GENERAL

• Evacuation Plans for terrorist attack/bomb threats

Specifically, identify all entities: i.e., ZBW - FSDPS
Proximity to facility and at ZBW- child care center

• Dissemination of information on nonsecure lines

• Crisis position log

• Periodic summaries

• Use written communication vs oral communication

• Tactical operations through command center no regional office telcons

• Less reaction more delineated instruction. More command/control mode during first
48 hours

• Interface between organizations - more command/control

• Emergency should be same structure as normal operational procedures

• Merge telcons

• Merging operation and administrative communication creates confusion.

• One vehicle to communicate information. Web, Genot, NOTAM

• Post event reconstruction should be conducted away from operation. Needs to

Administrative

• Separate administrative and operational activities during telcons

• Questioning direction. Absorbs too much time for TMU during emergency

• Additional staffing on mids

• Fan out procedures

• Adequacy of paid Security Guards at facilities - AT/AF issue

• CSM response needs to be more coordinated

• Press leaks
• Visitor policies in terminal world

• How do we identify foreign national visitors-not on drivers license

• Outstanding security violations cited during facility evaluations are not funded for
correction

• Too many PLANS/Orders for emergencies

• Importance of AFSS in system. Needs to be recognized and equipped accordingly

• Telcons. Specific subjects and/or agenda. Do not use ccMail to request info for
telcons

• Lines of communication identified

• Use of terms. SCATANA, AFIO

• Update SCATANA order

• More direction on implementation of SECON level from regional office

• AF maintenance moratorium

• Close loop between fac/region/national level on operational status

• Information really needed by outside entities (FBI, NTSB, etc) clarified

Provide list of types of products we provide

• BTVA and ATCT rental cars parked against building

• Must tighten security uniformly at all facilities so as not to "move" the problem

• When issues arise they should not be debated, but forwarded up the chain

• HQ should bring in current operational personnel

• Develop action plan to resolve those issues that we can

• AF communication system at ZBW

AFSS

• Equipment

• NOT AM system

• Conflicting information provided with no understanding of AFSS/GA relationship

• Roles blurred during emergency (improve communication)

• Interim plan for the short term

• HUB AFSSs operationally now for dissemination of information and will provide
shared information

• AFSS option expertise should be maintained at all levels

• Separate pilot briefing area. Perhaps closed circuit TV is an option

EQUIPMENT

• Phone lines within facility not recorded - crisis room and EOF

• ZBW digital voice tapes

• STU phones
Needed in Operational quarters
Cumbersome
• Hot line between ZBW and terminals

• Walk around cordless headsets

• Voice recognition software

• Record TMU positions

• Redundancy of methods of information

• Cordless phones - NEXTEL quick connect

Throughout facilities and call out (ZBW)

• If TELCO fails, what's left?

MILITARY

• Military phone coverage. Need knowledgeable person and correct numbers. Pete
1
Woman, USAF in RO took action item to follow-up

• ABW TMU Unit not effective - size and layout

• Check with 510 it was included in previous F&E submissions

• Military needs our Airspace boundaries. Working Colin and military

REGION

• ROC lines not recorded with time

• Number of RO phone calls. Identify one focal for a facility and disseminate info both
ways through them

• Prioritize requests to facilities

• Multiple direction - administrative and operational

• ZBW - too much help from outside.