Hz . Questions for GAO Interviews on U.S.

Embassy
Non-Immigrant Visas (NIV) Policies and Procedures (as of 4/17/02)

Name: Sylvia D. Johnson

Date: 04/22/02 Post: Kuala Lumpur

1) Has your post made any of the following changes to the NTV application and approval process
since September 11, 2001? (Check all that apply)

Yes No N/A
a. Strengthened anti-fraud programs X
b. Instituted new or changed existing standards on how closely an X
applicant's name and date of birth must match the name and date
of birth returned by CLASS (before consular officers submit
requests for a Security Advisory Opinion)
c. Reduced the availability of personal appearance waiver X
programs
d. Increased the percentage of NIV applicants who are X
interviewed
e. Other (please specify) X
f. Other (please specify)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

A) This post already has a strong anti-fraud program, involving visa applicants. We have
been working with INS to provide additional training to Malaysian immigration and
airport officials who regularly encounter persons with fraudulent travel documents,
boarding pass switches, etc. Persons who have been involved in fraudulent visa scams
when interviewed have stated that they applied for visas in other U.S. Embassies in the
region because it was too difficult in Kuala Lumpur.
B) We haven't changed our standards because they are already very high. Shortly after 9/11
we reviewed our VLA and CLASS namecheck procedures. This post is very
conservative in matching names/dates of birth with information in CLASS entries. We
also conduct periodic review sessions on evaluating CLASS hits and more than one
officer will review very close hits.
C) This post is an "interview" by exception post. However, we carefully scrutinize
information received on applicants, randomly call in applicants as part of a check or
control on the system, and routinely contact the applicant by telephone to verify
information.
D) We have to interview more applicants to obtain information needed to determine if
additional administrative processing, i.e. security advisory opinions will be required.
 E) We increased instructional information available on the website for visa applicants, and
applicants may download the DS-156 and DS-157 through the Embassy's website.
F) With the introduction of the upgrade in software for NTV applications, we have begun to
scan photos of refused visa applicants.
2) About what percent of NTV applicants were interviewed at your post (a) in the 12 months
prior to September 11, 2001, and (b) since September 11, 2001?

a. 12 months prior to September 11,2001 15%

b. Since September 11, 2001 22%

Please provide additional comments, if any.

We interview third country nationals in almost all cases. Also, we are examining the travel
patterns of applicants for more than 10 years, therefore this information is not usually available
on the Visa Forms, and interviews in many cases are now required. We also ask about the
circumstances surrounding lost passports in interviews. All cases are initially reviewed as drop-
box cases, and the officer conducting the review will determine if the interview is required and
what additional information the applicant should submit during the interview.

3) In your opinion, to what extent, if any, do the following security procedures and requirements
help your post's consular officers identify potential terrorists?
(Please check one box in each row.)

Great extent Some extent No extent Not sure No basis to judge

a) Security Advisory X
Opinion for selected
individuals from States
Sponsoring International
Terrorism (see State
109933)
b) Visas Viper Committees X
c) CLASS name check s X
d) The 20-day waiting X
period for selected
applicants (see State
196355)
e) Requirement that X
applicants provide
information on the DS-157
form
f) The Visas Condor X
process (see State 015702)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

A) Security Advisory Opinions (SAO) have always been useful in providing information on
cases.
 B) Viper Committees that have cooperative members are an excellent source of information
for the Consular officer.
C) CLASS name checks have always been invaluable. The system provides a rapid
response, indicating to the officer that additional processing may be required.
D) I am not sure how the 20-day waiting period differs from the processing cases by
reviewing CLASS and/or through SAOs. If it provides information on applicants for
inclusion in a database then it is useful, but it doesn't provide this office with additional
information that can be used in adjudicating the visa application.
E) The Supplemental Form DS-157 does provide useful U.S. contacts and educational
information that assists officers in adjudicating a visa case.
F) Since January, 2002 we have drafted 2,200 Visa Condor cables. They are very time
intensive (keeping track of the time, contacting the applicants, filing, in addition to
preparing the cables). To date, we have received one response from Washington on a
Visas Condor, but after the appropriate delays had passed and the case had been issued in
accordance with Department procedures.

4) For your post, to what extent, if any, would the following proposed changes to the NTV
application process help identify potential terrorists? (Please check one box in each row.)

Very Some-what Not

helpful helpful helpful Not sure
a Interview a greater percentage of all applicants X
(If you check very or somewhat helpful, please
indicate the percentage 96)
b. Interview all applicants X
c. Fingerprint a percentage of all applicants (If you X
check very or somewhat helpfitl, please indicate the
percentage %)
d. Fingerprint all applicants X
e. Improve training for consular officers in identifying X
suspected terrorists, cooperating with other agencies/
international organizations, and cultural sensitivity
g. Make the visa process a law enforcement X
function (If you check yes, please elaborate in the
comments section on how this should be
accomplished, e.g., should the function remain
within State or be moved to another agency)
h. Other (please specify)
**.*•**,- X
-Sftui
i. Other (please ^^^ X

Please provide additional comments, if any.

A & B. Interviews don't uncover potential terrorists, particularly if they are articulate, well-
versed, and have a plausible story.
C. & D. Fingerprints for some, but for whom? At what stage of the process? Men, Women, and
Children?
 E. Training: Consular officers already receive extensive training on interview techniques,
and we are very pro-active with sharing information with other agencies at post and in
Washington. Unfortunately, other agencies are not always as forthcoming with
information to consular officers.
G. Converting visa processing into a law enforcement function would not helpful. The
focus of law enforcement agencies would not be to facilitate legitimate travel. We are
having to deal with stories in the press almost on a daily basis on how U.S. immigration,
airport security, or other law enforcement agencies mistreated men, women, and/or
children. Give consular officers the information available, let agencies work with us and
share with us all that we need to know to properly adjudicate visa applications.
H. There should be more information sharing on patterns, organizations, associations and
the persons involved in them. These areas are most helpful, but are the most difficult to
obtain. There is not universal database with the names of various companies, their
principles.
I. If fingerprints are useful, then implement a system at the point of embarkation, tied into a
international database. Also, implementing a system at the point of embarkation or at the
U.S. port of entry will ensure that prints will be available for persons entering the U.S.,
including those with previously issued visas.

5) How feasible would it be for your post to implement the following proposed changes to the
NFV process? (Please check one box in each row.)

Very Some- Not Not

feasible what feasible feasible sure

a Interview a greater percentage of all applicants (If X5%

you check very or somewhat helpful, please indicate more
the percentage 96)
b. Interview all applicants X
c. Fingerprint a percentage of all applicants (If you X
check very or somewhat helpful, please indicate the
percentage %)
d. Fingerprint all applicants X
e. Improve training for consular officers in identifying X
suspected terrorists, cooperating with other agencies/
international organizations, and cultural sensitivity
f . Make the visa process a law enforcement function X
g. Institute a secure travel document that incorporates a X
biometric such assMJlBiCrpi'ints
h Other (please ^Bcj^f)
v*f ^ ~ -

i. Other (please specify)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

Interview: Our current resources won't permit us to interview no more than about 25% of our
total workload.
Fingerprints: Fingerprinting all applicants would require additional space and staff that we don't
have.
Training: We would welcome additional training, but we are already cooperating with and using
information that is available to us.
Travel Document: The Malaysian passport already as a computer chip that has the photo and
capability of including a fingerprint or other biometrics. Unfortunately, there are still old
passports in circulation that do not have the new technology.
6) Would any of the following factors make it difficult for your post to fully implement the
proposed changes listed in questions 4 and 5? (Please check one box in each row.)

Yes, to a great extent Yes, to some extent No Not sure

a. Consular staffing shortages X
b. Lack of space, facilities X
c. An adverse effect on U.S. interests X
in the host country (please elaborate
in comments section)
d. Host country would require same X
of U.S. citizens (reciprocity)
e. Other (please specify)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

We are already strapped for space and are sharing desks/ work areas, and regularly working
overtime just to meet the Condor requirements. This post is not designed to have 100+
applicants entering the consular section everyday. It is only designed to hold 30-40 applicants
including persons seeking American Citizen and Immigrant Visa services.
The Government of Malaysia has cooperated in sharing information with the consular section
including tax records, and entry/exit histories upon request for their own citizens. To impose
new more burdensome requirements across the board for all Malaysian applicants will damage
the working relationship that we have worked so hard to obtain.

A large number of the Malaysian visa applicants are employees of large U.S. companies such as
Microsoft, Dell, Intel, Shell, and Boeing. These companies have postponed important meetings,
sales of aircraft, computer installations at major airports, because their employees were caught in
the 20-day delay or Condor process. Our office has worked overtime to provide outreach to the
Malaysian business community, American Chamber of Commerce, and other organizations, to
appear as helpful to them while complying with all of the regulations that have been added to
visa processing.

The Malaysians accept that additional security is required, but they don't appreciate being
included in a select group of nationalities that require additional processing. They point out to us
every day that Reid and Moussoui or none of the 9/11 hijackers were not carrying Malaysian
passports. In most cases, Americans do not have to obtain a visa before arriving in Malaysia. If
additional requirements are imposed upon Malaysians, particularly, if these requirements are not
applied to all nationalities, the Malaysians will probably review their immigration requirements
and impose new ones for Americans entering Malaysia.