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Questions for GAO Interviews on U.S.

Embassy
Non-Immigrant Visas (NIV) Policies and Procedures (as of 4/17/02)

Note: Jody Woods conducted a telephone interview with Mr. Donahue on April 25, 2002. His comments from
this conversation appear in blue. f . VQ/N \:

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Date: 19 April 2002 Post: Islamabad
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Mr. Donahue is finishing his third year as visa chief in Islamabad. Prior to this tour, he has served in
Karachi, Trinidad. Washington DC. Islamabad (first tour), and Singapore.

1) Has your post made any of the following changes to the NIV application and approval process since September
11,2001? (Check all that apply)

Yes No N/A
a. Strengthened anti-fraud programs X
b. Instituted new or changed existing standards on how closely an X
applicant's name and date of birth must match the name and date
of birth returned by CLASS (before consular officers submit
requests for a Security Advisory Opinion)
c. Reduced the availability of personal appearance waiver X
programs
d. Increased the percentage of NIV applicants who are X
interviewed
e. Other (please specify) Verifying more I- 20s with U.S. X
Colleges and Universities

f. Other (please specify)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

Post has been coordinating more closely with US agencies and fraud prevention officers of other embassies. Post is
sending many more "close" CLASS hits for Advisory Opinion. Ambassador actively promotes the Visas Viper
program to ensure that all possible terrorists are being entered into the CLASS system. Post uses a universal drop-
box program. Cases are reviewed in me drop box for those that may qualify to be issued without interview. Post
has established relationships with the most commonly attended U.S. universities and regularly verifies I-20s.

Anti-Fraud Programs: Mr. Donahue stated that, since September 1 l' h . he has allowed his fraud officer more time to
devote solely to fraud. The officer has, in turn, increased the amount of information sharing (s)he does with other
foreign embassies, other U.S. government agencies, and local law enforcement. Mr. Doahue has also sought to
incorporate more fraud detection in every day visa processing. For Islamabad, identity fraud is a real concern. Mr.
Donahue stated that in just the past week they were able to refer two applicants to local law enforcement, one for
providing false documents and another for switching the pages in his passport. Overall, Mr. Donahue felt that his
staff grew better at detecting fraud with experience. After being on the ground for another year, his officers are
more able to detect fraud than they were when they first arrived. He also stated that the staff is more aware of the
implications of their visa decisions since September I l l h . and therefore look at all cases more carefully.

CLASS hits: Mr. Donahue stated that prior to September 11 t h . Islamabad often did not refer CLASS hits that did not
show exact spelling matches to the applicant's name or had a different, or no birth date information. He noted that
there are a few very common names in Islamic culture, like Muhamrned. and there are also verv common name
J9/11 Closed by
//Statute

formations that make it often difficult to distinguish applicants. Since September 1 l' h , however. lilaniarJad has
chosen to err on the side of caution and send in matches iliat sound a like or have birth dates in a/similar range.

2) About what percent of NIV applicants were interviewed at your post (a) in the 12 months ,prior to September 11,
2001, and (b) since September 11,2001? // I |1

a. 12 months prior to September 11, 2001

b. Since September 11, 2001

Please provide additional comments, if any. ; \\\e September 11, 2001, the num

this is due largely to several factors: I }}\g illegal immigrants believe that th

Applicants believe visa officers are now more restrictive in issuing visas. ; \g the same periods from S

September 11, 2000 - April 19, September 1 1,2001-April 19:,; ;


2001 2002
88,666 24,490 ; \\ ^
Total number issued

The chart shows that regardless of the number of applications, there is a core of legitimate applicants, many wh<?iare
clearly eligible from their application. As the number of applications goes up, the refusal rate increases significantly
reflecting more applications from outside the core of eligible applicants. A personal interview would provide little:
added value or security. This group consists largely of those| i

Legitimate travel: Mr. Donahue stated that Islamabad generally considers!

jai legitimate applicants. He also said that because of'thc time of year, they are receiving lots of
applications from family members wishing to attend their relative's graduation from college. As the 7" largest IV
issuing post in the world, they also see many people wishing lo immigrate.

Problem applicants: Mr. Donahue stated that Islamabad commonly denies applicants

I
3) In your opinion, to what extent, if any, do the following security procedures and requirements help your post's
consular officers identify potential terrorists?
(Please check one box in each row.)
Great extent Some extent No extent Not sure No basis to judge
a) Security Advisory X(Mr. X
Opinion for selected Donahue
individuals from States revised his
Sponsoring International answer)
Terrorism (see State
109933)
b) Visas Viper Committees X
c) CLASS name check s X
d) The 20-day waiting X
period for selected
applicants (see State
196355)
e) Requirement that X
applicants provide
information on the DS-157
form
f) The Visas Condor X
process (see State 015702)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

The DS-157 provides valuable background information that helps in selecting cases for closer scrutiny.

StOTjdarxLSAQi Mr. Donahue stated that the standard SAO procedure in place prior to September 11*1, is extremely
helpful in that it enables consular officers to flag suspicious cases for further review by main state.

yisa.Vjpers/CLASS: Mr. Donahue stated that just as Mary Ryan emphasized in her testimony, the most important
way io stop terrorists is to provide consular officers with their names. He emphasized the need to include any
potential terrorist names known to U.S. or foreign law enforcement in CLASS, regardless of the quality of the
biographical information on them. He stated that even if the information on a hit is vague, it would still give them a
chance to run the applicant by headquarters to see if they pose a threat.

DS.:Jj_7; Mr. Donahue stated that by giving consular officers access to information on the applicant's education,
work, and overseas travel history they are better able to assess the legitimacy of the applicant. In a sense, Mr.
Donahue felt that the DS-157 enables consular officers to obtain information that they previously only would have
gotten through an interview. For example, if a student is applying for a visa, but does not have the background
necessary to qualify for that university, it is easy to deny the visa. Having the work history also helps consular
officers root out economic fraud.

20-day wait and Condors: Mr. Donahue stated that Islamabad has not yet received any come back from
headquarters on these two procedures.
4) For your post, to what extent, if any, would the following proposed changes to the NIV application process help
identify potential terrorists? (Please check one box in each row.)

Very Some- Not


helpful what helpful Not sure
helpful
a. Interview a greater percentage of all applicants X
(If you check very or somewhat helpful, please
indicate the percentage %)
b. Interview all applicants X
c. Fingerprint a percentage of all applicants (If you X
check very or somewhat helpful, please indicate the
percentage %)
d. Fingerprint all applicants X
e. Improve training for consular officers in identifying X
suspected terrorists, cooperating with other agencies/
international organizations, and cultural sensitivity
g. Make the visa process a law enforcement X
function (If you check yes, please elaborate in the
comments section on how this should be
accomplished, e.g., should the function remain
within State or be moved to another agency)
h. Other (please specify) Legislative change to language X
oflNA212(a)

i. Other (please specify)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

We are already calling in all those cases where we think an interview will improve our ability to detect terrorism or
fraud.

Fingerprinting will only identify terrorists who have already been fingerprinted by U.S. law enforcement
agencies. I suspect that most potential terrorists do not have fingerprints on file anywhere. Fingerprinting
could be helpful in starting a database of immigrants and visitors to the U.S. The eventual database may be
helpful in reducing identity fraud by immigrants and nonimmigrants to the U.S. including terrorists. It
would be difficult to determine who should be fingerprinted since immigration fraud (and potentially
terrorism) is not restricted by gender, age, or purpose of visit.

I see little advantage to making visa adjudication a law enforcement function. Regardless of who is
adjudicating the visas the best weapon against terrorism and fraud is a deep understanding of the local
country and culture.

Interviews: Mr. Donahue did not feel it was necessary to interview all applicants. Applicants who have a
long history of rravelback and forth to the U.S.. and those members of the elite who are well and favorably
known to the embassy do not need interviews.

Fingerprinting: Mr. Donahue felt that the U.S. should develop a database system that tracks visa applicants
from the moment; they apply for the first; time, to the moment they become naturalized citizens, and all
steps in between. He felt this database should contain some form of biometric indicator so that both State
and INS would be able to pull up the applicants history and see if they are indeed who they claim to be. He
felt that, a system like this would drastically cut down on fraud and identity theft.
Training: Mr. Donahue felt that consular officers should be given more time to gel out into their local
environments to really get to know the demographic, educational, and business patterns of the country's in
which they are serving. He felt that due to workload demands, consular officers never have enough time
to really get. to know the country like they should, and thus are less able to judge whether an applicant's
story makes sense. He also felt that consular officers should receive more in-depth anti-fraud training and
training by law enforcement on how to conduct investigations.

Other- Legislative change; Mr. Donahue felt that the legal requirements posed by the current 212(a) rules
are too strict in that they do not allow consular officers to deny easily on the basis of terrorism or crime.
He supported including language similar to the drug clause of the INA, that allows refusals on the basis of
"reason to believe". He did not express a preference as to whether the ability to deny on terrorism grounds
should reside with the consular officer or main State, but did note that many consular officers would
prefer the latter.

5) How feasible would it be for your post to implement the following proposed changes to the NIV process?
(Please check one box in each row.)

Very Some- Not Not


feasible what feasible sure
feasible

a. Interview a greater percentage of all applicants (If X


you check very or somewhat helpful, please indicate
the percentage %)
b. Interview all applicants X
c. Fingerprint a percentage of all applicants (If you X
check very or somewhat helpful, please indicate the
percentage %)
d. Fingerprint all applicants X
e. Improve training for consular officers in identifying X
suspected terrorists, cooperating with other agencies/
international organizations, and cultural sensitivity
f . Make the visa process a law enforcement function X
g. Institute a secure travel document that incorporates a X
biometric such as fingerprints
h. Other (please specify)

i. Other (please specify)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

Everything is feasible assuming there is sufficient human and financial resources and there is no concern about
inconvenience to legitimate travelers. This post is currently suffering with its second evacuation in the past eight
months. Our staffing has been cut by two-thirds. Due to the security situation, Islamabad is the only visa processing
post in Pakistan and it is over 1,000 miles from Karachi. Most of the visa fraud we see involves imposters or altered
documents. Much of this will not be detected by interviews since legitimate traveler appears for the interview and
then the visaed passport is lost, stolen or sold. Fingerprinting or biometric visas would help fight the problem with
imposters. With current resources, implementing some of these changes (particularly interviewing 100 percent and
fingerprinting) would require strict limits on the number of cases processed daily resulting in months- or maybe
years-long wait for an interview.
6) Would any of the following factors make it difficult for your post to fully implement the proposed changes listed
in questions 4 and 5? (Please check one box in each row.)

Yes, to a great Yes, to some No Not sure


extent extent
a. Consular staffing shortages X
b. Lack of space, faculties X
c. An adverse effect on U.S. interests X
in the host country (please elaborate
in comments section)
d. Host country would require same X
of U.S. citizens (reciprocity)
e. Other (please specify)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

Pakistan has a relatively small number of legitimate travelers to the U.S. When travel to the U.S. by this small elite
is restricted, delayed or made more difficult, all other bilateral issues can become more difficult.

Adverse affect: Mr. Donahue was concerned that universal interviews might be insulting to the elite and won't
enhance State's access to the host country government. He provided an example that if he were to bring a high-
ranking Pakistani official in to be scrutinized in a visa interview, that individual might be less cooperative if the U.S.
needs his assistance in another area at a later date. Mr. Donahue was also concerned that the 20 and 30 day wait
procedures may prevent officials from attending crucial meetings in the U.S. He provided the example of two
Afghan officials \vho will be unable to attend a conference on Afghan reconstruction in the U.S. because of the 20
and 30 day wait.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Throughout the interview, Mr. Donahue stressed that visa issuance is like a pendulum that sways back and forth
between control of borders and facilitation of legitimate travel. He stated that since September 11 lh . all consular
officers around the world now see protecting America from terrorists as their number one priority, but they must
balance that with granting visas to legitimate applicants and upholding the ideals of the United States, like family
reunification and free trade. September 11 th showed consular officers that terrorists can be clean cut and look
legitimate.

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