo<?utelop-ijiu jKiliry., ; ; ,- -;. , v.-Jial sho?hu'! nilfi bV-of the Xational JJw-urity Count-il'-and the ' : -. ^. - Pr<-si'l.-nt's jK-rsonftl alviaers'1 Wliat sUoald the roto Ixj of tl CIA? X~>Lou!d it ''. ,[>urvJy an nU'lligt'jite âtiMTfuj; ajj*-nc}'-.^c should it u.Uo . ,
v
.liiirarjtHtitnu<>ri5i in certain \vh*fi: "ttrtutTi!>ts ftreMwjrn<xi *.! stftkt.-?.VV will hts-fawnl with >tt\'t*t\tj>?ttt.\ us vÛ.-as'tinconv^ntionftl sitHCics -in. Atw* --.--'-'xl.if \v<^.4ri to nvu.'l ;uor' Viwt5ttins w^ vfilbhavc"t<>1!et; cur-',- v :' , ''ii iif-ufitii>nn{ fiouso j:) (n If-fjfi'st, It seem* to m* limt tiri en .xx tttV..si-tk. _Tho UttWrt, .^/rniî'J years i lii-ld v.îfi'Miit h'-atin^ aVitl >!/f'*un'd s<fm .highly cuiifili t-.-tbii'iiy ."a the suT>jo:ct of.fortifra noUryjnakJns; ^jwpiiun-s. But littl'? 'f-iwi-liincr l)ftpj'.nic} about,\'"ttil. - - - -
tlit ill? f'ti
_
M.-iir.L-, rt:I 'rth^rs ytA tln'u ''( farther .0 Miulyni* l-V; rilc vf ilu/'-ii <>r -i i!'jv**r:rioTil a'â.-j-^.ujxl bnif J'-V>iiiiv^lv'/*l in Mp: >i'.id t'X'rr'fioa '_rf {yrci^jj. [uliff. A careful > 'i<if J^DI i"u ot Pr^W<-iii^ V h(-.v )ili)nl'i r'vr^îii>.' t'rv^^n aid .u.'i.l<l Tc just '^('"?t>^> io"
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si'l'i ri-vi.r-. 'i-n ' ' J U l i u ' j i i u\'vr 't i'iiiain nful or ! i--.ui', 'o .ij>l>rn\irunti.'.^ li'fifrrfi'-i A.'!i>?rjiiji p'i ! ui.iif---!.ljf;"i u-nf; fo. fr\\ -jpi-, t.-.i uv ^rc ,iih';. io d-.i t'.Ji.,1Iot-int.v,,'jy-': jj't.-par-/ !iJ f.*r>-tij arnl itil;o^ n f:vr -lfe:iUT fif'/rt t'hri f-rr r, u.,tTuiv; i.!iii-li :i/idi.r.r- "f <Ci'iv-..*::tciT u'i, M' , ;',iifj w/idt rlr/ 1 cvittvif n \rj lirnir ^r:'!rM: '
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irhiink V'>u^ Mr. 7*iia/rn..J"' i> it
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Mr. Luc*; I understand you have not been too wdl since you came ' bm-lf frrni Vietnam? Mr. JA'CE. I would likik to . '- . TLc ('H.MPM *N. Would you bring ilia miornphon*' dose up to you. ThU public address system is not tw god. r . . - " STATEMENT OF DO! LUCE, EAST CALAIS. VT. Mr. LIVK. Kftthor ihanâdiu*: my statement I \vo>ild like jiu>t t*> add .*inic supplementary Minimal, and to emphasize -a -Jew {>oint> tin* ' niftEis in tJici>t*liucHt. .. c 'Tjn- CMAIUJAX. Would you like t"hvp tlw? entire >tjitemctu iit-^'rU'd in lite mxird? . ~. Mr." Li'i-.K. Yes^l would. . "1t(riCiiAtBMA<:.."\VijHJd yu aununnriz'r it f>r,onr inforniHtion and J \u*tt xinmcnf "ti it. -v " . - . "~ - '*: -^ Nfr. LrcE. Ris;hr.ye>. .- ' -" " . rxn or wjT.VEsa
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' ,\ly tiaiinî-i Don I/iu^ and I wont tv Viitnuin in ltf5S wu.h littfr^ lu'u'firjil yliiH..a.-y .Sfrvi"f a?" an u^ricultural votvinfrcr. fu 196i"- - ^ I--' IJj'Vaine r?.e director for 1VS mid i^j-ved in Unit pi^tioiv imul-1967. . J~tli.'n b.itjw*d pjuiicularlv tu5i-iik out acsuustt poicioof 'lefoJiuUoij, v re.tdft?*? cn*Uon rfa?e^ cn^t-ion and tKrtubinf;,tx.rt.umnt;,-sartirularrv ârtirularfy within S*ulh Vio(pain'.._Viol pain".._." 1 wiK .Jnu-t *.n> Vif tnani in 106> iw u fvw Jun-ie ji>ynirlL-t aiut th^.i ic June l%ti-stMlftr 5 . ivrrk "with \}v\ World <.V.uri* of fniKVu. My jolr-wi?i in d>i a studv*..n liiU-r ti write for the E^-un>'>nicid Pn-s.- Service of the Vr'v' ivniiin>r"(.'*^c- Mr. !/uv. 1 a'oiuler if you yruld ^jw-Jik a liuk bit iouiT. fnr.tv*r\1)ij4y"! ln-tH'ti'. HM'ti'dinn IIHIMS ' ' -. ; vf.u, J[ tliifik j>erfimk. it \ovlij r< >rk JM.'IUT Tlii-y arr"rtot very jrood'.
Nfr. LIVK. Thi- fifri Tuiihc I would likfr ( d.--
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-_.>"-...} <>:ii',:-rtnd frfii Mr. \fnnv-V J-'trt-ir in ;/'*. vn-t. fr^rii r h i - Tiniv whit wr cll"i)-<ijil'j ajpiiv, JT"!" vi'r, w- Jr;-J Ji.'j|l'-^4 tn nriii-\ it iri--J..r. ^^lv>-|c>rl IH vnrfa'ii t'if).ca>r-ni'/^ljr'C ni -utli
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nd .Efforts tfait flic American pt-oplo have ,_,.. ....,. e: Kntmiig-'bf ihb-fnrat cnnceru at yours * t t'.tf <h- American ptvi/K may. nv or.w aâin sk you to mike alt . effort"-, > lUat tlw Op.NCtOVcrtinicat>tt>i> yl-Inilitary Afd to the pna:ni rcjpn>* .".'af'nl xvitl.drawCnll.olf-lj.^. trootn1 frole SflQU'Va-uutn tbtiO-Mitit pos.Ni'ble. '"Pcac*.- okfl thw bo' achieved>>n4-tbi: rtuniCcatiim uL Vi:Vnjuw can Ije settled.
i<-. incf (heir . . ' ' t la ^ronrin pcn-efty, IiW?'<>f hunuiu

Ikl^lll'.^V^- U*^L.*'Jl.tl'Ml
u-t .'he A'jvi]<i'aii.(cb',>t<;3iih:bk iv nut'ijjil; r.'jijpng: u war, ilr^'ifttM-'u/ii is also1
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itlid. dl'^ltll t/l
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tttO-troif'i.i-7'u w^stws^ ir^vMiiry.Iiitili and :ut<wii( tif-tjrrt tji'jf Jcurrttoir tortt;ri-~Iii I'JT^v^.1**- AfiV't-irulk .Oci. ^rnnji.'iiC Iftur-1> Hil;_ t-irnc^ >-.Ur fUj'wI* J>rovi*lod fvT *-d ro SO.Jr *.Vi- J'.-tkOi iavojt '<\/nm- it^nrcs, tficy re tskij^^rnfn t-he ftof 7nr AjpJ.a'HA'Jor in \i<.>ii>i. AT thi*- *rr^ manmit; t. L':**. firni i> wusir-11-r.i'c wAilton ceil*. in C<u. iî/n li<l:m>i at the :w. 0 'amr*- Clun *:i,000 t> t'.M T.x;>vcr. ^ ' . -. " . ,
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VW .ipj/i-s! r'.~fif-|o ask A'-Mf .( iovcn>rnciit rov'-f.p i oicfft Vhf ron'ciriirtiin -jf .-JK. if. Ciw >.>,t t-liul, f di-n.v fyi>M w^t a<)Vic* ?rt-ori.s di-tfnl.ur. oimji.- ;ir*1in'.'-:rr.ifUifj'i: e^riStt... Your should lidy us to Ii'iiM ncjj'wfe i't^t'suf nf t'n-Mja!1.- tu jjnjvrov^ our >f l/nnalirinj and /<rCit>rwii rivr;*V i.n.'y*'-ilttt Hlic f^'iiiiri I tu-ute!
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it ( ll'>-"'.in n\n>i^\t\<ni in ^.li. iriVi-.tnuiciii- lir jwn'i-/ iiixl n.'>t 61 fur '
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ilffi KIOUT TO lirJcf"
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ûft'uJjfiilijaijw/'iriilii'Nuif".. :c*w.JI u^ ffvci-j4,t*'jrm:.:iii' fir.ivc-r^h.'kw, iv t>i.".cr /r iii^ri'.tt'urrrtl l-n%. Tso coi/nrifiif'.* wji/yir J Au'it.] [ikf> ti>
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Iri.r ;li<- truth giacv* nwl hurt*. Tin- r.iifi-.n th* pn"Ji<-r w.f" cm]> in N<rt.lr- ^~ YIr'ru.t6i. thk Miuditix tr*K>[;s. <o iniru<J* yito C'lifiilH.Mlc* zii-.'i I^.H, will t*riu>c\ri> ~~~^r I'.c juuidj rouU tluil tli<j,i;caii mili-ljc >n yx'.:bjnp-t-C p.ri.'i>ticrj *'licu iht war
f uini'd likt1 ti t'ihpl;i>iz<' t'lis feeling aC;ii'*~ siuiwitf YiotiJti.iii^, n p ii t!m.r is tJinl tiwrv \vill ui. bo mi cxt-hrtiJS0 -hf jR-is>tiftc?t i>iH3
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i-, iwuco-r nL least until Amcriani tro'>s an*.mil tif Vii'tnini'."1-".- ^ ^^ Tltcr ^.<C:>tul short coiiiuutm w-bi'A I would like t read t-oiiporiis".
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>. - -iVitViEU ',l>.u !<r>irit. would ItK^ to srr (hf Aiu>:ri<Mn rdr.tii.iuj; from inter{iT~"^H t'l *"^>" internal affnir*. c.-p'-cinjlr . 5n thi- f'UtlVwdilrty, fji c;iotis, iti a> fd givi" \ ;vlnanic!" n rqiljU rttu:o tc partk'i^nto in *rl'''i!i-'/ ii* Tynii'T r vtii<T withour any <li.<<-rirriii"hUriii. Tho fntrnOJt of tat- rlecUV. i .<litvil(|-o coulrtitlfJ li\-ti'>pylir p-oups nnrf <i[>puaiî>>r]r_pfifilbVttlicr thau forcicu Xi-ifiii.'Jwiir:ji \i"ill In.- cr'iH-ifiiTcd su diirriiiiinitori if rc^HMWiii"'* VM|l'l't;u' priy-nu-n wtil uot In-iibli1 U> [>ut!iciliat< i
(Tin- L-i-tPisi n-forrcfl tvli'llow:/

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TONO HI.- i Sttii-.'CfKN VIKT-XAJT

VlJCTN'AX NlLTJOX^r. fsTlTlKST UNION,
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^ 'J&HjItm, \'xlnam, May 8, 11)71. S< .it-'i1 î^t.iiM Ki.uiiin.nr, ; , - . ' , Cl-'ur^n't ti tliK t'oTt,yi^ l!c'alt"n.< (jtmmitttt, t> .t.fi-uii::., f/>'_-. 'f t!ic I"rij(<'dJfa J .sC'fnio< - M, w-i n-uuld i L'UCO'H t-!>iuiKiv\* :itif>" I'.S. &:nafr> :-. tbo t^j, KK'4-inKt from tbo -I, ... " ii i> 'i.ilf -if Ui'.- Sfouth Vii-i !vtTn Nuli.m.il S/.H')i>jit. ("ni'in, m:iv I [ir''."'"* fr-'ymi
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T? i-< i"i;.iif u.r rva-Îi f" ncftuiH." MC'U- v.iuii. )vj>j>.t<>n fO"^ L'.S. truly wuiiti in >:.. i^ô'itb Nict Xaui. 1'ijn-f.k- wht wr nil <J>^j|iIv iijipiij . HI>M'VT ( we fi-i^l h-.ji!i'r {" arliirn- it in frr.m u f r h r rîiLMinoim C.h. pri'.vi ifiii tf warfiiru t tinpr'--";ii i -i;iriir>n S->itJt \'i" ,<' in jico f VJ< t Nuitv, *': ur- ri'HtjuitslI.M; fir (hi.. , tlir--.-i.li Jli'- -ycar-f <!!]. I 1 .''.fif -V'i. % n-I^CX: Jtiid luijTisi'iiirn-nt, fu tbiK n.if ''J^bitriii' ",'i.T !.<. *'>'i;njs>,-vh.vjor:r| jiiul tji<-nl;il - that .%>!." luiv: it. \V(. tin r'.'l.w'iî'_i-<"n-jtîfyLMJd, j>iir p< noli <Ji-tr>_M-d ly ll'.i- U.3* ~ Hi'- C'>iic> rn -,'iud HIr't 'lial -tii" American poojtt,- )iav: iJ[/ine 'i if'lii-'v r<'iw>: ITduM.iiK '*f y>H uri-m <-<iiin-ni of v<ir> a:vi ! All'"1'11'"" l"",'f_'''. ".'' '' <!i>.': iK:iin a--K ,V'U t'MnuLi- all f l > f-.S.-a'Mfffiiiii-ul-'tiiji nil jiuJi'Hry aH li Ilir |jr-;iji/ ri-toiii.; rtll >j( (j.r'. Jfn..|.- {'tin SOntli \V t "J'ari III'- -1'itiot ["fcoifjU',.. JV:iL.- ,-4', ll^- tr; :v'i' '\"d a!;*! 'lj! U' niiili<-ai'Oi Tif Vir.i Naju call I}-1 .-.''ifj (1 u ilii'.-iu' nii--|v ln"ii>"" <-|<ini .v' hr<itii-rli'i'J, ftA,iviaIIy frmn O'R I'r-'Slj anftiii;'i > . j > > i
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I ' l ' - i:.i!i ;c li.i !!<.' ~h;:il' tlitiT-:. .' "f Olhi ^ i*p>u ( V.-- Jl-Jj"' i'.i.A yi\t W'JI l I}/ U-u M l i l i m t : ''I'lJaLi-v "i lli.it Lin Ciiiti-il St;(t<-> irl l . :< t Sjiii i.'jij c-jM-cijilly tin!'.>. IE: fl V ?>. ; ( > i ) I h r.Ui .llrt M ;. ? ti'Uiiiilt.ttli.l'f*'- 111 l l i " fni.lD 1 , ... .
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Kiiit(.r>*iJi>:v'J;*-lieiK r*-ufij art- huiii'iliff^d,. Vjijif.uti-d. tc-rtiiivii and >h,ii'Vkl iu nair'iw." d:\rk .niuf fiv>iy~r'II.<-I'r<'nik' .ire i;>|in.-h"<I-d anyvlfv. niM '..- liy it.-y cunty .iia.-nej'~ih^'iv tx-'iae, pt.-nv'ii'/l tfiT>ilff tWtr rvl;iTi\V>i a:ij uithirit , in in ka>u-iii>; Uwir olToii-f , (|<-fiaucu- jf aR Vptl prnotlurw. H'rwoii* cl.-ni:> ->i-?|H.Tf-, rtfi'.ri-.-il a n d arjniltf<t d ; . . {t.-np^.j orm-rvi'il tlw:ir t<*nn'. jiivfiitk* nflt<ucky, oM iitnl du\v->itj>' -ted nnrsinijc mother*. ' - , ' . . . . ; . , ' - - ' ,~AVi ia>. no'.fuitccil IhM- llnr prison nînu* N <nu- of tlif fiOttrlM-iidJUR ;, -if th<* britt^JUTfli: vnr in South \ i-Uian>. Phi- vftir- trf thr irro> lit d'îtiUiiiniiLr-^ l*o--ln "j-ittTii .tvilJ )r. jb-jli-tn-d, tin- si.iffi- "ing of tt1.'- Vw-tnAinc-c {)<tf]jt': will '.-ml r w|v n (ti-ii ji^Clr'.' J*-r -t-i>'v<l fi <<ur tnntf . > X,Vir .in- !" *-'Hr.liSr'Il 1d.aiL.tii'1. VKJ-niiairs'|ioopl; havi- ''it riitlit to self% <|i-ti>ri.it.'iiit:ou ml Unit ti.K'.X.vt'nc^- Jn 'Uf' aiul tln>:r n^ph-îitntixf-'iu fx>tl> h-i ! <if C!>''*ir> will *th'>1i'Ii'iirt-lM- <ii;i"mrt IK HI t'jr ?tti{^;l- for Jj'.ir riftlir if -i!n-v kdrtgr 'iow tli<; \i*u-ficar' inf r\ .il:oii luv Sroiisiit j>\-rriy. !>. \>f li'imn-i ivtiim of tfitftliiiiial fiiliiiri- M.-tferiiiK iiwl rt-:i'li i^ ':r |H-o(il<.])< îf--riV.m Kfr.'cnum-Ht i.-. nnt nnlv- w'jr;in: Jb wsir Jn \irtnjuu, it i- aN > liu'lJinR-irtMîv aii4 tl'-U'itijî ciuinr-, nuiniun^ ?ntd s'li'portiiiji the IvirUtro.,ju'jio >(tiifi.ii> ct-iiicrv, prjvidiiiK fiiinU atid advi<or .to wnfc-rj of ii'-r/'niion .iv.d N.rtui" Iu IV7I). tl^' ,VUIITI-A.. K-rvîUK-rt proviiji-d fuiirf-. for-^-.i!r{iy.( tjnivaii-nr ''3 ilrrco titiu- Ihf f>jl'r)i pr-r- 'iÎ f'*t .dii-j!irtn, llr it I* f'S d||:T iO.'.l !i> i3((>.~.r<-<l i n ' t "S 'lollurH ;.!. UM-iio not luviit tii*-.-*; if^m-i, 'bvy a^- '.'il.i-ii fr'mi t! i. ri'p-trl nf.'vuiir Amlo: -uir in Sn-lri-iui. At.tliirt vi:ry ôrrvin^ :t f : .\_{irin i-i on1,trurrinK j.MiL-ilt'îi. Ci,'ir-< in ('-tin Sou I>tid at tin- cO-l f;f îun.- ihan 'O <l(.ilI:ir/< :S.'jO.tHK_'hVl"."! \iuc pavi-r". _ ' " . Motivat-1'! fiy v tin1.-*- conviction", wo i-nrm-vtly hpfH-ol to you, di>tiuein!>lii>l cUa-i.ii"'ri -rf tl. - .7>Tjjt<: I'o.fisn Ki-Iationi Oiniiiitfr^: nniL ;iil iiJMiil^-r-i of t i < tVAi^.ii'Uv, if u-ll iIiM tndtt t-> C'. AiniTifuii \ntji\i; ilw imili , r t-i-ali"l MI 'v<: iiif:n( rn, I a!1''*'*1, tbi 1 trulti j> n-vcat^l in tbi: jtyc.* .if the: Mxry yv vf ii S.in wiiu i;i-aHur IJiiid (K-KUJ-J.- of Jni;<- lhr/in jiitu th'-:tiuiT <* and . *. <. ;u MI- in pli.tt(V;fciphs t.iV.Tji lA' two l".k<.r."j^f~"lf|'"Vl'>4 afl<^ pnl I.lFji iuu{r I/HII-: UK- f r u t U t.- n-vc.-ifisl Uv C'w- d--:iiti a-' llic HTiii Uuc dci'ii-on rn!ii|i4 mi Alien.* ."/, \\l~il (if 'In -till l>r>-:i*'-f"<t li"l p Mu'i wl.o *n- f;iM-t. -i.'o ;r*..'xu vvjth iii<> (nnt-lict riiui ! ti Ui. tl \ri-sai-i- {i-> ri>ifliL-.iI r:in- >io- X'Vi-i. In IIIM, 1 n.rrtru'.'ti i-i f;->-i !< (> 'hi* i.rl ix-jr.-ifii 'J'ri-n ttn *Cgu-wli-.jim- tV'-fi- itrir<--?'d wiiiio<ii jjv pviurf >jf jf'lill ur W.Hi Tin- onli in7'!i of 1 inn i-inliv f<-r ' t<ivi:ii? Ml<-*-<:viJit'ry </r tiKtidriC fi;r |wiici- in \iMniiin'-. Tin- tO' < ri-vt-.ili-'l jii IM.HI^" c t i~,--f-ir winch *v>- i.lrt;uii rd'n-ri-r, VK!I-IK . h'iw>-\i r-v>i<- t - . i i l Tufli C;;ik ri '<;. V<- Ln'irii l/'it !;. gii1 -".ft * ilt; tlini!i'iJ u j m n l ; ."'i-.iluj- ,,f 'i'',,' (/r;i-'f:i l '-il n>oiin: 1 pD-'im-ri In i,m:l u C'ir(ui.i ( .-i-rir.". . '.J " V" '" ''' "*'' t'1'1 i-riiiiii-ti' !> -'.< | nL inn-" Ihi- rnit-ii t.i-t jn ,,: . i: (.''-riiiiii-iii f' rMiMi'Sp.'M.in-'. .li icnn-.m fiiiii|i- .-mil i(i' S'li'" niif<i-tit -fi'i-iM li.-lu ii- t'i huIJ n*li'i'-l-< ni<ii.i>t 'if j.ri'ii-. 1 in inv.ni* i" i. 'T pri-n|i /I'j'iiin- i;,'.i .Ml uf linil:ili/j,ii: r.'.fj r<'n>iri/mi( |>ri-mcr<. Hi ki:<iu' li.aJ T!,. 1 Atin-Tir-ju |M-OJ^|< uri- .ijiM'Vi- rii l'r (in-J<iii'f in \orili \ i f t n - n u ! - r < j l < . l b'l!.(.i;n-l., I 1 ' :Jvi ,.;jrn. -'J\ l\ifi '. \\f li'I[!S<' I l i i i l u!n- L"! u:i\ In Hi'. !):'. . tf-j! <l< ~i.'- i* )'<r (Jjc An-r/'-:>ii pr;i|t- rn uu;.- f!i,-ir K-ivi-riiim-i' f>i [n'-', nj.. t J-'.--ii( M.-jifiJ.i -it of |.i'r>iiii.:rs'rf u nr.iri.l p.lim ^1 ),ri--iiii-'ir. Sn.-r'i'Vii^ iru. '(.;. I i.ôivrtiinciil if- vi-ll ai Of \ S j-iViMiiin-i.! -l.n'.'lil nvirl t >ntitjr..i pi "ifc^ ^: .1- lliox ui ');.|"j'il|.iii f' l!n- fr-Virijlu.-iif.nl pOfei-r .ii>d not :i:. (f-itlM ,ri uiki, .,'< Jr. 'i- if.it ilii-itp .-.;;, ri-.|.fi-i i'.r tliir ijimnii .u^j ]T^ri;,.i;ii\ ) 1 m'l t-i ii'.ii,- .\.rl a1 j'i ii-ir uin;i. i ii.t i i f'if n--1 d;i:( pi- <r' I 1 n *!*;- v,i--:i|i|BTn|,i.> '
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roft-TBc RIVET-TO Lir\
United Stattt of Anurjca, Washington, D.C.: .' -.. . y Mr..Ch*innan and Ui*<,lngui bed Hwotwrx of tln-Ujj. Senate F'treien iCvui* CcrtniairUrf, I divm it a privfivKv aitil . r^ponsibUity to talur this of-(ioniinit.y to uddr-yu inyst-U to voiir diai.inguii>li>!d GjiuuiitUT. In my rapacity of Chairuuux of the Vieituonoso Wound's Xliivenicnt for tp Itiulu t'o- Lift iwl co-nufuor of a "jUtc of PIIMV" Agn^nictit Signed.'} >t wren American and Vietnamese -Womeu f>rr Junuary -' '"71 m Saigon, (icnundSng Uiat Prraideul NIXU.N immediately ar-nounc** ( date, prior V, Ui<: trad of IU7I; by wlrirh <tU U.S. and Allied military Force,* tthall b\ withdrawn from Vicl N'ani, '^l wouW Ukf -to pritiout t you touu: of my views on tlic lituatioa in Viet Nam, in eoiuî-tion with Uic Praw inoiic. . ' At pVcxcct, i'b th<- Vu'tuiLiniSaliDU of the WAT, which means k contiiiuaUon of - Jin- wmo >ld (>oUey of *.,-ki(iC iniliurj- violory, tb- <iitUAtiuii in Sotifh \'ii-t S hn>< bcroifkt; uf^pravatcd ptlitifjtlly, economically, o>.i<Uly vie. ... 1'oliticftUr, the nuaav.; a.uMLnicliOn o( tiinnan lift- And physical d:uiiuf .-ii cn-d by KitursUoa bomi>in{; nn-i clujnicul-", n.s oll n^ the annihilation of ivilI,nKo-< in id tbfir ulinittintion from th<: la-OKraphii-al uup of Vi<-t No/n, have nKAllfi4vd lhc1 'lugiliniaey of '.<i. to-eailt-d "raciticatioii I'ronrwi". Tin: .K/vnoniif -itiiutimi i d'-t^rinratuix at a frijthli jnux icn-c ov-n krn.wn u[> v. ovon itiidcr tlt Ff'-iicti atwi > living eifcct* .-rr- urni&, JO!>H in tin- rit !<.>< HIV m<.rv nud iii'iro diflicuH u, find (id.l tli'- iii'wly crvatrd rjrunn dwllrrs, forc'-d lo move from (h> ir farrr>JK-cj-iiiiiit runn dwlli-nt, Miiprojicctivr bceui <n of it\f defoliation, <ar to return tt. t.li<-ir iujrour- 1 is i-iiiifiiii'd t (vf'iK camp.1*. fur a* the Agricultural production i w*t&t'twA, the- <:"lLtp.<- ha* l-<lu o that from a f<ir"r rirr-nw-rv of South hant A.iia. South \ i - - t N.-ini ba-< tiirn-d to b'; ii inijtorLrr-if ric'-. KUrk-murki-t, (.'rruptioti ur<- r^Hipndt. Thf -nrnl (:ihrir it I'Mlm^ upiirl. 4f*i-i)iu|i;iniou bt all ^Mflit tif iMrf-uil i>I:ii;i|f-: rin>C'iitd3)''', ni[i*:r i^<;lj:iiirh. :ilroho|ijint druft-4 r pi'o*fitijtiifii . . . -whir*i ohuUcii^c ill** \ M'timnit-^ 1 <liK'iity, rhM "f ih** woiiu-it. in Imrtn-uUr. Th'-. !<->rii<.l d'Tuil'-iiC' 1 slif:iti'im llii- luipp.ii'-?"* of >cr*;>t iniinlii-r "f our Cuirili'-.t and th<- futiip- i our.youUi Tb. p vi-rwil of nior:il vulm-u 'i ujMrdi/'- our itlioli- L-ivilizntioii, d'^lroyd f;y ri f-in-hiti clK-upt-ni-d wav of l(rr. 'r Mi'- \ ii'tnaiin-u- |M|<I--, ;. pi'i>|il>- u'liidi hî LhroiiKh 4<H.li) vii r.i of a lUuriou* jii'lory, ji.'.-il.ui.^lv pn-x rv:d .1' inor.'il IriiiiitiiMii, u l.t indc'-d u |iainfnl hunnluljoii. ^loi.K \.ii\i ,iii' il''lraf'i\' r.-.x1' '>f hiul' l>'<'lti">li>Kir-nl u;irf:ir' - . the |K>liCii-ii] Inlmi'-1if \tar !>_'' M.S UK r<: Li jtunitil'- jind inl'i:ni:in lonjrd.' 'In 1 c i v i l i n n |i ti"ii vitli ih- I'jilifnl ifix-i'i.-n-lc i,( woiin'ii Iwir 'i i.ip'-d r i d.i-:n.li, younij <!]
"To- Titr FOBF.ION RELATION* Cojmmxt.
Saigon, May r; W* r .
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. S.- inîi.-rl -A-H.II i'\i\::.n crii'-nipt ; lunn.'ni ri^ht-t im- tr:ifd|ilc.-l u:l>'rf<nit jind civil iili-r!)' - tiok(-'i iiii t ofoxisii lie'-. Tin- !/' oC (he lr:idi'i<^:il |M,!(Î li:i-> crown vi'it.li Hi. ri'pp'i'ivi' rni-an-jn-" ;i rh'- S;iiufj'ftXrii\ri',-i- of tin- w:ir i< viift r>,Tlv from III--. of \,^,in/ Aii>>'nruri- 'jicnt.'-'-d (h -ir Lv c iii rtii" tiYi-if'ti l"d. rii'.w:infli of A r j r i i i f:niii't< ;m- profotmdl>"Kri< v-d In trn^p'irulil'- I'M**. ',' iioiiwunU >s' Ali^ ri'-.ili t> < .ii'-n li:i\>- lo t i \ > in :Hnd1; , n'i/rr\)H^ ;it]"iit 'tii'ir -oil." or iMMlttili'Is ln-ii't' !> ijiiH-'] .if n'ur (ni-o/ii'-if f*r th<- (rirli td;ir<v K ul Innti; I!K- r.'tid oil l)i<" |irin<>ii> r- .ir <-iLiii|> in N'crili \ 'ji-t N.H.I, th' ru-tidiiiK 'r<ifi[> tn infr't'l 1 ' H<t'i C;ii/>I, .");.i .<Mi l,.nr-. Kill linliii t- I.-IIK <inl\ if UK <-xtlriii".- ->f ,>norii-r wli'-n f l u - nvinlii. lA'-n in I'.S. 4oiii'-i>:i<- :i(T;ur, thi- i<r'>iu 1,1 war p|ii:..- hrinuK uii.ii i< (In r>n/4int r "itr imnf Miti>ori:>iit iu'ii,xiri< ftiii.-ivrr, t-.^.-ili. ) w i t h tin- r<-il'i'-iinii </f iirii;ii,|*lut in.-i(i r i i < - r \ i t , tliM profit i-nli icj> i i i ; i h - r t i n - pri/-tiiv tjor fh<: honour of i f n r.S V iil.ifh iiiihl:irp. mt'-rvi-ijii'.fi ln-< lin'-i' *:' f]) (.'olid' mfii d !;, l; ilioicil jm H'fl.i- ifil--ni.il H/'I:I| fiiilijjr ofiiiiioh. I-.-.MI th'/HKii J'f".d'-iit N I X O N IIUH rnp -:iN-dly >lii(crj rhu! ill'.1 I 'i iibjr: ! iivr ! lo in - ir<- MIC Koutli \ H-iii/uiit-M 1 (H-'ofiic n lit t>) d'-fidn th' ir 'w)i f'liur'-
f>>rccn MiU'rf'JWcr, uiid that th: Anly unwgQtiahK; (httiK to vim StlutU VioUinnu-w jtt'.ipf.;'" rintii. lf> (it-ride thrir own foliMi'.il funirt'. wfiuti, by n'lpportitis! the iin-triit il:ct:uiiml rr|{itut- of pn2.idt.-ui NljUYKX VAA -TfllKlJ, Pn-^Jdriit XI X< X Ji l.r.iicnly trantplmK <c tho- Virtitauio*- l[n^pk-'n&[( iti^rniitlatiou rinht. t>.> ,>o(it)riJ .mlitioJ anu moral danmcfr Sir;rt t>^> dammr onirwi.|< oii(rwi.| n-d liy Uy (li. (li "-X'icCiia'Miin'ioti "VicCiiaw'iVioti of .war" i-niri.-il on !<> tin iUc-Kitiirit<t.tndL uifpopuiur K"Veninn. in Spw, Jiiin^r nj military victory* cviiu U-forc it i^xild lr vmn ut. |J|, tt;C 'July alccr_..Vt; whii-U will kafi.'Kiuird L'.rf. houour lirt iii tin1.ctmrelvfor a politii'al ri'ttlitniin' r > vnm Lj^t to W<vi. jdihls^p Atiwrfisiafirf.Viet Nut. " - . and iti-AS Knni| httVr f|tit!\t4-d fr a. "n-vuiioci 'f -Aiuvricmi p<lir\ u: int^t i.'ltKiu'TiI "Icnionriranuti* t-v.-r MHJ in ttii-.HUtofy nf AiiK-ricii. tiiail iMiifcrnpiry i^ artu.-J, tirfuo'd hy an uicti-a.^- of /tî-tiUti'" to (bo- xar ^(/((iiir ^rn'X'atK'r", UPS IH-W trtii'l 10 faior ol I'cntx1 linn evolved itiln u cunl-r'.i'J \l<:"l \< llV:llll?nt Aif Jit'^rt- ihsl >li* ftr"Vltf IUlJ>roilllr tu MlllUn";.* !K-iaiH<K.
of il". Inn!.- I/at: of Mii/!>r*. iriflu'jiii .. .. - . Th-'lVifii Mi>\^rm-nr.i liarr Lvk-n n p'tUir stand awiiii-'t il:>i'pruk>n^\tJ9D of t(n> ar "Hi-Ji-r îty^-vfut, liiiLinr. fh' rivlofBlwn nf |im<v xvilli tho cunipUti* -ithdnual.ol I'.S :mrt toi-'iRtj trC'f lionX'p-L Nam mi'I Uc 1 i-xi:tiili->hi'ii';t f n 1 Kitvrniiiiîit truly r'.'i-r'.-M'iii'.itivc nf tin [intiili- >( Suiir'i Vi<rr Na)n '" -l.ni'I ii|t And aii^wi-r lin'ivdia'fly tl.<- î'in-f;il |:<-;i>j! nspintlirtni tt.thin iho omlfSL .11^. r. ifi,'\ 5ufl nuKi (> ^';lf-Ji,''.i.riiii|i.ilinii. . (hat th: |i(|.l<) -if, \ wtlli- il.iir iM.-ntiil ;>ff:iir.-> :ni,i.iit t!ifii[<rlx<t. wHunut f.irc inn iiiUO'-Jit A- r:ir :i- u..- \Voini-n iir-.- uouo-nii-ij, m i.hr C.IIP-II! |binri-<l^li:iM: of *i- hai'i1 )ilriM!y xh'iuu tli:it w<- nilt iinl .-il hilh ffd'li-J L'ui'Ji ffu~n>B Oiir V-;trK tt i.},.- (Miii'iiiMinx i-utli-riiik. of >ur iH'<t|fli-. \\i- will fm loii^'cr nrt-!-;it IM '!):. iiinji vTk'i '1 licd'iiof u friicl nar "liu'li h:r- Hvirpi-d i-ViTViIiiu?'. froiu o:ir ntclit '-I Lift- u r >''ir i'-a~>ri in t;f>\ (r'Mn out h-ittl f net' tmil |iii-n- i.f clatliiriu C>> <>nr ,
W'lil'' flu ! ulci-. "f Smiib Vii t N'.'iDi li.ivi- ,li<Rn lln'Ju-^'lvr-, iin^(>:il i-iiriiiK u ilivi 1,1 Ji!t- i'ir it'ir [i':u].|>- :nnl -afi'f \irii; flif ili-i-u loiii-m^ jB-a A tuili' ii.Llf'ii, f lif'vu.liiaiiivsi- V \ i.iin-ii i'C' iiiiif*-l ni(f>w. lidf.-U w i t I n n itn> \ n. VV'vuu'd'- NJ'iM-iiM-i.t fur \ hi Ifiuhi t<> I.ifi> '.tii Mli:-.in-r <if I" \\miioji (''riinuixut-on ii, nri|' t I" -"i|\i- l l n - (irnlji in nf uur ls\>-. .'iiifl ((.iH 1 -- umi nf imr r-UiHry'jt fvl uri- l>v uijr-i-lti Jl ii -i':r > .irii'v 1 ".' i -li tn f.-riD;; mi i-i.,rl f d '!iii i}. I'm t:i ur, -.! llw*. \''ii<'J IIIH-U in it i'1* -,.:! iMtH r - l t ' u t v . lln- j n|>|i- nf l "n - t- :iin, r;m li\. iil"!'-[ t'n'ji^<'f I'i-.iii' f.t-J ln-l 7^ nI' Hi--1 :il") <;in <li'\-)i' Ilii-Jii'i'U 1 ' 1 - tu tfulilii>L' u >-IM-II I VJMI.'I! <>lt linrnuu i^j-l.'ilil> ; "i(I liii| ( i|h ru'^niiit ..... w i l l i .ill IHVI!'-)I>VH/.- j.ii|,ti-. i ! v...rlfl. '-:>f'i.-!l- lî Vim nc.iii ;H i-jrji ).!- , >.inii.)'i :,; ). mi. Hi ,4:,(J ii,:i('n:iiiiiiiify III il-> !:i:l)l fur !! iiji'al iff .li->ii-. I n--i)'iln j-nd I i iiifi< ni'rv 'Ipirj. MI n i l h :i<lniir;it|iiii II i w i t . - ;M ciiiH-fiu in -)ifi Kiliir-1 i! f i i f n f - -if ' S \ K-I \jin n l;iinn.liij, f 'n -i <l <iii i" 1 ii .-f'il i (iijiii r:ili'iii :in>l inii! 'i.rl n -j ( r' . tli:ii. I :iin l.d.ît' Mi'. fr.*->J m '- i 'n;i!i ; I!, i' tlir I H .Mînli* F'ir'i;in li'i-l iti-n,, ( '<iij:rniM.( < w.ni:)>j -i.fion Jy 'M. i .it-,- .11. .i;i..r''[.iiu.ri' r- M n>ti -if II.. ( ' > - . p.lir^ in Vu I \':.in. 1 i i i i v n i < { :r f.ul >.if !:.,.! \'. t !!, \\iil In;-!,.- Al'ir-rici ;iii Ijn-liiv ni-li.t-1 -i! .% I ri'-Ji-l "f \l ( 1 t *"';,m, Itirn'i'^'f ' t i - -' !.> ili>i:i <(j t ' i i ' \ ii t U n l - v J- [ nj.|i nl' it u irlil.i* -li ifinl'li li' ". im'tf II,. -, -.P- '.,..,.,-.:.l t... '.. . ' , W iv'i n l u i L ' j M i i t . in- .-. fi>,|i| J.|: i i j.icctrii 1 \iin-rj, -iinji-lr;it'ivik' fmin iiiU-H'TUior MI ->iu- i i . t ' - i i i il -tltitir-, ;' "i i'l> *. f'>L.f> fii'kiiii^ < Ii'p*,..r.-, n ,i \-> I'I'M !>>, V i i . f : i i i n ' u, <i|iui i..iri- i'i |.-ir ifi|i.kii in, In- il.-m.rf:i:i!ir /ir.K- - *!.' r air.linn r IIT i.t!. r th<;n' :n,y ' h - i T i n i , i i ^ f i > i n , !') lu>|-iif '>( Itn. |i'iiiiii" -1^ nl ! r..nr i-,, III ! i,- |. ,|>ri2nr Kin'i|i iiii'I <.|'iii,-,iii'i(i | <i|<l<- i.,rt,. c ll.Ki. 'f; i-ir>'.ivji icmn. l.d-i ' j i i t i " i Jl !- i;i>ii-)<Jf.'rrfl n- rli <riiiiiiftMiv i* |iii'tili'/'i my|-i*Ti-t:iik'.';ii|iilJ ' Hi>- I"- V'ri ?<;,:i n-l.'if.nTi L .n 'J'f'J'ii'-li tin 1 - n-(.,rM','ii ri'iin:i'i>i'k '< \ '!' N:i|ii, s ^':ir<' 'rti-l U'>'i'i]r '" A'mTini, .'-iin-j-f. Jv V'>i,
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448
TKKAVMEXT OF POUTTCAt PRISONERS IX SOCTH VIETNAM'S PRISON'S
Mr. LUCE. Now I would like to go on to some additional comments to my testimony. There art; at least a hundred thousand political prisoners in the'pnsons in South Vietnam- When you consider that Vietnam is ft country less than a tenth that of the size of the United Stalls*, this is equivalent to having over a million political prisoners in the fj'm,eil Slates, so you can see what a tremendou:> number of people this ia in terms of the population there. I have visited-many of the prisons, and I have talked with dozens and dozens of relea-vo. prisoners. Just in the last year I would like to bring up some of the things vvliich I have been. Just a year ago I ittei with 10 students who had been released from the prisons in Saigon. I suw the blackened marks under tbe fingernails which they said were from having sliver* put under the fingernails. J snvv the black and blue >pots on f he knees where people said they had been beaten, the small round 'holes \vhich they claimed were from cigarette bums, one of the students v:i > being fed intravenously In-cause he had greatly lost lus stiength. He had lost his hearing. He claimed they hud forced water into his ears and then pounded *his in. In July I accompanied two American Congressmen to the Con Son Island prison and saw then1 the people who l;ad been, win* were paralyzed, could not stand up, as we came in, were tagging us for food and water, were showing us marks on the body where they claimed they :ial been beaten by the guards. In Xovemlx-r J w:i> a>ked by, told by, u friend to go to f'|u Rny Hospital, ftrnl I took a friend with me, two AP rejmrlers. \Ve v'lMted, we â\v two women there \vhobc faces appeared as if boiling oil hud Iwen poured on them. Tli:-;e pictures were puhlt.->hcd here in the State:-. ,.. . A emjple of weeks later i attended with the vongreioiial aide to Se.utoL lialfit'Id, I attended the. funeral of a girl who hud lieen torMire.I to death by the police in aigon. \Vhui bother*, me uuoiit. Ibis, t i n - extent, Ihe large numlier of pohlieu! prisoner* nnd the torture within ilie priîn.i particularly is the extent of American involvement, iu the whole urea of r< pre^-ion. 1-ruoKtTiEs iv r.s. AIO TI sorTif \JKT.N'A.U I wou.'d.likf to point out in the report to the Ambiusador of UIK j>-:ir, il:ut the yiil to public safety }\n> gone from s#'jo.ji ruilli',iji p> -S:{<J Jiiiliioii. At the ffitw ti/ue the ni-.i to Mich thit?> r.- hcahh and f;or exumjili-, (! aid U education hn- deiT'-a^-d from V>.I inJJlioii ,t 4.5 million, sfi ihaf <mr budgeted Ii;-iire fi/r Jt*?), w ury jiuitiii'/ more (hfir; t-ix lin)f> u> riiuch of our aid itito ll' f- puliee ttnd t'i((<-.ivv rhH< tl'j-* if. tf.e kind of prioriiv th u VieUmine-M- would like to .ê i t , Antfj-jcjn uid. i u'ciutd like to furilirr einplirtfi/i- tlit>* by p/ading jiif-t a quote from tin- i]iri'i-.mr of AJfJ* to the I-.S. Artb:t."udor, nud In:
i'i70 (lie |".!K<- < lii-'iii'.. ij lî iii((ir"Vr i|n-ir I'aimliihty i 'l'iii- T|K if l i l i w i v j'i'J {fUriU'-*' H>:ti'tO i ft'rtlV(.l( I'-jlitaila-d ci\ il -'*,'->t'-in ai We jrre il|t<) tlu- h i m f e cduculioil -Trttejn. I do Mi>t believe
'- iin-t.-lvinsr tli .war WIOKKK. .-tua-ats, and ivligmn- Kmupd. thereby
like to ask tliis c.oiiuuillce wi;tt ri^bt, tlu? United Slates has'fo > into another country and vucoitrn^ri; tin- containment of the war vHtrcans tu< stuTloiits. and the- religious loaders. I' think tiiftt w? l;ave to usk ourselves who is eucoiirrijins: the spitJad of violence when we ndil 50 percent more aid to our police aid.
BDILDING OF NEW ISOLMIOS CEU.S
I would likfc.lo take one more example, and that is the exmnple of the lijcor oaja-s. A* all of you know, I think, the tigrr cages wt-rt1 i!nijticil out. However, ai tho beginning of this year they have started to tuifld new isolation colU to r*pluc th? old U<j<r caj;!,-?. T> first ihi-v uce .-miillc'r Mian tin; forui-.T tier cuj;eA. Tin* 'first blofk of 90 iôlitinr, c-lL< \va* bui't as u. at-If-hvlp project; that is t ho -jvrisoheJ> itiuli their o\vu ti-w i-nr.loscd tip-r cap's or isolation cell*. lioui-vcr, rliii rcstiltod u\ work strikes and so on. TJii-n. -iu;i:orrnii to Mr. Robert M^Clot.k'-y, who is ihu State L>>7[iriiuont hriffi-r, IKH-HIJSO of cootie-Ming difficult !>"> wiUi the -most ivvnli'ilrutit yirisout'Di it \\iis df.-ided to Itrinj: in-UMK, whicli is u ntra.'t firm, la othf-r words, bciruiiso tiio prisoiier wtu^d not build (hr-irowtj i->ylalion cclU or li^t-r fasis, I In- Lnitc.ii StaU1-; IIK.-; brought io u conrrui't.comuitny to build tin- new isolation cc-Us or to rcplucc ibi- lijii'rvaKv's at ("mi Son l.-,Knd. I uUo brin^ ihia up, brim i>p iiollnT pnint, and thai is th t*ndiviu;y ii' bfi'f-r> hi-ri- to <|ci-i-jvi- tli U.S. [lublu'. Kor i-x.iiuplr, in thi-. Fi-bruury I'l pn--> briefing:, Mr. M^lonkey =aiil ilmt. ilit-M- fmiiU (i.iIi/.<- "Im-ul fiiiTeiwy in f.-,trfs -funds made' >v")iiluhlc by thtr OVN for L">. UM--." llimi-vT, J huvi- hwi- the Iclt ,-r of aîverurnl bol wen th*- Drfnu'tHK-ur ! N'uvy uttifi'r in i-harî- of i-o-.^tnu-tinn ttnd HMK-BIU ami th iio'ici- to proceed on MACX'OUDS furifitics <'>:i Son prujnci. U S(iL'.'l,'7(l i-olnUoi) cuiupoMiiil, vv'iich mnki-a i' v-iy clcur tnat \\\K*V finals will n-'it bi- excc'-.li-d nd ff cli*n;>'ahlc lo a A7*;5'(H')7 liwjil yi-nr J'.li'is. Pfr lT:;i M.VtVOKUS n<l t-u on. I]IM* romp froru 'M.V'CÛl).-. fund-, in oilier word*, United .Mures. UI f<>r :li'- '.\I-A i-olutiou <'flN rc U.S. funJ^. 0"h' I'-tti-r n-fiTwi to follovvn:)
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2. Th! Contractor is directed to prepare an estimate for CLtenge Order Negotiations ,'< ("'uwtrartimi Khali be in accordance with enclosure (1) and contractions Irov. th: IfcOICC Pbu Quoc. 4. The ucl rjfr-rt of Uiw J-ttcr iucre**^-* tht- Contrct/>r'.- oUttctitional and fxwmdiriire tfthoritv in Bureau Project A755-OD7 by SVN'27,<WN.H:>S ($2:M,fl.M .33) ; B74J-W.! by *VNM,6!,.1K9 ($I23,K27.(J2)- ano C7.'J9-4(J3 by $VN4,Wf-,Mt ($41,*i21.C3). Obliâtiocw and cxpraditurea of th-sc fund* 'ifl not U- cxci--dod nd Jin- cJuu-g.-W>- to: A7.VMM* fFV 6* P(J r.'.l) MACCOItDS A IK CVOX <KT 25B. MACrOKP'S-NLI) MIPK #4-8. B741-O02 <VX CD P(J (T3I) S AIK CV OC Mb. MACXX>IU>'S-NLI> MIPH 124-09. C7:<70 PO U31) MACCOKDS CVW OC 2iB MACCORDS MITU63A-60.
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:24 (B741-OD2) 324 (C73!)-4<)
The CHAIKMAN*. Mr. Luc**, I wonder if you could ttddn-its yourjt-lf (<> fjin question ol th<- (x-iulidjc lilln on liow to cud (lif war. Most f iu urc <x/iviiuvd tinwar ouprht t<) IN* fiulcd. Mr. L*-i;. Kttrhl. And Ih*?^ conditions, ** d<-|ilorabl< tw they arc, or rAssiN'o MCOOVEBX'UATTIELD ACT !><> yuij havr KUV VU-WK alxiit -^fi'-tlHT il uoiild lx> uix- for tin 1 O)2Ti-H> u> |>^. wlidt ii; kitiiwr a* th>- M< fiovcni-HutfwId A<-l? Mr. I/n;K. I thiitk (hut lh' i'uii^n- vntild IN-, ye*, I think that thin luw fttir/ijld \*~ (>>M>I|. J lirtii've that the United States should (nil! all nf itn lriH'| <'(( of VTietliatn iujjdrdiHfely, but t f m t us a fi.iriiIIMJUI M'e <.tuM)Lil M.-t u (Jiffe, uiui. that lliut date should IN- f*>fore lite em I .-f tlii> year, tl<*t tin"-- troof>i, tlie Aintriran rroo|>!< for ihe fw-l iutT''i-t> of if<j|,h th>> Viel fiiunerw )x-o[ild am I the [wojde of the I'fitN'd SU.|JM{ tiint thi-wr, that the Anvrkion tniojo, >.huuUl !< (/(jiii.'dJMi/'ly wrtfidnmn froio Vienm. TIw < 'HAIKU t v 'n> reiw>luf*jn f>rovidf" that they tic with l>v Uu1 <'ii<f of thj.i venr. When \oij MI iiiKni-rluttel;. , do yii lliivf th'n i. H renMfiiuble y t irnx't-ed? Mr. l.rrf.. I think M eoiild lw don.-
451
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, that is the nearest time \ve have under consideration at the moment. Mr. I.r:E. Then I think thitt that should be passed. I think they could and should be withdrawn faster.
EFFECT OF PASSAGE OF UCGOVERX-IIATFIELD ACT
The CH AIKXA N. Wliut effect do you think it \\ould have if we passed Mich an art? Would it lead to negotiations prior to the ehd of the year? Assuming hy|x>thetically nhat it were passed, do you think it would lead to a negotiated settlement? Mr. LIVE. Yes, I think that the withdrawal of American troops would lead t<> a coalition between the National Liberation Front and what U called the Third Force. These are ]x>oplt'. such as the religious group*. Buddhists, Catholics, Cao Dai, Hoa Han. I believe the strength of relationships first of all. the great feeling and nei-d for reconciliation among the Vietnamese, and the strength of this feeling within the religious groups which are the most irn|>ortaiit groupings of the Vietnamese, would lead toward reconciliation, and I believe that the Vietnamese among thernselve: ran find peae.c. I think that as long as we are there, bombing them, preventing this middle force froril getting together, preventing this middle force from sjx-aking out toward jxia;c, that there will not be peace, but I think that with our withdrawal there could be jx'ac-e. The ('WAIHMAX. The theory of this act or amendment is that setting a date for the end of the year would load to negotiations about such things as the prisoners of war and other conditions. Do vou agree w i t h that? Mr. Lr-rE. Well, I think the first thing you have to do is set a date. The CHAIKMIN. That is what the act does, Thei you do agree with that. Is that correct? Mr. LITCE. What? The CHAIICMAV. What the Hrnendmerit does is set a date and you agree with that? Mr. LITE. Yes, J agree with netting a date tnul I tliitikfit should he us soon a possible. The CHAIRMAN. Would it promote the resolution of the pri.soncrsof-war-qucstion? Mr. Live. I think, first of all, it would promote a strengthening of this ihird force mid tin; beginning of negotiations Iwlwecn them and t i n - \LF and a movement toward a coalition. A> fur as the release of prisoners is concerned, I hav, not talked with North Vietna.iifsc ofii'-ials on this. My own wnsc of just ]muv inj; Vi'-tnai;^^1 Ls that if North Vietnam were fully convinced thi*t ihf United StaU-s wu.s jxilh.ig out of Vietnam, that they would begin w i t h u thaM-d release of prisoner*. I think though that us long as they fwl tnat we arc apt to bomb Hanoi again, they are going to keep the prisoners in ftanoi, j>urily to tirou-ct Hanoi, The ( ' H A I K M A N . Vou look very hot. Do you have u f-\-cr? Would you lik'- the lights put out? Mr. Lf.TK. So, Tin; C'HA(KMAV. Would you hav anything further befon- we go to
T'ntOPOSED CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION' Tu Oll.sEKYE ELECTION'S
Mr. LUCE. Y-s, one other thinj: I would like to tidk jusl a !>it about i he ( > Ii*-tion> hwan^- then* Is one of tin? IJL> on this. Tin- ('HA::.MAX. One <if tin- liilU. Mr.Stt.>vi-ti>mX |>roi>oaos timi MO >i'inl it coll^nôiitlliil delegation to observe Ulc elections. What do ,\OIT tliilik :d>out thai? Mr. LITE. I uni o;i[>o>4'd In it. Tin- ('iiAtKMAX. Wliy? Mr. LITE. To bejnii with. I i(n not l'li<-\<'tlisi? ili<-(<!<vtinus l h i > f u l l in \"i'-!:iitin fii:i ttr iiK-Hiiiii^fiil. Tin* ruinliili'.tc-, tvionot .-.jK'ii.k out uboiir t!ic- rii:ij'>r i>-.n<-, nf ilic ti(in'>. TIi-y <-iiiiimi. fr c\ii[iij)Ii-. ^[n-k ub>iiit u .u!iii.,n :r:>MTti;i!i-nt. 'I'riioii'^ Dnili D/.u. u)m \\u-~ t i n - nii'.ucr-up in tin- l%7 rloi-JitMi.s. lis IH-CH in jnil -iiic"- I'jfis lor JIN! ]irn|>!>-iiiK tulk> w i l l i ;l'i- \LF. A> J liiriilioln-ri Itcforc tli'Tr uf<' & Iniudn1*! tiioilxilltl |i"liii.-.-.i !ri-x>iK-r>. Tlu-v jriM>iii>r> CUIIMDI ynrlifi|>;itc in tin- t-lcction.-, iiln-r Iiy \ d i i i i ^ or liy IMTOIUJM^ invniviii in l i n - fjtiii[uii<rti.- Tln-n' fMiiiiiii"'. i I n 1 ir<>v<-riiiin'ii; t>.kiit<r ovi-r ilic<!i>irir( (>. 7 ;tini ."S [iroji-rt.x in >;tiiro;i v.Iiirii \\t-ri- fx-in^ run liy it inori1 ]>ru-|N-:u fncditii, MI ihi- <-iry ^n.Tiiinriil j u > [ look o\cr oiii- of tin? Hlo>,l .-.in-ccs'sful MK-iui \irlfic
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Mr I.ITK. Y.-sVuii..' T l . t - < " H . U K M A V Wlia! clf.-r! djt! i!,.-\ fmv on (he eWtlon? Mr. I.i < i.. t Miirik i!ie Tir-.i tiling \\dirii cv did. the worst thin;:. i\.i- 'In: tl.cv le'/Kimi/i'd :iti !,-<-iji>n i l m t t|ji- Yiefm > .n;c-<- did not IKli-".- in. ' l i u i !lic\ *.iid )!i<- -ti-i-iion, were fwir In-fore (lie VvirnniicMelection jiriwi'.--. judged Hir '-lei t i i H i ^ . 'l"!;c_s sa,i<l liie> f<ir e.\lll|il(r. the elc'-tii.n- r i i ! i i i n i t l e i - III ( I n - < ''ili^ljl i i c i i t A^-i-Tid>!v Vntfd. J I>eij-Ve I lie
tu'.i- ;.-.-x.j'iciliin^ iiki- Hi in '2 :i^.ii'i -i v .ilii]uiiii^ i In- i-!iviio. ,-i.iid il v. -.t> m i l s Mr I.i i K. In t i n - \ ' : - I : I H I I I I " ~ I - ( r i i M f j ( i i / - n t A<rml>h .
Tin- ( " l l A H C i l \\. I ::!u I,vlkin;. :i!*iiU i l l ' 1 role of Adi'Tli-iLtl ("oli^re-. ( . : . . . Ar.' i l ; i - \ e(|iii|i|H-(| :ind rii[i|j|c of jii-urillL' ! fnir election if they I ' l l - l i i - ; ! ' ' I'ld l l i - \ ( I n :LII'. l l i l l i ^ t o jnîip : L fuir *-li-'li'i'i'.' Mr I.i K 1 di.n'l l i i i n k l i i ' - v did uriUhin;: ::fui j .lo.-.'t believe l l i c v i .in ijn \iT'.' i : i U i li.
T i n - 1 ' i n m v \ v . Vi'luii i n n iiieyilo'.' Tlie < ' i \ I K \ I . \ S Ve- Were l i i - v dcliiujij'-nt in lli-'ir d'jlii 1 .-or eoulil I i t i i* i ' i ' * Mr I,: i K. We||. :i i oiiitiieiit frtJin H. \ i-iiirtiii'-^- friend v.u< llii.-. He ^ , 1 - J . ' ">\'-!!. in \ o n r I!M>N, in \ 0'ir ele- li'nr-., \\.- un- (join^ to -"ud
'_''.' \ i'-' I I : I M I C > C w 1:0 doli'l -[n-;ik Kn^li-li lo l l i i - I'niled Sl.ih1.-, fill1 4 dh\ Ml. I.i ' h. U'luii a!i I';'". d"'.'
in -i-i- if \ i i n r <!!-iiiti:- up' fmr," mid tlu-^ \ \ j i s \\ hut. we did. We sent '2'2 \rii'Ti. ,. i. \ i l i o didn't -|i-jk \ leinmiK 1 ^ 1 lo \ ' n > l n u n i f(/r 4 bi\n u t u j
i . i i i n 1 I'.i- ii I l l l d ~ . l i i | I lie |i-- I l l i ' i - ,'. -Ti 1 f.ljr
'I i i < - ( ' n u;"ii \s. Wli:ii did t l i - . - <lo d u r i n g llie t duv-.'.' Iîd tlie\
o f i . c i - k e Tlie i - l c c t o f i d JiCo-'e -''.
453
Mr. Luco. As I understand (hey went around and watched. |x-ojilc put, ballots iii box**. [Laughter.] And \vc <:an do Uiul ttgaiu. Hut I don't flunk thai il would solyo uiy probk-iiis, aitd by sending our observers there and by [tutting this kind of priority t lionet briRs the elections into * kitkl ;' light tltnt 1 think lopLimizrs tluan, nd so on. (Mr. LuwV prepared KUtcinciit follows:)
ST-.TXMKNT <> I)ON Lrfi; Ut.rour: TUK.SKSATK FOUMON RKL.ITIONS CiiMum-r.?.
I am Dun J.ur.- from KMt OjtUu<, \VrinonL. I unit lo Viet X.vn it* 10."S a-* a \olunlivr in jmri--iillutv. My job wt to work with v-ople in UK* hisiilaj.J-' ivu .if Ban Me Tiinoi lei find a IMÛT vuriclv of sui-cL |oUit<>. In IIWH, I A,-* :i|>|Hini <1 Viet \tuii din-dor for I\.S. In 11*07, I resigned " llx; iX'S/'Vi*'! Ktun dircclor 'i> puIUirly nUiU- my npfKB>iliori to UM: I'.Sv |lify of it- luw rrcauoii, (J.-fotmlm :tml botnliiue of tli<: riMinin >id/-. Ounnt; lh<- VI.-IT Uutl I KX< in thu- I'.S., I \ :i nM-xrch u.-MMhu^lc nt lii (VnUir for liibxruntlunal Studies ut Cornell I ":i-i-r>ily. hi (^toliiT ]!M>>>, 1 n-turm-d to \ M-t Nun as u frx'r kuu loiirimlUt mid in Juno l!> '.'J fM-Riiii n >.tiitly un poxt-wnr nTo?i!tiructi<Ki for tliu World G'oiiuril of <.3nirrl m (tt"<X^;. I HU.M alto ufkiil to nt<- for Ibf IX-unicutiud IViX StTMnr ul tin- \Vl ''.'. I ain i-till i-!:i|>ln.i <>d by tin- U'CC nn n-M-nrcli oflin-r for Viet Naiu, bul ;ny i.-;:luoiiy hcr- i-. inud<- OH u jiri\U- citizcii nJ n-W UK a |Mikiîn!>n for I IK- \V<>>IJ (,'iniucil of ('hurrlitrH. I. >ro\oMir '\~\H- n'-I t-ffiTt of UK- Uiiitt-d Htatcx nid itrir^rtan ha* IMVII to cn-nto n <m u > Tin- }*K(]*1<.> hnvc HoiMjiK, TV W*M. utd tô-y kin>w thcuulv tlu^' is f<r U- AiiK-riruns to hluv- N'ow, inmny Smtli \'J-<IIH)<T' waJil Arn<Tifin L-I itn\ i tlH-; run Ojiitmin- 1< lixvo InKlx-r paving join, yvt t tbc ^mriu1 tinwt nnt AJii'Tiraii* tn U'.'iMt Iterance (Ivy d'tii'l vmiit fori'ixiirri mi tlwir M>|, nud brcmtvi tlu-y run tut- (h<- tnfitci>d'M t.nciml dinniplion 1 1ml tin- fno'lpwr^, Are mutiny. A.IIK nru auj lutrt, in iC'iicr*!. wnliin-d llx- (W4> lielttifii llw rw'h *Dd Ttw |Hir. 1ln>- )H-i>jilf win i tuive Ixvu nti(e lî X'*t rliMf U> Alxi-ririUH, particularly .- f>minu-torj*, t r'-nt luu.Hr^, .r provide <iUn-r norviii-<, fjiiv- K>(U-n rnuch rlrhi-r. Tlif |M<-, by c<ni|riiii, tmvc KII>'JII tfiu.1 much JKNIPT. ( Jirriijjliuii hii" bf</iiiin drejrfv fiilrfiirlw^! Uiul il (uniKil IK; ,t>jip'd. Kir cxajnpji-, lli- rliii-f fitHlntii); tul\k*ir 1i>r tin- L .S <iuv-rurmit in Suiifm refnitlv Ttf tlml "Ibe r<Hidjtiuii< nt Tun Sn N'hut Air|><irt fn-i-Jv ittluwx ttf rjiniKK''"* "f dannrr-î:- ijrnx- ainf IUUTOLIO " Aunllwr ndvi>r VIT-.I/-: "Tin1 .x>Ie luodi-ili of <'ui(<>tii al tin- air|rrt (CM-lm tu l>e tn a.;,t tbc-v iiiug|^<T:t to iiriiij; in tlwir r-mUubaud Without tniidrtuicc . . ." VV'illi Uie Uiakdown of the iv/ouuiftir iidf lif'-, MMT< hax IXTII 11 C'irre*|MiidiliiC l>ri akii-iwii f lite vM-iiil hlructiin-. Tr.-nlitioualh' t|^- f.-iiuily Im* l-n tin- uior-c ilu|i<irui[it MX-IU! unit '1 Ij-- niioU- fufoil> w:i iiuK'<-d in I|K- jihiiiiinc >:riiuii^. :ind tmr\- rire. Km IwKinriiiiK lit ulmul i'Mj'i, Killi tlw Li.ru' foreiil ri-fuKe<* musriii'-iii-. ilii fuinilv ^lrlJl i lllre WIL< l>ro|.-ij ijun. Tlw fallwr* joimil one nnuy or ttie otiwr. tin- old H'mx'ii w.t-l^'d tiiiif>inii> f-ir the l<iriiiiii M/Hi'-r-, lln'(ilUKUjrli uorkfd in ttx: lmr> alid Itrvlln I-, uiuJ tli< rliildreu f-UiHvJ nlu>-, HjU'Iie.i i-or-i, w/.-ln'iJ cjr-. u ltd -Uil/- from rJir-i. Til'1 i/M-inU j-. of the finiiil> f'njnd Ik-if lly y uere no Jonr/-r d.'|endci,t on OIK- niiotlu-r, ojid Uxim lo nj>nWi dpurl. Tti>- furl iluit llv li'Jlf i:l>il>Inii ofti-u mail'1 im>rf money tU.o t.li'-it mollwr-t uiT.-le/alî llui br>jikdt/Hii. (t k< my L Ji-'f that oiJv u return lo U**- furiu ruii P ' -ljljli-Ii Ib<U'-litfll/ nt (lie O.liul\. JlliMeVf r. I doll t tu-lif.e till-' full lyl|>['ll ;i lo:i|( Ur< Die ('.>. l.< 111 .*>!) ill Ijtl Aîa, lilnl;ib|( tlie ridjnW) -jije, of in tile rilii-v of Niulli Vx'liKin \iln\v\ttfi luKti Hicunif- nr l\v |>rnriij-e of lii^ti IIH i/irw- l<> |>ei>|i|i' l l n r . 1 t w i n i> iriir roil i limed \itt-jiin- in Viet Nuin H>11 n~-i;il in u uoreuinu of die roiiijiiju- uii j nK'.al -idMliiHi, uuij ui> lucreu/w in > ( n L > - and anti-.Viiwj'ji Jiii-ji, 'Mi'- 'ru-lm('vl ("i|ile till! "\mw tt-ir nliK'T ulxiut Itu .itn;iiiou- u HI"I.IUOII (l.ey don ' fully i.nd' r.tuiid. Imt u -iinuliou Itn'v *ei,^- i- (}.- iro.MiiK livin.
II. Hi flu HI
Tln-fe !r-al l-'H-l l'MI,<HK [>oliiir:il |<rc'>ifrx in Mie j>il. 'A South \ iHrntii 1-odnV, .''Hn-f \ leiniiin i 11 <y/iinlry V- I Imn I, in (!. MW .if U*- (,' I-., l!n<< j^. thr ii.iiiv uf tiur liu'.iii^ n.ori tli^n 1 nnllioii Anie|ir:ij jmlilnal j>ri-ioii<rs in jjil. iltf
454
or ih'-e people is tragically bad. 1 lutvi* se<-n paralysed pri-oiuw who bad ibArLlitl for UioilUt-. I ba\e felt broken IK>UCM of people, wh'xn- hjini and ujd IHITI beaten. I Isavt- .-f-en the evidence tj -divers r.trk under t:ni-n.ads. Form, r |>iirouer.-< Imve devrriU-d in fjnttt det.iil to tti.-: walrr torture, ihe UM- uf rli ctriyii-* on -a.iisitiiv park* of the body, and IUHUJ oilier kind- of torture. Tht Uw- uf South Vii.'iuant niaJv it iMMwiMr for a [KTf-ou to be am*t<d and Leld far up to 2 vi-arsi without trial, which in renewable, acain without truiL Tlit IIMIUM that n JXTMIU ran ->in'nd div:id-< in jail and never l- trii-d. In fact, J hnve l:ilked win: - \eral political prisoner- insido pn>on>- who lut\e been there ince Jit-Vk-THi. JJei-eiitly a H'iddhi-1 nun mine * iav triune to a*k for help ni ei-niiic ln-r brother out of I.IT-OK. lie via.-* nm'-t-d in !'*> >i. uenci demoii-irarum, stnd -er.u-ncvd to ."> n-:;r.- in i-rr.oti. At the '-nd of hi.* vtenn- fi- \Mi< nitt reU-a-x-rt, Ixfaixe. the [lin-rtor of the Cabinet of tin- MiniVtrv (,f (uterior n:ud tliul, ". . . in.-ti-.id of
t:tllie<l (J">p<1t'i^ on lii> I'-'Vel of repefilante."
Ii. Jnlv uf l^TO F actônijv-mj*-*! Conjrri~~iiieii Aniirr-nn and ha^'J'm- t. C'cn fun 1-ilainl ivlu-re *e vi>ifcd 'hi.- "USt-r cait'--." What we sow tber.- ba- \niii ^"-.cribed tn.iny tiiu-<, aiid 1 wri'i ti > itit" lhat :ii;a;r,. miat I yiTint to HUM- iK-fxn- ii. fi7!i.tuirli' i- that tin- t'.S. i- building new "isolation" Cell-, to re],lap- tb'<e . "lid'T C.-IKI.-'.' tiic i>f tln - n-a^'ii. /or dome tJu.->. a< -tat-d bj Mr. Unbelt Mf('1-r.Jfev, uf rht 1 L" S. tati; Uejiartrm-tiL uti F-l>ni9ry iU. wa.- Iwi-au-e <>f 'ronunuiuir <iilVi(*ulti \vitb tin- n.iivi nvalritratit [>rr-<>iitpr.-" wh" ....''! in it imiJH their n'-Ui i.-nlAti.î I'i'II r i j n j i -I. a< M-lf-lii4;'. |r'i;ei.'l^. The^. neve i-otvi'Mi rHls are 4-'>-titir <4(Ki.'K.'o I'.S il ID hi- hri'-tini; nn Fi-hruan' U-, NJr. Si ( 'ô-kiry ..ii'l th^t lhr-' were "f'-iii'i i I.. avaiL'ible by the <ji.\vniiin nt .f South \~i<-^-'!ttii fni I'.S. u*-.'." H.,H-I-V. r, t i n - 1 , tier -if fltjrti-tiieut b> > te>-u the !Vi>ari.ni"i;f of tuN a i j . Officer in Charge of I'-.n-iru'-'tnin. ajid the tienerul Manager uf UMKHKJ whu i-, carryiu/ out tin- i'"'ii-tpirii.in, an.-. VTV :x(>lioit tliat thc^' fund.' wtt S fund- coming frn'n MAt'OHMiS. J will Ejvr- the C'lntmiUcr cojiy o. the MAO.'OKIIS idler r.r tli- n-cord. I an. rai.-LuK thi- i xurnple lrju-e I JxJiive it e.iiitair.. inany <A tin: v > r - : i-leiiieiiT- iti - n j r mil pii't;raii>. 1 ilon'i I.-lie\c tin.1 I S. -lioulci be bui'Jinit pnn-lis. for ;r'h'icd! i>ti.->'iier- ain wl.-Tf It i- jui exaziuili- c. f h"\v oftvn .n'r Ro'.erntiieiit has ln:-r--;.r'-v j;Uf.' 'ALa1, it i- Joitii'. abrnaJ. I Ic'in '. It.at 'Jir li'lil'l.'.ifc; of tlir-j' iMiIa:in:. i - - l i - fur i-r.-iniiT- i.n (.'.!< >"ti ;.* cni'i:n:vl in ft>:'.!. i:.%[n-i-laily when v.i- n: T>ujri'jid, f lily awiiri 1 cf hnw pri-on olTiîiil^ li^ re I '"I ui~il ihc " n ^ t j t.'iixi 1 ' n-Jt liien bv l!vi' l"n nrl. Am, nr'.r:i .iid in r tiviHiraxi 1 r- prin'i iui- t'lcn-u.- . _ n : i ' l y in -JAP Lj-rt yv'ij. Jii !'(7tt. thi I >. i't,t ').'* iiiiiU*^*. ti'iUnr"'it,. ,tii IMIÛ* . f i i ^ ].r-*i;r.'t"'i. Iii I^TI. *t ha-, bfjiii;,1:!"! '.',n iLiitlinii f*jr j'i;bl;o ,-.ti*'l ,'. "*ijd v*!iil< xe h.ne nn;'i :^.-ft.t >fui ajti Inului-i '.;' -J ." n i!li >ii m l'i"l Tue I iiitvt.ir of n*. 'vlr. J .!ir. i:. M"- '*-r, di .-<TK--.J tl-.- uui.!;>p .-.if- '.> i/r<>i'.f;i.ri, i;(.'.|i in '1 '> iiu(>ro-.e llii-jr i:'i!'ji-i!lM tl. 'nuii'i'ie'il ;<olie> f-..iie'i'ii.-. Tl.i.it ";:n-ly jnl ,i.-,'j\e a--'j ii; <fi-<-;i'. !-, e >n tun .nl u\)l iij-turli.ui! c-; tiiv-il'.iiu'. ''' *'-ir V l> r:iir-. -filil-'li'-, ;i* ! n i t K i - f l * KW.'p-, ll:i.7> In pr.Ai ntn .^ "I.-- -|in 'id uf
\|nl !i(e."
J u - i . !/ -fi-n 1 l> ft \ ii t-i.'jtji. J vi^ t u.ij :i j| ir.it \t..eri':uii-\ n'i;:,rin > :.(< rr-i:t,i'i'li .- 1,1. r f .r F'J\V-. \ f t e r tlu'i' M - e . I :i.i'! 'i ''!i i->ei '> lalli r. il!, .11. oj :ij.- \ur-n,'.,r. iiilrrros i t o r - H.I I- , who J.- ' fi'ii J "i tm llu- t-ori<H(i:i!i> T. it tun i : n]',-, niirl atvij ii'iw 'I., iiiti-r v,i-;.:i- ..r. . 3iTi'-'l -lu' Tin- r. '.'.- .<! .1! -.1.1 f f.. : nj-ii . ,-.i,d ai ,|t. ri.jj /r .-Hi.!;!!:!:- l- ..f : '^ I'i>VV- i- l!i- Uii'L '..' u.i' r ' S.,n.. d.-ie* :l, f - |'l I\V . tv-^ i- ri'ieil by il..; \:u-ric>:i i .:.r"r >j,-it'.r ^- u '/''. ^-:- ! .< -. <i< " ( i t u i of n :- rr-'ôf ! U !.*: h - i j . r - i -, In -11:-:. f J|.,i' *hn. )' i'.V i-.1, e - - j .1 , r., t,-., ;(,. r.-i Oi'ar I I . . . . u.il-T. :i"il :ire ;i l.ii.-l : v.-i i j'i (. !!'i,ti ,. r, .'.r"-r i r . t i " < i .if .'1-1.1 , if
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I i - t;i Mi-1.11:1:11' - :u i' f r *)"-' e v. \, r . . j y . - c I * (. i.. u. ^ ' i' . . '^> *"'-' i i -n 'P:*i 1 l , i , . 1 I ' i j l u i - i . - . ; ..i, '[., t r . . l i t - , , i,'. o f j'llV.'. . l . i l i l | i , ' ;,!', t ' ( l \ V . i - i'J'.i-ti 1 (! ! : . ' > exern-" . ^ jt. ", : i ' i ' l . ! i . - i - i ' , ' o ' - i n r uf I ' < i V V . i r i r ' l f - . f l - i iil.-n. . !' '.-i:. Mi;.: ;.n-ir.. .1- ,11 i:.|i (- i t i | . u i . i | 1:1 j i . . . v. : . . 1'hi u . t . r r ' < . ' . i : . o i .
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tit VOV-, ow- vt ftcttinK ad(<juat: food, witU-r, ud rxtM-iae. A\\-.OJV lakhig ariU/.i* "C LiH- fju.. itinl XJ'-rjju7-<4: haw tortmvd uuuiy of th<- mi*wuvt in tth> fi'-Id {". iir uIy. V\V Lr.iTtt tiiw U KIU'HK 0:1. wu eoitdun*! it, thru a-oc ihf Ncctb \'i-l.uir -M* i-< tnwt our ju WCKJKM jwwdim: to tb<* V-n va (imveutwo. I .htlif-vii lK.-.t -Af t.n;-\ ). ibow co{>riatU lu our <iMnj t'l-aUm-dt uf Nirth Yk-tuaRMie ui XI.K iyW-, jo Uitl * cvi df-vii^ tire fate of ?ar own itriiauei* fjvm good
'
.. 't tH-U \x thai the, v-fcrii.ti".-1 iu fici'iam will d<> rmn-li it> clBiURr.lhc Kflua^r<v l> f ini|ii~.'>ii>li' to iiA\.f iti<-qii:xfi^ . WIK;I> .iu SonHt Vii-rrunn at thliilii;. Kit>.- "f 'ib, <:.-nHidat.r- ruunut rjx-oX fn^-Iy aiv'ml 'Ix- in:ijor (^.-lii- o( today:. ir. t >i oiril1"i'-':t.;ti\i'rniiiiiii'. Mi Trj"n>{ I)iaii Dzir. UK? ruiun-r nji in tin- Itttt" -'jU id jait {f>r .".ci< pn{j"i*iiis Iliat. Jh< - KJv.-mi/iffii talt WiJw Nfil*.
1
,.>ii Î't.j-iUkfi1-. 1 iurdiy. UK- j;.'\'rii&i"Vit tii if^-li" m n 1"<-ti<-- ^H'Uitii. wbirli U'l 1 - ft>clu-i'-d fb- tskirm "VT ->f an ir.'lc> tir f.-nei.". <j^ci'J ^>-ifarc- jir<ij<Ti which -,t i..n- (.u'uii'il-->-. -wu- cliai.crJ in a \<-r>.- o nir -\ t>riiil odir: 'elect iii. AD '4Ul f |if!~.-i,t>' 11 !i;ii>^ t/nxictl*. ^s ml: L tli> - ^ t^-. J crv U.l.c-..' llit an .'.iM' riijtta iiir-i-r\fr Irani can d<.< much ) >nxk<- tho ir i-".t- t i:r. or lUa'. tlv-i ''vvu iiuvr ajiy i\-:J tiil- iii \ K'Uuuii at- I fair }j.>irtt. . i-lwi-rvi.r .iram Hin.1.1 in tlw fir-it i-cwc. U'nyi"Jatvi- <1 i-Kx-li>ii (j
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L-.iLitiii !:.- di" Ih.'id r-'-u-'-.. ..I lb- "N'l.K I d'-rfi'i U-l i-.-ir, rr>li- i'l.'.iv tthri- Ui>- I. i>. i !-sv% din- t-i il.r ii.iiiturv di.-nj)'li>>u-> uod tin('." i^'tjin-/ ( ;>!*> J Ui~ T'.i- 'I ii.-t.u) .1 iniii-vr U'jt in J. ubi'it i^-rjixl ufvr it*i' ! Ii .!.'.. '<' tWi 'ifii'ijj* will Ifîn a |* in"! -if in-K'iti.iIii-ii avuj i<'i'->u<:Ui;Uiii Wli'.ii I 'x.-XX .''f >'' T'liF'i i'l-p-f, 1 'Jiruk ni.illil> >j( l-lj'- rrltft-;.i-l- I'-MifK-l.ijj. atid L'11-l.u'.t ail ' Mv uj-ijii." r.li.vi'.r n, S - M f b Vj'-'naiii AJ."-i ali ( I n - iii*|uin.-tiit r.'ln;""--- ! !: ti:i-.-- tirj:--ii ri-.-.n^'ilnti'iii In Yip Ja*l ifiuj-T -jx-icli "f S'jiu'.-ti Viul iliii'ti. -\-i :iti-(iojj "f ^/ii"/fI.iw iuij.
' ! ' - i i i" . - " l i , ijlnf |n\ ' fur lh' i"-ii lit n , "li'i'ii-l IH In ilia in l""> Û'l [i-iirt . T i.f 11- l i < ".'in 't- ;"idr id :t i.ir>T' im-.i-ui'" -n. (1,*- iii(>-rii.i'iii.d M':;alji>ii,
l,i >. '-' 15 :'Hlu-' i .'("I !i.i\<- iirc <l |o-9n :>mi n ciificiliulimi. Tli'- l-riii(fi..-v t i l t ' ' r "f I !..- i. tic -|v;;r->-i;i'.. -iu.J f.'i. n ^c I i v . I;, l-.irlU'ijjalll.M. <li a |>- : (ill 'i'f|. i . ' i - i . i ' ;.' i J i i - . U' r' -! n' tj :i h r ' l i '. ^ i'l f"? h.xn.ii. I;!"'-. f -Jj-ir j"-i.-;.t.' 'tud T!I.- , dif :'.i.-<- Jv , ILV.<
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Mr. f hniixutn. I s-k tliM 3 Mu-t:* fruB'.ttlbtMi* <*i Vietnam which I Iiavo
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CTIX-EXKSS OF epXGBESrfONML
PF.LKGATfOX 1 0
i. x. Mr. Shaplrti had i tbf;n-ut. \\cvf .of tlml. Mr.SUapJtjjj, what do you think about- liie effwuvvuc^s of a < 4''l<-âiioti t'i in>ur' the fairjw*.> of urr olwiion? Xfi-. Sa\i'j.KN. W-1L OA f said in my vuit''!^!!!. ."vuator I thuueUi. th. dt-l^patians that wi-rc iliercr in l{M'I--J%r nnd J967iu<lct-d, u Mr. Lut-*jui, M-onipli-4tl VTJ litil*-. if tuiythiii^. H>w"vr. I think yon 'iii havf, > I tutid in my ittitfiiU'iiL, amoro prof<">S. How, from tUo O Mr. .SHAi'i.bv. I think aii.i;^ iber liiu-s of Scnalof iSl<'Vf>nsfHi's liU, \>\\\ } \Vfiiild rortainiy wh'.H^t' n *ir<>uy: |>r>f<'>sionil flc-nu-nt of jwrt'n-ipaiion ami *l\-y-c suoii tirr fur^xAttiflc, a i.'irk .Sciuiiiiioii-lypi<ff roij|> (r<> with tli?fn rttul sofiw Vi(>lnaim><>-*jfskiiij; jnfji{r t<H, :i * i.ul<| not obtJttn cvitlf IKV of riirjaii^ nil wi\-r th< % iI>, but I think If MK li n ins|MM-tion \vrft- mure sfioiilifinilly coiif]u<pt'd it <->ii!1 nHiicvt" u i/<^ Ihn Inti I tliiiik for (-iir <>\v |uri''>''. limviiifj put as uiurd in VioUmin a, v-i' hu.vc. Uf ilo liuvi 1 nftui) t un <>i<!krutiirT) lo ^^ licw iroiwl or hl iitl lliU fopT-fi-'iiiii<; of .ilnnofTM* y f' > ' bc-!i, f lliink wv coiilil liud viJ'ii<:' of ri^pii;', f<>r i-xauijilt.1. W<- M i.vit do niiTM'lji'n 1 fi<-nr . fniild Imvc ilniiv lu-f liny. .MiKlly, what us tlntu- w.- coniiufi] to iiiiroii \Vi* il>t !]!! pt ijow it f> <!' villa^cv. und proViu<->. Tlie C H H J K M * N . Tlwy <l: ! n<H t: ut-.id' of Saip-""' Mr. ^HAl'l.F-.v I tliiik t l i u L Ma.-, tlri'j'asf w i M i t,f<'vv fiv-ptiun>.
JM>CTK VIKT>'\KSB
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l^ von (M-r-ouully i-o.'iniili-r th' !>>>(
Mr. >-HAPI.K\ You l.uvr JA. ii:k<- wiiTHl'-l'-i-rion.. f iliink tin- 10Vi I'lt^Mjo-i fr H f<i(i,ijf ui'ii) )i^.s4-iiilt\ TVS-, iu -j>rn' i1/ i i iT> t-fuii.M' it w:i- tj.- <irxt, lli^:m^.t fmr. I Miitifc t i n - 1}*'.7 rV-j'in for ljn- Prc^l'-tiiy MJ-. in ^'i'(HMH^(-,^' ii-rn-.-. !.'i'.'4'i) t l t c f<.r<-i--f*>i'i|in'.: jir*fci-.i i'iijios'il ij(oii (Ji-m. n-uviiiuM;. fmr, but rlahiiy i">t ^> fuji' w^ it should Ij.ivc
JH-CII ,\> III'' IllM IfUi.'lU'lil. tli'Ti' W K.-. .ri)i- <-ji||..ii{fruhl>' f\ MliL"l<'' "f
fmli'il ntHii)/. li!!o' I>.>\ vinffjn;.'. in 'Jinw |irii\ji<-i*. Tin- .^^.n-j" of i'.*ii7 - |-r),iu{i- iii* Kio-r unfiir ofn-. If iji>k Bfî-rsI d I fore it V.H^ ilr>-idi-il - j i < In-, \\i-rt- Ti.inl'- ul llu- lnM
VIM\AM>.'iE sVrtTfcM <>'.
IiaU- iiiMrd Iv fur/-, l l i j f llii 1 ,"Hii."li N ' l i ' l N n l i n <w- rruljy up 1 Mill \cr_y' i n i i ' i ' i.'if in i-lcrtiiiii , ,'liul l i n v (no r t'li-ir on i) .-; -'I'm of j:ij p o;iiiiiM. ! .lion Tiwn- MII- ;i HiiiliJiii-i i'i"iik v, Ii't \iiij-il di n- M>JUC y'iiis ô. <*ln- of ;MV ' oliVir/iii-.. luul > l u i j ' ' l n - iir< - H!I<TI to
T!i- < ' i i K ( ; v . ss. I'r. Hi
457
v!i<S:y-Tf Ota-lions U1 Vietnam? Yia hav- had Http ffxptruaite there. -A>Jv.HlCK>.. Wn,'.i iavi; alwirr* quotioiiiV Senator F^'bright, tc* nfrt- t>arr of ikrir Stst orient fow-Kgroimd, TW <>l;,t'ral -|>KCC>S is _ . uot an injotunon Uui i^ otyply r'.HU;d't: Viofaîu -The CHAIRMAN. I m lold l.Lry-ttr^-vory su^punoqs of t-Wtioiis.. I L.'.that your i'X}Vk-<<^ ' ^ . Div QICKLT. A C'Hid uiMiiN. peopl.- are, I tJiink. CViiaiuIy most rtrdiiuirv jv>i>h- in t\w city, xv-orcfiig-. dtw jc>pl'*. tlit- pt'-aâut jwopl** ui> in tl/e hijrul^ju}-?, tf}>lo in tfaf ji.ilft, ar- suspicious. TI<-v wr* a 'hit ufi^tid of i l*wn ix-ei.isi- for -most -of f Jrw ^x-nrunt-u -t\if> K-wt taintiwt they hu^v with (lir povernincnt UIK U-ltor off f}iy ar-. and the idea of itcr.vioi: t-o -z> utiii rfgyUT and p*ruViprt.t>' in a <ciivTnni*iit pn>j;rani -ofxiivi-. s.trt rhcr fritrhtt-ns ihtrm anti rittliT;tlri.-.atphv liu-'ii. ,". P-.ipie huvi; at^ttys wiiij thy uûlo, ovt-r a jH-ri<'KJ of time, learn .tM 'Ifwiwralic proci'"> by partiojpatuijr in rJovUons ati'Tlhls I hxv<Tiftv*! it >n our country, n-ullv Jjmt liîcii l' th ^nptmuni'st-. F-.T rxjiJiipl*-. jiunuTous \ ietnaincj*; r-allv duiii'4 want u constituUoji in J'JtXi au<3 J%7. Kvr tlu-ni h t-onîliiLJi>ii sort of boscd th;io in. Animrwi^ lily ttr.ka-v-JC'ViTythinp iii vry m-at purku*> uiul this vit-vr it alwiijv uituufe^t iii-|ilar^.like that. The, -f!oAi KM A v. Wf ii'h wr_ ihcrfi. i'jnoro. Kt. W.hi'-li w! then ijiriorc. Thi-Vw-tnanu-.-M' til.uay- lik*1 to b*- b(i.ijiiii >i_t-. ,u y-i<'tn or !M bowtiJ by :i M-ri*'.' of rcnhjlion>, aiul ibinj^ hk- a r<>mfti!H'i>i) do l.i-1> 'btiii. Th-y f-| iljcy would evolve 4 kind f rojuiftutioii <ivi-r a. j>cnofi of linn-, but it wouldn't W ai:y-_ thintr lik-11 Airieriîir < 'on-titmitai. ft *-ould Ix- r^rrihjy vngur. and.I. ftiinfc w uo^W find it H}raLl.i.i dft>lrttiilc (Iwutncni rcftlly from our jjit of \i-w, - 1 hink Jjt-iio.nx hnvi- \vry unwli tin- âiuc role. Th'-rei--sU itiiu- n'liMi about them
OWSKATJOV or r&OfKK< or AI
T_h*- CfiMHiuV. Would v(i> ^.(rfihf *.-ht you mead liktiuiiK? VoK'Ir/iK'Ji on tlii*.;yo:i -'ijjg*'^ > T - 1 ' not ijillt*' 'li-f it. VViiiiid >oi; jijtrj"> thai tnouyin H link 1 further n-. to lw* y!i hy how fhi-' jjrw/-> of in-.-ynjirii/^ldtx-n ivill a< tuu.ly
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458
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\. Well,' as I> Indicated in The testimony lhe-0s-sp.iic of. -- -tlip'Hf0unniodatiO'i thing is A bargaining ntux-ess and it is act anything .iiiystx-rtonsi for us. . . ' _. _ - . ' :' " ThV.:Ou:u&JJAN. .How-.'ii-it carnal ou? lfs it Uic .ttadiUftual leaders of the "swlsVir howl' ; _>.'' -"-"; " Dr. Hioorr. WIi, it is catried oajrt allfar*>U.For eKainpic.'ttiarriage among &vf \T*!tn.iiiitte who" st ill Hvt 'according to tradition is not. a manor ul-iontsrijije or low ; it'l*. & question.' of Mrgftuiing bctu'et-n two fanijfe=, AiiA it i;-. a 4X>utr.-ioluaI relatiortdiij/. And what thn* do Aviion . th-y bk^rain is^vork out (*fi aocumuuxlttUoa. Vu knowr, 'Vpur fumily -^has uhift oip? for tbcm, oar fiitnlly has J.hl*, tuid t.hy Bargain and. . ;; v,ltci i {roiii^ to ftt what oaLof thv arrarigcmcJ)!. Eventhin}; is d>ne For IXHM>J>I> swine pflopln .">a.ve dcs-ribo*! ir/ m if yoti-w'ant to ": fiay off it jKrticâiati in -Kaision if you are stopped for a.triiffir x'iolation wh'jtt you say to biiTj i, "'Can.\v"e work oot an accommodation?" Hft ', Sa\ s "yes," and then you sort of Lodge. Itisa {>rocoss of your prf{x>:injr ^ on? thing, bisrounN'rpnjjKKUjgTand then it is >iu<irrsUKhl tliffJ._you . , are Kuiftj: to work out something, Usual!} n larit arrangeurioat J>o<\rrtyu \hr, parties iiiyolvod. . . \Mwjj is romifs to tins poliuoal .Jevol in the central o^cnna)^, it " really i.s uotj grea, deal <liff*;nt than wHl, t.ivas bri=rht njt in -; the I'ity of XJtujiiuro in ihc old lltk ward oriJJte soutli s-ido, aud ijwrc o raauy .puiiii<;ul acconriawdatious ihst -took pltn-e. . . " " . . .: Au-l sunn; ftiropJc oj^rut" politicaJlv- auuiinUtcaiivHy, vtr>' flff--ûi ilwir o-u ^n-iety, It tHu'f .-^ Jf the
k -v-nfPFuodiiJiou <viitv;|)t i^ khid of ti iny>tfrious oiicut..! tJiiiig; iikf ' ij*',"t'huii<t' nVv^c that Hunir-boM' tb<- HTxt<Tii iiiiml <ran't prKSp. t r.,ix.i,> ,]o wjiii llw rule* of jwiui'^ <jiiFd pro <|Uf>. .'nun if> ciihfgc sr.? <iown ai;d )i/i H'anl> to make z jJcaJ witit tlti '.L'ti or rrlijiioij* RJI*II]J. H} .*ayiv .to tin 1 J<av<Ii'r. "ft'';iil- rio you f-'.'" and ih<'y-/ut-r \vith~vcliibt tny vtuu, ami lbu U>.-y>lnrt v*ii)ltr:ôul 11 iJi-fiL 1 tltiiik ihi- i- teba-t. &y iliti in W>( with .{;; Hoa Jf:ir>. :ifiijfi..b v. i.; t>^jT i;>iu:iia>I ou? c.<a'-ily wlm.1 the detail r.-ret b'j' i iiis !> ill" kirni nC tlunjf it i*-rH i,-. ôrt oi" ba.-ii- wurd )H>li'ic-> viiJi "'
iii.MTif foit A..KIU->. io'Tl"' i ''liAjtimv, ^V?.ncti iûr jcjuiijEh-fntioii. as iho L'ud^.r.>c<-fâj'y f >r;iir âii! rt f t v jl;> iL'> b'-fon: tfiiA i.oJjjraJ'(M<..yi4 ouj" objwiiiv: .. fij^lt- an 'r|i|iorlii<ijly "w 'Jjotr<* ^ frc</ MK-JC4.V. }i_a- jriij ub[i!i- jiuoff- To !:UM. I, mult-Mood it (>r nt<;>ui toJ!tyuj>ur ki.(] t t i n i j rt<-<-(j(,fi. l-iiiiVl our ;jlli( of vji'W, In îft: tlwu; a;; .-npi>or-it(>_.ii< fi,r -i j>,-i -i^-ji-i'. K-'U^J IK* ' Khojv lTi'jn " t--. ^'.irk <'{ u<-< oiiirTJ<;rr;MlHi'.) N i-iuil r/jrri'fl'' . _ r! \5.. ft Wtudii r.iif'jsi our f i - j ; j < j v i n r oill'-'iivi'' /L'OJU -
l.ni.' pla<;". ], rlifti onv/J'.' .." . _. Si.ei.n.r 1 {.I-.K, .A'j ]'-timviftL%i -uujm-'v nv o4.-ji}j>-furf:.';-i I : jrrci ' . ' ' . ' " ' .
.S-nt*(or OA^K. Tlini.ijiCHii* Xitr Vietnam . ij Or. lT;o-KEi. IvtetfUy, yvr . ~
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{la\iHMAN. I wfttU-'fo wfttU-".it j'oiiauHe, j'onflude, 4tnf -amfTwHl mmuxliatcKvi 11&- <"hi-vtHUAN. I win immcdiatcl\v*md -V-nMor (;'A.SK. r*uvsJ'rv\ Mr. (^winnm., but v* have lx?si waifiu^
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î>v .c<->tittnue).-1 "Wrt riot îjr( <f"tfir .(JevK. i iW.wk that spirit of "tii' tJuujT; Uio ivuiorftl .'uf Anicrirjih ,rxn<J T aould
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_ a i .<>( if->oluiir)iu I tako it^.ortwr Ujun llw1 S ' ivormrt iii'tlml? ^ - / . " ' - . - .Vfr. .JSw^w-KV. 1 4lirHitK.-syjv:* mvhfSC S ,t th* ll|tfv;)J r>!S4>luti(>u ^ think Uu?"Vitj.<U'iit <-un urn] j.irf- n (,ii\*>ft iljt!*-. itU'l ! BUTO'iti^t niicf-l'SW, inî lji;*.4jliij.'rfhs tokin^
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\lf. ^M\>'U^/A1. Ul^S )><til''--i>l>ly lf^far US, } W ifij.in Jh- .-(jitf-m^nl-, i hi-Urxf ;i iv^.'iulwT. mtriit/ Iiiiu to tnovc- us iiikly it- iK>^lKtojin<l rofiMuIiin^ HJ n-j^jiar iiiK-rvuU w i l l : < '<>uic:>n ojt tiiHt i><irt.<i.. J- tbutk !< nlivjwJy know.-., i tiiitik irno.-,t 'V*-jy)x>!y ~ HI- an- M<A guiji" to 1m v. IÛ^vc in ftHottjiix Liif 1'iî'if'Jii lu'iiiorc along i!5 lini-s-hc* Un:> fojJciv/iiii:, - l.it âkiuj; ntur- Minit<' (.'r*: .<4m<.- j-Iffj/"iii. jlitl-lM72 would be my <fuuii.<luH>. TFi'1 1'tiMHViL...' All 1 . ilirif of yon lifttx 1 >jri^<'<i. vory ~intwvsiinjr ' viati-mnjit... uw\ LJjV-rt- i.-% ijrUfii I v.(uM likt- 1< t,.-!;, lm i <nmli> lo niy r*B*iij;'iB>"*ii uf.'jKtrtiuuiy ' " -. .
->'! /a Cue 'iyiuillfjUrn, 4 frsiirVC "
Sii'irtr>j- lSx.vWTO-N. Th;i.ifc ywl. Mr. Cllhir Mr Hic!frv t tt 1 -- bi^-fM^' jr youf Uiou^lrf- ulial tjiTiêf >;<<. 1 - 1 j,'i:iln--r jl, llii.. iJi-Mfi- i> ( , onri l/ |njm-t njr .%ji ivtv of i.i -' in V'i'i;iun), t !> j'i-t iloii'i urKfiT
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.Dr. JfTrtrEKV." Yiw. I would sny .thttf we .(Us&ujKV thtyf they Vw-vv lociiwn.-4.th-1 Mmr- ivsy-wr de, and itscywry .dcJvntely Io uot. It ic. ltar-j:';o dmriicterixr- tlw.\wiy iboy view iJitvn^l think it forjwy mixsl.'.i.s I >-a>, with suio ifftopu: it i- ft ]>rotf^Îi<-v would irdW not to (*> A-lafr fkf-lM.x-aiHa*1. i|ic:y ore <Joiin dirwtly wiUijtiw f.o'woiuiK'yt .'"'id coining in roiituof v.iih i|io local cffictsis uhioh is sonrthiti/ wfc^3 jM-jiûMt jKv.ijjIt'-' |i^rfi*'iTt'riyjdo iiotHkv, . " . . . . "-" TiiH i>s4itiM'tIuig .tl-sx* proftT to nvoid. . "'
OMBW rX t.vos
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S'nat'r SvTWN'ffw.v. You <.'ontm<'iud in-yirur slt*nwn'l on. th^ diMi?t"rions vff:t*i. of iKitn.bjng in" Sowtli_ Vietnam. WLat jin> Wsir coniittoiMri oj'Iwji/biiij; ill JbatiV' ' I)i'_Hi':KKy- -I rt'alit", Senator, do not l i - > . . >m> li*>'haiid knowl^l^p xiid I would pirfei ;.ot to *xjin^.-s any vicv.
VAtCfi'AVft ^CPECVISIOX 01'- VIKTXASfiriE I,EOT>UV
or SvMT>rtit.<. Goin* Imck to 'Jic ']pA-iii)R I*M.M.'. do y jt is-^-TniliwliiJufor n> i " Jrii*"*- mi elwhon of Ui? in VK^hiiui, tuid if "<j iniw lo vou Uiiuk > $,houl<l . . _ Dr. Hi<.'KEr."\Voif. gjv^tj. <h( tlm cloctiun is >< of a wid ii i-t pfMiijj'i-'j-lslct' -j.ln<-t I ttf-l llmt liic SU-XYMMI -{trniiu>;iL ih
qillt' 1 VttlM, Jl> jt JIJIS- {x-i'fl JX-OJKlM'd t<> W!1J(J |M!<->[if<- Oilt ?* *i() .s)H^lk
V'lt'tnitif !, in othi'i' .'uni> Jiavf H i.f>r|>^ <if jx'i'ij^f and I utw]-r*Jnnil Sn' r- ^'f-itixji sfinw of t^c Vitunji^r -j;-FSf>.'., |>^.n>k Jik< tltir. who wrre in Vu'U.uui anil 'inj sot't'-vl ut JH ijj^ r'.U'tl aw^t*. 1 ilon't tbinL you vjtfi lo >' iw'Uor tiiiui ;li:, I liavc wtnw of !?-,< iM<oph: .tl.>Ji<c. 'J1u-y liv< fMUiiliuriU'. Von i-criilil vt uj> :i kind vt |n*'M<ioJojry, i Miirjfc, if you could cli it tjjjil, Ui d>'yii.)j>tf su|M'n'i>-i<jfi -in <-<yi:iJit urt-us, NJW, liipii, y-ni fw* tli<^ jrolyl'ii; v. iiji-h, I rlihjk. ilicff* 3'<uut^ frllow.-, jtn- awan- ./, of xrtiiwni*; fjf'Uinj: inlo itn w<'t ^Kifîv I|Krlwtiuu wid \o wi u|t .a jppHrufi;> if fil-.-v <l d f ;-iv' -iv' ynii, you klw/w. 1 find Uii:^- t>.i-fiioii arc vry uii^Vrii. /flu.'y JJl'irried ul r-r-uMjijably u-<-'l iii maiM |/!'s, qum- w-ll in oiTici ,, urul Ar-UJulJy in <>tl^rffcoj;:-*j>liicjdui'-ji-. JJu. ] lliink tlj^-y rould vuirk t 11 **-hiiuc K (but V<; I ttooid y.l a j>n-lty y<J V.:H' if you had ic rijrhi fru[>Ie. uifJudfil in ll.- jroj<^. SVIM;TUV. Tbauk you,rv'oJ-' I'.b, KCATCMKN'Tt* ABOUT K ' l t l V < OI %T A\0 OTIJKK
Mr SJuijii-ii. 'I i is j;<mij ti s<ii> yuj uûiu. J mn -iiry-I wa-i-ut in-jf > hru ,\oti jiiiulc your ntafiibMif . (nU 1 lni.\! rend it nd wodli] u.-k ;i frw rjm"-ti'iuh j;ajij-.i ii. Iiiin ttj-i-iir-if.' /;'o \<m t h i n k AnH-ri'./tii slrttviiwiit.>( uiMiijt t-in-niv I<Hly i-jiiiij/s, .'V'rtft Vji-iiiiHurM- U'iick kill-, uiiij u|>tiiriij ~?io^ - ncnu'1-.ti! dn \u tliirik ilie ufv? '-KN"- t iliink tli'-v Jij>i\" IX-. im'. *".-*'jitjn)lv jfii'oni'i't. J f l i i n k iht.' in *Jn'
401
our los<?s \\lion I >ayour losses I iiu-au tin* .South Viotnasneso *j>>, nliie-1 losst'i \\(-rt- un'k'rplawil. Tin- kill ratio originally wu*> 'nriwil to lv souvw here hf iho jei;dilK)rhood of 9 or 30 to 1. A tar nu.ro ivu-onabU* figure is now privately admitted by the Americans. HIK! by iii- YJe.tuaniOfC> to lm\v been *onir\\1it-re between three. aiul four to on** v Truck kjls. you run probably gage more accurately b^cAU^c you ' an .-^'f H uuck burning. rtt yon wrlainly cannot jndjrc', for (example-, tlu 1 Hniniinf of Hiiiinuuilion destroyed. This has lx-cn ow of the ridji.iilo'i-; aîxM-ts of thc'.LnoH in<-uivii>u. Ov i rnijrht tin1 lijiuivs w'nt up in Snii;<iii fro" 1 J7.(KIO to 17*>.(HK). 1 tliink Mmw-IxKly ju>t fonjol to put tlic to; i tin- ntrht pIjK'rt. mid \va* too afniul 1 fhnu^ i? af!'T\\'iir<l. say it hUinN 4t '7(5,000 tons, of ammunition J<-on CLASÎFJCATIOS Sfi^r S-j-MiK,iTox. Thank yon. IVluii do \ < i n tliirik <' ju^tilM'JirifriiisforkwpjnsrrlftSsifw'd tin 1 sort'" rdt^'-. of. J'liitftl Stut'-.!iiivjraft in Iridot'lii^HTSpjviJirally, I am ti)ilcu* of- ?* uv tif H 52V in N'oiti.'t-ni J/a"s, ifif<;rumtiou t-'.aîfit'il until la>t w-t-E, . ! a typical jilu-iriUiuii. . .. Afr. ->K*KLEN'. I v.onlii *)iy it js_w rt f >^cjfU:v u.v nla(<-iii-nt. 1 :uu ncin-'t it. I thiulc wo .-iiould no1/' stop t i n - iMiiul'ii^riit \ort!i Ijio-. J M-C nothing to hi- trnhn'J 'by i-onUJiUins it litviiu^' f ->li'l lxi!i*\ii tli< J pnvv uf vtuul i)fTi itiation in Jâo^ cu'i (">c .-[KT-jIctl liy Hjicliiiif ihi- liuiiil/injr tijcrc. A-. J l>'i >.jii<i, I think ut1 lutvo t> ot^tilish a rut off <jnt*_for all ^Jinliinir of jiny kind myv.liw, I iliink \v<- sliouM -~\*>\> the lxiHiln^ of X i . i i h Vk-tnam, vf-n ilu- -i)'irttlii- ixmhin<r. rijrht nnw, tiii<J i IhijJi -V*: ?-!r -jl(i <''jiilinu<. 1 -> ]ic!p '.-lif .^juth Yii'tnaio-M- t (Jii-';in- f<>r<-.' (>ut -rut out ill ii--'iif Aiii<-ri<'iiii airpo\\:r. 1 think l-âJiJ in j - i v > t i ^ nil-ill^, ''i-iiainly iliin um- y-ai1." I vyiU pr<-f'r !>"* i' -i< prwii ;i'-li;atlv ramns-r t h a n 'hal, >x>M-iljlv l>v thc'i-iu] of iliL-. vi-ur.
' i
' . * . *
\!I.^-;:r< Ol'J'OKTfXITV lou X

-
ii-ru'vr SvMiNviro.^ (/iin^ <o tiimtiiuj* >"5tjw;t. '!" y < n t riiinitii's fur ij-<rJifltiritff 7jji(!'i-.rnl in Vii-, f {link >.'.< <liJ \w !i-i\''. Thi-iv an- o-.l n(H'n;ili.-!.^ ^JcJ li'^tofiiirio v. iin J n i \ < - fiifl'.i'.vnl tiii- f.u in^j i Tl'>M-ivih hiii.-. J(Ui J t l i h i k ui- hji\<- inis-cii ,>^>r! n j i i i i f :ninj'i:u i k ti trou lii-'-vcjir-,. .".I. IIH- nf thi'in vM'i'i 1 .-ri<>-, s(>;ni 'ACH- :i^). J 1 \\-.\-. fll n ' l ' i J l l ^ ' . r i if liicfir-.. ^'" r j inî tic 1 - fiuii'iij-, jicri"(! in Vii-iuqiri (.\v-r.il y-.-iis :i^< ' vv'icrilic J'-I.-. nj:l llic !l;i!r li^ %n-rr T' ill 1 / 1<i il-'ai i M ' l l IK. V.luMi Ai:)!' :.(ln;- I^'Jiri; v-:i-i s t i l l t'tiTc. 1 i!,i:ik luit jiti.rtxriifiir dfon in.-iy h:iii'-'n <k iii'/ r r;'i<-(l, iljikl ii .\M-. i:ii-icly u -mi;; lin;* i-JT""rt <!) lli<' |>i'5 f Jf;:l."i , ' i ! ' i II'>'Mfl'_' \;T_V srj'l ill, \' n , 'rilJ-l-dc'l. H'l! J-'nr iA,'.|ii['ic, lo inj;i' t(ji i;io-t fj.-fi-iiT "It. , ill ll;<- flll f la-T VIMF, ^-ii 1 lu.|it" iii'ij l.i 1<" i:i 1'Mii.^. In ivtri'sj.)'-''! -vi-n i|i<.u'îi MmK.m i'i:' !(,-): -|i"iin ^ t : i i < > i i | i - i i t >-nti<iiini-'.l iinihni'/ v.ry ic-u , jx-rh, ji<* 11 a J , / ' ' \ :i';;il4' i-~, tlic li/liln;' of il UH* lICVi'Mln-li^- Jll'cn.'.ljll^, iill'J J
tltink \ve jKissibly should have sat. down and said, "all right, are you willing 1 1 talk in secret about those eight points?", rathej than go nlic^l nith Xiirori's fiva points which, as \ understand, were. j>reyuivd in advance, even oefore Madam Binh canie. out with her &.Atvu<nt. We had ln>en working it out for several months, and then we -'-nt through with it. Retrospectively, I think we may have done better just u sit down and sco how serious Madam Binh really was in talking about her eight points. I don't personally think *he other side was terribly serious, but I think we. should have tested their sincerity at i hat ]K>int. There have been U. -tical period* in the pa&t where 1 think we have been so insistent upon setting forth what pur preconditions wen; that we were not willing to consider \\hat their preconditions may have Ix.-en, in detail.
VALVE <Jf VISITS TO TNUOCI1INA BY SEXATE STAFF
Senator SYMI.VKTON. What aiv your connnent*. about the valu<' of visits to Iiuiocliina b^, S-jjate stalF? Mr. SKAWEN. We ;.AVC had so many of them through the years I find it hard to summarize them. I liuve known M.IIIII- people who have come out wlio ha\e done a particulflriy {"'ixj job. I thin think Senator Musfcie, when he was there, uiixl very hard tolitid out what was going on. 1 remember when -John Turmey was there several y?Ars ago and he Clayed on for 1 or 'i we<Jcs and )rav<4i-d all around ihu eountry and nia^le a sincere eifoit to find out what WH> going on. Hy :>n<J larg"1, I would say that the average senatorial or K'pr<'ent alive visit of :{ôr 4 days during wiiicli they talk to C4irrespoijdems aiul get *orne MA< V briefings, &>'cofnplLsh v<-r>' little. v Senatwr SVMIVOTON. Thank you, Mr. Shaplen. i 'ongra.lriilatc you on rhe artielv. you have writt'-fi about that rouJiUy You Jiave-'d(>ne as much as luiybody <!!* to infi.nu the Ani'TM-aii pi-uple *to j'liut what lins Ixvn going on out tlwr<:. Mr. SHAPLES. Thank you, Senator. <- ^Tmtdr SYMIXGTOV Thank you, Mr Cluinnxn. The (Ji(A)&UA. S<;Ltor Aikcu.
HKtsOX POJ{ MK. LCCE's EXITLSIOV FK'^M W/CTH V I K 1 3 A M
S*-nai/r AIKEN. I would first likcô itsk on<- question of l>.ui Lwu aJid tlu-n po*.-iMy oti<" or Iwrr of tFn' otS-r v>iln<'^-n, i\'liai rcn^Jii did th'vSoutli Vjctnainew iAl'i<:iuls. give tor t^-ljing yoii^to U'.avc tin' MY. 1-M'E. vi'ij'' reM^jn lli/i.< 1 was the given n-ason w>w "for Mr. Live. Yes. N'/iHior AJKKV. Thn, is 'A-ljist tljny ^JL'd.jl, Mr Livi. Y,c- S"imtor AiKfcN.-An(J they didn't tell you what th<-y weiv1' ^]r LIV>;. \ j(n.x>ti tiling. TJic <i(iiciiiiVe; *n u- "for .jw-''ial rt'H-wijiv"
4C3
LAND REFORM IX SOUTH VIETNAM
Senator AIKEX. Yes. Just one or two other questions. Unvc any of you seen f>vidt:res of any progress made towards real land reform in that areî? Mr. I ATE. 1 haven't found much ênthusiasm from anywhere for th<? land reform. 1 think they have I think one of the proMems is that iboy tried to put, they are trying to put, a very complicated land reform system onto, with using an already pa[>er thin administrative structure, and u>inr offiriaU who are very very tired, who arc underpaid, und that *he result iu> been not very pood implementation of it. Se.iiaUr AIKKN. Is a lot of land still owned by the French? Mr. LCCK. Not so much by French, 1 don't think. Senator AIKEX. By their own upper rm^t, you might call it. Nfr. LUCE. AJ.-0 one of tlie major problems is not MI nuidi the having: laud for tiie tillers, but it i.- to have tfilers for the land, that is i<> !ive u h4v-urity situation sv that the jeople ean }io ba^-k to their own larid^ POS>IBIUTT OF FAIR AND MEAVIXGFCL ELECTIOVS Senator AIKKN. U yu think that a fair elex-tioii cîii Je carri^J out AJt-iiout itny obhei vaiwie ^^^ t>u(*ervisi(Mi -or aiiyiliin^ from any *>\l\t-r Country? As I re^-all, Vi<v I'r<iden1 Ky said there were no many |x>liti<-ul factious there, uliicli he <-all<tl (htrlies, <ht he thou^rla it uoiild be. very difficult to curry out a fair elwtion. Ua\e you any opinion on that? I realize that jterhap* it hadn't IXM-II your 0(4d. Mi. LUCE. WeJl, u> I expre^sivl earlier, I don't think tliat 1he elections <-aii IK*. Cr>t f all, inesniriaftil, ^liich 1 diink i> mu<-ji more HifMirtant <hun (iu- question of Itcinn fur, that they oaintot <x- njesiutx-cûsc the major i*Mies <-a.n'i be Iiv(i>sj-<l, Ixu-au^- .-î -many an- <it aliowed l<i participate, Jx-eau-ê if they participate and nui freely (Iiey would IM- put in jail. Question* like thi, for *!*', orn- /if ihe ^'on^resKinen, now Trail N'pie i'lniu har- tK^-n, |M' .Mipr*urii- Court ordered la>t MHV. MH.V a year sjr<, .-jiid thai iii> iiu|iris<itaneiit was unconstiiijlioiinl. Vet tie in Mill iu pii^Mi, niui yon have example nfler example lib- till-. .Senator AJKK. You hew those arpmtentK liere, too, but I <;-<jeaK the effivi on lhu {KTM>D w not quite as ocwre here a* it is there.
LK4TH Of AWXEr POKITiOKrt IN MJKITU VJfc;T.VAU
I uji<Ji'r>L*iuJ that C*lHjw;t oflirer*. 1 litre * an hol/i a ponitiou only so IIK. J think the MinUter of Foreijrn Affairs, Trail \'iui Lum, told me lie Itiul 2 uiarn. Do you know anything ulx>ut that? Mr. Sn API.LS. I don't think u-x<' are an , <hwe i.s any, kiiid of . , S-nator. Some Citbiuct ^jfti -err. have held tbur jobs 'I <JT 4 yen> Ot Jiwv have held tht-m for a much leh*er \n-r\m\. I tiu'uk in ' eae jl mny U- lai
Or i^TEKErtT f.V HAMJ-KT A V I * V(U,A<;i: KLtX.~nO.KK
I uoold like Hi Hdd one Uijnjj abouf th-el<v-Uo<M. Wiiilc 1 uirn..' uiih Don Lui.-e -.uid iilwui tlw reht/ichwih foi- hu\in; any fair exj>re>-
404
MOM of views 1 lh<' top, I (Jiiiik in all fail-no.-**, while 1 <-riliizol them in my -taX'jih-nr Th<- whole methodolotry whieh we- imposed inon the Vietnamese, vwlicaAizrng UK- thing from the Top down there is some hfjriiininp evidence at tin* village level of ii^toreM in hnnilct and villager elections. Tin- most reei'iit one*, for example, did Itriuj: out a younger Hement. for The first time. This Is piwng to tx- very ^nulual [w / pn>cos-.-s \\bi-h will iM'roirtt1 jmri of the weorwnodutioi\ think all throi- of us li.ivr [>uintv<l out, hut 1 monn it i.s riot nil black. Tlie Injri7.onfl <-if<vt hm 1 s-jx/ke f <rluT has Itud s ffcft-,, i* IwtririimiK TO nliow ^mn*' adults atul will |)crti|/.s slu.v nioro iii lime. It ii r.t tli.it villjiiTi- Jov^l thnt tlip. wcotiiiuotlatiuti wliii-h .fi-m Hii-kov <Iis-nlk^l -; tlw l>jijrîui{: prorir-..-. lukiiii: ! path of lV^r n-,winuco H.- \voll H,- l-amit)<r to Jivv lli;it _ \ arti<;lariy. s'-ill rouiiihuiit;. lint. I tiiiiik, uicain, tin* jiirtmv i* not all
I'Urk ill til.1t M'lJV. POLITIC*!. PLAN?. OF VK'f J'HF.SIl'EN11; SLY
fjs. p) bark .h.v. I ixti.'.
IJo V<MJ think Viiv Pnîlcnt Ky if -ally tvMits 16 to finn? UIK norry, >ir. l>(.:n \'i; Fr<'.--J'J<'iit Ky n'ally w a / i t t-o rHitv froiji
NIV! Vjink he wmits t*> run. llial is whnt In* Uil<J

C tit lc:l-l, .:!! tW-y <!' !:!ll''''' o^'UMoIl^,
Si-miif-r AiKfc.\." f am K-fHiijrV'ui wimt !> ioM tu.Mr, ^JVRJ>GS. J tliiiik 1* i^ n;li:ttwly M-JJOIK ntwiiit nuiui<r' h.- i-; Piv.,i(j<;nt TiJ<:<J. I tluuk It- .viniils t^ run. JCy lias . of lii> d\\ n i,n irtstiiy r<-*JKfrfc. hi my res.]Ku;l> In; Iia>> ik-a! of jiilo^rity.Uf juwy al-î hn\v rmulc Iiii runnVy an t\u: ^k!e, 11- inane Vw'ti'HJiH'Si; {wv-,. tmi In- ha-- his UIATI f^clifi <.if jnil*; nil;! n;ititi::li-ni Hi- !.u> bi- own <jiia!Uip- <if iett'!':r.-Jijp. J> is fjir -m>'.mi ik'-< t nii'l fntthridi* titan J'rv-idrnt . TbitMs, J (jon't thjuk -it i< Very lili'-Iy- --my jiiviJiciimi i-; |ir<ii>a!ily not .worth unich. j " u-iy lu/.sir*]'Mi^ l>iii 1 would prc'lic! ;lm! ;it fh M i i i l i uiiiy li'<ii|'1 mil i'.< run. H>? w-îtJil hk<- flu.- whoU- lhin pavi-u to dim 01. H -ihvr |i)ai.tJfr, MJJI{ lie in MOL tyiiiu; to jjd. liint. 6'j yiz <-ou!jj h:n<- n t-'.vVi-.iii:iti ru<V Ix'TwccMl Til]' U hfld K.V. N'U.ii^r -\f>,tN f 4- \jifi-j, tjjf ;'iu.--' i-i fikc il iv ijvr^- A jjaitl umny <illi< bil- u i u l .M'-in!x?rs <if <.'ujiitr'.i<-.-. iwmid likt-< Ui j'etiiv. Only i.lwy cn't b-ixr t.iii 1 lliMljh! <if M -.iji'-< 4 -viL'r ' Mr. SHAM.I-A. Prcsi-icnt Ky savv In; J^ n-ndv -*o rHiru hut lu- dc->n'i mi-ait it. 'H> iinjioft-aHl tlihis; i.-i liiitt lx;cui.i-j- of tin,- .system, we h^vii'ij|'i,,'-,i, rlii' i-nji-r^'H'v of utty <'iviJiaii li' \'U'!-nitly )>!Vi-|ijdcd. Thi- i^ cm'1 of ihr fnl1-.of our iim i^'i--k\\'. A'ld ?!:> of tli" jv&soii* we ouHt-t to ^."" T.I: (it. --ih!r;> to ;illutv. t!,>roii'^h l:ii- f>rocc-,^ of ^, IH>- nf -<njji- i-ix'iliiiu .I>vii*'j^ \\lm iii.i Ifuw
ill'.1 < Uii- - ( I ' l l ] d ^ i | ) l ( > '-'Ul ji; j | i i - \\ <(.(] 'A ink.
:4fl5
SITUATION IX 6OCTHBAST ASIA AFTEB U.S. WITHDRAWAL
Senator AJKEK. If and when we complete withdrawal from that part of the world, do you think the situation will improve or will there be *' \rrne period of political chaos? Mr. SHAFLES. It is reaiiy * difficult <jue*uon to answer, Senator Aiken. I think it certainly will improve. There is some evidcnc* that regionalism is making progress. It takes two sides. What axe the Communists going to do about it? Are they going to push the insurgency into Thailand and Cambodia? As I brought up in my statement, these involve questions we have not answered ourselves. Such as, whc*t do we have an accommodation? Senator AIKEX. I am satisfied that when we have completed with/ irawal our own situation will i'oprove anyway. That is all. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell. Senator PELL. I have uo questions. The CHAIBMAX. Senator CAST^ .
QUESTIOX OF MAINTAINING MILITARY BE&fONSIBlLlTY. OB NUT
Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to < xprets my appreciation iar everything that you, ail three of you, have brought to us here and much of what you agre<* on is very clearly brought out and the points on which you nax-e some disagrreinentr> nlbo emerge. I ttin ino.vl interested in your view of th* future after the immediate war i& over. I ].ave beard <Titir:ism in the |rtre*s. by wrik-rsof the Kixon doctrine as \ague, involvuig, among other things, reduction of Ajrw'n<-jin jxjwer at the baui<j time it escalate* in very vague ways American responsibilities and cramitnient.s, and I have heard j^ôpfe, who &ay that sort of tiling, say the l>est ihing we rjin do in to get out of Southeast Atia nud Ahia entirely, and u-11 thes^ <'ountri^>> Me r<going to do it and th:it it is up to thin to make the best d'^J they can H iiii Chum and uith Japan. \lr. IAUV, is thi!. your vL>\v witij rvjMVt to mtli<-ary lwlj? I ai not tnlking iihout economic help. I am talking nbout the linn! qw^rioti of uuintainuig or nol maintaining any military responsibility at all in that arcu. Mr Lf<:E. V'?s. verjr simply I agree with that. Sija.i<r C.i(iB. V<i ugrw with tnat. Mr. LrcK. We should pull our uiUilurj- power out of h:t U\P ^\x-ak <f V'telnam. < f AK. No, 1 uui tulking more broadly atxiiil the future of llie whole region. Mr. LIX-K. 1 think that ah long u > ke<>;> troops in I)MN area HC uro goitig t<j get coutuiujJ slrius with the people of thf urea, thnl wr arc uni goiug lo bring about llie land of Mubijity that, ae think v.<arc, that liu- people uiihin tlie area cuii woik <ut th ac<.-<iui>jiolm>oi)s 'inwlvcu .HIM! \itli (.'Jiuju uiiK'h Ix-t^-r ihun they CUM with of AiiM'nciii) troops standing there jookiog over
466
Senator CASE. I am not talking about any particular number of Aiucrk-ans. What I am talking about is should we get r,&\ and stay out and say to these countries "make the best deal *\.u can."
Mr. LUCE. Yes.

Senator CASE. Is that the best Heal? I don't ;ueanto*,press 3"ou to sar anything you don't want to, but I just \vnt to know what you think about it. Mr. LCCE. Yes, I do.
Senator CASE. How about you, sir. Dr. HIOKEY. I do think we should remove all of our military personnel bases from Southeast Asia. Senator CASE. Flow larjre n area do you mean by -Southeast Asia? Dr. HICKET. Well, including; the islands , including the Philippines. Tbi-; would be areas south of China all the way to Burma. Senator CASE. Japan, Okinawa, Formosa. Dr. HICEEY. Xo, not Formosa or Okinawa. Seriwtor CASE. Koreu.
Dr. HivKK}. No, not Korea. This would be Southeast Asia. I think we -b'liild coin June military uid ro the Vietnamese and Thai.-, people we Jm-ve ;ii<1<-d in the paM. Tin's may cat-nii a military us-i-tnnce pror;u'i iiul t'li- .-Iidiild }*' kept \ery. very MiialL We hav<- very yood and enrtid ^xsople in our military ^-n'if-fs. who couki liandlc a (>r<'fik<- Uii-.- V<TV w^l. I think (\\^ \* !H-isHr--dejinnMratPd in lia. Tliis i- a vcrv effi'i'tive ]>riirum JxH-auê you havn people irj cJinrjfi- win. uci'i' in VietriHin. Th'> luilitajT as-isiaii-e din*-tor, Nfr. Liwld, w l i n wj- ( 'oluiic! Ln.ld of Spwtil Force-;, li:i< nn nniierslatidiiip; nf \\linf i l l / - ba.-ii- (liir.z* tijc Ciuttbodi-.il Amiy ni-ed>- -iiui i.li"-ort if kiiiJ t-f iliiiiiTr- lijsil they had in -JMTJII! forc-r.-. very e-.w!iuiaj iliin^!*. 'Hot U l ' t nf f.-mcv equipuieii!. Hut we Jmv^ pi-opk1 like (]ii^ in nil brrtin-Jic-. ai:d I (.'link they < - nn wrve a very useful fiuwikfii, a jrn>iij> We >Ij.->'i{d silwayj. k<:ep oir pre-iMiet> nl a ruiniiinjin. iiui f i h i n k '.\" Imvi; .-i r<'-pi/i:-ibiHly (o cMuiiniie -the militiiry aid.
Sit.iit'irlÂ-f;. I i.ike i iii:it you ajjree. Mr. Hipl-n. Mr Suvr-i-tx. Ye^,

Si-Tinlur < 'vs>; 1 t!in>k from your -tlriuc:ii you -.uJJ :i lii jnoiv lli l]jul \ f r . SU\I'LK\, 1 a<Iifrr*-.(NJ my-u-lf mofc to it.
M M V T K S A N t ' i : tH U.S. l-ilVÎCAL P O T K M I A L J'OK 4
S<'!:Nir '. ' w-: You uoul;< ;il ].tot<-ri|.i:ii firir u'-iion. Mr, >n\i'i.i s. \\-~-. ] l l i i i i k v/e -lnild ki-i-p mivui force- in t i n - nr*-,i. Tli'- liiunlu-r. i i i < - l i ' ( nf.r.oiHid'ic^fcrry ju-t ;fv<- HP- couuirjc- I would ujrivc \ \ i t i i Tlu- qiii-iinii if Tliai li J-- i.- -jjll ijp for jrruli-, v. hnther w 4- -Iioijld Juvc (he ri^lit to i->e tli( F )n a^Min if ji/'ccâiy. TLe /pH'-.tioli itiTvii"-- \ v l m t i- Merri>?)rv if Hti ffiHTi'i'iii-y ITOJIS up { Jvlji-v/ 1 Mnall iiiiliiiiry w i.-iuii< i- pio;.'rnm-. nn- ' !il, liut J t h i n k n<- are in danger tili, i-M-it in ( 'ujniiorliu ('M|V, for exiijiiftU*. "f not knowini' quil^ 1 hou wv u n i (x> j.ro/uj-d vMi.li tlm-4- j>royr!ijii--. fV>r example, it i- no M-fivt, -iii'1'- fonncj- i 'nioiu'l j.ii<i(| hiiis -[t<i\uit uboijl ii, Mjui J <pjot<M) him in my !fc-i pjrci1, then- i-, diiFerence of opiuion filrcailv u- to hou ue !-Jj"ijt(] irjn i h ' I 'uin^^ltkii.-. ijt:tj-riil M^Muxic i" in favor *.f pj-iuJin^ IH-ijjN- lieiv, -ciulinir t.li/- (.'uiulwxj'nn^ |o Furl Leavejivvnh and FOCI
467
icwr, whereas O>LncI Ladd is very mxn-L against thai. He wants to train jjeoplc in count crinstinjciiey terms in Cambodia in inteJUgcirce lopuitics. ft cetera, et cetera. I think Colonel Ladd is right.
C.6. FIHAXCISG OF FOREIGN' TBOOPS , . c
Senator CASE; Now, in..te*necr, to 'American financing: of foreign tK*>p soch as Tli (us. Lor aoaCambodiaas, would j-ou bar that or would yoa leave that as a. matter to be judged on a case-by-case basU. ' I think wo have to leave it to the , . îiator CASE. You would not bar it as a possible means ._ Mr. SHAPLEN. No, I would not, but I think it Ufeds to fmslty down main to what I said in the statement alxHit liuvinj? to determine wbal tb role of the President K and what T-he roles of the dozenWh makt-s. the tleision? Mr. SI*SPCT:X. Wh" * mafc*>s the decision. We Law .far t declaim: the-c iianps. _ . you <r<j ? tdr>L< ptrrnil tin": what have b n Cflled.ajrcnnry o'p'rtiuR& ^nuncud by tfjc United .States? Dr HiotCY. I M6i}dQ'l arfnsr it. I.ihinkif thf -couiitrie* thuseives work it out, for exumjjli-, if the Oamboiiajis want Thai troops. and fWv SP- ivitliny to >upport tiiem and finnre t hf-ia. I cjin't think it hs lict-ii fflrnven v-ry virrctrce in Vtetnani.- v-ry frankly. Senator .C\-*E. And jnt to sharpen the cont^f. hot\ve-n your JHKSItjf.n urn! thr >th;r*. Mr. LUCI-. I tuko it you vioaUi not have any of this busini1?*. - Mr. Lrrr. No. J think all kinds of international u^sistuucf >iu>u!d l>- don*- under sonw: kind <.f an inu-niationid uuspii-c.-. I think it 5tmiJ he iht dirertjon t>f th l I'niti-il .State.-, to work through iutTht'nual u(J{t'w"i M<ich as th> Ultited Natioius rallu-r than ending ehlit^r srnal) or biir Aiin'riran in'rruarj' teatus or what have yuu. Nmator CASE. Thank you \ KIT much.
!ECKIX'Y rOXCERVtNG f.. CSE OF THAI TBOOFiIV LAO;>
Ju-t nior' thirst Nfr. Shuj>!i'ii. Von op-n >ni a j'icsfirri B.- to who j.-. ina.-tfr of ourj jmIici/- at iionu-. who run- :h" #how. am! forth. Thi-- is i;or i!u u[i{>ro]>rit4- tine? to jro into thaJ ujuti'T JJi any ilrluil. h-J i ju.-t Wi.nid u.-k you olic rjiKsiion uf:;<-h !-ud- off froiii thai : \\'lif i=. thc/fta-un. in your j<jfi'/m-rii. ihut liwnwa> 10 ruiifh ^-rn'ry afxûl our !)--. lUfijirin. truiiiiii^. atid finafitiiijr of T)wi triul- in Lao^ \fr >HAPLEV. WfJI. J think .lii.- derived --S>pur ("A-E. l.'ntjl recjcntly it vviu-n'< <>vfn uoniiited. \fr. >HA.r\ 'fontiriuinv:;. f think tW;-! derived iiin>tly fro;n tli*ini>Jeiw:i' of tli*? Thai-.. Thuy didn't want it to U- wad*- imhtic. S-Hut<r <XA.!E. Von tjihik thp fii>jltvity of rhc Thfli> U a actual fai,lor hi this .-ituatiou. r l*-a>.r on*. Mr. SBAM.KN. t ibink it w H-, u f:vtor. ><>.. and I iliink uito indirub' thai, hy Ilw !< /if Thai*, a':<1orilinjr ti our owi
46$
agreements with the Thais, that we were in that seme ACtdcning the waiC But the initial impetus did come from Bangkok. Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman. thank you. .- . The CHAIXVAV. fteimtor .\fcGce. Si-Tiator. McGEE. Thank yuu, Mr. Chairman. -. . I want to say, vvi/h ro disjespect, that I have followed %<b-Shapwn more than the other two witnesses by i oinciJencrs of being caught on Hirplrncs with articles ami 'his sort of tbinjr. It has "brrn vrv .stimuluriji* and very eonstn>e<ive. Even when I wasn't sure I &gn-e<!, at leasr it preye^. on my Conscience at night. Mr. .SiiArtEV/ It prey? on mine. S-nator McliEE. So if ha*.- been von- iu>lj-r. .-.. .
RELEVANCE OF EABU "h, U.S. EXPERIENCE** IX ASIA
I Tvant to raise a question Gat fio> .*._ ^ - U Base's question^ rn n-irsni to our rofc in Asia after Vietni;>. whatevi-r that may m rinin . . .a liruad way. Js there any relevance at ar,- .-. your jujf^nent. to our " earlier &ct of hl'torical experiences thcif In the ibirtift*? I mean Muitrliuriit, rhe co-prosperity sphere a?nl our involvement with Japan, '.vhirfi nation lw.iime thr preciominaut balarirt- of poxvor for tor in; i hat ur-a of tin1 world? Mr. SH^PLES. It is a large st of questions. I don't think we ean -over tJietu in the time span that relate^ tlw-^w, UVgol caught w-th tin- .TapuiifM.' in World War II x* a.r?till i>( Pewri Harbor. Ourinten^-t in China )ias Ix-^n A justifiable auI hi-toric-'il one, which has to INrene\V(tJ. te- I >nid cnrlu-r. S[/cakii'.?of Wtnani. I think our primary utit/ul uiUtake in Vietnam h'riveff from our aM->tanoe to lh* Frem-h. \\'v came out of World \Vr f I without kiiou'incr hardly anvtliinc: mmut JiuJocliina, acid abiit r Vfriiiani sprcitirftlU. Then- & tulk of making d<a! with Ho, tryiii"; i i fir--Tiiofy Ho, whirh WLS s/irneihinj: I liiink r.ve shoulil hav- done. Nfaylw w d i i f n ' t r,tiii;d a 'X jjien-ent t-hiince, but 1 think Ho wtif ri-tuly o iji-Hl witli the Wc>t hfaid at t h a t timi-. particularly witli {|K- lilvral Vrwh ; biif Jia jt tînn-'l out. tho><.- |>o^>if/ilitics were ritiut<il !y th*- FreiM-h niucii niur ifiaii r>y rhe Viernaincuc. Our ly-eutest mi-tuke in Vi'-tnam t<K;k |laî! durii;^ tiie {wjiinl 10-M--14. We were afruid hecw we wanted -French sr;j>por ia Knrop1. u> -limit- our >upport of the Frem-ii in indcidna. The Fn'iK'h. 'n1t-d by not ^lJp|orfinv om- vii<woii<>.- in Ei/rnjie anyway. -; ib'-y hv.. r.'of !-i:jtfM)r'j/J thfrn in N'ATO nu.r- p-cnitly, but th.^ in'j.r.ukc WL- nuu'e.
<F KREVri/ f.v V J E T V \
XfrGr-K. We hnw dl tfjii'fiilHtt'.l on fliut J hiricj-ight. .~',i|tIK^'' -KK i;-vl st'io on flii- fjm^tit/rt. We W'-n- Killing ff p^y u lii^'h prirr fcr the Fn-in-h rtkiiiiiiitriier.t in N'ATO af a tini- wluii u^ 'it ilti-> wa the critical d'-cj-ion. I liavi- fried l/j i-nvrritfii, if / hwd l'-fi <n t i n - policy -iii.t at thiir {ji|f. l.o\v hiifli it price if umjjil liovc Iwrii w / / r f h paiiuiT. Ph'rr/1 i* iui qui-sfion now tlinl rf *> }n<( chf)-.c;i lint in fmvr Ijoti^lit Fr*-n Ji |>artici(iatii;t; Jhror'(icully virh the 'uinmitrriciit jn .Southca.-'t A--IB at that point, then- iny have fx-en quii.- u ilifffrefit proeesK had w been link.-d wuli tin- ind'-j^rjduiice n;uvc. n:'i.t, ffo and lh- Uk' f .
.^ J-y-aalorMoGEE. ^ think" icia tôrni point. -; "'.T v >- 'Mr.viHAM.5X. (Contmuia^."> JL think lh*t is tny. Oi^r support of tli>-:" ~ Fri-iEci. wo? by'-nw n.ctcis a uri*nima3U;otv^. Inltho"'carly 1950'srfor.-"- , . ?xurai>lfc, therf* were tHC(nT.'ijt'viiw6oinf exuressei witbic 'he Ainori1 i-ai mr-sKn ab>nt our î^.j/uft-cf the Frec.:l. MmBUi.. Cftitiioit f<r j."rr.As of ha 0^1: which were in shajp contrast to, tJic tJcr m Vifetnubi, Mr. Hfeath;-o did ttw latn'hcjwl-' oftbo' :.Cwtf"'fcf"'>vi -\dniioi3U-atior,. .Vt. Robert Blum,, who ih;V> ,ih<tui-ljnth nifonus much motirquivily than' then they Wore doio^,b<'fort \vw would continue to gji'c thrFrench our '.Vuji^xiM. I t^sipt one of oir problems h>? bten that u'ij cam* ill prc- "-'. We-: " '" |>ard to this \vho! Rwa. ^âvW had ayn6tion of ,bi<f "~Lr "*" hatl v.o fi,"loc!ina dlL Aii^brtJv- j\-lio kntw aDythi:ig aboc > ^.tvaclied to the French" -iesk' in tfcc St ^fl Di
XFCE.-SJTV OESl-COXD -T
. concoCKrac rca!iy-Abu*it"not just. sin, fi.ll ftf/mjt cas4ru ureas % ^v tiLjtOlicat pu'ndlcl. My -fj*] rack<-r.-iii Iiidtory L. to pl&y with th.il^ Vfhat \v<ulti âYe Jiappcnrd if .ta[)nii lihd hfun btopij^d Jit Manchuria? Wha^wuiilitTiave happdiuui >|iluiv'i' To.sonu.* i.f my c<ilJagues iâivys at Icuat^-i'^ siiould haxc t. rTtaiiJy tiidn't .^"icjj ,.-< to Jo ik bur il r<rtainly .Un^ht MS i of tiipvr-wbo an-'rernuhUn^ us i~ut the inm<>nt w ^rtînly nol Cbina. Tlic n iuly I**? n v?ry tSstjlLhiive Jupciu t'coiiomicaSiy, ^thit-1, the
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;; it i i-'. iaM iut itik w: ougjjt to iinvx- u afron^ io<t f;. THIS U thi.- r"u-'"Ji I )i * rnui'li we jull F)u'k in i. ' " . /".' 1 il''t kiiois* w-ât it <:;rw p, but swri'* diiy "f JU'i V'lii Iiiiv; fu.yyji'vv.'. < my ,>ii. >n.ir:.N. I w-vni.il. <ii-acr< *l;-jr,;i. i (HrJi '"'iirtbKTtJfi '.vjtti -i/b ->i:i' iul-'k rl,' 1 I' \. i- -li-fi $u. ). \ ., Iv it rv.itfiir.'i-t A .--in i- Ji > iî lb ftiMMfi?* . jh'-f. fh'i' ''I" fii- .tbi:!*.'. .w<r
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, .i-i;c <jttiHii"s' ni\- jj'HUi; ur ruitTJM- \viutui < iiiitiu^n yjwt>w*s<ir*A9w; ~ - 'V^VA >avi' U^deaJ.iw:. oCi^v \\iifi-Japen biiv ui{,it:&]| b> narwr^ of -;., ~ ^ ~^^\i.tiiif^t Asia..,' -' ' '" '"":"- '. "-1 '".-.-; ': ,"- \. -"N -ro AVOHJ' fo.VsE'jV":Exo^".OF .^'ufi..t*'r NfcGKi-:.. ?Touid lL-m V- cny purpt'sfe oc j'rrrruiT, OIKC Lh Jftf,u>uir. i-i-t I>.vk".ml^-f-.V inik^d'n' i>u<h;f>-? Ja{iui -xrulfl;lKr virfjv <^Ci'i?J7*>:'a!nl vcrv esiiysv:- in tfic ocon^mio sphM-o if tDorriliiffr'.t
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w'Uli.K'-kii}^:.. Jirul ihf Kt-rcm-. fi^Hw.in ihiv,-t/x;_T think we havx t^>
471 '.
"/>r IK,^ <f UiesMiCst nuny yetri: YIU can't .null mt;rr>in.iiucFer -v. <tat-i*iy\iv('i2:bfa of the consequences/ S<. I -w*u't (a applaud yobr . owiiivnt''tv"tliarvtl^"ui'>viJ i tstuitay;- - :u" -I , .-' ; MIRK *CECTION r:-: .yierN.oc ,A.
". 'injw:tcd /rum th*~\xty fiisl bw**uso ,'*: tnd 5f-ju(lirc f>{birs>by.(..ur yxporifjie^ \V-!av^bo*-ri \\.trlf5nx 200'yurfrs, t^fjV *<Kgrc> frc" lino.-, un.3 w'w*tiil doh't-.hiivc tJiem io '.l^ffcti-iit- ports <if the ,C If fn>ui uii nufiquatMl i-olnriial ,Minxtmciiirc:; to protluw ft ii:_-5 or
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hi,Ayvb<'n-gnnty of ^ver^xpcctipg atid of act'in^ up a l, Fthnik tSi- kind ^f p>vcntroi'iit <hai man/; of th<jM> pou)itru.':> ln-V4- \+ dvf>Iorul>ri>, bcjt (h;v Hate them t<> Ijivi- thcn, Americans or no Am'jciaitxs. I (Link tlwt we would dy -.bettor tr livc.rrx! uUrtf-lrcs from, the dirfcction of those ,. . . J r^/ivfiibi-j at tlw tiinft of thft 1 4*17 cicctions Mr DZH. (h* i ;is siyiHg, ''tlfat of roiirnc thi-str n <:Uon> w?m not jU-i^. bt tln'v nyw- "cffUrinlx1" fh<" ftrc-t T -havf our >miti!iir<l^." jivfl ur' ull_r^tivc ihiug:i,"nnr iu juil., I hui*' to powl fu our. own h!'.or\' o/ those ikjiûi.Miitur iu i*ii wltto'w. vrre ut w^ We do not have !*<! olerici.i iVcoivl. It.ô*-sn'i tw-ju -ihaf it wa-s yiylLtîn oiir own dii Wororin \\V><i<l War I What wr dhl to thr: Jfftf>a.h-.if dtbct'ii j iliF-ouutry IH World Wiir.fi ,w/if> if'M tlu> mirti OvfuWc. It ,-ioiply -tys VP ought to JH- it littl*1 .ux-n inu'i-rstnoduiz evt-ji tlit/Utcli it tiwrt validnw thl> pitxx-sx. Jn i{ of il-'it. yj-rv. JiCU" i ?) uboui tiu cclntivr p of evi,-Dt uOil'prJillful y|[H>-4iiion wul 'iv-t?l<>cUiCi>jJi North Vb r I Ix-lirvf ihV-yJ Woiri( iu '/onlvxt.. Wliat all tliis;' ' we >lmitJd noi rin*ki- .iitikMi<.>iiiui:r:s.of: nil >f tiif/U. {Mr.j to bu n-alizulilf . Jn rui' <v>i>iK/u'. for H i:n:M. ios time1. it ouj;ht to !>*? nMwapiÎ iirttmi-s of tfcj art-^ and h but j/.irL iirilr; world, in ti-nu-. of j.otf>', kitui -<jf . Mirf of a <-Ij i'ir for a Jiillr* wi-*:r pfufkf!r.]ii:i(f - flmn _-]j^ iiuj. r>in up *i:b v'iJii:" un*A'. f (liiitk *Va-i \iv\v ovi-rdo the
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Mr. .SrjAt'LRs-. I tti'/tv, v.i:h you. "MMiat^r- f jliiiik \\i- fr-nl i^; b<hotii-r than MJOM iift<;r'*(- I. " Mil. I.tLink :it of n> ^jrn'' we fiw fed tlii-4 Auu-ric*" -.jvlern. t!i- V\Vi(t-n>. ijivtftru. ftr too rjiii'-k'y in V>-tiiatn .
<; u/;jri.ii;j(7xfntK(n llv- ln-'.ti-r jt will L. But Jt is ijl>o>.fj j< tiuuv eci-pl it j- riot, too la.tc in 0111[>r< wr *-. run Jx' lrjhti j in > >1 lairj 3w t/mcr. of O'-vk Iû'l^Tf -'uli lr*(.ff'jHy"tuk'-' piwU Off* tt'fr /i't-0'.lt,
T OOVEBNilKNT
A*'';-. -l"*t J'ii'tir^ iip fh'TJ fill-* ofhcr pn/^^'-t. We :'.n-,ii v{i;:il tif <-i>i:w-rMifioii fi-jl(! tt( ijd[j(c )jl)ot>i w j - u t w- fl> with
472-,
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or alMMii- the Thieu-Ky govern "n* whether we furce them out as ve arc: getting out .r whether v quire a composite govenuaent of noinc sort before we withdraw. ~L sort of thiug U a very ten ptiug
Jp.rOr|HVt.
Tbo concern, which I think is legitimate,. is if you are goir^ ta agree to whatever we mean loosely bv Vict)uunizutioin,-t>o that Jhe ( jyvt-nmont of Vietnam can do more of the tliinss.we likvclxû doinc -<i wf mil get out of there, then you are at one and tle same time. . undermining thn chance of that happening if yon. l*xin again tc tumble doun a government, howetrr lousy you may think that ?o'crmnifiit is. ; It U tho going concern and we ought to disabuse o'.irselves, J xvoiilii think, of tning to have it both ways there. You csn'i have it both way*, in my opinion. V At tlii-* late stage of the >game> to be riali>tic aboM it we aro gcivi to have to bido by thfl pr sn<' of that gi>v-i.niiiuw fr bÛcr orfcf H'orM- mill lot Mibsequpnt events in that rvgard tnfca tb-ir oun course \\ithoui otir intftrfftrewi 1 . Ym mention, I think, in the latter part of your uxt Umt you thought maybe \v could do a little more by putting on icon- heat now to add ome |i.-xv iiwrrediftit;. in the j>re>oni CzgitGc wi in th> upr.diiiiiig plci'tion interval. .". Did 1 mitinterprri that? 1 Mr. SHAPLEV. Wi-ll, f thi^k sonn-vhaU yw. I m^rt-t* s-poki ! of using t!icrt of |M-oiiii>ioii to hasten the arroimnoditioi) pr&.-r&t^ C rwtui 1 know a nimilnT of Vifdianiev. I ihink \\t- j>i do. uho arr-.n',ivifn:.v io i-nier^p (K>liti<-uliy. Thf trouble with th Victiiiiôe now if llfut havin lived for s<j long under tl>e impu-c-t cH" the AnyriejijJs tli^y sitilMook>i f t to u> fur tiion; than they r-liouM. For exaiitjrte, yo>i sl'tll hcur CalV cverywiiere in Vietiium tu>Iaj*, ''Wu <-an't tin uuvtHiig vithout yon Anierieini^. KVMI if we want to hitvc another couj* it't'as to hvc yvnr approval/" TiiJs i> jfo'tirthing tJiy mn't get ov-r. Tlit-y jrr hunp up on lliui. But I thh'V \v. xhoviSd .Jivalnix- <ii;rs4-]vc'& of |J;tyjng fhut kiii'l of role, a^ you were -ny:!f^,, J-. urioliier i-oiip py-jible ill Vjetimin uft^r . I hex- e't'etivji-? My >iii-i-r j-i ye*, it i- c'tiiircly jio-srf/je, un<i if it ukt--. piu.-e we *.hul.l lutve uotliiJ)}: to do w i t h it u.id \r should ju*t gt oui a* quirftly u, we ran /d let them .-clMe. tlu'ir owe proliieni^. -.1
- r t ' D V OF C..-, KOffl-AI'TE.'' WrrHOitAH'At, K
Senator M?:(JEX. f igrei' with yo'r other point in your ,-UU'lueiif that the I're.-.idi:n 1 i-. Jiving up i<> hU wrrjiniliiicnN >,n : j(Iidrjual. . Some dUajre with tlv A|>C:>:n to th^ i)<TLbi;.iirj> > -.^'ut'liaiui;-ri:tiii<.'ly f tlutt .-jiiu: pjthiT ih>* liuiîa!;!!' nor tat; m'vmjuu''** cf tbf witLvlnivvul liu^ been rtoiatcd w i?<:ilii rn'tter nrvifiif gi^'jrai nuuo.'ia! tsjJ^rnst in liifirtt;^ our wl^t' rolo, if aiiv1, the UnivÎ iiiite :nii.nt j$*y lit tliit d" liir wood or it: tlw wfiolc wocUl in. the wake <;f witfiij
'J'h; it'irrta is ro-Hid: it \:ttw~ no H"pcrutit'ti; diritivv ','uti'<.
.Nfr. >Ai'i,rv. 1 v. mild udd onr- Hiig, .Si-mst^r \fr,(/t!e. 1 :li'n < < i/uld do 'iii.'r/.- limn we Imve iit lin^f -'if'1'.j thr [/r-.wcs!* of j.-giona"!
173
i. AitF'I-fray, thwe lias bt*jn jMMUf progress maiie hr the last f<-v' verve*. Tbe troublo^-thcro Is you have, too many (rrganizatioiis involved in ^hut, Uo. You .bar* got at Icjtsi seven or eight outfit?, ~ taabo Plao;ÊA.TO,'-taiA ^^rious others.
it 'aWâreb American akl through7 -'Ôbft cdwknt-ls Au.poiwibk, hat tbink.:;*VJy;iJ'lpr<vv'- role, J< & world tuwter, In. atrkigbtenUigwit . softio -of l)fj ^^Vf^V*" elWBt9 tai>ng t|vft rpon gruupiogi whi<-bvwil 'n^p '-n*VAr<sifi^!c^rr them tajjft together thewsjely.rsl , _ Wft are dojajf thit irrfiaro}*; bfiV'w'iJ- ro no!<Nd<*uj: it irt Aiii . t\"e _ C-*jri sis cti-iinj tfa: World Bank .*! IMF as qty _t>ic <rf ioing it 'but ; I; rUirifc^tfVtii: go further nif aster atoaft t4K!JuMvJ7 'ûii nw'.ai-ahV^V^bc' rJi&iitu-tetl in thai direction UHt^n^ ot itidirid'itj f^wTj-i^ji bilaterally. i"hi^|k the iiMMMicr'vi't'd lieticr off rrc: Wik -bs in preserving^ pui, pauper Amcvicjtn . , . You yi<l ,vou wtnt f-Vîtam in^JWS and \' ruv tinru>. . . v iIr.,SttAei.EK.wrhat Is rieh't. ,^ ..-.'" Sciyitor >t^-i5iKf^.l was trying to rmiJtl ilk liino J MU.S tlirre :n 1954V ' iiaun- (iV iwul 'i fl.rc tjion; u-l yotnyi-rt- t-brr during ttmt time. 1 have' to npoUieizO to y.jy-rul|f.4guw i.fc. IJir.ve txvfi friwh'iti sofar ui th: I have no Iras*? Jr <i fandidarr at the national JfcvoWrr. 1 ûti.jruki' '* rnnch ix'trrr [iit<k Tor cjui.liilucv in VTtanun r.*fifinc._I \. htttc rA'T<'| 19 provirjw^jiow. Tht I* nicr*- thitn 1 have cov<-re4, TI-. .So;1 \vj1J. torn ovor this ftfwifif.*- -taCywu if you will turr over; that oiif to iX;Tiu:t h vll I.huve to say/Mr/ChijMinHri. ail I thank ^'ou vcrv nni'-h-.: " _ -" " " ' ' " V_ . :K. . Th*k you .;. . -/I fiTrrl. wviRllto -;a):,Jio tiiti'h I Tpp^'cJnt4 yonr u^tunotiy. I think >r 1 ir lftv^Llv..ti,%^vlt<. ti,"ud .vivy uwfiil <o im -. ! fwMnl' courc-iv'Mljly ctviT nfl i(h; '.{.fc-rhr.7.i.I>ttiooll;]ikf'f*i i**k. 'nf ilu-ô * Jftmu I . Irk<- to nut. IJi-fon- I' ho.rfiuvV_tlu;r<h;i>, bi-rn ani-idfrnhli' di^ lUxiiit '.lit- 19*17 i'l':tio! Mud fh<>-^;:ini of /ihm rvtrs thai we M'ljt at. . _thal/^4jriK^LjnirJii lxp ap|iro{mh' For nip t<j'.îiiOn.'ut." . .
tt, .. . .'lin'r.of , r. . ..._ th- fn'iin- iiti'J w'iih r'i[ifx'i to ( I K - i-.il>iljiy of huflilm-' i : ,I'ii'/iUly-trfîi Sjiji ViL-'-tlnrfL It iciH-(!.)tt tot iljitt i cn-'il fn. uirr.t Ui _-*f>fiu'J"f^s!iibii-'^|it-of '.luit i-vpt'ricnctr;->ii'!.Hots.very >
.
-.;'-'..-;.
474
It *.* while I WHS in VTrtiiaiii ui that time, with flic excellent eUucbtioii I got nt that lime from p>ple like Boh Shaplon and other niomhvr* of (he iire*. tlml I first aoqtiaiiiTei] mvolf with the qu*tio:i of the [trot-ess of nrvonuuodittiori. I oiiiic to belie \v At that time thatit n'fMiiJ IIHVC to fx- the basis' for n final political srttlcnionl. r>f the ISMJM ja South Vietnam. urui I tried to .oiiirilxiU: soiucthJhg to it, ior xtiry sai-wssfyH.Y. I tried at v-vcrul village, days boforv the !.tii-jret some iiupreisiori of.the fluiijity of the political probV>m, t, to .\tliirh opposition '-aiuiii'iUo had n opjwrtuuiiy to
ioii'of the political nvf'i)n<s> uf when I tuiki-i] 10 \HHI iii}iia)I.T:.^ Sst\v-r;'. vitiri'y-f > thei'tK-tiiio^ <*i ull. IK- rbouibr 'Key -r.'vrii ^''o-ripL-N'"^"^;.^ nf^jnif. ihiif;)i-y ;>ni:J f '-^ ' K.'Jioui'-r: ;/='! ahiraoUP'K1, put (iif qnc^^rj I'Vhiin r;f.-vi!n-ili?r/if ht* t!;rtu,;ii ilic Anit'ri<-u:ts jt -Iir4* j)HtiiTiv aito<.vt!irr w'ifti >oiltjj ViVltunn if l-lii.1 I'tc.-n'^t:vifk'il to h- vi-.ih!y.ji:ul ilctni.:>!r<ihl\ u nciupiftr' tV.iliir*'. wouM ho . Hi* jfiixv thai iihirii^ 24 l|ourv tlmMjrlti aiiO c^.r t> ?rf-e nit- o;i i-lv.iiei. <3;>y ai Aiuhn'MnIor Kriim-r' r-M'ieH*-*-. fit- wiW. tlj;if if ihnt *.vr- tin< (m-uvjiiriK'- th'-y -.v'oiild Ij.- wtHin;i to try l*> innkc n poiiti<:i i -t> h;l{i tin- (vfiverrint-iif i:/kr thf eJe< iiirii> uv/rk fi: *)!!!' jK;liii<'iii fail'ioii. fjr piv.-j.'i!'*^1-;! ariri-jflc pr<j;riii>j in îth-r .iiii'iN. In- I'Xli'tidi'if'ihr </>iv.- {iruiK ii n. ihf Onvi-rnif.fiil. j .--iiw i4'jt t l m l tliur wi'..i futsjiu'iiii-jt.!-, J [c our own jrvopii.-, i-i.iin.1 horiM-. iiii'l oh-^-rvi-fi 'vlint ^'iTi( on. U'jrliin ww-J'!- In- HS> put '. juil hv thf (iuVfrii/hiTit. It WH- -U-ur to fm 1 sii tluif. jii>iit iha.t' tilt- '(jov -r;inifiit wij> Hit*iri.'lc'.i i.i tlii- '-ifi-tioii niilv '> |.'xi'i:{.:o j'lx-lf :irwl i:;t for I hi; p'lrpow of buifdin:: J>liti'':il vn.hility oi ->tiirtlnu ihr [ir^-i: "t' :l'i oli:(t(o'lu'l>Dl 'Afii<-h I -\;i^ < (iljvi:ici-il \m-, I In- null V i.\' \,fi -c::!i:
the
i xu.m '>! TKVKN-O:.
viii-r .IKI<| 'u.-i. r I vinilu lifci- (< ;i-k Mr. LM<C )i V|ii(>-ii<H(. f ;vi>iil(l In- rn"_'i'UV- tu f l i t - Svwn-iijii |. [-..[i-i, ul f.ir :ifi I'i-fi>jui 'i-n./rii.'j-i'iii Ff i.' "<T fifiiliin^' iiivi' 1 ih.u'i jlf DIM- .< Kini i n - l f w ' 7 I t h i n k w l i u j ->ciij'o,'' Sti'l'fLiiii iiri- in iirirni i- thi' Mp|>ni)iiii:i > ii > i >f .-i)<'h n POIHIUJ>~ -iii Miffirjoiiir ftii in j ( Vrtiirn- WH- ;i ni''iuscii<;fijl -\-jiriii/i-'iv..i<l r'/.. / - x r r n t t" wh:- ; if poji ! (Ktikf- it'*-lf f-ii Wilii '!..T kjii'J of
>t,i; ; il (hf-rcriMiiis tl.nl yi'l In. ^t'i7l.. . . . Mr f.i'f J,. J x - . ifH- -wiii oir riiojv i -iii-fiTT !. l i , i - , h'.id I t'li'ik .tL'' :- o f i j :[. , '.,l vii-i.lvr l.-iu'K of t l i f i y ![ Vi''ti:-ju, v. i fuj! ;> ;ry f n
--ii Hicfu a>' \'i.'l.n;[|,i^.- v. M'fid-i'." ^'(flj. U'iini I .'iill-j U-JC J- f<'f l "''"l
V.-
475
to prstciui tlntt you were a Yietname^, ud that another country was si'iidm* this elections team nvcr u dig ir.'o nd sec what was happiMiiiur m your "elections: I think that t least you would be bothered I feel that jhe Vietnamese arc bothered now by the thought thai huro on inure tune they cannot do something without requiring- the ou.tldci tb AmcrH-atts: l> :'>jao tri to so* (hat their rk-ction.s ore fair, My point thai there nrc many :apvble Vietnamese who couKl h, tiiii if they were y\A showed H>do this.. if 'hey tiro not "tnii to In- pvojj jhis kind of freedom, there is not aiiv rhatn.-c of the t.-loc'fjf/ns fwing fn-o in themselves. So thnt my jiniiii i* thRt \vc sbituhl urge thai the -y'V-tnaiiwae iheia^lvw, UKIM^ ;rro!:|^ .,liu are in i)])[iositi<;n, b- allowed t(* niukc the s>uinc kind of aivt-sriiratii.il' that you woukl, and if lh<-y ir ]>i in jail fîr ii the ~ '(n/uUCal'Ioti'JL'is hpr*- have die iKiliti'-a! couruj:.' rn sj)t-ak out to îve tlit m>'oint Hud of prutectiou. I ihintc t h a t vkuuld br: the iiinlirotuii. ."-', l(you-'still tlmu^ht you hud to hvi: un oip.sidt> teum. thru ul ioa.-t iCx'V'uld be an in fern mutual t-Bin, but I find the idcu <if an Arw-iicaii team aeuiii cnniinj: into Viftnani, 1 ain just afraid it will takr uwuy " th<- whlr Teelinjc of the df}Hndpnce th<: Viotrinrnese Imve on thomJJJIAV u, u<> i' for yiu. You ruii't oc tiiul y<iiir oun^t'Irjtio;^ ore fair. ."-Wo Lrtijvitflunx' i'j 8ird.(U thiii for you." ' ~ S-'pahir M^flkiE. What would yon think of uch a tf-arn und-r tha*,i.ipff:cs of ihf l)jul<'d Xution-,? Mr. LIVE. I thiilk ii would b-.> u:nh hctlrr. 1 think that ideally that it Wfiulcl by a Vietnanii-sc tram, iH-rliaj^ with tlie pr<<tuctjon of -' iitor MC.SKIL. I)i,';yMi think that the present government in i euiild be. pcbUiuled lo go along with that idtw? Mr. Lt:<:K. No, I .would suggest, for example, that you try to gel Au Truoiig Thanh i<> come buck fiom Frtuiee to ( on this leant. . N Sîut'or .\ft;sKiK, I think it w>,uld be un cxrelli-nt choice. I wouder V if voifnouhl want to rend to I'mt, Nfr. Shaplrn. ^lr. SiiAPr.EN. I do.'i't think I would disajjn-e with whut Don ...aid. J think jht'y t> i>ot mutually ex<-lusiv>. 1 thiidc yn\i could have a Vieijnuiv.V1 uid yon </uld have an Ameiican team bet Up indef.*-nJen<|j .id .:parat!ly. There are a:rtain advanlago-j to having the l*f:il"d Xntion> do it. J aûtnr a disadvniiliige \*> it: It would too rwidilvMn'c-oun' euinb<!7xiiiie, 1 um ufruid. although 1 thitik it would be ^"rth trj'ing. A-> (o Au Tru'ir.jr 'llnudi coming bacJc, I think he v,i,u!d be the one who would refu-i' In go hak hceau.Mj s
. avlv^j. It i-? utw Hiorv exaJiipl^- of-uur puyini;, ''You <-irt do it; we
>.'_ S*-iia'fM'~\1r?gKtK. Jn'-id'-iUnlly, tln-r*' Men- -everal othr-r in J'joT. |)<t~you kn-'W liow many? ^ Mr. -Sit^MJ:;. 'J'liTi- VITP- xilnt- otl'i-rs but they w:rf: unheard frlii; 1 L h^v -luiu ' 4ui:</w'- through trry nnwh. I think v;<- would do better, fu'iiiV tlniii .work through the I'nJird XatioM- at tlij?. point, if wv Siicd a/ have our J"iim ju-i-oinjianii'd ly u uiiii.her of othr-r ob.-^rwr-, (riiiinlr from lii'i.f naiion.-* which have taken part in tlie. wholr iiflulr: Auîrtiliu. \' Z'-iiiuuc', Koreu, and tho Philippines,
47"
Of (.ourx1, tin- !*hm|>|iiita! Jiavv no prrat n.voni >f frw election* of i heir r>wu cither. Bui f vrt.uld think wo should vridcti the bit-*- of our it-iiin; yt's., ami I would appr^Vf if what Oon said about having the Vi''tHMiihi' liav,- Uii-ir /WU.^'JUH furicti-"iuu; cojapicioly iipurt fmin ûr*. Bat to iif. <*riain]\ tt.uiig our O-um tlii-tv wutil'i. 1 lhi:ik, pn wi.1' an umbrvlia of fnv*lx nndi-r wjiidi iin- V
"
<MLtk>nitui yieid on Uui (mint"' :. .

T;> V 1TH .M>T'T
Tin- (*KiRu.\v./l r iuyp . a y.Mrx\ imjMV.-.-ion. f.v.ouM 'Jiii'.k.

^ Mr, TIi)r.i'> w. ft r-'nitr. m* if cur Arnhn^M ! if In- is in fs:t (n iMtiritt rr^n'I^nitt of Mr. niifii. tluit 1> M~O!I! ?o;iil M>men;o -U.- uivl jn v tt:ul to tiul 'Hu.-.*'! M-t-nA n'.little lifcr.^liiMiov ix).\in{: to JIM*. Wliai i'.kin of (he-ci > }:i>iQn<;h(j> Of our Ami->-'iilor ttjt.lt t .of ^<>?J5li V:M;W!II? . , " if .-fa. uu tactrcuulv. \-L> \virh i'rrsiijcjn Tlneu. anffcr. Tfluiifc hi; his <-xiili'in of rtii.Uuit'ii Si^-?.; *ii'?I I- \vlmi nn
tu ilfl I hi- <"'M\.Tt \V. ' ? Y<-v
" . Mr. SfJAr.UiX. Tli'-i1'; ar- i>>iiy ni'miix-r- " I In.- Aiiip *-j*w4IIy youiijr'r iiie.'iiiii^r?. w]{<> Jo mil >|iri' be .vii'wV of |c\cl nf tin* niJ.-îoii ott our r^'Iiiliott' uiili tli,- Thi?ti ôv*niini' i^ by iirtjnca:!" ,i-iii<'-sii!i'.i (hiiij:. Auibn.->^Ml:>(; Huiikt-r j rhir thc'.fiit{ioi^ w!iu-h li^ li.it Ix'on uriliTfl Ui rry >;jt. Tho t.'ifAicw.vN. TVrlw]*. I rkhcnilil 'iy. l>it i* 'In- view of t i n - V i r i - , iitM/icM. 1 -witli r->ijird jn t!i<; rujulfun*- of rir Ai<ibu<M4ulur to (In'- [ires-cut ri(rvcriuni'iil? U'lmt fun''tiii <fo thi-y ilijiik ur An;t.>;i>.-<iiilar --jiwi!h i r tfonls, our (ic/îlwu'lil*- olli.'ijij fejirrVi-tifudî 1 - lioiilc( o!uy fu J|Kc'vlioit? Tlii.-1-* out- cf t i n - things rlui! 'imilwi* nn: u b o i i t ' i l . JN'iid ii Miii^ro-MTiial (li'li"/utitir!. |irc.-iiijinl>ly -nfirif i.f vdiom -ii/n'l ujfti-i' with ^Lr. Bunker, <uuJ you .'<!'- vi-ry r-trurijr* 1 .-.tnirttiiin, witli ibr AmbH.tsaili.V.011 the ou liwul Mi|ij)omo^ Mr. Thi' | ir i _MiJ infin- of tin- ('onjjiV-SrtiuMi Miyinjr. "AWi, wo ijon'i know, w<- urc irulc|M-inlr-iit.' r Thi- ili^sii r l-fifik VITV f<'K"ibji- (/ HII-. Mr. SiiApu;v \Vclf. lljr Ainbu^mlur Im^ la-.c'ly prt-i- out of Jiis -Ajjy tî g j \ . ordi-rji-for nil Arui'jrii uu* not to tuk' -.i-lo ir. tin* I'li'i'tion, Imt f u n n y Sc?m!( Vi/'imuiiCM- fi'd H'i- nn buckiiiff th(> Tbicii jjoi'i iiilii'-iil ti> ihi- hilc, ni^l iititny of llic'u ri'^'Ui ' ( . 1 (iiiiiiv si-ndiriir u u-niii-ouf i-,in n u \ , Îrmtou-boxiii'/. Icji J think it. umil.l tr.fc" |>rt of tnufc rurx'îlf. / ^lunk."*' have H'ii u Hch too fur <|i;uti ilj;- Ijin- in .-,ijjjjii.nuiu' Tliicti ton" liii<Jly uijil. lj>'< opruly. A'ifiiii, in till fuirm--'- t'j A:i'b-ûlor IJ'iiifcfr ami i i"f"inif I h u t fV-jil<-itt Thji-u vl<-. i'vrryili"iji vv.- liin'i- v.'.m'cil V.irn t> do. 'llicff v.'rri' M-VITDJ u*!iff/l<'- ( in-li/diii<r tb/- Tr N''/oi- ('Jmti <'u-'. in vvliii h h<; did not <Jn
477
S OF VOTE RECEIVED HV THIEV IX 1WT ELECTIONS
Mr*KiE. I wonder if I niighi rer-all that in tin- I9t"i~ rlotion fhu'-u rei-oivetl only '.\~* |Krcrnt of the vote, which v.-ouM -i<;u \>ry -iLrurur in \\!\\\ of the rûtrol ino-;t oSiMrvi>r frit he hail over the '. rli-i-tion. T\u' cunvnl an-wer (o t.liaf at ;ln- time wa> <hal h" _very -ly'.y *rrai^' u this bwaiiM' they fear!>l if In- trot OVT 50 porr<-n. ih< ouipii \vsIiJ be to*i ot>vioiii. \Vhut i^ your an.-wr '.itu- fact that Mr. Tliit-u ?ot only .J.r pi-nrcnt uf ili.- v.-t.-'i,, 1967? . Mr ^.jAi'j.KN. I tyink it n-jirS4:ei-<l a fairly fair <-ult io pin 'lowii. hut at '.hi' \url riminrnt Thieii was afniid it tlriî \itti li\v jtrnl tln-r<- were stories itmt ballot lnxe> in i" ni" (iia Ditih Pruvfnri:. for exainrlt-\vvrt* stiifftfd to fnii<r/f the 3H.7 ipvel. I foiwi what il WHS exactIv. hijt Th^M- are (.ufiiliy utr<l thiii'^> TO pin din\'n r which ail f u^ 'vouM afiTrt': But J - "Aii siy\if>dny i iif,it'-l think urorc tiiati 20 jx-reoftt of.the people are for Thi* YL S.ntc 'Mhr-r? utay vote f;sr lum a>. Utr path of U'a>t rests'aiiv IH-.C-JHJ-.- flx-y scp- agiiiii.-t Ky or Bit; Minh. Tl i.- inter:slinj that in Saij?>ii it-^-lf, in lyf>7, tlie- -ttiBtie" w us Trau Van Hu-n:ir. You cîii jr%i 'u fair elcj-tioii in Suipois-, aniTit }* inurh iwpirr 'o-iijf ballot lx>.v^-i>i-U>. \illu};i-: aiid provio> where the <iLMriel nitd.'provuiin* <:hif!( aw all par: kf.jhi' Tn'i'U apparatus. So if you eouId^.iMul a (<'am out wii1> tiiis " kiuil "f I'.rrfiaraliun yu are tiilkiu^: aboiU. arul -*vith ]>n>fo.w|i.iia? i<lIjiê-. a* eiirly at< jMiivi.!)!'' ami staying then- a.-> loiiji a> poâihl.r. S-fiiiUir NfcSKie. Thank you wry intteh. There ar' other question* f r.|il(j ji.sk. S*;iiaUir SpvnjJ has Uitfii lien- all morning. We axe the two jiuiior onjiutitee ini'inhcrs. We hav- ft> vait aJI iMoriiinjr atu'I we tieA f j u p patiiHice, but i want to"U- fair to my fre.-lniuui colleague on
Tlie ( ' i l . M K M * V. Si'llhtor SjXiilfr. \
^nalor *^F'\O. Thank yni, S-i-n('r Mii-.kt-. \N hav a t l . l i i N ' t i hf-fc u lon/z vvliil^ f -Aiiulil like J.:i (Ituak ail of yii for your ajiju-aralief lii'l'e f lia\'e tMO 'pU'.-tJol;^.
KI'UX'I WK *'ItWI>\WAL IMTK ON n.TlMATE j'l'UTU AL Ot
;\ir, Shii|>I*-ii. in vour statement you -.av.

i- f,iw iJi n. i i.nt in VH li u -nj i- ( iiv<-ivi- whafcvi-r i-lumci- thi-r- iiiav U.f..r tli.. V'ii-tn.'iriu.r'- to i-ji'h ! [ifrfitirul x-M.U-iiki-n( nitioiiK tl^'m^Jvi wit|j"'lt r.-lit-iin,!- H.ft< li'iUjj-.
J- it liki-ly in inaki- any iliili-n-Ji'-"* in tfi- uliiiiiii''- iMiiv:i *~u(h V'lct/ihtn uhHh'-r nil Ain.'n< an Forcr^ fom*1 JMI! by the M<1 uf I W 7 I , ur a- \ o t i f.avi- -.ii'.n.'Û'il |y t i n - jnnl<H<- f 1M7'J. nr liv Hi'1 .n,i .' I')7J or |07:r Mr, SHM-LKV \ <ui jir- 1 n-l:in^ i.in/ ii.t>?..iimi: ' \V<"i!'I if niuk- any
Mr. SHAPLEX. I don't think the number that would be left, as little a- 20.00(1 |M-oplitI don't think in 1972 it would have any political effect. My reason for chorine thai date is because it is physically unjxjsîble to get out sooner without leaving that many jnen, and becausr having gone down the line teaching: the Vietnamese, teaching t!ie;u t/> Split the wrong kind of war, wo at le^t have to finish the job u-aehiujf them how to us what we haxe^ven them properly. I don't think it would have any political eTect. I don't think having 2u,000 men A'ould make much differcuv now.
NOKTH VJETXAVESE AND VC DETERMINATION'
Senator SPONG. You mentioned aUo in your statement that Hanoi L- weary of tho w<ir sind that they tire havinp "Conomir, moral. and !<i:i::{M>wcr problems of tln-ir own. Js there any eridenc.? that North Vietpuni and t!w Vii-tconjr ar^ any l-o det-nnuied to achieve th*-ir nbjf.-tives, ui Sfmtli Vietnam than they \VMV 2 years ago? Mr. SHAPLEX. Xi. ^r, I ili-u't think th.-re U "ci-ator Spci\i. Tharik Vol.. Mr. v'hairiiiuii. 'i'h- C H M E C U A V . 1 supjH/M-, Mr. L'iw, if you w.-p- -ni:>.'r-tiil A- :i li-.tti', ni*::>l'r. you ivmildn'l y\ n ". i--a for ^[M-rjal p'R-vim; uo:iM you? Nir. I.J-I-E j am quit* siir- tliat i-, tru* 1 . The '.'HAIRMAV. You :vro quit*.- sure of tlwt.
'(ifUtli'incii. it i-, In!'. I ii:ii- ! c.iiifiiiiK' i'ii.. i unly w n t in i one jliftix':t.-e of itj.-iiiinii M-, to rh- crirejii-y viit's \iJiic-li you thr/ 1 * 1 , t ..{vi-* Ji> U-t\v'en Mr. .s|iH|i|'ii iiii,| the ntJii-r :w<>. n-ûrd the u-c',-ity IW ri-movinp our prt^-uri-. You {! thai t*; >!ionlil leave that lo tlw )'r-iiliit, Mr. "-litiplen, wir-pa, Imdi >f the other pentleinen fee] we -h.ii]i| n.i.ve a.- rapidly a- poibli-. l'ri:sr.ipnb!y nil we can i?o ij-ouii'tiijii^ likf- tin; MoCi'ivcrii-Hnil'i'ld n e t . I HIM imt tn'ii/_' t" p-i' \iiir.l- iii vo-v mouth*. b<i'. trvm^ to w r n p it up a> t<i w h a t your vi/:v.- .ipf. Is iltni i-i-rn-ct -.\iihoif my 'Iulmrutii.ii? I uaiil to knov. u-Juit yo.; fenj. Mr. SMVH!,K\. I ilou'r -.unit to -/ive the iiunr<:.i.Mon that I don't w i i ' i l In io-i oi|l :\~ ,oi.|i n, |/.>..-,jli|r. 1 t l i i d k \ve >hould. J thitik J -aid thi-l- in .-evi;rnl pJai-i--. f rni-reSy tiieil to imt it. in por.-pwl.he of f.-a.-.!biliu'. f t1;j:ik i' IN ulino-t jhy-ir illy irn)-.-!Me TO 71-1 out by t i n - end M ! ."I, :i>, tlw.1 IIHite.lij uiu'itiiin-'Ui, ii-olu'ioii, <;it- for.
'I ll' < " l l i l i t M A " . 1 . { \ i f 1 \ , - . l l . i l l i c l i i i . ; i l i - l | i ! l i | i ' l i r 11- IItl e\pre,.ij|| of ojiinion liy tljt: ^'onp'e-- v . l d i J i o'l^lit to bi; fii-rsiilisix e on the
ir.if j; |-rli:i|^ In i>'.<; ur tUo qnc^'ioti-. I '.l<>*jld -:iV thllt there I- .-Ji'.nc
Pci-.-nMii to j>roi<i|it him to movr ni-ire rapidly tlutii we now think IM^ i.- lioiiiir.
\ f f , l.\l'J.l-.^ ] ..U/'je-ti'd -t.t-'t,
u
re.iil-ili'ili.
'l f ' O l I'eilllv -'leur uii
lo vfnir ~ u M i i i | i | - - , j f,i.(d:i^lit în'i f . - I t it UH-. itiupiiroprinte for 'ii ( ; (';:-.'fi--.- !> f'.'L u n v i l i i n ^ -b:! ! : - li iii i l l - 1 I'reiiiiiMil.
479
>fr. SHAPLEN. No; I M;re*ted a resolution asking the President to n;o\ a.- rapidly as pos-siblc, consulting as often as he can with you. The CHAU.UAX. 1 *: I was misunderstanding it. Mr. Su.ifi.EN. J think that is clos-e to one of tlic other resolution:} \ii: huxe: the Javit-- resolution or the otlier one, Chur<:]j-Coo|ier. The (.'HAIRMAX. That raises another prohlem. Which resolution is most credible? Which is likelv to be the most persuasive to the President? Some of us, as politicians, ulio have already tried to tier-undo \\i\\\, have felt that an amendment \vhich has the effect of IHU- and an effect upon tlic funds would be more persuasive. That is alu.ut nil that is. It is really another question. I really did misunderstand your point. Am* I cor.ecl that both of you other gentlemen feel that action would be warranted which would, in our best judgment, have the of removing our physical military presence as soon as possible?
EFFECT OK RAPID WITHDRAWAL OX OCTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY
Dr. HK:KEY. Yes, Senator. I do qualify it because, as I said, I have qualm* alnnit the date primarily because of the economic situatii-0. rmt l>-4.use of the jiiiliUn1. I 'think the Vietnamese we. quite eupublu of carrying on militarily by themselves but the economic filuslitm is really quiu- ies]>erat* in many ways. At. i said in my testimony, we have restructured their society and it ha* had a fitntastic impact on the economy the traditional economy uiiii we have created a wartime urban economy. As the wartime boom diinJniahea, the Vietnamese tir*- already fucing very serious ec<iiiouic 1/roblcnib and I don't think vorj' much is Imng done, I miÎit a<Id, about this. It is not just po*lwftr: it is transitional. This i-, ii really ijelirate |K-riod, tnd I lliink if we withdraw too rapidly tiiU would tilt ti.e thinjr and j^>sibly crec te an economic. crisis which would th'-n tri<rjr'T a |)oliti"!il fii=.i~. The ( 'H.VIBHAV. You know, \fr. Hit-key, we alrea.Jly have a domestic economic crisis an evidenced in .Europe by the depression of the dollar atid the lack of confidence in our own economic judgment and poliiiciU iiidgmeut. J am pl*d you brought this up. I linn thought that the wciirlit of die u?>unjony was that, our continued irscij there luiidi- no u.-cful contribution to the welfare of the peoplu of Vuttiuun. Vox think it doc*. Dr. IJicKKY. So iimny of the people, in the urban urut!> partiiniliuiy, are lixin-.' off of the L;..*. prewm-w, thut we huve to consider this, I think. The (.'IIAIJCMAN. What about lli(f-<' we kill every day, tbfc dfihtruction of property that continue-. apa/-<-. und tln:i*e xiutinuej bombings? IJtM--ij'i Uii.-. more than offift \ \ \ < - welfare of the urban population in Saigon'' [)r Hit KKV. Well, I don't think the urban population in Stijjon reullx i-* aifecuvl by it. Tfi'- < ' I / A I H M A N . Wlx^Mr it is you hav<- in mind, I would Jj^we iiu,M'_'h< (lint >ur cuntiijUfd xm^m^ of ! vmr i- far more d>Mrvi F tivi<!ni:i v. liuii-ier tin.' inriilcti'iil i'fn<i(ni<' effect to the jM'oplc i-.. At leant, jt (eriuinly it destructive ii^ i|io,e wild me mpigrd in it witfi the
continuation of the refugees ami the delay in returnine the people to th'ir fanus. I would have thoujrht the economy was all in favor of our j: out.
F A I L f K E To ANTICIPATE ECONOMIC PitOBI.EMs OF WITHDRAWAL
Dr. HICKEY. \i>. I think we have been very n-rniw, very fnuiklv. in not rccoiibun<r th' re>j>onsibility to anticipate tin- ecoiKxnic problem* aiul Jw-în to try to formulate program* in conjunction with the Vietnam* 1 ?*- <rovcrnmciit, and >o now we are in n situation where we simply ilon't have a w HV of coping with the economic situation. TheCHAiHJiix. I thin A tliininbpi-a ' then- iV so l tin- uchifvenient of !></ and uf our fri-uiii!; trUt. 1 IIH-HII there are a jrre.it many p<-i/,nV who rlon't arrrjit thi.~ inevitabilitv of our n-tnovij tlii>t i> Minetiin's exprovd by the udniuii^tratiun. There, are jn-oph 1 U*|KI think we have no in tent inn of reUinjroul completely and there i-a J:OIK! >iivi.siori of opinion a to tlie sijrniliirauce of the Vietnainizauon
NECESSITY OF ro\i:|{E.>SIOVAL ACTION FOR T.S. WITHDRAWAL
In fiw-t, J have v-ry j:rvp <]fmhl> that will p-t out in the fire"efuhle fnture if something i-fn'l done by the < Vmfrre**. This ronld po on. !> Mr. Kv MIV->. for 15 or 20 years. Isn't that ttltoul what he -*uiil in u recent puldic statement? L)r. HickEY. Ve-. in one of his public stuiemeuts. T!K? < 'HERMAN. In one <if hi> public staieinents. What thes*- hcarinfc- ure de-.irne<l to do i> to try 10 ^harfx-n the qrie>tion. First, i-it really in the national int4-re>t of thin count r\. and. icroiid. i it in tlii- interest of the Vietnamese for us to remove our plivsjml military pre^'iu-e out of thi> urea? I> it or isn't ii?
l)r. HlCKET. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Vm< think it i. Thf CHAIKMAN*. I thirl:: n-aJly \OM ail think t h a t ; don't \<.ii? That if what (lie '|eri-.jun is. U'e have them- proiwisal*. while u-e are H!| interested iii other ns|N-e(>. of it, the projHtsji! we have to rcjkwt IIJMMI i whether or not, in etfivt. to re|xirt the Hatfield prop^nal or -nwlliin^ HkA it. The Steven**!! j)fn|Mû] JMI'I <Miit<- <JeMjniel in the -..:iin- <--.iiU-Kl. Jn fad. I r u t l u T ' h i n k theiniplicntionsof thrSu-vcnxm propot^td mnr ha-^-d UJMMI the uûniplion that w an- likely to *fny flu-re I mean the uercptHiir-e of tluit uiiiiip(ion and, tlverefore, \\e lire jroinjf to try tt elected government after our own iimtpe. I don't know what other piirpose if would serve. If they ure oin I" Imve such a grovcrnnient. jx-rhup- iliat i- >TO<M|. ulthoujrli I mil very |M'rinuied by ><mr vi<-w tliut ih')., i* really neither what thi-y w a n t n<n in their interest-. Nnr would it cniMitnle u free society iu the ii'w of the VietiiHini'M- HI op|NH-ed to th- vi'-n rf our luirnini-tration. I think that i^ u l m t > < > u >nid and I think f ni:r-c w i t h t h a i . \)v HicKRr. That jc "correr-i The- ^'iMiiiiUN. f lliink < ur'1 v<r\ arrogant (n u~*uuie idol we Imve the iiltinntte in poljii'-ul orûni/.aiion It i- *!'> diHi-'ull for \\v.
r.-i M
-71 - S3
4*1
i:i \wx of our .iifficoIU>>, to underhand whv Americana b*v complete confidence that wo have found the ultimate solution to human stn:ial aud political probbios, but m*uy of us do.
NS OF W1TVESK -
I don': know what else I can add. I find i vm- lielpful on many of the>e qufUon*, t have the views of such exporieiiwd nicu. We in the Ci>iip-''w arc often accu-H-d of not knowing what we an1 talking about, I don't kiioxv any Americans who would more likely know wbat they are titlkiiijr about relative to Vietnam than you three. You have beou there certainly longer than nios'i of our offirini rvpn^fntmtires. I don't kimw any offu-ial roi>n-ricnUtiv>s wlio havr b^n thrn? as km M> you h.v<: <io you? You naiv Nvn a^-cK-inIcd with thl-* for 15 .v>*rs. Dr. HK.KET. Yi>s. Mr. SIIAPLEX. Thrre -have IKVO a <ioupli of ix-opl*- who bax'i- b>ejB th v rr 10 yours. Thi- CtiAiRUAX. Mr. Bunker has b^-ou htlf 4 years Mr. SMAPLKX. Mr. Jiw-obson lia.- be^n UHT- 10 year*. He i- the di'|ijly tf Amba^Midor Colby, auii ll-ro are >ouic youujpT ix-npli1, Miiii: i-xlrenu'Iy aM* \>uiir iHijpU-. who Iiavr Iwit* out 'veral OVT 10 years. Thi: OuAlHUAN. That j> ntill not a- U'lij: a you have bwu You Marled lat-k in 194G:didt)'l you say? Mr.SnAyLEai. Yf>. but my total thin 1 probablx in Vietnam add.- uji tixin)aU'ly 10 or 1'J iai-. Tin* CMMKVVN. All I atir Inini: b> >uy U ihat. in my opinion, you flt-ril li'invn reallx ar<- l>-ttcr qu.-ifititvl than uliy ( !oiirre-nittn who po<-^ there fni- n W4-4f. with all <l-f-rHicf lo ( 'onsyf>-infii or think votir HI I vice j> helpful.
li Lîk'l din'i'tly on thi.. !>;i I u n l f<> ask you ubout the r-n.^- of Trail Xiôi Chau. Thi <-mnnii(ie.e. diu- to -oim- of our Muff who weri* iiilinuttell* arquaiuled w i t h the riiijiitioii, Irieii to IK- pt'r!*nu>ive tin th<' >r;i:'li VieLiiauiex- f/overiuiii'iit . Are unv of you familiar wi'h lii.-c:!^ uii'i uuiiid you CJITC to co;/jniciii on i( jn-i f<.>r my own itifonuuliivn? \riio i-. inu^t fjiaiiliar iviili it, or nr<- nil of you? Mr. Lr; K. (iciujruliv fni;iilinr w i t h il. The CUMK-MAV. 'Vhut .lot-;, how IR- IIUN Ixvn in-at/.-il jnean w i t h ruûnl tn ih rbariu-ler of the Sixiih ViciiiHiuev.- fjoveri' 1 flit? -\lr^Lr<'K. Well, I think Chun U in |>ri-'>n nou for {nIi<n-d n-uvm^. Thui the Thi'.-'j ôS't-riHjt.-ni iuu liiin u- :i |>oliiiil tlin-ni, MI Jiv j in jid! for itfki j-'-tirxin Tlint al>o [ think jt imliciiie* liovv little n->[>*fci the Uovt-riiHii'iit it*elf h:i? /tr il- own, fclituiion-. Tlial i llu.- ii|r,iio oi;ri diii'I -ny th; he .-hoiilil he i mid ye? Thieu ju-t ignore-; |rj> Tin- < 'j<i.n:M.jv ' I'm.V -v t h a t ihii ''oiiuuinet', or ' leust I. J.T I'liuiiiiuii,. :I!NO Lrifl i<> influence tin; x r i i n i i i " uji!i rejjurd t you, l/t:i v.i- \\i-n- M)i- v i.'v-cfiil. \V'e irieti o êt our <fo\'ni!jit-ni tn inieiceil*- iii S'our ix'hn'if.
IS*
Do voti know about the Chau c.-*, Mr. Shaplen? Do you wit4i this? Mr, 5ai.pt.BX. Ys. I apm* with what Don Lno- said. Tin: su court >* ignored. Legally, Chau '.- found guilty of consortine a (joinumubt, with bU brother, but the supreme court overthrew th<> <&.- morr or IPW ou l<-;Iim<:i ground.-, the niflhod uf arn-s-t, the u-n cf tb> military tribunal r a proper a<vu5tivv body. He i- fo.-tnf; kfpt its ia3 now for politirai reasons. We have trie*!, ux> hare urged the Vietnamese to let him oat, to no avail. lli.m CHAI&U.VN". To no avail. Do vmj wi-h l<> comment on that, Dr. Hirkcy? Dr. JfiCKEV. Yes, 1 know Trail Ngor ("liau The CHAIRMAN. Do you? Dr. HICKF.V. Fairly well, quite wvli ui-iuiilly, ami I quite n^ffwith my j,wo -ollr>jîji->. AUo a numlx-r of Ameri<-aii. who ha\o IH!<I; in \Vt.mun, who kium Chau, would u-j-ufy, \ou knov\, in hi- behalf. Thi.'y Mouhl in- iirM>M-<.-<l to >uy shut thi-y tin not think this man U u. uhvt-r.-iv<.- >f any kiuj. He i an ityj/icul YivLnumt> nationalUf. a rathiT rariou" tyjrf-. hut not t \ p i a l . A good many pco|)lf like Ch.-m uriil I a<n~<v< v.it}i l)on"> .-tutt'iii''!!!. Th* CHAIRMAN. Tiii- troiililoA m- wLi-n tlie uiliiiintstraiiou du^ ita juiiiii;ati.n fi/r pjr.->uiny thp war. A.- iu.Uxl niumtly by the Uuier SttiTKLdry of .ÛiU'. the priiuary n>a>o:: i< (<> pv' thr; South Yjeiiic*!' un o|i(;nhitjty for a frc*- irovfrnmciiJ, !>ut thr ôvernjiiriit ich we Mi[>|if>rl thrro <l<K-s.ii't M-I-JM to luc to i-oim; u(> to r-u-h u bi;rh fi-lunl. It v.fr.j!.l .-j-.-iii to me ji i- *y{>i< a! c-f t!ie u-uu! t, w h i - It <, have iric K i ; V I I M N G til V.S. JS'.-iTlTL'TIOVK
Ii rnjM^ :i.ûjri tfiv. IIH)>I ~crio:i- ij-uiioti (if nil uhii-h, to inc. i, ho' W- hniulicc oijl vihuf ihi.- w j t r i- )<!!!;_' Icj l?n- L'liitcd >tit>. for w hr:h I f*1*-! primarily jv-puiiMbli'. ra!h>*rrhai> for \'ifiiijiin. \cr-U" whtfVi.-r po-Nibli- uj hicvcinciil KI o'jr vit.-il int'Tcst-- i,- it ui-i| lo bf cnlleii, thi- war S4TVO. I am bouiri tn -HV it coiur- up ail in one iiiroiion: \\"c an- nulling our O-AJI o'jti'ryj are uuilcniiini'i',: our own You ri'inarkc'l you h>'/i>'-<l 'iu-a- cnuli] ! a r.'c')r.ihu'ioii thi- lAwiiiiif aniihr'i you wiy ^îiifthin^ Jik<- l l m i ? Mr. SIHFLK.S. V---; I -iil 1 tliinic liw.-ri 1 i- a ^'icrrilli: war TJM- Cii.vjuMAN'. 'PiU /- 11 >'cry j-riou- s:a''T und [ ajrrec w i t h you. That, i- exactly h;.l it i-. Thai I- pirl of u l m t the-e Iwurin^s JIT about biy'BUip vie h u \ " been uiml'l'' d> inllii''in c the F>X''< ijtiv'r nji to How. Ti- [MI!|A i! jiiilicû*. fur .'iintevei tlx-y arc i < ( > M h , i h a t the cji-ur ruajori'y of i\n- jx-ople \vi-h t ) u - v.nr to b- endni. Y<-i {ind miuiy young pe'ij/lc fi-c! 11,4; tin- <(ii'\e.itii)c]ii i-, uiirc'pon-ivr Ui what i'c believe I.O bf- Ixilh Jh<- i>-.;p'- :un! tlie ftjii<!:iUli n l a l illt'Tr-t ; of our orinirv. Thi- i- the ha>is fur the iruerri'ln wiirfiip 1 There i*-, thi.i iliff-irnc- of ii(iini(Mi, ohvioij-'.v. Jl I- :><i j'lî the yo-iny jx-ople. biit u lot of "!'I Jieople who fee! the -Mine ".ny. Tll'fV ry to din-M alt/.-nlioi; by sayiirj; it is tiie lon^mir-. but u ioi of -ljoilinir< fei-1 Mii- WHV, too, , J Ix-li'^'i- it Y.I<- 7-'> ;><-r'-eiit cf fl.v <inl|u|i i-.r Harn> |'lt.
4S3
I think it i* a cross section, i don't think it is one element in this rouniry. Mr.'SHAMJtN. I agree with you. Senator Fulbrizht. t think one n>tsrr> for this feeling derives from the fact so fcw Americans arc a.war<* of how we got involved hi Viotaam in the 'first place. There is rhnt lorij French pc-riod I referred to. WV really drifted ii.w Vk'Mara, anil if you want to place the h'.aiiio on any eluglr one iadi\>.i<jL whi-h U dHHrult to do, I would plactMt on John Foster Dalle>* interpretation of the :KATO agreement.
HE.IST\K'~E TO IDEA OK SICSTAKE
Tin- f V M H M 4 N . I vroulu uM-e. TJii* is auothcL.nintter, but I .>;!: >il..-.i yti'i *ny. Iflrn-'vnth your -fiifn>nt. I lyiiex-e. tt it H iiii^'tikf Ui s-jj[){xin Fraiif*. a roloiiial power, which WH 'oatrjiry to uli our truihtioiit-. to arhJf vo a purpos* uliub i> unn-latfti to Vietnam. TliiM* MI', I tliinic. iiiiytukcr. but slim- i a tn>nwuo!ou' ivsUtancv ia thi^ f i r i n l r y i<"> *c'>'{itin<r tlie V\PK that t^li^ fo^p.tn- nuidt- :i mistake, Mh you kni'rx . Thin U true iu tiw 'onirnit-rep. It is iucmliblr to jiv 'A'L^' tl'y are fr<-- r<> ^Jtnit tJthl tho TFX .IN x <i"cisifin mmlf by exncrly 'K' tbf! same prupio who marfr the î-iîoa in I'.wj.l to e nlsrvc th<" r. A]:h<ni2rf I think \\<- uuar:irnou<l3" v.i!! tigiw- that th? TFX f]' 1 j^'>ik MO.- 11 mi=>tab;. whv is n nii-takf iiivolnnz * wr .-o w ('Hrnt thut wi- '-uniiot, a*imit it? Tho priin'iDi.- of infullibiliiy ilwn't upply as ftic ii.- -I'M !'r(îil*"nti:(| OnvtriiUM-ii' i c>nc*-iiicii. I <]on'i think it ilr* . Vi-' J i r / M ' k '!:^ V'lint V())J ^Hy onL'ht Io t>" JXT-HM^VI-, t'tal w I iicrrt;^. I think VOM >ai(l v/r mtul<- a mistake, ju>t as si;nple as tliat, an- 1 f ji-jjfc rompW'Iy. TljiT*- U iiotiiinp inirnnntl about maki-jjr a l'<j\\'i> ul mi.i.akv. Mr NJAM.KS. N'c : J aj.-rc- Ti .ith you; I tMr.k w<- .-hoaM avoid it hy i i< lr:.>> | ui. : 'j:iaji/iii < ^ i'iir>*.-iv*.~ 1 v.wiilij Lk'- u u->k i''u a fjUistjoti, if I n.it\ . Tli>- < 'n v n : M * N . Y<>, sir.
r - i j l K I ' x V HIJI.A.TIOM4 AVD t;iVKj:X'Il' Vf i P K I
Mr. SKU-L^N'. Why L-n't rli-n- nu-f con hrlv-ti-i! your ofn'r-i'tt* 1 ' 1 *'id -"w-ittttor Jick>tf!,'n Corr.iiiitUM' oi G*.vrr'iicic'ii ()pciatjo'i.., wliji.h for ii'îiy y-nr-i l;is bi-i-ft cviminii :^ the ur- 'f the |H>li':yiiiKkiiij; jirw-ss arid trying to fiuil out wla v:e - H ru(:Jnr*ti!.il lit!T-!n'< of lM'i'.vf')i >:imtor Ju'-lfôn H^f! the chain rim rif 'hi.- <.onioitit*f. I tliink flu 1 jK'i.jvitjpj. of Sci aior -rn''ki<rj K-TC prinârily li^-iin.'1'! t^> trv to ',Ki-l<T'-ijt th<- \f-.i\nfiii-i- of rhi.s ttrtiitmttf* . Hi* rorni:iittv.' hii.-- no b'\>]uii\ < juri^lji'tuiii JM t.lii* iii'ld 1m' tunny f tbo-.*1 bearing* you ;i<-ak of tti-n' ilr>ijni<-d Ifi ujulT'MJt '*IP idflurr' < f;f ljic f-nipmiftw. Tb.- :i>liriiai>itniijnr), bciiir in wcorti u i t l j ,Si-/iaior Jm-k^xiV vjrw.* ai>i;ij- lb': i'f.NjniKtLfmal (Vmiui>jrii.-l '-oriKpiiucv aid our iutr/vL, finl.iir.tliy ifiiijtsl to trv I" :iJiric' tb.i, coinr- j(,trf niii] t!j-y doiic '-wryihjnjj povtib)*: i/o <iuii;raU^ ibisi coinniill^-. M. 'îiAfLrn. So yc;u hiiv*; a gMrrrilJa v/or within Coupr'-fis u>> and tb<-
LN. Tliat is correct. -Senator 4ackaon represMits the F>? within ilu-('oujôr., as von know. Tborv Kno JKHTCI about it. He ** the Prrwleiit.'*. (it>* c-hoic* to b Secretary of DefoiiM>, and maybe still i*. i don't know. {.Laujrfrter.l '
fXJtKTCKVAtUXG KOKC'CS IS C.^. *Y?TKM OF GOVCKNUEXT
Thi- i^ (fO.\tf u-uo, bill it i/- not Unusual in our system rf government. Jr Ls set ut> to <-n?aU' M~hat some pronfc call miit<-rviiflinjriori-'s. A frietiou hciw. ) the Different views U bUppos^d to lw th<- fnmlaiM'-nfal Tirlueof our syMi-m; for cx#nij>Io. tl>o oivijion of tlio*-xfti-iui\v frtun l:i* h^sUtive. TJn- ConstituiUHi iu <^ff<-ct Jmnft riillfl for iriii-rrillu warfare.
Mr. SH.VPLBX. Sir, Uii-i is fwt wliicli we have lianJIy (Jiih \vitli. It swjii^ Jo mo. we liavo our 'jwn (iomwratif iruerrilln cimflict tvhi<-{i iinJtt^ it mil the more futile for us u> try to IIUJNIM* our vmvr- UJK>II a o>un(ry. wfai'.-h i- more iiutunJly twnf u>HMi''l k'hojitarin rult- r .ttjiy. 1 M-V uoilun^ wnins wki.i nuUKiriuriaiusni for Viet iiaiu, I think wlmi it H.-iually iieinU i> uiUti(irh*jiaJi rul<r at Our oii tzntion ns far a- twJbU' tl<rt-uô the village level, o really i u||nnM-li^l the problem fr<_.*u two oj)|>osit<.', almost
OflJiOM-ll. \'k>H'.
Tin- CHAIKMAM. J .ûltiit't :igii-e w i t h you ruore TV'e hawjio 'm>iD<'sa Irving to iiu[io>v -our systeiji u)tfi mivixuly. I< i- uur y>tenj.-bul !>< au-*1 \v<- are big *IM| ri''U we have huJ th< unoghtic'- to 'Junk w.'<'rfji i:ii]K^' 5' on other peopU- wnj i.hy ou^hi t<f fui ve jr. Mr ^ttAPi,fc\. It <lo- t'j tiu'ua wo <-ji;,'i iJ" c-eriivin (!iinjr> to help A\. It i-eriuiii.lv il.a'--,:i'i ] nffv.-i- \\iih tlmt ^'ery ,iirli. f nirli jniljtnriiy iryin<jr fo imi^r-c our -vîfiu- on then nk \ H I hsvi- Ui<l- ji it;: v irr'-al roiitril>ntioii \V(> \vii! fini-li the '- on lhi- ajui I hope in I!H- \< i rv ni-ur ful'ire (lit- coaimiHei* yjll
- A-. OH (I qljr--t jr II :i- Id \\ hill V\<' I'uri ill!
- lift- SeJuii-ar froru Viruinin is luwk. 1'i'i he ''ijiiii- bvk
to a-k
tf'.\ st- '(-<j.ji"l Hint the JicHrJJJj: ft tain ic tj'itn^fpn--l to i be i 'IHH-US li<nnn Ixs-.m-e tin-re were Ji Miitribi-'r of I'f^j'lc u'uo were iinuhl'- ui i:l. ii> today. 1 a/t: unJ >i;rc the Sei-njlary ttilluttj'iyM a-, liijr aii utiiJieiire iîô-a thrttr o*i'J. hijt in <-v lif i!'**--. \uJiai:- U'j-ii rivjd^fileii ir < hn;ij.'e the h<"ij.riii(^''. tht'(.'.-jijcitH lioo/n for the ijn^ wj;!i rlie S.-1-reijirv (if state UdiiixTou. .')oyon have unythiii;:" x -^- vnn would like i-o f-av? If tin', iJiank you v-ry in..<-li. >, at Y>'A r > p.m., ih<; eoHiiniii' 1 *- wu a<!jouniil. Jo r<
LK<;iSUTJV PJMWOSilS BELATIXa TO THE WAB SOUTHEAST ASIA

TUESDAY. TtAY *5,
UMTKI> STATES SEXATK, COMMITTEE ox KOHRMJX Tin- aiiiitaiU'f Hid, puisuaHt t<> indira*. ai.lfl a.m., in rixim 4221, Hxuklibg, Jvaiatitr 4, W. Futtirighi v
. FiiHirighl , Pell, Ailu-u, Cov, < ^M>IHT, uutl
i' Th> CHALK* A V . TIN- CJtllMllitUM! Sfll
STAlTEMKVf
lMl.y to s >m li^gtJtttiiHj reUthi^ to enc'-ag the war in .SouUiCHM A>ut. -art: })l..W*i tn have tti tJw uist witness 'tn' "f tl' nauois's ui<>at <Ji>tiii>;utLi', rt'tirwl. Gcu. .Sliup served hi- country wcil for 37 year*, I'luiiui; tus '-arvj' a.. ( <>i(Unttri'Jai)f of Jio Muriiii1 C'<ij>s. lf niuc'l flw jutlior;'^ luÎiest ili^'otntion for vu!r, llic Coii^r^-sional Medial of Fiuijor, tmJ uituiv mlwr i-ward*. I wi]r insert in lL<- roi'<nJ u lrie/ bittjirapjiic Ji/.-tvii an^ tjji' <:itutM)n fnin his t'o *>f Huniir utt'iyd. , ;.;-".(TlM- inforjiwtton refciTw! l^ f<J!/.v^ >!i> M, HHfirr (l.'SMO, Rt.) w* (Joininad'iiUit erf Ui Marine , Crj>s /riu Hi- ua Iwr^ in JalJ^ fJrouitd, Indiana, iu J^)l, j-rt^ved n A.R, J J<- I'imw tVivcrîtv in I'rî nod 4-nliTnd tin Mjuiiio O>r()i in ttat you- lie (erred on |(M5 1/S.-5 Mryii,d i'J^-3I; wtu ;b JnxtTw.'l><r i Uu: MaruM; C'orjM SctuxJ, tijcu'MfU'i , iuiu bJ<' vyx>lt vlbc.r H4Hiûui<?tit urrui 1941 wiiifu }H; Ix'CUiu.- Opent'uii.- Ollm-r fur llx1 Fir-l Mantis Iint;ajJf in J inland. Ifc in J!M2; H' ix/r|> Itt-JClûarUT^ iu that yew <j<;u'nii Kboup wan Officer, SiiVua- OxruuiuxJ, J;Wt Marirwf Korr*-, 1'arilir, iu H< UiviJim f'-biij uf tfralf, Firr !VfJ-if> fHvi-i-rt! in I'Xft; f.v.UimajK^-d the Bnic , hKl BI, Quwrtidi IV.'jfH.V,'. itod wiu I-'iM-J I>lnitor iu M'MiiiaKUDi lu J. 't'ijird . p< I'J'i'i; utul Ctiiiiiiimidniit, L'nitc'i Stut*.; Manru- CorjM : HU- ii-un-fl ui 1( ' <ji)iTi Sii'/n|. ylctn tin- ('<>tiitri".'>-t<ni<il M'CuJ of Hor/(r, j'urpk; flcjirl nitb <>U<;^L f.I'i--(<-r, ivitidn of M'Tit vvitli ^'uailint V, l)^f ;>inujlfd pu-rvrw Mcdul, a.rj'1 ilic ISritnu iJlitciiiifuNi'i'rJ S-rucc O'Jrr, (4*.;)
Ftftit OESBKAI, Saocr's CI>S&E*MOXAI.' Mxn.u, or HOXOR AW

"For eîiiifiiexioui1 îviiaoTry.and iiiinfpidity :*t the- risk rf hi* tif>-: atovtbf>yju<itti<-<aili<>fdulyasunmiu&udiiigiiflictT of afl Marino Corps tr"O|>>n rii.'m S.jihi*l >nnijr J^pnr(-sc f'-rc'-si on B<>'ut> I*luid. Tarawa - 'oil, <j;5bfrt Ihtiid<<, frm 2*Mfl 22 NV.v.-HiUvr, 1045. Although a^vnily Kio-kfd h an crj>l'xiin|; *witty X-'F of lor t.nUin^ t-xh' jiju *nd *'iff iTitit; front a. rrio is, painful leg wo*md ei tt'i bwvrtr*: iuf<-^^<i. C<Jun<-l Shfc jr.: fisrii.<*Uy crjiowxJ ''imw'if M> th*,- tmfic } r-Ii ptk-^M'sU.-Tj, jua-'ûrguii, and rifle an- fpiai hustilcsh'Jii-frupfsocnii-iiU^ bvihr' hi. !}-ft::iai tr'i}>s |.<.r In* .n inspinni; b-!n>ii<iii, lie gflJlaiitiy !J ihftia BCir;'"* t'j^.frinj?inu rc*f> to c'nniKc *h- liftixily fortiti./d ishnO ajnd reinforce our lia.-d-prtawd, Uii:Uy held Hnr*. Upni :irnval on !h<>r<-t "b<- afi<n*d coommn4 of alllandcd fori'n- and. "vrkulK without rest udder constant, withering etictny itr^ dunti? iV :xt t- d'.vs, coadurtod fnuwhing attacks aipinl iini h'-avj- CftVAhift1 By hS? brilliant l-adorslup, darins; tnfti.ce. unrj st <icvofn>& t- <i-itv, O)lwiol J?h-a;p -ro." largely rt-9poii!iilI<-"'or the filial dr defeat ot ilit -U<MHV> and his ituionuiaîc fighting jjirit -rfli-RU pnsit credit tli* L;ntd .î.itv.-. Niivnl S':rwcv ' .
XV BY GENERAL RHOCP
The CH\JKMAX It lia* beau a, little more *.hAn 3 -yârs since Shouj> testiGeii ix^fori? this committee rouotjiniinw the war irj It is-, f tl'.Kik, tvort li twutlinp u ff;w v>f liis <x}tuitu:frt.s on t-ba* . A? to th<- j.p--i5'I- ilir-al i> our Xation's vital interests if N VTic(i.j:u w v fcnt ; i*<irwmuuisT. h- said: ''It is 1'jJicrous to tlink tlm just lw.aus r.-r !a~e in ScwUk V-jptpmu Ihftl very aoiu .somebody i> croing io l>e frrswjing nii'-i lfri'">(Jrin^ ,it tin- doors of T*pn:H HiiTi>or." Aâfn/ori tho pwispwti j-jf " a, railitury1 victory l\c xaid: "I don't thai you <'urj J^fcat h - armod 7crcos of North Vietnam hy , ,o>al!^d, ui South Vlotnim, IXV-AUKO their b\% ann\* js not i'i-. .ô .a luUitury. victory, stayin* below- the d<>uiiHtanzes, in my opinion." On tl:ti irnija^t of tb<f \v*r. on iJi* 4 'attitudes of young 'poon'l* b said ilifir typical ro. <-uoi) \r.-r-;r "iVni!. "tore we urn. \V> wp.'ii through the [H.iSfti' ^1 <'Jinip ;f jmoaTini" iho lff>4 caMjiai^rn] juiH WP listwiwl to < v ;rvi>oily. . . . \Vliat ôjxlrtj<{it do Uj vow if that is our >y.item? The . Imlloi iiisl'-nd of th<' Ijiillet. B<it wljMt 2*>O'i ii<l the ballo) do us-? \V !>:)!Iot<-'i for on- thjnt* fln<i wv (J'-fcatflfl the oilier and now we ôt w;hat MI 4j.'f''<ii(ii*),)' -Siijt^'. tiin w him* haJ another prpsitlf-iitial elcK-.tiou, hut t'-tf tvni continucj tt-itliout -an end in nicht, Gi.r;rn\. -A'? vrolenm" yosi back aâin, 1 know that your obswvalious jj i {.I '-nrteni situation will i> of <rr-itt lielp to the comiiiitt'fc in <'a*b-nsiz |fo I'-ptlution Ix'fori! us. .J, 'Jo ytnt to *y that. S'.naUr Syuiuisct-iH) akfd iw^ ^wx-iii'-ally 1<> -ay thai. In: lied t})!1 jjrf!ft'.<*st r<'>;'t!''t' for the (rPjMr*i, but lie had t-o jo f<r Jy>- ALnw>'; '*n b*jiiip>s in ''(ijioc^tion really villi tujjnc of ib*: fi]H!i*-i> vitii which we art- iviu'-erryd. He in vi-ry sorry u< DVJ.*S> tbi* ' v;ry int< p-umjr tt-nt'nii<iny, but he i>k<ul juc t<j (I'-ri'-r^l, m iiav^ >.(.l'jn i jit J iwIi^Vf. I it/i iuivc tt very bri.-f on'. y>u
STATEMEHT OF GEB. DAVID M. SHOUT. U.S. MAEUtE COilS; '' RETIRED - '
JP, Mr. Chftfaimin. again Thavebeeii honored by an invitation to ar>]>ear hefoix- this distinguished committee which provides u. forum for the disrt'Usifinn? -of niatfefe of great national importance. Ovt-r't. fJioviûud daysttgo, 1.160, J washer*. Most ?iistiwshio: it is for rui- ;< rr-s(Hx' ibai th subject. is lb<> name. Mosr. depn*sungi< is to know that, in die intervening p*-rin<f ihoro hare ho^j) it ronlinued tiHinp od Tna>o'>r f mio, yornen. and chiMivn. letnlction of vfllftj?cs- rops, u-LKKl'ttjult, ;,nd c<>unti->'side"'p. >o!rii Victnwn id 0m<4t, much more of tii- siu in two ftdditktnaJ oountrif* that havp boch irtvad^. . H<r*fei'<r/"t!tv has hfvn in i V^^ft y*rs a significantly ifrtj>ortant <;LnTi' in ..Vwrica, Tht; fM.'opi<> iwJ)<R1*ren't slire 3 years ago are sure now. "'. i. Si'ir^ tbt th>s <*>oer^f, hi pw>in;: the Tonkin nsJolation without itito')uaU' (ielilmrrt'ion and within [a'^yr dis^nwioji of the possible JT3|>licHtioiisi,,ahTX)<rHtc<< ilicir r^nonbiliflHita- tu them ftiid (tided in t-'-'itv-j?!^ Aniorioa ,tft,-w'jnf>t dcSpifuWtr and ufxdrtH \vw. Sure (hat' rtxe .K-fein rotfhifion vrjur.a . niistakr. l>y the fact -<tj*tî# same Congress* .. " it. ".Stir* *}iat the nir costly of mistake â- and has li' unclwestiin-rtjon of f5u>,, Crtj)afailiJi^' of lite *n ; and ' ^'>ly s>uv thfijp-are tio'sr iha tlioy *it^ tl>" killing aiul the il^stiiiction- '_ in Sontbi'-ast Asia and t,;n f.*Jried Forces ' withdmwnva soon . . reûesft for tiie. Tonkin re)lution in such o. fcAttierliMriwl-jjiaur.er, tlioreby .SHiK-riotiing !erK;afafion iu South VieUwn, -_ . inu>t now v-^.Jtr.e ihîr proper res ,oi'sil>ilitics &n.d gel cur Arrood '-_ or'-tjs o u t < ^ f Swiith Vietium. ' " - " " The Ain<arif-an pfoijlc. anxiouIv .aait lhi action b\- tfieir (."ougres,s.
.", The CHAII.IA*N. Tbwik you, General Slionp.
.ia.
>
CKKECT OK VIETNAM WAU O.M MOKAT E OK ABVfcb
l. in vew of your !on--i'rvi<-<1-i- ilf Atimxl Forces, ild tlu- <'ontiouAl(i).'! ot fl;'- war ^jj X'icitiuiu, ui ii'w of t}i<Ppfident'; intwition now of viitiMir^wiui.'. hnve upon di& niortlc 6l ( IK- Annul Fon-cs? (1'MWii! Snorp. VV^JI, J -t^ ilk ran look ;ir-Uii i,n n rclHliiv busi*. Thv- niriil- v a> very, vei-y'îKii when WP firct-wciit in ihre and in v^.j-jyj fin'^niie t4tn, and \ I: <li*-f (luit wh<*nwe read of fragnientati' n <ir of frying 4-f offiuT'i aud r^^.'&iurniiisjoru'd oflim* by other rank* in tli" Aron-d'-/'nt> tiiwc !>< po question about the demoralization, jj? !<* t r ( >rti i luwl of it. ^. ['urilii-r, J iliiiik tliut <ho en.rnp1<"* thwl ' rend ib,>rt in the papers" (ifniTi' !);< jtfivr.'jiijif/'- f\i p<;ojjle Unfug dni^ JIUK rihi5 -Jxîil rurjn^ tlii^- lc>n;' pi-rio^pf r-<.îu-Joji in .Miu(.h>fl(*i>x\i*, Of <*iiirv (IwD? j Hl\v;:y>i i ^wJ fu('u>o- f^'-t.iv iilunit tjeiînf" home >'V )J Ani:-'j Forr'-.-, lijf I tjiii k.ili;ir tlifniorule of thf Ar/iieu FOHVN til s.>yjLi'H-i A-i;i lorhiy i- idiijicucuniLly ;lowcr tha.fi it wuh 4
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v
ou VJT
Geueral SHOVP! ^V-, air. -. Th- (."nAntMAX. "At that (iuw iy<fti pointed out. in many ways tin; v.is.-loni Jif-ixmchuiin;; the .war. Now it lists sroao oamui, of t-onrsc, \\itV n.say thousands of additional ca&uuitii?s ami deaths. It strike* me ihitt ii ts a vry da.npevous thing to subject -any vnny u u ipnjr umi.inuwl onflict .of ibis kiafl -in vldi-h the ar.nouofcd policy -J> not to i\h: iiKvwar, wluvh .ft^ bWji tin 1 i>duVy"uf rbi- President. Hi; that iie is withdrawing^ " '- " J itoiiird iu tKi* ri'on,iinK's jwp;r Jhcr i.- en artxrant of .-. vtmsKiil- attack U|wn tb- <^MI Ranh Bay rxwruplex, wliidj \\o Jiav. built Mud uiricb I bad tx,*^; tcfd wua the tiioit sivciirc, uio^t [>o\\<>rfiil, Aniiiiciui bast in all of Soutliejtft Asix But in spile of thai *oniMHtie of the iwtppers of tiê 'neoiy <-ue in, as you kuow', *i'd bli'w' iijj *i tuiUioa aod * bUf gallon^ of *vMJeu pt-sojliw jitsl. vvst-er<]^y. \Miai <ioes tbl< indic*t<' ( jrou? -' v GCMMTU! SJWUP. \\Vll, ns tx>* the fir it part, the fatt.tbul wo couldu\ w in, I bclk\Te 1 s4Atd thai Z yeaiv ago by tbc melfiodi we were it urn* iinjpi6siUe. A* U> tlw tnorule oi the Irooiw, tlw AnueU of tin 1 Uiiitl $mts, ijidh-iduiUa tire {ruined ]>h}>titiAlly and ir jui equipped uutetiully to belie^Ti in a. jwyrhijog}' of w^Diiing. VTfaoi <Wiii <x>nditioiiti prevcut tb<U( front -wi-uiing, prcv^tu iltom from using the total înabilities UJH.I *re ivailftWe to tbetn, tfaatis ,few<vrlizin. I tbiok uv> toqwrieniW *om(> of thai in (he Korean rii^^tioii. As bfou JIK tijfre wns irwli<-,aUofi thatVe wer wot goiiip Xonb Vititnaiu nd tb'rfbv v'ere not goiiy: to defcai .Uir Vii'tjauiiftM 1 Army ajul tl)ri-l>' not hav jo*i'u'>" victory-, 1 ai that point the uoialo of the figlitii^r forces Ij^gun to jro do J think tlmt the siruplo fuel Ujat tlie Arun-d FM"n-> xivr*- <'xHi'roiir*l :ind >sjj:iii l.-k iniiK^-iblc" for ilioin Ui j^Korot, itat i aJw> frjstraliic, jmrtk-uljtrly wlu-jj tJiww A>si<yinn'nts ooiiu> froH [c\<-I of tlu-ir Goic-rnnifiii, arxl iboy want to comph with the tbut tiii-y X''1) they \\niit to do uii&t U cxjx'cted J them, tuid they ihink is ^jx-ctvi-i <f tln-m i.- 10 viit u niilitiiry vJ4'iJ>ry. .N'ow , *!V<f> orw- kuoxvs t h u t (in- Arniwl For<-A an; an iitoiriiiiu r/4 lli- Fd^ral CitMsnuwM. 'J'ln- Ft-dcfnl fiov-frnirifiit ha* li'^lit to Us*", the Arinnd Fon.-d to attain * political vi't<fj'. In thi.cttM<- ttify ha.v<; UM| tin- ATHM-H! Fortv* lo ill lain u jMjlitiuaJ vit lory un<] liu\v /aili<) A far to ^t îtiier a military victory or a jH)jiical iif i>iy
XtTEBJiATIVE OF NBGOTIATEO
'fltc, ( 'HJHUUAN: It M.X.-UI--- ])iri<'flJ lo uu-, il tbcy are not ôiup to pui'suc ji iHil(tti^;VM'l^)^v , ihj- niilx iv'u>-oiiabl<.' uJu?ffj>uiw ^ Ui pro ncfroiia/fd-s^'tilfnu-iil. jufi a.- the French did in irjiilur unj u uir, ountry do*-* when a virtu*! in tin: nnJitan ' ii^Ki JJ iJiwc i no di-t w-cin* to inc.
KVIJJfc.Vf.'E Ul tOVf ^XOUM,K OJ- ABUKU f'OIW'Kh
~< .'online 1Uk t< oiif ((licj rf>i<i{j, I noticed in llii- rijormi<{;' iain-r a rrKrciin- U. itt-im-d Abnnft^' n-iw-tioJi NJ UK- ultM-k on u bunker
:;r the UMZ in whirh \ tliiuk 30 or :{:? of our soMiis were killed a *-inj!e tv.mkrr K. a rocket attack. He was furiou-' t their failure to run;: mi! on'.ler- never to ron^n-gate in MU-li a Munition, *. of oiur.-i', lt-i to thi-ir dear! . Al>o there i- the failure of >rrtriiy ii> f -m Uaith B\ . Someone w |IO.:VM> l-orguard duty wa> !nx beeaMse lhe.->e people runic in to a \vry olnborauicri v.j-ri lur-jrf Iwsv iiiere aiUJ appn.w'ie<! tin- 1'OJ, 'jH-trOit'iini <il and h ^tru^k me tii:;t tlu-s*1 \\^-r<- iifJiciilinits bo'h of a luck of morale or uriM'iifiii iir <Liii!u)-ia-iiii for thîr ilut-y, on tlu> oiw har.d Mini, <m rhr otllcr h::iui. an unMillisipK-s? tr- n-alK follow, jpparontly, ttuonl.-rs j^/si' ^ f<iH}rr<<ri>tiii: togi'llior in u >inirl<- bunkt.T, At I^HSI this morning's JVJIJMT n-jvoiis that Oencral Al>runs was vi-ry nnn'h -jml out nUnil tlus. S<> then- ^ ev>r\- oridrtitv tbnt the moral'* of tljr Anf<I Fonv* is v^jy low, whioh in itself is an
TIME N'EKDKD IU V.S. .XrilllUHAA'AL OF YRK)P8
l, if a decision were nuidc to îlbd/aw our lr<-oj froiii Victas posîhU- iu an onliHiy itamref how long do _vou think it noiild take to <io tins';' 4V hat do you think b 4 ho maputude of the SHOUP. Mr. <'hain:i, 1 am sun: you know you \viiuU - ttaUii{f miK'-h iiialj-rini you u a n t to takeout. 1 w'(m]l <;oiMn<<iit on :<'tiircnlit'.,, th- live Wlit-s, <rat of South Victim i u. If you t<k jjiout 10 ir 1'J iljty> for un<5 ih fosiu,i;ijn<r of traa-port ytiu cwuwl tak^1 every Ai^/;riejtn \nn\y out of (|i;n: in 15 <!iiy. Viu <jinJili-d t h a t w i t l i r<-jrnrl to the mat/nd. that is the rnaehim-r) and jtlj lh<- cr|iii|jtii4 ill. That i*. anollierinatt<-r. Gi-m-raJ -^jioi-'P. J jhink we nil remember tnJ in KOHJH we. took IO.I.IMHI INK.])-, (uii of ;!-re in 10 days with lyjuij-iynt. The C'H.tiKMAV. lOS.OfK) in !< days with their rjupmi'nl? ^ Genersd Snore. I tliink >. And that wasn't M \i>r>- inwWn oittiit 'jp tl.ere ixnnpHrtl to what yon have in South Vietnam todny, wiUi rn*\x-f\ to inui^jxt.rt.'" The ( H tii'.MAV. *N) tjiert- i* not any -^-ridUi* lopwuraJôWeiu. J is really a question uf [n.tkiu<; the determifi&Tion to do it <." riot U> do it.
OK
(icttcful, if the i'tiiii'd StuU-r. announced a. iixi'd witlidravi >d dale, b It likoly ihnl wit-my fon-t^ would tuL- adva.nta<re. of tljitt Jid our iroop- if iliey wr-re Iviu^ wiihdrawr, in your opiniun''
</<-;.e'- *[><HI)\ v. Wit, J '.>, a:i>'.\er -n4*"ii>rifii!ly im. i < HIV f ttnii' iite l<> j'l.-'L'- i! fe CII|JIIH'II| - .ijw/ij! it. Jn the îiekin^ of u \it\i" .IM! u-lj'jii.^ i l u i i fiu p ' t' u bein " (iVirisiHvi'Hi tu ifn'Î.'nited
* : i ' < -, Jl i- inr1''!; lliir<! fnr .n<: <" r o n r e i l e l>ei-,'UJ-<- j! jl r-'liit*- In lh' -!:ni!irI7^ci V i h n l v - l h e \(>r)J. 'Jii^lit be |>!(H'!iJ!i;' > \ l i e l ; v v .f 'jlll.^riH.'. l - l i f t i In 1 ini<':i'Jy I H I - u d.i't-e. > '' ;tre jTnin'.' ''> w>. l i d l n v , , -iill'J tjinc- i>- iv iii|!i n - i u tl'iii 1 ^ 1'* l i i e i i i j c u i : : ! |.<iji! t l l m J , jl j-. t ihe.ro. If they are sroing to do auytWitg then in theory the longer we waited to et out tho more, or the better jrepiired they w ould I* to do it if .tfyey arc really planninc on someilung. Now, 1 wouldn't eive them a lot of rre/lit for Mug nble tn run d<>* !i si\tth aud (jreale havoc and. as 1 believe- tjmy use the words, blond-bath busii.e:v-. I thijik it i> ataurd, ur P\&\ v>'fi have hceu nlwurd ub<;jj we Lave (<iid the American jwoplc }KI\\ vie have built up m:d traiiro*! ti niilUi'ii-inari ar/ny in South Vietnam and about a million of I!M; ]<&} fon.-<--, and nowliow tht-y have got xiN*rioiif4 iu Gn'lwcJia and Lnos arix} they are qiii'.<> j n tin.iy, ruiw wr are jroini: to (yni uround and say a ; citjiiiiin-man arni\' ajid'a <itillioii-mati defense force a.n'l protect their owu people from a fourth dial iminU- 4.haJ n^p;hf Iw in XotlJi Vii'Uttitii. Are we jjoinj: ii do that? I clou'l Ujink it inatces.^*jjiif. Mr. Chuinnan. I don't ihiiik it ma Ices i'j>w> u> >ay Uiat we woiild'lx- botliored. If we .eun't, after alt th<! forces rhat wr> t^til! have left down tliere, r.he uoiubatniit foiX'Cf. nd, of <:x>urr;e, tlie otlier> are supj>u.vd To l>e nble t<> jin>i*-et UieniM*!\i: u little bjl,: ibey ure -tilHmt ai> outfit tlmt '-mrf li-rnt linir wr in or <iiit of ilw |JKT bin;. They are eood ariwil for-êx. And- with "th*!*1, thru we have u not, hopefully, -overlook H few tlio'jijtud Krrfvuiis and a few TIiai!an(fcr=- tl-t are <>v-r fL^re m> mir side. ]f H!! t|tat f<irce "-an't prot^t the jxtiple ot South Vieniitm n iiliM.il bl-i ^'<>in a fixirth w IDHUV >i them, and prot^-J the A itti as thuy uitlidrw. then I tn'uik (hero lias Iweii Minie ab-)u1 wliat have, lea-riiei! f.1'/!)! -;! riciv.-.pap-^- ;I!IDHV
OF T.>. -VriTHUBiW^t (IV fl-'nMATK PllUTrrAL <il*TC41E
KMAN. G'iiicrai, in y<^r opinion, what tliitereiice w.mld it iimkf iu xi- uittiuul" political outcome in South Vietnam if nil U.S. forr*-. ur<- wiilnlrawn bv the :il of 1'JTl, bv tlic i-iul of W2 <r t h e 4-nd < j \ W . ' ' ' ' General SHorr. Y'.'ii ay tJi'' |><lili<:ul itiinti<iii. The f'lAiuuAV. Wliaf <Jiffreu'<' -lo you think ii W.IU|M ?n.\ice in the 'iltiuiiai; <^litijU4 n:i!j-xnie in Smitri S'I-*tnai)i? I'F- Well Mr. T'liainuan, whe.n you ->ay ihe iiltuijaie ouU'ouie in Soul h."\ 'iel itmui, ] llicQ hav, to turî to my o*'n j,>orso])nl opuiioJM i\tl -aV that j tliiiik that it wouldn't ~inake any ditlen-nr/- M'hais^*ewr iu the. ujtinjat^ oiiU-oiue bivaUBe the ultimate 'ut-cojj^j,. J.> poiji to IM' some kfnd of n<'j;oUati<ii^, in my opinion, Ie( w*;u jtafi" South and (lie North. A-. soon n- they get iji* out aiuJ pel the jiovorffmisiil Uiat the N'orth doe^n'l lov- too much out of (here thev i.'ill fnake f n a e w>ir' kind n of o ajrreeHjent ajrreeHjent , and an njoji.thi* n j o j i . t * killing and of t<yir own own rovjiitrymen. rovjiitrymen. Tln-y are are all all \ itttnuiaw peoje. iuavj<i(j or ^'^Nfc, Nfr (.'iiairiuuii, f will pa,>. for the no"-1'"1 i luiv TJjf < 'n ' HUM AS*. * S/'niiUir ' ( Wp-r. .vriifii'tr Côt'Mt .^.-jiiitof I'prtroii. fh ' 'miifiiAs'. '"I'Hiilor P'-nrsori. S,-n','.r i J r.Ar-fN. Tliank yon, Mr. C-i
''
'iiAHtifAK. N-iiHtor <'),
491
Tidier*!, 1 was Dot here a. thousand days ago, but I know ah3 rwp\:T v<mr views on this subject from the press reports. I was interest^ in and surprised at your response to the chairman about the logistic capability of withdrawing our forces from South Vietnam.
FOBCES INCLUDED IX TOTAL WITHOBAWAL
l, would you include naval and air forces in TOUT recomof total withdrawal? SHOOF. Well, we presume the naval aud air force*; you are talking about the 8eet? : Scuatcr PAB.SOX. Yes, sir. General SHOCP- And the. air forces in Thailand. Senator PEAHSOJ?. I am talking about the air forces wherever they ma.i be. tlw naval carrier {we, Ajnexican aircraft in Thailand, South Wtuain, wherever they may b* bituatd. fjetMfai SHOCP. Well, if w want to stop tin- maiming and killing of raeo, wotnuo and children in Southeast Asia, then I ueiieve they wooM bf more likely to be doing that if we don't hav <'ombatant f')r-s f]osf. enough tx> functioa in that capacity any \uaf that- our Oovcnunent fcoought that Uirv tvaut^d to do it, that il would take iinx' <iâiu to place the outfits in a strat-sgic ]Kwiuou to pt-rfonn those const)*! actions. i ihhik it is past a matter of enuimonwde, if Ut^y are vbere and ready they might be used more likely than if they weren't there and ready. And <>n that twsiB, as far as the South Vietnaaiese via* which \ cu talkiup utx-mt i.- concriKHi, they h/uld <x>m out. N^w, I am not talkiitj: about th great Ktntegk- interntKnul iniplic*Uoni ot the fleet eh" wing itself in tlj Pa/.-ific O-au. .SeuaUT PCAKSOX. I ani relating uiy qut^titxis to f.li*- o|>eratioiu; in Sout!u-jiM Asia. HOUP. To hti specific for tlic reax> <f intt-rjwting Uieminto the South Vietnamese military acti<>u a>> ojtprMiod i<> an juteruauonal uituation or ijhowi(i|; the flag aiui all that kind of t&utf, Slit* I -ay, yen, get tlieui all out. iv-iutt<'r PEARSON. Naval arui air force. (jpartal SHOUP. That are rdateil ju>-t f-pexifii-ally to South Victuatn, not <.')<: w.irld international ]>roi>Iein -in tin- *mtr>. arouud it.
AH> TO .ilVN FOBTEfi AFTtR WiTMDKAH'AL
S!imtor FEAKWJV- (rnu-ru], wouU you favor c-rtj(ii(M*xj aid to the. AKVN force? *ficj- our withdrawal?
ue aiv now cojio'Tiwxl with gciuu^ out, and iJten we have th'* of what we do a/UTward.-. 1 -y'ould have lo nay du'K. That I M'n^vtt if aid hl that tune )U<h tiiat-M'Tiu.i C4iu4lTrttH>U iiu*4 be ivm i'. tii off.-r jif H*Ki>.UUK.><j t*> tU? dep'tV ttJid < the amount dchirwl by the Swah V'k-inain^xc. 1 think it t*<ruld be an opp<r<uiuty, if Clo-y a/-'^ji[ huch uM^turu'j- ju rvr(^tructt<iij, ;<! tiifdiml and i.ri'u-., tLa maybe we %Mu!d r^!i::4- t!i*- t*rrib^ image thai H iuur<ifii'r
.r
. - . ' MY LAI INCIDENTS
Senator PEARSON, i have some hesitancy about raising this next fjUftrtion, but I ani very very deeply <?oBwrned about _tli report in thu morning's and la>l evening's pros* of *he statement by, 1 think, <V>li.n<'j Htiudrasan, where ho indicated that overy unit frmu H. brigade up had its UMI My Lai incident in the war in Vietnam. you c.otmn4>ni oil 3hKt-, General? ~ J StvX'.p. TJios** are his wrds*. r PBAKSON. TJiose are liis w<rds as reported by the SOOCP. That is my answer. Tb/iso re His wirds. I thr.uk you. " r CASE. JLf the Senator would yield? Thf CÎAIBMAV. Senator Owe.
Xr MILITAKV fc
A>E. On VOHT former point, an artk-Je in the May 15 Baltimore Sun >ny- tîat the oiilirary {tltunicrs in Suiôn are telling ir}j*)rters tiui (hey shouW ass'uiae that the Navy ourtieiv at Vukee Suuron *nA tiu- Air Force units in. Thailand ttilfuot be mW*i>tL*lly rv<hiul and UuM inter<iir<ion of ihr. Ho On Minh Trail will continue.. I \\omli-rlf you <xjiwd<T this (o be our cturoni.fttrat<-pyfor air op^raticiUK lo owitinMt! unif linilivlv creu AUT our ûouiid^troojes ace oui of there-. . (j^-iitral SHOT:P. I don't know thi 1 t'ivorly und^r^nnd tixi ^(r^-jnc que-iiifrti yon arc a.-<kiug. Senator CASK. iVh^t do you Uiink our current f ..flU'*!y is in ift;ard to <lic inaiter? * Gei>*-i-aJ SHOI p. UV11. I ihiiik jR-rxrtisUy that Vietimnu/aUoti, for cxauii/J*-. wasiM-ver^-visi'd (oend l\v war. Jt u a^ a d*vkf iu <iiiinue the Wiir. It i*ttb * ik'itoc to <-ontiDiU' liw nr with otlvr jx-fHiU1.. nith flM>n<tariei>, South V'jetinuivdf an<j others, and f xtricote Jiuflk-k-ut number of Am<Ti<-un peojde wit of thei* to rrduc*? tlie number of 'asijulik-t. to H l/'icl arwplHbk' U th/* American public. By that I HK'n tuvK-jiiaJble in that tlwv w<Mitd not raise saifh u <-Jamor and <TV bout tlx- nufn):r^>f <t^naitei> to tlwir <'ointnjuidr in <-hief. that tbey would lie quiet *hout it. It would !>( lew Mjou^b so that tiwy wouUi U- ywi. -That in what Vu-tiuinu/jition w.s. Ar dw huiue tiot- it inquired a treoviviou* iwjmber of tnilliorib ^f doflais of ûipiwnt to equi(j Uii> w>w niillion-fium or u|Mu*a-niiitioiinr^n Hrniv. nd WIIHH^XT uhcn AJid if uv pyt out, hich I haw never ^J.MI uiiyfx'dy make a oe>: a(oijt . and t Jyy keep on fi^tiUfi^ in South \'x-tnuH), Aim-JV'a IH <-Mifron(e4l with j>4j|<jji,vin^ thoê /Nyj{4e from airi'lfiiic-- on HJ> Ui }>l!*u heûuf; tlu- ourf1 of hUi>jHy for South Vu-iiiHiii <<j.Liy. is. AiiK-iV'ttnHwMle go<xl. uiui ii will iJw uUerly million-. aJid luitiiiifi* <if dolljir^. if u<- didn't ha\v any houibeis or HIIV 1l<'Hs vjltine out tlk-r/'. ii would tatc njiiljonx of dollar*, ju-ct lo tlu-v fijrhl , nd to ^-ii! and ifiiM<' to uhaU-Wi- }<'v^J they oWrc. Tlw.t of ii. '
i' \i,i ji>k ;i you
V.S. INTENTIONS COXCEBMMJ MiLlTARY SVHATEGT
Senator CASE. Yes, th<> precise question I would like (o get your thoughts on is what our intentions nre in respei-t of rontiuuiuj; American air Mipport from ain-raft carriers and from Thailand. Would. j'ou answer in tin.- light of u furtlior statement Unit ws made to the same reporter thni interdiction of the Ho CM Minh trail is and will remain beyond tin- capability of the South Vurteuuic.^ air force. "One.ral SHOCP. \Vell. I think we have proved lime. and tiint- aun that bombing perse tli* only thing bombing can do i destroy. You ran'i hold an area. So if yon dump so-oiauy hoinbs on a trail and then TOU leave you cairt stji.v up there all day taitl all night, mid kwp Ue;:i rominjr <lown. You CHU rebuild a trail. Vou caii'l stop the snppiit>s coining lôw^< from the north by bombing over tl*> trail. \\V <Iid;r stoji Ihejn in Uie north wbi-n they ranx* iowu. I ^:u'-ss bofore Prp^dent Joliit-<tn siopjied (lie bombing Jit th<- north, uu1 lidi-:t slop tin-flo\v<.rf: h-!'- It L- ludiorwis t> think yon <-.n sto> 1&r noa <f sujpliis-l>y -iwTal. vo nn- not fl an- wha? . \VV >uv not quite o>i -f)v >unif waveb^gth yet I am no< ttrûjnfr ivith you tliat our UMJ ; G:iuTl SHO'VP. S"kc'd \\ltjiT lUiink tlx-y an- going t do about it. ri'Jii'* Scnnt'ir ^'AXE. Whvtbcr MX- an? iroinjr 1o visy. (ii-iuTui Savri'. { lion't tiiuik Uu- Prpidi'iil ' idcu* >U'<'. 1 have tj<-ver M'cn tlTn. Uint tin-*,- cw-j- inii-iidi'd lo gM the flc<'t or tin- bfunlx-r-. out iff ivni-h .if .-xintli \'j -tnain fur niwny year* torniLe.Thiit i<rny opinion. N'ow i*ie otily wuy hat ue can do it U jus* \\lia! i- goingon hen- ijjrht iiv.'. f h<>|'. Sniiat!<r t'A.-'E- Thst I-ihf jij*'-lion tiiaf J did uant vor judsrnviit nn. 1 uppp-i'ii'J* 1 it and liuink >ou. ou.Afr. Chuir ( '-cof K*K. Ci.-iii'raJ. I ki"<A v.mj- [u.-iiimi and Iwvc h--.ird ^jp-nk - j - v i - i n l iuuc>. 1 awumo tli-.ii \ t ( . i \vi>nld liki' in ->< t\lni|i|N'ji in Vi'-i iDiin. On'-, <>f mir-*'. i!i<- .'-ru) uf Au^finui piir in :!. w a r . inul ili<- Mtd "f M!| (i^liiji;ir in V i i - l u n i n inl IndfX-li th;it d.rn- !'.' (ji-ncrul >Hor;i-. 'Mit- i-' '.-orrfs I.
Nf; OV TOVTIVl A \ < : K "f WAW
\<ni
-f V
StuN-N <iii] r;')l -'np[l> 'lif N i n t h Vi'-tiunm-rw- with ny ami*, i;ih'Tf uu\ "itt-r fu<-Tr i l i u i v,/.'ili] hear H|K>U iln- imi- Jii i f i he \v.-ir'.' dciH'irtl >ifofj- 1 i l j i n k , Sen. i t i i i ( 'iiiiper. ihut >ntii!i Vj-'-tnuin nhd .\n:! \ i i - t : >'jn \ I H \ U \ h i i x c h a d .-ii'iij^h if \\ m . 1 ihink s^^l^rda 1 .' vki-l'ii'li'-l itiliiKiljilioli uf ,1 .ii"iik l>ci-;i:i In- MHl-'cd to MV^ ;>e-j-e. J l l i i n k ilii > I. '!'.'< Wi i'limi^'li \\iir J dnii't t l j i n k if iv |>n!l <m( <if ilieje llierc i~ ;'.<Jh^ lo < < > j > l j i i i < < - l-< Iw liirlitiiiK. nml J duu't kn-r,1. wiial llje
494
would bo if we. nwr -sent them ey more supplies They would hare to quit unless they would then be supplied by some other OOOPER Wouldn't the United States make hs position withdrawing? . les. '
CONTISt'ED iHJATA.RY AID TO SOlTlf VIBTN.U1
. COOPER. 1. Mil} ask. again tbc <j)psiiou-th>tt.;botk So Ca.-4*; tid Senator Pe-Arson *$ktd. Wbulrl -TON theu recommend ""*? floi supply $i)Ut'u Vi<?tn*un with utiy "nul'iary aid? " Gvnerul bnopp. 1 think we have to supply theia. "" ~ Pt I liink we htivo to supply lhen> wjtii niil it"< until ilifr/" is a jrood, sensible rej*.-on to belic^T that father th'<? gJiung do\ni th*>re- i.-. gfting to slop cud tb^.v w.oji'?. nw-d ^ny inore or tlvY curi C'.vjtiitui* to'di'lowd th4XstlT.'S fconi v
. COOPB.K. liu^ iii,^' i> -wrlic're \vrt se<im i<> g?t into &? prtt>lrni -with Pre>idi'nt Xixfn'>* {>r^rani. Y'on want 10 oxmtiuiMf ro îv.^ tlit;ru supp!i<- Hdij] ili'-y <-jui defend themselves rcAaonabty: i*
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in wtlu-r \.<ird> tJw ji^hlinp would % on. I> rij.î^ oth'.-r ..xvjiy thut voo. Uiiiik n mi^lit b^ JjdU-r, aom.- jriai: <?<>: lia'Mii '< 'Tii7 afi %Iiui'? SH'P. \Vi-l], i have -AI<J jw>.inany \iinef iimt I think u> n-e il ji..tuteriy -iiniii'iii-vaWf ilint ovcv uH thftrf' Jiiontlis that we h;'vn't eftu uH!v tcît (j-V:i and negolift^ v.'lmtc\v,r we want to u ;v. r'-tijiri trf,j'riL"il''.rs..ih<- <-cJs<- fir*-- or <*-a.so <Lx: aixl -r> v*-r/, /ery, \i<rv *o; ^>UMJ pi
ol S.OKK- fSHRi-t*. Nov. .;
wiiL. u lii ik-'iii'i' ril* r,c! ih*-n you <:'.i sav ''we. will te'.-w i.ext
1 wan they h.rveri'i dorn- i&yihinf ab'MJf.ending: ihe Ac]'. H^J" f Wrj t-ure of 'liii-, in luy iiiji.id, if îivl when you .-.lojcjx-d, it w .50'if-h ViKiiAifi. ,'iiM.I ! lien the u u r i u \'ietu[r>wi]j ^1"P ,^ i>rtitki.r i'ôoi'FCK. i hi>fje HJ, but we hs.w wocried-^'*'t'ie;i,!<ur!\'
of ihr pi'opk< >tilJ Iff i tii..rr<-. It vjrts"i/j JXK- ihut iu.iu.aiji all uf r.h- pro|'(;.-N t.bat. fm%e lavu iu:ide, il iiyficl-lftkcu Llt<-.30(XiUiii tin- ftu't (^"at. iiui'-ss: th^te nrtiwjj'rti6<iont.if'>i'jia"A]cijj], thtiijrlj-tinfr ix-iJ.i -lill g?.<>n, rhefcf, would >-'ull be r{n;tihwd Jcyiinsr/i^ (mop)r in Ido<hii:>'..
b.-loi-f-yjî <<!' in. i thuiJt it t^ fwik-.ji<iU.- lo ihiijk i!.t a

j a fllillion-HlU.il !<><^lj (|1fMIi',f'W'X5 Jlu.-> <itl;T
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OOXTINCAXCE OF yOiTARY JO&
Senator COOFEB. You ilo approve, you would approve, coutinntnce of m&urv tii to South Vietnam. GinTul SHOUP. We 'ill hai'e to until they hav-? some settlement, I ibink. And tht-y wUl have h quirk if *-. grt out, in my opinion.
WITNESS*' TIME MTTM JolXT CUlEFs. OF STIFI
ror COOKIE. ^ SHOCP At tl: mi of 1903.
r l Suocr. Y-N .
r CoiiPKj. VfU v\v;v a ni.-:i>b.T of iho -Joiat l"ui.-fri of ^5 r*JT, u'l-ri-n't you? Wer- ywi n utuub<T of tfio Joint (."Lit.-fs> of St'iff at tbut . i sar u-'Jth ib^ Joint Chiftfi <^" Jtalf atnl ui ,not- nitli ifx.1 l-iwû--cI J u-rt-d u^ a uioniuT -hen things pcruuiwtl i uic Marine l"-.r;rs. rvubtor COOHE^ Ai tlwt [>oirrl. Mining tf t; "iinv ilkl /on ever <]i'-iK- the si-ruling of trodjxa u> Svuth Vi*inm? G'-in-ra! SHOCP. JJj. C.oopcr. ffr t.ho^,- ytjirs. yc.-i, n<5 in p-.-ry r as*? n ! r vrry ^-inor officer ibat I kw* , >in thrve Pceii'Itnts,, ail saiil wv ,-li*/'ii.; rwv-i .-^nj frruijiul combat fon*a intu Southeast Aîa ho Said ,tit'! K.r?. Ev*ry ienior cihivr hat 1 knew for 4 or 5 y-an> ar.l ,-f ;b-" ^>iri r ii- f.V,ri>>. a:nl . N-'-nU-r t'^y/pir/' But iLfry V' irix>js to jy.mh **"rit-ri,i >Hf-L'f- C ':. A-.J I i.av*-a'r fmitiJ out \vlyyet. -- tutor (> Htf r.n. vHrnt? G*:i'ri} SfkOM'. J Luv.-i-'f f>'jrni out why y:. >-: y i < > r '.r'?::<i. I um nos. i tvi- l/.i ip^ yi.-u OUf j i i s r tn'i:'^ '.'> Zft the f *'ix i^'-sUl'iTV >:r.:i^F''. . Ji i- a fu<-: 5:iii yi-j vc^-.- .irfji:-/ ir;-rv \vill !:.' . T rii.: C'-ii" f: <.y>trJi tJf f-r-t irin;^M>.T' >*-:i\ into Viotrinm. 1 /v-ii^nii *UI>:'P Tii:-1- L- -' fli-- fj.<-t. .
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. vt-.i-i-'r- I'fi i'i-.'jj' Sî>}n;îy Tai miilioriA'ti. Uvf>ri: I Vfi. I believe IV ','^ !2.:R>*J. aii.' Miiiii.1 of i5.r: %I:P; if Ji--'r'<>rt lifiKop^T unit.-. b-j\. r'r-'-tv HH- ,v- T'.nih:.t nuif -a-rji o V>tnni r.-l-iii; f UK* in (hi- Mariiw
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. and tiiinfc fh- hfsC way to e<t thrm *uf of North Vietnam N t IL-ton a bit in what North Vietnam .-ny>. *hont what they will d to g't ih-'in 'iit if w*> do *>rTuin thine>. I iliiiik if vn- w<iIfi jot a lit lie n:itiati<iii nbmit "fttinz lh jrL <>nor- 'ut on ih^ hiiMs if \\ithilrawnl of ^mic "f our trotj>s I ihiuk .mm1 "f rlK-ni woulri otniic diit. I i>:l:ik rln'y u<mi<l on a nvipfx-^l Ija-U hiij!f th<*m out. I h<n*' it L^ n<it nvr>-an' ti> waif 'iriti! th\\' rmriiii'!'1 rhc e'lil if ilu> war and a (n.-ac-^ rrmt\ bt'ff>ri* we mri p-t th>- j>ri^':itT.- "in .f IIIT- ami f 'Ifiii't f t i f i k i i!l lr. I think n*z-iaii.:i- wirli tin- \i>nli <m |>u!l<>r(t .f tnx>jv. will zi-l t
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(A'rf-nil SIJ>Y'?. .I'nfofraiiai^v I ii not {R-'-aJisi1 I VJ* not think UiiM.-I rujiru't 'Biiikr ;nr>'(f b*-liv: 'hut t/i pur ~rhifj sit>B*ui Jtil>on tin* rulfiuUr u jpMUg*f> belpgî uu<> J tJtink that * tiî' pp^l iti the- ny|UHi'^> iii^v i ttVr Utter pnrt Wbeltjf? th<* i-nl>if or i if- GCM <|iwrtirf w.Nrfri! brig r-f Jrii>r i kmd. unil if;I ht\<iaf.' ^{n'-wliHt to &_ Un. tmt I tim s^"? ^;* '^X ^ bfM-au*' a >>c>n;s m<' .^> o*>*])Iy. I atn n.' u 'jHiiiticiAit. I ai;i a"rvJtti<'u5, but I. rc-^d vvi-rj'thjnp_ att iWini V> !'vcr\-((iir.jr l.Uat f raiLpn.ti^jIt'sid^ *^ thU uîn-. nn<] jtist ^>nncli<\v, Nfr. C'hHinouK. i <-rti"r hr-V)T i>ar 6x'l thai thb < xfni"ai<fji, rhi-; wit!.;(iruwnl i.f /.to1 fnpv> ft<iw S</ittU Vu'timtii. s/.nkrtK'". U r<'iatv<L ti a .; JHV.W- if it n r i v wy will Ituv<-
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wbir-'n Prt-iwl/Tit Tiijr-n i- jjojng in {>< rusuii:jr y*'a\. Thf- CiiA.iKM.tx. If I i>lvR>iHti:i >'(.J omrrly, y..u ifiink >hn tlml on-iWi-Tuii'in '/ rwl'i-tjDjr Mr. 'i'Jwu "houH not b- K ronMfl<Taiin for < .'rifmijini: Aro*-ri':nii jni'it ir. f'n-^ in VMIUUII. f'fi'-rj/ hffp. I iliiiik'JLl'KtniUi )> a {rhn-tly tl-ii:-/ if tlmJ i > l:fi j >u, 'r ~\<f <-f > : | i'/j' iji Oii-i <ftkrttr\' w)>ji-h i-utw* \ \ t > m a vcr "f -.< from n nji i ( , nil . |,K.k tik: Im- >i' J 'i
COMMITTEE .^. I doiiHpsrUcuIarh-likîiuuuiSf it off, iTthough v. U the- -ruy tyj? ^rjegblaiio'ti \v have before us.'l iriopti the earliest dr-to in the Hff<sufi cWj>rr "ttic ciaî*e U1 De/'aauber. Looking At the history oT'thV' French x|ierii:n<-e, they derided, I believe in Jun? 1954 in their Congress, 'hat ihe war should be ended. They set the daw. Mend^FwM'K set the date, hiijjsetf. He suid: "I will undertake to make AH e^rocinent to conclude 'by war, a cease-fire an,d an agreement T>V JnJy;20;\!-.I dikk it, wx: ^piy- inline 4 ^r G vc;lK and they did ron<-!tiw thi* war." Pers4ihnry I'ln-actk prefer tliat lx? done tk\v tiiun i'~ûy 20 or 31 'r.n^xt yfcar- ArtaiUy thcs- bills b<jf>re u>, <.>u ring> KSV baM>xtr coiisidor way* and miâ^'hy whiLH) w> 'fix'. Pn-si'l'-n t "s derision \n copvtudc rFn* var at tti*1 ^Hrjir^ date. 1 viîv ilu-m largely as pfrsuash''1 iron tlie Rrcsidcnt û a t(r*\t if urFrtC.ti<?aaxti /or t Jir- (juqw^- of. giving tli* Congr^-aSj t Jie >Sîiat<.* In faniruJar. in oppcrt unity U expnv*. it^ opinion. . :' i on iuirt oarlitT Ctip't^s anpruved t5ie wsir in the T('nlcirt Gulf th<*y rp|>caled it sv>3 pjc-jVtill havcrcîtCJwiltility to d-i thty otii to end the wuv I sinkfts irw tht ^m? --ti<ii by rhi7r iuid \v- <<-nainly h,rvr puMiT ovt-r Uw eoirtinuatiini of iht? of tlw \fn^_ w-MiIff Je tt|i[>ropriterc. I am nrt iire from whatyou waid *Fifth<T y.->u think it is innunrnjrw.te or -not. What it awitai douu to, wlii-tlier .the morwy cui'I !Kst'i*>jM-d or not, i* .-sn >-\.pre-i.>n by ihe OonjWAV t)mt the wnr outfit t< !- --nfic<l *;on. If \vv- Jijiu ^ |r.irl!i>rticn.r:iry system, if we could cxiT.-L^' * tut bind wf iftflbftf.*-'1 upon ih<- Kxewrmv, jl wuijld \w u. frt-nt imviuiw r< L-tiiiti; that irv, XotliuviiijTihai n<ni in<l not being abl- to cLuii^ jjinr, aft WY 4-tji jTijuily do "as a prtK-tu.&l j!itT L> to jfcTsrtiad'r bi:n ? oluut<- hU i.'vcb triad Thf i iiiKf jhc.M? hearing1" ire al>out. That Lwhat.th'-'M- W!# sr- d.simnr<{ to d. Iu form they rut otf thf inouny. lui all of ii" ki.oiV .'.Jjut chat as a fonjf vvn.v fr.iin >wyui il can be dojw- cifuci-*- ii bill <Jojjj That would (irobabiy HIM into dilficultr'/ in or !*; vi-tiit-d. S> ilfur-- ar<- the joliti-al r-a!i<ie of ->::r .'^ i .
PESJf\"f WITHDRAW AT, POI.jry '-JCTaTIOVEn
YO-.S !>ri:-4.' "P ''! MPU of reI>va(KV to the eh-ciioJiA. I lake it, it uv.'i l! y aûined t hi.^ r-> rulntMl \n the dwtit>ji-. Uo yoij tiuiik ji i- not ? Oiifrui .SHOfH. I v.ouJci xay i', i.-. a ^bu.4>ly ihoujrht. Th: 'HAIISMAV. I i-hi;d.* : jV, <oo. J tJiirJc it. i- a irhaîly U.oueJK 'o read <!>ty nfsvr'ilay tiK:rc -IM a/ltlitiofivi Ani^rirant and ufbi:r ' \ \W kill^-i in a v-'Af in 'Ahfch our f^'ii'T i- i wjthilniwr. i tjiiufc ji t prutry ^lM*fi> i h u l oi ;nrir^vvr<; kijifd lln' i^tlj^f Jy wJu-n it ii ain-siiy th? u r iiiiji:< i'ii |tirj.w*; to uiiiidra'.v. l.-i>rr tihiifjt Kt;httttyT (irTseni! SKvr/r Yi-.-. If Mîtif. to ;ix. Mr (.;hiijraiit, Vhtf if w; Jir*1. W'n'Jy ir-i!i^ to <Ji.- i: Tfi'fi i' <* ,'ift^ni: iiuft* we jrn.'''* ih f;r/.-:i. r.o'ifli Vi-: tmiiK-.^r, nui:i'{>i-f->i>i!>, iiiqern.iiif. triiii'i'J tnuy u (.'Ij.'irj'y for i'.-.-if f/ff/ifc f- rf*.*illy-.(<Tiii our Meet o.i!f \S/iV m>t &" a nitu^-firn amj <.?* oar ^<> > i.r tt,.u/inl ilebuirjtiyV; jipd ep|jr<'iilii/n {w/infc xiui n i ' h u r r i n f i f M fT1 & tjt- v hiitcv.u- jr fôlc-iy/ do t'n' or UMVV v.c '.t'tdl *.* h"/.*;!! J l ijjVtrii<' i.- jn jYortritîr. " in.iJ?'1 Mir .{pci.jon J 7,'utilii fi|'J..i,v
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po and ay, "This U over. We are going: to withdraw and these
L.:ve t}>e.-e proposals and that is why we have to follow thnl procedure. It doesn't matter particularly what I think about it other than niy vn.c i whatever means there are to express tbe collective opinion his committee and the Senate. That i whiu we are trying to Jo.
WHAT CAX CONGRESS DO TO PERSUADE PRESIDENT?
'tVluit can the Congress do? What can this ommittee nnd the Senate t\fi i<> jxT?uade the Pr*-ident to change the policy to a more inimftiiaie conrlti-ion <il thi: war? f ii-iirral .Miorp. If I may enter th: {Hiîiiiliir, too, I think tho time i riL'tir lu'nv and incrca.-ing in which this great Gingn-ss can, tlirough tif simple fart that their ci>n?(ii.uenu want thl- wr <VT. UAIKUAN. I a^ri-*; with you. I think the time is now. J agree Tin- CU
(i-ncrul Snorp. Thi-> Congr.f.-> Mien <-nu !! their Prudent know fiff -yj-- thsii tiif pe-iji!e i>f America w::nt <ttit >f this war. That L- (he way to <!'> it. in my opiiiinn. Tin- CHAIRMAN-. I think they d> want i,;jj uiid I uûld \w fur that. Bu' vc deal with what vv.: hn\'e. ami w i t h \\itat Me can do here. 1 wouid fii; fi-r :htt. I would >u;ipurt i(. 1 think a n>iint>.T w.iijld. I d-n't knuA iidliM :i inajority xvmilii. I think it wo'ilil U- in r.ur wn iiiU-rs.ts, ibf
i i i n r f : - i.f tiie Vli-tli:iRifai: |M-ijiJe, :iud iii-.- |irij>il<T 9 nf W . H , oicry-
'
-K' K K T A K V jiF,-OI''h l/OIBTfl A ' t . T r;.-. INIVoLV --VIF..VT
Tf,.- Si.-rn-'iiry nf th Army, Sinn!.'y M>--<ir, r<-i'_'ii d * tf.\- dnys ago. J:i tin' \\'iu,ljt\git.n I'.'-vf of the 2:;d -sf NJny ;!i^n- !- UK jiinirle by Mr. > f i ' i . j : l fii'ilcr. I will fir:t tin- wMv aiiirj-j in ilic r<-'-iri, hut it i i:.'.-r<-.'iir/. Tin re i- ue j)ar5rriij>ti which -ay-: M'Vii.-i \ - i h ncA-.ini.-n in t\v Pci'*iror d a y ^ f t ^ r hi- n-.-ignstfJ" A. i nnuli- p'dilir. Kf-or ailmii'<-ii rf;;if in l.iiul-;j:fiJ li'- hud 'd'Jtuh'a .ir>-.'i! - t i n - v,i-l(,,ji vf L'.-S. irivoivernen: Jr; \'ii,-tnr." ." 'i'iiut i.- a Hither .-irnjr -tutvnr^r.f. JJir i.-nn.-oVtii>-few win* :-' in at rci.' jti'^'iniiiriL'. ii iii<iN; u'onof^f"! n>rd of ^.rutary Ac.h^îH, who i:v- t l - . - i d : - c . . w>iii-ii L- risie' j/ogrw>. Ol t.o-iPr". Si-crctî"* Acln-viii :.> ;;< iloii^tn olifrut jii:y jii^.itii.n 'ui- h-s *:vi-v'hwJ. 1 \-iii |iut iw whole .ipn ir in li^r, fi'-fvid. ' ^ ,-: Tin- iciforirwMoi, referred f'.iiov.'-:/ . .
(tw W>Mnr!B V'jn. Utf 23. Vi~,\\ lCt>oic .-IJM. L's-i'l:j, <.-. '. Jt;.-. , U if. J',y M'.-i..vi . 1 - r , _ , - . . - .
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- .' n r . - :li< Am.'. -''r.i- . J: ;ji... or I', '.'-') -i..i-, '/v:r cix v. JIB -f -' "'.. '/.:''. I""*MII- ri lu ';,< ['< n T n i r ..... |., . .if'/r ''.' ; -i , ::!. . ii' '.'.r ;.')!. n/'.i J '_ii;il. .;. Ji.-i-i-iiiii: '.- ;i nj O 1 .'.' 1 ' ' J1'-' '' *O'- Wi'J 1 '/ I'.*. - '.' "in i i a, v ..'.. .iii.
'
it tki.->ifr:*C4f.4iet*ii>rfxi-iC'iz:.iiVTllly unHrftZtittn'tli, -IS Vas> ifir tiitlisxllM.* << r ti-ki: Vr *.*> tryiwt* 'h* tkfri'Hifaitn.l'f." ' .
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. - "CVci." t* >tfirt. "in f\Mcr of (TIWI, Vii-fir-,'i..5cid <-fcii' u c fA^'.i!."rc^tii|, :ifrd "
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,ii. luthtrig <-ff!<:\<Jr;Kxl;A in h- irtiy.a. un in/ziij-wroir, i- -b* wt'n osrn>-v (vr? air< iT^Jt'Ttivt: " ' ^ o-w'-;;if tc-J" of t'2fili:a; it l^ '
_ 'I Ii'- fx-twv.-i tl.iit wli;i;:Vrr t h - wi-Joiih of ;;i;i , tcv.''I"i-'tf >i-i,>ff I'lujl'-ft. military j;ivr fvr t>riii:i:<J " "
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1:1(111} - -itiAfi M>|>n-i1U^ '
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Army' ja-âid OB Thr -n.-j;tiini<rijioti'- ali-v-jliiiitfjT-fiiPi 'nii- i-'.-Jr"* i*ua. fw y'jr-, iCiit- f C'i!>'< nuui<i< Inkcii in twi
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1-..I ,!, iiuMrr nrin; iJiîi lln- I'.f!. hurt l-îrr K-irc.t. 'l'h' roi'i'lj "Artr.y u-ud hi r.r,.i-)!7'; i- aUr.rt VXi.oixi n>< it. H'-"i' ^.tU.
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x-i.f r.if-'' for a- t ix|'iori><T f'iro tire :i
'indiî out l-> !< ofT f:irc't, lu> fu,'nl. To
il I- n'i . jii.d 'JL'> !iiiif-i for fi;i-;i Hi roiia-at ."JoiJ^. '!' ,<:">I "( -virti :. f'/j-tt , H - H . K t t i - tn'o foj/i K olid (ilklia into tln.r. *'J,r M ^.1'" J, ' w i l l rt.j'r '' --
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,'
. Tiyâi^cr.witiuyBi is tin- Honorable Avwll Harriinun ,*t)hi.- fa.io\r^; lias Jbnjc sorveil his Gitvorunitrrit^ ..
.
- \ \<r.uu*i .i l/ makv the sitrnc" JitinoiimTim-nr. Tjoihitor -.S aJvtil m-- t*> ftÛifaiat In- uos v<-ry sorry, hut hi- is-iri'fxi* AJsuuiw <in buHiit> ^'kinji to inform J.int*4l-'*lKM.'c.tbc iiiysu-rii's of tl/v atomic jr6jr*m. 'V"'*,*n-' rwyjiU.-s.vxl |o Jr<tvt: you. Mr. Hummou. You It^vf a ircparf. Mr.X'hainoan. L w a n r to i-xpn-^ my ip]>rt:liutiun fir th- oppv.'tnîv it\ a-*tify Mum thU i-ojrto'ia'rt' oj flic iuihjcc-t i..f i-i)tHfi.2 thV wtir i ViftitAin. Tin; Kr>'-iloinV pi'n^ranr of V'iftriaiui/jilJ'jtu i or.i' of ptrju-Unitioii rath-T thsuii tîrriiua. u>; of tfur lijrhUtiX', TbtT'/Torp "I fet-1 Mrrtiigly ilti th<* C'oi^tcv1 ip'i^t'inlfC 1 .uf.\io:t
Locking ^Jtti'-k ic ^.-cni- ivpiri i hf itfut tvi- s-hmild not Iwve .*o invfilc.-ij Pri'<Mrn Kito^-vi-jt. tatcd in .iy pri-siTic-p on wv.-'nrcuvifiii:: Iuri"jr -VTurtrl War IVtitnt hV liaii IK inrîtioi of al!rtwi>;jr th<- Kri'i.vli (o n-iurn to fmlod'iiia Hp Wait <ii< oi'jj-ir i<> tt.v Pin-Jajron. f uJidTstJiHil.'.Mr* tn.iciuk'? -plirr.fi (or rLi< tin'-j if(pr iho 'Jpf-'Jit of, frtj/tui. iui he tliil iiut 'rlt-tinc. (iitr |>iitj<'iiJ. oiovcs b'.- fiu'l in niiiKl. I'jiftirliiHiiji'Iy, 'ilji- Kri'ti'-li ui-nj ^llctwjiJ l>ark and ftiil-'d ir: i]-i i]-ir in :-wjin.w ti un ayr'(['-;>( fyr tbc iiiiloiN-iiifrjti 1 !.' of .. i wU. J%lKt'3'.
Evj'TS'iim- ii>ii'ornii)nri'.ly. wlj*-i) Frt-urli juilitKiy "fT'iris failwl uiiI .\fi:ili'^ firi'.-. (iif <-(Uiin^l of N' Tf,raH*:. a A.r.inU >( I(."/4 wr i-.'lc '>\-r from Frurii-<- fn S ' to . that < !. .T. (iiu-ctin < T-i>|'.itiM. furriiJT Chief f>f "Vh'J of f hi* U-"*. x\riH\v -.>-?i'iti"iiri! t/,iit! the Mtuaiii'ii in .^.'.jfJi \'_ . ym'iii1. H'j 1 vi-;i }i\ '-.ji-p v.'i- bn'.iiin': ninri 1 >ifj Ji--i-ili.il; i^ li-.U IMl.c/wllli-.
v Hcf.'n^lu
v:Ar.K roue,! or itt-.pi'\-iKi.t; Tlif -'Ji'ii.-*.'. Mr. < liuinniiii.-of i-ruliiii: ih O.-/H- is ni>t. a. th>' JVr:.-id':iir a.--rt;;. ^^.v-iin hi- |><ili<:v "f VirtiiH'niza'i'vii of "tfto wr a-< t*i* a)i<rfuitfvi -uui*. 'briprinj: (list'' h1* I he oilujX-'TiiO-i'-cii'i V.>' -Wl'i >l>oijld he :i" i.iîf-'fji-vH'-v ni ri->-]Mttr-*ii*if j>r<imp7 iii|iiiriro:iK . 'I' hi.1 fir-f -.feji i- !-./ lii-sr-itinte w!l' ij<- <<l5uT "JiJe .for tlf" '.'iff VJIIir flruv. j! i-f .:)! Aiiirrjây f<-jn-e hy A" rle/initi/.tlfi'it, jirrft'nilrtv lk(- enrf vif ihi-.v.i-r Sim/ 'fM-'flt'r'Jili'iil , m iJe|i.V:<^ uf tJi/- rli-<-irt* of l b'- J^T".'*' (iij/nrif.;. nf ilii'_ A-fii'vL mi jx-<.,Fi'. ffii-n-- f' ffll'.u fiti- iv>nr>--,-. J >!liji:;li En In- it- (I;;;-! 'J;,- -l'i;:i( ji.n j, ... -i-riim* KtKJ [;/ lii-i-u ;fi>r. 'li:if;jC .! t l n i i - ij\iT'.vl'i-linirrj t l i n r the 4."'i|i/rr>-- vtmiifij )i<.-j'tJ Llr ,;.>:i^: i.'.tli.pii.. 1 -1'ijfxiriT'. '( iKlir.il 1 1ti- i'\| n-;ii|i* H."'' ' if , f i ) r n l - t'l I'nlnpf'i ui.f.ijr.jni.!. Tin i;.iiilil f'ln < t i n - a<i'iii(i'ir.t(i '' f i V i - i i t c r sj'. t'ir -'1, it ;it;ilril'.' :il - ' \
wwvio'teitv in tK'-niirotikti'.ms foiMhc withdrawal of mir forv<?^. < ?[>o<5;fa VvTwtgerrwrHl* ~!>lir>uld J>c- imtsfc.for tlibirsafo departure. Both .,' 7- ., ;NorthA t iHriar>r*.id lire'N,:{,v>ol Liberation front -have stauJ that "
r
'-',. ^ronvJly, of priint-uit>i"taucc'Jsthe OJ-jrotiaUort of an'acretnieiu .'! - ,'"'. the-n-lro^ of our meti Vk-Jio are" priAinerv of war. ThU nm^t b< ai'<-<icoT ; pS-îcd before ttieftna1 \vith<irs8'a) ofôur forces. The normal time fur . _, Jfw return of |iri>oVii-K U \\\icn *(L> fi^hUnp stop>. Cotirnuiiti? th<* war ,
*--
Th' IVesiiit-yt. on^tiattly; HTtrîjx"^ to justify hi* rjcpnJi>ioil nnd

ifbtaia tlte reU-ai'< of our pcUviici.> cifwar. J5uTv.ly, Mf. Owir/Uan. l n < v.Uy V- vivc AiTiC'ci'-j:i>-.'lY>.r S- ^'"> * v ul the JT^htiiijr. I>rin^ the tro'tpr.
<U}<.-ini in HW!>irun-0 !JY i\v otV-r î.'Ie If their -urtions are r.nt
.- " The thcru sul'j''<'t,-j>n '.ihiî î}ir(i<.'fp'iT' -*.'ioul't b*-. rtadicii wnuW t"* , " t/ jvrr\vi! that '!^-re ho. V rej:H.'al> by i:!tlii-r 4Utu ftjjain u^llierent' , "f'the iifv.r, i wjih vam fnun >f internaiionfll suj^rviMon. TlF* Js.."ri'' '"-'.-Iv-i'M.'isi'f^t^l for ;)]>rit|riu?-'"aiyl!iii.'fnr vioii?.
STV r.A.~i OF 'iXTBKesT IX-WMJ'UOMTSE
' ' _ L
" .,
<- li-fr. t-> ne;ro{ \Ju: i..,i;( iiiii>r->i, ,ii_v*i . 5 i>'^. n*i'j IUIKH. 'jy, V^J^Y , 'lie " i i v ovid f. i.t.ii'-: ui'ii' uwr" -tUjf rhA Tkn-'i t"V'TttiM<-f<< i- ii-.t i:]i-r>t>d in a )ir*prn:iac scttl mifr; Inlat^^-ttrb.r <if IfMl^. ai> i!tarler>tutniin^ wo> reached wir!) tht.. ^'."'b Vi;tfiiiiif*'ie Tlih* jifvifuttcc] Presiih-iif J^lirisdu to s<f^>p the t>'''iib'* . insi i if .'tlit1 i\or*b HM' {^(rvi'li'sl f<T tfw Ih^jiiiiTiinp <if sulwttinMvft iji{k from til*- \f>rth VieHijiirjew/-\v;tv ihc jiiirti'npîioii of tV-, Sni^n rivenifiK-n. H'livi-viT, to l*r*.i<L*T't .fi.liiJMTiV s>irfirix\ President Thieu at .'vi-niii.Mi* in S -c'f.n ilti.f it w.-uld )>nr.ii>'i]mt in Pun-; "Wu* )t- el.-nr u uj'r .aiKs ;uii iîijj nr- -ciiîjumi in enny Ayvpnirwr-jyuN, owe m (fie ii:-.{-ij]ijpi:rarf dJM-j.s/o!i. jii-êi.T'itirry^'lilror'l.sfalt'd. would b/jve lfr,-.-n uv red(?cti<.'>i in th<- J'-vd of is'wjilja'', uinl vioieiire. Wo ^'cre ev.- ' - v-irr.'&'l '.< OyJieiV; that prngp'.Ni ii. tbi1* t'jre;tiau could Ix,' iiifnie. f;^ . iiiÔvl'ibt'r uinl t'uriy Vo-'eiiibw:, lire N'or^b VtjJ,iiufrjf^..h>ul (nlii'i; 9') H'*I^ i>f I'tcv' "fii>-! liurl Ijt'eii wjlJuJruwi) i>ov"''. Miv 'JOfh para '""' '' ' ..-. . ( , j ( j t j. , - . . . a-o ubl'- ',<- (licve the J^r Air Ciivui
. >B;-j.ir!:iiire-, t/i ji^ti (lie taljc- in Psiri-, rti l furtli-i* by tli'-it rînijix of fm.'d.*ij
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503 ^
iirivrv 1 left Paris in January 1969, we then ex;Hvteti serum* nc..'">iirioiir to cocr.raftnve. My ussQcint?. Cyrus V:mw, at f.'oniil<*rble ;HT-;"-' iri-jon \-c-niei ice, reuiain<vl in Pan.-1 to a^si-r in Ntiioathin;* tit? vray for .Itffha-ou'ior Lotijjrt for 1 itiontti. Howevur. Thi-u pulhii tho nij: 'in' frnux iinji;r L!K' nRpotiatioti^.IIe Miino<it>r<Hi thrrt bU ropr*>fnti.tivo< \vniiiif iiijt take part in private meeting uit.h \'w \LK, rIajnii!)T > h u ( ;<.:it;l jjivt- iiietu undue prestige,'-ttlthouph he ktn-w full well that it -l\r- only in the private meetings <-hat any jirocr-s.-^ rcuuH lx- made Two month- later "lie Was finally p tariff tw jtri-> t^ purtk'ijiatf. ri1 '. .; the >aiii(' time ho ftrinoiiii"-:^ -...! ht wiwili] hot it\ *ny irnmito H cuaJition governv. ft ot or jvniiit fhc (*o:iini-ts to iti- :xl party in Jxmth Viîtuir* fjy priCHt-i\ v'.-ith hi-* : . >< 1 1' LTi-.^s In-.- Itfvn rnntlc in ly.trls -.MJ.-.I.. A^Ti-i-i'-fii' '-ii il'fi:uff 'Jut*1 bit" inipi.-U' Ai v v!V < .n.jd-i the 'J'iiicn piv.-nmvnt : iini{onk. -'-'.ijjjHii into th: ctnvriirwnt & Sttij;.'ii nini u :<;urr fu-ri ' Oi n'w: t i n - jir'\i"ii^ .-ulioi tt^tnivu-i. jir--ir' wu^'ju.! 'm Tfiii*< f'
fjf.- l:''(l-( "ii.|||i|||i-I j:niil|f'^l ''Irfinlllf. AfU'f fU'lîlttHti'ill.- ill J'jill" .':'..I In I ' l l aiTfi'i'i! In III MuV <f IWSi, Tlll>'U i l i i l lilinjl ll 1 Snlllr Tcpri'.^'nt-
:it;i.' . iliii':-, ini linli..j a- Friuir M'i;:-ir Tun
^ u? Hii'/niTi-. w'l|f
: i i-ifcr 1 < iiiiTvii-u- LL jMipiJur .oi(i|>r' in prcrmntti'-n f"i ^-riniiE .(/".i.'ij'.ii-. JI.iu<-ii-r. jJ!'i- (} jui-riintr vitli jV-.-io' nt Ni'.'ni <>ii Mii!":>> l - l i t i i t l , iii i L i - ;niTiiuiT <( \'.*'M fi- n-ti! "'.-] T!UI>:I^ witii MV-IU rI KJjfUi, a fiii'i'tiry niiin-r M }i<> w u- .! of IP ^/. i.-ourtl f/Jlowers. .Sine ? tb::ii IKI ctfor! hu.-< fc -j-n ui^'iiin briji^ tujjt'i.lu-i the non< iiinri.mil.>' yrnp-. Ii i" hunt'to I'livis:^- -uii-fjn iir%- .tiilnUoii ini'!-. lif >;>iV(:iiiiiifiii ).- iir-.jtii' ui-il fi> i;n'ii|iii- r-'jir'-M-iii-utii'i'-. of tjje iiibjuMry "f tin- jK.'ipl' 1 <if .Nnuli Vic(r./'i:n v. !. iii."irie-iii<nal>ly ivurit ;.<!,; - ;I,i I'miiiiiinl j;r<iii{i*., i l n - iiJx-rat C/ithniiis. i!n- Cnn Dixi, the lli.-j ifi^j. liic lulxi 'iiiiiij;.> Hii.l titliri rii-ii-< '"iinnMhiHt gru'jj't. Thn -.îii'; \ ;i'Uiuiiii'b'. *li'Hi5! l- i-iii'KiiriiîI. in-ti'i;-! <f prcvpijli.'J, to it r<'u-ui.J>li- 1-hnwn of will nin<- nftiT li.'- rini nf iiii'.'iillii"*
N AM* 1'KOl'tSAL wCVfcl,
'!').' ft>:iri'. iuwMi-r on uJii/-|j ji j\ imponunt f.ir u- :</ (inn' 1o an u.'j- in-'nt -A'th llrtiinjj- fur -tilin- pnCTMio. rtfoiij: t n > - I i i n ^ 'f Pro-.iilcHI. f.,'i.i-.jd\ J:.!ii. fio;ikiii<. MM-i-rh of AJII il !%./, fur n- nii-trij' liuu arul : "'!"''? '(.flnji'iii'iif i.f ili' iiri'ii Thi- -instill !> mi inli'iiiiitioiui! i-lf'tri v. !ii< :, -.vmiJil DM li;ili' purii- i|iti'i In tin I Yiu-'l >!(!> ui ( ,J t}i: Vi.rfl. Vic n:irii.'M-. VV-- nni-i i . c i i ^ d j / / - rlnii i j n - \..nli Vji-tn.iiii"*; ijjl !! !.! ,i 'I.Mf J^n v iji/ii'j-ini-iii nf liifil.' fur ii Mii/Ji- ilnv ati/l . .!'. 'H. hi li:i;-.; l>i- i<-.u |,/'ij l i i u l Îj/'
.f (> ''if li |" ri/i*J nf trnr- K 1 nl.OU'i' :irrt|li/i-Iiji-|j<- w n i j | < { p-nllilr rtll I. i < - / i f-.( V ' r r t l l \ J r l I i / ( ! f i t i r X ( , f k 1 O|
5<>4
airl u)Kintht p'iMv in ihc !(**. Moreover, fmvinp be*n in-rolvtii iii ii r'-tin~ ch>- <t.'va>tatiou, > LavR an im-scajuible obligation to asswi
1
OF NOIITH VIETNAMESE
From tht many private fliaru.-iio!ui { had witfi die-N 1-snit* Fun*. J l>wnfl oiC thing. Tticv an- nVvay nationalistic.
v/ar L tneituf, they \ntnt *imihir nations. nith flu- Uwitwl Statra. IJkr Tito. thi-y nvochtzi* ih<- e?ti for AH ahiTiifjive to boinjr t-oninili'tl tu r.>!y oil tlit-ir |*w<rfii] < "onfiuni-( iw-ithlx>r. TTii.-y want vjfiniiriil iofonnatioti front u--. Th*> .thtmol n*ol infen^t in miracle ri<-<-, wltidli tli-y ho^tl vroiJd tiutktr th>ni JitifqH-iiJfnt of ini|x>rt-. ruruiinj: a> hijrfi as 300,(KXfc too* a year.
POUI'Y
in VicUiiu i- !< -i:p|Hirt if rc^Jtnl!*1-?. n' \<H-H\ <,|t;ir>-ri':i.

. vast r*p*'Mtitun.% an<l |MTjwtnnl [4.'hiif>-rT. Iniiifhiria U *> rUi* iu tin- t"iin*vlr!i-r thu? ilii- ;x>!ji-y t- |irr>im-iitivi> a|, . in the .-as*- i if I^K-. -A.iti W curt-i.-icri'd fy Chiuu n> n thrcnt t" it^ >''jriiy. ff u- tiftki'i! .ii thi
ifw c'lilitilitlial [rn^flli-f rf ittT'-'l' L'lljtPd .^t
.ujtli (h' - i-.\'<-c|tin fi i- Iwvt wt- I'uti (.((. .nl in tlic- lurij^ mr. <.';in|mtil>lr iih iir tfivst^ fu > i t " of tljf- fflijt <i(irt J'i Ann-riîiJi fore'-*. &:-A Ani'Tir <-aii! JPni*iiIiir.t"'i .lu.tr / rl^- unrdi tuc^tty<: u-liiiit-. his jyili ai/.iu-r the win "nip.flof, <1'<'V>|>( < I \ I T n lni^ Jn'fi'Kl. wv rtlf<i/'.vr." Hr ..fnici! tlmi <cti- tlir i.rhrr-i'lr- irr^. in n zifinn ui!! Irmj (' "\*V\M*I untir.-? riw- ar." " *iin<-' ih** ilr<J' tliKt In- j'iw- lifit - \ - r i n iii
'flu.1 Pjv-.i.-l'iit \M- f>M ihm. ";( <ifir JI'-VMT Iwi c-lmrarti't' nre in-itiir *-i'<l i;i worlil o|>iii|(m T^*^ n|
ron'iTl. U'lnit ]- IH-J!!'^ Cc-ll IT- iur JiJil'Ûir'it :utd t
<nir jii-iid^s Th(< -i-'Vi i riiup [Vii-ii-Jrut iiuw fifi'iiii-fi l^' tli' uiinijjii^ vuilnlrjw xi.iv i v."-i!:ii'<I-. <[ >mr f./rn- t */;iir:tJi(.- p'-* *i iilH-t-t its'1 Imlnru-r. V^f -i'l ;i f> r Mi li/ir/r-r A-i.i^-rji nu njr usiJ t>>ifi.:ti' ^'ipjHirt <>'. iM'\;.rrnl !!i'-r (diUii-" v- T! .-;i:. "J i <^ f i ' h \ I''I/'.H[).- N u l l l i \ U l . i . i n i . ~iv i i-,
ri'i' i > ''! :'! .iiii;rfi i ' i!n- x'ii.-! .uru- '!i:if will ' !.i'"l'- 1 f'.r f f i i i i i
i i i i t j l r ; ;i!,ii ( i.i.-.hi)' Jlil '.n t\i< Tliwti i;<>'. i-njiKi'iil ff 'In- VH'h'
/.i'j'! i 'if ' I n - w.i: i- ' :;'iitm i 'i V V t i f j t i n 1 ^j
oO.>
Cambodia, substantial sum* have aiô lwen committed to that nation. Even though American casualties hav< declined, South Vietnamese *jldiers are dying in larger numlwrs and civilian casualties are coiinuiiiir. Pursuit of present poiicie* would ji'ault in a confficl of m.lciiniie duration. - -" The pn>gra;n for Vietnambung the war is based on the dubious l>ro|MKtition that the South Vietnamese military will improve to tine' point where they can accomplish without 540,000 American troops what they could not accomplish with them. Furthermore, it is-deIH'tulcjit on an~un}H>pular and repressive military government.
HEM RE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPCE FOU PEACE
III lOfi", despif*1 their jiVflwcice a.- military and {covfrnment&r It-ad-Ts, Prudent Tlucu and Vic* President Ivv received less than; 25 jHTcon! of ihe voT'.1^ cast. Over 60 j>ercenl of the vo^cs Were cast for civilhui candidak's uho had- iome sort of peace plank in tlu>ir pitform-. The honaloriaTelections htst August gax'e further ctiU' .f tht- de-ire of llie [w.[>le to end tlie wur..Tli': anti-covenimem. }ro-pen<v Buddhist slat- hemlwl by Vu Van Mau rêivcd rhe nurnU-r of vus. flu-sc elections cor.finnd that tnc ijeopU1 of A.mth Vietiiiiiii want |>oiice and no a continualioti of tlic wat. I >iiid on -c\vral occanions in-Paris, with the approval if Washington, Unit 'the United StutA-s was against impositioii of a eovcrnmrtit on rfio ^>oplt>. of South Vintnaiu eitlwr by Hanoi or Washington. Are wi- not now. Mr. Chairman, tlirough our unqualified jbupjxnt of the iinpopulnr and repressive Tlucu 'guiVrnmcul, hv-fai;t altempting !< \\ti\Hn*: that riiiiitary regim" on the people of South Vietnam?
KOKTHCOJfCVG KLW.TION.S. J.V S<JL'T1I VIETNAM
IK will iuk." plan- in Scnjt'rt Viotnam in October, follow in;; !<iî"ltivp election.-! in August, if ;Jit jM-.>pli- of Soyh Virtinna itre.jjiiivn uii uniniiibiinl iiiiporiunity fo i-\pre.---lh'irr wilt. I do do not b-li"'vi; thu! Prîili-nt TliSfcu. wo:i(d lw ri'tfirncd <o offiro, I MXft'ld i-\\fft fh w I'li-i'tion of u ciiiidid.Hif di-diratod lo jej'king a t-ninjnoiuiM- jx'uff. Th<T" nrv luj'A^vcf, ^ uninlicr of Gictors whu'h indifiit*1 7In 1 iiniiki'fio'->>-if uti. uiutnuiujri'ui ei r i > tioii. Thien }IK- juil-d u inJjLb*r oi i.!ii>> <>]i]vf-ii to hU poljci.s.iiii-l'idinir t h c u u m vlio i-urtv in -wi'/in*! i i i T l i o lî'i" priîdi-nlittl <-lccLiiti. and even t> rn^dc.T of tl,t- lower lutu^- in vjt/I-ifioii of Jri-i .<-nuiinio[ia! ifumniiity jind a. Supreme Cunrt. rnliii'^. fucid-i>irtlly, Mr.-C'lniirniafi. In- HJL^ p-plwjft the jili' .\!KI niiuii- fhU rulirijf. Afi-r lik ruiurn /roru Midway, Pr<-i(leiit Thi'-u MirMiuirril tlmt hir xvoiiirf pij[ti<Ei s^vi-trly sill nfivoca^- of >i coinprocm. \'i-A-.:tipc.r.-. in opi>osHion liaVP \n>i:ti <-lr.,!-d down. iroi'i'diiri1- do ntibj.''fi
. HUH ut^J tin- fii'djirii-. -.ull I* inori1 inipivrttiiif. ihiin v.Irat iak> [ilwe
.Hi rliTt!0!> i!Vs. \Vl.iill- tin- OJ/'uTHTs >llol|I.'l. of ,f,\it^-, Jiîk fof >>i<il).'
f Jr;i['.-frK-r ii <,f Arii.TR'an niflm-iicf, Mn-v' niUnt tiU-> fv; nble to r^fj'n'r m, t i n 1 jw'ivitic-* (f Thii-ii'.! jnilitury mid |>u!itira( (riivhiui'. 'lln- IVHI!I':I' of A;neri<:u)i ol/^-rv^r* inijrtit itiliib;* '<rortri Ui utatiip'
.V-C>
i:U*v til" (jreliolla. If, 'l> I fear. I lie elecliuli- are :iu;it'tll'*I<-.-eulltrollitl. tlie ctuMiniltrc repo/t would in like (he American people :twur>- of ihe fiM-i^ and di>[>el any illiMn> uf u (Mipnhir choice.
:'
r
C'ONCIA'MOX
hi coi.rliMon 1 unre thi.- committee \n -iiippori legislation by the (Vi:i*ri-ss:: (1) to UM- it.- |muer over the pur4<! ti compel a respon.-ibh' ni'u-truval of all our forces from Vietnam, preferably by tinend of ihisjenr; and (2) lo send n mi-sioti to observe the forthcoming South Virbiaiaiesc oJeotKn-, and to report on whether the South Vietnamese ure-iti fact bring civrn nn o;>|iortunity tcond objective by .'en'fin^ protnj>dy ai'inb<Tt of it;- -taff to Scmtb Vietnam to observe nt{ report, \inits* by ini-mlxTs of the committee could foeti- public t tUtilion on what Ls occurring. ' Thaiikyou, Nfr. (,'hainnan. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr Harriman That is a very forthright, off>< live, and j rrs-ua-jve statement. 1968 'irw.iR7trxiTY FOE !EI:II>I;; You r<'f(>rrprtunity nt that lime to enter srriou- iH-gotiatioiLi. F-* thut correct? Mr. H \KKIUAX. That wn- not only my opinion, but shan^l by S-rrefar,- of Defeux- ('lifford a.- well a* < 'vrus Vance. The CHAIRMAN. Were you in Pari ul tlmt time? Mr. H \ K K i M \ N . 1 H - J I I Pari-uiiiiUuiiuury 19, I'Jfiy. 1 came l>onie. of i-ours<>. on .several if i-n-ions during (he (i months in which \\<- talked.
'I'he t ' i f A I K U A N . Jl hii" aluaVi Iwen m\>terioil.- to me a- tu why the South \'ii-tfmille' (jovrrillllfiit n-fn-^-d to prrH-rcd M i l l ) l i i r Ileôliii*
ti(ni> at that time. What do you think it tin- |irinci|iul reuo:i? \fr. liAHicntAS. Tin-re wen- rumor* in pi.l|ie that I'rjileiu Thii-u WH~ jul\i~<-d t h a t the elect,oil of K l ' l i u n l Nixoll ouM H'-illl in TI toti^lirr -upjfort fit tli<' Thieii ^,,HTIUIII-II! tlum if the I)-m<Kniti< cundiiiaie bml been i-h-etrd. J believe i h u t lo IM- trije. And th.'ii 1 t h i n k Thii-u il>-luyed Kiib^-fjnent ili-.cii-.-ii.11- bv riii-iii^. H- I l i m e -ui>i. proc.><lural jiroblem- in order lo pre.ent di^-u--ioii!> -lrii;iL' l>Tre ihe new udmini^tration caine in.
I di'ii'l u u i i l !!. in utiy w\ .-uîre.-l l l m l ihe I'ri--|i!ehi .f llic ('ni)i-d *tlte- had H l l \ U l i n / I ' l i i i l ) | nny uf tlie-e (|i|r-l|.., III f l i r l . I |-l|r\ i- t i l . : I i l l " 1 llie-.i,'/e \\ :i- -t'llT ft on I h i l l l .' n 'J'f I J ' M I I l i n t !) U l l f l t f i l l o lur.e j i r o i e i l l l l u l < ) l ! i l l u l l - - i - K i ' - i i I n - f u l l h e l l i l l l ' 1 I l l t o o l l l i e S n I u l l i I M I t i x - i i x 1 i n - ' i l - n i ^ h i m . b i l l i b e l e > ! < ' T l u m people .'. ihi illil i n ] \ l-r ]'li'-i'!i-:i! Tliii'il ( l l i e | n > l | f i i ill -i: iflt i"]| in i l l ) - n , U I | t | V
In* i l l > l l -.|dei'l w \ \ - > n i i i \ \ \ t i \ f ln'1'i, '.'. <]! i . i i l i.f ' I n - -|l i):ilin IM \ ' l i - l i i j i i n eVi-li b'T"le ( l i e e l h l *[ ]'.'>'.). I - j i \ l l u . ' v i l l i >o:iii- n : i r j i l i ' e I M - I nil-*' 1 i:!il - n l i - l n d l l i . , ; h - - w - n ; | , | h i r e , i j i | / i , i > i i r i | i l l n - r ( ' l u r k ' ' I d f o u ! , . | (ir.ip.'e Bull *>! i e l - , i \ of S l n l e . met { !,;ie\i l|i<-|r \|i'i -. n l n l J cm -,i!| f i < - . | f h , - i l| ( e I In [' - l i l - ( l i l i !l ,,. ll hi f"[- I l e n t i l l u t i n g V. |'|. I he Noi <\t \'jel'i;i: H-. i- i o -i ! i.f |''<|MI lion of llie

n l J ' i II i I'll "--life u l i r l t h e n j, po!|l i i - i i l -ell|e|i|e||f
',/ I ( i - i l l I but
rM>EK:,TANI>IN"T* AT TIME OF S1*8 UOMBIXO HALT
Tin- I ' H \ M : M \ X . There hnvo IJCM. ir the pre*-. aid in the </..! di-c:-;i,,ii> <:hotu the under-.tu:i<ii''<j , the liino c.f tin' hur/'ti'i in 1VMX. Could ym cliibonito n hit ubout timt? Km 1 example. <!.<! tin 1 North Vietnam>-e t t h a t time asree topi-runt rrruiiiiai-MWi 1 l!icrht> over their territory'.' Was it u part of the inulrr.'tiiiidiii? that could continue (hut? Mr. H A K K I M I V . We understood they thoroughly recopni/i-d that we would continue observation flight*. Tty- C H M K M A N . Thcv roi:n<fiiiwd it. but they didn't ajn^1*1. Tlwy just nro'ptcd it. Is th i< what you moan? Mr. HAKKIMAS. .Ml of this WHS nil iiinU'r-ianiliuir ra'hiT tliaii u \\rittfn iiirn-ciiu-iit . Thi-y tijrn-i'd in a rhrmsv it ill* 1 ln;iirtio fr<i:i \ \ h u i llM-y nri<;iiiully d'nuindt'd rrun!m<: t i n - <'iui of th- hondiiiirr nnd "all otln-r wi-t.s of war" t> "ull dtlu-r M-I* iiivulvitip flu- ux- of f<-rr-." Tinfn - t t h a t tliry fimdly f<'iptid this iHnsriinp* nmde it MTHI il>vii>ii?. in us ( h u t tliry Imd ai i-cjili'il uiir iiiidorsUiivliiitr tlmt rtTniiniii..uiic> |iliHM' ufj-i 1 iioi th' list- of force mid tlif. i- -forr wj-n- jH-nr.ittiNi. The < ' H M I : W A V Kfi'oiitiiiiMHiici' |il:ii!1^ accompanied liy hointxM's. Mr. HîiitiMAN'. Thai i- not tme. "Aci-oiiipanied by lumbers" is mi :n ( uf f'-rcc, l>ut not iiiiarincd nfoiniai.v-iiiicr planes \\Iiich we T h r < ' n % i K n N . Uid th*-y understand that * uoukl rouUniw nrerlli-.'lil- of rei-oMnnis.san'-,e planes ncc<iiipuiiird by Ixunbers? Mr. HAKUIMAN'. No; there \\a> no ideu in our mind, in Pwi^. they Mould be acciiiupniued by lx>nibei> - ju-t unarmed uiit->c<>rlcil piano*. Hill nfi<T they IM-ITUM afliu-kiiifr our |>lune> in vinlutinn >-f ,whnl we undersio'Hl wa> the linden-landing, tin'ii our iiiuiriixtl ]Oic- uen* cM-or;i-<l in urined plunes. Tin?, wnin ri>]>oiiM- to their attack.-; their i>hootin^ a. our unurdied ri-counais-mice jiluni>. Thi-< 'UAIKMAV Tlii- ha- hfen u runt (IT f considerable <ojiiro\iTsy. I note that one i-f (he North Vii-ttiaine^- -jH>k~ii'cii, Mr. Npiven 'I'hnnh !>. i> re|M>ri'd in the Wu-hhi'/ioii J'o-i of N'ovi-ciU'i lîis lo hu\i- -aid
\\ I.- ..il,' ; if t t i - ' mill i . .! .- . LI t, .i.<. an-' t ! i t ) ' - i I" M I . . : i.i- \ n - i r '. i -*{' : ' , !,..: ...... iir-.-.-.-.. i I. I.- r. ,,;.. r\ 'Tl.- r . . . . i . i , - i - :m. liii 1 : i.f :n; , . i r - l - i, i - . i i | v i . i t ' I I I " '! 'i( f'irri \, it r i i . j l . .11 J i n r - ' l i M ; l!n,si- fCil.li Itik'li:-!. ' l i " I i i i l i - i j s ' ^ - i . |.;i. i i i . m . i r f i .1 ,IJ. u.il mi- w ' u r l i infriiii*" c^ 1 v m r i . K I . ' . illnl - V l l i f '-i I In }>' '!.< f:..lir Itrii'.lill'- 'if \ irt|;.llii " 'I'li.-y -i-i'lui-il l i i Ink'- ' I n - I I O - K I O I . nlluo-l | i i , i ; > i - d l i i ' c l y f i e f ' l i n t cojifi-renec l l i a l l I l i - V did li"l ni'ri'i' IK f l u - c i / l : l l l i i | : i l i o l i n|' I ' l l - p'coll-
nais-iiicr <li-;lii. Vnii ih'tik they ai'i* iii i-rror in diakiii).' llmt .-i:itei.icnt Mr HMU'.IHAV Mi- ' liniruuin, t h u i i- a., not our under?' Midid;;,
u i n i l h \ iili| li'il j i M t i r k - ' I I P rn o|iIi)U--Mli<' M j i l j t l i e s fuf soun- Mine
Tlii-v ini^li' :i"i iuiic n t i n c k e d ihi'in if .-ul-.iiin!i\c negotiations had i'i:ui> (iri'inj'tly. Tin- i- nil -|i-Tiil:iii\i-. I r uinioi ii-îify in u definite
V . . - I . :.|Tniil ;l. Im! |l v,n~ \ < T V i |i.jtr lo II- I bill l l i e v linder-toiMl \ve \\ere J/nlll^ I I I l o n l l l ' l l ' - li 1 ' " H t l M l - - l H H e f l l ^ h l - I ^ M - H ' I M - V i e refll-.d I I I t t i ' C I ' J i l
il.ii.'Ji laiijj'dn'ie, "end the bofnt.ii>;; mid all oilier ju-t of wnr." \Ve i.t-.i-ti-d uji'iii l)iiii*u.j',:i- I iliink ji 1 wa- ".ill older .i''i* inx-ohini; tin* u*t- of f ' r i i i " Ji *ivriicd \er% i [ejii they tjiuli r-('io(i w i m i ue liud in nui.ii i 111,1 u. rl .-lire tin-} Mould h a \ e Hlluckcd |>lunes if we had itnrfed, ..i on< /-, .ili-i,i;iiivc luik-, IMJ I I can't prole tlmt
506
(The Article referred to follows:)

ITnm tiM WuMaftM POM. Mr. 7. !)]
VIET REDS Cmmt D.S. on P.UUH DKLAT (By Erie Wentwortb)

PAJUS. Nov. 6 Norta Wtiumi and it* National Liberation Front aDit* dir-ctl prniraK&nda t tke rnibarrami-d: 1'aitcd Statm luir today over thr delayed start at the enlarged pac<- talks, North Vjrtnam^p delegation spokesman Nfcuym Thanh Lc atilcd * |>F"w conferencf hrtrr U> chidi; the Americans for failing to Jierp tluir word about holding * firrt fucftinjc in ih* urw round of (acr talk* today a* whi-dulM. Thr Paris Inform*! ion Bureau of th' N'LF (ViKeonjc) eontoidrd itwlf whh written communiqite akmc tb*- Minx- lhu. The l.r.S. d*lc)ttioo, wtiifb had rvfusi-d to nit ith Hanoi and X1,F n^pnv tx-ntatiVPH in the1 AtwHticc of any contJnpiK from Sajpon, di^liifd (o aiMwrr tb<* Bllarku- No n-w dato ha IxN-n'M-t for th'1 lir t nintrnu South VinnK>i- Fri-mdmt Thiru ha halkrd at diflpatrhinic <*nvoy> brrv withoitl aMUtraur * -\ hat, anion^ <>thr thing*, tliry vould not have to deal with the NLF a a if|);ric ia,tity. When Ihf I "..". Mi'%*tinn imiiKht a iKx(]XHjpinnit tx-cau-tf no Saieori delegation wan commie. L<- iMMrrVrd today, "the L'.S. side did not implement it axm-naenta nd vJi'dgm " H- addnd: "Th' I'iutd Sutra aide and the Sijôn administration mtiat bear full r>j>on(>'lHlity for t!n." \j- atw> ditntiuti-d a North VH-tiianinw T'orviini Miniwtrv Mlatrnntit attacking tlii- l/nitcd !*tat for continuing anrial r'ônoauMatwo (lights over North \'irtnmni IIK^ ill'- boniinng rt*4f wai haltnl uod, in aatwriog a qii'-siion, iniplird M one point flu- \aifriemit w^ro tlwMty T>r(kiug tliTir iw-crrt und^.-nitatidinK with Hanoi on which the IxMnbing o>!atiii wan ha.cd. Thi' agrcîni'iit. arrordiug to mfornK-d ioiirr<T< h<T'-. called fr UK- l'niti>d Klat t halt air. imval and artillery hmnliardni'Dtx and oth'T "*rt involvmir tlif ))> of foro*" aKiiin*l North Virtiiati). IlccnmtaLiHaiicf fluhlit wrrc excludrd. Whon ank'-d if the roiiiitnu-d nvHinjuaaaiiri- flicht' viobtiog the agrtM-inent. !-" replied, "Tlw PTOiinaimajK-e flight* ur' atitong tlie a<-t involving thr 5<- <>f force. A- :i reniilt. iniiiirfniiiiictheKereconnainNunei-flightH, the Ciiit^d Stutm has <;r'iT!iili<!d illâl act* which infringe upon tb>' tovereignl y Ahd n^rttrity f/f the I*-HiKTitir K'-[)Uhlic of \"irlnai." Bv mJlinn the fliglitM "(lleûl," huwever, the North Vietnuntiw poke*iiiari to|i|H'rt <>f rbargjiix the L'nit'I Stuto explinty u i l h failins tn keep its worn on I.. foiiii f{|* \e-M Story. ":'.. fv ii\vt L'nuIli'nKed ri<-'K HtnrT. tiawij. on u . ^ ' i t h \ ietnurnehe Arrnv high <:otnnirid C'ini'i/urii'|i[e, thut itaid Hanoi wan n-lrj-Nnktytinn more i x[Jirii|y ihuu (>efnr<- Ui1 <tt> lro|>Fi wen- fighting in the South. Hi- >^Mi>tl n error in tTMi. elating tin- rjiunj\,nj'|iii' from \ ii'tiiniiw to Wntlern laiiKii.iK<-. /VkM K-in.'t.hit ili>- f|eclii>n in I hi- Tniu-d Slat'1* -lerdnv vtoiiid cl-ar th- y for inpiJ prHtre*. in ;iie Pri lulk*. \r repli.-rl '"I'ir ( nj< >i .vat^-K {irenideiitial electioi'.- ar<- 411 Ainenrhn di>in''tir affair. We iiMV* on|-. iliii to nay - if ilu: friwnt or t'H'in- |.-*rf'TK of the ('nibtd )>"ti*t<ti ref'it-t pu< .'in euii to tui' Ainericiii* war of j^xreiwiii aniiii*t l|* Vi^tnaUicw (fople, >f (.he-, rrftiiw- 1" viliidrnw Amenraii ud lut-Jlite tr>xi| froni Woijlh \'ietruini, t'l." will otilv *uffer rtill grejiter IOMU-^ " 1'\f XLF roiiiilitifiiif'If dnniv^l the L'oited ^lalJT rnu^t l>er "l.*ir fult Wld lit in- fnpuntllillil V ' for fiontpodiug the u'liedlll'-d l:iu'e tklkn
The CffjUBiutf,
Senator Cooptr.
Of
SenuLor iVKircH. I Jtuvr Kreat value UJMHI Mr HarrirnntiV xUU>incut for nittiiv reiw;(N: Firtt, fn-<-iic of |H lon^ <'X[M-ri<'(M^' ji dip'omAtK iM>;o(4iil4oi)M for UK- I'uiteij .Mui<>, tle fait ilmi lie WN.v-tjv ^ly JH voiced ii) iu*?<jtutioi>* w i t h tin- North Vi Hmincw. aruj on two ^riiMioiio w i t h r|Mv t to Ijtui*, *tnl il\m Inlcc
509
"
to the war in South and North Vietnam. You are thoughtful;' you think llnse difficult things through; you just dou't look for some ea>y solution.
HOW CAN N-BOQT1ATIOXS BE ACCOMPLISHED?
I notice you MU.-VO that we should place our ejiipliasis and this is what I hive always- thought the best approach upon negotiations iifituM upon several factor-;: withdrawn! of forros, the return of prisoner*. of war, a political settlement aft^r wo withdraw our Torres. How do you think those negotiations could foe aceoropltshod? We hav<* negotiated in Paris; the North Vietnamese we there, the South Vietname**-. tlie 1 jberation Front. How can we negotiate these objectives? Mr. HAKRIUAN. Senator Cooper, it seems very flear tome you bsw to hztve negotiation* for withdrawal. \Ve simply eannot pull our troops out without some x>rt of an understanding and I am satisfied a* they have mdimted they are ready Ui negotiate the Conditions of the >afe withdrawal of our troop*. They h*ve said it o many tinu-s and I am Mui>fied thi-y mean it. Wi- have "to have an ndii)ini.-.trntiou in \Va.shin*rori that wants to iicyotiatf H -j-til'-inctil Hinl u<* lmv<- to have an HcfmihiM ratio'i in Silicon t h a i vvatit> to have a t'egoliation. \Vr have neither at" the preî'iii time ami theref<ire no projres-*is-bM2_iiide. I ilou'i want to s\ the Nor.ih ViHtiittrn.^ e rusy to doil with, hut there are certain condition-, we have to ae.-ept. One i.f dt we have pni to jrrt out and <lay >ur of South Victnnni, atui raunot inipnsi* a ruilitury K-zime on South Vietnam which i* responsive to VV-'-li-ni uliiaiief!.. It has to IK-, as it wa^ in l.os, a ii'-Utral and nonnlincil u'lVfi'iiiiK'nt ainl that i>> the bx^t wi> can expert. If -OMIC of tiicx' fundaiiientiil? are lu-rcjit^l by th*- dduiinistiatioti iii Wa->hiiijrt"ti, an<l if ihi'ie i^ u-nm fielded in IViisi from Siiiiron tli.it Wnlil- To Iic^'utiaU' :i st-tl IctlliTlt, ilif'|l)clili;r Tprix.-Iit Alive* of tln-K- ditT*-n-ut trroiipj, wlm wnii' \x-wt-, why, then i am satisfied thoe nil, tier-, which 1 hav<> outline*! nt IcaM <-<>n\<[ !M- agreed MJKHI, utid a -Htlnni-ni uhieli cuVtTs mir re<.pon-.ihiliiif> uf ircitinp out. hui al>o I think ^l^l^( virt <>f coinproniiM' could In- worked out fa-tweeti the nnn-< 'oriimiiui-t leiulers lid the XLF. I u;iht in imint out that ulllio.jjrd the N'LK UK uripnnlly n ciculnre <>f the \nrili Vii'fiiaiiwM-, and lint, been directed and finained ud îi'-n inilitiirv* supplier, and ûj)|K.rt/-d by men and mafc/iel from the ', lln-v ure Mditlit-nuTh, ami tlu-re In a c^rtnin iiide|M-nd'-nu>, and t.hiT*' an- <-<Tlain llunpn wliich they wpnt. For in-tatice, th.-y watif to huve Smith Vietnam independent from tlie North for a certain numlvi of years. That ha* Ixvn arcepled liy' Ixith the N'orth, Hanoi, and |M< by the NLF, and (liut is one of t'he ty|e of thiogi that I (hink i (ild IN- neôiinleii, We CHM'I lu-ûliittc it. It Im- 'ôi to be ni'j;iiiiui.i-il ii/noii'^ the Squill Vii'trii-nie^' thi-m^'lve-., and there ure iiidini!piii~ ilwy are rmdy to inakc 11 oni|iromi-' which w i l l make it l>--ilil'- iii 't'.iiik oijt :<>ini- furt of an jij.'rccinciit Iwiueen (hem, fim tlii- i- -.omethin^ fur the >nii'h Vieiniunci' iheme!v-* t m t h r< pre-j'iij.-iiiii'. of tlii- ,siii;oii (jnciimi'-ni mid t!u- NLF tu \\ork out, iiini ur> riuiip-t dji l u l l - in them. Tin ir reluiioii-lii|i \\it!i n.c N'nrtli
'illili'il Iw dl'-lnlt-ii |>y i|- <>r e \ i - u licuoliiited by us. The Siilllh Ijjlrt \n lic-/i>lltiti' H i l l ) Hill,.. I the |f!j|t|i.li-li]|l llii'V ol|'_'l|l lo | l t i \ e III the elld i if (lie li-.'liili,'/
OF fcN'DING FIGHTiNU WHILK !THUKAW]SQ TROOPS
Above all eL* though, S uator, wo want to do what we can l-o end the iivrhlinf while we an- withdrawing our tnvi|>^. It i>n't conceivable . me rlmt h war <\ui continue soitisfw torily, siicee.-wfully, without mai-sire American. u|>]mrt, a>. I have indicated. I think tlu> niillionniau anny will fade away. It ha-}?>t thv largest desertion i-atr of any army tlmi I think we have Icnown. There is \vry little- ovidomv they could mttinuiii Mil bout stronjr American support the M of ihe forces that are thorp. Tlw-n- would IK- gradual dKeri<r>ti<'i) I'Vcntuafly a niilitnr\- tiikeovi-r which I think would I*1 unf-iriuiiat^. I think tlud-e are lliin^ that can bo douc tlmmph nripitiatUrfiM wlxkJi wmild n<t be possible if tiie war u> ronl-inncd and a military dLin^t^r <W:IIHS, which eventually wn-Id occur, if wi> were to n-dnc-e our urr-
K.VABLlVf, -iFrrTLKMIi..VT OF LAOTIAN'
S>nalor C'OOH EK. I will turn l a pn~t >i'iulion Ui ^- if that has any value for tin- [MVM>nt situation. You were tlu: rluc>f r for the Uniird States under the administration of PjvMilriu >n the f^t<>(in.n nrohlcrn, -.vere you not? Mr I!AKKJMAN'. Tlmt tn-rr<'< t. SfSintor ('OOPEII. At tlwt time th- Nonh Nlehmin.-.-^1 .funvr. were |ire-oiiii(r intJi Lns rnd tliere ua,-, un addition^ <-ivil war. You wvn- able to iiepntijtt*' a o-a.-M'-firi- aaul at least a U'TnjM>rtry sculerot'nt. What w-re tlie factttfs which enabled \uu at that time to ra:h awpuUMiu-nt? What jHTsiimitnl llu> N-ntli Meinarnev t stop their invusioti at thai linu- nd t<- biing the jnirtio to a^reemeni? Mi 1 . HAHIIIMAN. Well, tlie |iriii<'t|>:.l fsn-tor w tlii- aoviitaiuy- -<njr w-i'iiMUiCf >f i neutrai, fionaltned l>ao-. Fn-vious to t)J> time-- in ihe IITVJOUS. tt'liiKitN'r^'ioM, lliere had Ivi-n an attrnt|>t to Li-ep in J.HI.^ ;i îivt'riiiiii-Ht tliut T\J* re^poiisivi- to e<.feni alluutec.-. and that u *< w h a t w;n> l^'tlip efiiilr.N'd. Tll' CluiU'^ 1 \w|'e '<fnc'TIU'd- ->o Wel'e thi- !S'>nJi Vietnanie-u' i!ii wen-, ar. suniei'Midy said in ibr last iidinitii-'raiwui - jirevioii? l: ih- Kennedy adi!imUtra>ii<ii ~ -dial tln-y -r' ^.'iii-jr t-o njiike a bu>ii:i if Wc-.trrn r.trontfli oiit of lâi. " ) f ' i ' ..i;'t dt&k'1 ! li'. -ti'iti <>f -.Iri'liirtli <ll "f \JIH-. IMTIVIIW -iJwy are ii iK.M'-t/liivitijr jx*"[>!e i: -rnull tHij>ulii -d. Jtiji uln>ve all !!. f^!'.- iriirf--! iiu j-ôii.i-'l ill* .(.'hine-M- border Tlmi . vi-r\ pro\o i aiiv- niid lu-ri-tM, 1 t!iii:k u i'-ii'imiii'!n of tlJ.- -.'.r'j-j;';!"
Tin? ''. !i"n " e did :ncep( th<: J^riticip:;! of IH-Ulrnl IvillnlillcniCMl ,- when
m- i(j'i H./'-\IT tii.-rr ouulidii:'- fi>r the iiiiiu<- fuinivf^rshiji, JVi.ice

>;iiiv<iidi:i j l i i c i l i l u . \Ve .ViTC able hi W>CK out ail u^reCIu>Tll . fl Wai
vrr; <ii;lj. ii|l j.t i ha' liin-', lioni-n-r. t'l t;e HI) imjrri'inen: fr-tu (i-ncrul I'lioriPii. ? h.i i. i;nti-d i<- .-< HH (iili-nic 111 s'jiijj'irt i i i i i i l f i v i*-tiM:i in .I :'! otiju'ry. but IHI>-<! of die )H*o[ili: Uiive l-en l(vin>r ijtfl-r die 'I'd'- tr<ibl *u- tiuki i l n - \ordi Vji'MitUii' -J 1 .lilt : k it ke< i/ die
riTee'i.eii'. Tliey i'ilif i l i n i ' - i f" '(-( die Ho ('hi NJil b'l'Vliil, \.hicji \\ a*
Hi MO!II||HJI of uiir n^:ei-riieiii < J u r ji^n-'-nceji! v u- fwiTei.lly <!' p m' t!i:.r t i n - ti-i'iil' "v of J,4n -.lioiii'l n ( ' be used in unv >iiy by ufiollwi
511
puwer for the introduction of military fr.vs and the understanding \va> quiH" Jear.they could not.
'.K Or AGREEMENT WITH IUNOI ABOl-T FVTTBE U*' AHEA
And this is a VITJ important reason wliv we Miouf.J come to un HgpoMiiont with Hanoi about the future of the area. rn thai way it is conceivable that there can he JHHO* in the area. B"t if we just walk 0111 wid leave it without miy attempt to help, to come to *n agri>eruerr *.vith Hanoi <KI tlie future of the area, I thiuk there w.mld J roiitiimal problems, and 1 see nothing but chaotic conditions. It i* not uitrcHSonaoie to tliink that an agreement for reconstruction ft'ung the lines of President Johnson'* proposal of April 1965 could be reached. TliHi was our impression. In any event they won't accept that particular u^reement, and I think it has to be internationalized. It can't, be an American-directed program. But I don't ee how we can possibly avoid responsibility f< 'iclping to rebuild Indochina which we have done so much t conti te tfi destioj. I think, talking about prestige of, and the confidence in, the United States throughout the world, 1 cannot imagine anything more Ji*.-trou;> to opinion of America, than to walk away without offering to contribute to reconstruction of the damage that we have participated in. ft is our Air Force through constant pounding that has contributed largely to the destruction in thifl area. Jvimtor COOPER. I ajrrce. I just have two more question*). Mr. HAKKIHA.V I know there are some people who feel we caii walk away from Tudochina, Vietnam, but I have no hesitation in saying ire inn-it, contribute to it and therefore v * should do it under agreement. Senator COOPCK. I like what you say. Mr. HAUKIMAN. I think if we have a A-year agreement that tiu* North would keep it. Their whole talk with us wan of developing N'ortb Vietnam. They never on<-e talked about North and South Vietnam as one Hconoraic unit. Tliey wmii to v\ entualk have the ( \vo part* of Vietnam join, but ilicy are not impatiftit about- that. if the ii^litiiic would >iop relations between the North arul South uoidd \*' iiornuilizd. One of the great mi Make* Dir.n tuade in 1954 w- int in c-iabli,sh p-asonable ri'lutiou,- with tin- North, with people iiiul goods riio\ing Iwk mid fort It. That tui-t to lie done, by fho southerner* mid northerners of \'i<-tntu, and not by 111.
1 ji>i have taw HI ore <ju'-tion. In your long r\|)i-)i''iu- u> iui Aiiiba-rnailoi' to Ku.iu. und liuving jiwli' ijiuU-d in iiuiiiy lu'î'iiuiion- Hitli the Soviet*., do you have aiiv id'-u lO'il the Mcwi^'it.t of Kuni foU'iird (hiuar, wb>-<h<T it Aoiild Iw willing (o ui *<>;jtf IMIJMT lu'lj; bring alxnit a -rtllcment Mr. i l M ( K i M A r > . AI the inom'.-iii, I think, MO-.COU' i keeping their hn:>d <!. in- hiding tin- negotiation;,. They an- continuing i-ujjor1 t^ wljui thi'v dill u "i-(cr .Soi-4Hli-t MuUr and will <o:rtui'U.'a.>.Ioiig us tin; ur coiiiiinic.t. Of i*tw#' Hanoi U getting aid from F'-ltinj: a* well. Bui I wfr- iuM by Mr. Ko^yiyii when t >ti him ill IW>5 Lh-y wuuK-d to - UK- lighting t/jjprd. and thc-y did hi'lp ui in Paris in IWiK, bgth in
>.
512
r -m. siMQotJriiig out souw of the rough edges which were making: h iovoiue to an understanding, when we stopjwd All the bombing, .and in, Iwiping us to settle in January 1969 the argument over the shjipw 01 lite VttWe. It seemeu to me, quite dear to me, Senator, they wanted Southeast Ain ViTQi'g enough and independent enough to check die Chinese advance to the south. It is somewhat the same as an a*?* which you ace very familiar with, the subcontinent, India air<l Palristau. They are helping India and Pakistan in the same manner. We uax-e parallel policies there. We want to see Iivlin and Pakistan independent of Chinese domination, and they want the same. Xbw we can have, in Southeast Asia I think, the same. kinduf parallel policies not hy agreement but liy parallel action similar n India, and the snilK-cntinit wit li T\ hii-h your Senator, are so familiar. They are helping India and Pakistan and. as a matter of fa<-t, in some ways wore than we are. They arc gning military nwastiuice, which wo are not willing to do at the present time, as- wel] as economic. Senator COOPEK. Iwillclox- ---Mr. ILiHBJUAN. I want to add that we huvo definite conflicU with thx- Sovift Union in other purls of iho world vhich have to be resolved rca.-hing definite agreement *. but in tlii> area, I think, our fup rjiii \tc <i*velo|>ed by di^^dssioii.-. leading to paralM policy ihuu l>y an agreement.
OK HETTJ.EHEXT rOK WHOLE AUEA
O)OPEi. In i-.oiir-Ius.ioii I thsiik cvciyom' hen- WAJU^ to C:ni to .-rid tin.' war a-, fur as T.S. f<?rces are concerned. 1 ^r <iire h'î- j~no cjtiotio/i alnnjl tliat. But I HIM gia<l thai ^>rru>o'ie like f iliyour-qiialiiicHtioiis and long fXjX-Ti'-iices. <-ti aldres>s '.iit uttt l\ic p<^tti!>ility of a sîttlpuieiit for the who]'1 area- a M'ttlfMini! would viuj the ligh'ing in tlie. whole urcu mid wh'cjj would .:ve )ho-><> (xiiinfrier. u chance fur tln-ir rC'-oiiMtructioji. 1 don'i ihiuk cnougii HiU-mi'Mi im^ lmi giv'Hii o thf Jje'-'^sily. f am glnd t h u t nanpoiw of sxpmein-41 like you hiu> tuJdrebaed this quf-stion. The CJM ut w A \ . l^ tlie Sna t or finished? Senator COOPEK. Yes, I .tin through. The C'nAiRM.is. Senalor P<-J1, A'liuior PKIX. TliHiik you. Mr. f'hairmaii. I would lik*- to apolopi^1 you ;nid to Jlu- wii-nesM'S for not !>dng here for ilw whole totimony tty. but I am i-liairing die edu- ation lifiiring which i* going on now.
C'OMMBNi'ATJO.V OK WITS' EKi-
1 purlieiiJurly n-grct n<t fiuving bwii \n>re Ivfore to hear tin- flavor of Mr. Hurriinau's httitcnient. 1 rejueinla.'!- I Jefl ihi: Korcign .N-rvire orj)_'iniill\ to eijiguge in hir jHi)irii-n] i-itif)]tuipj for the Presiilency in VJf/i. MayUr Miiiie of tlje ri'iijlls. liHluy (Vniild nt \tr what tlwy arc if w<- liud iK-liieveil \ji-tory in those fur off dayn of ltt.'/2. J r<'<-ull H!M> ilnif when I wus Fori'ign S^niie ojfi-r Mr. /lujTrruan wn- ll/e /ir^l Aiiicrican fioveni/nent ofjiiin], not cmiiitiug Win-toti ^'liurciiill. M l i u Jlie/leiJ !J K/ the dilJlger- of MiiIifiiMli j|i t| ( c of (In- 1-njd Mm- |icii<.i{.
Willmilt flic UN- of I'KlreJlie ttord>- like u>jlliln- Of exlj'cjn Ill"ll'- of i i l i l l l\pe. lie ulelteil t | j c AflU'liiHII jM'OpJe j i n i l the (
513
racnt long before it was fashionable and chk-. I think some of ns forget ; the debt we owe Mr. Harriman. .
POSSIBILITY OF BLOOD BATH AVD PHOVj.-ilOK OF A8TLCM
There are two questions I bad, *>od I 'ook forward to reading your statement in full afterward. One" is if we do make a negotiation , with the Xortli Vietnamese, what is your view with regard to asylum 'for the South Vietnamese? As one who, as you xrill recall, for a long time opposed ibis whole' mess, I thine now we wee the pendulum of public opinion swinging so rapidly that dht movement to get out is such thai we will leave the South Vwmamese to fenrt for themselves. To my mind we have an obligation to those who might get their throat* cut. \Vhat is vour view with vegard to the possibility of a btood bath, about vbirh we have heard, and what- is your view with regard to the provision of asylum for tbosc South Vietnamese who would like it? Mr. HAUBIMAV. Thank yu. Thanks for your kind personal comment*, but if you w8l read "my prepared tertioony you wfll see that I bflk'Vr we <:tiH negotiate, wfa'ile we are ruUidrawing and indeed not delay tlie departure of our troops fl ua\% an agreement tbrough wiiich (her? w*>uld ti no reprisals In either side against-' adherent*, of the other. I Chink 1'iat is ixyva*uin . I .think that is our r/tf)>outfibBity to do it. They have i'vjlcated that tbur would Us one of the subject* on whii-h they wii apreffuettt. and I think t is nocessan- to do w>. I'J ho|M then would be some >ort of internationul i I liie International Control Commission trt least, wiich re, is the easiest to use. 1 think that is our obligation to arrange. Then I do think it is our obligation rather than supporting blindly this unpopular oppressive military junta to help bring, while we are *till then-, the non-Communist grouj* together in a non-Communist coalition so they can face up to the rather tightly knit XLF, and if ttmt is done I am uatiifusi tutt a Vietnamese . ,pe of solution, MAW compromise < S.Q be worked out that Hill make it possible for all parties to live in the country. There would be nonie wro would want \4t leave. I tun not speaking: of .those- fviiv have alreîv Iwugbt their ti-:keu u> Paris a.xl who have laf^c accounui abroad but. tl.ve might ! *vtiie legitimate follower^ vrtxr huxv sui>portl us and have bmi loyal to us that we should give safe haven\o if they wantetl to leji.v. That should be considered and worked out, We have a responsibility toward the poople A'L> have support,-nt a. I don't liave any grcut feeling about Presidei^ Thieu \*er#rnMy, bocaufe 1 think ht- has uol C|ipported our polu-ies and lat gone hi* OH 11 way and wants to HW biuiMoif maintained in power, but I am t(Ukiiiir About tbe peoj>le who have bmi loyal ulwl a good many of them i<;lit (fi'[ they wouldn't liaiv a future in th* country and uattt <o . Kut 1 do ttjink it i umorl(tiit. I don't. agr^ w<- ^boulxl walk away just uûutt' tb<Te Hill be iw blood both. I Ujiuk v'f âacxxuL' t MgrticiuHiit, a mixormh'r- agn^tmTit, trbirli *v/til/j co lonj; way |>rranting ii,, . - \t is my impn-sKion tbKt tJj*' otbt-r 4d<- dow/i'i waht n blo<xlI'batb M.II/ni<r^ lhatt*>do. It u tlwir country. Tliey" 4ii to ,>* the
514
<: CRBUU& OF t.S. INVOLVEMENT
'
Senator PEL*,. My seeond and final question is from your vantage point of seeing the sweep of either history or current events of tUs . !enuiry, .where tlo you think our etr^r eame in Vietnam? We all broke at.different points. Jviine of u> broke-earlier than other*, bm what \?a> ibe cause of the basic error or do vou believe it was. error for ;mir getting ihvoivod in this essentially civil VLar? Mi-. HAHBIMAX. Semitor, I mentioned in my testimony very briefly that President Roosevelt indicated in im' prepuce on more than one occasion he had no intention of letting the French go back into Indochina after-World War II. I think that he did give instructions to the Pentagon hot to make any plans for Indochina, and \vliicu. they dVu't, but he did not define the politL-al solution. He did mention to fyrtJin at Vtt't *tau there siiould be a United Nations trustees-hip for the area. Whatever the solution uuuld have Ix'en I lliink ova ^.listnke wa> to let the Trnch -baek whieh did iuvolve vast cxj>euiitures of money and. joss of life by the French. I liunk they now realize it bad bei-n a mLnakf. It also would hnve prevptjtmi us from becoming Crvolvwl. Not Irt follow Roosevelt's poliey v,'ai5 the lirst mistake. Now 90 far as President Trumim is coiic.erne<l I want to quicklv say I dwft" think lie knew of this. 1 was in Moscow Hitd I don't kninv whut wts going on. Luler on when I was with the Marshall plan I 4Id feel we mud.- a secôd fcisiake in helping-the French. I was opposed t<i it at th*1 time and I thin't it was . mistake. It was done Realise it wa.-. thought it would encourage ihe Frendi to go ahead with the European Defense t "ommuuhy in EurojK.'. Then, of eoursc, the big mistake uas iti-JJ,^ Muen-we literally pusliwi the French out of SaigJt- after the Geneva agreements of 1954. The Frcmrh had cerlaiu reiponsi'jilities and we literally pushed them -out uid took over from tliem. As I re<'all it, General C<illin- iiuiJcaM-d thai there was a grave question as tn>il>iljiy.
v
, ^
I don't w a n t to go on and try to ii,)|)raiM- li<- misttik'-r- uc nindc -\\n-p t h u t time. The rerpojjsibilitic?. vu- tfKik in 19."J4 le<l i<-i fnriher >tep> whieh got u> more and more in\o]vcd. All J tun MIV i* nuw \\c nil- in tin ui)t<'iiul)lc (xisiiiou anJ now \ve uiu-.( get out. Tin- ^miier \\c <lo it the belter, but Me niu-l ir 'Ut in H iv^jwu'-ible manner. Senator. mid wr i-tit) get out in n re|Nin><ible muiincr. We don't hav<- t< cut ainj nm, u^ J huvc *>aid before -the Preci-.lent ciill-.il "buggiiT" ut tlte Mitnc tinic. I uiterh disagree v.jth (h- idea <if Vic:uunii/5iif imi of (he Vir. Thi i.- u policy for the i uiiiinimlii>n of the u u r .
.,, . w h e n \'ou Mij>jn>r( <-<ion.> Unit bfen/-|j a
although >ve never signed our nim-j ill.blood and 1 think they felt cheated. If we had follc.red basic rules of .morality of keening our word and only supjwrtinj: countries whic-h keep their-word, I thint-we. probably would tiOt feaye gotttur into the-mess.-I* that not right Mr.ftAHRTMAX.'!think-ydu are'correct, Senator. ' ;- ' Senator. Peu~ Thank row. . v ~ ' ' v> < v The rKMRUAX.v.Senator Pearson.. ;.
PROPOSED: 1FOT7R lOISTES TO /3E" OTGOTUTW> "
Seiutor PEARSOV. Sir. tiarrimaA, &s i-study vow statement and hear,vf th great respect your testimony, runderstanJ x'utf'yow propose generally four points to be negotiated. They are. withdrawal of; all tcoo^. i by & definite date, release of j>ri >4>ncrs of -war. no reprisal ou either *ude muier international supcrvwioB, and sonie forl of regional development. To a degree hadn't this administration aud the President atiupfed dl of those projKisjils? ,Xir. HAB^JMAX. Ko, sir; no, sir. ' ' ' > - -: ' ' ' '. PRESIDENT'S PSOPOSAL OF . MUTCAL WITHDEXWAL ScoHlor PtARSOK. I sk this not as a rhetoric*] or argumentative question, but I understood or rer;aJl that the Prei^deat early in his uilnainlstralion wupawd m. mutual withdrawal of ll (atxes on a ule ami a .given. 111510, ' ^' -^ ''.' \fr. H&BRIMAN.. There cjionot be an agreement on mutual Irawftl. Whetlier we tike it or not they eoii^der we are the t forw's. The\- ha'i* suited the dejrfoyment of Vietnamese troops inns*.' In* ues'Xinted betifeco tlw VietnaiiHê themselves. I am -iatisfied the Vietnamese rn TMfrotiaU- the withdrawul of the nort1irnrs from the oiith, but they will not negotiate with u>. for mutual witMri-ms). ft is obvious they unn't do it, ttnl I think we are astitif; time t ftiking nbotitit. They will dWnss the withdruual of nur t-roops by n definite date, and iWiWy. Thuf they ha*v staUsd unii T Uijnk caii l>e don*. Thuê other niaiU'n* <-au be jKiroliat/yJ during tin- cours/' irf <ur witJidrawnJ. If it is by the en ncirotiaN-jJ. If you tdk ubout U-tiîi r*f jiini 1 jf tietfotititiot!, when the French mnie to -Ju'ir dcri.-io iliui. tlw-y u<-re iletejTiiiiied to willidruw. yon reiiM>jlT i 1954, ii - a nilt<-r of H f-w week* (Kjfore th<'y iijrr-<l np)ii the r"<1rpU>yintMit of fonv^, <-ea>rf'4ire aix^l certain other arransementc which were made. T|:MV (jas lo be an agrwmeiM now lliat we are jruintr t*> v"'t ^'H tmd slay out, and we caniuit diftuU* w l m > hup[H*i> iH-tw^-en th<: North and tin- South ViKnarne <. That jnu^ bt- die .by ththcinftelve*, sui-1 wlmt uill ItttpjM-n i1-^ impossible for u~ to If we don't do it iwiw it v.-jll bi- f!o:c !*( on v.ith cn-ater lo*'1. 'if life in the iiieadUrne. 1 liii'.e iilvi ii)di'-jt<-(1 r sir. Mm* I iliink w- h \ e a foj*i!i!-ibU5iy TO irv <ti rji-iil* 1 a MlOHtjoti in the South by wliirh thoM- v.'bo \vuni imurp. v-lio M'lip'M'ii* tlw jf)HJi;rity of t]v jN'of>li>. ecu b" bronjrlit toytlwr ^/ tlwy jiiv J'K i fRjsitjon t nezoijiitr fur the fmUP- of ilx-jr <-ouiiliy. Prt-jileot Tiiic.ii IIWK nmdr il \rry jjlnin lie won't coijj|;roMji-4'. Von ejin't. rûiie to :i ttgru-eiivjiT if \ou re tmi illiijijr to (onijTouiinf. I iii my U'tirijony thu* lie aiinoiiru/fMl he would not * u-r liave a
coalition ovemmeiit nor would lie icrmil the South Vietnamese Communist Party to be legalized. . The North Vietnamese refused for many weeks iu our talks to M-gotiate with President Thi*u. They look upon him as, I am not saying that he was, but they look upon him as, one of the military who were mercenaries for (he French, and not involved in the liberation of (Vu- country. They don't trust him. I am not defending them, but just lulling you their attitiK?*. Thieu himself cannot negotiate but then! nre plenty in Saigon Avno ran No political parties amount to anything in JXNII h Viol mam, hui there an- jrrouj of jieoplo. such as the Buddhists and Otholii> and various groups that I mentioned and lhy have, leaders, who represent tin? political, religious wncept* of , their people. PBESIDENT'- roxninovs KR WITHDRAWAL Senator PF.Att.-ov. Mr. Harrimau. you .nay call it withdrawal program orViotnaiiuzation, but I under-stood thai the President, as he slated, defire.<l flexibility in the military und diplomatic field nd made iii-, program conditional upon violence' of the North ami capability of tlie AKVN foR-e>. I take, it in yourendorsemcntoacertain-Hda'> witbdm\val. and the accept anoe-.by this commit tee of a bill to cut off funds, thai you don't believe that those conditions are viable or reaionabkv Mr. HAHRIMAN. The proposals of the President by Ills own. de<i.titi(*n are ffr the Vietnamization "f the war, and -we. are never g'iug to get our prisoners home, which i-* oneof the matters tljc Prâdeît is j&UTe^tiHl in that way. The President indicated he would keep <mr troop* there until we got lhe |>fis<tners home and until this government in South Vietnam, thih wiiitarj- junta is strong. ecupigb, 1 to hn vc a rea<Hiabl^ chauc* "r JJ^KH! dwnce, I tliink are the words h/ used, of survival. Under tluc circurnstaiu^s. there will Ije, HO rejurn of yiur priiionere, which is very important \o ;is. We ha\'e to In* willing to stop the fighting andâgre-e. to gel out and irtay out. We have to be ti" to let the South Vietnamese end the fighting and com<* to a romise greiment but not im|>one our M>luUon on South Vietnam, iy, PreMdent Thieuf and hi* military group.
or WAK
or PEAKV^N. Pardon me for inierruptin^, but as J your nrxt projNixMl <>f item of lu-gotiation. you would -make the riefoliations riibjcct (o and coixliiioiud upon the return of the prisoner^ *f 'ar. !> ilwi correct? ' M r . H*KWiM4.v. Wfil, in d*-alinfr uitli them you uav- jjot io Jo Hijiij:.- tlM-ir way, I am Mirrv to ^y. They l<tok u|xn ihrmtH-lM'* a* ten snipll p<-opU' niul we 11* gianl^. They ihink they wer<- de<-eive<l iii i Iw I.f/4 ii^rccnieiit and (hey ar.' vi-jy <'urcful ai>out liij^ cimiinitiiu'iit. We woijli] huvc i4i nwy we wrre <rojnji io negotiate wilhdrawul of <>iij- it-Hop- u>. of a I'r'iiiiin time, ifial wcfild \n a>rrw<j ii(>on, and under rcriuin (iiijijnjnu- of iva-w-firc. slop dw fijrhtin};, Jiid -wi forth, or w I i u l - \ i T ii would be. Then uc would ~lu1e Iut,of M <lurjii'_' llji jM-riod ih.-il our pri!rfiner.- woijjd co;ne oi)t. \'o i 'cjijciv .|IIM Ifnlpcrn <>V N'c\v Vork, fi flejiu iIk- with both the N'orih Viclmuncv mid the XLr In Parilluil ih<-v Here rmdy k> di^'Uni. nt ihr- <ju<^linn of-
517
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whether the prisoners are released but when and how they would be relraaed and I don't believe we ^ would h&ve.any real problem in reaching an agreement on getting o\ur prisoners home. - I dteagree -with the idea they wou'd hold our prisoners after the fif-htiug slop* and ,noi agree to rdefexe the prisoners if we were withdrawing our troops. We would simply _ announce this if, what we expected to happen. ; '
OOKSUtTATION CONCEEMSG HOLDUP IN WlTCDfeAWAL
Tben K the-Congress weix to fix a date oil ivhich funds were cut off, at the cud of Ue period, if a condition rot>e which, made it desirable for the President to hold up withdrawal <>f the troojw, he could come to Congress and 'tukjftr soroo relief and the Oukgress could agree. Senator PEARSON*. tjive the Fresdcnt power i< do it, perhaps. Mr. HAfiRiitAX. Conjf, baric if tliere ;> cr>nditlous; This is a. inatUiT on v.i>Kfl I think ilbe PreadeiU *liouW consulf Congress. This is, I agree with the chairman's p/islwn, whirli lie -has taken on a faumber of occasions. This war is belof conîrôed without the approral of the Senate and I-think that it is high time thai the President- listen tolhe views of the Senate. ' At the ;jue time, if the/ Tresident found there was an eaiergeney, I *vjuld BUgecfct that it not be left to the discn-tion of the adniuiiitraUiHi, but I wouid like tc see the C<Migre> consulted. .- ' ^ AkBAVGEUCVl OONCERi.-N'G UEPE1HAL8
'Senator PtABbON. Mr. rfmnianf when y<m sjtoke of making a\rangen>eut foi no reprisals on both sides and some sort of infcjfnadonal fw<* , - - . . - . Mr. UABRJUAV. N<, air; intfrnatitMial supervioon. - Senator. PÂHBOV. IJnternatioiial auptrviwon. I inupjobVivUxKi vout and niv qiiefifion is not too Televtnf th<*n. I was ôiU'^^med about v giving rfaem -^ Mr. HAKBIMAN. May { say r, there are going to be wwne repnwis. '1'bw*' an- gciug lo be peopV'* killed ou bout Jod! becau.se titere art vm- bitter 'natreds and there are gujug to be Home tragedim <xx-4irring, You can't ^vî tlimt, but I ihink it is imjx/rtajjt to have international w|>ervi-rn M> ae in indicate that thm IK intmutional intm-nt and this jiiU-niational fôup <-ould r/'jxjrl if tiierf is tun' major violation.
Tlwr ai'e p(ipfc w1iu lOakf a. iyeat deal, and i -think <ror td".i/iJ Mii&t iju]>piijrJial views. Its tfiuunnau i-<
KIM] NFL, if tlwy <Jid <xiuu- to nil uprvtMueu^ uuuld uaiil to see little vioJi'iMU' *
^ They tiUk uJxjiu tJif-uroblfnih ibey bnJ in if^- N'ortli rtf J-akinr 'bi Mini) (<M r k <>
518
!K.T'!tHaeut', U*y know the problems they had .:id they nee t hern: repeated. .They art ready to haxe jxîsants own tiu'ir own !:id nnd various thiu?> of thai kiv.d which could be worked out. Hut forgive my interruption, wv cannot avoid iiuolioii* findinir some *>rl of exj)LV3.-iitii in violence. but I would 1 w\K that it would le kept in a minimum. . N-iiiitor PEVKMI.V. I appreciate that comment. I wa- cwu-enivJ. Mr IfAKhiMAV. I don't ajrroe with I hose ivlio think that -thm1 \\MitUl bo auUimalicHlly no ropiiîi!.-;. I think if nothin<r is done, if ii'Jiliu;; is Allowed to i-nutiinio, this war will co on iiiddinitoly and iiioii- and more uill l<- killed au<l it will l)r'ak up into all kiiui^ uf >niall itattltvs and the "iifliri v.ill be dUastroiis. 1 lliink it U utu-rly inr-j)(i;i-iWo. to fiavc a policy timt is L'a^d on thv Vietnamese <uriiniiii^ !; war themx'lves. Tlx-n- would develop <.'haoiu' nlitii>n. if ui- >\-(?r^Ju draw <lt\vn to n s-nmll iiiuiihcr of lro. Violwuu; v\ould l>rcnk out all over lli^' o<mtry, and it would IK- a irajiic >itnatior. vvliirh would W (.o.th*' <li--r!dit of ilw Unif-d Stair-. ^vMiau>r TEAKSOV. I haô ii!jy one ijuirt- question, Mr. Chairman. { appnviat* vour romuiojt on that Ui-an^1 in w* of tluCo fori'iû prcîKu- and in view of your *n <-ouiuio:n about NorlhV failinr t<> honor tin* 1954 Gcii'--\a A<-<-ord. I was afxidt it.
C^. AID IF THflCr r.O\"EEVMEXT
In viw of wliat i-. nou your (fcrsuanioii an Ut ihr 'I'hk-u (.lovcrnn<'ii)T it> :K-N in n'fiiMii^ in ju'frotialo. iu adlicmix-e to a c-ortliljuation of the war. if in the iwxt i-liu-iioii tVic Tliiuu Gov^ninvnt pn* vailed, as il did Ix-fon-. would ywi favor a eoyliniwd United .States *id to South Vietnam? Mr. H A K H I M A \ . J don't know a> I i>inlt>r>tand your xjur-t ion. sir. But f (dink tlii-, government, Tlik'U wa^- uui\iri^ 'w tlie direeuon of i>rinjnn<r in (iviliariN in WN and that wa<- re\vr>d in 1V*W. I don't know what hap|>ene<1 U-twet'ii PiX'iiieiit Nixon and Pre>id<Mii Tiiiu a. Mi'iuay, l>ui I. <!< kiiow wlien Thic-u t-a.nv IUMIK" I lie lif!' tiling be .-aiil to tJk- |p*9N wa-. "1 *ui '^tliif to severely (JinfJi. a.'jyont 'hi III-OJKW ,-t wuHtioii j;overiiniejit." aJid (Iwn lie did acvept tilt- jv4jtn.ation of Huoiitf and put in a military tiun. 1'inUr tlie furvioiK administration pr/'MSAire had ween on him lo brjiij.' in <-iviIjnii!.. NOM. I MU not in any way i(ni)(ipjiii<: ThienV jmtrioti^ni. 1 wn Kaii>1i'd if be had to f;u<- up Ui it lie uouid I<iiic Civilians into hi (foviTtinfnl, a- lie did in 1%S when lie vm:-. fax-ed w i t h lh/- Fan-,' ltdks, nod I >im nJî ûii^fi'-d if we withdi'HV our troop' and itutjrntfd we \\oij|dn'i jjite liifn HJIV fnoji- ~iippurl ihl he would hai'<* to nejroUni-'. liavt- lo briii;: in ix-opk- wljo uri- iedy t' ne^Dtiatt*. I ilon't know wliut is iroin^ to haji|Mrn iu tlu.- elei-tuj iu O^fciiwr. Ji it. I'onn-ivijble ilmt Tlueii i- not '/ouii' lo be reelceu-'l. H U conreivul)!*1 if iJii-r*1 â- u rejdly fr<-*- r^-cijon there would IK' -*onie jwîu^'^>iii(-. undi<lul4' wbo wax dedicated (" jM'iU'e, \unild. lx- elwted. in which -a^- he would .-tar! Fjj-<;otlationH. ' - . 'J'ncM-, 1 don't think wv <!' iiujMcrf' I an> not siiêiin<j jrj >-,ny way that President \i.\on dir-wauitL- \\\c Tbieu (lovrmmei.t, Th< \ T <>riii Vii'irmni':^ 1 (iiiulU* um'-ed in IWiK to iui;olin.U' *'iLh t]w Siijôn ijnveriinvnt bur at tin- i>aim- iinn- u (earn oij^lii to Ite (i/'l'Jed in Purjs. ihtn wuijU t^-)w<;o!m(<'. not a 'emu lbt dw-Mi'l w a n t to ue<;oLUiu.
ol9
1 don't know whether that answers your question, sir, but wgoverurm-iit in South Vietnam, dii-taic Jo the goverurm-iit W<- ran. however. tvll the gownunent uudf-r what condition* \vv \\ill (Xfiitinuc. t< th-Hi thw is a frw- *lvtiift and 1 think Mottling would obviwisly b- more d'-urabV from th<- U.S. standpoint than an flection bT a president who \\HiiU-d to ncgo;iat ix-ace. Thwv will bt a logisliit olmi>n in Augikit, and wo ought to see'that thai i> fair and froc, 4 -N-MHTor PEAK>OV. I thank you ver\- jiuifli. Mr HARKIUAX. Wc> ran jmi tho ^miliglit <n them.
K VIETNllfUATJUX AXO J O f e > J E bLOO1) _BA'rB
Tl- CHAIRMAN'. Mr, Ilnrriinun. witK r< .>[!)out u bio<>d bath, it Mrik*-* inc wo may havo uvi>ri(K)kwi the luct ihWt di<- Vio-t nain<-se have . million-Ulan army eo.iiijijMid with ihi' IM'-I x\c-:i(Kint- that we <-ouid tnv* thorn. It -WIUK to mo that tht1 I't.'xidciu of tlw l T uitl Stt-> lias M*twl ou niutiy occasions that X'i<-riiijiixrtt'KH) i< -ui-cwdiujj. \vhi<-li nioaH,-. if jt means atiytKiiij:, l!i",ii i!n- >iuth Victinuncs*- Army ha>- d'V< iopiiHl,1 into an ?ffodlvn .(urw. Tliii U'iijij triu-. wh\ i- thcr<- few of bloiwi batlj? \Miy sho\ild t l n ' v not ix- tiblr- 1< jirot4--t ttu*ir |yypU- fn*in a blond bath? You uinint tiaxc it Ixdli ways- it is >uc<^lin{r and it L- Hot s Tin- oiriy. I'-aûi there would tn a "blood bath != . Nfr. H^Kf-.tMAN'. f do tux ier<-4'. -ir, ihat this funv \\ould ji'iv.cr. I think yu would vc a gnuija! r<?dn<'tivi hi foru-: you would 4-i> a. rcdiM'tJoii i fijrli'tinjr.rtbilify. . . . Thp < 'H \IUMAV. I did n<t >*y you suwl 4t . J -..- tin*. Pr^sidt-m wud it . Mr. HAKUIMAS. i do n<t know \\liaf tht- Prpsitlfiu haid. but I iliink x-i>T \vmiid *< if th<T<.' i-> a contunutioii irf ihi' tt'.ir without vecy ?ni>-t)ir^jHl Ani<-ri':aiiii|ij>orl. would >ini|((y1rad.'1-i> th?dint<'STttlon ". What \ou are *ayii)<r i> Vicfusimbifuin in -not .->ui mid. ih"jv i- likfly to !>< a bio.id ba<h. HVuiiiMAV. Jt .-unijot xni^'^'d, in my opinion, without \\ie sii|v' u Initjtr "U.^. forvJ. . did not a; you <-ai io* rhw*- isJKt+Mf \ jfi -ayinjr Victjiaiiiizulion j.; >uc'iA-<;(li iit-() in \\i -HUX- l>rx-ath Baying itu-H- i- a |ius<iibi|j( y of a .bkod \u-\ runn'o! . jliniv? it txali wavp.. If il \?, not aUi^'M'diitg - . M) . HMU-'IIAN. TJiat i^ a u-'-hnu-al diw-nssio?;. 1 i'.<Vf with you if iliiiv w (! sjfilf 1 ^ wid tlie fijjhlinji-ilwri11 ivocld not tw* ' l>!ooVH>ath. But if I'u'-rc was roiilinwi 4i{;liluj<;of a \''n uljliappy nufun- tiKtlVâJring ni< inio .n'jjlly a 'ragwly. 'I'twrofoiv. whilr; \\-i- }' -Ab.!idjnK'u.i; our tron{,> \v.'- oiijjht u> M-- .to it thut Ins'Siiutji Vji'tniui'c 'are'broi!it K/îhi'L. iifi-Sl^F aJiJ the olh<;rH. Wo Jiavi' jln- n'>oiiil>H)t> Ui >i-f jrr'0 lo . . , ' hove Iw-i'ii ij](-n- ijo<v foMiittiu ;>rtr->, and J-.io not bfjievo thai
.-.itli -ftt> fi'-;'.>ii.vj|j)lity . t all. T ha! j~ what l . ' i f i n tr\-in^ tv> I^Htify tilji.nl lllt'l I U.IJJ tltto'iy,of lb.<"l**liijf . '.!'<" r>jjl IIMVJ- ti ir^JX inhibit- ttithou our -><1<' to-
things whkh I haveîggestcd, and die South- Vietnamese if they work together, .wilt work-out some land of * South Vietnamese solution. The OBAIBU&H. Thank yr,u very much, Ambassador Htrriman. "We ippreci:* your coming and /our testimony will be very helpful to the committee. Mr. RABBI WAN'- Tbiffc yon very niucli, sir. 'Hie CHAIRMAN*. Gur next wit ness i> the Honorable Joscuh Clark, a former member of tins bod^-, and now president of the United World Federalists. Mr. dark, we are happy to have you. Do j-ou have a written statement? ', STATEMEH1 01 HOI. JOSEPH CLABK, PltKSIHKiT, WO&LD JEDE1ALIBTS, U&A. v. Mr. CLABK. Yes. I do, Mr. Chairman, copies of which have been filed with the cominirte* staff, and I ask consent that t&& statement may bo. printed in full in the record and . 1 would like to make a rry few brief remarks. The CHAIRMAN*. Yes, Mr. f 'LABK. And they Hill be brief. The CauHMA-N. Without -objwtioii. Mr. CLARX. First, i apjro<-iat* the <-ourte*>v of the chairman in tnalfinfT ^ po-iblr for joe to_be here today, if I <;an make any contributioa to your thinking, it is becaude I repre>ienr a sort oi political poiut of vif*- ttij <4ipiMed lo the point of view of die distinguished tiokiier and the vr\- able diplomat wha;n you have heard omrhW today. My own view is it is absolutely unrealistic to view the Vietnam war without firing: some impact to the political implications both in Vietnam acJ zc tins countr>-t and unless we. ônKtder this matter in part, at least, a a politic*) matter * ule not-faang the basu* fa<ts.
S COKFBOVTIVG COMMITTEE
I think the questions wliirfa Confront the i-ommlttô right now are, )ir*t. how aod when do we get out of Vietnam? I think we want to êt out of VietDjuu now btx.-a.iw an overuiielniuiK majority of the American people wast us to g*-t out <f Vu-tnwn and this L* u'poiitica! dfv:itdun. not a di-iiom&ti<; <icixion. It in not a ruiiitary dricujn; it T believ*. jJUioupJi I eannot prove it, tliaf tho majority of th<> ein^rb- of- tWt* roflimittw think w<j Mhould get out of Vin'tnum ,t licKt poAJbie uioflu'iit. So tbt- jroblrm if bow do u c <lo it mid , I fugg^t , is a j*>!iti<-al q u*u<), and it !<<ads f<> t4 as ui what <û tiii commit !<<; do to <'XjM>di^' from Vietruun? Pr^'iij'ul N'ix^n. J *!( it. /kx^s not agrw with what I - U' a njajity of ilw* Auiericjui pef/f.tl*'. H wtuits a Jiiueh more 'jjja.-wxl A'jriddovi'n *>f tlw war, IfHriiij; re4du*l U.S. {own, including a inD, uttorig Air Fwnx1 in Indoclaim for ijovcral ynr< lo come. He , and i ûiu^ <liM)Kv, lJi( <!UK uilj t'\pr<Ule tlw release of pribn)<i-s <>f war.
521
SUGGESTED COMMITTEE ACTION'
So the iasw is up to the Congress in funeral and to this committee in particular. Should the President be supported? You can, of course, make a good case to support him. I suggest be should not be supported and this committee should take the wad bj setting a date to end American participation in the fighting, and by using the power of the purse giveti to the Congress under artick* 1 of the Constitution to prevent the continuation of American forces in Vietnam after a fixed date which I would set in accordance with what I believe would be the modern version of the McGorern-Hatfield amendment, the end of this year. Now" this does not mean that there will not be subjects to negotiate. I agree quite thoroughly with practically all of what Ambassador Hamman has said but the first step I suggest is a political step, which is to set a fixed date for withdrawal, and u this is done, I am confident that our prisoners will be promptly released.
nUSOHEk OF WAB ISSUE
I ask that the committee place in the record three excellent articles which appeared in the New York Times in the last few days, two by that very able reporter, Anthony Lewis, and the third ihis morning by TCM a" Wicker, discussing this |>risoner of war issue and making it very clear, to my mind at least, that once we fix a date we can negotiate for the release of our prisoners and they will be released and, of course, if they are not released we can always change the date. (The articles referred to follow:)
IVrtm tfct Sum 1** Ttmtu. afey 94. 1*711
A llArrca or TBOST (By Anthony Lewis) PAHIH After an iut-v<W(With XuauThuy, N'ortfa ViHnaaTi ebxf negotiator in the Paris [x-.*c<' talk*, two iiuprftwioni are tin- strongest : H<* in utterly confident that hi* id*' will win the war it baa I*** fighting in Indochina for 25 y*an. H ia d-|ly us|H7j<X4N of Aiitericau policy and motive*. As the Americans who have dealt witb him in the talitH have found, Mr. Thuy it. jjTJCubtte, ioforni^d and usually affablf, Hi nuwner in tbt- iutcrvi^w wHrianit din lwi>tuag- not markedly rigid, belaugbtxi DOW aud tbra aw tw made KMIM* rhKoriBut )v joivc no indication that hit. <ovrnitn<Dt viu> priîuvd to tivp ground on it* aiiiih or ltd iicgotiatitig laiîcx. And th^ air of rouiidJTJCf wao rtriking. When be uaid lh<' outôfii*' of MK* <*ar wa "tvidiail now," hf MuiM jut if b*- wiTf ctating tbf HIB \T<^- of UK" rnitcd Jtai^ji Gotcrnnjrtjl came out tUingly in tb*- rritmed nsit'-ui'TJt that he. did nut ix-lu-vc I'rewd'Al \ixoii jnuiui/-d to withdraw all AUMTI<* fore** frofri Virlnam at wiy time. Tbt- rotiditicrfis bud dowti by tL<- Preid>t for (M-iuii({ -jthdrawaJ dt-, lie raid, were wjy "a j*rt<Tt1" to cover a demiou againKt K'*t<i<iK out: If North VHuauj gavr way on o<* couditiim fuch a tb<' f/rworit-rr, Mr. Nixoti would just rfci*' tmoihiT. A/t-j nil that iiu tuii'|ii<vj jn \V-(uinii, HiinojV iikeptkiurn alx>ut Anx-rirjui iDl'-unon* iii nut t-twUv curprMMiK- Hut it* \ifv, iX I)K- N'ixou withdrawal program do<n iiidiciit<' ii<>w lu-rK' K"W otJU (icjit* (M-IKI-III tb- tu tud'-f lure ju Pane, uw i>nh' Li i jui'i l/'it jn uiid'-rvturidJiiK <rf I'lu-h oilu-r. Miwt Ani''i-i<'jii', <-ven KOIIII- rniwai <rf tli'1 /'roideutV jolwy, Ix-Jjeve that Mr. Ninon luih Binned an irfMTnihlr pro/v** Tlw I uji'-d KtH>: in K'-Hiujt out <rf
34
522
Indm-hiimi ii lias-no choice in ti.raxs of political or luilitarv 'realities.. 'Tin- only rwJ t|iifi,uoii now i*"how niuoli nmr- damage ill fo dono to the li.dorhmrse ii''i>l'l<-' srid to ourselves before * finally gr>. " ; HutHanffido^sutAgiH'it that way, Mid tlyp reason is clear orimipH. A vrry w>o siiifi..>r.i of the Vietnam imgcdy, And of tin-- talks here, put it a follows: --"It is a uwt3T of iruxt, Th'-y just fundamentally mistrust u-V - Th" <.onlin';jn^ fic.adlnci on the most (-motional and \\tcrt4ort? oh"triK-Uv < isue 'jailu talks, t!i(i ;rfijijeTt, is a nanilt of that mistrust. : . " AT Hput: UJROU*
Tbc" t>.*?. <i<i'' in the p^ce tidies *.umc.t ** why rfeo North Vietnamese do iw>t jffsffiirc mi tU- prisoner* provid*- moiv tonri^ft*' lists of b> AihT>cans. or all t otic<- or mi<- firui conimiUirem lo r-k*c trwiu rf OIT* it lat jnn s i<3-mijil dat^ on AiDericmi iniliUtry jnvolvtiuew in lud.K-hioi. . " ' $j *tiv Ajufivaus M.V i' -uph sl<->^ wuuld <-otvl Hanoi uotliiiiK Wfail<: nio^t 11111 'ftui in a **r j>n.MOtiTe KJ-* ri'3rntall> tctt tih th* "cid of bostditits. s Hfcnoi -fjints nut it woitW unpro\'<- Nun ti V-U>i/t> n<-coiaatiiiK lcv-a- to tnk' Action That is littficid tbinkin*;, but it d<>ci 'vi,t talct; accjiuut of tbt- nu^tfuM iu Hmn<ri. Thi-rc, it appear*, tlw prison**, aw >en at protection agaiu-t an American re.>.M-alati-ii<< tlie vwr. If in; card i^xivcii up. ibf JV'niuiuni.Ht nido f^W!.. UK.- I'niuid, Stato miidit f/.t-l "more- fr<- to g<> on bombing iudefiuiuJy J1 over Indochina, including N'ortti Vitn*n;. Mi^tnint ad utitiundt-rÛuKljiig su-f iJf) factors iu HViuagtou. Prt=-ida MTisi/.i >.(ims ttmt Ue (JoiiuaiiQi^-* rci-unw^d FrtJich prisoawv after Frai rtIM. td< J *v tb<; f JtiH'vn coufepeiifi- in iy.">4 Hd withdrew her ffiro.v. yet he coutiuu*-^ <o i/iJ îr'ianerican puWic tlcit rbe only wr tn nt ntrr priKincrs oui JK t* l. in ) i oie for tinal withdrawal riu- reivfw of Ifîe. And . -> pririK-r >^H*- re<uaiu>> in JCM parndiixical powuon . W<j rtd' f<>r t<;t^l withdrawal imtil ibt-y nmki- coruiiiitiudit to r<Jpa,-c itu- prituitiurs; t ri-fu-M- t" iimla uny coiwiitUHM>l- until w set a date. Bi-catiio "f such differtnc*, men hv to -go oil killing and bci'tiK kiUed/)>niUilirui^- ;fa<-in*'Ivo~ and others for m i-"nviiwin(t cau.se. Kit po^Mblc* How will it l-.iok to hj-tori-T \4tiic-it the fact of mistrust, ^tie f<;o!- the hojw of snuity. One -id'- IT tin- other iitav iTffl fhjutt.c .u twtir* juid Tiialce gei<ture of faitlt. Xuau Thuy may net- fr^^h juitrufiiuii-, and t jmtnc jxiint thin Mimiurr tMt-jr A f'liiini^nieiii mi tht. prinip'T-. ^*r I'nîdent XixvJj may find reawKi to chauK1' liij ilicv i>f iipiî-i-iidtd wur. (Fro Ut tie* fork TJm, AIM., t*, 1VT*M\'i\.*; J.iKh*. Pi IXOCT I)\'n. ^^l P.O.W. Afifboii.v LfWL-i f in.'*. May */ -X.ou Th-jy, North \'wluwn'-> vliwf iH'X(>^:it>jr in lite Paris ( i.--" lill.-. -J*id yt-nix-rdai th.tt tU- <jiie-ti'.>tj "-f AJJKTICMI pn.-owTr! cuuid lw> 'rxpidly " iic! - ..-!r.-lly" M-'t-tlt'-U if I'j--.idcn( MTixob ;( a dÛ.-i'i'r t->ul ' 'ut " ca^</iialik' r " Mr. Tfcay .
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"Tk: Vt&lstortr profit ikrift .\Jr. .V M2.TJ<Jy^ Mid. "A . rtfjrofiaror, J mtti upraic in * to^ty- Vieteam propJr a wcfl.*'
25.
v JixoCic 'nr Virtxui

W.iMM,T<."3tfjo: 2 An tatervieir wi)fc JCunn North *> r-jc<>ut..r in Pads. bÂnibouy L . bM mstr .W t h e e.<*cRtUi j In fact, r * uirt " in Ntr >T rn-l .tt a <Utr. fur-t)uAcr<-ncn trx-tr* fnvw ur.fci. Hanoi pi-3iru.-<-> worr thao\> c.u :lwir purr wuj * co s," l>- *io frfl 'Apnl 2K. _ orv-thtir'-tar with r-gwtl t<-tl>? But W i- tbf thrmi, if nr, yrtueh mskef th;- ^tmn^ crcdAjle? Mr. Ni that aH Anw-rie*!, *r'y>p 'ill IK-V le*vr South V>rtBm "rn>iduAl <" an-f<ttifsl .-iiu artU r-*in until tb- priîivix re rtlrm><r4- Brrt *. ..rct- etn"irtl> csocut rtlrci tbr rcJr.- (rf t br pri:<cae!>i if the <>f tin- yt-arof la<tyri r><'iJdnitdot Tter, 'Mr. Xbt<' / etah4 n<< only can :.> an rxplici: ^miîn th*t tb*- puUcy nf .' t i. pi Jurr of t-.tl vitbdnval but -c f withdrawal t<v joou- poin to be hr lir. Xixwn. 'to the! basis, if ne arti kôp *>c Ucxip* n. dct. art priofii> . wr >- kv*-p VVutam until the All ---f (hat. Mr. Thuv told Mr. Lt>. mcrrlv tiinfirm* the wibicion uf ilt. Nixnn rf'ie* n-M intciMc a trw nritborawal. out pUn<t t.) kwp e (>/rcr ib !ndLirji Or (marant.t tbc > urvival ci i Uoo-Coonnunirt Stwt.li -*- rcpnie-r* <>-<Herean c.lirtiD " I '. biy wU Jv- that Mr. Sacofi J* correct that "a promt** to dincu)> nwan< oothinft fr.Kn thr N'->rtb V^tujuo^fo." Kvcn i, if br n- d^Vrmineof t stick wi;h bu wllliJrawki (i^lirv, h H liffGeuh ;>> v^ wbl e .)tl4 tj^- j.mt by rxtrciuvvr iiocrct dxic'i^KrD^. IE. Pari- iind pl--f win-rr, f -^t if tbrrr euvtld yi.r. 1-r df etypod an unilnTitandinir. it .ir nplicit, tbt Wab:r^ct(: aRd lUoî woijd m;Qi>uitcr Mni'iUaixrouoh: C) fi /' fr tt.- eoojJi.'ti' .n t the Ac>^nc,(i W;tLd.awol. :ind tb) that on the P. W.\ w-jij.1
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il.-? *îW not oair rcn-vt* :,V Kif.*iij f.*r th- r-ii<{iial Torec, nLKJj would tic t-nuiri v-wm of pnii(ie*i eoiiu^/vcr / in ifc* eonn:ry wirf rk*-irt*rr', it would aUo *U'.ii.- drpr-ve n;t {fc (^Vlrliit*! J>-fi-vrs.Uf f'reiidi-ni.tal nomiW'*-* i\: -kfT H'Tirr J^rlfrfi'' of th*icrcbi-li porfjiHEr gf> Viwitam. ." .. K uii<nlT rrtstt^r. !* \tm>-4 ><.IOKI%\ tlutv he t- Ib v in fr^f ;.-irty
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Vfr ifrt'urthi" pxrfr.v.j .<> tJ.-c in- s+.itlb: i.i,:'-rftî ot/irurtd fart that t\*\re ^ litrl<' <rh^tr- 'h' I "cn-U .tUt'* fa. fjri'<- Blur.- irfl;-'iic' than it ii'w juii .-MI lU: f-ii.ir^ if Ir.d'H-liu if'*' tt h- firjlJi-i ixit all ir f./rix 'r.tb^r at Mr Vix'M/ ((..i-i.ri'.i'i ^ f-.rc - ûf ciirtmic -liuft a war r'^-tl;. io all jinitli! (.riKt-.if ii,.ir- HO'i-ptulik- arraf-ic: nu ;.! tlwr; rt(?)rwui t/r U*- "K otijfr'jt. ' Jr iH.sklr^'li f ( '!: >ri'tfw)> Mr:., r.-.'iir t*r;f:J-, Mr "n.-i\ It rj: i-rnji r,r. t-r H i - - . irnr.-iw"-:. h- ij.rc-fi u, Mr. \fi\* \t>n .s..^< ,,; tj? fi,ii,rr f Mr \;vir'-t îf-.-r < t'i ; u "rîiitr, v / ' ^ ' j 1 iLr i - r - U ; '>n ,r- f ;trri*-'xiM rff>i [-'^, tf.^N'ir'n V^ '.tiur:^ - r .-> f:i-.i- nnlv i
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525
If t.ht jvf.r~*nw Hanoi ttitiii>-. it wiil oot br. po*<ihl? to n%|tof iat^ any tin settlement witl</>ut -"]l^tntial eonwîon^ from Washinicton nr.ii S*i#jn prwuml>K tr. nM-ptiîo- of >a interim arrangement for !>hjirin(c lijTiTrirul powr-r in Snub' Vietnam .tkmonK xll contending fl>-mwit until a longrrif ra. iirranjp'i&vai ear Iw reth*d hy the partly them^lve*. .[' IT (rue 1 Lt that might open tbf door to a CVnmuft'dv tikr-ovi-r at som<- point in ifa ir.riiiv. BI;IL withdrawing all Air.-riun Troop* rlt far man- un-ly open 1that door, and :>rolonc A *d- fc>tniexivr, pointr-a* war r>y how many y.-arx no on* can >av. Th-i". Mr. Sixonrt:i'i not onl> e*n -Jo WKhin* to Affect the i-lr- 1a Micv of t-VcJ )th<Jrft-al hut oia- of with Irmal \o Mime point to b>.-i. (kt \y-.^ N'ion <^>n tha'fnMci'V'if ure aw to ktr-p sonic troop" in Snith >it>i-il t&^ pri-irtnpr-1 an- rtlra^^. wv;-emy k'^-p both troop* and prisonf-r* 6ETTj.n\IfT T CAMDODU LAOb AS'O VIETNAM M" f ';.XKK TlK" nJ-xt thius ' I iH-li^vr1 Uuif flic y^r>plf of ( 'ui i;<t 5>-iir>. mui Ndi'tit rtnii vScmtli VicUiatu ni;^r sf'itli* their u.n fate jW.iii'-.-iliy. 'Hicr*' ici't tio >n>'k [iniDjirv ovj-ri.oiv^ to fn> *tir*\ but |>riinKiiiy rhi^ wW V, in she '-ml i t v i R NT, whu.1 thoy really want tu ln UVHU.J- th<>ir rirtl fotvr-. jurt5-oltwly iii J.JM mui Cilnniia, uro < urak thai 'I vrrfir!(i think a prpjM.iirliTJint iiolitiojil vir\r uf rlio-*- j,H-o|i|f> ^ !.. wljrti h*ir fiifurt- îirkid IK- wntild prevail, and I acrc<* uilii (iiivcnir^Httrrinian, IHW WP fix a tlaU1 to ^rt 0:1: tht ihe NV.rth Vi.-tiiHin'' ami th*11 >oiiih V'i^narniw- can |mljtii'ally ^ttlr the *itintii'ii ix-: vrr-ti them Hii'i if \vill ihfii bf-coirw aj>purci>[ tlint a riiilitiirA' vii-tnrj- 1~ jn-t a-i impftHitiblL' witliuut I'.S. paitii-ipmion a- it i. rith it.
IMP>HTAX''K <F S1OPPIXO f.S. PARTJCIPATIOV
Tin- iiii|Mirtunt.thuic b- iii -(>[) AmTu-a.1 parrifipatiou in the jntr ft.rui the IkmitiiriL' r.(nl 'hf kiliinir Mui t-i brinz our >r<K>p ^ -U-lji-vc t h u t Mi?r- yhi>iill : lip !Kmi' bitmmUmuil iut-ni'iil which n.i!ir.-l' K.^ p-ncwirj}; Lhi- !('('. 'Hiv IuJin-> h*:li u-. *<!( ^., ih- Pnlî nncj thr- other ir*/utr> - -- Mr. i ' r . s K K . C'ltnaUinnn, t*il I think rlii- w/iil<l In- u^-fiil. It kf.ip'i? .-tlM. Iw u^'fiii I" rftiivww,- utinllicr (Jctit>\3 ( 'Hfrt'i-nrf. hut U t niirotiat- fr<{ii - approi-JHrin^ if Bejpiiiatidii- ar- rntin-< > orfuI I if tinn.-'t r'-^-Aîl, yri ran ahuty.t >ay .x-tt-jur a ilat- <JifJ iv>\ In w h a t w- tho'tghr it >onlrl mid M- urr it"in)r t'* r^vi*-* that nmdc T initiatJM<-wlLK-|i * thmj^lif imii-1 lraJ to no' [ ivir^nallv U-liP\v it will Inn) Pr |M.-arr>. h-r O-IHT| Shxiip >ii\ h>- th<ii^h( vu r 'Jni'^ tb f oir Kri-'. i's 56 lay. I Jnnf .M^W^'V'! *i niunlii!-. t}tfiiirt I -ny"iii'riiy t'.ai'jii/ît ) liiiiik it i^.tifi û- loix in-t) ^wk^. f unL.itfT if AH ctl api.n>'if._flit iiKTr-.iihtK hii.-criii'îu-y Hi;-i'r i <itaii" v.'liLli i- i ;! rft the iVnt?iriK. w h i - h 1 <.l-.jv'-. of I hi-
MOR.lt l-'JTV OV.-r v .ft.li STATES
I ivoiilii aprer with Gowmor H^rriinnn roicpfrtely nbnul tliv Mood bath. I thjuk. fianklt, tills is Pi>uiat>n j/n>paguzula to tu-arr little r'lildn-f) in tin- durk J thf hf oI i'it.v to the jwopk- oF South iiini J think w- hav- fulfill." I rbar -ijutv. I think uv <io moritl 'Inly u> repair tbi- liaiuug*- wir'iur/f fronted ihw anif J think al.-o U '.In' i \ifiit we <-jri do so thai rnultiJuferallv, instead of miilmereHy, wi: MouM b- much l?tlT luivijcti front ni point of virw of otKr (it|,lojoa'->7 aful ] uoiild foiimictnl \\.hal Proiilt-ut NfcNninara of tin- Worfit Bunk ia rryiii]; to got dmif. \\ith th- Asian D*voJopn>ciif Bai:k nti-i the M-koiifj VulJi-y nmi olhi-r places N weU. I u'ould think itiU uoulti b<* a -.itiraUoii where - ooul/1 projM-rly rail on rh- l:iiiiil i-- to tak -onw* parti<-ipti</rj on-,-<- rin- <i'/li(injc ha.-<
FAVOIIABI.E KK^MRT ON McoovER.te-H*TFiEf.!> BILL KEQCIXTER

i, J link this Coioiiiiit'-c to inuki- it prompt Mini fuvoruM* re[tort on the Mrfiovt-nt-IixiuYlii bil! uhirh i> now p'ii<l)T3<r in thU <Tinniii>lfi- IL an uinriidnifiK to whuN-vt-r tt{proprition lf:i,-ltttiofi i-> now rr *hrtlv will t-nrnr Ix-fon' (lu- Sfrmi*-. J t hunk tin- rneirmaii ngain <twl .-N-itntor (^Vifwrr for lhr rnrtf>y in Ii-.ti-:iin<r lo rii^.
VJfcT*'.-! or IEAN
By tin- way. i-air I pui in for >hr n-.-oni i.hi* r^thrr i p ofiirl hut lin^ arti'J'- bj' DKÎI Achiôi^ if. the TIJ:I'-- fhir. ihu> wilh 'The DrJM'1 rffi-rrw!_K> stK'i \f r. < 'lark's ,-uV>-itr;ii foilo\\ :,
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I <jni<i'. d.i vrtuu ;<!' a-ik.'sfit that you ma., know tlist my rrf>i>al i- :m:l. I Kt'-'^ it. fr&ftxi~." Bid rrjr, on-* ?<*r uTi>-i"iuaJ ttirry !! ri>ii\trti<>ii- Sirm th.. end of mir fffi-rtiv.' tnhrwy"iirw-nf' m Witiair. will Vv- |.l;un ri^'Ugh tn Ix'ni* military -<i-ri-i. 'i-nl t/ i-f i-Hi'iU'<hi>d t-i in-nr^ whrtt H.uicu wmild hvr ni. ri-a-j'. for r-fii-iim. OrK'-r t h i i - hi*t liron dii'if. LlR lofticL! tlt< fnrt- ft*ii|l(( Kiaki" i;l'-:r n f[T^|ili-f# îThdr^Krfl Sf-.tHi \ i-tiuini by rht* i*iid ii l'^>.
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528
Uive jLould rcc'Hi.rrirtkd to tlto S;ntc postage <rf tin- McGovernbtU Mttiug the dirtc of Dccem hrt 3Ut, 19T1, f'>r the (<nd:r>K of htc-tifr afurf: 5vr Amencan farce* army. lukv-v. air force uiid iarmc- aad the withdrawal (,{ aU </ Mir armed rfcitcr* from Into Cbinx {( thin is dvpe ovr irtivxpt* will be reUnj.-w.-d. If ibU h ar dune <ii If lh,-. I- d/'-rw toe irxThanlf of uMrftu-*! con protatUy tr wirkM out at tht Pant twill*. tf thf i> nol d"i* it*- Port? Tulka mill c>rf>tiuu<- !>talriahxi iud<-CaileIy. It tli", /imo Um fcr of the p<yjpl*: <>f Cjunbodia, L<>i. y<>r\.b and Souvii Vicinaiu w;li iwr rtU-H mn- %rajr <c jirvittK-r hy tboe*- ;-.pU' t.bt-ii<cl\-. If IhLt i:. n<it <V>nr thr wiir w>U continue indf finitely vitb A o-nnmiuiR tlirvot uf intervention L>> iiiiû. <^hin nr both. can IK- Mpful .inch a.- rrni-w<Md acr n n-KwDiUtd G^w-va O>ti,i. Hut thut qu^ti/fi lart-d m>t The impuri:i0; U.iujf ].> m -'/><. Airn-nrno j<aniripati.iu in the ^h.B.t'oj; and 4n>;i:tc arul Killmx oud I" hrir.? our Ivy > t>i<m<*. iWrpji/- :b<- irwrnjilji- (otj tape and Vyjriftlifi/ " 'Jw P>-f>taKn -ix iut>tti- i.-> oc!'' nf time fo Acbirvc.- tlitx- ob/.stivi-. tndwl -(is invk- wiMilrJ 10 fact \iv I'f.7 f Tnlk < a "blixxj latii" if w- n'l'.lif'rjnrt- non.-i< . <Ji:tv" to ih*- i'*"tie t-f S<utb Vi*nam < rsm-+ti3r Tbcy . >.;- <-i-ic <fr..p iban ibc-' bav t.fca I'hiw.'w. Ail th-y u r : i < t K ' . hi-:crv- . _ . . . . >( jj.p/>rtir.c "t$M- "fore'-" '^ tfiwî/' in Tnd> X.'lots i- n>in;n^. fair - r>- ftlJ ik-t:iirhi;n wb>' : -.f th- < '-irDii'iini^r.-, 'l trill OK nn arjif-n-'nu-iif t>> p|;r<>|>rial<- l-i>'uc<u.-{j xiuch i- j>r>w (.-r Vill i-..nnr 1-tf'Xf tlv '
you V/TV < VwifipF. .!<> ;.(>ii Iiavi1 arty .-vnutor CIH>>ER. \V-I1. I wanted to v/ait cr>d hoar our former
Mr. i't AUK. I appivrittte it. .S;iitor Cooper. ..-.-.: .vij&tor COI>PKK. I *lw:ty> *>o;oy .etui, lie says. He w pretty strong iii 'vvrytliiojr hi* -av>. ' Mr Cr,utK.Aliru.-ivc i- tlw wonf, I tbinki
SfJliJt'/r C<K>PEK. WJjttt? ;
Mr. < 'f AKK. Abr<ivf i; tlw> word . . . ^nnuir * VMIPKI:. Well, you Jik" to \> bft;j!* you #'- wr Attention; "( ir. \rttr\-\\y u\[ rtjrbt. . . ' '
SOWOKT fB tABt
Th'' CHIIKUAN f tliitik-you Thi'if ntr a.Mifnlfr ''f <"ir wiiiU'-^v uito 4>^rc<* >itli you. I think {! Kmjoriiy if tlwrn flci. Of nil t\t<f^ [<Kjx)*U wbi/:b hve lcrt x-iii- ilk.- r(j/x-Hsii:-: c,( 'Jfvrf'- who U'lk-v -);i,il.l fr<-( twt at fh' 'iiflif-f |w-.-i'f>li- time. -{ i ;H^,ibl- to ix-JjfV/ ih;i.t i/.v-<- M'-n.' so_ i5i'-|('-"l1 'A<- could -/i-'i_iii rnrlii-r. flp- Kn-n<-!i <ljd TUut j* wliat f (!ii(k tb ffi'di-rul K* i.'ilkjii^ 'iljK'.'i. rfiaf it v*uiil U- j><7>!-j)>l<-. I i{/> '"<' rlijTik Is* frijllv ihiiik- if (^ \cty prii'vuf/i^-1 iiUop'ruifulyosrlba-i !> |iiffi" { .'Iii- ly i-uviny 'AJtl; |)ii:iiiitii^ Hml ifif- jriJM'rin;: <;/ tout ji'r';iuin' if rioujii tnlc*' V w<'&. H*- diii iif'f iio'nfi from ff,i- ;-ry
)x", r i;?iiii^' In I In; ITU!- f wi.nil>t iiUli'if.nl' ft. v(O)i[>i *jlc' a '^.IHK\ ij'-'.il uf
r:i:i-;m I. Tin; I'liV-l* '' ' .'<" - l l i f l f i i f J'jift I if 1 M-fV <|'ll''k,
529
Mr. CLARK. -You remember, wlmt former < 'oiisrrrssman Rankin said when ,*he, was tu&od how lo get out, "I v ould say I would get out the iame wv J jpt in br boats and airplanes." Th? {'HAinsiAX. Tluit is right. Ji would not take too long after he decision. The French experience would bo a very good ertimatc, although ourn would bo longer and Ifcreer. So far as I know, you represent reallv A consensus of that school. Now, there art- roauy p*opk w^.o apparently think we should not. get out, that WG should maintain a strategic presence in Southeast Asia from now otr. There *w such people, its you know, who nre not urtw*ftted in getting nnt-
-woRKuro or DEMOCEACT
Mr CI.ARK. \>5i, .S'tittlor, but I recur to my suggestion this is a !>oJiti(.ul question and this L-J supposîly a democracy anJ xvc should \K- >:ovenifd, Ut k ant in the loaf ru/\ by public opinion. . Thi> CifjUcwAX. It L<t vt-ri- jxx-tdwf ^rmw-racy. Mr. C.'LAHX. It ccruirdy L" . . Thi- CHAIBMA.V. Its ri->pon.-.iv(.-riiaw is vcrj* <Jow, as you well know. It i- u }>ig <-oGittry and if wo bad n pArliamontttry svstem it rv-puld be iî< k<-r, ( think. We bmi an picotiou uiui one of th(' plank.-' in both plarfrinns, 1 (jiuiBf. w* PO -nd J'hr war. President Nixon said he had it I'ian to ''ltd the ^v*r, Thf ftûnrp'ion was th&t it would lx* done, I .'Junk, within rfasortdblc jK-riod of A)*ybt; 0 or 8 months. Now il i> iwniriy .'1 \vart. , . . '. Mr. CLAKK. (VrtuinJv before 1972. ' > Tlf> CHAIKVAS. How uw;* a drmfHTut-y react to fhaX kind oi a Mtu.tfiou? J,wi quite s-urr1 thf/v- who suj{ortd him though) they w-n- proifiiiUn^ * Mian w lio iin-nd-d to end tljf war quickly. Mr. (|U\KK'. \ff\\, 1 ujrjri->i thi.- is pnrt of rhr jrtsponsibllity of this .mnrnnfT-V-. - ,v T|J f 'HAirtif^Sr. T ' run the. <:Kv:tbn? Mr C'I.AKK. Kb.'tKj; to follow :!iic difiatf-f ilw vin.<Jlii. ititf-nj'.vni, 'f [xliti<->d o|nn(on, ever, (tii!^h th- i'jvfMi^w? may not Tin' ("ifAUtJjfAS.-jL -think ;b<g f<>mii:iui*<> U very lilu-l> ii t!o ^lu$i. f rjurnot ^n-ak .for ifwiu. .As fur it* I Jim r/i>'rn^'l,J huve nlrc it very r|er that I am wj'.liiig to -.iipfxxl it . ;>'HHtor ixwpiT, fMy-iv votizip, I *( by tV rlix-k. on 1 he 'f ji; n'ifrn'>fit to ib KeKvwi dwrir]DX:i>i. We >yl have to adjou>5i. Thank you very ranch. . .Mr. TJ.AKK. Tiinfik you vcrj- much. 'Whi-rpjyx.tji. ot I2:J5 p-ta.. the Iten^nir wu.-< ndjoiirtwd ulijffi rt.'l of t\i? Omir,; . ,- - -.
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE WAR IX SOUTHEAST ASIA

WEDNESDAY, HAT 26. 1971 UMTKD STATER SKVATE, COMJHTTEB os Foraac* Tlir committee nef, mirsuanf to notice. at 10 a.m.. in room 4221 Now Senate Office BniMinfr. Senator J. W. Fnlbright (chairman ) prtsidimi. 'N . " 1'irsent : Senator* Fulbrigbt, Aiken, and Case. The CHAIRMAX. The Committee will come to order.
xr, fiTATTlCKXT
T,h- committee is meeting this _ morning to continue hearing* on I sliding legislation relating to ending the war in Southeast Ajsia. We are pleaaed to have afi witnesses todar .*> men with broad expcrii-jin- rplaiinp to TTJ5. jpoliry hi Asia. Mr. rtiarlpp W. Yost served tlw N'nt'on Irn<: and well in t]ip foncipn wrvire, a carper that Bj>anned four di'i-adw Among the many ports he held, hir WM Amlm^sador to Laos in tin- ciiirial jieriod from' l.r>4 to Ift.ITi following the end of the Frenrh Indochina war. Mr, Yost was railed out of retirement in !%$>. by I'iv<idpn< Xixon, who appointed him as TJ.S. Bepivsentative to the 1'iiifwl Vations. where he served with distinct-ion nntil earlr this year. Our -u-i-dnd witiww is F>r. )ti<-hard A. Kalk. Allirrt fr. Millwnk. of international law and practice at Priiurton f'niversity. Fittk b? written many books and articles on topic* of interlaw. including a study of the legal Kpwt nt t]> Vietnam W.H-. In lOfift he was cije of the princijl authors of a tudy made for. llii. foimnittee on neutralisation as a possible Mlution to thie problem? of Soiiflwast Asia. -. Tin Mi'nl witness' i' Pro'f. /Tnl,n Iff, T^-WIM of tlj*- fnliiU.r of Poli(irjJ Sti'ilii-i. Stanford I'niv-jvTty. Prf/ffvr Ijew'w is one-of *l/p S'.-ili'iifV Ns'iliuy.i'xW'rts nn A*IH rt<l 'lu antlior of rrmnr bonifs artd a:+5d.- -in TT>ttter?< involving that ar^-a. He i <v>nutfior r for example. cf "'I'll'- t'niu-il Sf.at*1-- tn V'i'fr)ar-i." ;in oufrfaniJinpr rfudy of liow tlir T r niteJ StafesJirtewne involved in th<' war. In onVr f/ enable mr-roJ^rK of the rommi'tw to put quc^tioni t' oin; or all of tlw wjlnesmv. I will ask that ihey Hit af thr tablp ^ .Would you each <five your prcfmred ^faiement and then v;i- will Mi'' li'-'fitHKion. M 1 . V-t. \rill yo
S-AT*ET OF CHARLES W. YOST. FOEJCEE U.S. PEttMAHZHT KEPKESEHTATIYE TO THE UNJftlJ XATIOVS
Mr. Y'isT. Viw. Mr. Ohairmin, I might mention at the owning of my -fjiU-riH-Jit that. in addition to my exijerienw wlfjeK you mentioned. I wat alo Hmrge d'affaires of our legation in Thailand unmeriiaieK' af u r \Vorid War II. i hat I was first Minister and then Ambassador to Laos from U.H to 1!."0. and that I was deputy to Adlai Stevenson and to A nhiiriioldlîg^t the rîfr-d Nations in JWtf. JW;:.nnd I W*;. when the situation in Vietnam was unckr active consideration there. Also in 1S*CS, when I was in rrfire.nw.nt. I prepared, a comprehensive <-t ndy on the Vietnam problem for the Carnegie Endowment on Jntmtat iona 1 P. and the (Joancil on Foreign Itelat ions. Wiriiin Ut past few weeks I have written and the \\ ashinptou Post has published three articles on the subject whi^h ii-prr.^'iit iuy JUT s4-nt views and which I shall ?umma-_v for the in*ideratiii of your .. <x>\ FJ<VMF.NT sirocLT nx m: wmiinuw.vr, r> vn. In I'rii-f. I U>]u>vp that the T'.S. lovi-nimcnt should Jsovv l\\ a linn dnti? for the withdrawal of all our military foivi* from Koutli VK-IKIKII an<l tin- n-<.-)ation of all T'.S. military ui~tion from b.s vs or siiip- out-idr- VjH'jam. I ndirvf thai fixing #m - h a date *!jmilt.l IK. Milijwt uniy ti. niif <-'.iidition- that tlio Xorth Vietiiaiiii-^- sigriv to the iTiea.v of :r!l 1".>. prison<M-s of 'nr no IfltT timtil the date fixed for roiiilileti'Hl f <>!ii withdrawal, I Mijffrr*.!. mon-ovi-r. that that date should !* u-t :it (' to 0 inoiitri.- from th<- time iijrreeint-nt has U-en rea'-hed on relentof i. . prisoners.
\\'!iil>- } -li'iiiM iiol put furu.ird any of her '''iiulition-i pm-edeni t<> HIT i t l n l i i i i v a l . f -iKii'.id f l i i n k llnit tlu-re u-onl.i lip a n-atuinabk 1 prof r f ' i t l i M f . if Jind R'h'-n nt- indicate :i willin<rne..a to niiriouiu'e a (iiiii :iml ;ii'ly .dale. :i;r'v<'/ii<Mit roiild ul-so lie rr-ai-hcd with the Xorth \'ii-tri:iri:i'-ii' for either rompleti 1 i>r a |>:nlial i-e>-alioii of hostilities
U-IWi-i ;i the I'liêtJ ,Sftlteand tlie Itelli'H-l :|tje It'eptllili'1 of Vief Iialll. V
\"ieii'ojit' firre. dririuy the ]' i'l of with.lr'iwal,'i'hir< would If in our intei - Urnii^-it noiildielifveoiir foree.- froinihe'thn-al of nt(s. I r a m l ; i!i:if.s heftiy !o-w- a f l i r they liave U-en nil^.-f-il to relatively mni( 1 1 iiiiinli.']--. li would )* ill ll:inoi' iitlere-t -itnv there would U- little jkoinf I-, their ini-iirri;i' <-a.-.ua!ties ii. atlar'uiiijr forces which were iiiiul;. 'i.ininii/'-'l to witfidr:iufll Hiid Wf-re no longer initial ing < f oiiilat. *'f oiii-^- if f'.S. fof-e- weie ntlaek'-i} during !!" pnK*-^. of withdi ; :iv'nl.-Hi'v woiidl .(utinui' tn defend thfuisehe-i and woul| In- /rt-o
I'irriiiiiti r.itttl'-l;.
U'! ill- t J i < - :fil/i)!ni j tr.ii!(iii |i:m iniiioiiii.'eil ir intention ''Vriif u u l l v to v. i f l i d n w all !'... for-.-t.- from Vietnam nn,J has alreiwly *i'ifhdrvvn I'I-HI! !i j i'f <>f tl:oM- ]>n -!:t -il f l u - |n-:ik of our purtji'ipution. K i \s-nil. ' . ' i i i - t i u i i - mi- " t i l l r;ii-j-d to ivfniniitting mir-eh'e. t*i firm nd earlv il'lti for tirfjl! V, If I M | I ; I M ; I ! . I j'lmulif lil.e-(/i dc;il In fefli w if li fhe i i i a i r i
i'.ll t'.'lll-
533
OBJECTIONS in KTTix<; wrntiHiAWAi. I>ATE First. it "]' argued that we should remain until the South Vietnamese J-ni-riuiii'iU is better prepared to defend itself alone. This ispj course an argument which has Ix-on made fur ninny years and whick muld continue to In- made.* for many years to eomo. I would agtve with many MeinVrs of Omgrcss tlnit wv have already done as much. indeed far ni'uv. ir. providing massive military support than any ally Jias a right to expect. >eve.ral hundred thousand Air" , loans liave IHVII fighting in Vietnam for C> years, The T"nifo<l Spates has been arming and trainini: tin 1 Vietnamcjse Army for 1; yean-.. Tliut Amiv now oulmuiitierc and is fur ln-tter equipped than its enernie-!. It should nt lonp Insf lx> ai;le to d'-fend its t'oTintrj' hy it.-^lf. J would hope that it would lv. If it ultimately proves not to I*\ tiiii failure would in it be. because of lack of military equipment or training but because of underlyinp jwlitical factors which the I'niti-d States would not be ablo to oven:oine bv n-niuininfr in Vietnam for ancKlier year or 2 or t-wn 5. It is alô argued, Mr. fhairnion. that aiui<iiincii]<r a fixi-d date for withdrawn] would undercut negotiations. The niiestion ii; what neirotitions? In mv judgment serious politjcnl neôtjations could take place it: Paris or elsewheri1 only if the T.'nitcd States and the !>outh Vii-tnauiese CJovcrnn^nts wen- willinu to contemplate a fundantental rhanô in the composit ion of that Government, indeed its n?plament by Korne rt of "neutral" or "coalition" ôvemnient. I believe thaf any nnrli rliuiipt, if if were nr.idf:. should U- ina|f by Vietnamese, not bv Atin'ricajiK. f sue no: v'tpti whntsoevi-i- that the South \'iefnume>e (Jovenintrnr is willinir even to consider sin-li a rjjan.f. Then-forp. no si-:tnlinmt |M)litical want int ion* xre likely nt leasl until uftcr t'ie Soutli Vietnamese elections in the fall nnd. very fro}iblv. until aft^r the T'liitt-d States han fixed an curly date for withdrawal. To fix that dale now would not inhibit. iinWd it mijrht encotimê. ival negotiations JN-I ween the two X'ietiiaiiH-.^' jroveniun'iits. As to negotiation*1 aUmt the release of prisoueo. thi-M- re almost ccilnin to muke im pro^res* until we xtnte our redine! to fix an eaili flute fin- withdrawal. The <|uick4'< way. |>osiblc tht; oh way. tn iret our pri>ojicTv out i?< to set their release as the essential ifit'tl /tru mm for tixuiiT Mj'-h a date. Ofherwi^- the North Vietnamese w i l l continue to use f l i r m us the \ulutilile b:irj::iininjr count <T which we have made only \IH> c.lciir they >ii'. Mr. riniirnihj), I riiould ulr^ Iik<- tM-fon- corif lu<Jii>(r to t,uch on tu othi-r Hsjjc^" of the pnlflem--firrf. what our policy toward Southeast A-u fhiiuhj I- 1 after we !mve wiihdrnwn our military foirujs anL <otid. how o'jr withdrnwiil and if.- <ytii<f<\wi\wt < - un U-HT Ix; presented to the Antcru-nn f>eojile.
. Ai l'i I h- /n>f. I should (viifider tliul uv- v>ould him; an old if tl^. vi,-n contijiiicF jjft/'r tlir. withdrawal of our force*, to f/>titijme '" ""IT1'* XHJ' ifi'IitJirj' and e<xinomi< uwittutv tn frinndly governni-iis of South Victiiiui. l*o and CamlXxJu, in CHC they desire it
ran tw it effectively. This aid would ! unxlfigou.-* ti> thai licing lUrd Xortii Vietnam \>y the Soviet I'nion and China. However. J not recommend keeping C-S. military advisers In those countries after withdrawal of our forces. On the political side. I would suggest that we exert our influence in Uw; strongest povible *ay to bring about an early reconvening of the Geneva Conference, with* the same or a similar composition as the earlier Geneva conferences on Southeast Asia, for the purpo.-*. first, of ending the hostilities in those countries, second, of reaffirming ttw neutraliztion of Laos and Cambodia provided in the Geneva Con volitions of 1954 and 1962 and prescribing once, again the withdrawal of all foreign forces from those countries, and third, of adopting any similar measure* in regard to Vietnam that may be acceptable to the (iovcruments of both North and South. I should also recommend that we oifcr substantial aid for rehabilitation and reconstruction after the war to all these countries, whatever their government* might '>.: such aid would best be supplied through international agencies. Finally. I would suggest that, while removing from Tliailand our nir fon-eM positioned then* because of the Vietnam war, we reaffirm our commitments to Thailand an<i the Philippines concerning their Defense against external attack; we continue to provide the military equipment and training tliey need but that, as the Nixon doctrine provides, we Itare entirely to them the responsibility for ma internal security. pfwsrr. TO BKncriiAMzoiTn AVKRK AS rrorur. As to the .-âction of the American |.-ople toward the course of <_ve:its in Southeast Asia, fears have often (teen expressed of a politi< al backlash against thoae lusld nsjxwxiWe for what mitrht lie repre.uted as an American defeat there, and of a nationttl retreat into isolationism if all our pierifices there aecm to have lx*n in vain. I siiould like to urgK tliat die leadership of tioth our political parties -rn[>!iuabe the following points to tlw> American jople. First, the \~nittti StatM has not been defeated in Vietnatn and has not lost Sout hMHt Asia. We hare for the highest, of motives--defending a small ally from external aggrmionprovided it was massive and prolonged military rapport, supjiort wLidi from the vantage f>oint of liindsi^lit wi- now <we was disprof>or;lonate to what our nationul intererft< nijiiinrxJ. N'evertltfelw*. w have done our part, fur more Hum our pun. niid what eventually happens in Soiitluuwt Asia will defwul. an it must depend, on the jteopleg of thorn; c-ûritriex. not ou us. If tin- Com niuni-** take over on* or more of them, despite all we hav dotw t/i lielp. the loss will be thtirs, riot ours. Our honor will huve lcn more f'i;Ui s.'j(fii;iently defended nnd our es-.-ntinl inti < re4K will not h'.e (HVII irrt>rirul>ly damaged.
S>TJI||<(. i*l<>li if the Oilteoiiie in the tl'.H-e rut|Iltrie sluiilld \H; far from -.i--f;i/-torv 'roin iir jHiinf of view, ilic i-fl'ort will not hau- UT/I \ \ n - i f - d IIDJ- \ < n < - i i '.in Ir,i-v /|M'iil in s.-ii'i. Tl;e climuli- of intenintiorinl .'illYi^. ii:ixj-li]i;ij.'<i| .xiilwtnniinl^ itii'e !!'<'-'. ff now WCIIM iiiosf imlikdv that there vijl be* in any near-future widcxpteiu! resf>i-t fo ('omniuniW iiifpir<-<l war- of iiiitioiiul lilx-nilion >-iniiliirt I lint wliicii involved nMi \'l"l":iin, r-ijtiiiMiini-rt Cliimi M"'fii.< tu }*-, for :i (inn 1 Ul leant, in n ;iif.ri' nr.'lefiitf- :nnl eoiieiliiilorv fi Me of mind. The Voilh V
after all th?y have suffered and lost, are in uo position to attack monof tbiir,neighbors and set more dominoes to falling. Other nations of the airav- -Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesiahave had time to struuLthcii their internal security and carry forward their modernization. FmaJly, the American people, who would a few years ago have been badly divide*] over a pullont without victory, are now close to ron-^nsuson the overriding need to do so. Third and last, the central fact needs to be stresefd that, while we have ovvrfu'fillcc our obligations in Southeast Asia, w< still have very great responsibilities elsewhere. Popular opinion everywhere, moit of all in this country, is* jienilinriy subject to wild wmgs of the pendulum, from leaking the world safe for democracy to keeping out of foreign ware. Acting on the first of these slogans did not make safe either the world or ourselves and acting on UMJ second hag never prevented foreign wars into which we are eventually-drawn. IA us in this caw treat the Vietnam war as part of the painful experience of growing up as a great power. Let us concentrate o meet ing the |>reting needs of the future at home and abroad, which we davp nep)*i whil<; we fought the war. Let us help bind up the wounds we and our adversaries have inflicted on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, to the extent and in the way those peoples may want our help. And let ns soberly and maturely reaasoae oar interests AIM! our commitments overseas to determine, in the light of experience in Vietnam and elsewhere, which of those interests rroaain vital interest**, which of those commitments should be modified and which should be Htsiiiu-lily maintained. Thank'you, Mr. Chairman. llit CHAIRMAN-. Thank you, Mr. Yost. I think that is most thoughtful am) interesting and provocative statement. (Tins art icles referred to follow:)
Wmbtngioik t'wrt. AJ.I 11. W > 1 1
iB) <Tirle W. Y(M| i Y<i<t 1111* ihnrtf' it'll flairs* at Hnmiktik m IH4'>--H. itmlni**n4'ir In /xj/> in . l!t>$-ti unit ftipfcd AU Forrlfn- K<nic* i-ttrrrr vtlh lir't yuan IK iim^nmaHnr l'i tlf I nU'J Xnti'ini. *(/i'v I'rtirmtru, hr htn lion tt'lWinlnl V"/r* Itr f.'iitr ihiii. mii\ tin- ' ' i i i i i i ' i i nil KxrfiEU Ki'lNtli'iM f. jm;T In w)ii''h 1 iifjf^t Ili.-it iii>* ri'ii-ntlj '"iniiiii'in fit tii'2"<lt!"ii* In l'url It- n>*<><| to .-)!, n iMtlllli'ul wt'li'T.i'Hf H l i j r ' i . I !iliiti'il mil, vMi'iM rfjulri' 'ulMii'laJ tnwl iKlnful i "n''H'nl>n->" lij lîtti #ii\t>* It -AH. |-rf'-<-Uj il"nr dial Ifn (! troulil n'A i-iv|it ii tr;iiiij wlifrii li-fi MII- 'I1i.>'MK> (.'"* rtiiiiciii In |Hi-r< ln<|i'firj|irl.T i,r nlncji |>r<iililil for nUwil'id <> -urrU-i -Ait iy tliut K<t*nini* iit. fv<ti with *iw Inl^rnnUouul m<nrii'l<tr.. Thi-ri- l ii: itr-*K lvu<b'ti''f MJntiK A)iin <rt>'rii. I'vi-ii In ivlnfliffly fr*-f oliKf \'iii-. l'i inri'i't tli<> titiinilaip "f It-mil"- i\aii I*, in V'il<- fur tin- piiriy lii |HIH>T T llnp"l. <!>(luii. Diri/im""! l>y III'' cri'iu'lil HH|K<-IJ tf<ir> r/iini'lil Muuli] 'ii-ji i<is "f n'l i' Inn) firticht f'ir Mil'inxniKt "li!inl vij |ifi]-r ><iieK*iit>-<i. Hii't'-fim: ibm *i' i-xj'l'-rr wri>ni>iy iui'1 'ir^mM) In |'nrl 'iicry "tit ) iln. i< KKTi'rriiiii'nt fr>M|k whlrli l.nili (|w TJil(>0 i'ir(|wuiM mul tl> N'nfl"iiiii l.jf-mtl"ti rrm wniUi ) fKrliKVÎ <>r, dltTtmtirrly. unc l/i wlii< ii li-.fli Hi<ii|i| Ir.- |IH-IM>|II I'll' In u minor rol<- If Ui;< Ki'rf I-xnlM*1. I lli'/IIClH HI) n-,,i,--.)i..(.- .....;;,. .,.,,,.; ii< ,.,..!.; i,l'Ui cii'l tin* enr rn|'l<ll) WMIIM If 11 iri"! ,t,Mit.-<1 r>ri in IfiHTlni X'fvrntwril H(IJ''>I tlu- XI ivou].. <!. uri> c it WIM (. iiiiic,i-iîiMi' i<> >nir Klili- ami tlw u*ftlnll!int w<>tjl<l fml
Tni- \>a\*-r a jat ulnit tn U- -irfUt"d ' tin- im>mlT* of tin? two orCanlottlnnv whifh *fm.orru. Tbr fln-t rvqu.t ntili-li n m*Ue to nw after I .i<-r-i>t-d tlu* i>Kj wnv that tbl IM|MW nor Ucirriiiatfd. it v,s ! rly Inconsistent. with tlu* polk-jr which th> adniluI'-traUun lnt<-r:ile<! to follon. Iurin< my tuo yiir lervlif w i t h tin- Jdiniiilfrutioii I was not l\u]vr<] in Mnx way in th- formulation i.r fxitittlun of it* j<oIK-y louurrf .^-utlHt. I AMU. My AihSrv *a. iwver <i*Ueil n an; ul>uiativ<> aM-l'l "t the i>r<wl>'ni ir-r >vys I m-"Ul lu any National Si-urifv '..un'-il dclllMTti"iiK <n if I tlwr . rv .vjtrtixl ffntu UK* sUHnu-* v l t l i croulne aii[>ivlifnIon nn<l lii'ftrfjflii* Tlir "^r..loiiui'iun of our military Hf"rt in Vietnam far >-jnni>l wltst w-iuii| t im- a In <k-t>iM-r. !:?.' 1 w. ui<irr<l t "Ulimit a iti wln.-ti I iiuiii^ tli^ urcuuifUt :i< strouicl) an I cuM I UK"! tluit c I'lu-r "i-rinir alifrtif ilrx-tl-' <4uiner In f l u - <-Iiara--<'r "f tli- Salpn R"v-niiiM'iit n> a !M.if f-.r i>llrl<-al Mfttlcnifiir" 'r. if that wai .n<iil<-ril t<> ! ii!iat<n-iitui>Ic. Mint v/f yitlntjiiifuiJIy ^ÎtTJtp tr>>|> u-ittiilrnual \t>r riofloil any nisxmv ' thN un-ui-imn-luiu. <m tin- iimtrurj. tin- I'liri" n*-AtmtiotiH w-r- Ilovn-:ittnu-<l at tirt- xaiw d-llli*rati> jru' whii-h in April. 1!71. Mill It-uv.-^ :î.ixm American trooi-" I" Vli-tnum. Kvcti Ismf Wilu-!iiy". aniiotiii'i-nmif l>y the l'ri-iill-lit of slijclitlx aii-li-rniI witbtlrawals would .lir.- ,iliit l0.ri* \u>criniu< MI.TC nr tlif t-piririiii>: <( I'.'T^. '.n'arly ?><! jfarnufi'T our uuijr iiiv<iiv>*nii-tir in MM- nr IM-CHH. It uax ami vtill is quitt- ! ir (fiat. il.-s[iii^ tb.- \i-...n ! !rin- ami (!> m-.iinir UH.-II! t.i "\ iduaiuizati'iii." ' ' l'ri-.-i(l-nt atnl hi* lutionfll (mimty aJvJwr. Ir H-iiry Ki<it|p"r. rontltin*- ti U-lii-vt' that "vliti>ry." in tin- -iiw of (In- uiniiiu-iiniiif of |M-W*T of th" Tlili-u-Ky eovt-rnnjflit. <-u mill Iw aHiitnH. atnl il<iir i-->nruitiitl miliKUnrlnl I'.S [wrtli-iiKitliin iu llit- war for MiN iiun1"^' '" ""' '"'I.' jiiii>ltaltlc itut nir-csuary, Tln-y ivintf-nil l^dt nil Mi-lr inilitiirj' u<-iinH. In.rli ilcf-n-iv.. awl offMi-u<- !ni <':ini)>il!a n'I Iâo*. an- <liîKi-il (o n-UIS little i] >ul<t thai, if the <i(liiiiliitruii->ii vi.-r-- f>n(jip^l I'itliiT to :ii-<f|>t H I>lltloil -'fili-iii' i iil inri.hini; a <-\tuliS>- HI UnZ'lvi-niiui'iit <>r tn lix a proxiinati' ilat<- for tin- 1'ilitl wlt!ulrj:il of I s fu tli>' N'irtli \'lftnuirn i ' > wiulil Iw only too 111 inif xul>tant ia)!y to ntluifliuKtHi j wi-ll to n-li-a'U' ill! I' S. (iri"tirrs lit tin- tinir t' S v.lilnlrau:il If a[i]-arn wort- likely iliat tin 1 r->il n-nwiim wliy tin- I'r.-niilmr ami KI<-<ili!T _< (iri-i^fiiiiU-d wlili at li-ant tli'- acj-J-nrati'-i- of vict.iry In Soutlry>.i A-la *&: < 1 1 t)u- nimi'iiM.1'' rriiri-jitioii. stnni(>f<l on Uiclr mind* LII tU'lr ixilitically foriunl i r < - >iiir iiml ii'-vi r rlm>nn' i hi i il l f nn u|MM-^ljj.tic ln|liir Kl"lal -iriix^l'' U'lu.i'ii fouiitiiiniNiu mid the "t'ri't- tVorM" lu wliidi any iwiinick it, cither *\i\iaiiywiwre tlirt'atfiiK i r i l l m l l y tli- -I'-limtf l/uiaticf of jowrr ti-rynlwri'. fî tlwi fear that tli<> I'"" of Soijfli V^-lnam. nfl*-i tin- >-x|*.-ijiJItiire of KO nnn-fi Aiic")'-ii() 1'lixnl nd lri-uhur<> in i(n ilff^n*-. H'onld jirrlu'p'' a U'liiifwilr [M/llUi-al i.|')n 'Viil in tli<- I' S w'jii-U wouli) diiu-rcdit tbelr aiiininli'tratioEi and throw the Ui-i'rililic'an 1'arly iDto t.u- flruin of Itn right winif. ami < : > i the fiank ulii.-h M>em>i to .>viT<'onw> any Anicrii'iin J'rt'ttld''fit at DM* thought of l>eiii !! flr<t "to low n war" lei-ply felt Kinoti-iiiM are. J Mjh|vl. iiiiif.'li biore lii-riniK 1 w i t h tin- J'r'ii and Kltwi;ier lluifj me tin- tliun* /'rildeu! ronxblerMtlonH Whidl IctI tlwui to \trot\iilut the Vlxoii I^M-trine '1'lu'y 'nniiot >i-l hriu^ tlM-anM-Irt-* to rc/iotirn1*uiilitjiry ii|rfti.rm" linolvlnir I.'.K l u f f * uhldi Ilie; >l<II Iiof*- will [iri-^'m- Hie tndiN quo iu South Vietnam n<l which the AJU'-rii-iin iml'l)' toiilil wtili Ul>rîiM<ii*il lu t>iliT)i'<' Tin' J'l "IcN'Mf liu< j i i i r l l y In Hie IT< i< f |n^ unli rlM-liiric. (n-r-ujdwl himiB'lf, un l'r<'"UJitit Jolmion rjirl 'iirlier, Ihiit il "lo.t."
lit >oi|IU VJ.-tTIUIU, iMiH'CVrr It < Jllne H l M l U f . Woljlrl lie 1111 lllfolMl)e "lillllllllll l\'-r." u i . c l l i j niutv (lie I' S to ln< i-n(i>.|fli>ri > <l l>> I'Oth '<H-O HIM) frii 'I')H, "M J ' i l l f i i ) . ln-I|' -w
Klnnt" mid would fatHlly l-lof UH- r-imutlun In bitor.v of the I'n-M'Leiit 1." |iri'14<-<| or It. Actually of dujrw, thr morn li-flilcra UMI> tul f>rt of UfUrtUf Ifl jiulill'-. UK(ur Uvx rno flip tiu^(ilM-r wblrli rould nulw It -lf-fuiailirit (t JM at icaht
537
ai reasonable to contend that the U.S. hat, after six rears of massive engagement itself .and a vast buildup of Uie ARVN. far more than fully net any obligation it might hare bad to wit-determination In Vietnam. If the government of t<onth Vietnam cannot in 1972 maintain itself without U.S. military involvement, it unlikely to be able to do no in 1973 or at any time thereafter. Moreover, it would now seem to be demontrated that u< practicable expansion of the war Is ilkely to be profitable or even tolerable. The Cambodian "iiit-urnlon" last rear and the Laotian "incursion" thin y*r, while they produced marginal tactical advantage*, have had two much more prejudicial strategic contfequeures : (1 ) they hare seriously overextended the South Vietnamese forces which we have bctaj trying to prepare to defend their own country and. in tinLntlan case, hare badly damaged their morale ; (2) they hare so aggravated U.8. public dissatisfaction with the whole Southeast Asian enterprise that. as the polls Indicate, a majority of Americana now wish to withdraw almost immediately. Under theae circumstances no further expansion of the war. concerning which the President still seems determined to keep his -option*" open, lies within the realm of political reality. In this connection, neither the administration nur the public has faced np to the r<U-. present aud future. of t'.S. alrjmmvr in Smitluii!<t Ala. The Impmtlon IK. however. emerging rluit the nms*lve way in whlHi it haw lieen nurd in South Vietnam since lWi."i. uivl in Lauti and t'anilxNlia more re<vntly. is not nnly Indecisive and often iiiuuterprodwtive In 11 war of thl* character, bol In no undiNcrlmlnatlng between i-ncolniUnt aud iiotinmilimtant. no devastating to the lives and livelihood of friends more than f for*, no cruel and inhuman in ltn rrale and <vmmqo<>n<vii. that It IK unjuntlflablf undT t-ithrr the laws of or the Um-H of humanity. or.unj-xr. In nnanmry. in lieht of all this trash1 liM'r>' ud tiu>w liu-xorablf arcumulatIng f'-t of life, what should the United Htatt-x d M'/V aloot getting oat of MiMiCiM-ast Asia? I would propone tlie fnllowlnK fl\v ftepM. 1 UV xhuiild }>roni|itl.v aud |iubll<-ly ti\ u date fr tl*- trfnl wllbdrawal of all U.S. niilllary fortim fnmi Houtb Vietnam subject only to North VleinanH-w pgrwiiwot u> uMnmeiw.v releaKlng U.S. priMXM-ni ax " the rfleaiie of all priw>iuT In fun: -ithdraual in <iBi|4-t*td. TUIn date Mionld preferably lie live. 21. 1971. but. if thin idxMilii turn out not to be lo(rlHti<*Ilj- feaiiible or If nrreenwut on the rei*SM> of prioiier <roobi m* be nbtaiix^d HHtm i-uouen, it might be March 31 or even June 'JH. HHZ. but if rtalnb no latT. 'i. At the MIUM- time that e fix a dale for withdrawal. Me xlimiM propowe u gfiK-ral ceaM-'-fire. 10 take effe't at OIMV or at auy time prior to coui|>letiou of withdrawal. U'e nhould mit. however, uifke wititdrawal couditional on H ceam-. (Ire. A.-r.-|.uiJ(f of a Keiwral <Tw-flr- wi.uW mean that the utatiiK <|U<> ilirouidi<Mt Soutli Vie.na'u. aud |MT)UI|I ljum xiid fVinilxidia an well. wiMild be frozen w l i i l e tlu. Aujt-rii-jiix wi-re HitiMlrawiDX- H wemH unlikely dat KIU-II a frerxinic (or M |*Ti'Ml of inanjr ui<Hilli xnild t>e a<-<vptab|e to eltlier the North or K<mtli Vli'tiKiux-w. ou Ibe otlwr hand, mflt-t *< 'luti- liud been tlxed for I'.K. Hllhdrawal. IIW-H! fi-iiw nn>H to facilitate witlxlraital inljclil be ijulU- feaible. .'( \\i-luTi- iinuouniînx a llxed iljte for C.H withdrawal, we nhoul I nffer tin* Soiuti Vielliuuii-He XoteniUH-lit II luif "HxirfUliif J to IletColiate a \tii\\l\e*\ nettleIIH'H? i>li Hie only l>u*i on uliii'h It mliclil cunrclmlily be {je|CitUlte>l- tbltt in. Hti inl>*riiu 2ierinu<-Ut aii'i-(>lttble to foofh nldeti to i-arr) uuf elet^loiin <M>tioiiHl>. if SaltuD weiv wllllnx to iff to negotiate wiu-fa a M-ltktiKfit. it would have a U-tt/T <-|mfi(T of tlolnx tui Kirfii'wtfull) while the AuiffliiiU* were utill mllitiirily ;>r<"wul in \ifinutu niu\ |rti<'i|uilinx in (he I'arlx ui-eolUtioux. riliMv. however. I I'-rr rnur.'i il-/ult tfuif the Tlilm Ky eovernment would atfrw '" wgotlate I 'Ui of i l i i kiiwl. i-v.-/i fuci'.l w i t h the jr 4|H<<-t </f eurly r '.H withdrawn:. iquid mrf MUKICI*! 't'layirii: for tlii puriMw for nfire tliau one aKruth tUe ..HII. .IIMI/I of a f'Tiiiimil iLile for I S u i r l i d m M j i J . U'.- itlioulil, *luiullnn<-<'ijKly nidi ttiN uniioiin<vuieiit. jir'>|x*e to all |r*rti'-l in I hi- Oneva An-i>r'J of JK.VJ nml \'M';i rHurri to the full >ifipli<ii'ioii of fhow a vonlx, nidi u''li ui'>ilit)i-atl>Mi* a* I'li/i nir<il i'lri'ii/jiMtiiiiiv re<julre or u Htvin r|e*iraMe to ii!l .-inn i-rn.'.l, lnjr njx-i-ili'-Nlly Induditig wjtliilnv ul of '.'// fureii'ii ItiTiif i liK'Iii'linir Norili nml Sniuli V Id (IIP * i fntui J*>* imiM'iiiiillUi lin<l ri-iifflriMulinli of Il- iM'il'rullAI(i"i> n( tlirw Iwn mriiKrii-* Olw IniKlillculi/ill of fltt* ;iii-onl nlilili wmiM !* (mwl ili-xIrMliU'. If il miil'l ) olitiiiruxl niilr| )M> tin* T>'bftii i if tiiort- i-flWttve nu|>ervlr>r> uiacliinert limn the oll .(Ttiinmlmlciu. If a , IMIH-IS fiiiifervnfv nvri- ns*suCy to aiv'>mi>U.li. It f*ry 10n-ly would l\ tich a i-wifrrvncr. w i t h I-H- nmf or birst-r slK.uW N- omvi-nul t-non a- P"wjiltlc. TfiMt.uf-rtti Jtwtf wiUi Ihiiuui. if tin.- finvi-rnuH.lnt of t>r.i N'irtli ami'Soul IL x> fiip'd. but It *oull not UI-SMI rity di> PO. .". WH Kljnulil A tli" same Him- n-itpnii** tin- oflV-r wtr lijtvi* nimli- in tin- }!i*t o *-.ncrDrUtt- *tti>ftaiitially to * trocr.tm. f .w-moiiiU.1 relmlillltiitKin. rwimstruo i>iinj-m. In \<>rtb and S-mtIi Vt<<ftiam. La>s owl (.'auitmdiu. In !* <"reil -tj>r*>fpraMy mrier I'tiltM Nations u.<pii.-*-R. Ai-hi.-vnomt ..f lh>* tii>vtiTi>)< j>rij>iirrt DfidM- tlx-w flw point* *<n to nn aod |im'<tiiblf. A<iiifV<-tnet f the ot.}wtlv-< &[>)roitl,r still liy tb aUuini.'rtTMUcn"^vnw tr> u- Mn-rtui^ -if ivttU-li HniliT jinvMtii firi-uui!>tftiicc5 <<uM IKucirMr*-aml moral fhan*fTf flu- Aiu-rK-urift"<>|!<..
.hii:ittoti I'o-t. Ji-rll 11. 1HT1( CAI S-HI UVIN\" \ K I T K M Il.v 'luirl(-:* \\\
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Til-- dln-ct iiml uiH--lvi I' S. I'liltlnry Ii:vl i>iixt in SotlflwaM Aia ui *" wu> eriity cjiijipijirfiii ft ' *" any n:itiu*l nT<-r tin- I'liit lia<l in fhi- hr*.*. nl ""il lirnvi"! fuvly <liiin;rÎtii.' t.. the ncir'.iri .f t i n - Vii'tiutnif-i- a..i| fji'iiiiui |Ht.]ilc. TliT- an- tiutiy i>-a"ii-. wliy :liis liiclily ui"ti\.'it--il liut .ill<u'>tniu.>c ui!!K::il--ii1ati<.>ii l>y I'.S l<-ad>t>Iili> cxs'iifrtil In my rn-w. ciirtrf n: jor ;n rnrv <>f jrirtîm-n* <Tcn>-r! n 1" gt-t m -u <l"-|ily : t. Tli" first wn >!;.- fx-Ili-f t l m r i'.riiii<ii:rii.<t rifi:i tad h. tin- in.'uw -nni I:M>K Iwrth tinlnti-iitl->n anU tl-i- i-u|cil>tli<y ! <-\ti<:id it^ <r<>uilnj"n l-yiul .it;. li'.nJ-r~. t ii.iti'rniil fihi*ratir>ft" \vdlv)< It w-vild iic>|iin- ami >i|i;n'rt In tlti- --""Icr Jiîit f l.iml-l^lii ttt enn3v>-x nti-T>i:il. w'ltii flu- -\o-{.ti<.ii <.f tinwar iii K->n-a. alii--lj w.i-. rf.ituly f.-tt. t.i-lr- (Irr.iK-lvr. nitil tin- u:ir-in Vi.-tM.iin. li{c-L <i-ri\i". rt)]nt w h'>Hy frmu Vi-'n;untpM- mlft-r IliaJi <'l.itn"-'' Jiixiiinitjnr ('n:tniliil-<t i'hiti;i Iniliv. n lit^J- IiitciiTinti (ir ni[<ilii!i(> f iiivuU'Jn^ ltvi-!f illrii-tiy <> _' Tlii- Mi-rind iiiisl.-ifci- !:i jiiilîiic-ijf. llj*1 "<l'>niliin tln-nr\." v-'a* lil niii-n -ir t< siiUvi-n:tn ;nj.I takf-nuT : tliat If î.Jirh Vi.-tiuuu Ml. .i(jnisf .-.rtuln in fi|li>w. Tlil^ crr.r nr*4- r'nin oil utiilis'TUiiiiDitiiii ..f !! -ininii.in in Si.-itlli Vfi-in.-mi. l.-liji fur I" \t-nr-. j-rii.r t. V.i'rf liinl lw.ii (Ill-lilt M'l-.vfi-J at tin (n'>ii-^r<t.(t>- i t l i ''"iijinuii)-! oilri-n T.. tin- rc-î ,if S..IK|J.-:JI ^\~:(. -M'ii-li li:iil uijt.Ui-ii i>ciii'tniti-l lit jiit v.ln-virn'iirlj vi]i.-l) a i|i-erf .f <-<nirM (In- i-xu 'i-inii :oiil ci.iiilu.-t of H i t - i.\nr in r"-i''!! \ i : i r - 1i:iv- in;nli- J_'ii.i iimf *':IIII|UH||II UrU<]> iiinr<- miii'T.'iliIi ti. fiiki-'iViT tl'.ili tin-! <-u- iJi Jin- ].."(.. ',', A tliinl i-r>'"r in jnilzim-hl 'M- tin- |ii.ll>.-f l!iut XirT.li.Vji-i'uin. It l-urti illr '.i- wliiiil} i'n-tri<iii<! in tin- f-ar\i. R<III|I| *-r\- tlii-r^-ft- r :i> u "iii|>li:tn( l i i i t r n l i l i - l i l "f ''Ili/lilllli-'l I lull, I A i T U / l S l y . ;'- t i l l - llislnr> Hi' 111.' J.;i-t _'.'. .-.i-;!!-- I/ i-
iiil-h ili-ib'ii-ufriiii'il. '"il^ " Y'lC-'Mta 'nni;piU(ii>-ii> li:m ni;.I-l f l u - N u r t n I t-li.!!!!!!--^- lu JtilT (.it-kill rt-<- id-it mil*1!- iiiwl iii:li-j>i'HiJi-ii'.I Tin- f'niitli j-rr'i' v\;is in iin.i^liiiti^ 1 1. ui N V'l't'i ri-alit >l-i)iiifiii<'i| in s.nitli IM-I .'.--l.i uii'l in -.I'llinii ii|> tlnT>- u |>nriinc<| ini|i|nr> t-o'/titinti H l i i ' l i v.i- in f.i'-r -mi' ;i fin :u|.- fur iuii::ii>-nil [' K. u|i|H.r' { m-n-j,il wiiik i iniiin* r. V/-v. r
tiit-ii".', si.'/i'< iimj r'n-î-niit i.f fniiiRiifiiii.; MH- r /.fii-i stutf. t'. i!<-i-i-r :HKI
lir'Ti- f.-riulti (''riihi-nii'lil in SnniJic,it V'-ifl f l u l l i v.'i IM-, i!ii'-nl lM f:|i't îi Tilth .mill itl'I'i- iMlli.'it '.-.llîliilllirx Illi-f. 'in* li)"-l -If i-jvt- liiiî.ik'- inii'li- In V ; ( t l i ; i n i alul. fnr :i tiiur. ,i, I ..-PI :( f i l l i-iUMinNin-l Mini iintiiii'iilrtili.-' ;iiiil. "ii t ) v i"ii!nT. il- f .nliin- i-H'" Jr. i-l.i tit ; r i - i - l l l i u t t i n - 'i||i|ii'l'I it M- nil* IiU.'iiiirli {irn-iijtil fin.' i-i-îini' In H-.-.I in i.irr. n i t r'foriii-i uliii-li .fulfill liiwi- zm-n l l m nn i-xiiitid/ii-: |iH|>nl;ir l.i;iil Tin- -1'itli iiit-liil.!' .-ir-i-c fr-ii/i tin '\ii,itn^;iiir f - J i f d jii Miuiii-riii-.iir.'i ;ii \ ' -.Oild. -v -]! W;i.|.ltd-ni l h < - 'iiri.! IXplr-. I'u-r-il .Hi t i n - <-'-rm I :I>.M Mi"-iit |i:i' I ''||M!IMIII)'-| il^'l J- Mull vv.li llrtli i-furtli llmti- liUi'ly t'> t.lLi- I I I ' - furin '. it ^'i ti-in i Hu.u ..f -rMx-i-.f i i t f j ' l,.iu-r'i-- futHiii-r". if ni-ic-rl!u-li-î' rn-irniLii-h < > i < n > i i i n i i i ' i | Hi" t n | i i i l i i l | f y f .''>'. f'/ri- !. fur iniilii-r IHIW tli--ii.il/lil> rr.iii.i-il
539
fur Mii< iiut(i!\ f. conduct tJili* Lichly MpkixtwAted ami acutely (mlltJcal tri* tit v.mfaro -iii "urlrouuiratK tcliriv luueuip-. custom* -aiul t&vM'-sl condition* wt-ro *<. uln-ily Hiieu totbvin. 7. Tin- Mr<-Btli i-rrw was al. a military onv: U.S. in^.-tonw i>u organizing And, iritludi).' jii'x-r i.f tlw Vletnnrnrnv furo--. from 1XW on.. to lt|;ht n Europtati or KorMin-ly;*' w.ur rather Uuin tlw counter InxtirpHK-y. Serious effort* have IH.VH made in reo-ut years ii> nvf thl< ror lutf even now the AHVX ixstltl trained tu 6dttMlth itLowive .air and urflli-rv MiW'rt. wiitch iR.vloU'lt will * far l'.-ss s! Tlw tlimt error <f jiidguii-iit m-currrd reinntfdly. afti-r nnr Kialfe in\'i>lv.m<-ti. n'Jim nv w> oft-n tn-KtecU-tl or fatally cwnprofflkMtJ i>tfiitial ffr n.-p.niiiicu. fiUw-r ftr f)>lw-mcral cuflitarj- *dvantnpi- or for fear >!! i'ui >I>H] fu
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Th'/sc who a>lr'H-4itc wtrly awl tofjil {'.S. rritlidmiral from Vietnam nretcinx a-<4ced w)iac iu>lirr we should adopt LI. \\ard the area a/t^r n-itlnlrawal. Khould we want oar h.-twls of ii vntltely? KhouM wt- contlno*- mllitarr niicl/ur cmamuic aid? Vfijiii. aln/iir i^w i ;id ;id Cflrol.odl* Cflrol.od* ? Wbaf Waf *!ut *!u lliallaiid? liali Tliwt*- art- frflr. i)ii^.tiiii and *l#wrvv i'pc li?*t aiHB'^f nv oan (tiro ofi tli laxl< of _li- fucts> rj-iiv kn>ra-n t >i" Kino- oiiiJiixu." differ vastly :il:r>ut 'liat will liaii|>c-ii in I(i'lLH-litu:i :ift-r .-: dt'i-art, uiM vvi- iiin<t >livioii'J!.v Iw; |>ri>|iar<il to ri-K|ioDd or in,* ri rctjuftxl IA vjrriou1* oii-tinKi-ad.^. oiio way to un.Wcr tin- iiwAion^ Is to MisK1'-'- r< l '-i>nff k i in i-iiiji of tlirv IMMPI'.III** r''nrio< TIuk UM a rfiojan'" .iini|irn> tills*- p'-liti'ASl xfftii;m-lil in Vii-dmo.. Lirm unij f':inilrdi.l !>&>( or nft?r tiUf ; till.- sm.iiiid a-ii;iif^< nijild '"TuuiUDi"! rh-turJcH: tlio t)i5rd axs
iifir^t cas: w- *<.uM XTHIIM>-W; fliot " VJiîiuiii. ntt/ir tbi;ir <ilo..-tion4 In nnd afti-r wts l.uvc unnouiicol a linn darr fur our withdrawal, lljf- Xortli atji Vi>:ti(nun-sc RovcrnuitMiiy and forn-.-r "IiilHT^!l>i fruiu" aj:r!0 <in a intrrim jc>tvcni:i.-iit in file SnijUi, <'l(IiiT '/in- f fiiritini)/-. in oilict- f<>r wnuUif '-i>ijjj(r; iv n'lnii'iHf:it<-] or ii'- to li-'M curly !i.Tirtci lu Kiiticc iis? no r>uijt>u wtiu ilit- Nor'.li.nniiM J> nt<-in|i]ni>>.| f .| tin- IrnIi-iluUc fijriir.Cmt'-r fli-si- i-irnujjotuiu''^ J-'n|i( r>fntii[iii-ini ili.ii Un- rs cojti iniii-, if i>o ri-iiii:i'(i'0i. to >-a|i{iiy MliifuQtiul -<--"ii''>jf)if ii I J IIF Tlii- ii.H'i-ini or lu-tviy olii-fml RutiTiiruciil. i'li<;r <JIrtly or ihr^n^li iii:<-r:ihiinli:ii uvtu-ii:* ;i* (In- ison-rtiltu-iit jin-fi-rs 'Mii-ti- would }'i-vi|jujelil.v !" I ' f l i - r" no m.-wl fnr 'niljt.iry nlil. <-v<vjit [+-rli:i|i. ,-i.u:i s-U'- i>.'i.rl> .ind nnn.jii)jiU"ii.'r i' S. .i If u-c }.'.i,|j Irawal of .il\ f.'.ri'i^ ri"-''iji-t{;ini'':i of >.ijliH"ii (.^'rnnn-iii-' i-.m^ldy ffl'-'-iInx '! infer/ml l>aluii>nf (Kftt'^r. P :'. ,7i>J ji|l'-} " k iltl iu thivw i lr* > uiii > >'ntii.i*-> ! (In- u;u< > w* tjja* [ro|K><"l for Vii-ttiiiii'. . ', Ji w/ii;i,l ).. iii|v.,li.Ae< < >iii io :ii<- |M|il>'i nf llic iin-n uii'I in riiir')w-. i>f lntlxi-liili.i. '.T if Mill I /.' " li't.|"<-.'(ldr lit Ic;ist r,!Hi^ ;i)id C uiljodla. l.-ull/j-'l." Hi.n i- ih.iL sill./or'.'lt'ii f'tr''CH lip.fvliKif ! 'bur tin 1 '-minlrics n-i<i'in:i!]> K'i'ir.iiirii'd .i^.kiii'i vi<-rn.i! ;i:fj''k or >I.IN>C(I.I||> lu-j'ir'vl l i i s i . flr.il MKI r,.ii I'.irti iK'lJ-' Hi nr l \if<iv\i-<} l<y anv U i i l J l u M nl!uif. Hint lli.it .ifi'M Hi' . }!'! ! -u|>ii)i."i n.v /'lliiT t'iiin cr"jii {H>;vi<r>' 'J'l"' r'rnii'ii'-liK-Mh '<>nld
l.lUfvl l ' l , J ' l i - , l l | f l ' l - | | f t | ' l l l l l l I H - U I - V : ! TV,'".' .-OIlflTl.')!'-'1 îK 'it IllTH'i>U-. T||l'y
or miîii riiit In-. -il*!- "!)< form 'if inl.<Tiu(Ilouuf riitn-hirwrv. jiri-fi'niMy l"ii!r<l \ n i i n r f .ill";'!"-!1*, to i;ii,i(i'i. ri-iiiil'!litulj.:n ait<l riM-odhfrui'tlnii if 'ftljcr K-titJJT. "I V-I.Hi <-.i>inirli K <).-ir>''l '> |'iirlii-!)>!iO- id xintu' or :.ll "f ilii'v*. :irt:inilfH/i-liI*. MJI-; iru^lif do v> 'J'Jilt M> n i i i i ' i <" ^ l-<:iî->. !]> nioji f.ii'ird.l'li 1 iiiii^nm'' lit Mi"1 w.ir tli:il wr j-nii);! r t M l i u t i i a l ! ; . li'i|- tor ->Jtn) .f. wi- mik'iif iloifr it. tr | imul IrilprMinMi 1 ili:d /Jti n- i-..n;.i iu ;i "K/irr.-. i y i < - "-ii|'Ui"-nf" iinlc-% t|i- Nui'ih \ ii.rriauH-m- Jin- dr1-i^lXl-it dl-f* C ' l ' l ' M l t i l l - I l l - I l l / < f f l l l ' t l l A f t e r l l N V i t l ^ f ' O I U l l f . HIi"(NfUll> UlWill-(
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I - . . . , . r n, ir> S:></,, S. lii, I h l ^ t r ,<)-.!, :i r , niiiliui.>iii(iir fu II,' I ?* S , i , f , , li'Iirinirj , I... ii ... ,.- ;,,|.<J K ' t l i Mix C,,|ijnil,),i h<-lionl ul IliKfllnM. cul A/Tune.
f \3>ericui for tlx yerrt^ H in hardly likely tint they wooM, nnlew defeated. tMf with the Sootti VMnamese for anything It** than the Mirt of eomp'mnlae Uiri^fJ shore. !% rooZ *1 crnaclrs to uro a compromise would seeui to be r. aft^r oar withdrawal, -t Onuiuunlst rlctory or aa indefinite continuation of th* war between the two. Vietnam*. 1 .' . , " . Tltc worst r0*t*>le ewe. would presumably b- that after wr whlidrawal the JnU CtrtiunmUsr. fore** In Vietnam, Iô* and Cambodia collapse and fJbp North VjctngtjvH.' or their client* take over t-otnvietely. ID that cane there would be hltlt- or nothing the I" S. could or should do in Indochina. fh'>nvt*i we 'would at one* Mve u> decide wt<h the gnrennutmt* of neighboring vooutrt* i>rtioti tarty TluUInad, wliat would oe nccmaary.-imd feaiiiilr tî reinforce their *ûriiy. We woiiU pn-winutily witdi to oCcr aaylnnj to any VieUiaineue, Lo, and Oanlx>diaBii who uUehL rcqu^Ht It. ' T!x- fhlrd jxMibl wCt-narlo after our dei*rtare ""would he a corttaaarJi>n of Qski'nx detweejo. Victnaroene on a substantial cale and for a substantial jK-riod. V jdT tfose dr<-mrAn!S I .would awnmc tint we would /! oblftt<J to wntlr j^ to mipply tle Scmtb. VieUiamciw icovernAient vritb Uith mlltt&>- and i-c<)jOnil<- 1J wiiBcient f< enable- trio <.-ontlinw-ltn rtwisrtawp. f>ilr rolt- tln-n-aftfr >ouM If *nJ(i?ons to that of die BasÛnk aod Uio (.hirwae ris--vi the Xr^rtb MeiniJiMîc, I would reconnnend. liow-vnr. that in Mitx^ circumtiiD'fS we- o uiurh ioty- Ti|toroul>' Uwu It/ the |j^. tli- levcnwe'couwrted 1th our bid tv (trww-thn SaUon B<irnmt t*> iKff<vUu^r if rtie otWvtJ^ were*b> willlnR, 'om}>rouiiiKf jt.>liti<*l neuienuint .itout; Die lln* KUpce<4d in the flnrt wfoado il<-w,-rtlKKl abiire. Pnrsuuuibly we wooW 1*0 limit our ailltHry aid to wtmt the <t*uld a*K t-ffecOvtly >od would lot Otalotain un/ Ainrrtran there. If flKUtinjj aim comiQiH1-] in Lai*. Oinlrodia or lioru, we <du>ul<f alM> ci>ntinuv ur uiiltUiiy, and etonouilf (ud to their goror)uneut< t'oug the mum; line* aii to . . l.'udr UiiK tceoario. lurw'4-ver, wirh niibtwajjtjal Ogbiiag utiLl mtlnnligf in i/iitv r more <>f the countries, nn inierumlonai corfft-rcv to end the iU;btjnpr and nwiUK- anti would Ur"U) fill more urgent niid tieCrxsury and we should likrd to c/rtvue it. <>f cojpe if tue Kortli ViutTanwrne Iboutht tliey wô they would he Jlkeiy to wjert ortif>rT>ce. tiut If they did w> they at ~i*t u(Tt*r WODW- poMtditl danutê lu<id aixl outhl<V rlrt arui. Our offer i..' >/>>Qowio aid. to jwonntnwtion nifffaf )>e tlc worrt <aw> loejiti^nrd aliore, jf would IK- In our Intvrenf, in ord<*t tiv io<urc n^loxt u "doiulno eRM/t,". tJiat we rcxfflrtn imr " >rnmlt incut t i(ii>(K(rt TtuiitanA In ca.*! of ^xt-i'anl.atur! *nd that w c/mtiniK' lullitur}' nnd crop'tmU; alii.lv That ciMMty. M' Ki-w/d, lifrtr^rer, w;Jb<Jniu- /rB) ThuJMnd fjj/- afr fimvn rl.t ni.-ci- UHif in the ImWx-biuv nr*nd lUnit our wllltarj' pri-M-no- In fl if uu ir.U'CTtailmiu) c<wrfon-n<v *cr IxrJd tuiiler any <f lw nhovicould ! rvticticd ther^ to nrntr.'iH** indix-hbw. 'i -fff>rt mlrlit l>e t -citoad tbat m-ntralfzatlon to Ha- wlsolo ftr lri;c'r jmrl ' H A.-.IU It tljKt were i4iKiwf<jl, (In; Kouth-*t Asik Trcuty '>n;inl7mtU>ii K'mhlartoo foK, UaÂ. 1971J TUB U'jB tovr. Co W, Yxf*i MI- f>t ili- mint- riMujirlllng factor* oauoinjf nuw"*Jw t/.S. i ;i- >->M iilntf iuir |'iirtj'->|i.ill'i in ihf VlcdittiU wnr und tn more n-ry xU/wly In ODI* , V/(inlri'i'l* fj^'xti"^ Im* ]?.t)x- ti'tt ft rtoKit'HHf* liui'klu"li J/ fJ***
'.'I-! '" 1' lll> (I:H fj Wrt>Mf<J, pJ_tlJ>' 1>V HO>llOy (fHlli till' doUIOtl
.if i in- '!()!.' uf China in ifj ((* IfrUtv, fiiaf. any f'.K. adiuiiiintrwflou in li)i*ti;ry m Ilk- llr*r in "!<>M<< n ur.
'\'r \ (r i wb i-tiPrjf <ll'rtff*lf<Mi iir I.''(iM'i.-itr In }',H', 41'. nihlr;[..,nl<>c ( !,> In A .-rvwf two r*r lu tb* Nli.' Xdn1'iiTjtiBfi niMiu4of to t)i t* V, **rU>ii* Af tr,
,541
..The iii-'St ) .u infill aud traumatic a^Kx-l i'f our nuiiuUv? iuv.>ltfin'nt simv If**"! ham &' inur.s*: ln>*u thf" lo* uf uioiv than 4*MJ(X> American lives. It i.* now tirxued . . thiit, If UurOoRnnvnlKtJi siwutd cli-urly And rapidly . win -tjio^nr alter our withdrawal. tli- tlioujlit tUt Uivw ni bud died'.iti van would j.ixMu.f it irvul.iiou nut <ml> -HKuiwr tl.o adjiaiihitratiou )n pcVr but also against aij ' further t'-S. military [rirulivmvnt u-c?ai"TliI could. H U ftrared. Lad to a'x>w mood of MolutHJiiisiij In. the countrr, comparable lo N tfiat In tUe lJX.Os ud HQO*, nhich . i>u!d unil'Tiniiw X.VT<> imd' all our fowlco cuuiuiltait-nu and. could opeULtUe ' - way fur ;>> iVuaAiuuixf expansion irts"*pLcrc.' . .. , 'L U'lmtt-UT jnay.li* tinii*Uiioe of tlwrw ft-are, * tew Tvordu if tutiou about tlie rti-torji- of iM/tli^KlKlilîuid I>*ft <-n !)<. iJMtuo nilfbt Jlcst b- rc A-< to tut- rh^tiirie of tli<* ftiirhr. It wftuld itppC^r t>it.evtru\<uc]iD^llc about tlv uatji-ipuitil back!aiir> 'nd-<.not to dixiiel tiut to- fontrr. *nJ ftoti'it. To URSi-<t. )"< i'Xrtiii|i^ tliBl i !i<- C.S. mitclit lie "n. jiltiful- hfliii^jvji (fiant."1 tt It does HOC at tfilv wiajf.- rct|n;'l tu f<^r< wttli Ktill jn<ir totn- in Vit-'Jinni. ituUda up Ju ll* -..uiiirj i ! V,TV |ii>yriioiJs tbat Is Allied. Afttr II, w$Tf fttnl power, Britain. H ii>.- :;i.'Kr.-ir--i'. i-)t Jn mcMtluQ <;<-nninj utid JUptu, Lah f mm time U tiiu? a\\fft-r-U il-f'-uf p-lx-ti It on-rcN'luiutitl J>A iiajl>U>i'"lnt ha> uwa X<ir [iriidriiiw rnrlit-r. Oiau ifnid-uuMiu 1'ir n-tn-nt y!i<ya u ncct'i'tid mjd ltK.-!f l'. rt-ulttlfC v. . ~ ; .-As !< Hi'- rlj-ri.rro <>f lift- ti-ft. if is'iuai.. cftimivrj'r'Hlu<-ti'v<- to Indulge !n If-flttiC'llMtioii "iind to talk ait. ffKmKd nv <*<Tr u Oatiob i>f- u-Jr ali. TUiT(v..ran IR- m> i|n/-sti"ii rluif tin- X<>rf)i VivtiiinDf**' tn^Mii thl llrtj1" Smith S')';(imm aij'I 'jj'-s. nlt)iut any jirOi.ocd.tl-.iii froin.4jiir sUde.'oxtenilcd ii laler t.jOt>iTii>Uui aud <-arrW It.un fruiu lf- lîmlat 'H!i "'< utwu^f nitJi'los-.tii-^.ti mill j,rix.-ii>:iHiu-4>i. n't- li:nv f:rre<l Ii^'iiNjudcIojr iur ca]*:>iitHty 4i.-d Ui.t >{ i irr jl!i<i< (> I'HIT.V >.! *iu-It u wnr tup<TswfnlIy ainl t <ln vo witliout Iw-lrij; Iniwn liii-.inriJMrlly Int rtm.-r klnrtu ut uirm-lovn-new. Our"JLt;ntionR w<'r>-. "hon-o.-r. "f tin- mcsi iiri'ichl>l4-~-tci su|j>ost tlw- iirim-ipli- f n-Jf-d<t(xuiiui1tJ" :ti^1-t IM-IH sit.aU rijiitiirii-K n-s;st aKirmdlim ai hail riifl^lr nd tiurwwft nll> il ij<- in Kiifoa.'T rtraw nii-irln-r i'.irji]|i.l it i- * M iiiHjiiif wrfli *Imt i ji.-lwii > rij! Suiiet I nii.ii winilil lurvf r'tictt-d if (Ji" \\Vnf dVnuaux )>aJ trlt-d t,. t.^^- ,..IT Kuwr (h-ruiutiy it. lin-'^jiui' iii.iiuii'r lin j \rili . Tin- AI*- i iii-rwvii iir<->"iit if niw f U-ratr mirM>!iv<> "it).<j- fur I m v i i m :i ~w:ir. n'lirlt n n r - I>IT ^Jir "lily (/i Uu i-xli-iir < laa.li', it <. n-^r for :<. fiiutrbt -li uij ii smlc AM .-i;iKjrlil:fi- t" '-ur ilitcn-M :ii)-J rlm'-f of tli<> | ..n.-( i-rn-il HiUnT. u 1 - tl,'i rni<y for <>'ir uuilnMl rr.-iiini i. in iiinl !i<ili)d tukc ' rj).if.;rt f f i l u I)ii< flK.-r HIM) our ili i* uuy lia\i- ln-1'ii Jn Hf-ftjii. .-Hid xiilf. liii1' Jii lx''?) riitli'dy in vrftn T[io ji.ix.MiT f ît y<';illiii-' 'iii-ii.-ijjvj'l.- u>J'<l -"iiL'' "f tlir liP'Hc'jr*-.* M'iib u tjlrli mir iiili-rVfiili'n. 'Ails nfi.-'iii.'illy (Iff (Km.i| ti'i-ii|M*. f i r s i . rti" d.'iiwr f wi'Ii-.|.rt-:nl r'-wirt t "ivj^x ,if mitioiial Il?-rati->ti" - H j>"-liri'"|rn> fur i-Mnii'liliii '"iiiiii:iinV 'I'ûiliafii'ii. wliicli iv- f''iir<-i I" 15*!'. <:u" er-iit jutw/rs liav- wvn tLui: û--!i icar-. w l i . i t i- xrivi liur/irds rif Llx>y tmvc <-^4 jily iinl l'i'-l. it lnil';' uliai.'tntii-il. Ilii-V r'- lik'-Ij to fw <-i.|ili.itiN| ill '.Ii" fllliin- i v i l i i ./>; ) 7 n(.ir;ilT 1 y iiMin- rjtiriuii mid i'i tr.-ilnt _*""ji'l._'"'ii'i!n'ii/iM ('iiltiii. w t i i i - l i H] .] rt-il |p llufi tn IN- ii, H l-,llijrir"].r tn-^n if in.'' in J:P <-ii('f 'x'xiiNf in<Mxl. lux wN-iii-' iTiO'rt<-ril in liinir'-'iiMC. Hi l<-a; 1" i'.i(i-'tli-Krri tt- 1 K'lii'liiii* w " i i i 1 r r-N n f i l n unrl.l Jl i f.iMlint>ff id.if. v i l i - f - < r f'n- r-a j-i;i. ni'iv In . jr wn-il'I lit 7iri''lit tircfcr r;iii'|"ilit> r.-iMii-îlj-'ili turl"j!. j,. . ritimiij; ri- :n-ir iwii;l<li'fr>. .' '(nn'l Mjilii- i- li-in' r-|M-.'it'"l!y iinlri'i-j-tiiiiMti-.l luiili :li<- ;inil.i|ii>in< ;. -1.1 rhf ! j-ri:-J":iiinn Mif () Vtirlli V|-nniiii < tlifiv I H I I U" ici ilniilrf t f i a * (t '. I'-tif fcrifli 'rif i . r > l';iirii> n/-r tin- jmrt i-li ji.'Jtr* Ttrt<n'm.[ ~n'in >im nun:"ii'>H i 'tji;r''-"-Tlifif :n':cr .1 U'tflr/uctit in i,Hi n<"MMii' Jind J,.ii- .ti'i-i-i'-aliU- \<j itn-iii.
'(!; . - . r i j - - - .if.-H'-iii'iii.ii ,I[K| .-f ,>.' f"f :i hiii- jit U-,i-;r ;.. I.. ij|;ijnr (r<''il>*lll ' "f li. >M;U'I-:I>! t^lfl.
In V|/-viinni f.-ir M'KT (i)ifl<-iip. in <i/ ^r*nrilu n tliir "Mi: n < r t r ! ( > liniJ I" trove ("Wfird iii/^L-nilxuti'm Jn f"fU" r->.j <t-- 'J'h.) .in1.
V:-iii{iui < '('
>"iftl4..">'< t*> the r.P. tlntui'Mt it* WVIM?. wl)U<- tin- duration i-f >' f <"ir 'icw** havt- t>i'-r-:is) our rrnnnin. flioy )..(. :il> IIIUVM! u.< n iiutlniMil musonMix thai th- linL^ha* rmm- t" I>ull 'Hit. In iSKX f I'H-oImlily.n majorit) of Anifriojuiv \\Jn> would liwc ijijosKt arid. rtl l>y:$vltljdra*\aL without "\ktory." Now dt.-sust aiid liwith tin- irt)i>I<: ( utorVrLv.1 N Jm w ttli';(jiv:i<l tlirfl wiihJMu'aJ wmtld ri y ,<r)stbly In- STt1*1'.^! l>y ,ui uoriuoa^siRh >;t rcUvf, imt nf ct>ur**- a uiiatiimouS "t a r"^-donilniit <UM- \VliU^> withrtrnwal In 1W1? tnirfit not Jwvc "iironslit u< r." rt vf ry jiniNaMr winld do m-w. V-S. luis tJjrcnwh 1>N rp-rieuc<'. trade am! dKfclvt; as it was. v-d .a nar raluablt- lesson. It hax. KiiiAi-A lUt !ti>iihU.it>H5 of ils |xivvr. It ' l-rnt tint. dfsr*tt<l 1* P"^t aaiUtury *d Ânonilf ,<tî,pth.- it .cinnot t! *r-nts in <liunt jairis of Uio world. AnJ it ha-, fortuniiiel.v y-.i i In a jibio- mut tlm.- wbfl AtUitrc. wJili-_f ooorx- ]ia(i, f il. wa fatal, liirfot-d ton Hi 1 *, i wiiiiM *nnie, !frj<>usl> xiitnuizi-d our *-v*' _ ir tlii>*' nf any oi niir alU'c^ wryk. 'Hi<v*: in Tin- luiiiuflUtt- tliiffr <if vr Jf i < KH-IU>: ti< a *<>>rtlr M .> iou.1iut it n>wy f>m- in tInvp*>ri.i>H-ti; >i hls-t'iry to
j' it wii! l-r. -i i- t<> ' Inn- iI>>)-4-[|(]->''>f I'liiir^- >! liiw n.- ;
;I-A.I> ti^ iK'Uiii<niH Diniiixl ri:i'ii.iin<<iiti>.. .>r 1C

-i>li' tli.-it. UTaiv; \- n;i-r<-(( 4(i>t(Kl iivi> ;i'h<l ^- l'ilI i'lîr ov r*ii-> Iiiinhciiifiit. t lii\>-Jiiwnf i- in <*" t-n < ivi.dM biiT- ).î far in'>r- tlLin tli<- ari-;i ..n
. r.('..iKiii .It:if3j ii i.nr l u ^ l i w u i i v c:i<:Ti ymi. i ^boitiil wniji fli :iirt<>m<>t jk 1 lf-I.T. rr-.il U^- Jiut-('liitju' uvir 4,-. i>urt nf tin(iivii'Tnl i'\[iTi'Jn'- of î>iubiÛ|i .i1-;! ^rc:i: |mWiT. J/t-f u.iirti'-i-iilniti* mi jtus'tiii); llii- j-n" mtf IIM->L- <if ilii- fuMirc .il II'-BK- ujt'l *I>r-iiJ, ^ J fjl<-Ii \\r liriiv ni-cl^-it-d v lull- fmiKl*? ili<' v\:r. I>-| ii IH-.'JI ljuJ uji tin \\nui.il~ :;ml <nir;i'!v>*ixurii- Ijiiiv inflli-ifil "ii Vii- ii-ij. IJMA- :inj 4"ii(IMiu. '.o !) ixli^*'t ainl In Ili>- way 1 11 1 I'H- !! I ' " "^ t'" "' n.it|i.;i^ inii.i mint -Mir IK-'I- !>' !)-. ouf- :f;.lii -.nIxTli ami nuii'jri-lj n-a:~."">''ii.r (Vium.iuii"ii'.-. 'nr ljii<-ii->.iv HIH! mil funt^ :il>ronil. (;irA Hum f In / .*** ji dtIf .! ll^l^^ iti tbi<- nuj' Wr- slj;;ll In 'JUT, di-niuu . (.iti" li.->w 'ui.rL" tli-.u.rr. .nd "V 'J--4<1 <h:ili in-t.liai'c flu-il-lu v'jin.
'1 In; CHAU.-M.-V. ]>r. Falk. woirlil you tesd y<>iir"tnt''irit-)i^ jdi-asp.' Asir. '- ' . STATKMZFTOFPEOF. RICHARD A. FALK. PRUTCETOW UNIVERSITY. PR1NCETOH. JfJ. '-''f. I 1 " ,i K. ATr. rii:iinii:i.i. [ u^lr'H'ic ll" - (|ip<>rtiiniry t' Li l[i-> '''HinuitN" i(\:t\: I V.'iil "-uiinii'in7(" my loiii.'<r vlaU'ruf-nt tli:il"I '.vi!l Mi'irii? in' tlit- ii-jvij-it, a i i - l I ii.i'^lii I M I | I - ,ii 1'it- i [ri^'-r :li:i'. tin-it 1 af(- 'îiH.fii'-.'ui -imUavilJo tn'-'Wii-'i t l i f - v it \\i- tl'at .1 wiJi lo iiJ\ liiu-c u i i i l l'iii- tliul lutvi- j>i-;t licvii
*
Ti'f il.r pi iiir'rj'.il jxiint!- f ) i * J \ \ n u M '-jDjiii-j-i/'..' i i r i ' . i i i r f'lllow'in^r: f'ir-'i, l'iv'H<|i-jn Ni\oii'.- ViHjuMn IM"!'!':!'11- ;iM' iK>t ilcîîicd tt> <-;ni c f t i ' f .\ui<-n'ii i i.Muh <-IIIIM( -in I'ldm-li'iKi or fj;'- 'vjif it-i-If. Si-'-'iri'l,' MM- \iui-i \i-,iu inioKrjnM.r in J-'f I'ldo.-M'in - w a r < - :iu lur:.'|ii-I!\ I'l'Ji-jJ on ,i l.ri-i-. ( l i n t .-jitiîf- t i n - NM! IiAri!* of ;<|] ri'l'v; ill tin<-<iM(ll<'t it l i i i ' Cinlt'il *l:ilfP :ij;l'- (liil'iif O|M-I :i( ; < > t i i i n i i i i ' i l i j i ' ' ] ^ , :ilnl \n w i l l i i l i - . i ' A a l l ' i f f ftfi'i 1 - M lîj'i'I! v :i- jxi-i-ioli' l ' i l ( ( , . ( i : i l ( I l l i M l i I ' l l ' f i l l ] ( i f lf'71. ' - . ' '
Third. 't'lutt the United StaUf c*n help end the Vietnam war by .jrJving its support .in Paris to tho. formation of provisional coalition jo.v.rnii,u>nt tmtrusted with supervising, the transition from war to ;i>ca4.-c and orjrmizih;: elections ot a pennant ur ôvoruinont- for trnitli Vietnam. ' Fourth, that tbe,rnitcd States should support the convening of in Indochina, peaor. x>nference to Ûfe the outsUmduitx>nflis throughoif hidochiha within A months of rear-hing the tasis of an arrord on a Vietnam .spttlfiincnt. . - -'.. " ' And fifth. that the issue of warcrimCi; piacos the quest ion fit ending ; tii<- war tn jn entirely new pergjective that converts for the Conjijix-srf siie of [K)litical judgineut into one of %irgont nnd categoritj moral ncflstuexr's xitofAM .f ocjcv The v*ncc of my position, is îat President Xixon is tc'ling t American |>Jil>lJ.* that lie Ls winding the war doxrrt wliiie. in reality lc is pui-sjiiirp the wx r aims of earlier AdniinistrationB. Besides in vol *JiyrJexîWbJuthi!* kind of j>i)licy inflicLs great suffering on llift i>rpp]f<! of Jr^k^'hina. without altering tiw> prospects of the eventual political <>ufc<>rii..Itt order to sustain the UlasTon of ending the war. whidi ha? Ixjeu dcifiniHl maialy as lading tiic Ajacrican ground conibat rflfPtWidetit Vixon has lje led to spread flic war out from S<tutli Viethaui to Hijrnlf aJI of Iiidoohin.a. 'ilu.- pn-hsiire to e^-alat* <-OIDC*, lriu th< iietil to offrtit the inipai^ of Americuu, troop wit'ulrawajs TMI the military .-larut- ^'{(hin Sîuth *\*ictua'iu. This pD^^^surf ^'iJl ?Jua.ULSO Jnij-.r-a.s ill,' ..aduujji-jfratioij seeks to coiubine a policy of trfop wifjidiawal vvj*b a (Tuiiiiniliiicnt to at-oid.a deterioratiur of tin- military Mtuatioii in Vietnam i-nd siii)"l{aue<>uily j-efuses to "negotiate îwaiti a i"ilitiiul îiiipiY^niê. " Jx?t jiU'-lw f]eafT. 1'it "idunt Xixon, likt- his jnvd^x>?ots irt -ofuW.. ins r.o illii8i<ij]> of a< > l>iov;jir n<.try in S<uth Vi-tnain. TJu- objective irjjiîns :i ln-foir. |( avoid or at least to uVfi-r ijfjvat. Tlic fffi-rl.x of t*Y>n|i wiilil!iial and su-i-alkij Vi(4nanii/j'"io:i arc \<> .Ii-fer (JM- *>\joyi, of (l.-l'f.-it f>ci iln> H7'J 'l-flion daU'. No Amerion Pix-sidi-nt. lias lc<'ii w illjn^' lo a-hiiow li'd^c ll(<- i .fstvf.rabli' balarift- of pnltlk'aT J)f( f n i i i i j i n I'OI.-C-N in *-.,.,tn \ Miiaj.j: niaîu > 'iirfc > K'nfion<aii>iji^r JUi'i'i i m i u n t c d:uua^f Ias Ivan <? 'Wîwd << DeiitraJuee. this jiiihalau-v. ('onîv^.vJou. lia- )jvit imwillinjr fo JUT]I< rc^fKinsibility for <-ndi{i4; im- '.\ar K-i :in ftrti-i'lii'c iiianjit-r. whifli jim-wârily JiK-an^ '.vi-ptiii ti:- :'Jk i l i u t politir-al und jrjilitary realiiit'-< will IT'JHJM* r'ji- ourc^'iiK* "f !!; Jon^' strnyffl' for-iTojit ros of .South \"j<-t ji*r ( j. ajuJ/in Vn.-rnaiwsc w liu f and. licfort -, fb f Frcndi ha.e Mjj>p'>rt'd will V dri\<-n or -.\i!l il<-c from t t\\i-r. Tin- risk i^ unavoidabu' in Jiny ^rious njoii- 1" [i! :iUoî-tiit'r Aiwrifi*'.-! miliritry infolven'/eiit in tlw. war. Indtvyi tin- i.-l.-i-jn onlt IK- j>liiiiir>icril In v.-lui^vx tin1 war, bul wiiinitijr tlw U;M , - ;i irvj| l l j a l i'li:fj'<l tlic ("niti/d .StiUs \vlieji i< had jnTfc t)i;ii ,'..io.i.(^ (uxi)is OH tiic^/ri'uml mid pulili'.- ojjijium in thisj'r>jjj<ti.K. morifir I'"-- uiiilcd ix-tiind I in; wbiiiiii-trtMon. a hilu:ition tlj;jt la^r-d until t i n - 'I'd oifp|jîv- of -J^'brnary I'Hi*. MOJV tlia 'itiirr oli'iuc-iii in tin- < initial- Aji:iif-;ij) Around troops a/id to K).5>oiii itc It'iiuta 'ttiiiu-;. <i( \ln- S:ii^
544
55. 3T6
Hie key to getting out is to get out. The way to begin turning this key is to set a date for total withdrawal and a complete end of all American combat activities. The Vietnam Disengagement Act of 1V7I, S. 37G, moves far in this direction by setting a definite date and clarifying the conditions for orderly withdrawal. As has tieen dear for several tears to anyone who has had contact with the negotiators for North Vietnam (I)RV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Sooth Vietnam (PRO. formerly the. National Liberation Front), an American commitment to rapid:and complete withdrawal by a certain time would maximize negotiating opportunities in Paris. Wre the Senate and President to adojtf S. 370 a? national jwlicy today, American prisoners of war could begin to lie released almost immediately-and go-home ceasefires could be arranged to assure tttat. no further American casualties wtnild be incurred. The Xortli Vietnamese rlrlegtte to the Paris fadks indicated tlut the announcement of any Tt^Hsonable date for total withdrawal would be sufficient to assure that *V*L'Mir questions, hxJndinp the qoejakm of releasing captured militnry jafrii". could "be rapidly solved.4 (Statement of Minister Xuan Tfcuy. 113th Plenary Session," May 13,1971.) In otlwrr words, the of her side U Tint demanding a specific date for adoption by the United Stales, but nrtly that die principle of to(*I withdrawal wHhiu a rea.'-onabJe f >eriod be Adopted and implemented. TFhy then does President Nixon fail to adopt SJJTCof its equivalent, as administration policy? Tn< baric answer, already foreshadowed by what I hav snid. js rliat fl. removal of the American military rok> will twourajre a. {wlitj<vil outrofjK1 in South VictJiahi that truly reflects.the j>n>caHh) nlalion nf forces tfien-. In tnitli, no one ran IK- SUP- exactly vrhat that <>utcone will Ije. but there is nâwi- t Nippos?. rimr it would inv<il\-e tlie replacement, of the present Saijron leadiership b\ (tolitical ilpinn; more representative of popular fore*-* in the <v"mjtry and, rjuite JKSpiblr, by a irpiioe. fhat would *fJw AC/roinnifMlation with the PRO. In due course, jriren it* year.* of stnyyrl*' and hardship, iri.veu iN Jinks Jo tlic nortlu ,njd gi/en its onranixation s*renjrfw in the south, if i-oaw>nable.t/>er{>wrt tluittb** PRO wouldcujerjyp aVflie-dominant for<ie in South Vietnam. This course of emitx i* likely to wr whenever tlie United States ends its c/>mbat role in Viet ruin. To.defer RJ>'h n outcome by maiolaifiin^ the war-at hijrh Lyej>i of intensity a'vnmplisl^s- two mam results: < hidet-'flie pnlirli-al and nrilitary fr<n irjost of the j*.ywnvari pul>lie. and it inij-iws the niel .rvj of higii technology YUI tlie Indonesian fKVi|iU-. Tt lias also Iwn 'Jii. h adruinistrntion ofRciaL that u r>*|'id wirhdrawAl from tricwr in Ann-ri'-a mi ii|-ijr^' ot' ny\\i^\i\ff polifi-% ail re.>;jf>neP t/> <hiK conlwition : Firtf. no i'\'v\v\wf xii-1^ that 'ifnortr; tiiit i-onecrn: tfie !rfwiri<' Fvnti:ii/*nt wvnw to fjvr c'rther wnninpr or p-ttinjr out. nor flu 1 wn-t f. intermedJattf apjr<i;i<'h thsJ. j.iFjp'mp-piifvued bvt}^President. it i liisrli.lv rmmoral for th' T'n'ih'd State* tn fro on LilJin* jf Indwhinew rwjj)le mid d*rtroving lljiir severnl eo'un' of 41 ^<-or of a UOHK-KI'v bwldi' Ji. ,r<l thirj. since- 'p'*' wHI be fortv-d lo c^ out of V tnain * i< iu-berf l/ do wi iui]ilic(tlm>utfh tii
54}
SEXA.TK KESUtCnOS 6 AX1A S. 370
In a serisv.. Senate Keiolntion CC. responds most correctly ro the analysis 1 fiav tvca c^ci-inr-b its call for sn immediate end" to all combat not specifically related to the. defuse of American troops. liiis resolution exhibits 'a clear understanding- that further killing:, except in strict self -defense, sm'cs ho Intimate military or political purjKisc in Vietnam as it is neither designed to reserve nor capable of reversing the underlying aiitiregimc balance of forces that has prevailed in the country since die wars of the war against the French bKTwn ii47 and Uir4." ' -* " ' . .S. -?7G by its focus ou scheduled withdrawal does not necessarily piivlutic destructive and sujjwrfluous military Q}x?rot-io> in the interim. In iractic, loirever. tJit- passage of the Ti(!iiuin DlsengAgi'iiwint Act of li7J wouid lifctiy t-u^'ond^r rapid and suc?ful , war-ending i-nc rosmox AT Tfn ) K<r [Kwitioji at J'aris. fii-sr onuJK-iatvd in the i-ifdit-point projx.snls of Madani Nguyen Thi iiinh on September 17. 1970, tut reitertt-d fnvjijwitly in n 1variety of other fonns, l>as ^J1 *"*- *rms for \v it biiraw-a) shouW Ix at-coinpauwd hy af rw-inwit ou the fonaof polirii-.i] stitlwuefu.ôijtfs fourand wvcr of Jicr proposal call forthe selection <>f a |>cruuuiPiif, irovernnient byelixîaus sujX'rvL'a.'d by a provisional coa'liiicrfi yovonnrKuit dmwn from thn-o prin<->i>ai jrroupings: tlw1 VUG itft-lL lite pr(-?cnt Snijron r^nc.ofher than nneu-Ky-and-Khjem, and ali tiiird forw groups in StûtTi Vietnam. Some ou<.h traiirttional jKilitji^l amingenei\t offer& \ha best asssuranee that the American withdrawal will not 'rout-rare a blriodbath or another long round of warfare in South Vietnam. Evei? without ]lftcin<r any great faith iu elf-^-tions as n way <rf reîst^rinfr the wili of the, Viefninu>9e population, the replacerJieiit <?f The present rejjrtsffve. re/rinvp by ar interim coalition srovernnwut is jr.ist likelx- to eucouraêth" healing forces of i-c.-Jin-'il'mtioti in oj-i-rate frcdv t-nd to yield.* jwliti'^l outline tliat. cxpr<-: tlio tnn- bulanfie of forrt^tliere. 3I:ni^ter Xu:m T)IUJ% cliief of Xurtli Vie* num. h;* alt^ stT-ongly jnthuatedui a puhlfc iin at nejitance of rujiue kniul of iiiteiliariorjal wip^n jf ion for tliii-^- [H'rmanenr eU'rtious. As;ain. J would warn Against fspectiuit auv Viftnajiif-se elet'Toral pnnvas. luiwpver saperviA^l, to~provide a t'-r i" any wdwjuate rfnsv^ of denwTalit' .-j-ntiun-'ijt. Jiut f!r willin*in t.o i.'.-iui>Vish a--fi<'iiuit^r}' framework ,'tud t<i allo'iv uiu:7i<lc fiujjcr. i-ipi) iris!-* râsoniibUf a^-unmce thij erode siu-l brutal abifies will n"l tui.e -(kls-v and that iJif outcome will GktJy ,r"-ile( 'he ovenijl Ijji'.tju'cuf foj.'r.- HI 'vjuth
. .
J
Hmt e tjidi-d our iifû.J.on with elwtVirH pp]iti<.'& hi S-nitJi V''i-iixn a;- pr'-xiiitlc ^jn!=tiHjte<L V/V i.uurf. understand that i for frexj JwJbw>n>"ui Viotnsni M Jcmjr as t1rf. iipp:<r.'ir-us1fif p-mer tFjere. It-lia^Jwn haf Thieii a re^'
.)->: I patronage m a rutlikiS fashion and that'in the [ost he has rv10 a variety of tHmiques to gpia voles out of all proportion ' to i>is real popularity or 'power. Nguyen, tlso Kyhjmself conceded the 'fraudulent nature of the 19<i~ elections ly which he and Thieu were rejurned'to power. And in i. nwnt statement Ivy desc-rited South
A siurJii ixal. \rJtli a dwtpfjvvly fcofai i-oiu of joint outahk. xnd-a lii- i-: iji.-fciitWiil. dWt.jaI. -iud dishoncsT.* A trtilrl of -cviud and tte boat will i:i*t to tlw b6tt"Jtt.
,'It also seems naive to place much -&.<it-k in tlie uiuaeiTain prosix^ of a |Ki?sift!o oi>ju<itUiii I'/aiididate srch us iJkuun<r Van ^finli. The clian<v>K of hi? winning ar? Tiyrli'ly unlikely, and it mu^t l ir-jiiciiibciTHi'that JJuonjr Van Mmh. soâflt^ Big Minh. is larjrely an miknovvji 4juant!ty. thal.li* 1 may U1 ffi'e ^scididate of some Auiwi<vin fii'tfK-j^ ui Siufh Tjetsam ( iuchidnij; rvjwriediy the Of A), and that h<" proiidts rib great K^niranf-e of Mtli-r a caj>a.'ity -to <r)i'L-rii or lr> tti'jrotiaU' j>ea<v. AJniittodiy. a \Ict^ry hy Ifinli would ?/-rrainly Lnij/i-yve rh<- wiwvjif Jy nojiex'irfent pros?ixyt.s of a Vfc|.uarih^f' stttleinent. But then- is no n-awî to have any great hoj^sforeiflicrthc liifogriiyor the siguificaiiftt of tJic I97J fvuth Vit-tuauieM1 elections, n-ârd'ew of . . In my judptx-ftt, S>au- C'owunvni liesolution 17. even if inipli'nK>nted, wcmld provide Jittie giMisiine assurance of either I.~-S. neutral if y or the integrity of tlie oWloral j)toc;s in SonUi Vietnam. It couJdhe easily foiled and would then serve to stieojrtLen TJiieu'srlaini that the ein ions won- a fair expn-ssioii of ]<ilj/ ir-al wut ininnf << in ûi h Vietnam. Tiie (.MipnisS &]ould i-onc4.-;^-ate on ^citiji<r AiiU-'rican? out .of Vietnam and .on ending the warfare in Wrnani and the rest of Irdochijja. To inivt'tid by way of .-urefy for tlu- eWfion*; in S>uth -Vit-fnam is diivrsiouiiry at <Ji5s w<re and invites tin- xtill further ûufui-ioii <>l the Auicriean puhlie hy aecordin;.' tLc>' lîoju- u fn-d.ibility(h.i( thiH'dikiio
iK-ri: or '.
Hi'- i->ue of war crime,-, in jay judjriiK'nt. [jlaeesflu1 whole 'if i: inline Hu- N'ietnan) war on an entfrcly Jsevr plane lnâii* a {Kili<icut<|ur i stioiiof judgment ujtoone/il'inoi*] und Ie { imperative, Jt i-; iiii[irtan( tu [valiw tliaf an inereasin^ jjumlx-r of internationil Jaw expert^ arid ejriyx-n> i;c<.rid Amfr'u-xn iu\olv>nicn< in the Viefpara var :i.- part Kjjmt ion HI :iii onôinjr ''Hminst enteipnx-. Wntinjr iv'enf !y in ilu- New Vork Tiiue*. Veil Sheehan. u ff e , read! n^r "the kvidiii^ hookr pi*"^'ii4ir(^ evide/i-" of J".S. war '-rime.*; in Vicinuin în/'ludejl Uini "if von credit as fur-mal only a fraction of ll;e infonnation a"eiiilijiul h.-re jlxjin what hapf>ener| in Virlnain. asid If x'ou apply tin- \:iv.*. of -*ar t/i Ajn'-n<ain ,<vindnff <liore-. tlu-t "u- l*'aitpi>. of the I'jiifrd Sdj/4-r. fur the pa*i iruilU' of war Tlij* lia^ Ueu n-infoii-i-d on main oe/'dMons. insist -nxrutly Iy tlte iiM-ni of Col. Oiyi'fi IJHideixon on irial f.r the Mv Iîi. foj1 on HI i ihi'M.y Lai uiu**mii-ri'. whoKuid iJuf every hrijflule in South Vie hiiK r ' - o w n M v
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547
:iro inoinwifenis assertions that cannot be lightly dismissed: nor will i&w. disappear by pretrtdiug the issue does not exist or is not weXl foifeded. The My Lai disclosure, tlie Calky conviction, the credible .ffistujywy of pervasive criminality by veterans' groups, and the. aoc-nmewted sdiolarlv analyses of such responsible observers as Telford Taylor make it clear that the war has been and is being wagpd in a manner that- violates the ruins of war as embodied in mternatioiini tn-jitie:? and cnistonuiry nonns and that suggests the relevance of the Nuremberg Principles to the standards of responsibility applicable to American military and jioliticat leaders. T do n<r vtusidv.r it a digression to argue that Congress has an ejspe<-ia! responsibility to stop the executive branch from engagwgrin criminal activity, wljether here or abroad and that so mch evidence of <M-iniiu:>ni y now exists that a failure bj- Congress to act will amount in l<'ii>lative *vrpli<'ity. Innocent i>eople in Indochina at\- l>oij.\<3! ki!l'-d aiul uiiiiiM-d each day by tljftsc cniraiial policies of iTi<iiscrinvin:iU- warfsre. Fri> cn'nws against tht- peofjti *nd the landx>f those p.<:")r Induchinesi! <:ou)trjes occur: Vice PrcsJident Ajenw actuaHy told Anit-ncan television xudiejuv th*i oUJ of the purposes of tlw Operation was to destroy ithospitiil comj)lci:es" m the 1 aj\ !>. an objective dhvctfy in \*tolatioi) of Article 1] of J!K> ''^nvfirtH^n for the Awttor*t;w>n. of Hie -Condition f ^* :njd Sjck: )inge li/Miie piow* are coiitinuing to convert large rt* 4rf'fertiK v rW paddies 5w a hungry Asian country into barnin anii in wliieji <! îil ii.bwv. giuy, and jffeless; Aniericans.jire diw<tiug p*:ifi/'rt( ion effort* tliat im-iude forcibly removing peasants from tlt.^r x:H<iVb aiul that iv*fv^ uu*l)ili-/yng for null it MTV serviw and i-lnldivn ;a<jfi\v rhi:- nv of T:-J* well, indiscriminate Ixwnbiog and J'>ug-range. Artillery patterns persist, rcfiancc on antijKrsojjnel weap> onry 'nitrji!U ?,.and rhtt Pluicnix program cntniling aKsassination^ of 7 t ' ' Tlw- Kioral dinninsion of tlv, *var has been brought into sharp focus .ht I IK- public n'jMlifwi to t'uJleyV conviction--a nvacrion. Ihaf.ivuteivd nuihdy on public. impressions Uiat shooting unanuM civilians wuiiornwl I'ojjibat a<livity in Vietnam and Uot Callev was offered up ar a -âi|ego,tt. It soanf- dear t&al llu? way iu whicfi the vnr i.-; ^jidi-d - will influence whethfcr the erorion of gove.rantental legitun^Hn thi* "<iir!tn' grxs further-ocIK finally re/guted. My.cofitoiitiou is that uult"* Oonjrit>K atis clearly to-irivee*igw* 4hf- facts of war crinM*- ;iud r-cpudiaûj *?*<"- policies it har. f^.ikvj to uphold its ivvjHinVihilitv'iu tin- AiiKji,*!i piiblir and will fuil^h-r daTriAgt* the- rolf of thf I'nitcd in tt-orld aftaii-^ f )ji<- of t\w joost diuraa{riiiire{''.-"is of the war t-h to lirc^k tli ooojiwtiou U-twfB huiguag*' mtd reality iu oliticjil life-. N^ ynl\ twvf lief. Ip-^n 4fld and deceptions: on tin- public, fiit r\.'x4t*i oflSc.ials in Coiign-fw aud tinhave not tskcii swroi^lv their own obligation hi fiif<ijrc <!Ktwiuji ajrainrt thf PivriiVnt. We will not ivntoiv publi'- coufiiii liie country until tJip branf-ix--; *i{(rttwnitbriC, Ifgin f<> take tlje latsr of th land. Swb HII iinjK'i-atin- i-.ijh' fm- a I'le.ir si a ml by < Vtnpn-fM against the c^tttijuutic/n îf tljw- v.'nr lit aJiy J - i j i n , Tl;nk you, ' Pnif-swir Ffflk'.* f ull statpHKr/it follow*:)
34S
or PQF. Uif;KA*n A. . the oj)iominlry to prvaent my fiew.* on ending th<> Vietnam AVar to ii^ c'in&iUtc-? today. T)f MSxrticw of uiy- jxistf Ion is tbat i'n*i<l'ivt--Xixon is iiinr thy Anifriwui i>ni>I<'-rJikt ic is uindu-u down tlie- war while 'lirreality he (pursuing tinwar aims of -qr!i*-r adnit)ii^Tratinn.s. lipside* involving <iorcf<(iiHi. i.s Jiimi of JM|ICJ inrliff- jcn-ar saitfi-rinjr <>n UK- }M-OI<]O <f ludiK-iiimi nitliMit l'^riuf the ]inwj>L<rts of tl/<- eventual itoliUvl ou triune. In ordt-r to sustain the ru.V, rnriidfiu Niiou has IH-.-U ted to jir<'Hd tin 1 wjir -rtit from (') iulf y'l '>f ,Ind<x-hiria. Tlr i>n.-->iir'"to *..-aIst> otmo from i-o.l t'> <iffet tin.- iui(iai-t of Aaa^rucin irî[( u-ulMlruival- on tlic mlHt.iry -Hi., in S/nrb Vicfuy^j. Ulijs jirc.vsun- will n-inuiu so i'-ucus tho u'luiiuNi. .-.-ks 1n comMut-- .1 [!iry .if tnmji u'ltWian-nl wltb n < iKiiniitlRcnl f< ft (irtcrioraiion of MII- military NituatJ'iu :mil r-LUM-s t<> iiegoiintf tiward r.>> in "flin-. Jui^ m> lllu<> <f ifijivriiig i-iirfir.v in Njutli Vk'tiiMin. 'flu- irfijcctixv rrui;iins. as U-fiin-. siv.ijfi c,t al lea,st to <lffi.-r 'i^<at. Tin- i-flV-^ls f 1nn> wltiidravuil arrl ô-iuilli-d iKimutearlim an- to ili'i-i- tJr friilftu.v "f <l'-f-jit jtiht tin- r.C2 elation Iat-. n .liu'-riiaii J'r<".iJi'iit lias IK-W) wiliiuK t ackiuwji^lsv tJie iuifavi<ra1>lc J*lnin j-j''i/tj<til nnJ military funtv in S^VJi Vji>riiui : nuivNivr intrrvtitti'ui rauviiiz 'f )ia> lwx>u li'-fijnHiI to rjcutniliz*1 tin's injt':ila)ic-. ftm\vr in an <-ff>-.-iiv)- tiwniir. *Iiji-h neix>Miril> jura us un*'i>t'ttig tJw ri><k thdl )xiliti<-nl aurf iiiiliwr/ ri'alitw* il! ^lwin- Uw- <>ui<-UMr of U.- long stnictrlf for control of S<*iili Vi'-rriau) anil -(IiHt tin- I'li-tnaim**" whom i- and. In-fon- iiv. tin- f'p-ni-li liau>.tjfij>'rf.I wiHC*' driven or will flit- from jiuivcr. TJii.x ri-t i>. navoHiH<k- ui jt:j wn.-'Ua1 msnv to i-n<l alt>g-tl>i?r An.Ti''s military juvoivciuiit in tin 1 war. ririli <iiu wily In- 'lijuinxti-d l>y iviiin.'iis Hn- war; but winniux Jintin- I'nifcd St!iti.-x wbi-n it Ii:il mop- tliaii .ViO.Ofdi tr<M/j(.x 'ii r)it- î-'iuii'I Mid jiuWjf opinioti in thK <iiuiifrj' wsif inon> or !<.- nniti-d ln-liind i li- adWinirfniilou, - >jtntion tlixt lawt^-d tintil tin- T<-t ffi-ni-jvi' of F 1'> More HU:T .'5 yi-irn later *itii iro orlu-r rphfttiii cMnirnt Sn fiKo'jjiK and C/ r/- /^-j/ to ff'-ttin-ff ottl m ifj yd wuH Tlv way to |*-gin turuing this k<-y is to R>t a (tat*- for tvUl witiidrnwal and * cmniiJeU- <<nd of ail Anwriciiu coml>nr ywtivltiiif, Tin- Vii-tuaiu J>ii4<'iiKac'Ux-ut Ail at JiTJ. S. .'{7<(. nioi'f* fr in thin din-cfion l,f scniii; a definite daU- and l>y olarifyiDK Uir vjndition<> lor orderly wiii>dca*'al, A In.: Jxtn ctear /->r M-vi-ntl jf^rK ti/ aii>'our who iuis had cuiiucr with tbf iu-2"''iator* for Nortu V-Uiiu (IKV) aud tli? I'rovWonjil Itrt-olutkinarr t*w"ni:u"i Xatfcna.1 IJU-ration Fwftf. au Aiu^riruii /vduautmfnt U; rapid IKL -'Nnujilftf witbdrnn-iil l>y a tl/ne (i-rtain tV'-uJd uiaxijtu^- ufûtiatiiu:o(>iiortuiti<^ in l'uri. tt'.tv th Kfnaf* and i'rculd'-u( (o adojrt K. 37*5 us national (K'li'a' fnd*y, Auwritan I'rivwHTN of *ar o<wj !> n-l'-aw-d nl)ut ituuniliatfly and s Vmuu- vvtirm-firi"* could \m ari-.tmrnd to aKHiir*- that tn> fnrtJur .Ixnrtii-Ma.uasijaftUv would le iniiirrfd. TI*ft \orrb VMttauu*)^ d' 'legate at Uu- l'*riu talks iTKJJi-ar.i-/) Uuif t]ic ;in/i"uii'*-nM-n' of any ra'rtialilf datt- for I owl witlidntn'al would ~l>> f>Mni,ftit !< a>*\in- <ti*c "tiwr (iiicxUuiis JU'-ludUu: tb? */ui*tioo of r<'Ji.ir)C rîpti"'Jd uiilit^ry iwn" cLlrt "in- raindly >livd." [Stati-uinit .-if .Mini.h.T Xuau Tli7. H&lt f'U S'siou. Muy 13. Wi)- 1 Jn iib-r w<rdi> fl*- oflw-r (.Jilr- is ni iMnamlirif <|ji- for ad iiitlwu !>> tJx- rnifl a(**. J>ul only tiiut the jwincijili- (if dr^H'al witlilii a raiM'ualI- ;<friol IKI ad/i;>ti-d <iiul juipii-im-Jit*^!. H'Iiy rrt".id-ut N'lXofl fail to adnjrf S. S7! i> Adiiiiuiiil.^tivjji jmlp'j V Til" f/arir fljnw*-r. .itr*-.iij- jCon-wIiHdoKvd !>' wliaif. I uavr wild. <>: lJia< tlK- rfitmvtl itt ttv Anuriaui u.:litnr> roll- n-ili n/aJii- iuiri; liti'ly fl jiolitical outrojiu- i South VJ-tiiatA tiutt 'riily n-rtwtii tl'' (TKi'ailinK relation of ftinw. In truth, nu or.<- fan Iw wir*- exactly wjirtl t d u t oiifoiui* *-ill !. I'Ut fUfM-i- iw r'-n-'on t/> xn(>|i'iw- Hint if u-oriid jiivo|-r<? of (hi- j.n-si'jit Knit'"n J*-Ju<J<T<)ii|i l>y j/ljtii-al litfunv iuf>r*- r-jr*'t jx.pnlsr forcvu uj fb*- rouutry. and. <|ijlt? jxxwiljly. 1-y n rîjw- Uiaf with tlv 1'BO. In dui'-<*our*, t'ivi.-n itf. yi-aw "f <r-jsi;li' Mill Iuird>.hi|i. jfiwi" its liukx tit t\u- VM. n/icj tlvii; lib (/r0ini%a-(i'irwl -::<- vîji jii ' . Kf.ijfd il i> rMiiiaMf K/ <-i*ii't Owt 'Jj: I'Wi would i-tui-rfi' an !'!. douutiuM forc in Souib Vj.-inn/u. TW* /'our^*1 ff -vn(* U likely u> ix^nr In VMnni. To di-ftT wieb o
549
outcome by maintaining the war at nigh levels of intensity accompllsbes Tn o main result* : it biden UM> joUUcU and military realities from laost of the American public and It imposes the croel regimen of high-technology warfare on the Indochiirr-se i*oile. It has also been Intimati-d by high Adtnijiixt ration offid.tN that a raiiid withdrawal from Vietnam would trigger an upsurge of right-wing jtohticti lo the United State*. There are several resi>ouses to this conf ntion : fir^t, no \ide.ncc support* the concern; the right wing .sentiment favors either "winning" or "getting out." not the sort of intTJuediate approach now In-itis pirn>ii<d <>f .clou- withdrawal and VitnamizaUo:. . weondly, it is highly immoral tf-r the United States to go on killing ami wounding Indodiinese people and destroying their several count rie* because of a fear of a domestic tacfclaFfa: and thirdly, inc<- we will be forced to get out of Vietnam at some, po.nt, it is tx-st to dc M ax gracefully aud constructively at, pos.siblr, which impliti tliruu^li negotiations. In a siii-*-. S K4 . <J<; n-Kjtftiiils1 r?nnt corm-tlj t> Ibe analysis 1 have be-n offering l>j us call for uii immediate end tii all combat <>|M-nttioiis iu>t J5>e'ifir.ill> jviar-TV<-. m legitimate unlitary or ixilitical purjMiKe in Vi->r<iam a.* it iv eitlH-T designinl in ri-vers<- nor tpal>le "f reV4-rsing tiic iimlerlylri^ anti-regime lialarii^ of f"r<vn thut Iras prciailul in DIH country .since the >ear.s of the w-r aâiu^t (In- Freii'-li I Jtl7--->4). S. 37 ly its fix-us tai 'hedule and suiierfluuiLs milil;<rj n^t-ratioiix in tin- interim. In i'racJu--. hiiuever. the IrtJwuce of the Vietnam I*it(euc:ieajelit A<1 of I'-fil wiillld be likvjy 'I'lv I'Kt. ,.riitijm at i'arir-. <irM fiiuM.-i-iti-d in the ^-IMMIII prop"Sil.< .<f Madam" NKU.KIJ Tlii Uiiili u St-j'tt-njlx-r 11. Jt7. but reilerated frei(iienlj> ;l) - i'arlcl> .if oth-f forum<-. luis' !. tiiat tt-nn.s for withdrawal sliouid l>e :n-< onjj-iiim-,1 />} agT4t-n:ent on Jlw ff/nu of ;: }>Iitu-aI wttleuieiit. I'omtx < an<l " cj41 for tin- selection t a ieniiancir* ifnvi'iiiuwiit by -le<-iion-. sniien'l^-d by a priivoii'iial <-<iulitioii K'rtfrijiin-iit drxi.rj trui" tljre<- [iriii'-ijial gmiips: tiie 1 Il<;. she S3iy:i rtsriuie (itl:-r t|i:m TbU's. Ki ,:nu\ Kli.fUi i.;iii.) ais iliinl fnr-e rri>uj.-.. .siun- !>u<-h iraijfltioiwl jMijitK-ai jmiiutfcmenl offi-rn llu- J-Kt MFMINIMV tb:it th- AiniTiiiiu wiUiilrawal "ill jnii teii^nit*" M I'loodbKth r another }<mx roiiinl f wurtarc. J-.ven u itli'iut \>\u<:iu\' -jjiy erâl faith Jn *êrtii>uj u^ N w.ny -f regl.-'trrjiitf tli> ttjll of tin- VieUiuuK-se jxiirtiiatiou. th- reiilaeeiiM-ut of tle nr-*yit p-j>re^se rt-Kitui' by :in l;iT'>rJni rmuitiou -;o eminent i- ill'".-.: like!} (it t-n'.'Urujje the li'-uritiii fr':>-" <tf riH-nrH-iliaU.'fii tn oj^-raf*- fr^-lj UIH) f"> .ii<-il a jx.litiral ouf'oute in Vi<-tnam tiiat exllre^8e^ the (rue balan'f of forgets there. MintvhT Xuan Thuj. cliu-f nesMvi!'>r for \<.rt|i V 'ielnaii:. l.!iv | iutuiuttivj in u jiulili-- interview an ueivj dance of some k.uj>l of it M[|TM~i.iiis for eb-'-Uoux AîJn. I would warn aipontl en'crtiui; any I'liH-ii.r.i! i>r ".-s. lni- I'n-r ûj> r )vivl. i" pp'tide .1 lull tf--t i ili-MiH-niiK M-HII jiii-ui Km tlji' itlll.'iiiine;* l/i > t-'iliijvli i-iiiii-iiiator> fraLwvtork ami to ;i)lov. mii.xiilc su;-rvRjo gives r<-;i.xt!jiMe aM-urHijtvf Uiyt frnde and brutal aJmsen w i l l ii"t lake jdiice atnj ihat Orf onfj-oijie -îli JJtj-Iy reilfi-t I'M- on-rall balajioof f->r<'e> in S>uth Vii.umu Jt js .'iJ*o tituH to end vur infuUKitlou wiMi elei-t'inil ixiljtii's i;i Soiirij Vi- ivjuu :is jiri-rj-titlj rutiMtiiutttl Wi- IHIISI uii icrstnud t b n j tin-re , no i-erjou- ;>r' -; -i of fre- clii-tioris in V'ji'lfiaBi m lolif a>; Tiiieu cotirrols tlw ii|>[i;ir:itu-. of juiUi-i I) huN Ix-i-fi \Ji>>-uiuei,r(yl iM-yond any reuwjtiable doubt lliMl Tujoj iui|>riH'n;n(li r:it<- o|iin<it ion leiulerx 0:1 a pcular un>J Iiu^f-vale butifi, lluil he tiuiiiii<n l u i f K lo-'tii |>:itriinuKi- in u ru'lilcr.*- f.'iKlijon, and t)mt h' 1 ha*, in il>e jui^t r<-.- "(''! ti :i lari.'ti ol na>s of iiiiiiinii vti<s i-ur <f nil jirojKiri ion to |ni> p-iil ]u>jiui:inn r jrf>vi<T .\i")>4-u <(> Ky JiiujM-lf <vi{in"*i-4.l t)i4- fruiidub-nt uufujv of tin- ];;" 4-Ii<' - iioiis b> uliirh Iw nfnl 'Tlit4-;; vwr" r - t j i i i c i i <o |uiu-r Ami in :i r4-i'i'iit -:.id iin-ui [ÂI n> \/- }V/i /.- /'j//i<>. Mu> J7, i!*7lj Kv Im- Ii-4Til"4l KoiiOi VII'<I!:TI. u>. '.r >-:iikin/ I ).)'. Hilli a iji- i'|-li_ 1 1; îi i-nxt -if junni iniî'li-. nii'l ;i l , > , m fu:ili w l j n IA- uiifaitlifn!. /|t-1ov ; i>. .iijij <l,,Ji.iui-i A tt'ilrl <-f e. : mj tind DM- lioat ; w i l l urit t.. llu- boltoi,) " It n'-Ji MM-III* lulic t/i II|H-<- /nin ;i K!.. lv ji 'J- nun r(:iin
'
ot 'ij- ^ i j n i i n r an- IjiirMy uulik<-l>. Mill il mi;t l ifiiii-n-Ix'N- I ;lui_* M > ' . r ; i ' l "l-ii:" Mmii ,'i lurjfl} Uli Ulil.ljoiui <;ii:i.iTir ' , t l u r f 1)4- in::..' l IJi!- ':ii:ilMlHti- if i-oii|jA:II'-II'';MI f a ' l i u i M in i^.nni S'ii-i n:tiii ' iiii'linliut.' r<-j-i (lly ilw 4 ;,\', tin" . M' J- priii ir|>-. in/ ai'ear us-'jnui's- >)' i-iilic-r cajrfi'-ily to i!of4-rn 'ir !f> iM-goiwujic:m' A i j i n i ' H - J l y , M t'l-fory by M'nb Hitylit well Iipr'ie llu- <urr4','itly lioitf X l - ' r l i f |.rn-|-ilM ^jf ]| VietlWUir se- s< "ii-niHlt. IJut IhlT*- . IIO Ti.'.imti to l,iV<-
350
Aiiy ;:ivat li<>i>$ for either Uw intrcnjj" <>r tl<c -iKitiiiuiiuv "f tin- JJ7l South Vi-iiiann-f cltitiuiiM. ivtfardli-M- of rlii-ir ouU'oiiH'. In mj judgment. S. ''\m. Bw*. i~. I-VI-M if iuiiilfiuclitvd. would ]>rovjd- lift!*- ^cnuiiM* ayMinun-e tit .-itlx-r l.'.S. iii'iitrHitj or tin- integrity nf tin- electoral [inx-t-^s in South Vietnam. It <fuld ! rasilj foili*<l :ind would llu-n M-rvr to MrciiKthvii Tliirii'< <-luiui tliat U.T" rt fair xiin^sioii of jKlitii-aI M-uiiii > uu> in S<mtu Vietnam. Tim O r-l.oiild i nfiiviitratr on Kfttinj: Aiucri.-a oiu <>f Virtiuiiu and on fudiiis: tin1:1 Vn-riuini and il- rest' of Indorliina. To i>r--'iJ !> way of s-nn-tj f>-r tin- rlwtin:i- in Smith Vietnam i> 4i> <TMonury at tlii> s-Uw tinrt Invite still furtht-r riifii*:iin of UK- Ain-ri'-*i; j.udiic by aix-ordint flu-. <-!iftioii- a orvJBifliiy tuvj (! imr di-servi-. Tin- i^-n*- of war cftim- " arritvs t!i< <n^-u^-.i)n of ftidins 'i- WJT onto :i n>;" 1.-1--1 -il.ov<- i-.-nii-> vf iirudi'iKf. ]jruK>U.itl-ui. and K'-'-J'''!!!!'^- It Js iniixtrt-inr to T-:ih/.<- tiisf un in> rwi;.in^ )ivunl r .11 uniTiiutJ"U:il Ltw <-\i-rl- and ifjz-nii\olv-i"ira id tin- \K-III.IIK W:ir .1^ |.:i:-l:*-i|i':n in an nitTi'1''^'- \\nfiitt r<--i-iitly in tiii- . \ < v \ > L '//.<. .\V-J n. uJicr r-'adiu^ iln-. [n-hiit: liAnk- ir<-*'iiijii2 vulc/ni; jf ('"if'-d States of \..,- iiifnrbiii'iDii ;iv^'jnlilcd ii'-ri- alHMt li:ii liufijt ti-.-il in Vn'in:<.iu.;jsj<* if T :ili]-l.\ 1 1 n- l y \ \ - i if v\ar 'o ,.\Hi''J'ii-an uiiiin t llu-rc, lli-U tli II-H|IT- <-f Jiu P !;.i ( - < ;i>r t i n - I'.t-i *i\ .var- :i! Ica-i. iin-ludinîbi 1 iui'(init" - nt I'nidi'n M i l l . on- NiiL'>ii. ma > !! !*< jC'iilty of war oriun'<" f v " I''""/. 7'i"" . Mjir<-L -*. 1!C1. Svi. T, ] J.j TUiN i^ a iiioun-utous ahM-rtion t l m t 'iiuimt ! lislftl.v Ijiv-,^1. ii'-r vi ill it >Ji-3ii>i<(ar li> [inrx-ndiru liif ivi- -tin*-- not <-ii-i .r i- n>T '.\. IIT'iiiiKl'i! I' lia- Ix'di p'Jiitorcfl on many minion*, for iulaii<v. l>y 4"o!. i>r-ii iJ.-iiJcrwjii'a a,>v;i ioiiu coujili' of <!>> 11^0 ibai vvcry i>rii-tili' iu Vic iui^ n^ M> J.-ii Tin- M\ I-!ii <!IM II.VUTV-., thf ':i)J<-y oinviftimi. ii- i-r'<1iliiI ' n - n * "I i" n.i~;v<- nuniialiiy l>j v<'l<-raii^' ^r-iiii^. and il>,- diH-iimi-Titi'il ~<Ji :niiilv:j^ nl IV-IMIIIM!I!I' oliM-rvcr* Midi 11- fonm-r fJ.-in-nil T"lford 'J.-iy!<ir ',t i-Imr t h a i iiii- \\.ir hav lut-n and i.- licin^ wa*"I in a ;n:inri<T tli:n violate- t i n ruli - of v.ar !- i-niliiHlinl iu iii!<T:i:ir:i>i:al tn-:il'n - .<! <-it.-Iojji:ir> Horn- ami :li; ! -ivi;i'-i- ili' 1 n-lci.inii 1 o]' '! NuicuiiH-rii 1'ririi-ijilr-. 1 i!o ii.if (oii-idi-r it a i|i;nviMH ) nrf'i- liiat I'nnzr--- li.-'s an <--|M'i-i-il r.--|Hin-ii,ii)Ty to i-t"i> t l i i - K x t v u i h i - IJraii'-h 1'rmi ciij.'iîn^ i" n a n n n l a. - t u n y , whi'ilirr IHTC or :i!ir<i;id. and lliat >n luJ'-ii i-\ii\i-uii" of .Ti-tin:in'> u-iv\ t-\i-.tt l i a f ;; J u n n r n i>j Ci'ii^p-v- to ad w i l l amount t Icî-Iatiu- ri.i.<|ili< :n Iimo.-ciit jN-i|,ii. it, IndiH'hiiia an- l-in>: killiii Hinl iii.iiiiic<] <-;.cli day li\ jin-i-i- <-m:iiti:il j.cilii n't. nf indi<<Tiiiiiiiiii<' warlan- Kri--li ITIIIU-. aunin-t Hi- in^.|.li- .u,(: ji.i laud '.; rlio-t- jxMir Jnii"<-liini-*4- i-mijitrn'- . u - i i i r : \'i"- J'r*"i'!''ii! \^;-A ai-tu.ijly told as: AIUITI'IIII Im-i i<joii atldii'lit:" lli.'iT iv <' (In 1 i>uriiM'- of t i n - <'.iiulirti:in <>|ii-nili'iii nain i j i - i m y ' ii-]nfi:l i .>iu[<li'V>--" in t)- -.irii'riur.i ar:i. ("F:i' " !. n;i "lijii'tui- < l i r > " ' i l \ in M-i1;(tk>'i nf t n n - ' r Jl of t!>i- fii'ii'ia I'onii-isJriii f o r l M - .Vjui-ll-irati"" "f tin- < ' o n d i t i > > n -îf tlic W<iunil*iJ and Sj--k : \>jt~i- Komc [liow.. arc rduiinuinj; to <-'.iivt-rt l.ir?'.- ira^'iof r>-rii;.- ri".i- |iaii>li>-> in ;i lun.^ry A-iait '-"iintn- i n t o li.unvi: I. lie! in v \ l i i ' - h i l i -oil i-. I. IP-, srr.. and lifi-I--: AIIIITI--IH- an- diri-.-tin^ inr j::'-ul!"H i-ffiTt- I!MT iiii'Iinli- f'ip'ilily rcinoijnu j n - a - a i i ' - ff"UJ their iitla^ 1 '-- ami I^'.M iiiM'hi- nioli:li/.in/ for n i i l i t j n fjTvi'i 1 "liili|r.';i .iln\c dn- n^'i- <if -i-U'ii : :i- -\t-i', n u l l - r i n i i i i . i i i 1 In'iiiliiii^ .mil loii^-nin^** ailill-r> i-:i'ti rn- [ n T v i - - . ri-liun* 1 ' 1 "ii .m'i-i" i -"fiii--!
V '-.I [ t ' p f i r ^ X'W'Hj. Û'i Tilllffll'M'Ii:\ I'T'CIMfJ - l l ' . l l l i l l ^ . 1 - - l - M i l 11 l i . I l - i > < \H-t-
i i . i n i i ' - 4 - i - M i l i H i i VII-IM-I-T- ri'ii: iinji--. Tin' iipir.il <Jinn'ii-i"ti of ihi- >\;ir lia^ )-i'n l i i . i i i / i i t . H I D -li;ir| foi u- l.y t i n - inn,ii- p-.n-tion to < ' n ; i r \ \ I'niivii-iioii. :i r.-a-Tion i l i . i i c'!ii.-r"cl iii:ini!\ <', |.-j'il,i- J.'ii|iN-.-ion- sii.it r.Jio.iiiij^ unarniiil i-i-, iliuni v.ii*. i i n n i i . i l ''I'lnlial i i ' i , . ili I ' l i t n i . j n and th;i! ''.ill"> w , i - .1 - a | H - ^ < u i i . It -'! 111 ;. 1 1' : i ' : i ! f l u - H I J \ if wl.ii'li t i n ' v. ,ir i- i-iiiji ) v ( i l l i n l t n . fn'<- '.-. J'l-lliiT t l i - iT'i-)"Ji ..; ; ..... r i i . i t r f i f u l ! ii iin.'ii',. in "'i- l o i i m r i ym'v. 'nrii.i-r 'T i- f i n a l l y rc-i-i-d Mi i'i.nt"ijiicu t< ' i i . i t nnl'-ix <''nsr--'- - j>io[n|.;h to inxci-ti^.iii- !ji<- fa<1.'i ,i.r "r.ini't; ,n,i| .|i . i-m'!j ri-|iiidiai<- tln-.c' jm'iji :-. jr La . n i i l c d (c II;.|M.|I| i(r, .[ . i ; ^ i n , l i t \ 'a ' i . t - V i M i T K . i n |.iil.iii- a iid w i l l ;'i'rl!i"T thi:n..y Hi" f" "f i t i i I ii i". -'.ili"; );i i\..|-:d : i l T a i i ^ < H n - "I t i n - ii:i-l i]:i (n 'îiii.' '-ft'i-' '^ "f ''" '-..if t i ; 1 IM -I',! a, ni" 1 1 I In- i ..u.'i". -f IL.'I i i i - i H i - i - i i l.iiiîm^'i' i iii I n- ili!; ;n Ann :'n aii ' . ' l i i t : .il nf. \'.' ..lily lr:m- I:--, lî-'i !"!! :iml .|i"'.-,.i i..-it. |.i.i|-i<.i'- il o,, !! |,-il, ,. t,.j* !<- ii. I '.tli' i,-;'-. 1,1 Cotu'1'1:- . t i l l Hi" -"iirt- li.i-.-i- :i"i I.lUi-V - r :"H-^ l l ' i : -ni ri .:.!, 'i. fit i - . I O N . I ' i ! . i - .'ii, .! i i i i . o n ; i ^ : i i n w t i in J'r'---i'|.'ii' \\'i- c nl ini | i - i o i " |i'i , inl>-ii' m t i ' . 1 ..... Mr. u i i ' i l Un lii'.-iii. t ....... f ôii mini .[ IM-L'III '. tal.'' i . i n n i. ii;i' i . i .f t ' n ' i un! :i; Ii 'in mi;* i i i i \ . - i- ill- fm ii .''. ir -Ljod li\ i ..n/ii -. ,i^ti"in m> I ' o i i i j i u i i t i n i i ' Mi lini'ii-liiiiji Wnr in liny f o r m .
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!ij tin- ! niti-cL S{c-v *c rrtJfl.Hi to S.nirt.-a-.> tlw .<.rira^t^r<J'>>lx,-t* nn&al'zp. ar IMI^ Jat. Sino .\iK*-fie*n r.iiili'-n> Sr.'-li n->rmafi;jit!n w >>(/, It. pn"-i^'ir *?*>* ai'l âbility ehn.nsh'' ', fk-- CT.ii'ff/f a* in r>fnt>**-Ky AmTii-t f- ;)! if / pf f t fin '-A'^V '< Iwi'i'ci , 1 Mi" *aif is a i-rioi.ipi\ vJifrn'""1 'r >fcwi!tf '* *^.<iRl: . <! < a fS'lSr of .n-Urii * t; tlw J^'-T .-f ui"'int.:i_- i*vt>l> i:^- \<f in-r-i^lii;^ cntfuî : CUT it. ti/- ik.i[:.>!uO int-fl ic, fir.l ?!:> KiifJ'-.^ riiuiiial l-i:jvit.r It u-p jtl-i;- u'O).-ti.' ..>V- ^f t-ii.lir.z -h>-. '"n.iai f.ir nr.-.-l\e . - i >; ir, .1 rc;.fir.<*ii>ii- f.i;,i<in Tii- rtHi.Mrj- xiili. r
r a<-'fni' 'Iiî'.ij : j;t,v. ii i- tnivrciiii ' r'.-a--v;r- r:.'- in3>- " :;|.IM .i) ;i..i."' "li; o-r*. "i- t: ~< I.T ' n .tJ)i-~. 'r <- n-t* ..i_i(- :n ! >:.,'.-> ili. I -., H;ili-: ; ..- -<!;j!>ll-!i i U.fijj j -/.-<( Yi;f ' . - i l f u 1 i't-'J '.'-'J' Hl' 1- ' !:>.r t!..- t. '?? -.î-2l' I tf.-. }.fi.| pniii.iniv : ...... t|jVj(>!.- :"->"-. -4? ;:.-' - v/ T.I! -!; rlswii "' '' fi'N'-n '? tin- ''".'lir-'*^ ^r <l Is t^cv. J ir^t "f -.li ''u>i>-< -!i"i>(.l j;-i [-. ..!% ^r.iii; - ::i i : t j j ' : t i T-.-v
Tn.ii r.i I i ' i r r fl.i- "iii'ii- ' '. w.ir l.> ":if"r:i.i'ti :'!' ". ' fi-i- '* '* <'. v^tr Tl-.Tflv. ' '!;.:! -- -T .uli) li-i.-l ]'- -.11; i-, t i., s.-.( i:<-r ILir.tj-l JJ1:^!'.' ;tMi.r^^; t'<-r a "r:il ".:ifrri .'. ..... { .'ivn,:n-Ji' i-.i.n-r -I '., *': r-r.^rii^ji r;-.- .V.H'-T;> ..f inf'!3I,i'i',i l.iv. ;:;: f.; % T'i I'M-"-- ' I ' L V i i i . n . , ,:r \ j. 'i:j:- J'- !>.*riil;-. r.'iii^---. -tim.Ul :>'.. rjf ijH" tc-iiit>-r-h r ;- in -.irifi; .-.rt;uti;, -.v.ffi r"-.|*.T [., rj^ r'i- r iirl.i- r:u:->>r us--. ->i:Ji -.iiMr-i*>>i r.ft :r.- i"./;.i:i ns w r-i mM-iit.-.f -.v ir nrwi 'J. . :ir:.i " f i^'-.-'JuIfiii-:! ^..'!j;vci>r. Tin-
t'r';if- ->(- i>-v i~. '..'mil] \t.:i I,I,-,T j:'r.'- yor .-taJ'-in'-fjf. pltis*.'. tir. ST4TKMST OF PKOF. JOH5T W. IFWIg. ZVSTXTVTE OF POLITICAL . STAJTFOBD D'lrrVZBSITY. STAHFOED. CALIF. U1*. f,,v.;-. ' I l i i i i i - . -I*-: . i f . n. ii'-:.. Mr. < 'h.ii' ji-;.ij| :tr:J Seifi'-rr
Mr'. ' ' : r . ' T U i . J ,':H.:- jt r .-j'.ir.-d ' PM -' .!.'i: ! l-:;^t!-v >-r.T*"ii:, m i v :.::. ^ t.i: v.-l it i"".-!~i{> nf < '];! 1> , t j . . - Ir.-t'H !)!:. i .<.>. \V*!i vi. >r :"!'!,,- . i f : ! v ijl f'-l-ju n-riiJ 1 !'-/ if :ifi'i n-'iut'-t f!, if :t (* ii->r1<-i| ,]'; \ . r . r r t f i t. :,-;.!. 'if i v.'>:.!i( t i r t ij'. 'i> I:I.IK - i f>".v
CHINA'S cinxaxa KOLE is rsro<;Hi>.'A roxrucr

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nv- lnyin by focusing on China.',? changing role in the in<Jochin.t ct. Tlut new role not onlv nukes a settlement now nre essential. btit it bo offers the real jiossibility of a. srttknient that ir-jclies across Asian boundaries!- f t is tlie lint between the greater Gtiivse involve-' in the- Indochina war and Peking's rervjf "ping I^ng^ diplotb At highlights *he pirfiey alternative* to oni the war. t i. Ciiina> new role Jo the Indothina conflict* The prtncip.!} is jxjliiirsl. It Ijegan with the Cambodian .invasion. Most ginitirantiv. C'hina i\n>-c h*n has loci ia th- const ru<t.ior, still underway. of a.ronliti'm hctw*^-', Fad<v:ldnrse rfv*!"' iîaries ttml itself. TkL- L?-. tlwr Srsl C!inr^<-fndo.:liin's<' coaikion in liUtorv. It ha^ U't-n Ftt^ki'd with iwn and nn.-. fh'inftte-ai'l in itsc-lf is not new. The multilateral cnrdiiatioii of ntilitarv stratepj- and aid tlm'iiighoMf Indochina is. Witli the crralion of fiow niaf[ 3y.-t-ni in northern f/aos, the possibility now exists of.trtawide and "Chineji.;F,)U"k<tl !oiri-t<''a! <roor<linatiofj. Over 14,n'if> (,'bjnfe*s engineering, supj>ort. anl air defense tnx>fis r*'p'irte41y srejiow in northenrlaos. Thi^ i^doubln iKc ii'ihiher there io late J5KIO. Tht-ir itry and the associatwi .-iliift in th' N'<rth Viprf.aiuM*' strnrr^y in notthcro- -Laos have lit-jrim t tmnaforin the <"onflj't there." Under t!Se new dircamstiin es. a .rfitunutior: of .Vnu-ricaV iiivofvcmeot in the Laotian war uw*tpa>-." Iiiirly risks itrmtiiur a conflict towwai ThaFtand aihl >.*orh Vietnup; hi'-h %onJ-'. -ngulf the entire NMekon;; Valley aaicotild now ew;i irt: '>].(' rj-f- ( 'hirw.-M-. . V . This hx-1 another hist**rii''*hdinitni?i<'rti. Tlieîinwe JortfitnCry Jea'iev-iiij. whidi in WA-K't cautiously introduci-d Ci.in * lops' ;.-al <! :tf-jir.- ir:.o North Ylrtfisiin was criti<*ixcxi;anii pur*.':d. Cu>ir* tunel ii:ward duriii^ tin- iMjltunJ revolution froni ]fH!ft-*'> .-inf! wentually n-'-ailifl its uiiits from >"orh Vietn,im. Tin- Marl-t.^ k-t ir be kxiown. .tiiat rh; f*oj>Ic of Indf>:hin>i wouid have \t, vrii f!<Kir srrujrtrh: <m' r'.-Jrwn, . W]ml t!;is. mean*. Mr. <"iiainnarj i< t);nt wv lino\TV tliifj^' >f set out to sto[ in I:H;.' but w!ii.-*lj tFw ai-tivi- <'tniif^' ifnolv-jiii-t;t in (!:k- ar^n as a wiioi'-. j iiiijorjjr rtf"" fii'l.*-liin i N- ^JifJ Chin'1**- to inf-r Anw-ii'ian s<:tKti. JJn'r. wii.-.M- { 'It'nia'v niniiiiia! irivoh'Tru-iit in I'.>'>1 rix-rd <'Xjin--;'.ionô^f -,,;,. -iifcruM'- ff;ir in tin- 1 ..*v fj"- niiii: t -f. i* w'îiifl appear t!w,t now v/< rtr;- pri'j'-.iP-fl t-' t.ik<; I':kj-icV tliri-at N> asc forw s^riou-jy only if ;t.T i.-j;vf>i ,-r<- ou tlif ^.-ul*- ijrf"( l hin8"". Korr.-iti inr/'r-.'i-iirion in JIO'?, . 5 IH{IT tin- tit!.; "|>ro{r<u:lV;] war." (.'iijf;;a''i n-w to.rj;c -ij.-a /if f i oiii'lj i <}.-r > >jj'i-^. ii r^JnilHf^d c ^<-fi'ii-.. A- S;i^'<n l
iixd. f / pn-^-ii .11. >l t.v- -'i,ii!: \ ii'.iiMuii'n- ;'-!>:( ';,ii>- to aft/icl* f*i'// :itifl ( ;ii
';.v ftji'.t'-. f!' <.'riicrj!,K:ifv> woiii.l r.ttif;i;it-lv ti'vm a ;;i'/i' u-.ir ir, Jri't'V?iiri:i P M < < wid^r" i:i . fT.-'iii'-;it f-n td;- .-.irinili-
HI.VA"- xr.w turfxM.vrri >!> vl/iiV. in April this war. tin- unandcipaiftd happi-ned with the iiv<t.T,>n t thf- i*ii-ri'*an faM:- tpunr* it-am ro visit f "lima. ( fjx-mting Jivrh w'fai Cliine*' Jont|i>rs <-onsideiv1 tlVir iww position of stirncth. ' - Low C'hu:a " jr.i <-o;i*niry to most prrfliolKihs-oi wij'lit at untlVr such i-Ii'-iirii'-'uji'M^. Pi-fcin* ly .th'is" unrxpv'f'fl maw lv>ui fo .xpl-irr 'v." J'o*- f. iiinn f f i o . w r w i!:ploiii:iti.- straN^y ha.- nniiiy 'titt\\ii[f. H ,">1t!.. '>;<}>'i-riii'T to t.iki- t!i- i i r i t i a l i v - iu nn liid'x-hiiu M-nlc'-î-nf. AH
Siu'i--. fl .lTi-r-% tlu- ( ii:ii-<l .-M-iti-;- t'n .;jrfiirtiini-f \ for i Î-UIUIM* fuci-if: f ".>. [i<>i:rv townnl t '":in ' t'n'iv lii-s f t- fij[ur! i;iul ^ fm a jit-ifi! i:itol f]o viii Wir-f to Iii^- -JIII-JIT. limn \ou liai'i- :iln-:uiy Ny ."<)nli;iuiiiir Tii** t'..*. i'i>iixi: TI < inv \ 71'f'iV v.'c iiioi.'Iri f'j-'i'b'l to r'fun;' <'"iii ' ( i f i - j \i i f ' i t"ii- \ ' n ' f' - T .r<r1'f i'i ["">'r(l in Jii'l'*vf,[fia. AVJi.iT w : i v r-ion 1 ojc-;sf.fit '_/ifh t i n - iJat'irv an-I^ (.[-fir,'' of tin I'lii'i-if .-'i.ir. :;nn ! &. a .--t(l.-iiii-rif t-i l'i>- war in '.on towarfl !;.< P-'opI^"?. (JrpJiWu' of fiiiint. My prvparvrl j-tatcnifnt ynri-illr refomir1"?!!'!- a *ur;]l';n.-iffon of muJt:l::ffr.iI arri>ns. };ilia;i-
i \ t . - i - ; i ( i,.ii. i -tcid r ' n - I"ti'fi-"| St. if'-. Tin'M* ri'i'Vii . -hoitl'i niM, woaj/l Irt. in --ii'r-tanli.i! :i.-i.onl witli i5i<-> of Ajii!':i-.-:nIor V.->-t. I'i-ctca/1 ff !'>r"\'iz f'liiia fo u n i f y Anjcri'-riV aÎu r-:ri-'.- .~.L':iiu-f ;i., ('; .,( Si:tl,-.. f i n - :t>!i.ii'>..,tr.>r : .(ti > o , i M fri-.'if ( SilnaV lo'.- .1- a -r.ii.!!i/if,^ infliK-iifr- iii -t;i hir>-:Ti. iiifiii.il ^fll'Tiwi<t. T'l^na mn-f '>< in. '-iij.'.i f>-.:a;ii.' /.f the i:u-f il 'in- i O f i i i - to |>1ay in f l i < - :i!( Ji>'iu--:iirn .i-'/iiliit'.'.'r'nrv .'o-iiifi/iii, "f l,< f " r i i f . - . I Si:if<-- oro-ijj'il t i i i - .iF^mf t . i i t c m . if :r t-fiffiir-v^ NI f.ifcc t!i" M". --.iii aftiKii!-, (!i<- 'in-'ilatiou f (hi ;MVM friitti .'n'rft ['iMi-r c'>ii)Ijcf n !' ' i i i M l i . ' i ' i - f l i r r n M i f ifiim! i-rff; -(:"rr of I'-nfliP;.' I'/ ;i Ti"ITi:'l:/a! I - I T I ill f'.S. J'.-I i j i - i l : - v : t : i tiiiI". !{! "- Ift f > i i l i ' : c . .Nf-i 1 ')'- Tov/ii.r'1 ( ' J . i i i : < .s'il! It'it ill li"'!'-'l\t'.'. l i o n i i . ; . ' -; \ ' i, ' t .!; T-. i i 1 . { Ji 1 1. -ic ! . i - ; -i- )',.- , _ j f j; of ,1 v.'rli ir tv.'ni .i;il.- :*rnl t!i(' ' i'I>- . " i > | i uf .n-i ion- f . c i . ' - i ' nv J*.i r /<'<; T : i t . l I >< ( 'rii; : i i i , p j ; -- '.'.i/ii-iif- v. if !. '< |.....I to l!i.- Soiif ii. N- [ / ; ' - t . . i ,idl ''!.;!: i ; " ' . : [ , : \ . > ' i : : i i n . . l i < ; ; " . c 1 . - i. - ' : < 1 i ,;''. 'f. 1 .' 1 '''', ! '.'t]n-r. \.f<:-:i- :'.. :'-.. i ! oii-- i n n ' T i . i t l k - rci !,', i r.-iii;: : > i i j i | j t r i : n - I : ' i i - -t Si.ii>--- :i | . ; < n - f i ,/ % ' F . - ' T - . ( f r. i- Vi :-r| tin- v. ir A i- r '-' : >'l '<-ff!-!.'i>'ri' v. if jnf.-ni if ioii il [^'.i^rr'.'t'- ; v . u i i l i j c n l r i s n . i. t ,,{< i-f I 'n- I ' r : , f r ' l S r : i r > - - . In -/in i .'ro-r - - o f i - f Hi. r' .. >n 'ioj- j-'i
OtM
relations. and allow the South Vietnamese to out tlw rrmr.sitkwal rrnngiinÛt to o<J *!& w*r. J>urh a a tcneof Lewis' full sfcttwncnt follows :)
T JOB 5 \VxuiO3i Jj-.wis
W t<> 4-nd It' war in \ flu- IM-M! fr u AmCHJm i->r lj- nithilratv.il f->rv< from In<t'M-b!fm U'lttmnt trttrrtnz to 'the jrnvloa t-!Tiiiii>iy .ls f'.Huinln*-** n iun* tluh u jsiînff ^y. I \\onM Ukr " ui.il.>- tlw ii flrm il,-|t for wirln'rawal i* <.nly tlw finrf of wwral tr(*i tliat mu-t !( rj*k-n to l.r'ns; jii<* t<> (nd'N-tilna. Thlx lrr>, vliilo <l*cWt ely Imiiortanf t i-ii-I ili- nnr fi.r HIP I'niV'I Sinti-v mini l- nccnni|ittniii<) ly fljT IP|.<. Tli- nt IM.II'.-I like t'i dliy.iim tlii* r: rulu^ in detail b tii* <t<-|i iti If taken i<rtin\ ri..r-.t, Ij t iui- r>fii:i ttf f.îjiiL. "Ft fliina'ii clianslnc mil- in I In- In<t-H-Iiin.i (nni'-f T;rir r.- ri.i<- i;-it ' u>- mnk- ,T wtrli-iufitt nw in<ir- f^-^nrU). lt It Ir, oiTi-r* a r.-:ut Krt-li-itirv r u wnl'-m'-rif tiut r--lu- IT<H^ At.jn In. .inln<-!- It t jnVIvct-nt n r'n- Jml-H-liinn war aul rbut ^xbtlKbU lh? i*>ll7 altprnalirr.4 M i i.i:;i!ry in In<tr-tiimi. *.- i'iii;iriV nt-v. r!-- Jn tin* Indoc^ttp Conflirt? Yn will ivall tlmt l'rln>f rK :irru-i--,ir' for frw tl:ij M;u'v K'^'^rnfiK*111 r'i*rtilly nttenii>tI trt -rp|.>re tti> * r,o> r-. Tliat px|>l<>ratii>n jm-mM i!i-o>-il a Vi-frian>-* f ARVN) frri frcnti tli<" Mint anI nt .TTtai-k* uc.iln-t Ni l'fi-nH that * r I'm j..lnr Ar^.-rU-nH UtVN" ofTfnivi> ar rlit- <-nJ .f April. Ax n r.---iilf i.f tli.it l - I'liiti-i lontff-rl tt tiitorl' nl tfltnl? tnwnnl Mi:- Ir<l''tiinj innili-t. v-.it u.i-> n" lonKiT <-iifliuxl |>rlnci|mlly to Vietnam, ainl vrlt'i l'rlii>-')k :n l'"KliiK thi- <"'liiri*-^ hnit tn- rhtrr.c^ to nrt Ilirouxh an Iml'-'ljiiV""' Tb^y nliandooM tb mtimrtp of conr>rn*4 d^-ta^hrm-nt thnt gr>v<rn><' Utcir rtJi,n< from Ute V.fS> on, and Ixîb to intervene directly in tJie nil-
'Hl cban^r ]* a fiolitl'fll on-. Mime flrnlflranllr. <*h!nn 1m < Il Ir: ihi> rnriM ruction. <ifill nnd'Tway. of rnnl|tjim ht-iwwn th*- Imli> > >iln>- n-voii;. M'.nnrUK aoj _Aof. Oru[ilTumi.*ljrf J'rln/-/- Hilmnonk from liH t>a*- In <'hlna )>.i< iwu si-n n ritfjor ro!- in tliln aojx^-t <>! I'rklnz'* joilrj. Tlx1 1'rlnfi- tfiot tli>jfiili.itlrr In nTtainixing a lilgh-Ii-Vi I summit ronfcri'Jj'T rf JndfX'lilm-iH' ji".j.Ii-< ..u ''liini-v sfiil U li la<t w>k of. April H^TO, an.J .Tlno- tlu-n 'lilna Jin* <?nV'-rrp h'lrt In *urlv ilnn-U fdU >^nr at lh'? tlnw of 'liou Kn-i.-U'" t.Mf ro H:ni/>i. l;i(<-r rhnt ;..>>iirli during ilif f"j.vrr nf Jx- Inr-^n in f.-Uinj. ;irn| 'hi- :<>.' ft .1^ jmrr of HIM \!ry Jiar r<'J< 4) rjfjr>ri< In Mi'1 nin<-^' <iij.Jv.il. JI:n. Tu-ttins on lî/ M. Jl>7^ \* r '.nallr roinml'fM liii own j'rpntlgc to flK- tilflniat^ 4ii.-.-.~<, < du- rri')<M-litria r<-rluMott:iiy <vmlltln. Ji.fJ I'lnai lu hlx'illeli"'^ Ui.tr mwiQiltififiif l>y M'firnng to ! unit/ <>T Uw ^liJnf>n'-Jt"I-MnrH.' ofnii;^!". innrkli't; n *iiari> 4<-;>iirfiiri > from tlM 1 \*i\\fj line ti'ii; KI>TITI'i'iri- A[>ril li7'r / ^tiuz L.-D. IH i-n iji-lnvly t.ullilinif ():' Or/f f'liiiK-w lii'l'^-Iiiirf'-u' 'rtttifiion In liiiory. T)n ir'i i-t -x i'irjk-fj wifii m n nut] iinn" ''i'in<-' nl<l in Ii.-U IK not new. Tinii,iiltIftf<T:>l ' 'V-rditjutif.n of iiilllfary mrnlcpr ^r,,! tf lij tlir'iiijcliofil Iii<l'-iilna 1^ rrfii-.'M < >r>litui(l''ii tu r!f i-xi'-nr rlnr It <-xjj'.fl -.. H |/rtn< ijoiilj t.-.l*,r^r;il iri "Nil rii'-i'-r fii-I m fur a ll.inl *.ii< fitr<-rt>Ml ^Jiv>- > niic li l.iri<T ,-i>y to t'. l:'.*-i'ir It Iriii/lrrr^'iitifi; iir nil l>v\'sitlnx -fr;it../y, I|IH cimnHc h.'iV', ^'.;.li'iy - >jK-*lcdz-.I f!u- priTiTi' of h.-ir -iii| a(h'n.r. In NorHi Vu-iiunn. ;iri'l il- IIK,ij-r -if rli.-ir ii.-ili'arjr x'ltM.ir* r/-(,n.-(|l> Jrfi* li<i-ri ij./ut.lr-'l nWwv t)i' Uînnin^ /f f'-l'r-inrv iin )ij: rtin- !'*'< I'Mni-ii.- tir.il IJKI ljilir>-r li.iv>' lvn v.i f\.\r,-4 i /i t'i i KM- ( r n . lioft .it 4 lilzhnai l/'4'l;>i/ ffitu f-'lilnj ( fli" MI !>!/ J J n.-f |. li t-t I' .t Ib-S'.x In /triii'rUn. rlnci.iiirw / /'!] [il-firic a Mgliw.tj o J> ;ii.i--ii|.lir;
rather Lao but rinet tf ~4mlNtlaii lnnrloe last y<rr tbo Chl** bare DC fc-n* titan five DCO-reftiiNlabte fckl ajcr.ti*rnt* or i>pMocntn trti&'Vanui. an.1 otw trtih rrlnw Slbanouic. Tb- pOKiltUity ~bor exUU ot jr*r.t<>nn4 lofUUc-ul cuordlfisfloo Uirougbovt tfer an*. __."-'. ' "" Tin- A!nt-rUiD-KUii">rTKl iutatfom nt \Mf> )h K*truary t-vrn farther *4il:ir-il thf Chun.** rmuiuitiacnt rc,fbHr lnJr:blDee *.USc. Krr H.OWH'li^/vr ^nein--rInc. up(Hn. and air deft-wir trooi r*|>rtoilj trr nnw In nnnlirro J>M. Tlii- U ilmiMf ttw nMiuU-r jca.('-<''<ti-d <>t brlnx 1" tldt nun5r> l<"f' fli^ t ,iiu<>ii,-ii operation bo_jin. Tlwir cutrr And IN*- a.nfl*Ml atiffl jn tin- North Vk-ir,fliii tnitcjt/; la norrix-m IJKM bare b*Jnn to tmnrf'tn-t tliv rooflkt tbrrr. Tli--^Ffinfr>i-iwoti IIP^MP a b-kJtri<>u f units from 3; Arm.f iX !n-arr i/f ttiat << -unity. NVA-I'f)i.-t Iji<> it^,-ra(imu< nil 'In- l'!i In IfMXi afid l!7i |<ot t* \i-rr (iri-ixnrc <>n V)-utiain-'.< it^vs, *t Siiin Tliun; /;><f' Jrii' t'tu-ng. wliii-)i ar- iirilH-![*llr mannxl !; M-. l;iR Irilouion uml i-.:i Gti>ral Vaiix rn. Tlw ut(ak Ihl* year |j*\v !< .">art f a ffcrtfir^t tluit iirw inrliKlf li ar-n Morr-.unrtlnjr^tt*- a^nL'Ti 'ral*iit'-//"iJ>: <'lii-nz n-ratJ cii'fu-tiiollv imv<- h>^-ff |<^| bn/l I* f'iT :n\rni\rf J\r .*trik<-> l>y Ui< I '.5- 3inJ tuvr T)at trixifm. t'mtf-r fl-' ami N'urtii Vietnam wblrh *mld wiffulf (lie t-ntiro UrLonf olk-y aii-t Milil n'w rvwi Invflvt* lie- CMn^Gt (n ii reottt hrrmfi<^. prthnf^XflMMy link* rh irriiwioff jcu<-n3Kft |.n-/iin m TUiriitiM wjf.u tli- nil Iiiif>K-haC;i *truKelr. IlfJ-vv in a t>Uat l/iuoj<a/'t l>y "T> A[.rJI .1. "lifMiiflib? tu (lie mil nf {) fouHDUuinl 1'arrv "f i). flw i/nlrli.;.i- rui>' nn-I ^-"I'l"' "f TltplfalÎ . . . ban- Ihnx >-UH""'tl''' i-H "f ind'H-hUjM in tlKur upltrixC I.'.S. Krw|oti aiui for r..iuitli thrir hr'<li- rumliat ro.>vrtjiuitl"li- iMirtitit flilx t-M"it| ur,.l--r r-Ti- v. tlrt-Tlni' |<ofn-/r. (,ri>ui!fit i J-i^ (>o(^(-' nar- In nil lt[|i (i<-ltlM. -^f ; . ;.y io antifi Ix.ritirln? Lamnrut <'inU*lla,"T-i fc('{.rn-j:i(i- luiu KlziiilMnfit Uic:^ d<-v<-!oj.nv< iit> a/r. xrvrrut \xMi\f .it l>t>f. 'V .'.- H-oriii noflne- fVr hnf<(rli f vr* f'Mria laJ n-)tfd-<l tl- [><Ii>rl.iii. M- )'VDiui>iir M u Igrzrly uiiliuj-<rianf ]>>>ti\>\vnl urnt iiilwl>it*rtt.J>> u ui>*-(iilii<K /'.uJlK f I/r ii'l Iiirg'- fioiwd mi ;N-r<v;ff<l jhrrnt (>i CIiluu. br
i-' I "
/'/. and. I^w. L^d onlj v for I't'.i't j'jkN in J33-VJ ami i:rl i/uiiii)l*. In tx/tlj ' 'KJ..- f(K- AiiK-riraf/ -oipifrji.-l ''n/lilw k" niuvi-^4 iiijr. in line v.'.'n *-. i.>r Hniiinic ti '{>* ow lur-iIvi-4 )ri tij in-riplirral nro. ni- An i rlcan uir ltacL-( ttirmff - 'iiijif.iry x- urtir C'"'lniia' mtl rn lu>r<U-r f-.r- [/rtn|r(i-fi C!iL;>/v t<> ');-)<!" l v-ix .V),0>iy ni>-u t ni-1 Hufi in ;u'l :rri I'"-'. >-\- u flii< )in>l'I ;>( fj/>[> {>rv'Lcr| c'lti M't-j T- niii^. fl-ii '.|.rn.jn^ MII) ji-1 f!," l:i|j>-iiir>. f'-'-b -ili<- ptwiliKii I lull ( Ijjuu <l...t|ji| ..jj-f/l? iiHi)I >'t|.jF..rf *fO< nut IMI..HII- .THl.r'i;!' i| . t-r.il-. iii.!"-;)!1 it, (..-MY viriruf' f"r fir r>. itm.irt :! I i<if'-'l MH'I-. J,ir: ri.i"' l.iaoii'. rru!i--f Si-|.ri-inUT WZt. ii.v i|.i- -'if-r. );!(.. i- <if ii-ry r-> ./;iit|i>i/ar war. IIIK rw<l in rl- mi<lt il.-t.nf.' ni.<| jtuMi.-i .Hi;n-lr ^' l ( i < ' it-riif i'if J TI -I rli ('( f'l"ir- lii" | V jn (! V'H-II:.III-JII .inu.'It- 'Jin- ii>llir;io "uniiiaiiil t'"*v*t\ M> f'>r .t !.!> fin in nf fli- ('t'liii-'- r'/iit..iuillui>; K.ifK" Jful l'.^-i.i:ii tii;t'. .M i>i fn .-r ti |... i.urî.J t>; Hi" ''ulluru'. !(>: of nrion. uii-l Hi" ..:.(.! <lii-f ' < J.' ' M":fr (_-i , f u j ; j ' ( i ^ <\n i.(if.li.-I> ,' f< f ;l'il t'.r I.JH f. M tnr-- 1o r<it"t.'<.:/<< "fj'.'iil |.r,ci-(|.:..-. / |. r,|.li''is w:ir 1 iit for M;|i,: ilH'iHil -li B Hit,'.' iti'-t.nl n.'.i..>r; j].[,f.,,|( h ii/ fiii-ff tli/ Aiiii'rU'ii" tlir'-iif t< -;,!'. r. (;!'. "I i-<I(. i,. I j.w i!)on> >i. W'iii!lii;l'>ii ':i 'HP f.n:J l;c-< :fi,.* < 'i- 'i / in rn'ii in- i" ( li'nir^" i,i-ii;.ii')- i f! .'if . i'< nl-iiii if. A in) f, \'t'< .\\ tl-.- viTt !if|i> fjril AIL- r'Mi i ...!;iH'/r. n. l'r>.^ . ni> <! in ti,,- iMprriii! !>. -lufriiicn' '. itir- 1 }i',f--v I. i i i t | 'V- >'< ./f -i mi. rii,i')i' J i ' i i . furtli: r
rrar'jLnsi,'' bud Mrnt<id<-[;> b4r JotCrtrtCMrt H* ivortlrt ax Lht i KHlciâk^VitoaL :?&y tcP0**1**** d* <*i*Cyf .'Tailed action" : i.:'.j -M*-d 115 Ur i}r,ci.T/iri>ir It4r'>'letnc OoWKnmlw JW^W^r-Ja-Unr war. and -Trt .) tx- kuvwa-Ujyr am! jpfW~tl!;t th< pwtAr.-of Iwi^chuw, wmld tiavc to 4 >;. ii^'ir /arrjjjy* ^^fcltei t^ Jitn^ricny an tAfclr on>. Tl^ ."b)4w' Uc 'JHM . v^cir -riitH'Ucif irliat -'?> Tfrd-d s- Hanoi jTilitrip taftf'2 v -2UM-<jMMbillf^_ ?ici*too* after ira(lx Tiatti.m fcumoiiu; nt the Nonb u Iterrti ii, }>. -::~r.&.û9*rtoilai aesioKt Uie VJtf ttam*1*1 attain t)u-lr ~ tci^rni joe) r>f4>i>U(Ai JilwratJon ftntf icadliV-tJ<j> of tlarêintlMTtMnd.". Mean-
6? nt thU
^.io:..-! t>it N " , . .cj' \ j] if tt.*jh4(l4tiotr i.'nitu fr->w--tl- X^rtb 0;al Jut'} tyro &*-tt there two "
.., . . Jctrt OJP ^vrrnni acllrp lavoirpjuciit To In- IM. tlirtv are ooni>.Hitv*-. TTio i ifacuarfr ol iri<xt Ktvndx (ike.tluic f noUi.-r rul tJw fiKt of -x.?rphy rnJ dir -cjciTiuf nillharj- aid ciM)-a>.%iuU iirvNencv ilnt <wst bd J-fcr-ît. ''"t tli>- poaM'-Mlr.idlo nblft Is fat, fin; i!raHial!<- (o W egustM tu tU " "-- "- s l.i that vr Jiartf Uiu* Iwwi . iii'lflilti irtit wliirl'r Cft"" 'II'I Qfrt cxint : An JiCTite fltinpse ifiv<i|VrisHft i 3 whoto. atid *" rxurJjoaiinu aiuiitut Iht* l/wJX.-k!>k vnd (.Itltmb1- to r Ulk lK>tic 'Mrrrinif T!r "llu-t *\Av," HI*
. of rimri. oin fall. . . or iIi*mtHr'H'7 I)M> nJwr. U7Tf China'* minim** Lavufvtowjit i !:! wire rIirlim f oi'>t'J<'n<l>l- '<tf in tlw I'nltxJ Slvtcw />nTi.-niiiifii'. k <>nll *FV"*T ttiat n<>w -*^ ure prvpr^ -4 take JVkt' ifrrcMtfo ttw /ort *.-r. .i!iy <m)y It \t niuvrx art- ~,m ttir *x;e <>f (.'liiuiS K/>rt-MC Isiw5*illn Jn
-
Cii<J<r fh^ iillp 'V'^nK-t'-rfJ ^-^r^1 t'liim'n ^- r5*- nwv Jn1. 1.. l '.( i-3ttir>J>*d rtflKitau: s ru&\ti*ir*t mriliil} Iff l'.,*., > rr'iiK At 8fr(j(->n |irril in fwc. rwrtit Ij4riiib cnxatCfr rniiiljiiiirt>ull> thi> |fr<*iiil)u- fix"- Vk.<tiiDlJUitIim and tic V. rtli VWjiduirsj; frm-m n-/>nlii r>>K^<nd wln-n 3W^)ipL "Jif ni.< 1^ . k.tj. and ib* South \ iH;<3w-i< T.ri!(iu/f NrîUeK LH" Hi.' furiin-. <!>> '-irfii<|OiTi<(-i( triurM uKiiKalfly î ft aar r "Infill nUJ" In /tii|"-l'iiui a fid w{d-r inm!vwii.ftt for ilw miuiller ^B>/N?f '^ J" S.
l.x- f"n>. and iivw t)HTi- 1/> a . tn . r-f'.I! full . Till* trwn w flu- iiiritniW In A|.rll KT^s fLr Anurlcau 'ityl'.JutUiilH tcni Chin* Opera flm fr^/i -iinf Oiiix^r ir^drrx c.-3<<4r?i4 tj^-:r r^-U' b, auJ ivxitrury {<> u->t fff^n-Jkriw of tn>vr I'Miii* tin^lif a>t to fi/dor*
On t . * HlfiMHMLlt," "f l)K-lr t*rwi-f dlrtut tin* fir-' fr^ jor l>rîktLr'ffi>i ji> Mtn'r-Awricau rÊntlariA in fwt d^îb-H. Ttu- fff'.u>!< ttuttfl't of tbU rfrvfbôicnf iii i,iD<-kJ< irjiirx aniwtirr "f t' )* tuor*^ r-m"r;'._ i/-ni( anil IMTPI rcstrictlorai In-Jpo mikA Jjiv itxnt/ifllry 4uilntMrAti<>n rrt1 nd bur I -;l";rii| tt"ti>|tjt<'. KtlftMllf. tt* < l.iwtr toffi ttt'fHWit >D
j t!;f* '" 'Ow l:rtfltl N*Uwiu< iM* full. iTwisiv.f; ti- Cliim-N* r'U- oairyfAn. 'V-;.lii inti'mat local UWc tfnul* m.-xchco'lu Jaimn-t" bislisht .''jtut' changing* [mltrlM tafarr u .fajnuN*o .iiKln-iiMr, Morv twc -.voc, -ranxf. t-t UK dic'UlRp prirti :h and Ji>fo!vvjnrrit in '7'uiwno .-uwl tl.f r'Ji ot", i>-< JMi i'i iVkSmO; otlcwliitlon*1. ("iiiim1* Msoirvului must Iv tir-l; r-t.'j rtrt!i.ilU> In rU: i>urxtiit .f its >fir.-ji-t!i. ot-ji
aV ni fiwcico.jwll'i? *) in- l-ait w i t h IK thh< roRift. :::-V on < 'hln,\%-. "^>w l'-l<ii>K I* J"inj;jt> IIMT '*< ; !' sX'Mni-x- ri;)-.iii.- Is i." ay uii.iM.1>lri:i' h!fJ.- n HiK-i wif^l. 'Wf.<i'iIt -H-i-ji-lon filter th- I'j.'fwv t rrf.i tirj Jcjvr ir<'>).jv.>2(l >rfl!'Ufiit \vhn-li >filn> Mitli (id Ann-ri'a.'i wi Kd Iji . ,T>''!l''liH'iif Jv t.'i ti:' julw ><-.-i"-l 4 " f" ! a: f' ie '!)|'I"i.i; . !. m j ' i < t!- I-!-.: ..f ji 1-" ilirtiitritlin; - (< t - . i - \. S. t'i,ir..i l-;i< a t w < [froiiCi-*! lr.il>5;> : <iir N- rutv; " '"t.'> l^-'tlic J S i-f :ifjt fjtrrdcr -.!.: ' Tii-ri tl> J:r fi f lr:rt>;v"'tj(0 r>-cvnnl-> f" ad purtii".- itf n >-n!>-nii-ui. ;i vr:ifa.v Hn<>t lllld I'fkillf,' HiiTV' i.1Mlf fOlSr-HiiT - llll|i-h umrr-.ui. II l-fc! t'< !ln\ f lr<. IfJ'.'-i liliil Mi Mini. II. i"al(lcillic Mlf-. !;.ftfr-r, If !. ili)|Hr.l.-(;t li. -if-l'tf l'.V. (!:> iiiul'x *>! lli>- F'I >,in>;-l(:ili<>i r'-lKii"f.*ljlf- 1 linvi- I >*, .-i-kdl "J'.!!! " r Cs-' d >!:! s>ili I'linn iiiiij itM-ffiiv tml'KH ^' t.lfiir r<> fi.r H>iH"i' '.îrul ;'?;. Too - .K;:>rr it li" l'i-kitie ri-tls iiu r\.]aii ii!uj. w'rli fii- luil'-- lil)if><- Jiy M j..i^;.. r-Lij. if nj.-i'iN nl n > s>ivii|i'!> tifd at {.*> .-.tjii-lii;^ ,il>r"uil IVM-ri- <-i." :.
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li.liA will Out hi Hu-oiwhvi. honcuT. iu><Tf tin- Yli'trutm war. llrrv tlic k'.r .. tv- M.-> M-Uii/j; i' ftiUflr.iwl ilat- and thr Milj(u-n ni-Tinn* b.r $alen and , :. <'.,uimtinM rlfDifnl.o ml'.U n-*f>M-t la tb<> South. N-w |K)IU-k toward CUitt nr ; *oril Vlrtuuiu al-mf an- irmuflli-(>-rit. 'ftikfii r>K"t.lt-r. U<mvirr. tlu-y be<:i>ui.imiulli rHiif'irriiJX niul "ff'-r tlM- C.M. n ^r-tuitinK jiltt-rnatln- tn rnil thi* wnr. .V^"i"l.lu/ tt- ufhii-vi* Arttlcuii-nt wlfJi llaD./f uml ivkine iiiiiiUsli<->u!y -.mM Nîs a :'innli-r nf jii,w.rtui>t r-*u!(A Tb*1 in'-^f laj|>rtHnr '..imlil ! t -nil tin\-y TII! trx li *!<. ''alt HI: n--Ui*- *tftXui*-i>t Ifuii includes t'hliia tan inanf ; i > i ).i-..{il<- A l-r.i<l M-tll.-n 'H -JrJ- infi-nifttioiuil cuar)i:>ti-- m>uM t>it!i<niv tinj.it-.'ij:., .if il.-.- 1'iiii'tl StiiicH. tutciii t ui>-n- c-rti'iru-fnf j>'rlix! a\ I.'J*.-rWo'^' rt 'ai;."!-.. fltiui tt.r tnnitl<)I nrn-tiif<n r'^ !<ii<llni :m>rr<; a ilt~tin/ whlrti l<< by B" siiijii r>riv.rriiii5r4l an Comavii-.iHt ..r '1..O-' 'mmuniMf. Wl-ili- any c^t'Srini-t;! Hint Uiltflir n-Hiitt w-rtl'ili IMI drlne t'.-i'nr:' jxno- li i In- ^. if flroolil tnlwv ttiv uv'ti )ru[>>-r:flUt -b-nro-t f Interr i',.i, nl fcl-rtinQ. -lil< - liarr t/riil m> (t<-rriinrntal >< Amprloan nd Allan
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>>> /f-I*rs u^>. ( vrr.,t.- flat - vttl.-iu-nt of thi* klnil I* (Tr'>r^ likely '< IN]?.,:. a':^ rUlilf mid IUKIIIIJC tbnii any JJuti-*"! !> Am^r-n t-rtr.-r TJjU i>< -*," ' !'-;.. ^.1 i I ixaiimruiMiv flu? t ' n tin* \x. Tltunk you VCTJ- much. Mr. Lewie. Iliat is H .very 'tii'^K-stinjr mill HU'-rinrt niminary f your pnjxr. ]i V4VHB< to IIH- 'hnt all thn* of you mffnv ith thr srttinffof -lat* t'on<Tlly in Ifjo l*^ri.lntif<n n-frri*l to ns S. W"tf, There
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!.!- - ( f i , .if V | , M ! )''7<i. NiTx-f i l u - r i n ltd Cliiiii^c |i:irti''ii>utioti aii<l -. M-,I. i f . j / i v v-(t!, < v H > r i l i ( t M f i/iti w i M i I m f l i t h i - 'I'Fi.n niid lip \nrtli l\ .f/-.ii.-. t i n - t<c.i! if ion '1.1- }>rtni fo liavf truftiii^-. ici < f 'x/n{irmfc<l '>' - I f / U ' ^ l . liU Ii,|| ,| MlllilrtT of !IM-Hillir. H lt!l 'Ji'-i-'liii- It-ff-rrlHI' fn .' i in- 1 "tittt'Jtf if- f'llfilliDi.'flii-ir oitlij^Hf i'iii uwJiT flii<*-o/|if irn 1'n1 '. 'II<.II:M \% Ii>l xou *nv I lii- N'nrMi Kun-nn-. Tlmi n'J .Vortli
561
Mr. Lewi*. Yet, sir, the North Korwuw are induded in tbia. In fact the first move by Ghou F/n-lai in the aftermath of the Cambodian end* WM toward Uortli Korea. The CkAflutAir. Didnt it it :Iude North Vietnamese aLo ! : Mr. LRWI. Yes,- the Indochincw four ape the central elements of the coalition. There are two others, the Thai and the North Korean.*. The CHAUOCAW. I see. Mr. LKWIA. The Chinese hare been working with afl ii of those, the Cambodians, the Lao, the North Vietnamese-, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, (Indochina that l) and then with tin- Thai mohMioBAriai and the North Koreans. The principal *oms it ôur*-. has bren Indochina. (*hnn Enlai's first mov came in North Korea and that has implications for the anti-Soviet l*nt of this coalition which I liave mentioned very briefly in my statement. Now the flimesr PMHV Ua. May 2.1. have tnfitfd five a|rreenient0 and protocols *ith the North Yietnamewv .they haw *igned an ajrrmnent with Prince Sihanotik: thry have compiKed or are ahotit to complete the road system that aom frrjni Pak Brtip to Mnong Sai op in northwestern Lao and from Muonie Sai in North IJK* to Dien Itien Phu. Th*> nioctinpt continue. Hiey ait- held on the order of something like two a month with the major leiwlei* plus military officers of the various mnntru*. WJca asL-wl alwut thi5 1'rince Siluoiouk said this was not Vet jif the liM'^l of command and control, but ho and a number of otlu-r^ including; the Cliiwuc have aid that this includes ve.T clow coord in.-ion |Mwrtion of militan- strmtcgy. miliUrj- aid.* and the Vine. H r *ll it. the wav they will conduct tliemai-lves in tho war. I would cnijh.*i7r thV /-ivatiort of thist crialition is still under way. I would *l*o cnijtlwixi- that t l is still lias to overcome many of tho iliffen-nri-j IK-IWWII tlww various |K-o[>li8. HIK is iif>|[ hirm<inioii.u in the *<iiis<> <hf> CliinM? BH- (vow th<* btood lirotlicrs of flic lndf>*'liin<-M(icoplc, l/uf they hc in iv.HjKK-t u> the war deridwl to work togetlu-r. sir.
THAI IXMl'W.r.XTH
'Hie- CH \IKJJ 4V. Vm rcfi-rred to thr inmirpcnt Thaii, T mean tho rrtimii, which wptmvcofb'ii liwn rcferrifijT. Mr. I,rwn. 'IlM-Tliai JnureentH.y. "tlu- ('M\IM***V. It IIOM xomHmiPK liiifn i4iiiiat>(! tlml Knu*<l.in^ likp atliitnd i< inur^-frfn in N'orthcAitt Thailind. leftist what MHI lmti< in iiiind * *lr. I,rwi. Vi-4. lif I nlw hive in mind thf fii-t of 'onrdinnti'i^. Tim lroal'-iist that I iKiTwl Iwrr in my wriffrri rt.ttmwnt \f ty|i<'ul of flu- Chiiii'i'f l..iwi-iii*<. 'Huff conw arid &>. Tli' hrondcasf ofwuly j\; fhnf -<ltirintf flii.* in-rifwl imilcr n'\-i-- tin- Thai Patriots/* tltf-'Mini in0(rt:'irti that we an talking ab>Hif. "ftrnjitrit^ tln-ir jn-ojili-V in II-H lionlrrinjf Iâox aid I irtVht dny with niijie^T to thr Tliai. ati>i Miix i* nl*) tni*1 of llw I jin. Hiil the MM iv *)fiality fhf f ciiifihnxly^l in n*>}n-<-t In ' fxili. v (ownnl im.thnl i* [i/fi^ |ncdi['l'>rift''v.fni thcoiw hai.il. n 'outlier li' on f IK* trfli^r hind, i* wliaf ih*1 < Virww.arr k thr ojx- hand, ttw? /* tMlcintr a intu-li harder lirx- t//wrd tlxi'i(i]>h*iMir.in(r. K they did <>ri tlu- anriivcntt.r> of MHTI'* May
t. tin- way \n which the war will go if tlio Thai eontinne to -u]i|.ort tin" Lao. tin- ami- f-tn iwulutiiiria'y fon-es. and if tlioy 'out/run to wild forces. Then the Tliai will increasingly be involved iii tinwar. On the rthcr hand. tin; Chinese say -if you want n settlement, if yon want to tack off fn>m thaf more uiifitiuit strategy. then w will muko n .settlement with y'm." nn<t ihe Tlini mv taking that seriously nf the Koreiini Ministers' statement indieated the other day. The CHAIRMAN. The Tliaiaru taking it seriously. Mr. Jj.u-i>. Yes", t-ir. As you prohablv miv from tlw Fiinfigii Miniitrr's stateiwiit in tin- middle if M'. llio T'iai aiv \ory nite-.n-stwl in tliis. Jus* toi'ivc you soniu of the Saver ut this Thanat Khoiuan r, tli.- I4<h of Mxi iiiep'niHi tli*t (his |X>li<-y. what wn i-alliil tlio new Thai tiolicr toward tin- I%i|li-"s KopuMic wf China, ha.< UH-H oiip|Hni-.-| liy ani won tin- admiration of friendly rotintric.s ami I:- HIVS it hit- thf Hp(>nnal of all I>I<-JIIII(K within hi* ôvi-riintfitt. He tuhl nlH)iri- f , (Jt;'t t' j.s jrfilu-y rxjulil U-in willi trade nnd c*>uld lead on irtli'-r rffatKiit.^liij).-.. ntnr' jKisitive reUtionshi{>ii, with the
THAI Tim> IV l-Mf
' ( 'II..IKM \v. Did he say anything tbout the Thi troop* now in I>i< f .. Mr.^.i wi. UP did not.
n<'(' ii. MKM \\. I y>n->tlvy < nil thi-in volnntwrp, Me. I/i wiv I l l i i n k t i n - <-\|<I;inntion [t>i I (int. ~u IK; tln-y :ii'f, (ui.it* f i ' m i I'nni-e >'>iii;iny t^lt'iiiin.'i ihrotln-; day. A.-- you [iiolmMy .sHW ii> i'i" J'cm^kiik l'"-t. if \''ii ipt t l r i l !n-i-f i.i the S-nati 1 K'>n'iirii Ilt-hitioii-. ( ' i i i n t i t t i i * . I h i 1 |t:iiiL'M>k l'<r-( on [''flii inir\ ^| ^'ir. i- nil rX|<I:in:iti"Il "ii I in I ..'" i Tliai M''" .' h a v e l-i'ii -*-nl nji to ti:hl <n I he I'hiin of .Ki:- w i l . ' i \';in^ I'.in.- A''''<iidiii^ i the J'ir-.t. ><>uv:iimij I'honnia .-<iiy.-i
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50:',
f.S. GOVKRXMEXTV IXTEXTIOS
The CirmwAX. What is your assumption? Ytn you think. as you interpret 1*.S. Oorprument'H intention, that it is to withdraw compl>tely or is the Vidnami~*tion and all thftt poos with it. as deserihed previously, designed to prolong indefinitely our influence nnd presence in theronntry? Mr. LrwTf*. ;f think then* is no douht that tlie President wants to withdraw ground forces. I do nor think that this leads to tin-*-nd of the war. 1 donTt think that this leads to a complete, withdrawal from Vietnam. I (hink that it, as Professor Falk pointed out. lends to a new t4vhno1ojry in the war, tlwi further hotnhinp, and I think that as on anxiotie.* prow with respect to the safety of our troop* that there i <-\T"prenter u.'penry or e\er preater need to fake action to defenti tho-*- Troops. I 'hink we are also at the mercy of what the South Vietnamese do. an-l this means that we will have to. if the situation liwomes more iMvzrions. take actions to defend ourselves. Tims I think this d.ie.-* not i-ad to a complete withdrawal. Moreover, tlje.re is one important point that oiuzht fo IK- made on this .irT and tFat IK. as my statement trie! to indicate, we anmi.ssir:r n (riMm-itdou* opportunity lien- in rearhinc a settlement. The idea that till war will wind down and somehow fade away does not end tinkilliinr.doc* not e.nd theloav^tothe Asian |fM>jile. It i-i only with a Meti lemeut that those lon.sesstop for tliem. and it is onlv w!ir>n tlir- killinjr ^-tO|s tliat the T"nil.*i States will pain in llie i-iitl. ttum in tin- Hen* of if* interttitB in Southeast Asia. ^ ri'MPtrrf. r.. WTTI'I*\WAL ^vn v-CTK.UJZ.\TIDV or somirw \IA
'I hi- C r r \ i i ( M x v . Ito you {ter>>nally favor our i np!et w i t l n l r a u a l from SoiithesfCt A."'n ami itmieutrali/ation' Nfr. I.rwi*. YC-. -ir; I do. 'I'll'- l ' i i \ n : M \ x . \ <n\ do. Tli^* i- umr |i-iitini. J)r. I'alk: i.ii"t it * I'r. KM K. VvH.it i. 'I In- < ' ^ v f ^ w ^ ^ . itin-r one of \oii jp-ntlemon, ami I would inrlmii* Nfr. Yft. I nx-iuiie.'feel fliat if i. in ymir word*;, in th* ennential inti-r-I- f thr T ' t i i r f d Stai- < m u i t i t n i r i either direct, firoxy or ny /ili4-r i -infro! <<f. wt- w i l l -\. y I KIM- 'ni Itidm-iiiiui. I taki- it. u>n aifi'ee t i n t i' i:- in 'nir )nU-v-|i. tn lu'iitr:ili/i' :iinl to j;iv* up tlw idea of niir '-on nrniit'.i,' infltK'fi'-''. domiiiatiofi or am nay you want to ili^-ril*- it, in
l n > l i i . - l | i f | ; j I- tl'.ltt i-olTl'i'f '
I ' l . F X I . K . V". tli:it i. i-iTi4inli niv i^frtinii. Sfiiiitur Kulliriitli*. ji- f n t | nilil j.'i further nd a.iy tliat not < nly do vn- not J i a v e a l - i - ' t . - c n i t * rit in - l u v i t i ^ tin-re lint w hmi- :i ITV stionp |irtiitive M - ' H M ' . inti'(c-) n. -tf ntr out. and Hint our i-l:it nii-!iip to I lie nli'il<> ii ( , \ .1.1 di-pt-rtrN iii-iii our ailui-dnj; :i i-lt-ni ;iti-l ilffimte |iolicy f w i t h i ! ; " V . i , ^ < n , r i ! i i h ( : M l îr-j-Mi'r f l u m t ) i : l t (lOrtlull / . f \>-i:i,
'I 'i<- < 'n \;i.\t \\. \of oiilv i i i i l i l i i r v pn"< in the >ii-<' <if inilil:ir; | - f - . i , i ( w l . l i t i l (tic xti|i|Mirt id i-n-ri ntlii-r -:iv i>( a ffiverriiiieiit w l i t - - l i v.i ' i t t r . f i l i - r mi i i l l v and mil- of our i-lient-i. if yni M o u l d lil, t l m t .mil. :i>- fiiitfii-ited to ii",itr:ili/:ilr >n in v.'urh WH Icne iu> irion- i n f i l l i' i !> HI .iri, ntlier oi^ j-ower.
I>r. KAI.K. Yen. I certainly think thnt the essential fxtlitiral Imhkrupiey of our jioliry has resulted from .s:i waiting regimes in Southeast A sin and elsewhere in Asia that art not rajmMe of goveriiinir their own ;io[Milution without massive external military Fupjiort : it is tlie illegitimacy of the* governme.nt in relation fii Imputation that ultimately draws us militarily and ideologically t> Hip]iort regimex tluit often contradict the most fundamental vahuwo purport to stand for in our own society, and I think South Yietnazu is only tin- most flasrrant exhibition of a more total pacific policy tint requires, in my judgment. drastic revision. The CHAIRMAN. Would you suy flu- same with regard <> Thailand ; I >r. KAI.K. Yi-?. I would. " Tlw CiiAiitM \\. Anil>M i --widor Yo<t. do yon have an\ disiijjrwi.n-i-r xiitli u h a t I'l-ofi-tsor Falk hii* *aid? Mr. Yoi. \\VI1. I tliink wr have IxWh a short term mid a lonjr t.-rm iiifcn~;t in withdrnwinjr rai>irily from Indochina, tho sliort ti-rm inTvn-st lwim tin1 one that Mr. Lewis just referred to. that, us our fiv;ir>- [hata-<l <mt und n^fh Hm:ill nriniU-r^. H* loiuj as the f>rescn( ?itii'iI ion rmtiinues. they are in pn-ater and jm-afer jeopardy. ( >ur [tri.-iJitTwill remain when- they nre. Tlie dn/iger either of Ftifferin^ heavy los-ror irivoh injr nursejvet- ujniin 'ven jin p d^ply in an effort to pre i-iit |.,-,ôs ><><'Hi~ to me to e.i-alati' us tiini- PM-S <>n without a Hrar Hint -i -tuiiditiL' alxmr our niihdrHwal. williuiit an understanding l>y I:,. 1 iitlicr side that we are withdrawing x of ni<*h and ("u<'li u film-. :iiin'rs under those rimiinst:iiin>s.
A- 1" I he lonyer ti-nn. I would ajrn-*- that if i- highly desinl'iiin .H'lir rali/.c. if |>o ililt 1 . the xvhoh* area or a- iiiui'h of it m- < ;ifj IKiii-iitrali/^d. I nni nt MIIT thnt can ! <!<>IM-. ( am not com inced t i i i t lln- N'TlIi \'i''l:i inn-- nl u h ^ l f M ' f *;'iti-i niiri-iil ina\ rnu-l^ 1 1-\ !.'; ;Ii'. in ><iiitli Vietnam vull In- prcpari'il In In- n'!itiaii/<tl
MI <MM; of "MI nrM i/H"
S'hntor <'\i.. J noitilrr uliat you ruraii li\ rif-uf lali/rd. \ tliM/K it woiiiii hi- MT\ v v i ' l l tu iiH\c that (jintc <-|i-:ir!t -|n-Ilc<l out IKTHU-X- 'i t i n (,MM. ^ntv i| mi-mi- our xrettinj; out uuil lm\ iny nothing to do w i t i i ilic I I I I H . lint in u tf<-)niirnl si-iixt- it iiit'iin- nolxi'lv roiitrol>- thr uii', i. Am I flirt i-i-l I ^f| Vo-i. K\alK. "oafor < ' \"t . Idit \ T \ l i H K >>II|H-M ij' it inn! prolet-ii t. .Mi V"-i. It iii'-aii- f|io-c wtair In-ill^.' in a -cii-^1 nuiialiiinl. tin) iM'Ui^' :illii-i| Hitli u tu i Jrin.il (Hiwi'i alliion^'li tlii-y 111:11. of .-..in -. li;i'.c fftrinlli irlali'iii^ uilli nialti. ami I.T.-HI' I'l-oiioiin* -j>vi-' ill' ' fi'iru many.
MVI lit M I ||(\| I/ ' IJiiN
!'.<!( :(, I s a v . I lliilik tliat -lionlil \ our uliji-rl in-. I would '< :i ! i t t ! > - pKiii- ânîiiin1 aloii! .-iiii-\ inj; it In J/n>- und ( 'aliilxulia f : . n i III Vu-ftultll loll | >|n>'i!;i ti\ |i iii-liii-i > il Id a!( of thrill, I 1 .*' < 'll MK\I \ s, I n-1 ' ud i ii^ I liailaiii) Mr YII-.I. U'i-11. i Iliink ti'-'i I|I-|H-III|- pn-lM much on lite Tim-. .1it w o u l d oil I In- MlllaV -lllli~ :nnl till- (M-opli- i if >IHJ.'U|i'!ii. If lIll'V H :illt
to mm 111 u j_'i-iiuiiii' iiciil rah/Hi ion of tin- whole area. tine. Jf t!,ry
iloii'l (tiHl IM II|i li; tlilMI.
505
KBQUIEEXEXTS OF C.B. SECflUTT
The. CHAIKJ<\N. To try to develop this * little farther, do you agree that the security of the United States, and you call it the essential inf -jfdts of the United States, does not require us to have an ally, a client stale, to whom we are responsible for their security! Mr. YOST. Yes, I do. The < 'iiAiKMAX. We do not require it. Mr. YOST. No. TLc CHAIBMAS. Do you agree that we would be tetter off if we didn't ave the responsibility which usually carries with it the prospect of our becoming involved if they become involved! Mr. YOST. Yea. Of course, we do have cert* in defense commitments with Thailrnd and the Philippines which we simply can't throw overboard. The (.'HAIRXAX. We do now, but I am looking to the future. There is that kind of an involvement in Thailand. This leaves the Philip. pines. we will say offshore areas, aside for the moment. That is a little .(eparate from this immediate problem for various reasons, particularly in lite ease of fulfilling an obligation where the fulfillment is dependent upon the Navy and Air force. but it secjjs to me traditionally the Thau have tried, and have succeeded largely until recently, in IK-HI}: independent or in a sense nonalined. Is that not so! Mr. YOST. They have a remarkably successful history of doing just that. T!v C'U.UKMAS. Tliat is hat I say. It is Dot contrary vo tl.eir traditional approacli.
FUCVAIf J.V; W.XTIMEXT or f.X. MEMilKItB
I wanted to auk you while you were speaking, since you HO rewntly Mm.- from tin- I'nifed Nations. if you could tell iw tin- |Mvvailing sentiment as you nee it in the L'.N. among other countries. What do tiit-\ think would be the pro|>r attitude and projier jwlicy for \i in tin- area i Could you tell urfthat? Mr. VHT. I tli ink the viu* majority of t'.N. munberK, exc>i>tiiig a t''H from the iinnuvliaU1 aiva thetv, would favor our jroinjrt with'ii:i:il UHI] vimlA favor an iriU>niat tonal i-onfen'mv to try to work MM! -Jinn- u^rc<'il fttabi!i/.atioriof t IK- area, 'II ic ( 'iiAiiiMAV. Ix neutral i /at ion a (>art of that c/inrvpt '. M r. \ r..r. f think that would >M> the ;roal of most of them, yes. and ih- )IU.|N-!I llii'gciiptal viewthniv for many yi-ars. l l u - <'HAII:WAV. In that foniirction, I ivim-nitjer the Ktudy in which J'l. Kul'i jmrt icipaU'd SOUK- yearv aô. I thought it wax a very, very - iii-!niijr :rnd jiro found Htudy. It xaid that in utrali/.iition was a jrai-ii--:il and ii^'fii' conccjit to IK- n.m-d in thin an-n. Of rourm1. the ?tludy , t-, j.ii'i i-iii ht ,n many otli-r jmjlKof the world.
A'lTITI'l* T i W \ l : | i % K C T l : \ f . l / l r l | n V
J)r frf-wu. |)o you lielicve (hat I hi* CliincM- would IN* favorable to l>a; H'-ij/iinnt', it'iyt in un iiitj-n.-ntiotm! ^re-(iici,{ of (lit- ncuirnli/jition nf I ! i i UM-;I in ' M> that w' have just ili^'rilx^l it, (hit) ihev wunld ><"t ,n vc milieu , .lyvNorinilitat v for"- in t h i r - a i f H . Inoiht-i word*
thev would accept also this idea, of neutralization of Southeast Asia

iiidiH'hina.inHudhur or exchiduij: Thailand. Mr I-KWIS. They have sjHvihVally come out in favor of tnis. Tin- ( 'IIAIICMAN. Th-y have. Mr. LKWK. In tlw? last few days:, as you may have seen, they supjiorted the new -*>t of Isttt pro|x>sals which included a i>ro|iosa] fur neutralization or ,t return to the neutralization at the time of the 1!)S (jcni-va Conference on taios. Tin- < 'liiiies? have niso approved this idi.>:i for other parts of Southeast Asia. Tiiov have, of course, i-rciiided the North Vietnamese. They have. 1 t h i n k . lH-riiHtohed;je on what will happen hi South Vietnam: tint i Micy hu\e bucjtftl tlw.- PK( proposals which in effect ny tiie \\:i\ tin- transifinii "fti-s will In- ip to the South Vietnamese aloitc. Tli'-x w i l l U- \villini: to inû'ato S<n;tli \1etnam Imt they do not ;it tliir- |M ( iiK say very inu'-h aliout the )i-iirialix,;ifji)ii of Smth Vietnam. CiimlMKliiin n>-uf,-;ilix-ilioii. of course, is ever more diflirult IxâtiMi if t lie shift mi the [dirt of the Cambodians after I'riii'v Sihanouk's ouster hut the <'hin<-4: still jmblid^ xuji{>ort the neutral ixation of < 'anilxxlia. I would {Mil thic answer at anîThtr level for tljose otlir count fie-; tlr.il are imw U-puninjr to think al<out developing new relations witk < liiici. the Thai, fie \fala\s. even the Filipino. 'I'iie ('hine>e are pressing tlte idea of neutralimtioii mainly for IiiJ(wliin:i. They say they re willinjr witiiiii the Iiro.-ider context of ;in :ijrn'emei]t in A 'in to itjrriN'- !o the Lusiififion of Ijii/fH'h.iii:i frtini niitî.ie iiillilrni-f s t'i flii)-. X'.'* only will :i -.<!! I. 'iiii'iil then inrhide the insulation of Iii'lncliina. it w i l l inflij'.Ie a lir<i:ii[iT -4-M lenient for Ka.i1 Asia. 'I li:it j- ulî in our intent. The ( 'hinese. in talking :ilxit t l t i - to i lie .fapiiiie-e. for exsnnjili 1 . have U-piin t^ conviri'-e a nninl>er if .lapanr^' rliat t i n - I'.S. .Vixjy iloctrim- i- u d'x'trirn- whivh hat Asians fitrfiliii^' A.-IUII-. iiml I'onlbiU*'.- ti|iiariiy. Tli<-ir din-trine. :i* tiity .av. i^ for A-uin-i to work witii Asians, to roo|K-r;it- w i t h Asians. ,t in. iv -4-eni "-tniniri1 that we h:ne switched r'> *!iis way. hut tln ,* \ \ n - i > i!if ( 'liiiU'sc i-oiiM' out on this, and a nuinl . of .! pallet- lM'ii.-\e hem.
IlI^TolIfi- ( HIM <r: ATl'ITTPr 'IW&KU At:*.\
'I In- CHMI-M \\. In t!ie lipht of C'hiiicxr hi.-tory.tl- wsy tln-y tre-if-d t l n - < - :n >.-;i.- up u n t i l the tifne the\ lievumc tiK]ji'.<'lte< m rent w i t h inf i - n i ' i ! i('.-^-n-i'in. w h a t vj-< their iitlitiidt toward the*- area.>< \VTe I In- > I ' o n - t a i i t l v sMvkiiiy (o iiii'>rprat4; them oj- did th-y reco^jii/>-. l l i i - i r Hi.lependeliee 7 Mi. J,i.wi-. 'Jouurd Southeast Asia rhey tr\ to stay <vnl r ( f if . Tin-,'. i r i n l :i- li--t i hey could to kii-p fhe war as fuj d'-'ant i'roru C'hifn a* | MI ,>.i(,|r- v
1 l.i' * ' l M l l ! \ l \ v . I :ilii k|N>iikit'<.' of U-fore the w:tl\ Wu>< the l r - i l i l i M i r i l -i tni uili df ( 'In mi tiiu-iiril il>i- jn-.i one t l i a f u m i l i l )' roiî.-t'-iii rt I ' l l .'!n- ;|.-i'i-|il:ui''i > '"f a in !! ,|t Sollt)ii'H-.t A -'II ' Mr 1,1 M I - . A l > - o l i > l c l \ . My -tatenti-nf Timket. a ]i'fit on tjiii. f!nf I l i i - v h a . e l l i l ' l l t i i n i l l t Imiki'il on tire Indoc)iin<-e [M'OpjeK a-t l.>'irII.MOU- jN-npli- ' i m - i . i t i i h i'iiiiii'~|ii-d in f i a t i i i - i d u l w.ii 1 "., and f h > F v i i i i i i i i n t i fu Ini vi- ( i - I x ' l n - f lli;i( u i- !H>| to -t:i\ out of Jri'l
r.s. .ovF.!ix:uxN-j-*s Assvjcmox CONCERNING ncnrosF. OF WAR The CHAIRMAN'. TVn tin* aawmptiou of our Govcnuwnt. particularly undvr <h<? previous administration Im^k ia IdOH and 1%4, that this nar was being wjigpd in order to prevent the aggressive Cirintfe? fn>m incorporating this are* was not. in your opinion, a valid one. Is thai, correct? Mr. LKWI*. AjhsoJurely not. hi fact tin- Chinese did not get in t that point, did not want to rotnv in. There was no coalition at that time, By our net ions iu Indochina we haw created that coalition. We have created the \Trv thing ive Imvc tried to stop, which, ris I .said, did not exist, in IDGf-lSHJS. 'Tiw issue of (China's xsntrrinjr the war was a <rnfral issue in the liejriiminfT' of the cultural revolution in 1!WVM!K5.". TJios? who argued in favor of jp^tinj; in, a snmll jrrouj* around Lo .J\ii^?iinjr who was Chief of Staff of the Pi^pl^'s Lalwntion Army juul o(lit-r. wetv and <>riticiKi>d sjwyMfiraDy for tfantinr f |Lrft in. Tin? Maoists for prtînfr out, and WP a^sociat^. with that Lin Piao's statoof Sefrf<mlicr S, 1JMJT>. in wliich he arpu-d for the s.-It'-tx'liaiu-* Ot th- Indorluui'se revolution as wdlasall othei^rei-olutioiw in tlw world. arjnw^l tr*t they would wA do well to associate tliejn^-Jves witi) any outide :orw, including the Chinese. Tliat was the ^liiueM; positinii on nil revolntjonH, and it was specifically ivlated t^ Indochina. Tlie trajrody of it is that they have now rever?"d themselves und'-r the. jirewurp of our ivceiit policy sine* ("'a
AIIMIWIOV l>F<'KIN \ Tl> r.V.
1
Tlie CiiAiitHA* . Wia( ejf'ct do you think the adtni.*sion of Cliina to th T'nited N'litiwns would have on this [K>licy of working oi|t a neiitruli/utioM aprwnwnt? \Voiild it have any effect at all ? Mr. Lrwis. I XM? them? *teps as interp-luiwl. S-uUir K'llhripht. I think then* is indeed a set of moves we ivtn make to Itrinp China into the world community that will normal i/.c our n-ijition-. with JVkintr. brin^finp a whol* new era in n-sfx-ct 10 United StaN-s-IVJfinjr ivlatinns. That in itwlf will not brinf [>euce to Indochina, dut it <!( IKfully sii|ii>ortive of what I think has Iteen arjrued here for Irinjr'niir [if-icf to jiidorhiti*. Oiif hel| to support tlie other and that is the \i-rv pn-a* advantage in following wnat I hive regarded as or what -ntwl as t two-pror.^'od approach to the wttU-inent of tinmr: w-rtiiM ^teix toward ifnooi and towunl South Vii-t-. MUIII. certain 4ejifoward< nina.
'J"l' *(<'|^ tow aril China MUp|Kirt the Indochina iiioi'es. The in lu>>iiili of the ChilMfii' I'eople"^ KejMjlilic flK the feprcscntal i\e. the 'Vil"1 ii-ini-^ritaiit'e. of China in the T 'lilted Nations MI iny view, would ,i i r i - . Mrou^. iMMifJM-effei-t.oii China's n(f itmlr fotiard I If
"I' M( < K I M AMI I'OI.t PIT \l. Hl^( l*.MfM>
i:.h von ill lcn-1 Sciciiiii f n m i New .Ji-ix-y I u..{i( to juhlrr"- a <ju<-sti'>n oi two to \ on. l>< I'. ilk ^ on mi*-*] a {xiinr whii-h I iielu-ve ni-idu-r of tlu- frtlc-r and tliitt if- t h i s qwHt ion of war crimes.
Ar. si /hilling {Kiinf, one of the uioal articnlate advo;at>s or rcpre- nutisv.-i of tin? :i>t.nni|ition I mentioned was JWretary liusk. Ho nude siine quite- dninm.n<; statements butli in this vominituv and eljjoa iniv during that period which created the impression that here was < iiina srraiding aT the JeasJi to overrun these- rouufries and that w >rrjv standing like Horatius at (In- bridge, rcstain>ne them. This, it "M'"ITIS to ni'% is essentially a niisjudgi.ient of a political nafmv. J could -ay ?ln -of others. but I think tbU is a good illustration iii that he u M-, mil guilty of any moral dclimwencv. Jt was not an immoral idea. 'l'!u- ocly tj-o- Jilo vi-as tliat hi- did ot.iiDcIi'rsta,nd citlwrCbimtJf liirftory "i tin- -i(uation. Id- probably ^-aJly Ix-Iiwccl that lite v'hiuvse wtr> - j;i-r "-wairmy to overrun all tlvosc fww>r Httjp cxiuntries and incorfiorat^ ilt.-ni. a^ they say, i-nslave rhem.aud all the fhuahoyaHt languajrc wfiich iiM-d 'loiiTOinpany thiitidea. That being true, is it really sound for uf to translate these political uicjuilinjii'ijts l'a*J larj^cly upon ignorance into a moral r,.Hicept ami Say he is pvil n.tl<l oi.'^ht to be {mint-hod as a criihuial i In: F\uf . \Tfll. 1 wo)3 say two things, Svn^tor Fulbripht. I thin1! th*to :ii very difficult qu<ii>{ ions. First, and I think this is t'ery iui|Knnai{t. aft^r World \\ar II we promsded to leal with Japaneu |Klif K-iti and niihtan- WoS'ra who sinmvly Wieved, ami 1 don't think t h i s wus qin-stioned, that it was iuces*iry for tliem to engage, in H policy of military expansionism in order to prtwt (hi1, iii'ist itindaiiiHsta! o'onomif Htvnrity of .bpan. Japan's very- life aw a society re'|tiin-<l mon- rve>s to raw materials cuid the establishment of what Hifv ciiili-d the coprosperil v ijihei'e. Neveilhejtrft., at the Tokyo war rimes trial* \ve proceeded^ on tlie a.<sumptioii that the decision to I-;MTV wur artvihs inteniational bouridaries '! circuinKtHncesotlierllian :<'-lf-(h'fMi.se constituted the rrimn of aggressr >i uid warraDt*><l. Mnder ihox- iniimstatnvK. imjx) i'jg individual r<*sj>ousihi)ity and criininU f don't think we organised wr crimes trials afti-r World ^Var II i:it. of the s|)irit of vengeance or an virtors so much as out of a ?iense n>u* tfoifniinejTkis should not IK- enf rusted with the discretion to det*-rinin- wln-n to u-*' their military capHliilities to napp war jgainrt a t'ivijm wwierv. Tliefefoi-e. in the context of the Ind'X'liiiui war. ihe l-<:i.-.iori whicii wr^tituti's in my judgment tJu- ch-aiest inntance of a i-rinit- nga'iihf peaix- in tlie Vun-inlnTg- Tokyo wilt*', is the derision to .rrv f lie war Ui North \"iefjnim in February 1 WM. and the division fo l;jnb Noith Vietnam in that- massive way in riivninsfaiweK other tlian ;iormaUy nnder*-t.<KKj K omw of self-defenw. and it wafi even (lie Stut<^, more than any other government in the world, that had MirHifi^t fon^ ruing indinvt aggn-sfion or aid to unhwiViti' -ni movi-mentH UK i-quiiiili'iif (o m\ at tuck :icnp*< a Ujundnry
lld \ i;>i|lCHfe reciHirvet.fi :*plf-d'f<:lisi', ' I J I M I ^ M . I.I \nu,rj V r<>
Wh:it I am siigui'stinj; i^ thiil the ^nreinU'rg 'ruilit ion in the m<ii-t

|.I.ji|:il/l 'fit.'ll îTI-.j' |eMi-d on t|i.- |,t/|>n-ll Kill lii)U ili't Hit iljg Uirgli'r-sll'e ^' 'i i i- ;m act fur v\)ui'h j lid it nllniK H I in fîiide t l u r t |inlii-v^. li-r|mlit( I' )li- i . i U MI governnifiit, a " ) l > j i ' < ( t*i c t i n n n a j I m o . l i t v . U'e 'howglit l i i n t was a v<-ry gor*J idi-n w h i n < r l l n - i ofljo you really think that this society ,-. -_ ,. mature tûmieitîe that kind of A-.TJvity* This is-very fat- reaching. Tliere i no question but that b-forc it *'*s to a irre.at extent stimulated liy t1o fact that wo \vero thtN \-i'-t>i^ rather thaJi bv any jrrvaf moral, sense. l)o you tliuik it \cas.a little variation iu the *icd of n-tali.itiuu or punishment that is usuallv inflicted ijjxm t lu- defeated'. III thp Franeo-Pru-Ssiaji War.they ]ried a bi^r fme an.d<hou^ht tJikt was sufliiîent It ir&s- a rather quick and easy \\-r. It didn't go on very lonr. .So Ti nullio.i francs wenteaou^h. Tii*-*' war- liave gone, on for ft lonjr rime..-In World War U they killed a lot of jK-ople and wv rlu- . vii-c<trrf. l^<> vnii think .. are re:illv sufhVienflv nirttun- t-> .sell the (;'Hnrnuuity tln< V.TV high moral coiuvjits involv>d ju your of thi<% jrrsintHt (hat it might l*> in jn academic so ft. i obviously, inconsistent t<. tate-.i <tJtfeii?nt view of u moral tion dejh-ndinp u|on whc.-tl^r you HIV victorirms <r defeated. Hut as a [irnrtK-al roster do v>u itUy flunk that a society, such as we tr. fhnt <*an Ix- sold on one different îew almost month hy noirfh, ean n-i|Hiiid s it d<K*i Ui a Pn-ridcntial statement ; I>o you think you ran pprvnxde a socictj- as immature joliricaHy as this one on suHi a eiiut'Jit ' ?)r. KVI-K. Well. J tnink. Senator Kulbrijrijt. ,thaf the-n- atv twn u-ji.irato IV-HIU One is to u-iint extent way the Niirenilierjr tnuii*'ioi extbli>hed a* a eonseque.nee of our &!\w of leui{T nftors in World WHJ- II ' I think it ,iow hux lie'-orne. a way of distant iiur tile seriousn<-.-< of t h u * juvx-ede it to talk ultonr it as lieiii^r ineivly the t^xertion of \ ii-tur's piSuiw. ^ . -. Hut if you.âmi n- the kiml of .scutime-nt* that I think situeMv aniiiilt-d not only ^mori<-an>i but othern in the world, fiejv was a *:w tli:it it w-as vi' t" iuijxr*nnt. to rn-ate a [iremh'iif for llie, future. urn! that then- wa-> not really u vindictive spirit in undcilukiiijr t crirniml trials but inueh m-ire a .sense tLnt ti>tvâs nn i.îh- of e world *x'iefy. r.i|K)ns had Ih'en JeveJfrfM'd and u-d. ;ind if T>-nily |xirwin:il ref>{Mi(îbi'it\ on <ho>4' li-ad'rs s by tli< *:! of ln-injr a victorious |>ower. but that it \vjis auimaU'd U'd \>\ \>\ imii-h
l.lf-liMi'lii'ljl fo|ni'|-(iv tlrij Wt'fi- olfji'dUcli i-orri'i-f ,
Now vsln-ii w<- couie <<t the i|M<'-t'('iri of 'how to CKli-fiu tills f-. o.n-.-j-lu - in fhi- I-IITII-^' of :i Imit' war wliii-li h.-j-; <|lit the \CIA I>M<1U 'ilrcuiJv. ! afOH* tli.sl m- liH\f H (jue'-tion tlxir i< or. it dif . fi-n-i.r !-:i,, d >f (ilanc. mid J :IIK a'-nertinjf. w^TcIford Tuylor :ii:d others Iff. i- :;k-riii-/J, tha< tli'- U';_'iniiiiiir of any kind of tvcowrv lnm il-ii xu'-i II-TJ. !> I* In ucknov. Indtrc what the realitii-- uiv. nof ro mu'!i in ifi)* i- fn I'.ofov-e-f he trial of J>e:i}| IJii.-l; or f>vi.'do'i .f'>lin.-*jn or 1,'i -h:ni| V i x ' i ' 1 ii -. v- ill1 I'miiiicil-. but in order to i-arry tin- jil.iiu- of d'sfiis-ion ii'-i'il <".;'(, >\if I'.tt-A'ii Menu war attune tlw- |il:iiii- of |irnrtir;i .'ri*o|>li(_j'> ul,i-['- i-i-iîiiubi*1 .'iifir^ nf ind'/nii'Mt <-ttii lie miidi1.
\\'ir.i1 1 ilf:i (i-i ui^' .-i s-av j-.hal tin- i-vtdcli- Mijfjre-tf'- th;if tijc Jli<Ji> ':n:.:i l\:i> (- nn <iL(;oiii^ i---iiiijiit|l -,i|i-r|.iW. thiit if i-. il'c duf v "f all
u
i i|i ti-t'f'ic rri'uti'j u Hjalli-riiTi- fo
570.
a t'lm'lenge not lost '^HI jwinavr' Americans -and on inauv |H.-opl>. i}' i ohghouf T'IJS roisjitn . fwr u r!ea r a:u| <l<?<-isive-taud. not o: ambivalent with respw* to curling tinwar.
I think them is rnnoTr food for though? and mn.-h tflt'iit iu. what younav. It-would seem. to nwtliat nsiijiriictical jiiaftw,in *T>ri of whit has' taken place and of the iharhroA-y of government f Imt^xijtîf such nihfhvs and .*acb -niitir-iuî> to the moral as{>wts (/ fxu-ur -umonv 'juopk*-. to me the ôjjifcal result would b*. tlint we shotidl .^gain luufcrtftk* to Jiiftk-r. xw 'j a thing a# tlio I'nitwJ Xatioii ; ft^-.rk inlrd <>f neglecting it. J mean ju^* machinecy fordealing wjQ -tbetn- ]>rol)lpjns. As. lonjj as we condinw to have every vountiy judge r^be,1*' t>r>hlems/)i its own and nmkd-itso^n decisions t< :ntrfe<?pif li-r HS tbn Jajwnese did by ineving w:ross national Itound&ries into China and iflt<> HviKîuria 'in contimst to our misjudging a situation and nxtt hit' into s cL"iJ wtr. Mieviug th*t_wt woiv in some way resiraiiwijE; this IvPinpmlovs^gp-essive mortmcni.. of riunu I agree with whit ]ns l^ffi said tht.ihig w8 simply a uiisjudgineju of fact baned upon a xui.-'iViiderstanding of th.' situation in Sourh Vietnam as well as what <'hinV purpose and tntejiTJ.insw,*^. . ' I have Jxffc'u tiiiukijig abifjut tine a good deal ever since tlie (,SHey 'trisJ. VQ& wouW be- useful -tc vi" ^njntr\' in bringing it hack tt> a mo** iiormal posture and would itpnmotfc'or would it interfere witli ;A wumption <f a more united and more omlized attitude fownrd those problems? I Always coui6 baclr to thft t'.X. It seems to ire here is -mechnni?ni we created ft*r that war, along with the yurcmhtTg trials. I think the oouariouenegs that jnnwj tLe /rials in Germany and Japan also stimulated our ir^rert. in the edition of the L"nirI N'afions. _ ' . - - - , . I think tb: gr<?at?t mita.hc we7mi.de. xra<? jn neglecting tJje rnited si. that>' is in paying iipsen'ire t< it buf whenever we haw jxuj'rHWs we always go around it. We really don't use it.'WeTton't try to K* it; " " L'.K. K,MTAwV.T, TO JNVOfAX tn>.TTJJ> SATJUSTS IX VIBTXA5J.
I tltifik in "the raxt of tin: Vietnari e{)ixie ,w were very r)uft.iut uiid very alov U> even jt-fer Hrthing in the f'jiited XnUwr-. Iwi'r tt/at i-/)rrwt, Mr. Vofitf : * Mr. "iVwrt. Vw;: it -wat \Ve did make a mrifrtiK eff(*rt Irncf.. iu MKA-fo to mvmlv <h I.'niteil Nation* but w<- w;-r* prevented in a wnv by our ovi ji ,jK>lii-y viti-a-viK China I.KK!UUKI> it- WHS impoaMM* for tlu I'.N. tit involve itî-Jf UK long as lite Cljifu-A.' n<J the lT<tn;inifo* wwv Jw/ rr|u-ewiit*il lher. Th^y \iKfi iraulf if ;>erf{.rtjy /)<: r llM*y wonUl not :i<v'jt utiy judgment or rt^^muMindation or v4i.on by the. I'mtea Vu4^111 K. ar 'i in thai rate if WMH k-sir that the I'A'. eoulili''!, H'-t, lint I airriu- wifli you entirely JM to the future*. IVliiJi' fJie inability of !(,* I'.V. to wt in VitîiiUfi. hnK. I thin}'. hcjfn<d in di.ilJUKwming <li' Anu-rifan p<^>|L- Uiit it>i e{l<uh-<'ne*. f would, (j iiVJ; in tinr ';!i_'.'?- [,,,1 their d>*-illiiiiii.irinu'tit v.-jlh mir miilid-i'a! acti.in in Vi>-v.;iii<J ti-*d tlu-in t< tin- rjirn hj-uon lliut in the ftjtfin' it would l-~~
' ~f ' " L wiser topvotlieiob toâ.Jivnltjlateral institution like, the U.X.t<> d-rl tvirii situations of this kind insofar as/yrternal action is needed. ' The CtuaucA vJ I.may be wrong. bu(t I dont recall at the time, sav, of the spring ir sunuifcr of 19G* that we made any. serious n"ort*o involve the Security Council in this matter. Did w? ;."
The OnAiiotiSr: i'es; "but yc" *e the die -was a A pretty woli by then. It is a little Kke the Dominican iuivasiou. Wi invaded and then wh*u people began to raise questioD*- we perwiadad tce CAS (Orgftnization of American States) retmiclivefy to sort-of approve it/l^? cause most of *hem were receiving ocr idj we had a leverage on ih<\*n that caused,them to do it. : When Ue alleged Gulf of Tonkin incidents toot plmoe, -QT prior to that timei we made no effort whatever. In fiict there is inêafiinjc evidence^ which gradually comes oat throrgh this barrier of seccecy which vr have installed in. our Gorernment, that months^before the thi'- Gnlf of Tonkin incidents, plana wene wdl developed to do-what w* finally, did. . , . Ttte Tonkin Gulf thinr was ctea'î m order to give al that time an i-xcuso to do what, they had already determined tu do. I persyniUy do not bdieve tlie incident on the 4th of August ôok place. I don't want to review it all, but I think what happened WPS that a very nhnci incidiviit t'tok place on the tidof Aujaîst. They didn^t realize liere was f a the thing tliey x >re looking fw, BO the? xc^Ged it and satdi_ kmt i _ ;+ * rwm ".. . _ A t". ^ *.. t _ T ' ^ * _ ^. . t. _* --a
. twn, m-. and all the rest of us. Mr. Yob'r No; it was a little later, in the .\HDCI icrand Tall *n^ winter of 19G.V-C6. ..''' -...
.'~
If that had Ixwn taken to the "United Xt'tionsof coui-pe they wouidn'i dare have taken it because, it was a fraod.'They couldn't liarc Uikfn, ;t to the Uniu-xi Xutions. bat this is a neglect of die United Xations wliidi I think is very much against- our intetesfe. If there is anything t" the moral aspects that you are bulking about, Mr. Falk. and there is pliUo.-inifjhJcaUy certainly, for jnariy people, Utc mJution is O> iu jjonie wav. tie tJiin in to tlie nrceeRity of using th'. United N '
WHAT VXITKU XATIONH CAX AXD CAVVOT BO
I>r. F'AUC, Could J connatait l>wfly on rfialt Senator Fuibri^ht? 1 1 Heeuw to ma we have to be rery cl<>r about wh*( *h* United, \jaons <uj/i and cannot d>> cnd"i' pvt><y)t cJrciiinstaiac^J?, It ib wry different to UM* tiie 1 :iatnd -XatkinH m th indochiaa war the way we did fnxn tuitt- to tiwe t/> njobili/f >io pubiie opi(>ion to wipport Uactk>u iJia;i <uii)g the I'.X. aft an authentic uitfrifution of international Tlu- ( 'M.MKHAV. Tlut v right. Th* fir* Mftmijw of it. i _ Or. VM&. Well, but JL is true that both the Soviet Uliior und Ihe _tJoif<-d Natiocu oorttro' over a art or circun/trtmuaes that xVey were (teîly involve*! with, -^ _ (/iha(birigiit.
372
" tr. KAIJC. And tVre kuo Nations -bad either the capability -or. that fhe superpoweis disposition to allow it .to function invxMitlict where liw define . JutWHSf,* as implicated. . . \ - ~ ^' " TheCu.uWAJi.
c:oNSTmT.XTPOLn.nES OF VIETNAM 'AK.
-V
. ..
. I>r. K.VUL One other tiling that, seems to -me tu IK>AI "-*m rhc general dU'c'uhsiort of the moiar-diiK'js<on of the, war is that ii ?. mft tyrant poil&uf American jiubltj opt1 :oa do indicate that a large majority of tinv Americffu public now regard otirinvohemcnt in Vietnam as imntonil, liot only as imprudent, and I think that in certain ways the public may be ahea/i of llu* <iWTi?WPnt witli nsprifl to.tlM-ir yeneral n of wliit tJxv wr has ftnâiU'<|v lecaHSft'fh<t oierwljt.'lmiji^ ,to tin- Callcy rouvifctlun, paiu-larlv 'aC'"i tl) first initial i outlmrst MUS tlal-w}iat I 'alley diii wai u<?t sqnufic-antly different from what Iff had Ixvn sût-out to Victnaai to do. and what was ixjin^r dofre was a martyr of official jwli<y. Tlw> D-.VJ raids, tiie riaturation uomoing, and &> on acctûpjishwl- l>y Ji U'doioloîcHlly -equtvalftnt. means d^t 1id Lewi d<Bji- that <tiy V 'My fî. I think raal th*' j.'ublic reaction, aiidtliis isajcaht "idioatwiltv tlw joon'-rwvnr puiCi> opinion jwlls. âs thxt 4o isoiat/* (.'alloy and to su#gct that H\t: <-r>-'u] iK)lk'Je^ are somehow in wmt rîdict ion with wltat. hupjxîif.1 at My IM. i.s to make him iiito a sc^peôat. and to obsi'iin; tin- real Criminality that, is in\ulvt-d in hifliotine jjenusrîit injury on unarmed civiliîs. It istliisMrûdflonsctliat iui<iily mtr^luwdtlu iss'uv not UIP .SPHV? of Attacking for^fn coun/ric.> and n<> \ . % - f > i . -^ . ^ni I ! fe\rl \r :RF( F of o Uio luttk'fii'Id '' 1>'J< >f hiî military and political . tb* <v>iistitueiit-|K)lii'-ics of Uw war violate the most fundar-<rahitx on tlw use of military JKIWT in time of war, and i:i " ^ln- ( 'IL\II:V-'. ^. I dou't quarrel witlt fiiut. I am su i-\;iniiii;iti{ budi a jx>Jni ^>f view that irp-.^quvhs vwy IK- u^-ful if |M<SSJI>(\ utilized t.'i ivjir. i^.r^f the I'.N. "dii-'iMou^ U-ft uj.lljf hands of -individual i\vjaii nations are Jo cuirtiniic (< l>e mi^le, I mean mMakex vury-isIiiiHar t/i the oil"?, we i* made. I think, for reason* 'fl!wk of understanding, of i^jjiorancf, ,i you like. , .'- 1 i^-juii d'ui't think tht the people wl> made rlw-w inintake.- were "uiotMiiU'd hv MIIH dee.p and vi-ry evil desijrn. Ifiey v.r? simply mismfornu'd fliid m:sjuti^rvj th ôtid Miiiatiwn und ou" relattou r/ it. ! f i a \ p no d'niU l\n~\ rttILy U-lifv<?d. Fliis IK iheir ^J><>î/ii) wiiirth<; id-' l"i!\ f c<ijuTuni|)srfi tjat rt.ill gou# on to a pro-id f steriL Then- are iHUJiy p'oj*lc..>tr'd movement jn this i-oiinti'v f'vthry iratherinjr vast .MIIIJS- ol mnyi-v ^rf.-Iy ou f lii hni-> '<f "-* ^d us moiu>y : w/> will r.ai e you fr<im tliU Uujralxw of <vnjiunmHii." ^qualirjy it t/i the devil, I^-'llv iis iKtlieni'xlern Satan, and +!>' |>f>eal to tii*- Haiue kind of em'ftioii ni<itivtH (itopje in tlie-'iruddU- apew uhd^rii the dark a^'e^. Ifoiv >o vyu epl in the prosperity of <v;rtaiu n f t het*e Hmvûur . J > r -ÔK. hut, Svnufor Fuifmpljti I would diKt4t)<;ui>ib ij (he firrt wii-c to wliirii I think your attrifontion of (f
f nit ti i- ji;:?titiiii!<VHhlu>gi I don't oiiMph-tely sljajx- iU ur.J fntntTv ".r -tin- -swum! ww of U* ivjtr erinws lV.sn. niv eiitaik'd ly tj>e r.iuru. vih'ich-thc witf -Is conducted which the jteop]* WLQ wo responw.btffor pmerniii|Br'tJM- conduct of the year -it her kLov " about x>rhouM knww about, ; _ . -. . TLt : 4'u\i5:MA\. I <l<ijO- tiHrt- ;o leave it that I think ignuruiice and 11 .-i^ a kfj>'. ii* Jus*ifibi-. Mve make mistakes and w<- tr>- to 'overcome h<'Hi 7i:nl'Ltor to rtjvit tlwpj. Wliethcr serious jt>r no'. I doft try ro Jusiif v oiir'ijnioi-ai-ct r*irr iiiissrukw. 1 do think it ir "
. J.JSTiTsf TION BtrnVEJ'-N (JKMÎ.M, |1>M<"V ANP JXWV'ri>r.\l. A
.iJut t.ljeiv-'w iu dfnyt'yr tfiis diînctko) lcuven tlie ofiicjul |K>lu*y ' - f k l v yi. fii.1." wwir. >t'<:r*tfik/y ^f-T>uira %\-ns tinire and this question was laWil. [ lxOi-\<- /n.;"ov'sori*iiMr of tin- witiH'sW-* nmdf a jrivat doa'I tU tliat riii;c alv.it lu>' Îjxuidf.jl <iur .winy \vai. It was similar to tinsf or'u .-i-i jti;y--lcrid !i?oiif tin' <i<-nuaiib~'tl)t' llilns. \on"kn<tw. who tiswi t(r coi hal'itc-t in Ji'J<;i.<j,i jr lir iHiriniiiii^' <'f WorJd \Var f. - :'^ Vi-tronz woalJ diaisi)how] a Iwal . Tiwn tl (juestion \vas asked of Iiow Jr .-ax iilrt"joM fi\ TO l.r'ji a liomlKin ibî^trt th*ift v.'yiîtin;ly diffeivjit in :i moral ^f. it ~:*-Hf.n'i nearly s Ijoirihlc and I'i'iultin^ to tln:u .H? tiie fart a Hiau would [wwviMiaHy iliv-jrjSôwvi auotlior liiuniil) Wii.r. 'rii"- is ttii> diffriViW" that, i.^sj^s J/H!I. v und ifi'J thoii. It was JMT -tly <-k'nr ;it .thut lii-afUtg that onr Ivadi-r> ;i( thai and aipairHfl-i-Jli d<>, f nu-ajj xvc :ir>-
..
*r. KVI.R !*ut ion Sfi: that uiwir-rltijv* mv ^-IIK' tiuil t[-i in ttiiiivjw tii< k ~\Iii<irtaiij i M:tr jx>Iifii->. ;il a o n j j . Uin -JIM livimiiji: i-xin-jii'iifi- that in Jrt.' K-iW- l:'ni- t.M'V Uv <ji*for I'Djiaîn^ in iKî ofily M. di-;iiSH.iitn> ;lif.'y from j'racti"4f. of vit", l)ur -a (inpmvjj {.oJii.j'-fi'om-. monil ])iiu of *H-W. \\V ij:k' tHr jx-XMiic ivlio^- Wriv- lli/' nrfhiUvt^ of tht- riolii'V fttlu-i 'lie j>n.-fiiJi';U: oj'-thc1 F<! Foi.ijuJsit inn or jii/ift'i^ri!- of -ii'f< iil'^Jn- f jiiii-i-fruy of 'Ji'otyiif iiri'ditoi'-iif dPfiiriyii Afl'airvoj of t\:f World lVJji.1;. aij_d h s*TjO': lx inc. if one Tool;1- al tin- ' </ 'MitY-oiii.- Jiki- Allttri :.t(i.vr wlio. a* -you knoi. wa;- ûju M 'i(Tui!(il vi'u-r criujitia!. i}i;t( h ffijijitvrt s/unc khjI of i \ > i l i f'' i*-!*' hi- was really i.-nfa^'-'i J't iiud t i n - |rfilii'ii-^ ij'' {--jillv V-;IK u^Mi.*ili|i- for in order to r' i ;c|i/'iif' ; ow''iiTiinijiaJit\. VOH s*^-, 1 don't 'biuk llnit \ \ i i j i i d tluÂinfiv.-uii flit- iJn-rr 'm- l.i*<'ji :i ii'al n-'ji^'jiiliofKif llim-url ijujjo-itJiinf v i u r o t i iudii'-'iiiic^- firojile c |IIJI'(MIM' {or . l i i f . i j w i i ; in l/ill iin |i I ' M - 'ii^'li tt-cliijolo^s w:il - l;iiv, t. .''H.'jTl ^ t l u n j of fin- <v
574
iwo refugees. Now* third of toepopulatioD in all three . countries aavc a refugee stats'?. Tnis is a horrendous kind of polic that hafMiot.led to auy senaft on thu part of those who \verc cn In h thai they were iuyolyed in something that violated vnry ii -inental moral standards. " possnuurv -jf soorrvV'AOcrpnxc WITNESS' oo.vcwr CiiAnuiAN. You are quite. eight. .What yo-i have just stated is why raised tlie question of whether you. think this society is capable of Wepting or really ezamliviitg the concept that you hare put fonvarcl. ' Oruld society Jê induced to i*Iirx<e. as von do. tliat it is t 1vo have to take steps not only.to stop this war. hut I would hojxthat to try to prevent its recurring? I was tryinjr to cirress, tho \vry aUftcof ofwhat whatyou you aresaying, saving, that there isn'i anv idling of tlrCAr> senê are we at a *t&yp. of development wliere this t^Micppt can lx sold r ran acceptable at all as a ô\rernmeutai policy i ^ rai.-îhisqm'stJonwhichhasbotfaereame. '^ ' '- - ^-' :J->KMI:MS . Bimw.rs -UGH -LEV H. WKHVIKIK OK J -4ii: ôin^ (u dosirt with one ôbservation. You mentioned was nn 'article in u locîl jr.ajra7.Hn- the Ultcr day by a f or c<rra|)srintU'n of
uiid the wa\. thi* jxiw^r i^ <li,';xv'd of. a/ut tlw lanri 1 of all tlm-r-. J( was OM- of -t fur -/;st stJirtJin^. I fhouplit, liTf'stina coiiuiM'iitao^s ujx<n liow the pc.ft-cr of frr<'*Lind fni cfnin T ri< > 5> Js (iJf<>r'jic<l,'iTid tln rewiltsof itw of tlit-M- tliivV I'u-ii ;i!l vvi'itiufr alxmf a vi-rv siin']ar Mr. LFWI. >ciju-|<ir FuUn'itrht. <-xi-us im.-.. Ix'far" w pa c ou >rm (if:- (.nliji'it of WHT rriii. 'Coiil''' I ju4 juijcco-w 1 vir*f i-oiTiim'ili. J "Hi" ^'ii.vjj.'srix, < Vrtajnly. I wel*oi)j* any co.-i'unnt oithci" <^n- f >(>u iii^ !<(-. '
C->. TltE.VI KK.VT O' . M \ \
Mr. LKU-I/J' I tJiink it is import/ nt not 'u i< tiskf an l^wri'Mii jx>ijit of view on <}K- Hil'jw*. I <JiinrJ tljnt rlu- 4<ro1>l'>nj is pnrjilcxiiiff a. It w Mr. T^-WJI.. Ft ha- 3 treat jnwjv l'u'ii/. .> whii-h I think oujrh* to } siJidicd l>ut T do thinJ; (Ji>:t in \KI-J Tticit- ir a 'idp*jn'jid fe^linjr t!m( nv h.nv'.1 Ix-cn willing lo tl<; fJu- Awaii 1 * what ^'c nn- rio< willintr r/i ,}*. to [H'tj|tL- vi'l)/ -in- wot in A.ia-, I l>-lir>vc ll.at il i. well U> krs-|i in iiii;ii| <)ur <in' of MM- 1' !.-<- <n> 'A-Jiii-h wf w jit rcbujli! JMC policv in A on <.vlj>!i w<> .rMiiiiUt otirôlii'y_ in ik- I'.N., wilj l.n- to
tin- \-;jnf<y wt- IYMI-ITIPNI \\\
HI- ;i;-<- n'lllitiiT ><> fn-'il Ibc ofhci [N'()JI!C, U'c -hi..ij'I<l itof ! willing (o Irciil 1 lii-iii :t* c-')(1)iM <il>ji>'U in a (Tjiniujil vi m- /îjcftf jfi ti-un.-. of
.-iiiiph nio\ itg them * round the map of the several countries of Asia. It L* :i moral i|uoM:ioii in that sea5!? to them. and I tliiiik it is well to ]> lU tr.;t <it> the record. T-u CuArrjKA.s. I don't dunk there 5$ any doubt: It has often been written alxnit s^d commented upon that we hax'e dehumanized Asians by tpnriinology and otherwise. We often don't refer to them AS people fir a.- l:umn beings. They are gooks. or slo[H-s. or coolies, something inmuiuflte. That hae been done for a jong time. Tliis goes back long Ijofore this war. There ". nothing. that bettor illustrates the attitude of npsfernexs toward the Ci- nefie-than the Opium Wars and the way t!i British treated flie Aiinv* beginning in .about 1S59 and 1840. What they did subsequently to that was exactly -consistent with what yoa .styl This is nothing new sind it is not fast American.". I mean th<* ronu-mpr in which westerners jield the Chinese all duruig that period. and the way they carvod up their country was coasiswnt with tliat. They <15dn"t treat them like other human "beings did they? Isn't that ;i f HJ r statement ! ^fr. LKWII*. Not at all. t]>at VP. tliat is a fair statement. Iliey did not treat them fairly at all during that period. As a matter of fact. th<- N'orrh Vtfliuese--you can correct, me if I am. wrong, Mr. Falk l>ok upon TJS as the lixriwrianfi. We ride into town with our gun Iiloxing. slioot the town p. :ind then ride out without a fare thee well. This is (he ri*-w of the Asians XV]K> consrder themselves the oirili&ed jn-ople willing to make the bargain, willing to wttle. whereas we treat tlieîtuationnsalinoft a nonJumiaiione. woKnvivc în~r JAST r<i('XTf4JKiTF.cTrt>: St-nator CA*F_ Does it do UP any good to worry about ourÛte of inini^ Tin: (.Tiineci*- don't. Ttiev'are the middle" kingdom, they are tin- <-ii.->acTi jier)ple. and everybody else is a harbariiin. It wotOt ix-cur to oar Chine** to suggest, "maybe 1 have len wrong in mv considering rhc wt<rrn-rs t/i V* barbarians and I o u h t to treat uxem more as \\1i\- don'T we f<rt^taU thjsrtuff. \I i.llink. iff, {,'! inriiin. there is influenrc in *a<: central fat tiiat v.iiai w<- \t&\t.- done in ivu-uf \'-ars has U-tri <ol*-:-1ix)V Iife 4 lo d-tr<K ;>n <-n\ iroiriiienT. to destroy a ifK-iet;-. We IIU.VL gone far. lfeyond anylidcg tl;.-if r<ois<ii>sl)l(- jH-JijiIi- ('in justify. B^t vvi :hild fi- of wi - aw v .kjjjroiir*!\' !il will vvjjcjli'.'j \re an- b;ic) ///; fni/t-". u'Li-iluM- ;;;'- g^^'li 'Mia'1 '<f Ann-iic'jii flforlf i'> -tnbili^' tjiMig.-. in tjit j>.iif Jif tin-- "world. wlii't.Wwi- ]IA>\ S4nne ioKp;i-.iI'J!it\ or noi. All Jlii? i-..l":iIJv j/TJHl.'ivtr-.-dM*- i-Hii,- Jj,-caui- wiiat v.anr t" do k Wi g<H rli
r'li.T -ûiJu-i ii.\ni.TJc:an )'<: pii>1;^t *vjii.
k
< ti(KiI> -I v.ir. J>j(v>iJ ifavc. am -t/nu 1 y^-.iPf gor tno^Hjifut in England with t\u- ctrni* i -.'-. I'; tKc Jl<'[)/tiU--ij) Party in tlsia'-ountrv. Mafham îrf 5x>th
>"'i;r of v : -Ju f 4 - i l i ) i < j t'jcxit wloT iht-v a/<ii*f wjt;i( t. lu-ar lîiili -J jun--.il Ir.rO-i" A'nl it W')M: 'o i,ic jr vs-*;iild
,tv ii^ j>i-:lil-. \Jiu for 11- to in -:'lOwkuJgi- guilt in ^"'ijii: lijiflz Jo oriiftliK of vlîjnit' 1 w rong.
pood idea for us to i-oiKX'iitrate on niakinp it jx-rftH-tly Hear tliscf HM mutter where th*- fault lay in the past. I aprc-e with yu. Dr. Yost. rh:it there was SOUK- jood accomplished by American etTuils in Mi tUij\ and for sometimes, and that this was not a war in wbiol altogether wToujr i>eoplc destroyed American -liies whimsically to no imrr.rrnxr. ox WITH JOK UK Kvnrxo WAH Hut lei"- for<M that. Let's get on with tbe job of ending i* h-iw and t n-quir'ijjjr <'! i other to }ro Through ihi^c Motions that will satisty our own Jndividual intflk^-tual pr>rtnot:rta! needs. Mr. Y>T.^<'naf"r. mi&hl Isaya'word. T5)f ('ji\t:M\N. Yes. sir. ' , ( Mr. Y>s'. . I -would lik<' to sub*.-nl>o to wimt .Scji:itr ( V<> has' just '-"itid. 1 . wv^'oiiH? our dniwinj* a moral losson from Tltis wfiok aflair. our i*'i-ipfinV.iii^ lwt by figa<rin< in thi> kind of war in tlic ni:(.ssivi luy \\o ii:vp:ind hy tlie usi'of our advaii'iî twhno1o<ry wo inevitably c. vitL- \vidi-iiircad devastation and sutTf rinfi" ;:L an uiiirajp.'ou* fashion. I'.iit. îi t li>> oihr-r h:iKl, I would frol a> you do.3f r. Chairman, tlust - i? is iin !:< to iijtrodui* ivcriininatMiiis at r!ii> -ftajsp into our jxililicMl liJV. whi'-Jt is already ^<Jiifrv>nt<-d iy tin* r,w diffi<'nity of adjusting to ;i serious ^-tbafk, \\*" ii>side pr-at sarrifii'es. .*-uffi>red jrrt-at losses. .ijul :< i- i'oiujr to Ix- 1- xt I'l-iiH-iy .'liilimlt TO iM - fKiiiticai life on an -v*-n k'i-i, TO jxii^m the :ji inoî/lM-rv by rvennina'jons about tlw J>ast. \ >\<>\)i Hiinjj would beholjiûL 1 woii!i afrrw with Senator {'asp that 'ur objVdiif now should !>. "! <M;! our aj.quii'kh us {>.-*{>!(. and in tl.- most d^vnt way jiossiblc. :nul to draw }ho l<^son.- f'n- lie future fjfinj oiu1 i'SjiericiK*. A*-' VOI ay. I uoitM '^'laiitiy sluinjrty ur<re that NV dim nioretothe l"nit<sj (tV |iri""Tj.ri- ^^ .af a l<iw>-bl no\ but thi- i.-jiot jje-4>s;iry. I am lot (iv-mii-iif al<>u1 tin- furnii'. It }j;t< di>inonsti>al>i.'J in ias>> l)J;c the t'îiô md (" 'yprijs and Kashmir, wliere tlu-jv wasn't a too dw| in\'>|i<iuw(ii aruODt' the snjwr jwnvr.-. tliat rt ^111 In- cfli-ftivt-. J <inhl IIOJM <Ji:iT wi wouiil itrjw fron: Yiffiiain a J^KWU) fhaf i in our "tnJeiv-1 ill flltUJV < F a-^ to use tile ?'.V. I iVO/lld llOjfK- that fhf Soviet
I'njon a!^/ Hiijrht I"- jm-jtaieil to do -o and thaf Ix/tli of us would in future reinforce its jH-aeekeepiji^ < < u{)abi|iti<-.-. îv- if ^Jid jiion- authority ( don't t h i n k rliut is a T'topiau h AcitCt.MfVToy VAV/NJ; nm; ,\.vin>iNKN'(; Tbc ( 'li.iifMA.v. We do HJW yon Jniylit sa\on two-rtj-jw. You all ttin-i-. J thought, njfrifii IIJK/II the Imsic tJ.injr^ wJi'irj* inmiediat<'ly 'orn'ront <ttik enjiiiiiiftci 1 a^ f^ wha* thr foinijji<t(v slH>u)ii do jtJxjiir t!- ]-<?n*ltitHH] 1',-fnii- jj, f t h i n k ujo-1 ,' ô^(l fiiimffW'-* '"oiild ! raid <. \*- di<'/"^"d ij* >>(i|>|Miit of the N'-oluf ion tiMiiiiiif.' a dafr and ( i n ;i)lirimr iiiii tt{ I'M- |t<iln-i cf .-ithdiaw)il 01 dirt-n}.'tiX'-'"M'l)f' *'"' " K JH>< in HIM' iti-tei-e^-tf. in iciiiain ]n\ t/i iiuiiijlinii a l^n' there, a clifiit i-tiite tir h/mevej' you want t/i d<wnl>e it. l;ii( tii will/draw and hnv'e
the
Then 1'rofe.ssor fr'alk, who Ij, the only one who did. injected th<> ev miiKiUoM of tlw moral as|x-ot of it. As a prat-tic*! political nutter, i d.'"t th':i < that would help us either to jrnss this legislation or et a quick end to the war, if we rui do that. }eea use this has to follow mr traditional jolitieal process of action hy tin- Conîvs*. if we can tyt the ("oujm-sw to t\n it. It is very questionable whether the Conîx^* \\iH do it, hut I cciwnh siijjjKut this effort .<ud I ajrn-e with your !-IH.- recommendation* in this field. Maybe w<- should examine that a huh- further, hut then vaSoudi jrenera'l agreement upon that asjx-ct of it fli;it 1 <i'illft tiiul liujrli tliat I could raise.
IVm^K Of K X \ M I X r X . MOISM, ,-.'KT
The r>--i ^'rfi I H'SIS i'Xjnij)in^ the moral a^jH-rt after I)r. Falk raise*! t v. ,-i< ot for the JH;I-JKIS.- tliat I detwt the S-ua'or from Xew -Ters-y (hoiiîit. >ijn-4- tiii." snjH-ijxiwcr is involved ia thi= one A>*\ the <rther major >ujTiMwr most <vrta.inly u-a.> on the rei-eivin^ end of thL* >:r.in' tyjie ot tiiin^ iii W-u-M War U ivln-ii they lost an estirnutod i!'.. 1 xvas ('X)i!iiJI V. t-O ^>v if out of tl^S eSlH-VU'lWV Wt> N'iin't rjc the (K-*>|>1:. ]iarti<-iibrjr the {x-oj<I<- of *}ie su[K-rjx>wers, to if \\JM>. ih:tt l' ak out ar- eontimied. ThU lyjM' of thjnjr i> taMi- and tlw .'nl\ "'iii 'liin^r V<JH 'an do nly>ut it is to HI'>V> in tlct ion of the I'uit^'l \:i;ion.s to v/hore these stijuTpowerj. aro wiHiu^r to .-jcj-i-pr ^niu 1 {7ani< - ijjuiiji! 01- iinolvr-nwnt of the ("nitod X'jttitins-'. I <l<)n'f 1>Ti<jU w'hat th< - j'rojM-i' word i>. It i^ iit nhke iiiv vi/.-ws. aitlioujrh 1 shouldn't liriag tliem-jf> at this time. tl,ui t]ic xi'-fiiViu- dejiartinent of fhlsîovernnieut oujfht to give are soi)u.'wh;d HJe the (".N. Their* is a collftire jud^mt-rit i'Jven MI <|>iKniunity lo. j;iako a di-cision and to expres,< its wj.4.) oh ivoi\enu>:il of this 1 ind is I'-^s likdv to make a mitaKe than an iudi iilij.-i'l -.jU-rocMk'd by " w h a t i:i n>> U'elf de^friled in the Ux)!^ I referred f thiuk IfA', I'.K. J<x.'^ luue a role to play i/ Jhi* and could -sai'e I .hi- n[.vrjH>ivr,* {fma innkinfl stK-ij mistake^, an we have niado That /'f ivally what I ws t r i i n j r t o say. Thepe etjM'HHicesoujrhr foif^di u^ b^JiikHiiinjr. T 'KM. ouiSi* lo teach n& rhat tlic I'nited Nation* in a muvh mof promising way U dtal H it5 thi>> than ue ha < hi-r-'toîre t lioiijrfit. T'Jiere )<UP hi^-n almost a jfrcit <JJMi!u>i<).'i]a<-m And defeatist) alxutt tin- I."uit/'d Nation!-, ff fin's* is not lo U* made <o work, wjjy I think we < n i'jc|w''i a nimnvm.v of thoê wijne kinti of i-xj^rw-iuv^. ft M-i-nis' to me jolh:<-,y!U th:t ix wiurf ft likely <o hapjK-n if u t>M\fZ it> have w-ir-. WP hav tJioiiând^ of ^M-uplH ri.>:ht now wra ejj'lira:n-.iji luori- soj|;i>j jcated waystoîM \*>i>\Ap. \Ve demte iti'U'e money, tixiay to fxaniinm;? in inojv and idi-;i ^l.out ."Hiiii- I'KtruonliuariJy ^'((lii^fica-tr'i tn)'[n-d'> or j^lantr <>i lioinli. '!' (rreat t!ir.u-i today L-, 'thiukinir ol more and !<ehvr v^j\> to
k i l l |H'0|-V (i|ii|i> O^llleklv ?(<nl IlJfJtt- eMi'IlSI . e!;. . Jt j.- Hot jUXt il) tllih
count r\ .- 1 ^t-Himi- it ir-MiniJ.'irhi fjtjjr-in. I'm '.sit |x-RibI<- fi; dr iv> froio <he horrofof tfMv kiiid^ <>f an A.t]>eri!)'* :t l"-î'i t h a t wonM if;d (i- to ^j-, hitf 1 ^re;il'F I'oii-.idci'Ation lo
37N
injr a United Nations work. That is really nil I was trying to t. 'i'hcre ought to he .^cmetlung pood come out of an exjx-rienre >f'thj-i kind, We ought not jiyi drop it and say well. it i^ inevitable. Tjo noxt time there is a civil war and some hj<r,po\ver gets involved you an- going to have a repetition -uf this. I think that is ditfcivnt from the j\ona1 examination of our moral character, which is another matter. We sometimes think about it. hut :n a political instrument I really don't think Uiis committee j^jahvrrvmiteien* to deal with <\\i']i a profound subject. ; We may make a contribution toward reinvigoriting the T'ni'cd \iuions possibly. n(K.vr .-Misirxji-TKATioN KH.H-Y IXVOMT* < n .\vctn T\'TK>- - \'<T
f'f. F.M <v, Scn;>i.r FiiMir'-jriw. if 1 -o'i!fl niake one <r-n<-njl rini}*jir
in jv-ponfif.' 3 find \vbat u>u h:ui i'ist sui'l ;MH! what Seruitor OH*/
-:>;<l i':u-|ii-r {.T<ûj'|.'>v- th;}t t l j c ris-Juki- h:>- !':tp;'li''<l :i?:r n jti'j.-\ tiuit rt'iiilj:iii'< rhc I'MuI of no-ion vi> !;;ivf . lmf trying to carry out in Soullu;a?t Asia. N"<n\. i/iy rvadinir of administration jxilioy :,u)d substantial ronirr*' -u;na! ivjrnjdiar.ee or acquiescxina- in that [11cy. is tliat there h:se Uru a rhiiiipn.1 of tactics, not a cha'ie<- in the basif objective?. When Mr. XIXOR took oftif^ tinwar war limited essentially lo .South Vifi)):DI),' with finite fifrhtinjr fnAng on in Lao;?. Xow the war i? to u nivh i- ;is hirh as it bas |K*H nt -any timt in lh i war: thonurolxT of civil mi casueltios Jjer moijtli i> a.- hj^li'ji 1 - any time in the \\ar: and il/** H-")in\^; toi'iwni?.iiHft 01 North Vietnam has hwii inîvw^n^'. If Mr. \i\un werct-o llf. p ^ prrnj;h of the rate of homhinfir of Xoiil' Vietnam the iif-Kt tniH v he sjiKtics to tiif" Ameiifan pulilitf. one would K-I;i HliHi-ply risinjr iu*ve nivoiopanyinsr the American vitl.ilrdwa' af rro'ind fora-s. Wh.i* I h,vj -aying i- !hj >'!R- pili'-M- of Viftn:miiK.'i*iia < or.-hin '! iih extM,6d "ttHJidriiwa! urc- ;i slii/t so la'-ii-^ that art' .-rU* -ii^kinjr to ]v:- .u-jju-ww a/ifi-Oimnniniin reffiim- that tft i>o'^t<'d it- i\vn |K>piil.ifioij. and that until \ve wniif; to fi-rnjs with that way. no stnioijjit of ]eyi,-hiti\-e 'OnK;d'v ;tion i> <OTn<r id'? it."jv<|iiifej- not tin- endor^'iiu-nt of uhst 1're-ident Xivn i* do.irig l>tit ,t 'fvcogftttjou f'l.Jt what J.ie Udoijig IK improper, it'^tiwi^sfnl. am{ v . i l ! ou'y If-rfd to further Piitffrijijr for tf<e Tiid<>o}iincrf {n*oiile. :ilj,i..'[ilji.rc here und aiiding tiecriniinntioa.s. it s.*n>r. !> n>*- they :uv "ilv-iHj^jiiJIy i.iija'*'ur<' that tlie atmo-i>Jiere i?- alri*adv (iniVnuvi, tJi.'it 'In- i- a:'*1 T+yritiiintrtii.'rji- uhi/'h Jiave u^-ji nudc: 4 pretend ,'hev <!o .tt'if r* ir-f v.v.j(iH-<.i n;<- if/ In* a hjxnrv that only hich tiovenimenl oBi'Mal t < ^ ' w ^ * " < *^* *
I- '.ij.le bet ;i ma4-r f the J'tesidejit trying in coin Jne^- ihe public o,v f l u n k ' ' M.^^-iiCj- id >fii_viji U .--vniUjHc of (l.iM'onf ii:nify^>f AiiM'ri'"ijii
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579Our failure to even respond to the North Vietnamese and PRG's proposals in Paris is a symbol of our unwillingness to negotiate, wliich lifts diarnctenred our policies toward the war nil alone. So I just d not think w. cau proccwd until we come to terms îtli the qrestiors on some moral level. , . Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, may I respond ?
The CHAnocAX. Certainlv.
Senator CASE.? respect this man very much. I regard him as a deep The CiTAiirMAX. HP is a enu&lituMtt of yotrrs. Dr. FAUL Oh, yes: a loyal constituent. Senator CASE. Aren't you still at Princeton \ Dr. FAUK Oh, yes. I said a loyal constituent. / Senator CASE. "And. ê have been in touch with each other many times.
., -.;. -, naXABY QCKSllOX I.* KNDINU VIETNAM WAR
We are not very far apart, I think, and I believe this exchn helped to cUrify our understanding. I thu& that those of us who are <trongly for disengagement ought to tfeattrt that the war refWs certain aspects of our society and its methods for waging wir.
I do not say that our 'methods make the North Vietnamese indi ^ virtual Oiisassinatirtiis any inotv viglit. They are just as evil as the wiYnigdoing on our aide. But this is our thing, and there comes a point at which j>roperly all of us agtve we will not have a part in that kind of thing anv more. That is what we are talking about. And if yoii will accept this a? sufficient groundsand to tuc the grounds are. superabundantto :itorv the war, I say, fine. But I am IjothcreJ by going further and trying to attach guilt to the American people. They do not really feel this guilt althv.ugh they may well if the war continues. The primary question is bringing an end to the war. -' . . But lefc us not overly dwell on this historj becvuae it is so tangled. 1 will not admit we are any worse than other countries, and certainly in intent wo arc probably leas selfish than other nations in trying to preserve an influence in die world. I think we can all agre*. on tliis.
You will find many people who will sav they are for disengngwrieni, and they will also siy they support the President *B conduct of the war at the same lime. This confusion is just a bad thing. The CtiAiitUAX. I come back again to this question of what we do.
.^nato" r-Atjr. I. uw sorry. I hate to U-ave this galaxy of such stare a this a..nny îiiie, but I have two engagements that I am late for. Will yon f<./gm mei?
Tht- CHJMKXAX. We will mm you ~y much. You add a great d*&l v t/> the discuasion. p
.*M-iiutor {ÂUK. All right, not \ er> often.
The. ( 'H AiKM AK. Yes, vou do. \<> ivA wish to belabor thirf too much, but I find it very intelerting of tlu? quiililv of vour iDJ/id*. We do not often have before tut t'.'f. leaniwi mid expprii'iired men n>- you arc, both in diplo1 ii; intcll'H'tiiiil life. .
5so
xiNnxi-nr o- ntEscvc JBOUCT Vou did prompt me when you said \|t\ Bui^rjs remaining i" Vietnam is a symbol of the continuity of .the fkvu^y. It seems to nic that tlu> gathering on Saturdav was a much more dramatic symbol of the continuity of that polic.vilwn even Mr. Bunker. I cannot'thiuk of any oecurreneyiwrhieh would dramatize more the continuity of our ixMicy for the tast ^0 years tliun. was exhibited on Saturday under conditions -.of which the whole country was. made aware. I Mip|>ose tlve effect of ..that would U to demonstrate to you. Mr. Fallc, just hw.diflirult questioning the morality of this Iead'rslip would lie.
It i-i an
POTENTIAI, *{?. V. FOR AVOIDING MOUKKN WAKFAKE
i have great sympathy for the idea, nut I still feel that if any use can U- made of it. it is to etm>ha:4i> if we continued without tisinjr ihc ^ l-îted Xatioiiii. the inevitability of this sort of thing hap|>cnin as mr'j continue to recur. 'In other words. I ;;ucss what I am saying, and it might be quite Haive. is that tlu- l*iute<j Nations has the (Mrtential of avoiding this modem warfaiv. f linvi* always had in my mind that tlic existence of hydrogen homl*s. in tlii-msclvi^ if |Mt>p|e ever could IK- made <>nscious of their significance. would" give sup|N>rt to the f'tiilcd Nations or to (lie idea that no longer can we engage in this kind of war on a major scale and~ritat some iitcfl;on> ihV control have to In1 develoj>ed. The only one I can think of t f U . - moment, is the I'nited Nations unless there i> some altemntivethat nonieyet has brought forward. K>:rj.iNT.(t OK fj. rirmjc I do agree with S<<nator ( 'dse aUmt the fivling of guilt of the jteople of this country. As to my own const it iietiis, I do not think they share it to the extent that maybe has U-en suggested hen-. I t h i n k many of (hern do not feel that they participate rcallv in the decisions of our (foveriimcnt. I find a great many of my "oflciigiies who feel that uedonof parti'Mpnte in thed< > civiiasivc. Hut [ am not the only Member of the Senate who feels we have nn extraordin\ry tenuous relationship to the dcciMionniaking process in (liisfiovcrH tient. Itiit the |H'o))|,- who live in tin- ()/ark Mountains do not feel any conscioiiMir^s that tltf.v pwticipateil in rh' di'cisioiK which havi' e.snlti'd in (lie iioi'ii>i>. to which von have ivfi-ivM<v. ( )f COMCSC. us vrrfcrs they 111:1 , or niiiv ""I li;i\r vot>'i| for the puilicnlar o(l'nrial>. but foilliem I | M - f;i:nlr In fei-l g l l i l l gm'-> viTV fill'.
Tin' <:uili <>f t l r - i;>ilividti:il ulio makes tin- di'<'isioit> is nnother mill ti'f. < )f cfiiirsi'. th.it uji-i (In- theory of tin- Viiremlnirg fri;ils.
581
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AcncAioTv -ot OOVVKHEXIT. TO TM> WAR
Perhaps in the few remaining minutes we could say a little more itbout the practicality of a conference. 1. nivself. have often said and felt that the pattern' of the Geneva Conference is the traditional and orthodox and. in this case, thernosi.suitable way ro try to end this war . wliich I tliink is consistent with what you said. If 1 understood you, many of tLe things you said and ideas you advanced really would be directed to promote another (teneva Conference in which these details of the settlement in Southeast Asi.% including neutralization, would be agreed upon. Am I correct in that ! Mr. Y<r. Yes: that would certainly be my view. I doubt, though. that we could |>ersuade the other side to come to such a conference until wtr announce that we r? withdrawing as of a certain date. The CII.URMAX. Ves: I accept that entirely. You all three agree with that. We made that statement before. Tins is B |>recondition to getting a conference. The decision this committee and the Congress have to make is to set a date, if we can do it. Here again I have to put up the caveat that, as a practical matter. I doubt that the Coagress can |>ai such an act over a veto certainly or even without it. Its significance and the significance of your discussion îs to try to exercise a jK-reuasion u|W>n the Executive to make bis decision, because really, as a practical matter under our system, not being a pârliamenta ry system, there is no way to make the President io an/thing of this nature he really does not want to do. We have very limited powers of maLing him do it. There is alwi>-s a [Kweibility of jiersnsdinp him to do it by the logic, and good sense of the suggestions. I think it is inherent in all three of your i ' atementu. which appeal very much to me, that as reasonahlv nM-n the time has come to first set the date, which TOO. agree fa a practical matter, and then move on to a conference which would deal with nil of the other mattei-s which you have descril>cd. J> gny of you have auyt4iing to add as to how to persuade oar Government to mr -e hi this'direction ?
It* HK ri>XrHXT>U> fOXlTKRKNTI.r WITH
Mr. LKWIH. I would like to endone tlie idea of a confeience while raying tiiere are additional bilateral negotiations that xliould be conducied concurrently. I would like: U go back in talking about * conference to the point Senator^Case rallied that we are the outy one*, if I paraphrase him eorm-th. wi> are the only ones who engage in ihis kino of wl tearch- ing and go i/ack to look at birtorj1. He mentioned in that specific context tin- ('hinnsc. 'I he Chine*! went through a period of xoul warching. looking at tlu>ir hixtory. froDi.MJCC Co 1968. We will call it the cultural revolution, Out of that i-xper JIIMJ the (.Ihineje looked rt their varw/us alternative* nnd na w that tl>>ry could not only advance tlteir situation by participat-
11.7 in this coalition. a-: I indicated, but a!io oy engaging in diplomatic nctmiit^ of all kinds, including a conference. I think the fact that the Chine*? n- notv wiilir-: Ut act as a stabilizing ir.fluonec, now willing to take part in tJte settlement. now sayiiig they arc Killing to go back io tieiitrva, is a vt-ry im|K>rtaitt development in this period. Vow could not have said that X or 4 years aô. They wcrjîrjectiiig international conferences. They WMV all churned up in this radical activity that we associated with thtv Red guards. Out of nil of that lias coiuc a new enunciation of Chinese policy, and that policy, as f say. is a MUTC for some optimism in looking at a conference and in trying to decide, whether a conference will he successful or not.. If voit arc lix>kiiig for arguments .to persuade people. I think tliis would he oncof the most important. ' - ^ In bringing the Ctiincse in. 1 think that when you hiring them in. the lluîans will <-omr alonp with them. We always haxtt had the idea of starting with tin* clussians first, and pushing, having the Russians push, the North ViHuniiu>sc. I tlunkliow tJic Russian^ will come in niul plav a role, in part because they feel they will have to go along with (hi* in order to maintain their credibiHtv with the North VietliaiiMwc and others if the Chinese are hacking a settlem -nt. So I tliink that the auguries for the future arfc ver very hopcfuh1
ItaWfADlNO KXKTCTIVi: TO TAKE ADVASTACK Or 1'KMKXT OITOini VITT
Tlic CIIAJICM.XX. Can any of you think of anything further to he said in pcrbuuiling the Executive not to miss this opportunity wi* have? Ambassador Yost know.-, more about this than I and I do not wish to review it. We do not have time, but then* have been oWK>rtuiiitiea in the i>nst possibly w^djd not <aki: a<Ivantag>. The, one i;i I'M'A .iiul 'iihi>-i> hnve ofU'ii bciMi cited. Can you think of anything that would br |>ersuasive on tlie Kxivjitivc nntl our count rv now to move more vigorotit.lv toward taking advantnge of this . Dr. K-\ut. I Jmw one thought. S-natoi. uiiil that is I think that if there ;i- a nvilK dramutic focu.s on the negotiating <ip|H>rtiuufJr.>>t ih::t r\i.*t in IVris w i f l i res-jH-i-t to having M*f the date it tni^ht really have a iMiiMilcralilc ptiltlii! ini|nift. The North Victnaim-;*- have reullv inaiie it as clear as they |x>ssil>lv can. Ixith !>nblic|y ami to some extent in private discussions with Senator Hurtlte and witli other American.x who have talloxl with them ii-reiillv. that I'lu'J1 llii>v gel something lila* a tirni commitment. the issue of pn>|M>rt ; omiI and rapid release of American priw>nen can he settleii easily, rtwl then, furthermore, that the nafetyof the n-maining American t.roops in South Vieltinin can IN- A-rumH rhroiigii what are (uilliul go-home cease -fi nit. and thi would mean an end to further Aincricnn i-usnnlties. which 'tre still ormrring nt a rather high rate if one l:ik'> ivonnded Americans into account. I do not tliink the American public has ever n-allv had the sense of I he de-rive to which a n>al end to t.Itc war is pegotiahlc. nnd I t h i n k t h u t it waiiM IN- |i:rt1 of nn cnWtivc buildii[i of public prcsMire on the I'lest'li'iit to move in this kind of direction. The CMMI:M.\\. (to ahead and dcscrilic how. What i-" the means -/' doing > h i s ?
5S3
lr. F-.t.K. Well, I -' ;y C think whatJuui not Uvu done is fojr a .CWiittiv like tiiis*. for .uuttunve, to examine very carefully _ and a$ dramatirally as jiossihlo just what tho Vietnamese are saying in. Parts ltd whv that would help to got U4 out in a most reaHQuabje. I think very- few Americans really arc aware of the fact tjiat the YietnaiitetK* haw coute forward with something like okrht or nine separate vn nations on these pronosjils tofcy to n\t some Kind of respojisv from tlw administration, antl I just do not think that is known outeidf of u f>-\v |>eo|)le who have Iron ..follo\viu<r thr iK'gotiations* " ' ruthcr , The CiiAitoi.vx. Thcr* have bcn accouaU iu the )>aperi about* it. StMiator llartkr pave his tv|)ort. Thov^havc htvji other amounts, but whi-u official:; of tlic Oovvrnn^nt I think sinvifioaUy of otir Ambns:ulor at tho Purip talks. \Vhru ho. is asked about this suhjecUhe usually s; v* t Iwiv is jMithinjr iww : they hfiveji't moved an inch. They always put it in the context that we offered a cftue-firc ai:l irot no ivsi>oitiK>. It, was almost the sauic attitude wlu-n Mr. Rusk used to y UWIL v.-e have called them but .they always hang up the phone: no nwponse." He said this year after ycarJ i , ..
CAN FRESRXT NrROTIAnXQ Oltt>|trfMTIlX UK I>K.\KATIZ>J>?
wv very quickly.
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I MH asking yon : How can yo*1 dramatize this? There ja no secret nbom it. I do lint know how tV 'dramatize it. I do not know how to ilmnuitix^ anvthinjr. 1 Dr. K.xr.K. Well, I do think tlure is a peneral mi.Hiinderstandinc that a ccaso-fire j)rofx>tial is a serious, proppml, You *-c. I do notthyik it i^ meant in good faith in that sense iwcauae. it would. lavc the .political and police control of the country in.t|iq hauds of tlic Saigoa reîint. It would confine the National Lilwjration 1'ront to the juiiglu arms and remote partu of tho country. It wottVl involve a dej^ree of tout for which there i no boaia. Tim;* it seems to nii. if one U talking about |Miruiuur>n, tlu> area >{ rivatorf roufuKwn thattrtill remain* is t Jw I houjrht tiiut wcatu makjjt^ reascn:il>le )>ropoHaJ0 and tla* other side is U>in^ rijrid in Paris, whereas the opj>osite is the truth. The CtiAfitMAS. How do you dramatize that in a |>vnuaiuvr wuy to t !n> country, to tlic Prvxident, or to the Coriffn-.-* \ 1 Thi-M- hearing are (his coniinitrw'ij only meant of dramatizing it. Tluit word is not appropriate. Wt? are examining it this inoniui^. What ran we do^ Vou can w how many are luuvôut of K> niemU'iv. I mean this shows how dramatic it is and how it LtpresMetf iwa tinoiiiniitff>*. Mr. LKWIK. Senator Fulbrjirht, may I comment on that '. 'I1u> ('it AIHMAX. And tliin is a very normal operation. Mr. Lrvnt. Vrj.ir.
I t h i n k that we Hhan> your discouragement about (lit- ini|ierviouKni'iM of the fiotornmHit Ui rutiotiii! argument. T think this lias been our x|)erii>iLi:> fora very longtime,
I capie before committees of Congress quite * while ago, in 1964 and 1965, and the arguments that we made then were not persuasive, and* TbeCHAjnuA>. About whjUwereyoutalkingf : Mr. Lewis. This problem of persuasiveness all along the line.
The CHAIRMAN. What were yon talking about in i864 f Mr. Lewis. We were talking about the Vietnamese, what they wanted. We brought Vietnamese to this country, leading Vietnamese. Buddhists, leading ethnic and Wsineas leaders of Vietnam, to say what they thought would be the best proposals to end the war.
I ran a project at Cornell T"nil-entity to bring Vietnamese and other*} to this country. In the process of that they developed, iu conjunction with their constituents r\ Vietnam, a set o'f proposals. We tried to sell these proposals to the various leaders in the administration and they said, "Well, we can't allow you Vietnamese to take the risk, and we a're going to stay in Vietnam until what you are saying is persuasive.'* In time, the arguments were forgotten nnd the realities had jMwsed the various proposals by. Then they canv, back to us from the administration and said, "If only we had believed you back then perhaps we would have suceeded in reaching some kind of an agreement.*" That has been ow4atc all the day down the line. Time afê,- time proposals liave been made. Tltey do not persuade {leople but in retrospect there & clear evidence they could ha v worked.
rKKSCABlVC AROrXEVTS FOR TODAT
But th* la our problem today. You want arguments for today, and that i? miew matter. 'Hie. only thing I can say in additionto what Mr. Falk and Ambassador Yost Lave said very eloquently is that we are in a hopeful period that may be withering away. We are in a period, in my judgment, that has great dangers to K and, perha^*, it seems too dramatic to emphasize those dangers. I do not relish the thought of having it put before the country in any way that the Chinese fare involved because this has overtones of "tine Chinese are coming,** and "we have got to trtop that threat.** But if there i* a true sense of wliat our policies have created and a clear sense of the dangers these policies have brouglrt to the people, of tans, the people of Cambodia, and tlte people now of Thailand, then I think there will be a greater appreciation when those daogcri. are juxtaposed to the opjiortunities that we have got to take advantage of thow> opportunities.
Mr. YO*T. Senator, it ^M-MS to nu* that ve xhotild focus public attention i-u'ii more than it hart been, if that is jMNtnibte. on the safety of our jJi-itfoni'iyandthe'Mifetyof the troop*. NOH. these are t>w |M>infN. of course, that tlie adniinmtraiimi rviN'ittedlyHt retted aw jiiKfinmtion for what it m doing. Hut 1 w>uld like to we more made of what nenm to me tin* op tunity we now hve. We can certainly find out very quickly wlwther in fsirt we do liave it. I ln-licve we now have an opjmrtunity to innke an u^recnicnt with tlte Vietnainctie wherein', in exchange for the offer of ii livin and early date tor withdrawal, they would agree to relifinc. within that Hfan. all of our priitoiu'ra. They Would probably "I*' agree
585
to ban*- or attack oar troops as they withdraw. This would mean that, in fart, as far** the United States was concerned, the war would be ended, toall intent* and purposes, wry abort Ijr. There wmtld be, after a wry ^bort period of negotiation on this limited objective, no more casualties and the prisoners would then be : coming out, . " On the other hand, our bargaining power is constantly diminishing as we withdraw our troo|. We micht be abk- to make a Wry good bargain of that kind now with 230.000 troops th^re. If we watt until s year from now when we have 30.000 or whatever it might be. a hundred thousand, they will be ntore- roinerable. and there will be If* incentive for the North Vietnamese to negotiate them out. leas reason why thev sitould try to. why they sltould offer complete release, ea rly relfa*, of the prisoners. ThiTf fore, it seems to me there its every advantage from the point oi view of what I think is uppermost now in the minds of 70-odd percent of Americans to moving now for this limited understanding and l*ying the price. whish is setting a date for getting out. NKCCIWTY or rra&avwNo rnmoENT or I-REMCJ.T orronvvrrr ~~ The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Yost, I agree completely with that and a small number of Senate re. not by any means a majority, have, I think, been urging thiN What you say to me is extremely jwrsuasive. I did not want to repeat what you said again because I agree w.ith that, but I was trying to pick your brains on what do you think could dramatize if. to cajl it to the attention of the people and eventually the President. A* I Mid. supposing this c&mmittee approves the resolution that you have been talking about, sotting a date of December, vnder our systt:n when we go to the floor. There will be a large number, if not a majority, who say. "Hut this is a presidential function. We don't want to interfere with the President's discretion." That is about what lias be*n said already in other arguments. We had a vote last week on a matter which is not directly related. Thev did not engage in tlu> merits of whether or not the troops were nffdttl. Tliev just dismissed it by saying that this is a presidential function. This is (he type of thing we nwrt tlieiv and 1 antici|>ate we will be nwt with it again. I do not mean that I am completely convinced that we niay not grt a uiajoritv in the Senate, but then* will he these arguments r.nd th" givat diffiri'iia' of opinion. Professor Fa1k said tliat you IIMT to drainati/i it. I wus taking him up on the challenge. How do we (!r.inafi/r it'. U'liat can IJP doucf l)o you have some new idea Ix-i-anw wi have all exliausted ourwH'i( and. pr.':::;*. we liave become tcx> inurwl to tin* presfiit situation to Ivlieve atiyihiitg ran be done, I have a M-MM? that a lot of my co!U>ai;ups an> l^n-d with it. Tiiey do not wiiut to <trar nu>. or anyl*ody eK-. talk about tin* war. They want to talk about wôguuil mattcm'ur souw otlur nubjeci. TliIH list* IM-.-II talked altout HO much. I do iiot know, frankly, what t do other than what we an* doing, which is having * hearing, and thix Mt>nis icrv mild and ineffectual thing to do. although it is all I run lliink of'"'!'>, It IN all I have the juriMJiction b> do in this coiutnittM*. I do not know how to Jftiinatixe and to bring the logic of what all thcr of you lin vc Miil N<> forcibly to tlw aticntion of the public and of tlur PrewoVJit
VJ. 'Ail11 M
so that it would indiKv not ion. The practical matter in that, us I said Ivfoiv. unless we can {tersuade the President to aciVQtt this idea that now \vim!rt IM* the time to motv. I do nol think anvthuic can be dune. Ho IKIS Kitve&ifiiUv said, "I am winding down the war.** Von know what he says time after time, I do not know how to break this stalemate. I was only asking you as a last desiderate chance, do you hare av ideas of !>o\v to break it. how to impress the public, and through tlit 1 public, the President. That id what I was propinp for. I agree completely with the lojric of whaf'you said. Now i< the time to lo it, Mr. Yo>TvP:ib!ic opinion is moving. T1>i% CIIMRMW. It has moved. T agree with yon. The indications are flu- public opinion has moved and the majority would 'ike the
\' i>r st'i|>rd.
Mr. YO-.T. When it moves lievond a cvrtain |wint. the President will t-il f :iccount of it. The CIIAIKMAN. But the public lias not vet moved the President. :i'!il I'M- division to nuke '.he offer of negotiations of whi.-.h you ni-e s|M':ikiujr is. under ur siysti-m. the President's responsibility. Do you have any other idea ? I do not want to keep you hore beyond the time unless you have something further in this direction. siioc'K wmT OK WAK rriMFjt issT'i:
Dr. FA'.K. Well. T have an idea. Senator. I am not pure how welcome, it would be because, you arc,, the n\.son I introduced tlie war crimes i.ne actually is precisi'lv fo- the puiiuwte that you are now .sujrcestin^ l*ecaiine I think thnt it has a c,'tiain kind of shock effect thnt sivnis to me to In- constructive in the prest*nt contest Uvnuse h*. doe tr>' to break throiisrh this itri|>enetrable dialog between the President and opponvnfs on wjinf will brinjr the wa r to an end. It ni** the discussion to a dinVnutt level, and I think to some extent the imiwaclinient issue rtoeg that also, because it is nallv trv'n;r to tell the A'tierican public that there is xomethinjr intrimc-allv wronjr with eoinff on with this policy, and thaf we hare our responsibility at this time to afop it. My own experience is that there is a responsiveness to this incite and t!jin wav of t.ilkintr alniuJ the opiestinn that wfs this sort of nttntion. thnt. overcomes these vnrs of failure !n tryinp to win merclv bv havinjrthe more jjerMmsiv*- arpmients. Tlie more jHMNUjisive nr{rutnents have been on the antiwar <*ido for a decade, but the folicii Imve persisted iust as lmp. So that T do think that then- is a need to shift the plane of discussion to some extent bv those who are opposed to the war. The CrrAtnUAV. Von saw the reaction of your own Senator. Do yon think that wns vcrvsympathetic to thi^nppronch ? Dr. FM.K. I think thnt hi- needs n bit more educating in thi-i line of ilivussion. with all due respect. T think thnt when the issue of w;ir crimes wax first discussed in American fiopietv IIP n whole .there v. " fsinfastic resistance to it even on the part of lilienil "tyiins of opinion Hiir-li ns the Vew York Times. And it in onlv rather rwentlv. with the impnct >\', I'M- Mv Lu'i disclosures, f.iaf this isxiie hits U>conie one. [ think, of xaliencA within the socii>t v as a wliole.
587 :
My imprcsbion that those of you who are closer to the center of povercoajbeiiKmiasalat^mthMen^peetofromthen^camsits of opinion, at lafttt among JMOpfe who an informed and *aoiti c ^jx>qt ^frjtr^<<^n-0f thftM:fi"'ijil^f'> The? really do view it as a continuing criminal enterprise. . Mr. YCJT. I would be afraid, Senator "ytto t\j VBOATIVE inter OJT B4WDCG WAI CBOnft 1SSCV
Mr. Yotrr. I would be afraid. Senator, that this particular dramatic tactk. whjle it might certainly stir a certain number, would hare a very negative traction on others and would tend to divide the forming consensus, which we have bvett speaking of, toward getting oat The CHAIRMAN. I think Senator Case's reaction is indicative of (hat. I had a very mild experience in this connection some weeks ago in an interview. This question of how does one influence the President came up. I was examining, in a very brêf sort of interview way, not in depth at aH, our gyrt^m of influencing Turn and that in our system, contrary -to the parliamentary sftem, tbei* ia no such tMng as* votei AO confidence. If we had u parliamentary system, instead of the legislation we have, there world be the traditional vote of no confidence in the pursuit of the present policy. If that earned, you know what happens; you get a new one. This is what happened, in a scns^ in France. The way the war was brought to a close. I believe. ws they voted out I*niel, wasn't it, who was Prime Minister, and pul in 'Mendes-France, who obligated himself to have the conference which, resulted in the Geneva Accords. That was their procedure in their system. , This question of im|>eachmenl came up, and I very casually said. "Of course, in. pur ysUD we have no. vote of no confidence. The only thing we hnve in an* impeachment procedure which is so drastic H *ju never been used.** Iw was atlempted seriously ouce and came clow in the case of Andrew Johnson, hut it has never been used. It is considered to have overtones of moral treason to the country. Anyway, k is impractical. Well, the word got out that I had suggested that thv President be impeached, and, as you can imagine, I got the most negative n a,-f ion from many sources. All I bsd said was this is not practical and we ought to. consider impeachment as the equivalent of a vote of no confidence. T am bound to say, Dr. Falk, I am afraid that would not be a verv fi uitful way to dramatic it. I regret it, but I do not think it would. Mr. LRWM. ' ray I comment. Senator Fulbright, on your call for suggestions hcref The CIIXUMAV. Vee.
DRAMA or ro&HUjr. KBA or WBOOTUTIOVS

Mr. Lr.v.'TH. Tlte suRgcjrtwnH that we have made. I think, arc fully tfupportaM* and ha v a LinH of logic to tltein. Whit I think is dramatic about t))it is that a dramatic sction can do anything, A conference for
588
the first time in many yesrs can work. If wr abide by this on* jprtrtHttihion tfjtt we have Iwva talking atiout and that your conuiitttte has been focusing on. the precondition of setting a dote certain, then vim nui move to the dramatic stag*. You can grt a settlement for the area, you can begin to normalize mr relations with China, you fair begin to change the kind of bi|M>iarizalMHt and hostile |atterns that have governed Asian relations in the last two orTatxv decades. That is of nuijor moment, in my judgment, and that is something that I gather people of this administration, when tliey talk about themselves as peacemakers and making historical shifts Trmr hostilities to an era of negotiations, consider. UY have the |xwsibility for an era of negotiations in Asia. \Ve hare not liad it before. We luive it now. if that is not appealing, if that IK ~not dramatic. I do not know what wou'd he. LACK or Pinut' ximt or rnxMirrxr. IIRARIMM The CIIAIBM AN. How to get this across, This must lie the eighth or loth meeting on this subject. None of them !iavc been more interesting to me fertainly than this, but there lias heea almost no notice taken of the fHTvioiw bearing!!, whether they consisted of general or a scholar. We had Ambassador Harriman. and there was a little notice on the I<kh jtage of tin- j>a|er. No public notice was taken of h and I do not suppose the President took the slightest notice of it. if he ever knew about H.
WHAT W1U. rTKKCADl AUMlVIfHTLVTIOV?
How do we do that? I agree w:th you this is tlu* moment. It is a dramatic moment ni.r! it could IN* in our history. What procedure WMild do it i This is wha' I am groping for. I may be asking you a silly question that yon did not expect to be asked and I do not fjlame you for not knowing it tiecauxe I have no idea. Mr. I^KWIH. It is not a silly question at all. Senator. The CIUIKMAV. I d> not'know what to do to impress u|on this administration that this is such a moment. Mr. 1/rwin. vVell. you are considiTing a dramatic act. You are considering netting a date certain. That could lead to these other things. If you an* inking what will pent tade your colleagues, that is onthing. If you are asking what uct will pertiiiade tlw administration. I tnink an act of setting a date certain would do that. That is in the [mid* of the Congress. TV CHAIRMAN. In other words, if we should pass by a large majority tut* resolution setting the date, that is it. and you c/mld think of nothing better. Mr. Lr.vt* Well. I am saving that will lead some plan*. It is not an end in itself. It SHK tlu* basis for a number of other tilings, The CIIAIUMAV. 1 agree. Mr. LKWIS. Within your grasp is a jiolicy that can lead to number of other [lolii'ies. The CIIAJUHAX. It is somewhat comforting for you to come fo the concjunion that what wearptryinjrtodo willU-effective, I Itojteif will. Of fouree. tin- committr has to lie persuatied and if in not. easy to ude them, as you can we, I <lo not know how I ittn going to them about wlmtyou havi-Haidthismornuig.
I reirtvt thrv were not all lere to hear what you bad to aay because . I think U would have Imrn penMUttive. but to JEV their attention isdifi<-olt beaub* on the floor at the moment we are petting ready to vdc very- soon on an amendment to the FT*ft Act and the attention is fociwnl, * I rtkl in tbr U'pnninj;, upon new wranotw \-st*nut and drafting and thr prvparat:ons or procedural for the pnM<fution of the wr. That w when" the attention ix of nost of my >llrajrurt now. In any r*dc. I apprr<*iaU> very much vour coming. I bo|ie you will excttif niy probing into an area* wherr f tnip|M)tf> noliody kno'wa. In a Rival wintry a* larpr an this K, as diffused as it is, and with as many different intemrts, I ûpppoae it ta not an ea#r matter to pet the atteution of tb |Hiblk\ ind certainly of the administration on matters of this kind. I nnw my i' is verj dilRrult. It is a problem that puzzles me rery mm-li. Anything eke {I thank \mi very much. You have b*en most (iatient and very helpful, and it U a great record, whet Iwr anybody * ill read it or not. Tliank you very iuu<-h. (Then>upon, at l^>1j pan. the hearing was adjourned, subject to the call of UMT chair.)
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE WAR IN .SOITHEAST ASIA

TKUMOAY, HAY 27. 1971
UNITED sJTATt* SK.VATE.
CoMMITTtE ON FuKElUN K ELATION !>,
\l'ak\injt<m.l'.C. The commit ue met, pursmtiit to notice, ni 10 a.m., in room 422 1, Nrn Senate Office Building, Senator J. \V. Fulbrighl irhainnaii) presiding. Present: Senator* Fulbright and Cooper, The CHAIKIIAX. The committee will come to onli*r.
N*; CTATCMK3T
The commit lew IN meeting today in the I*>t of wrif> of lirnrwp' on roixMtU n-Utiuj; to the eiuliiip <vf UK* war. 1 ho wilrw^BO UxUy tuv Coup-ex-iiun Amln-w Jm-ubx of Ituiiuita, Pul N. ilci'lotJcey, Jr.. ttt Califoruu, >rl Mr. IJ. H. r, coiiiDuuujcr in rim- f of thf \Vtt- ruu> nf Forrign Wnn>. Pucinnki, \vho biui bvcii Ht-htnluieJ to tt^tify, * un-x|HTU'dly califij to ChifNgo thi* inoniiii);. CoDpan^tuiMt Jwolw wt- tins v-ry pU'iuteii to liav you. Do you have u prepare*! fctaUuiu-iit? Mr. JACOBS. I do, Senator. Tin* C'UAIKMAV. Would you proceed, please, tfir.
siATZirarr OF HOI. AID&EW JACOBS, JB., A XEPBESEKIATITE

IX COIORES8 FROM THE 11TH OOIOBESflOIAL 9I8TXICT OF THE STATE OF I1DIAVA
Mr. JACOB*. I thank you for the opport unity to appear this morning, Senator. Mr. Chairoian, I should preface by xaying that I am not a |>*rilit. I would favor ruthles* destruction of ty enemy who uctually threatened my country, * I believe that all of South*ca*t IHIB doe not, in a capable way. In a thousand year* they could not iKWeibly put enough MKinpMiw into the Vmtifu- to arri\i i at our whore*. Nor atn I an iolationiHt; nor ran 1 conceive of how itolationixm could have got u* inU> Vietnam. I belicvi* it in puMtible ?o triule with our neighbor*, who are not attacking us, without attacking them. I think poiwibly, an error that all of UK full into, in the ("otigiVMi and in the country, i* thut ut time* w concentrate M iniich on what i lx'"l for our country ' war effort, that we fail to consider what war effort i* bet for our country.
(Ml)
Mr. ( 'hainuan, I appear here today in .support of my resolution ( U . K . 219), among otner reason*, because I am opposed* to Govtmmitu waste, whether in the fv (tubjugaU* Indochina. During tiw interrming IM years while oar 'iK rty ha* prospered, Indorhinese people have struggled to expel ai( foreigiuts from ihetr .-oil. In 1954. thV Fn-nc-h tiitrir Ix-inp-iiifcusivfly arnutl b\ ti.
EKBOK Of f.rt.
r
IVTEKXIINTIOM IV VIETNAM
lu IQ. KI, SiaU> Dcpjirtment uBlrial .John OKIy wrnrnnt that iirb Mi|ijxrt for Frm-i- uua likely to tuck tin- Umu-d Strnt*^ into ilirrft inliTVi-iition. This |roplii-y, ofttMiiv, |>rovil m-curt-. It mipht bMiore |>m-LM> to ttay that ui> rmulut^l tin- moth (lyint; into tht darn**. My n-solutioi) cuiuiot be propiTly juilpul without- ohJ4rtivirly i-vaiuctinjr (!H> fortôiiif; mul followinj; ftu-L--. Vi<'itim luts a total imputation of 37 S million witli 19.9 million in tin* rttirth. I'pon that small and unhappy laml we have dropped thriT Utnra as many Immbs U.H in all of World War il. We have rommiltfd mon* than a half million troojm and <tiormon> ordnanrc and iia-IN-nkahlf detitraction in our effort to suWut- th<> north*rn radtvs aiul soiiiluTn iiiMim-ctionbttM. And yet they fight on pmrlaiminf; that they will continue even hi to future îterations the 184-yeir imiprli to exjM-I forripirr>. Uould ue art any differently if tlu- tablet* were lununl? Dot* anyone really believe tlitt we rould subdue thctn* forrrs without per|>et rating a further depro- of violt'iiw and ilestnu^.ion uoar<vptabtf to a rivilized people? And why? Bec-aiiM', H nearly even- Amerin agrees, we rrrrd from the outxrt lv our intervention, erred both nutrully and |>racmatically. The moral ([tiitu of the (Miliry of intervention WHS ba>ed u|ion the <.'omniuiut rharaeUT of morit of tlu- o|i|MMilion to the regime we hUi sfupjiorted. Thus, the policy from the utart wax rant in ternw of * holy rnwade on In-half of the Jx>rd to subdue the minion* of hU Satanir Maiettty everywhere. If thin u a valid point, are we- not letting the JLord down wlu-n we tolerate communUm in China (population 730 million), tinL'.S.S.K. (|K)ptilaiion 2:K) tru'llum), Kiutlern Euro(e, and Cuba, yn miles off our *hore? Such imagined revelation is the stuff holy criiMule* hve alway* beett ruaile of.
WHAT CAK WB IK); HOL'HE KKiMM.t TIOS" 11
!l is said that though intervention wait error, uorwthelnw we are there. So what can uc do? House KeM/mtion 319 U my answer. It rcjccu tin- "Ut-k'em ami tiring buck the lx>y" argument, whidi v/outd leavo Vii*tnaio subject to the same forces u -iM>fore we intj-rveiu-ii anî would serve no puritose evept ii vain attempt to soothe our ego. Thi* rr(Mtuiii>ii reiiniinceM a rather innocent faith in a refurbished idrji of Viet nuini/.a! ion uhirli. fur '!> \i-utv .- MI often been falified b\ evciiln. the Ill.^l recent In-ing l<aos.
33
Thi nôlution rrftWbrthc reality that nu and n\ trimi our f <rrt , -r diuunwhttd in inHTivUvrnt^M i* tbr liiuc tu baipun for release of Aiwriran prinoiw-rs of war. TUe Washington PoM (*pnn<<ri nn May Is. 1971. that Army Sw-rrUry Stcnlcy Rranr ha* aamned that by thi* fall the Uniu-il State* will n lotijgrr hav- enough jjhwnd combat Mtmtgth in South Vietnam to influrncr the fighting th<*tv. How then could hre b* ; enoujî atmtgth in influence rHeiw of the prwwr? VkrVnamizatit>n tnranx life impri*ument for t)w POWV, o this trapc pnU^- which put* forrifn |>oKU4-ian( ahra>i of Qkrorrican |M*VS t k<> ne " barpuninf; |X>WM- w> have with whirh to obtain i it w wornr than that. At tlir nmrrl r::to cf killiii^, a many iran ld^. M art- n>w MIA'* and POWV will bt ktllod in un*|riJcaltr b.rnr br twnni iliis iiwtant ami iht* |: 4itKally tarp'tnl <Uu- for it}itirati of our form. Ami th> im* iu>r* nil! n-main i-vw then. T!ii n^Jui<in n-tnir* to the vunl that we Jimlain furtlwr libfrntrs ov-r |i'em>ti of tntralatiitu or tittwalation : that we are bip enough to arknuuU'dp* frnw again*! a Mnall an uvoiil future Virlnam^ is fir 11-4 in TpttHtnue our i*K*r in txi-<irjuiip itivotveit in thi- oiuOm* bean* it Haiti that a ivMitmaation of iulrrveutimi will mean a j(eiu*raii(Mt of IMHUV it will l<wh tin- O>'"niuni*Ut a Icsmdi. Yet in th* very rniil-t of tnir niamnioth effort in S<.utliea>l Aîa did the Ruv-uni. even N mm It N hi'siuti- to inviuie Cxe<-hoHlovakiaT \Vlio would ever U-lw-vr that tin- uililerdfveloiied ti|> or the Asian tail could waft tin- world?
<;K.VCKATION or rtiA< E? w AK TO K\U ALL WAU.H?

A pMi^raiioti itf ix-m-i-? A war to end all war*? f wax 13 <vhen World War II ended all war*. Ami I knew that x>rl of thiiifT wa* or>ly (r my fathers' pciu-rution. 1 would In- ^|>arel. And KO at 18 I niui MMI! into hell with an Ml ritle to lu'lp bring back a pini*rtiHt 'if |M*ai-r. My little xi-.ter's bo\-friiiii]!t wmild bn ti[>ared long enoupli lo tterx-e hi another cruaadc, thU time with M 14 rifles and another |>nniiiM>
of !>
A mi rwit tnotith my little HiMerV little U\ will be fti. A generation of |*acr? A war U> end all warn? Hou about a tu nid all wan? Mr. Chainuan. if our country ever goc* to war again it ithould be becauar wr have to. not iul btn-aiiHe we have u chanee to. Anil wr dwu't have to borrow the trouble of a war to protect fre>dam wliere Uirre i* no frettdoui to
KXPOKTIKU UEMOflUCY?
Export demoiTacy? What democracy? (outd it IN* the demotTacy denii-d to our own citizen* in llie capital of our own democracy? If MO, it HWIIIM to have been damaged in hhipnwnl IM-VOIU! rcognilion. Some HHV U-ll it like it i* would it not IN- even belter to do it like
>' KKBOR
TV mlv w-y Ui avoid future Yir tiuuito i> to recognize our mw in Im-mmiie involvwi in thi* ow. Aiul that recognition that nrjization will not nt>uU from official Government declarations that Vietnam ha* ôwu "our uiuwl hour." On thr contrary, only a recognition that Vietnam pwiwjr ha* no* bmi uur finest nour-Aiulv Uuoi-rfi that national ratharHa on wr ever hope to foam that "finest I. TS" have a way <tf becoming final hour* for thousand- of kid* .vho desrrvf better of their national leader* thai* anothi*r uWauV of uiuuvcj*ry death, llial'fi thv load of OuvrninM-nt wa-U- I *i-h more fx-oplc would be rniicvniiHi about. TluV n-solmi** nays in the world that we are < *|>blr of inanung thr denr letôu of hitttrv so eloquently staled by urws commentator Paul Han-e:
NBI>* *Nwnto cmunot IN- )iri<d tb<- pain nf llr. \V<- otitvMirni t-sn |>arr UM- Btluin fnont floor mnd lnt<- otir naiU bud pra\ hirt flctuocnc.v iu<utt "delivrr" iij>rK, wlui t be tinir ii> ri|tbt.
% thi> re*oluU<m rvn--lH that it is ciuMuliik^ for a prat and . (Kiwerfu) NatiiNi ti jwltnit error. Ant) it affirms our faith in, the prrtiipb, uf our Founding Kathejs UuJ "a d*ceul rmpect to the npininni . of hmitkimi'* i* null very imjmrtciit. Mr SjieakiT, tut* follow iiip ii> the languap- of HOUM* Resolution 319, vi-iw-h I introduced on March 17, 1971. I wa* hoping it miît ratch. the atleiitiuu f the adiniuiiU ration: Thank yon. Mr. Chairman. , (Text of H. Ri*. 319 fol!o*>:
liui C Kt.nKl.fTfOk ill'J \Mi,T,-j- ttu: f'n-i.i.-m uf Hi. t'mti Stuto >in M:vli 4, 1 07 1, -ttl iLul lu* |K>|IO i- tlii: "A- lone a- UPTI- art- Aiuenmn PoW* in Nonh Virluatii 'tll liun- t>> tiiainlain a n-Mluul farr>> in SiHt'li Viptiiuin. That i> tlic lru*t wi- run iM-Ratinlr fur." H'lxTfa* MaJaiii Nitmi-n Tbi Hiiih. cbi'1 tii-lt-g.tu,- ml ilw Pr<n-i-frK>J it^volu> tinnurv 4>\>Tiiii><ftl 'if ttw R pul Jir <if ^mlh Vtrtuuln tnlf>l >MI Scjrt'tiilH'r 17, 197*1, ttwt the (tolirv of h<*r novn>in'nt i- "In CM-*- tin- t'luttnl Staim (iovemntfiit - it *ill witi>drw from .*iitli X ictnaiu nil it- troop- mid thorw at the other ru'* in tin- l"mil >tati- catn|>. tid !) |mrti p will <-iigaef at ourc in ii- i|ii'-ti.>n of .-ii-nriiiK -nf.-tv (or flu' touJ KiLKdrattnl from Simtli Vietnam it'il <l4tf trixt|M nd tu<x-<- of tb1' <>Ui<T foriiKii nmiiinn1 HI (be L'uited > ruin[>. "Tin- <|i|--ti'<n ill ri'U-uîiiie ra|>MirKl cnilitarv IIM-II." llriMtlcitl. TliiH <tw I'uitvd Slwt' -tmll (<rtU-it.li jifojuw. ut ttv Pn* pfiico tll- ttwt in return f->r tlx- r*-i urn nf nil AiM'Tu-n [irivHMT- b<-ld m ludocUna, ttu I'niti'H Stulf luill withdraw all it- Arnu-d Fort - from Vietiiacn witltio itj- day* folluwiiiK ttit* iKtun|( uf the a/5r'nu-iit : froculnl. That Cb>* mCf^'JIWOt ohalt noliliun tfiiurunUi' tiy (hi- llftniMTatic Itcj.nlUic1 u/ Vir4n-.ni mid the N"UiHial Li'Mrration Kronl of -af" i-ixiijurt out ftf \ictiiuni for !) Aiii'iiryn prisoner* nlii all Arni-ncxn Arnn-'l F<ro- innii!itix>iuJy.
The CziAJHii .N. Tlntiik you very 111 ur-h, NIr . Timl in u VITV elcxiticiit -tai' in-lit uud otn- of the luifnt riumnct êll ri-iiv/ncij. I think, ui: Imve I,, -id [-lt>ri- the commit tee ui thin of l
395
OK FKCV1UCH TEMlMON'r
If I understand it, your rrsolutioii U quit*- similar actually, to tbf hutguac< lunt was n*-omnHmd<*d, iuit bv molulioa. but bv very- fine tab-incut yesterday by Mr. Chad** VMt. An> you familiar witfc bU *Utrainl? Mr. JA'-OHX. Ynt; I hav- tvitd it from tin; prat*. The CHAIRMAN. Aren't you struck by the ainiilarity trf bi iuteuu-ni . wiiiob tv- trot m rtwdution, and what you recauuumd? Mr. JACOBS. I was uleaaed with kin ntKUrwrtU. The (.'HAIRUAX. AJihoujeh I uu not *urr ln> a-n <f your n<M>lutii*n. I wo^tlii oav his *Ut4-tncut U fliroctly in atippoit of it. Mr. JxcoHh. f think ht- i> nun of the ivally RTMrt Aiucnc*i>>.. Mr. The CH.VIKJAX. We u*d Uintt xcn pod UUrtnenla ynrtrrd> fnnii fcimini-ly well qualified- men. That is fiom different point* of view. Otic, a you know, a pri>f-s<uooal with, j bf>Ui-v>. ôtnc 3<?-yers (xih'riciice tit the fornicn enT<*. Mr. Yot ; .., d Mr. FaDc. a dLttinguinhnd prnfesor; and Mr. Lewin, who la ait ex-xft ou China, Uglified. Or anotlu*r point I think, although I forgrt wbtv ii ww. you put inupbarils on tlw timiof;. Str. jAfoiif At tin- very ix'pitninôf riw.-tAi.'inpnt. Mr.fhairmiin. Tin- ('HintUAX Ii U ijiiitr n>iiiiiiixviit <>f Mr U-wi-' V M - M . Hi- u> <-in|iliit>i/.inz, llw nio^t ix Himsivrly of anyone tin.' hnv<* hoard, thai tlni-fiii <-hiiiipi tn tlt- ititiul' of th' ChiiMx- ^n-x-iii^ us with an o|. | h .rniuity for nioving towarii MII ovrrall -cttlcinrnt ami a ronfiTem-f 4iti -Miuiiti-uM AMU .hat u<* Imvr iw>t hiul fur many yvur. Yon miclii sny Mini- I9V4. I (liouîl it ^^- (jiiiu 1 inlcn-r-tiup that you tu-irhi'd 4>n
that ui~ f , U t \ T
^ on rui-41 u i|iu>-tioii lliut uu*> r.ii-^'il yf-i<-riliiy in u little different

i i x t l e v t ill ( t i e tutenii'lll ttf ProffoMir Falk Hliollt developing our VleH-
of .i)>|>roiii-liiii'(r thi> HM ti mi^tuk.1-. HI- eiii|>hiu<i/.e<l tlie moral tt.-|k-<-l of \\\i*\ \\f were iloilifT I detcet tlmt Vi.il od^!!i'>t We inlmit llHvill^ made tt |Hi!i!icu! uii-'idce i. jn.lL'ineii! iii liuvitu: enlere.l into ihi- areiin at all. l^ that eorrect? Xtr. J*f>t!-. Mr < 'liairiLuti, if I i-oulii cite on.- fiurly 4-nrrmt hUtorie ref.Tenee to tlmt |Mini. I Ix-'if \. wi made tl'i- urne iui|]tk<< lht(*hini**' liuide 111 Ili'folii'KlM. the mini uke (llul ideology v\4iuld Ink*' |ir<*ceiU*llce over iialiinulMii. Tlu'ChinHM'f;!*! into l>i^ trot jhle in Indoiiiîu, 1 think. IjeejiijM- iliev [tp-K-rf'd for lliejr o\\ u i:iter\'eiiliiii ninl tlieir undue influence in ibf internal utfair* of llml nation, ntid :t ^n-at upbfavai ulid of iJi-Ktli folloui-d. I think lliey iiimle tin i*rror. I t h i n k tdat we have mmle .in <-rrr <>( tlie -ume kind in Vii*inm.
Tin- O l M K U A N . Jt letilly l-ll'l Very i|tllt-l.'ul f4r eoiltllrJ4's t make
error.', miv inorr tluui in<lmi|ii.t!~: i it'' Mr ,1 \ii>".-. U'i'll. HI Ifrtijr n* i!i'-y nn- niml>- up of iu iivj.iuuU, Mr. < 'liiiiniiiui, I ilou'i knoM itny alf'ieiny t l : n ' oenir- when we A n t h e r
lic/i-ilirr: -"l(i'tilne~ e heriilii" u 1)11 ilullîToil-. I t h i n k
.196
iirruTt.Tv tr rownr\iTv IN ADMITTING KHKOH ' The I'H.MKVAX. Wliv is ii thai yu think ii i* MI difficult f >%. \-uminnnity nmde ni> of iiviividuaJ* to admit it made tui error? Mr JACOH-*. Mr. (tuunuiui. I like the <|uot' rf thefonncr mnyw of New York C'ily, Mr. l.*(uan:iM who OHIV sid, "When I m*ke luKlnk--, i'. w liraiit." Tin1 '. 'HAIKM: \ Ii i,- U-tut, y*s. Mr. il*-oB*. And that kind <if tiling in MI ran* mini no rutltle llit betwvrt it hiq>|wn> it *rrm> to invoke pilo >f dinimtion. 1 llîrik of KruiHf in (tic rutt* f
< an- irn . v r>- KOIIIK t<> nund tlw >>ir ctwn nmntrA, in dffttinr f mir rmtntrv, and lint try tu nin othiv |n-o|4i-> affii>. We didn't KI-I t>K- '>rtl (rum Mnunl SIILBI <-tuaU> to tlii tbl,
Th- wbMt hj|H'iiMl t Frunir? It swmi to int- its imtioiml hardly went dn, it wiit u|>. Thl- CHAIUHAV. It rmwt ivrtMiiily did. IK- (imillr INN-HHM* u hro, I think, its a n**ult of that iwrtimlitr a<-t, not >nly of hi> out: Country Iml (rnuTally. HP w n> pivisi preut cntlii all over lite world for hi'-* Mr. .T.\fon>. 1'itiplr uho urc jii^'i-iirc timi it difiictilt to trrnr. Ittr oliiiM stor>- in tin- world i-> dial 1ijr men ran <ikiio\v1'iljr<> rror. AhrahNin Lincoln suH:
If I h\i- rvi-r nmdc an jfi-rtiun nu( uurruiitrd liv fart und it N (MHiitcd out tu in'-, 1 -l.nll withdraw rhifff uU\ .
'1'liui kind of tiling is IIKI mliuirulilc mid most Tli(> CIAIICMA\. U'hv >luni' ' f l i c I'niicd Stul*s feel MI Uinl i( i un't l>rin^! its4-l) r to udi r u mistake? Mr .Ucoii- I have no idcj. Ir. ( 'liuiriiian. 1 regard my country w i t h love and I reptrd niv rummy u i t l i admiration in terms of itn imiitslry und it strength. \Ve luive all of it. We i-aii defend oiirsi-lves; ue can |>r>vide for our defence in u nui'leur up- und still nt-knowledgc en-or wlwre v hnve done it. TliiN conc<j|)l of .saving face is somHliinc that s-<-iiis to me as a l i t t l e IMIV I reniiTiiilN'r our inukinir joke ulxiiit the Ja|>anoM> over saxiii^ fm-4'. Saving fare .surely eoiildn'l ! as imjtort&nl, false priiU* coiililn't IN* a.- ini|M>rtj>nt, as saving liven. The CHAIICHAV There wus a time uhen ue rather ridiculed th* tendency of the Asians to Ix- so concerned H!M>U( fw/1, as if *r were ,itiv<- stidi trivial eoiiHiderHiioiih. Mr. .lA'.'oitri. Vi'n, sir. The CHAJIIMAN. 1 don't mean in thin war, but \tm-\c yan> ago. Mr. J Aroii*. Veri, nir. The C H A I K M A V . You have referred to thin in your slai^mnt i*hn yon wild, "tlw MUIU- forrei. u* before we int^rveiwd and would erv no |iiir|H>-M> eK<-e|t a vain iittemjH to MNitlu* our ep>," Whrn you nay our <<>, JUM| what do von have in iniiiit? Mr. JACOB* Well, 1 ÎJ|I|M^' | tun uiii(; tlie editorial "our" in a sense. The C H A I K M A V . N'ot your cj;o? Mr .(AroUH. I don't think i f j c ^retit bulk of the American \\t-n\t\e reullv unulil olii<u-t to dealing forthri^htlv with fiw t- and with the world, but I think it mine* down to certain jmiit ii-iuiu frHiikty who w.iiilil like to save fticc. J jncun I rnvnelf did nut opj>oe tin-
SOT
'r until I IIP Uu% summer of 1065. 1 was alreadv a Member of < 'onpi's.- idrn, and I rv*d mv fast hoolc by Bernard Flk and liegan to study tbv Geneva accord*. began to study tb> Unpmgv about .the 17tb ' parallel. Aflf all wlnn I went to Korea ami wo talked about thw 3&Ui itaralld and agprmsion ami it was eauy ewouph tt> slide psychologically into the assumption that the itarue situation exists with to tlir 17th parallel But it didn't.
WITNESS EXPERIENCE IN KOREA
CHAIRMAN. When did you go to Korea? Mr. JACOBS. 1951, just Ix-fon- the Chinese spriiip offensive. The CKUIUUN. Wen- you iu ihe Arm\? Mr. JACOBH. No; I ua* in tli<- Marines. TUe < -HAIKMAS. Marino? Mr. JACOB*. Vw, ?4r. Tbe C'liAiiiHA.v. Hou liip v.-ere you tiH-n-? Mr. JACOBS. I a^ tiicT- for 1 year. Tlw? ( 'iiAiKMAX. One year? Mr. JACOHS. In the infantry in the Marines service in tlioe days Was 1 year.
rsEKCL\ES.S OK E X A M I N I N G OUIGIVS OF VIETNAM WAR
Tlie CHAIRMAN. This pmnli-m rau^Hl the gn<at<'f.t dtyre' of trouble yititarilny. I mean lum to (inil with this question of i it useful to examine I be origin* of the war und whether or not it was mistaken. Senator Ca.-e. who 1 ho|N- will be here thi> nioniitip. was here yesterday. He raised this very serious question of whether or not it is useful in promoting your objective, which i-. the ending of the war. nnd the objective of the other resolutions, to even examine this or whether it 13 better ut least for the moni'-nt to lay it abide and simply try to develop a consensus Iwhind xmie oue of these resolutions. There ure several pending before the comiuittee, too. It was a question that was up in the air. ( >nc of our witnen^>> feels that thin is one element U> uttriwl sufficient attention of the Members of Coiip-e>rf and the public thai would develop a real consensus behind the move to take, fiction n^w to utop the war. Senator ('ase, I detected, did not feel it would. It is a vtry difficult |iychnlopcal qucHtioii and I will confe.- I ain a little put yjed as to wLfllter or tHJt it would lw useful prcM-ntly for the pussap* of Icjrislulion and tJut taking of action thut would end the war. I < tm't know fnuikly. i was at one time iucliiK-d \n believe it would. >/uw in view of some of tiie re4u:tioiin I tun not MO sure. I would like to isk you -Mr. .(ACOHS. Senator, may I i-omment on that point'.' Mr. JACOJIK. 1 think of the \\onl.-- of Adlni SU'Vi'ii.-ron tliat w lirn th' 1 pre-^Tii r>itn in judKiiuMit on ihc [>u->l die future i> lo->t. But I think it \< eliildi>h to try to fix btume, to delertniiie wlr.> i-. right, rut her tlui.'i deN-nnining what i- right. *v< in ihal M-II-M- 1 t h i n k t h i - J in exutniniii'.' the hiiflory it is not useful and only exucerbule poliiri/.al ion iind bml fneljng.1 in our country which certainly exinf mostly from Mtuiid.ti? of i:ni' another <t u.
The ' r H A t l ! M A V . ( V r l a i l l l y .
59$
1VI, on tile other hniiil. 1 takf really the op|>osup viewof I he White Hon-e it> to wlnt will civalr n .*iiiieru|ioti. genemtim of jiener. Tin-r-i' '/union of the kind of error of tactics t l t a t v.n gtrt us inio thi- -on if tl.iiig. it M-ern> to iu'. i- the way to avoid future involvement of thU ki'iti, imnecfsry involvement. \\Vhuvr tried 11 the other way. it seem* to nv. teiu-hiiig the !I-SHM, miikinc them xtnurt :i'i<l hwinr them once and for nil, and lluit kitu! nf thin;?, intervention- ami that sort of thing, for NO mniiv \vnr> now mill < \-n p-ii>T:itiiHis. S it mnv IN- tliitt ut ilii-* |r<--i^< inoir.ciit it i f.ir l-!icr lo ronii* tupMliiT rci the pruicniath' n'iibti~ of thi? rnonirnt, n-< >pîiz** thut thoo ki<1> uro going tn VK- comimtUil < Hf- inn^prisonir.i-ni liy Vietniunixation prrK-^Nlinp as it tlots, roooj; gp tlmt tin1 way in tvmvr tb<-ni unit |>ri>vcnt others from U-iiifr co^vurnl anil killr.l iiini injnnxl and ilrivi-n iii>uni-, 1ii<-h is an interesting thingnobt-iy fVcjr Uilks itlKiiit the in.--aiii' of the u'ur. I hit XT seen them. One minute a. fellow (CAM wlking nlong i-umnng a HAR. Tlie next ininuU' a iliell lnrst wxt to him, jlie 999th one, the oi>e thut he <-oul<in't take. He U r\tn: lilu- a hfthy: they leail him -helpless u-ny. I never sec that on televi-ion. 1 never x4-<' that in the iiewsjmners, <l-'i in jtsyehosis for the n>!>t of hb> life, to languish in the mental hospital. Those earfiitillies IH-\>T^HMII lobeinentifHHsi, hut- all thut if iiivolv*sl. So I might- t<il lo ui^ree that at this inoinent the way to come together a* a nation unil mx^jrtiba1 the realities, pet ourselves away and get tliis behind n> uiigitt well U- not to ri-k placing Maine.
BUKEDOM WITH V t t T N A M W AH
The CHAIKHAN*. I uppreeiule your statement. It U a ver>- thoughtful statement and I agree with t h a t . Actual I/, I think the point that was being made ye.-tenlny wa> that there hu.-> Ix-eii so inueh said about thi> uur. and MI much criticism that the polls have in icated. for whatever they are worth, that a clear majority, some 70 plus jiercenl uf the people, would like it to end. They are not clear about just how t<> cud it, but would like it to end. Then- eume through the testimony that people have become Ixired with it. They don't like to hear any inure ubout it. The\ Imvc heard enough ilx>iit it. You can sec fruin the i-ritwdfd chnii> of the, committee how many members of the committee Imve heard eiinutrh of it apparently. Tliese heitri'tg* have been giing on a long time, I know and I sympathixe wkh them. ThU i- the 10th or 12th hearing I think He hiive had Mr. JACOBS. feel very much at home. Mr. CliairmaJ'). Tlie CJJAIKM.'K. The CongrevH rece?-M-d u little ejirjier than was eX|Ncte] whi-n this hearing WBS set. This i-i a pi-yeholo^rj'.'al jr<rf>lem t h u t really I am troubled about tis to bow I*M ti do it.LACK OF Arnox nv HOL*SK OK KEFUESKN'TATIVEX Ttike She HOUM- of UcprcM-illative*. Tlu'\ ar- s-iid \*> be the clo-^nt to the people <( tlie two HOII*C of ('ongn-w. If it i* \rw th-it n clear majority of the Ainericnn (woiile u-ish us to w i t h d r a w , why U it that -nine nctioii hn-t not been tiiKen? Why i- thl* not reHcrU-d in the HoiiM- f Ke[ir<'M-filjitivf-? ('yiiM you explain t/i me w l i y . so far as 1 k n o u , n- u body live niHJorily of the HOHW of J{epreenlative has
599
iitkcti no action U> wtiert what IR SMI J to be the predominant public '.pinion ->f the country? I k'*ow th -re _n> individuals such as youwelf and certain otherr,. 1 am a* are of tfoit. Mr. JICOH*. Well. Mr. Chairman, I think the Houft' of Representatives is verv much like what tin" Vine PrettdentiiU office used to be. It i rather obscure actual!v. We don't have The CHAIRMAN-. 1 don't follow that. The House is obtain-. Mr. JACOBS. We don't really have the pnws coverage, we don't rvally hav- the television coverage. Bv our own rules for years and year*. AS you know, there was no televised coverage of the committee procwodings in the House, and I can 'ell you as a witness to the history of the House of RejHvsentatives in the past 6'j yean thut a whole slew of Rej>re*ntAtiveM have changed their mind and changed their minds dramatically on tH question. I can assure you, sir. that 6 months ago a resolution for end of 1971 withdrawal from Vietnam would not have missed passage in the Democratic House caucus by merely 4H<e voto, as indeed it did only a few weeks ago. so the change is occurring there. I think nearly every- Member of the House of Representatives readies .today that he tnuct either be for withdrawal or seem to be, and that is, I 'think, tta present status of it. There is some, movement, not as much as I would tiko. I guoat some fellows are out of touch. Some fellow* don't even run against anybody every 2 years. I am not-onr of Uiejn; dam it. }fDaughter.] The CHAIKMAK. You will fiud if you take positivenositions on iwiy coritrov4i>4al issue there will itlwaytf be opposition. The way to have no ontmsition u to be careful to avoid ever committing yourself to anvu'M? and then sometime* you can get by that way. Mr. JAOOBK. There was an old show tune, Mr. Chairman, that I recall, that wiit, "If you can make a bold prediction, brand it merely fiction; scheme to get the credit; and ib-n deny you said it." Your longevity in j>olitiv is asHurod. [laughter.] The C'UAIBMAK. You doi't seem to follow that advicx.*, however. 1 IK lieve vour father was ifk political office; wtw he not'! Mr. /ACOBX. Yes, sir;{ieiicrved one term in the Houne. That makes him better than I ain, I gucs. Tiu:OuAiuMAN'. One term in the Hou^-. He s]>oke out also, I take. it. Mr. JACOBS. Yts, sir. TlicCfiAiBUAK. 1 nnibt say I think your statements about the basic ideas of the war mid wiiy w* should move to conclude it are excellent.
C'OKHTITUTIOKAL At'THOinTY TO i.'ONVJNUE VIETXAM WAR
(>j, a different subjtii-t. as you Icnow, tlte House joined the Senate in llu- reiM-ai of Uu* Tonkin Gulf resolution. \Vhat tutiiority do you belli ve tun Pn^sidnnt has ui dej- Uie ('oiihtilutiou to ronlume the war iiuhifuiildy sirnu- that resolution has b*H-u repeak'd. Mr. J*w/iis. None, and I <-iU' for my authority, among others, Prehtdent Abrulium Ijiicoln. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, you are familiar w i t h llie letler that \u> wrote. I don't know if it HUH u> Henidon; it souie cloM- friend.
T!ie C I M I U M A K . With regard to t'w Mexi'-an Wcr. Mr. JA-TOH* Well, tui\ the Men.'-aii Wur, ju-*t the quest kin of |">Her to make w a r .
GOO
The CHAIRMAN. Oli. yes. I think the war incited that statement. It was a general statement. Mr. JAfoBs. Ami he said that tin- provision for tneCongnw* to have the (lower to raise armies and dcuuimne th- declaration of war involvement of those armies was I ho tlireot result of centuries of tragic experience under the monarch* of Europe who committed armies to foreign soiliud then said, like it or lump it to tin- parliament:*. If you aro not pa triinic, you won't support tluun. If you arc, you will, mid ho said to this friend SIM- if you can fix anv litgical limit once you have crossed thai, shall we say, Rubicon, in Presidential |>ower 1 could make out a cax- if I wanted to be a Icutlicr-lunpc*! out <'ii tin 1 soup (MIX, I think I could make out a fax^ a y-ar or fvo ap> to pi ti war with Canada, "Why they arc harUirin^ our draft dodgers up there, folk;*. I^-t's go get them." You can alwa>> make out that kind of caw hut it smiis to me, if you are puLrtf: to appropriate a man's money only by going through the ( 'oajrrcss, then you should go -through the Coiurritss tn appropriate that mmi's life, get him killed. ; The <.'UAIUUAN. it x-4-iiiM t4i me a v<r>- persuasive argument. Il stnick me, especially in vii<w nf the fact that in the last ejection} one of the most pcrMia.MV<i, I guess, or at least most widely puhliciz4d 'anks, tn the jHntform ttot iily of the incumbent 's party but Mr. 'allure ami others was the nvMahlihlimctit of law and order. 1 have al\vuy> iwi-ii iiudt^ the impn'ssion that ti.e C'-<iiLstitution was part of the lia^c law f tlii-< country, At least it u*ed to IK-. Mr. f .icons. That i> what they >id in luvx <-li(M>l. The C H A I U M A N . It u> >ai<l t<> he in law M-hiHil, wasn't it? Mr. Jif 4iB>. That i> my n-collts-tion. I was not as good a student us I urn sure ou were, hut that \ \ > - > ea-y enough for me to grasp. Mr. CH.UKMAX. It ua^âiil to In- tintin-ta>i<ta>i<-Ian Ian of ofthu thu land. land. To anyone wlio ruu^ on the platform of lau und order, 1 uouM tliink the Coii^ t i t u t i o n i> ju.xt if entitled to res|>cc( u> the l i u ^ against burglary or nmrching on the Mull or jirot^^tiii*; to the puhlic and to the. Coll gre. it is u rather ironic twist that hu.> deeto|ied.
rrm.ic -rrro'ir nm r.s I'oll.- I n-aliAi- re not the linul uord on tln-.e multrrs. For whatever they are uortK, the ln-uillinr of th. i (itillup |MI|| in Fehru;iry i->, '":< |M-rceiit -ii||i.ri |>ru|xal to M i t l u l r n u till triHip- ilii-, vp4-jir." Then the
article-gor-oli to tulk B!N.I|| l l i f l l H t l i e l d - V l r ^ i o V i T I I Jiri|>-,al und >aVS
Mi<- pulilic >up[Mirl li/i^^nmn druiniiii<^<lly from '>'> iK-n-i-nt U>-t Sep(-inlwr io ".'5 jNTci'iit in I In1 lrle-1 -iirvi-y eonilui-ieil in mill-January. it t:jvr- nil tin- ilriinlr. I will pm it in tin- nvi.nl * (hut the rt''>rd in Another (toll, llm Hum- H u r \ i ' \ , which wu- a little luler, think, 'i very Mmilar n-Milt. i will put them both i*j tugi-thrr with ruore iecj-i.il polJn, 1 won't n-wi them now. (Tin- information refcrn-d tî f"1l-.s.)
01
/: r
The Gallop Poll
IFrn tkc WMtdagtM Fo*. Jan. 31.1MT11
73 P*:K CLKT Scrrorr PaorosxL To Wmrosw ALL TKOOM TBU YCAX (By George Gallup)
^-
PBIXCCTOS, V J.Public support for the HatfieU-McGovern proposal to cod U.S. troop involvement in YletnVra by the end of thin year ban brown drmma: tifaUyfrom " pur cvnC last September to 73 per cent in the latent survey, conducted in mid-January. ' L ' Tb* proposal was introduced lart yew in a Senate hill, sponsored fay (R-Orw.) Reii. Mark Hattidd (D-S.D.) aad Sen. Oeor-e McGovenu Personal iiiUTvio-rs were conducted on an 9-10 with a total of 1,502 adults in more tbfJ) 300 seuntifietlly selected localities across ihe nation. This quoxtiou wai< akcd: A protvxat has Ix-i'n made in Cou*rw* to require the Uî. <io\-ernront to brin^ honif> all l'.. troop* ItKori* the end ,._rf this yer. Would you like to have your (onnrc*iiiu vote for or against tUU uropOMl? ^ ; The following table compares the latent pjrcfutagrt saying their congressmen Uoulii vote in fa\*or with those frotn Scj>tc<ubcr: .
1*71 <pCMU
jfl
1J70 (pwent)
Uta TrîLjj
fftMMlQII" CtfMCfltl CGUMV HiffelCllMl
.
,
.. . . . . .
7J
^. (4 " 41 Cl 47 57 1 1
+21 +14 +14 +17 +11 + 1 1 + 1 1 + 1 1
71 (4 71 71 0
...
. .
. . . - - .
..
75
10
C>ididwol
(From tbr Xrw Vork TUum. Jin. ;;i. 1U71 ] POLL Snows Uout. ASK Swirr PITLLOUT XJ., .Jau. 30,-^Tne Gallup Poll reporU-d today nn upHurge of public tupixm for ille HatfifM-McGovefii proposal to t-iid t_"iuted Suites troop luvolvonM'iit in SoutU Vietnam by the end of tiiu year. Tlv jx/11 n-ixMlcd thut impport for the pro|>tMaJ had increased from .ro pprriuit la-it September ta 7- jxTccnt in the latent wirvtry, conducted Jan. V-10. It coK-ri-d IM2 adult* in mote thau MO Mtrtted l(caliti'">. Ttu- (iropoital Vk^ introduced hu>t year in a tanate bill by Senator Marie ilatfirid, Hc.publiran of <>r^tou, and Keuator GeorKi- McGovfrii, Deniocrat at South IJakuta. Senator tlcOovcru recently auuoiuwd tii candidacy for the Prenideury. lu itn latent xi*.iiplinK the Gallup ornatiization alwo rcporu-d a m-w high in the ]>r>iport4uu of AmcrifanK i pt-rct-ntwho belifVe tht- Ututod Ktat made a iiii<ak<! in involving itoulf in X k-tiuun. It alno uot-d that r. 13, 1971] TU- Hurri-i Survey licrf./KT roB XiKok o WAK I>HOPS TO 34% (By LOUJM HJUTJH) Ax u nixili f the move by South Victnsruow- troops backed by Aim-noun air pow-r, t nit off N'ortlj X'tctnuriu-m- Mippiy linr* alti|{ th- Ho Chi Minb trail in J/ao, u||)orl for PreKideiit Nixou' UandliiiK of the WHT in \'i/'tnm luj* fallen off nhurpjy i')fH- January i down 1(1 point* from 44 pt?rre;it to .'J4 pcro-nt. H<TC iii t)j' tri'/id over (he punt five inoutb* iu re*pon^> t^ thin qUeHUoii, jml ed mo* i r.-c<Tith' AiuoiiK a cronij **i ioo of l,fi2U houeboldj< nationwide between Feb. 2îwid 27. <tf-250 71 - 3
602
&<nc tcetcU yra rrtt At job Pretidcnt A" iron fca* been. doing in aa*<i/t*9 ifce tear in Vietnam ez&Qtni, pretty good, on^t fair, or poort
topav OMMO , SI U SI 52 Ntur (pucwt) S 3 7
Own*) Fjfcnw.i7l ....................... .. ....................... Jmufv ...... . ...... ............................ ............ Xov.niU.1970 .................. ............................. Oeto&w ...... ................................ ................ J4
A comparable question on the President' i handling of Ui<* vmr in Cambodia and Lao* showed fvra lower support for Mr. Nixon's polie>s a 28 per cent to o9 per witt negative rating. Two Uement* are now weighing against Ute President in the Vietnam situation. Chip if the conviction ou the part of a majority that "it is morally wrong for the U S. to be fighting iu Viotnam." The cro*t tiratioo WM amkcd: I>o you /rTtt M morally right or niorolly vrmgfor the L'Ji. to befcfhtinf in Vtetxamf Tt*t fttVic ftrocmt Morallyright ...... . ................... . .................... . 29 MonUJy wrong. .................. . ............................. .M NotMJ-t................ .- ............ . ........................... 20 T!ii!t latent Harris Survey find* once again, much a.-* aft^r the incursion last May, that the President ii beginning to sufft from a credibility Hîp ith the rank and fili: of the public over the war. The erosn section wa salted: Da yon tfrint -that t*ren<icnl Num iuu been front and ttmigfiifoneard about Ike war in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, or do yov feel that he hat >^t told the American people the real truth about the vorf ' Tvttl fuWe
^ Percent
Bf-ni frank and Ktraight-for .-ard ..... ....... . ....... _ Xot told people real truth ...... _ .......... ........... Not Mirtr .......................... . ................ (From tb* Waclilajcton Pout. Ua/ 21. Jtt'l ] TV Harrit Sun-ey
............... ............. ............
33 51 Ifi
TJIIE or Pcituc OMSJOV Truvn DrxriuJVKLT AOAIKKT TH: V\'AU (By Louin liarrin) The tide of Aoierican puUic opinion lias uow lunid dncisivnly against tbe war in Indotrhina. Thj latent hift of public O[iiriion aKairiKt tli war wus triggered by the fading, 4'> to 24 per cant, that tbf recent South \ii-lntunew in?ve into Lao* wa ft "failure." Here arc BOOK- of the Mgn of tbe det'li;w of public ûpi>ort for the war at>d tbe now rigidly growing faeliug that tlte United htat&t hould K1* out of Vietnam an quickly an powiibli;: For the Jirl time, by narrou plurulity of 4L' to 39 JX.T atit., UMV>t Aiuericatiit n'oiUd ujcrw to a "coahtion Koverjinieni in Kaigmj whicii itidud'ui the CotniuuuiMt in it," if that ÔUTM- were "the only way we could get peam* in \'i/-fjiauj." In late 1909, tbe piiijiic oppov^ ouch K coalition govnimiit by n rnarîii of '9 to 33 jcr c<'jit. Hv 60 to 2G per cent, a majority of the public now woidd fnvor rnnliuued nithdriiHiil of Aiuerkun traoftn from Victrikui, "<rvwi if th-- governmfiit of Viet nun collapifd." For th' firxl time, by .%* to 'M por cejjt, a njiijority of ttie public now thur. it i- "morally wrong" for Lit" l.'uited Maio to be iiKb(i;iK in V'nîum. A rroMt-MVtiou of 1,'ihU hou.vluJ'Ji wa>> axltejj beteeu \\ir\\ \'i a))d April 1 "Oo you f) the rcfrrtu South \'jutuain ni'\e into Lao* wu u KUWJ>/. or failure?"
603
rtut
'. 24 Failure ,..45 Neither. 8 Not xure . 23 By nearty * 2-to-l margin, profile feel tht tk^ Laos incursion was failure. In turn, -this has led to grave doubts on the put ol the Amvriean people that br entire policy of \ ir-uuunitation is capable of working. People -vvtc asked': "If he (T-S. withdraws all its combat troop* from '-' .-tuara, do mi fed tbe South Vietnamese army will be capable of keeping the Ootuiuunistb from taking over South Vietnam or not?" rfrrtHr
Capable . . . . . ........ ............ i ........................... 24 Not capable. .......... ......................... ---... _. 5V NotSure .................................................. Itt Jurt a m-mth before tbis Uut poll, between Murch 16 and March '21, tbe publir ws asked about the ability of the .South Vietnamese anuj 10 hold ita onii uâiaxt tbe North Vietnam**: tuid taost jMicpk-, 4C to 27 per c<>nc, thought they could. Thc-n ih<t precipitww withdrawn! of South ViuttivneMe tvoops from Lao% T'wk place and fi;il,-)ic outiuion drauiattoUly ruvcraod. .'Hit- dcU-anituition (f t'ie Aioufican people to liqu-dal< U^. particiitataon in the ur can tx,- w,-e3 niost clearly in the. question: "If tfio reUuctiooB of U.S. troops coutiuued at tbe prcsuut rate and the govrrhriietit of Vietnam collipufd, would you favor or oppose cuntiiiniug withdrawiag our troops at ttt present rate?'* > TetulfMUe Ftrant Con.inu? withdrawal of U.S. troopi. ....................... __________ <K) Oppose continued withdrawal .......... .................... - ... 36 NotSwv ............. ..... .............. ... ........... ____ 14 The oilier ranking change fitu.-riCfd W!M;JI for the first tiinu th: H x rrijt Survey rts-ordjd nion- Aiin-rit-aos in,/avor than oppoot-d to a. coalition government in Tb<: croy.x-section a aclced: ".Support! the the orJy way we could pt jxaice in Vietnam IK if they wer to agree to a coalition goveruiu<:ut A'liiclj iududed the CouunuuUt-- in it. Would you favor or oppow such a coaliUor in Saigon?''
OppOM NrtOMltlt (ptrcmt) ByKcfw. .
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42
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os; N (By Oorur (Jullup;
J J KiscKTi?si. NJ. IVi'xidirnt Sir.iii i^ currt'itly fucini; B gi:int-Hizi- ''credibility cap" mi the1 iVtnuui wur. a* i-viddiivd l > \ ' the r/'-ult of tfu- Jat<".t ntitKrfi "ijr\-y. Tin liiu..iir'' Mliowr thiit' !'( Ain'Tii'UiiM M7 ^frci-iit) unrtv with I'rrKJiJi-tit. Ni*r(j that wjlJ "l'a-c in (t.- !.-): t î'iu-nttii,n" jf wi- ICHVC South \M-IIIUOJ in a prwjtii>n t conditions nsvrllv laid riiiuii by Preside!!' Nixon for withdrawal of all I'.S. forei ---- thnl Smith Vu tnain !" ntjf to stand, on it- own and l".S. prl-oner.- arr <vt imed--have any chance of lieiHg -ret lef<ire the end of 1972. Only one ixrson in five, in a recent -':?. v for N)itiiml Kducational TVlcvijjtm vi id hat the Nixon Adiniiii-t ration i- Lellinc the public all they should know nii-iut the Vietnam war. Ohk-f*'tnplAints are that the pnlilir U not get ting "traighl :m-'wer- reisardini; ca.-utalty rati>r (both <n:rs and the enemy V) and UJs. troop v ithdrawal <i|fiin-<. The Nixon "orcdilrtl.ty Kl>" '* N'ictnam i* virtiwllv th*> *nio ,* that which r.-nfroriU'd the John-on sQniini-tration at a cinnpar:il)lo (Hiint in tinn- during I'ri"-id-nt Johnson's tirnt full term in office. A total <>f tt.'i pern-tit said the John-on aiinniii-tralion was not tclliiiR I lie public alj they -hoiiH kuo-.v about the Vietnam \viir. roinparrd to (J7 jM-r cent who bold tlii^ ojiiuion about the Nixon Admini tr:iiii>i> today. of political !>ipiilicance i the fact that the Vi.iiiaift war and a wide credibility j!|i provi-d to IK- factors in PrenJit Johi>-.iMi*> di-ri-ioi:, in the S)iriii(; of 1'JGS, to r'i"nirjci' a second t4Tin. l'n-.ident Nixon's cnrront pojmlarity rating, a year an'l a half bofore Ihe 1972 pre-ideutial cliftion, siiuid* si. .V.I percent approval. At a comparable |>oinl prior to ilie l^S:? pn->idmti:tl election, i'n-sident Jolinnon'-. nit ing wa^ 4t>read nii-Kivinn- about the |>olicie-, and .tatenieiit-. of the Nixon ad!i.inititioii regnrdmj; the Vietnam war underlii- attitude* about thf t/mi.-talilf fo- withdrawal of all I'.S. force- from Vietnam. What American- want in the \\-.i\- of troop withdrawal c.intra-iN "har|>ly with lli":r exjH.clation'j. Iârc'1 majoritie- liave Iweii foui d 10 favor the withdrawal of Trunps rmmr^.tatrly or by ihf iid of thi< >-ar. Ho-fv-r, only <* [wix-tMit in th*:<Mirrei'i survey <-x|H-ct that all troop-, will ai-tuully be out by tin- lime. The r.'Milu rej .,i'iti todai' are ba.-ed on a -nrx-i-y of l,.">iK> citi;n-: IK and oliier. interviewed in pv-r-on in more llum *MI .-nt'iitilically-êlertfd IwoJiUts across (In nati-in during (tie p -riod April -IJ-Uti. i'allottinn are the >|Ue-lion- am] tin- niliona] fmdincl'ê-i,Jei:t N'ixon ba-i -aid lh:il if li-a\i- Situtli Vietnam in a ]>o-it.ioii to defend 1" '-i:lf we will liavc jH'aci1 m the ne\(. generation. J>o you uerei- or disagree?
\witNo >| .iin>ii

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IVi1-' lent Nixon ha- -aid lh.it all I'.S. Irmp- will ! withdrawn from Vietnam '- -i)Oii a- the South \ ielnani'">e li:i\e a \n> pn-oiier- are return-d. When do ; on tluuk tin- fine ' likely to r,om-? ftrrrut T u ' i v -ir- or limuer, in i .. . . . . . . _ .,. ^41 Uefnr. end of IU72 . ...... .. . ....... \U 1 Ollur P -pmisi -, ij'i o p i i i i o i i .^ . . . . . ... . ........ -17 Do v 'Mi think the NIVOI Vlii.ini-ir.ili'm '.-. nr i- not I'-Ilini; the [inMic all thev -linul'l know at>i>ul tin- Viitii_iin war' I'en i tit I. . . . . . .......... . . 21
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W h e n d you think all !'..-> Iroi/j^ will be out r,f \|.-tiMin''
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15% I'tnl of eiirn ill Jear"
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605
LACK 01 IXTLCENTE OF .C^XGE. X PUBUC OPINION
Tlio (CHAIRMAN. This is mrious to me.. If I were a Congressman, nlf 1 liuil tin- most profound convictioiHhat this war is in the intere-^t.s of ita* tountry, I would think I wodld be influence*! by this dramatic change in public opinion. But 1 quite grout that then- an- jK-ople \\ho believe tliis, as you mit it, is a kihd of-holy cp.iMidi and that it is our duly to pursue it. flu-re always have fovn, and !liiv still arc. That \va>. more or loss the justification for it back in 1905 b\ the then .Nvivtjtry of State. Hoi I thought wr had moved beyond that now and << unly nn! of tinie-ninony has beeji to thai t-fffv-t. Mr. JACOBS. May 1 ihukdjuM a romuictit about that, Mr. (Chairman? The CHAIRMAN". Yes. Mr. JACOBS. My expericiii-e. us a. pr^-iiu-t coiiuiiilteeinuii ami then on up through tbt; SlaU" lefrislutnre and the (\>ii^rtss i> t h a t jM'ojil" gciitTally hceni to jxll nion- hauki&h than thev vote. The<''u.UKMA\. Tl-ey what? Mr. .JACOBS. I say tliey -4'in t< jnill inon* hawki.-li than they v<>ie. A fdlow si amis at your door '-\ith i i-Hjiboanl and a>ks, "An- von in fsvor of pnhijr ""d pMthipthMn?" Ami yon have maybe * Joiwi ft'avite movie iiu _jLj'ir television x-t, and your family i* \mtrhiiii; and von lo>k hcrt>\\ay>. mid you say, "Well, -urt-; 1 am tough; let'? <ro gel them." Itut then ulicii you think about tliat 17-\car-old boy tf yours \\!m -\\ill lie 1> ne\t \ ear you tend to 0 I|I\\M und vote for the miididal'' for 1'resii '\ who M-CIIIS-rO?-t lo le for |wace. I think that huppeneii in the 1 <)."). 'i-dioii. 1 know it liuppened in the l'j"><- election, IM the MWiO election it was a l i t t l e one, <ûeinoy und Mat*u, but 'li'' IM-.-K-C cundidutt* uon by H little tnnr<n;i in thut content, hi 19<'>4 thei^- <':ri l>c no (loiild thsil the iN'tti-e cutKliilate uoti, and in I'.M'.s t i n - pe:)i-e < MiidiiUtc MOM, which brin^- up old Koêr Price',-, pro]>'>-iti<>n tli:ii, '''Von can't fix>l sill the pfi>p1p nil the lime, lull *f \i.u can io it );.. \ou nre irood for -1 \CHI->." Thai, J t h i n k , is tin- problem, und I think the phenomenon .1- \ < > n h:i\e described Mr, is mi-re|\ the fcl |)i<it ill! tile people IUIM- mi Jonp-r IM-CII foolt-d alx>ut wh'-re oiir real intere.st-i are, and 1 rc-jiect, 1 ropecl 1'rcsideiii Vixon, 1 n-rfhi-ci Pre.-ident Johnxiii, IN-CHIISI* I beliei- they realh l>elieved t l m t t h i s is :i crilsude, I lelie\e l*oth of ili"in do iiinl, therefore, I find \i't mornl deficiency in either m;ii>. 1 think the. actually believe that. But I don't think t h a t jishat they believe "-in Miind the t<_l of history. '" " . The <""JIAIKMAV. That is u vervîxxl stuj*-iii.'*;.* f really on<;ht io move ojj. but yon protupt me to reflect t l i M t in '{'.< reM'ul licurintis \u> have had Hint ut Other lilil'--. I luiVe Iir<re4^,]|' yoi.UifJ people, Millie nf whriin tiavi tM-cn l>cfiie ti:e commiltee in 1 -jinni;-. and oilier* on inforniiii-\ isjtx, i l m l they uni- 1 IN- patient anil :\n-\ must condncl l l i f i r f h - i i v j t i e - u j l h i n tlie i-y^lciu. I h u \ e tried lo pei>na<le them i l m l worklie,: u i d i the \-ieiii, exercising the riîit lo vole, iy the unly w a y . I hclicM- dull und I lime Inn) no idlenoiixe. When I M>e t h i s c|eur. 1 !>cli''\c, shift in opinion, it botlicn- me I O M - C the mirc-|nin-i\ciic-.. nf
ft.6
V
our system, to what J believe Ifo be the public desire, ojKiiion -ir wisdom. I would rather jy the public judgment, leaving out their desire, because^ think their jiKfguient is correct. The unresponsiveness o' the System to the collective wisdom of the popple of the United States bothers me. . -'
UElJWbNS OK XXECVTIVE A.SI) LECISLATIvr BKAXCHKS
It is the samo war I foel about the relntjons of the executive and the legislature. ILvre yon have 4Z5 men in the House. We have a hundred, making 535 men. This business of ignoring and not even raking or receiving the advice, .^s I think thfl. Constitution providW, of the collective judgment of the 535 men "when decisions of this kind are made by the President negates the very basic assumption of our svsfm. Some of uiy colleagues h*ve said I hat as commander in chief tlie President has the unfettered responsibMity, aside: from the right to make all these decisions without consulting Congress. He doesn't need any authority from Congress. Thej win say in answer to the question I asked you about the Constitution. "He has ij." Thry wid say a< Commander in-Cliief ho haft all th* authority to do *Hie j4eajs with our troops. ^ Mr. JACOBS. Sir; I have bTii here long enough to remember when that used to be called rubber stampLsm on the part of the Congress. ^The CiuiaifAt;. Yea; but it isn't. It has been i.tid on the floor. It tfmi secret. Bocenlly, it; the d"bato c i troojw, the ujrument was made that the Congress n illy ought not to interfere at all with the discretion of the President to bring home anv troops. It i> not our rcsr>onsibility. Of course, I absolutely disagree, t don't- think the majority of votes wa based on this nurrow point tlm f we .havH no authority Oi speak. A number of Senators were irjlunncid by the fact, that Mr. Brezhnev had tnadt* a.sjfKe^h. Tbnre are alu'nys a varu'ty of reason* that enter into such doFisim.:*. But. (h'<re has grou-iiup this idea, beguming with Secretary Ache*'n, at least iiiore so tlum anyone e.'sts uj throuih Mr. Ku'-A'tibnch and Mr. Husk, that tin- Congress has no role to plan in t IIP tivclaraiion of war. It is an nb>letc provision of the Constitution and we i>t:ght to be content withdvalini; with lo':ul project* for M>wnn> und waU-r or making ln>t<>l reservations fT>r our constituents wlu-n they come to Washington. When we venture Ijeyoiid anything fiiore iiii|>ortuni tlnm ?Jmt, we are iiitrudiiijr upon the privilege*, and prcrocxiivtv of itw? President of tiie Unil4-i| Mut.v. We have built thu Vresulency'iiito uli odicc the like of , ^'Jii<-h I don't know exists anywhere in the world today. No power of 'jny tiiujo}' country has the ki:id of unfettere.d power that the President lui if you accept the theory of I ho people who buy as commander in chief ho can do us he jdcH.se:>. Mr. JA<:OUK. I tnighi d(e u. great Id'publicati, Gen. Douzlas MucArthur \vh" snid, "llie.re is thai cor|H<niii >i. and if it goes uMTay who sludl control it: that corporation which run ijuki; the (wipulaee it. pbylhings in an hour und its victinis fo i>ver." And if Uiu pc>o:>l of this country no longer would p-* a bit! of ri^lit, if they would MO longer sij]i|w>ri a Coimutution which nmlo it sufe to IN> un|Kj>ular in our Nation, tluin 1 think llu;y uro drivhig nai'i* i;>io tIwM'ouin for denvcraey in .ur Nation, aniJ it fi-iglitvu>; uu> very much. . The CHAIUUAV. 1 ugrm*. It. frigliUftU me, too.
-607
I thank you vfv much, Congressman JaCwbiri think you hsy<> made a very thons&fiul and perceptive sfattment; \_'.^ The nextVitness id the distinguished Congressman from Calif orniffr Paul N. McGoakey, Jr. Mr. McCloskey, we are very honored to have you this morning. . Thi House of Representatives i& performing a great function in your coming here and sbTarinjf with us your views. STATEMEHT OF HOK.ÂUL X. KcCLOSKET, JIL, &FBESEHTATTVE DT COHGBESS FEOM THSUT1{ C01iOF.ESSIOAL DISTRICT OF THE ; STATE OF CAIIFOJUnA, ^ v -- ' ~^\ < . Mr. McCLOdKEY. Mr. Chairman, before ~f begin my f>repaml ^ statement I thought I would like to say a few words about "the man ^""" who precedeij-Toe as your witness.
-: CONGHESSMAK JACOBS* SERVICE IK KOREA
It sometimes is conrdered that those of us who apeak against - ib* war arc unpttriotir- or give muf and comfort 4o the enemy, but I would like to t*U you that Andy Jarobs.'-whu has jasl spoken, scn-ed as a Pfc. in the 3d Battalion* of the 1st Marine Regiment in Korea. I think it was exactly SO y*ars mid 1 month ago today. There wan A massive Chinese at luck, the first spring counteroffensive in 1951. that broke some 15 miles through the Doited Nations, Hues. The 1st M*riue Regiment of which Andy was & member was thrown into the breach to try to hold the flank as the 3d Chinese Fieki Army moved around to trj" to cut off the 1st Marine Division. - ' I"was~j;>rivileged to command a rifle platoon on thtvt night in Charlie Company of the 1st Battalion, 5th Mknp.es. W* moved back a number of miles in a hurry. Mr iilaUx>u bap[>enuii to have the privilege of tying in on u ridgeline with Georg Company of the 3d Batt-Jion, 1st Marines, and Andy was on ray left ou that weapon uithin n huiulred yards, in a line '.' two-man foxholes. 10 or 15 vrirds apart and that thin line of Marines in his ronpany, his battalion, and to sou** extent o.h, ~*ithst od for some 8 hours an assault by the 3d Chinese FT -Id Aruiy. HI" Sattaiion comtnunder, rotnmttiiding officer, at least linlf the jxropie >n his battalion, were killed or wounded that evening. So when .truly Jaerrlw ttjiertki* against this war as a patriot I ran titx \ tpol jwrxoiially 'to his semi'e anil that of tlw marines, who foughV ijhnt tiigjit. They are not *peakin:t with any iuteutton but best interests i>f thin .îrnry in wind. It is ni intentional that we testify in ronj unction with each other, II is mere Jia|i|)enstnr^ that I a:n over here this morning to t*tif \ fr>llowir^ him. But I am <dul to have him on my left today a he -* 20 vearH a{o. >*ir. "1*he CHA(KUAV. Thttfik you very much. Mr. Jacobs was to< modet to take mh'tinta^f\J)f thut. I asked him if he hud been in Korea and lie iu*t haid ")W. I did not know the details of which you Imve njiok'1!! und I nhi very pleomi you hu4re volunteered theoi, In my o(iiuon, it probably takre. more of a kbid of courage lo go apiinct the opposition and accept, f lie criticism tlia' he has and all of y/u hiuc received in recent years than it did Co do what he did in Korea.
oos
There U a certain kind of determination to say what you plcaso and I think you both exhibit that as two marines Mr. McCuosKEY. Mr. Chairman, there was a headline in the San Francisco Chronicle of the day following this \\itL a headline "The First Marino Division Saves U.N. IJnes." and I would suggest that Andy's company aiul several others were the basis for that Leadline. And I sav thai bet-aiise in a day wlu-n we have seen great war veterans^ such us John Kerry apjR'ar lMvfore this conuuittee and 'near other distinguished veterans from the Veterans of Foreign Wars Notify today I think tiic reasonable disagreement that exists \vitliin those who have served in roinbat und Iho-i- \\lio have not, this is an understandable part of the democratic, process. But in any event I just wanted to mention that. The CIIAIUUAK. 1 am glad you did. Mr. M>'<'I.OSKKY. It is a matter of some pride \vith me that I served with Andy. Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to t Mify Iwfore you this morning with re>|H-et to a visit Congressman Waldie und I made to Southeast Asia Ic.M month. I will describe four >peei(ir factual situation* we encountered there, but would first like (o mention an i>ue which arose rc|>ctttedly-during our trip, an iiic which luosents Congress and (he commitd-e \ \ i t h a problem as .-ertons a* that of euiling the war itsi-lf.
I>E<'KI'T1OX OK ro.VCllKSS HV KXKCl'TSVi: IIUAN'CH
'Diat issue is the dclil>cra(c, willful, und continuing deception of Congrcx* bv tin- execuiive brunch of Government. In both Vietnam and Laos. ('oiigrcsMinui Waldie 11114) I wcrv given dec-[iiive briefings; wi* were given incompI'Me and misleading information in the prcx-ncc of officers, both military and foreign M-rvice. who know that such informal ion was incomplete und mi>leading: ue were given incorrect facts on scvend occasions in. the prcM-ncc of officers \\hii knew tluil such factn Were ill->rrerl. yet >IIMM| mute. Th'* dec-rption Wa> clearly no! a matter of )>ro^ccting secret inforniutioii from the enemy; the intention WHS to conceal information from the people of the I'nilcil Stales as if we were I he enemy. I believe that this deception wu not merely nn i-o!uied ii.>iume of conduct by >peeif!c iiiiliviiluaN; the Defense Department und the Slate Depart men) seem to have developed a pattern of conduct u h i i l i accepts the conecpt that the exeeiitive branch i- entitled to and should conceal facts uhieh an* unsupportive of executive bram-h pojicy. In recent weeks, for example, the executive branch ha* refused rc|M-nted rfp:<>tti from my offic" to rcle*c .>.tatitic>,on the follouing: i J; The number of ampu.i-i oi.ûiillie.s in Vietnam; i'J) The numlM-r of deuth from overu^* of drugs in Vietnam; M) The nmnU'. of Laotian village^ deMroved by Air Force luiinbing. Tlie-e tire not Ktnljsljc- ( h u t necil to IM- vulhllelil from the N'orlh \'ieiiuitii''<.e or I'alhet Lao. The piiriHtM 1 in concealing these stnlisfjcf, can only IM- ( h u t ihcy might eau*c llw Amerinin (M-ople and ih- Con-
C09
demand a more rapid withdrawal from Soiithcal A>iu than the aiul State Department* feol is appropriate to tho Nation's !>e>t interests, Sueh cnncciilmcnt, tin' <lolil>o.rato withholding of information from t!u> C'onsrejw*. presents u. prtve constitutional qiu&tion as to whether the li-âtive dranch oa* (rfo|ieiiy |M?rfomi its* own legLslativ n^|K>nsiliiliiira. I'mltT the I'oustitntion, we in the Cotign*s have the solo JK>\VT to declare war; we (uiul tin- Manding Anny. hut for a JK-riotl not '2 yi'iirs: wo iirU* HOIIM- of HoprojftitativM who fu-c fur ror'-ction ovvry 2 ytrs must bo initiHU* th rviMu Ail of llit-.M- |>rovUins won? dourly ittlomhtl by iho frainers ot tluv ''iiîitiitiot: to frivo Confines tlic fontrolliii>r K<'i-ion-- in inattors of \viu- uinl IMMI-I-. Wi- make tin* Invvs; I lie IVfsiitfiit iu (\itiuiiuiutor in Cliiof cnly rxor.uios> llnisi'iaws. ' If < *oii!friis> i to r-mkr wwo ilorUions. ho^'i'Vi.r, \vr must lo fully itifi>rni< % (,l. \Vi; cannot aiilhoriw u \\ur \vitliiMit~iwiitploU* infonniition; we >lu>iilil in>i |M>nnit a \vur.to cuntiiiito without rurnpirto information. Against tliis liiu-kproiitul, I uuuUl liko to Upril>' tin- four sjo'itk fiiciiiiil Mtimrions uv obsvrvefl in Sotithonst Asna nd 4urli Var ii|>on tlit- Joi-iMon to cut off iumliii]; for the \vr \\hirh U now Iwfoie
r>IV4Tlll'TIf>V O/ 1IAVI.KTS or V I K T \ A M
A \i';ir njro, 1 ri'porictl to thi contniittit' tlmt in <>tu> of Vic.tnuin's 44 province*. Qnuii)r Nam I'rovim-e, 307 out of'.r"i5 htiinlct^ h>wilcun ili-xtrovril by AiiH'rifaK fon-i-s. On our IIHR.; n-rvnt vimit. C'on^n-ssinan \Vuldii- iiiul I vishotl i-itics and lmnilcf> in each of (lie six nnrl hornrnost I'fovino^ of South Vietnam, from Qiiur./Tri ju^t south of tin- DMZ do\\u ID Binli l):.i\\i \\Vronfjrnird that the piiilcni of -dotnirtion in (jiinn^ Nu.ni Proviiici- was not uni<(iii*. In nil si:; of (tut northern 1'rc.viiu-c-s. -,\ I- lU-w ovnr va^t arâs when* only h'd^rrows rornnin to iiulirate win-re liinnlred-> o' I houMtnU- of pcoidc once 'i ved in <piiel rural villap*, It npf.H-iir-i I hut at leant half of the hmnloU in these six Provinces havx been driilx-niti'ly (te^troyed by American (ire|><nvr r. In our êiil i' ocparate. the pinrrillu from hU bu.se of uj>jM>ri in the cininlrvîiU. it. iippcur-t ll-ul we have acc-omnli^hed ihe name "wanton <|e^t ruction of nlltê>" and "for<*ible relocation of civilian pujiulation' (ht we expre^rtly defined tind dcnonnccil ul N'nriMiiberj; as a crime utiniiitrl. 'inminiUV. a definition of criuie which we likewiM* in.-isted lit N'nremhef^ should lx> ttpplicahje lo uli nudoi.s. not juhl Na/,i Germniiy. I coultl liul no American olfircr or .->tateman, from Ambasoiulor Bunker on ilovvn. who could leli uie />f any oii,iili>r>il ion Kiv**>' by A'ljeric^n dci-i>ionniakers to the i|iirlion of whether we ouraelve*, in oiii1 j'r'-li and de-troy, free lire /JMU- poliriex. IUK! not violated our own war crime precedent* iînblished at Nuremberg. \Vor^' \vi. Americttn olficcm ii.-.ijrtu-d to brief ns <>r to /-wort our in|Nu-.tioii trip either did mil know, or cho*e deliberately to 'onceal. the fuel dint American force.-, uiul American firejiowcr hwl detroye4l the hamlets in îicnti(>n. I would like to cite oiu> specific example of thi*. In Tluiu Thien Province, tin.) it the M-cond Province (Urtvn from (lie DMZ, tviul I h*
610
eitv of Hue is located in that Pro\-inr.c. we flew over the lovely river valley of the Sofx Bo Rivor. I would like to show that on 'he map, if I may. Mr. ' hairmitn, the Song Bo River Valley is this river right here. It flov s down to the Gulf of Tonkin to the right. Thecilyof "Iue if. off '.ie map to the tight. 1 want to locate two specific spots on this tunp. Ve have photographs of both areas, one. is the hamlet of Ap Thanh Tan. ami this is a l-to-50.000 military contour Jimp. These little squares represent homes, which indicate that a village or a hamlet is within these areas. The refugee omp that .ve visited later, Xuan Ixx- hamlet is located at this end of the country approximately 17 kilometers to the north.
HAMLET CHIEF'S RECOLLECTION OF DESTRUCTION OK XVAN LOC HAMLET

We flew over the lovely valley of the Song Bo River, noticing the burned out hedgerow* of dozens of hamlets now surrounded by overgrown fields in what must have once been productive rice paddies and orchards. We flew on some 20 kilometers to the tin-roofed refugee cainii located in coastal sand dune country where the refugees of one of those Song Bo iliver Valley hamlets. Xuau Xoc liamlet of Ap Thanh Tan village, were gathered to meet us. With a circle of American advisory term mcm!>ers, Vietnamese Government oflic.ial> and our own escort <>fiicois listciung. we were first told by the local hamlet chief through both Vietnamese and Amcricr.n interpreters that the hamlet, of Ap Thanh TIUI had IMVII destroyed by the Communists in May of 1969, aiul that his people had fled the village after th"ir homes had been bunied bv the Viet con?. That 1969 should be 1S.6.
The CtuiuyAN. 195fi.
Mr. MrC'LOHKEV. Ye, sir. The hamlet consisted of 128 families, of over 500 tottd population. We asked if Americans had u-skwlthc people to leave. The answer wa> "No." *.W askeil if American troop* <>r planes 'jul fired on the village; the answer was "\o." We asked if the people ever returned to the hamlet to do honor to the grave* of their ancestors. The answer was "No." l;nder repeuUul questioning, tin* hamlet chief insisted (hat his people had moved out of the original village voluntarily and thut 1T.S. iroons hail helju-d them to move. A number of Vietnamese police nt<K<J behind the chief a> lie talked, mid llii! Vietnamese and American adviser* and escort officer* lunldci] approvingly, or remained silciit as this story unfolded.
HO LK'S BEfOu.MrnoK or i>t>TKrrriox OK XVAS I**- HAMLET

A-> we (xintinued questioning the chief in the ceutfr of a group of perh,ip* I (Ml listener, -i noiulcst;ri[>l *orl of fellow HI a MMiiimilitary ntufonji wandered over and nuide a few liitigiiing comments to one of our interpreteri-. It turned out lii* iiHiuc-n-uh Ho Iv. the a^MMant platoon lender of the I7lh Popular Force* Platoon which o]H-rated in tin- uru. Hr> \t- !nnJ far different recollection of tlie destruction of X'jHti LW hamlet. The VtcLc.orig lui'l CM'cnsidiuillv conu> to the village ni 'litrht. but in Mivy IWA't, ruuri'ii., oi the .'{J Nfurine Division had ordered tin* o V* !i:v<>. Tlir-reafUT, the mariiip burnnl the village to tlut
611
ground. Ho Le stated be liiul participated since 1065 in military alterations iu Tliuu Tliieii Province and that hi* platoon hiut been to the second battalion of one of the marine regiments operating in the urea. He slated uneauivocally that the Vietcong hud Dot bunted any villages, uud that uo homes had been burned until the mariiu-s ordered that the villagers move out, at which lime the hamlets were burned down by the ni&rines. Hud Ho I.o not. volunteered this information, I am absolutely satisfied that the U.S. military and civilian officers assigned to our party woulii have permitted us to leuvc the area with a wholly false impression of the liistorv and circumstances of the |eople of this one small hamlet in Thua I'hien Province. At least one of those officers understood and. sj>oke Vietnamese. Upon completion of Ho IJ&'A account, no Vietnamese or American present suggested that he had been incorrect in any deiail. If the ea-v of Xuan I AX; hamlet us described by Ho Ix is typical of the hundreds of other hamlets which are now completely destroyed and abandoned, then Aniericn ha* deliberately perpetrated a violation of -tbi- Nuremberg principles which is far graver in its scope and the ii'imlMTs of iMJople affected than was the evacuation of northern Nor-wav-for wluch 4ien. Alfred Jodl was seuteuced to xleatk 25 vears ago. /f the rhainnan is familiar with General Jodl's case he will recall he moved a hundred thousand people out of northern Norway, burned down some 30,000 homes because of the danger that urea would support partisan activity or possible commando raids. We sentenced him to death as u definition of this crime against humanity of forcible relocation of civilian population and wanton ilestructii u of home..'*. 'Hie sr-c.oid section of my testimony relates to the deslnu,rion of the village* of Laos.
WITXrsc' 1MTXKKT IX L'.H. I-OIJt'T TOWARD VHJMifM IX I.'OK
In view of the American policy of destroying vilhge..* in \ ietnani, I 'ongi-ciuuniui Uiiliiic uud 1 w>re interested in osccrtainiriT U.S. |K>licy truviird villngo* in Laos. Af<-.ordinjr to ex-Ambassador William Sullivuti, orn 3.500 villages om-t; <'"ist<fd in the northern and eastern (wrtions of Laos which have been i-oiilc'sUnl or under Puthet Lao control since 1962. Prior to our visit to I.HO*. we had received some harrowing reports of lienvy iHtmbing of the** villager, and from Government documents hud ascertained that nearly 700.000 out of the million or so original inhuhiiunts of tle*e villufres hud beeûne icfugees during the puxt 10 yenr>. We were further advised that in 1009 ami 1070 we had dropped nearly 1 million ton* of l>ombs in IM:I*, nearly twice the total of the prior 2 year*.
!TATEMKXT OK VM. OKKICIAI.S CUNX'KKMXri IU'WTIirtTlOX OK LAO
We uuesUoneti both Air Foice and Sl.ate Department official* on (hi* subjeel ut lldoni Air Forcj- Dux* in Thailand and at the U-S. KmbuM^y in j,uo>>. We were av*ured by Ix^tli the c.onntnding gisieral of the |.{th Air Force, Major Genera! Evan*, uud by Amhaiwudni (iodlcy in Vw-ntiune that we are not. nd have not bombed villuges
G12
mul I lint to thoir knowledge y villages that had liwu hit were hit by miMake. Ambassador Sullivan luui teMifii-d liefore the Senate Kefu<:e Subcommittee a year ago. indicatin;; thai only eight village.hatt been hit by mistake iit tin* 4Jj years he had served ill Jlaos. letininatiiu: iu March of 1900. Both Ambassador Gotlley ami General Kvans s;ated that all targets in Ijios Itail to \n- approved by tlto Ambassador. or bv I'nited Si.ates-I.ao aerial lire control tennis in
On I lie evening of April 13. at a dinner at the home of Ambassador fJodley. \\e \\ere told by various ranking country team officials. in tiie presence of both the Ambassador anil Deputy Chief of Mission Motiteagle Siearnc* that (I) \ve hiul not bombed villages except by <M-cit>ioitttl mistake. (2) no survey* of refiiiii> altitudes hail IMM-II made lccaiiM> of laek of staff. ('<) iMxnbin^ u'a i-ertainly no more, than one of the factors, and certainly not a major fti'-Uu in causing refnpf> to leuve their IHMHO, and (4) neither the I'nited Si Hies nor Kovid l.ao Cioveniinent had forced irfngeo lo leave their homes: they left voluntarily. The dinner party lasted owr 5. hours, and we wen* rejiealedly iiiin'i| of the validity of the foregoing four point*. I think it fair to Miy that C'onp-esaUian Waltiie and 1 \\ont to lied thai cveninj: Ix-licvin^ that uc had been told the Iniili by sincere and dcdiotied men end I lint the rural villages of l,aos had not INIMI siibji-ct to dc'ilHTut' 1 I'.S. boinbin<r.
SI.-UMAUY OK KKVIT.KK OI'IX'- N>
i>-r>.
'-
On the follovx iiii; mo nin<r, \pril 14. ho-e\i-r, n \ounj: political of!;crr at (he Kinba^x Mated to i,. (hat a .summary of refugee opiniim> did <\i-t. lie unit \\iHi mi- to t( >t|lice of Deputy Chief of Mi ~ion Sd-arne* uhom I a>ked to >lui\\ m* the l''.-tiiin'ni in qiieîioii. Mr. Sh urnc* picki'd a heuf of pajx-rs off hi'dokjcufrd through them, mill finally haiidi'il them to ' u- ut my rc<juc>t. Thi-> re|H>ri v. M> e*ilitl'-il: 'Xii-ii^ Khouati*; i'rovincr I'li-fuireo in Vientiane Plain." and dated lu!>' I'*, IU70. Tin- report Miniin>iri/.c* the rc.-poiiM-s of <>\cr 2iM' refuêe>, from IKi >eparale villuê> in lli' I'lain of Jars nn-a. \\illi re>|H-ct to the iMdiiliinjr of their home*, (^nuiiti^ from pa</e>. '> and i> of the report and I Imvc u cop\ of t.lu- rejiort if I lie chairman CrrU it -IliMllfl IM- filed \\ith I lie committee The ClI.UKMAN. Ve.-. (.S-e p. ti'JU.) Mr. Mii'u>.*KKY. (jnoiin^ fn-ni pu^c? .* and ':
""' |>rirrlil of I'.Ml n i'Oiuli'Iil.o "aid Itu-ir li'Miw* li.ij IHI-II iLllluiX 4 Liv I In'
7i> |M ri'rut -uii) Ilir :iii:ick- took pl.tcr in Tli<- liomlMim i- flrurly I In- nin-C rniii|-llitii: n-tiftnt f<>r inovini:. Hul'i (lie fuel.- -taleil and the conclll-jiMi* ill MlM report, U4ldrc>M-d |HT.-(;M;I||\ lo Mr. Slrnrile-. l.iy (he U.S. Illforiilalion Service oil .liilv l, 4!t"D, are of course in Mpinre coutriulii-tiiiii to the testimony fnrni-lii'il the .'N'lUlle Refugee Silbeomillillce lust year, tt* \\i-\\ uinioii-i-lcni witli the fuel- ami opinion*, ex preyed MI poiitive|\ lo ii the previou- evening.
It i- <.lenr tlnii Mr. Slcarne deliberalelv inl-ridnl fo i;ive man VValdic und me u liv> than r-omplete picture of rcfnp'c
G13
and (tombing while \vc were in Lang. The Embassy prepared and gave to H, prior to .the April 13 dinner lis",ussious, \vhul puqiorted to.be rather a careful ."briefing book" on refugees. I Imve that briefing book in the same form at given entitled "C siigiv>sinan McCloskey"
Khouiuig ,-., ... ... ., learned from Mr. Albert on April 1G that Mr. Stcarncs had calked Mr. Albert into his office on the afternoon of the 13th, just prior to the dinner, and prior to the time that lie gave us this briefing book, and asked him if he was the one wh-> had prepared the rejxirt in question. Beating in mind that this rc|K>rt, and a shorter report of similar survey of refugee* ilk a more northerly camp, were the only such rcjtorts in (he Embassy's possession on the impact of bombing on refugee*, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Embassy did not want inqiiirii g Congressmen to learn any thing'about widespread botnbuig in 1%9, directed and controlled by the U.S. Ambassador. Th" omission of this re|iort from the so-called briefing was cleurly deliberate.
VISIT TO BAN KA NOA I i'.FfGEE CAMP
After finall.) obtaining |>osscs:.ion of the repoits in question at approximately 3 p.m. on the afternoon of April 14, we were able to visit one of the refugee camps, Han Nu Xga, located alwut 40 kilometers north of Vientiane, on the morning of April. 15. We were accompanied by four interpreters, including two, Ucvcrcnd lioffe und Father Menger, who hail been (icraonally recommended by the Ambassador as unbiased. We talked to 10 separate individuals and various groii|>s of refugees who had come to the camp fiom at least seven .separate villages in Tas&cng Kjtl, OIK* of the administrative sectors of Xieng Khoiiang Province. The refugees were unanimous in describing the destruction of every in;r|e home in each of UK* seven villages u here thev hnd lived. Thev Iwth T-U.S and jet aircraft, as well as the use of C'BU cluster bomb* and white phosphorous. In all but one of the vilh.gcs, the refugee* hud seen jicoplc killed by the air strikes, the mot numcroii.* being the village of Ha Phone Savanh, a village of .35 homes lierc niiu> were killed and 14 wounded. We itcrsoually oWrveil and talked with a number of people l>caring scars from CBU (H-Uct* of white phosphorous. In talking to the refugees, Congressman Waldie initially tiacd Fatlu-r Meuger a* an interpreter for the first five individuals interviewed. I ucd lieyerend Uoffi- and u ChincMc interpreter nariM'd Wong. After several hours, <ve eomiared unU> und found that we Mere receiving identical information from the refugees, nave iir<jnc rc|>ecl. The refugees interviewed by Congrc>*man Waldie said, as interpreted by Father Mcngcr, that Pathet Lao soldierrf were living in th villuges at (he tune of the air attacks. The refugee* with Mhom J talked, interpreted bv Keverend Italic atwJ Mr, Wong,hinted that the Pathel Lao were (.iliiuleil MJIIIC distance uvvuy from the villagcH, uith flu* clo^->l soldier^ being at least 5<H) meters uway and generally UH far as 2 or 'A kilometers uu u\.
014
We decided to exchange. inuu-pretera, although I retained Mr. \Youg to monitor Fathex MengerV interpretations, us we won- advised by several IOTA! (tropic accompanying u;-. that Father Monger had & reputation fur inaccuracy. Thereafter, nil persons interviewed agreed that Paihet l>a. >"Jdiars hud not been living in their villages. Most important, Congressman Waldie re-inter viewed one of the men who had fust staled, according to Father Monger, that the Pathet I MO lived in his village. This tiine the n-fuê was unequivocal in stating that no Pathet Lao lived in hi> village and that his earlier comments had been misinlerpretod. Tlie refugees coutinonly described the killing of their water buffalo, and (he fact that they hud to live in holt's or caves, fanning only at night when the bombing Ixx-ame so intensive in 1069. In only one of the seven village* had a refugee seen any visiting Pathet LAO soldiers killed by the bombing of his village; the soldiers were described us vUiting the villages only occasionally or as pssinj; ihmuph on the road. At one inUrview, the chief of Tassene K&l, the administrative area \vhcrc '.hcsc villnp's had lx-i>n locatea, volunteen>d the inforniatinii thai his Tassen,,' had been evacuated from the Plain of Jurs in early 1970 b<"'*us' they w-n- ordi-rtl t-o U'Jivc by the Proviucc Goven.or. V.S. |>Iiiiii-.s [inividfd the airlift capability.
.VI K KOUCK IIHIEKINGS
Tim Air t'ltrcr brii'linjjs from (w-iii*riil Evans and hi staff coni-lusivi'lv (!i>nion>trated b-.nh ilie imiiK-nsi- ureurary of tarpelinir ind U.aiLnjr, and aU> the volutniiioi^ itnd i:om|irclu:isive. aerial reconiiaisMinci- piiolo^;raj>hy \vhich prccudc^ and follow^ bombinjistrikc.-). it i.- clenr that the Air Koivi> i.-. only fulln'.viiii: order*, and that nil targets arc cleared asid upproved by ilie Str.ti! Depart ineiit.
PAKTICI;I.A)H'-V WHICH WITNESS WA.S MI.-JI,KI>

With rcfiTi-ncr t< the forrzuinjr fact-., it is dear that the Embatov i'lli>-iiil-, on thf iti^ht of April K5 di-!ilNTati>ly tuisU;d Congressman \Vnltlii- nml nii; in four jtarticiil-jr.--: I. Altiuvu^h tlicv denied it, txinacridenial boinbing had taken pl.ic4> in nonliiTti IMI& iliirins; 19(>'J. '2. At lea!>l 76 (MTWHI "f <)(' .siimll village^ had i)uon hit by such 3. Kfporu had been mad'1 and uctv in the possi!S!>ion of the Emba.s.-v. showing that bombing wa cluurly the most compelling reason for refugee.-* liviving ilicir lii'iiic.,, 4. Some of the refuse-* hud movi-d bei-jiuw of the direct order* of the Uoyul Jântian rmvernmi-iii, i.i voluntarily, and tranxpurtation \MIS furnislicd by I'.S. nirrmft.
li is rl.-iir ( l i n t I'litsti-r I luin I)-- M ; I < ! l i i ' < - illlo^pllorl><la wcrr iiM-d ngjiiirsl ||n- civiliini jiiipiiiu 1 1 . '/f u f i i i i i i l n u i t l l whulii l i n - I'nitcd Stsiti-H tin-, not i!i'r!:!iri| \vnr. '!'!>' linnibing 'AH-. d'HJi 1 nmii-r l i e - iliri'riinii n'ld ciintrol nf t i n - Stiih- | ) c j ; j i r i i n < > i t f . Hoi the U.S. Air t'rre. Itt.ili ( I n - i ' \ l i ' i i t nf (hi- tn,:\\t..nx -irni i'- i i t i j / i n ' i oi: ilie ' i v i l j u i i |n,|iip|uli'.li iif l,iiii-. ^ ilrlilii'lMli'ly r,n;irr;,|i'ii iy I in- .>;:i'i' I )eiiiirl!ll"l)l I"1i w t - r i i ' I n - jHM'i'Ml Jul> IM, ll>7", w l i i ' i i i l i r p-fiiir'-c M-jior! iv .eiiii:pli>ii>d, t i l u l .\|>iil l i t , H 7 I , tthi-ii i l l - ' iv;...rf Mil- r r l i p ' l n M l v h i i t n l . - i i , < ;.; In
I>':;>'i!'. < 'Jiii'f of Mi-îdij .^H-iir'.ii 1 - iii V
615
REQUEST FOR AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF ACTIVE VILLAGES
On April 13 and 15, this was U|x>n going to Vientiane .and leaving Vientiane, I was privileged to meet \viJi Major Gencrai Evans, Commander, 13th Air Force., and on April 16 with Major General Hardin, Vice Commander, 7th Air Force. General Evans confirmed to me that i he rules of engagement in Laos required that no bombing take place wilhiu 500 meter* of an active village, an active beLig defined as ou tint. At tlu> April 13 meeting, 1 circled eight villtgt-s in northern I.aos at run.loin mid asked fur aerial t>ht>tograr''is of such villages. General ICvans said lie would be glad t have such photographs located and enlarged. On April 15, General Evans advised me that his staff hnd local I'd only two of the villages in question, and showed me two photographs bir.xvn up to ajiproximalely 24 inches square. Jt was clear from ihr phorogruphs, and General Evans confirmed, that these two villages were no longer in existence in the circled areas indicated. >. I might add wo were concerned for a while there w.cre also no bomb rr<itors in the ATCU. U'c realized the fact that cluster bomb* and. white phosfdiorous do not ten re craters and these \vere the weapon* that the villagers had describe*] to us a> destroying tilt- villages. I tisked General Evims fur the photogru|>hs and he replied that he would iirst. like in get prnnU-ion for their release, from his sii|ierior, Gem-nil <1ay, ComJiiii'ifU'r, 7'h Air Force, in Saigon. He stnteil lie wi fniny to Suigoti the following morning and request |>ermL*oii from General ('lay fr their release to me prior t*) my <Jiedute.l depiuture fn>m Saigon at 1700 the following day. April 10. On the niitrning of April 17, I called at "Hi Air Force Headquarters at Silicon an.I HI;.-, referred to Major Gcnend Hardin, who advised me that General Clay hat decided to refuse release of the pictures to me. and Mini I should request the pictures ami anv other Air Force data umj informitrioii from tin Air r'onv lini->oii oinW H'asliingtoit. I diJ this by letter to Maj. Gen. John C. Ciiraur **:'c of legislative liai.son at the* IV'iitiu." /i on April ID. 1971. Or A. -.. 20, [ j[;jnitU'd a list of 190 villr.fj "to the Pentagon, reqiie&tinir recent photographs tlwreof. By an curlier letter of Xfarch 17. 1071. to Genera! Giraudu, I had requested :i li-,1 of the villages in northern IMIH, which had been hit. by U.S. bornFw sincr such limbing commenced. T.) daU* I have ha/I no res|wnMve reply to these rcquekbt, save for the delivery of 12 phoN>graphs of Lnotiun village^ which were not inrlu'h'ij in tin; list of villages for which photographs u<-rc recjui-ated^. [f ( may intitrrupt {or a minute, Mr. Chairman, thesi; photograph* of viI|ugi-4 of Iâos are typical aerial photographs, they are cu.ty to obtain. The Air Force advi^g nx they have photograph*, of practically every .Allure uu-h of northern Ijutm and f tnink it in significant when they wni >K the photograph* of villages that arc still clouding in nortii.Tn Laos not one of tne 19G villages that we requested pictures of were included in thin list. Somehow the Air Force weened to believe t h a t if we Mere submitted 12 pholographs of other villngen that we would go away and accept the.ir xlufcirientM that (hey are not bombing .tllng'> in ii'iriln-iti IM:>*. I think (lint mil of nil of Mtis testimony mid nil of rlii, concern mid the coiiniersiatemctiN -* to whether villu^cn 1.11 vi- been bomlx'd or t;i. Mint 'lii- committee diia it within
616
its jmwer to enquire the U.S. Air Force to furnish tin" photograph* -of oven- village in northern IJHW and cerlatily uf tbcfe 19G on the list npttended to our request. and wo will learn once ami for nil whether the Air Force Ims l>wn bombing villages c- not. I dou't blame the Air Force for this. It appears quite appropriate to assume that the orders 4-ome from tin* Mate Department oi- the White House not. to release these photographs. The Air; Force has been quilt" eoo|MTutive at every stapo of the proceedings until tin* question r*mc of releasing photographs.
UESTUUCTION* Of LAOTIAN VII.LAGKS STtl.L OPEX TO
How ui&iiy of tin* 3.500 villup>s U'liind Put IIP! \A\O liiu-> Iiuvi> IMNMI di"tn)yi>ii by Atnoriot biuiibii^ U a nm.MT wliit-h is ;il| <>|H'ii to qui^tiim. This qiMvtiou can lio dctrniiini'd <jiiit- oasily, liowrvrr. if the Air Fonv will product' cnm'tit (ili'iiopuplis of these areas from its comprehensive tiles. The failure to produce thoc pliotojrrapJis. tinder onliimry rules if evidentiarx- law, can only he deemed to jirojtcriy raise the inference that the villages have indeed Ix-en destroyer. contnuy to the Ulemcits we nreiveil from State Depart ment ofTu:iul*. I niipht MIV that one Air Force officer with whom I dix u*scd tlii.-> mat ter at Udoni \vus a captain who (lew ucrial recomiai.vance missions. He showed me v here he had flown the jircvioiis day on a I -<o-.r(0.(NK) map similar to that on tlir Ixmnl. lie liiid Iloun 3() kilometeis. he Imd (town up one river valley for 10 kilometers, up another, and on a third, i uskwl him. "On the map, dtiilniu. there are some village*, tli.rs4- 111 tie sqi'.are dots lhaj indicate tiie villujres," ami J uslced iiim, "A>e tliose villajjes?"vand his rc.-|>ni>e to me was, "Mr. Congressman I have llown over northern iîim the last 4 mopths and 1 haven't seen a village." And un Air Force colonel u|i< a> pa^.-in^ Ity and made coiiinifiii "There juM aren't niiv villap-s up there in northern f,uo or the MHilliern purl1 of North Vietnam fit her, for tlmi matter." Tiles* slafements 1 iloli't U u l l l lo accept ll* precise but (he pholoP*aph- v\i ili'tenninc lliinHiiinlioii, mil if I he Congress is to know what the fact; re in Juos, I think we arc entitled to have these photographs. The whole ihniM of my rciiiarks, Mr. ChairmnW, i that w^ cannot make proper dcci.-iin* on the issue ! u inning or IHMD^ or lenvinj: thi war uithout ucciirate fuels from the mililury and the State. Department on I hi* kind of tin it-sue.
THE 19S* J>OI V I K T N A M TASK KOI(<:K Ti:V
Since reltiriiinjc fntn S<iutlieu>l AHU, I have Icnrncd ilmt in ItMiT, Secreinry McNainani n>innn*{inu-il n lu^k force within the Department df Defense In -lucly lhr> iliTiHuttlDllkitl^ proi-4>rs uhich hud ted to U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The study WHS in he i-((W[>rclicnive nnd tljcciivc, and refen-nces were miide tivtiiltible v^'ijcii incliid'-d till relevant DOD docinueiils suve ihone which were iiiiemllice nu'inor* solely within the While Hoiie il)wlf. From September \W\1 through An^nni t%K. I)()D |>eople in the Oilier of the Secretary put Uêtiier n ;M)-vitlmiie "iinl\ of the ci.-ininan<l decisioim which ted to U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The Htudv
U17
was cmitled ''United Stairs-Vietnam Relationships 1845-07" by the Vietnam Task Forre, Oflitr ,,f the Secretary of Defense. I am U|VIM<(! that the study not only details t i n - dccisiuiiiuaking prticrxiut tin- V>hite House-State Depart ment-DOD level, hut reveals a number ..f instances where I he public uiul tin* Con<*re**> were deliberately misled |>y (he executive branch us to: (1) TIII nature if tin* intelligence estimate available to the executive branch; (2) Recommendations made to the President ; C5> Plans and programs under consideration; (4) Decisions actually made; (5) U.S. purjHises and aims; and (i) Programs Iwiiifr conducted ly I lie executive branch Since the decisioimmkiu); | inn-ess covered in the sfudy ended in March I (H>S, there would x-em to Iw no n-u.-oti today, 3 yeiir> later, why such a study should n-inuin unavailable to ('< nj;rc. Recent books by To\vn<>rid Hitniics, and others, refer to much of the material contained in this study, and have quoted maiiy of the documents on which the study is based. Because the deception of the CongiVss aHeêd to have b?n sot forth in this studv is consistent with the deception descrilM-d in sections 1, II. and III of this testimony, I would ir|>ect fully rcqi >t tlib* committee to reijiiest the delivery of <uch study for concessional review. I would further request thai this committee invotiâte the matters referred to in .section* I, II. and III in this statement.
I.\qUUy AU'Jl'T PHOENIX PltOGKAM
Finullv, if I niuy. Mr. Chainnan. I would like to dix-u briefly similar deception that occurred in Vietnnm when wi- inijiiircd about tln> Phoenix pnâm. The Phoenix pro<;rnm i.- the turret nacificati'.m pro^rnm this year in Vietnam. One American officer told u.- tliat it was an American constructed program uiul IM-CUIIX- the treatment of (he prisoners t h n t we captured and turn oter to the Smith Vietnamese Ciovermi ent under the Phoenix proj.Tum relate> to the (ieneva Conventions and because of 1 1)'.- need to protect our POW's and seek Geiieva C'onvenlioii protection for them in North Vietnam. I would like, if I ILUV. to briefly discuss this matter before yon. I would firt like to refer to a document. "The (ieneva Convention Relative ui ill- Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12. 1949." We are u Mihscribcr to article II of the fjcncva Convention and one of the acts |>n.|iil>ited by participant* and signatories is ihe pu*in;r of sentences and tin- carrying out of extMitions without previous judgement pronounced lv reûlary const it nl'd roiirls, according to nil the judicial guarantees wliicli are r.-ci^ni/j-d as indispensable by civilian peoi>lei>. In reflect to the (ieneva Convention I have a second document, a copy of a letter from the I'.S. Mission to Internuiional Or;rani/tioiis. Geneva. ."twitMTluiiii dated I)<.....mlx-r?, I'J'O. finned by Jdur Rim.-tiul, Anilm>-Hi]'>r. On I In- heeoiid \>uw of tliin letter, which concerns i III and the iirtsiirmiri's of ilu; IJiited Stair* that we 4 re coi with tlu> (ji'nefa ('onvention, thin paragraph ti|peur:
With n-'iH-i't l tfoiith Vifinanii'M* riviliuix ra|turf(I liv t'.fi. force* uiifj irir -rn-rl ly I!JTIJ to tln< milln>ri(v "< >li'' Jt"|"illu' of Vicinutii, the t'nil>-(J Slut>lliut it hut u n-id'iul r'-|irn-ilility t>> wurk wilh tn
CIS
Covvrnmmt of the Republic of Vit-tnam to <cr that U 'irb civilian n- treated in accordance with tltc requirement* of article III of thr Convention. TV- United Stute.i and the .Govemmviti. of the- Ue|>ulviu- o. Vietnam aiv working together to in.iiir.r fuillnwni of their
Now that statement by n hijrh ranking U.S. oflieiiJ to the IiilerRod Croxs in Geneva. Switzerland. to our ol>servalion in Vietnam is fiUse, because what is actually happening in the Phoenix proirram w that American advisers working \viih the South Vietnamese Government t\rv tai-grtin;: fome (53.000 South V"ietauni4ik' ei\-i!ins iH'licvrd to bo members of the Vicieoiif: infrastnieture. At every *tg,v of this proeeilure the .\inerieuiM advise South Viclnainoi- in lioxv to iiientify these iiulixiduals. how to rapture them, how to interrojinte them. nd how ultimately to senteiue them to whitt nmounis to life imprisoiuneitt.
tut.lional
PHOEXIX PKOCRAU PUOCEIHTltK
Xow this. Plioenix nro^TMii xvhieh i the tn,;et proprum of our effort in Vietnam lust- yenr was oripnully rei>reonttvj to u it.- entirely run by CORPS, (ivil o|HinLtioiis miii niri'.l ilevelopment support projn'Jini* And we irere shown "deceptive Imefmp ehurts, elinin of foiiiinnrid elmrtJ wh'u-h sliowed t every step of the proeediire (he profes.-ioiuil m'litury un<l State Deptirlment odirers of COKDS ml \ix-it mill font rolled the Phoenix procedure, Mid the proe^'Iure i> fuirly .-imple. If you run n soup-h and sweej> mission out in the rnuntrysiile or rnriioti mid ser.rch iMul yoi: surround i\ von trv 'o p>l nn infonni-r in thtit \ illume to sit in something tlint lMik> like >\ eliemieul toilet -vitli u .--lit i;i it uiid two men sttuul in that clie;iiic:il loile* hiddrii. u x-eret polii4- o(li"-er from the Vietncmee M-'TCL police, un.l the inf<miter, i-.inl us men liie by they ure identified by tlie infonuer >. poteiiii:vl Viclc.niir <.iispe> I. :ind thtit evidence, lli:it ln-iMViiy evidence, i* Miflicieni to CUIIM- llii> muii to \H" druwn into the proresw. So i'.l>o ci.n u nii'.ii lx> dru\\n in n :-. Viet<-oii'/ u-.pe<-t. if lie pushed out :i lenllcl or if he Miid xiinethin^ lUiinponisiic touurd the \ietnarneae fiovernnieiit in Snipiti or if one |x-rsoii <>r if one neighbor >u{r* (Tet> llnit he i* H poletitir.l Vie|j-on^ .-U.^pect. .A do.vii-r, mill they c:kll ii ;i do>.-icr. i-. then o|>etied on tiii^ iiulividuul. i.ml Aini'ri" ,'.:i m!viM-i>, ttdvj.M- in the |>rcpt.r.itioii of thut dossier. The Mi*pe< (. if upprelu-;iiSel either by >ur niilitury forers or by theiis ivi-tiie.; w i t l i our udviscro or in the police network, the u|>ecl is then turned over louii orptiii/nlimi eitlleil tli<- provim-i- i;;U-rrop'.lion (enter . privmer itiierro^(ioii center, thr word I'JC. Jn t-ffeel, PJC i- u secret, solitikry coiilinenieiit prison. The one (hut I HUM in Hiuli Dinii Province UH, con.-tructcil in the iu-.iiie of v\lm( tippe^red to be nit cm;>'y x'liool. if you l<i.>kcd :it it from tin* outride, it looked like u lot of vncr.nl .-,< lio'drnorii- Itcciiii^- u i i l i Aincriruii iiiê'iuitv we luwl built otit frîn i lie iuierior corriilor of the x IK*.! fn!.-. wulls .>o you hr.il i'. line n( 'l-\ j-,ol;'lii.ii celU on one side of tli<- tnii-rior of the Hclioo!, JUul tnreiTDûli'if- celU nil thr- upjiimitc .jde. Tli" procedniT i if n su-j,ec| d.ii1-. u.il ii;i%.- llifee item* of evidence iii In.- ( i f .T-.iiilleiciit t'l indicate i re:iî;i:ibie pfiilinitilii y tli-il li'- i-- u se'-uri'.v '-It i t i n 1 N i n t h Vietjuii-ii'-e ( i'lveniim-ir. . licit iirii\ iiiuni i-
019
sent over to the PIC, and for 46 days the South Vietnamese interrogators at the PIC arc entitled and instructed to extract confessions or other evidence from him sufficient to enable his ultimate conviction bv the Province security council. Now the Province security council is not a enun at all. It is made up of six out of seven members who cowe from either the jwUcc or the Vietnamese Army and it is presided over by the local Province chief, generally a lieutenant colonel in the Vietnamese Arm}'. An American advisor advises that Province security council. One voung major lold U.H he had been successful in getting them to upgrade their sentences from two and a half months average to 9 .nonths average in the 7 months he advised this security council. Worst of all about that Province security council is that once it >ciitenc.rs a man to detention, what they call* An Tri detention, he has no right to be released except vvih the approval of the Province military chief so in effect he is sentenced there to life as a result of this evidence. But the crucial fuel of tliis whole procedure which is advised, directed, and controlled by American officials is that in the Province - iniiirropoiun center they are turned over solely to the mercies of the South Vietnamese interrogators, men who are believed and reputed within the country by most Americans to practice brutality and tortun-. One American officer told us he had seen rubber hoses in the l*>3Citiion of interrogators. Another man said he had seen them issued to South Vietnamese intern>gators. rtioesix puocitAU UOE.H NOT COMPLY WITH GENEVA CONVENTION' Now this process docs not comply with any concept of the article II f the Geneva Convention about fuir trinl under the rule* of civilized jM>oi>lc because this program, American created and American controlled and now American directed and targeted, this program denies a man the right to counsel. it denies him the right to confront hU licenser*, it denies him inc. right to see the evidence before him. it denies him the right to even testify in his own behalf or apj>c*<r at a hearing which may sentence him to life. And this is the program that a full colonel in the American Army told us was an American-constructed program. Now this program i absolutely inconsistent with the representations vve have made to the International Red Cross that we are trying to u-vjsl the South Vietnamese to comply with the fair trial for all civilized nations.
iiCKi>EK or PKOOK is PHOEUIX PUOGUAM

I would like to define one final part of tlii< procedure that appears from an American dociuncnt. thev gave u The burden of proof in the Phoenix program, and I would like to n-Md this Ivruutx- this alone ii u significuJil denial of due proves* as any Ai >ericin concept knows it :
rvulcncr (nr Inol i lucking, Imt it IH n\ jiuri-nl Hint tlw u-|'i:l in u tLr< t to th'! tiulimiul wfuritv, the rriiriiitt''(' Tiny ini|>w*c u'lini
This ii> (lie An Tri prnnuncnt detention. This iiii-miti tiiu.1 not only do they have the right to do away uitli u ii.-jwrt on evidence in.iiifficient to -convict in court, but it gi\v them
Gi-n
tin* beautiful means of imposing |>olice state control against those who dissent .from the CJovormnent jmliey. lurause if tt nmii should come forward and want to run for the Assembly or the National Iôpslutun* or even for President merely by two or thnv |>eople giving hearsay evidence that this man is a susjux-tcd Vietconp he run be. imprisoned for lifo. i think it is significant that the man xvlu jran second for President 3 years ago. 4 years ago. and a Member of u-i Congress -or of tin; legislature is still in jail today under similar sit nut I ns.
'_ 1XCO.VMSTEXCV OK U.S. ACTIOXiS
N'ou-, I sngci'-it, Mr. Chairman, thai for Ainrriru to He t-ondnctin*; Uu bonihin}; in Iîos, ti> liavtvtli^stntyiililir villai>s >f S>uU) Virlimm. a-i I IIHVC d>sfril'il. to IM* rontiiictin;; thl< Phoi>ni\ iinûm as xx <!<) IfHiuy t! Hi these iif inronsUtonl with flu* goal:, and idealism thai must exist in America if wo are to have the faith of our |Mi|le in our C!<>x-eniment. The real issue t h a t is before I his eoimtry today is how we restore the fui ih of the |>eo|>le in our own (JovenuiK-iit. \Ve cannot do it in ruiidiic! i î>roirnim><f thia kind and openitiiuis of I hi,- kind abroad. Our youiijf JMH||I> will not htntHl for it. It is im-<niMstent wilhVxer>-; they have IM-CII '.Miipht ul>unt \\hnt thU on.iUT meuli>.
SKXATK AXI) HOl>B TAX EM> WAIt
I listened very carefully to Lieutenant Kerry's testimony In-fore this committee aeverul ueek> ao and e>sentiall\ vxliiil he uii> ii.-kin^' i> \x here are the lenders of Americii to restore (his country to its former rouls. I Mtpêsi. Mr. Chuinmin. that the lemlersliip can come from the S<-ntv'e and the Unix- of Kc|>rc*cntn(iv<s. \Ve cnn end this war in the i!c.\t . r > mof>ths l>y voiin<; tociit olf the moiie\ for thi* war \\hen thi>Mu|mrt|iriatioii bill* come In-fore us or when a continuing rexih.iinn is offered for us to continue the e\|M-ndiiure>. In my judgment, ue .-hould (ironiidly mi.' the Hullirld-Mcfiox'Tn iimeliilment, the 1971 DiH-npapeineH Act, not jil>l fr<-cuu.-e of the jiluniii.ii in Vietnam hut Ix'caiiM- we rtiimoi justify ihi> country toonrown |)c<Mle if \\e are pursuing |>ro<;rain.- .-urli u I have defined iinlu\ . Thank you. ^ The CiiAiKiiAN. Thank you, Congressman McCloskcy. Of coiir^-. I n^rec with that <unclu->ion. A you know we have IM-CII strii^lit,^ with I hit in the Senate and the only Ihit:^' Me lack arc voten. There will he un opportunity to vote on thin upuii very soon in (j>" Senate.
l.*fK OK I1K>I'ON>IVKXK!S OK IIOf-.K OK HKrHK-KN'TATIVKH
You jirompl me to a->k \oii the *iii< > rjuention I a>kei| C'onprcM.mun JiM'obs. U'hx \IHI think the House of Ki-pri-ciitiilixi> hits not beet: more re|K>iir>ive to u h - i t appiirently i> die I'lnm^cil view jiinj the predominant vicu of the country? Mr. M<< V-KKV. Well, Mr. Clniiniuiii, I t h i n k , niifor'.nDutely : * > n t politician^, in the Houc of KepreHi-ntutivex have become u profeoion ileiljcuted to our ovvn |HT|M'iiiution in office iiml, n* II. L. Mencken oiiresaiil, "every profe-.jon i a conpirnci apiin-t the publie." Until ibii yeur we have ilrlilwnitclx jirevenieii cnicisd voles from lieiii"
621
record \otes in the lion.*' of Represt'iitatiu-s. As you know, our procfiiitro over in thr HOIIM* is tliut hills conic out ol committees controlled hy chairmen utulT the seniority svstem. Those committee generally present hills so that any crucial issue will li:iv to bo offered as nn amendment to the dill itself and this is \\liat lias occurred until this year, when* Members- of tin- llousf of Representatives., choosing to \ote on crucial imiies on an amendment to a hill have loen privileged lo either a voice vote or, a standing vote or a teller vote none of which \\< re made pnhlic. uiul I think the chairman is familiar with the fact -that \vc don't (ten nit a JMTSOII to hringa pencil or pajx % r into the gallery of I'u 1 HOIHO of Representatives. Part of the reason for that is uppari-nily we don't w a u l reported lioiv we vote on voice or standing or teller voti**. Now this veer ftfr the first time the teller vote can'be made pnhlur upon request of one-fifth of the Members present and I think \\r are finally beginning in the HOUM- of Representative:* to fiu-e up to our The didiciiliy lui> |M>CI>, a> I think the chainnan Mated \vlien NIr. lacoh> was totifyin;;, tluil if you take n |M;>itioii on contnverMal isiUH--,, vou,' c-i)Unlilucut ace tiiont.* volOa on couLroviTi-iitl issues, and a certain r-lice of the pupiihition in its apathy or in its general approach to |H)litic> nuiv tiicreufter vote against tin* |H>lttician in question purely In-caiiê of that i->ie. If you CIMIIC out, for example, for a national abortion law, there \\i\\ 1>c Catholic> \\lio w i l l vote nirainst you for the rc-i of their livrr. IM-CUIIX- of (heir anta<oni-ni on t h a t i~>Mii . If you come out, say, to rxrliirtr eliiro|)factie from medicare ctivera<;e, the chiropractor.-* ami (heir patients will prolmMy vot- aâinxt you. and llii- is why our profe-îon o-eiiiN to have Mirroutulcd itself with the dc>iic to remain anonyinoiis on controversial iw.iio. I think it i* very M^nilicatM tliut MIU-. thi> Vieinam v.ar started the iImi-4- of ItfjireM-ntalive^ luio never held a r|iiare reconl voli- tif thi4> MemlxTi who approved of the continuation of the funding of the unr, and I look hack at (he roiiMilulional anlcceilenl-. It is quite i-lriir I tin t tin- framers of (he CoiiMilulion did not intend to (five to lite executive the (toner to di-clare war or to fund a siafi<ihi army. They pive it to the iloil-j- of Uepres>iilalive> lo iniliiitc lluoe ri'VeIlili 1 IlliMîire-.. They <;ave it lo the ( 'olIJTIVr.-. to ih'rlurr war iN-caU.oe ihey w anted lo keep t!ii> jiower in the l{epreM<n(a(ive-> cl"-"->t to (lie |M-o|ile. Iii my judgment, the HOIM* of Ucpre,<cntativcs ulniiculed I hut jMiuer with the f f i i l f of Tonkin re>r>liition. But when we n-jM-nled ill.- Gulf of Tonkin n--.oliiii(Hi tlien- can IK- no cxeii-c uhitts^N-ver for I in- iitninlenu:ice of the kind of war we have in Lao* and Cumiiodia li.|ay.
rilKMOKNT's K X T K V > I M \ OK W'.Mt AKTKIl ItKl'KU. OK T O V W I V ( i l ' I . K UKH(>l,fTIO\
Tliut ( l u l f of Tonkin rewilution anlhori/i'd the Cliief Hvecnlive to make wur in Soiiiheu-.! A*<ia. It wu- not limited lo jnt South Vietiiutn hut for, after tin- repeal foi. him to then yit iiiln I..jo>. and ('jimhodia w i t h a tlinii.-and plane* today, not jiNl the Ho Chi Mitih Trail hy iiorlhern I<afK and the I'ifli Nil I'a*. In :ny judgment, there i no ni-M' in hii.foi-y wlu-re when ('on^re?<x has not îvcn anlhorilv a J're<<id'Mil lui-. exieiiiled Iii- war powcr and M'nt troops into foreign conn-
622
"trios There arc 140 some instances in the history of this country \\hcro after Congress gave the President the r.uthority and then withdrew it, no American President has continued to broaden the . of warfare .v
CONS1DKBAT1OX OF DEBATE ON 1MPEACHJJKNT POWEB JUSTIFIED
Southeast Asia raises the consideration of that other historic provision the framers )>ut into the Constitution, and I have tried to quq'e Edmund Randolph on this. This is a debate on the impeachment 'tower. There were tuose who suggested that irajteacnment sliouki not be plaeed in the Constitution because we only elected a President for 4 yeari, and there was a little dialog between Benjamin Franklin niid Edmund Randolph on that subject, and he said:
Tbc Kii-cuUvc will hw great, opportunity of l**uing bis power pmrticularlv in time of WAT when the military fore-*- and in sotiio rwpcrts the pubJ'r money will br in hi* hunda. Should not rgiilr punishment be provided it will be irregularly inflicted by tumult* and insurrection^
And the impeachment power was then put in the Constitution. 1 don't view impeachment as being a necessary means of punishment. I new it as & constitutional provision to give the Congress the ultimate check and balance <*.i au Executive who might abuse bis powers. In my judgment since January 12 when the Gulf of Tonkin resolution repeal was written into law, the President of the United States sole powers in Sou ill Asia have been the protection of American lives of men remaining ii; Vietnam. He has that right and lie has that duty. But to say that right and duty also entitled him to Lave B-52 bombing in northern Laos where no American lives are risked save {jerhaps CIA. agents who advise the Meo tribesmen, to day his power extends to massive bombing of north Laos or to provide close air support to Cambodia, CO miles from Laos, not on supply lines coming to Vietnam, to <>|x;u up a road between two Cambodian cities is btretching the Executive's power and Congress should speak out and say if he wants to make war ill Laos and Cambodia he should come to Congri-bi f'>r thut supinjrl. The CUAIBMAV. Tt.at i> a very interealiug statement. You knov. inij>eachmeiit proceedinp* have to originate in the House. Mr. ilf^JLOHKEV. Weil, I don't want t suggest it. [Laughter.] I don't *~aut to buggcnt im|M'urhmentf St>nutor, and I don't advocatt; ..npeachinent until tlic Hounv luwts its own rejion.sibiiiues which arc to determine wbetlier or not to fund thi war, and we boj>e to have thut vole by June 30 and I \in\tc there will lx> such an out|K>uring of (tublic opinion to the Cougre** that we will vote to rut off funds and get 'v'r>'botiy out i*y thf cntl of thin J'ear. Tl CHAIUMAN. Well, Mr. Congressman, your conclusion is vciy ;;r*u*ir>ivv. Vou huvi* given us a lot of new material. It is difTi-rent l, from firHthaiid obs4>rvution, which we have not had.
KEQLT4T TOR JVrOKMATTOV YttOJt SUXKTMir Or DTJtXUt
Vou have rained one or two que.itiout, particularly by yti^r reference to tiiut hludy. It M> Jiuj)|KJiis that I, a chairman of thin cotninittee, hiivc rwjucxU-d already in a formal letter of Anril 30, to the Se<-retary of Di'fonstf, Mr. Laird, ihree pruidpal item*: The command and control
G23
study of the Gulf of Tonkin incident: the 5-year plan for the military a.H3Htanr<> program; and the history of the U.S. decisionrnakinp: process on Vietnam oolicy from December 20, 1969 to July 21, 1970. The last one WHS the o'ne vou referred to. Mr. McCLOSKiv. No, sir; the one I referred to a study that went from 1945 to 1%7, and it id so entitled. My testimony is precise on that. TJhie CHAIHMAX. That is the saoie thiug though. This is part of it. . Mr. McCLOSKKr. Well, that study was made in 1967 and 196S so it can't hare any reference to recent" decbaonmakinp. The C.HArRJiAN. It is a continuation, I will say, of the stme type of study. Mr. McCLOSKEY. I see. I have uo knowledge of it. (The letter referred to follows:) UJS. SE.\ATE,
COiHIITTHE ON FORCIOX RfcLATtOXS,
^ \\~aihingtan, D.C., April SO. 1071. Hon. MCLVIN K. LAIKD, Srcrrlary ef D<-Jeturt H'aikinytan, D.C. DEAK MIL Stciu.TAKv: As a former niyinhyr uj ;>.. legislative Branch, I >iu ure that you understand the need for Congress to have acce*i to report*, words, and other ifonnation in the possession of Executive Pranch department and agencies to'enable it to cam- out its Constitutional responsibilities. Piwidenl Nixon, a did President* Kennedy and Johnson before hiu, recogniied the uhportanco of CongreM' right to obtain Mich information to tfic proper working of our system of check* and balance*. On April 7, 1069, be 'ro> to Conjrwinnmn John E. MW Chairman of the Foreign Operations and G weramenl Information Subcommittee of the House CommttUii; on Government 'jperation*, that bin ". . . Administration was dedicated to insuring a free flow of information to the Congress . . .," *nd slated that the doctrine "executive privilege muni be very narrowlv construed" and "will not be asserted without specific Presidential approval." I aclosr>, for your convenience, a copy of that letter and his memorandum which spelled out the procedural steps for invoking "executive privilege." On a number of occasions in recent year* the Department of Defense has refused to supply the Committee on Foreign Relations with specific reports and otb/.-r information, such as the following: Mi n Nlinil
TMkM lutl p>.4. 1KI. Kir S. IH. It* U. 1*71. . . .
(MM*
"ceini4trl ta k* dcin**r-"iMMrapfi>l *to it ailwJ* Ik* Lucwtiy* tiut* " . Itgn tot n t "tMtalw* pUuwif dKsb* oxHiwf to ft mlonjl inutnt le
|4f* lor tt mfcttf r mettoH Jw* K. UM
HiJtrr *f US d4i()i-skinf pricru Dn. IMt.luIr?!. 1)73 .... "
"
nun
"
lii none oi tlf intanceji where the ('ouimilttrt1 hui> l>-cii di-nied urenw to report* or document' hit* tin: doctrine of "executive privilege" Ix-en formally invoked through th'- procedure outlined by Prividi-ut Nixon. The growing prortice of depurtmiMit* and aKi-ncic-* to refu<w to provid<- inforiiuitioii to ('oiitrcHHiorial committ/vv, without the President claimiiiK executive privilege, is u dangerous trrud wliirli erodes the autLority of Cougren and fhn-utcn* to exuci-rltttb' further rnJntion/4 \M-lw.t-n the two tir*iicbe. I do not lirlicvr thai a no-in:ui' laud *i>iiciTliing ('oflgreî'ii nght to ax'ceim should exi*t. I, 1therefore, respectfully rer|ijet that citljir tin* (k>ninutiee be furnUlwid with th' doruinetits lifted or tluvt the President formally invoke "exerutive tirivilege" iu authority to withhold thecn. Anotuf-r facet uf tliin getieral prril>|eni relate* to the right of own* of th<' OcoeraJ Acrountiiig Orfin- to record" and iaforiuation from i*e|iaitnt<iit and etirie<. For example, laot year the Committee aked the General Accounting Office to make a detailed study of the u*e of rw< materials iu the Military Ap>iUuire
C24
Program. It i- my nndrr-taiidiiiit that odort- to |rrform thr ,t:idy liavp i::iin|>en-d by the rriiictanor. nnd i-omctimn rvfiionl, of Deiwrtmrnt of Dc oRti-e- in \\a-hington nnd ovcrx-a,- to pvr the (JAO aiti>.- tn rrcord.* and inforin.-tuon |HTtinifit to thr -tudy. In (jmr>, for example, the tJAO .-ought to obtain arrr-- to t'.S. forcr objrotivi>, liM* of Military A.-*iMancr Program np|>orted unit', and equipment allowance data, all of whirt are nooded to comply with thr Committee'- rrqu>. Thr GAO staff was advi.tod by official* of thr Joint I'nited Stnti-o Military Aid Group, (.in-ere, that th> Kuropraii Command had prohibited thr rrlra.r of inih-t of thr data n-qiie-ieil. and that, in x>nuin^l.tnci--.. in-trnrtionx for thr prohibition ramr from thr Olftt- of thr A..Utant S-ci-i - tary of I)rfrn.x-, Intrrti3l: uinl Srctirity Affair-. Fiirthrnnorr, I wan advi.trd tli.tl (lie KrtiiTal (irol'lriu of (i\(> avi to l>r|>artinriit of 1 )rfnw rrrordi and iiiforiii:ition ha- wor-rtird in thr |>a-t year, -"(Kfinlly in ra-r whrrr th<: (iAO h:>- Ixiii on ti--itainiciit- rrqui >trd by thi- Coiiinn'ltrr. I uni di-<tiirt>rd by thf f.irt that thr tiAO'- n-virn- i-fforl- hnvr IHUI hiii|M-rrd by drlay.- and rrfiral!< by ollirial- of your Drpurtni'iit. Tlir n-fu-ml of departim-nt* nnd aR'iicii'S to jyx-r thr < 1 \l) nrcr.-.- to rti-rdi-d information i thr .Nimr us dniying tlml informal ion to thf CiiiiKrr-4. I uoiilil appnTialr your Kiviuc tin- Coiiunittii- y<n:r view* on thr arcoss probli-tu in K''tirr:il, u-i writ a- advi.iinK inr if rxrriltivr privilctcr i.- lx*ing iuvokrd by the I'rr-idcni a- authority in \\ithhold tin: document li-trd. Sinivrrly your-,
J. \V. Fl'LBIIICliT,
Chairman.
Till: U'lllTK lloI'KK,
Wnhinglon, D.C., April 7, /9fffl.

ll'lll J l l l l N \':. MllS-.
Chai/iiinn, r'or.ti/n Opirntiiin* tin,I (larrrnmmt Information Kiiheommitlrr, Hfiunr of Hil^fttrntntnr*t ll'iivlt'nyhin, /).('. l)i \i: Mi:. CIIMIIU i\: KIIOWIIIK of your intrrr-t, I arn -riidiciic you a copy of a nii-tiior.itiilniii 1 havr iurd to thr h.-utl- nf rxri-iitivr di-purlinriit.- and -IH-UIIIIC out tin- i>r,M-.'<l:ir;iI -to|r to )f.nrrn thr iiiviM-ation of "rxiftitive iinriiT i hi- Adiniiii-lratioii. A- jon wrll kn<)\v, thr claim of rxrnuivr privilrsi- ha- ln-'-n t!ir -*ubjrrt of much ilrl>ulr -inrr Cicorifr M'n-linictoii tir-l d-flarcd that u ('In.-f Kxmitixv liiu-l "i-M-rri-i- a di-rrriiitn." I br!ii".i>. ainl I havr -lat.-d rarlirr, that thr -rojK 1 of rxifiilivr ,>risiL-w iiiu.-t IKMTV n.irniwlv i-iin-trtii-d Cnilrr I hi- Admini-t ration, rxrcuiivr priv ili-gr will not ! a-vrlr I witlintK -(n-rilir I'rr-irit-ntial !i|]ir.ivul. I want to lakr l l n - it|>|Miriiinity to anrr V" 1 :>d your roniiiiittr>- that t h i A>li;iiiu-:r:itii)ii i- rb-iiinit*-il In in-iirini: u frrr How of informal inn lo tlu- CoiiKrr and lh" IH-H- nifilia and. lli't-, l tin- i-iiin-n-. You nfi; I am >urr, familiur w i l h ilu -laii-inciil I madr on I hi- -nbjrrt durum I he ruinpatKii. Now thai I havr thr ri--|Hiii-ilnlilv to nnplrtiii-iil tin- plrds(r, I ui-li to rrattirm m\ inu-nl to do no. I Haul o|H-n Koxrr;uiu-nl to IK- a n-alits in i-v.-rj way |>i!>!'. Tin- Aiiniiiii-tration ha- aln-ad> K' V I'|I po-itnr rinpha-i- to frrrdom of inforniaiixu. I ain i-oiiiinilti-d lo rii-uiinu that both the Irld-r uttd -pint at thr I'ublif I;, i-i.ril- uill In- nnpli-iiii-:iti-'i tliMuuliout thr ilxi-rutivr liranch >>f thr |(ov>-ruuu-nt. With in\ )_.: VM-lii Mlll'iTi I v . N'MI.N.
M MU-II -24, I'M'.*.

M l U O I M M l f M roll T i l l H> M'.* OK I ' l K M ' l r i V I I f l . P M l T U f StTfc AJ.i Ao>.it ll.Jt
' l.-iiibli-hinu a I'riH-rdnri' to 4>ovrrn ''ompliunrr w i t h ('. iiKfxionul J)<'iiuintl for Information; Tlii- pnhry of t i n - Adinnii-lr itjon i to roinply lo Ihr fullr<t rxtrnL w i t h < '.inifri-piionul rrc|i|i-*l for inforinution. While Itu. 1 Kxi-c-iiliM- Itrunrh IIUH the n > p o n - i l l i i i >< uiihlioldinK n-riuin information llw dux-loinrr of whirh would In- i.....irii|'uli1)l-- w i t h the public inieri-i. Tin- Adminiitration will involltr tin:niihont\ onl\ in (he nn>i i'oni|x-lliiiK 'irruiuxtunreK and after a riKorouH iiufiiiry i n l ' i Ihe arliiiil need for it- rx'-rri-e. J-'nr IhoM reuHonii l.xi-fiilive privilrtci* will not U- ux-i} ivitlioul |H-c-i(n- i'remdentiul approval. Tlw> foll'/ttiuK )ri'i'durl c'i j" M i l l iin\rni the inv'H'atioii of J'ixeriifiir 1'finli'K 1 ':
625
1
1. If thtt hear of an Executive department or agency ^hereafter referred to an "department brad") believes that compliance with a request for information from a CoagrcMional agency addressed to hi* department or agency raino* a substantial question as to tbe need for invoking Executive privilege, he should consult the Attorney general through the Office of Legal Counsel .of the Department of Jurtice." 2. If the deiiartmcnt head and the Attorney General-agree, in aceprdanrc with th< polity net forth above, that Executive privilege hall not be invoked in tbo ciruunitancc, tLe informaUon shall be released to the inquiring CongrcMional agency. 3. If the department head and the Attorney Oocral agree that the circuniHtitner.-i jurtHy Ute invocation of Executive privilege, or if either of them believes that thr imiw> should bo nubmitted to the President, the matutr nhall be transmitted to thr CouMei *o the President, who will advinv tbe department bead of the President's decision. 4. In the event of a Presidential dneimon to invoke Executive privilege, th de|iartniciit head should Advise the Congressional ageury that the claim of Executive privilege is being made witii the tpecitic approval of the President. 5. JVudiug ft final determination of tbe matter, the deprtnii-iit head should nxjueKt'tho Congrewioual agency to hold iu demand for the infoniiation in abeyance until *uch deterniination can be niadc. Care nbU b< taken to indicate that tho r>ur])OM' of thin requetit is to prot<-Ct the privilege [>ending tbe detennitiation, and that the nxjutut docs not crmntitutv claim of privilege. -....... _ . . -.--' UICMAKO Mi
DEVI A L OF UEQUEuTED MATKHJAL BY EXECUTIVE BRA NTH
The CHAIRMAX. This overall study you were sinking of I un lersturid was some 30 volumes. Mr. McCuwKEY. Vcs, sir. Tlw CHAIKUAK. As you said, it lias IK-PII referred to by TOUTXCIU! Hoojiett and others. In any cuac, the request^ jt4>tns wore dcnieî. The last item if, if not identical the tudv you had in iniiul, the same tyiw of thing. The key >u-nunco in the lX)D referral was, "It would (M* <-/>nirarv to the national interest to <lbMeiinate it more wixlcly." The)' have defined to pve Uiis material. We have again applied for it and rcquttttid that if they are not going to |>rovide it to exjilii-itly pled Exceutive privilege, that in fur the President himself to authorize thi- plea. We have been trying to engage this matter and bring it to an issue l>y which we coukl he much rleurer. We have had many instamra, goinp hai-k to my first effort of looking into the validity of the allegation* made at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin, of great difficulty in obtaining infoniiation. I have had very similar ex|ierionce>i to voum. Keceinly the Executive has btteii even bolder in denying eve i the GAO Himple Klatislii's about the contributions of the Gennais for our troojw in Germany. I thougiit ihi wa a routine matter. It amazed nw really that they now a*ume tlw right to d<?y anyt'ting that tliey choose with almost no reason tflher than it i-> im-onvi intent . It is not in the national intercut U the way they put it aiwi they judge wlu-thcr it is in the interest. </*' tut you vaunt COOI>EUATJOX OK KXtXTTiVE /;uAvrii? I think you have raised tlie niost difficult of all the questions that have confronted the commit fee nitu'.1 I J'jvc been in the Congrcs Mid.lhtit in how do vou force c4o|M>ration /if the executive branch. We nil are brought up to Ix'lieve in th,- ' oust ilul ion. I do Ix-lji-ve in it, I think, if we can live up U> it am' if it can U* mwie effective.
620
How Jo you pro|K>se to force an uuuillinj; Executive to respond to these requests for information. I agree with you that without the information we have ti terrible problem trying to legislate intelligently, to moke up our minds on policy or to <!o anything. Mr. McCuxsKKv. Mr. Chairman, we have seen this country nearry torn apsirt by disagreement over the ExecutiveV policies, und 1 go Imrk to the first purl of my >tai4>ini>nt. It seems dear to me that i'o:istitwioimlty .mil lii-ioir-idly I he CoMgre--, was intended to bo the <I<jmiu:Uil branch of (iovcnuuetii, w. enact the laws and the President carrie!, them out. The CHAIHMAX. I don't disagree with t h n t . I ngree with it. Mr. MoCi,osKEV. I think as a practical matter what wo should do is to very carefully refrain from asking fur matters which might jeopardize the imlioiinl security, in our judgment such as the atouiir ncgMin'iwis, the strategic wea|x>n, the- ureas in the range where there is a clear worn* in.national MTurity if we nsk for information which might jeopardize our present situation. Bui. when we ask for ilcci*ion> that wen* made Imrk in the time of I In- Gulf of Tonkin and documents that relate to that dcci.-ion, \vhei: xvr v si-k ft>r the niiuitier of amputee- or f<r Air Force photoprapl of iill.ic>. the.e ure :it matt'-rs which are ôing to change tlie nature nf f.hi war. Tin- I'athet l,tu and the Ntinli Viet tinmen know we are li-nviiig Vietnam. The JYeMdent ha> iinnounceil ne un> leaving Viejtiain. I t h i n k if we identifv .-.jM-'ific rc(|U^.t^ \>\ the (Jongress so the ( 'liief Kxi-.'fltive and if the VreM.len1. >hou!d rhiitn Elftcutive |}rivilege. 'ii.it we h:i' i> tin-:) the same i-on^tidilionnl confror.tution that existed in the early day -.o thi.- country w i t h .\farbnry VT>US I iliink wt- oi!'_rlit. ID go lo the Sii|reme Court arid have if dcierrnineil whctlier ihe Chj'-f Kxenitivi* /-an extend this claim of Executive privilege to dcrisimi* that \\ere mu1e M-^'iTal years ago or fa.-I.-, which tudiiv exist, an>! 1 think '.lin! lin- ultiiiinle leM of whiit i> i l i e l a w of t!ii> N':ition i- tiiat l:>id down hy |li- Siipreme C'ourt in iiiterpreting tin- ('oust ii in ion f'jlly briefed and argued hy competent lawyiT-, :.DI! i iiavi- rre.it ;':iith in llu- jildii-iid >y<teiti j:> lieing one of (li>- iiii-.m.-t ti e.-.:abti-li 11 !-' '>!> of confront utiuiin. The CHAU;IIA\'. I think in theory yon tire corn-cl, but iNti't it a fact lliul 'lie i-ourt^ lire iiirlin-vl i.> ireat t!ic-e problem- of confrontati'Mi bi-'W.-eii he evculivc Mid tllr Icgj-ifiitive bnilich- - :IM poiiti<al f|Uention-. j::id ri'fu.-e lo take J!iriv!ictii>n? Mr M < ' i f f M - : v . Wlieti you u>k for >omething Hki- the number of rnipiiN'e.i. if the f.xeciitive briii!'h ntiviM"* ilia! i-* ndver-e ti tin- natiniial si-i-tiriiy tn reli j.-c ih<' i>mul>er of uiiipulee-. or t'ie r.iDiber of [M'opie who have died from nVfttio-w. of heroin. J t h i n k the (!>>nrf
tcniilil '|(rt lie rdllrtlilK lo liiuk' 1 :l ilci-i-.io|| UN to whftliiT l l l l l l ir.
ri'ir-mtuhly ;i nnill'T <f nniiorini M-i-urjiy or i* not. I mi'.'1't i*ngge>.|f Mr. ('liuiriiinii. liie Mature of On' despair th:if >-o iir'.ny jN-ojile fei'l ihnt t h i - (i<>\i-niiii'-ni c;i:inoi ! ivô.i-ivc jiN'.ifii-ic-iiiig sutiic of the more oiMniV'oii- - t u t t M i i r t i t - of ' h i t ndniini-trati<i;j a> to tt'm' \ ((i-c-.jirily < t i i l i l i ' - l d by Kxi-e'iiii'i- privilege in tt our 1 .
627
DENIAL OF IXTOfcMATION- JS POLITICAL QUESTION
The CWAIBUAX. Congressman, > I am very sympathetic to your idcti. I winh that I thought the courts could deal with it, but hor.estly as a. practical matter I think it is u political question. The only thing that redly can solve this is for the Congress to stand up for its own responsibilities in its own way. In other words, unless we van get a majority of bolu Houses to do what you, I think, and I waul to do, \vc are not goingHo get the courts to solve this for us. There would be a long judicial procedure on each of these issues and I can't imagine the court would set a general principle whirh would be satisfactory. I am not sure they could set one wlikh would b"i broad enough to include what wo need and yet allow the Pr'-ai<i<;iit the kind of executive privilege which, I assume in ti very limited way, he may be entitled tv. But I think it is a political question.' We cannot get away from the fact that if we are going to stop thi> war or discharge any of cur other responsibilities we have to generate in the Congress a sense that the Congress is important and that we are not sycophants or errand boys for the Executive. I don't think there is any getting around that we have to get the votes and we have to make the Senate and the House feel tliat they do have a n^jMjnsibi'ity and to vote for it. They fan do it if they will do it. Mr. McCLOSKEr. Yes, sir. But we can't vote wisely and make proper .tdgrnentM unless we have the information. 'ilie CHAIIUIAX. 1 agree with that, but wo ran vote wisely on the principle that we have to have the information.
Mr. McCix)8KEY. Yes, sir.
The CHAIBMAK. That is the very issue you are sayiur, \ce have to look to the courts to solve. I think wp have to look to tlj * Congress to solve. I don't believe the courts would do it. I w presented very seriously by some lawyers wit i a request to enter suit*. I won't go into the details uow. After very long and hard stud ' and necking the advice of the wisest jx'ople I cor Id, at least our ooncHJMo~!j was that that is not going to bo n fruitful f roceduro. You wfll finally end up at the vcrv top and the court w> .11 bay that is political question and they will decline to rule ttnd 'ou will get nowhere. So I iliink your energies and mine and Congrossn; An Jacobs' have to ; be to convince our colleagues in the Congress that we have to rea*M rt the constitutional responsibilities ourselves. I thii ik this is potfible if wo can get ft majority of vote. The fact of the matter i* that up until recently the majority of the Cmigres* has supported this war. I don't think we can deny that, although there have been nomc who, a* individuals, and a number in both parties, have felt and have shared your vifwx about it. But we have iifM'or been able to muster a majority of both HOU->OK. Mr. Mfi'tOHKEV. Yw. sir. But I think the reasonable disagrceBifDt, cither for or against the war, it ecins to me that all of our colleagues in the House and Senate would rwognizc. that the claim of executive privilege, of denying us information, particularly
C28
us or willfully trying to conceal facts that would cause us to act differc ently, 1 think wo can examine that. The CHAIRMAN. I think so, too, ajid I think that is an issue on which we surely ought to get a majority of both Houses.
EXAMPLE OF SST
Mr. MoCLOSKEY. I ran give an example that has nothing to do with the national security but which indicate-, I think, the arrogance of this administration. Take the SST. Tlk- SrfT -last year the administration asked us to vote for $290 million to continue that program. They gave us overj fart, every argument that could l>e amassed by the entire executive branch, fiut that they had one report prepared at taxpayers' expense delivered to the Department of Transjort:ition that tliey declined tc give us until after the vote bccausr that report indicated some adverse impacts of the SST. Now for an ad mini-it nuion to deliberatelv give only part of the facts to the Congress* Iter use they felt the farts on both sides might confuse us or might indicate support for a position that they thought was not best for the American jieoplethat is arrogance on the pan of the executive branch, and the Congress* must *tand up and demand that this information fa^ttnrished to its on both sides and that they admit a mistak.- and admit facts that are not consistent with their support.
FIXAL SOLUTION IS CON'CnESilONAL POWER OVEIC APPKOPUIATION'w
The CHAIHMA*. I apree with that and I have demanded that they fiinii,~.li this material and they refused. Tlien it comes to what do you do about it. I reiterate tJiis. I don't want to belalmr it, but 1 think the final Dilution is the exercise of the congressional ]x>wer over the appropriations. That is, approval of appropriations. It lias never In-eii a very happy situation u> IK- in and Members lire very rcluetjint to use it, but in the final analyse I don't think there is an)' ho|e of getting lite courts to s*>Ive this problem for us. I think we have to do it in the Congrcs and if the Congress isn't willing \i, do it then- i> no Minion. We will just allow the Executive to control all of the essential functions of government. AM a matter of fuel, this is exactly what hahup|>cnc.d iu most of the countrie* of the world. TIM- record <f other countries is againM us on Mieeeiviiiig. So if we run do thi> we will have done uhat vety feu countries have Iw-ni uble lo do, which is \ u>seit the right of the legi>luiive body to pUiy a nutl role in the (joWMIlietiL. J think this is tin- tmî criticu! of all the tjiiolioiis confronting our txx-U'ty. This idea that you and olher and various of our young {N-ople work uitli tiu* syisU-m can IM- mule to work. The only way it '>in be made to work fs to have Member* of the Congre- who are willing to assume the resjwiisibilily in (he fu, of Kwuiiva |x<wcr. Then il run IN- mule to work. That i-, I think, the nur>t profound ih.-iir fitcjng the Congi.vs. Mr. M<<'I^HKKV. 1 think we owe our jM-ifplc tlw obligation to ut leiisi try, sir. The CIHIUMAX, I appreriate ymir coming very much. J think you have mnilr a real contribution umJ tlinl niHterial you furnished will be nut iii the record.
i The information referred to follow:i
629
JCLT 10, 1970. XIKXC KROV'\\U PRUVINC*. KEPUCEKS IK VIRSTIAXF. PLAIN In thn past two weeks our interviewers have talked with refugees from Xicng Khouang Province, located in twenty settle-menu, from the Phone Heng area in Tiiadeua District. Most of them came to the Vientiane plains with tor croup evacuated from the PDJ in February of this year. They came from 96 village*, located in 17 u>wn.ihips. (Ta.<aeng). Bad weather and thr usual travel impediments hampered the interviewers' iiioi Rinents and limited the scop* of their findings. The lack of time and paucity of the interviewei*' ejqicrieuce (only one of the four ha<i ever been involved iu Mich an exercise) were also limiting- factors. Nevertheless the relatively large tiutnber of people queried should give some degree of validity to the finding*--** least enough to indicate general trend.- of thinking. This group of people is atypical when compared to her refugees in Laos the length of time they spent with the Pathct Lao separates them from the mass of refugees here. A separate re-port i.- being prepared on those people who have -ought refuge from their homes in Saravanc, Sam Keua and Luang Prabang. (People representing the lat'-er two provinces now a' Ban Na San Site 272.) A cable will be prepared for tit- Ambassador on the 272 people. SOME i. BKSPONDKNTK' 96 -INI. .cut of the a-spowient* admitted to having lived under * Pathct Lao administered government, 62 percent of them from 1964 until they sought refuge with the ULO in I W.I. 77 iNTCrnt said their children are living with them; 20 percent indicated that their offspring ar<? now with the Pathet Lao; and the remaining .'{ i)crcent told the interviewers their children are away from home serving in the FAR. Mot of the people lh:- interviewers talked with left their homes iu 1909 (this wa- true of 93 perct-ut). lurliiding the mow which took them to their current lixration, 4N percent said they luid moved .1 total of three limes since leaving Iht-ir hoiiie>; '!' percent twife. Nearly .V) percent cuid >onioone had arranged for their cliildren to be taken to school 78 percent of thi- group said the PL had provided this serv-ii-*. There wo* an exact correlation lietweeii the location of the .schooling and the parents' read ion to it if iu the villugi , all concirrued said it was de>irs!>k-; if away front the hoini-s, the ]Mi>pl<- said they did not think it to be a good tiling. i. A*r::iT* OK UTK rvuKu rut. rL Finding liat ttx-v like<l und di-Jiked about their experk'nre-i with tile c<imiiionij'l'i proved t't be difliculi the refugee* were quite naturally reluctant to ?|x-Hlt with strangt^r* about tlwir fwhngs toward the romiuunixts. However, the interviewer- did maiiagp to get '.'1(1 reKponite* 'more than one res]>oiisc was allom'ed) to the question, "H'hat di-J y>u like best atx>ut the PL?" <tf this nuiiit>er; 22 t<ereeit saw "unity" as a j.tive a<|M*ct of th-ir lift with the PL. ("I'nity ' in Ibii case nuaim coo|H-rative fanning, foiumunal arraiiXements for looking afler eliijiirm, vie.) 18 |<-rcviit of tin- ff-poi.te< ir licated "morality" (tinlham) v a feittiin! of life- under the PL. iNnte: No doul,i one reason tliix was juentjatk-d i tlu> Kteaimg of toe refug<N>s' cattle and wub-r buffalo by tb<- MU If troo[.4 prior to tlwir evacuation from thi* PUJ). Nine |erceijl said they liked the PL *ynlem of edui'ation. Porn-d poru-rage wa.- tU- li-aM de-iriii>U- |-ct of life under tl- PL (41 percent of '.UJ'.l response*;. Next wo* taxation ('M iwwiiU. (lief: McKeithefi re]Krt a delaik-d lU'i-ount of li(p tindnf tiie PL iu Xieug Khouang.)
i for nwtiv uf iln' 'juKkKu. OK rmmlr n( mirttim it lr tbn tbc lout tmmlx* of px>pl<> tntttrlrwui. l-r iwi nui liairr niuwiv.d <m- 'in-^tkiu. IMI iitbrr. rir T\ir prtmnrjr irvwii tut tlj It JIM I krd Uir tt.i.-tt lovur* iim in rurry tttr numU'Hin^li' wltli tlvni irlill.< wiuluitliiir tic InfrrV-w. Tliy tKrlrutrUi-txd !' j(t unitl ihrv rt*M !\tnt u ptvr nj) (r- l\tf p>i(>lc lntfvl-.'il to luu-'k 4wil tii' trtfuamt, Tlii w.i* liiiix In mi rltiirt Co kr'I' UK- . li'iinl' <if IV lhtrvlir m icUiMl uii'l ttrr dirni a' po^tlilr. I titu wv"*i It,,' lM>r*-|-ur. 4lmu( ru*.Mn/ wlc'i U ! U'iu< Iu t iltul^t* tlv-tr liiiaitiKu, CltliiUi* It brttrt to dclp MM' rjumivn tluii h<- |Mrtull>- if M*\ itiiiri<r inurkMl down. TlK liictli <>f thi< >|uUuuuUrr. UM 'Jrlilnz riilM-Tiu-tT will, 'li HUM y i<dli^ lnt^ryt>'rr* fr,,k ^V'Widtli'iti'iu-rtllylr.i-iiii-iiiiituritwiTuun'iUur Hi* w\vi\r |>r<>i<p^ rmjk'H In inntiy I.I, ink aiwi-f ![ llmrwrr. Hi' rjtl>> >i( rc<tiiuv4 to !iuml>rr nf rri.iirtf ul ulrjlafd lur '-li i|u>-<tlii tluwt'l st"- u u rrtuuiudly wcurnlr [lirture of tbr rpuudf[it<'
630
3. BOMB1NO -
97 percent of the people said they had seen a bombing attack32 percent as oarlv ii. 1964. 49 percent said they could not ro\mt the number of timed thcv had seen bomb* dropped, and 43 percent- said they had seen planes bomb "frequently.'' G8 percent m 168 responses tabulated indicated that the respondents had seen someone injured by bo:nbing, and 61 percent had seen a person lolled. Given the period involved" for most of the respondent* (1964-1969) the number of people eeen killed bv bombing was extremely low 32 percent had seen only ooe person'* death cau<wd by a bomb. The only exception to this was one refugee from Monang Soul who reported having st -n 112 people killed during a bombing raid. (Unfortunately, the interviewer who talked with this man is now sick and had to be taken to a hospital in Bangkok, so it if impossible to get any more details about thi' ess.'.) The'irthfr response* indicate a generally low casualty rate.1 ' This appear* to be trite for the enemy as well. On'lv ! 8 percent of the respondent* said they had actually seen Lan-Vict" troops* killed by Lrfiiphing. and 25 percent indicated they had heard rumnrn of deaths caused by bombing. The one outstanding exception reported was a T-28 strike on a cave "neur Sieng Khouangville used by the PL as e cowntunirations renter. The air attack was reported as having dor,o away with tlic conuno installation as well tin some eighty PL troops who were in the cave at the- time. Other caws) reported in which relatively large numbers of tni-mv wen: kilted by bonibiac. included 20 PL meeting their end at Phou Com Pbi-t, :jl> at Pbou Kha'Boh. and 20 at Phou Tuong. That the bornbing rriwxl havoc with the liven of the pcojdc. while they were ;n the FDJ .area is not to be denied. 75 percent of 1 90 respondents said their'homcs hod tx-en damaged by bombing. 76 percent said the attacks took place in 1969. 99 percent of 21 2 responden < said the bombing made life difficult for them. G3 percent of this group told our interviewers that they were prevented from earning more than a hare nubairftencc living during the most intense periods of bombing. 37 percent reported building a shelter in the woods after they first saw a bombing raid. Even after being exposed to such trials, 74 j.iToenl of the respondents aaid they understood the air attacks were caused by the PL waging war. liut, 23 percent told tho intervirwert that the bombing ict'direcVed not only at the PL but also the people 13 percent said H WM aiim-d at the (M-ople ouly. 71 percent of 23K r<-spoii!wn indicatj'd the U.S. U r<{>onsiUe for the honibiug; only 17 p<Tceot laid the onus "ii the R.LG. Tlie 38 p<-n-iiit who had wv-n T-2S droupiug tombs naid they lud swa jets doing the snnie thing. Their familiarity with pLuiat was cotmdwaMe; F-10" w*-re noted in some con vernal ions, a* WTC "sky raiders" and F-4-hs (???). The PL projagonda niafhin- ha Ixx-u reasonably effective, although it would ttoeni to In; aimed at a highly receptive ai'dienrc.
4. RKrCCKCt' ri'TfKt /tUPlKATIOS;*
With regard to thtar apiratioiu fur the future, the response* guth<-red by our interviewer* did not yi-la a yer>' clear picture. 49 percent of the people whose answers were tabulated on this point (1 11 of 226) said that f'-nr of bombing was tlu' rejuton for their *y-kijig refuge away from their horneti. 29 t/crceiit listed dislike iff the PL as th! reason for I'-nviug. i'l percent said the HL(J comijig in and ejtbir allowing or <rouragiug them to wove was a primary factor in making them rnlug?+*. Tlu'. bnuibing in clearly the uioul coiu]>elliiig reason for moving. >' ixiv-ut of lUJ 213 reitixmdoits said thi'y would n-tuni to their villaws if the air attack* were stopped. How-ver, nearly 96 pfTceut said they would not KO bafk if the PL were st ill in control of their honn.. Th'T*' ore sJ-vejOl jioiMible rcaHOim for thi latt'-r r-nporif. One (night be thut the piv>|>le fally cannot imagiiie having PL in the vicinity of tlicir I>OMI*H without ri'hi^tant lx>iubing. Anotiier might ! a fcur uf having ulii'ijiited the PL by coming to tlte HHj side, UIUK l<îving thi-irufjvf* open to retribution. Jiut jiro)al)ly th>' moHt ii>ien>w w a simple deHire to !* uwuy from th>* war and (nun all the pMJTerng und hardsliiji H briugs.
K4ir|ii U KiilttMU r.-lwrtd mir ' Invuliliu i>lr ill** ft twk pi*-* In Junn \'jtti, v> >UJi"f< fruiu IClon* Kliny '' lMf>v M tliruuirli tlw Hlto Jin v<tlli>v In S'mgt Pi* l>y I'l/ ftrmpatlijuri. Tin" itr'tup atftlipruttnwMy 4,tK) w rimtlu lu Ui 01... i iwid Ilrd upon rnimiilvUr. Tlu- "jMjiiIUri. K(.uur(UiK t Ui-KHCIwn. nuiiiliMM "vw (uriy. Altof (he fu In' HMI. Wui Iwt-ri' (twyniuMljritiarvl, O .'1'Krll 'uid .uurl> Iri'f tli- \Mi>\i\r nrnin Hlûnvl Uy ttir ' 'jrixuiur UMlrniurrliUJ N'UUE IIM.
631
My personal impression is that it was a combination of three factors that moved iwt of tta rcfugees.'The destruction of their home villages by bombing certainly instilled tV type of fear that would make a person want to move. However, 31 percent of the people hod lived with bombing since 1964. Though it was not AS r-teouc as in 1969, it rtill represented a throat to their homes and lives. Being forced to strive as a porter irritated a nigh percentage of the people. On the other hand, while living under the B.LU bring* with it some mistreatment, it is ncverthelcM a way of lifr u-hich generally doe* not inipor oany restriction-!. In my opinion, it was all these factors, coupled with the /poruuiity offered by the Kij<j> sweep over the PDJ in late 1909, that brought the people *a the Vientiane government's side. " Attachment 1 The following" is a biographical sketch of Thao Vilay, one of the interviewers who partieinated in the disciiions held with refugees from MR II now in Vientiane Province. Thao Vilay himself sought refuge away from hU homo in Xieng Khouang at the same time most of the refugee* we talked -with did. _ Nam*?: Vflay ; Age: 25; Bom: Ian Phoun; Tamcttg: Khang Muons. IVk: Province: Xirtiig Khnnnng; &udied six yean at Phonavn; Married to Nang Bouavan hi 1%6; owe son. Presently lives at Ban Na Sg:1., Vientiane Province. Before the XL.HX came, Vilay was a schoolboy. He was happy. His village was prosperous, with plenty of rice, ti>h und good wells. The government was responsive to th- needs of the population. He kid hope for the future. At that tinu-, there was enough food and thi: living was oany. Anyone wtw wanted to could go into butincs* for liiniM^f. Nobody" tiotlu wd anybody Hw. Vtlay waif hajvpy witn ^hit.4ife, whub waw iret? and democratic. v IJut_ unhappily, trouble started u(r His village fell into the_hands of tUir N'UIX'g neutralist troojie. At that jjoujt, he bc-cante a bonxe at Wat PLonsavan until March 1, 1%1, on which date he left the pAgod* and joined the neutralist police at Mi.ong Khoun. He served the neutralis-t partv until 1963. when the party cplit into the Kong Le whig and the I>euanUt-NLHX wing. Thu, from 19C3 luitiJ 1%"', he served in the !)euaui.*l police. Then he entered the Minijitry of the Interior for sever months, af'cr which he left ine police aud went to Pbonsavan to re-tt up for a > car. During this year, he bad no right 4. He wa under the control of the authorities. "I <aw planes come to attack my village in 196.'> for the first time; the village cam under air attack many times in 196&-69, resulting in five killed and throe wouuded. Apart from my own village, there were 42 killed at Bati Theun and at Phoni>avau. I uw eight killed at Lat Houati^. None of these cacualticM were relatives of miiw. "I have beard of planes bombing Uie N'LHX, with the following reoulu: 25 kjfled at Muong Ngan, eight killed at Bai' Lt Kea, seven killed at Ban Dong and four at Phou Pl>ouNavn. "Under NLHX control, I liked the conditions of equality under which everyone workedbut I didn't like taking part hi rice requLntiooing tours. From 1906 on, I wa uwigubd to a Croupe MobSe by the NLHX. I worked with the Croupe for four ff*rt and was vent to the front thre/; timw. The first time, I was wot to help & VLHX artillery eotnpauy for 15 days. Tbu FM ny Grot combat experience acair nt riglite^t troorw. I wiw not w>:':d"'i Tlw "lôod time, I wan s-nt to Muong Kboco for 2/> days, fhe ttiird time, I a-a !&t for three months to the forexta of KiJOio an Clio. "Tbeu I wan awugued back to ->v village At the time wheu the bombing wa* at iU peak. It wai no bad that > <m could uo longer lead a normal life. Until 1909, 1 had at leafft been able to cultivate toy own ricrlield, but the war atid the bombing bad no bncome so aevexe ^hn* life wan no longer bearal>le. "The K J>HX ordered me to leave with them. I learned that the}' would leave for the N'oug Het area, juid I didn't want to go. Tttwe/ore, I and my family turned ii in to the troow of Mil II. The family was sent to Tan Pring, but I WM ax OUP of V-wi PUO'M w>WU-r< I was wut to the Ilaiii of Jar* for nix month* ey uivxled men *o aecuapiuv the nûg*M from L*l Sou to Vientiaff. At the r-viite time, I brought my family out with them. We live in Van N'a Nga at the time.
Attached un- iriili'Jftôiic tit inlen'M-ws roftdurb-d ''.v t'SIH i-)|>Uiyec with rufn Mil II The stgtefnnits ore indirativr nt th- general typ<^ of rew-
632
Following i* the text' >f an interview conducted in Iâo tiy Pradit Sri<uyochandra, I'SLS employee, on Juno 2.~, 1<70. The intervifwer. a nuro. indicated there werr two rea-on.-'for her >eeking tefuge away from her home: Fear of tho bombing und dislike of the PL. Pradit'.- .ran-Jation of the interview (tape Xo. 1) follow.*: Tin- interviewee 1.4 a '26 rear old woman from Kangpa, Ta-eni; Kicng, Muong Khoiinr, Xieng Khoung Province- She served a* a nur*- with the PL lieforc nhe cnim' to the Vietiane Plain- from Maong Khoutie. She studied nursing for eleven mouth- in Khan Khay (with the PL). She is married and ha* two children who Are now with her. Her hu-band did not come with her, a.- he wa.- sent to Hanoi to -tudv medicine while they were in Muong Kbimne. The reason >he came io Vietiane was Itecause of the bombing*. The planes came to drop boml all the time. She decided to come to the government side when the government troop- caiue near one village. Shf wa.- not happy under tin -PL. She had to work hard day and night without nt. She had to live in a ,-hclt'T in the fore.-t most of the time. There wa.* not inurli time to earn her living. r?b" did not like the PL. If .-hi1 liked them, >be would have none with them when the PL left one village. She lived under PL for many year- and found her lift- to In- very difficult. She did nor like the way the PL font J IHT t-i Work das and night. She had to carry the liable- on her back while -he wa- working. She did not want to go bark to her village if the PL were still liter., Ix-caiiM- if .! did, -hi- would have to Miffer living in the >heJter in the fme-t again. She -aid tlial under the PL, women were .-ub'ect to liard labor and were forced to build ri<ao-. Vouag girl> were made- to lx> |>lane lighter*. I'nder the PL -In- had to get up'at four o'elook in the moniing to cook her meals. She will return to her village only when that area is under control of the government. Attachment 3 Follow inn 's the text of an interview conducted in the MI-O language l>y Vang ("hv, I'SiS, on Ji:ly s. l'.70. Thtr mter\-ii.-wei-'s original h'Hiie, which he left in I'JCI, i< in-ar Muang St>n, ju"t acro>-' the L-ô border in North Vietnam (on route 7). lie i- now li/ing in Ban Than Peur (TF 70'j:i) the interview wa> conducted there. Houiiliaiig Souyen, t'SIS, tran-lated the tajM-d eonverâtiou (ta|: no. '-). (ilwu Kheu Xon, forty, came from North Vietnam to Ban Than Peur, Turing Phou S.mjs, Vieng Khn-'iim J'rnvinc'-. lie liad i-ight children, three of whom are now d'"id. One *on i-. working al Long Cheng and one MIII i- in the arm}' at Ixinj; Cheng. Hi-i children were educated at Muang Mok (Site 4f,i, and no children were educated with the PL. He cam'- from North Vietnam in I'.Hil. Thu rea.<on he Ivfi hi- home wa- di-Iike of tlie North \ietiiame-eadmini-tr-ition and taxation. Tlie N\ N -"-nt agent* to <tav in the village to riillfct the rice tax. He could not >tay undiT tli>'iii. -o lie run away. After leaving North Vietnam, hi- went to Ban Nam Thong. He left there due to lighting Iwttween the RL- of Immtjing, and he UHI xfruni of gelling killed li\ bombing ui.d the lighting. \\'h>-n the troujM from M I U I took him from Ban Nam Thong to Muang Mok, he wa- very happy. Two I'L had b'1'ii killed in the lighting and lie wa* frightened. Later, he went Ui Ban Tlum Peur, when Mu:>ng Mok wa- fo ight over. Talking about liii home in 15-ui Nam Thong, lx- -aid lii- land yi4-lded AU<) kilo* of rice per year and that he had two cow-, and two bufluloe-. If there wax no war but the ]'L wen,- in hi- hometown, lie would go bark. If the war i* not over, he wan:H to -lay here, b<rau<e IIK home is de.-tioyed, and he rould not rebuild it now. The heavic-t bumbing he ha* fi-ii ha- t:ikeu place thi- year, but hu ha* never j-e<'ii any villager* killed by bombing. He sia\* in tin- village, nut in the forest, during iiixnbiiic attack*. The villager- contact and give information to the UL<i ami call plane- (o bomb Uu: PL, so Iliev need not run uway from the village. However, he ha- built a hut Hi the fore.t. Thev knoH' when the plane* will come to bomb. Ui* village c.'JOperaU'' with tip- army to light, the PL Mo-t of tlie plane* bombing hi- village are T ^*i< arid J'"!*. Ju*t a few drop 1 nmb- at night. l>uring one attack, there wer<' 100 or more PL around Li-> village. The PL >liot at u plane one lime, but di'l nut hit it. He J'*fi In* hoTiie in Ban N'.'im Th'Mig becuuw tie wa* afrnid he Mould Iw killed or CH j >t 11 red and tnken to North Vieinuin bv (lie PL. Al->, he thouglii ubr>ut the nafel) nl Inn family, lie hu* |>lenty of rice when there ix no wnr, and he want* to go back to Bun Vim Tiring if the government end* him or there i no war, !caune I lie land there i* very feriiji-. He rjiw* not want to go back if thereHtill ji> uur und tin- ('ommuiii-i - ure till I heir. He lin not lived under PL IM-FOII'. J|JH homi< WH^ destroyed in !(*<) by bombing. He thought the plun WUH to drop tlw bomb <m Hie PL not to the villager*. Me uw PL killed by bombing. I'L never kept arum in Ine villugi.' or other*.
633
Attachment 4
Following Li the text of an interview conducted in Lao by Pradit Srisuryochandra or. Juuc 24. 1970. The interviewee was formerly a teacher under the PaJhct Lao in Muang Khounc, Xieng Khuang Province. She found some aspects oi bvr life with the PL appealing the equality they gave her vis* a vis the male member* of the society was to her liking. She indicated that the bombing she was exposed to was the main factor in causing her to It-mve b<v home. She said she did not wa.H to return to it until the RLG controlled the are* in and around it. Prudit's translation of the interview (tape no. 3) follows: The interviewee is a girl of 17 who is now living in a refugee site in Ban Na Nga. She came from Ban Koua, Taseng Nhoune, Moung Khounc, Xieng Khoung ProviiK-e. Shi- wa> a teacher at the elementary school in her village and also taught the adoUs to read and write. (Under the PL.) She left her home on April 59, I96'J. Her parents are farmers. She also Helped her parents do the fanning when they were iii their original home. She it always-thinking of her village. She wants to return to her hrmie if she has a chance. The plane!" dropped bomb* in the area of her original home very often. However, she never saw anyone killed or injured by the bombing. The planet) bombed since 1966. There were some PL troops in the bombing area. The things she iiked about life under the PL were the equality of man and woman; she also liked the unity. The reason she left her village was bccaa-e of the constant bombings by the planes. The life wan very difficult. Everyday "he had to live in the shelters in the forest. She also heard that other villages were lw>mbcd by the planes, but casualties were very small. She staid the planes which did the immbing belonged to the American-;. There were three kind* of planes imolved in the bombing. LI 9, T28 and F105. The Immbs wen.- aLo dropped at rJght, especially during 1968-69. She never heard of or saw PL soldiers ki'lW by the bombti. But she did see PL wareh< i ite destroyed by the bomta. During the Ixjrabing, tier life wan difficult. She had to live in a small but in the forest aua did the cooking only one time a day in the early morning. .She ha t<-n brothers and sioters. Her older tester is now in Khang Khay working with the PL an a iiur**. The otlier brother and ni.stcr ire now in the secondary .tebool id Khan*; Khay. Her houw; was destroyed by one boiub on March 22, 1%9. She will not n back unk*s the government freer" her onginal burnt. She is now working for th<: Ministry of Social Welfare distributing medicine, helping the government rnodic at the Ban Na N'gu nûgt.f tiiu-. Attachment 5 Following i.- the tit of an interview i-ondneled in L:K> t.v Pradit Srisuryocluitidru, USIS, n June Z'-',, C'/O, in Ban Mak Hciou. Tti^ Dent J)i>trirt, VL-utiaticPriivinw. Tlii* roll vernation bctwc'n Pradit and \.\v refujjoi- utwt many of the IMiiritx utatir by othi-r r"f ujiws whom Pradit and our t.lher three \ater\-ifwi-rn talked with d.jrinx their MTVPV: UK- refagWH found living in a war zone extremely difficult and are hppy to be awar from it. Praît'c trau.-Jation of the interview (tapenu. 4) fiMlttw*: ' _ The interviewee in a mun of 27 from Ban N'aXou, TuKHeng .Sen Xoi. Muong Khoutu:, Xieng Khii.-ing Province who ix now Uvine in a rirfuKe KJU- in Ban link Jlcio'j, Muong Thadeua. He WSK int<-nfiewed on ta]>e op June 2x(, 1970. HP in married and hn- one wui. He nuid the ren.son }y It-ft hi villuge und fni<- to the VM*ntiane Plain wan tp-cuuxe iff i he bad MJtualiotj und diHicult living in hix village. He could not even make bin living for feur of tlw plane*. Thi wa. the main reaw>n for bi>< leav. a bin home village. ThepliinuH r-larted bouilmitt hi- village in HXJ4 and continued until tin: |;re-<ent time. The (ilune-* dropjx'd lKtulwi>ejir IIIH village very often Tiu'ix>rnb wi-re rcrnieUfiie* dropped far uway from hi- \ Mlage and rwinM-tirrx-n were verj- close tf> hix village. Tin- bo'nbx netuiiUy hit and deM roved hi village in 19ft*. Tl*e waii no oie ejttjiT injured or killed d'lrinir tlie bniul>iiig. Thi" wj> lieraime tlw-re WUM uo OOP living in ' villuKf- They lived in the *lieJten in the for/'nt. He Ut-ard that villu^tr' in fitliiT viJlauc* wvrr injured or killed by the ho;n)>ing. The bombit detro>'<d hi* vjllugc in February, \'MV.t. During that time he wan looking fur *ome fro^-< w 11 l>rodk in the forent. He didn't like living under the PL IKTIIHW of the hnrd life and hm-mixe it wu very 'iitti'MiJt t/> make a living. He Jived under terror nil ' ii< tijue for fear of dt !i from i lie li.jruliirg. He did bear ihe peoplr talking uboui I'l, Mildiern killed by the f,'i-'iV>--\ -- 41
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laud. H* will not. however, go hack until the wnr end*. If the war in over, but the PL still control his village, he will not en back. He said ho i* quite happy here. Thf govemmejU gives him fi>od. If hi- HIM* tuek lie will have to face M>tu<-'di(Ectiltiis To make a livir.p there would e vory difficult because his land ha* been left 1111us.r|, and he d-v* cjt hax'e uiiy rattle to plow the land. Hi1 cannot possibly do it by hand. If hn had cattle, he would go back. Hi- wants to remain heru (or awaile with his government. He said the only chance he has to gi> back now is if the govcrument corrects the situation and tak-es him hark. : Attachment 6
The Uatt of the following interview, conducted by t'SIS employee Pradit SrKaryochandra. probably reprr!enU the tyjw of n-tponse the inua-vieww frit Pradit wanted. That he got few lik* tiiu would indicate thw girl's conception watt self voitidtftd. Praiiit's translation of the text follows (tape no. ">}: Toe interviewer U an IS year old girl from Ban Khou, Taseng Kat, Muonc Pok, Xing Khftung, Province, who left her village in September 196!). She and one entire village reported thetnsolvcs to the government troop* who advanced close to the village. She want* to re-turn to her tillage when she thinks about the land and her house. But when far. think* about the PL. and Viet Minh who arc ttiU controlling the village, hc.docs not want to return. .She would rather utay here. She could not mmiulxT jrhen th- bombs w-rr lint dropped on her village, l-nrauw sbe 's t,K> nniall. She can reineniber vcr>- weil that bombs were dropped on her .-Ulagc from 1467 until the time Hh<* left the x'illage. She fell, that the planes probablv did not want to iKMnb the village, bin because tU'-re wen* PL troo|i in the v" ~"<; the pUnea bad to bomb it. She always rail to lli? nhrHeJn whet) she h<>ard tl <\d of the plaiken approaching, fthe said quite a few x'iUagern were killed unit t..,_ J by the Iximbingr &w liad several shejters, one clo*- to her farm and the other in the for<(. In 1!I67, she hardly lived in the house. In I'.KM and 1'JOll, she r-'iimijed in the forust all the time pud never went clone to the house. ;>hr saw PL troops tiring anti-aircraft guns ,t vile pUuiei from a long distatic>-. S>hi>t exploded everywhere in the sky. She itiinwn her home v< ry niurh, but nhe had to leave it. Hecr,,.-c the PL troo| were there, the planes had to boinb. She also does not like 'hi PL. She did not like them because they always a.<kcd her to work. People were fed up w i t h them. That -.van why they came to the government xid'v To: Frank L. AllM.-n From: Tao ChuaviriyrSubject: f>/nvenation with f'hinrn'' refugee from Ku-ng Kluuuig. The refugee, a woiimn, wn.c .11 the find group f Cliinnw refugee from Ximtt KtiDang to com*' to \'tentinue. At !be pri'sent time, she ii* renting a iiiiiall house and mayinfc in it with hvr mother, her three children and one younger broth*?. Ilir husbandsoid ineut in Xietig Khuanganil w<t arrested by the PL Iwraus*' he hired other rtersons to n-jl:v linn ulim he was called by the I'L to work. The PL laid he did not coojteru'e w i t h them. J)uc\ l>on>bing the I'L adviwd 'he womuii to mov< lo a shelter :n the bii*h while rhe wits in Xieng KliMing. (''Hiking nan a pmblem: nhe had to make a stov and iio iiii./ke from it could Ix- allowed lo In- tn^-n. Cluth't luui tn.picuously It-Si I'u-V befiimi' boinb turgetn. Before he PL left Xieng Hhuuiig. they "iuvitcit' tin- Homaii and her i'umijy to run with them. But, ohe asked to wail for awhil" to prepare food for the trip and tlfMi the FAU i-nine and rlniwd iln- rvocuatiuM route. She mid her fao.'iiy were evuouolejj in Vit'lilLHiie after Iliin. The woman's \i*t> nls are Chii>eiie, but she wat< born in X. " Kliuung. Toda} f\'i- i u'lJiug funi and vegi-tuhle* at tin- in.jriiiiiK market to support her family. Ill the pool week our three inte^vieW'Tit have (ulked illl '.'" ri^llgee.i,. Most of them are now living in tlie Hun So Sou-Bun Non area 'site 'fl'i). The inajority are from Minuiit Ileim in Luang I'rebang Province and Muong Son, Suu-Panb (Son K>'l;). Some are Xieug Khuung (jir? from Miinug Kham (around Ban Ban) hu arc now living at Bou Thai, rKr Phone Honir.. And a few are Moo whose original homes were soul hwent of Muung Sen in North \ let-Sum, tn th<' ti! ' hut protrudes ! nto La/M just off itoute 7, after leaving North VftNam thc> bad moved to
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MsangMoU foit>: 46) andCthtn to thrir current homo at Ban .Than Youp (TF 7493). The same factors that limited the report on the PUin of Jf*,ref jewlack of time, bad weather conditions, the interviewers' lack of xpericbeo-hampered ,/ ' . this operation too. Nevertheless, it gives some notion of whV^tb>. people interviewed have experienced and arc thinking about. "~ ir
HOME FINDING* ( '
(I) Typt of people nttenriewed The male-female ratio * -* 60% vs. 40%. 70% of the people interviewed had never attended school. 73% were ordinary villagers, not holding any position in the village hierarchy. 18% were 3/0. Bm*. 92 of the 97 were married, and 88 of the 92 had children. ~ -7tt%of thooewiJi offfprinc atid tbrir children were still with them, and of the children who had left home, 15% are now with the Pathet Lao and 6% with the v RLG. C (2) The largest group, 22%, left their homes in 1997, 19% in 1969, 15% in 1966. Since leaving their homes, 41% have moved twice, 28% three times, and ; 13% only once. (3) 50% of the people said they left their homes because they did not like the PathetLao, 23% because they feared bombing and 22% because th?y wanted to be away, from the war and when the government troops cam* tuicy went with them. ^ r (4) 79% said the areas in which their original homes are located ware con"troHea by the Lao-Yiet wh" tfiey were ttwre. The intervtoureed from Sam Nona bad been with the communists sine* 1953, for they were caught op in the itsistaiut s_ movemrnt against the French. (5) The interviewers could get only 22 people to respond favorably about their experiences with the Patbet Lao. Of the 81 who answered the question "What did you like best about living under the Pathet LaoT", ,M (73%) said they did not likv anything. The lack of favorable commmt oC the Lao-Viet may be atrtrilniU-d in part to fctr of reprisal. However, the fact tliat the same interviewer*' got m&ny favorable reactions from the PDJ ref ugeoi about their experience with the Ijio-Vict fliiggests that the 97 peopic interviewed this time do have genuine feeling* of dislike for the communUU. A partial exphtnatipn may be found in the U-rroruini cinployeu by the Vietnamese troops rboi first introduced into Loos hi largr numbers in 1963. Another factor, of course, is that mot* of the people tiiokeu with ar'* now settled and scum rmsonab'y happy with thrir new homes. (.>4 C,D Maid the land they are now on is as good as, or bctUrr tlian, the land at their original homes. A few of those from Sam Keua spok>- wistfully about the profits front growing opium "back home." But they conced.'d that tbe land around site 'JTi'l is Ixrtter thaii tb<y previous holdings for highland rice.) Of the many undesirable aspect* of life under the Patbet Lao mentioned, the kigbi_t percentage number (4K of I'M item*) centered around forced porterage. FoUou-jiig that was taxation (33). The otbtr 52 negative nponses Ml into ix . U>> '&% of tbe rcspondîiu ssid they first HSW bombs dropped near their village in 1VC4 mid a higher perceutagt- (37%) twd heard of bombs being dropped on other village in that year. 6V% said they had seen bombs dropped frequently (48 out of 7O. 00% said they bid in the woods during botubing attacks. 1 7) 25% (24 of 97) bad seen people killed by bombing, although only one bad witnessed the death of over seven people. Tbe majority of those who had seen people killed (5K%) had seen two or more deaths (29% had seen two and So equal number had sum three). (8) 6V% said lucre were PL tntoiis in the area being bombed, although only 1H% bad f*M enemy troops kUcd oy air attack. A sugbtly highrf pereeotMEt>r (24%) had heard of cuemv casualtU* being caused by bombing. (9; U2 people aid the bonding made Uie vur>- difficult for them80% of this group ying they could not eke out more than a bare ubwutcife living after the attack* kurtvd. A point of some interest here is that only 7% said the}' feared death from the bombing. (10) 57% of tbe respondents said they bad seen T-2H bombiug and 40% flu-uti-Micd having seen jets. 49 of 92 (5.1%) said they thought tbe bombing was done by Americans; 16% listed the U2U as tbe responsible party; and 17% said they did cot know who was doing it. (1 1) Although to 23% y tbe respondents said they had left their homes due to fear of bombing, 23% said they would return home tf H *ef stopped. But **% 0>
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L.
all roApondunU Mid they would not return to their uouic* oven i the pUncs tomicd bombing. as long as the PL wew rtill there. Reasons given mrc, leu ot continued wr, dislike of i&e communist*, and mtufmction with thctr piwcnt situation. ' C
The CHAIRMAN. We have another very distinguished witness this morning. We are very liappy to have N'lr. H. R. Rainwater, commander in cluef of the Veterans of Foreien Wars with us. Mr. Rainwater is accompanied by, I beficvc, by Xir. Coo|ier T. Holt* theVxi-cutixv director of the Washington office of VFVV; ftriil Mr-. Anllioity M. Kit-Donald, director of national serurity and foreign lULuir. C Mr. Rainu-ater, we an* very happy to havt* you. Do you have a prepared statement?
Mr. RAIXWATKU. Yes, sir, Mr. Chainnan.
The CUAiitUAN*. Would you like to proceed, sir. SIATEKEIT OF H. B. IAIKWATEE, OOMMAVBEB H CHIEF, VETEBAMS OF FOREIOH WASS OF THE UBITZJ STATES. ACOOKr PAHIED BY COOPER T. HOLT, EXECUTIVE DIBECTOB. TFW. AID ASTHOXY M. McDOH4LD. DIEECIOB, HATIOHAL SECTTBITY AHB FOEEIOI AFFAIBS, VFW
Mr. RAISIVATKU. Thank you, Mr. Chainuan. Thank you for the op|K>rtunil.y you liavv niveii me to pros'iit iuy vie AS as irotiiiuandcr in chief of the nioic than 1> million members of llicVctoransof Wars, iitrluiiini; over 400,000 Vietnam veterans, eonceriifiij: ruiniliculious of U.S. involvement in Indochina.
VIKWS OF VIKTKAM VETKHAKS AOAIVST 'VAK
Our w)tn ictidii,; are huswl on the combined ex|nrieni'i' of our uiciuU-rs, and I ho|N> to |>recnt a realistic picture of our ', c consensus of opinion. Tin- majority of our mumhrrship is dt;<-, -, (unuu-rned because thp views of the minoiiiv of Vietnam veterans are Ix'injf fwiirrl, and stri'SM'd, over th*- views of I lie majority. A- you know, llieri! havt Iwt n in exejv> of 1\-'i million U.S. MTvicemen involved in the linlocliiiiH ruiifliet.. The Velraiif of Kon-ipn Wars has.includtid in its meinherslu'p almost 20 jierccnt of that toUl tLS. coiumitmeiiL. The views exprcsx-il, ami <nv>n such UM|in|H)rtioii)iU' uews media co wrap*, by the Vi'-lnani VeU-rans Agaiimt the War represi'iited less than 1 IMTCJ-U! i>( I he Vielnum veterans; neitlii-r their ulUgc.d experirtwf* nor opitiions n-pn-M-nt the nveragi* veteran. Furtlieriiiort, it is ver>' 'mestiotiaile wh'-ther their [i-inniiiU for future U.S. jwlicies would IM- those which the N'utitin mi^hl f 'mo-u- if \i \vere Divert o free S*'4tl r*-(v itlv ikidn^M'd liiitiH-lf to thi* (Miiiit [>v Gertrude Stein whc.ri -tiie askud at her deathbed "N'o, mn \vhnf is the û-.A'i:i', but wlial i 'he f|Uclii>n >> " Tho.M! who are in u pnaiitoli >i(f'ct iiationu! ojiinion r>;M-*t SI^MI Hskin^ the N'ulioit luule,il questions; (jijei*Lii>MH winch hei^htei. mid perpetuate u iie^ of our >>itioii mill i'.r. jiolicie,-.. A just. but. confused au-<e, cnmiol olfer atjequutf c<nnp<!n.iiilion fo' tl(^.,ij(re,rin^ and .ip of ;i nation. in ^dililiou, lt,' baic !U'/-.|H >.ill nlwayw include aii niiein undwrejl. balanced, al)d unrirejiidiced p/esentatioii oC the jiroblenik at hand.
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IMS DEMOCRATIC CONTENTION PLATFORM
The end to which persons of all convictions should be working was best stated from the Democratic Convention platform that nominated the now very critical Senators Humphrey and Muskie in 196S.
Our most urgent tank in to end the m-ar in Vietnam by an honorable and lasting j"ettk'nu.tit *'heh tvvpocis Uic right* of all tlur p-o|>l- or Vietnam * * * H' haif borne a heavy burden in helping South Vietnam to counter aggremon and subversion front the north. We reject an unacceptable a unflatrral withdrawal of our force* wbjeii would allow thf t a^gre^sion and subversion to succeed.
" I ain here, Mr. Chairman, to address yoii" concerning the views of the \Vteriiiis of Foreign Wars on the very subjects raised by these comments. We fully agree with t'ue essence of thi* quote. We do not ;ttgree wild those who espouse an immediate, unilateral, and unconditional withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina. We do not agree with those who desire the abandonment of our present judicial and pKfMulivnt investigative |M>lifie.$ concerning alleged uf.r airoc.ttics. We do not agi* e -with those who rail for our withdrawal of *up|>ort for the legally -elected Govenuucnt of South Vietnam. We do not agree with those" who -l>cUeve tlutt (he only methol for obtaining die release of U.S. prisoners >f war is by Complete abandonment J our present negotiation (Kilicies al the Paris fieace talks. We do not agree with those whu.Mioose to isolate certain tnridents which are abi-rrations of ILS. (Htiicy and ust> them us a basis for total condemnation of our efforts in Indochina. The idl-etr4>m passing tnd self-rigliieous iing'T of condemnation which they p,u:t at the heart of our Nation is. leveled b\ a hand of ix-t nival. Thi>se who wish to affect tin- opinions of our -citizens must realize the reSj>oii>ibmty en<'uinlMmt U|MII them lo rise itb.>vc ihe p't t i ness of- their own pride and their ott n menial (toliliral aspirations.
C'AKB AM) HBHVK'Kh Poll VIKTXAH VETEKAVH
We do recognixe tlie IMHJI! for < 'ongress to enact i':;L".. ili-ite l>gishition to provide increased care Mid tervices for the Vietnam veteran. This is necesaary ill all areas and on all level.-.. The N'tttion atnl our (ioveniment Liust slop treating the ViiUnnru veteran as r se> ->nd-elass citix^t. We mui ^t(>[) thinking :f (he. Vietnam veteran as a war issue and start thinking of him as a human being badly in need of our appreciation and our help. The btu>jc mvil of the Vietnam viMcran will alw;>ys \M" a nation's thankx and .up|MVl. Mistaken have IM-CII miuli1, but We cannot exjieci the^* young men to pay for ilu-ni,
H f K O K N 0* HHIV<;iVO VATIOV TOUKTHKIt
It i.i nuturul lo assume that the Nation wants to survive as a. free y . The burden of bringing our Nation together fulls on the -s of each citi/en of this country. The President uiul Mcnilx-rs of (ongn^s -can only provide lcalership. They cannot provi|e a mean* for escaping (he rccpoiirtibility of individual i!<'cUion which rein with everv cjiixen. The President and the Congn^M do have the responsibility l*> make the Nation acutely aware of nil aspects an/I all opinions and to provide the Nation with the proper iiiioniiHlio// with which they will give our country direction. It is not the role of the majority lo be ruled and dictated to by the prejudice* of the majority.
63S
OPINIONS DCKIXC ANI> AFTtll WARS
A dose study covering U.S. experiences in wartime from 1776 to 195*2 conceded that wars begin with enthusiastic support wliich tiicn is transformed into criticism of the President and his administration; \vhi;n the war is concluded, many former critics "discover" that it was -in act of statesmanship after all. As au example, in 1950 a Gallup poll showed 81 percent in favor of President Truman's intervention m Korea, with only 13 percent opfxfcscd. But by January of 1951, Gallup showed 6 j>en:ent in fvor of immediate withdand only 25 |>en-ent against. In 1952 -tâin according to l\i.up poll, President Truman's popularly had fallen to an all-time low of 26 pen-en t. After the Communist assault had been stopped and the war ended, however, opinion.-, changed. Clinton Rossiter, a Cornell University historian said in 195C:
1 am ready to huard mo opinion, to which I do not come easy or lightly, that Ham- will eventually win a place as President. If not a a hero, aloug-iide JcflVrson and Tbeodoft- Roosevelt.
1 am in no way, by mention of these events, advocating the Vietnam war, or any war, but aiu attempting to indicate that once agalntbe people of the UiuUsd StaUiS are found suffering from an overkill of information, an overkill of criticism, and "abundance of interpretations of world and domestic situations, but not nearly enough opportunity for adequate reflection and t.valuat'on. They need an outlet to relieve the pressures of frustration, and I fear that the accusations being leveled at our country and our President, are allowing them the refugo they so readily seek. It becomes apparent that by criticizing our country and our President, we are saying that everybody U guilty and <> nobody is guilty. This is not the answer that we sock; birnple anuvn> provide only immediate solace. Increasingly, we have heard many cnes to end the Vietnam war immediately. V hear them not juat from the left but from independents, moderates, conservatives, vU-runs, war widows, and even thu Hives of prisoners of war. Thenare still the traditional cries that not one dead Araerican is worth our proclamations of protuciiag dmni/cracy, Ixvuiuse it is a drain upon our e^>nomy/ bwaiwo we badly tuted to ojiuud tlu- money at lie me, because the war 11 militarily uriwinnable, bitcause there is graft in tlie Saigon gi>V4!rnment, but Uie mt.*l rccj-nt cry of dissident* is that the war u point Ic.-s and immoral.
COSiVEPT or IMUOItALlTV
Iinmi>rality, is un all-eiuximpaKsiiig coiu-ept wliich, if used indixcriinir.ut^ly, resulu in a rhulorcial trap, fh ; rhetorical entrapmeut caused by k' fnrestricted accusatioiu of U^. immorality have caused many \t> U, , tlittv all U.S. military mun ur.: rnontrous killers and that Vietnam k a devastated wa*l Bltuiil rusomblinK th moon. Tliis is not true. I ltav rocuiully brain tliffB and I am thu Arst to adiuif Miat 'u>ra luivo biten many imstakfrs, ^>ut thefts has also IM-.MI much good ao. fiuplUhM. Tlw I'lUUfB tlutt is Ixiing pro<k]ittd to th<t Amuncan |w>ple, oy (lit- tiuul'u, of D.S. iuvolvf.iiiunt ui Itidocluna ha^ ti'it \nwu tiuulored by fa<:i*. Uiw-aiwo f this lack of ruliiVAii'^ to roality tin; Amorviiui |if>pli' re njadyiiig tluii(U;|viw u* (u;muu't au act of Iwtrayal which is
v
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hard to imagine. South Vietnam is dependent upoa the United State*it is country pathetically dependent upon the United States. Are we to leave these people helpless? Are we to leave them dcfcnsclo^ in the face of a North Vietnamese army constantly being rcoquipped by the Bussians and the Chinese? A humanitarian concern for life cannot be restricted to nationalities. Are we to Sacrifice the lives of others so us to make our position at home more comfortable? When speaking of moral issuea-we must remember the responsibilities that are consistent with our position as the richest, strongest, and I hope, most humane nation in th; world. Is it moral to desert these responsibilities? Is it moral to end this war in such a way that we will encourage future wars of aggression against small nations, or is it monH to end this wafin such a way so as to show all that even in iu worst hour, American democracy has proved ite strength?
SOUTH VIETNAMESE REBUILDING OK THEIlt SOCIETY
The fact is, that with American assistance, the people of South Vietnam have taken significant stejw in rebuilding their society in the niTilst of a terrible war. They have written aconstitution, held national elections, dcveiojwd H national assembly, a lively multiparty system, nnd an indei>endent and critiral judiciary. It ha"s been said'by some, "N'o one should go to Vietnam for the first time.," but if you must then it is ncccseary to go bark again nnd again; only then can you see the contnirt inn! only then ran you sre'llie true value of our concern and effort*. During my recent xisit, I saw certain things that differed from ntv previous visits. I saw |>eoplc smiling, children going to school, relatives visiting each other, rice being moved down roads that were imptissnblc only a year ago and in most areas, jn-ople once uguin able tu think of their tomorrow as a reality. We cannot abandon these |>coplc ut this |N>int. I hojie and I pray that those who ask for uniluUTttl \vitlidru\vul have more compassion and more ninlcrstandin^ for the |<'o|>le and problems of the Uniu-il States tiiun they iin ve fur the jtuople nod |)n(h!cnis of South Vietnam. When we ask for a just peaee \ve do not w>k for u tolnl military victory over North Vietnam, we a*k for opportunitiesthe opportunity for us to retain some dignity in light of our |m--t errors und uie oppi>rtunity to help insure tin1 right of the jwople of South Vietnam to determine their own future.
WIIKKK DOK8 rOVOUrjWtOVAr, UKIttKtfF.VrATIOV KXIl-i
I reuli/j- thut it i* the duty of our elected (tfni'iuls to rejiresent us in ('oi)grc.-i und thnt rur ('ongress hits certniii re.-tj>oiisibilit.ie> within the (iovenircieut. but I ak, Where doe* this repretc-iitution end? The J'rc-i<!ciit of the I'nited Si tile* j>cuks u.- the voice of the ('nit>uJ StuU's. Whi'ther you or I agree w i t h his jM>licies or not, he U tin; only |>enon who run get U* out of this terrible war. We must dejd with tlte realilici of toiliiy. Only aft^-r we lenrn to effeetivel, dent with the hanhncsrf ol ri'ttlity cun -. i>ver njtirc t< progress und reurh beyond for a more enlightened dvtiny Umi cun IM- ours. The reulity of o'ir situation in Indocliitm is thut we tire withdrawing. We hope timt this with'Jruwul Hill l>e Im.ncd on a |M!uirful and ecjuilable negotiation.
640
The reality of the negotiations Lt that they arc throe dimensional. We have yet to evolve from the one dimensional asjtect of negotiating amongst ourselves. Hanoi has yet to.hear one voice shaking for the United States; I believe it rather presumptuous of many of our officials to represent themselves as the voice of our agonized Kation. I ask, as a lawman, why they insist on undermining the voice of the President and encouraging; the hu\vks of Hanoi tor continue this atrocious war?
PUBLIC FINAL DATE FOR U.S. WITHDRAWAL
Many of those who are in conflict with the H'tministraUon's present program ask the question: Why doesn't rtie President set a public Una! date for U.S. withdrawal? As 'has IM-CH mentioned, the ho|N* shared by all of us should be the evolvement of a negotiated settlement. This would end the war and not just our presence In Indochina. It must be remembered that an American withdrawal is not synonymous with ending the war. Any date could he set for our eventual withdrawal, but it must be a date on which all alien forces would withdraw from South Vietnam. On that date iJtere would no longer be a need for security: "Vielnanuzalion" would mature naturally. If Hanoi could obtain the date for a unilateral U.S. withdrawal, there would be no incentive to negotiate seriously. Hanoi would be enc-ouraged U. -finuc .wars of aggression throughout Indochina indef imt ?ly.
PRISONERS OF WAR ISSUE
Hanoi, realizing there is no hope of a military victory, fully exj>ecls to beat u* at home. We must not help them. An extension of the previously mentioni>d question, and one of prime importance to the American public is: Won't the other side release our prisoners if we set a date for'unilateral withdrawal date? They have .said that they will "diciW the prisoner uf war U.-UP if we set a total, unilateral, and un>unditional withdrawal date, withdraw our troops, the troops of our allies, dismantle our base> and facilities, pay reparations, remove the lenders of the legally elected South Vietnamese Government, impose a "coalition" government favorable only to them, and gcnerallyend our program of Victnamization and pacification. Thin would IN: alfeolutely alfourd. Do we not remember that it took 3 to 4 months of i\iw very serious diM-UMions jut to decile what >liU(K: the table at the Paris j>cace talk woulil be, and not much has happened there on their Hide since? Do we not remenijxsr HanoiV promiw* to scriou.!v dicuss mat ten after the U.S. bombing huh of Nortli Vietnam? \Ve must nut tlirow away our bargaining position and leave the fate of American pritonefs of war to the generoiiity, or wvere lack of it, of the North Vietnamc*-, Hanoi mutt realix/e that we will not dtwrt our men. ThU |Milion i conaititent with tiie PreoidentV Hithdruwul policy. Averell Hurriinun has tuted that ue uiul underotand that .Vorth Vietnam will pay any price for our compIcU; with<lruwal from Indochina, and no the point i* not the number* of men that we leave UK u rchi/jiml fonu>, but that we. will retuin a prettencj' in Jndodiina until there U a naliwfaetory <j|ution to the priftoner of war problem, the No, 1 i*u> of the. Veteran* of Foreign Wiu> thin year.
641
REASON'S FOR SUPPORTING V1ETXAJUZATION AND PACIFICATION PROGRAMS
Since 1969. the United States has over and over again affirmed our desire to have peaceful and purposeful negotiations with the enemy. On October 7, 1970, the President offered a comprehensive peace iii>Native. Why was the government of Hanoi tlic only government not desiring an immediate cease-fire inplare, supervised by international observers? This is the question which must be asked prior to asking the Nation why the lolling continues in Indochina. Why has Hanoi ignoi-ed all unilateral gestures and offers made by Saigon and the United States. This is the question which must be asked prior to asking the peor'e of the United States why we doubt the word of Hanoi. The President has said "our objective, remains a negotiated peace with justice for both sides and which gives the people of South Vietntim the opportunity to shaped heir own future." In turn, Hanoi insists on what would aino'unt Co a complete victory for itself; a total unilateral and unconditional withdrawal of our troops and the overthrow? of the South Vietnamese Government. When will they present a more reasonable attitude? At present tlu-t question must go unansweredlUid that is why the Werans of Foreign Wars sup]>orl the Victnami/alion ind pacification programs of the President. During a recent visit to South Vietnam, French Senator Andre Armcngaud contrasted his feelings, on this occasion, with his last visit to Saigon some 3 years ago. "French nationals living in South Vietnam now find the country generally secure, and rejotcu in the refound freedom of movement throughout South Vietnam to the point where they can travel bv car without danger from the cities to (heir plantations," he said, fn addition, he said, during his last visit, "Frenchmen in Cambodia and South Vietnam were uneasy and asked about repatriation to France, in the fact; of 'omnipresent' Victcong pressure; nobody talks about going back to France* anymore."
INFORMATION* GETTING MOST PL'UUCITV
Iii a country, such us ours, where there is u tremendous flood of information, what kind of information ge.i the mont publicity?the bad, tin- problems, the difficult. Our country i* so problem oriented today that we often forget the perspective, of our problems, and we often forget that we worked very hard for some of these problem?;. If you continually take these problems out of the perspective of, not only change, but of progress, you can get a tremendously distorted view.
hOCTH VIETNAM IiS UKUUUdNG IThKI.F
South Vietnam has Iwen torn by vrjr for decade*, but in the punt feu- yeurx ue have vvifiif*'d H niiruculiiii* development; we have wen n cu'intry in the prow*?, of rchuil<lin<r itself during war. There is great n-u-dii for ftope. Tinluy the people of South Vietnam tire being given H choice between two opfiiming UUVM of p life. Il it, true that the*|M-ii[(|c want peace uml thai they want to M e the Vit-tcjm^ lay down their arm* and the North Victimine** leave the hoiith. Tin-re i* much ce to tliis effect, Jn J9/54, aflrr the Viet Mirth vic.i-orv over the h, ulmoxt a million Vielnurnew immigrate] from nortli to Kouth
642
rather than lire under communism. During tbe last dV-cade ibe 4>nJy flow of refugees has been from enemy areas to areas of government control. Any support that the north hallow is extracted through terror tactics.
V
SOrTB VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT HAS PKOGUESe-EP
The Government of South Vietnam has progressed. It is reaching out to the people. It is assisting them to achieve hotter living condition? under increasing security. On September 3, 1967, 4.8 million pe-ople representing S3 (tercent of South Vietnam's registered x'otcrs, and nearly 60 percent of the country's entire adult population, cast ballots despite Vietrong and North Vietnamese efforts to terrorize voters into staying away from the |x>lis. These elections were freely observed by over 600 members of the internatiui'.ul press ror|>s and by 116 international observers. In a pantile! development, elections for local officials have taken place in South Vietnam since April, 1967. Today, more than 95 percent of the hamlets and villages in South Vietnam have ejected officials. President Thieu, while ujx-ratinjr under extremely trying wartime conditions, has called for a unified loyal opposition t; uner responsible and constructive criticism within tlie constitutional framework. Tin-re have been ovcrzcalous attempts, mistakes, and abuses which have occurred in the government's* efforts, to control subversion, but these are befog corrected. The as-sembly and the judicial branches of Government have recently taken corrective action in many cast*. They have criticized the executive branch officials and an* o|H>rating inde|H-n<lenl of the executive branch; for example, a [tending bill to exempt civilian offenders from the jurisdiction of military courts is presently before the assembly. As we all know, corruption is a serious problem in Vietnam. There have, over the past 2 years, been measures taken to reduce or eliminate corruption in the Government. The Inspectorate, an autonomous fourth branch of Government provided for in the constitution, bejran opttruaons in N'ovember l^C-'S, and has made great jirogresit in reducing corruption within Government ranks. Tbe executive has taken punitive motion against corrupt and ineffective officials within Go\'erutnent. In this area. I believe there if* more to IK- done. American men are being sent to South Vietnam only to find themselves totally immersed in a drug culture. There is mu -h work to be accomplished at home because obviously these men are susceptible when arriving In South Vietnam, but I would think there is also much more we can accomplish in cooperation with the South Vietnamese Government, f believe our cause IK j.it.1, Imt in South Vietnam and elsewhere, corrupt officials and citizen* make fortunes by poioninj: our voung men with drugs. Drug traffic .-.an be, and iniiitl be controlled, if these countries continue to desire our help. They had better do more to solve this terrible criws.
PUOGKKHK BKVOVIJ TUAT IV GOVKUKMKNT
Beyond the prognSK made in the Government, there has be^n a gciu'rully favorable expansion of tlu- educational program. Shifting the rr.*\n>n*\\>i\ity of eîucuticm to local communitM-* Inw greatly increu I lie proportion of educated [MM>ple in Soufh Vietnam, On*March
G43
1970, ]*reideiil Thifiu promulgated into law * new and revolutionary land reform bill. Passed by the Vietnamese National Assembly. die program poes far beyond any previous land rcfonn measures and is aeMgned to provide ownership to all farmers whr cultivate the land. As of May 1, 1971, the Government has issued titles for 537,728 acres of laud which have been approve*! for the distribution to 173,942 tiew landowners. The number of commercial hatcheries in South Vietnam ha? increased from 47 to 57. Vaccine production and distribution in 1970 has increased steadily. After 3 years of operation the miracle rice program -*a he considered an unqualified success. The public health assistance program in Vietnam has expanded drastii-ally since 1963 and acoonlii-.fr tn a recent assessment by the World Health Organization. the program has l>ecn an unqualified sucix-ss. In 1%5 there uere 3.5 million refugees in South Vietnam. In Xoxvmhcr 1970. the number had been reduced to 470,000 with another 240,000 presently in n "return to the village status." This is progress. It i- progress that should not IM- ignored. Tjiesc programs are fundamentally Vietnamese. The territorial security forces are Vietnamese. The |rolicc an* Vietnamese. The liwul hamlet and village oflidals arc Vietnamese. Those, who recei*c and restore former memlcr> of the enemy camp are Vietnamese. Those whoj-egister and pay Ix'ticlits to the refugees are Vietnumese. Those who sow the new rice, those ubo explain the Goveniment |olicies arc all Vietnamese. I do not pretend that what I saw VMS totally a Vietnamese effort, but I did M'f |>cople li Miking for help, mid desire to help themselves. I call upon yi'ur compassion; we cannot turn u deaf ear to these people because. of nustukes we have made in the past. We cannot voice mijejsms. that were v'i lid in the past. concerning a situation that has drastically in the lust 2 years. US AND I.KSSONS or r.s. KXI-KUIKN K is IMUJCIIIVA f HMiilii like to cluse with u quote by Ambassador (liurle.- \V. Vont wiien addressing liim.v.>lf iti a recent issue of the Wuslunjrtoii I'it to the problems and the lessons we have encountered llii'iurli this iruiric and divkivc U.S. ex|MTieiice i:i Iiulocliinu:
It WPUI.I now n eoatly it-NWHi. tml it may roiui- in ttw ixT^ficclivu of (li-^tory to a rviiiwkaWy clit'np our. Wlic-ihcr it will prove to tic irin- di'iicnd* of roiirw un IIDU' *rr trtu.-l. If wi- ithuuld IM; rurrii'il wny by \tuiziti\t mutual nfrinunationn, or if w should Miniplintii-ally i;unclii(li- that, Ixviinw wr *tj'd <4O,(IO() IIVM uiicj '.VI Million dolUro in Virtnain. no uttu-r ovi-nwa^ involvcou>nt ur iivc-toii-nt i-< in our nliimitl inUTi^t. thi'ii itulrvd uv would liavr |ot far iiinrflliau ttw w sutd ibr wr. Jtul tlii would lie quiti- irruiionnl folly-- like conrludine ttuit. IMT.HIL.W t(ii-ri- are .">G,(NN> dcatlK mi ur liinli'uy rncli yi-nr, uv ulutnlil
MTUp tillIt'lltHlllAtllc.
Lrt us tudnT, <IXT|> und iiiiiliip-|\, Iri'iit ihf IiuJo-Cliinu nr ar par) of llupaiufci) rxp'-riiiici- (/ urowicK up u^ n itrttii ponrr. 1st UK (-oiici'iitrnt*- iti tin- nri-rfiitg m-i'dri of I ! fuiiirr t Nome und ulirojid, whit-li wr luivc H'liil'- vri- foittcli' tliH wur. L>-t Vf !.''lp lund up tin- wound- < and our ft li:iu' intlirU'd mi \'(clii:iin, Liio* ami (.'uintiodi:i, Co I In- rxl/'iil olid id tl- w:iy ilu* jwopl. of tli''-*- mil ion- inuy w.-iiit our ln-lp. ]/<-t u-, oner ajuiin MjU-rly and muii,ri'l\, ri'u'T our coiiiiiiitnn tit", our i(it'Tn-t>- und uur KHTJ* uhroiid, to d>IJTIIIIIII- in tlif li^lit of i-xpiTii'iici' ttliidi limy |jc IIT-, or imji^t wlucli inifdit Inmore, iioiiipclliriK ;ind nrronari thnn Ili'-y urrc u dccMi*' irr two u((o, If - U-lii-viin tliin nut wi- uluill in fiw-t, d'fpilJ- our itrii-voiii- losw-n and nil. t;iki'<, have "'jvod" tli.- ;ir, und our di-itd 'liull no( Iiavi- ilu-il in vuili,
The CIIAIKMA*. Ymir hwt 'piote is a very moving one. It tin*

lllljrli metit.
TOOT'S TUTDCOHT We luui Ambassador Yost before u* yesterday . Hi* recommendation to the f^Mmif^ was that it adopt the ao-called Hatfield, McGovernAct to set A date for withdrawal. That was his conclusion m bis testimoov in public session yesterday. I do not think that is inconsistent with what he says here about a proper attitude toward the experience which we have had. ' 1 ou have given us a very thoughtful statement. In view of the fact that"! have questioned the other two witnesses at length, I would be would be dad to yield to the Senator from Kentucky for the moment if he would care to address a question. Senator Coorta. Thank you very much, Mr. C airman. I did not hear Ambassador Yost yesterday b> 'cause of another engagement, but I did read hid full statement in the Washington Post a few days ago, and I thought on balance it was one of the best statements I have read about the war an, I he problems that have arisen because of the war and what our foreign policy could be after the war.
~ KKCttSTTT OF COHPBJEHEKSnne ffiSTOF'' OF FEB1OD -
I think jou know that I was one of those who pressed for a long time for the cessation of bombing with the hope that it would result in negotiations. Also, I have introduced legislation at various times, which was intended to limit U.S. military activities in Cambodia Laos, Thialand. I wanted very much that thaw hearings be as comprehensive as possible. I think com|>rohensive bowing* are necessary for u meaningful history of this period. I think such a historv is ucciôry for many younger people who in the beginnings of tfiis war VHT^ not- yet in school. I also wanted our country not wholly disparaged for its purposes during ibis war. I think your statement is a iielpful rxmtribution toward providing a comprehensive bistory of tlie war and our involvement in it.
OLOBIFICATION* OF YOUTH VIETKAKEKE Ak'D DtSPAHAOEMEKT OF UKITED STATE*
v
^ I think tliat we ant aware that some American* have glorified the .North Viotnatueu:, and there has boen dU|)aragement of our own country'* purpose* and '.he motive* of iu military by others. I do not think ucb viws are a full or true picture. It w a fact, as you have said that the North Vietnamese are in South Vietnam, in Laos, ami Cambodia. They are aggressors against those countries,
BEST OUTCOME TUHOCGH VEOOTUTED SETTLEMENT
I think also it i* correct. I nay again it is my view, that the best ouUonie of this war would wine about through a negotiated, settlement. A negotiated wsttlBimmt, to fie, SIMUIW the only means of assuring thst th fighting will not continue. It WMXIM to me, that i* tlie only muam to assure that fighting will not continue in Viotnant aftur our troops ure witbdrawm.
645
WITNESSES' PRESENTATION OF OFTEN FORGOTTEN FACTS
1 wantod to say now that while there are |x>iuts of difference between views which arc pretty well known, nonetheless, I think that you have presented here facia which are often forgotten, and which are necessary for a full history. A full and comprehensive history would nut he a denigration or disparagement of our own country'* purposes in Vietnam. I thank you. Mr. RAINWATER. May I respond, Mr. Chairman? The CUAIUMAN. Certainly. VFW DOESN'T APPROVE OF A'..! WAR Mr. RAIXWATEK. Mr. Senator, I think Uie thnut of my statement was to the effect that we did not approve of any war. We arc the victims and our people that we administer to are the victims of war. We are the last people who want the war to continue. :
>FW'SJOSITION CONCERNING VIETNAM WAR
I have made extensive ui|s into Vietnam, Cambodia, in an attempt it* inform myself in order to advise this organization OD the |*osition of the Veterans of Foreign"-Wars. which it should take concerning the national security and foreign affairs. This was so, also, of my predecessors and will be" of my successors. The Veterans of F oreign Wars feel strongly that war should have been declared in the first instance, if we were to go into Vietnam. It was not, and through three adnu'iiistrations the Vetccans of Foreign Went has sup|>orted our Govemiucnt's efforts in Vietnam and backed the men wiio arc in the field in Vietnam, while always calling for a military victory and a speedup, and getting the men pulled out and home with the least loss of lives, commensurate with the job the}* were sent them to do.
DRUG PROBLEM IS MISUNDERSTOOD
One of the most misunderstood part* of the Vietnam war at home here, is that somehow it is believed by some that the men returning from Viet mi in who are affected with drugs and other problems u peculiar to Viet num. This is riot true. Them- r>eoplc were not born to the Army, they were drafted ami *ent to Vietnam from our society. Tiie drug problem in South Vietnam is a most M-ITOU* matter bat reflects the drug problem in Uw Umied States whie-h has grown to epidemic levels among those who are now or have \nxn in Uie Armed Forces. So we think that the whole Vietnam war is a part of our society, in tlic xccure areas where you and I are it has to be based and treated in sume. way. robMuiurr or KEOOTIATIONH WITH VOBTK VIKTVAMEUE We would ho|N' that the N'orth Vietnuinese would have accepted negotiation* many yeur* ago, Hut I know, having served in Indochina during World War If, they are very Mibl>orn, tciiuciou* (wople, and they ne^'iliute long, and tfiey wgotiaU; hard.
040
I lliiuk there i still hope fur negotiations with them, and 1 tltiuk that we are moving to do what we run. But i do think that more than anything else the negotiations now depend totally u|xi their whims. North V ictuam, and I do not know whether anyone in this country can influence them to negotiate. We have begged of them, we have pleaded with them, we liave (iclitioned them for fair treatment under the Geneva Conference for our prisoners of war held then*, and we have done all sorts of tilings. But we have had no effect on North Vietnam. Thev are in a frozen io:.itin:i and apparently are going to fight for a military victory as long as \ve are in Vietnam, and onee we have gone, if we do not supjtorl South Vietnam and Cambodia, I am not sure they can stand alone.
NECBSMITY OK COMPJ.KTK WITHDRAWAL
Sntntor (ÔOPKK. I will just respond briefly, Mr. Chainmtn. My |H>.Mlioi) is, that the United Slates ought to continue to move out of Vietnam. 1 am not in favor of a date, but I think complete withdrawal Ls iiii|x-rative, and thut complete withdrawal offers the only significant chain-? of getting any kind of settlement in South Vietnam and Indochina. That view is in disagreement with some of your statements. But I do know that1 am a member of your organization and I have never found anyone who was a member of your organization, our organization, who wanted war. They want to avoid wars, they want t j get out of u:ir. Mr. RAINWATKK. Thank you, S-nator. Senator COOPVK. Will you excuse me. The CHAIBMAN. Mr. Rainwater, you have given a very thoughtful statement. I do not know how to approach this problem. You do bring into question seriously the role of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War who testified hen-. 1 believe you said that they represent a small number, I (icwnt or less, of the Vietnam veterans. OASIS or vrw rosmox Is the position of the Veterans of Foreign Wars based ujton the views of your tncml>crs who served in Vietnam or the total memlwrkhip of the Veterans of Foreign Wurs. Mr. KAISWATKK. Our. my authority, wmes from the p*t Irvel of which we have 0.000 ihroitglioiit the United States. Their resolutions generate there, ihroiigh n district level to a Stale level and then a national level und become the ni.-mdntes of the organization. rntcf|; (fnuil throughout all of these f<->t.s are the Vietnam \\ eruns und the miluence, uii'l in some cu.-j-s. total nicml>cr.->lii| of the post, is Vic! num. and thut isr not to say, Mr. ('hiurmun, that all of theê fellows are lt> years old, 20 yenr old, tin-re are .^HIIP regular Vietnam veterans having served out their regular COUPM: of duty, and can fie considered Vietnam /eleraiis. By an<l lurge. the nnliomi 1 council diree( K me throughout In train (lie niitiodul convculi'iii-, and 1 operate under n number of inundate* licit nr<! pcomulgitU>r| in tin: field und come through tj> me u4 authority for my u-uihoriiy uii'l |i'iîtioii u~> niu(r>m>'iits. The CriAiuMAV. ( ilniio) fjijerttion ul ull your iiuihorily to represent I he VKW OK a whole. The only rjUcMion was whether your view
647
represent the xiews of the VFW as a whole, including veterans of all wars, not just those members of the VFW who are Vietnam veterans. That u correct; is it not? Mr. RAINWATER. The judgment that I make, I supjwse, Senator, is similar to yours, in your position. And numerous letters are directed to me in the W W in our offices, concerning any issue that I might s|>eak on or might ab <it to be speaking on, or appears in our national publications and. by ami large, we never have 100 percent agreement by the membership, as you would know from your constituency, but we do have the majority of opinion that allows me to reflect the opinion of the organization. The CHAIRMAN. I do not for a moment question that you do reflect the view of the whole organization. The only narrow jwint I was making was is there any way to toll whether your view represcnU the majority \iew of just the veterans of the Vietnam war who arc members of your organization? That was the only question. You life no feasible way to ascertain that, r <io you? Mr. KAIXWATEK. I would not think that it would be possible through the computerit would be, I suppose, possible through the computer to ask this question in a long and involved system c process. The best process that we have'-found is oj>en debate, democratic debate by delegates elected on the flooc of our national convention.
IMKFEICEVCK IX NEW!* TOVEUAGK OK VETEKASS' VIEWS
What led me to believe, Mr. Chairman, that those, people appearing here in the first instance of the demonstrations in the first part of Mar, who purported to represent the view* of the Vietnam veterans, alwut 1.000. I came here, obseived them, and decided from my observation rightly or wrongly that only about 00 percent were old enough to l>e, to have IMTII in Vietnam. The others were either females, girl fiiends. or wives, or too young. Thiit did not Imthcr me because those jieople ImVf the same rights of petition that we do as an organi/jiMon of l,f>(X),000. What did bother me was that at prime time for 5 days and afternoons at 0 p.m. tint lhrc major television networks gave 1 hour and 20 minutes of news coverage to the action* of GOU men. whose action* were not totally approved by our members who j>up|..rt our withdraw*! from Viet num. Subsequently. I 4ced the three major networks by telegram and telephone to the president* of the n<:lworL> to allow me 1 hour and 20 min.itc- in prime time for 5 nighth running, and I would bring 5,000 Vietnam veterans of our organization to the Mull, We would slay there, we Would demonstrate peacefully, march i Arlingion with (he Amcricnn (Ing living right *i<lc up. plucc u uretith in diguijicd munner on lh- grave of the I'nfciiowii Sohlier; e woulil how atrocity lilrns lilmi of u i ro< !((> by North Viet mini ai'iiiu*! South VicliiHin and Amcri:uis, itnd we would cotnc tuyoiir odii'i' mil to rlirow blood or red ink on your ilr-k l>iit to Iiy lo prun-fnlly *v.i\y you of your coiiviclionx. Ji mi-fli* interc-.t you to know I hut the nn-diii tunu-il me doun ftnt uiul ''old. Miying they would not giiurmilcc me .'JO h/voiuls. And Unit WIIM tlii- rriisoii in my siutement, .Mr. Choirmun, (hut I referred \a the m >>rki!l. the nnbuluiiceil reporting t h u t fiu>* gone on ulxxit thin war urui
G4S
about those who now advocate.a policy of immediate unilateral witlidrawal. Not enough of the other opinion is emerging in the United States to give a balanced report. Mr. Chairman, in your taU&fSvith Congressman McCloskey, you asked the question why doesn't the Congress react to pulling out of the war quickly, and* I think it is because they are close to the people and they realize the ]>eople are not speaking for the majority of the people of the Uuited States. Thcv are a loud minority, but they are not a majority. Mr. HOLT. Senator, our membership presently stands at 1,600,000.
present are Vietnam veterans. Certainly we fwl these young men joined our organization for a purpose and, I l>elieve. the purpose for which they joined is they In-lieve in what the Veterans of Foreign Wars stands for. They believe in the programs of our organization; they Mievc in what we are. trying to do in order to unify this country and bring us back together again.
ISSUE IS POLITICAL DECISIONS NOT CONDUCT Or MILITARY
The CHAIUMAX. That matter is certainly not in question. Mr. Rainwater, your previous comment to Senator Coo|cr is the isMie that U present! d to the committee, wliicli i* really not tlie conduct of the military as such, the sumtort of the men who ijo the fighting in the Army. That has never been in quolion rotJIy in the Congress. Nor has it ever been in my mind. What is really at issue is the |olitical decision. (Yrtiiinlv not tin' men killed in the ranks, nor even the military themselves, have ever been held, I think, responsible for the alleged mistake**, if you wish to call them that. 1 think they were |M>litical mistakes of judgment. The [mlitical decisions, a* you have said, the conduct of the war without a declaration, were not attributable to the nu'litary. ThU wa a jMiliticul matter, which was not requested by the, military as Mich, unless you consider the President a militar)' num. He is considered a civilian in spite of the fact that lie is the Commander in Chief. This is the root of thi; matter, so far as this committee is concerned. I know that many military men have taken unto themselves the criticisms which have not really bcci. directed lo them at all, but have been directed at the |Hlilict,l leaders and llicir j'.'lgmci.t as to what is in the interests of the cuiitrv. This has often come up about the conduct of the *'ar. Many military men also criticize the decisions, esjwcjally of t>.e preceding admiui>tration as to tlie rules of the war. You are familiar with that. 1 do not know whether you share them or not, but I know a lot of military men did object, and f till object, to the policies of the preceding administration regarding this matter. I think that the military people have IMVII overly Hcrinilivc in taking to theninelvea criticism of thi! wur, which really is directed at the. folitical leaders put timl frreocnt anil not ut thi* military men at nil. Mr, UAJVWATKU. My ober\ujion, Senator, on the many trij that 1 have gone, into the field in Vietnam, to 1'arrot's llcuk, Cambodia, w i t h the troop* und with the CamlCKiiaii, and South Vietnamese, is that a military man in Vietnam must l>u very confused about now,
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particularly those in command, About this great migration of expert* from the" tJnited States looking over his shoulder while l.c tries to fight a military war. If I were in command over there, I think I would be chagrined by it now, and probably pretty frustrated.
JOHKKEKBY .
But I want to get back to a subject here that was a subject before your committee to try to clear the record just a little bit about who represents the Vietnam veterans, if anyone, besides himself. You had a very articulate, young man here recently named John Kerry, who has suddenly beeu picked up by the news media as someone running allegedly for President and he is a very sincere man in liis efforts, but, certainly is not an angry young man. He is an opportunist, taking advantage' of a very confused minority. He has seen, in my judgment, a cause for young people who are fmst rated and confuted about this war, and he has rushed ahead of them to say, "Iok, I am a leader" and that was why I *aid I do ot think -the views of those 600 jteople that lie leads, represents the views of the veterans of Vietnam. [Applause.] The CuAtBMAK. I can appreciate approval of the leader, but to continue our hearings it is strictly against the rules for demonstrations on any side. I realize a certain amount of it is unavoidable, but if we aro going to make progress, we *ill have to try to keep our minds on the questions at issue. That young man was very articulate. I, myself, feel there are many poople outside of the Vietnam war who share nis feeling about Uie war. to lact, there are a substantial number, not yet, so far as I know a majority of the elected Members of the Congress, who share his feeling that it is in the interest of the United Slates to end the war, We are elected, of course, to represent the iutcresU of our constituents and not Uus jHsople of South Vietnam, They have other ways of protecting their own society and thu first allegiance of those elected to these offices is to their own people. It is what the war is doing to our own people that is of major concern to the Members of Congress. At least, that is what they are elected for. This involves again, I say, a judgment as to what is in the interests of our own i>eopTc. The cost of this war has become so great and continues to DO so great. The delay and the neglect of uur own problem is, I think, the most critical matter at issue. It is as again, as I say, a matter of judgment.
COXniTIOWK IX SOUTH VIETNAM
You wr very complimentary of the conditions that now exist in South Vietnam, more so than anything I havu read or heard. 1 was utrwk by Uie difference >jf view as to tliu situation in South Vietnam today liutwcen your statement and that of the Vice President of South Vietnam rucwiUy reported in the press on May 17 in the Times. In fact, Uie article is written by him. He said:
Houth Vietnam U like a Miiluujc boat willi deceptively good coat of (taint otiUiifiif and a IwliMftuian who i unfaithful, diWoyoJ and diboi>i. A whirl f wiitd oud llu.' boat will tiiilt to tbi! buttoiji. It in clear that tbe \mnyHt: have I'Wt faith in t-lw tfovi'rmtuifit. Ttw old have IJCCOIIH? weary and di'illumuii^d and tin 1
42 M71
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disorir.. led. Corruption is rampaging. It is so widespread that corrupt official* have a price list for every transaction, big or small, requiring their services. Jungle law rules in all government ecbelp"- Corruption has become public, open and as it were an incurable disease.
I will |>ut the whole r.ticlc in. (The ii.fonnntion menvd to follows:.
[From tb. Xr York Ttaws Uy IT. MTI|
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NOUTICN CAO KY: ON THE Sixiuxc BOAT ''By Nguyen Cao Ky) SAIGON-. South VietnamSouth Vietnam is like a sinking boat, with a deceptively good coat of paint outitidc, and a helmsman who is unfaithful, disloyal, and dishonest. A whirl of wind an'l the bont will sink to the bottom. It is clear that the people Itave lost faith in the Government. The old. have become weary and disillusioned, and the young are disoriented. Unless we take urgent and radical measures lo redress the aituat.on, I am afraid the danger will become more and more serious. Conniption is rampaging. It is so widespread that corrupt officials have a price list for every transaction, big or small, requiring their services. Jungle law rules in all government echelons. Corruption has become public, open, and a* it were, an incurable disease. Today, not only an- the [ienp|e writhing under social injustices, but they are also becoming more and more miserable because of the harsh economic measures decreed in the name of national necessity, for the sake of so-called efforts toward olf-siirh'cie.ncy. But that is not defensible in a situation of continued injustices with the people being required to accept restrictions to the point of being miserable and near starvation, while powerful and rich people continue to evade taxes and corruption continue* to spread. Although we are in a democratic society within which there is no class division, a new class of profiteer* has emergi.-d, made up of those iu positions of power and authority. They-are everywhere and they would seize on any opportunities to unscrupulously grab money, even if they had to tread underfoot the sacrifices the combatants have made iu blood and bones. These people have been able to achieve for themselves a life of luxury, while other people are living in misery. In the meantime, our soldiers, who arc directly contributing lo the national struggle by sacrificing their live* to maintain securitv for the |>eo|4c living in the rear, are Ix-ing given the lowest standard of living. Their salaries are nol enough for ibrm and many have to try to scrape up additional money by working part linif as janitor* or drivers. Many a trap? and heart-breaking incident has happened to the families of those soldiers who have died for the fatherland, as for example to war widows who have hod to lake up indecent professions to live. The civil servant* do not liave a Ix-tO-r lot than the soldiers. We have seen lliat the mure bone*!, the more diligent they are, the poorer and more underprivileged they become. Tlirir miserable situation makes us tliink tliut honest civil nervunls are a foritoLten iJu.-.-t. .. The jH-ifonlry, which make* up the icrcatrr part of our soeiety, is suppowd . ~ ' n Ix ictveii .ijxy'iuJ help through our land reform program, but in reality they are till lieing exploited by internuidiaries. With tlw sup|>ort of SOUK: |ieople in power, rice dealers are free to exploit l>olb |Mift*mit* and con'!mers, so much so that a high ' io'.erninrnl official ha* hud to admit recently tin.* incapacity of I be Government to |>iit an end to this itiial'on. We ciin we by tlui<e lhinit ihut Lite poorer rhuwe* and thr.-e who are directly ucrificirK in tiie >lr<igg|e for national defenw, and contributing Iu llic work of national reconstruction, an1 being forgotten whin: u minorily of irresponsible l/oople m portion* of |M>HIT tlnnk onlv of grabbing money and consolidating tin '* po'T ti> njntifi'.ie to exploit 111." people. Tin* "ituuf i'n ieu^ tii iti'irr Koeinl injutir<'B and to muny u COM> of corruption. Since tliix ejiiiw of profiteer* niiiot (iroiert tlieir own jiiii-rrl., tliev are reivdv to ink-rule ull illcKal act' It i* not xirpriîng that the poor are utill paying more tiiti'i i dun thi; rich, iw shoMii in nationnl Ixiditet dix-'nuii'iilji. VJIT,I'D t'.uo Ky i< the Vice I'ri'-uli'iil of Sonlh VM>tnuiii. Tdis article * ecrrpt>*d from a stieech he inurjf at the School of Social Welfare in Kaigon. The siieei-li wu< truu'luU'd Iroin V'i'-itiauifM' liv the Kuigon llnri-au of Tlw New Vwrk Tim.-.
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The CHAIRMAN. Have you read that article? Did you happen to see it? Mr. RAINWATER. No, sir, Mr. Chairman, but I woidc* like to comment ou that, if 1 may. The CHAIRMAN. yes; proceed. Mr. RAIN-WATER. I think one must realize that this k an election vear ui Vietnam and that Vice President Ky is running against the President and it is fortunate probably that the elections then are in October, because he is running under a system similar to ours and he is saying: about the same thing the opposition is now to the administration. Maybe if he cannot do too well there, lie can come and run here the ncxt*ime. The CHAIRMAN. I really feel I cannot quite agree with you that our system is the same as South Vietnam's. Mr. Humphrey u still free and a citizen. He has not been put in jail. The man who ran second in Vietnam is in jail. Mr. RAIMVATER. But, Senator, he is in jail for corruption not for losing a political election. That is the difference. I do not think Mr. Humphrey was in corruption while he was Vice President here for our country. The CHAIRMAN*. I think on that there may be a difference of opinion, but there are people Mr. HOLT. You mean Humphrey? The CHAIBMA.V. No. I meant (laughter] a, to the reason why Mr. Dzu is in jail. There have been many reports which, of course, you arc free to say are not true. We heard quite A lot about a Mr. Chau, who was u member of the assembly there who has also been put in jail because of his criticism of the Government.
Arc you saying that the reports that we liave received through tlie pros* and elsewhere about the arbitrary and diet atonal metiiods of thu President of South Vietnam are not true? You do not believe tliey ure true? Mr. RAIN-WATER. I would say, sir, they an-highly exaggerated, as ure most of the item* of sensationalism coming out of Vietnam by tlii- Press. The OH A IK* AX. You feel that the reporting generally is incorrect and that we have l>een misled. In that your position? Mr. KAIVWATEE. I think that America is being mii-lod, ir, to a rcrtai'i degree. I said in my statement there are faults with that system down there. However, but you must remember a\>o that tliere were fault* with this system when we started in this country, and tliere might be those who think thenare still u few fiiiilu, with it. But I tliijik, by and large, thev are moving in an attempt o clean it up, and you inrist understand that we liuvi'\ve HOIIHTUHC* try to irn|>ose on Asiii America'* own mind and morality, and they do not tliiuk quite the mime way we do. But 1 do think, and from this trip 1 am pretty ' confident, very r^nfidciit, that Hrewident Thieii will l*e rye|'cl'.-il ami tltdr government will continue to stabilize. It hu- ]>robleni. It Imx the su-ii" kind of prollcins sir, (li.it we Imve. Jt liii^ iitfluiion, for inut anee. mill tlicv liuve lorurry t!ii-> h":i\v jnilitury lu:u! nftcr we leave, tigaiiixt. Vorth Vii'lnnin if \"ortli Vi'-tn.nti iu-*iit4 on
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continuing the war and occupation of a part of Vietnam. So I think we are asking too mucli to ask them to be a perfect government in the midst of a war. Find, I think we would harp to judge in the long run, after the war is over, how they react and how they handle themselves.
DOWNGRADING Of UNITED STATES
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rainwater, you have complained. 1 Mirve, that some of us who criticize the WAT are downgrading our own country and Senator Cooper seemed to share that view. I am lx>und to say llial for you to say that our country is similar to the Government of .South Vietnam is the most damaging thing I have heard anybody say about our own country, I have never said anything as serious as that. Mr. RAINWATER. The makeup of the South Vietnamese Government and their legislature ami method of electing, sir, was my intention in referring to it and comparing i' to our own system of government. We have spoken out about those who have continued to harp because the United States found itself involved in Vietnam. But that is not tlu- judgment of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. This is not the time to criticize our efforts in Vietnam, while we are still engaged in the middle of a wur. And it was brought up here a few moments ago by another wiltUss about the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and its having been rcjH-ttlcd. This is also the first time in history that a resolution of war hus been reiwaled in the middle of a battle, no I think Vietnam is unique, sir, is what I am trying to say. It is a unique und unfortunate. esj>ericnce in which we find ourselves and collectively we must now work ourselves out of.
DIFFERENCE IB OVEU METHOD
Tiie CHAIRMAN. I agree with you it is unique and I agree that collectivcJy we should work ourselves out of it. That is what these healings are about and that is what the resolutions before the committee re about. Mr. RAINWATER. Right. The CHAIRMAN That is exactly the. point of it. Tlie difference, I suppo*', is the way we do it. Mr. RAINWATER. Tlie method, the way we do it, that is correct. Tlie. CHAIRMAN. That is a legitimate political question as to how we do it.
SOURCE or PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE AMD EXPAND WAS

You mentioned lite repeal of the Tonkin Gulf resolution. You prompt me to ask you what you think now is the souna* of the President's authority to continue the war and to expand it into Lao Mid C'umbod'ia? Mr. RAJNWATEU. 'Die responsibility is that he incurrednot this President but another one at the time CongrcHS passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolutionburking him 549,000 men in Vietnam, It is his rcMponihili(y now, in my judgment, to cxirirjuo those nu-ii in the poftabl/' way couimensuriiU' with the leant amount of 10** of Uu> inU'grity of ihi* country.
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The CHAIKMAV. Again, I agree with that conclusion, but ti>ere could be * legitimate difference of opinion as to whether or not what is going on in Laos is reasonably designed to <**>mpKgli the purpoise he announced. That is where the difference comes, b it? The general principle is the one we accepted. e 'Cv~ Mr. RAINWATER. We hear a lot about refugees and Laos and Cambodia. I dwelt for several hours and hours on this refugee problem in Cambodia just recently. In fact, I flew directly from there to here for this hearing. It is not the United States that is creating the refugees in Laos and Cambodia. The North Vietnamese hare created the majority, the overwhelming majority, of lefugees in Laos, and now are the sole creator of the refugee problem in Cambodia.
REEXAU1VAT1OX OF IWTWWATIONAL AGREEMENTS SCUOCSTEO
I think I said this to you privately when I talked with you earlier this year in your office. The United States finds itself assisting a country in the same manner we assisted South Korea and then we say this is'not die Tight system, and this is not the ^way -we do it, nd I think I raised at that time, you will recall our conversation, that we ought to reexamine the agreement we have on the books of some 42 or so agreement* with the rest of the world after we conclude this unfortunate experience in Vietnam and decide what this country's policy really is going to be. I really do notl>lame the young people for being a/of used about our double standard* and our assisting a Communist country on the one hand, and rejecting assistance to a Communist country on 'he other. You cannot blame those young people. That is Uie it-spoilabilit y you were lulkir.p about to Congressman McCloakey. from iny own State, awbilt* ojro. I think that the time Ix-yyiid our getting us out of Vietnam and getting this problem settled, could best, be used by Congress at tliis time to bold new bearings on these 42 international agreements, either verbal or written, that we have with countries all over the world and see. when we go again aiid who pushes the button. Tln> C'HA.IHUAK. I agree with you on that. 1 think I agreed with you at the time. Mr. RAINWATER. Yes, you did, The (,'H AiutfAV. This is reallv part of what we are doing. I mean we are doing the immediate one, tVe have also had some hearings on the long term problem.
POLITICAL PHIftOk'EUM IN' SOUTH VIETNAM
Recently, we bad a witness, who spent many years in Vietnam, state there were, in his ipinion, as many as 100,000 jtoliticai prisoners prenentiv in South Vietnam, What would be your <>mment on that? Mr. ÂIVWATEK. Well, sir. I would susjiuct that, apain, that may be an exMKgcrsU'd figure. I suppose that we would find in this country if we wen? suddenly involved in a conflict within our i>>rden, witbin the continental limits of tlie United Kut*, I wupjKisr there would be (w^ple here who would be supjxjrtirig th<; other government but if would \n- found ntM^'ssary U> take them out of circulation as they have in South Vw-tnani.
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I recall our unfortunate experience, I know, in World War II. I lived ou the West ('-oast when it started and there they moved the Nisei, the Japanese, back to camps. That was an unfortunate experience. It may be that |>ai i of those political prisoners will be found to be an unfortunate experience as we found ourselves in an unforf .late experience in World War II with the Japaoey.
TESTIMONY OF GENERAL DAVIli SHOUP
The CHAIRMAN. We heard testimony a few days Ago from a very distinguished soldier, i former (Commandant of thu Marine Corps. Gen.- David Shoup, who has ell the highest honors you run thirk of including the Congressional Medal of Honor. He believes that we should end the war and he emphasized wh t he Iwlicves the ffi-cl of this war is on the monde of the Army. Are you familiar with his testimony in any way? Mr. R'AIVWATEB. No, I was out of the country at the time, Senator. I am vaguely familiar. The CHAIRMAN. Do you know General Shoup? Mr. BAIXWATEK. Ys. The CHAIRMAN. You do not question his integrity or hi* loyalty in any way; do you? Mr. R. iNWATEit. 1 know really very little about him, but I do not quiistion his loyalty: no, sir. The CHAIKMAV. You would not classify him as just an opportunist, as you do Mr. Kerry? Mr. RAINWATER. Well, I do not know what Mr. Slump's intentions are: know nothing aloul linn at all. So 1 really do not know whether he is motivated by genuine omHisition or whether it is some jwlitical opposition. I have, no way of knowing.
JOHN* KERRY
The CHAIRMAN. Since you put it that way, I want to emphasize llnit I do not accept your characterization of Mr. Kcrrv. I think his re'jord in tiu.- service tej-tifio. for itse-lf. He has done his duty, as many of tho others have, iit my opinion. I think here again that one should not question either his integrity or his sincerity. You may question his judgment as you question mine or any Member of Congress, but as far as liis character mid bis motives, 1 do not share, your view at all. I think he i a man of tho very highet motives and purjXH*-, The rea*m ho was s|>okf*mim is that he was capable of expn**ing hiniM-lf, I think, more tlourly than any other nu-mUrr. He wa-~ choM'n. I wan told, in an informal way by those veterans uho were here. I Hpolu* with some, other* who, in private, were equally u eloquent. I was ver>' deej>ly imprest by their MHreritv. Again, this ulwavs Wves rKm for difference of opinion as to all of our j>olitkal judginciit, f.->|xc'ially as to what means WM should tnke in dealing with the war.
KKTKST ALLC'F POM.
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You riu-d the (jallup jxill on wveral o<'<-iiioii indicating you fvl it lius w;iic vulidilj. What do you my a l x u t the recent (iallnp \><>\\ t h a t id/li<utwl TA (I'TK'ni uf the American \n'u\t\t> th(;ugli( tinwar hhnuld !< cmled ami
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all troojw withdrawn by the end of this year which, iii effort, is quit* similar to the Hatfield'-McGovern resolution? Mr. RAINWATER. I think that the poll might be low in its figures because I think it would depoud on bow you -asked that question of a person. If you asked that question in one way, I think you would get 90 percent'of the iieople who would say the war already should have beer, ended. We think it should have item ended not just ilie end of this, year hut ucfore now, had Congress declared war, committed the en tin- resources of this country to that war in a total, unified war nnd ailoxml the military field commanders to seek a military victory on the fu-'.rL It would depend on how the question u asked-- 1 do not know how the question was asked. The CHAIBMAK. The question was asked in terms of the HatfieldMcGovern resolution, as near you can get it. I giiis* I will read the question for the record. This is the way the question has been asked:
A proposal has been made in CongrcM to require the U.S. Government to withdraw all U.S. troops befort the end of the year. Would you like to have your CoBgrouunan vow for or agaiust this proposal?
., It .veuia to nu> it could not be put iu a more clear-rut wanner. That is the effort of the Hutfield-McCJovcrn proponn!, ano thU iiitiifatcs that nationally 73 jiem'iit voted aye, that they would like their Congressman to vote in favor of that proportion. It breaks it lown. Ill- an increase of from 50 percent iti September of 1970. \Ve voted on this matter in September and, as I recall it, 39 votes in the SrnnU> at that time suppi>rte.d it. It is a resolution or a proposal that has been lone before the public and, I think, surely ought to be well understood by them because lucre has been an enormous amount of publicity given to it. I bring it up because I thought from your reference to Gullup, you had some confidence that his poll was u significant measure of public opinion in this country.
AS'N'OUKCEU DATE AND UECOVEHV OF PKISONERS OF WAK
Mr. RAIN^WATEH. I think, Senator, from the experience thut I have hud in the past 4 yearn, as the leader of an orgtuiization almost totally immersed in the prisoner-of-war Ut>uc, which has been my sj>ecialty or expertise, if I have any, (he argument that I would make*against u Rriuoumcd dute of Dc'4-cml>er 31, or wlmtcver the dute M, whatever bbel you put on the date In this one thing. The Xorth Victiiumese, in my judgment, hold one trump card, one uc, they arc waiting to play and that ace i* the li VKH of how matiy of our prisoners of wsu* tliey hold. As I HtuUtd, I think they will rlo almost anything U> get us out of Indochiuu so titey can get on with the buhUiess of ronûo,! of the entire nrea and that is why I would fear saying thai we will pull out, back out, by December 31 prior to securing tlu; assuraiu-e tlial with tlmt puilout afwl uitli that Uwt plane home we Imvc the Uot prisoner of war almurd nd that i* tlie (xwilioii the Wueruns of Foreign Wars Ktund on this itMut* UH ajiprovwj by u recent VFW' Vntioiml t'ouncil of Atiminiktnition rneeling thin Bummer. Our N'ulional Coun/'il of Adminihtrulioti is our supreme govcrninc Iwxly between uimuul iintioiial conventions, We have asked the Freoident to warn North Victiuim uguin wxi again thL we demund bettlemcnt of the (>rivoiu*f of war I-
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other issues. I do not see how. Senator, the VFW could support a position of pulling out of Vietnam at a given date announced in advance prior to having that assurance or you or someone else giving us that assurance that we will recover the prisoners because, remember, Madam tfinh's September statement was to the effect, and still is quoted to me o vet-seas, as the official position of the North Vietnamese, that "We will only discuss," only discuss, after a cease-fire, etcetera. Well, you know, Senator, it fs very difficult for the North Vietnamese to call a cease-fire in Vietnam when they allege they have no soldier-; in the south to call a cease-fire on. So we would like to see the same thing. The Hatfield-McGovern amendment represents I think, a seardung for, a quick way out of Vietnam, and if we do it unilaterally, we xvill never recover our prisoners of war.
COXc.KEftSMAV IIALPEKV'S COXVEBSATION8 CONCEKSIKG FO*'s
The CiiAiKMAX. Recently a Republican Congr "ssmnn, Mr. Seymour Halpcrn. went to see the North \ ietnamese and Vietcong representatives Palis about the prisoners of war. The storv is rejxMted on May 5 and I will read you a part of it. I will put it all in the record: In a transcript of thr discussion released by Halpem, Xortb Vietnam Spokesman, Nguyen Thanh Le, said regarding the POWs: "\Vc have no intention of holding them." A Viet Con*. .Spoki-MiiMi, Nguyen Van Tien. alo was quoted an saying th* Comnnini!>i^ "will agree ti release" the I'OW* if the "appropriate" withdrawal date is wt. Tif-o"* full rc|>ly 0:1 this point. The problem of the capture of military men in a problem connected 10 the war itself. It i.s a problem to IM- dealt with as an aftermath of the war. iTeiieraUy speaking, it. i* only solved after the war is over. But in order to ."how our good will, we have stated that the L'.S. CJovmimcnt need* only to declare an appropriate date fi>r the total withdrawal of its troops from South Vietnam. Theji we are ready immediately to enter into talks on procedures and ways to release the captured 'mrn. The diif'insions will be on how to n-leaw; t he men. Tlic question is not on whetbT we will release them or not. We will agree to release tlw nien. The discuwiions would be on procedure^ to ex|edite tl>e rdea^!. That i> t i n - liiU-M stut<TJieiit tut tho subject I liuvr seen from a n:.-|ii)ii>jllc Mcjnbcl'of tlic floll^ 1 i if KrprcM'MtHtivrx, wiin inl<T\ii'U'l tiie rejireM'iit-ativcs df I m l h (in* \'\flf<n\ mill llie N'ortli N'ietiiatiicx 1 in Puns. It would x'dii to ! u v<-ry jm-itivc utnlcrtukiii^ that if a date, such ii.- i-.~ nicillioiicii in tlic JJiilfield-McCJoVeril Act, is uiitiolllici'd, thiMi tlit- prori'diin-n foi ivlcax- will iiiiinrdiuti-ly iM-îriutid Ix-urrniifrod. \Vliut j- yoiirciiiiijiient ulwnil t l i u l ? Mr. K A I . N W \TKII. J lliiuk tlu- ki-y wonl in tlu-n-, Mr, i> "diîiiw" ami tlutt i.- what tin- whiil*1 ihnin' i>f lltut a'tiU-ncc >uy><, diM-iiw. Tin- < 'IUIKMAN. The iliM-ii-Moii i only nn tin- mrthoil*. I think you n't it. It nuyn to *h<> our good will we have KtaUid that. th: I'.S. floverniueiit iHd only to declare an uppr.jpriaU- date for the total withdrat nl of the troopit, Thiai we are ready inrdieditttrly to enter into talk* on procedure* and wuyn to releaw. Th will IM on how to rele^nte the uien. Tue i|ii':*tâ ix not wniûer we will Tlu'V tn-fi'\ii tin- coiiiiiiilnieul t'i n'li'uiM* thrm. Tin* only li<-iii*r.ii,;i i* how do you d'V it. You do not JIM tUH) thi'Jji IOOM-. V n i l hnve to fliukc nrrunyinnilf for their traimpurt mill their cMrt1 iltirinji t l M - prm*.. Jf the hnicim^' ini-unr, ttiiythiiij:, IJiat ir. what il nicuiih la me. They u.jc not ijiiibbltii}; iilKiiit it. He *uy* .(M-x-jJicjilly, "The* quetion i>> no!
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on "whether we will release them or not. We will agree to release the men." VTbatever discussions there are will only be on procedures on how it can be done. Mr. HOLT. Sir, what {wsition does that individual have with the N 01 tli Vietnamese Government who talked to Seymour Halpcrn? The CHAIRMAX. There are two of them. Tb'e; are described as North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris and of Vietcoag. They are both representatives. He gives their names. Mr. RAINWATER. Sir; I have interviewed any number of officials 'rho have returned from an interview with the negotiators in Paris, both official and unofficial, and what he is saying there to Congressman Halj>crn has not been said by any official at the Paris |>eace table. The North Vietnamese used two approaches to this war. They have always used two; one, propaganda; arid, two, their official positions. When North Vietnamese gets ready to make an official {tosition the United States has official .euresentatives sitting at 'he |>eace table now for 3 years, waiting for the North to accept or to modify or in some way to make a counteroffer about the ending of this war <nd exchange of the prisoners of war and, in my judgement, based oh ti<? exi>erience of having interviewed the North Vietnamese represejilativeu in New . Dflhi, India, you had better have it in writing about the release of the prisoners of war before you make any announcement of withdrawal or you will be writing the prisoners of war off. (Article and text of conversations follow:}
the WaaUata Pott. lUjr 0, 1071 ] Reoe DKMAKD Puixot'T DATK TO FUCK Gin Kep. Seymour Hal (tern (R.-X.T.) aid yesterday that Vietrong *ud Kortb Vietnamese negotiator* told him in Paris that the I'.S. prino. .ers; at war would be reluaMcd if the United State* etn "an appropriate" date for withdrawing it* forces. Halperu, a dovish member of the Houxe Foreign Affairx Committee, ai(' he apent eildit bourn with <x>mmunist Vietnanu-w representative* la.it Wednesday. ID a transcript of the difcuwion rdeawd by HaJixTn, Kortb Vietnamese Hpokesiniai Vguyen Thanh Le iiaid niRarding the 1'OW'n: "U'v hav<; no intention of hoidincc thcni." A V'iKcotiK xpokennuui, Xjtuyen Van Tien, alo w- quoted as caving the "will agri.-c to relcaiu;*' the POW* if au "nn>ro\innU'" withdrawal otrt. full n|>ly on thi jr>int: "Tin- problem of tb' rapture ut military uwn If a problem conwi-ted to the wiir itnt-H. It in a prubleni lx> be d<-alt with a." an aftermath of tlw wi*?. O-uerally HprâJdiiK, it is only solved after the war in over. But iu order to >how our good will v-' have xtnlJ'd ttat r.bi: lT.t>. fcw-mote-ut rtt^dx only todedjire rn appropriate daU' for The total v/itlidmwal of it> troop: from South Vu-tiuujj. Then we are ready inituediaU-ly to entrr into lolk* ou proocdunv attd HVK it, release the captured uu-n. "Tbf dincuwiiotix will In- on how to n-leaw th*- nwu. Th: qm-rtion in wot on win-flier we will release Ibtan or not. HV- will OKTW- to it-ie-a*.- th<- incn. The di*euitfiion would be on procedure* to cipedite the n-leaw."
CoVV>;llH*TIOV BrTWKKK CoKCUKMKMiK KbVMOftt liALPKlIk' AM)
LK, DKV DixncATiov Pri, April 2H, IV7I, K. In your remark* to iiw you y that you've bw.- /<! )"xl of being barbaru- by <Jv U.K. ftdrnjiiixtratiou on tin? priotier iwwe. You v./w that ' net <ui. H'ouW/i't it be the obvtoUH thinic, the nimpk^t tfajuc lo allow i/j*j*ctktf) to verify yûr flaimt; of very good tr*tiuent. (>>; it luw Ifccn verified by auuty that we have U>wj giviu< very Kood treaUueut to Uw captive pilot* aud the bert ujodicaJ care to the nick ud wounded.
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H VLTERX. The Geneva Convention which you .-ipicd and which you seem to know so well calls for inprrLion* on treatment if prisoners of war. You certainly an- violating thf princiide by re-fusing to allow a verification of your rUinw of good tratrnviu by intmiat.ional inspection. The very least you in do is release of the sick and wounded and agree to internment in a neutral country. The way to prove that your treatment IN humanitarian is to take these measures. LK . You talk about our ide not negotiating the release of the sick and wounded. If it were not for Xixon's bad mu-tit.ons tin-re would be no prisoner problem. H ALTKT..X. But it would be in keeping with the priiiciptiai of the Geneva Convcution that tht-rt he inspections by a third party or international team. Lc. We wen" ignatories; to the Geneva Protocols. In full keeping with them we npply Vf-ry cofvi trcatmmt to American pilots. The problen* TI<>W is the security of thf; pilots and our own peojilt:. We must discontinue the visit*. HALPKKN. You nay you provided, a list of the prisoner*. We have caune to bt.-lii.-vt1 there have liccn more captured and that you Lave not given complete identificali'jn. You have not ajrwd to imp.irtial insixxtion. You say they are treat'-d very well. Yet you will"not allow verification of this by neutral portie*. 1^.. \Vc did give yon AH accurate list. Wr did start to rek-asc men. But now we tako proiwtivc" reaction itcunst attack* by your aircraft, and rescue missions. And President Nixon ha.- threatened tliat ac long a*1 thurc- L< one prisoner of war left, he na.ild not witadraw. HAUTKX. Well if you want the U.S. to withdraw * wouldn't it be the oun ii:ingthe n'tiuortcst thingthe right thingto rdt-.me the j>riuon<Tii j- Ihi- repatriation projJOsuLs? Wouldn't it be the ri({ht thing at leasrt, to update Diniil'-v. the released li.-ts? Woiddn't it be tb-r right thing to allow iuspnctiou to vnrily the Uvatiiwut you cLuni is so good? Wouldn't it be the right thing to ruiiio\>- the sick and wouuded fur inUTnment in u noiitrul country? Viin have told me in your n-inarks Uiat you would talk iilx.>ut rrli-atu; f {>rus<iniT ontv jx-ai-i-./ tu-gotiatcd * * * You say on the nignitiK '>f pear*-, i>rutMts w(>uld lx> r<-l<-a.H<-(i a. .tiHin a- a wJuii-in i^ rcai-TJc-d. But quit*- difffri-nt from that |)rincii<le was ilu: pn.|io-(ul .4 the FRO who fUiid the rt-leuse would occur provided Frivid-iit Xixiiii declared a fiu-d daU-. Is yma positioh tin; .sn; as the FH<1 on this issue* Li . Our |x>-ition IK to suj>port th' 1'itfj. I l A L i ' i u v . But to JIIOD- !iM-cilic. TV PICO t<-Uf in-- it will <-nt"r diHcusoiruit on th'- r-'tease of :iU its priôu-rs of war one1' an ai)i>ro;>ritU- rixej dU- is net. You sui-J to int, tyrlit-r you'tl talk about release *d pnouerrt only d/t'-r ptvtre is urgoliatfii. Tlit-n- t!iu! be- a differcucs- ht-re. Could you iJarify it for nw ? Li . W. would inrliid*' the |>ilr>ts c:i[pturrd in North Vit-uVu.ui lu- ]<art of this. H <t.rrKV. Ix.-t tin- >* surt- I uud'-ri-'aud t.til-i. Aud I i-inpliasizt- that tin- PRO aiul I rr|>t-:tti>d t.o tin-til their own words only today and I rcix-al iv hen-. They told me they uiU dMcijfcx '^; r<:li-:<<- of all iiris'jiicrM u! War oui-<: au a|f>ro|>riaie d.ittir. .-M-I. Tln-\ i-xjilaiocd -fa>-n they HS\ IJIHCUNSI>>IIS tliev iu<-a ways mid procedure-it for |(i<- uitiial n-ti-asf. l)o >ou mean Ilu- sume HIILK' !,.. <>f conrsi- we mt-aii it, providing mi appropriate d'-udlnn- is M*. Then ail paru'* 1^1 th<- prtrftlem would U<c-iHti the proradurc.-i. Ori- thi.' in done, it in our iiiUiition to n-liase all caplivi- pilots -nut only the wound'-d and Mickbut all, MO t!wy can jvium Maf'Jy iud dirc'tl\ home. H II.PIIKV. Tiien I take it tliat it >" yoiir inU'iiticni to releuiv- prisr>iu-rb if tutê wa.-. u)(ri-cin<-nt on a fin-d date. And if is not your intention to ttwii jvt- <-.oimid<ira'jn 01 J> afU-r a ^x-a<!e i rngjied. You atcree you would release If&u afti-r a date M-t and itiiini.-diati-Iy ditwut>- th<- jinnxdurr". 1.1.. Y<^. W- liavc n inlijition of holditiK tlit-iu. We'll '">f. tdvi? theui traiiHjHirf.tiou. In fm-t they ran briim home flnwrtn frmn V-u-t-N. *.. H M.PKIIS. V<*'i say you cannot allow vt-rhlralion of 11-atiiicnt lM-cauM4- of ktTnrit> rcusorix i>o(* lliif- inrun you ronldri'l trust an international inspection miul<- UN of i-fpr<-/w>nt.a.Livi-D it! ix-utral fiiuitrirn? Li . In ri gard I" thin unJ to your Klatrfju-fiU about Vfrificuljcdi A t. lIuTc ui-r<- MHJiorx. If I wanted t" I could I'ltj- tiiany iriHlnnr<-s. Tlu- l (ii'iu-riil i', net u roriiiji'iniitl. Von al"o n-ini'inljt-r that fumoun ojxTiition tu n-l firi-oin-i-- Nixon and Luird luivi- "aid tb-n- would b>- otln-rs. Bt-caiiHc- of the Mccuj'ii^ of Ht-rvi'-i-irjt-ii wt; fur mot ullow otlvrs. T\u- Mutt-mi-iii* by Nixuu and Jjnrd h:i\i- 'ittier vmitN ini|/OM>il>l<>. it IM lox-uijm- of lljcw tliri>al. liAi.fi ufc. Von talk ulx>ut llu- nrrnrily jwpM-t H* the reason for not nJcjiKJux priHoiu<r. und not uU'/Miiig iiiH|M-iioii LC-I*IIIX to verify tn-.ilnii-iit I'oadiliolix. Why dun'l MI fr<><> tbi-ln Mid eliniiimb- flu- w-ciirity *|'rt ulj loiccther. At leitxt you run allow iiirjK-nioiif< and n-leuw tlu- nick mid woundexl t" u neutral ciiijutry. LK. If \'m don't IUJIK), tlw- I'tuU-d KiaUm d'x-sn't take into iwrou/it any interimi i.ii;J law. Tlr <iffjrt> A^xjrd* of !.'* fall for unity, iud*-pifMd<fi<v,
659
-and te.Titoiial integrity of Vict-Nam. Abo the Geneva, agreements forbid je introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign military personnel, weapons, wk mat-nils. Bat the United State* has taken no account HALTEKK. In your remarks you talk about the eventual retaase of prisoners. I talk also of the treatmeat of prisoaen right now. What I'm talking about is not negotiable, but what you should be doing as a matter of course. Why, and I ask in the name o* humanity, do you not accept our proposals? I believe your attitudes on the handling of the prisoners issue is just plain stupid. There would be a lot more support for a disengv^nent if the American people knew that the agreement on conditions was two-sidednot a situation where we must do tKs or that, and then you'll diseow the "itoatkm. L*. We cannot do so because of the security. We must repeat that during 1968-1969 w have released nine of the pilots. But instead of taking this as a good will attitude by the Vietnamese, Mr. Nixon turned it into a campaign of slander and distortion against us. H ALTEKX. The cause of peace would be enhanced if your side showed compassion on the primmer of war issue. You would gain more trust by showing your good faith on this issue. Li. I assume you are seatimentAl. We deem you understand we've been victims of many wars of aggression causing pain to millions of Vietnamese families and we deem it that American people should -show compassion for Vietnamese f *m2ies. HILTF**. You Ulk about the feelings for peace in the United States. You menticr. demonstration*. Of course Americans want peace, but that doesn't mean -it "musr. be purely "on your terms. Let me assure you the American people are eoinpk4iy united on the prisoner of war Issue. That is why if you were smart you d be willing to fulfill what is not only in accord with the Geneva Convention but recognized international practice aud allow a third partyan international inspection to verify your dainv of humane treatment. You would allow the internment of the sick and wounded to a neutral country. You would supply us with continuing complete liaU of prisoners. LE. Let me aware you they are treat*! wellvery wefl. People have seen thin; it has been verified and reported in your prfc*. You can take our word for the good treatment. HULFEXK. Can I go to visit the captive pilots and see this for myself? LK. I said exriier many people iiave vt.-ICed Uie good tre*tmait <iud good e&re and thin ha* bttn written in the press throughout the world, including the American press. But for the security reasons I mentioned we must refrain from visit*. UALTJCKV. I find it impossible to accept that reasoning on a subject of basic bumanit}, not to mention the principle* of the Geneva Convention aud international practice. As a first step, the American administration has proposed a repatriation of all prisoner* or their internment in a neutral country. I fervently ask thai you reconsider your policy and agree to this. You mentiun Buppurt in the United State* for disengagement. By supporting propoA- 's f<ir duengagemeat, it certainly doesn't mean agreement with all your positions. But the advocate* would like to take seriously your assurance* of intention!) t<> negotiate * ju*t and Luting peace. I appeal to you for a more enlightened, outre compaxionate and humanitarian policyia keeping with your earlier rwnwlu to me about Vietnamese ideals on the captive pflot*. Yourprcsent policy ha* greatly damaged your posture and i* jeopardizing support for the peace LE. There i* absolutely no problem, provided a date i* set. Meanwhile we give our word we are giving the best treatment. H u*Kk*. It is impossible for me to oadmtand wbv you rfu*e to ait down and negotiate for (H-ace here in Pari*. You *ay you wiH not talk to the representative* the (wugon regime. You knew who they were when you accepted to join these talks. They're th* dame people. If you're seriou* about wanting peace, they why not ait down an4 get these talk* moving. Then u*e a* a ba*i* of negotiation* your concept of what the Haigofl government *bould be. In ortber word*, you'd *ay "Okay we I! talk." aixi thun give your term* regarding the personoel of a proposed new government. Lr.. We join with the PBG in our po*rUon that we will talk Co anyone in the feaifou admiuMtratioa other than Thieu, ICy and Khieui . . . anyone who believes in a toocracy, peace, neutralitjr aud indepcudmee. And the proposal for a new Koveraiurnt in Soutli Viet- Vam ><y the POG wa* meant to reach national accord hartuouy. Ko tlw; problem i* clear. Who want* peace; who want* war; who want* union ; wlj "> dnn not. I am trying to be very frank with you.
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iO- BKTWEKK COXGKKSSUAN SKYMOUR HxLritRN AND Mu VAN TIEN-, PUG : IRI.ECATIOK, PARIS, Arun, 2S, 1971 \CCTKJJ
HAWKRS. A* one who has identified in the cause for peace and justice in Southeast Asia * * and as one who is one of the sponsors of the Disengagement Act of 1971. I frrl the American |>eo|>lc w'uld be more prune to support the efforts for peace if you people showed more fle< ibility and more evidence of good faith than that reflected^ by your rigid prereq .sites and preconditions on what should be iiiatwf for the negotiations. 1 btuiex-e the. American people want peace * * that they seek it in good faith * * * but they want good faith in return. And surely, as I said curlier, if you were smart, you would release the prisoner* or at leut iiie lists. Tost would h4p create a new atmosphere. Compassion and huDiauitariauism can do more to contribute to a just jxuice than words and might. Tit.s. You misunder- land. Our positions are flexible. We hax-e shown good will and a flexible position. Many flexible points are made in our .S-poinl peace initiative and tliree-point statement on the vea.sefirc. And as to the prUoncrs, let me y again. North Viet-Nam made public tlicir lists of captured pilots. Do you think this has made th.- U.S. more flexible in negotiation*? HALPKUX. \V> question the completeness of that list and we question North Vietnamese refusal to allow for verification of their claims of humanitarian treatment verification by international inspection as called for, uot only in th<- Geneva Convention, but as an accepted international practice. And we must look at the prisoner of war picture as a total issue * * * the
trdLtZauill, Ov* 1'^tjt mirl r*4jiiu^ /if nmin l>f twitJi JJQJ; Vf>rt h ^nA l>y tllu Pil f jt
TIKN. Before North Viet-Nam released some American prisom-r-,, we too reri-iv-d many peopl)^ concerned with the same virw. Tb<'V -aid if you release the list you will turn buck public opinion. But after North Viet-Nam did make its move in Rood faith, the I . .S. is still pursuing the same att itude as before. HAU'KKN. The American |Mple and tln-ir rrpresentativKi in the Congnvs wliether they support the Administration or not ou the Viet-Nam i-<sue are completely uniti-d ou the prisoner of war i.-*ue. All of ua iu the Uniu-d ritau-s are concerned. Families are unknowing aod are aJjguished by aiixi< ty and speculation. It it ju<t impossible for us to underxtaud such an inhumane policy that won't identity who, the prisoners are; a policy that won't even allow mail. None of u-> can understand whv x-ou won't give us a list. In the name of compa.s->in I bnnic tlw appeals of tbe Auiencan ix-ople for trw rele-*e of the IUUIKW. We dun < care how you do it through nw, if you will, through Senator X, through UK- French, the Swedes, the Poles. TJKK. Don't forget then: is -till i *w going on in South Viet-Nam lighting against American trunsgreisorx. tt'e cannot fulfill Uie list-< IK'OHI-H- tin- IIM i* Iteirg lengthened ever>' day. U'e would have difficult-it-.- in doing Uiis. One thing we want to aiture again and again to the Amcrii-ifi |-opk- and that is, we ure treating tlie captured men in a hiunaue and very lenient way. HAIJ-I-HN. Duly a few days ago I vaw a news tory iu which the PUG call<'d on American voidvr* a dfifitct. Tlwy wouldn't be shot, t-U'. Vou'd help them go auywhere they waut * * * let Uiem gn home. If this in true, then obvi'jiisly the.ie tueu would no longer be a threat to you militarily. Tell mi- then, whv don't you r.4eae the priHoners you hold? They will not be luod mil jtrjy aguiu. They would have: alMoluUJv nothing to do with the war. You run reJeuw them. Or at liîst you can identi/v them. Surely you should releutu; tue wouudtvi uitd sick. ThorUi who have been twdd prisoner \><tê no tlin-iit. Ko wouldn't the net result be th<: nauie. Anoi'icr thing, you are stupid uot to njeuiw the [H-isotiHrii. Il would In: the itmiiftest tUing for you to do public relation*wiw. The Aiaericau peopl<: ciuir ot ncwpt your uttiiud<! and it cau-wM not only untold unguwh, but hurts the gual for \K-MH:. '1'n.n. Tlu- i>fi>bleiu </f th<- Capture of military f"en if a |M-blem ^niwM-t-'d t" tinwar itelf. Jt in a \K\>V-M to be d<-iilt with JIM an aftermath iA the war. Oeurrully IHiiking, ii i only iA"i-ti after the war ut over. Bui in order to hhow our guod will, we huve Htated t t llv I'.K. (jovi.'ruinent ned onlv to dexilufe an upprol/riute dai^ for tlie touu witbdrnwHl '/ ii troops from jioutli Vp-i-Nam. Then we are reudy iiuni'jdiulejy to enter into lulks on prcx^'diirets uiid wuys to ridiiaiw the The discuHtjisuv will !)< on IJOH to riieiw Ttv quevtiou in not on wtjeUicr e the the men. nteii. Ttv we Mill releaw them or uot. WH uijl ugr>y r>y to rijeuMrcleuM- tl>e llK-n. The UlxCijtmonii would ( >>n |rroce.dureH (j> exite.diU' l\>r ri-ltuw.
661
Let mt- also point, out another fact. North Yiet-Nam released a compleU. lift of American captix'c pilots even hough the bombing is (fill going on. Vet, this did not i(.-tiT the United States from iW position. The bombings arc still going ou and vcry-ai.f edy. So it still wouldn't deter U.S. agrcssivcncss if we gmvc the list*. But we are not able to do so anyway. We would have great difficulties to fulfill the list of captured men. H*o.rKK\. But it would be the right thing to do. It would -nhow real evidence of good foitu. And it would be the humane, decent thing to do. And you profess how humane you are. TISN. Wo wan: to release all American captured mennot only we think you and your colleagues instead of niiaiug this problem here, should exert more pressure with the L.S. Government to euJ aggression, set u date for the rapid with dmwal of U.S. troops. " -. U \UKitN. I can ouly emphasize that your refusal to give a list can oiJv hurt the cause of peace and it is stupid on y >uf j,.rt to maintain this attitude. " TISN. The uthcr side of tiic table the L.S. and South VieuNam administration.*, up i .til now refiH-j to enter into serious negotiations and talk directly with us wen the problems would be more easily settled. As for the Saigon delegation, it reflects warlike policy which is seeking a military victory which doesn't desire to end the war. So bow can wo reach a solution with such a delegation. Only a few days ago, Thiru declared peace ihould be achieved through a military victory, i .,., the Saigon government wants to stick to the UJ>. in order to get, j'li>idod aid from the USA and ib wder to prolong the war. That is m-by in order to reach serious_ negotiations the U4. must not give support to this rc-gime. Let tbc South Viet-Xam population set up a coalition government of their desires and ibeu we are ready u> talk to such a government. UALJ-KUS.. Do you think,the U.S. ca*i dismantle the govrrnmoot of Saigon? Tlhx. If the lj.S. want* to, of course, it can. Now the Nixon Administration continues to support this clique. HALPEUN. J"ne Administration says it will support whatever the people want. Tliey have assured they will support a iraliticdl solution, that guarantees this* gelf-dcU.Tinination. Tits. Otic thing I would like to add. We have been pursuing a very flexible pc 'ion. Since the beginning of the I'eace" Conference we have put forth many proposal* in >rdr to Nettie the proi>leni, ut all have bvien rejected by the American niieail and ve tliink lliut uov, the LTJJ. Government muat take stepi* toward And the key to peace is in the Nixon's Administration'* tiands. -PKUN. Vou have quctioiicd the good faith of my governim-nt. Isn't i'n-ftidrnt Nixon's jx>Uty of rapid withdrawal of troops evidence of L:>. wood faith? Tn.x. We have no confidence in Mr. Nixon, lie talks about \'M't; but he intj4iMifiivs tlu' war of aggression in the name of VielnatnixiOiun. And now it is exjmJid/'d in all of iiidochitia. That is why we uy President Nion is sjxîtkiiig alxut IXJHIV, (>u( is uct.iially intensifying Har. HALJ-KKN. How c-an you say it is intriisifitui if troops are rapidly Ijeinn reduced? Tu:\. It i> IMMIIK inieiisilicd by air and artillery forty*. A>> fur as tlie VH-lnamiziitiou pri>Kru:u LH i'oticjT'H-d, tuio actually mea:i>< a (oniiiiuatixii of tinwar. it means Hi*,- pupjM't Saic'Ki iniops will li)Uit in plac-r uf U.S. troops with maximum air and artillery support and logistic support uf the CSA. UAJJO.IIN. Thin que;,-tion i-, a very niuijJi!, but a very realistic one. Why in Uj<: world can't tip- Vi<-Uiujije*e gcrt together uud talk7 Why lon't you sit down and negotiate- witltoul pivre/|iiisiu- rotuiiliviiH involving ifwues that should *>< the basis erf tbe Uilkt.7 Wbwi you cunie to J'sris von aid you'd talk to tbcoi. They're the |ieoj>li' now Hit then. Why call'1 you K''l tO(, '.hT? Haw cau peiu'e ((- re.solved oul negatnitioii. Vuu uicrceii to mei-t. \DW you sa> you won't talk. tal Vou uiU-4 fiw-e reality. W [j_v <kri't you i/.'-i tulklug and take up yuur proposal* at (he \ul>libut don't lin[>n*e them I x -fore gel tint; 'Uirte/1. Vou mu.U uiidtYstaiid the realilie^ Unit exist. Tin- governuj^nt i/ Suigon rcfyirdli'-s <;f wliat vou may Hunk of tin 1 individuals re<'.oKiiize* this realization. Tir.fc. Het'HUKf of the rotU-u.'ieHs <j! (lie preMiil udtniriirttnition in Saigon, that JH wliv we di'jn.Miid tiie U.S. reiiounu- xiippurt of Mich a o-Kinu-. We will Kindly ofrepi ie|iie--ntttlioii of tlic SaJKi>n <ioverniiieiit, but not Thieu-Ky-Khiein- we will inlk urirj w>rk w i l l i any |M-r-ons from il- ;idinijiisiruhf>n uliu sf.und f"r pcuee, i w i i l i u l : i \ tun! ii)fJ i |x-H(ii'ncj-. Hn.ri.HN, You ure. MHkniK tlv United Slulj.rf t ri'iiniiuce I lie Suut.h Niel-N'um AduiiJiir" r.iMmi - tu depose it? But you nould impose your vo\iC*-\>\. uf wliul llu* IL<>\iTiiuu-m should I*1, 'liu; UniUul htaU-s duiiui't wuul to iiii[>'j*e or d<-p'M<i. We huvr irj'id'- it <-ieur that He will uwopt. u poliUcul decision l.lmt would gi\e the pivjple >< .--'^jtli V'lut-Vuu thv oji]x>rtuuit,y to deride their own future.
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.Abo, aren't you preconditioning a viewpoint that should l>e *ul>joct of the tnJks you rrf >wv to participate in. TtKX. Wo will not discuss the matter with Thieii-Ky-Khwm, but &s I stated, we will be plunged vo.talk to anyone else withiu the adiainistr&tion who believi-s in peace. independence and neutrality. I! ALTKRX. But whomever would represent thf*v .stands wwild havr to bo cleared by the PRG. Vou would havr the vcur, power. Ini't that the sain'- as im|>cing? ' believes in peace, neutrality, and independence, atid (3) persons of other farces aside from the aboveother politta! force*. The membership of the provisional government would be divided through discussion* by tto-sr ifirii: segments'. Discussions would decide how nuitiy nicmU-rs there should o,- in the government and what representation each moment would fl \ur CRN. You mentioned that the people of South Viet-Nam would settle their internal affain. Through what mean*? * 'EN. Through free and democratic gencrar election* in South Virt-Nain. HAIÊKN'. Uould you aco'pt international ox'rnoon? Tirti. The provisional coalition government coraprwing the segnunts I monJOD: d would have the task of holding f rn> and democratic general elections. That trohl>,tr. would be decided by thi* govvfiimrnt. . Isn't this a subject for ncgAu.. ; OK at the table? TIB.V. We think this will be a subject for dtr.>iMii(m within the provisional coah'tii n yn-ernpK-n,t. H is not a difficult problem. ..... ItALTUiN. Ti> American people want more tb&o rhetoric or gi-neralitica or au Lplurtic, unrealistic formula!) for peace. And '-his is what teems to be coming from yo ir Hide. And wht else seems to confuse the American people as to your good fai i,\i, is your constant reference to the word "coDsidcr" after you would gain certain conditions. People don't understand Wliy only consider? Why don't you sry you will do this: you will do that. Then we would know where we stand. TICK. We didii'' sUtU: we would "consider" a ceasefire. \Ve said it would be. observed. It'a the first point in our three-point statement. We will olwerve a ceaselire and will enter Into talks. I/et me say then; are manv problems that ct>uld lie settled immediately, such as the problem of a ceasefire. T'be ceasefire woulii lit ininjcdiately obscr\-ed. We will take mcdwur^ to assure the safety of American .troojw as they prepare tlieir w.thdruwals. Hut there are other problems that twvd certain discukMons and then there is the question of carn-ing out Ue other pfobk-ms, i.e., the question f release of raptured military men, the disi tfc-ion on Uie ways on how ue cai conduct it. We mould talk immediately on the '(ijeftion of release if you announced .1 dote. And roiuvrning a dut>:, by that I im>^j a most appropriate date for a rapid ceasefire. HAIJ'KRK. Let me g;-l back on UIK issue of the priu>nen>. Will you recous.'der your withholding of the names unti j;.jke them avaib>.bk through whaU-ves iiwjutt you feel most appropriate. TIKN. Ue will tofcc into cox.Bideration your ideas on the orisoners. HnLrr.li):. KarUcr I inentiouevl my iMrwildoruuuit at the I'liG'n stark refusal to rccoKoize the South'* represeiitr-tiou at tlw talite. A* I said, you knew who tbry were whe.li you accepted to joif* Ui<!*c tftlk *. Should nut tlie difli^ciicex you hav>.- be tl:e very tmwit of Uie talks ttximsclves. ICeccnUy 1 (net with Vice 1'renidoit Ky in Suigou and tie certainly has indicated a willingness to dis<:uit the instiii). He feeU in order to go further there wiuxt be a forrb of rctoncUiation home flexibility to ungotiatc aims. TIKN. Nobody can l>eli<:ye tiini. HAUKKKV. Obviously tho^r is am impiiMic. Morh must yield- -even a little. We have yielded more than a bttlc and have mode el'vir our flexibility. I certainly fwl then; would Ixf u lot i're profrcM t/wrd {M^LU* f <>> A0ierican pfO|>k* were to tuur tf HU'-U- deyiatjoii from Uie rigid p/Mition of your ride. J j-li-oUlly, in Vour roumieuU carlie* rJ<oul. UK- Urge deinoost rations and /ir >y* in llu I'jiiu-d KtuU'ii and the groing nuoiber of CongrK>Mnieti and f ~f w\w nupp>>rt a liisenxaK^mi'iit date, I ih to take immc. You arc reading ' L-fj'irU wrongly. Tlw- y.-Mit this war to e.ncl. Of rourne they do. J believe all 'M''* do, tlirougli whutevri formula they think bent. I aui among those who st'ip,<ort a dineuKageiiu-nt /lutr . But I do so because 1 want negotiations for a taxiing penw to g'-t undfnm.?. Ko waijting pw is no* thing but for you to think it reflects full support of your terms is another thing,
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SENATOR HABTKE'S MEETIXG WITH MADAM B-NH
: i i,
The CHAIHMAN. To complete the record, on April 20, Senator Hartke, the Senator from Indiana, reported atter a meeting with Madam BinJido you acknowledge her as one of the representative? Mr. SAINWATER. Of the Vietcong? The CHAIJUIAX. This is a quote of his re|>ort as given to t'lis committee on April 20, Iv71, after he had met in Paris with Madam Binh. He says as follows: "And, Madam Binh said, 'Your men are a burden to us. We want to be rid of themthe sooner the better. I can tell you, she added, 'that if the American forces withdraw in a rapid and approruiater fashion, your captured militaiy men wQl be returned in a rapid and pnropriate fashion." Then to quote Senator Hartlce, "Let me summarize what I learned on this very difficult issue by saying that there is now no doubt in my mind that all of our POW's would be returned to us by the time our last troop contingent is withdrawn from Vietnam and a substantial numberparticularly the sick and woundedwould be on their way home within weeks -of the setting^rf a <late for final withdrawal." Of course, one can always raise doubts .about the motives or the veracity of any man, I suppose, but I see no reason why either Senator Hartlce or Congressman Halpern would have any motive other than their desire, just as you have and I have, to obtain the release of the POW's. PROFESSOR LEWIS' TESTIMONY COXCEUVINC NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT I am struck also by a wholly irrelevant bii of evidence we had yesterday from a Professor Lewis who is a longtime student of the Chinese. He testified here with Ambassador Yost and Professor Falk. Professor Iêwis is a professor at Stanford University, and he said he believed that the present situation is the most favorable one that has ever confronted us for a negotiated settlement of the war. It is very interesting testimony. One of the reasons is not only such things as we have referred to here with regard to the representative* of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong, but the attitude of the Chinese. It has often been thought (hat the Chinese were, perhaps, an inhibiting fern; on North Vietnam about negotiations. He made a very persuasive caw; interpreting recent moves by the Chinese that have been well publicised and analyzing other things not so well publicized as to what their policy It now becoming. He mentioned a eat many things. It u too long to enter and introduce at this time. at his judgment, as one of the best authorities we have on the Chinese jieople, is that right now is the best opportunity to obtain a negotiation if we would make this form of commitment to remove purbcfves from Southeast Afcia, particularly Vietnam. It was a very impressive bit of evidence, together with the statement* that have been reported by responsible Member; of (xmgrewt. I think it JK quite persuasive. As I know it is your principal interest to free tlic POW'tt / think that you should not dismiiw tnb* kind of fVtde:ic<! too lightly, I think it might well be one of those time* when
6W
thcv arc in a mood, together with the Chinese, to move to a negotiation. I think if we miss it, and other events occur, another Tct offensive or something, the whole atmosphere could change. I only submit it to you for your most serious consideration because I am sure your influence is much greater at the White House than . mine. I would hope you would consider that as credible evut*.ice. If it is true, it would comport witluyour own desire.
STATEMENT OK MADAM BISH
Mr. RAINWATER. Sir; I want to clear up tuatj me thing about Senator Hartkc and the statement made by Madaif Binh. She made that statement t week, then purportedlv told Halpcm and Hartke also, and then when she was questioned by the news media, and Thuy was questioned by the media 1 week later, he denied everything she said and only stuck to the "discuss" statement she madedl-cuss.
CHINESE COURSE CONCeUNIN'G SETTLEMENT
I also want to1 did not intend to get into this put I think it i? relex'ant and now that you brought it up \o comment on Cbina. in my judgment, from just reluming from there and having long discussions with ('hina watchers in Hong Kong, Taiwan and other places, I think you are absolutely correct. China can take a hand in the settlement " It dc|H>nds ii|K>n what course China takes about the settlement. It is my judgment that China is interested in the liberation Front portion of the war, in Vietnam, not the hawks that arc running the war from North Vietnrm. I think that is what we have to.waleh for diplomatically in negotiations which way ('hina goes uilli I lie National liberation Fron', whether they will indeed make any kind of settlement or not.
TALKS WITH NOUTIf VIETNAMESE UEPKEsENTATIVES
But U-yoiid thai, I think I musl make this btatemenl. f say this only a- a luyiiiitn w i t h very little knowledge, and I think there are i:X[tcrt> t ha!, are involved in thi* probably a Ut more knowledgeable than I am. f think that is one of the problems in I'ari*. that too many people, are going over to I'ari.- and getting involved, *mgly. from the " United States. The. CHAIUMAV. Do I tuke it you disapprove of anyone oilier than our otiieial representative* talking to these |>coplc? Mr. KAINWATEU. No: f do not, but 1 do disapprove of too many |>eoplc indicating here that the United Stale* hu* received--when f know different that the Vort|, Vietnamese have nnulc. t>lfer> In the United Slate* to withdraw our troops. They have not made Mib-.lanlial offer*, they have made unilateral offer.-, where llu-y Hoiild \>i< the benefieinry loliilly, and we would overthrow the Goverilnif'ii' in Soiitl; N'ietn/iin. mid (he United Stnteo would conic home lock, (iM-]i. mid bnrrel, ri-gunlleM of whut the imposition* were by the Nori'n ViHiiumi^r. Tlii-j- ure die tiling- thai I think are troubling me. Mr. HOI.T. Senuiiir, (lie other,, iliin^-. iPMibljng the mi'inbern "f our
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organisation and 1 found this in my travels, aud that is some of these people who go over and talk to the so-called delegates from North Vietnam at the Paris peace d'Megati-ui and representatives cannot wait until they get home to talk first to the President of the United Su;e about tbcir visits. The first thine they do is run outside the building where they talked to the North Vietnam representatives and grab .he UPI and AP reporters and tell them all about it. If they are sincere in their effort to make the maximum contribution for peace tJcj should first come back to the United States and Ulk to the President of the United States about what they learned before blabbing it to the press to be heard throughout the world. SENATOR HARTIE'S POSITION Concerning Senator Hartke, on this matter, it is awfully hard to figure the position of the Senator. We talked v ith him about this very same thing because we had hundreds of letters from our members about thU. Senator Hartke quoted the official delegate therein. Press re|x>rts from Paris told us the same thing that you have just read. "Okay." we say, "All right. If we buy this, what do we do? The Xrth \ ietnamese are talking about discussing." 'Well." Senator Hartke stud, ''It has got to be on our terms. The reload of prisoners have got to be on our terms in the peace negotiation*. "Okay. If the negotiations do not go according to the way we want th"tn to. what are von goiti" to do?" Well he sftiil: "That is tie problem." Hut also in the conversation he -aid to the President of the United Stales should not withdraw anottW man from South Vietnam. It is awfully hard for us to figure out what his position is. Oti the one hand, Senator Hartke is saying we should set a uitc in nJI probability to get our POW'a out in order to negotiate. At the same time he said not to withdraw any more troops because if you cannot gft the release of the POW's witfi 158,000, or 200,000 troops or whatever w- h^ve over there now, we r.ertainlv are not going to get them out tilth 50,000.
WITHDRAWALS AVD POW AUuKKUEVT
The C'nMHWAK. Von know, professor Ix-ui* made this point, loo. When he was emphasizing that now i-, the lime to try to reach a nrjroiintion, he uUo made th< point that if they proceed with this uoi-iilli'd Vicjtiiitnization and withdrawal, he believes we might be much Ir !&!> to get a batisfutttory agreement on the POW's if you wit until tlirre are 50,000 or JOOJOGO instnul of the 2.r0,000. J/e agrw-d with tlml poMlioii. h- li'lii'vc> thai if we do not do sornetliing now and try to break tm\ stul-mot*-, we ar running into a more dangerous situation Inter. So in linn iiHa** he would have bfn ugrccablt*. Mr. UAIN.VATBH. Thut is isxiwily our point. Tin- ( ' H A I U M ^ V . The jioini tln-n i<-, if you accept Mr. I>-wi' point, now i- tin- tjiuf! in H tin' fljili- uii'l M' whelhi-r Ilicv would live ii| to it.
71
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' V
CONGRESSIONAL ACTlOtf COXCERSIXO TROOP WITHDBAWAL AND POW RELEASE
Mr. RAINWATER. Now the responsibility right now rests in mv judgment with the Senate, and the Congress of the United States. If both of these Houses cume forth with a resolution stating in efreci that the President of the United States should hilt troop withdrawal^ with a notice to Nort Vietnam that the first sett lenient of business was the securing of ah agreement for the release of the prisoners of war and. that, thereafter, we would de-escalate our troo|s aceording to thr numbers tlwy release, and the time that they release \tlieni we wunld all come down together, Senator, and there would }>e no reason for us to accent any more Communist lies about whether they will release them alter xve had unilaterally withdrawn. The CHAIRMAN'. Let me understand you. Does this mean that if the Congress overwhelmingly accepted the principle of a total withdrawal coupled with release of the prisoners you would support that? Mr. RAINWATER.Would i support it? It is my position if we haVe the guarantee agreement signed and sealed at the Paris peace talks, that wuen- this proi>osition is ntadr to North Vietnam that M- ich have a cease-fire in position immediately The CHAIRMAN. No; you are ir.jectuig another term now. "CVaefin: in jtositioti" is another tarni. J wa trying to i.tolata the issues to kirp myself from being confused. On the question of setting a positive date, lot's make-it hypothetica', for purposes of illustration. Sar that we passed by H Mifficicntly large majority a bill MJVJHC we must withdraw by a ccrtainulate, wliirh they say is their condition, and at thu same time and simultaneously they would agree to release all the POW's. Nothing would remuin except the details of ndeasing Uie.m. Would that Miil y<>u? Jêuve out an}' other extraneous conditions. Mr. KAIXWATEH. Jx-i me \nii it in mv own context, if you will. The CHAIRMAN. All right. Mr. liAiiiWATER. If Congress passed a resolution, a joint concurrent resolution, with the Semite culling u|x>n thu Pntsidctit to halt any further troop wilhdruwals until North Vietnam agre^-s on a method to reliuise the prisoners, ami after which each time the 'orth Vietnanu'.M! rel<tas4> a nurribcrof prisoners, we would reduce (he troop level commensurate with th it particular ratio aud we will u<cnu- to that kind of a projiooition, Senator. Tlie CHAIKMAV. When you say commen>urute, what do you mean? I Mippose. that ix a iicrceritagc. Am 1 right? Mr. KAJKWATEK. Jlidit now there are 24K,(MM) trM>[>s tluu-e. The CtuiKMAW. I iiiiderbtand. Mr. KAI^WATEU. We think t.iere are Mmewhere in tlu> neighborhood of (M) priiM>tuTM of war. The CHAIRMAN*. Doet. that exrlud'- a deh'nite date? DOCK your pn|H.al cxi'lude a dHimlc .Ial4>? Mr. KAIVWATKU. Then (he N'orth VietnameM< would b<-^ttijif the date then; wouldn't they? They ke^p nuyitig they uant u dale. Why don't w let them *H one?
ThrCnAJUMAV, J^-t u illume tlieyKiiy Deci'inlxT.'.l. Would that be acceptwbl \t> you?
Mr KAIJ.UATKK. The Nurih Vii-iiiuinc.î rûlil put (heir mwliinery loj.;criier and get everylnly << n^ree up there in (lint l"iigth of time, I HUI fiivorabw to come home the ilv after t/morrow.
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The CHAIRMAJT. I think it would be bettor the day after tomorrow myself. Mr. RAINWATER. But they must withdraw their troops also, in my judgment, or we will probably find ourselves The CHAIRMAN. You aee, you hare a tendency to keeping beyond the POWs and to inject other issues. Mr. RAINWATER. Why do you insist on North Vietnamese troops remaining in South Vietnam? The CHAIRMAN. I do not insist. I think all of them ought to get out. Mr. RAIN-WATER. I do not insist eithev. The CHAIRMAN. We were trying to make the proposal here centered on POW's. If we go into all of it, I get nowhere on even understanding how important you think the issue of the POW's U.
ULTIMATE PURPOSE OF CONTJXUIKG *'AR
.1 do not know whether ve will have time. It is very lad* and you hare been very patient, but it finally comes down to the important consideration, which is what is the ultimate purpose of our continuing the war. What-do we eek- to achieve by it other ihan ihe return of our POW's? There is no disagreement on'lhat. That is very important. You put it,.as I understand, as tLo No. 1 objective. How important to you is this idea of giving the South Vietnamese a fiance to have our kind of Government, other than some other kind /vbich they may in their own good way desire. After all, these people are not brought up on democratic svstem and they do not understand it and they have always settled their difference by what they call negotiations. We have had experts testify to this: I remember a Buddhist monk who onre visited here and said, "You know, we don't any of us trust "anybody's election. We think they are all rigged and we nevr have settled them that way. And we think you cannot settle them that way." He said: "What we do i* what we call negotiation." As I cnderstand it, thai u sort of various sects, groinungs there either on ethnic, cultural or other grounds, getting together and kind of agreeing. I wjpjwse it is the sort of that way in sonic of our big cities, the various factions get together and agree who is going to be a candidate and who is going to be this. It is not unlike the way some of our business is conducted. Mr. BAivWATER. Well, Senator, you have said over and over again, and I am sure you moan it, you represent the constituents in Arkansas. Th" CKAIRMAV. Yes. Mr. KAIVWATKR. Are you willing now to gamble the lives of the POW's from Arkansas with the unilateral pullout forces before an agreement is made? The CHAIRMAN. That is not the concept that we arc- supporting lierc. If in that the announcement of a date of a commitment to withdraw obviously would be subject in expressed or implicit conditions. They wou'd have to abide by the spirit or purpose of that. It may be proper to nay the sluU'iiicntM you discount are not exactly accurate, but in viewing thi' whole context of Ue war I am nui'-c sure they would like have it over as much u we would. After IP it u their country that much more than our* is.
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The logic of the situation is, if we agree to leave them to settle their own nffaus among themselves, thev would be willing to return our prisoners of war and do whatever eke is necessary.
FBKXCH PEISOXEES OF WAR -
You know, the French went through this before in 1954. They settled it in a very short time. Their prisoners were returned. I noticed a piece in the paper the other day that said there are still some French prisoners. I have seen no affirmation of that-by the French Government. Until the French Government confirms it.'I am as suspicious of that as you are of some of these other people. I do not think there is any evidence whatever other than an unsupported statement. * : The truth is. so far as the French are concerned their war was liquidator!. We unfortunately stopped into their shoes. There is nothing to indicate that they would want to keep the prisoners if we agreed to get out. Mr. RACCWATES. I heard during this trip, air, in Cambodia that North Vietnam still holds over 300 French prisoners in that war, 18 years. The CHAIRMAN'. 1 i>aw it. Has the French Government confirmed it? Do*tt the French Government have those men unaccounted for, the same as we have in North Korea? ELECTIONS IK SOUTH VIETNAM Mr. UAI.VWATKU. I until to clear up one tiling. You talked about a BuddliUt Monk. I do not knqw when you talked to him, how long ago, bit!, tin- Bi ddhisls now in South Vietnam are b favor of elections since they just wou tin- largest slate in the lat general elections, and abo about this, whether they cure witat government is there or not, you kuuu and I know you know, Senator, suict the 16th Century, umg before we became, a country, there were hamlets, and village efeciioo* in .South Vie!'mm, &' we are not importing afcv&tetnof elections on the South Vietnam^ people.. They had local elections long before we became a country. They are concerned about who govern* them. They are concerned about who comes to their village and extracts taxes from I In-ill us the Vielcong Lave in the pat.
PI LLOLT DATK AND U&JOVKHY OF FOWS
So 1 tliink we luive done, ttir let mi; go ba-kI think we have don ul>oii: as much a* we ran /jo for the South Vietnamese. 1 think you are i. They urn uov\, 1 tluuk, r<-iMly lu .ttiuui alone with probubly uiiJ, i do not kiu>w vvlio from, then- uiu.t be wmu Uirougli it aid but we mut not be le.l into the trap jut tycauH- we net a iiu-of pullout tlutt we will retxiver the prinouun. T)LB Frew;ir>iia<le tlii-ir iigrej.'iui:nt witli North Vietnam cfu-r the ceiwu*>(ire tuul tluit is whv 1 n-ki-d for iv <-cuM'-(ire. (V'hy dw* thi- North object to u i-i-un'-t'in-'! If tjiey uri; oinirrr nbiiut the i)i'eoti*ii(ii-. tln'v ci.nnot objri-i \it M-jt-c-fire iu pliM-i-. The (!H4tUMA v. 1'lu- P-IettM.- of the priîiiT* win. f purtof the u;aseiire r.rrt'cuieiii; wn it m;t'.'
Mr. RAU.TVA.TER. Tliat is my point exactly, sir. The CHAIKUAK. I h*ve kept you long biyond * reasonable hour, but you were so responsive and interesting that I could not resin it. I appreciate your coining very much. It is nearly 1 30 p an. Mr. RAIKWATEK. I thank you very much, sir, for your patience and your courtesies extended to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Most of tiie gentlemen back here are members of O.K and although we may disagree on methods, we both agree thai <-.e must gel the Vietnam war concluded. But, in my judgment rhe first order of business is to recover the pri,*oners-of-war. After tijtii, then, we make the rest of the agreement. The CHAIRMAX. That is right. i think there Js no disagreement on that. I will insert- in the record a nutub -r of articles concerning the problems fawd by veterans of this war. (The articles referred to follow:)
IFrom Cbki<o TriUam Jlpr. 11. WTIl
VU.T X M BBKKDS A NEW KIKD or VET <By John Wheeler) They trickle boiae every day, unheralded. They are the Viet Nam veterans, the nation'* younz returned from vet another war. No baud* play : no crowds chrar. At bent, the ex- Jl find apathy, except within the rli*e circle of family and friends. .Vnd even ben* the debate oiuuUnxd raiig< 4 across living rooms over whether the coaflict and Uic sacrifice* were worth it >-r cvou mural. A* the v.-tcnuu tell it amoc f, (jUcmnclvctt. few in the United State* care that they braved and pa*+Kl thru a bell where the dying and pain and terror and ditfguat ux-re att ri:ul as in any aar any tune. More than 2.5 million mca have been sent to Viet Nam, where 4*>,000 diod and 2%.OU() WLTL- wuuuded. Some 2'J(),000 wiU br partially or wholly disabled for the nat iif their live*. "About '9 IHT ccut "f thude guy aTi. uing to adapt back into the inaiuatrcuiu i>l hfo ai>d beci>me useful ciliv.it.*. a N'elcrans Adnuiiistratinti nuurcc laid. A nuti-mwide nimvy of veterans found its wuupliiig getierally suppurtod the V'A' aptitnwm. But the survey also indicated that from th> otiuUl minority th'.-ru may come Morioiu pntbleau and even daugrrs fur *>ciety. An pleawd w< lh<-v aru wuh the overall ri-cord of veterans in far, iwychmirist-*, 8<>>:rU wnrtern nud VA oficiuls nay the seed* of danger have b>:'.-u imptonted 111 a minority which w mode up lankly of Mackn. ''The draft calls brouicbt in Bigninca:(t |)r!irx)rti'jn of lc-s educated meu and luen from thi> lcs advanlaia'd furuilu-n." tuiya Donald Johnson, bead if the V'A. " thy now me properly oi"ti',ut -d whea tl>cy c^.uia bock i;il the rn;ii;,stri.-am of Unitod SuiU'K society, they wilt :> pr.ibVuut for Soci'.-iy real and othet-VA nfiici.ilK i-oiphnxiw one of thi-ir imjur c/nici*rn i for the fait 'if black (ill po'^ri-jR b:^*k into civilUa life. i A. Slenjfer, twiid of UK- \ A' Viet, X.'uii Krn Ciinmiltee und chirf f of tlie medical, n'lriîcol and lie irolofciv ho*|ia!.'. nuys: "I aio v<ry hurr is no iitUi- OTUIIK <ut of violence by bluet.-". Tiwy ur>- , cry \>-J.l--r the ira-n' they '.<;1 ttw: u/;ed U> (Iriice back. l^Ltvk v<:brr;iii ask tui'UMei1. c* <f Ihfcy really count ta p>-r< riM i;i our H-M ieiy. "The iwrved and ot!riln,'d and wore more likfly o we roinbut proprotio thati whi'i-t. Andi/tien they raitu- :u-k NI tt.e Khelto ju<t v/lirn tlw<* U-liev: Kill iit: diiTrrc'iif !n:cnn' tlu:y luivr done lln-ir bit for their country." VA ffifi:ilii jy job* (try tin- *u*gi>' binv,-'1"' !!< wii!; today 'K vi-Urarm. J.ator I>>tic.rt.iiie:it it^tintirx how iin.':nMovnn-;it ainoiiK vounjc veti run* i nearly donbli! i l < - riHtioiiul iiicnre. '<r bltii;l>n, tlt> rnte ::i IU.2 (x-r c>-tit, ulx>!it tri|.!> tb; nutionii! figure. Tuk>! the rum1 of C'liniX""" Wiltin William*, 22, H!IO went t/j Viet N'mi. twice, th>- KTJdjtl titni' u* a v'oluuuu-r "ij jxroplc ;njgtt think 1 HIM worth dtriuic *-/IIK Ithii-i for when I got. oiit, But I giienN not, nut even with niy honorubk- diifliu UVH
670
The voting Negro vet has a wife and 3-vcar-^ld daughter, two yean of high tch<>ol education and no job for the las-l six month?. "What kiud of system is it that treat* we like tbi? I go fight for tny country and noljody heJ|M tur. Public aid pays my food nod rent, but I haven't even got carfariT left ov*r to g> look for work.' "1 don't want handouts, I want work. But if something don't bftppcn, thoi, there may be vtotaicr. I definitely would like to take- part in il to how pcnpkwe nt to have help and reaped.-" So far, at Iâst. law enforcement official* say fears haxv proved unfounded thai veteran* would turn llwir guerrilla warfare savvy ncain-it society eith-r for r.tdictil grwiif* n tbtc right i.r left in small anicry bAiuU. At the University of California in Berkeley, cradle f the student nviHtiUoiisry movement. thr president of the Ktudeix body and a sixikcxiuait < .- the most powerful antiwar group said wifuna were notable for their .UKM-IIC*-. Hut that doe* not mean there arc no \vtrran.* radical alK.'it the war and other nocial issues. Take Cltri* Suotix. '2~<. AH ex-Mnrine from >w V.irk who w mte \>t the. mi-ril vocal uiemli.-r.-i of the Viet Nain \ot'.r.in. Asain-t I IK- U'ur. S>urcs s.pKe eloci'iciirly fur uii immediate end t.. the war during th>- recent IVtroit "mq'nry'' by tin- <>rânix:iiji>n which claiiiii u|><.v.ird-> ' "t.iHKl nu-iul>.T?. Smn-jt* soMivnirs from the war inclcdi- a hicMy vs-ibli- iui.rvmi--iif< and fnusumt pniu fri-iii a leg wound (hat pennaiienth rnp;>leii him. "I joined tl- Muriltcn becaiuie on uncle ?:\'\d lln-> luid ttii* U-t tniiniiig und fr> it wa.i the U'St l>et if I wanted to i>urvi\e. (>nlit, itfe. I uu.i patriotic mi(14ved my ruiidtry and lill d->. "After our oiitiit p>t hit. I *|ieiit H mn^'h' in the hi-pitat. mid I >trted iiiiuknifC :iljiit the war. 1 iaw more mid more muni ii"'l i<n\.- I'ctniiiK in, lit'.' ;t freight train unloaciing cvrry day, you know. Thru I wanted i know why. "Tin- C'amliodiun in\:Mi'm arid the lii.oiini;-' at Kent iStale really did it. I Ixrcamc '< real militant und we K..I a |n'ti:i->n u>> in t!ie hi^pitnl by more ihnn 'J(K) (il< to Nixon Baying wi- deplnred the thniK ln'i-asiw i> jii.-t Ducked ill another cniiiiiry nd nw it would U- in. .re (.':iint'<Khan< :il->ni; u i t h more Aiiiencaiii* and inore'~Victiiarii~e Krtlii.n killed." Like lit her unhappy vein at t i n - iMn-:; nu-< tine, p-nrr* left lii Vii-t N'am m<:daN. iiu-lndiiiK lun i'urple lli-;tr.,-. 1:1 h:ii w : i - i-.illcil )i> thi: UK n a r..llin of Th- lraiiiM>f iiii('T, bift'Tni's^, fn;>-tr:ii;..ii .n:d a xr:i>i- of personal defeat which ruti tfir:i-"ine vi-li-rati- li-ail \'\ u<linirii.-f raior J'lhli-i)! t->t>ay that nol only could tliey mi. yinli-nre but "I heir fru-irati'iii- and an,\i.'iie. could lead to serious mental IK j prirblem^ we'du uoi in>u' we. \Ve may in a couple of year.-." "Mun> iiplv wi*ti'l M'ck l)e|ji iir trenifiient liei-aM.^' they hate nny organized form of ."oi-iety," he fti'ti. "They ih.- VA u an extension of (In 1 military, which tie fi-rVaiuly are n..l. TIn-> w in'l take adv:;ni:i|(e of tliiiiK-- due tlwm ) caiiM- they fear :li<'.v uiil have t pay the s\>lein axain." To ruiiiii-ii the prolih-m, the VA (< r t\v Jir^t imur h:i aband'iii'-d its policy of Now half a do/en j-ro^nui- :uv ui.d'-r v. ay, iiiciud:n^ <' f iin-eljii({ in Virl Nam to impn << on tli' \'etiTaii-< whai llwir rich!-" and U-nelil- are and tin- de.-ircbilily lit takjiij{ advanta^- of lliein. Still the pariu-.jiatioli rad- is In-low World War II and Korean W:ir l<'tel. AnMi'T oi th> VA'- nener prouiaiii- i- "im-'d M tin- drug jiroldein whirh IIBH i>l/ur'ei| m an alarming ra!>-, purtieitl.iri;. in 'lv n>e "f heroin and otl-r hard drii^^. iiut, indir-alioii.-. an- Ilinl !)' \ A i\r-,4 |<ri(rani, v. hirij h:indi''K nly fi,'U wrk'inX hej|t in cunriK theiii<i'>lveM. i- f.ilinij; (::' lieli:)id actunl tn-ed. John S'lcehan, ln-ad of t i n - \iaiili:i't::r. VA. l!"-<pil:il .-aid: "We ran handle only l!'l addict l>ed |Mli-nt- al any om- time, at.d w.- hax' 1 l-"< mm on Ihe uiiiliriK |i>t i i-iiiui' in. We nre rimriTiied; v.i- In'!;.", ! ,-liould lie aiil<- to lirinK !> an iiifi-pn'ieii! program u n t i l lh>- ln-d- .;<' r. n;.' ' .Slieehan lia-. a lOO,(HJ(J reqiient peinlt:i)( iii VS'ii-liiiiKI"!'. In ->1:;ri. I'i-ii , a likrable x-infuiitr;. niiiii, i- our ,.' 'li"-- dniK -tali'licn. lliri |fr<ibl<-m: "hi-r-iin. "Me, I IM-K.IH on dr'iK in \ n'i N:IM," !.- - i.-l. "J wa on (.t iirut anil then I nlnrt'"l liiainlminK ojiirji.i. Man, il'- H.' a :i o.....iin| mi -!|i-- v.'!-n t h a t tulT ym'H nK in - I ' U r li'i'jy. I "l.'iil'-'l l,"c:in-i- 1 ;>- -<"ii <l, and v.iii-n I wji on I he .sfnlf I dnl:i I '-?' H'li;it U'n- ti.'ippi-tiiiiif. .Seven 01 till- i-i(ilii III' L ;I in tny Mjuad IV<T. iiînK opium. We (i"edi-d it. It ju^l "<irf of iilniir"! i l r r m - o'l', "r>nr", MM- oHii;r! kww we were u-iiiic -ti.ff, >.', 'n- not t,ujiid. liui iln-y JWVT il. I air.'f iiiiiK." , J'r'i- lout \n>l\t Infy to it mine.
71
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Now 21, IK returned to the United States wfth his drug problem and <b*n year and & half in hospitals. It was here be switched to heroin when they Mopped shooting him with morphine and other pain-kOling drugs. "We w*re buvuictfo stuff from putfaenHgtt fa the lioinitil/' , .' Pete eventually turned bimscu in and uow w hopefully; on his way to' * core in an East Coast hospital. "lH new turn back." Pete *ys. The PfcUM who turn themselvro in ore only the sraaB viable portion of * iceberg thai has trouuud thousands of veterans. Moot will never trv to turn themselves in. M*ty trill Uwc the courage to take Ue cure by the time hospital space is open to 'thvrn. Manx-, very'inany, will die one- day of tbelr habit. The VA hospitals, where Pete and mom than 8(10.000 veteran* arc expected to be treated Mi fiscal year, arc a cornerstone of $S.6-billion annual V A program. 'They have cumir under fire from both Congress and Viet Najn Kra patients. The VA bit" responded by ehaBt-nging the former and instituting a thor<>iighgoing overhaul nf routine-, staff attitudes and even the nutcm to ease grips *t the latter. T)u) VA -siy* that while the average caw load is expected to u*? steadily, nio'lern treatment methods make for a faster turnover and that waiting lists arc down to 3,000 men annually from 1 1,S26 in 1966. William C. Wvman, 20, of Boston, can testify that sp-du;r turnover can be * relative term. Vlfyruan wiw nerving on a voluntarily extended tour with the 101st Airborne in August, 1970, When bis j*p hit A mine that ripped off both his feet, . broke iiix left kg in two places and sprayed shrapnel into bi- jbw. Today bc'" still in the hospital, wTuling for doctor* to' dccidu whether still another operation How d-.j it go with the disabtai, how do ttwy fed about the war now, vhose who next to tlie dead gave as much for their country as a matt ran? "GriiwaUv th disabled bavp high hopes," W\inan said. ''A couple of GIs gave, up in fto-aon. That decided nve to push on. You give up and you might as ocll Ixr di-ud. Twenty yeara old is kind of too early to give up." In score* of intprviows, thi.- virts generally appeared indifferent as often as angr> about tho*p against the war and who refuse to tie drafted. "Everyone has to di*> hi own thing. If they think they're right, thru so whiit," was a view oftiM wired. But *. too. wen* slogan liko "Ix>ve it or leave it." An x-paratrooprr snid, "I violently Ui.'n^reo with the proU-Ater*. But I adirlire tht'ir courage. It's no little thing to' go t<> jail for su idea] nnd screw up a whole life." Thfht: -a bo did go to Vun Nam will continue to return for years. The indications fire that ewn with a major upswing in the economy i>me of tin- darker trends now being notirel will acrvleniU1. "Tlw> probU'in.t we w_- now are often disturbing," a VA official said. "And there if rorm tn tuik aN>ut jtoU-ntiol dangers to utir society. lu coming years we may haw to <hp the word puu-ntial."
(KnituUf UVtiUiKton SUr tToMur MMculw), JLpt. It. I'.TIl
TBI; CI RKTT;IX . . . 10 A Srî.u. Joii I'UOBLKM (By Gene Grow/

If tlx! iineritpl'iyiiii-nt rate has born rising steadilynnd it ha*for the pact yenr or more, -it hu* lieen miariiiK for tltr> rerntly d'Hcburge.d veteran and it is mftfbinic t>trnU>!>pberir Iw-iicbU fur the black veteran in punicillar. Consider thin from a Veteran^ Ad:nini;>trati'/ti udy of U.U- lat year: "Tbe iineiiiplo;-ineiit nite. for all veteran.* wan 0.7 per c-jit. . . , The unetnplovntcnt rate fur nil ScKr<> *a* 10.C pirr <-eni rmnpared with A.2 per rent for w>n-Nei(ro">. NV^ro veU-rans were niii'-h more lifa-l; to - k employim'nt a*>i-<tiic-frorn th.- VA than non-Negro vcU-rnns. Alnto~t one hi five (10.6%) of the Neicnp-.t us rompun/rj lu ">> per rent of tin- iion-Ni-tro'< rM|Ui>ft-<l employninit u**i iianii-. <; at four rjfi.li';) of t)w Xi'stroen lio bad not completed Uzil xc'.HK)!. iiliiii-l one in five '!*."';) ul tlw Negro hitfh <u-houl Krudnut*-* and one in f-ix ')<:/, t '>! the NetaoeH v.lu luul uilvnnred l-yund high rflurol CMIW to the vi for employment u'.<ilu:iw." There :ir<r :i riiiinlxT of problems whirb contribute In tlioMt* diumn) tatintin. One. i/f ronr', J. i In- tler/f tin- froiuimy itwlf. <>, a* tin- l>epnrtri>ent of Defense lint it in .1 rejxjrt: "Wbil<' the eiupl/>yineiit pirture beyond the datr of tht; rejort (Ortolier, I'.i/'M i. lu/pi-ti to improve materially, there h' Ix-en an approximate JO per rent inrrejitd- over I In- liwal yirar IWH* of vet>riit)> ni-kiHK job liclp throiigh tiin local ntnlr einpl/iviiwiit wciirity odicoH." Aitotbrr fartor Is tliut tiwre ore about
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4 million Vietnam-era veterans right now and eventually tb* total will be at leatt 8 million. Then an now about 100,000 men, 10,000 of them Mack, beinr disihargod from the Armed Fore** each mouth in what ha* become the large"1 demobilisation In the United States since World War II. Many of them, black and white, arc whttt the government calls "disadvantaged." a word which the government is hard *.ut to ooC-tte but, as aa official of the Office of Management and Budget aays, '*by implication intends disadvantagod to niean *oineone with lr* than a l education." What happens to the Vietnam-era veterans, especially those young men trained only for combat and then returned home still without a civilian trade? The problem has bran worrying the government, and a number of efforts have been made to find the answer. In June, 1099, a presidential Committee on the Returning Veteran was formed with the mandate to '"find ways in which the efforts of the Veterans Administration and the Federal Government iu general can be improved and made available to the largest possible number of returning Vietnam veterans." 1 definition "A decrease nation'' crunoniy and the emf4oynient situation. More than likely, there will be serious economic dislocation*. The employment picture for the unskilled and untmincd, for veterans and non-veteran? alike, is not encouraging. Approximately 5 million civilian jobs were in defense-related activities in 1968: 1.5 million were directly attributable to Vietnam. It is estimated that 000,000 civilians would, if the war ends, be required to shift into other employment. Based ou post-Korean experience, this shift could take IK months or longer. "Iteturning veterans will add to those manpower problems. Many <>f th-i-e veterans are relatively unskilled. The combination of unemployed civilian.-* and veterans looking for jobs will cause social problems to the diaadvantaged veteran. He cannot hope to compete with the flow into the labor market of educated, skilled. ez|Mrienecd workers. The unskilled worker also face* the prediction that in 1975 only five percent of the labor force will have unskilled job*." The implication!' are, however, that most of the "unskilled" do not waul unskilled jobs anyway. And. further implication} ra.i he drawn from the fact* that while. seven JMT cent n( nil disadvanUiged veterans in urban iuviis are unemployed, 10 per ceut of ih- disadv.antaged black veteran.* arc unemployed compared with three per rent ( the disadvantaged whiten. Also: "Chronic unenip|r>yment is a problem, especially for blacks, whose mean number of weeks worked 14 nearly half of the number of wei.-ks they ci|id have worked." And. when he worked, the unemployed urgan Ixack vet.ran earned an average of Slfft while the urban while veteran corned $110. Among those ex-wrvicemen who were working frequently, many uere unhappy in their jobs. Sixty-live IXT cent of the white? and only .V) per cent of the nlacfc veterans who were employed were *tilied with their positions. When it came to,ehancc. for promotion, "black* uere far ie.x optimistic tha-i whites. Forty per cent of the black* fell their chance* for promotion wrre not good. F.ft-en per cent of then*: iu urban area*," the tudy : ^d. "planned other kind.* of education or training. The percentages for Macks 1f<eeking more education and trmnii.g] were very ;nucb hittucr than for white;'. 2 .' per cent to 10 per cent". "In nummary," the report concluded, "employed black veteran*, then, earn less and arc more diH*titified with their job* than white veteran* but apfx-nr to be more hopeful ni>ut ttinir einplovnicj.t future. Ttiey want to udvnnxv and eppeor willing to do uhat i 'lecosarv to achieve bi'ltcr employmei.t." fTiert- are om In govenilneut wl.o are deeplv concerned with thix reality. Among them \ \>t. Cliarlen K. Ktengi.T of the \'i-y-rn:.* Adriiinitrul;o(i'.- Depcrtnientof Med ciiwandSurjiery, chairman of the VAV Vielnam Kra Co;nn:;tu-e. "If the bhu-k giN-.t bark to tlu- urban ghetto and i^-tn cau^l;t up in the old life," Or. Bu-ri|fer i<ayi, "we may try to reach him but it's very pox.<ible the nio.-nfte wor-'t get through." "We held a workohop in Vi'W Orlennc recentlv to try to pinpoint fh" necrf- and probl>n'< of the Vielna'ti velTan nnd one black got up nnr] told u<: 'We eet t'jl'l ;il)OUt benefit* but it d'H'-ri't fiieau Illllchwe tit-ed to tte t )I'I in n W'. (''tit rem-he* >i.' I'm afraid that when th>- VA tnlkx about r!n>,>| nrl triii;unt it t u n i < off maiiv bla.'k". We need to lind h wav to i>uv it *<> that it ineaun KOiv.et,hiiii; ti> all blnc^x. We nifil to look critiruHv at our prograiiiH and our nietho>J^ of i''>n>tri'inii'fttiou with t!ie bluek veteraiH." As ri'K'ill of lii* inve^li;ulion>i, \>r. Stcfii-.-r VU>K that "ht w're doitic now in not i IMI'IC'I It might huve l'en after World Wur If bu' it'ii not (irtw. The />:el no* that whatever the I>tal>lii<hriient tell' him, the rxlol>liMhm<-nt li i not r>ing to come flirnimh. He st:ir!>- with u neiuitive bias. We n\n-~l
673
up with innovative, -imaginative alternatives in order to reach hiri and convince hm> of our sincerity." In addition to questions of race, education. ad economic background, Dr. Stenger's committee lias noted, too, that it is essential "to understand the particular impact of being in military service under circumstances where we arc involved in the longest, most complex, least conclusive and least popular conflict in our history." Given this background of rooming unemployment rule* for veterans, insufficient educational background for many, inadequate civilian job* skills for niany others, a number of programs have been launched to provide the veteran with training for meaningful civilian work. Project Transition, far one, i a Department of Defense program which begins before a man, or woman, leaves the service. It is dtnigucd to provide guidance and training or educational opportunities to servicemen during their but sis mouths of duty in order to prepare them for "a productive reentry into civilian life." It is in operation at more than 200 base*. "Transition," nays director F. M. McKcrnan, "is beamed at fellows leaving the sorvicepvho cither don't have civilian skills or their skills deal with only one type of equipmenta radio repairman, for instance, who has worked on only one make, or an (urpbvic engine mechanic who doesn't have an nx license. We offer feiiicatioi.nl pixr^rams and trainingbefore they leave the service they should !x? able to grt vocational training for a half-day live days a week for a total of 240 hours of entry-level training. We either get industry to provide training without coat for the skill* it needsall the major auto companies arc training mechanics, for instanceor we arrange on-thc-job training with smaller eiupiovcn iti cities near the bane, such as hotels '>r finance companies. Second, we have the Department of Labor providing training through funds from the Manpower Development and Training Act. And thirdly we have on-tbe-job training on the military base with what fanliti'-s we have there, computer training for instance. ''I think we're doing rather a ell, especially tar the black veterans. While only 9.9 per ceut of those coniiug out of service are black, 18 per cent of those in Transition programs are black. We arc training about 60,000 men a year in Transition. Of coarse we're operating under some constraints; a lot of the men come back from Vietnam aad are discharged immediately so we can't reach them, and what with th- budget cute we have tn early-ruleatc program now and many are getting out of the service six months to a year early. There are a number of specialized Transition programs. One is KEDIHC (Military Experience Directed Into Health Careers) which has recruited some 30,000 foruirr service medics fur training "in health services. Ilie Poutol Service has trained some 6.000 through Transition fur careers with the Post Office. The bricklayers' and carpenter*' unions, the National Association of Hoine Builders and the Portland Cement Ansocu-ti-m offer courses ia construction trades and the FcdiTol Water Quality Administration is training wau-r pollution control technicians. Some 2,HOU have received law-enforcement training through a program provided by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. There arc dozens nl other programs. And there are, loo, educational program*. "The education programs in contract to the vocational training," a Transition retort ctau-s, "arc concvrtwd principally with bringing more personnel up to the high school lcv.-l through the existing CCD (Central Educational Development) program. We are fared with tlu- iumcapatde fact tiiat almost 20 pur cent of enlinted personnel still leave military service with less than a high school education. TLr in- rvice programs to reduce tliis number arc nen.istc.nl., but many men during their tour <>f service cannot take advantage of the (vo^riuns, iirinripally thw whose- time had to be spf>nt in preparation for dutv in \ letuoui ON well a* the actual f-ill time pursuit of that dut;- in-country. TluiH, whenever possible, the Tru'isiliori prnftiua has endeavored UôtJvr tlice men inU> CEP programs dunt.z thif lout few month* of icrvice. Wucn this cannot be done, atteuipu arc are >adv t<i up]irtw individual* of remedial education programs offered by the V* siilfVqnrnl to diwhorgc. " H'hui i* the challenge for the iuiiuediate future? Sixty-five per cr.nt of returaiuc vrvitpnif-n are 'i'i or below: tliin in a vuy young group who*1 emiHoynvDl >'X(i> r^-n n i* h.M \*'-'n luia;tijaj. Altnoiil 20 p>-r cent *lill do not have a high school 'd> r:iti<>i.. Appr< liniu 1 . ly '.W IHT will ore iu)trrid with 'J PIT cent with more than tin-' di-fi':iil<'nt. Forty-eight \x-t cent havn v<-i\ duly in Vietiuirn. 22 JMT reot rnrrv infantry training only, and another 13 prrcent ore in other "kill area* where en'il.an r.nversw/n is uiiiiimsl. Another 1'.' prr cent arr in rl>-rirul skills normally <ill>-(i li>- v.ampn in civilian life. Thus alxrtt !A per cent may \M- in some II'.IIM! w.-t of 'incertaiiily." Tl'" tiiu'Ttninty was prr>dd<!d by the economic d<rwiit:irn. Vtuiu ihe fi*cJ vi-:ir to tlie 1970 iSwul year tiuxe WM * 20 per cent increase iu veterans
G74
looking for help through state omploj nu-nt offices and m 60 |x>r cent inerw> in veterans filing lor unemployment eumpen-<ati<>n. For lb*p \rtoransi who want an education rathvr than vorationkl training there
]>r>ividi< college tcvrl remedial course* t<* individual-! who never thought about point; tn college." There i* a teacher'* t nii-iinj; rour-e for male teachers in center eity .-riit-'L- at Welisitcr College in St. L<mL- fur Fert I,eonard tVotxl ajsd another pruicrarn nl rcbx. "Of>l!>'g>' discovery," the Tran>itinn jieople say, "a* an identity experience han enabled confii<-,l, anxiety-ridden "ervierncn t<- broaden thi-ir |*-rccptual worlds by examining their value orientation!*, their latitude- of lhem.-<-lvi-* and their environment.-. I'ainful n. it h.-vs been in foine t-a.-c... per-iuul Kr>>nlh nd devr|tt|iha\v hevn the ni-t vi-ible oiilcmei regardlos uf thi-ir choice to enter college or private industry."' thre tbi- vc-teran." arc out of thi- s^rvin1 tlirri- an- a mtmlx-r of prosram! help thrm eft training. Th- Veteran* AdminiMntiou ha." it-* utrcnrh program in whirh it 'icio to n-ach fonticr wmn-im-n to tell th^m of their rich!-- and the training iivailnMe t.) them. There H, of r.ir>e, the 1:1 Hill and. n> n n~nlt nf tin: tudy made by the Cimniittre on tl.c IterumniK Vet.-ran. Coii^n-- l:it year in the aiiiiiiuit of nul>*itriice frotu Sl.'tO t> #IT."i .1 ni.inlh for nil ii!iinarru*d an'l provided a $*iM-a-nninth tutorial allowanre f<.r thiwf w(_n need !-| nicirtary trnininft- Coiigre** olio nlHiIiîxHl the bar to d'lflirnte [fa.vinent !> trsiniujt now ran rII>ft both hi. <! Kill Irf-nel'.i-* and lionclii- from the Manponer I>I-M lopnirnl'and Training Act nl tlw same tune. The v v tin* horn nmnjiis joli mart- armmd tlw country, loo. liritiKinc jiotential employers and vetpniii* toji'ther in nn effort to ninlch lniim---.' nei-d^ with veteran.-" ."kill". There nrr tr.umiiK proenni:" nv:iilnl>l> - ihronch the Hepurtnvnt of Ixibor and of Health. Kdncatimi and Welfare :i- w-H a- tli- (Klirr of Kronomic Opportunity. Then- are MI many proKC'-m-*, in fart, thai la-l OcColn-r n n:w program, Joii-. for Veieniu.-, \\ai> lie^tin. nritnurili. a .-|<->k''.~ti.aii -..id. "lK<i'i;n-' a ci-'iitral Iilint; .-y.l'-iii w:i- needed. The \ \ ^tnp t* 10 l/ip; they (lid., I fcnow all he them-j-Ue.4. We're to lie a linking- niech.iiii-ni. Wi- x\ant to i*pur t.k }iroKni'i>!< ori-i-> in every cciimiutiil' ~ver III.INN). Wi-'d lik>- evryonf to hav- a rotiiiiiiiiii:y proKratu for vet rar.i. liki> tin 1 "tu ;l,:it <! funrtiori*- in Chirat'o. We can't en ate joli- (nit < ran tn:ir-!i:il die eneruj !> train tni-i a-id !.lj J..1.-.1' I'rimnrc <':npha<i< of Jili for \ fi.-ran- w ill li- i". "i.ukiiiK l>ettiT IIT of exi.^'ini; proernriK a'ld r-'iijn p e nf t'ie fi-.Jer.-J, tuli- and |o--:J icixennne'it-, as well as tho-ii1 rf t'ie private u-c-tor." ii ;i iki'.-rn:i:i said. "Tin- r;'-n|>:iii;.i i< t-xp-"-'--'! to liriiut new fin-Hi, n Ilit-ir IIP'-I- '-i^ra:.!" iili'l in imp.-ov ir.t''i'-:iK'-tii-y '< ..... irk. For i-v;rii]il'-. it will e:ill t i n - nil. i . i i m of i-m;>I'i> 'r- t-> pro-jrarn- >f !li v : rim Adi)iiiii-lriiti(i:i. nrin-.; lrn-'ii t'>n\:iil th'-'n-M-lvi ->f l'ir oi'-t'ie-jiili 1 nu'tiii ,-niviiou i:n'l- f the '! Kill an.'! lo rinê ti-e ( rn ntiiit"nr/-d jnl> i>:nV-- -lablpiSied 1:1 Vel -ni'is A-'t-tane*- <iMtiT. iii ni.u:' eiii'--. Tlie e.iinii:ui;i: mil (> ri'i-j-ly Ki'an'd 1 !> t!i- .tctivitu-. of tin. l i e i u r l r r ' - H t nf I.ati-ir - '.'.JiHi Jo.-.il lii-M oilje.-*' -n<! ili 1 f \ eti-r::;. Krntilo . im-nl S-rvici-. v. liieh \>rn\i li^ ii'i:i~linz :i:nl |il:iri-i:ii"it :i--ii-I:i!irc In vtiTHii- -"'''ki'ns j'!n. It w ;li rrh luavil 1 . on (tic I le.i..rl'1'.i-T't nf ("ntnllii-rce to pii!>lii*ixi- veteran-" u-i"t:ini'e pr.iKram- of in :< at'" :teii'. :;-ifJ !>i olii iin IHI-.IIH-"Mi|>|c>rt f'>/ tl:e-e i-lTorl-. ft uill li-ivet ul ivi!ii t!;r- .(Tor:- i-f tlif Deârtmi *il of |)i-fe:i-u>, v. iio-i- Tr.i:,i|'ion a -id II' li-rnil iir-i^r:.'M i>n>\ ,'. o[,:mri'i':iti''- f >r M-I-Vin-iri'-n I r-iifi'iieiii-i- prep.-irati'in f <r ci\i!i:.:i ^^!: |>rjor to *>:> r:iti'n from military . !' i-xr-'-pt Hi-)-- in r/iveriiii.- 1 !.: ith'i !':iv n..di '' :i -ial ir-.i-ern and. of cii.ir,'. liio-w veferitfi<L i-.li>i havi T.io-d tli- f n i ' i r : i i o - -if n - ' ^ p - i r - K '" emi-.an lif' l i . i ' i u.'i'ler-I'XHJ uli.-it a -eriou- prlil>"ii f:i-i-- I'.i- p-liir-n-'l X'i>-i..în \i-t--r:in nii'i ill-' " >-r, 11:11 v utiii'U'rn'i-t tîv luin i::iinfnl enipl<ivi>.>-ni . It n,:iv !<, of roiir-e, ber:ni- of l!ii - lialure of I lie A.ir ii-^-lf. "Tl,- V j > - l i - u : i i s..i.." i> >-,.i- .>l<-Ti.>'il i;i u I'riijeet T run-it inn r>-iirt. "lia" had no terminal ii-iint icli a- World War II or K"re:t. In. (' ud, Ih-Iiv lijil.il- )i:i\e II 'iwi -d in u n r ) nut of -. r 1 . !'> :il I 'i>- eotiejii-ion f t'x-ir ijrjifl riiilixatinn >ir lirl enli-i -tii-nr." l'>-r!i:n>- sti.it i t i n - n-n~on tli'- n-tiirninK veteran ha-" mad" l i f l l - imi:i<-( -in 'ivi!ri>i life m Hi.- ''niti-d K-ite. ln-N-ii'1 >f Ix-i'ii; dtifn;>ed on tlie i-c:iriiity in one fell -.u'/np, ),< r>-ni o- i:i-i!it.ti 4>y ni'intli in ord>-rly rol;iti'm, liiil, if tie i- l>i reiii.'iiti ordi.rh' aft- r lii^ n - l n r n . a-i <-<.>-ii more ordeily mid xii/<tiiii>d elfnrt lua-t )' moijnli'd >'> ''dnnil' , tr.iiti a'i'l , 'r'-vrlv linn with jnli nppvrtunitie-. I'trviA reÎi'i1--' ri:"jire
t>7o
For manr veterans, their present plight i> port >f a relentless rhnin of events that ha* followed from the early iiiadef|iia(.>ic* of their educational oppurtuiiith'a. The n.-port <>f the President's Cotumittw on the Vietnam Vrierau pointed out that : "T<l n->uIu-< *h>w ihat 3D permit of hiiih school graduates :n the Amu 1 Ftiiw scored as pooriy or wne than the nverajte score of live who had not completed high school, Ironically, the:* factors an- an im|x>rlaiil determinant in placiuK nien in military irreuptttioiis. Thi*e who had not completed (heir hi|(h school education and thoM' \\-ho perform poorly ^.u vin- ((italiliration tests have less opportunity while in the nervier to arq'iire -kills apphrr.l.lc to civilian jol.s. . . . Available survey dnt:i show that panii ipatioii in (11 Hill training is inverse to need. Nearly .V) pererj:t of the veteran.-, who alrvady have college 'raining at the time of di-cliaw ttnd therefore have the U--t pn>iiTt> fur ininwdintc cnipli>yiiii-iit Mt-k to upgrade their eiiui'atioii iiiiilvr the vi Kill. < >:' 'he iither hand. liioM; who have eriou edite.itinn 'JrlirirneieM sliow partii'kpalion ratc^ a- Itiw as ll) |nTivnt." It i.< clear. a, J>r. Stf-nu'Tof (' \ A li:iaid. lliat "what nenredoiiiK now i* not ciiniivjh." It 1.1 i-wnti.'il Ilia! all cocut-nied in tluc.>(:i>trv l-an "toimdfrvtand th' p:irfirul:ir i;u;jax*t of l:i 1111; in tnintu.y :.i-r\'i"'-" ut. vlii> iinii|ii>- ]ioutt in our lu^ti>r>". If the ili-pnvwrt !(tsit: of tin- i-i-i.iii-iii;. w<-ih.- Ifuvily :it;:ii;'?t cxi>ti:ij; rtTi>rt to itiiort.v.I'll' >iiuali'ir.- "f all n-t.irnini; <!-. then Rtcat-r^-ffcirt- an- mi-di-J to r><ll.i .uul n-laie to and improve the luej. of tlie vetiTmi-coiiii-ti-inir. In tfnns .'f pi.: "itt -it nations, 1'rojrrt TraiiMtifii, with it-" ^jxrialized training, education aiid itnnLinc'1 jiroKnuiio, the VA'> new Jol>s for Veti-ran* proKram nnd the Ijlmr })> partuient < \ ulemn> Kmploynu-iil Ser\-in- rannot lie (unr an- they intended to Ix 1 n eoniplcte puimce* to the |.r.)hl'm of civiliau uiuplu\ luviil fur a-t u ruing veteran-> liir tin- an- part of the answer.
[From Uw Cblcco DiUr Kcwi. Dcctaber 1970]
Ocu VtoLRNr Vu FSAM VETS

(By Ur. Charlw J. Levy*) A .1 r ..... arch n-^K-i-tt'- i:i !!. F.:ilior-itr\ of Community IV.'chiat ry at the ;. J \:ii-il Metlicnl Si-hiHil, I have -!!. t o\.-r two ji-ar- < x|fl"iri:iL' tin- urnire^ I>y \Uin-li men ;nlu|)i t ( i i-oiiilmt in \ ii-i;i:i;u ;anl hiU-r rr:ifl:i),: to i-i1. in:iu liti .
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The n n - t i -luilieil ar>- froiu :i .M>ri>inx-e[.i>- nri'zliliorlnioil. T!i-ir l>^-kt;roiiiid iri:ik**^ thfi.i repre-^'ut.it:v.. of in'iî r n - n ci Ui*' anneil MT^'II'I'-'. Tii*' OM!\ fii7ereiift: III. iv IH- : ii'il .ll t h e o n t - i ' ; (In-.- !i:u! :i ;r:v.i!-Ti'oiiin.itllient to tlic V, ,ir, il"i:u>n>lrateil V.ilell e. u'li elill.steil ill tt.c M;>.'iln' ( 'iT|'-. All of t'.i'i..' i|iiule<l in tin- follov. i. ii- ; f - i i n i ' i i i \ HIT.- ;iniiii(i['-l v. hi|>* in \' ; rti;:iiii. OIK- irf i In 'in w;t" :mur<l--<[ :> .-.I1. >T >!::r. '1 li'-.r ijiifil.il u n \ , :ire i:irt ':i>:'!" frmn tipo n i i - - t ' M i of olt .ri'Mi' a--* itiii iiaiui - , 'I hi-j- M'(<-ran-. lu-.e i,. i-ii h- >!; i'<r .1 \* n.ri riinuinu fr.F.ii three i:i'inl!i- )> ihrei;. i ur-, w i f l i an uvi-raw f .'.i:.' ;i ir. Their ilt-rn -.<>!, .. ill; i:ie r.'v':il:ul;. ile:ill u i l h . iol( nn> in \ ii-iii.ini. .iii ! ':! ir -i.ileiui-ut . Mri':i-^te-J ;i profo:mil ili<or:eiiiaIIDII. 'i'lii ini'!' rl\ !nx o.i I' fi.r :HI|K'.: !o ! . ii:.ra''.'r; ><'. '.\\> ir i'\[Ti':i''<' in V :ii:iin. Tin > t:iile 1 .11 l e r r . - i>r :!.i- \ i.. : ( ' > ; . . : ;i;i;l N o r i i : \ietii.inie-e arm; n..t | j j i i . lif pri:i;an {"<;.- '! i '! :.-. :.iif.. . i.i-l'1:;'!, referi'iii 1 '". to t';i"::i an 1 invjri.iM.. |n-i:i\'"', Ili-.'i i- a t pii'.il a;i;.r:ii- '. ' ' : '. n '. ' ' < ' aid \or!'.i \ i'-t n:i:.:e' arm .. .
"The. *[! l l - ' t - T I l ..... -i! '.'! !!.!".': !'. :i ill li.l"-. V.lli'll til'"' Wen-
r-:ill-. oii:inn.j>>-.i"| :.ii'i !!. :.i! !.i -f ..;. . -fhni.!'. M..-I of t i n - I I I I K - -.w'li l i u ^ - I.p- -:ip ri'i',!;, ie,i r t'.i.ni. I!'.: v 1.1 :i i' [.:.,. ( l i m n aii'l I!,''. K'"'.'. it ar.il the.". wi ! ..... itn.i;ti!'rr'l, tii" 1 v ep j:.-! _ 1,-ij. ' i il'i -ir ''.! \\ ln'iii'Vi-r ' i n - A lit N Aftn;'
if I ' . ; , ' !:[> l ! > I i e i if ?*>' Hh \ li'tli. i. i. 1- I'l ' r ' l . l i 1". !l" I' I per !'.'fl ll.e I l i - i l ' ( 1 1 1 of
tli- '. ot I.- : ...... ui!i! " 'J I.en v. ' re tun i " i i f r . i l ::iiY':- '. >\ t : : ' :,> - t i . i l 1 e\;ifi - i-.l |i tin w funiier inari.ii'.. i)u.< ),- ili.. \|;\ N "I l.jv.- l..'.'ii in I|i*. (..'.:|ii r r' .t . ir !r i ' ' t * inn. 1 . \\- \wre t''.ni/ If.'ii'r. to re^c:nil-ill n: l>:i!i.i'iy. We pn||er| t! i- ?r i r. n-.i r :i:i.! tl." A ! J \ V eniiin-i-r il-ip[ie 1 <\* at u ro:i'l : >iiie|i \ ni| I In- 1 1. .re 1 1 . ili-.-i 'i. 'I ! . III-.'KI. < in; -ii-l.. Tin-; 'r<- tr 1:1,' to lie I i n l i t a n . ."! I h e t ' v e KOI l i . i - n- i-!nlo"r. up. Ami thev -inpii.-'! Hie f n i e k Anr) the ilriv-r i- -ii ; Hi"/, '{let i el i of t'.e v. .1 - . i - ' i I.''.!.1 -Jo|ir-.' And the;, ro::!.' nut ai.ii tlic-.
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676
WV bvr a rounded vetoran.' We mid, 'so what?' They said, *He doesn't h>w one Inn. Could you give him a ride up to Uio hospital?' So everybody's saying, 'Ij-t liirj hop'. I uv; in charm of the tVUil " 1 Mid, 'Let him ou.' I was in the back of the truck. It was a P.C. (personnel cnrricr) three-quarter (ton). So he come* over on hU crutches, I Mid. 'Throw your crutches up.' So he pawed up the crutches. And ' I grabbed him under the arms and I pick him up arrt I tvt him in tlie seat. The little olopu grabbed DIP by the leg. And I had been in the country long enough to koor- that most of them urc queer. They bold hand* and stuff. ''And thi.i sort of irks most marines and soldiers. And we're told that it's a Vietnam*-*1 eurtnm, when you're re-ally fricndlv you should hold bands. So they end up getting boat bloodv. The guy grabbed' my leg. So I got mad. I wasn't in a Kood mood thi:t morning and I worked him.* And my buddies grabbed his crutciie*. And I said 'Go!' So we took off. \Vr threw his cruU'hes in the rinc paddy one time and went alwut another l.Vl vardu and throw the other crutch and then out ! went. He van screaininn and crying and begging us. 'Out you go.1 We all ha** a 2->od Lvi^b alwit that." These private cnnflit-'U" -XITT capz.Mo of becoming public battles, u another Marine recalled in this episode involving the ARVN: ''They'll put their hand ou your leg and von mucker them, because as far as we're concerned thoy'n1 queer, tfo the ARV.V lieutenant told hi* men, 'The nest (>ni>- a mnrHe liit.-< you, I want you to shoot him.' So our lieutenant heard about it and I'M say*. 'As ooti an you sn-e an ARVN pick up a weapon, first I want you to kiil ih.' lieutenant and then I want you to wipe out all his men'." TV, the!- arcCKinU, the oilier tancet with whicu thi'sc former marines appeared prcori-iii>i'>d wai thu Doiicoiiunt.îoncd and c inuii.îoned American officer. The [olli>winK t -o raxes li'w how *-acl> type of irffieer Ix-rume a tiirget of their grievance. 'Ti.i- kid, hi; wan driving a trurk. Thit Aruiv lifer Career man) come and che\u->! him out. K's a Kood marine. It wa-i in an integrated convoy. Combined Arm; -Mi. me convoy. And it wa.-* a rough rMrr thing;. It bad to uo through cnc-uiylield i.'.-ritory. So it was one of thuu- thintcs evcrylxidy ha* to know wliat they're do! i-. Vou got to hav<; it certain discipline how far you'll kwp from th truck in fr nit of vou and how fu*-t \ou11 go. .-'> thi l:fcr u. giviiu^lhr lftiire. And KV looking at him. Like 'This lim't my iTHf d:iy in rountry.' !^.i the lifer *i-nt behind the trurk. And K released the lirakr. Itolli>d the tnjrk back and cni.<hi-d the lifer between Hs tnick and K's trin-L. Ai.d killed him th>-y couldn't prove he did it on purpose. "That fool (the commanding officer) i:iad>- us build iiiia a porch outnidc of his I'-ul. He had an umbrella nent from the St.itc... |d; would sit there and uip dri'iks. And wLiI? the guys would Ix- oat thiT" killing tlienuwlveg. Not only did we have to .'in- Miipport on opcrationy and fire uaro.iinent-tire all night long uliile we're iii [>;>-iii"ii, but wv had t<> work. Like one time hi- wanted, what he did was he wanbij the wliol" bcrm Cembanknii-nt' luovtid out Ml vurdM. He wanted to enlarge Uic position. Thisi would entail picking up oU tli'- wire biirricadex that we put u;>: ronei-rtina wire, t:uiide foot, upro' , all IhN, :md thU tak'^ u lot of ti:nn -mil n lot of cut lurid*. And that all h:t>l t'i IK- ptill'-ii up and uiovd out. And we knew it WM>< *tupid. And !ie hrouKhl tl.- 1-jnTo trarton out and sliorjf the upcil liiîtK on tin while we were working at ofcht And this U also endangeriiiK our liven. .',) -., ne itivlit tlii.t guy, If., l*x.i>y-tr:i[>i>< d hi.-* ti-nt. In tin- muruiiiK it wa.Mi'1 the C:.i*. lhal got it. U win* the >:x<'c:Kiv>' olIiciT, Cupt. W. A wiki lite 'iu- we \v:nit>'t! i /'t. Hul it vox yift -if giMid to KI-I \V. IT" npi-twd Tip th" flap ( tile rûit uii'i in 'I- rig i|n, ili' 1 w:iy the tn[i wire wus slreti:li<-iJ. he w.nild p'lU the pin ou ltu> wi'.'ul . \'id iluri- tvn.' tun TXT D'ipplfiiifniury churgi-K '-d to th-1 grena^lc, whii'h i< t',f> [)i;t:i!-> "f TXT, which rut:!!! fmir rin'L "( TN'T and alMût u hnlf u | x > ' i i n l <.( t J.injxîti ID U m.-nl" th.' gr'"i;idi> aii'l ohrapiu-l ind uluff. Wi'H -im -vT'V, it lili-K "IT b'li): hi< li'i>, it lili-w up hm crtrb, ii \Arw up the wde f h ' f.i.-i-, ifiria- C'liiC'T" -in oiu- hiind, und jx-ppi-red b.m with fhrapix'l and ntnff." Tlii- /i.r'iTirj- cin.iriiitu'fj ly lh'-w IIH-II whi-n ih'-y return h<iin>> in oi>'i:litrly di<urifiiti'il. .'i- in \iriiuiiu, the target* <if their ln*iihiy tuny l tlmmr who are on th.'ir -.ft.-: "\,.\.<- wli'-n I KI b-wk fruiri V'i-iuntil inv siiitiT Vflled ;it wu1. I *pht her leg n|-ii v.idi '. latnp. My iiM'lh'-r h.'ii'J (cxii'-'hing \ die one night nnd I tlirew u |MirL:iiii<' J \ ut h>T. ft ni:tk' p x you tin iuuiJi.iI. I,.!: you can't r''aHu." Tln'ir liifir.-m.'iiK'ti iucJ'i'ii-* u n-ui'/val { liouik(Jurien Iwtu'ueu VKJIIIWO and the <'.,;n/i,-,!ni', in wlu<!b tin') p-liirn: "y^.ii sj.- gnv with l<'iui blown off. '1'Mikn with fl'ir bi-ad* bUiwn i>f{ und tbi'ir I'-g' '-(T and their rheU wid<; open. Von -..ty, 'in:m, u that all tln-r'! in to it?' Jul,
677
von're dead. And no men. You get that attitude that people are just, matter. It's just something you begin to live with. So that when you come home and you gut in K fight or something, when I think nothing uf biting a pcr*otu's ear off because it's juatonvi thing that I've begun to li\ <- wivh." Since lb effect of Vietnam on the various Aoitriemi combatants fccou to vary only by degree, the problems need to be treated collectively rather than individually. In this way .the men would be able to help each other solve thorn. Since the problem* appearing ia cr'iliaii life originate in Vie-lium, they ought to be dealt with there. Otherwise these problem* art- compounded by the ftrca of returning home. The program mutt provide witrk that is a coiutt-iictive on combat-related activities have been destructive. Only in this way will each man acquire enough elf-regard to again consider himself a "prnun.' One way of doing this would bo for American troops iu Vietnam to engage .u a pubue trucks and environmental program there before returning to the >>u.tu-d States. This program should be n> lias tunbiuixia the a the one that created a ttevd for it. Through relxiilding homes and n.-f,in-.-<tJitir.n they will be helping to restore both Vietnam and themselves.
(Frora Ui Knr York Tim*. Oct. 19, I97B]
Tut^Docnu: WOUND* or WAHOSPITAL CMUR UK *: FOR VICTXAK'II

CCT T
(By Hcrlx-rt Mi In another autumn of ar without fanfare in Vietnam, the ehane** of an American soldier RcititiK wounded, nnd Mirviviiu{ with a broken body, still rrinain ' very liinli. Despite an eiicoiiraûix dr->i in hatUcdeld death*, \'irtnam by it ven' nature i'.>^ti]iuo.-< to be a da ICPJMIK. t>loody wnr. The dinjcnxions of Amrricajt own "brxiy coiuit" cannot be tmr^.-d hy ViiTinînizutioit or optimistic rhetoric. In tli week in which tlie Preaident made hi* lateyt peawr propnaalK, 6fi6 Annricanx were m-ouodcd in action. Hie usual li.-linc of Ainerirni di-ath* strvsxe* that the kiilcd-in-action r.itio is dropping. That, fortunately, U true: hut it etiJI lcav>.- about fifty deaths rp|>orteii in an averac'1 "good" ft'o-k. And that does not i.icl'ido alx>:jl 2!KJ South Vietnamese and 1,200 North Vietnamew? and Vietcong who die we<-k!y, much Iryf the civilians b are niuiiii-d without statisticd. The wounded are a telltale of the nfadv toll exacU-d by guerrilla tarti. In -'.i-ml. altout seven times a* itiany AnuTii-ii-i -oldiers are wounded u* are killed. hi* I'giirrii t how that the brunt of the casualties killed and wounded are tuketi by draftee-* rather than Army reenlars. Thr- are up front. UTe;al;.', riiorft of the wo!jndi!(I have i-en put out of art i' in in the contwted northern province of South \'ii-t;iurn. Meavy patrollini: e\en without major operation ha* mi.-ant i:inrr uu:ided <-:-.n-ecl b\ the twin }>rriU of mine* aud b<>oby trn|w. Sniper and tiiurtur lire by .t:u;:'.i >: eui\ furro avarit di: tant bunv catujw can be kept up indefinitely, adding to lite (found* of fturpri"'Tii'- fKilmuiiiZ peril? in total 'u-'i.iliy terms arc rerlerted in comparative (inure* for thii" and other twentit'lli-eeut.iry' wars. In V Fir*t World War. W,4t>H Anii-riraui were killed ni.d 20I.IHJII woiuided. in the Second, J'.M.-'.IXJ were killed aur! (;7i>,r.xKi ivouiid-ii . in Korea, :;:;.COO nere killed and l(i:(,(jO() wouodetj; in ViRtnatri, 4'-l,W) have been kiii>:'J and over 2'MI,?,i>i> vtu<tmlrd--fi far. For .he wounded, rhunaii of rerue from the Imttlelield ore rtater by Maie 10 per fX'itt over previous wiir; tlmt i.-> the Peiitacon way of lookiuR at the "wounded. riif uiiufTi'-ial way i madder in huinau lrnt:. For exu'iijjle, jx'jci-ntuê diMr>jiitk-i for impair'uejit of T:' orKaim wru 5.00 in Wijrld War II, KOI in Korea and J4.iJ7 in Vietnam. Wounded Army personnel neparuU.'d for dunliilitv JIH a resnli of airijiritutiont i>f arm- i.nl legi were !>.()- pr I'ent in World Wr (l,2l.fi4 \:\ K'*r.- ana 2S.:H in VU-tnam. tsaved, i>ul at a t>>rribU: a:td continuine co<*t.
Mini'' ilw deiiuuidx >>f U'ui' ure entile** for the yniih call"il upon to r;xk tlu'i" 'ietl.- ui,d hinb-i tltere, th' - w-f;iided are not a.-i;red of rvc'-ivili|( tl(T uliii'iHl IN nwdii iJ iur>- onrc hrk in ti,e ('oiled Slate*. The ui'ot nescn- bjvw v.wt r-trui'l: t-.v i mouth)- :tv.'.t, not on the h.ittiefield but by tlu.> While Konw, nlfu Pr.--idi'ii:. %'ixvn vetiwd a Sv'tiiiie-Hoii-e flort t/ appropriate1 an additionul $IO."> KI .-i iliciilly for Veteran* ArJinini trution hopilal,
678
"The war iWHuii't inflation must not bo fought in the ward< and clinics of our veterans hospital*.'* *ys Senator Alan Cranston of California, chairman of the Veterans Affaire subcommittee. He and Representative Olin Teague of Texan, chairman of the House Veteran* Affair.' committee, have been erpOMng the *orr>condition.-* that have resulted in inadequate medical care because of shortage* in funds and nenumnrt. They still hope that Conr*w* will pcri*t for the sake of the wounded Vietnam veteran*.' The hospitals aro overburdened becuu.-e neither President Johnston nor President Nixon anticipated the human price of the war. Helicopter rescue and evacuation and ?up|>ort hnnpitaU hacking ur> field doctors have enabled many men half.dead to live tit tell their ule*. But it i- another >tory on thi* end. especially for those needing long -and can-fill rehabilitation, tilling tbrouch Kingnbridge Veterans Hospital in the Bronx. Representative Le*U-i Wolff of New York found only one night nurse to rover ninety paraplegics. No matter how one feeb< about the Vietnam War, its victim-" deserve tbc it-spec* of ;iii|>erior mcdic:il care. Of course, the conditions for the wounded cannot be Jetached now and in the future front the war it-x-lf. Time it why Senator Goonte Mctiovvrn of South Dakota, trying to tix a timetable tu end t'ie caxUblty lists, nmde an iinpv>-<ii>t:ed plira to hi* coKeairu>-< and couiilrymeu: "hvery Senator here i partly npin-i!>lc fur that human wri-tkaw at Walter Reed mid Betbred.1 Vuval and all across o:ir landyoutu* n.. it without lejc', or ann>, or .Kcnitab, or fnc-'( 01 hi>|n'.<. Theiy ar.: not very niajiv of lltesc blasted tnd broken |K>V# who think thi-i uar i a clorioti-t venture." And he ended with an admonition far induy bf Kdrnund Burke: "A conscienlioiu man would be caution* how he dealt in l.l>x>d."
IFtoia NmwwK Jttr. 1>. \fn (..pr. 7. t'<7hl
THE VICTKAW VET: "No ONE Givts A DAMS"

UnlM-rt S:inchc2 can home from Vietnam I:i-t Julv nitli two Purple Heart* and a !<ei:- of m-Ji-U-iiin. For A month, >u:uii--/. *J4, uln> had .-crved a. an inCdiitryinun with I hi: iDl-t Airlmrnr Divi-ion, '.\a- perfectly ronU-nt to >il ul Imini' in Comptoii. Calif., "jil"t groovinK i>n the K"od li\iiiK tn're and all tin- fri'-nd- I hud iiii.v-d out tlwre.'' Becau- lie ua* youni;, S:i:ichi:z fiidired he would have little trouble landing u jb and one dav he raMially 1dnj|'j--d by it H*.~ station to MXiibiMit ^/-Uins work a. a meehanic. Say- Sanrlij /.: "Tin- piy I km-w then- for yeai> t-ui<J, 'Sorry Bob, no job* around li:r-r.' That didn't worry me IIKI inurh. The next day I wnl out to Kome other .tali<*n-. and theun-wiT ua-> 'no.' Tlwn I reully lx*Kiir 'WulniK. I tried everythiuK, but n one Maiili-d meno di-bu'a.-lw-r, no In i.' Ixtyf, no niei-htfiiic.-. no buki-r'.-* b''l\-r- itmliinn" Todav, Sanchez i- -(ill unemployed -and bitter. "It make* you damn mad." he ayn. "( volunki-red for the Army nttht o - it f lush -ehool tM-rait.ie I fic'ired my country needed me. For four tear.', m> job ua- killing f>ir tin- red, wliiu- and blue, and I reckon I done my part. But if I tell tli.it to juiybody Itere t i n y ju-t laugh at me. Nou I don't try it any more. I forget, about Vietnam and all that. I forget about tryinK to %<-l a job or Ruing to -c!:ool. Tin- fact that j"b^ are nut there j bad enough. Buf- there'- >i>tnelluiiK more that Me veteran- luive to fare. It'. tlw fiwt that no one IUM- a dumn." Munv of I If 'i million teteruii-< of I!M' Virtnuin war are talking like liob Saticbez the.*- day- --Jifily but w i t h deep reM-niment. liuviiig ' doi>e tlwir part," tb/'y are returning t<> a "M-n-ty that, in general, i- iwiili-r proud of tlw MTV ire nor opi.-ti-lmiidj-il u i l h ii- n-vturd-. I'nlike their father- lifter World War II and their grandfather.. arU-r World War 1, the Vietnam vet i M^ldom melnimed back by i.'ivic purudi-.- or bru-.< band'. In thi- HOT, Johnny nmw- ><truggling Imri" and ofu'ii nobody notice' Given llji- iiii|''',|nilunt> of tin; war. mdifferenre t<> tin- \jetnam vet U undert(ind;ib|e He mav e\en have bri|ghl noiiie of it on himi'U: tin- </n and !!*here jncrea-initly *f (he Viet vet', o/ol welcome home ** not only un>';ir but I|U>IU>TOU- The jieril in that it uiIJ po-l[>ni- wijntiom to lti urgent ri'oit'itmr. eijucuti'inul und medical problem- .1 imir.I'' of trouble that can only get wjr-e > more and more men come back fr >ln the ur->.
679
JOBS
The iiio*>t pressing of these problem*and the most tangible source of frustration to many veteransis joblessness. In what ha? become one of the tightest job markets tu yean, unemployment for all "Vietnam-era" veterans tan nearly doubled in the. put year. The job squeeze is especially seitrc in the larger cities: in Cleveland, 42 pr cent of the male registrants seeking jobs with the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services arc veteran*. Particularly disturbing is the fact that the veta arc faring distinctly worse than their (KITS who managed tu avoid military service: unemployment in the 20-tn-29 aê. group is running at 9.4 per cent for veteran.-. ">. |-r cent fr nonveterans. Mi si handicapped of all arc the black veterans. whose uneni|iloyn>enl rate is almost double that of their white uxcoffiradcs-iu-arms. "As a result." says one Lalur IVpartownt official, "we Lave a lot of angry yours men <>u our hand- " Public apathy with the returning til'* has only r;rui*>und<-d their employment difficulties. Whereas veterans <>f eurlier war* were boosted by Federal "hire-a-vet" drives practically from tin- nioinept of discharge, it was not until hut fall that PrtMii-ut Nixon launched the Jobs for Veteran.- Campaign. The organixation has M-at our SOUK' !H)0,(NNI letters urging employer* to give sjM-ciut attention to veterans, liut rrf.irl- to plarv them have been st\nued by the economic pinch. Prodding on til- local level luis not proved much more .um-wful. Ueceutly, the ^Vmcriran l.ffciun in Orange County, Calif., invited MX) l>:t>inessnien, mayor!1 and city supervisor* to a M-minar on the prulJeui. Only two p!ential employers showed up, and ouly three others e\en iHithen-d to send their regrets. Some of tin: veteran?' economic plight has to (Jo with ehararteriitic* prcultar tu their generation. On the nveragc, tod:i>'!> vet i-> younger than his ((redco-^sors and less cx^tfrieiiceii. Fully s"- |*T cent of them are 'M to 24 in age, and many of them went ittraight into tli>- <-rv:r<- out f Ligl. M'tKKil: about one in five never completed high vlnMil. "Many V'-UT.MI.- whkintf fr j"lr-." says a manpower officer in Phoenix, "have n>->et h.-iii a job in their li\>- In fonr." Add" Mn|. (Jen. L.K. Vi'crbiT, UkLihoinit'-- udj'itunl gc-Kcr.il: "Tuda;'* vet i- not like the World War II man who alreuciv hal C:>:IH- ba^k nud -j-tiled into it."
The widely puMirized n*e >( dt<t?- ,n VL-tn.-irn has further diniinihi-d the (mployiibility of veteran-. "Kmjtlovert claim they don't knw if the one" tliey hire will Ix- addict.-*, pushers or .-inuitd<-r-." savs an official of the New York Slate eujil..yrni-nt oflire 1:1 Buffulo, "and that's why they're afraid of taking them on.' L"ral and late polii-e departmentstwo traditionally heavy employers of war veteran* ure iniriirul.irlv ini|iii-itive about an u|>;Hiciit's pa.l associatiitn with lirugn. In Flri<ia. Oade County |ilice rfcruiter-< can-fully iiivi^tiKaU- the background of each veii-ran who applies for a jot>; one (tuff of pot in his pat will disqualify himacid "in- ex-Cil in live dunk- lit*- l--<l Tin- extent of drug uddu-ui-n among Vietnam vet* i.< unktiown: many chun Veteran* Adinitiitr3imn tn-utment iM-eu'iî- of the nirenry's Military alf/lialion, and uutil recenily. VA lur-pilul.-* wo>tlil n-tl iidmil u veteran whi> hail received a les-thiMi-houorable dichargi> In-eau-K- >,f driiic-*. In Mifw citie*. howwiT, the nunjlv-r of addicted veu-runx may In- Jannmily high, one putient in three at a Kali Frunli-M-o drug eliiiic i* a veu-ran. Tbc VA has only IM-KUH to make a *inl> at tix-etini; the prol>lem. SK nveitiadorv programs were lauiu-lvd around the coiintr;, ul the lx*xininrig of th>- year, and already UK- d-muii'l for tr'Mtfiient h^ fur oi|t>trii>|i> d 'I11' ^ AV capacity u> deliver. In Sew Yrk City. fr example. tb<- \'A hux allotu-d i.tiU twenty }*-4* for drug i/aLii-ni"; J<<> ieterun> are currently on the wailing lit. A SOCK Vi/'iimm - lilu- /ith'-r wur< - i.- M-nduiK !iom>- an apiâlling nuintxT of veteran* mb'> hav l.i-t lirnlo in U.ly tra|i- anrl mine expl-Mionv, nnd i-rthofiedir patM-nU b'> n"('iir" r'-lmljiliiutii.n ure taxing th<- \ A' li'-|-it:il -rviu-. Another largt nuinU-r of cunnli.i-s CIIM- hotiw with "ru'iirogHM-huKrie" probleiiiii: one-third "f (lu- ffi.t*l (itni->-iioii-' to VA hoitpiul* e:tch xiontb fall into thin category. VA offirijil- iHi-tbiite UK.- high figure m.ii:ily to tin- fart that todav'n vet 'it tii'itf 'Ailliii/ i'/ <eek (xyi-tiiatrf eoiinxeling limn '-r<- |n pretJcresMifit /ter World Wnr II nu'l Kofi-3. Mental difficultH'* n-liitcd to battli- i.lrr. are far !<
680
Ui*n in previous wan thank* largely to the uhort-:,- tours of combat duty. And, say In. Gayk K. Lurary, coordinator of dinical psychology at the- veterans bos|titnl in Minneapolis, today's GI is more lifcdy to express hi* conflict, lo show angrr freely and to "act out" his frustrations. He is. she think*, inoru likely to "hoot someone." Or is hi*? A recurring bit of folklore about the Vietnam veteran. jMU-ticidarly since the My Lai killing*, us that he is coming bom.- brutalized that the Indochina experience has turned him into a dcbumanizi-d "gook-haUT" al best and a 'latent killer" at worst. There an- particularly chilling runiurs of lethal cadres of htaek veterans, ready to lend their frustration and the'r iuiltt.-\ry ex)**rtuit* to guerrilla warfare in the ghrtu.i.fr'wne uf the horror storks no doubt have a grain of truth, but UK scare* stviiw out of projMtrtion f > the threat. Latcm-ii have not thii.i fur traced any pnrticttlir criminal bent tn the Viet vets, nor have the ghettos boated up perceptibly with their it-turn. ''Most black veteran* like nut people in general will [undoubtedly] eschew pulitic*-re\ "lulu-nary activity/' Charts. Moakox Jr., a North western University ocjolocist testified on Capitol Hill this winter, "and auvk to improve thoir lives along individual lines."
~ FKACE
Moskoe may be right. Returning vet* have been conspicuously reluctant to join veteran* antiwar groupsthough one group, Vietnam Veteran* Again.it the War. claim* a national membership of S,WK) of which .">,0<)0 are expected to .thow up for a five-day peace demonstration and lobbying effort on Capitol Hill in midApril. At the name tinio, however, many vrterah* have K on disinclined to pur-ue the mot>t traditional line of self-imprnvenumt further education. In the periods immediately following World War II and the Korean War, one veteran in three -took advantage of tin,- GI Bill. Among the* current rrop, the figure is one in four. Their youth contribute* to th decline, but perhaps the most important ram* i. rt-duued btnefiU: after World War II thr CJI Bill paid full tuition pliu $75 fur monthly expenses; now it pay* a full-timu student only SI 7.1 a month, which doesn't even begin *o rover tuition charges and living n*t at mr>*it coHi-an. itut there is another, krss tangible reason for thert.Trra.-n-Jii-Verest in a rollege cdnratJot,. Tom Long, a ^{-year-old Ctiiraer* veteran, explains: "I tried going back to schr>ol for awtile," he nays, "but I felt I couldn't get iuto it. It war like going into tin- Army all over again jii*t another bite institution." Indited, so pervasive U the veterans' reluctance to be institutionalizt.-d again tlmt it has made ai*tivists of sonic of the luort lUKK>->h institutions of all. The . _L)e(urtment pflO-fetise has w-t up a projn-t called O|;ratiou Transition to provide civiliun job training for Ill's in tlieir last feu iiinths <>f wr^-ice. And tte V'A U niuniug a massive "Outruach" prujyani wlnrli include* 71 "anKHtani-e centers*' wht-tv a vi.-t can leiini ttliftt F'*deral, state, and Im-al groups have to offer him. (jiven the prew-nt job market u.id tin; low iM-m-tiU. it isn't much and di.-illuuonni'-nt LH likely t>> grow as the boys C'Miw strui:Klii,'.t honie. Two years ago, BU old Army corporal niunod Jacol. Karin.T, who hod served in |H>UJ uorld tnni, died at 7H in a Miami tlo|)hou-v, icaviiig f l.",(Ml niid u letter nainiiiK "the r.S. <joveniiiieiil a mi Jx.-neiicmry. I (XI per cvnt." It it dillictilt to liiiniim- such a g>-Ktu;e from a (Jt.of UK! Vietnam Keni.-rnlion. "When u ma:i n.'i-d- toeut imd in ttxi proud to go on welfare," K.IVN ftufxTt Sinc!..v, "lii CDiKfieife l< 11" him to !<t/'ul. II ravi to liiantflf, 'K... t!te world. For a uio/iu.-nt I wu.-> a hero. Now I'm nothing but trash'."
n, Mar. ~^, \>r.\\
3.1Z.OOO \IKT \'r.n JOBJ.KFS W.-*niN';ri>N. *An nii[i'jl.lii'lK"i Lalxrr IVp-^rtrnetit repi>rt (o the Whit sliow; that ut lejixl. i'r_',(K)(l returned \'j-tu:iiii veUTini-. are nrieiiipln;ed. Ami dei|iiti- u icoveriuittMt puliry of lii-lpiuc veUTun^ f.ritl work,' K'*t or return tn w-hool, , tin- u'wtnj^M nu-iit rate fur veter.m> . > it guint.' . up . pcn-eut fnlJT than f<r llu-ir civilian co'inU-rparl . Tnu yit:lnMt rale fr "\'ietnan> lira" veUini.ii.- in t'j- ^0 tu 'J'( \i:ur old tiff; Hfiit p ro-j fr;ji 7,'J to 1(1.1! [xTrutil u ^'J.J \VICK\\'. iurrejw- Ix-th'-cn tlv,- end of la.- 1 >i-ur and March I, Durini: I lie sun>e |<erioil rivili.tn uiiedipluymeril in tlw xaine uge fcfoup row 20.0 fien-jTit --from C.H t
6S1
"The situation is bad across the board," says the Labor Department statistician who worked out those comparative rates. "But the veteran* are even worse offone oat of tea of them doesn't have a Job."* And the executive director of the national Job* for Veterans Committeeset op by Pnxidwnt Nixon last October to "highlight the quality of the American veteran"says the figure* are "shocking." -. "Oor effort* can't be wrong," said Cant. Richard Maurer, the Defense Department manpower specialist who heads the committee. "We will do some good but it may not bV enough. 'If the figures don'; start to show aa improvement noon additional steps are going to have to be .taken," he added. Both the jobs committee and the Labor' Department admit the veteran employment pattern since last summer has'not been encouraging. TV Labor statisticians said the latest figures show that about 10,000 of the 75,000 veterans being discharged each month are unable to find work.
r. >by 31. ni
GI Pi'M/ocr CALUCD OKLT Hnoix SOWJTIOV (New York Times News Service) A Cvngr'stioiMt ttudf mutton hat reported Aat the heroin addidtion'problem -has betomtô tj'toi among U.&. teniccmen in Southeast Alia that the only effective loluticn ii the pvlUrul of ail troop* from the area. Bribery and corruption at the kiyhftt lmtt i-f Southeast A nan govenunentt and military Ufl tiUif. ha)* thai tiu nerot* tru/iC could be halted in the near future, aeeordinf lo the npoft. Jr said an effort bad to be made U> interdict the traffic, adding: "If these effort* fail the only solution is to withdraw American servicemen from Southeast Asin." Tin repo.t, vritlen principally by Sep. Co>xrt H. Slette, It-Conn* and previously revealed in pan, was officially Mrawed yesterday. It said that, in the longer term and considering ail MJUTCT* of opium-heroin production, the only real aiuwtr to the problem is to outlaw the growing of opium )rappies throughout the world. "Once the poppy pod Is cut and the opium gum cxtrnct'xi and "ld on the illegal market, the battle to prevent the end product, heroin, from reaching the addict it lost," the report said, "Thejjrol^m* nuirt bt- sttacked at the sourcehi the poppy fields of the Near sod Far Ea*t, principally in Turkey, Thailand. Burma and Laos," it said. The report to tke Howe Foreign Affair* Committee taid that le'.iceen 10 and 15 prrrmt of all U.S. troopt and iioulJi Vietnam, or biAwem 30.000 and 40,000 men, had become addifted to heroin in one-form or another, "la nonx- units heruiu addiction might be as hi^b M 25 percent," the rrprt aid. The report told a story of widcprend bnltery and corruption reaching into the highest JcvcU of govfrnmût and military of La>ir, Ihoiluiid and .Snub Virtoani. Altbougii the extent of c<*miptiou throughout .Soiit)u-ait Ania wan difficult to SIMCM, the report said, "reliable tinaoft tufntrt that at IcMt two higb-runking Laotian official*, including the chief of the Laotiiin general otaff, are drr^ly involved in the heroin busineM. "It in uMumed by tb (J.H. military that thin twtivity rft*rhti( hiel: IcvrN of command, to include the politirijin* ii: l>ntb Lut>4 mid in Smith Vietnam." It continund: "The lJJ>. military roininand ha* i;>!>Ii<>d Atiil^Kdor ''FJi*worth Tj Bunker witji the namen ot high-rankm;; \'ii-tiia;iu *P offlciulx it .'U'pcr^ of involvi-nicnt in thV.' heroin t-ade, and lJicvi-< that tb'1 rorniption liax n-arlwij thu point -share only forceful intervention by Prv'iditt', 'Vcyn Van) Tlik'ii rnn ueened in rbecking tbo traffic. "Tbef have aUo b<:i'n report- that Vice Prwideiit 'Kguyen Cw>t Ky in ifiipUcalcd in the current hroin traffic. Tip: vtudy miiHiun wni uriable to find aiiy evidiuic.- H Kupportthi* allocution." The Di'ffiiw; Depwtinent tyro bn* \ni\t i: <'ogniwd that iuari;itanr and dru/ bi, including heroin addiction, wa^ a |wr-,oiiu*l problmi in (yjuilM-iJ<t A<:u. Hut f.he Ht/'-'l" rf>ort declareti, in addition, that bcroiu addirli->n uow liu-< Ivfarrn; problem a* widi.
-2SO71 14
682
The report aid some- South Vietnamese troops and IT.S. !<ti;>|x>rt personnel involved tu the t^cciit Laotian campaign nei-dtrd treatment for heroin withdrawal pains tx'raiu* the drug was not readily obtainable. Berau.c local population* had become affected by drug abuse, some governments were making a limited response to ttie problem, according to the report. "This i" particularly true in the South Vietnam military force*." the report said. "We were told that during the* South Vietnamese iuvoMOU of Laos, :>onie of the South Vietnam*.-**: troops who had Ixx-n traJi."fern-d from other areas of Vietnam on .-hort uotiei: had to be treated for withdrawal jiymptoins.''
Tlie C'HAIUM/ x. TV commitleo i mijounicd. Mr. KAI.VWATEK. Tlmnkyou, sir. Tlu- CHAIHUAN. Tliaiik you. (\Vlieroii|)Oii, at ] 25 p.m. the committ<t; adjouniel.)
APPENDIX
STATEMENT SUBMITTED BT LAWTSKS COMMITTEE OK AMUUCAK Potter TOWAEDS VIETNAM ON END-TBC-WAE LEGISLATION The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in -to be commended for these hearing* to determine the action Congress should take to met our involvement in Southeast Alia, rather than continue to leave the time and circumstance* of our disengagement solely to the discretion of the President. In determining what the Congress ought now to do, it is particularly pertinent to exploredespite the tendency to muffle or bury the point whether vie should or should not have goaf into Vietnam in the first place. For if our original intervention was wrong if South Vietnam never was of major importance to our national security then we should forthwith cease to perpetuate the wrong and negotiate a prompt end to American participation in the war, leaving the resolution of the tragic conflict t o t h e ludochincse people tbenwrlvca. . . . . Uiii.il mid-1949 the United .States displayed little real interest in Indochina. Jt was only when communist rule was established in China in mid-1949 that Washington undertook major support for the French. The Truman Administration was increasingly preoccupied with the policy leading to the containment of China. President Truman, indeed, linked his decision to send American forces to Korea with the announcement of increased arms shipments to the French in Indochina.1 Washington henceforth described France's rule in Indochina as the Free World's stand against communist expansion and ceased to viw the war i:i Vietnam w primarily a local colonial conflict. The Indochina wur was thus linked to the Cold War and anti-communism became the banner under which our involvement continuously escalated. After the fall of Diexbienphu on May 7, I9./4, French public opinion mounted for peace. Pierre Meudes-France, the new Prime Minister, stipulated be would resign if a peaceful HelUeincnt was not reached within 30 days by July 20. On July '21, 1954, the Geneva Conference was concluded, registering trance's defeat but providing her with a face-saving means of diaeugogcmcnt . Three days later, ot July 24, I'J'A, Hecretary of SUU- DitUex declared that American |iulicy iras "nut t4> mourn the pant but to s>-iz<! future a\t\n\rfm\\'u t*> prevent the loss in Korth Vietnam from k'oding t-n the extenxiou of communism lo*ard Southeast A*ia and SouthiM-nt Pacific. Thereafter, American military peroouiu-l entered Vietnam as traiuerK, advii-jrs and (Nmsultaiits to the South Vietnaiuev; army. Ngo 1/lnh Diem was installed U> replace Baublic <if Vietnam in Baigou. Diem utteii)i>ted to crudicnU- the cadre and sympathizers of the Victtuinb, many of whom had Income \'i<-Uiiiub iuj>|x)rtf.n bcoue of it* program to inei-t VietnauuW- demands for iudejieudetire, a redistribution of land, and an end of u.urj'. The decioioti* of tlie Uieui regime to nd traditwAal local and regi-onal autonomy, to rcfu*> (with Am<:ricau mipj>ort) to hold ttic eloctioii* for remutication by \t'i called for by Via- Geneva C<>:ifeTeiice, atid.Ui eli;ninate all politiciil opp/nituju, while ignoring the determination of the Wtnumex' |opie for national independence, land refi>rui, fair nijt and tast-n, led to the | ire-en t conflict. WaMbingtou was boHtile to thi' idea of K'-iwraJ election* a |K>int which underscores ttte bypocrii>y of the Juhnwm and Vix'xi adminiiitratioii* which have coutiuuouoly pri^daimed that our intervention wun to afure UAH-determination fur the Vvtnamexe pttrple. The reason for Wubigtou'H bootiiJty to general elections in illuminated by President Kiseubower, who, cao.didly wrote: I have never talked or corresjtouded with a pproou knowledgeable in Iiidi^binese affairs who did not agr<*! that had elections bwn held us of ttie time of the lighting, possibly MO percent uf the population would base voted
t *( **, litUitla ('Mbl(tun- iuir *. !'), I'. 5 > /.( uff Hu. fUUpp> (JrvlUi m4 lnaj*mtltvr (JVw*-r V-w York, I'W),
C84
for the communist Ho Chi Mini: as their leader rather than Chief of State Bno Dai. Mandate for Change, Dwigl : Eisenhower, Doubleday Co. (New York, 1963), p. 37-'. The decision agamat allowing the election foreshadowed a renewal of guerilla activity a year later, iu 19"7. It is for these reaton* that the pursuit of American objectives 'ban exacted such an incredible toll. That misadventure lias alrc:uiy co-t almost oO.OOO American lives and hundreds of th!>*ai"is of Vietnamese, Ijaotian* and Citkbdians and an expenditure of more than $1 2.1 i iiilion. To warrant this colossal toll in lives and treasure, Washington hns advaittt-i! a series of jn-tifioHUoo*all devoid of substance. The American jieople have been told that the United States was fighting for the freedom of Sotith Vietnamese; hut for 16 years, Washington bag maintained repressive, authoritarian regimes in Saigon which have prosecuted war in defiance of the popular will and have, indeed, imprisoned those who have publicly advocated [face and neutrality. We have been told that we were protecting South Vietnam from "aggrrstuon from the North"; in fart, the Diem regime which w<- installed and wpported was o "eprc*>ivc that it provoked eivil war.5* .imericatix have been told of the "domino theory"; yet leM of Indochina it pnncntlv under the control of Ameriran-upported regimes of South Vietnam, Camlwdia and Lain than in IQ'A or anytime sinrr. We have been told that continued American intervention WH* preventing a bloodbath : but Ameru-.au armed forces have used .*iUO times the tonnage of bomb* used by the oth>*r side.1 rind for the past six y-ar hav- killed more civilians every nix months than the- olfiw side na* in 16 yeais.4 At long la.it we should nM-o^nise that our intervention wax tragically wrong and we should move heaven nud i.irth to halt our involvement with consummate npeed. The K(>erl.aclo of a military colu-sua dc.tro\ IIIK a tiny nation ban defiled American Ji.nior H- nevrr U^rr in our hi.t>n\ The willinKiie-w of American President* to (-.irnlirv the ei\-ilian po|>ulatinn of Indochina to futile coM war irbjeetivm in relation to ( 'luna and the Sovii t L'ni.m ha.- ljt-n notri(js throughout Anjerira'n irtvolveiuerit in Vietiiairi. "V'ietnaniizatiou" i 'imply the ek'Vattot* of that mtnniitiiu'iit to the 1< vei of ftcknowledp-d [M.liry. Former Ambaiwadfr, W. Averell }Iarniii:ui, h.i> correctly branded Vietnaiiiizution a program for the |>ei>lN*tuatkifi << u.-ir. noi for |>eacc, nntjng: "The "i'u-'.,nniizr.t'on <A the war is an imukmJ tiling " > N'o Amcnc.oii can disx-nt fioiii tlut ax^x.-Ttwiit. It i-> ti": prime ohliKtioii of Citnnri-!". iind>T our C'otistitution to extricate our cation from th- \'ii:tii.iiu w:ir; to vt u <-li .<r Mid tineriuivorol timetable for the with ;rau:il of all Ati-riP:ui troop* fnm) S.i(|u-u-t Ai.i. It is the ConKri-B;* which in \'ejii-d w.itli the roititiition:il an'horrtv l'i "r:iiic aiid uppfjrt armier." and to "dechire w ir". ( '-orijtrr-.i can no longi-r tand by in lilr.id itcri'irtAnce of the |xJicu-s ttmt tlie I'n:tide[it in j>r>;x:ntl> piiriuinK- and in the fun.- of tun utatcmentM that he inieiirU t,, rojititric to t)iir."iip tlint [xilicy fr the indefinite future. There in not th fl'mht --i vesiige of :i < > i,i l .tit,j(j l .( l: il l,:ii- for tlie President V continuation of the w:ir in I'.n- fa<->: ( ll> <- ov-rwh-!iiiiuK vnt- i>y the (*onprrn to n.-pt.'al th*1 CJuh* uf Tonkin ll<-.a.lnti,.u oi: DiT-inl-r .51. l!7't- -the r'j'iiier wan indeed signed by I'ri-nt li-fi Nixon tiirn-^-lf in Jnu:iry \'.I71. < 'i-iir it i.~ tlint the I'rrmiiciit'ii d:ei)4i>jis to I'urtir i;i:<t>- in the iiu u.înn.- of (lie m 'itr:d countries of La/nt and f'ambodia xwitrtl In.-. con>iitut.iiiii;tl power.- ;inil lajiiiot but in- coii.>idered n deliberate niMitm^'.r Uu: will of c'oncreFS. Ulnilev.r authorityil'ibinijs nt Ijest, in view of the narrow ''!;: inieir.le<' l>v the ('ont;re~- :in-J (lie nnulidity of a (iflegation- of the wur-/n:ikirig power ve te<l in C 'oiiKre . :u\.j i-on-ttitutiofiolly a nullity in view of the di-i.'fit ii:"1 :;iUn ;>rew-ntJiUoii in it.- proruretii<-nt --WUM fTOtitexJ the I*re>idefit undtf the Tn!.i:i fjulf liiuhition, it w.i- totuil\ n-;thdriiwri by th/; CongreM irheu that Jt/'v>!ii;i-.ii WJK repealed.
TV V.... l-i'tainu. IIrti,M Kail n-eu^-r S- York. IW,, pi> W2-^, V-Crtf, Ioul k* (MIT Pf" < "n.-n'Tl-Ifr l'ft. up. rt-7. ;, "Wlii .lniri>iii>rrui<<riCn Aiii-r|i-i mlliUirv Hlurt Nfiui luîly I'XJ, It ww tltutH tint wilr f ,s. iijV | "T'tf r, f i,r' t affni.nt 'I (> CVn.iir r V i-i-IH'l nrr <-i-uttf il rflwt Uw ">ni r*r|>4^n'i' Ir "f 1 >"f:i uf '*'.' fim*< " Mtnl't jii't f , t !i n î> tt'ttit Thf Abvu "f Pwrr, T\irti4otf I/jr l'r-n > V"rk. '.''< fit "* J"i. '.-;tiM:i - fr.Mi Oirt"1 "f A'"' "" r*lf . <>( iJ'f'iiv 'IM'.li- itjri DirMuu, /au. t, JU7U). clJ la 't.*uui ,n I'v/iMo Mi/Tit "< Hiilii." HVtrtm \'<rt* II.. -t/, . A I" lUJrl^blii, rw> p. 67. 1 Krlinif -int I'Jn-i n'tr t'vutl't l"' J l'm< <n hiit'tii ni -luff ll/ inf t*Hmt*4 lot *>uiironimJ!(<. '" :n-.-tfir >! !'" il>"ii I'lHiivit'l tltl, |{i.rng.f< .,M r ! ' T.' .t!Ur m> Mir Jlii'Ilolary I'.g. 'DVI l ' M . ' . i r " r ] i >..!!<:>' >, ITHi, jr. I.1. rMuulf)- I'.r'ifi 111 wm'hly |>mu r*l'' i.-':>rf'ii ; M - ; . \ A V j>>*. V>r 11, Wn. p. ". '
ltjt Vl>' '..ir'li V|.-[fi;|i:i r.- "t]']\n \"-<- .I'liin.f tlir -:i"MH' tir-rt n'lll'li ti>l>M HO,aU ( tint tlln/ "
)<tia'iir M.':> M .'.-.(i.'M'i, .vMr"* a> V.'-MV (' ilv.tnty ;,::i if, i<, [ rmpotw to ui
683
The Constitution grants to Congress, not the President, the sole power to determine where and when we go to war. If war is to be waged inXaos, if Laotians are to be IdBed and Laotian villages and countryside destroyed by American faepoww, that decision esn onlv bt made by tbe Congress. And that proposition applies with equal vigor to all of SoutbeactAaia. "t ia pervwsion of tbe Constitution to maintain that the President'* "incursion*" into Laos and Cambodia were authorised trader the powers vested in the President as Commander in Chief. The doctrine proclaimed by President Nixon that the president by himself may laouch au attack across a national boundary into another countrymerely by proclaiming It to he for th "protection of American lives"is a most dangerous and pernicious doctrine. Research has disclosed ho instance in the past wnere a president has purported to defend a major mffiury effort across a national boundary into another nationand a neutral at thaton tbe groojkd that the attack was necessary to defend American troops. The real purpose was not to protect American lives, but rather to maintain the tottering regimes in Cambodia and Laos and to kill the marimmn number of tbe enemy possible, nûjdless of the number of t/wtim and Cambodian people and villages that might have to be destroyed in the process, Tbe Administration's attempts to label the present massive aerial bombardment in Lacs and Cambodia as an effort to save Amfffoim lives in a cruel-distortion of the realities. The "Mxon Doctrine" of unilateral executive war-making power, if not eonfined, implies some awesome possibilities. That doctrine with "military logic" could be invoked to launch a land invasion into North Vietnamor an atomic challenge to the supply lines in China or Rossi*. That doctrine eouid constitute a. rationiUxation for *yrtV a president ebooteo That doctrine flouts the explicit provisions -of our Constitution. The framers of tbe Constitution give the war power to CongrcM because of the healthy fear and concern over its misuse by tbe executive branch. We do well to recall Abraham Lincoln's exposition of tbe warmaking power: The provision of tbe Constitution giving the war-making power to Coogrew DgS 1 i dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons: Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in* wars, pretendtn* generally, if not always, (bat the good of tbe people WM tbe object. This our Convention understood to be the most oppressive of aQ kingly oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should bold tbe power of bringing this oppression upon us.' It is time that we completely and swiftly terminate our military participation in the war. and keep to a bedrock minimum Any further loss of lives, treasure, and prestige. To accomplish this goal, we urge th< Congress to adopt a plait for disengagement that meets these criteria: 1. It must be a plan for complete disengagement of all American military personnel, both combat and non-combat. It must not permit an indefinite retention of a residual fore* of any size in Vietnam.' 2 It must set a firm target date for the completion of tbe withdrawal. Our fi".J disengagement must not be conditional or deferrable by tbe decisions of Baicoa or the other side. 3. The withdrawal should be uwoiupliHhed with consummate swiftness, in order to limit the further lom of American liyi-s and Vietnam'** lives and the further disruption of American domestic prioriti**. .Finally, public disclosure should br mad* of our intention to withdraw completely and or our proposed termination date, ftuch disclosure isessential to provide any hope of breaking tbe staietus'e in Paris. A publicly announced 'frf"*"* would make certain that after a specified date, no more American soldier* would dif in Vietnam, *ud tbe vain ia/rifi<v of Annntaii lives would be over, feo would the waste of tevs of billions of dollar*. HV would, at laat, t>e akir to turn oar ies ami resources from fighting this efidk** war to solving home of our own ng problems here, at home. We would, at last , hav* tbe opportunity to beal tbe profound divisions the war has opened within our own nation. We are opposed to both tltr, phiivipk- iu>d practice of tbe Adoiinislration's pplky of Vietnamization. We otipose as iinn<>ral s/>d seU-defKatiriK a policy which gives either American anus or Atuerieun blood to ptfj*tiit.<> a corrupt, despotic
' TV Wnt*,, tf Almknt Ltnoln. Arthur H. l.tpOtf. t. U'ulj-ur/i. IWi Vol. : pp. . ' I,Mt tmamt* itvioM I' Ut.vltd l nmfaor (br fXitWî of mS4ttal f'jrw In Vlnnwo w woidd ooM out Uit uttl* CMU*tlli at* not tb uoiy n_ji*Mn tuflrr+A trf Amnl.'M truim. Tb* trtr ti w mMl* Sootbwe iri* tb* tutor ovtom pco4w<r at tt> worl4 t-4 tryni MBTti Stuxr tb* In luiux Anvfleso ontU bwUn s-MJctloo Is st Ugli M Wa-t Uitrtr tbs< wlU Iw wllU tu to s ]i tiaw>.
CS6
ant1 unrepresentative foreJgn regime. It is neither iu the interest of the American penj)!" or the Vietnamese people to maintain such a regime in power. We find it morally and politically repugnant to create a client regime of Victiuuiicse generals in Saigon and then give tbcoi murderous military technology to turn against their own p;.-oplc. "Viet*, jnization*' aims to tranquilize the American conscience while the Administration wages a cruel and needless war by proxy. An enlightened American foreign policy would ceane trying to dictate the outcome of fine ssentially local conflict involving various groups of Vietnamese. We Jt> well to recall Senator George Mc<overn's statement made before this Committee, on February 3, 1970, at its hearings on Vietnam Policy Proposals: ICvt-n if we could remove most of our forces from Vietnam, how could ue justify before- (Jod and man the line of our massive firepower to continue a slaughter that iifjiher SUTVITI our interests or the interests of the Vietnamese. The policy of \ietnamization is a criw-J hoax designed to screen from the American people the bankruptcy tf a needless Aipericau involvement in the affairs of the Vietnam people. Instead of Vjetnamizing t he war let us encourage the Yietnamization of the government in .South Vietnam. We can do that by removing the 'nbrace that now prevent* other political groups from assiimi:iC a Ityiderihlp role iu Saigon, group- that are ca|able of expressing the d"<ire for peace of the Vietnamese people. (Hearings, Committee on Foreign llclat:ons, L'.S. Senate, yi-t Cong. 2nd Sess.. Fob. 3, 197<l, pp. 123-124). The Administration proclaim* that its goal in Vietnam is the assurance of selfdetermination for tin? South Vietnamese people. That ie a plain deception. The overndins: interests of u dear majoritytlie silenced majorityof tlie South i'iioruuiie.-**1 -pcaople is jMtaccto Up the killing, to atop the dttKnrctton <rf -the citii. vill:iKi*!>, and farm* of Vietnam. Th<- overriding inu-rent of tlw milr.Ary rccinx- of South \'iclii:irn i war. It is the war that in the buiis of the junta's virtually absolute ruK- and itn corrupt i.'cojne. I'lvt-rsiiiri' l'J.">4,th' Whiu? '(OUSMMII V\ ishiurton has madn t he rhoice of government fur the South Vii>lnaiiu > .-'- p<-ople. 'Ac ha\e done NO by Hii[>porting wjl!i our soldier- and our tin-puwer and v/iih eoli vs:J sum^ of money a military reuiuie whi"h N to JJv d'.'ix-iident on that support, and which suppresses all political imposition. As lulu: u-> >ii"Ii a n:irr.)v.iv i>a^.-ij r>-nii'.u- r'niain.- iu poucr. t|u ro fiin t- no ri'al "mJW'-itTimna'.jon" for tin- sik-nn-d majority in South Vietnam. "V'ietna:iii^4tr<n" uoi.ld have us Itrliew 1 tliat t!w Thit-u-Ky recimc iu Saiôu j-tana- fr f freed-jin utsd po;i':l::rl'. locked n-Kiin>-. Ariiially. the Sxinou reuuiMi.- aii o;)pr>'>-ivi- dietai T-hi|< whicii jails its criii< - and blocks the development of :i br:uilv-b:i(^>d 1:01 r-ri'iimi'. The S'.n.'h \'!-fi.:ni.i--- p-Ki'iie oP.-ially .-wJirils tliat ii hold- mnr" t::aii 4'l.WMi PIT-OMTS prison.", 'lin-e-fo'irtli- of whotn UP- U-i:ig held without trial. The roiiilil.on nndi'i w iiii'ii I I < M > J > ' <>f I ) C M ' >-ot>lc .-in- liel>i ure JIIIIOUK the or-i i;i thi> v.-rjrld. Th" i i u i v - r i t j of 'in- ; l-'ical pri-oin r." are noiicoiinnuiii-'if wl-o urn f i i i l t v of inHliit:;: mori- 'l;:i'i :i lvoc:itm^ a ne:ltr:il m:a' efiil f u ^ i r e fur thi-ir roui.tr}'. In 1 ijro;iorli'M ! to ]>\i\il-j'i'iii. the 4 ' M N K i polii 'i :-.! pri">tier- ofl:"i:illr tidi.iiiied by .ai'i'n.W'i iid ! i he e.-un.'ilei-: <if l.;Jf a null'o:i i< i!iiie::l pri-oner^ in thi. ('nited S:-il---. Alfred HaIer. in !i> book, .sVi//'!. I' K . . \ . 'lln-lmrd J!:iron, NI-W York, 1'*7it. p. '.*i!: ci:e ill" !./i!re nf 'Ji M'.if HI a~ i lie n M ire real i- !|< - n u i i i l t - r of un-"ne^
l
aiid iilral- are ri'pre-enicrl !' tlie Saiston m-ueruN o/ ti.e.r corrupt predere'-or1-. We rfh'vild eeaw our ernirrae. of t i n - firru;.! anH :niti-i!eiiiijrr. l itic re;cjnu'. Wi f'lipor: (!:> !i:i-:;' nni-;:,!i., ( .;,,lMir!ii-'] in the Vi<>t:iam 1'iwnuii.eiiieii' Act of 1'jT 1 'S, ^!7iii jii;ri>>Ji'"i'' In Si natur- Mr' In-.< rn nnd li:itin-Id luid ro-^ponxori'd bv II-I.-IIITOII- senator- ^'e ro'ic-ir vit ! i ' i n - t i n d i n g K i-'1 forih JH 1 lie \ i e ' n u j n I'l.-eiâtciwijt \f ":ii:il !?.it!i iln doi:n--.lic and foreign poln-v mtiT.-xl of the l"iiil'-d Ma'e* rei|ii.re .in ciiji'd.'iou. i-nd ( I lie :ir in V let nan-, t h a t t !ie ce.iiilict can t" ! '<, reM'dvefl t f . r - i --.'I > |. >hti'-..( -i-: - I :.n n' -iiinii:' (hi- "rirlii i -ijicernedMiat i'i lii'.lit of all i"i!.-.!il'r.-i:i'.:i-, the -'ilipi'in w Im-h oilers the Kfeaf-i-t - a f i - t i , 'lie !n",lii"-i tneiixiire of li'iii'ir. i l i i - lies-. ]iK'-iilio'"j lor t l j < reluru of I ' m v d :->!jte>i pn-io'i'T-. aud tlw mo-! i.n'aiiî.^fui o|>pori u n i i y for a poiiticiil M-liIt'iuetit v.ould IK- :'.i i - i i i ' i l i n i i i i n - i i i of a dale i-eri-iin for the orderlj withdrawal of iili Cmu-d Mai' " Arined f'oree- fn'n \ let ram". The Vietnam DI-I n ^ a i ' . - n , ' n i ^<-: uiniM ,'icr<pin|j|i-li .(.- >-t:iieJ pnrpo^ 1 o/ di cii:':i!'itiK 11." Vnlion frin; i!n- Sernbl-- aj- li\ c:if t i n g off fund* for the inajiiij-iijiini/f .\IIIITI."III i i i i h t a r v per-oiifn-l ,'ifier il>.-propo-j-d tertniiijiiion date Vê rorniiw-fid pait.<-':l:irlv (lie pro-, i-ior, n Inch \unild r< -tncl, jJler M:n I. IW7I, tin- /î^'jidi'Mre of f u n d - to briiiKing about "the orderly I'rmin.'ifion <f imiituri rij^-ration- there Hiid the f ;if" und *y*teiiiatie u i t h d i n w i i l of reinaiiiinit AI/UTICMII armed fon-o". Thereunder, as u<- inu-rpri t t i n - |ir</\ .-.'Hi, ouJy military opfrationii of a jiurely
l"|f; fur their ;io|l'ic;il lieiief*
it |< ;i ini'.e-U
to il:iplv t h a t Alnencun inlerehl*
687
defensive character related specifically to. protection of our armed force* <; orinpr the withdrawal iicriod^would be aut , .ed, and tbe President would be 1*rred froir waging war. ft. 376 al>o provides that tbe withdrawal from Vietnam of all U.S. forces nhatt '.te limited by two other considerations: (1) tbe release of prisoners of war, and (2) arraugeiiNrnks foe asylum in friendly countries for any Vietnamese who might fed endangered by ourdi.en#menient. ~ Whik- we endorse- the lasic principles of the Vietnam Disengagement Act, we recommend 1 hat the termination date bo set at 30 day* after the adoption t -roof. ' ThU would reflect the real sense of urgency which the situation requires. iêrre Mcndvs-Franee, France's Prime Minister at the time of the Franco-Indochina war, stipulated he would resign if he did not accomplish a pcacvful agreement within 30 days and, indeed, tbe "Agreement on the C-~<stion at Hostilities in Vietnam" was siftned within that 30-day deadline, on July 20. l'J~>4. The Vietnam Disengagement Act, which would accoiujtbsh its purposes by cutting off fundt* for activities of our aruied forws in and over Vietnam, is a proper exi-rciê of Congress' power under the oon.-tiuition to control the expenditure of tax money. In principle, it OIXTMK-S no differently than would a bill cutting off or restricting the expenditure of foreign aid monies in a given country. Since tbe Constitution vests in Congress the power to declare war, ('-ongrcss has indeed the respoiiMbility for uudedaring a war that never was declared in the first place. Our major role in tbe war began when Congress adopted the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which sut>scqtimt hearings ixrfore this Committee established wan procured by miijir<*eBttion and deceit. President Johnson thereafter Hrt*rpretAd the re.-uliition in a manner that deprived Congress of its n-sponsibility in the field of .var-making powers. At loin; last, the (.'MHWSH repealed the <julf of Tonkin lt<olution on December 31, 1970. and Hidc-cd tlx,- President vifatcd tbe rejâl in Jiuiuan* 1971. Congress took some initial >-tei>s in reclaiming these rcspO!iihilities by adopting the National <"ominitnu-rit.s Ue.-olutinri and barring the deployment of combat trooj>< in IMO* and Thaibuid and in Cambodia. The enactment of the Vietnam IM.teiigageiiM-nt Art would restore to Congress its firoiMrr rol- in th*.- m-r-makinc field. There JN y-t another reason why Congri'ss niu-t ri-a-*e being merely a bystander in thi" tratfie eonflitt, nnd assume it- respfai-ibihty in di^-iiKaiyni; tbe Nation from the Indoehirm war. The aidmic fit a major war uicvitnMy involvn- <-x(rea>ely coiitnn'eivial and wn-itivc i-ues. If the inrinlxTs of Contre..^, wlip n'f>re:H-nt tK)1h partie.-> and a wide -[x-drutu of opinion, *\i*r\- iii tin- n-spon<il>ility for i^ndiiiK tbe war, th<- rhanrev of a -olution whieh will eonunand the ronfideni-e of tlw American |M-i)il- wilj br- very mueh improved. The adoption of the Vietnam Discnttauenient Act will help Hjn-ed tlw return of American wrvice im-n nov. hi-ld :it prisoiters of ar in Indix-hitm. Tin- N'ortli VietiiaiiH'M- and tbe National Ulieratiou Front huvc (jt-cn explicit i:: their MI-KOtintitiK position that if the United Stut<-s would wi u date for nulitiirv ^,-itbilrawaJ. uc roiild i-xi*"'! immediate ii'-aotiatioiiB lo HMMire tl' frly >' "iir fnri-e and tfie return tit ail pri*on*TH <rf war. Yel, und'Ttln' |*re > >idi > iiiV"\ tetii:ii:iizuiion"forii>iilu, a the pn> ;>eri are ju<t ih'- oppntib-. If "\ icltianii/.ation" con!'inpla!<>- complete witlidrHWai in the ul> net- of a settlement, tlM-n tlie Adinini!*! ration :i:iist regard the prix'incn. u* ex|>etidulile. On tin- o'hiT hand, if tlw pl:m i- In ki'i'p Atnencan fiWJ-x involved sio loiif: u the advTrU-s huld Anu.-riemi premier!-, UK Pn-iu'ent N'i\'>n luis KUKK'-l<t<'d. tlwn it exploit-, tlw prisoners as a just itieat ion for i.ei-j):nfe Ariierii'Mii forces in \'ii limiii, Kecreturv of DKeiiw Laird was liii 4 I":idiiiR wln-n In- told 'li' 1 Senate Foreign It/'latjoirt ('iiinijiilU-e la.st year of tin- Adinini.it r:i'ion'<- rJ4-frnnin:ition "to we ll'.at ttw ( It-lie v:i ^'onventiotiH are Inei! u;> to and tlmt tlwi- men an- >na^<- free nu-n". Tin 1 "iml>l<' fa.ct i-. that the 'ji-nein <'otivi-ii!ii>ii -fa!'-' no oblmalion at rJJ for t!w; ri-tiirii of iiri-iiricrK dunnic rii(iinii-d war, Articlt- I IS (;,!<* t h a t - Prin<iiers of wr ^h.lll In- n-li-uw-d and repatriated w i t h o u t d- lay afl'r iljo ((>.-itioti of aciiN' 1 h'stilitw". So \nt\ii u n t l w wur HIK-HHI, therein no buni* in internulionul law tod<miand tli'-ir jf AdininiKtrstioii ha>. ind'-'-f! r<T" 'c(| iliin painful t r u t h . In1 tf lfit iJi-reuilM-r by tlw rv-iiuh '. .. n l{e]:ifimic {'otniniH-"" , Fulbricht :iPcd Secrctury of Stiitt- J{KITM now \ ieiiiuini/ndofi v.ould dfal of WMT, and tlu- follow IIIK exchaiiKe eniwd: TU- <'IIAJKIAN'. Ko that th<- primMKTH could ntuv there indi-fiuilHy if t|ier- if ttu iwicutiaN'd wttlcnirnt ; IH that not correct/ Kerretury lUx/> KH. H' II, I \nti- to nay that an a fact becitune it CM) iiucb fa'-t, but { do not know tlml else to do.
688
Ou this point we wish to call the Committee's Attention to an article written by Prof. Richard A. Flk, Chairman of our Consultative Council, who is Milbank Professor of International Law at Princeton University, entitled "The American POW's: Pawn* in Power Politics", wmch appeared m'the Congressional Record of March 11, 1971 (Vol. 117, No. 33). Professor Fallc demonstrates that the prisoner of war iue if beang used tn divert attention from the Administration's failure to negotiate an end to the war: that the Government ' ouu Vietnam strategy is prolonging the prisoners' period of captivity: and that official professions of concern for the welfare of the PO W are totally at odds with the treatment being accorded North Vietnamese aiir* N'LF prisoners. The President ha* also argued againxt the withdrawal timetable on the giound thnt it would enable the other side to come to power and warned that a 'Moodbsth" would result, distorting histroical facts in the process. It is significant that uo "bloodbath" of Cath >hcs or other anti-Communists was reported following the Cummunist assumption of power in the North in I'lj4. Il is true that the land r.-furni program implemented in the North during the next two years did involve bloodshed. but the target* were among 'he jieananlrr in rural areas, including many who hud fought the French. It is most notable that from 1955 to Itttil, tU- French and the Diem regime (submitted only 4-> complaints to the International Control Commission alleging ]x>litical reprisals by the cujumtiLiists in North Vietnam. As<ian scholars Jiave indicated that even if the communist* won complete control in South Vietnam, they might wJl find it contrary to their self-interest to n.i'iate large scale violence against the civilian population. Action of that kind Tronld diminish the communist*' ability to uniu- the widely disparat element < of South Vietnamese society. .Moreover, the- "bloodbath'' argument is at odds with the President's own theirv of Viet numizat ion. The Soigom-M.' army iiaA ovvr a million mcJi under arruv North \'u-tnaiiiese and Victcong forces in the Houlh total only abût onefifth ; hi* number. If the South Vietnamese armv could be destroyed bv a relatively ill-armed und much sumlkr enroiy, this would indicate that the Sntieoneae army i< |.r')fot;nrilv neak ai-d if thin be no( it would mean that the President's Vietn-iii.izution plan to train the South \ii-tnaiueHe forcrx to tae ovvr the burden i.t i !i>' fighting Mould have little or no chutice of success in the fon-setyiUe future. Th'- slimghter of inuot-ents .ind the plitchl of j>rione are too important to lieiomr ]>artiiuui and political i-wufs. It i a treat disservice; to tin- American |K'i|iI.- aud the ix'opl*; of Southeast Aîa to expli>il the more R*.-nt-rous and civiliiird iiiitinr's of Uie American public to uju epheuiiTHl support for u otherwise md-leiisjliie policy, ('onwrn for pns'Jiier.^ of war nit the safety of people of Iii'l>>.-Iiii;:i should 'notivate our offictsl. t.o end the nar, not prolong it. Ttie ufJ(<t]oii of the Vietnam Di.scucap-ment Act of I'd, modified to fix the Isrci-i d:iU- for the completio.i of the withdrawal of all of our forces from Vietnam nil hin a .'id-duy ixTJod iifti-r i U enactment, woiJd d|xJl ilu-end of this catastrophic war. In tlui connection we do well to recall the niovi.-g articL.-, <;ntiil-d A filaughlrr of It*nnriist* fFcli. 1M. 1971) written by Tom Wicker. Washington corretprtndent of Th.f \rw York Tuns*, coinmentinK on 1'reîdetit Nixon's ncwu conference of Febrmrv 17ih: Mr Nixon was careful at every turu to Ia> down, a> * l>u for on unlinuu-d air w::v, the doctrine tlil he uould be jet ing only to protect the lives \n:erifn ground troop'. Tlii'. bl-itunt deception WM* iiêd to juxttf> Ihe ni\:ini'>[i and i- IN-I/IK u-^-d to jut : fy llu. current extension of 'lie ground War into the Laotian panhandle. lint it MAS expowd us a fruud I':' Mr. Nixon hinwlf, who I'luiiwi that the fixhlinic in ('umbodiu had cut one North Vieln.-Jrnem 1 "lifeline" a:id MK.-II ".u'l of Ihe mareh into Laox: Tliis action would either c'it or M-rinusIy disrupt the ot.her pipeline or lifeline . . . tl4> Ilo Tin Minh Trail into tlu- north hulf of Si>uth Vi<'<narn. Tlierefore, we expi-fterj the North \ let imme><- to liglit here. Tlwy have to ditlit Ik-re or gi\e up the Mtrugglr to conquer South \"wintiiit. Cambodia, .LTirJ th'-ir intliii-ncj- evU-ndiiiK throiich niter I'-irtH of Si:theaHt At.i. And T' 1 1 Wicker !< it ijill ; lie Co -l of 111" 1're. 'J'-nt V \ letiiaim/n ion" I'lJicy
'thein' tJ-rfiiK:
"It in pohcv of iiiiiiKcriTfiumfe u<Ti:i| warfare and blind fireiw-r oti tli" /ro'in'l tin-it UK-MIS <\< sn'i and destr'icti'>:i v. liolenule, not just boriy count* 'it nemy dend, but u Klangliter rf n |ne>-ni. - -woi-ien i,d c!;ildren and old 'oj.Ji vilUK''K destroyed, ttje ejinh rjvaifi-<J f refiif.eeii in their nuwrul/le
689
thousand* wandering, homeless iuid hungry. For the people of Indochina, it is m wanton lie that this Administration is "winding down" th<* war; it is spreading the war like a holocaust. In A forthcoming article in The New York Review of Books, Daniel EUtfberg cites Senate report* showing that more than a million Cambodian refugees have ben "generated" iu the last nine months: that in Mr. Nixon's first year in office about 50,000 civilians were killed, and in his second, more than' 70,000. No one knows how many there will be in his third, or what iiuinl^r of innocents will die in Laos, or how many more will be made refugees. But thy will be mauy, and evrry one an ineradicable stain upon the onceproud name of the United States of America." The members of the Senate Foreign Relation* Committee., who arc- charged with a special responsibility for asserting the war-iuaking power vested in the Congress under the Constitution, should take to heartand act uponSenator MeGovern's moving statement that the massive lx>mbing of Indochina by tl-.e United States was "the most barbaric act committed by any modern Stale since the death of Adoipb Hitler." In closing the debate last year on the Amendment to End tb; War, Senator Mf Govern movingiv observed: "Every Senator in this Ch atibe-T id partly responsible for sending 50,000 young Americana to aa early : grave. This Chamber reeks with blood." Members of Congress, though possessing the constitutional power, have declined to halt the slaughter of the innocents aud have routinely appropriated the -oMwive fund* for prosecuting this illegal and immoral war and hence i:ii:.-t hart.. f?;>ousiljility for the de:tlh and destruction ill Indochina. How luucli longer will the Congress allow the slaughter to continue? STATEMEKT SUBMITTED TO THE SCKATE FOBOGM RELATIONS COICKITTEE (By Robert J. IVpio) My name it Bob Pepio, I Tved iu Vjct-Xam with tb^. 196th Light Infantry Brigade, from Oct. CS to Oct. 69. Before I aimwor any questions I have a statement I would like to read . . . W look aound todav and see tlie youth of the Nation up in arms acu'i.-t t.he authority of not only tbeir parents, but of their countrys government a* wejl. II at titneg one woudert why Aiuerica's son* and daughters protect :TJii.- ihjt they do not hate thîr countrv, or that ihcir parent* have fail'-d: bat thai ;J] of tlteiu are h'irt . . . hurt by life, and hurt m the sense that their countryand ours ar wellm not all it was made out to !*. Tin- youth of thin itepul.hr wen- brouylit up brii'-ving tliat we were all . -a,d we stood fur. TUat thi;-' crent Nation "f nro. and we are a ^rcai NaUun, fo'iiu ti<> nd, even more import, liquid Ju uu uT'jiig . . . Vet wu Iuid oursi-Ivi-s '".i^wd in a tratir war, fought acrose Hie fur and distant sea. Uue ttut tia tried lli> wrv fili-THof Xut.ipualptjrjjosânduiuU-. A war ilia.at its Invt, could only be d<^>>;ribed f an tiavjnu J. l-xluar Hoov<Tsend Kliette Ness to southern ('hie.-i^<> witli the innriirti'tuti to h'-lp Al Capone orgwuz*1 tiie "Keyutofje Kopn" *o that JJutcli .^ct.uliz couldn't take over th Snuthnide. Aud evi:u'though th1.1 liitterm:hs!_thr(iui;h''iii our land can In- w>>en, bei'ûse of thin wvr, there are ttonie of us iu lln.- N'^li'in'n Carnal, who mill l"!ievetb.- -^r HUM an on Km l>-i us consider for a luoiueut, the. territije pruv ue're paying for tUis r. it IH nut ju.tt U>f wndiijg of th>- rliildren of thin Nation to defend u ]M>u|>I> uho are not willing to fight for llu:iu<--Jvc>.. Of uejjjinx ' l^'Uf'le who nu-j lnlln'im </f dullurx wi^rth of efjuipmejit from n, uud <ln-n well it buck :it a p r j i i t . of n^cn'"uiiK ffiere bovs for a ;:O|/1 wiiu when a.skerj i.u draft th'-4r nun KUJIH repl;, "wtiy should \ I'-tiiaiiieMr boyn !> vt.t to di<- for Ainerjciirin." <X having Aujerii-:.n>- iu oijtfoude'l itiijjpni/:itfintiruiK :uifJ dymi:, wlul<- oiji Synth icMmtiK-M.- counU;rpartn,if(|uii>pi-d with the LtU-î I*MPUN desert their poMiums;<>f helping a gweruui-;it in wlncli C'HTiii*tm i- tUe i>a-wi<rd, and the, arroKanu' i-I jvi< r u< ul! they CD;; .irebi'iid. I IK no:. j,j i he 4.",'il(l inieric:ii,N kill.-d in Ij.-atJ.-. or tlie 2"/,C("' killed i'- <> eali-'d ocndeiifk - UH \ v t - n a <j.J. in t h < ' Jj^fd . i",>" on :' iiwiie and it IK c:uli"l an lu-f-uli-nl, or wlu-n a (/ 1 driven I|'>-ATJ r^'jt" ^. I and h> jeejj jiitH a mine and llmt jx c.Jled an accident, or when u n<ui>g child witli i:X!J;i>-|V'1> aftui'lied to hi" ior|v, blown u;> a down <i.l.'. ynd Knit in rillf-d an :iuui.i4Mi. -winch n: re.Jjiv bring* the actual d'-.i',h l/<tiil clocer to 7,<jOii irMU'wi of 4'>,'NXJ UUed iu ueuuu. It i>> iiol jiint tU :S[I,MM) wotiiiib-d and -U'/ts <rf tlioiiMtnrlM maimed for We. or '^<- I,IMI the aluiUfct two hundred billions of <J'/.inr*
V-690
that we could have used here at home, now forexvr wasted ,*>>--this "quicksand war"; nor is it the knowledge that for every second that we nr-cnd in Mel-Nam it cost us $800.00; and every minute another lift.Vietnauwsv, *>r Aroerican-r-, is !OE~ It i- not just tncHC things that I am concerned with: but the very errfitti of everything that we stand ?R; at home and around the globe that worried me. Why a itth$t the Preside.!'.* of -be United States of America, or for that matter the ViM-Pre* ii.-nt, cannot tf\,' freely anymore without the threat of violence orêonfiontation? Why cun't tix-y go through Latin America, or Ktiropc or Asia 'or even on the College Campus of an American I'nivenity withcuit !H>ine sort of protest;..wo all know the answer, and we al! know the answer is Vietnam. T?jis is nrtt the wur to end war*. We annot defending freedom. We are not serving huitianity. What we ire doing is drstroviri-; everything we have come to chcr.h. Relieve ire, it is not enough fo say "1 Jove my country"; and still let the war go on^ For America means 'more than jusk- the land, or the valleys, or the stream*, or (he mountains or the co.-istlmes. It means the right to "Life, lilxjrty and the pursuit of happiness"; and all the other wonder concepts and ideal" which rnly made our ItcvoluLon the IJirth of Freedom. Few of us comprehend th j missery and horror of the xv.nr. liecanse f\w of u> are dircully involvod* xvhili- the rest of us continue our lives and pursue our ambition* undisturbed by the sounds and frar t*f battle. Let us reflect :i moment not on th"so-calledwisdom and necessity of our cause, nor on thi o-enlled valor of the South Vietnam>-e, bin op'tliir hrrro.-'' of the war. For no :iin.>iii,t of 'rt'5l-i^>u>ni'ss rari nbsi-urr the agony aiid^jiitiu ^L)â(t^ of warbriiiK in a înule clulil. T..II-Viet-Xam War. i- an i"'eiit of historic moinrnt, ui'iaionin<; ih<- urudi-ur an>J rvrvnfof many N:itir>n.-. liitl.>: i~ aUo tlte vacant inoiii'-tit of Minu^-d fi-aras a rl^-^hiT tnd rhild watrh de:ith !>y tin-, fall I'roin ar. in:|>robable nuicliini'. -'ii[ by a rottmry tlu-v barely nmi|.tvh.-ncl." It i. th.sildilcn U-rror oC a yoini^ man -ti-ppi'm ou ii lniiu- n>alizi-iic tlmi iti- life -liall end in but a fleeting moment. It i- tlw t'nit-tration of lining thronî life ivithout an anu or without a leg. . . It is the try ot an augui.-tied mother A. nnf.tli-d Uruiii- U-ar oiiT'a -tt-:idy drotie With tear* in her <-yi-s to welcome hi r fallen .-on iion-.iNow all lu-r fi-ar- and worries :iri- (loinFor tin- Iloru-inun of l)r:iih ha~ tinully wori 'l'li>- irur- rolled down ln-r Krinif f:u-<Soiling tli' 1 ifloomv blur!; >nor>'iinz l;i<v <>h htiu- lit- pl:i> -1 ... It seems like yeftterday Now t i n - Honor <!uard h:i-< louered him avvinAr.rl now all that uns li-fl w:i~ tin- bugler and his taps "Ulow, bni;li:v bin-/, 4-t I! wild erli'K's flviiii; And answer, ecln>e, niiswcr, d>uri:, dyiim. dung" For it is the nixlit of death tli-tnniiii: ye>ti ,-tlu\ s lio|H'. and toi>n>rros dreari'S of fatnily, and lami. r.nd liorn<- :md 1 >\ed ne-> It i in ShaUi-.-ivareV words ... "A ((looming IH-OCJ- Hii nioriune. uitli the .-nil f-ir wirruw Hill n<il rf>w liis lu-uil: (<o liirnrr. to li.iVi' n - i r e talk of ttiese -ml tliin^-: -oiin- sli:ill U- |<:iri]one! nsore v.'- than this", ll i- nil tlu-se Uiiiic" und niori-. Tht'sM1 ar '.!> lliiiia tliut ue rlimild be i-onrerin-d w i t h : tln-x; ure the Uftii*on rny mi"d. liie-1 lire ll -iiinit-' (hut- brought forth r-in-li tnen us W:i.-.|ii[i(.t'<ii. JetfiTHon, l.iTicoh: uti'j K:-nn'-d\. An'] tt'.ee are the tliit.U, that .-hoilld be on Vnur Mif.d.t IIH v.ell. There is t'xlay :i otrjinge hu/p- of di-sillii-niiifueiit |V.>-IHIII K - ox ;r this Nation, ll is an-J ran be wen in .lit OHK> ni n.i- Nation's xoiith A p.e of f u l i l i l v und u feelinz that no one P all)' r.-iri-i. Tlie fif'I white enn be fiuriiiiied up in \i >;.nl.ir lulU'l of tin !> . . . whii-li - i h.,|(ll> >IU(M: "All tve are !> ing N gr..- I'ean- ;i eh.ini 1 . 1 ". For tin- iM'W g>-i,iT!itr>n. ni'if' :li:i;> an / o: ,>< r. n-nli/i ^ i,,.-,t if ,. do not rl"UM'." thi" wrl'l ipiu', ih"ij Ili'-r" in.Îit dot If uiiollier i"-ri"i.;li^n lo l:ike our <l:Lre. 'J'liaf ihou^li I In' '|in--ti'iii- :ir>' I'T.i'Xi :in>I tin- ;IH-H>T^ tiiiinili-. n de- no' rn'-aM there ff no <o|ii:i'iii-. !>-. u- re;ili/e tii:il the itorld i< noli yiiii^ i!ii-ii!,'l> a pi-nod of ( m u l l e i n . Thai i^ vn- !i:ne \fi\v rrrtn" n;/on ;m A-e <if U ' \ " I n l i r n . . , Minie>
t i m e . v.i>l<'|ll a l l - l - O l l l e t l l l i l " . I t ' l l : b u r I I I " I 1 | " f <>. o l u l l u l i t t e u u f i l i - I I J I I I l|>.
We have it in our iiom-r through the iie if mir ii'lv:iiii''>'l terhnologt :ind liujher nieim< of eiliic.'luMi lo make lli:i( r-'volnlioiuwv l r > i n - i - t i o n a |';n><>fn| one; or Oi we i-au lj-eoiii" relrogn-isit'i-, leiiving the unli rtli o;-n to vi'il'-m-i*.
691
Let us not follow in thv footstep* of other great power* ... for we sieek no now frontiers, we seek no new claim* or uubition- . . . we s-eek no Pax Americana, to be imptimriitcd upon others through the outright ILSC of armed might, or the Kuhjttsation of others through the iix- of our yi\anccd technoloijy . . . this U not to bay that advancement* were not achieved in tLc pa>t by Kmpires. Great Empire*, pa*, and present, have been able to endure almost all the dements of nature. In 9>uch a state thing* arc acrumplixhcd: for Dominion" were held and tax's ColWled, road.-* were laved and hoiw:* improved, |M>rts were developed and goods increased. Annie* were raised and Navies Imilt, crops were grown and people fed. -hi)r were constructed and cX]Hrts spread, the frontier* were protected, the King was GOD and the Nation preserved . . . and for all these achievements treat and -mall, the one main factor that h:-s destroyed evt-ry < Ireat Kmpirv. has been internal decay. Though i-very lunpire ha* lived a long life an u State, H has destroyed it-self, by denying lt owtt people the very right* to live thrirown live* in accordance, to their own l'li.-fs. Such state* that rode the waves and a\<vnded to the en-t f power, in the end: der. ndcd in an avahuichf irf di.sa.-ter. For -i;eh n the law of nature . , . that that wl.ich liv-x for itself and r.ot within it- environment is .-ure to die a loneh de:ith. S |.-t our goal? b4> that of Thoin.i.* JcfTeison "|j'ace, rommeni- and honot frii-ud-liip -,\ith all Nat:->n<. entatielitig (mihtary 1 alhaci-* with noiif" . . . Hi-U>ry ^hall record th;it :hc future of th-- ]>I:inei wa- not solved \uth the triumph f "world ('iiTsitiitiiii-m" or t.he triuiuph of "world C'ai>ita!i"pi" . . l>tit in>tend vill rrvalvp :iroui.l uhether a Plnraii-tir CoiniiHiiuty of all Nation- lKi-4"l ii[ion the individual riaht- of anv Juan, woman or ehild t-> IK- differo-.u. a< jT-i>"ifi<fl in o-ir own Con-titution of th.- I'-mtfd Stair* of Ainrrirr -hall prc\il. or vh'-tlier nil mankind --linll ut>riiit :unl pay Immaui- t.i an Aii>t"iiilian Cilll'.in manipiil.ited hv n liiiri-uiicrntiflndu-trial Ti-rJinical Triplexforcing :ili to eniifonn to :i ,-! of fnl-e -tandaril-; :vn.l in turn miking man -tuve T.I the St:>lt: uud nut having the Si:r.c \\.>rk for man. All the prote-t m:irrli.--, :iii thi- -i'in-. nil th- r:illie-, uhich !u;V" tzikcn place reiiMitly :imi in the pa-.l --and llio^' ~lill to oreur !'>!- not in :in\w:n -icmfy tli'- U'i;;iiniMii of thir i-ini of l l n - I'niteci St;jt'-. <>:i (he ''.nilrnrv. I In l i f \ e th,-. tin1 worlj- U'-t li'ip. , to l- :!i" -icungr-i i i o v e n i m e n l on i'V.nti. KOI uiiat i\e M.f al)>"> '.' n- tivliiv. j. [he i-ud of iiti er:i and th" In-ginnim; of a Nol>'e ({ue-t. for thi" i:>. ii'T:ition of Am<Tii-:m- -eek.- a new.-r world' :i world in which all ehildn-n ran gr<>\\ up in and live uiihout the "-wor.l f I ):iiiioele-'' h:>tuin^ c-iit:iiitlv over the head-; u wnild in which the | a w i-. ju-t uml the jx-ople frtt:: a unrl.i in which ih-- prxir can pro-jMT and ttie |iri>-piTou- ui:l i: >l try and keep them poor; a world in uhifli aii\ man can Bet n j>>li a-id r.nt uorry vh'-thef or nut h.- w i l l 1-e :ibl to inai:it:iin it and icnaratilji- i!i- riyhl- of hi- f-imilv; :i world that ni pi* any man. u0111:111 or child, reisardle-- of t h i - pii'irM-ntatinti of their skin, th" ii:itiii:ilil v of (heir >ijici>tor-. (In- religion of I!I.M- lurl!:. or the |iohlii':il \ie.\% of their mind. . . . live' a hundred year- ;ig->. in thi* Xatio'i'ji C'apitol. Al>rah.im I,in'-.,In. re:ili/iii (tie mi-t:ikei and mi-e.-ileulatiDH- l( nr ciH-.ii'ry iiui'l'- in the pro-emium of j <M-n-eli->. and lr:igie w.-ir -p-il,'- Ix-f'iri- a vm' we:irv N u t i ' > n . . "\Vif.li malic" I'lwanU iirue; witti rh:irity fur all: w i t h lirr'iii---. in the r.Îit, :i- 'jod i-lve. u.- 1., -r" tlii- rmhl, lei ii- - t r u e on :> lini h (in- uorlc . ;ire in. -. > tind u;> tlie N:i;:'>n'wotind-: to care for him who -hall h:i-.e l.oni<- the li:itt|.-. :.n<l f-,r hi-< uid'>w. nnd liu urgiliMii to do ull wlni'h IIKIV :iej\ii-ve and clieri-h n j'M. :ni'l Ia-ti,ii: h'per pe-ic.-. aimiiig our-.-lve- .it.d v.ith :>ll V a t i r n ~" . . . And K' Dial the I'ri'sid'-iil i - an h:-><- i l i i - r<if.T:-ii ' ' i f l v i i o:ir nii^tak'-* ui-.d pilL rin end !> t i n * ujr le. ami'iuneing ;i d:ite of %M'iir:uv.il u i i l i l ! i > - niipulutioii t h a t all I'O.'.V.', I." e X .-|i:inu'd. tl,.-t l!,- ^ l i l i n t < - > a - - . t h a t a I X. T ' K m (ft tip :.i,d i ; - < r \ , ~ - fn e l i - r i i ' i i - - llirii.i^ho-it Ind-i-''!ii(.:i. t h a t we alnde >n the re:i|t, ai.il if i >|i pi .i|,l> - n{ f ', .N. mi tn r- r r u i n fr ! f (,< N o r t h , th'-n tliev Hh'nild lie g uir::ntied t l , , < )> !!, wi[-'-ii .unl pn-.tei o f f , . I N.: t !iat r. Trei v of J r - e n d f h ' p he -i^'rreil l i ' i u e i n ' < > i r f. n pinÎe.4 -) Miii' we I,.:L-. ! ]p il,eni l i . u k i i t i i i r t> :. :iinl it..it N'tce .. do v. t'hdra'i w ',.ake : .n in .er to re'iirn again * ' * \i I if we fnlloH t l . M i ..lir-" .if a i l . ' i t i . I:. n I :<: coiilnietit t!-.ii m t|,e i n - i r f r i ' i i ' - i l l - |'Pid'-nt nf tne 1 n i i i - d > t . i t > n of A I M I - I I - . ' . can i-'Mi.<- I - f u t ' our v.,T v ':ir- \:ii i-iii and - i> !ii:>! Ii" I,.:- p - i l .- -.1 in! to ' h: r-.n-: I r i-n- and l.irt.arntt u - > l'ia! iv .HI ' K..IV :u-|iii-se :n,,J ,-:,. r , - t i :; ju-! :,, . ( I..-"!,/ pi ic. , mieirg iiir.-t-.. nl v. nli all \ation-".
'I i .in'. i t t . I V oe|<t l : k > to p ' l i n l out t l . i i t III I lii- : i l r n ii I' ill I. ' t-i ;; : I n . - i :iv I M - - I I |.i-.l. and '<S,(MM),00 u . ' i - l > d .
692
A MKSSAGK Fon THE PKOTWTAST CBVKCH LEADERS COMBLTATIOX UK VIETNAM IN* PABIS March 2O-27, 1971 (LiMK* in Paris, March 2C, 1971 by unanimous decision of the Consultation.) We MC group of SO United Stale* church men and women from nine denominations ana two interdenominational croups, and from twenty states and the District of Colombia. We have twra in Park to listen and learn. We have brought hare only our Concerns and questions, no petitions or proposals. We have been htre as member* of the Christian community, not as professional negotiator*. While many in our group have expertise in international affair*, that which bind;* us together a* a group is not profearional competence in such matter* but certain religious and moral commitment*. We share a loyalty to the God of justice, judgment, and mere? who demands that we love all pur neighbors; commitment to our nation and concern for its integrity; sûi^b over what the war in Indochina i* doing to our neighbors, our nation, and ourselves. Moreover, we chare res|>onsibility for all our nation has done and id doing: Wfare involved in the killing of every ma*i, woman and child. Finally, we share a firm determination to do all we ran to stop the Idling, work for peace and i7iinitr to the suffering. In Paris we had lengthy conversations with leaders of the official delegation* to the Paris Conference on Vietnam from the four parties involved the United State*, the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), the Democratic Republic of -Vietnam (North Vietnam), and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam TRG). We at.o bad converwitious with Vietnamese Catholic priest*, Biiddhitft inonlcx, and former government official.* an well as with reprewmtativr.* of the Sihanouk government. French scholar* and journalist*, and other parties. We want to convey to our fellow Americans some of our convictions formod or intensified at a result of our conversations. mx COXVIOTIOS* 1. Tht Irulal vsar in Ituioehixa must he stopped now. Millions have been killed or wounded. Millions more liave> been uprooted. Homes, field*, and forests have been destroyed. Societal *tructuri have btvn undermined. A whole generation has known nothing but war. l'<t>\>\r IIHVP suffcrM enough! From nil groups with whom we Uil !;* of their politif.il stance catne the same bgoniiing cry: "Stop the killini'.1" Thi* cry inu-tt be bn-dc.-i. 2. A'o n&*plii'-ilf. mtlitnry tol iiion to tku fonjliri including "Vietnamitalton"- it potnble. l-jicli *i<if (irmly l>'Iicvc, that its outx: i.i just. Thiu, d'vpitr warvscarineM, each nidc if prepared to (ipiit rv iona a* neoivary. "Vitrtunmizution" the provision of arms for Asiiui* to bli oth:-r A.-uan-i will not rrwilvo the political - conflict that und"rli the war. Moreover, "chanicing the color of the coi>~>'' is morally r>!pugiiwil to u*. If ttu.i brutiil conNii-t, whicu Iteinn more than a quarter of a century ago, U not renolviil clirouaii |>{itical ucgotialioos, it could continue ii.'firiitfly. 3. AUitwIa and mrthoili of nfjoliittion must change if a political inlution it In b Just tut encli t'uln io io tin 1 conllirt tH-JieveK that ita rjiu-w- i.< ju<( ad the otlwr'n unjust, M> uutrti f'nin in tlii- m.-Kotuition.' feel* th^l iu o9iT i rcunonalrfi; and Ui<! otli'-r's unriaMOimttli*. Mureovcr, ihn very otyk1 of th<r iieKotistioi) talkj with no cliuiniiuii, fi" >nriii:rlor, no exrhaugt: i>f notoi, ainl DO private meeting* K^f^p-ly limlN tin- [. '.ihility of u.':ii<iin>- dialogue. It i> our fufling that IMXXUW the (Jniiixt St'U<-- <>-,l;; party ho at th>* pr*'rjujt limp in williiiK to talk to all dcI'-gjtioM, it siiould icivc tlir \''w : tlk.< A inudi liig!i<'i priority, aitd aatLoriu! it* d'Jpgatiou to t tl;<? rinitiative iti /Vvilitutui;; nexot,i:itio'in. <. A plfflgt by tht L nife-l titn!f*, l,i irttkilr-nr all uf ilt {mop* ffitm Indothino by a Certain dnlr. irottld Iff >l .njhl'i tiyn'jirnnl contribution to tlit nfynlialiont. Botii the (1-ile uiul m'lMcinr of With'lr:i<;d nn-^l.t To !> tif^'iliiiU'il. We IUIVM cuxicludfd that the biioir. 1-inwrn f tlii' i'llt',. N'ori'i \ieiri;uij, :itid miui\ other Vietnautîte with whom * t.Ukcd it t'l-ii the C.S. i;ii!i:.ir' fi>re>-< fiio*^1 to lâvr thar land. Our
gtfVriJ.Tl^llt tin* Illre:);'' ruliP rildlle , inlli'.r'-<]-i ' tlli)i| Mtll* uf (UCII aud l/tilioilX
uf d'AV.tn ovr-r n ten-;, -nr (wrio'l in fulfillment i>( wh.-it^-viT i-uintoitinent it may Imv .iiivle lo tli'! Hjiiiûd g'jviTiitiieut. The fl'nutMil that our KuveruoiMit now d>el.ir il inti'Dti'ifi lo witli'Ir.uv ilx- i.ot i4ei-m to l> i|)ifivi[j:Mi)le, .">, Tin o'tl'j vug In t-rurr tin- rrltii.u uf prtninrm uf icir in thrintgh a poliliral Mfltlfn.fi't '""he im\v wnv lr xr- ire thiif |iu|itjrl wttl/ .iiet.l ii tii pledge to withdraw (J.M. foru-y. The PRO UJi'l N''irth V't-'timii' have cx|in.4iv>ri (heir williiifpiCM to
GU3
dicuM the release of all prisoner- AS soon a* the United States sets a date for the withdrawal ..f U.S. forces. 'while the opposing panic* to the negotiations have strong reasons baaed on histon,- to doubt the voracity of each other, the historical precedent on the rtrlcasc of prisoners U cloar. Within thirty days after the signing of the arniboicc between the French and tho "Viet Minii" in 1954, the French aoldien held by the Viet Minn forced were reloa.*ed. We share with many others a profound concern for the prisoner* heig held bv all sides in the war and for their families. It is our firn* .conviction that the President's intention -to leave & L'jS. military force in Vietnam o long a? U.S. prisoner* are held is inevitably: self -defeating.
APPEALS rOK ACHOX
In light of our moral commitment* and llie*r convictions, we make these 1. We appeal to the President and to the Congress to declare i nmediataly Dicir pledge to withdraw unconditionally all U.S. military forces froa Jndochina in the itnn.jdinte futurv. 'i. We appeal to the Preaidrnt to add credibility ro this pledge anc to brine a major part of the killing to an end by din-cling ull United State* air, iVval and ground force* in Indochi'.ia not to drop bombs or to tire weapons except \p response to direct attack 3. We ap|vyil to our government to initial^ immediately nt the Paris Conference nrK'Kiti<ms on the timeUble fur the pk-dged wtthdrawul of all United State* military fora*. Â } U> ap(ual to all of our fclluH church meu and omen to join us in calling on tht i'riatideut and the Congress to takr Iln-?e \-\* inimediatdv K<-|iresenlativri of "oor group will s<ck to see the Pn->idrnt an..' r:T'iln-r^ <>t Congress to and
STATKUKNT or Hifiniiu C. JIIMNSUN IN 61 PIM>IIT or \ CouruuMinK PAKTITION

StTTI.I Mt 3.T ~f THI. Vll.TN%M
Mr. Chaitimiii, and juembiTs of the ('muiuitlee, I would like to express my appreciation for the opportunity to pmt'tit l!ii ^taU^lellt regarding a phm for peart; in South Vietnam uhicli hu n>>l been tried by the United States so far. The views expreaiu'd in thi* matcnuMit are solely my on and arc not on lie-half of The United Melhndinl Church in lm-h I wrvr tk> * pastor of Ward's Cha|>el in Baltimore County, Mr>land. TUe |>roponol recommended to the C'cimmi'U-c L>-re a th;it the I'niU'd States guwrumeut slioitld lake tlie inuiulive t>r;ird.- workitttc uut a compromise parti; : (n x.-tllemeiit uf the Vu-liuim War. The plun recommtinded it tlut .South X'leUium would xffer to the Coniiii'jnluLs tlut South Vwti>uui would lie pttrtltioned tcitu twn paru. The nortjieni oi:efniirtli uf its lund arra wonhl be runeed-d to North Vwtuaiu and Uie Viet Cîatf. The nouthern Uirif-fnurth- uf it- lard ar--a would remain under tlic present r-|"ililir of South Vietnam. TliM proposal i buM-d upon tin- x ie-*pii;nt lint it i- U-ttj-r tu try to MiKw llinr-foiirtli., .>( Smith Vb'lnain thun to r i - k I<>*inK :>l\ "( H a* the Ann nrun troop HiChdruwalx speed uji Uinrd< n jcl;i:>ic Pi>-.i-i>'iii Nixon's unnouui'ed |{"-tl of l''Ul wiUidru.wul. It i- iny U-licf Umt u K>:iu'rou offer lur :i C.Î.III.IIHIM- (uriiiiou xtUcJiM-nt <if tlw war rould bp KiicrexHfiil touurd.- i-mJniK 'L<- ivnlln-t t!u-r.v In the ulwc-tii'i: "' "'K'li an offer. Die ConiinnniKlK tno-t likely will not ac.rê to :m> i:cu-x- fire iH-cau^r to do >'! would be in effrrl lo udmil u ntiijor <i->i'at fr 'lu-ir i'li>. \\jthocit Niirh u ciiinproiiii'^- pardti'Mi x'ltli-inenl, after the I nilj'il StuU-" withdrawal, it ir. po.MMlile lluil South \n-lnani ti.ay fail to tlu< Ctmirnurii'tK. In Ilia' riclil, Anieiiru - lrenii-iidoii> arn.,--d M-rvirex .rxrifiri.< nnd rx|'iii[itnrcH MI.-IM w.'ilij \H: throw i' a\ and I i--t in 'n<- Soutli \ ii-tn:niii'^<.> douiiOil!. Tin- plan for u part ii ion M-iiIeim-nt if l!.>> :ir v.i>t\[,\ U- i-urrifd out in four MJ-|>- a- follow*. fti. f, a in . The I 'mied >i:iie- i'n .riifin-iif- M 'nilij r>-i-oiiiniiMir! u p;rti:-m M-lti.>fiii-iit of ihr \ielti:mi VVr The l ' > . Slufe I). Mifimi'iit would advie tlw Tl ii-l Xo\i-rntlMTit lli.'if ronlifxieil n.i.itjl'. II.--;-|M,H'C l>i S'n;f|i \u-l|iU[|i HO'lld ili'jH-inJ puitly upon >oui|i VieliMin'- rtT'irl- ('ittanl- .' jiartilion M'ttletni nt of
I I.I- U . I I .
CM
Step Tiro.Tf.e South Vietnamese government would offer to the Communists a partition settlement for ending the wmr. They would ji'rtify this politically unpopular plan before their own people as u ui-cessary measure in order U> ronuuiie refcivv. ft United State* military assistance. Sltf Tkrn\The North V^-tuamcSo government and the Viet Cong would agree to a partition settlement of the war. The South Vfalnaineae and United Stated withdrawal* froi,. the northern one-fourth territory of South Vretnam would ,'ake place in stage* after: (1) a cease fire, (2) a return of all prisoners of war from lx>th sides. ..'{) a withdrawal of ail North Vietnamese armed forces und Viet Con>! guerilla fighters from South Vietnam, and (4) Communist declarations that they would refrain from initialing armed attacks against the republic of South Vlotuain Utter on. Stt^ four.The partition settlement would lie impliuiientrd and the Vietnam IVar would come to un end. A middle solution of compromise would IK- achieved. Koine South Yietmunes.- territory would be lost. But the self-determination (*f about lo milliun South Vietnamese, people to live in freedom and not under It Communist dictatorship would lie, preserved. Tnu of i'ae reasons in favor of Mich a compromise partition scfUcmeut would U_- the following. I. A partition settlement would offer an incentive for a quicker ending of the war '1 he Communist'*, just like tin- t.'nited States, do aot desire to quit the war under terms which would amount to an important '-fent for them either. Then-dire, without some substantial concession from Sdu.h Vietnam, they will naturally IK; very reluctant to cvase their fighting and to admit that their effort for many years ended in n greit failure. A generous offer for a compromise partition settlement would thus change the negotiating situation at tlic Paris |H.-ace talk.-. As in the case of the (irst partition of N'nh and South Vietnam in the Geneva Agreements of 1U.V4, the Communist* might \n- willing to agree to a partition settlement again as tbev would gain an additional area of Vietnam without having 4<> tight fiirtfc'T for it. In the settlement they would also liu.i :m sifreptable way to end their ca-.. Jilies and sufferings from thi- |.>ng and costly uur. T!..- l-i^ of ionic Smith Vietnam n'irtl'-ni tTritor>' would not be |Kjpul.nr with the people of .-'utli Vietnam. But on the otlier liand, lh conltnuiiti'Hi of tinwar i< nt popular with th'-m either. And certainlv it is in thr- l>est interests of South Vieiitam to pre-ter\'e their freedom and s<-lf-detenniiuition in ihn-e-foiirths of llwir territi>r>* rather than to see their whole country be taken over by the Communis!* an1 they would Io-<e everything. -. .1 pnrtiliiin trttlrmrnt traitLl lir a praftiral tutittiim.I'nder it, Soutlr. Virtimnii-M- i-i[iz<'ii- /if twith tin' pri>-('oiiiiniini-t minority und the iion-C-ommuniiit majoriiv nvMiUI eitlu-r remain when- th/'.v reîder>nth or north so a* to live under tlie type of government, of their choice. Tin* wmiU Ix' a practical way other tb"n by electi'm* tom'ardx achieving wlfdeterminati'in for the two irreconcilable -ide> in South Viet num. Aft'T a cettM- tire, probably a majority of tin- |xipulation of the conceded northern imr-fourth territory would iniicrut-- Miiith to tte remaining three-fourths territory under the republic of South Vietnam. Probably a minority <>! ttw peipl<of tlv soiitliern tbree-foiirtli-* ti-rriiory of .South Vietnam would migrate north lo tip- oui-f'Virth territory to ! cr>nci>difd to the Communists. Such migration* in theni-elvi- would ) a powerful proof that nuM of tlw South VirUiaUK-M1 prople pn-ferred u non-<'oiiiiiiuiii-t government and v.ere o|i|><>-ed to a CommuiMst dietiitor-hi|>. Th- nltern:>live to n partition settlement hu U'en a praciicul sobition rhich ha- tc'i-n uiil in M-veral other iluation-< in reiu-nt world history. In India, for exannile. iift.-r World War (I, th>Te wu tin- deep divi-iod ^tueen the Hindus and the Mo-lem- there. The country wu- [mrtitioiied into iv> imrts. Itwlia and Pakistan, at th" time of receivniK it indept'iidencj-. Alxiut IH million Hindu- and Mo-li-m- iiiigruN-d to t'iffereiit area- ) a- t*> li\e und<T the government of their own religion. 'lh partition -cttlemeiil in India enabled txith of tho-e two Inrge population* l'i tli'\i-\i>[> th-'ir own K'>i'Tiimen( and culture- eparuti-ly with le-- tnfe und lilo'l-lii-d limn otl>erwM- Mould )ik<'l> have I* en the <-.. >oine year- lut<-r now, it unulrl >ri in tint a -erond jtartiiioii whieh would create twi M-pr)ite cmintrieK f V\e.t l';4.i-turi uitd ''i'l I'ukixtun would l-'i \- u logical Mi-v.tr to the -liiirp 'onflii'l v.liit-h ha- rxpl led in l'ukl--lau recently.
VS li'T'- f l u - r e h:t\>' l e | i l-ollthcl- lietween the f n e Horld Jlil'l < ' o n i l l l l l l l l - l l l ill
n i-ciii -;:i-, m-jreo'.er, |iyr;itir/,i h.i- lik'-Hj-<- | i n ^ < d ! l- :i practical -olution

M h l . - t l try- (" I'll JlCC'-pll-d bj I m i l l Mile- ill < i ) l l l - l I U l l t l ' M l - Tll'l-, there hale Collie
685
to be ftw So-ith Korea and Communist North Korea, ftw^Vrt Germany and Commnnist East Germany, and free West Berlin nd CoiiMiuuist East lictlin. .Such partition settlements have not been ideal, long term solutions. But they haw bWn Vhe best arrangnueuts which coulil be agreed upon under those respective circumstances. In conclusion, if the Committee should recommend that efforts should be made by the I'nited State* towards mvking a compromise partition settlement of the Vietnam War, it is iny belief that such Congressional leadership would receive the support of the American people. Upon K-ing recommended by the Ûnited Slates, surh a middle solution of compromise might eventually mceive the agreement of >K>th South Vietnam and North Vietnam, and also of Communist China. Once agreed u|>on bv those governments, such a negotiated settlement would then IM; an ini|>ortant step forward toward*, peace in South Kast Asia and in the world. PAKT I One of 'ho many proimsak for eliding; the conflict in Southeast A*ia is incorporated in the "Joint Treaty of Peace Belwee.ii the I'.S. and Vietnamese People" or "Pef.plcY Peace Treaty". Tlir Amrricnn Youth /or a Jutt Ptacr is submitting its analysis, Tkr XSA "praer 1'rtaly' Vernut Ikr Proplt. Ix-cause we believo lliat the Senate Foreign Relations .Committee and the American .people will wish to hear all sid< of the complex and vital issues involv,-d. Amrricnn Youth /or a Ju*t J'rafr is a non-partisan, private organization comitosed of VVIIIIK |H-ople whos*- political views range from liberal to conservative. vV'e arc opitosed to Imiii the estretnes of the left and right, and we are not a "|>rowar'' (croup. A YJP i as di-'voted to (Mace tut any of the protestors, jtul we believe that if 1 pejwp is to have any enduring value for the l>e(tnnefit of mankind, it must Ix combined with fn-ed-mi and justici-; it cannot IM' u |x*ace which reu-ards gn>sion and th'*ret>y fosters more war. Within this framework, A YJP supports a policy of graduated American withilrawal from Southeast Asis gired to the ability of the pcoph* of tliat aria to assume the burden of their defensi- against totalitarian acgressioi.. We p-eatly fear lliat America's precipitous withdrawal from Southeast Asia would: I) sabotage tlu: Paris Peace talks: 'ii coudi-mn South \'ietimui and Southeast Asia to totalitarian subjugation; :t) subject the tx^pU-s of that area to Communist "blood debt" liquidations us ocrunvd in Hue, and which according to such exjMTts ax Douglas Pike would result in the murder of -i million p<rople in South \ ii-Um tu alone; 4) blot out pluralism and dotroy the f>ro*fii-rn for more dtniiovratic development in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, we feur that a precipitous I'.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia will cint>oldiii and encourage totalitarian aggression in otbi-r parts /if the world such us we ore witnessing in the Middle host, and th>-reb> threaten our own security. By making a stand in Southejtst Asia against totalitarian uggrivsion, the I'nited Stau-s luu upheld ttie princijilc of the right of self-determination of small nations. We ttetieve that this ]>olicy it both p<ililically right and morally" right. PAST 2 v.
TMK >WA "?r.M-.r. TBKATV" VtMtcn THK PKOMJ; 'An fimJyiii.i of a political fraud, prcfmred \r" Anwrican Youth for u Ju I Pence) The National Stufleiii Associnli..n (N'HA) i Ufking American.', Anifriruiiv, to sign and iitltcrwim* endorwr a "Pi-iyila'r Pi-niM- Treaty." Tlw o-culled "tP'uty," they nay, can "end the wtir," Obvioiii>l>, ending the war i u good idea. But n h:il ternii- d>H> tin 1 M>-callcw "treaty" \tru\MHH: thut thi* should !* rjoiu-, and by U|IOM- m:uidute?
My WIIUHK MAV11ATK.7
Tle '- tfuiy" M railed t i n - "Joint Treaty i>f Peaci- lictwecn the I'.S, uiid the \ iet(iull|i-<e l'en|(lei>", Se)ther the name li"r f||i' iH|b(alir'' "f the "In-alj" W;i" c|''i'>.J'-iJ liv repreiwntutive rniirifliitv* i,l either the American \-"\>\'-, tlx- North
(x-uple, or the r.'ijtli \ > lnalltex- jiei/ple.
696
Union and with * few representatives of the alleged "South Vietnam National Student Union", announced the "treaty" at a Washington, D.C. press conference upon their return faun a two wtx-k visit to Nortb Vietnam a* gucH* of the North Vietnamese government. x
HOVl- REFKE.HKSTATIVEI8 NSA.?
There arc some 2,400 colleges in the United States. NSA list* only 5*5 affiliate memberships or kits than 25 î of all U. colleges and univenitint. Moreover, student government Is-adei* are not elected or polled on the j>a*a* of their position* on the war in Southeast Asia. NSA u a niinUcuie minority within an fight million minority population of college ctudeiit.* in a country of 20 million college-age youth and a' total populate*!) ef 2 10 million people.1 HOW RCf RESKNTATIVE is TL'E COH1.JM9T FAKTr or NORTH VIETKAX? In contrast wHh South Vietnam ' C! major |>arUec and 43 register'*! parties, th> Communut Party of North Vietnam (800,000 members) a Uic only political partv in North Vietnam (-0 million |>eoplc). It has never permitted any opposition [mrtn-a to exist or allowed competitive election*. Coalition parUf* which initially Khart-.i power with the Comiiiunuu in 1U45 aod 1954 were liquidated. During the 1954~.<>6 collectix-ixatioii program and the suppreation of inêllectunls, tlx* Party awawinated approxiniat.-ly 100,(XH) peaaanu and caued thr dcalL of 500,000 through forcM labor and .iniprHonment. (.See Bernard Fall'* The Rrmme, The Two Virlnanii, ancTHoann Van Chi' From Colonialitnt to i*mJ 1'hf North Vietnamnx- fx)iunninit Party not only monopolize the political proevM, it nionopolizef and exert* control over all other u*p"ct of life in North Vietnam, uch M the economy, religion, culture. For example, m January of tbii >car tix- Hanoi Municipal People'* Court entenr<>d the lender nf a pop nitinic Kr'Hip, Phan Thng Tomi, to 1"> year* in jail for stniininiiig a "mrlaucholy, ht-arlrciding, provocative" miirfiral !>eat that encourw-d yrmnn people to a "di<i)o(>(te, depraved, and orcy-liLe way of life". 'Sen Hanoi J/o> Hanoi TodayJanuary 12, 1&7I.) The Stal'nist nature of the Hanoi government if alxo pc>inted up by a 19C4 North Vietnami!*.- Presidentiiil D*cr- on >-ealled ''couwwr-rcvoluiionary" cninfa. It mokej it a capital crime to: (I) "du-riipt public order and wcurity"; Cil "harbor counU-r-revolutionary eleiit^nu"; i'J) "defect or flee to foreign countries": (4) "undermine the olidarity of the \iitnamvxe people", i-e., the t'o-niiiuiiMt Party. (Radio Hanoi, March 21, 1JWH.)'
HOW NETBESEHTATirE THE "SOCTU T1CTKAU KATIOMAL TCDEKT VXlOti'"!
The "South \'ietimm National Stiid>-iii t'nion" doe not ex;<t. The claim by NSA t!il it doe* | M ir<: fabrication. There are four neparale student unioiM in Vietnam which have never merited into a iikiionul t udV-nt union. TV>' art- thr nouietit unions at line, Dalat, *ni|ion, and Can Tho. In additinn. there i a Hii'ldhiN', Student L'nion in Sainon, and a National Catholic A>ociatiun. One NHA ddi'ipite allegedly connSrtffl" a few repri'H^nt.i':Vf of the Suigon Stitdeut L'nion. Hut NSA hu produivtl no evident*- thr.t any of tluiw; rcprix-utulive* enduriH'd the "treaty",
THE Tf.BJU Of 'Mb "TBEATr"
Article I of the "treaty" ulatec: "Tbe Americamt agi're to inuiwdiitte and total w;fhdraw(tl from Vietnam and to publicly rt a dau* by vchirh all Atuorican forn* nill be removv-d."
i.in ill pcroMt of lli N'4 A 'ii'inVr ln<mU'>i Mii'I 'W*wjl^< tu tli aimutl MXA f'oiufdj, txl f-w M ii>"rprMnUtlrV arc 4"'n'railr>lljr chrtMi l>jr tlilr 'n|irrilrr Mu'Vni bodlft. NX A I* nrtuitlly run h r l u Vaiiutul rfuperrivirv H'wr.l iX.Bi. .-.ii.ll!iuf 'rffawofll,-înd r;rMrf**iilailrii rli '<r i< wH* pnw*r<. lifc-liHIiiir I !< rlr'it lnuft"rii*ufWY" >ll.-lm iMtwrni tl> tmwiiifj >if Ih AnnuI ' rn-rrrl. >< I'UNH.\ //<riV. IttVlilitfpiti. iJ.C,. SA I'HSTn A'.-,4 lUififl, (Houiluri, '
i/ri.
' K * * /.ilrfl/ tn4 l<Ul>tli r^-llnc ou Nnrili Vl"[nifii ow KuttlDH'r, Jucph A . I Vnm- X rf'.i . fnttrr, vf'l; .M. liwimrt TM T'fi Vifjitmt > S V. \'<wt, l'7i. Hon/. \ .. f IM, Cul'tnutlirm la i.'im'iimium iV V., frkKr, II4.: lloiiv. P. /.. t nm">untfm in Vlilium, A'ofrt I: Hplnkt. < dvlx, ft *1 , 7V AV</, VlrlMmm Htf,**; Iiul.ljlk.ru In !* ul r)*Wu.l, (IW/'/.
697
T. Why isn't the withdrawal at North Vietnam** fbrew from Sooth VieUMJa oo a publicly art. date also called (or? Some 400,00 North Vietnamese fora* have iêsentlr crossed. intsroationauy reeoaiised frontiers into neutral I*oe, Cambodia, and into Vietnam. Aeeordinc to the South Vietnamese government, the NorUt Vietnamese, have kffled 120,000 Soutfc Vietnamese soldiers, wtpndud 232,000, attacked and bombarded with rocket* nearly very town and city to South Vietnam, kffled 31,000 civilians (many in deliberatSy staged massacre* sueh a* in Hue and Dak Son), wounded 74,000 and kidnapped 38,000. How can the people of South Vietnam ever hope to fulfill their nattoobood peacefully if divisions of soldiers from a Stalinist state have a tree hand in South Vietnam? Suppose there were divisioBS of South Vietnamese soldiers in North Vietnam seeking to "liberate" it? Wouldn't it be logical and just to insist on reciprocal withdrawal* an a condition for ending the warfare? Article II nates: "The Vietnamese pledge that as soon as the U.S. Government publicly set* a date for total withdrawal, they will enter discussions to secure the release of all Anv*iran prisoners, including pilots captured while bombing North Vietnam." " Antucr.ln the pjst the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong have "pledged to discuss scriousl} only if the United States would unilaterally take certain steps. But in -acb casethe unilateral bombing halt of North Vietnam; the pledge to withdraw large numbers of U.S. force* and the actual withdrawal of over 200,000 TJ.JJ. troopsthere has not been the slightest reciprocity on the other aide. What reason is there to expect it now? In wcchMigf Tor the total, unilateral VS. withdrawala major concession which would give to the Communist* on a silver platter what they have not ban able to achieve on the battlefield or politically in South Vietnamthe "treaty" merdv oilers to "enter discussions" about POWs without nny assurance whatsoever that the POWs will bv freed. This is political tJarkmaif. Ou btricUv humanitArian grounds with no political strings attached, South V*!lnm has offered a touil exchange of POWs with North Vietnamr which the North" has rejected (Paris, December 1V70). Indeed, South Vietnam nas^xlraudy ed over 1,000 POWs as compared to the North's release of let* than a Flnafly. it is important to r/ote. that whereas South Vietnam has abided by the Geneva Convention regarding POW's and has always opened it POW camps to International Red Cros* Inspeefiuo teams, North \ietuaiu has" totally rejected the terms of the Geneva Convention and has never permitted International Red Cross inspection teama. Article HI states: "There will be an immediate ceasefire between f-S. forces and those led by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam." (PUG) Answer. In the past each of the 15 cease-fires agreed to by the UJa. have been violated by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. The massive Tet Offensive of 1908 against South Vietnamese population centers was launched during one anch "cease-fire" proposed by the Communist*. Ou October 7, 1970 the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments proposed an internationally supervised cease-fire 'or all of Indochina. This proposal, like all other allied and third party propo*. ' - cease fire, was rejected by the North Vietnamf** and the \ iet Cong. >Iaa..me Bmh in particular used the strongest language in Paris to denounce any eease-fire as a betrayal of the so-called "liberation" war. Thus Communist performance oo cease-fire and it* proclaimed position on cease-tire, bears little msemblsnre to fact. Moreover, it should be noted that the "treaty's" proposal appears to apply udusivly to the VM. force* and not at all to the forces of either North or rioutb Vietnam. What kind of cease-fire will there be if them is no cease-fire between the pnoeipul antagonists? Article IV states: "They" (U.S. and PUG) "will enter discussions of the procedures to guarantee the safety of all withdrawing troops." Antirtr.Ml allied proposals for the reciprocal withdrawal of Toops have totally rejected by the Communist*. All discussions of international inspection and guarantees for withdrawal have also been rejected by the other side. As with
' 'fitr Pioriii'jfial Ktolutluiury (t'lftmtftit <nt pfrfultnr* unJuiv I. \'M. It Ullw product ott mntr U<WMV Urn Kdtnasl MbrraUrji rruut (VI.K I frtu'J In IWU s4 Mir AUwxv nl MiUMinl ltrtaaer& uid r fnrcr-< (AJbOfK) pror'ibiMd l>r 'Or C'otiuuuiiM< lit ttat Ourliic Ux> T'l '/ffciiilvt. Tim* r>n(**il.'VKL< ptitilMr mppurUd tlnat. to4 OVf It * r-l <W1 at mdn KF (n hnr (hat 'l"f ftr tunonly an H.'ll'. H,nuA Mwl (r Vlr( l',iint't Ulmvliun (U4IO, TU' liidirtosUau OOlcf if II* PUCi lu l'rl X t VLC IfwiulwrfM. (I.UtttUm Uttlt, WO UHT, 'Mlunr. 1-jMii. 3-a50Tl 49
'
60S
the other "artioto" in this "treaty", it fa only discussions about the procedure* about safety that the "treaty" promise*, not the safety itself. Article V states: "The Americans pledge to end the imposition of Thieu-KvKhieni on the people of South Vietnam in order to insure their right to selfdetermination and to that all political prisoners can be released." Antwtr.The South Vietnamese Qoyernment was not imposed by Ameriea 011 the Vietnamese people. It eame to power in September 11*67 a* a result of internationally observed competitive) elections with all other political pa-ties. The winning ticket. which won 34.8% of the votes, wan later joined by many ropmwniatives of loalng sUten, thus inereamng the gpvcnurent's mandate.4 Since 1 9*7, South Vietnamcw: have had the opportunity to vote iu five major tits of competitive elections from local village officials to rcpr-nonUtive* in the National Assembly. On October 3 of thU year, South Vietnamese will once again have the right to vote in competitive elections for the Presidency and Upper and Lower House. North Vietnam has never tolerated the litmus test of competitive elections. For America tn-drpo** the South Vietnamese Government would amount to a fJap in thr face and M grosut denigration of the constitutional processes and of the right of millions of South Vietnamese citizen* from all walk* of life to choose. their rvprc*enlatitcs. How then can the "right of self-determination" of the South Vietnamese posniM' ) nhanced by an A.nerican coup on hcbalf of the PUG a Hanoi puppet oriciuii/..ition (see footnote) which <>n July II wit* invited by President fLivu to partiriitnt*; in election*, but ba. rejected the option of being judged by democratic choice? . ArtirJc VI KtrtU-w: "The Vietnamese |>lrdgptn-form a 'provisioniil government to organise democratic eWtionn. All parties aftrer to respect the rcftum of election* in which nil South Vietnamese con participate freely without the presence of foreign troops." Xiuuwr.The Vietnamese already have an elected government. and on Ortoher :< the VietnuriH-sJ- will Bgaiu have the democratic nnht to re-elect Tliieii-KyKbicui or vote for Nomeone rl^-, inrludiDg the PUG rfhuiild it accept President ThM.-u'* ihviution. Why tlu-u i- there u ti<-<-il for a prvwioiml icoveninuuit? Hut even icranting thi.i lu-ei], wliitli \'ietiiiilne>o- will "plitlgr to form (what does that mean?) a prr^viiMunal gnvcrnnwuil? The PUG led bv Hanoi? Jn Ifuu duriitg the Tet Offenxive of I4NM, the 1'UG radrejt ranied out masM liquidatioiM of MCUtal or "oU-ntial |Hilitiral op[x>ricnU. Tbin in a cootinuation of :'u; (MiUiTn eittabh'ithed by the CV/mnuinirtg in 1M.V40 when they crushed all coalition purdeA and fnurdi.-rvd imtioiiuh'-t lruder, urxJ in lV'A-!i~> when similar |H>liri.jK were corned out hy the ConununUu iu Korth Vii^tiiam during the "ctmtolidatiou".* in vi*-w of thi Kri'ii record, whut Impe ia there that the -South VieOtanwM* people *v,i (Aof.v their faith in Coinmtiiiiitt pLô* to respect democratic elections? ' Artii-lc VII utat**: "Tlie .South \ieinamesn plnige to enter dixcuMious of procedure* to guarantee th*- safety and i>olctical fn*ud'>ui of thoe South \ it tnauiLje who buve collalMiruud with the U.S. or with the LT.M. supported regime." Answer. Again, iiftthUiK <* **id about KUaranleeing the Mifety or political frr<:(lom <rf an^xnly. The treaty gimriiutec* U cui',T discuMii>un about procedure*. Tlu*re are, in any *, Mevrral million Houth \Vcnanieiw who can l<c clanoificd as "eolliklxwatorir". In Sorth Vietnmn "collaborator*" are "rounter-revolutionarie", and M thn I'rMidentiul Decree on Iimiirgiint'y utaUic Me lial>le to nummary uiocutioii. In fact, tlu- Viet Cung and North V'iutnaiiKiw hole tuurdnred ("collected blood debu") utato 3I,IKK) South Viotuanwue as "collaborator*". Hhould this rc/rd be glowed over in ctchjmjte for a mm; "pl<-dK<!" about "pro<M!diiroiir' to guarantee thv "aafirty and political freedom" <n thow- people th>- rôiniiiUJiists hitve l**'i) trying *' hard to liquidateT What kind of "political fr/^doni" will there be in Koiith Viittnam under a Nnrib Vi'MnauK-M) l/'ointnuaist controlled form of govvmuient when there has
ll i-jii>ll>litlm wtr oiiallil'C'd HI (f*e* Uirit dtflrrriHM I'ltHiit in unwUliI* umdUI'KU (u (>.*a-. Tii' npMt "uriniiidlil/iiiKl" ntrulidtflo, Hr Tnhifiit (Hull I'iU. who rffld 17^ .4 U- rol, w*n i-liitrnnl itr. riiil-rrr.tfitstil ml |WMllK IM4 dr'.'Jn fû maii/4> VArrr M/ tltettmiu. Hit 1(1*1 VW dcltlmuUll' mMft In iir'li-i i" *Uir hlui Iu run fur I)M VmMntet. it >t>-fitll>t ufi-flir.vcnni mm( u( Ihw clrflmii wv. lit. I'rniitituta. lltmttt, htelthm l nm nrlilinruui, l>.t'.. fir (' HfH> A.-nurtitilufi, Inr lw,7r wrivMi. MtK M. fllnnkdHK liu(liuU<i\ "Vlociiwn IM C'mtUtlon Onm", Tin WIOilan , . <l, 7* Vut-Htuk It,,,,*. (CuriMU fnlrwillr, 1*1), l<uulfir. A H'tiun KmlxltUi. iti. V. I'riwciir. Jim;).
GU!)
never be^n the (lighted gUmmering of democracy in North Vietnam? Why doesn't the XSA ''treaty 'r demand guarantees for the right* of opponents in North Vietnam.' Arucle VIII utcs: "The American* and Vietnamese agree to respect the iudeptnrtaicc. peace and neutrality of Liuw -and Cambodia in accord with tbr 1934 and 19ft! Geneva convention^, and not to Interfere in the internal affair* of thcue two nations." Aiuver.ln groK> violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1 Witho North Vietnamese haw consistently and massively violated Laotian and Cambodian peace and neutrality by grading hundred* of thousand* of troops into neutral Loan and Cumlxxlia; by constructing roadsHo Chi Minn and Sihanouk, trails through the*- two countries; by establishing military base areas for prosecuting the war against South Vietnam; and by launching attack* on the people and government* <>f these nations. How can anyone believe that the North Vietnamese will respect Cambodia and Laos ait they attempt to conquer them? ' Why doesn't the NSA "treaty" require United Nations supervision of both tbt> U.S. a'ud North Vietname*e military presence in Indochina in oroVr to safeguard the sovereignty of these natioiu? Hanoi has always rejected a United Nations supervisory roleArticle tX stiite*: ''Upon these points of agreement we pledge to end the war and resolve fll other questions in the spirit of Self-determination and mutual respect for trie indcjuuidcncc and political freedom of Vietnam aud the United States." Awnerr. Tlie Allied governments have proposed in Pahs to resolve the war on the ltni> of: (1) an iuteruaUonally supervised cease-tire throughout Ind->-Cliina : (2) ati Indodiina peace conference; (3) tin agreed timetable for complete reciprocal withdrawal*; (4) a fair political settlement involving tdl of the major forces; () the unconditional release of all PoWs.* Thiae proposals have been rejecu-d by Hanoi and i>;< PHC who have even refused to diacuM them. A ith no much eK in this alleged "treaty", it s.fins tlie height of liypofriny for the uure|>re-litative inventonj of tliis "treaty" to Ixak-'Ve tlmt llieir one-sided proposal* would be acceptable to tut parties in the conilict or that such propooals could assure svlf-detenniuaUou and peace in Southeast Asia. COKCLCBIOX Tlie prcuncc of the- American. South Victnanu-so and North Vietnamese delegations At th<< Parts Peace Talks points up an internationally accepted fact: Uealie* are iwgoualcd by government*. They are not negotiated by private groups. SooK-tiines UK; negotiating governments are broadly representative of tlieir citixcn. In tlie United States and in other Western democracies, tlie electoral process hu >rwun*d such widrsprâd reprcxt-ntution. .Sometimes, the governments negotiating UrticM arc authoritarian or totalitarian in nature, representing only a tiny elite who rule by force.
' Tlwr* mn U ndtuO pollti'jJ p*rtlw tu JKiuth Vlrtiit'it. Tlwo L> on* In Uw North, and two puppet (HKIO. Tl>n> b > (IN trUr union nioviunent In Miutli '.Vlnun wltli fHu.ui') umiu\Mt, wbo )ur* iiviw uu KitlM taii won <lrfnndflii ittr ndrfrt ol'.ti* w.-it. Tlirfr l iwi her ttvt unluii nutvcuw .t In KorUi VUtnmtn (gr In mr ConcnunUl -aouirjr) . Tlr w> It i*> ("4Un rwwp| rr In Hnlxon. Tl/ Jau.rtlo:i wltli Inlrtrnltuut cMumUp. but Owy totwUmi. Tlmf U un o^mritlwi IITMH In Hv J>'rth. Thcrr *ntuur rrifefciut frouiK In Vlrliuni iiubiw tli* llou lino >u<l CVi Dot (3.i udlUaii). tlir < mliuU.- (.'J nillUon). nd iiiuckrai* unt lulltunt ItaiUHilnu. All or(iilv ul Htntr awn *ni>r4. purtW(n,t niri rurd.4* . rfjrlni: fatr*n of I rtflumo* ' (4IUÎ wd -*"-^"KMiiir li>. Vo mirh pkirdl'iu cdiu la North Vietnam. In tliA iwntry'i ' In MJV Iw? 1'niur Nor<xlni WI.->rHli jwrinl AfUc th ;'w-li Irrmpi Hi (.'nuibu'Ila. tlir \ l<-iiuui^>c L'uuuuuiUf U (ruuliiM lu our country lu ot'lrr " N*uu>illtr , "BlKXlW H^jlh Wt/uuji bpoiuir ' ''minimum . . , |: wuu:<! U ilUk'ill fc" I^> Co <!(. Tb* *MH> (y> lor C*n>l>ur|inrntrf1 rin> Narlli Vlrtnm> nn'l Kurfian Inrmulvtlnn rIHii|C (uf liuif prt> (ntUtUMi C"TTjjnuTjt lirxlwl h( iî.inili>t iTHicr wdi* JHIU )'lu"jl.. lly J'li '' t/au au ati'I ati'I . .Viirtli Vt>4nufn>v rro ullekliv ;br t>rv fitmiiuriit iililcli tl^y lirinj|t))l lul .. io* luiclti**nilnfarmtt~nKrlalintlAXmtUutilAiiii*iul\'M,inm.<jHHmlU*<fai F'x'-lvii , i . j x ' - i i lUUIlww w w(Mwliwi Itijcloii, IM .. (; it II-VTIIII..I I'mitliii i^jTu-f. I'Ti": Fll, tlrniwl. -* lulam* tt t CHiti. (S',y. UmiliX dr lin/ii; Kulwl !') CMiuw ^M<m|r>//< ri/fM, rulilUlmii.. Inc., , (tliuxil... O.-Huck . ., lM>;lxU>-r ' ' Mlrluwl. (,'nmtn'H: Tkr Hank lot Kreu'Hf IN.Y. I'rwiu-i, Iwi7<; itlicplln, Kulo'rl, /wf K**lut!m i V V JiarfW M><1 X . l'^>> Aumlnipn. t.f Conmui.iim if Vutium, A iJoennuttlait KuMi, Li:\<ttt. Alivrlnn Kir Av-'Kbibm, IX7i. ' J'rriU'lcnl Xfinp't ftdd/nH U. tlK n*-i, Ortoljur T. l7<)
v.
700
The pitiful fact about the XSA "People's Peace Treaty" is that U embodies the nible fault of repJMBMiag a mtoiscule minority in America bidding for dictatorial doubie power nrer on behalf of a mlnianile minority in North Vietnam which already eserd*e dietaUrial cootfot The "People's Peaee Treaty" is not a formula for peace. It U a disguised formula for the victory of tyranny which undercut* the effort* t u o achieve a just peace.
KAXIOSAI, STCDBKT COOUSATIK Cotuurm FOK FKCXDOM i VIETNAM

SOUTHEAST ASIA OFFICIAL COIMRTKB STATEMENT OK TBE VIET COKO's "NEW" S-rOltiT PEACE
raorosAL
Mrs. "Nguyen TU Binh's "new" &-pomt peace proposal would b comic*! were i; not for the dead seriousness with which Hanoi present* it through iu to-called Provisional Revolutionary Government for South Vietnam. More .vrious U what we fed win be the hallucinatory reception it win receive in certain American circles ready to "escape" the Vietnam War at any cost. Looking at the substance of thi* 8-point proposal, one cannot help but doubt that a spint of good will lie* behind it. Point 1 is already a major topic of dlcussion in a number of circles. It has been all garbled up by the press saying that Mrs. Binb offered a "eeasr fire." In fact, inc did no such thing. She only said that "in the event tba V. government di-ckuv* the withdrawal from &Mitb Vietnam of all American troops and those of the other foreign countries in the American camp by 30 June 1971, the People's Liberation Armed Forces will refrain from launching attacks on the American troop* and those of the other countries in the American camp in the course of their withdrawal." This is not a cease fire. A cease fire means an end to ALL hostilities. In essence, Hanoi is offering American force* a chance to withdraw under the vague prominc of refraining from assault* on our retreating forces. The war wil' go on all around them as Awed forces withdraw. Furthermore, only after Allied forces pledge to withdraw all their troops by June 30, 1971 will Hanoi discuss "the question of a guarantee of security for ths withdrawal" of Allied force* and "the question of the release of captured military personnel." One wonders m'bat security will the withdrawing Altind force* face until aii agreement on "the question of a guarantee of security" is worked out. As to the fate of captured peraonnej, despite some press mis-report* Hanoi only of en discussion of "the question" of their release. From tbeti on, the ft-uoint program u the same an the by now stale 10-point program presented by Mm. Biub in Pari* last spring. It ban*t changed im* I'J.W wtu-u iio Chi Minh presented the French his 8-poiut propooal for pi-aa: in Indocbma. As in the part, Hanoi dopi-nd* on iu American allies and the duptit who follow to grab this occasion to cry about major Coouuunist conc'.'wtitnw and gocd will. For an understanding of Hanoi's view of the way to peace, let us turn to recent article by Mr. Itobcrt 6. Iloyd of Uit- Knight Kewi nen-kc. linuoi invited Mr. Koyd aod other news ervk-Jt to North Vietnam, in bis own words, "in the belief that thfse reputable organisations would ezpUin its sid" of Ibr otory in the L"nit*d HtaU-s." His dispatches from Hanoi were inspected by the Couimiinjj't tbemaplves txôrc sending them back to America, so tin-re is no doubt that hi* writings met with th'jr approval. What utunen this e^rribie war to continue? Mr. Boyd offers us ati >nt< renting view of lite other ridi;'* stand: Tlie root cauM! of thr war, tin- tuinit all the fighting ha* burn about, is woo fhall control Mouth Virtnaoi. Tlie Vietu-mesK CommunistM fully intend to control it, iiiU;rvkr-K with their traders and study of their official statements uiade clear , , , Ankcd if there io'i some small st step cither side could poxenhort of adoptinr the entire 10-pnint puan.* phwi proponed by the Couimuui*is (Hanoi] Foreign Minister NKUVCU Day Trinh <hook bin bead luoj. ... In fact the N'orth Virtuiunrse haven't buogfid from the IU points rvfii in private talk* witb f-'.K, negotiator)) in I'aiii. Tioie aiui statin, Mr. Nixon lia* offered joint withdrawal of U.fi. and Hanoi force*, leaving the people of South Vietnam to "jetUe tln-ir own uffairit'' an iJf.
701
Binfa M oft says. Mr. Boyd's disetnsion of Hanoi'* view on this problem is niort totrrertiog. panictdarry since it met with Hanoi approval before it was dispatched: . . . they claim hit promise to withdraw all American force* eventually rt spurious beeaiwe be attache* an unacceptable condition to it; that North Vietnam also withdraw iu troop* from Sooth Vietnam. This they will never do. the {forth Vietnamese insist, because Vietnam is one country and they have a right to fight for their mb.êndencc (air} anywhere on their soil. Mr. Nixoti knows mutual withdrawal to out of the attention, Hanoi ayg. From Hanoi's 17 year technique of negotiating absolute power for the Communists under the guise of a peace settlement we can see a total unwilliugne** on their part to bargain out a negotiated settlement. In the words of one Hanoi official to Mr. Bord: "We do not accept the idea of bargainingof giving one thin* in return for something else." What then was Hanoi trying to do with this 8-point proposal made br Mr*. Binh? To answer let us remember that a *hor* "'* ago the Hatfidd-McCovern Bffl was handsomely defeated in the U. Senat ' ">>* bill also called for an announced deadline for U-S. troop withdrawal. No one a agaiiu-* Allied troop withdrawal from Vietnam. What everyone opposes is telegraphing the deadline to the enemy ahead of timela essence what Mrs. Binh did is to offer Hanoi's own version of the HatfieldMcGovcm BUI, but sweetening the pot, as the saying goes, with a /ague promise to brgin eome sort of obscure discussion on guarantee of safety for withdrawing troops and the fate of POW'o. This only shows bow much the Hatfield-McGovern Bill would have served Hanoi's aims, bow if not careful, weU-meaning senators can find themselves serving as ur cnowing agenU of the enesuy. Since Pre lent Nixon has already promised to withdraw almost all combat force* by May 1971, it becomes dear that Hanoi's fear i* that it will be no match for Republic of Vietnam forces backed up by American logistic support. At best, Hanoi might also hope to show to the entire world bow the American paper tiger withdraws with iu tail between its legs while its Vietnamese ally fights on. However, Hanoi knows full w*>U that no American negotiator, no matter bow anxious to end the war. will be foolish enough to consider this g-point program. It is therefore obvious that Hanoi's aim is to give fuel and spark to the so-called "peace" movement now that it is dying, and to encourage more face-*aviug barrangue from Senator* MeGovem and Hatfield who w discredited themselves with their surrender bill. The timingin the heat of the electoral campaigngives away Hanoi's crude and transparent game. Nevertheless, it hope* that pro-Viet Cong propagaodixU and agitated activists will obscure the facts and wul daim substance where there k none. With thin foolish 8-point proposal Mrs. Binh has once again sought to insult the inteilijc fit* of UMI American people. We reject her proposal as meaiimglew! LCTTCBS TO TE EorroK, Tht Ntv York Tvnu, A York, N.Y. ELUKCKST, N.Y., May I,
Mr. L<w i against the tfaigou govMniment. But, unlike wot prp|e h*- doenn't jut talk s>xut it, b doe* *otutbii>jf alx>ut it. There is no wrn-t In this.
GCKTLCMCM: I have known Don Luce for several years now. *Yr <i,.-t in !'. ^ naiii, t>otb in 1908 and again in 1970. As a member of the Vttu- .Corp* ii, naigi>n, I wa quite familiar with Mr. Luce's activities a wrll a* what other fellow jourualit thought of him. Mr. Luce cannot be characterized * jtwt a journslint sn.-king to <*spoe the aorruption, cruelty, etc. of the Haigon go^-emmeut. He i uiucfa more than that. He characterised bimnelf as a one-man attempt to overthrew the Saigon governmeut. ritarUng from the premise that by wrecking t'.S^Kaigon relatinns h* culd detroy the Tbieu govenuncut, be ha* worked t urgauize uuwnive propaganda campaign^ \i> convince American* that it is rotten. He ha* organised Vwtname> disidfrnu, Las Mbekcrrxi fugiUves fro; a the lw (Ksigon laa-) and ban coordinated L'.H.-Kotrtb VitftnanMe leftist acti\ities. lie ban given uuawy to left-ifius; antiTbuiu Buddhist group* < tjntttU of various Awertcnn orgaiiixationii aid ha- used tup farilities and immunity aff'^dud him a a uiciulter f tue Prewt Corj>. tu tu-rve their f nd".
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including be himself, recognized this fact. Your reporting on the cue is moot misleading since many reporter* write against the Saig'jn government without twin* deported. Like the rest of us, Mr. Luce was free to advocate overthrow of the Saigon government, but Irving to do it is another matter. Being at war, Saigon feck that it cannot allow foreigners to run'around helping the other wide. I respect Mr. Luce for fighting for what he believes in, but I must reject the martyric image you gave him in order to fit your editorial needs. Sincerely, DANIEL E. TKODOUC. Formerly Vietnam eorrttpondenl for the .tow York Datiy Column.
LETTERS cr,.v. MINH Having just returned from a second sojourn in Vietnam where I studied the political situaUo . across the country, I would like to challenge Flora Lewis' presentation of General Dong Van Vtinh (Dec. 8). The man is neither as popular nor as widely backed as she believe*. Nowhere in the countrysideatid I talked to hundreds of peo|tledid anyone other than fairly high-level officials know of him. Port of the ruwon for this is that Dicm's overthrow did not mean as much to the countrywide as to the due*. - General Minh's soKd urban supporters are not people who can deliver large numbers of vote*. Sonic are just opportunists whose whole -power base comet froc: courting liberal American circles. They assess the situation much as Miss Ix-wls docs. But people who count, likr the Buddhists from Ontral Vietnam, who can <trliver large numbeii of votes, arc very reluctant to support Minb. They regard him as quite a weak person, too easily 'maneuvered by his infamous supporters. They fear his election would lead to "coalition govcnim'-nt" and aftcr^ their ei[H'riein? of line during the Tct Offensive of 19*18, they want no part, of it."" They am *rio:t4ly -ooiHidrriliR putting up a c;uidid:vle of tlirir own or even ttitj>portmg Thieu if he makiw certain gmtuni* toward them. The military leadership is VCTV uorrifd. Il fraiH iliat by uplifting the mntiOiinniuniMt vote between tin-in, "fbieii and Ky muy permit 11 Minb victory . There nrc indicution* that tin- Viet COIIK also plan to secretly work for a Minb victory. Captured docMiiiiciitM dcMrrilie hi irwpttwm u.< mtit-t unefiil. I am surprised that in her Asian tour Mix* LrwU did not learn all this. Hvi-n iiln-r;U Minh admirers, like ICotK-n (>hft[4cu wliu I nx-t in Phunoni tVnli, coinpleuily agree tliat a Minh victor>- i* nnitlior de.-ifraMu nor probable. The real issue is 5vli..-lln-r ttiv An QUUIIK Biiddtnuts will it>'t logi-thcr with Tbicti, thus m-reckiug ('iiuinuiiist h(ri< of "playiiiK tin: cntr.-iilic1iiiiis" in ()>< iimi-Couiniuiiist camp. Thi: White llnun :. alxive ull rl-u-, dr's r,"' wuiil to intervene, lest it might shatter tlu? chances of stub a reconciliation. I U M K L K. TEIIOORI;, Au//Tn Krrfrlarif. .\'ti!ioiil Student Coordinating Cimtmiltrr 'for Prrnlum in I'trtiutm <wi ti<mthra*t A*ut, Jttfkton Hcightt.
NATIONAL SrruuKnr COOUDIKATIVO CuMtitTTr.r. rou FKKMMIM ;K

AM' Sot.TIU.AUT ArifA fUftaUK IK THK riKTKAMUATIOK Or TUK UCUAL
Report of a Student Pari-Finding Team In the courao of three trips in Auzi|t, OrtotxTwid UrceoiIxY 1'O, l in our group spent a total of three mouth* in Virtnarn und vinited owr ISO of South Vietiiacn's 44 provinces. The trip* ron-i-tf-d of rthauitive i^fforu to cover the territory, niosljy by road, to speak with the local population and to get a feeling for local situations by lodging in the hainletx. litre at home our primary Hource of information on Vieinaniir.iition has tvvu th'1 prmti, Kittle woiid*T then that wt; all went to Vietnam Hkrptiral of thii> policy's progreiw. After our trip, however, our view * cluing! rîiruHy, All of UK were greatly impriMiw;d, but thoiW! of u who hud IH-J-H lo Vietnaui m-vcrul ycur* i-ariinr found the progrew (tagKirriug. Thougli we noticed elironic weoknowe* mich u
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tration. shtggiahMas, corruption, and resistance to progress to be rtifl we discovered thatnew charafteristfcs had developed which compensate for . any of the lingering wtalrnraans (1) Moat importantly, we towaH that despite aB their perennial complaints about the GVN, the people on the whale nad changed their outlook on the war. Whereas in the pact most peasants fete no commitment to either aide and mane ebose_to support the Viet Cong, none of the hundreds we spoke to now consider thf a. Hardpreased by the cumulatively escalating demands ot Met Cong an an
and pomfcal support needed for survival constitute a complete revenai of tna*e measure* .which made the Viet Cong popular in the early yean. Since the pressure-on the Communists ia constant, the demand* made on the peaaanta are eiUeute white the returns are ntt. The people regard the Viet Cong aa squanderem of their meager sastits because they aee no sign of any possible Communist victory. To discourage popular efforts to evade Communist demand*, the KLF ordered the application of aevera punitive measures. Many of the eadrea we poke to at numenNU Chiau Hoi centers told us that they rallied to the GVN because they wen diaMuraged and did not want to poniah their *miH and neighbors as ordered. By drawing Allied fire on their villages, the Communisto have made plain to the peasant* bow little they care for their wett-being. Consequently, Communist-held anaiare almost depopulated. The people prefer to live as homeless refugees on the outskirts of GVN-hdd areas. (2) Hamlets classified "O" on the HES scale were the most impressive. In these areas where GVN presunee has just been established, the people return. But tteir return is not marked by passive existence Determined to prevent future Communist domination, they send their sons to join the Popular Forces, and they m turn actively participate in Uamlet Self-Defense Forces. While we often found RF, PF and PSDF local fore** to be deficient in militar}' akilla and aggressiveness, we were most impressed by the solid, if occasionally inefficient, commitment that l>eo|>lc mad? to seif-drfensr. Caiwin'g groat ennt4*rnation to our Vietnamese escort*, we slept in hamlets and drove on roads surrounded >>y enemy forces and protected only by these local peasant militias. In almost all provinces south of I Corps we found no American or ARVN troops securing tur: area. Only local fora* did that job. It L- our .impression that by emphasizing the development of such forces, tbu ViHnamiiatioo plan has been aU to progress to its present statethis fact was naer reported 'in the press! Our impression was shared by all the MAT advisory team* we im-t. These'teams were composed mostly of men serving second or third tours in Vietnam. (3) bespit* its rorruptiou, inefficiency and instability the GVN has been able to extend its rub; r \ administration to most of the countryside. Populariynlf-ted village and hamlet councils have come into being and in many areas have l>ecome local bases of political power able to exert pmuuuv on District andProvince Chiefs. Through these HiVn"^ many peasants become fraocuued and (irspite Communist threats continue to get involved with what they call their government* __ i4) By opting ind securing the roads and canals to central markets the GVN has crea, td avmiuu of prosperity for the peasants of the countryside. The allocation of GVN funds to village "cooyvnttivtat" has provided capital for modernisation. Drv<4upincut of modern fanning tecbniqm* and thf O]H-UIDK of uigti^M-ofit markets have produced a oouspieuous prosperity in touch of the countr>'side marked by trseu>rs, tn<>u>rcycl(, television*, eofcrnc b*MjHe with nuingled rixifs, and electricity in areas where thatched but* wet* all that could be *. i,.') Wtt iR-li'-ve the a>M>ve factors to be responsilile for a Virtnamizatiou of the rurul pojdjJsti'jo, Thr* eorumitment emJur.- Communist effort* at deKtroyînc it through nuiMJvr terror of th** pnr{>le iuid s'-'wwinttiioo of local ofticialn. Typical of tin- iiftitiidf of tlw> pnwsntA spok>- to was ad old man who lived and suffered .igb tu*- loi. two Indochina War*: For a long time tins Viet COOK made sons**, and many of iw gladly gave our on." nd our ric i*> 4-hrm: But. uiougb tber tAlkM of a parttiii** ou ârth, they ifvrr gave us a sign tlwt it was roiulna. Yw tiler year ttvy took tuor and mine, bcamr unite arrogant arl fi/foeful. They took our young mm for the Final Offensive, but our sf>u ni^rcr came back. Only the cadres returned saying ttiat this ws* only tl- first \y\uuui of the Final Offensive and demanded morn from us. Wr know now that they will lose and the CVN will win, but we are htiU too wak to refuse them wlusi they atop us ou the canal to eeilset
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taxes from UB. Oh, we give them what they ask for, what due can we do? But we have also sent the Ust oC our son* to join the Popular Force*, and a* wo pay UK widrw their taxes we say to ouraerws: "Go ahead, take all you want, you filthy bandit, but some day our ions will get vou and will mil your bodies on the sidr of the road for a& thoM of us you Wed to ace that your hoprleM war has come to an end." I am old but 1 thuik 1 will live to nee peace. (6) lo a effort to destroy this commitment, the Vjn Cong have ordered their force* to *neii pacified village*. To secure maximum effectivene**, they often mortar market place* early in the morning when they are crowded or at night when the homefed* refugee* sleep there. The meaning of sura a tactic has not escaped the people. N'or has it ccaped politicians in Saigon who sock political power through "peace" platform.-). While some meaningkaw dements, opportunistically call for "accommodation" with the Communist* tn the hope that they will gain support from liberal circles in America, real antt-GVN power blocs, such at the Buddhist* of I Coras, reject any kind of coalition with the Communists. President Nixon has been challenged by many anti-Vietnam nettonalitics safe here at home for bringing up the lesson learned at Hue during the Tet Offensive. But thi* lesson has not been lost on the Buddhisu who had to five through it. For thfe reason they rule out any move which might be favorable to the Viet Cong. There w great reluctance to rapport the presidential candidacy of General Duong Van Minh, not because he is believed to be a supporter of coalition government but became he is regarded as too inept to defeat the Communint*. Nowhere in the South Vietnamem; countrywide did we find sup]x>rt Coven knowledge) of the man. As for his policies: everyone wants peace, but no one wants a peace favorable to the Communists, not after what they have shown themaclvea to be. For the last decade the people of Vietnam havf been caught in the middle of a war whose complexities and international significance they fail to understand. But for many reasons, they now no longer regard the NLF a> a choice and they gravitate to the GVS. Despite its inefficiency, corruption and near-total dej<endence on foreign assistance, the GVN ha* mobilised, this new commitment, transforming it into a venae of nationhood. We may never be able to justify our expenditure* on this war, nor to excuse our policy blunders, but bow-much less so if we abandon our effort now? Vietnam has come to mean a lot more than it should. This is unfortunate, but it is a reality we must deal with. That if why we must see ir struggle for peace with freedom through to fruition. Toward* this end m-e must be sure that we compensate for o withdrawal by adequately and pmperly eqtiipping the Vietnamese. Already Am*, leans and yietnamcse in the nelo coniplaiu of ominous shortagex, partirularly in tra>^<r>ortation facilities. We need not ducu** here the technical apeeu of what we saw. Vm only vk to trancmit the impruMion that the people, not the official)! and their figure*, have made on us. Some of the young American adviinen we met in he field felt penimistic and Impatient. Betnc forced to deal with the frustrating ntricacies of one small area and not being uaeo to the slow pace of over two-thirds of tof ikind, tbrir feelings were understandable. But when we came to discuwing the" overviewVietnam spread out in time and spacenone rejected our ojrtjmwtn. Indeed, ome came to natv it. We hope to pass the Vietoam we saw ou to our pu.i.
N'*TJOXAI, STUDEKT COOROIKATIKO CoMMirrr.K vou FKKKOOM iv VIKTVAM BOCTBKAST ASIA CAMBODIA'S ITKCCOUC AOAIKST tmr The one point on which we found unanimity among Americaax in Vietnam i that AU>d incurvion* into Cambodia an- mt)>oiiMble fur the prMent lull in fighting and for the wrakiiwo of the Mx-niy, The myftieal naiJicncc of tttetny foremt fadnd away onoe WP oVnind Uyjn ufo ba*e in Cambodia. In contract, those area* bofderin*; Laon-whew the enemy ha>> yet U> U- dKuiitd Ui *afo basesrtill fel threatened by North Vietnanvnp forw. For laofl Awritn the end of Kihauoulc mtguit the end of w>eoiy anctuariei> in Cauitxnija. Kut tboM; opposed to American involvement view Cambodia M aooLher Vietnam HI the making. They say that we will be dragged into yet au'rflxT hopelimi war tryiiu to ) rop-up a corrupt artd unpopular tnilitary dictator*...,>, After xowlinjt With various political, admiuixirative and wiliury conrfudt-d tuat they * totally WOOE. C|) U> leamod that oppoi(on to nihanouk's regime, wax wide(>refi. |>croualised and spennive pc4kae an well a his corrupt eutourai^ caused many
soda! praUen* for fa.-****. But, because of Cambodia's royal inufitfoa,a*In other iang-eiuudhi*; Inoaarehiee, everyone tofctated Urn. Hi* tuabflfty to cop* whh Xorth VfelmuMM ebu*e f <^mbodian territory was somrthtng of * tot straw. In fact, those saca Ike LOB Hd who now rale were the test to earn aroand to tbe coaakistoQ that Sftanoaknad to t depend. (2) Mot<*th<m vho overthrew tthanonlr were more concerned with the sjoein p.-oblemfl of Cambodia than with foreign poBcy. Though they share in the genera national indignation over"North Vieta*n*t behavior to Cambodia, they regret the strong anti-Hanoi *Und taken by the Loo Not government. They uautt that with time the patriotic Cerw of Cambodia'* intdkctuak and youth wBl die down and tbe now tabled social and political problems wfll come to the fore. They feel that jCambodia b too weak to take on the OTA and that American assistance is too unreliable. They, therefore, caoeude that eventuaHy Cambodia wul have to "negotiate with the devil [Hanoi]," in order to Mlvage what it can. (3) Banoihaf nointenUonoftal^XTainbtxliaby nieaiuofacfaMicalcaptiiro of tb* capital, Phnom Penh. Ezperieno* ha* taught the North Vietnamese that inch a popular government could always become a jungle government, forever escaping their grasp. Nevertbdeso, Hanoi definitely has in mind to topple the Lon Kol Regime. This it plans to do through protracted and relatively inexpensive warfare, .aimed at paralysing the economy, rendering ineffective government adouoistratioG At " levels, Mt4 ftamrbating Cambodia's social and political problems. The "soft" political leaden mentioned above know Hanoi's leaden personally, so that Hanoi u weO-eware of their exintenep. It is Hanoi'* nope that with time these people will break with tbe "hardliners" oh tbe issue of national priorities, caunnic serious division in Phnom Penh. <4) ConUry. to press reports Hanoi's forces an not seeking to build a Cambodian Liberation front. Such an indigenous force may cause problems later. Instead, they follow the classical pattern of invader*. In occupied village* they place the mo*t unsavory element* in command admmirtrative posttioo*. Being oi such ill repute, these element* are totally dependent on the NVA/VC forces *>.d have fjo compunction about abutting the local population. Refugees and uflicd Khmer Rouge* from various areas told us of the same pattern of NVA/ VC takeover. (5) Cambodians er tbe present war as part of an nUtorie Khmer struggle for sumval. Their patriotic fervor and courageous spirit i most impressive. Despite this, Lon Nol knows that because they are >t> such a disadvantage tbe Cambodian* cannot surive a war of more than one or two yean. Thi* i* why he has made web urgent appeal* for aid. The fear is not so much that Pbnom Penh will be taken but rather that Cambodia i* not pyehologieaUy or physically able to withstand the Communist tactic of "aggravating tbe contradictions in tbe enemy camp through protracted warfare." By rising w> the challenge and refusing to continue to serve ai a passive base for Communist aggrewion, Cambodia baa taken an irreversible step. Sihanouk wrote that alliance with the VS. i* foolish because it only bring* war followed by abandonment and Communist takeover anyway. He advocated a policy of siowiy and peacefully becoming a Bed satellite, thus avoiding tbe destruction that come* with war. Low of Cambodia will not only lead to defeat of Vietnamit win a!*o answer the question that all tbe smaller nations of tbe world an aking benMelve*: "Was Sihanouk right"? Scarcr or Views or VTXAM VETZBAM (By Joseph Neflson) t, hmooDcnoM Anther of At survey Mr. Joseph Neikon i* a graduate of William and Mary College in WUliaouborg, Virginia, where be obtained an EOTC commission upon graduatiou in June, 1067, While in eoilege, Mr, Neil*on was President of bis fraternity, Sigma Vu, and an All Southern Coofe. Football bo0e. He entered tbe army as an ArtiUerjr Lieutenant on 26 fleptomber, IM7 at Fort Kill, Oklahoma. Mr. yil*un volunteered for Vietnam duty because of bis agreement with the United State* war policy and arrived in Vietnam la September, IMS, After a year in Vietnam, n*
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returned to tb United State* with a wound. a Bronze Star, and total disillusionment with America's role in the war. Mr, Xeibon believe* that the GI's true opinions of the war are not beiug told to the public but that manufactured opinion* are being used by politicians such as Vice- Prudent Agncw and President Nixon as a major reason to continue the war. Mr. Neilson decided that a survey of Vietnam Veterans would best destroy these myths.
Tkeiuney
The survey was checked for statistical validity in San Francisco by James Klein, a marketing: engineer, then working for Mason and Company. The reason why a survey of GIs has not been taken in the past is that the army has not allowed it. Mr. Neilson first attempted to take the survey at the Oakland Army Outproenoing Center. The army would not allow this nor would they consent to Mr. Keilson riding with the GIs from the plane arriving from Vietnam to the Oakland Oirtprocessing Center. Finally, Mr. Neilson had to settle for interviewing GIs at a rate of one or two at a time at the San Francisco commercial airport as the GIs waited for flights home. Two hundred and forty-four (244) GIs were then interviewed over a course of three weeks. The (icople in the United States have heard the view* of just about everyone on the subject of Vietnam. Books, articles, newspaper*, interviews, speeches, editorials, and surveys have made it the most publicized war in history. Yet, we have not beard the opinions of those whom the war effort affncts the mot -, the young men. So, not the young men as defined by the news media, but the other silent young who actually light the war. ~ And. why haven't we heard from these men beforein a large pojl or survryT Very simply because the U-S. Army, in their perverted view of the Bill of Rights, are fearful that a group of American Gin freely expressing their constitutionally injured right of free speech will itomeliow break* down the delicate fabric of public confidence and optimism concerning the Vietnam war. I believe their rationalized thinking is best exprtaiwd by a Colonel at the Oakland Army bane who served one year in Vietnam safe in the confine* of a division bane camp. "Remember that the kids arc yviing, somewhat immature, and th'-ir view of the war is limited to thi-ir narrow exjHrrieiici's." I suppose he would like uit to Mindly Ijelieve the official army view that we never suffer defi:als, the enemy'* casualties arc always > to 10 times ours, lew than 1% of the GIs smoke pot, and victory is right arouud the corner if only we use more force and be patient. After n<cciving absolutely no coojH-ration from the Army, I interviewed 214 enlisted Vietnam X'et/rans, under the rank of .Staff Sergeant. 'K-6, as they awaited transportation home from the San Francisco airport. The reasou why no officer* or enlisted men above '{ rank of K-5 were interviewed was because I wanted to have- a true picture of "our boy." As to be cxjxjrtfd, those interviewed were young, mostly in the 2O-22 age group. A ver* large majority never voted to elect the official* who sent them to Vietnam. They were the HOUS of the silent majority of the sons of the underprivileged. I.-.ss than 10% were college graduatcx but more thsn 10% wen* high school dropout*. In writing comment* to questions nuked, many Gin had trouble pclline relatively simple word*. Usually each sentence hod 'A or 4 grammatical errors. Sometimes a group of words made no sense. The Spanish s|x-aking GI had the most difficulty; a few asked to have the qu/rstiomi read aloud because they could not understand the Knglikb. It seems tiiat in Vii;tnam "Vou won't find college graduu.U-8 in Infantry f'->x* hole*," utid one college graduaU; with tlw; wattT-Ioggud tttb Ui vision. "At least W"n of thow fellom< I graduiited uith uever nerved in the Armed Forces. And those that did, like Hie, were tnJd in l<iute caiup jolw typing aud doing paper work." It uould lie wry inU-reitUdK to find out what tlx; education k-vel is of the young men vvhn died in Vii-tnuui f*W% of thorn' kill''d io Vieliittin were uuiwr 2<5 years of age) and wlmt their fatlierx' inroiiwx are, Thn tiguresare "unavailabli'" according U> the finny. I lielicvt1 tlu>y would shuw q<ilt" (ont1luJ\fely who in ligbtiug our d''Jii'>tr:ilic Viftuuui war. H. THK Hfiivi.tr grt.xTUiv AVO A unu'cuHlok or The Gin iTe given a quention and usually 3 or 4 aruwer* to clio<ms from. If they disliked all the given aiiuM'eni, they were allr/wed to kip the question or writs* their own fomrtw-nt. (jf* wlio linxwcred the cjuestions wen* also 'neour(C"d to
Writ
Z07.
Now that you am back IB the United States what wfll you do? Of ETS b within a few months, pleass answer at if you're act of the army). (A) Return to aid job (10%). . W Apply for a new job 01%). , . iC) Beturn to school (59%). )) Other, pleace state (13%). it would bea trade school or night school. Bow many of Utese men wfll actually follow through is open to question, but the government could mount a mow tber sorely need in today's world. How would yon aay your year in Vietnam ha> affected you aa a person? (A) Had a good effect on me (19%). (B) Had both good and bad effects on me (70%). (O Had a bad effect on me (0%). (D) Other, please state, briefly explain answer. (5%). Some comment* ("more confidentmore maturelearned to accept lesponsibility") emphasufd the good, but other comment*, *uch M "It taught me to kill and I enjoyed it, Especially those dinks" written by a door gunner with the lat Cav., and a Spec. 4 with the 108tb Engineers wrote, "I have seen bow rotten America really is," which showed the scan of war. Would you'like your brother (asnirm you have one) to go through a Vietnam tourr fA) Yes, definitely (5%). (K> Yes, with reservations (15%). (C) No, I would not (75%). (D) Other, pJemi* rtate (5%). A full 75% would not lite their brothers to go through a Vietnam tour and 15% Mid VPS with reservations. The reservation was usually that the brother would tK.t'ty in the infantry. Only 5% said yes definitely. A "grunt" with the mint Airborne best expressed the overwhelming general statement of sentiment, "I went through it, but I pray to God nry brother never goes." It seems that t'thotigh inort believe Viotnam -produced a fi;w positive results, the year spent ' ruing wan hell and too large a price to pay. A Spec 4 who worked with the i*tb Recon in the America! Division wrote, 5'It wrecked one year of my life," and another tipee 4 with the 1st Cav. wrote, "I'd never go through it again." What are your fixlings toward those males your own age who have not served in tiM; Armed Forces and will not serve in the future? CAi Very resentful, everyone who is normally fit should serve. (11%). (B) Knentful, but only to those who hod or cheated to beat the draft (30%). (C) I did the correct thing and don't care what others did (11%), (D) All those who escaped the draft are luoky, and I do not resent them (39%). (E) Other, pleaxe state C3%). Oue uucbr. expect the Gis who nerved in the Armed Forces 2 or 2 years, with oue yutr iu Vietnam, to be resentful of tbow who do not erve. But, only 11% felt very rewotful toward all who did not serve, A Spec. 4 with the 9tb Infantry Division summed up the feeling, "More power to anyone who honestly gets out of it." Combining (B) and (D) we get 75% of the Gb stating that they don't feel resentful to those who don't serve as long as they didn't lie or cheat to get out of Ike service. Tb South Vietnaoxve people sera* to be most interested hi which of the following: (A) winning the war (5%). (B) Following VilUe laws and customs W<). (C) Kupportuig thi! Haigon Government (bc,',). (H) Providing food, money, and shelter for tbemwlve* and family (54%). () Fighting the Viet Cong aud the Kortb Vietnamese (5%). (F) Buying alive (2V%). (C) Other, pieaM state (1%). The GIi) Ijelieve that the VintaairMie attitude toward the war borders on "totjtl indiffirrwy," and ttf uuv (wtn quite rcneut/ul. "Tbf people want to >* I'-ft *Jo)).-" .. . rtpcr. 4, Itilxt Airl>f>rikp, "Tlipy worry about itotbing lut ttwro8flv<-," . , . jiipri. 4 wjtU tbe Ut Cav. The ineii were cvejj iore n-srtitful toward the V'icUuwuesc attitude toward the til'* money. Time aud tiioe again the men coiuiuuutffd that the Vidfiamfsi1 werr interted in "taking your money". . , Kpnc. 4 Jabu M. Bay!tu-; "Moaking GI for as much as possible",,, apw. 5 lat Avu. Bde.; "Making money from GIs and living off the war", , , BpVf. 4 IK * B d - . , 1st Division; "Making nuntey off * GIs",.. Pfc 9th Infantry.
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Combining (A), (C), ai:d (E) we get only 11% who feel the Vietnamese are motivated in the war m-hile 83% from (D) and (F) befieve that the Vietnamese are most interested in 'Vtaying alive" and in "food, money, and shelter." The GI i resentful that hr rikb his life while those whose freedom he fights for seem to be primarily motivated in talcing his money. One GI summed up the resentment: "The men can't fight and the a-oraen can't f-ic. Their flag telk the story: what ain't red is yellow. The tain "dinks," "gooks," and "slot**"' we constantly usrd in describing thr Vietnamese. What was the attitude if the South Vietnamese peoi>le with which you were in contact toward winning thr war? (A) Very determined to win the war (10%). (B) Moderately determined to win the war (24%). '(.') Not concerned with the war (45%). nt) Not determined to win (8%). '<E) Other, please state iS%). Again the comments were overwhelmingly resentful toward the ViMnamrse war i-ffon. A Spec. 5 with the 1st Infantry Division wrote, "They don't care whose Mr they're on as long as it's the winning side." A Spec. 5 Crew Chief stated, "They want to win but ant someone ele*: to win it. And, another GI wrote, "The" only time they are concerned is when thev are directly involved i-ither |)b\>icnlly of financially.'' A Spec. 4 with the 1st Infantry Diviiou wrote, "The S'irtname!*' people don't care about anytliing except a |>eaepful life." And, again, as iu the previous q'uwlioii, the Gls made comment* concerning the Vietname** thirst for-thr GI doUar. A Spe. 5 with UtiARV HQ said, "They only wanTTomake a Imrk and kee-p thfiimclvs alive."
How is the American 1'acitica.lion program (winning the hearts and inind.-> of the Vietnamese jx-opl*1) working? A; tVorkmg very well (17'V)< H) Working moderately well (4fjr'(). (C) Working poorly f20r;).
i.IU Not working at all <~<~). iJj) Other, pleane staJe (W ',). Many GU sceni to fei-1 prognw if IM-IIIE made but a S|x-c. 4 ith the 9th Inf. Div. wild, "It's slow >iiii-e the poi>iilation is liard to control and moves a lot." A SJH.I-. .*i with the MACT said, "It' more like buying their hearts and minds." Must veterans readily admit that most pacified areas will fall-back to cm.-niy control once the American leave completely. .Should toe AH\'N be doing a greater [wrcvnUgc of the ground fighting? (A) Should be doing a much larger (leTceutage of the ground fighting iTl'/J. <K> Should be doing slightly larger percentage of the ground fiffhting (IK' <J. ((.') Should be doing about the same amount of ground fighting '6;<>. > l > ) Should be doing kiu> ground fighting C2%). 'li; Other, pk-aix- stau.- M',',). Tbe Gl^ obviouidy believe the AftVN should be doing more fighting. A Spec. 4 with the 4iu Infantry *aid, "They should be doing s!> the fighting. It's their country, isn't it?" Will tbe AilVN be able to take over all thr ground fighting at the end of December 1971 (one year from tiow)? <A) Ves, defiuiuJy (S'/c)ill) Yes, but with occasional ground 'infantry) Mp '2-';r,'). (C) No, but should be able to soon after December 1U71 (^1 c/c). il No, definitely not (3*0 <l-:> Oilier, please *UU- (10',;. With the adftiinistration utting a deadline of this sui..'< rs as the time MM AUW will tie doing oil thec ground fighting, the Gls (town to bolirve the AllVV woti't U- tiAe to do it. M f tate "No" defiuitel.' 1C and D;, and 23% ntat (it; but with occasional American ground lufautry help, (taly S'( nay ly "Ves." TUP GI'* scoru for the AKVN i quite open. "They're more td with avoiding the enemy than dent roving him," a rfc with the Wu Inf. . A S|x-c, 4 with the 4th Infantry nid, "The AKV'Ns are obviouoly coward*.'' M'Mt GI* did fetil that the Alt\'Nfc w< re getting better, however. I > i i>u Mpprove i>t dioapprnve nf tin,' way iu which I'ri-xident Nixon )< bundUng the war? fA) dfjinilely apj>ri>v- '^4^). 'Bi Moderatr-Jy Hpprirt-i- (',"). ff' Moderati'Jy dmapprovr HT'l).
: I i IMiniuJy dixappruve (13'';.). (Kj I'HfJecidfd (10%),
709
flv explain answer. The men generally approve of Nixon'* handling of the Briefly war so far. "ffis policy u the only way out1' and He'* making the best of a bad situation" were two pro-Nixon quoted. The den who disagrcn with Nixon'* policies usually want*>faster xate-of withdrawal. Concerning the troop pullowk ate. should President Nixon . . . (A) PuUafi troop* our immediately {!%). <B) Pun truopa out faster .(27%). (C) Pull troop* out at the ame rate (33%). (D) Pull troop*out slower (12%). (E) Other, please state (12%) Some mcu seem to ted that Nixon should puB the troop* out faster {43% from A and B) while others (12% from D) are for * (lower withdrawal. The mem who chose (D) usually have such commeaU as "Bomb Hanoi" and "Stop treating them with kid gloves." A very interesting aspect i* that many GI* aimply do not believe that Nixon it putting out a* many troops as he says he i*. "He put* back a* many as he pull* out' and "There i* a plane of replacement* for every one that leave*" are typical comment*. Which of the following closest fit* your description of bow the Vfetaanuiation of tbft war U progressing: (A) Verysueef*sful(10%). (B) Moderatelysuccessful (55%). (C) At a standstill (18%). (D) Not succeasful (14%). (E) Other, please *tate (%). Again the <H* *how optimism about moderate progres*, but, * in the pacification program, chow a pessimism about what will happen when the American* leave. "There i* progress, but it'* slow and I'm not optimi*tie about what will happen wbn we'll pull out," urote a Pfc. i>o you approve or disapprove of the Moratorium P*ac Protect of October 15th and November loth, 1970 aiid of other peace demonstration*? (A) Definitely approve (27%). (B) Moderately approve ^22%). (C) Do not approve (35%). (U) Do not approve and protesters should be jailed (8%). (E) Other, please state (M%). In a surprising mov<:, i% CA and B) approved of the peace demonstrations whUi: 1.;% (C and D) djuapprpved. A .S[>-. 5 radio operator wrote, "I was in Nam but iny wife was murcbiog iii Han Francisco. U'e'll make the next oue togeiber." Another tfuec. 4 said, "It's the grcatMt thing to happen in yen*." However, the other side of the coin wan commented on by a Sgt. -5 with the 1st Cav., "ProtwUTB and proUatt* hurt morale and give VC/N\'A a p*yeh>Io{UCJiJ advantage." It seem* strange that those nira fighting the war would approve of a \M-mrf. drmontistion but not as strange as it seeni* wbeu you remember that 80% of the grunt* are draftees who were forced to fight or go to jail. Those in Vieinitm do dot want tos t; there but fati'c little choice. Vice President Agnew in his glorification of the Vietnam GI as opposed to the "Peacenik Protester seem* to think tua* they are made of different material. N'ot ofily i this not true but it seenu thai the only difference between pome CJU id Kara and demonstrators i* that one has avoided the* *ru>}'How would you rate your officers concerning ibeT overall job efficiency?
If
I OMtf OtCfM ftMt....... f . *,,.,..* * *-***,+*,.* *,************* * ' A
I ft. c. M*I. "T klskw ft* p, a *jaU*r *MT MM * a*" What i your estimate of the M-16 rifle for use in VitamT rA) tosdlMt UW%), (B) ^toud (2&%). (C) Fair tf%).
710
(D) Poor /!%). ' <E) Other, pieiase state (%). The d were almost unanimous in their agreement that the M-16 la an "excellent" or "good" weapon. All comments were favorable. A Spec. 4 with the 4th Inf. commented, "No one watts awa-v from it." and a poetic gnint wrote. "Keep it etcan, it> a tMd maebine." " ^^ Are the body counts of Viet Cong and NTA reported from TOUT unit correct? (A) Very accurate (23%). (B) Moderately accurate (21%). <C) Not accurate at aU (24%); (D) Misrepresented (10%). (E) Other, plasae itate (22%). . It Menu that tnaoy GI* feel that the body counts, which the army tisw as success indicator* iwc inaccurate and inflated. Did yo<j.se any racial diMrimination In Vietnam? (A) Ve*,ttefiniteJy (3%). (B) Yea, but only once or twice (26%). (O No racial diMrimination teen (46%). ID) Other, pteatte utate. If A or B chosen, briefly explain. The army still ha problem* in. Jth> area of racial problems. 52% (A and B) said they did see racial discrimination. A Spec. 5 with the 101st Airborne Div. wrote, "Only a few lifers from the couth still believe white is better than blade" and a Ffc. with the 4th Division said, "It's part of our social system. The Blacks interviewed ee split 0-50 as to if tbece were any incidences of racial diserimmatinn. Robert tallery. a Black Marine, sair1 "The US. Gov't should handle its own problems before trying to solve the problems of other countries." A surprising backlash occurred with some whites stating that the Blacks were discriminating against the whites. A Spec. 4 with the 4th Inf. commented, "The Black man shows considerable prejudice toward the whites." Bow would you rate the morale of the United States troop*? (A) Excellent (10%). (B) Good (40%). (C) Fair (24%). (D) Poor (17%). (E) other, please state (3%). Apparently morale is not as good as the Government says nor as bad as some make it out to be. A Spec. 4 with the 1st Log. Command said, "The reason morale is good at all is because we kuw we go home at the end of one year. We count each day." What happened to your body weight in Vietnam? (A) No change (%). IB) Gained weight (18%). (C) Lost 1 to IS pound* (33 ,*c). (D) Lot 16 to 30 pounds (14%). (E) Lost 31 pounds or more (5%). With the donate and the food most, especially those in combat units, tend to lose weight. Wtiil'f in Vietnam, did you amolce marijuana (pot)? (A) No (4*%). IB) Yes, 1 to 5 times (H%). (C) Yes, fl to 20 Urots* (U%). (D) Yen, 21 turn* or more (12%) . (E) Comments, please state (3%), With tin- prewMO'c of a war ualf-way around the world resting ou their nboulden. the availability of pot in Vietnam aud a permMve social attitude in the United States, 4U% of those interviewed smoked pot vbile iu Nam. Yet, a survey in t&t VJ6. of young people the same age aud background* taken for a one year period . would windy show the same or higher rewulU. A Spec. 4 wroff, "ckc- a good buddy die or Iwum to hi scream aud they olc you why you sn'okc pot." If it wasn't for gnu*, I probably would have gone insane." said anoli^r. A tipoc. 4 with the th Inf. said, "My job was 4o*ay high "M tuutf ft day/' "V seeds a but* to throw drafUie* iu jail for nmokiiie <m ' with att the other thjjp faapueuing *--- in Ouv >wi*i rj.tminljer, .ho*-0ver, that 48% r&pxnted thac they had not waked. According to what you bavo actually nmtu aud particiuaUid in, ths alleged H**cre vfVjetaaoMiM dviliaus by American lufantry at My I-ai was;
7ir
(C) One of many aimiUr incidents that occurred fl?%). O Other, briefly explain (39%). Briefly explain answer. The qwartion was phrased in an attempt to Hlminato Timidw and hearsay. The 39% .(D) aad no personal knowledge of the incident, did not reply, r &M tptetfc'co*imett.~A. shocking 12% stated that it was one of a few similar incidents and at least 3% of the comment- in (D) could be fitted into the (O category. This would total 15% for (C). 23% believed it iras one of a few 'similar modent*. Some quote* were aa a shocking as the Life magi line photos. "1 would and did kfll women and kids, but if I hadn't. I wouldn't be here." A Spec. 4 aid with an intense smile, "I learned to kSH and enjoy it. Especially those people." It became obvious that the more eoinbat experience a man had the more easily be acknowledged .that such './tridents arc powible "especially because of our low regard for the Vietnamese wblclfmake* kilting them like killing animals," *aid one "grunt." A Pfc with the 1st Cav. commented, "After you are there for a while, you bate them alt" Another soldier wrote. "I have no pity on any Vietnamese. Tbry all get what they deserve." This dchumaniiation seems to be a primary reason why a My Lai could occur."They're just gooks," a Spec. 4 put in. Should the men involved in the alleged My Lai massacre be
(A) Oi isolated toddent tiiat occurred (28%). ' (B) OM of a few similar incidents that occurred (23%).
(A) Given a court martial (M#%). IB) Given a reprimand (14J{%). <C) Set free (49%). (D) Other, please rtate (22%). Of the 14M%wfaotated that the men should be given a rourt martial, many qulaified that by aaying "only the officer* should be court martialed. The others were just following orderx." It seema the vast majority of Git feel that the men involved in the numacre nbould be net free or given a reprimand but not court marualed. As a trooper wrote, "Omdemn war, not .those forced to fight it." Did the L'nitcd State* make a mistake when it became involved in the Vietnam War? (A) Made serious mistake '38%). (b) Made a slight misukt (%). (C) Made no mistake but fought the war incorrectly (40%). . (D) Made no mistake (10%). (K) other, please state. Briefly expu'n answer. Many GIs believe that Vietnam was fought incorrectly and that "they had to play politics and as a result a lot of good nieu are dead. Many men answering with (C) or (D) believe that if we were going to tight the war we should "Bomb bell out of North Vietnam and declare war." Those answering with (A) and (B) made such comments as "Killing and death arc Always serious mistakes;" "It wasn t any of our business;" and "No 3rd power has the right to interfere iu a civil conflict." When I asked one grunt if be bad anything else to say alx>ut the war, be volunteered a beautiful description of the war: "This, war can be summed up as the incompetent idling the unwilling to do the lur Mary tor the ungrateful."
STATKMISKT or DAVID V VIOSKAULT, RcrKt:sr.*TATJVi;, MASSACHUSKTTS GCXKUAL Cntrirr in fnvojr of the proposal* for the witLdrawsl of U.S. troop* from Viet Nam by JJcewnbor 31 of HIM year. I very utrongiy urge the passage. I believo that this war has been fouttUt with the grocery uwaey of ^tate aud local gpvernuieni aud that the ovrrduc tt'tSt tor tiJs negêt ace eoming due, I believe it w accurate to say tb^ f.be bigf* ait single J'l.-a-on fc/ the sharp increase in local property and sutt'sals ai*d income tax is this war. This war has cuased inflation, recession, and uneotployioent. It has caused the costs of state aud local government to go up and at the same time diminished iu income. MasMchusctU is a typical examfAe~*Vf liave before our logilatur the proposal to increase rtate taccn cl<>*e to 430 miiliou dollars in a state of '> uiillioo population and at the saroo time iocreuing property taxes. We will be 'in sessioH all year dri>sting this difficult problem aud the longer *K t'c in sewiioii, the bigger the figures for our additional revenue come in so Uiat before tto year U over UK: governor will rvobbly have to ask for ev<>t a larger amount even though thin amount is twi, 4 as larRe as any tax increase in the past. I agree with tuy own ( 'nuguMNiuia Poland's efforts townrd peace and urge him and others to push for roll calls a*d vote against appropriations fur tte war.
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Compared to Massaehtwctt* 2 billion dollars for the budget this year, I view with amazement the eooxervative estimate of 100 billion for this war3 billion of which would have come from Massachusetts and of 80 billion toward defense budget this rear, 2.5 billion of which would have come from Massachusetts that from thli defense budget the avenge family in taxed $1600, that the C5A airplane contract overrun at 2 to 3 billion t mater than our state budevt, that two-thirds of all tax monies go to Washington, that we spend $700 to $800 to educate a student and $10,000 to train a soldier. As far as I am concerned, the threat to the future security of the United State* is right here in our cities. I agree with Senator Sy uiiujrtoo's statement that some Senator* can bear the sound of distant guns but not I Le crv of a hungry baby in their own city. The threat to our future security are racial divisions, crimes, drug*, including the veterans not cured by the military. unemiJoymeut, welfare, medical cosU, transportation, housing aud pollution. I rent-lit also the fact that people front blue collar background*, many of whom I represent, arc bearing a disproportionate share of th<; combat fightings, sous of policemen, fircmrn, truck drivers, construction workers and |xul worker*. ! agree with Time Magazine that if it's safe enough for us to negotiate trade ago vim-ills with Red Cbiiiuand that if it'* safe enough to ncgotiite nuclear agreeincut- it-ith Uussia, then it is safe enough for us to take our mcu out of Vietnam in 6 months. PHII.AUKU-MIA, PA., May SI, JS71. . W. fLUUIUUIlT, L'mumiUff on Foreign lUlationt, H athinijlan, D.C. 1 H AU St.MATo*. FL-JJIKIOHT: Tlmnk you vcrj' much for your retum of my letter dated -\!uy T2. Instead of issuing several paces of reasonable K-npth which mi^b tend U> burden \our stuff, I would, iu^toud, like to present of brief suinnuiUoii o juy view. A the terms "pro^'i-tive reaction", "jttrategic dtêrrc-iice", "defoliation", rt al have captured our spirit, a new phrase of "neo-isolatioiui" ha> wJURLt vuUdity in the American vocal Milan. 1'nrsKieiil Nixon !ui> d)fM>scii bUfh uxjirt-ysjoiis uitliout Minnrl delinitlon: I Hiippox; tills exempt; in ainl'IKUIty is the ripht of statenineu. He apjH-ar- to Ix- >UVIIIK if the Aiiicricsn military coinuiituicnt to its leg.-il intTiciti'iuul re.-ponri!>ilitie- are not met, the Tinted States facet- a void of wc]u->i<>u ; that i. Aiiii-nca will no lonêj- r-coi{i:i- Uie nix-ds and dojn-s of its "fncnds" and ill tlo*.- inifi a shell of nelf-exi^mce. If wi- mtdcrstand the President correct ly, ilu* tv|H.- of A'ncrican Ix.-iiuvior i.-> \>ttl\\ "iinpructical and daugcrou*." It Would u|)i-:ir <|uiU- unlikely that the I luted .Stale-* could remain unnoticed in ll'.e ('immunity of n;tti'>ns; the conf -inporury a%e of coniiniinicati'm!' and tran.-*portaUnii m:iUi> all nalnMit> tirothers and Ix-ckoiii euch to assist in the eradication of IIUIIK riii- <-i:i:il ills. Th<: Amenraii resp<ins<- to domestic vniw should not be. isolatnuii'-m, ill-dehned and pixirly used, but the- itiU-Krution of resources und capabilitic- di -ixiiwl to kid the uholc- of humanitv. If the L'mted Stales uould utilize it.- Iibi-rul foundation of cooperation, industry and equality, not its at(Kre^-ivi.nature, isolationism Mould exist only in NewsjH-nk, ul>enl from the American C|iie( of "lilH-rt/ and jutici' for all." 'J'hn.ik you very much for your kind attention, JSincvn-ly, MA Kk
Hon. J. WILLIAM Cluiinwin, Ciiinniitlrs i,n fitfi.ign Hrlnliiint, U.K. S mats, WathirujloH, JJ.C. \tK\K MK. < ' H A I K M A V : On April 2/<(h afti-r witni- ~ini{ on televiioii your re. S|KIII-M- I" ilii- liarasotnefit from a Kroup of "pran- denion>.trutorH," 1 wrote to
}'! Ud'l re<|lleKl/;d |)ertllisxloll to testify before VOIIT roinlllllU'e,
<>/j May Knh I received frofn ifr. ('or! ilarcy, \\u: O/tmniUeeV cliw-f of staff, the folln-inK k-lUT: H'iib rei"pi-ct to your request </< t^-stifv in connection with Jworinc." 'in pending ifwimurrx relating f tl* war in Vietnam, it IMP. N-eti decided I hat no u/ldiUonaJ te.timotiy i/tber than that already H'hcdub'd will t* beard iu
713
public seswon*. You :nay, if you wish, submit within three weks a statement of reasonable length which will be included in the public record of the Committee hearings. The number of person* asking to be heard has been such that this course of action if necessary- Witnesses still scheduled to testify include representatives of the Department of Defense, as well as several individuals specifically invited to appear because of their unique or special expehenoe. It is our belief that the full record of the Committee's hearing!) witt show that there ha* been a fair balancing of various point* of view. Accordingly, 1 trust that you win find this letter to be of reasonable length: that it will contribute toward* a fair balancing of various points of view from the testimony taken. A point of view which I urge the committee to considei, in connection with measures relating to the war in Vietnam, is one which is becoming apparent to two minority grouns of loyal Americans : UJS. prisoners-of-war who remain incarcerated throughout .' Ja as a result of that war; their families here at home. Why must those families continue to travel worldwide, attempting to trigger soon-thing cabled "world opinion0 which alledgMilv is going to ensure humane treatment for American POW's in Southeast Asia? Why must- those families have to experience the humiliation of pleading with some foreign bureaucrat for word that thfir lowd onesour POW'might rtfll be alive after yecrt of imprisonment? It i* obvious why they contiuue their efforts on behalf of U.S. w prisoners: thfir families remain faithful to them. Also now obvious in the ele\ _*ntb consecutive year of indecisive warfare US. combatants have been required t<> wage in Sou t heart Asia is the stjtrt ftalicatteu the L'jv Government has forsaken those prisoners. For they arc being negated to history in the wniit- manner as were a similar {croup of Americana in thf inid S'.0's ns'raptivrs of Communist China atid North Korea. Two of them remain in captivity today in thr Peoples lie-public of Chiua where they hav- boen imprisoned sintu- IttM Those two men arc "civilian.-." onu could arpue bv the use of legalistic hair-split ting, and not subject to cojiMdcraUoii as "POWV*' Kvuts duritie thf pa.-t two rfocados, however, should justify our concern for tbm a American war \>n -oners. Al><> imprisoned in luainLund China art- t'.S. rombatant^ from tlw Vietnam War although we m-iitiiaiii the firtion they ar>- "<ietatnei-" ratb> than "P<iW>." Ar t - thcri- Anu'rii'-ui 1'OW- till cn!:neil in North Koieu? Circiiiu-i:intial I'Mdi'tin- [irm-' the *t roue probability that wisne remain there today a* :i refill of 111" inili-ri-ive c-iiijiiit' of the Korean War in I'.i.VJ. Ati'l in 1!*7l th- ("nited Stau-> prooi-d.. with a -iinil'ir -olution for tin- jireênt contt-cl in SoMtbea^t A.-ia. ! it merely "extreini-t liv-t-Tui" wlucli wnuM lirecunlalr the' cii:trne that I'.S. :ir pn-.oners Uj>'e lui-n fornak'-n by tln-ir ' loveniiin-n!'' It rii-\-tnl~ '>n your point of VK-A , j>:irucuLirly y>, if you rutve b>i-u KIHIIIX in -aiue )>ii~on r. il -IHIICW Ix-re in Ai>'a fi>r the lust. live. ix. or ni(iete<Lii year>. Or ni.-id'- inquire to ttw N'orth V iel.naiiii1-.' '1-lepiUoti jit the J'ans \-.tri- tiilk-, riircnnii2 the fate <if \oiir iiu-liand or son. Or rf you are coinoderiim a lifetutw career in the t'.S. Armed Korrfo. you er>- n tneuiber of orw of tho-e tniuonty tronjr-, nnt inithl be as a valid indirutinn that AtiM-ni-an POW s an- Jn-ins foriotu-u bv their O/venitjieiit de-pit*- jM-rioihc en[ire--ioii.. of couc4Tii on th"ir Ivhalf by toj otfirial-t of vnriiHi" AdiuitUKtraMon^ and by key ,'ieiiiberN of the Cotiure'' That's a difficult quer-lion for .sorif-otic tx> uiitwer t'Kiuv if he ha bi-n n captivity for the pn-oudiiiK KIX r more year.- ixHiM-whcFK in Asia. Hut the probability IF. trstn-ni'-Jy hifdi what hi< au.wi-r would inidude were he aware of many facto il>here duriiiK that time, liecauê thii IctU-r tjiu-it, U- ,f "rea~oimble L-ngUi," nly a few item- provid<-d by the meiul>er of tbi^ |We^tinifu coiuiuitt-: The nkeptiririi of H- rhairinun which !>', x-ted a rr>^>lutu>n uf the entire .'iiuf coiiitijflidiiJK I'.S. roinlmUiniH uho canici]iau*xl in the aw>aull late t >'<!ar on Son Ta>, North Vitttiuuu, in itu stteni]<t t<i fret- Auwrk-au war nouer. TU- wid<-ly heralded ntratney, proposed by otw im-mbcr, for ending U.S. iv.ilveiijejjt in the Vietnam U'ur whili* hundred- of America/I war prixorwrx -fuiun in captivity in Ain: "Tell the world we've won and corm: home." The apparently unwavering opinion nine*- IMi.'t by aftotber catuuu'Mv r that a blockade 'if Haipbr>n harbor would not "product- aiiytkiiiK n" rcgardiuK the- outcome of the Vietaam War, despite tbf wealth of evideiice availabb- to him then and in each subntiqueat year to
e^ 'iM1\
it
714
Periodic approval by any member of this committee for continued tl-S. trade with Communist-Woe nations in Eastern Europe during the conduct of the Vietnam War. Those few representative items, considered individually, certainly do not SiibhtantJjttf the charge that American war prisoner* have been fo <takn by the U.S. Government. Collectively, hoirever, with a host of similar items gleaned from ILS. domestic and foreign policies in recent yean, they fona a mosaic providing the substantiation. Consider, Mr. Chairman, the words of former astronaut Prank Borman when be addressed a joint session of Congress on September 22, 197V: "I woold implore you, gentlemen, Members of Congress, who have so much else on your mind, striving with the daily problem* of a great country the problems if war, securing qiutl opportunity, social problem* that beset this country I request that afi of you in some way, nvtry day, remember the people, the U-S. citizens, who StK pri*onen>, iutd I strongly beg you not to forsake your countrymen who have given 80 mud for you." Consider requiring the Nixon Administration to have U.S. military forces -impose a Mockade of Haiphong harboreven at this late date unlew North Vietnam and her allies promptly rdi-awc American war prisoners. CnaMdw urging your coflevgues in the Congress to impose a total ban on U.S. aid and trade to <wty country which tmdes with North Vietnam until U.S.. war prisoners in captivity throughout Asia arc released. Consider also the fact continuing U.S. foreign and donestie policies not devoted to exerting every noewiWe type of pressure on North Vietnam to abide toj^tfae Geu?va Conventions regarding the humane treatment of war prittmera make a mockery of the oft-exprtsned determination by U-S. Government officials to do "everything po*dble" to help American POWs. CVynsidcr also which nations around the world other than the United States will really t>" convinced if we mcfdy say we won the Vietnam War without und . !al4y daing to. Thos>; urc some i Mjsiderations relating to the war in Vietnam that I respectfully urge your committee to think about in it deliberations. Sincerely, Bzuf AJU> K. TOOK AC, Jr.
Hon. J. W.
o, CALIF., Jv.net, 1971.
Waihinglon, D.C. DKAK KFNATOE FULUKIGHT: Thank "on for giving me the opportunitr to prex-iil pl:m for ending tlv nr. \<>n K-qnr l-<J that it he of p'OMonabb- L-riKth !>o it could ix' inrlud<-d in the public record* of the S<>nat r'or.-ign Relatiotiii CouiA ]>IHII. and nuuiuul 'rf p<-rstiori. would tulc<- about U)U pane-;. And nine? no many urKunicnts, ]>ro aud ettn, hive U-cn i>r<'wjjt-d before, docunu-ntlion to support nafb û-p would take niauy thou-and- <>f <-xiiilut><. I faall try ofite druntie ttbori cut* j- FhtUc 1 of my i>res>iitatiun. Sinn- i mil not (Coiflic to pnwiit the voluuiifiou data, I nball (civp yon a hort outltui- of my inn'kKround to '.-uabk- you t/j judi(e a t<< bow luurb you cuii di'i:ud on the corrertiiewi and practicalibility of lay taf ijjentri. 1. I am an industrial efifdruier with fuorn than '<0 ypar^ <;X(<pT>-nw. I have ttJwitVb liad to pr'i4ejit plani for Hulvinx prubl<-iH. Kach |Hu had to be vuch that the probji-rji could Ix- >^>lved H'itlun it dfifmite tioie At v UeliiiiU' 4-ol Wnjj p<>ri>oii;i(.-l and oilwj- reHoiirc^n uvuilablt, and listed in tbme plan The iM-iielll* MjwsVn eKVeedlllK (hi* ix^t I ujKvh had tJ> produce tut* j'lanuod nd dewreji renulu. An "^-xplanauon" tt'lj.v n di'i ii'ii wort will nt doired re>ijll. ,>m;ie of ujy a>wi)pin>ent hitv: 'wen attempted by rtber>< who failed to produce. TlM'w |>riji-ciu w-r<', th-n, de<Jard, "iiu|>owubif" or "impractical". My tusk ui< not t>< develop au "Apiaiuiioa", au etenun why it wouldn't work, bui t>i iiow the *tep that will (ante it work. Au i-tîu^: Au Air Pore* Plant WU.H ordered to iuervnne >U output by Mf/0, Jt rec*-jvd aMJroval ftr a ' '<0% iucrenw; of punMMUiei, fruin H^MMJ to . i pfL-oonUidajjUij uiiucrease output Xl%iutdWtfecjJuriMMu>elfrcMu
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My phn WRS declared impossible by the general manager and his staff. I tfaen showed tfcem bow to do it with the remit that we increa.<ed output 50%, then 10% more, and reduced penonel to 8,600. This was accomplished in spite of such obstacles as Arm) red tape. Civil service red tape. Political red tape and The human emotional element involved when civilian and raiiit*ry officers had to be used to carry out operations that they had declared imposmbic. Among my qualifications, I wfll mention that: 2. I am over 30by 44 yearsI wear my hair short. I never rioted. I haw contributed to the community much more than I took out (and enjoyed it). I feel there is more of the good and desirable in the U.S.A. than in other country* and unless we make a special effort in thw country to myntîn our progress and prevent the rot resulting from corruption, we cannot avoid the disintegration that results from corruption; and that destroyed ALL previous civilisations.
VOW THE FLAX
I. The U.S.A. is powerful enough in science, in engineering, in industry, in military, that it can decide unilaterally whether we get involved in war*. We need not have tta agreement of Hanoi, Moscow, or any other center. If they will work with us, we could, and should, extend our welcome. 1. All wars have been started (a) When oae side had robbery as his primary objective. The earliest wars weretoy tribe* lobbing their neighbor tribes of thrircattle. <IOO veaw ago in the Western United State*, that was called cattle rustling and if the ''warriors" were caught, tbev were hanged.) Later, robber* ambushed Ctnners who were taking their goats, chicfcenes and wheat to the market to nrfaange them for pote, knives, axes. Some robbers 8taMLibed a continuing operation of robbery and they call their loot "taxes". Still later, the robbers called themselves "protector.*'. The victim* were told tbi-y would Ix: prou-cu-dfrom other robbers. Actually the robber* were protecting their own source of loot. Some robbers tented tbeL- area of robbery and called tbcmnelves "chief", "baron," "governor", "King", "emperor", and lately, "prewdenti". In recent robberies the loot was iron mines and coal mines. The Miteuis and Sumitomo*, ordered their junior partner, Hirohito, to tend a million of their 4ave to Manchuria to rob the Chinese of their mine*. It was cheaper for the MitttuU, Bakai* and Hirohitas (but not the Japanese subject") to rob the iron ore and coal than to buy it. In Europe, the Krupps and Thyascuu had their junior partner*, Wilbeim II and Adolpti Hitler, rob the owners of coal mines, and iron mine*, ki Frauce, Polsud and Checkoglavokia. It wait cheaper for Krupp, Tbysnen, Wilheim, and Adolph (but not the German subject*) to rob the owners than to buy the coal mid iron ore. Two hundred year ago George III and bit fynd,cate of robbers attacked the Kogtifth colouuts in North America who refused to be robbed. During the pant couple of centuries, a number of wan were started by ruling robber* for tUe purpoxc of victimizing their own Kubjecto. Tom Pain was the fint one to observe that. He said, "Kings and Prince* tell their subjects they need more 'tax> money for war*, but it appean> that they htan warn, or make j/reparatioiut for wan> in order to have an ôcuw for taking more money (taxes) from their ubiecU. The MaKinoi line had no other function than an a device for the war contractors aad their junior purtwrM, their }>oUticuui>-, to j-ick the por-kct* of their vktiuit, the French uxpnyern. The Magiiiot Lifte that cot billkmn did not have wjy inore dcterriag value agaiost the German* thao a W.OO Hpcar. la the U.S.A. the Safeguard doat not safeguard our citicii. It uflifeguards the flour of inco?:}- from tb>- ixickeiK of th>- veriiKe Aoterican taxpayer, the victim*, to the pockeu of the war profiteer*, their junior partner*, their j<olitician and lawvem. The F-U1, (we TFX, CSA are aUo dn-ioes for dayliidit burgbuy by war cootractorii and their jxtlitician* and law>-erH. TV MUIIJ up, the primary objective at wan and prppartatiOM for warn i da>1ight burgUry. Our burglar* charge us $450,000 to murder * Viet ptawuit when th*
71ft
rate for murder by the Capone gang i only $10,000. And that L< for an individual, custom job. Wholesale, they would praba'jly do it for $5,000 apiece and probably $10,000 for babies. But the war profiteer*, their |>olitician aud lawyers want a much bigger margin of profit than Capon*'. Now, what process do I offer to stop the Vietnam war, to rftop all wars? The process i.s to remove the incentive to start wars, to wage wan, to prejiaiv for wars. Take the profit the money -out of warn. ("l>o nut lead us into Temptation" "Where your treasure is then- i* \.ur heart also"Old, Old lessons.) During a hearing before a Senate Committee, when IJavid Packard, war profiteer, wax requexi4*d to give infonuatitiD ou the war situation i. Vietnam, hi< testimony drove Senator Aiken, one of UK* respected inejubvni of the tiraa-U-. from the bearing. When he emerged, he said, ".Ml he was talking about was contracts. I couldn't stand it Jiy lotiper. I bud to leave." I suggest your Committee and Senator ProxinierV Committee should join your efforts in exposing the thievery and name the individual culprit* Individual theft- (Jike taking $4.1.000,000 for $3.'>,OUO,000 Worth of M 1C rifles). Indiodual Cor|n.ralii.ii dir.-ctj.r~. Individual uniiv A: navy ..r?ic>-r> who panicipat*- in theM' daylight imrtchuii-. Iiujividual senaUr-, C'ljiKfvyMuen. rultiiK-t ruemlicf^, th- preMdmt.- and their lawyi-r-.. Tb'-n, co tt> the otizrrifrv and nr^c them to force the various proM-cuting attorncvs to charne the t'.u-vex with larrcnx and re-quest jailing of the burglur> and restitution of the t'oleu uiimunt,* plus triple duiuaues. This procesi. will wurt 11 you want it, I will -develop a H<>w-T<-l>o-It Manual that will make it o;T:it* nal. n- I l-.a\- d<-ne for the Air Force in govcniiuent and for x. nruaU- Arncriean 1 Irn in Chili-. Tr-- ::. The \>rm-r-<-<v you have tried thu* far liad such re-ult- a- 1 )urn|)iiiK John-oi) and n-pluciiiK him *ith Kiiu.ii (a Xcrc.x ropy). Dumping (he Srritinel and repIu-iiiK it with Sitfecuard (a Xerox coj.\ I. DumiiiiiK TFX and n-pJ.-M"iij; n with F-l II (u Xtj'ox Ropy;. Duiiiping a trillion dII;ir-. Dumping the i>ves of tWI.(KX) .f our youth a- well in the lives of <JUO,00() A-ian |M,'a.<aiit.. Try it, Senotor. If you watit H->w-To details, I'll furnish them. Mnn-n-lj , J IMI s \\ IVTOS. ('IIKISTI FotLou-ill, Matt., Mai; 10, I&~<1. lit- .Slutorueiit to lie iu'-JuJcd in public records by iuvjtatiun of Carl Marcy, Chief of Maff, on April .'JO, IttTl. U.S. SBS-.TE, Commitltf on Pnrrign IlrJalitini, lon, D.C. SI.VATOU FrumioHT, CHAIUMAK, AND MKMVMCH OK TUK O>MHITTI:I: '<v Jt^LATfoM). 1 Tii an k you fur thix invitution to uddre^ you. I do regret that your octuidule of jmbLc li'-anog. <jeh nut allow the j>uu.sibihly at uiy M-tnul pmwncc- before you, Since January when I vinited Wushiuifton to pnwnt the firM copy of my booklet "l'.S. Policy in Southeast Asia 'WhatV It All About?' " to President Xixon aud twelve 8eiuitorn, I have be-u constantly eiigai;ed in presenting thi NUJU- VP-H' to other citixenjt. I already hate mailed a copy to each nifiulx'r of your Cxxnuiittj-e. I again auk your attention to uiy written work, for in it in e*i>rewd HIV ix-ln-f in the "American iMiun" of Oemocrflcy which JM offepded greatjy and threat/coed wvwcly by our courw of foreign policy in Soutiicjwt Aria. The booklet car<.-full> poinU out the philoMOphk- error which biut \nvii followed by our recent ChK-f Kxecutiveji. Further, I muct dcrlare my diwifcreentent with out- nation V fourmin lodo-ChJua became, to sue, it violate* lu a grave uuuater the purpove aud teach Jug* of C!iri(. An an American I have Kivcti up everything I have ever pOMCMed in order to oppofc the faulty policy of our nation. Today I ni d<epk- in deM atid recently toy lather die in a pul>lic bed in Boston City ]io*pital where I could
ffr him nothing except a eon's love Ur A tired man dying much ahead f hit time. 1 tell you these thing* not to play the rote of * Martyr. I must tea 700 these thing* to teeart you in ywnr decisions difficult Mid neeeasarvI am not * radical; however^ I can readily undertUnd the frustration which impels so many, especially our yovth, toward violence against life and property. understand y*or indecision. For (oar months I tuwc delivered booklet* to colleges, churches, and to individuate in various occupation* and I disuvtied a great degree of indecision. The tragedy of Vietnam is indeed the logical outoasne of the many tragedies in our daily live* here in the United State*. We att mart begin somewhere to put oar house in order. Whereas youth diedafly on the tnttifrields, I beg you to move immediately for an abrupt end to war in Southeast Asia. Please move far United Nations' mediation of the question. I beg thenc things because presently I can do nothing other. .Sincerely, GEOKOC F. PCJUT.
Exccsrr FBOM UJ5. Power IK SOUTHEAST ASIA "WHAT'S IT ALL ABOUT?"

-FlUTVES CHS18TI POOKDATJO* LOWELL, MASS.
Who is to blame for the happenings in Southeast Asia? The President? The Secretary of Defense? Anxwer: Yes ana no. Yea, tb?y are to blame but not fully. Kach American nhares in that blame and censure. We have failed to U\t up to Tom JeffpfHon's nop& for govemmect. The Orertkotioo -of the United Scale* has l*tm violated by the Burger Court in it ducking out from bearing the Commonwealth of MaMariasett* in rU recent address to that Court Rtemming from the Stu- BiO. Tbe citixeng of the Unrtni States have surrendered their responsibility a.-> hav tbfir representauvex in Congrefs. For Fhamf! Biehard Kison, President of the United States, is coufufled consider*blr. Dr. Ki-winger bean the letters of H di-jrrw which pheaomenologically b tb modt turiefti of all tb degrees. Maybe the tiny ha* come for him to return to Harvard with Daniel to lick their wounds and W find tbemaelvts at they really are: Beings-in-time, human. At tbu point in ibi* writing I raquext the good doctor to appear with me on a nations! T.V. broadcast to dincuii* Southeast Aia in it* current etting. He need not fear that 1 am a Marxist because I havfe- corrected the flaw in Marxism. Karl's economic I>f>rorh to man got hung-up where I succeeded in my approach to man 'hrougb Dcxualiiy ad vouched for in my recent publication, TV Pen-it Principle. Siuce the United States, as a person and a people, has allowed ttoeif to get stuck in adofacent thinking (and it may etay there until a century or mof) the United tStnteit ha no other alternative but to tuni the whole Southeast Asia qu*t4ou ovii to (' Tbant and the United Kationp. Maybe that penon and people can net adult evi if for the Srtt time. We all have to react back to the Geneva Accord, not tugned by the United State* or South Vietnam, and get on with the taiJt of freeing people so they may enjoy Bcing-in-time, The United States has faik4 minerabiy. That in not to at* that the Soviet Union has succeeded. We have ben walting-in-place, a very I4oody, tragic_p(ace. The war must end now. Not tomorrow, not the next week, ami month. The war smut end even before the U.K. art*. Unilaterally, we muirt, a* Americans leave Vietnam, Thailand, Lao-*, Cambodia and we must take with u* borne aM American*thone in eombat fatigwM IMS weO as lltont- in P.O.W. cloUw. We have been away too long. We have suffered too much. We have done <*n>^ u<Bffmit for the historical record. Wr have squandered our heritage, we have despoiled our Constitution. We have killnd our boy* and the nous of other*, we have wounded our young, we have nix*d our <Men, we have made a mem of things once full of hope and promise. One*- at home again, we must all start anew. KILVK* Srvnc, Md., Uay It, 197i, Hon. J. WJUJAM fvuttacur, fftnatf foreign RfleUimM CtmtmiUee, A' nr Rtwttf Office Building* WaAitif'ou, D. Gtnn,Kvr.g; Aceompanyiuc tbia IrtW are two recent article* regarding the upcooiiu* elections in South Vietnam. Tb*w were written by Dr. Chanter L. Covpt-r, a leading figure in UJ^Vietoameiie atfairs since 10M. ^ fiu April f>, Hat. AdW K. Stevenwo III introduced a r*oluUon caOinx for the rf a Coaiiniitsion "to observe and *tudy" thene eieetMHis. when he
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testifrxl on itf behalf before you on April 21, sevc^tl questions wore a?kcd that gavti me the impression that *omc of its j>oiuts wore not made clear. Cl) At no time, was it n.i-nUoiied before t'le Committee thai the Resolution hi 'been discussed with various Vietnamese legislator* who have been visiting the (Tnited States recently. These officials welcome the idea, and it coo be expected that an invitation will be extended by the National Assembly as soon as it i# certain that such a public invitation would not be rejected. I might add that all Vietnamese political blocs have-at one time or another attacked the integrity of different election.". Therefore, the prv*vb<> of such a Commission would not seem to be s partisan group, favoring one side over the other. (2) The Resolution provides for observation and -supervision only over the UJ5. involvement. Although Ambassador William E. Colby has ^nid that be intends to maintain a "low profile*', most reliable communication and transportation there is controlled by us. Security for voters, in some area*, will aL-o have to be provided by American*. In addition, the rolo of tl,-e VirtnaEM-e police is x-ery much a U.S. concern, ?inr<- our Public Safety CXIM-ITS have Ut-n training them. Thus, despite the ln-st of intentions, our profile will If ohviou-. t-ven if low. (3) Thf. Resolution state* that ''no United Slates troops or other mililan assistance shall be furnished to any $outh Vietnamese regime which hereafter acquires, or retains, power through a coup d'etat or any corrupt or coercive measures". Certainly, there has prohabjy never been an election anywhere wi'.hoiit accusations of fraud. In Vietnam, w'tb IO,(KKI polling places, Kmie irregularities will be unavoidable. The ''penalty clause" of the Resolution would apply only if the victor* actually won because of corrupt or coercive measures. I:i other words, if 10,000 votes were found to IK- fraudulent, hut the candidate won by jO.itflO votra, tins would not be interpreted a corrupt or coercive under the Uoolution. (4) La*tly, the Comrni.-sion itself whether it be composed entirely of members of Congress or whether executive appointment* arc included Will quite literally be a P-'^^'aA . . . orlielfc-r. a letterhead. As seen in 1067, the 22 non-Viutiuuiuwe.i|vaking "obs'Tvers", sent by President Johnson, accomplished little. _ The irnporta.it jH-opli- are the ineriilx-n; of the s-tnff. all of uhoin :\ ill IK- 3in-nt in \ietnnmesfl. Sirce there is a limited reservoir of Midi talented men and women. any CoiurniMsi'iti would r ci'--anlv have to draw from that sarmThWitfor". the party or polarity of the f'nmmiai'imi riieiulHT< flu'iii.-elve.i would ij-dke In lii- difference, so lonit us they are all dcdicuU'd to the- ideu of free and honest elections. It is vitally important that UiU election not )>e uirr<'d. If the ;>rcs<-nt tovcriiuient is re-elected, under (he supervision of nich a fuiiiioiysioii, i'rridi-nt Thieii would have u fyff-i router pker chip to banum with: lie will no loncer Ix- coi,idiT<:d a "pupprt", and North Vn-tnuni and the LilMTu'ion Krunt would h;ur lo aeknnnledgf the k-gitiuiary of hi.- li-udcr.thip. If another candidate in-, thru he too would be stn-tifTthened in liii- OK n country and int he world by having the lrrtora.1 n-siilt- free of allegation- ;ui'l aL-nûtio:i. The purpose of the Cornrrii.sfion it to Kive tln legitirnate security to any government that might be elected. As a friend of many Vietname-a-, I know how critical it i th:it thev have thfc opportunity to show the world that the L'niled Stalo is keeping it- word to let them uetrrmini; their own dotiines. I Jrge the Committee to support this Itesulution and V> lend it- intlui-iice to it in tlw .S'liate. Sincerely yours, ' [From tl- N>r Tork Tinn. Apr. IX 1K71 1 Tin
;
l',i.i< ruu. <>ITON /v V I K T N A M : I f|li ('h'-t'T L. (''
i-iMM.r</\. l i>r IM..TV i) iu I n - . iii'f;irji-- Arii'Ticiiii "Min.'il raniee >>f ralcinnl*'- fr -mr in\i>lvrr/ii-iil in r>utli V idnii *''.'ii''i<'tririt theme cnu-rK''-: t<i pi-rmif the Sout'j Viftn.'irricx-
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their government. President Nixon has reiterated thw American objective. As rwvnuy a April 7 he reminded us that Americans arc fighting in Vietnam so that the people there nan "rhoow the kind of government they want." If the South Vietnamese art- able to exercise a free, choice, we will have achieved an honorable, albc-it costly, victory. Early in the Paris talk* there was hope that serious propositions could eventually he advanced and explored. Tt >U(dt was given to conductiw .elections in South Vietnam uider a joint noD-Ccm munis'/Communist electoral commission. The proposal was suffocated by Couunonis*. Usistcnee that the Saigon Government chould be replaced by a "caretaker" coalition and that that government should then cppoiat a joint electoral commission. Washington and Saigon were rightly -'skeptical that any caretaker government endorsed by the National Liberation Front fid Hanoi would conduct a genuinely free election. The month:) have ground into year*, and an important date on South Vietnam's political calendar which seemed rentote, even hy|X>tbetical then, now 'uoms large: early next October the people of Couth Vietnam will vote for a new government. Our stake in that election is very high. If it w fair, and known to be so, we wiQ have accomplished the one American objective consistently endorsed by every President since Eisenhower. Clearly, if the election is fraudulent, we will have lost the war, however many luore Communists may be added to the body count. A genuinely free election is a large order. But it if more palatable aud more easily achieved than virtually any other objective which, at oce time or another, we have set for ourselves in Vietnam. A credible demonstration of free choice will Ix; neither inevitable nor automatic. There is much to IK* done and one despairs that it may be already too late. The election laws of *>outh Vietnam should be revised to embrace all who choose to run or vote; th- government should be chosen by a majority rather than a plurality of the voter?: the election campaign*, the voting process and the counting of ballots roust be under the cognizance of an impeccably impartial body; military forces should be confined to their base* during the election. The press must not remain the private preserve of the Government's candidate; opposition candidates and tho*r supporters must be fn-e from potential or actual imprisonment. These steps will require careful leverage and skillful diplomacy with the Saigon Onvernment. It is a bitter irony that the vital objective of free choice is within our reach, but may t>; beyond our grasp. It is all the more ironic that our allies in Saigon, whom many believe an: American "puppets." prevent formidable obstacles. One wonders whether we would actually use our bargaining power in Saigon to insure a genuinely free election. An e.n mom difficult problem will be to (icrsuade the Communists to cooperate. Tim National Liberation Front has vehemently opposed any election conducted by the Saigon Government. If the dimmui.ists do docidc to run candidates in October or to allow the people under their control to vof, it will not be because they wish to help Washington achieve a ''victory." But sup)*)**! the ComniunixU agni-d to run and vote? And up|>o*e they won? If that should happen, we clvariy have been bucking the political tide in South Vietuimi. .Sadder but fiver for this discover, we would have little choice but to withdraw completely and immediately. Suppose they ran and, a* i< more likely, scored a mode-it vote? L'nder these circumstance*, the National Liberation Front and other political parties wliich performed well, shuuld b? represented in Saigon. Tliis would reioguizc the realities of the VietnonieM.' political scene. Now siippow, ac *ceui moKt likely, that the National Liberation Front boycott* the election. If rioigon bad (node the offer, and if the modaliV':* of the election would pass muster among fuir-miadcd judgea, the onus for denying a choice to the )xpl>: under Coujmunit control would be on the National Libcratioii Front rather than ou the Govrnun'-tit. Kveii MO, the vast majority of Koutli Vietnamese would have participated in the polilicnl prot-en*. In the mulign^d 1067 election, mor>- thjui 4.7 million vot^4 weri: rnxt. Approximately 7 million South Virtuiunest: were jf voting age in 1067 and OK percent ot the theoretically eligible voUr< eterri^î their choice. (Only 01 per cent of Ainericann of votiui; age cunt their ballots in 11WH.) If, in'imd, r>uigon'ft control now Mtend* over much more of South Vietnam than iu I%7, voter turnout, even without Coumiunut partieipution, should \i>" Inrger than it wa* four years ago. The goveriuiu.'rit c\\i}*ii\ next October i>hi>uld Ix- a.\i\f tit make a crfvliblp claim that it represented a <:lear preponderance of the people of South Vii tnora.
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Iltsss the Bsw XSrk Ttew. Aft. . ItTl] T ELECTORAL OFTWK r* Vrcnuit: n -(By Chester L. Cooper) WAnTO.It fc dtfteult for an American to sMuttd-guess an election in tbe United State*: All the more *D when he trin to predict one abroad. Bat, feMed on what one ean (tarn from the mood of the South Vietnamese in the M7 election and what one eaa<Uviiie of their present, mood, consequential, noo-Gommuiuct, pro-|>emce opponent to President Thieu might have at least an even chance. Duong Van "Big" Minn, hem of the anti-Dieu < oup and first of * bewildering eerie* ot Kfoersl* who took over the government after the death of Diem, wae prevented from running for election in 1M7, but apparently intend* to campaign in 1*71. A rigorous race (which may be expecting too much from that amiable and poptilarrjtat not very eaergetir man) and a fair election (we go back to Square One again) would increase the odds aRiinet Thieu'i re-election. But, unleat Thieu win*, one pillar of President Nixon'* Vietnam policy may crumble. An important /actor determining the rate of American withdrawal fa the demonstrated readiness and capability of the South Vietname*e to carry o the war. But this depend* on variable* beyond American control. Among thtse is the extent to whicti the Saigon government' committed to continue the war. The future of the Administration^ Vietnam policy could ultimately be decided by a development that may not have entered into Washington''* original calculationsthe replacement, midway in the Vjctnamiiation orogram. of the Thleu-Ky Govcrnan-nt by one elected oa a platform to .end the war. While Minh, himself. Is more of hawk than a dove, a government headed by him would have a hefty peace contoitueoey and would probably move towa* I ending thj fighting. Thit may be a key to the AdminUtruuon'* apparent iîBdenee about the mod&litie* of tJK dcctioo. A highly motivated, popnlar, nen-Communwt ueee**or to Thieu who would seek to end tbe fighting through bilateral negotiation* or dtfaOo arrangement* would repnaetit a truly "Vietnamixed" *olution to the war. Under thee drcumctiuict-s, we could withdraw our remaining force* after the October election without the hafcglinK that would inevitably take place with a Thieu government. One bopw-that Wa*hington pktnnec* are examining tbe implicatiou* and consequence* of thi lalubrioun contingency. An Airerican military withdrawal from Vietnam within tbe next twelve month* would b* widely regarded with relief and enthusiasm. But this reaction will, by ;po means, be nniyenai; million* of Americans could easily be convinced, indeed if they are not already coneinved, that President Nguyen Van Thieu (like Prenident Chiang Kai-shek of yesteryear) was tbe victim of a Washington sellout; that "politician*" and soft-beaded civilians in Wasjingtob conspired to dump him just whea Hanoi was on the verge of defeat. "Who lost Vietaamr" The exploitation of thu issue in 1972 by unscrupulous politician* is a possibility to worry responsible people of all political persuasions. President Nixon has an urgent task ahead during tbe coming month*and there is, thus far at least, no evidence that it is being tackled. It is curious, for rumple, that the recent State of the World message ignore* tbe forthcoming election in Vietnam. And it is unfortunate that in the President's April 7 speech there was no specific reference to tlte October election. The United States must be prepared to accept a political rather than military one. American* must be reminded, not every several months or so, but constantly, that our objectives in Vietnam, now and tomorrow, art limited. And that they were limited from the verr Heginning of our military involvement a decade ago. We do not now have and we never did have tbe goal of destroying the Communist regime in Hanoi, killing s'l Communists in tfoutb Vietnam or transforming that country into a basUoo of rrae World democracy, economic power and military tiuKtit. Our goal lias always been political, not military or even economic. An aneident of timing will present President Nixon with a hivtorie opportunity, If he firmly neiies it, the nrwards for him and for all of us may be incalculable; if he make* but a diffident and half-hearted effort, be and we may have bad oar last chance to fwtrieve something of value for all our sacrifices. Given a fair election in Koulb Vietnam next October and a bit of luck and otu; prudence in LAO* and Cambodia, virtually all Anwriran troop* euuK bn home by thifs time next year. President Nixon could face his own campaign in 1V72. even if'the talks in Paris Ki:t nowhere, with Vietnam pretty much behind him. No small achievement in an tttactioo year. And uo luiall comfort to Amoricaus for wbora 1T71 marks a decade at uur military involvement iu Vietnam.
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Hon. J. W. FULBMOHT, CtatnnM, Cemmtttec on Fereif* ftcbiuos, , (7.S. &ftl*, lTt*ttfm, D.C. DCAB SBMATOK FCUKICMT: I wish to thank yoji for lie opportunity to submit my thoughtsfor inclusion in the public record of th<f bei rings of The Committee on : Foreign Relation*. . I have read and heard a (treat deal of talk regarding the legality and morality of ear intervention in Viet Nam. As a Vint Nam veteran I fad all this rhetoric i* rather irrelevant. I would like to draw your attention to a problem that to me eems a great deal more importantthe me-rale of our servicemen in Viet Nam. There is an old adage that an army travels on its stomachthis is only a half truth. An army also trtvcN on its monUe. An army that ha morale problems is less effective but more importantly suffers a groat deal more casualties. In the last few years the morale of the United States serviceman in Viet Nam has deteriorate rapidly. As I am sure you know, drug use is on the rise, insubordination is taking -place within combat units and there was a recent demonstration in Washington, 1).C., against the war by some Viet Nam veterans. These overt acts are a direct reflection of the low ebb of 'our G.L's morale. As a concerned United States Senator, I fed you should address yourself to tbr question of why. Every man I have ever met who has fought in combat has hated war but yet the morale of the American units have always remained high. Even during the relatively unpopular war in Korea morale was nigh. The only unique difference abour Viet >*tm is that for the first time in American history men have sotmVt \o make a war * political ianie. - . . . _ People who call Viet Nain immoral, call our efforts genocide, politicians who campaign in campus to turn the students against the war, men who try to make Lieutena; Galley - > hero or claim he is a scape goat, these people may believe tiiey are sftmrking the policies of the Pentagon and the President; to the man in Viet Nam anrt to the veteran who has returned these are very personal accusations. In effect they sit- saying 'a toe man in Viet Kam and to the veteran, you are a murderer,you practiced genocide and you are Lieutenant C*Uey. War is hdl and the battlefield a ver/. lonely place but even'more so when your r.eigbbon and fellow country men tun their backs on you. I like most men in Viet Nam fed we have been betrayed. In other words certain men in an effort to further 4hetr political ambitions are attempting to tun* the country flgauvt our fighting rr.do and in turn ruin the morale in the Armed Services. Perhaps some of my words are harsh and bitter and perhaps certain Senators and Kepretfeutatives actually believe in what they say; however, I like many others do not believe it. We fed th t lives are being sacrificed by power hungry men now in Congress. It appears these men are making bcros of the North Vietnamese. The combination of encouraging the North Vietnamese to fight no and turning the country Ai'*.-.vt the American service man has been the catilysV in toe low of not only thu i&orate of the United StaUr* troops but a more precious and tangible commodity, life. I beseech you, the nest time you sprak out Against li war you consider what effect your rhetoric will have on our men in VH". Nan. ! the veteran. This I believe should be your foremost consideration, Hinaerdy, WATKK H. ST. CLAI*. Jr.Esi;r Cmr, X J., Way H, 197J. 3. W. FI;LHIUOHT, Chairman, Senate Foreign Bsljilun* CommitUe, WatkingUtu, D. DKAK KHUTO*, Would you ipit on the gravm of: I. The 4'>,000 Anwriraii* who died in Indo-Cbitia/ I. TV 2M),000 Allied soldiers who also died iu Indo-CbinaT :<. The 1,000,000 Virtnainew Nalionaliit civilian, murdered bj- toe Viet Minb in \VA-W
4. Tlu- ibinm*nd at Koitt'o ViMiiaRMw; civilians iiiurden-d by the communists in !Ju*-y? 1'lur juilliou* of Don-CJiiimuuw''. Iitdo-Chin***!- who wjll Itc <-xecuted by the if you vou- "yen" wi tue "McCovpru-HtM4 AiiKfidutcnt" or the
CLAKKNDOS II ILLS, Iu_, if ay 97,1ST I.
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"Vietnam Disengagement Act '? . ' You would not nil on these grave*? Then vote "NCTon the "McGovwn-Hatfield" amendment and the "Vietnam Disengagement Act". Respectfully, P.S. In response to rour letter of May 12, 1971, 1 wish the above statement to be included In tbe public record, of the Committee hearing*, on the pending measures relating to the Indo-Cbroa Wmr. WAMIXOTOM UKIVF.MITT,
DUABTMKIIT or PtfTCHOUWr,
Boa. J. W. Chairman, Ftrreign Rdalion* Conmittet, LtJi. ScnaU, Wtukinfton, B.C. DEAS, SKVATOR Fouiiuovr: I respectfully request the privilege of having these rmark entered into the current bearings of your committee in connection with tbe demonstrations favoring an immediate end to the rar in SE Asia. The comment* contained herein are occasioned by an exchange 'which I viewed on last night's television newscast between a young-woman and Senators Scott *nd Aikcn concerning an accusation of paranoia. While I regret that the accusation wao singularly directed at Senator Scott, I also regret the responses of Senators Scott and Aiken, tbe former because be evidently does not appreciate the broader context of the paranoia issue, and the " "
dealing in domestic and foreign poli that we arc indeed obse*i>d with a fear of a domestic takeover or foreign invasion by communists, and that this behavior has many of tbe characteristics of al paranoid state. Supporting this view are the bl<o)jr of tbe Joteph McCarthy era, pant and current activities of tbe House '<thaiueriran Activities Cofrmittec and it* successor, and much of the current stirJeillfjice of prnt^l and eat.*, dav rallies on and off eotleiie campuse*. I respectfully sulmit that Senator Scott s uuvstion to which the young lady runponded indeed reflected this paranoid *tat<;. AM a ina.ter of fact tome of your own pvrrbcg aod writing* are aadrvMed to this very proMcin. i would altio renpect fully submit that foreign |>olicy also has sonv> characterirtJcn of schisopbrenia. At tbu same Ujw that these fcara of communism are exprensed, we have reasonably friendly relations with a number of comtauniKt govornmeiiu. And some of w> with fairly good mcmorii-s appreciate the irony of a Mr. Kixoi who built a political career oo tin- exploitation of the communist paranoia und as a spokesman for the C'nina Ix>t>by, and i.< now eniburLed m a policy of d'.^-elopii.g friendly relation* with Communist China. This national (wychoiOK, no matter what one labels it, has cost us drariy in human liven, and ban Aeriouxly ditortd |irior)tic!. Tbt.-rr i* one <ipect of the prioritk-n H'hieb way be of intiticulur intervxt to Kntiator Aiktti. At llir a>f time that we manr.g<> a rnUitory budfcct f $7U-KO billion prr year, wo ilare a very low vaf'ic on improving the lives of the ddcriy. We hear tliat the Administration on AgiriK is to \>e cicMtit down, and that we cnnuot afford even a single dollar for new ruMCurch directed at creating u longer heeltbier life. As a dtU-'Ratc from this state to tliv Wliitc ilouM- Conference on Aging nest autumn, I can't h<4p but wonder if Hi in cnntfsttnef in to \>f simply ariothT exampl'1 of a|>f>carfug to br doing lowc' tlim<, while actiiiillv iu-foni[<li<hiuic nothinjc. Tlte /'I, ing kuiy hud uii inn>rtMin men.iige, (x-rliap^ |"w>rly rxpre-yd, hui tbn lio*tilc riMpouM's of Hrtivtor* Scott iid Aiknii rvveal an iiKCOxiiivity to thu rt-al which con rn our t!duc("fj \ mum people. VOIIM,
, J . . u t v T. KUIMKNTHAL, I'lt.l)., M.D.,
llf*eureh frufettor of Oertmluhgu-
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MOBILE, ALA, Aufutt 10,1970. Hon. JOHN SrAUHUX. Nne Smote Ogux BiriUMf, U3. Senate DBA* Si*: I respectf ully request that you try with all your might to end United States involvement in Southeast Asia, and most especially in Vietnam. I am a Marine Corps veteran who served in Vietnam for thirteen month* as at interrogator, translator, interpreter and intelligence specialist. I am twenty-tovp. I was in the Marine Corps from OeUiber. 1963, to September, 1009.1 studied Vietnamese for nine months at the Defence Language Institute in Washington D.C. I used toe language daily ir Vietnam, and taught it for two years upon-returning in August 1967. I now Ln attending the University of South Alabama (a junior) and am majoring in poliUeal science with the aspiration of obtaining a masterV-dcjêe in asuui studies at the East-West Center in Hawaii. I am part of the "silent majority" who does not agree with either Mr. Nixon's goal* or uu_*ans of the war. I highly nwnt this supposed servant of the people when he aay that, "I will never accept defeat; we will not be defeated, and throughout AroerkV* proud 190 year history she has never been defeated." Statements like the aforementioned one are characteristic of a chauvinistic, supercilious, vain man who could do great harm to his country through excessive pride. I mwd aid mv voice in the dissent against the Vietnam war. Regarding my opening sentence, I mean immrdialf withdrawal, if., as fact as in logirticallv possible, borne reasons are in order. The w-ur in Vietnam i* destroying the fabric of >H>th the United States and Vietnamese societies. It is disrupting and impeding vital domestic programs, and it is damaging our "image" abroad. Both sides arc being seriously damaged |M.ycboIogically and culturally. The intrinsic nature of the war in Vietnam makes tt impossible to "win" the war in a conventional humanitarian (Is war everhumanitarian?) manr>er. As long a* the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong nave more patience than the United State* doe*, and as long a* Ike United States chooses to distinguish between "Viet Cong and "Civilian South Vietnamese", Then the United States cannot "win". The interest* of the United States as denned in terms of the balance of power in Southeast A.i are not vital to the United State*. The credibility of the United Slate's commitment* abroad will not suffer. In fact, bur credibility in .terms of wisdom and practicality wUl be enhanced. What ha* happened to the various opinions of the area specialist* of the State Department and the other intelligence agencies? Why have people Ukr CoL Cwrson, and John Sommer and Don Luce, author* of Vietnam-Tht l.'oheard Voice* very largely liern ignored* Mr. Nixon obviously thinks leaderahip i* equated with driving dowu a one-war street. To further exiiand. United States troops have to daily make decision*'of life and ueath over Vietnamese civilians. They slunild not be put in the position to have to make these decisions which may follow tbetn the reft of their lives. Who are the Viet Cong? They are the people of Vietnam. Veterans who return to the United States are disillusioned and find it difficult to readjust. Lett it |M: forgotten, disgruntled war veteran* were no oroall factor in the ris of Facism in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Everything always seems anti-climatic, but not to the degree of this war. I'm sure you've read about Sergeant Sharp who belly-crawled and who sneaked up on a gas rtalion with an M-l nod robbed tli* station. The article on Sergeant Sharp WB in Parade, NumeroiiM psychiatrists have testified before Congress a* i-o the attitude* and srtion of dUiUimioned and frustrated veterani>. I, as a Sergeant while teaching Vietnamese at Quantico from Fp-bruory, IOCS to September, 1WW, had to stand duty at the- company barrack* many time*. Many black: veteran*1 cave me a hard time while I wo* on duty accuHing me at Ixring "racist". Ncgroc* arf no valid reswn* why they sboiild go to Vietnam, running the rik of lîng killed or maimed in the rMmx of a "racin" nor'u^ty, I war .Dually about tiv<? y?ar older than thniu. They hod not bad tlte ralminx effect* of a peaCKtimn Marine O>ru I had from 1WM to l!Mf>, Of coune the war i not even the major rruKou for Ncero attit'tiieti toward whiles, but it i< a t>ig irritant. I grew up in the South until I was eighteen. I have lived in Washington D.C. and Ixx Angeles. I know Keen**. United State* soldier* go through IXKK. ramp, leave dircrtly for Vietnam after a leave and short training period at Camp Pendkrtou. and then an discharged nbortly after returning to tlie CniLed State*. Bound* like all itnot quid on the we*trn front. I mu*t include thin. While at Camp Pimdleton I wa naked to <f rvr a* an interpreter for lotue I'ucrto Hicsn drufUw lxrimiie I ba/4 had two year* of higb school Spanish. My Spanish wo* lou*y, I haU not u*edHi for
724
years. I coulttnot understand but a few phrase*. Finally. * hi-Iinqual Ni'arin* wns found. This was at Staging battalion at Camp Pendleton in 1966 just prior to leaving for Vietnam. These eighteen P-lerto Kleans on ore platoon had gone through Parris Island somehow without learning auy English. Of course they knew somL Enirlish, but the fact of the matter wan I could not uodentand him and hecould not understand me. An interrogator friend of mine, who had U*n their platoon commander at Camp Prodleton told me about eight months after we had l>e*n in Vietnam that sixteen of tbrm were dead, mainly because of a simple lack of communication. They just -could not understand! Whoever lei>lrVvl or dictated or whatuvcr the lam-s that drafted them murdered tliero. (cannon fodder?) The Vietnamese peo|>le arc being turned into a disoriented society, mauife.iied ir. millions of refugees, prostitute* and black marketeers. While I was iii Vietnam I constantly talked in Vietnamese to shopkeepers, merchants, jauuderr*<, housemaids, etc. '. . . I saw thousands of them forced to turn to prostitution in ordt-r to live. You have no idea of the vast number* of girls forced to do this. I do. I also am aware of the inherentne-*< of prostitution in the Orient, hut not on thU *cale. 1'his made me sick! Would we want American womeu subject-d to these condition.*? Do you or I want to bear tlv responsibility of that in the eyes of history, aud more important in the eyes of people everywhere now? {credibility gap fur uou-aiiicned nations?) I'm sure you tnow the history of the Viefnami-se people, their thousand year year struggle against the Chinese*, their brinf , happy period of inde|>endciice before the French came, and tUe first Indo-Cbina War. America has not the patience Viet Nam has, \x., North Vietnam. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese are past *nd -present masters at amhttsmng, enduring defecating and urinating on themselves for days, resulting in some dead United States soldiers. What is time aud life to the Oriental? American troops on Vietnamese soil are food for an extremely effective propaganda* I know, I interrogated thousands of civilians, oldiers, Viet Cong, and North Vietnamese as wdl as translating thousands of enemy document*. The constantly reiteraU-d theme in the documents was, "Kiel: out the ini|*rialiatic, invading American pirate*." Never was there a word s.lx>in communist principles. It would not huve worked, (vven an ignorant farmer ran easily identify himself with jmtrioti-mi, or pro)>a|rfy mon- correctly nutionuii.-m, that slightly powerful force in mlrniational relation*. I remember how counties iational r upon asking a farmer who Nguyen Cao Ky or Nguyen Van Thieu wa,' thai tlii reply would almoHt invarialily lie, "I don't know," but they would utmost always know who Ho Chi ilinb wa., the navior of the VieUiamese people a&in*l the. French. When I malted North VieUiaimw soldiers who hod beim captured in tlte DMZ area why they were tightiug there, they atway* replied, "I was defending the North and trying to lilc-rate the South. ' They used the terms North and South u we do, lections of the ermnlry, not two separate nations. From my convernataoiH with both the North and South Vielnamrne, civilian* and military (esr.'iiding the South V'ii-tnstnew military aud riviliii in iarî-r towns), I dincovirrea that aliiiovt all of the soldier* and ittnorunt farmer* were not even aware that thvgr >iuutry wax divided! Saig"ti and ilaiu' high prirj-x for American* and M-U cheaper to Vurtuaiiifr-e. I <iicovrreit through interrngatiois that the word wan pasted to rhargi- even hiicher price* fur black Americans in order \n prmnote di>êiiUn. Must Vietname**- don'i fni\preheod thir concept of an election ouuidif their bainb-t! The lifr rtpm*iisrt of the VieUiomese have obvi<m>-l> licit b.t-n tki:li into aei-ount, sonx-luiiix whx-h is al)oliitely neceimar}- for effective proj>aicarida. Maybe a hundred or more years mokrs academic the argument t hut t lie I 'niu-d Stutex really IN-IOHKM to t tie hidians, but nisteen ycurx nimv the I4.V4 Centra Conference dues not uiuki- uriidefiiir lite fort tliat .Vorth Vujtnafii and Si.-otli VMttuiun are a hoiiioKeiieou< oeiet> witb the Kiune lift rxprricne**, UwiîioKe, traditions and cuoUiiun, and, |K)-wied of ad act i ve and living corporal- will vliicli uiake them a viable aiul \wiwtvfiMt\\' i<N-nay. U'Laf are our interexiK in SouUv-ast Aoia? Both rienutor Msn-lirW an>i Kulbnithl have stated that they are noi at all ure the Cm ted Stale* hu- anv DVITndiriK inUTfrt*. in Souih>-juit \*iu. U, a very quest ii>iud>le if, all of Sonilii'ii-i A - i u falls to the "etjwiininit<*", ure they tt'i'itit. \u begin cojniiiK Hcr<* ttM.> I'ucifii- in boU and tjeffiii invadiriK u*? Iiidoiiefia'* ina killiiig* of hundred* "f thoiKiuiri* of corrini'jnii>' in IWfi.'i if rertuiiily u valid aricument fiKain*t the dotnino theory. Thttil-ind and Burma arc rtaum'ii ni'ie|tid<ttt not to mi.iilion Japau. Cafnb'xliu'' rinmg tide of iiuUoiiitlitin >' fiiunifci-U'd in tlw remit coup d'etut and kiUintt- of Victnaniew naiionalii in CanilHwlm. IAOH i* vomewhat <iiui>Uoiiabl<-, bul I hi: United Hinlj-n can help inliibit ilw- 1'iillx-t \AV< if MI- do rc/t providr- llw i'ulhfl l,:i uitli food fur i-ffet'tive |>n<|iiiKui>iJ;i, \j\, I'mt'-d riiiitus (r<*>\> I>H J/Holmc il 'nii>
725
Si>mh> ut A.-ian OfiUKtry'* t'oil.') Malaya m-enis to IN* stable after her trouble* with the cuerrilla* iu the ninteen fifties. Vietnam it- unique in that it in divided, and ttuit the i*-.)j>le tln-rc rotiMdcr the I'uitwl Staler in th<: anx: vein as the Fruuch. Indeed, M-VIT.J VK-inamrsu D*ra>aut- I talked to in Vietnam at first thought I was Frelich. \Vbi-n H;.- ne\v.pa|ers claim that a "hundn-d and thirty communists" were killed in a bailie, that u not true. Maybe otic wa a cotumunUi if he was a political cadre. The I'liiwd State..- U in effect trying to stamp down nationalism, which, is a pretty difficult tuck to do. Whether it ix true or out, the Vietnamese peasant Mtftn we aiv trviug to dominate hi; country a> did the Fn:nch. Actually, the VMy-jamrse peasant does not like anybody. He just want* to be left alone, tint hi; will follow fcther Vietnaniiwr sooner than Americans. Several lime* when I a*ked Vi>uiarue-te military j*r>ont>l, soiu>* who wcro Colonels, who worked with nir what would U1 the best tiling wi< American* rould do to help \ ii-tr.nin. tlii-v n-jdifd, "(io lrk to your country rinht now ." Tlu-y told au- wt> wore d'>trt>MiiK ihcir country, tiiniiny; it i'lto a Und of n-fuRt-ca nnd |iro<tituu^. They Miitt lli.i: thi-y havi- th-- i>:ili'-ncc to lifdit on, and thi-y n-vognizcd we did not have th<* I-M! ii-nci-. The;, told in that thi-y witnti-d ojr Mipplirn and wca|ion4, but not our troop-. If nuclear warfan- ift u-ii-d to "*in", evuryoiu: will lo*-. If ono has studied th'- lii-tory of \'ic(iiam> then one mj.t coav to .he inevitable conclusion that the Xorlh \'i'-tn:itiuô are takiliK advantage of the Chinese Commuuistd. The VtotirAUirî- will all die before tl>ev l-"t Cliina don inate tb'-ui. Ferha|ht I underestimate tti<- r'-ligiou.- fervor of "intcn.a'ioiial proletanv> .conimuuiai." I do not think so. I think -rommuniMn to be weaker than iiaLv-ali-ru, only u*ed to perjxttiiatr ii.tiirmali-ii) eeonoiuically. If not, why did limitary revolt? Cit-cboidavakia? Ntcolac CrainTJU, ICoiuaiiian head of vtale nd party leader, has said, "I aiu o(.(;.j.-fd to :l.c Brezhnev doit rim- that *ocialis.f states call interfere in each C-hers' affair- to )H-itect sociali.-tii." I Mieve all c. (iiiuiiiiiûi.t to l>e "national vomiiiiu.i-ni-". li-Md'V, o:ir real cultural tie> are vilb Western Kuro|>e, not Southeast Aîa tt'e ;irnot and eaiinol U- police ch'n-f. A the world. Japan LH Ix-pujiing to reco/nizi- -he must do her part iu order to ,<rotfct lu-r fiitiur economic intcrut in A-m. dur uiîinni nnd prarticalily. i.e., o>'. prerti);e call \M- euhaitcud abroad by withdrxwitit in KOIK! faith noic. Fraiuv './at Indo-i'hina and Algeria in |>ra<tirally one fi-Il-o.î. I- Frann-V precise (urioujy impaired at urc--ui. ftui: is au atomic power. Tune (!-.* h.-al and (org'-t, though not completely. Th-- \i. iiiuiii coutlici i a complicat4Kl, but after liaving sceu the background ami roiili'mporary M-cnario in \ietnani fxiuy. it ii> unpi-ratue thul the withdruuiil In- U-piin in the immediate future ''now; so iw u> halt the potential urd pr. -,-in iii-idious and iM-rnirioui) effect.' of the war on iiur society and the Vi-tIIUUI04- --yi4-ty a.- well a> it' repurcUMsiijf.a al<road, i-.npecially ainotiK the nonaliyni-d n.kti'in.v T!i<- I niu-d Sitc> ho< Id not lx- attained of lUhcnualiitarijiiiijjii. I iui1. nr i-vi-n nu:ntiaed the butnaii live* Already taken, Uring takeu arid that t ill ti>- (ait'-n. I often inbrrrui^ted in hospital* and Haw uamy Marine- di<-. I caw i-'-nuiii \ i---tahli"> who cannot di.-si-iit, or unsent anv limp-r. Tliey caniiol eat apple pu- jir.v kiit'-r, nr ^t- their mothers any l'H(p-J. I am al*u tuck of the idea tlial miliury |N-opli- are more patriotic than civilian*, an idea that i very prevaU:iit iu the Mi:nlj. l.'nl--i> Pn-!<icU.-iit Nixon and bin i"ic<v.**or are ailling to tuy in V?liiuin n 'i in.i(i4 r h \n\iti ii take? to win a "ju.it jeare," tlu.ii every noldier killed or iiuiitii. d fnini m/w on is merely wanted cauuau fodder iu were the oue before. I'm lir<-d >rf !i.'nii({ aliont learning from OIK ptMt uutakc. I want our guyn to live. i fiu\. wjiU'd too lonit to write you. If 1 can be of any help, pleace do nut hei-itau- in oil on me. I will be in Waithiugion D.C. for two or utore week from the 1'1-t i,l AiiK'ist. on. I hab-d be au luierrogatnr, I arrilu*d iuy jjriuciplu> a a ti>iin;ti>itann American. I did not go to Canada or .Sweden. Now 1 want my Titin- t. IMiisovfjin M.II MiMrtixc. iv U'luhingltm, li.C., July I, H/71 . llur. .1 \\n.l.i\u ! IHIKIMIT, .-. i Hi- >>f"i Hiiitiliny, I) utli.i yli'ii, !>.<'. l)i i. - I \ M I ' I I Ci i uni'.ji i The N-rlmiial \j-.\u.m- i>( Ftiliiilieii of Aitwrirun I'n n'l- r .Hi'l MI--HH- in Miiidiriixt Acia wa- oncuiized more tht.n jeur uv f'ir Mw ii', ri I 1 . :nii:.iiiiii;iri:iii purlniw of ffM-iiHiti^ iitlenliod on 1\u- prixdlier ini.-iinn:ii-.nt.oi -i' i.iiinn aiming iil| ii;ilii)ii. We h.v.e |M.rn lirniKiHK urjlvn(je ufl'-nUi'ii
726
upon the failure of Southeast Asian Communists to treat American prisoner* in accordance with hunanitanan principles and the provisions of the Geneva Convention. Our larger objective*, naturally, wwra to improve the treatment of thu men and assist in bringing about their earliest release, as well an accounting for tike mining. The American people and the Congress responded to our appeals with a massive lettcr-writinc ana action rampaisn. By the end of 1970, mail flow from men hold by North Vietnam had increased significantly, if not to the degree we had hoped. We received a partial, although unofficial, list of prisoners. Some men previously listed officially n.. tnissiag-in-actinn wrote to their familitt* for the tirst .time. Thesis gams, although small, gave comfort to the wives, brothers, sisters and parents of men who had sacrificed their freedom for their nation. The humanitarian campaign wait producing measurable reunite. The North Vietnamese, at least, were rebounding to the pressure of cur efforts to focus worldwide opinion on tho plixht of our men. Unfortunately, there was no response from the Pathet Lao or the Viet Cong. During the recent months, however, tbo attention of the American penple and the Conjcrcsi has turned to various proposals for publicly announcing a definite withdrawal date of our forces from r*>uth Vietnam. As you would expect in au organization representing 2,->00 families, individual members have varying view* about this legislation. As a nonpartisttn, humanitarian organizat ion, it is inappropriate for the League to take a position on any proposed legislation. We liave not done no. But we are conrurned that there be a sustained, strong focus by the President, tins Congress and the American people on getting bunione treatment of the* prisoners, and on the callous disregard which the other side had shown for families who have not heard any word of their missing men. The blame for thin situation rests with those who nold our men, not with anyone else. We believe lark of Mistainwd public piiswure on the North Vietnamese and their allies in South Vietnam and Iâos as a result of tlie debate over setting a public withdrawal date is ul lea-t puniully responsible for the derline in the nurnlx-r of letters received from ttu- priioiier in recent months. For example, Ix-for.- January 1'KJ'J, only C'JOlettent had been rect>ived from \Q2 of our nu-u held in North Vietnam. After attention was focused on the prisoner-of-war/miiiing-in-action situation, 2,000 sis-line letters were received from 332 men in a onr-vettr period. Thu- far in 1971, the mail has dwindled to 400 letters from 182 men. No addituinal prisoners have been identifttid since December, 1070, even anpttirially. No A n<eri can prisoners in Ijws or South \'ietnam have ever been oHicially idejitilifl b\ the other side, und mail has U-eti virtually nonexistent from tb*s>e men. The families of the prisoners of war and missing in action are deeply grateful for the actions t'.K! President and tli* Congr**.* have taken on t>clialf of our in en. We are extremely aware of (-very effort, and deeply grateful for the support and concern shown by the Presidttit, Senator* and Mcmlxrs of the House of But constant pr'-ysure mutt be exerted if the other side is to be convinced that Arrerican concern for its in; prisoned and missing men is harmful to its cause. We plead with th<- (. ongrewi to nuic.tert its dei-ire for humane treatment of our Lubatidx, brothers iincl fathers. We continue to sek an impartial inspection of prisoner facilities, a complete list of |>ri*oncrsr rdiâse of the sick and wounded, pro|M>r treatment of prisoners, regular flow of moil, and an accounting of those men who are missing. We also want to ernphujiM that we have men missing in South Vietnam, Loot and Cambodia. a weU as North \ x-tnum. TlKrefore, attention must be focused on the Viet Conic, the Patbet Lao, and Communist forces in Cambodia, in addition to the North Vietnamese. The |rr>oui!r-of-war/niissing-iri-action iusur is humanitarian, not political. Thvn! l>n.vc iiH.-n have given up their fi eedom honorubly for their Country. They uned, and they OTtainly dcttervc, your continued ,-tfort und attention, , The Jyunue asks that you help u return our focus upon Hanoi and its allies to awt in tliu spirit of common d<cncy, humanity and according to the Geneva Co:ivi!tition. Hwcerely your*,
JOAK M. VIKIMUK
Mrs. Bobby G. Viti'n, \alitmal Coordinator,
SUMMARY INDEX
A free soui-ny Abdication of responsibility Accommodation for Vietnam ...., Actions of Lieutenant Calley Administration phnuoolog} Admbiuaration'. policy Aduiioistratiou proposal Administration statement* Aggressive war Agreement with Hanoi Aid to ARVS after withdrawal Aiken, .Senator George D.: Examination of witnesses: Craven, Jay Folk, Prof. Richard A GcUthorp, Edward Oregon't Susan Irwin, Hon. John N., II Javiu, Senator Jacob K Kerry, John Luce, Don Marshall, Chip.... MBIer. Senator Jack Shapeten, liobert Sullivan, William H Ah* and naval withdrawal Algonquin peace city Alternative* _ American women are huê. Appropriation* bet meant to end war.. Aitau Interest in life AcpecUof U.S. involvement Aiylun for Vietnaineae,-. Atrocities committed Attempt to disown vet* Attitude of xervicemeu-. Attitude of Viatnamer, Authority to continue war Auitralian ode to Cuba Background of Vietnam war Baaienced* Bilateral negotiation* Blood bath and asylum Bombing halt, 1968 Biwnbing of Lao* rx,fingonUinon7J9 Biiefiiigfyiidrcuai; Bringing nation together CftbinUpoMtiou* C.JDP Algonquin Can battle ytm work? Cwinot afford to wait Can and asrvicM for vet* Caw of Lieuu-nant Galley . Cwe of Tran Ngoe Chau : 270,458 224 _ 435 193 200 36,99,118,26^289,504 274 397 , 508 ill 491 234.235 560 397,398 221,222-234 284 115-117 189-191 462,463 234,235 124,125 463-465 285 114 233 386 233 163 331 106 261 283 185 204 217 590 393 196 423 5tfl 513 507 212,460 327 322 37 463 233 i198 225 637 225 481 ;...
*...:. -.
U)
11
CMC, Senator Oifford P.:

Falk Prof Richard A . ... ....... __________________ ......... _ 570 GanUr, John K ............. : ............ - .......... _ 352, 353,378, 379 Gebthorpr, Edward ...................... ............. 309, 4112, 403, 406 Hkkey, Dr. Gerald C ................ ........................ 458, 450, 466 Irwin, Hon. John >'.U ............................ . ....... 304,305,307,309 Jacobs, Hon. Andrew, Jr____________.-.: ----------- ................ . 597 Keny.John ............................... . ........ ............ : 194, 195 Liu*, Don ...................... -----................. ~ 465,467 McGovern, Senator George ..................................... 33,34,53 Shapden, Kouert ..................................... ..: ......... 466,467 SboupTGcn. David N ................................ ... ......... ,. 492,493 Stavwisoo, Senator Adtai . Ill ................. - .............. ---- 135, 136 Suflivaa. Wffliam H ____ ............................ ,..- ............ 306,307 Vort, Charles W ................................................. 364,57* Casualty figure^ ................................................... 300 Certain time for withdrawal ------ . ----------............ ---------105 Certainty of od to. fighting .......... . ....... . .......... ---- ........ 54 Change United Statr* ............................... _ ............. . 233 Chin* ......................... ................................... 439 China'* new strategy ............................................. 554 China'* rote in conflict ............................................. . 553 Chinea>! and neutralization ------------------------------------------565 CbiMw and U.N ................................................... 567 CUnne attitude ..... ............. ---- ..... ..... :.. ........ ..... ---- 566 Chinese intecut in coalition .............. .. ....................... ... 562 ChbttM on .ufement ............................................... 664 Cbtncwj reaction ....... . ........... - ....... ..................... ... 167 Choice facing Congmt* ----.......................... _.. ........ *.. 147 Church, Senior Frank: Pjgfifiiftiô of witntiam: ^ Senator Tboma* F__.... ......... .s ................. 331, 332, 333 Hatfidd, Senator Mark O ...................................... .... 44-46 Miller, Senator Jack. ............................................. 121-123 CHil diMbodienw ............................................... 242, 245 Civilian and military morale ------ ............... . ...... .^.. ........ 384 Ckwifjr ing information ----------------------------------< ---------306 Collect; community leaders ....... . ............................. ----367 tioo of Vietnam veu -------....................... ----2O4 Commendation of witneM.. ........................................ 250 CommiMion'* ptewnce _____________________________________________ 138 Committee action ............ . .................... -------........ 521 Committee bearing* ---- . ........................................... 568 Complete withdrawal .............................................. 646 Completo withdrawal date ......................................... 395 Cotnprefaenaiv* hutorjr... .......................................... 644 Co*npromi*e ----------------------------------------------------431 Concept of immorality ............................................. 638 Concern about Vietnam war ...................... , .............. 198 Condition* ia South Vietnam ....................................... .- 649 Conference to cud war _____ _____ .................................. 581 Coofidentti in BouUj Vietaamme g . .-niuient .......... . ............... 124 CoagnM duty to kigilate ........ . ................................. 333 Conjpew muat play docuive role ---- >______________.......__________. 100 Coogm* power ana prentnt policy ------------- ......... ______ .___... 97 CoogrtoM reqtiMto action___________________, ___________ ..... ________ 184 CoogrmMoaal action ........ . ...................................... 480 Conicrvwioaai authority on deadline.. ................... ___ ........ . 84 CongruiMional autboruatiou.... ___ ....... ................. . ...... 213 Congri'iMional Couiuuwiou ---- ..... ....................... ......... 133 Congritwioual particlpatioti ---- ---- ............. .. .............. ----272 CouKrtnMioual power ............................................... C28 Congr;.iuaii Kalpmi aud POW ................................... 4wfl Cangrt-waiau JacoiM in Korea ___________ .................... ___ ." ____ 607 Constituent poUcitu -------- .......... ^ ............................ j72 Contiauiuiu! of irr ..... . ............ ,. ............................ . 4U3
:
I.
IK
Continued unitary aid Continuity of present poliey-i Coavtituttonal authority v-. Constitutional authority to invade North Vietnam. Constitutional vacuum Consul in Dace* Coatiuuation of aid. Continuing war for purpose Conversations n cease fire . Conversations on release of POWs Cooper, Senator John Sherman: Examination of witnesses: Gardner, John W Harriman, Hon. AvereD Batfidd, Senator Mark O afondale, Senator Walter F ^ Saxbe, Senator Wffiiam B Shoup, Gen. David M Cooperation of executive branch. Coct of election campaigns Cost* of continuing war Coune to end involvement Criticism of war. Cutting of funoV.-..-;..-..-. .Date and recovery of POW't Deaths in Indochina Debate oo impeachment Deception of Congress by executive branch Deo*ioa not military Deunitioo of policy requested. Debumanuation of enemy Democratic platform, 1968 Democratic *y*tem Demonstration*. Demonstraton jailed Denial of records De*irt!sof American people Desire to end war Destruction of hamlet* Destruction of life Difference over method Difficulty admitting error Direction of piiD question* Disapproval of war Disengagement querti<KM*i DweuMuon* on continued fighting DiMcuMiuos with Madame Binb DMiuui<Miinent Distrust 14 leaders Documentary"The Kdling of the Pentagon" Dues United State* bomb village*? Dumestie destruction Domestic iUwais Downgrading of United States Dru;probfeiM Economic i<*u?.. Economic aMiwtaoee Effect^ war Effect of illusion Effect <if rapid withdrawal Effect of war criBM*
c
494,495 580 293 162 - 49 l 302 M 325 92 92
-1
i.
Effect of cougruMional action
354-358 308-512 54-56.79 166 176 493-495 625 203 276 26 117 86 655 280 622 60ft M8 271 330 637 228 226 _ 241 302,625,627 217 228 609,611,616 277 6(2 506 286 163 '. 314 93 237 3M, 404 385 209 310 / 104 405 652 205,646 349 191 83,259 330 479 fig6,/iK7
497
Effect of war on
frtrees
47
Effect < withdrawal Effect! vew-sti uf prograui

Kt U-71 17
336,490 394
IV
Effects of inflation ----- . EBcaey of date

TOBof oy at tiftttiftnff ..
.................................... ................................................
....................... .
. ...... 463 ;.. 357

457
Elections observation .......... .................................. 473,475 Election far South Vietnam. .................................. 130, 135,468 Element* taken into consideration ........ . .......................... 17 Emotional attitude ---- IT. .......................................... 406 End war. _____ ................................ 47, 53, 87, 252; 386, 410, 576 Enemy reaction to UA withdrawals ................................. 292 Enemy support ................................... . ........ . ....... 56 Ebony's cruelty ................................................... 25S Erran of involvement ...................... ." .................... ... 514 Establishing neutrality ............................................. c 133 Evaluation of testimony ............................................ 210 Examine origins of war.. ................................... . ....... 597 Examples of 88T ..................... ^ ............................ 6'J8 Exchange of prisoners ........................................ _ ..... 243 Executions ............................................. 240,261,284,287 Executive and Legislative branches ................... . .............. 608 Executive aad present opportunity .................................. 582 ExpeiienoMin Asia. ......... ~ .................................... 468 Etperienee of pofiey maker* ........................................ 573 Export of job* .................................................... 403 Exporting democracy ................. . ............................ 593 Exputton bTltr. Luce ................ ... ...... C. ............ ...... 462 Ertentof ILS.puDbeek ............................................ 469 Extended date-. ...... : ........................................... 114 Pair election* ................................................... 456,463 Filibuster suggester* .............................................. 226,229 Finance continuation of war ................................... , ____ 21 Finandngfofrign troop*. ........................................... 467 Finanos Thai traops ................. ............................. 305 Financial and military aawrtanoe .................................. .. 119 Finn witlMlrawal date .............................................. 532 Facing a date ..................................................... 55 Force* in U.6. lyrtem .............................................. 484 Fontgn and domestic problem* ...................................... 165 Forgotten facto .................................................... 645 Formula to end war ......................................... . ..... 24 Forthcoming election*.-.-....................................... 436,505 Found and learned in Vietnam ........ . ............................. 182 Four poinU to be negotiated .................................. . ..... 515 Free election* ..................................................... 471 Free enterpriae .................................................. 392,411 Freepeopfe ....................................................... 268 FrencVPOW* .................................................... 66V French in Vietnam ................................................ 468 French withdrawal .............................. , .................. 31 Fidbrigbt, Senator 1. W.: witAe**e* dark, Jo*epb ....... ....................................... 525,528,529 Craven, Jar ................................................ 211,212,231 Ettrietou, Senator Thoma* F ......................... 325,326,329-331,340 Falk. Prof. Bichard A ............ 63, 564, 568, 569, 571-573, 579, 582, 583, 586 Gardner, John W ........................................ 347; 364, 366, 367 OeUtborpe, Edward ..................... 392-394,399-413,418-420,423,424 Gregory, 8o*an .................................................. 221,238 Orueniog, Earnert ................................................. 171 Harrimau, HOB, Averell .................................. 506,507,519,520 HatoeJd, Senator Mark O ........................................ '.. 36,89 Hickey. Dr. Gerald C ................................... 428,457-459,480 Inrln, Hon. John N. If ....................................... . ..... 263, 264, 268-271, 275, 277-280, 294, 299-302, 306, 309-316 Jaeot*, Hon. Andrew Jr .................................. 595-600,605,606 i, Senator Jacob K .......................................... 114,115
J '
Kerry, John U56-188,196-204,20S-21C Lewia, John Wiboo 560-SC3,565-567,574, 573, 581.584.587,588 Luc*, Don 450-453,4,481,482 MeOoakey, HOB. Paul N. Jr 622,623.625-628 McGovern. Senator George 22,23,25,30-33 Marshal, Chip* 229,238 Miller Senator Jack 120,121 Mondalt, Senator Walter FII..II...I..." 144,147,162,163,166 Rainwater, H. R 647-649,651,657,663, 669 Saxbe, Senator William B 174,175,177 tieagliotti, John 223 Shapclen, Robert 456,459,476,478.479,481-484 Shoup, Gen. David M 487-490,496-499 Stephens, MdvilleL 256-261 Stevenson, Senator Adlai E., Ill 133,134 Sullivan, William H 280,300,311.312,314 Yost, Charles W 564,565,570,571,576,585,586 Fulfilling obligation 260 Fundamental change* 2OO Future I7.fi. involvement k. . ietnam.. 169 GalluppoU 654 Generation of-peace? ~593 Government retaliation . . 418 Gc crnmentV ability to maintain faith _. 42 Growth and success 346 Hamlet and village elections 463 Hanoi's and XLF's. position 120 Hanoi'* and POW's 237 Har.ispoll 272 Hijch lex-el operation 574 Historical lesson 514 Hintory of deception 169 Holdup in withdrawal 517 HonoraMe peace 383 flow to disengage 187 Human costa of preoent policy 38 Huiit-Wetwon Foodn, Inc 3!7 Impact of war 201 Impming IL8. ways on country 484 Inability to admit error 112 Indefinite iitvidvement 321 ludociiina and world peace 195
Informed 4<ert'>raU: 202
Influ.-ncf in Kurope.... Inflm-jice <if American women Inbmted war

Inspiration <if witnetw'
."
390 233 295

4IH
Intuit of deinoiiKtratorK Intwrt <>T K. On. tt. 17 Interact attd eono-rn iwueii InUa-nul documentx Intmiational agreement* lutruition of Preoidential power Invaniou of North Virtnam lovolvi'jueut and L'.f. intmrU Iwdfttiou cellp Javit, Kniator Jacob K.: Examination of witfnw<*i>: Oaven, Jay Gardner, JiAm W On-gory, Koiian HatlkK Kcnatr Mark O Irtrin, t<rm. John K. II Kerry, J'Am Ky'n on r.H. withdrawal
Divaoion iuV> Lao*
248 130 1*4 -Mi 6"3 56 145, 146 104 449 244 356-3M 243,249 HO-86 1X1, 'tti, W2-W4 209,649 259
212
VI
^
rut
c. Lack of action ; Lack of influence _ Lack of progres* in ending war Lack of .reaponaiveQeM._ Lam Sod 719 Land reform '- Lao Air Fore* and Army Lao* and Cambodia Laotian problems Leadership _ Legality of presidential action 1 Lotlen against war Limiting 1J.S. withdrawal Living up to agreement Long-rage program Low morale of forces .-. MeGee, Senator Gale W.: Examination of witnesses: Shapeton, Robert Madam Binb statement Making institutions work effectively Materiel ILS. cannot afford to leave Mean? of protest Meeting* with Madame flint Men back from Vietnam Men's and women'* attitude* 2 Military count Military industries.. Military responsibility Military strategy Military strength. Minority view_ Mistake. : Mirtrust and understanding., . Mood of troop* Moral aspect Moral dimateof intervention Moral effect* of war. Muskic, Senator Edmund 8.: Examination of witnesses: Luoc, Don Shapden, Robert My Lai incidents -. Myth* Name, date, and disengagement .National honor. National unity Nature lA mistake Kecowity of treaty Nec-d time for \"ti uiamisation Koed touud war Negotiated ettiement NeKoiiating opportunities Negotiating settlement Negotiations Neutralization New adcHinixtratipu , NPV policy question I News cnvfJHff... Nonli VkfUiaiucM; bead tart North Viutnamc'M.1 rHpr<!tiUtivi North Vu;Uuunese aud L'nited Htaten Nortti Vietnamese and VC attitude ou withdrawal Nortti Vietnam's intentions Not to luuwir queitions Obj<tios to withdrawal date 50ft <05 223 C20 323 483 311 312 510 185 166 208 105 401 396 488 468-473 664 197 176 ,. 227 235 1S1 222 334 407 465 492 385 247 398,400 227 208 577 112 H?
473-475 475,477 492 321 576 82 335 Ill 289 49C 170 fi44 5*3 461 121,437,494,645 564 264 45 647 117 fi64 644 1M 324 303 -33
VII
f>M*
Objective in Vietnam 326 Obligation to South Vietnamese 182 Obligations to Vietnam veto 98 Observe elections 452,4M Obtaining POW l October Sections _ 284 Offer* to exchange prisoner* 23& Official sod individual acts 578 Official military channels...... _......._. .__......-...--...-..-.206 Operations Committee* 483 Opportunity in 1968 506 Opposition to war 191,229 Pakistan situation 282 Paris conclusions 95 Paris jieat* talks 396 Parties to peace talks ; 91 Passage of S. 376 on President 30 Part countereffeetive 575 Past peace in Indochina............. ._,._.............-..-....... 15 Peace funds for military 166. Peace with China 99 Pearson, Senator James B.: Examination of witnesses: Eagleton, Senator Thomas F 334,335 Gardner, John W 354 Harximsn, Hon. Averefl 515-519 Javits, Senator Jacob K 114 Miller, Senator Jack 126,127 Mondale. Senator Walter F 167 Shoup, Gen. David M 491,492 Pdl, Senator Claiborue: Examination of witnesdes: Gregory, Susan 242 Harriman, Hon. Avwell 513-515 Hailidd, Senator Mark O 87 Irwin, Hon. John N^ II 308-310 Kerry, John 1*3 Stei>ben8. MdvaieL 253,254 Poj>Je of Ohio attitude to'ard coding war 17., 215,226,231 Penuiadc administration __ 588 PerMtaHiveneM problem 583. 585 PhsHed withdraws! 356 Phoenix program 617,618,619 Photograph* rf vSiaf/t*. 615 PJivfical withdrawal .88 Plan-o< Vice President Ky 464 Point* to be emphasized 534 Policy after withdrawal 533 Piilicy change 40 Policy in Southeast Asia 21 P<iUcymaking 441 Policy <if ViHfiamitation 265 Policy questioned 313 Policy values 37 Political accommodation 430 Political judgment, not motive* 88 Politics! mistake 595 P4iUUcsl prisoner* 653 Political ramifications *J4 Political settlement .'25 PoliticaJ msMoneat for release of POW's 126 Politics! settlement suggested 127 Political vacuum 470 Politic* in Vi<m 545 PoMiMe Wood bath 519 PoibHity of President's complete withdrawal 115
Vlll
POW and complete withdrawal ...................................... 118 POW argument for residual force .................................... 46 POW exchanges ................................................. 119,121 POW brae ........................................................ 40 POW release ................ . ..................................... 55 Power of Commander-in-Chief ......... -----..... --------------84 Power transfer .................................................... 365 POWri and MIA' ........................................... - ---- 300 PQWt increase as U.S. perout* ............ ......................... 122 Present eommit',ait ........... . .................................. 313 Present demoretoationa ............................................ 246 Present system ..................................... .............. 230 President and withdrawal .............. ..................... .. ...... 315 President Nixon's April 7 speech ................................... 96,219 Presidential and eongreMional powers --------------------' ---------57 Presidential campaign, 1968 ......................................... 347 Presidential policy ................................ , ............... 358 President âuthority ............................................. 342,652 President'* Constitutional authority ............................... ... 287. President's extension of war... ....... . ..... ------------------------621 President'* motives not questioned_____________. --------------------89 President's plan to aid war. . ..... . ....... -------- ..... ....... ----- 168 President'* policy .................................................. 543 President'* power limited ......................................... 54,347 President's, proposal ......................................... 264,ol5,516 PiwidKttt's statement* ...... . ................. .' ............ ....... 336 President'* withdrawal policy .............................. it, 103, 173,433 Pres* WJrta ............................................... - , ---- 651 Previous authorization ....................... ...... ------ ---- 299 Previous testimony ......... .. ... .............. . ............. ------ 595 Previous testimony of General Sboup ................................. 486 PRO postilion .............................................. - ..... 545 Principal points .................................................. 542 Priorities ......................................... ............... 448 Prisoner of war i.-mue _____ ................. . .............. . _________ ~32l Problem of anjluoj ................................................. 308 ProMein of xecrecy ................................................ 364 Problem of Vietnam war ................................... . ....... 184 Prooeu of accommodation ................................... ______ 457 Profrwor Lewis and xetUexuent ............. ----- -. ................... 663 Prohibition of funds ......... . ..................................... 162 Prompt withdrawal ............................................. 501 PropOMal.4 .................................................... 55.wr.271 ProjxxaU tx-fore CptuuiitttK ..................................... 186, 49 Proponed f'-onicrriMiJoiial Coniiuimion ................................. 137 Protection of L'JS. force* .................. ......................... 32 Praia* ((icvtiofXid ........................................... - ..... 229 Protracted warfare ............................................... 4/M Proviwonn of S. Con. He."17 ................................... 129 Public opinion ............ ........ . ........................ . 276,341. 353 PoMie prograniii ............... . ......... .......................... 412 Public cupport for eon ^rcwional approval ........................... 147 PuMic'i ri/flrt ..................................................... 350 Pullout date and POWn ........................................... 66K Purpone of continiittijj war ..................................... _____ 667 ;ion eufioûinK txwiiuittue. . . ................................. . 22 of L'>>, aiixtikr ............ ................... ......... '44 toendiiig war ----.................. ..................... 579 lartHa not objective* ............................................ 57K
Tactic of u-iU>e<eK ........... .................................. 247
Tank fora tudy, 19(W ....... T*ii>Kraphin( Atuerieau peopk> Tde^raphi/ig enemy upoeinc date
.......... .......................... ................ ....... .............. ..................................
616 HZ 82
TnrtuiKMiy of witw*ai ............................ ... ........... 255 Thai icbturifeuU .......... ....... ................ ................. 561 Thai troop* iii Uoit .................... . ........................ 304,562
IX
Thieu-Ky government ...... i ............... _____ ................. 471,502 Tone needed for withdrawal ........................ . ........ ------ 489 Total victory .............................. . ........... ....... 337 Total withdrawal .......................................... 98,344,4*1 Treatment of Algonquin* ............... . ..... ~_ ............ . ........ 234 Treatment of political prisoner! ..................................... 448 Treatment of POWs.... ........................................ 2I Rabbi Grcenb**'* advice .......................................... 113 Rapidity of withdrawal ............................................ 174 v Reason given for war ------ * ................ . ................... 392 Recognition of error ............................ ............... 594 ReconrtructUm and regional development ...................... -----,. 503 S Recover Congressional powers _____ ......................... . ..\_._-U 173 Refugee opinions ____ ........ -------------------------------- -. ---- 412 Refusal to admit mistake ......................... ... ............. ... 3S2 Regardforlife .......................... ................... .... 339 ^ Regarding residual forces ........................................... 44 Release of French prisoner* ........................................ 32,327 Release of prisoners during Korean conflict ...... _______________ '.!.... 124 Release of POWs ....................................... 220, 36f, 344, 45 . Removing US. presence______________________...... ..... , ---------- 478 -, -Report to Pakistan. ............ . ........... . ........ J .............. 279 Republican party .................................... _____ : ........ 30 Representation of constituents ........................ .______. ....... 201 RefrisaU .................................. , ...................... 517 iiequest for information ........ ------ , ----........................ 622 Requirement* of S. 376 ................ ^ ------ ---- ......\ ..... .'...". 32 Rnxiiwancelodate ................ . ..... ~ .......................... 354 Reniitan<* to mistake ....... ..._ ............ . ................. ^ ____ 483 Reajtect for human life .......... _ .................................. 329 Response demanded ............. . ................. ........... ___ . HW BtMponiM to China .......... . ......... ................ - ...... : 554 ll<vponsibilrly .................................................. 25*. 301 Retention (4 rwidoal force ............. . ____ ......................... 43 Ketum </ priuac ................................. . ............ 122, ">16 UtTturning vrts not wanted ....... ........... _ ...... ,... ________ 1S3 Ui-volutW'nariM and C-bina ---- ..................... , .............. 5<W B<4- afUT withdrawal ................................... .......... 472 Bolt-of Oongrww.. ...................... , ..... , ........ ...... ____ 345 UuMrtiau viewpoint .......................... . .................... 511 K*igu and foreign Kuppurt ............ . ........................... 332 KKn attrUide* on withdrawal ................. .................. . W9 S<v>U. Senator Hugh: Examination nf witneMxv; Cfa-vm.Jay .............. - .......... . ............ . ..... -. 23fr-23, 2*0 Oruiorv, Su*an.. . .................................. 233, 236, 23l>, 240 Irwin, Hon. J(<*n II ........................................ 27, 285, 2W Marshall, Chip .......... . ............................ 238, 241, 246, 247 BUfpb-MN Mlrille, L ............ ..................... .... VA, XA, 257 KutvcoHm BHUOOT Adlai E. Ill ...................... ......... 13&-13 S. 376 cflWt in Cambodia and Lao* ............... . ................. .'>0 8. 370 aod prJitieat aettleincnt..................................... 37 8eurtaud liouM;cannd war .......................... ...... -------620 (senate's Onrtitatiimai riît .................. , ................ .... 275 Senate'* doonttoend war ........ . ....... _ ......................... "25S Jienator /Cooper'* propOMjd ..... ................................. S5 Senator Hartkc nwU Madani Binli .................................. 33 Hentiu-cnt of v*tn ................................................ -. Heer<T >' in KuvervairKl ................. .................... . .. ____ >jeerey of Thai troopn in l*n* ............................. . ...... facftttary littor and invuivetDMtt ........... -. ............. , ....... tfefttinient of U.V. iwaJjffy ........................ , ....... ........ Htoft iu poiti(*n .................. . Situation m Cambodia ............................ ............................. ................ 254 351 4*7 Wt 565
365 431
i
. -..'- ; , '. * Situation in rnHî. 1214 Situation in Laos... : 213.-438 SJ. Re*. 82 bas tor negotiatiocu - 123 Society hit 40 Sortie raid* 461 Sooth Vfebuun attitude of withdrawal 190 6e><ith Vietnam election 339 Booth Vietnam rebuilding aelf 641 SontbMt Asia after UA withdrawal ^ 465 South Vietnamese election. 79 South Vietnamese has progremed 642 South Vietnamese invasion of Law SI Sptrkmaa, Senator John: fSxaminatiofi of witnesses' Gekthorpc, Edward. _". 395-W7 Inrin, HOB. John N. II 282,28$ Specific date -- 253 Spoil*, Senator William B.: Examination of witneiwes: Eagfeton, Senator Thorna* F. .".. 337,339 ShapeJcn, Robert 447,478 State Department budget 30"! Stevenson proposal ~474 Stopping U.S. participation. 52$ ftortepeimpik*Uons of r.. -.-..:.... ............. . :'.' ' 4 Sununwy of differences :.. ' 249 Summary ofJS. 37 25 Supervimon of elections .480 Support for Saigon 325 Support for withdrawal 528,600 Support of Chink and Huxaia ^ 56 a^portof R. 376... .26 Survey* in. South Vietnam _^ 139 Symington, Senator Stuart: Examination of wiinttuusi: Kttgirton,. enator Tbomati F.., 336,337 Gardner, John W 349-352 Hickcy, Dr. Gerald C 459,460 Kcrry.Jobn 189,205-207 Mtmdale, Senator Walter F 163-145 Shapdcu, Kobnt 460-462 System ofaocooiniodatton.., , 456 t:.Hf. ad modmi warfare 580 U.K. ucertJ 570 I lodenniiw economy 402 Undermining L:,K, iunUtutioiw 482 CJrcKucy of Ntuatioo 220 U-of B-S2V L'XaeUonn 620 {J^. activity in Loon and Cawt>odia after withdrawal 308 U.K. aid to South Vietnam _ 518 U.8. and military KtratuKy 493 tfTJJ. air activity* in northern Lao 306 I. J5. AuifMwador'ii relaUoiubiu 476 |T.K.attittjd 393 r I .R'acpcrictMiein Iitdochina... 643 V Ji, government aod war 567 L'J*. <;ov<Ynment'iiiiteaaon 563 1T>J, intervflutioa in VJnaam , 392 L'J*. irivoiveovtitifidraUon*..128 L'X laefc moral idinatioci ... 184 fjX, nmiulaindêowforcw... ,.. 734 l'.K. woralduty 526 L'X motive* in Kouth Virifiwii 127 VJi. u*ui/alify eonc^nuiig eluction 293 t'.M. phyMical potMitia] 4i
UJS.poJiey after withdrawal . ... UApolicv and foreign g*f*rnmnt8l._I....:... UJS.policy in Southeast Ada ;_.!.:.UJS. policy in South Vietnam-::, UJS. policy moral qaetUoo U&. portion in other areas UJS. posture :. UB. priorities. _.. '. UApoblicfedingB..... U . reliooanlps;. UJJ. reluctant to involve U.N U.S. -âpooaibaitjr to Vietnamese IF.8. Joe in continued UJS.. ' U.S. (Statement* of body count* UJ3. system questioned UJS. treatment of Asians U.8. turndown of propona! UJS. withdrawal. U.8. wooaenrtatua _ U.S. world role UJ3.,view5 Greek Government Veterans igafnai war ; \fW powtioti ^ Vieteoogand NortA Vieuuuneae Vietnam Disengagement Act VietoamUme Vietnam or Indochina Vwtoam veto against war... Vietnam war and foreign aid Vietnam wy aod prew Vietnam war presidential war. Vietnamese and UJi. eJectio&ii Vietnamem? attitude toward war Vietaameae fluent in Engliafa Vietnatneae peasant* VietoaxoGM people for peace Vietnamese rebttilding ocietjr Vwtnamication
Vietnaroizatioo and pacification View of 4ectiOfr Viwt lo i)n reTugee camp Visit* to Indocbina by Senate ftaff Voting of veteran* and ooaveteran* Vote received by Thieu War bad for tuiaine* War criaww and miijudgrocnU WarcritMw War eod imperative War in L*o* War'* interference with problems Weakening United Btaies Wbtoflaon_ Welcome vntu in audience What <uut we do? Withdrawal* sd POW's Withdrawal date Witbdri/W date ffet Withdrawal date reawmin* Withdrawal Withdrawal mdude other area* Wit-bdrawaJ opposed
1...1;
_ -; -.-. :
-
UJS.!*-.-_...
:.......
;....-.;.-,. .:
79, 139 P279 127 ^-- UO . 105 343 3SI 580 440 570 " 252,~ 480 229 574 282 432 232 378 309 22
344
fighting. . !;.L--,
<
...
* ^
-.
646 331 41 203 314 0,235,636 402 207 21 497 258 ,-.. 257 - 258 505 63 183,333
41 459 613 462 192 477 384 546,567 352 23 340 If9 105 134 86 592 665,666 354,640 477 M 33 .. 175 116,267
-.
flen>iIHy
. .
. ... ....
xn
" - "
Withdrawal pÛcrqwwtioiwd.
r
'
PC
498
WlttKlrmwiagutwiw.."!"""""".""."."".".!"".!"-!"-!!""!^"! 510 Wiiter Midkr : . ISO e* concept574 R'credential* . 209

'efforts
tt trip.
-
, :
. -
241 175
JW7
,
--J
WhocM in Southeast Arfa. Wboewmiaiead WitooM' role in Vietnam W>UKM'MTviee decorations Womeoin Amaica. Wornea involved in war Womm oa UJS. poficjr Working of democracy. .World BtAbilhv Wrong kind of war
1 ."
..-.
251 614 257 189 220 231 221 $29 ?9< 431

Fulbright Hearings, 1st Session

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UN-'.

LEf.lSLATIVE PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE WAjE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

-HEARINGS ^fe SENATE

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS RELATING TO THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

Tj for (|M- uw of f*K- f'(/nitnlltw on Ifurtifn

-an. CtivtMtiHKXT rMnnur, ovnr.v.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN BELATIOKS I. V. rOIAUOHT. AikuiM,

CAM, HJLMT, CM*/ /

i97i.. ....... .>,,-:,.,-.______::.x.V:. ....-.-,.,:.. 427

- -j.il- w^jfigtoAj'urt, Mft>-*vto7

My20, ij.._.... J .V.\.-_____...._..;,... ..:... ........ 712

' ....... -" -..:'::____.!: 721

April M: 1971.... V-,..-... ..'....I',.:...-.;....'.

PRQPSX&S%LATBiD TO THE WAATO-

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEC. 2. dmgtetts fiuda and deckre^ that under the Oon-

bring about the orderly termination of mih'-

her 31, 1971;

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

7 der the OxiKtitution iA the United Rtate^ the Preident and

the Congress sh&nc responsibility fur establishing, defining

"' explicit congressional mitliorizutiou. W "

Crated States agree to the complete withdrawal of all

J N THi: MKN'AXK OK TI1K UNITED STATES

I'li'-ilriij. of SM(ili Vii-liiiiiii ani\ |lit*T4-liy iilhvl <lirrJlv nii.I

8 MijijKrt in any fi*rui will U' pruviA'd M uny

SKC. 2. it i* tl"- '"iiM1 tit' tin- C<ii^i't>s ilinl UK

< lu1(' U*. <iiC S'NJtil

2 iiivulvuuwnt iii Uus 1W7-1 dceuoiw "m SouUi Vietnam.

' 0') 0V TV Commission .JiaJl dUWKt of tlte followiuj* .." '

V\V MfJIlltOTrf 4" tllC (N'Utttf H{]HMilU'4l Ky v ' ,

<vui|uii(jn ntwl (Jw w'JtJvitk* of I'jii

^* - Kind1* n^'ticuf, (ulici/iln, jiinl rjii/4ii mid |rrH

^ iugi, oonduskiM, and roooiniikrndft(inK wiiJi n-sjK^i (y (Jic

(2) The Coniuiission haJl. oersc to cimt thirty dnyx .

(4) to t'ropioy [H:rtuj'<.-l, (.r>) to jnibjuvrw. wi(ju*w< nud

U> my Soiitli ViotrauieBe government, howsoever that govcrnnicnt comes to power.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

2 President's programs of military disengagement Troin South f

IN THE SKNATK OF TUK HNJTIfll KTATKS

IN' THK SKSATE OF THE UNITED STATES

rnxi- UM- <iuv^m.im-jif nf tlir I'niuil Si:ii^ Ii:i- i-niif/iliiilfil

filw>t Vnldij; JlK'Il ill llj|'<'rt <>l ill' 1 |nJi|r <

Whereas if is the ibt<-utiKi of .tin-' (VKIWVS* *iT tK.- I'mtrtl ?>*<iK

the (>vfnn.iflth>f ihf I'liiied "";:

icIWfMi J(HI fi t )MTli|ii<-nl of. -!;-

-7- (Irnw all in' K- iMil<K\ f'>ntf'nain

id H liiiic-iy^tiirn ni l <Ai--'ii--.nm- [ii<>iifh~ from the

9 (luij i<f (he adoption al tiw ,.ri-"inT (jf-w'jj- 4jfr'-H-iil..jV

STATEMENT OF'HOV. OEOBGE McGOVEHW. US. SEHATOK EEOM

S-nator Mc<yovf.KV. Tliartl; toil. >f r. ( 'Ixiiwiah. and S-itjUoT S

PLKA rOR r.nTOIfr FOR *. 37U

So-6nc> train 7 cninc-ljc-fon- thirf diflii^cuished rommittw pleading ^

SMwoft. ntoitoK MceovKMt.dr sucrru SUKOTV

xMOCnDUCOS MIO DSAIkif~Tta CI^COWC*!**, /JMT SMttOM " . . X * ^ "--, - . *

i' VICT^AU VTTEA>-S O X - A - r H O l T AXH Tin. MUD

MrGorcru -OatA-M Ilurt tJruP:! Mnndalr

FiufletonNVl.;ii Rilii'-off Harti>>> 'Jut-it* - Bayh Jin.nji-

I'roiniln1 HarriK *- fjurophrr) .

n.KX!HiuiT UK wninm.vw'Ai. I>\T>:

As Alexander Hamilton ^id, the Commander in Chiefs power . ;

Senator Cuntf n. Ves.

Meaning ground troops. Here is Secretary Laird's answer:

Whereas if is the ibt<-utiKi of .tin-' (VKIWVS* iT tK.- I'mtrtl ?><iK

Hurww til/- Yin Mlb .| MHitf i^awj rt ruc^, w

tlou brVaMUi 1tiiTi.<f>ta Mf^^Aft.ta wvu 0vycw ABuiwvtp M.^H^BMUBW*

Kr wi <o Uotti T Hrjj'-IimtxBK Mt'T Hi ST I'ACT or l'i LUOI.T rr I'.K I

. i:--uftjtl {tC tt" driw j/Jjum for an AJBfictn-<n.iwrtl JuratUw uf a