Commission Sensitive

March 18, 2003

NORAD and 9/11 Radar Files

An Unclassified Information Paper
By
Miles Kara, Professional Staff

Overview
Typically, all radar-related investigations involve the 84th Radar Evaluation
Squadron (ACC), (84th RADES) Department of the Air Force, Hill Air Force Base, Utah.
That Squadron uses windows-based software to display radar files from the Joint
Surveillance System, a series of interlocking radar sites that allow NORAD to perform its
CONUS Air Defense mission.
I became intimately familiar with and extensively used that software, version
RS2, in a detailed, months-long investigation of the Cuban shootdown of two unarmed
civilian aircraft over the Straits of Florida in 1996. According to a November 1999 84th
RADES memo to the National Transportation Safety Board, "Analysis of Long Range
Radar Data: Egypt Air 990 Mishap, 31 Oct 99," the current version of the software is
RS3 and it can be provided to interested users together with a tutorial. According to that
memo, 84th RADES can also provide responsive radar files in an RS3 configuration to
aid investigators.
Points of Contact
Substantive points-of-contact have not changed over the years and they are
internationally known for their expertise. They are: Dallas Stone and Lanny Clelland,
who may be reached at DSN 777-2035, Commercial (801) 777-2035, e-mail:
lanny.clelland@hill.af.mil or dallas.stone@hill.af.mil. Mr. Stone will likely remember
me from my work on the Cuban shootdown; Mr. Clelland may as well.
Work Concerning 9/11.
According to web-available National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) information
the NORAD analyst most familiar with events of 9/11 is Cherie Gott. She presented a
"9-11 Analysis" at a June 2002 STK (Satellite Tool Kit) Users' Conference. The
curriculum for that conference described her presentation as follows:
Following the events of September 11, a scenario was created to serve
dual purposes: provide a graphical, time-centric depiction of the events to the
highest levels within NORAD and US Space Command Headquarters, and create
an interactive tool for forensic examination of the events. This analysis used the
hijacked airliner and NORAD interceptor radar data from 84th RADar Evaluation
Squadron (RADES) to accurately re-create the scenario using real-world FAA
radar data. In addition, the FAA radar coverage was modeled, to include terrain
considerations, to examine the loss of radar data observed for both the
Pennsylvania- and Pentagon-bound airliners. The entire scenario, including
high-resolution imagery, was then used to provide a useful visualization of the
events for further analysis.
 Commission Sensitive

According to information at the web site www.stk.com Gott's analysis was based
on "primary radar and secondary radar (transponder) information available only from
official sources." She fused all data to develop a scenario that "enabled analysis of
visibility and communications between the hijacked aircraft; examination of NORAD's
intercept capabilities; and the evaluation of airspace control and surveillance sensor
contributions." Among other analyses she created time-to-target displays that showed
"when NORAD's intercept aircraft took off and their distances to the hijacked airlines."
Course of Action
Commission analysis should start with Gott's work. I can set that up once we
have formally engaged with the Department of Defense.
 Overview of STK Users' Conference Application Track
CTI/ Application Track is the primary conference session, geared toward every level of attendee. It will consist of STK users and ACI rep-
O I IX resentatives presenting how STK's commercial off-the-shelf technology capabilities support specific defense applications; custom
systems integration; real-time operations; and mission design and analysis within their organization. In addition, AGI will be demonstrating
new features in STK 4.3 and discussing AGI's upcoming new technology products. Attendees can also participate in an interactive panel dis-
cussion of desired future enhancements to the STK software suite and ACI's technical services.
STK for Defense Applications
Monday, June 3, 8:30 AM
Visualization of a BMD Scenario Including
Ground-Based Radar and Infrared Satellite System
Carol Cheung, MIT Lincoln Labs
A threat scenario is complex with many interacting elements from both
offensive and defensive sides. Simulated visualization of the engagement
offers perspective for further understanding the interaction, can aid in
presentations to sponsors and colleagues, and with additional analysis
functionality, provides threat and sensor modeling. This session examines
a ballistic missile system with multiple stages, chaff, decoys, and a reentry
vehicle (RV). Customized ballistic trajectories for the RV and decoys were
postulated. Defense sensors included a ground-based X-band radar and a
satellite system with line of sight sensing in the LWIR band.
Monday, June 3, 9:00 AM
Test & Evaluation Mission Planning and
Post Flight Analysis for Missile Defense
Joe Murphy, AGI
This presentation will show the benefits of use of STK in the mission plan-
ning, and post-flight analysis of missile defense flight tests. Mission plan-
ners can use STK to quickly determine threat trajectories that will meet
desired relative geometry criteria with respect to fixed sensor assets and
mobile test instruments such as radar ships, and sensor aircraft. Analysts
can sample macro geometry regarding viewing angles, and micro geom-
etry regarding how exactly to deploy the threat deployment articles so as
to meet viewing objectives. The presentation will touch on geometry
analysis, geographical coverage analysis, dynamic communication link
analysis, proximity and coincident angles to USSPACECOM catalog space
objects, and radar analysis for characterization of expected viewing con-
ditions for threat objects.
Monday, June 3, 9:30 AM
Floating Antenna Connectivity Simulation (FACS)
Julie LaComb, Naval Undersea Warfare Center
One of the greatest mission needs of the submarine fleet is communica-
tions at speed and depth. The Floating Antenna Connectivity Simulation
(FACS) was a project to simulate a submarine communications prototype,
the Low Profile Antenna, a one element, slotted cylinder antenna at UHF.
The overall program was to model the hydrodynamics of a body on the
ocean surface, determine the washover effect on the antenna and deter-
mine satellite communication performance. STK was the major integrat-
ing factor in the entire demonstration. The project highlighted how soft-
ware modeling could be used instead of expensive build/test process. The
project was going to demonstrate the dynamic environment a floating
antenna performs in and why communications may drop out.
Monday, June 3, 10:00 AM
Space Support for Deployed Military Operations
Tim Slauenwhite, USAF / Canadian Dept. of National Defence
The Canadian Forces are creating a Joint Space Support Team OSST) to
provide operations support, space planning and liaison between space
organizations and the deployed operational commanders. The Joint Space
Support Project (JSSP) was created to define and acquire the equipment
for this team as well as develop operational procedures. STK is the main
operational software for one of the areas of the JSSP, Space Situations!
Awareness (SSA) as well as the NAVWAR support areas and the primary
JSST planning support tool. This presentation will focus on how STK, via
a customized Graphic User Interface (GUI) and STK Connect, is used as an
operational platform for SSA and NAVWAR support as well as on its plan-
ning support capabilities.
Monday, June 3, 10:30 AM
Impact of Terrain on OOP Calculations in the Battlespace
Frank Snyder, AGI
The increasing reliance on GPS-based navigation by defense forces has
resulted in a greater need to understand the limitations of this system and
how to predict when those limitations will result in a less-than-ideal navi-
gation solution. Factors such as Time, Signal Interference, System
Maintenance and Terrain Obscuration must all be evaluated when deter-
mining the quality of the navigation solution. This presentation will focus
on showing how STK/Coverage can assist the user in determining the
Dilution of Precision (DOP) for a ground- or air-based vehicle or ground
region based on the geometry to each satellite in the GPS constellation,
while taking into account the terrain masking effects of the surrounding
landscape. The times of degraded GPS navigation accuracy will play an
important part in determining the timing of planned operations in the
battlespace. Simulated failure of various GPS satellites will also be demon-
strated to show how signal interference and/or system maintenance can
affect the overall navigation solution.
Monday, June 3, 11:00 AM
Space-based Radar
Tom Neely, AGI
A concept for a space-based ground moving target (GMTI) radar system
including satellite constellation and radar sensor characteristics is mod-
eled using STK. The STK/Matlab Interface is used in conjunction with the
STK computational engine to conduct a Monte Carlo analysis of the oper-
ational effectiveness of a particular design. The design uses a simple radar
model with a single waveform that is analyzed to determine measures of
performance for the following elements: constellation design, signal pro-
cessing capabilities and system power of the concept system.
Monday, June 3, 11:30 AM
9-11 Analysis
Cherie Gott, US Space Command
This presentation demonstrates how STK can be applied to analysis and
visualization of aircraft events. Following the events of September 11, a
scenario was created to serve dual purposes: provide a graphical, time-
centric depiction of the events to the highest levels within NORAD and US
Space Command Headquarters, and create an interactive tool for forensic
examination of the events. This analysis used the hijacked airliner and
NORAD interceptor radar data from 84th RADar Evaluation Squadron
(RADES) to accurately re-create the scenario using real-world FAA radar
data. In addition, the FAA radar coverage was modeled, to include terrain
considerations, to examine the loss of radar data observed for both the
Pennsylvania- and the Pentagon-bound airliners. The entire scenario,
including high-resolution imagery, was then used to provide a useful visu-
alization of the events for further analysis.
Integrating & Customizing STK
Monday, June 3, 1:30 PM
Distribution of STK/VO Animation
Using Low-Bandwidth Communication
Louis Khazoyan, Boeing Space and Communications
Space operations often involve multiple, geographically separate, support
facilities. Coordination between these sites is enhanced when all sites
share an accurate situational awareness. The Inertial Upper Stage program
developed an STK/VO animation, driven by real-time telemetry, to
9/11 Analysis
NORAD USED STK TO STUDY T E R R O R I S T ATTACKS
I
n the days following the Sept. 11 Hf^^^|H|^^H
terrorist attacks, the world watched B^^IE^l^^^l
as reporters and analysts replayed ^^^^I^^^^^H
existing film footage of the tragic disas- H^^SJH^^^^H
ters, studying the pictorial record for I^Hjj^^^^^^H
evidence of what had taken place. H^^^^l^^^^l
In Colorado Springs, CO, the ^^^^^^^HHH
North American Aerospace Defense ^^^^^^^^•••j
Command (NORAD), which protects ^^^^^^^^IHI
U.S. and Canadian airspace, also pieced ^^^^^^^^^^^^^
together information at its disposal, looking for forensic evi-
dence. Among NORAD's analytical tools was Satellite Tool Kit.
Cherie Gott, an analyst for NORAD and the U.S. Space
Command, is a 10-year STK veteran. Her job was to provide
graphical depictions of the events as they happened and to cre-
ate a tool that analysts could use if similar attacks ever
occurred again. Her finished work, which was in the form of
STK 2-D and 3-D dynamic animations, then went to the
highest-ranking officials within NORAD and the U.S. Space
Command for internal analysis.
Gott's STK animations resembled the computer-generat-
ed depictions the world saw on TV But since her analyses were
lOunded on primary radar and secondary radar (transponder)
information available only from official sources, the use of STK
provided NORAD and U.S. Space Command insight far
beyond what film footage ever could. Working with AGI,
Gott fused diverse data sources to develop a true-to-life sce-
nario that enabled analysis of visibility and communications
between the hijacked aircraft; examination of NORAD's
intercept capabilities; and the evaluation of airspace control
and surveillance sensor contributions. She also incorporated
digital elevation terrain data to help discern if land formations
Navy Tests Submarine
Communication with STK
D espite its name, Satellite Tool Kit is at work under the
sea. Julie LaComb, an electrical engineer in the antenna
branch at the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWQ, used
the software suite to test an antenna prototype that would
allow submarines to communicate to airplanes, ships, and
satellites while moving under water at significant speeds.
Currently, submarines must near the surface to raise their
mast-mounted antennas, which broach the water much like
periscopes. "As they do, they create . an easily identified
fradar signal," says LaComb. "For i a submarine, which
is supposed to be stealthy and ' ' invisible, that's
a problem." Although subs can : communicate
I^^^^^^^^B By putting original source data into STK, NORAD
^^^^^^^^H examined the events of 9/11.
had contributed to the widely reported loss of transponder sig-
nal for the airplanes that crashed in Somerset County, PA, and
into the Pentagon.
Among her analyses, Gott created time-to-target displays
that showed when NORAD's intercept aircraft took off and their
distances to the hijacked airliners. She also performed a line-
of-sight analysis between the two airplanes in the World
Trade Center attack. While she did much of the work herself,
AGI helped out by writing a Perl script that sorted and
processed the FAA data, generated the objects' flight paths, and
brought them into STK. AGI also created a "button tool" that
allowed NORAD users to easily move to strategic points in
time. The finished video clips required no special hardware to
run or skills to execute—viewers merely had to click a but-
ton and a media player showed the images.
"I can't stress enough the importance graphics play in
analysis," says Gott. "Charts don't always explain a situation
fully, but seeing all the information put together in a 2-D or
3-D depiction is extremely helpful."
And now as America moves forward, NORAD and AGI
continue to use their skills and technologies to fight the bat-
tle against terrorism.
those antennas do not allow for satellite communications.
NUWC has been working on several concepts that would
let the fleet communicate at higher frequencies while sub-
merged. One model is a. simple low-prolile antenna that floats
on a buoy and is towed by the submarine as it moves under
water. It was developed as part of the government-funded
Floating Antenna Connectivity Simulation (FACS) initiative,
which had several goals including simulating the ellect sea-
water would have on satellite communication as it washed
over the buoyant antenna.
The FACS project also set out to determine it software
modeling could replace the current expensive build/test
process and to provide an operational usage tool tor sailors.
STK was the project's main analytical soltware. STK's chief
 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
84TH RADAR EVALUATION SQUADRON (ACC)
HILL AIR FORCE BASE, UTAH

1 Nov 99

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

FROM: 84RADES/TO
7976 Aspen Ave
Hill AFB UT 84056-5846

SUBJECT: Analysis of Long Range Radar Data: Egypt Air 990 aircraft mishap 31 Oct 99

1. Introduction. At the request of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the 84th
Radar Evaluation Squadron (84 RADES) is releasing radar data from various long-range
surveillance radars providing coverage for Egypt Air aircraft crash on 31 Oct 99. Comprehensive
search and beacon radar coverage of the mishap was provided by the air route surveillance radar-
4 (ARSR-4) at Gibbsborro, NJ, Riverhead, NY, Oceana, VA and North Truro, MA. This data
was recorded at the Northeast Air Defense Sector Air Operations Center, Rome industrial Park,
NY.

The enclosed CD contains all radar data and products produced by the 84th RADES in support of
this incident. Software to view the recorded data is included along with quick instructions to
view the data (attach 1).

2. Radar Accuracy Constraints. The primary range accuracy limitation for both search and
beacon is 1/8 nmi, which is the value of the least significant bit in the radar target reports to end
users. Azimuth accuracy, primarily a function of radar beamwidth, is approximately 0.2 degree
for both search and beacon. Mode C height accuracy is primarily limited to 100 feet, which is
the value of the least significant bit in the Mode C altitude report. Mode C altitudes may vary
from 'true height' depending on atmospheric conditions. The aircraft's true altitude can be
obtained by algebraically adding its corresponding D-value (included in attachment 1) to the
Mode C report. In contrast, the ARSR-4 search height accuracy is primarily a function of radar
design and the physical world (e.g., propagation conditions and target size). The average search
height accuracy, based on specifications, is 3000 ft root mean square (RMS) of the true altitude,
but any single radar return height value could far exceed 3000 feet. Therefore, the ARSR-4
height values should be treated as approximate values. A good indication of the relative height
error can be obtained by comparing the associated Mode C height (including D values) with the
ARSR-4 height measurement. The height measurement values of 102,000 feet indicate the
ARSR-4 could not determine the height of the target and are used to represent an invalid height
value. In addition to these range, azimuth, and height accuracy factors, the ARSR-4 requires
approximately 12 seconds to complete each 360-degree azimuth scan. These scan rates preclude
contiguous aircraft positional information (i.e., prevents a high degree of track resolution).
Because of these intrinsic radar limitations, all radar plots illustrated in this analysis on a scan-to-
scan basis should be considered close approximations.

3. Description of products in attachments and Emailed/FTP files.

a. Attachment 1) - D-Values (pressure-based Mode-C height correction factors)

b. Attachment 2) - Summary of events reported by MSgt Rauch of the NEADS/84RADES

OLAB as he accomplished the initial analysis of radar data.

c. Attachment 3) — List of all radars recorded in the provided radar data files

d. Attachment 4) - Quick Instructions for use of RS3 Software (Note: We've also included
in the FTP directory a more in-depth RS-3 tutorial and sample files)

e. Products Provided

Egypt Air 990

- Coverletter
- Coverletter Egypt Air 990 - (explanation of products)

-Data
- Filtered Flight 990 flight profile (RS3 configuration file)
- Filtered Flight 990 flight profile — closeup (RS3 configuration file)
- Complete data set (RS3 configuration file)
- Radar Data Interface (RDI) files to feed the configuration files
- Filtered Flight 990 flight profile (MS Excel file)
- Complete data set (MS Excel file)

-Final products
- Elevation Plot
- Filtered Flight 990 Profile overlaid on Maplnfo data
4. If you have any questions or need more information, please contact Mr Lanny Clelland at
DSN 777-2035, Commercial (801) 777-2035, or email: lanny.clelland@hill.af.mil.

MARY M. GILLAM, Lt Col, USAF

Commander

Attachments
1. D-Values
2. Initial Event Summary (from 84RADES/OLAB, Rome NY)
3. List of Radars
4. RS3 Quick Instructions
 Attachment 1

31 OCT 99 / 1200Z
(TRUE ALTITUDE = MODE C ALTITUDE + D VALUE)
AIRCRAFT MODE C
REPORTED ALTITUDE D-VALUE
FEET MSL FEET
1000. 383.
2000. 395.
3000. 405.
4000. 419.
5000. 437.
6000. 463.
7000. 492.
8000. 520.
9000. 547.
10000. 573.
11000. 600.
12000. 629.
13000. 656.
14000. 682.
15000. 706.
16000. 733.
17000. 764.
18000. 796.
19000. 829.
20000. 857.
21000. 883.
22000. 905.
23000. 923.
24000. 941.
25000. 960.
26000. 983.
27000. 1007.
28000. 1030.
29000. 1051.
30000. 1069.
31000. 1083.
32000. 1094.
33000. 1102.
34000. 1106.
35000. 1114.
36000. 1121.
37000. 1125.
38000. 1129.
39000. 1135.
40000. 1151.
 Attachment 2

84th Radar Evaluation Squadron

Operating Location AB
Rome, NY

Event Summary
31Oct99

1. At 1110 Z on 31 Oct 99, TSgt Sustarsic NEADS/DOCB recalled OLAB personnel at the request of
New York Center to locate the position of Egypt Air flight 990 which they had lost contact with. The
last position for the aircraft was forwarded to Maj (CF) LaBelle NEADS/MCC at 1140 Z. An event
analysis was produced and given to the operations crew.

2. Information used in this report was collected by the 84 RADES/OLAB Radar Data Interface Recorder
and presented using RADES system 3. All information is based on data recorded from J-52 and J-53
ARSR-4 radar located in Riverhead, NY and North Truro, MA.

Released by: RANDALL M. RAUCH, MSgt, USAF

NCOIC Air Defense Systems Analysis
 Attachment 3

ID NAME EQUIPMENT
R51 BAR Harrington, Canada FPS117
J54 BUG Bucks Harbor, ME ARSR4
J63 CAR Caribou, ME ARSR4
J56 DAN Dansville (Buffalo), NY ARSRlE
J62 DTW Detroit, MI ARSRlE
J58 EMP Empire, MI ARSR4
J51 GIB Gibbsboro ARSR4
J60 NSH Nashuak, MN ARSR4
J53 NOR North Truro, MA - ARSR4
J01 OCA Oceana, VA ARSR4
J55 REM Remsen (Utica), NY ARSR4
J02 QFF Ft Fisher, NC ARSR4
J50 PLA The Plains, VA ARSR3
J52 RIV Riverhead, NY ARSR4
 Attachment 4

This file contains RADES System 3 (RS3) quick start information.

General Information
The RS3 Help function should be referenced for "How To" instructions.

The tracks of interest were determined by the 84th RADES.

RS3 Radar Data Analysis Toolbar

Many of the tools used in radar data analysis have shortcuts on the toolbar of RS3. The buttons allow the user to
call-up certain functions in one simple step, without having to scroll through several different menus. Figure 1
displays the RS3 toolbar and some of its available functions.

Users may select the appropriate buttons on the menu bar to start processing (play), reset (rewind), or stop (pause)
the playback of radar messages in RS3. Users can operate use any RS3 function such as turning on the chaining
function (chaining connects each radar message for the same track of interest based on the message timestamp) by
clicking on the appropriate menu bar button.

Stop Playback Decrease Playback Speed Query Area

Zoom In ZoomRect

Increase Playback Zoom Zoom Zoom Chaining

Speed I Home Out % On/Off
Reset Playback Turn Runspeed
On/Off

Figure 1. RS3 Radar Data Analysis Toolbar

Quick Instructions for using RS3 and the RS3 Project Files

1) Follow the directions in the RS3 Installation Instructions.txt file to install RS3 on your system.

2) Copy all files to your hard drive, keeping the same file/directory structure.

3) If you copied the files from a CD-ROM, you will need to take the "Read Only" attribute off of each file in the
Data folder.

a) To do this, right-click on each file and select Properties from the pop-up submenu.

b) Uncheck the "Read Only" check box in the attributes section.

c) Click OK.

Do this procedure for each file in the Data folder you copied from the CD-ROM.

4) Go to Start->Settings->Control Panel->Display
 On the Settings tab, set the resolution (Desktop Area) on your
system to 800X600. Use your mouse to move the slide arrow
(in middle right side of the screen) to change the resolution.
Click OK.

*** This is very important since the RS3 projects were saved in
in this resolution and will not be displayed properly unless the
resolution is changed to 800X600

5) Start RS3 by either double-clicking on the RS3 shortcut on your desktop (if one exists) or going to Start—
>Programs-->RADES-->RS3

6) Go the File menu and select Open Project.

Browse the files in the Data folder until you find the project file (".RS3" file) you want to open.
Select the project file; click Open.

7) To run the playback, click the Play (start processing) button in upper left-hand corner (next to a small text drop-
down menu with the word "End" in it).

8) To zoom, click the zoom menu button (red cross with dashed box border) on the top right corner of the lower
taskbar. This allows you to zoom in an area of interest.

Begin at the upper left hand corner of desired zoom area. Press
and hold the left mouse button; drag the mouse to lower right
hand corner of the desired zoom area and release the mouse
button. RS3 will zoom in on that area.

You can always revert to the original configuration by selecting

the "home" menu button (looks like a home).

An Introduction to RS3
Please read our "Introduction to RS3" document included on this CD-ROM. This document is in Microsoft Word
format. This guide will help you get started using RS3 and includes several practice exercises to help familiarize you
with RS3.

Contact Information
If you have any questions please contact Mr. Lanny Clelland at (801) 777-2035 or Mr. Dallas Stone at (801) 777-
3194.
' ARSR-4 Air Route Surveillance Radar - United States Nuclear Forces http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/airdef/arsr-4.hti

FAS I Nuke I Guide I USA I Air Defense Illl Index I Search I Join FAS
^^== _
JT Weapons of
A Mass
Destruction th«- World'
S
ARSR-4 Air Route Surveillance Radar
The Joint Surveillance System is a network of long range surveillance radars, primarily operated and
maintained by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), but providing communication and radar data to
both FAA and USAF control centers. The newest long-range search radar in the Joint Surveillance System
(JSS) that has recently been fielded is the Air Route Surveillance Radar Model 4 (ARSR-4). Providing air
defense and air traffic control for the continental United States, Guam, and Hawaii, forty joint radar sites
were installed during the 1992-1995 period. The ARSR-4 was fielded through a $1 billion Congressionally
mandated joint FAA and Air Force program, and each station costs over $12 million.

The FAA also operates several versions of Air Route Surveillance Radars (ARSRs) for air traffic control in
the adjacent 1215-1350 MHz band. These radars include the ARSR-1, ARSR-2, and ARSR-3. The
ARSR-4 Long Range Radar (LRR) Replacement program is designed to replace obsolete FAA air route
surveillance radars (ARSR-1/2) and Air Force long range radars (FPS-20/60 series) at 39 operational
joint-use facilities with new ARSR-4 systems, establish a new ARSR-4 "FAA only" site at Caribou, Maine,
/•"-^provide 1 ARSR-4 system to the FAA's training and support facility in Oklahoma City, OK, and deliver 3
additional systems to the Department of Defense. Forty-three of the 44 total systems have been installed
and accepted from the contractor, Northrop Grumman Corporation, as part of the FAA/Air Force Radar
Replacement (FARR) program.

Compared to the radars it replaced, the ARSR-4 is more reliable, easier to maintain, and increases the radar
coverage area from 200 to 250 nautical miles. This three-dimensional, solid state, unattended, long rang
surveillance radar has an operational frequency range of 1215-1400 MHz and uses dual-channel frequency
hopping technology for long-range and anti-jam search and tracking, and is capable of detecting small
objects by minimizing clutter, weather, and multipath effects. Each channel pair requires 83 MHz of
frequency separation to maintain its highest possible reliability. This radar system supports defense of the
national airspace and provides initial coastal civil air traffic control.

The FAA and Air Force are also concerned that continuing to reallocate spectrum used by the ARSR-4 will
further impact the dual-frequency hopping capability that is key to its design. The Air Force states that the
need to have frequency-hopping, anti-jam capabilities and the use of Air Traffic Control and other radars
will make retuning and/or restricted use difficult in some areas. The Air Force maintains that the
reallocation of the 1385-1390 MHz band segment will degrade the radar's frequency hopping capability
that is key to its design for antijamming defense. The FAA and Air Force state that reallocation at a
minimum could require software modifications estimated to cost $35 million. Spectrum congestion already
exists in this band and if the remaining available frequencies cannot support future dual-frequency
requirements, hardware modifications estimated at $588 million and taking 5 years to complete will be
required.

Iof3 3/17/03 11:13 AM

 http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/airdef/ars

ARSFU Site Locations

Vanden Oceana
CQVR)
AFB (VBG
San
Clemen te
Island (USD)
Jedburg
Mt, Santa Row,
Whitehouse

Melbourne

COMMISSIONED Tamiami
CQM8)
ORDIN J1XWJ 4

INSTALLED (FINAL ACCEPTED] 2

INSTALLATION IN PROGRESS

2 of 3

3/17/03 11:13 AM
 .j Surveillance Radar - United States Nuclear Forces http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/airdef/arsr-4.hti

Sources and Resources

I Nuke I Guide I USA I Air Defense Illl Index I Search I Join FAS

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/airdef/arsr-4.htm

Maintained by Steven Aftergood

Updated Thursday, February 24,2000 8:02:22 AM

3 of 3 3/17/03 11:13 AM
 Pagel of 2

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE

COMMAND
News
Release
DIRECTORATE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND,
250 S Peterson Blvd, Suite 116, PETERSON AFB, CO 80914-3190
(719) 554-6889 Website: www.norad.mil

Contact: (719) 554-6889 18

September, 2001

NORAD's Response Times

PETERSON AFB, Colo. -The following timelines show NORAD's response to the airliner
hijackings on September 11, 2001.

* All times are Eastern Daylight Time; NEADS = North East Air Defense Sector, NORAD
** Scramble = Order to get an aircraft airborne as soon as possible
***Estimated = loss of radar contact
**** Flight times are calculated at 9 miles per minute or .9 Mach
***** The FAA and NEADS established a line of open communication discussing AA Fit 77 and UA Fit 93

American Airlines Flight 11 - Boston enroute to Los Angeles

FAA Notification to NEADS 0840*
Fighter Scramble Order (Otis Air National Guard Base, Falmouth, Mass. Two F-15s) 0846**
Fighters Airborne 0852
Airline Impact Time (World Trade Center 1) 0846 (estimated)***
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location Aircraft not
airborne/153 miles

United Airlines Flight 175 - Boston enroute to Los Angeles

FAA Notification to NEADS " 0843
Fighter Scramble Order (Otis ANGB, Falmouth, Mass. Same 2 F-15s as Flight 11) 0846
Fighters Airborne 0852
Airline Impact Time (World Trade Center 2) 0902 (estimated)
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location approx 8 min****/71
miles

American Flight 77 -Dulles enroute to Los Angeles

FAA Notification to NEADS 0924
Fighter Scramble Order (Lanqley AFB, Hampton, Va. 2F-16s) 0924
Fighters Airborne 0930
Airline Impact Time (Pentagon) 0937(estimated)
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location approx 12 min/105
miles

United Flight 93 - Newark to San Francisco

FAA Notification to NEADS N/A *****
Fighter Scramble Order (Langley F~16s already airborne forAA Fit 77)
Fighters Airborne (Langley F-16 CAP remains in place to protect DC)
Airline Impact Time (Pennsylvania) 1003 (estimated)
Fighter Time/Distance from Airline Impact Location approx 11 min/100
miles
(from DC F-16 CAP)