Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982 GUALBERTO J.

E LA LLANA Pr!"#$#%& J'$&!, Bra%ch (( o) *h! C#*+ Co'r* o) O,o%&a-o, ESTAN(SLAO L. CESA, JR., .( ELA /. 0ARGAS, BENJAM(N C. ESCOLANGO, JUAN(TO C. AT(EN1A, MANUEL RE/ES ROSAPAPAN, JR., 0(RG(L(O E. AC(ERTO, a%$ POR.(R(O AGU(LLON AGU(LA, petitioners, vs. MANUEL ALBA, M#%#"*!r o) B'$&!*, .RANC(SCO TANTU(CO, Cha#r2a%, Co22#""#o% o% A'$#*, a%$ R(CAR O PUNO, M#%#"*!r o) J'"*#c!, Respondents.

.ERNAN O, C.J.: This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any e ecutive or legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve the crucial issue of the constitutionality of Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$, entitled %An act reorgani&ing the 'udiciary, Appropriating (unds Therefor and for )ther Purposes.% The tas* of +udicial revie,, aptly characteri&ed as e acting and delicate, is never !ore so than ,hen a conceded legislative po,er, that of +udicial reorgani&ation, 1 !ay possibly collide ,ith the ti!e-honored principle of the independence of the +udiciary 2 as protected and safeguarded by this constitutional provision. %The Me!bers of the /upre!e Court and +udges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or beco!e incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The /upre!e Court shall have the po,er to discipline +udges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Me!bers, order their dis!issal.% 3 (or the assailed legislation !andates that 'ustices and +udges of inferior courts fro! the Court of Appeals to !unicipal circuit courts, e cept the occupants of the /andiganbayan and the Court of Ta Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, ,ould be considered separated fro! the +udiciary. 0t is the ter!ination of their incu!bency that for petitioners +ustifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded, That is the funda!ental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for 1eclaratory Relief and2or for Prohibition 3 considered by this Court as an action for prohibited petition, see*ing to en+oin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chair!an of the Co!!ission on Audit, and respondent Minister of 'ustice fro! ta*ing any action i!ple!enting Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$. Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their clai! by i!puting lac* of good faith in its enact!ent and characteri&ing as an undue delegation of legislative po,er to the President his authority to fi the co!pensation and allo,ances of the 'ustices and +udges thereafter appointed and the deter!ination of the date ,hen the reorgani&ation shall be dee!ed co!pleted. 0n the very co!prehensive and scholarly Ans,er of /olicitor 3eneral Estelito P. Mendo&a, 4 it ,as pointed out that there is no valid +ustification for the attac* on the constitutionality of this statute, it being a legiti!ate e ercise of the po,er vested in the Batasang Pa!bansa to reorgani&e the +udiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as ,ell as the attac* on the independence of the +udiciary being un,arranted and devoid of any support in la,. A /upple!ental Ans,er ,as li*e,ise filed on )ctober 4, "$4", follo,ed by a Reply of petitioners on )ctober "5. After the hearing in the !orning and afternoon of )ctober "6, in ,hich not only petitioners and respondents ,ere heard through counsel but also the amici curiae, 7 and thereafter sub!ission of the !inutes of the proceeding on the debate on Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$, this petition ,as dee!ed sub!itted for decision.

The i!portance of the crucial 7uestion raised called for intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case. After such e haustive deliberation in several sessions, the e change of vie,s being supple!ented by !e!oranda fro! the !e!bers of the Court, it is our opinion and so hold that Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$ is not unconstitutional. ". The argu!ent as to the lac* of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as 'udge de la 8lana is concerned, he certainly falls ,ithin the principle set forth in 'ustice 8aurel9s opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus. %The unchallenged rule is that the person ,ho i!pugns the validity of a statute !ust have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or ,ill sustain, direct in+ury as a result of its enforce!ent.% 9 The other petitioners as !e!bers of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of %any personal and substantial interest% on the !atter. There is relevance to this e cerpt fro! a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 15 %Then there is the attac* on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at !ost ,hat they consider a public right and not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to con+ure the specter of the public right dog!a as an inhibition to parties intent on *eeping public officials staying on the path of constitutionalis!. As ,as so ,ell put by 'affe. 9The protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, ,ithout a ,ell-ordered state there could be no enforce!ent of private rights. Private and public interests are, both in substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.9 Moreover, petitioners have convincingly sho,n that in their capacity as ta payers, their standing to sue has been a!ply de!onstrated. There ,ould be a retreat fro! the liberal approach follo,ed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshado,ed by the very decision of People v. Vera ,here the doctrine ,as first fully discussed, if ,e act differently no,. 0 do not thin* ,e are prepared to ta*e that step. Respondents, ho,ever, ,ould har* bac* to the A!erican /upre!e Court doctrine in ellon v. !rot"in#"am ,ith their clai! that ,hat petitioners possess 9is an interest ,hich is shared in co!!on by other people and is co!paratively so !inute and indeter!inate as to afford any basis and assurance that the +udicial process can act on it.9 That is to spea* in the language of a bygone era even in the :nited /tates. (or as Chief 'ustice ;arren clearly pointed out in the later case of !last v. Co"en, the barrier thus set up if not breached has definitely been lo,ered.% 11 #. The i!putation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enact!ent of Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$ to de!onstrate lac* of good faith does !anifest violence to the facts. Petitioners should have e ercised greater care in infor!ing the!selves as to its antecedents. They had laid the!selves open to the accusation of rec*less disregard for the truth, )n August <, "$4=, a Presidential Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation ,as organi&ed. 12This E ecutive )rder ,as later a!ended by E ecutive )rder No. >"$-A., dated /epte!ber 6 of that year. 0t clearly specified the tas* assigned to it. %". The Co!!ittee shall for!ulate plans on the reorgani&ation of the 'udiciary ,hich shall be sub!itted ,ithin seventy ?<=@ days fro! August <, "$4= to provide the President sufficient options for the reorgani&ation of the entire 'udiciary ,hich shall e!brace all lo,er courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of (irst 0nstance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all /pecial Courts, but e cluding the /andigan Bayan.% 13 )n )ctober "<, "$4=, a Report ,as sub!itted by such Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation. 0t began ,ith this paragraph. %The Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation has the honor to sub!it the follo,ing Report. 0t e presses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ,ays and !eans for ,hat today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the +udicial syste!. There are proble!s, both grave and pressing, that call for re!edial !easures. The felt necessities of the ti!e, to borro, a phrase fro! Aol!es, ad!it of no delay, for if no step be ta*en and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too !uch to say that the people9s faith in the ad!inistration of +ustice could be sha*en. 0t is i!perative that there be a greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those of !odest !eans B !uch !ore so, the poorest and the hu!blest B can vindicate their rights in an e peditious and ine pensive !anner. The rectitude and the fairness in the ,ay the courts operate !ust be !anifest to all !e!bers of the co!!unity and particularly to those ,hose interests are affected by the e ercise of their functions. 0t is to that tas* that the Co!!ittee addresses itself and hopes that the plans sub!itted could be a starting point for an institutional refor! in the Philippine +udiciary. The e perience of the /upre!e Court, ,hich since "$<5 has been e!po,ered to supervise inferior

courts, fro! the Court of Appeals to the !unicipal courts, has proven that reliance on i!proved court !anage!ent as ,ell as training of +udges for !ore efficient ad!inistration does not suffice. 0 hence, to repeat, there is need for a !a+or refor! in the +udicial so ste! it is ,orth noting that it ,ill be the first of its *ind since the 'udiciary Act beca!e effective on 'une ">, "$=".% 13 0 t ,ent to say. %0 t does not ad!it of doubt that the last t,o decades of this century are li*ely to be attended ,ith proble!s of even greater co!ple ity and delicacy. Ne, social interests are pressing for recognition in the courts. 3roups long inarticulate, pri!arily those econo!ically underprivileged, have found legal spo*es!en and are asserting grievances previously ignored. (ortunately, the +udicially has not proved inattentive. 0ts tas* has thus beco!e even !ore for!idable. (or so !uch grist is added to the !ills of +ustice. Moreover, they are li*e,ise to be 7uite novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The national leadership, as is ,ell-*no,n, has been constantly on the search for solutions that ,ill prove to be both acceptable and satisfactory. )nly thus !ay there be continued national progress.% 15 After ,hich co!es. %To be less abstract, the thrust is on develop!ent. That has been repeatedly stressed B and rightly so. All efforts are geared to its reali&ation. Nor, unli*e in the past, ,as it to b %considered as si!ply the !ove!ent to,ards econo!ic progress and gro,th !easured in ter!s of sustained increases in per capita inco!e and 3ross National Product ?3NP@. 14 (or the Ne, /ociety, its i!plication goes further than econo!ic advance, e tending to %the sharing, or !ore appropriately, the de!ocrati&ation of social and econo!ic opportunities, the substantiation of the true !eaning of social +ustice.% 17 This process of !oderni&ation and change co!pels the govern!ent to e tend its field of activity and its scope of operations. The efforts to,ards reducing the gap bet,een the ,ealthy and the poor ele!ents in the nation call for !ore regulatory legislation. That ,ay the social +ustice and protection to labor !andates of the Constitution could be effectively i!ple!ented.% 18 There is li*elihood then %that so!e !easures dee!ed ini!ical by interests adversely affected ,ould be challenged in court on grounds of validity. Even if the 7uestion does not go that far, suits !ay be filed concerning their interpretation and application. ... There could be pleas for in+unction or restraining orders. 8ac* of success of such !oves ,ould not, even so, result in their pro!pt final disposition. Thus delay in the e ecution of the policies e!bodied in la, could thus be reasonably e pected. That is not conducive to progress in develop!ent.% 19 (or, as !entioned in such Report, e7ually of vital concern is the proble! of clogged doc*ets, ,hich %as is ,ell *no,n, is one of the ut!ost gravity. Not,ithstanding the !ost deter!ined efforts e erted by the /upre!e Court, through the leadership of both retired Chief 'ustice Cuerube Ma*alintal and the late Chief 'ustice (red Rui& Castro, fro! the ti!e supervision of the courts ,as vested in it under the "$<5 Constitution, the trend to,ards !ore and !ore cases has continued.% 25 0t is understandable ,hy. ;ith the accelerated econo!ic develop!ent, the gro,th of population, the increasing urbani&ation, and other si!ilar factors, the +udiciary is called upon !uch oftener to resolve controversies. Thus confronted ,ith ,hat appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a re!edy, the Batasang Pa!bansa had no choice. 0t had to act, before the ail!ent beca!e even ,orse. Ti!e ,as of the essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly !indful, as it ought to be, of the e tent of its coverage before enacting Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$. 5. There is no denying, therefore, the need for %institutional refor!s,% characteri&ed in the Report as %both pressing and urgent.% 21 0t is ,orth noting, li*e,ise, as therein pointed out, that a !a+or reorgani&ation of such scope, if it ,ere to ta*e place, ,ould be the !ost thorough after four generations. 22 The reference ,as to the basic 'udiciary Act generations . enacted in 'une of "$=", 23 a!ended in a significant ,ay, only t,ice previous to the Co!!on,ealth. There ,as, of course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in "$56, originally co!posed %of a Presiding 'udge and ten appellate 'udges, ,ho shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, ,ith the consent of the Co!!ission on Appoint!ents of the National Asse!bly, 23 0t could $sit en banc, but it !ay sit in t,o divisions, one of si and another of five 'udges, to transact business, and the t,o divisions !ay sit at the sa!e ti!e.% 25 T,o years after the establish!ent of independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the 'udiciary Act of "$D4 24 ,as passed. 0t continued the e isting syste! of regular inferior courts, na!ely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of (irst 0nstance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the 'ustice of the Peace Courts, no, the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The !e!bership of the Court of Appeals has been continuously increased. 28 :nder a "$<4 Presidential 1ecree, there ,ould be

forty-five !e!bers, a Presiding 'ustice and forty-four Associate 'ustices, ,ith fifteen divisions. 29 /pecial courts ,ere li*e,ise created. The first ,as the Court of Ta Appeals in "$6D, 35 ne t ca!e the Court of Agrarian Relations in "$66, 31 and then in the sa!e year a Court of the 'uvenile and 1o!estic Relations for Manila in "$66, 32 subse7uently follo,ed by the creation of t,o other such courts for 0loilo and Cue&on City in "$>>. 33 0n "$><, Circuit Cri!inal Courts ,ere established, ,ith the 'udges having the sa!e 7ualifications, ran*, co!pensation, and privileges as +udges of Courts of (irst 0nstance. 33 D. After the sub!ission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. D#, ,hich later beca!e the basis of Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$, ,as introduced. After setting forth the bac*ground as above narrated, its E planatory Note continues. %Pursuant to the President9s instructions, this proposed legislation has been drafted in accordance ,ith the guidelines of that report ,ith particular attention to certain ob+ectives of the reorgani&ation, to ,it, the attain!ent of !ore efficiency in disposal of cases, a reallocation of +urisdiction, and a revision of procedures ,hich do not tend to the proper !eeting out of +ustice. 0n consultation ,ith, and upon a consensus of, the govern!ental and parlia!entary leadership, ho,ever, it ,as felt that so!e options set forth in the Report be not availed of. 0nstead of the proposal to confine the +urisdiction of the inter!ediate appellate court !erely to appellate ad+udication, the preference has been opted to increase rather than di!inish its +urisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the /upre!e Court. This preference has been translated into one of the innovations in the proposed Bill.% 35 0n accordance ,ith the parlia!entary procedure, the Bill ,as sponsored by the Chair!an of the Co!!ittee on 'ustice, Au!an Rights and 3ood 3overn!ent to ,hich it ,as referred. Thereafter, Co!!ittee Report No. ##6 ,as sub!itted by such Co!!ittee to the Batasang Pa!bansa reco!!ending the approval ,ith so!e a!end!ents. 0n the sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there ,as reference to the Presidential Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation. Thus. %)n )ctober "<, "$4=, the Presidential Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation sub!itted its report to the President ,hich contained the 9Proposed 3uidelines for 'udicial Reorgani&ation.9 Cabinet Bill No. D# ,as drafted substantially in accordance ,ith the options presented by these guidelines. /o!e options set forth in the aforesaid report ,ere not availed of upon consultation ,ith and upon consensus of the govern!ent and parlia!entary leadership. Moreover, so!e a!end!ents to the bill ,ere adopted by the Co!!ittee on 'ustice, Au!an Rights and 3ood 3overn!ent, to ,hich The bill ,as referred, follo,ing the public hearings on the bill held in 1ece!ber of "$4=. The hearings consisted of dialogues ,ith the distinguished !e!bers of the bench and the bar ,ho had sub!itted ,ritten proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the invitation of the Co!!ittee on 'ustice, Au!an Rights and 3ood 3overn!ent.% 34 /tress ,as laid by the sponsor that the enact!ent of such Cabinet Bill ,ould, firstly, result in the attain!ent of !ore efficiency in the disposal of cases. /econdly, the i!prove!ent in the 7uality of +ustice dispensed by the courts is e pected as a necessary conse7uence of the easing of the court9s doc*ets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together ,ith the reallocation of +urisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court syste! to the e igencies of the present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future.% 37 it !ay be observed that the volu!e containing the !inutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pa!bansa sho, that 6$= pages ,ere devoted to its discussion. 0t is 7uite obvious that it too* considerable ti!e and effort as ,ell as e haustive study before the act ,as signed by the President on August "D, "$4". ;ith such a bac*ground, it beco!es 7uite !anifest ho, lac*ing in factual basis is the allegation that its enact!ent is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. ;hat appears undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that characteri&ed its enact!ent fro! its inception to the affi ing of the Presidential signature. 6. Nothing is better settled in our la, than that the abolition of an office ,ithin the co!petence of a legiti!ate body if done in good faith suffers fro! no infir!ity. The ponencia of 'ustice '.B.8. Reyes in Cru% v. Primicias, Jr. 38reiterated such a doctrine. %;e find this point urged by respondents, to be ,ithout !erit. No re!oval or separation of petitioners fro! the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. 0t is ,ell-*no,n rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither re!oval nor separation of the incu!bents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incu!bent is dee!ed never to have ceased to hold office. The preli!inary 7uestion laid at rest, ,e pass to the !erits of the

case. As ,ell-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not a!ount to an illegal re!oval of its incu!bent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition !ust be !ade in good faith.% 39 The above e cerpt ,as 7uoted ,ith approval in&en'anillo, Sr. v. Provincial (overnor, 35 t,o earlier cases enunciating a si!ilar doctrine having preceded it. 31 As ,ith the offices in the other branches of the govern!ent, so it is ,ith the +udiciary. The test re!ains ,hether the abolition is in good faith. As that ele!ent is conspicuously present in the enact!ent of Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$, then the lac* of !erit of this petition beco!es even !ore apparent. The concurring opinion of 'ustice 8aurel in)an'ueta v. *e la Costa 32 cannot be any clearer. This is a 7uo ,arranto proceeding filed by petitioner, clai!ing that he, and not respondent, ,as entitled to he office of +udge of the (ifth Branch of the Court of (irst 0nstance of Manila. There ,as a 'udicial Reorgani&ation Act in "$5>, 33 a year after the inauguration of the Co!!on,ealth, a!ending the Ad!inistrative Code to organi&e courts of original +urisdiction *no,n as the Courts of (irst 0nstance Prior to such statute, petitioner ,as the incu!bent of such branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interi! appoint!ent, this ti!e to the (ourth 'udicial 1istrict, under the ne, legislation. :nfortunately for hi!, the Co!!ission on Appoint!ents of then National Asse!bly disapproved the sa!e, ,ith respondent being appointed in his place. Ae contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position This Court did not rule s7uarely on the !atter. Ais petition ,as dis!issed on the ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of 'ustice 8aurel in the result reached, to repeat, reaffir!s in no uncertain ter!s the standard of good faith to preclude any doubt as to the abolition of an inferior court, ,ith due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus. % 0 a! of the opinion that Co!!on,ealth Act No. "D6 in so far as it reorgani&es, a!ong other +udicial districts, the Ninth 'udicial 1istrict, and establishes an entirely ne, district co!prising Manila and the provinces of Ri&al and Pala,an, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion flo,s fro! the funda!ental proposition that the legislature !ay abolish courts inferior to the /upre!e Court and therefore !ay reorgani&e the! territorially or other,ise thereby necessitating ne, appoint!ents and co!!issions. /ection #, Article E000 of the Constitution vests in the National Asse!bly the po,er to define, prescribe and apportion the +urisdiction of the various courts, sub+ect to certain li!itations in the case of the /upre!e Court. 0t is ad!itted that section $ of the sa!e article of the Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all the +udges. The principles e!bodied in these t,o sections of the sa!e article of the Constitution !ust be coordinated and har!oni&ed. A !ere enunciation of a principle ,ill not decide actual cases and controversies of every sort. ?'ustice Aol!es in 8ochner vs. Ne, For*, "$4 :./., D6G D$ 8a,. edG $5<@% 33 +ustice 8aurel continued. %0 a! not insensible to the argu!ent that the National Asse!bly !ay abuse its po,er and !ove deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security of tenure to all +udges, But, is this the caseH )ne need not share the vie, of /tory, Miller and Tuc*er on the one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, ;atson and Bald,in on the other, to reali&e that the application of a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily factual and circu!stantial and that fi ity of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. 0 do say, and e!phatically, ho,ever, that cases !ay arise ,here the violation of the constitutional provision regarding security of tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative po,er of reorgani&ation !ay be sought to cloa* an unconstitutional and evil purpose. ;hen a case of that *ind arises, it ,ill be the ti!e to !a*e the ha!!er fall and heavily. But not until then. 0 a! satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose ,as the fulfill!ent of ,hat ,as considered a great public need by the legislative depart!ent and that Co!!on,ealth Act No. "D6 ,as not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of +udges or of any particular +udge. :nder these circu!stances, 0 a! for sustaining the po,er of the legislative depart!ent under the Constitution. To be sure, there ,as greater necessity for reorgani&ation conse7uent upon the establish!ent of the ne, govern!ent than at the ti!e Acts Nos. #5D< and D==< ,ere approved by the defunct Philippine 8egislature, and although in the case of these t,o Acts there ,as an e press provision providing for the vacation by the +udges of their offices ,hereas in the case of Co!!on,ealth Act No. "D6 doubt is engendered by its silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid e ercise of the legislative po,er.% 35 >. A fe, !ore ,ords on the 7uestion of abolition. 0n the above-cited opinion of 'ustice 8aurel in Iandueta, reference ,as !ade to Act No. #5D< 34 on the reorgani&ation of the Courts of (irst 0nstance and to Act No. D==<37 on the reorgani&ation of all branches of the govern!ent, including

the courts of first instance. 0n both of the!, the then Courts of (irst 0nstance ,ere replaced by ne, courts ,ith the sa!e appellation. As 'ustice 8aurel pointed out, there ,as no 7uestion as to the fact of abolition. Ae ,as e7ually categorical as to Co!!on,ealth Act No. "D6, ,here also the syste! of the courts of first instance ,as provided for e pressly. 0t ,as pointed out by 'ustice 8aurel that the !ere creation of an entirely ne, district of the sa!e court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion flo,ing %fro! the funda!ental proposition that the legislature !ay abolish courts inferior to the /upre!e Court and therefore !ay reorgani&e the! territorially or other,ise thereby necessitating ne, appoint!ents and co!!issions.% 38 The challenged statute creates an inter!ediate appellate court, 39 regional trial courts, 55 !etropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, 51 and other !etropolitan trial courts, 52!unicipal trial courts in cities, 53 as ,ell as in !unicipalities, 53 and !unicipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that e isting inferior courts ,ere abolished. (or the Batasang Pa!bansa, the establish!ent of such ne, inferior courts ,as the appropriate response to the grave and urgent proble!s that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate re!edy. The choice, ho,ever, ,as for the Batasan to !a*e, not for this Court, ,hich deals only ,ith the 7uestion of po,er. 0t bears !entioning that in &rillo v. E+a#e 54 this Court, in an unani!ous opinion penned by the late 'ustice 1io*no, citing )an'ueta v. *e la Costa, ruled. %8a segunda 7uestion 7ue el recurrrido plantea es 7ue la Carta de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. /i efectiva!ente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha 7uedado e tinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario correspodiente. c Culley vs. State, D> 8RA, 6><. El derecho de un +ue& de dese!penarlo hasta los <= aJos de edad o se incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorgani&ar +u&gados no constitucionales.% 57 Nonetheless, such ,ell-established principle ,as not held applicable to the situation there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City creating a city court in place of the for!er +ustice of the peace court. Thus. %Pero en el caso de autos el 'u&gado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. /olo se le ha ca!biado el no!bre con el ca!bio de for!a del gobierno local.% 58 The present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not and could not prove that the challenged statute ,as not ,ithin the bounds of legislative authority. <. This opinion then could very ,ell stop at this point. The i!ple!entation of Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$, concededly a tas* incu!bent on the E ecutive, !ay give rise, ho,ever, to 7uestions affecting a +udiciary that should be *ept independent. The all-e!bracing scope of the assailed legislation as far as all inferior courts fro! the Courts of Appeals to !unicipal courts are concerned, ,ith the e ception solely of the /andiganbayan and the Court of Ta Appeals 59 gave rise, and understandably so, to !isgivings as to its effect on such cherished 0deal. The first paragraph of the section on the transitory provision reads. %The provisions of this Act shall be i!!ediately carried out in accordance ,ith an E ecutive )rder to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of (irst 0nstance, the Circuit Cri!inal Courts, the 'uvenile and 1o!estic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently constituted and organi&ed, until the co!pletion of the reorgani&ation provided in this Act as declared by the President. :pon such declaration, the said courts shall be dee!ed auto!atically abolished and the incu!bents thereof shall cease to hold the office.% 45 There is all the !ore reason then ,hy this Court has no choice but to in7uire further into the allegation by petitioners that the security of tenure provision, an assurance of a +udiciary free fro! e traneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren for! of ,ords. The a!ended Constitution adheres even !ore clearly to the longestablished tradition of a strong e ecutive that antedated the "$56 Charter. As noted in the ,or* of for!er Eice-3overnor Aayden, a noted political scientist, President Claro M. Recto of the "$5D Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a concept, categorically spo*e of providing %an e ecutive po,er ,hich, sub+ect to the fiscali&ation of the Asse!bly, and of public opinion, ,ill not only *no, ho, to govern, but ,ill actually govern, ,ith a fir! and steady hand, une!barrassed by ve atious interferences by other depart!ents, or by unholy alliances ,ith this and that social group.% 41 The above e cerpt ,as cited ,ith approval by 'ustice 8aurel in Planas v. (il. 42 Moreover, under the "$4" A!end!ents, it !ay be affir!ed that once again the principle of separation of po,ers, to 7uote fro! the sa!e +urist as ponente in An#ara v. ElectoralCo!!ission, 43 %obtains not through e press provision but by actual division.% 43 The president, under Article E00, shall be the head of state and chief e ecutive of the Republic of the

Philippines.% 45 Moreover, it is e7ually therein e pressly provided that all the po,ers he possessed under the "$56 Constitution are once again vested in hi! unless the Batasang Pa!bansa provides other,ise.% 44 Article E00 of the "$56 Constitution spea*s categorically. %The E ecutive po,er shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.% 47 As originally fra!ed, the "$<5 Constitution created the position of President as the %sy!bolic head of state.% 48 0n addition, there ,as a provision for a Pri!e Minister as the head of govern!ent e ercising the e ecutive po,er ,ith the assistance of the Cabinet 49 Clearly, a !odified parlia!entary syste! ,as established. 0n the light of the "$4" a!end!ents though, this Court in !ree ,elep"one Workers -nion v. inister of .abor 75 could state. %The adoption of certain aspects of a parlia!entary syste! in the a!ended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character.% 71 The retention, ho,ever, of the position of the Pri!e Minister ,ith the Cabinet, a !a+ority of the !e!bers of ,hich shall co!e fro! the regional representatives of the Batasang Pa!bansa and the creation of an E ecutive Co!!ittee co!posed of the Pri!e Minister as Chair!an and not !ore than fourteen other !e!bers at least half of ,ho! shall be !e!bers of the Batasang Pa!bansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the syste! of govern!ent that is no, operative. 72 ;hat is e7ually apparent is that the strongest ties bind the e ecutive and legislative depart!ents. 0t is li*e,ise undeniable that the Batasang Pa!bansa retains its full authority to enact ,hatever legislation !ay be necessary to carry out national policy as usually for!ulated in a caucus of the !a+ority party. 0t is understandable then ,hy in !ortun v. .aban# 73 it ,as stressed that ,ith the provision transferring to the /upre!e Court ad!inistrative supervision over the 'udiciary, there is a greater need %to preserve uni!paired the independence of the +udiciary, especially so at present, ,here to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion bet,een the e ecutive and the legislative branches.% 73 4. To be !ore specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the e isting inferior courts collides ,ith the security of tenure en+oyed by incu!bent 'ustices and +udges under Article K, /ection < of the Constitution. There ,as a si!ilar provision in the "$56 Constitution. 0t did not, ho,ever, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the po,er to supervise ad!inistratively inferior courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is e! po,ered %to discipline +udges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight !e!bers, order their dis!issal.% 74 Thus it possesses the co!petence to re!ove +udges. :nder the 'udiciary Act, it ,as the President ,ho ,as vested ,ith such po,er. 77 Re!oval is, of course, to be distinguished fro! ter!ination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-e istent office. After the abolition, there is in la, no occupant. 0n case of re!oval, there is an office ,ith an occupant ,ho ,ould thereby lose his position. 0t is in that sense that fro! the standpoint of strict la,, the 7uestion of any i!pair!ent of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incu!bents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction e ists bet,een re!oval and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. Ae ceases to be a !e!ber of the +udiciary. 0n the i!ple!entation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it ,ould be in accordance ,ith accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incu!bent +ustices and +udges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its vie, be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No 7uestion of la, is involved. 0f such ,ere the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action ta*en by either of the t,o depart!ents. Even then, it could do so but only by ,ay of deciding a case ,here the !atter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into ,ho shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorgani&ation. That re!ains in the hands of the E ecutive to ,ho! it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore fro! the tried and tested ,ays of +udicial po,er, Rather ,hat is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the e ercise of the conceded po,er of reorgani&ing tulle inferior courts, the po,er of re!oval of the present incu!bents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act ,ould thus be free fro! any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernidble e cept to those predisposed to vie, it ,ith distrust. Moreover, such a construction ,ould be in accordance ,ith the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives bet,een one ,hich ,ould save and another ,hich ,ould invalidate a statute, the for!er is to be preferred. 78 There is an obvious ,ay to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and for!s part of every act to avoid any constitutional taint !ust be applied /u+e% v.

San'i#anbayan, 79 pro!ulgated last 'anuary, has this relevant e cerpt. %0t is true that other /ections of the 1ecree could have been so ,orded as to avoid any constitutional ob+ection. As of no,, ho,ever, no ruling is called for. The vie, is given e pression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of 'ustice Ma*asiar that in such a case to save the 1ecree fro! the direct fate of invalidity, they !ust be construed in such a ,ay as to preclude any possible erosion on the po,ers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be co!!itted. 0t co!!ends itself for approval.% 85 Nor ,ould such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential 1ecree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically provides. %The /upre!e Court shall carry out the provisions of this 1ecree through i!ple!enting orders, on a province-to-province basis.% 81 0t is true there is no such provision in this Act, but the spirit that infor!s it should not be ignored in the E ecutive )rder conte!plated under its /ection DD. 82 Thus Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$ could stand the !ost rigorous test of constitutionality. 83 $. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or har!oni&e constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pa!bansa is e pressly vested ,ith the authority to reorgani&e inferior courts and in the process to abolish e isting ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the ter!ination of office of their occupants, as a necessary conse7uence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable fro! the practical standpoint fro! re!oval, a po,er that is no, vested in this Tribunal. 0t is of the essence of constitutionalis! to assure that neither agency is precluded fro! acting ,ithin the boundaries of its conceded co!petence. That is ,hy it has long been ,ell-settled under the constitutional syste! ,e have adopted that this Court cannot, ,henever appropriate, avoid the tas* of reconciliation. As 'ustice 8aurel put it so ,ell in the previously cited Angara decision, ,hile in the !ain, %the Constitution has bloc*ed out ,ith deft stro*es and in bold lines, allot!ent of po,er to the e ecutive, the legislative and the +udicial depart!ents of the govern!ent, the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties bet,een the several depart!ents, ho,ever, so!eti!es !a*es it hard to say +ust ,here the one leaves off and the other begins.% 83 0t is ,ell to recall another classic utterance fro! the sa!e +urist, even !ore e!phatic in its affir!ation of such a vie,, !oreover buttressed by one of those insights for ,hich Aol!es ,as so fa!ous %The classical separation of govern!ent po,ers, ,hether vie,ed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle, 8oc*e, or Motes7uieu or of the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or 'efferson, is a relative theory of govern!ent. There is !ore truis! and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of po,ers, for as observed by 'ustice Aol!es in a case of Philippine origin, ,e cannot lay do,n 9,ith !athe!atical precision and divide the branches into ,ater-tight co!part!ents9 not only because 9the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of blac* and ,hite but also because 9even the !ore specific of the! are found to ter!inate in a penu!bra shading gradually fro! one e tre!e to the other.9% 85This too fro! 'ustice Tua&on, li*e,ise e pressing ,ith force and clarity ,hy the need for reconciliation or balancing is ,ell-nigh unavodiable under the funda!ental principle of separation of po,ers. %The constitutional structure is a co!plicated syste!, and overlappings of govern!ental functions are recogni&ed, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of govern!ental coordination.% 84 0n the sa!e ,ay that the acade!e has noted the e istence in constitutional litigation of right versus right, there are instances, and this is one of the!, ,here, ,ithout this atte!pt at har!oni&ing the provisions in 7uestion, there could be a case of po,er against po,er. That ,e should avoid. "=. There are other ob+ections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners ,ould characteri&e as an undue delegation of legislative po,er to the President the grant of authority to fi the co!pensation and the allo,ances of the 'ustices and +udges thereafter appointed. A !ore careful reading of the challenged Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$ ought to have cautioned the! against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is 7uite clear. The 7uestioned provisions reads as follo,s. %0nter!ediate Appellate 'ustices, Regional Trial 'udges, Metropolitan Trial 'udges, !unicipal Trial 'udges, and Municipal Circuit Trial 'udges shall receive such receive such co!pensation and allo,ances as !ay be authori&ed by the President along the guidelines set forth in 8etter of 0!ple!entation No. $5 pursuant to Presidential 1ecree No. $46, as a!ended by Presidential 1ecree No. "6$<.% 87 The e istence of a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative body ,hich is entrusted ,ith the co!petence to !a*e la,s and to alter and repeal the!, the test

being the co!pleteness of the statue in all its ter!s and provisions ,hen enacted. As pointed out in E'u v. Ericta: 88 %To avoid the taint of unla,ful delegation, there !ust be a standard, ,hich i!plies at the very least that the legislature itself deter!ines !atters of principle and lays do,n funda!ental policy. )ther,ise, the charge of co!plete abdication !ay be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, !ar*s its li!its, !aps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. 0t indicates the circu!stances under ,hich the legislative co!!and is to be effected. 0t is the criterion by ,hich legislative purpose !ay be carried out. Thereafter, the e ecutive or ad!inistrative office designated !ay in pursuance of the above guidelines pro!ulgate supple!ental rules and regulations. The standard !ay be either e press or i!plied. 0f the for!er, the non-delegation ob+ection is easily !et. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. 0t could be i!plied fro! the policy and purpose of the act considered as a ,hole.% 89 The undeniably strong lin*s that bind the e ecutive and legislative depart!ents under the a!ended Constitution assure that the fra!ing of policies as ,ell as their i!ple!entation can be acco!plished ,ith unity, pro!ptitude, and efficiency. There is accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the (ree Telephone ;or*ers :nion decision. %There is accordingly !ore receptivity to la,s leaving to ad!inistrative and e ecutive agencies the adoption of such !eans as !ay be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. 0t is ,orth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor 'affe, as early as "$D<, could spea* of delegation as the 9dyna!o of !odern govern!ent.9% 95 Ae ,arned against a %restrictive approach% ,hich could be %a deterrent factor to !uch-needed legislation.% 91 (urther on this point fro! the sa!e opinion% %The spectre of the non-delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative cha!bers.% 92 Another ob+ection based on the absence in the statue of ,hat petitioners refer to as a %definite ti!e fra!e li!itation% is e7ually bereft of !erit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision. %The /upre!e Court shall sub!it to the President, ,ithin thirty ?5=@ days fro! the date of the effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act ,hich shall be the basis of the i!ple!enting order to be issued by the President in accordance ,ith the i!!ediately succeeding section.% 93 The first sentence of the ne t section is even !ore categorical. %The provisions of this Act shall be i!!ediately carried out in accordance ,ith an E ecutive )rder to be issued by the President.% 93 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President is insensible to his constitutional duty to ta*e care that the la,s be faithfully e ecuted. 95 0n the !ean,hile, the e isting inferior courts affected continue functioning as before, %until the co!pletion of the reorgani&ation provided in this Act as declared by the President. :pon such declaration, the said courts shall be dee!ed auto!atically abolished and the incu!bents thereof shall cease to hold office.% 94 There is no a!biguity. The incu!bents of the courts thus auto!atically abolished %shall cease to hold office.% No fear need be entertained by incu!bents ,hose length of service, 7uality of perfor!ance, and clean record +ustify their being na!ed ane,, 97 in legal conte!plation ,ithout any interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 0t is e7ually reasonable to assu!e that fro! the ran*s of la,yers, either in the govern!ent service, private practice, or la, professors ,ill co!e the ne, appointees. 0n the event that in certain cases a little !ore ti!e is necessary in the appraisal of ,hether or not certain incu!bents deserve reappoint!ent, it is not fro! their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it ,ould be a reaffir!ation of the good faith that ,ill characteri&e its i!ple!entation by the E ecutive. There is pertinence to this observation of 'ustice Aol!es that even acceptance of the generali&ation that courts ordinarily should not supply o!issions in a la,, a generali&ation 7ualified as earlier sho,n by the principle that to save a statute that could be done, %there is no canon against using co!!on sense in construing la,s as saying ,hat they obviously !ean.% 99 ;here then is the unconstitutional fla, "". )n the !orning of the hearing of this petition on /epte!ber 4, "$4", petitioners sought to have the ,riter of this opinion and 'ustices Ra!on C. A7uino and A!eurfina Melencio-Aerrera dis7ualified because the first-na!ed ,as the chair!an and the other t,o, !e!bers of the Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation. At the hearing, the !otion ,as denied. 0t ,as !ade clear then and there that not one of the three !e!bers of the Court had any hand in the fra!ing or in the discussion of Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$. They ,ere not consulted. They did not testify. The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. 155 Their ,or* ,as li!ited, as set forth in the E ecutive )rder, to sub!itting alternative plan for reorgani&ation. That is !ore in the nature of scholarly studies. That the undertoo*. There could be no possible

ob+ection to such activity. Ever since "$<5, this Tribunal has had ad!inistrative supervision over interior courts. 0t has had the opportunity to infor! itself as to the ,ay +udicial business is conducted and ho, it !ay be i!proved. Even prior to the "$<5 Constitution, it is the recollection of the ,riter of this opinion that either the then Chair!an or !e!bers of the Co!!ittee on 'ustice of the then /enate of the Philippines 151 consulted !e!bers of the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the +udiciary. 0t is not inappropriate to cite this e cerpt fro! an article in the "$<6 /upre!e Court Revie,. %0n the t,entieth century the Chief 'ustice of the :nited /tates has played a leading part in +udicial refor!. A variety of conditions have been responsible for the develop!ent of this role, and fore!ost a!ong the! has been the creation of e plicit institutional structures designed to facilitate refor!.% 152 Also. %Thus the Chief 'ustice cannot avoid e posure to and direct involve!ent in +udicial refor! at the federal level and, to the e tent issues of +udicial federalis! arise, at the state level as ,ell.% 153 "#. 0t is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regi!e that it is the people ,ho are endo,ed ,ith rights, to secure ,hich a govern!ent is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant the! either e pressly or i!pliedly certain po,ers. Those they e ercise not for their o,n benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not spea* in the language of a!biguity. %A public office is a public trust.% 153 That is !ore than a !oral ad+uration 0t is a legal i!perative. The la, !ay vest in a public official certain rights. 0t does so to enable the! to perfor! his functions and fulfill his responsibilities !ore efficiently. 0t is fro! that standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure +udicial independence is to be vie,ed. 0t is an added guarantee that +ustices and +udges can ad!inister +ustice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or unto,ard conse7uence. Their +udg!ents then are even !ore li*ely to be inspired solely by their *no,ledge of the la, and the dictates of their conscience, free fro! the corrupting influence of base or un,orthy !otives. The independence of ,hich they are assured is i!pressed ,ith a significance transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus vie,ed, it is not solely for their ,elfare. The challenged legislation Thus sub+ect d to the !ost rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lac* of due care and circu!spection, it allo, the erosion of that 0deal so fir!ly e!bedded in the national consciousness There is this farther thought to consider. independence in thought and action necessarily is rooted in one9s !ind and heart. As e!phasi&ed by for!er Chief 'ustice Paras in 0campo v. Secretary of Justice, 155 there is no surer guarantee of +udicial independence than the 3od-given character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench. The +udges !ay be guaranteed a fi ed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allo,s the! to be subservient to one ad!inistration after another, or to cater to the ,ishes of one litigant after another, the independence of the +udiciary ,ill be nothing !ore than a !yth or an e!pty 0deal. )ur +udges, ,e are confident, can be of the type of 8ord Co*e, regardless or in spite of the po,er of Congress B ,e do not say unli!ited but as herein e ercised B to reorgani&e inferior courts.% 154 That is to recall one of the greatest Co!!on 8a, +urists, ,ho at the cost of his office !ade clear that he ,ould not +ust blindly obey the Ling9s order but %,ill do ,hat beco!es Mhi!N as a +udge.% /o it ,as pointed out in the first leading case stressing the independence of the +udiciary, &orromeo v. ariano, 157 The ponencia of 'ustice Malcol! 0dentified good +udges ,ith %!en ,ho have a !astery of the principles of la,, ,ho discharge their duties in accordance ,ith la,, ,ho are per!itted to perfor! the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and ,ho are independent and self-respecting hu!an units in a +udicial syste! e7ual and coordinate to the other t,o depart!ents of govern!ent.% 158 There is no reason to assu!e that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$ ,ould be attended ,ith deleterious conse7uences to the ad!inistration of +ustice. 0t does not follo, that the abolition in good faith of the e isting inferior courts e cept the /andiganbayan and the Court of Ta Appeals and the creation of ne, ones ,ill result in a +udiciary unable or un,illing to discharge ,ith independence its sole!n duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith ,ill attend the e ercise be of the appointing po,er vested in the E ecutive. 0t cannot be denied that an independent and efficient +udiciary is so!ething to the credit of any ad!inistration. ;ell and truly has it been said that the funda!ental principle of separation of po,ers assu!es, and +ustifiably so, that the three depart!ents are as one in their deter!ination to pursue the 0deals and aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people as e pressed in the Constitution. There is ,isdo! as ,ell as validity to this pronounce!ent of 'ustice Malcol! in anila Electric Co. v. Pasay ,ransportation Company , 159 a decision

pro!ulgated al!ost half a century ago. %'ust as the /upre!e Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other depart!ent or the govern!ent, so should it as strictly confine its o,n sphere of influence to the po,ers e pressly or by i!plication conferred on it by the )rganic Act.% 115 To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional syste!, this Court re!ains co!!itted. ;AERE()RE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$ not having been sho,n, this petition is dis!issed. No costs. akasiar an' Escolin, JJ., concur. Concepcion, Jr., concur in t"e result.

S!-ara*! O-#%#o%"

BARRE O, J., concurring. 0 +oin the !a+ority of !y brethren in voting that the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4=, Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$, is not unconstitutional as a ,hole nor in any of its parts. The issue of unconstitutionality raised by petitioners relates particularly to /ection DD of the Act ,hich reads as follo,s. /EC. DD. ,ransitory provisions. 1 The provisions of this Act shall be i!!ediately carried out in accordance ,ith an E ecutive )rder to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of (irst 0nstance, the Circuit Cri!inal Courts, the 'uvenile and 1o!estic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently constituted and organi&ed, until the co!pletion of the reorgani&ation provided in this Act as declared by the President. :pon such declaration, the said courts shall be dee!ed auto!atically abolished and the incu!bents thereof shall cease to hold office. The cases pending in the old Courts shall e transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together ,ith the pertinent functions, records, e7uip!ent,. property and the necessary personnel. The applicable appropriations shall li*e,ise be transferred to the appropriate courts constituted pursuant to this Act, to be aug!ented as !ay be necessary fro! the funds for organi&ational changes as provided in Batas Pa!bansa Blg. 4=. /aid funding shall thereafter be included in the annual 3eneral Appropriations Act. 0t is contended by petitioners that the provision in the above section ,hich !andates that %upon the declaration upon the President that the reorgani&ation conte!plated in the Act has been co!pleted@, the said courts ?!eaning the Court of Appeals and all other lo,er courts, e cept the /andiganbayan and the Court of Ta Appeals@ shall be dee!ed abolished and the incu!bents thereof shall cease to hold office% trenches on all the constitutional safeguards and guarantees of the independence of the +udiciary, such as the security of tenure of its !e!bers ?/ection <, Article K of the Philippine Constitution of "$<5@, the prerogatives of the /upre!e Court to

ad!inistratively supervise all courts and the personnel thereof ?/ection >, 2'.@ and principally, the po,er of the /upre!e Court %to discipline +udges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Me!bers, order their dis!issal. % ?/ection <, 2'.@ )n the other hand, respondents !aintain that thru the above-7uoted /ection DD. the Batasan did nothing !ore than to e ercise the authority conferred upon it be /ection 0 of the sa!e Article of the Constitution ,hich provides that The 'udicial po,er shall be rested in one /upre!e Court and in suc" inferior courts as may be establis"e' by la3.$ 0n other ,ords, since all inferior courts are, constitutionally spea*ing, !ere creatures of the la, ?of the legislature it follo,s that it is ,ithin the legislature9s po,er to abolish or reorgani&e the! even if in so doing, it !ight result in the cessation fro! office of the incu!bents thereof before the e piration of their respective constitutionally fi ed tenures. Respondents e!phasi&e that the legislative po,er in this respect is broad and indeed plenary. Eie,ing the proble! before :s fro! the above perspectives, it ,ould appear that our tas* is either ?"@ to reconcile, on the one hand, the parlia!ent9s po,er of abolition and reorgani&ation ,ith, on the other, the security of tenure of !e!bers of the +udiciary and the /upre!e Court9s authority to discipline and re!ove +udges or ?#@ to declare that either the po,er of the /upre!e Court or of the Batasan is !ore para!ount than that of the other. 0 believe. ho,ever, that such a !anner of loo*ing at the issue that confronts :s only confuses and co!pounds the tas* ;e are called upon to perfor!. (or ho, can there be a satisfactory and rational reconciliation of the pretended right of a +udge to continue as such, ,hen the position occupied by hi! no longer e istsH To suggest, as so!e do, that the solution is for the court he is sitting in not to be dee!ed abolished or that he should in so!e ,ay be allo,ed to continue to function as +udge until his constitutional tenure e pires is obviously i!practical, if only because ,e ,ould then have the absurd spectacle of a +udiciary ,ith old and ne, courts functioning under distinct set-ups, such as a district court continuing as such in a region ,here the other +udges are regional +udges or of +udges e ercising po,ers not purely +udicial ,hich is offensive to the Constitution. The other suggestion that the incu!bent of the abolished court should be dee!ed appointed to the corresponding ne, court is even ,orse, since it ,ould deprive the appointing authority, the president, of the po,er to !a*e his o,n choices and ,ould, further!ore, a!ount to an appoint!ent by legislation ,hich is a Constitutional anachronis!. !ore on this point later . 0nas!uch as pursuant to the analysis of the !a+ority of the Me!bers of this Court, in fact and in la,, the structure of +udicial syste! created by Batas Pa!bansa "#$ is substantially different fro! that under the 'udiciary Act of "$D4, as a!ended, hence the courts no, e isting are actually being abolished, ,hy do ;e have to indulge in any reconciliation or feel bound to deter!ine ,hose po,er, that of the Batasang Pa!bansa or that of this Court, should be considered !ore i!periousH 0t being conceded that the po,er to create or establish carries ,ith it the po,er to abolish, and it is a legal a io!, or at least a prag!atic reality that the tenure of the holder of an office !ust of necessity end ,hen his office no longer e ists, as 0 see it, be have no alternative than to hold that petitioners9 invocation of the independence of the +udiciary principle of the Constitution is unavailing ill the cases at bar. 0t is as si!ple as that. 0 !ight hasten to add, in this connection, that to insist that ,hat Batas Pa!bansa "#$ is doing is +ust a rena!ing and not a substantial and actual !odification or alteration of the present +udicial structure or syste! assu!ing a close scrutiny !ight so!eho, support such a conclusion, is pure ,ishful thin*ing, it being e plicitly and une7uivocally provided in the section in 7uestion that said courts are dee!ed abolished% and further, as if to !a*e it !ost un!ista*ably e!phatic, that %the incu!bents thereat shall cease to hold office.% *ura les, se' les. As a !atter of fact, 0 cannot conceive of a !ore e!phatic ,ay of !anifesting and conveying the deter!ined legislative intent about it. No,, ,hy a! 0 yielding to the above reasoning and conclusionH ;hy don9t 0 insist on cha!pioning the cause of the independence of the +udiciary by !aintaining that the constitutional safeguards thereof 0 have already enu!erated earlier !ust be respected in any reorgani&ation ordained by the parlia!ent My ans,er is si!ple. Practically all the Me!bers of the Court concede that ,hat is conte!plated is not only general reorgani&ation but abolition B in other ,ords, not only a rearrange!ent or re!odelling of the old structure but a total de!olition thereof

to be follo,ed by the building of a ne, and different one. 0 a! practically alone in conte!plating a different vie,. True, even if 0 should appear as shouting in the ,ilderness, 0 ,ould still !a*e !yself a hero in the eyes of !an +ustices and +udges, !e!bers of the bar and concerned discerning citi&ens, all lovers of the +udicial independence, but understandably, 0 should not be, as 0 a! not, disposed to play such a role virtually at the e pense not only of !y distinguished colleagues but of the Batasang Pa!bansa that fra!ed the la, and, !ost of all, the President ,ho signed and, therefore, sanctioned the Act as it is, unless 0 a! absolutely sure that !y position is for!idable, unassailable and beyond all possible contrary ratiocination, ,hich 0 a! not certain of, as 0 shall de!onstrate anon. To start ,ith, the +urisprudence, here and abroad, touching on the 7uestion no, before :s cannot be said to be clear and consistent, !uch less unsha*eable and indubitably definite either ,ay. None of the local cases 1 relied upon and discussed by the parties and by the Me!bers of the Court during the deliberations, such as Borro!eo, 2)ca!po, 3 Iandueta, 3 Brillo, 5 etc. can, to !y !ind, really serve as reliable pole stars that could lead !e to certainty of correctness. )f course, !y instinct and passion for an independent +udiciary are unco!pro!ising and beyond di!inution. 0ndeed, !y initial reactions, publicly *no,n, about Batas Pa!bansa "#$ e plaining acade!ically its apparent tendency to invade the areas of authority of the /upre!e Court, not to spea* of its dangerously i!pairing the independence of the +udiciary, !ust have, 0 i!agine, created the i!pression that 0 ,ould vote to declare the la, unconstitutional. But, during the deliberations of the Court, the co!bined ,isdo! of !y learned colleagues ,as so!ething 0 could not discount or +ust brush aside. Pondering and thin*ing deeper about all relevant factors, 0 have co!e to the conviction that at least on this day and hour there are +ustifiable grounds to uphold the Act, if only to try ho, it ,ill operate so that thereby the people !ay see that ;e are one ,ith the President and the Batasan in ta*ing ,hat appear to be i!!ediate steps needed to relieve the people fro! a fast spreading cancer in the +udiciary of our country. Besides, the Philippines has so!eho, not yet returned to co!plete nor!alcy The i!proved national discipline so evident during the earlier days of !artial la,, has declined at a 7uite discernible degree. 1ifferent sectors of society are de!anding urgent refor!s in their respective field And about the !ost vehe!ent and persistent, loud and clear, a!ong their gripes, ,hich as a !atter of fact is co!!on to all of the! is that about the deterioration in the 7uality of perfor!ance of the +udges !anning our courts and the slo, and dragging pace of pending +udicial proceedings. /trictly spea*ing, this is, to be sure, so!ething that !ay not necessarily be related to lac* of independence of the +udiciary. 0t has !ore to do ,ith the ineptness and2or corruption a!ong and corruptibility of the !en sitting in the courts in so!e parts of the country And ,hat is ,orse, ,hile in the co!!unities concerned the !alady is *no,n to factually e ist and is actually graver and ,idespread, very fe,, if any individuals or even associations and organi&ed groups, truly incensed and an ious to be of help, have the courage and possess the re7uisite legal evidence to co!e out and file the corresponding charges ,ith the /upre!e Court, And 0 a! not vet referring to si!ilar situations that are not 7uite openly *no,n but nevertheless +ust as deleterious. )n the other hand, if all these intolerable instances should actually be for!ally brought to the /upre!e Court, it ,ould be hu!anly i!possible for the Court to dispose of the! ,ith desirable dispatch, ,hat ,ith the thousands of other cases it has to attend to and the rather cu!berso!e strict re7uire!ents of procedural due process it has to observe in each and every such ad!inistrative case all of ,hich are ti!e consulting. Eerily, under the foregoing circu!stances, it !ay be said that there is +ustification for the patience of the people about the possibility of early eradication of this disease or evil in our +udiciary pictured above to be nearing the brea*ing point. ;ithal, ,e !ust bear in !ind that +udicial reorgani&ation beco!es urgent and inevitable not alone because of structural inade7uacies of the syste! or of the cu!berso!eness and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force, but also ,hen it beco!es evident that a good nu!ber of those occupying positions in the +udiciary, !a*e a !oc*ery of +ustice and ta*e advantage of their office for selfish personal ends and yet, as already e plained, those in authority cannot e peditiously cope ,ith the situation under e isting la,s and rules. 0t is !y

personal assess!ent of the present situation in our +udiciary that its reorgani&ation has to be of necessity t,o-pronged, as 0 have +ust indicated, for the !ost 0deal +udicial syste! ,ith the !ost perfect procedural rules cannot satisfy the people and the interests of +ustice unless the !en ,ho hold positions therein possess the character, co!petence and sense of loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute i!partiality, nay, i!pregnability to an te!ptations of graft and corruption, including the usual i!portunings and the fearso!e albeit i!proper pressures of the po,ers that be. 0 a! certain that the (ilipino people feel happy that Batas Pa!bansa "#$ enco!passes both of these ob+ectives, ,hich indeed are aligned ,ith the foundation of the principle of independence of the +udiciary. The above pre!ises considered, 0 have decided to tac*le our proble! fro! the vie,point of the unusual situation in ,hich our +udiciary is presently perilously situated. Needless to say, to all of us, the Me!bers of the Court, the constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and re!oval only by the /upre!e Court, a!ong others, against i!pair!ent of the independence of the +udiciary, ,hich is one of the bedroc*9s and, therefore, of the essence in any %de!ocracy under a regi!e of +ustice, peace, liberty and e7uality ?Prea!ble of the "$<5 Constitution@, are priceless and should be defended, !ost of all by the /upre!e Court, ,ith all the ,isdo! and courage 3od has individually endo,ed to each of :s. ;ithal, ,e are all conscious of the fact that those safeguards have never been intended to place the person of the +udge in a singular position of privilege and untouchability, but rather, that they are essentially part and parcel of ,hat is re7uired of an independent +udiciary ,here +udges can decide cases and do +ustice to everyone before the! ruat caelum. Ao,ever, ;e find )urselves face to face ,ith a situation, in our +udiciary ,hich is of e!ergency proportions and to insist on rationali&ing ho, those guarantees should be enforced under such a circu!stance see! to be difficult, aside fro! being controversial. And so, in a real sense, ;e have to !a*e a choice bet,een adhering to the strictly legalistic reasoning pursued by petitioners, on the one hand, and the broader and !ore practical approach, ,hich as 0 have said is ,ithin the spirit at least of the Constitution. My concept of the Constitution is that it is not +ust a cluster of high sounding verbiages spelling purely 0dealis! and nobility in the recognition of hu!an dignity, protection of individual liberties and providing security and pro!otion of the general ,elfare under a govern!ent of la,s. ;ith all e!phasis and vehe!ence, 0 say that the funda!ental la, of the land is a living instru!ent ,hich translates and adapts itself to the de!ands of obtaining circu!stances. 0t is ,ritten for all seasons, e cept for very unusual instances that hu!an ratiocination cannot +ustify to be conte!plated by its language even if read in its broadest sense and in the !ost liberal ,ay. Eerily, it is para!ount and supre!e in peace and in ,ar, but even in peace grave critical situations arise de!anding recourse to e traordinary solutions. Paraphrasing the /panish adage, $(ran'es males, #ran'es reme'ios $, such in ordinary proble!s +ustify e ceptional re!edies. And so, history records that in the face of grave crises and e!ergencies, the !ost constitutionally 0dealistic countries have, at one ti!e or another, under the pressure of prag!atic considerations, adopted corresponding realistic !easures, ,hich perilously tether along the periphery of their Charters, to the e tent of creating i!pressions, of course erroneous, that the sa!e had been transgressed, although in truth their integrity and i!periousness re!ained undi!inished and uni!paired. The Philippines has but recently had its o,n e perience of such constitutional approach. ;hen !artial la, ,as proclai!ed here in "$<#, there ,ere those ,ho vociferously shouted not only that the President had acted arbitrarily and ,ithout the - re7uired factual bases conte!plated in the Co!!ander-in-Chief clause of the "$56 Constitution, but !ore, that he had gone beyond the traditional and universally recogni&ed intent of said clause by utili&ing his !artial la, po,ers not only to !aintain peace and tran7uility and preserve and defend the integrity and security of the state but to establish a Ne, /ociety The critics contended that !artial la, is only for national security, not for the i!position of national discipline under a Ne, /ociety. 1ue to its relevancy to )ur present discussion, it is ,ell for everyone to bear in !ind that in this +urisdiction, this concept of !artial la, has already been upheld several ti!es by this Court. ", for one, accepted such a construction because 0 fir!ly believe that to i!pose !artial la, for the sole

end of suppressing an insurrection or rebellion ,ithout coincidentally ta*ing corresponding !easures to eradicate the root causes of the uprising is utter folly, for the country ,ould still continue to lay open to its recurrence. 0 have !ade the foregoing discourse, for it is funda!entally in the fight of this Court9s doctrines about the i!position of !artial la, as 0 have stated that 0 prefer to base this concurrence. To put it differently, if indeed there could be so!e doubt as to the correctness of this Court9s +udg!ent that Batas Pa!bansa "#$ is not unconstitutional, particularly its /ection DD, 0 a! convinced that the critical situation of our +udiciary today calls for solutions that !ay not in the eyes of so!e confor! strictly ,ith the letter of the Constitution but indubitably +ustified by its spirit and intent. As " have earlier indicated, the Charter is not +ust a construction of ,ords to ,hose literal ironclad !eanings ,e !ust feel hidebound ,ithout regard to every Constitution9s desirable inherent nature of ad+ustability and adaptability to prevailing situations so that the spirit and funda!ental intent and ob+ectives of the fra!ers !ay re!ain alive. Batas Pa!bansa "#$ is one such adaptation that co!es handy for the attain!ent of the transcendental ob+ectives it see*s to pursue ;hile, to be sure, it has the effect of factually easing out so!e +ustices and +udges before the end of their respective constitutional tenure sans the usual ad!inistrative investigation, the desirable end is achieved thru !eans that, in the light of the prevailing conditions, is constitutionally per!issible. Before closing, it !ay not be a!iss for !e to point out that Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$, aside fro! ,hat has been discussed about its effect on the guarantees of +udicial independence, also pree!pts, in so!e of its provisions, the pri!ary rule-!a*ing po,er of the /upre!e Court in respect to procedure, practice and evidence. ;ith the pardon of !y colleagues, 0 ,ould +ust li*e to say that the Court should not decry this develop!ent too !uch. After all, the legislature is e pressly e!po,ered by the Charter to do so, ?/ection 6?6@, Article K of the Constitution of "$<5@ so !uch so, that 0 doubt if the Court has any authority to alter or !odify any rule the Batasang Pa!bansa enunciates. Truth to tell, as Chair!an of the Co!!ittee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, for one reason or another, principally the lac* of a clear consensus as to ,hat so!e of !y colleagues consider very radical proposals voiced by !e or !y co!!ittee, ;e have regrettably procrastinated long enough in !a*ing our procedural rules !ore practical and !ore conducive to speedier disposal and ter!ination of controversies by dealing !ore ,ith substantial +ustice. /o also have ;e, it !ust be confessed, failed to co!e up to e pectations of the fra!ers of the Constitution in our ,ays of disposing of ad!inistrative co!plaints against erring and !isconducting +udges. )f course, ;e can e cuse )urselves ,ith the e planation that not only are ;e overloaded ,ith ,or* beyond hu!an capability of its being perfor!ed e peditiously, but that the strict re7uisites of due process ,hich are ti!e consu!ing have precluded :s fro! being !ore e peditious and speedy. 0 feel 0 !ust say all of these, because if the above-discussed circu!stances have not co!bined to create a very critical situation in our +udiciary that is !a*ing the people lose its faith and confidence in the ad!inistration of +ustice by the e isting courts, perhaps the Court could loo* ,ith !ore sy!pathy at the stand of petitioners. 0 ,ant all the sundry to *no,, ho,ever, that not,ithstanding this decision, the independence of the +udiciary in the Philippines is far fro! being insubstantial, !uch less !eaningless and dead. Batas Pa!bansa "#$ has precisely opened our eyes to ho,, despite doubts and !isgivings, the Constitution can be so construed as to !a*e it possible for those in authority to ans,er the cla!or of the people for an upright +udiciary and overco!e constitutional roadbloc*s !ore apparent than real. To those +ustices, +udges, !e!bers of the bar and concerned citi&ens ,hose eyes !ay be di!!ing ,ith tears of disappoint!ent and disenchant!ent because of the stand 0 have chosen to adopt in these cases, !ay 0 try to assuage the! by +oining their fervent prayers that so!e other day, hopefully in the near future, 1ivine Providence !ay dictate to another constitutional convention to ,rite the guarantees of +udicial independence ,ith in* of deeper hue and ,ords

that are definite, clear, una!biguous and une7uivocal, in dra,ing the line of de!arcation bet,een the Parlia!ent and the 'udiciary in the !anner that in Ais 0nfinite ,isdo! ,ould !ost pro!ote genuine and i!partial +ustice for our people, free, not only fro! graft, corruption, ineptness and inco!petence but even fro! the tentacles of interference and insiduous influence of the political po,ers that be. Presently, 0 a! constrained fro! going along ,ith any other vie, than that the Constitution allo,s abolition of e isting courts even if the effect has to be the eli!ination of any incu!bent +udge and the conse7uent cutting of his constitutional tenure of office. 0 cannot close this concurrence ,ithout referring to the apprehensions in so!e 7uarters about the choice that ,ill ulti!ately be !ade of those ,ho ,ill be eased out of the +udiciary in the course of the i!ple!entation of Batas Pa!bansa "#$. By this decision, the Court has in factual effect albeit not in constitutional conception yielded generally to the Batasang Pa!bansa, and !ore specifically to the President, its o,n constitutionally conferred po,er of re!oval of +udges. /ection DD of the Batasan9s Act declares that all of the! shall be dee!ed to have ceased to hold office, leaving it to the President to appoint those ,ho! he !ay see fit to occupy the ne, courts. Thus, those ,ho ,ill not be appointed can be considered as %ceasing to hold their respective offices%, or, as others ,ould say they ,ould be in fact re!oved. Ao, the President ,ill !a*e his choices is beyond )ur po,er to control. But even if so!e !ay be eased out even ,ithout being duly infor!ed of the reason therefor, !uch less being given the opportunity to be heard the past actuations of the President on all !atters of deep public interest shouted serve as sufficient assurance that ,hen lie ulti!ately acts, he ,ill faithfully adhere to his sole!n oath %to do +ustice to every !an hence, lie ,ill e7uip hi!self first ,ith the fullest reliable infor!ation before acts. This is not only !y individual faith founded on !y personal ac7uaintance ,ith the character and sterling 7ualities of President (erdinand E. Marcos. 0 dare say this is the faith of the nation in a !an ,ho has led it successfully through crises and e!ergencies, ,ith +ustice to all, ,ith !alice to,ards none. 0 a! certain, the President ,ill deal ,ith each and every individual to be affected by this reorgani&ation ,ith the best light that 3od ,ill give hi! every !o!ent he acts in each individual case as it co!es for his decision

A6U(NO, J., concurring. 0 concur in the result. The petitioners filed this petition for declaratory relief and prohibition %to declare the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4= ?Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$@ unconstitutional%. The petition should have been dis!issed outright because this Court has no +urisdiction to grant declaratory relief and prohibition is not the proper re!edy to test the constitutionality of the la,. the petition is pre!ature. No +urisdictional 7uestion is involved. There is no +usticiable controversy ,herein the constitutionality of the said la, is in issue. 0t is presu!ed to be constitutional. The la,!a*ing body before enacting it loo*ed into the constitutional angle. /even of the eight petitioners are practising la,yers. They have no personality to assail the constitutionality of the said la, even as ta payers. The eighth petitioner, 3ualberto '. de la 8lana, a city +udge ?,ho in "$<< filed a petition for declaratory relief assailing Presidential 1ecree No. "##$, ,hich called for a referendu!. 1e la 8lana his Co!elec, 4= /CRA 6#6@, has no cause of action for prohibition. Ae is not being re!oved fro! his position. The 'udiciary Reorgani&ation 8a, ,as enacted in ut!ost good faith and not %to cloa* an unconstitutional and evil purpose As ably e pounded by the Chief 'ustice, in enacting the said la,, the la,!a*ing body acted ,ithin the scope of its constitutional po,ers and prerogatives.

GUERRERO, J., concurring. 0 concur ,ith !y distinguished and learned colleagues in upholding the constitutionality of the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4=. (or the record, ho,ever, 0 ,ould li*e to state !y personal convictions and observations on this case, a veritable land!ar* case, for ,hatever they !ay be ,orth. The legal basis of the Court9s opinion rendered by our estee!ed Chief 'ustice having been e haustively discussed and decisively +ustified by hi!, a highly-respected e pert and authority on constitutional la,, it ,ould be an e ercise in duplication to reiterate the sa!e cases and precedents. 0 a! then constrained to approach the proble! 7uite differently, not through the classic !ethods of philosophy, history and tradition, but follo,ing ,hat the ,ell-*no,n +urist, 1ean Pound, said that %the !ost significant advance in the !odern science of la, is the change fro! the analytical to the functional attitude.% 1 And in pursuing this direct ion, 0 !ust also rec*on ,ith and rely on the ruling that %another guide to the !eaning of a statute is found in the evil ,hich it is designed to re!edy, and for this the court properly loo*s at conte!poraneous events, the situation as it e isted, and as it ,as pressed upon the attention of the legislative body.% 2 0 have no doubt in !y !ind that the institutional refor!s and changes envisioned by the la, are clearly conducive to the pro!otion of national interests. The ob+ectives of the legislation na!ely. ?a@ An institutional restructuring by the creation of an 0nter!ediate Appellate Court, thirteen ?0 5@ Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. ?b@ A reappoint!ent of +urisdiction geared to,ards greater efficiency. ?c@ A si!plification of procedures and ?d@ The abolition of the inferior courts created by the 'udiciary Act of "$D4 and other statutes, as approved by the Congress of the Philippines 3 are undoubtedly intended to i!prove the regi!e of +ustice and thereby enhance public good and order. 0ndeed, the purpose of the Act as further stated in the E planatory Note, ,hich is %to e!body refor!s in the structure, organi&ation and co!position of the 'udiciary, ,ith the ai! of i!proving the ad!inistration of +ustice, of decongesting +udicial doc*ets, and coping ,ith the !ore co!ple proble!s on the present and forseeable future cannot but %pro!ote the ,elfare of society, since that is the final cause of la,. 3 Aence, fro! the standpoint of The general utility and functional value of the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act, there should be no difficulty, doubt or disbelief in its legality and constitutionality. That there are ills and evils plaguing the +udicial syste! is undeniable. The notorious and scandalous congestion of court doc*ets as too ,ell-*no,n to be ignored as are the causes ,hich create and produce such ano!aly. Evident is the need to loo* for devices and !easures that are !ore practical, ,or*able and econo!ical. 5 (ro! the figures alone ?5=",D$< pending cases in "$<>G 56", $D5 in "$<<G D=D, >4> in "$<4G D#>, $"" in "$<$G DD", 55# in "$4=G and D6=, =>5 as of (ebruary 5, "$4#@ 4 the congested character of court doc*ets rising year after year is staggering and enor!ous, loo!ing li*e a legal !onster. But greater than the need to dispense +ustice speedily and pro!ptly is the necessity to have 'ustices and 'udges ,ho are fair and i!partial, honest and incorruptible, co!petent and efficient. The general cla!or that the prestige of the 'udiciary today has deteriorated and degenerated to the lo,est ebb in public esti!ation is not ,ithout factual basis. Records in the /upre!e Court attest to the unfitness and inco!petence, corruption and i!!orality of !any dispensers of +ustice. According to the co!piled data, the total nu!ber of 'ustices and 'udges against ,ho! ad!inistrative charges have been filed for various offenses, !isconduct, venalities and other irregularities reaches 455. )f this total, 6 are 'ustices of the Court of Appeals, ""$ C(0

'udges, 5 Cri!inal Circuit 'udges, 6CAR 'udges, 7 'uvenile O 1o!estic Relations Court 'udge, 46 City 'udges, and 789 Municipal 'udges. The /upre!e Court has found 7:5 of the! guilty and punished the! ,ith either suspension, ad!onition, repri!and or fine. The nu!ber includes 7 CA 'ustice, 4; C(0 'udges, 7 CCC 'udge, 4 CAR 'udges, 7 '1RC 'udge, < City 'udges and ;4 Municipal 'udges. /eventeen ?"<@ 'udges have been ordered dis!issed and separated fro! the service. And these are 4 C(0, 7CAR, 7 City 'udge and 75 Municipal 'udges. 3oing over these ad!inistrative proceedings, it too* an average of t,o-year period fro! the filing of the charge to the dis!issal of the respondent. 0n one case, the proceedings ,ere ter!inated after seven years. Ao, long the pending ad!inistrative cases ,ill be disposed of, only ti!e ,ill tell as an increasing nu!ber of ad!inistrative cases are being filed by victi!s of +udicial !isconduct, abuse and arbitrariness. E cepting those ,ho have been punished and dis!issed fro! the service, there are !any ,ho have been castigated and censured in final +udg!ents of the /upre!e Court upon appeal or revie, of the decisions, orders and other acts of the respondent courts, 'ustices and 'udges. To cite a fe, cases, )ur decisions have categorically pronounced respondents9 actuations, thus. %deplorable, giving no credit to the 'udiciary% 7G applicable rules. The ,hole proceedings loo*ed no !ore than a pre-arranged co!pro!ise bet,een the accused and the 'udge to flaunt the la, and every nor! of propriety and procedure% 8G %there ,as a deliberate failure of respondent 'udge to respect ,hat is so clearly provided in the Rules of Court% 9G %0t is unfortunate that respondent 'udge failed to ac7uaint hi!self ,ith, ="9 !isinterpreted, those controlling provisions and doctrines% 15G %The failure of the respondent Municipal 'udge to yield obedience to authoritative decisions of the /upre!e Court and of respondent Court of (irst 0nstance 'udge and his deplorable insistence on procedural technicalities ,as called do,n in 8-D$4#4, 'uly #6, "$4". (or pere!ptorily dis!issing the third party co!plaint on the ground that the !otion to dis!iss ,as 9,ell-ta*en9 and respondent 'udge did not elaborate, the Court re!ar*ed. %May his tribe vanish.% 11 0n one case, ;e noted %There is here so so!ething unusual, but far fro! palliating the gravity of the error incurred, it !erely e acerbated it. ... it did render the due process re7uire!ent nugatory, for instead of a fair and i!partial trial, there ,as an 0dle for!, a useless cere!ony.% 12 0t is dishonorable enough to be publicly and officially rebu*ed but to allo, these 'udges and their il* to re!ain and continue to preside in their courtroo!s is a disgrace to the 'udiciary. 0t is to be deplored that the /upre!e Court has not found ti!e to e ercise its po,er and authority in the pre!ises, for no charges or proceedings have been instituted against the!. ;e have a list of these croo*ed 'udges ,hose actuations have been found to be patiently ,rong and !anifestly in-defeasible. There ought to be no ob+ection or co!punction in ,eeding the! out fro! the service. 0f they are not booted out no,, it ,ill ta*e fro! here to eternity to clean this Augean stable. Candidly, one reason for ,riting this concurring opinion is to call attention to these evils, abuses and ,rongs ,hich are surreptitiously but surely destroying the trust and faith of the people in the integrity of the entire 'udiciary. /o!e !e!bers of the Court felt that these revelations ,ould be li*e ,ashing dirty linen in public. But these facts are of public and official record nay court cases, and sooner or later, Truth ,ill co!e out. 0n the light of these *no,n evils and infir!ities of the +udiciary syste!, it ,ould be absurd and unreasonable to clai! that the legislators did not act upon the! in good faith and honesty of purpose and ,ith legiti!ate ends. 0t is presu!ed that official duty has been regularly perfor!ed. 13 The presu!ption of regularity is not confined to the acts of the individual officers but also applies to the acts of boards, such as ad!inistrative board or bodies, and to acts of legislative bodies. 13 3ood faith is al,ays to be presu!ed in the absence of proof to the contrary,

of ,hich there is none in the case at bar. 0t could not be other,ise if ;e are to accord as ;e !ust, full faith and credit to the la,!a*ers9 deep sense of public service and the +udicious e ercise of their high office as the duly-elected representatives of the people. 0t is conceded that the abolition of an office is legal if attendant ,ith good faith. 15 The 7uestion of good faith then is the cru of the conflict at bar. 3ood faith in the enact!ent of the la, does not refer to the ,isdo! of the !easure, the propriety of the Act, or to its e pediency. The 7uestions raised by petitioners and amicus curiae for their cause, vi%: ;hy abolish all the courts ;hy legislate out the +udges ;hy not a!end the Rules of Court only 0s abolition of all courts the proper re!edy to ,eed out corrupt and !isfits in our 'udiciaryH B !ay not be in7uired into by :s. %0t is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and *eep it ,ithin the bounds of propriety and co!!on sense. That is pri!arily and e clusively a legislative concern.% 14 The Courts %are not supposed to override legiti!ate policy and ... never in7uire into the ,isdo! of the la,.% 17 Chief 'ustice (ernando ,ho penned the orfe decision, ,rites that ,hile %?i@t is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief 'ustice Concepcion in (on%ales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional po,er or co!petence, not the ,isdo! of the action ta*en, !ay be the basis for declaring a statute invalid,% 18 he adds that it is %useful to recall ,hat ,as so clearly stated by 8aurel that 9the 'udiciary in the deter!ination of actual cases and controversies !ust reflect the ,isdo! and +ustice of the people as e pressed through their representatives in the e ecutive and legislative depart!ents of the govern!ent.9% 19 0n any case, petitioners have not sho,n an iota of proof of bad faith. There is no factual foundation of bad faith on record. And 0 do not consider the state!ent in the sponsorship speech for Cabinet Bill No. D# of Minister of 'ustice Ricardo '. Puno that the Bill ,ould be a !ore efficient vehicle of %eli!inating inco!petent and unfit 'udges as indicative of i!per!issible legislative !otive. 25 0t !ay be true that ,hile the re!edy or solution for!ulated by the legislation ,ill eradicate hopefully or at least !ini!i&e the evils and ills that infect and pester the +udicial body, it ,ill result in the actual re!oval of the 'ustices of the Court of Appeals and 'udges of the lo,er courts. 0t is also true that ,hether it is ter!ed abolition of office or re!oval fro! office, the end-result is the sa!e B ter!ination of the services of these incu!bents. 0ndeed, the la, !ay be harsh, but that is the la,. *ura le= se' le=. The 'ustices and 'udges directly affected by the la,, being la,yers, should *no, or are e pected to *no, the nature and concept of a public office. 0t is created for the purpose of effecting the ends for ,hich govern!ent has been instituted, ,hich are for the co!!on good, and not the profit, honor or private interest of any one !an, fa!ily or class of !en. 0n our for! of govern!ent, it is funda!ental that public offices are public trust, and that the person to be appointed should be selected solely ,ith a vie, to the public ,elfare. 21 0n the last analysis, a public office is a privilege in the gift of the /tate. 22 There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. E cepting constitutional offices ,hich provide for special i!!unity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. ;hen an office is created by the Constitution, it cannot be abolished by the legislature, but ,hen created by the /tate under the authority of the Constitution, it !ay be abolished by statute and the incu!bent deprived of his office. 23 Acceptance of a +udicial appoint!ent !ust be dee!ed as adherence to the rule that %,hen the court is abolished, any une pired ter! is abolished also. The 'udge of such a court ta*es office ,ith that encu!brance and *no,ledge.% 23 %The 'udge9s right to his full ter! and his full salary are not dependent alone upon his good conduct, but also upon the contingency that the legislature !ay for the public good, in ordaining and establishing the courts, fro! ti!e to ti!e consider his office unnecessary and abolish it.% 25 The re!oval fro! office of the incu!bent then is !erely incidental to the valid act of abolition of the office as de!anded by the superior and para!ount interest of the people. The bad and the croo*ed 'udges !ust be re!oved. The good and the straight, sober 'udges should be reappointed but that is the sole po,er and prerogative of the President ,ho, 0 a! certain, ,ill act

according to the best interest of the nation and in accordance ,ith his sole!n oath of office %to preserve and defend its Constitution, e ecute its la,s, do +ustice to everyone ... % There and then the proper balance bet,een the desire to preserve private interest and the desideratu! of pro!oting the public good shall have been struc*. 24 The /upre!e Court has been called the conscience of the Constitution. 0t !ay be the last bul,ar* of constitutional govern!ent. 27 0t Must, ho,ever, be re!e!bered %that legislatures are ulti!ate guardians of the liberties and ,elfare of the people in 7uite as great a degree as courts.% 28 The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislatures as ,ell. 0t adheres, therefore, to the ,ell-settled principle that %all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute% for ,hich reason it ,ill not set aside a la, as violative of the Constitution %e cept in a clear case.% 29 (inally, 0 vie, the controversy presented to :s as a conflict of opinions B on +udicial independence, ,hether i!paired or strengthened by the la,G on reorgani&ation of the courts, ,hether abolition of office or re!oval therefro!, and on delegation of legislative po,er, ,hether authori&ed or unauthori&ed. ;ithout detracting fro! the !erits, the force and brilliance of their advocacies based on logic, history and precedents, 0 choose to stand on the social +ustification and the functional utility of the la, to uphold its constitutionality. 0n the light of conte!poraneous events fro! ,hich the Ne, Republic e!erged and evolved ne, 0deals of national gro,th and develop!ent, particularly in la, and govern!ent, a *ind or for! of +udicial activis!, perhaps si!ilar to it, is necessary to +ustify as the ratio 'eci'en'i of )ur +udg!ent. This is the ti!e and the !o!ent to perfor! a constitutional duty to affi !y i!pri!atur and affir!ance to the la,, hopefully an act of proper +udicial states!anship.

ABA

SANTOS, J., concurring.

0 agree ,ith the learned Chief 'ustice of the Philippines that Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$ is not unconstitutional. :nli*e )scar ;ilde, 0 choose not to yield to te!ptation by e!bellishing !y concurrence lest 0 be accrued of bringing coal to Ne,castle. Accordingly, 0 ,ill si!ply vote to dis!iss the petition Ao,ever, 0 cannot agree ,ith the Chief 'ustice ,hen he says. ... 0n the i!ple!entation of the assailed legislation, therefore it should be in accordance ,ith accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incu!bent +ustices and +udges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its vie, be accorded the fullest consideration. There ,ould be no plausibility then to the allegation that there is an unconstitutional taint to the challenged Act. Moreover, such a construction ,ould be in accordance ,ith the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives bet,een one ,hich ,ould save and another ,hich ,ould invalidate a statute, the for!er is to be preferred. 0t has already been ruled that the statute does not suffer fro! any constitutional infir!ity because the abolition of certain +udicial offices ,as done in good faith. This being the case, 0 believe that the E ecutive is entitled to e ercise its constitutional po,er to fill the ne,ly created +udicial positions ,ithout any obligation to consult ,ith this Court and to accord its vie,s the fullest consideration. To re7uire consultation ,ill constitute an invasion of e ecutive territory ,hich can be resented and even repelled. The i!plicit suggestion that there could be an unconstitutional i!ple!entation of the 7uestioned legislation is not congruent ,ith the basic conclusion that it is not unconstitutional.

E CASTRO, J., concurring. 0 concur in the declaration that the la, is not unconstitutional. May 0, ho,ever, sub!it this separate opinion !ore to avoid being !isunderstood by !y brethren in the +udiciary as not feeling for the! as !uch concern as 0 should for their security of tenure ,hich is raised as the !ain argu!ent against the constitutionality of the la,, than by ,ay of giving added force or support to the !ain opinion so ,ell-,ritten by )ur learned Chief 'ustice in his usual scholarly fashion. 0, therefore, li!it !yself to a discussion that the assailed statue is not unconstitutional ,ithout having to suggest ho, it !ay be i!ple!ented in order that it could stand the !ost rigid test of constitutionality, for in that area, ,hat is involved is purely an e ecutive act of the President in ,hose ,isdo!, patriotis! and sense of +ustice ;e should trust in ho, he ,ould fulfill his s,orn duties to see that the la,s are faithfully e ecuted and to do +ustice to every !an. Moreover, ,hile 0 also concur in the dis!issal of the petition, 0 do so on the additional ground that petitioners have not fulfilled all the re7uisites for the e ercise by this Court of its po,er of +udicial in7uiry B the po,er to declare a la, unconstitutional. 0 The creation and organi&ation of courts inferior to the /upre!e Court is a constitutional prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative is plenary and necessarily i!plies the po,er to reorgani&e said courts, and in the process, abolish the! to give ,ay to ne, or substantially different ones. To contend other,ise ,ould be to forget a basic doctrine of constitutional la, that no irrepealable la,s shall be passed. 1 The po,er to create courts and organi&e the! is necessarily the pri!ary authority fro! ,hich ,ould thereafter arise the security of tenure of those appointed to perfor! the functions of said courts. in the natural order of things, therefore, since the occasion to spea* of security of tenure of +udges arises only after the courts have first been brought into being, the right to security of tenure ta*es a secondary position to the basic and pri!ary po,er of creating the courts to provide for a fair and strong +udicial syste!. 0f the legislature, in the e ercise of its authority, dee!s it ,ise and urgent to provide for a ne, set of courts, and in doing so, it feels the abolition of the old courts ,ould conduce !ore to its ob+ective of i!proving the +udiciary and raising its standard, the !atter involved is one of policy and ,isdo! into ,hich the courts, not even the /upre!e Court, cannot in7uire, !uch less interfere ,ith. By this secondary position it has to the pri!ary po,er of the legislature to create courts, the security of tenure given to the incu!bents should not be a legal i!pedi!ent to the e ercise of that basic po,er of creating the statutory courts ,hich, by necessary i!plication, includes the po,er to abolish the! in order to create ne, ones. This pri!ary legislative po,er is a continuing one, and the resultant right of security of tenure of those appointed to said courts could not bring about the e haustion of that po,er. :n7uestionably, the legislature can repeal its o,n la,s, and that po,er can never be e hausted ,ithout, as a conse7uence, violating a funda!ental precept of constitutional and representative govern!ent that no irrepealable la,s shall be passed. 0f the creation of courts is a legislative prerogative their abolition is, therefore, a !atter of legislative intent. it involves the e ercise of legislative po,er, an act of legislation ,hich generally concerns policy in the for!ation of ,hich the courts have no say 0nitially, ,hen the legislature creates the courts, it suffers fro! no li!itation arising fro! the necessity or respecting the security of tenure of +udges ,ho are not yea there. This inherent character of fullness and plenitude of the po,er to create and abolish courts does not change ,hen that sa!e po,er is once !ore e ercised thereafter, as the need therefor is felt. ;hich only goes to sho, that ,hen done in good faith and !otivated solely by the good and the ,ell-being of the people, the e ercise of the po,er is not !eant to be restricted, curtailed, !uch less e hausted by the socalled +udicial security of tenure.

The passage of the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4= is no !ore than the e ercise of the po,er vested by the Constitution on the legislative body of the Republic as described above. That po,er carries ,ith it the duty and responsibility of providing the people ,ith the !ost effective and efficient syste! of ad!inistration of +ustice. This is by far of !ore i!perative and transcedental i!portance than the security of tenure of +udges ,hich, ad!ittedly, is one of the factors that ,ould conduce to independence of the +udiciary B but first of all, a good, efficient and effective +udiciary. A +udiciary ,anting in these basic 7ualities does not deserve the independence that is !eant only for a +udiciary that can serve best the interest and ,elfare of the people ,hich is the !ost pri!ordial and para!ount consideration, not a +udiciary in ,hich the people9s faith has been eroded, a condition ,hich the security of tenure, in so!e instances, !ay even be contributory. 0n enacting the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4=, the legislature is presu!ed to have been !otivated by no other ob+ective than to provide the people the *ind of +udicial !achinery that ,ould best serve their interest and ,elfare, in its belief that the present !achinery is falling short of that !easure of public service. 0t should, li*e,ise, be presu!ed that it has been led to this lo, esti!ate of the utility and effectiveness of the present set-up of the +udiciary after infor!ing itself, ,ith the facilities at its co!!and, such as the po,er of legislative investigation, of the actual condition of the courts, particularly as to ,hether they continue to en+oy the trust, faith and confidence of the public, and ,hat the cause or causes are of their erosion, if not loss, as is the *eenly perceptible feeling of the people in general. Responsibility for this !ore or less e tensive slo,do,n of the delivery of +udicial service can be laid on no other than either of the t,o co!ponents of a court B the procedural la,s or rules that govern the ,or*ings of the courts, or the persons e ecuting or applying the! B or both. ;hen t,o interests conflict as ,hat had given rise to the present controversy the duty of the legislature to provide society ,ith a fair, efficient and effective +udicial syste!, on one hand, and the right of +udges to security of tenure, on the other, the latter !ust of necessity yield to the for!er. )ne involves public ,elfare and interest !ore directly and on a greater !agnitude than the right of security of tenure of the +udges ,hich is, as is easily discernible, !ore of a personal benefit to +ust a fe,, as indeed only the +udge affected could see* +udicial redress of ,hat he conceives to be its violation. Aerein lies the propriety of the e ercise of %police po,er% of the /tate, if this concept ,hich underlies even the Constitution, has to be invo*ed as a constitutional +ustification of the passage of the Act in 7uestion. That is, if a conflict bet,een the pri!ary po,er of the legislature to create courts, and !ere conse7uential benefit accorded to +udges and +ustices after the creation of the courts is indeed perceivable, ,hich the ,riter fails to see, or, at least, ,ould disappear upon a reconciliation of the t,o apparently conflicting interests ,hich, fro! the above dis7uisition is not hard to find. 0t is, ,ithout doubt, in the essence of the e ercise of police po,er that a right assertable by individuals !ay be infringed in the greater interest of the public good and general ,elfare. This is de!onstrated in ho, the rights and freedo!s enu!erated in the Bill of Rights en+oyable by The entire people, not +ust by a handful in co!parison, are !ade sub+ect to the la,ful e ercise of the police po,er of the /tate. Eie,ed, therefore, fro! the above-!entioned perspective, the general reva!p of the +udiciary involving both its co!ponents B the court as an office or institution, and the +udges and +ustices that !an the! B should not find any legal obstacle in the security of tenure of +udges. This security, after all, is no !ore than as provided for all other officials and e!ployees in the civil service of the govern!ent in /ection 5, Article K00-B of the Constitution ,hich provides. No officer or e!ployees in the civil service shall be suspended or dis!issed e cept for cause as provided by la,. The provision of Article KE00, /ection "= of the Constitution gives to +udicial officials no !ore than a guarantee that their retire!ent age as fi ed in the Constitution shall not be alterable at !ere

legislative pleasure. The e7uivalent provision in the "$56 Constitution ,as inserted for the first ti!e because the retire!ent age before then ,as provided !erely by statute not by the Constitution. 0f it co!es to their re!oval or suspension, ,hat gives the! constitutional protection is the afore7uoted provision ,hich does not conte!plate abolition of office ,hen done in good faith, for re!oval i!plies the e istence of the office, not ,hen it is abolished. Ad!ittedly, as has been held, abolition of office for no reason related to public ,elfare or for the good of the service, let alone ,hen done in bad faith, a!ounts to an unla,ful re!oval. 2 The abolition of the courts as declared in the Act as a result of a reorgani&ation of the +udiciary, as the Title of the la, curtly but announces, can by no !eans, fro! any vie,point, be so branded. And ,hether by said reorgani&ation, the present ,ould be dee!ed abolished, as the la, e presses such an un!ista*able intent, the !atter is one for the sole and e clusive deter!ination of the legislature. 0t rests entirely on its discretion ,hether by the nature and e tent of the changes it has introduced, it has done enough to consider the! abolished. To give the /upre!e Court the po,er to deter!ine the e tent or nature of the changes as to their structure, distribution and +urisdiction, before the clear intent to abolish the!, or to declare the! so abolished, is given effect, ,ould be to allo, undue interference in the function of legislation. This ,ould be contrary to the pri!ary duty of courts precisely to give effect to the legislative intent as e pressed in the la, or as !y be discovered therefro!. (ro! the above observation, it ,ould be futile to insist that the present courts ,ould not effectively be abolished by the Act in 7uestion. it !ight be to arrogate po,er for :s to say that the changes the la, brings to the present +udicial syste!, do not suffice for this Court to give effect to the clear intent of the legislative body. ;here ,ould the agrarian courts, the circuit cri!inal courts, the '1RC9s be in the +udicial structure as envisioned by the la,H Are they not abolished by !erger ,ith the regional trial courts, ,hich by such !erger, and by the other changes introduced by the la,, ,ould !a*e said courts different fro! the present Courts of (irst 0nstance ,hich, as a conse7uence, !ay then be considered abolished 0ntegrated as the present courts are supposed to be, changes so!e,here in the +udicial !achinery ,ould necessarily affect the entire syste!. The fact that the /upre!e Court !ay specially assign courts to function as the special courts +ust !entioned, does not !ean that the changes ,rought are only superficial or %cos!etic% as this ter! has been used so often in the oral argu!ent. ;ithout the ne, la,, these courts ,ill re!ain fi ed and per!anent ,here they are at present. Fet in the course of ti!e, the need for their independent e istence !ay disappear, or that by changed conditions, ,here they are needed at present at a certain place, the need for the! !ay be so!e,here else in later years, if !a i!u! benefit at the least e pense is to be achieved, as al,ays should be a !ost desirable goal and ob+ective of govern!ent. 1e!onstrably then, the abolition of the courts is a !atter of legislative intent into ,hich no +udicial in7uiry is proper, e cept perhaps if they intent is so palpably tainted ,ith constitutional repugnancy, ,hich is not so in the instant case. ;e have, therefore, no occasion, as earlier inti!ated, to spea* of re!oval of +udges ,hen the reorgani&ation of the +udiciary ,ould result in the abolition of the courts other than the /upre!e Court and the Court of Ta Appeals. Aence, the provision of the Constitution giving to the /upre!e Court po,er to dis!iss a +udge by a vote of eight +ustices does not co!e into the vorte of the instant controversy. 0ts possible violation by the assailed statute cannot happen, and !ay, therefore, not constitute an argu!ent against the constitutionality of the la,. (or!er 'ustice Barrera, in a speech before the Philippine Bar Association, 3 i!pliedly indorsed the +udicial reva!p ,hen he enu!erated the 7ualities of a good +udge that the appointing po,er should consider in !a*ing ne, appoint!ents to the +udiciary upon its reorgani&ation pursuant to the 7uestioned Act. The ,ords of the e!inent +urist !ay ,ell reflect the favorable reaction of the public in general to ,hat the Act ai! to achieve in the na!e of good and clean govern!ent. The present +udicial incu!bents, ,ho have not in any ,ay, by their acts and behavior ,hile in office, tarnished the good i!age that the +udiciary should have, therefore, have no cause for apprehension that ,hat they are entitled to under the Constitution by ,ay of security of tenure

,ig be denied the!, considering the publicly *no,n ai! and purpose of the !assive +udicial reva!p, specially as cherished ,ith deep concern by the President ,ho initiated the !ove ,hen he created the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Co!!ittee to reco!!end needed and appropriate +udicial refor!s. 0f the only obstacle to a verdict in favor of constitutionality of the la, is its possible effect of i!pairing the security of tenure of the incu!bents, ;e !ay have the follo,ing facts to consider. ". :nder the "$<5 Constitution all incu!bent +udges and +ustices !ay continue in office until replaced or reappointed by the President. As to those +udicial officials, no security of tenure, in the traditional concept, attaches to their incu!bency ,hich is, in a real sense, only a holdover tenure. Ao, the President has e ercised this i!!ense po,er ,ith ad!irable restraint should serve as the strongest guarantee of ho, +ustice and fairness ,ill be his sole guide in i!ple!enting the la,. #. As to the rest of the incu!bents, they are all appointees of )ur present President, and he should feel concerned !ore than anyone else to protect ,hatever rights they !ay rightfully clai! to !aintain their official standing and integrity. They need have no fear of being ignored for no reason at all, !uch less for !ere spirit of vindictiveness or lac* of nobility of heart. (ro! the foregoing, it ,ould beco!e apparent that only in the i!ple!entation of the la, !ay there possibly be a taint of constitutional repugnancy as ,hen a +udge of ac*no,ledged honesty, industry and co!petence is separated, because an act of arbitrariness ,ould thereby be co!!itted, but the abolition of the courts as decreed by the la, is not by itself or per se unconstitutional. Conse7uently, the la,, the result of serious and concerned study by a highly co!petent co!!ittee, deserves to be given a chance to prove its ,orth in the ,ay of i!proving the +udiciary. 0f in its i!ple!entation, any one, if at all, feels aggrieved, he can al,ays see* +udicial redress, if he can !a*e out a case of violation of his right of security of tenure ,ith uncontrovertible clarity, as ,hen the separation is very arbitrary in the peculiar circu!stances of his case, for an act of arbitrariness, under any constitution, is unpardonable. This petition should also be dis!issed for being pre!ature, as is the stand of 'ustice A7uino. The petition as*s this Court to e ercise its po,er of +udicial in7uiry, the po,er to declare a la, unconstitutional ,hen it conflicts ,ith the funda!ental la, ?People vs. Eera, >6 Phil. 6>@. This po,er has ,ell-defined li!its, for it can be e ercised only ,hen the follo,ing re7uisites are present, to ,it. ?"@ There !ust be an actual case or controversyG ?#@ The 7uestion of constitutionality !ust be raised by the proper partyG ?5@ Ae should do so at the earliest opportunity, and ?D@ The deter!ination of the constitutionality of the statute !ust be necessary to a final deter!ination of the case. 0 a! of the opinion that the petition does not present an actual controversy nor ,as it filed by the proper parties. The !ain ground for ,hich the constitutionality of the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4= is assailed is that it is violative of the security of tenure of +ustices and +udges. The only persons ,ho could raise the 7uestion of constitutionality of the la, are, therefore, the actual incu!bents of the courts ,ho ,ould be separated fro! the service upon the abolition of the courts affected by the la,, on the theory as advanced by petitioners that their +udicial security of tenure ,ould be violated. )longapo City 'udge de la 8lana, the only +udge a!ong the petitioners, has not been separated fro! the service. Nor is his separation already a certainty, for he !ay be appointed to the court e7uivalent to his present court, or even pro!oted to a higher court. )nly ,hen it has beco!e certain that his tenure has been ter!inated ,ill an actual controversy arise on his allegation of a fact that has beco!e actual, not !erely probable or hypothetical.

The present petition !ay neither be allo,ed as a ta payer suit. A ta payer !ay bring an action to raise the 7uestion of constitutionality of a statute only ,hen no one else can !ore appropriately bring the suit to defend a right e clusively belonging to hi!, and. therefore, ,ould locali&e the actual in+ury to his person, and to no other. (or a %proper party% to invo*e the po,er of +udicial in7uiry, as one of the re7uisites in the e ercise of such po,er, does not !ean one having no better right, one !ore personali&ed, than ,hat he has as a !e!ber of the public in general. ;ith the incu!bent +udges undoubtedly being the ones under petitioners9 theory, ,ho ,ould suffer direct and actual in+ury, they should e clude !ere ta payers ,ho cannot be said to suffer as %direct% and %actual% an in+ury as the +udges and +ustices by the enforce!ent of the assailed statute, fro! the right to bring the suit. The validity of the foregoing observation beco!es !ore evident ,hen ;e consider that only after the fate of the present incu!bents is *no,n, ,hether they have been actually separated or not, ,ould the present courts be declared abolished. (or the la, clearly continues their e istence until all the ne, courts have been filled up ,ith ne, appoint!ents, or at least such nu!ber as ,ould be e7ual to the nu!ber of actual incu!bents, and they are the very courts to ,hich they !ay lay clai! to the right to continue therein, so that the status of each and everyone of the! has thereby been !ade certain. )nly then, upon the actual abolition of the courts, !ay there possibly be a violation of the security of tenure, as contented, that ,ould give rise to an %actual controversy% in ,hich the > i!proper party% can be no other than the +udges ,ho feel aggrieved by their non- appoint!ent to the ne, courts. 0t ,ould, therefore, not be proper to declare the la, void at this stage, before it has even been given a chance to prove its ,orth, as the legislature itself and an those ,ho helped by their e haustive and scholarly study, felt it to be an urgent necessity, and before any of the proper parties ,ho could assail its constitutionality ,ould *no, for a fact, certain and actual, not !erely probable or hypothetical, that they have a right violated by ,hat they could possibly contend to be an unconstitutional enforce!ent of the la,, not by a la, that is unconstitutional unto itself. 0 a!, therefore, for giving the la, a chance to be put into application so as not to douse great popular e pectations for the courts to regain their highest level of efficiency had reputation for probity. 0nevitably, this is to be so since only ,hen the la, is fully i!ple!ented ,ill all the courts affected be declared abolished, undoubtedly to avoid an interregnu! ,hen the country is ,ithout any court, e cept the /upre!e Court, the Court of Ta Appeals and the /andigan. )nly then ,ill it be *no,n ,hether an actual controversy ,ould arise because any of the incu!bents have been left out in the restructured +udiciary. There ,ould then be also a proper party to assail the constitutionality of the la,, confor!ably to the conditions re7uisite for the e ercise of the po,er of +udicial in7uiry ,hich by their stringent character, together ,ith the constitutional prescription of a co!paratively higher vote to declare a la, unconstitutional, reveal a salutary principle of govern!ent that a la, should, by all reasonable intend!ent and feasible !eans, be saved fro! the doo! of unconstitutionality, the rule corollary thereto being that if a la, is susceptible to t,o interpretations, one of ,hich ,ould !a*e it constitutional, that interpretation should be adopted that ,ill not *ill the la,. 0t is to adhere to the above principles that the sub!ission is !ade herein, that ,hile in the i!ple!entation of the la,, constitutional repugnancy !ay not entirely be ruled out, a categorical ruling hereon not being necessary or desirable at the !o!ent, the la, itself is definitely not unconstitutional. 3 Any of the incu!bent +udges ,ho feel in+ured after the la, shall have been i!ple!ented has ade7uate re!edy in la,, ,ith full relief as ,ould be proper. But surely, the benefits envisioned by the la, in the discharge of one of the basic duties of govern!ent to the people B the ad!inistration of +ustice B should not be sacrificed, as it ,ould be, if the la, is, as sought in the present petition, declared void right no,, on the clai! of a fe, of being allegedly denied a right, at best of doubtful character, for the clai! ,ould see! to rest on an unsupportable theory that they have a vested right to a public office.

'ust one !ore point. The la, in 7uestion is not self-e ecuting in the sense that upon its effectivity, certain +udges and +ustices cease to be so by direct action of the la,. This is ,hat distinguishes the Act in 7uestion fro! R.A. No. ""4> involved in the )ca!po case, 5 ,hich by its direct action, no act of i!ple!entation being necessary, all the +udges ,hose positions ,ere abolished, auto!atically ceased as such. The Act in 7uestion, therefore, is not as e posed to the sa!e vulnerability to constitutional attac* as R.A. No. ""4> ,as. Fet by the operation of the Constitution ,ith its ,ise provision on ho, a la, !ay be declared unconstitutional, R.A. No. ""4> stood the test for it to be enforced to the fullness of its intent, ,hich ,as, as in the la, under consideration, 0dentified ,ith public interest and general ,elfare, through a !ore efficient and effective +udicial syste! as the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4= see*s to establish. Aence, the constitutionality of the la, should not be assailed, and the la, itself, stri*en do,n, on the ground that so!e +udges or +ustices !ay be re!oved or separated in violation of their security of tenure. The la, does not directly operate ,ith Chat effect. 0t is in ho, the la, ,ould be i!ple!ented that this feared eventuality !ay or !ay not occur. ;e ,ould then be *illing the la, on a !ere speculation if ;e do so at this stage. This ,ould be an in+udicious act done in rec*less disregard of the safeguards built around a la, to defend it ,hen its constitutionality is attac*edG first the presu!ption that a la, is constitutionalG secon' ,hen a la, is susceptible to t,o interpretations one that ,ould !a*e it constitutional, the other, unconstitutional, the for!er should be adoptedG and t"ir', the Constitution itself ,hich ordains that a la, !ay not be declared unconstitutional e cept on the vote of at least ten ?"=@ !e!bers of the /upre!e Court, !ore than ,hat is re7uired for an ordinary decision of the Court en banc. This is not to !ention the stringent re7uisites for the e ercise of the po,er of +udicial in7uiry as already adverted to, all designed to save the la, fro! the dire fate of unconstitutionality. To the ,riter, the 7uestion before this Court is a si!ple !atter of choosing bet,een protecting so!e +udges fro! possible separation, as the i!ple!entation of the la, to achieve its pri!ary purpose of i!proving the +udiciary !ay have to result in, or serving the interest of the entire society through an honest, efficient and effective +udiciary. (or, it is unthin*able that ,hat is for the good of the people as a ,hole could have been !eant by the Constitution to be sacrificed for the sa*e of only the fe,. The greatest good for the greatest nu!ber is an un,ritten rule, !ore fir! and enduring than any of the postulates spread in our ,ritten Constitution. This, 0 !ight say, is the !ain the!e of this separate opinion, other,ise e pressed in the ,ell-*no,n and ti!ehonored !a i! %/alus populi establish supre!a le .%

MELENC(O-7ERRERA, J., concurring. There is un7ualified adherence on !y part to the dis!issal of the Petition filed in this case. 0f 0 a! ,riting this separate concurrence, it is !erely to state certain vie,s 0 entertain in regards to the constitutionality of Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$. The controversy in this case involves t,o constitutional provisions. Article K, /ection ", of the )rganic la, provides that the legislative has the po,er to establish inferior Courts by la,. /ection < of the sa!e Article reads. /EC, <. The Me!bers of the /upre!e Court and +udges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or beco!e incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The /upre!e Court shall have the po,er to discipline +udges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Me!bers order their dis!issal. There should be no conflict Bet,een the t,o provisions. Both should be har!oni&ed.

". a@ 0t is a funda!ental proposition that the legislative po,er to create Courts ordinarily includes the po,er to organi&e and to reorgani&e the!, and that the po,er to abolish Courts is generally coe tensive ,ith the po,er to create the!. The po,er to abolish ,as not intended to be 7ualified by the per!anence of tenure ?)pinion of Chief 'ustice Ricardo Paras in )ca!po vs. /ecretary of 'ustice, 6" ).3. "D< M"$66N, citing McCulley vs. /tate, 65 /; "5DG Aalsey vs. 3aines # 8ea 5">@. The right of 'udges to hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of <= years, or beco!e incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, does not deprive Congress of its po,er to abolish, organi&e or reorgani&e inferior Courts ?Brillo vs. Enage, $D Phil. <5#, <56, citing Iandueta vs. de la Costa, >> Phil. >"6G D# A!. 'ur., Pub. )fficer, $=D-6@. 'udges of those Courts ta*e office ,ith that encu!brance and *no,ledge. The legislative po,er to create a court carries ,ith it the po,er to abolish it. ;hen the court is abolished any une pired ter! is abolished also. The +udge of such court ta*es office ,ith that encu!brance and *no,ledge. Perkins v. Corbin, D6 Ala "=5, > A!. Rep. >$4G /tate, e rel. ,"omas v. (unter, "<= Ala. ">6, 6D /o #45, et al.% The i!portance and the i!perative of !aintaining the independence of the 'udiciary is undisputed. At the sa!e ti!e, the po,er of Congress under the Constitution cannot be abridged. (or, in the last analysis, it is not the security of tenure per se that is the only safeguard to the independence of the 'udiciary. 0t is the character and the !ettle of the 'udges ,ho sit on the Bench. Aas not the i!pression been created in the public and that there are those ,ho have abused the prerogatives of their +udicial position *no,ing that they are untouchables by virtue of the per!anence of their tenure b@ A distinction should be !ade bet,een tenure of 'udges and tenure of Courts. /ection " heretofore !entioned refers to the %'udiciary% as a funda!ental depart!ent of 3overn!ent. /ection < 7uoted above refers to the tenure of office of %individual% 'udges ?inclusive of 'ustices of inferior Courts that is to say, tenure of office is a !atter concerning the individual 'udge. This %individuality% character of /ection < is supported by the clause that the /upre!e Court has the po,er to discipline in'ivi'ual +udges of inferior Courts. A legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to Courts. Courts can be abolished. 0n fact, the entire +udicial syste! can be changed. 0f that syste! can no longer ad!it of change, ,oe to the ,heels of progress and the i!peratives of gro,th in the develop!ent of the 'udiciary. To hold that tenure of 'udges is superior to the legislative po,er to reorgani&e is to render i!potent the e ercise of that po,er. 0t !ay even be stated that, under /ection <, supra, 'udges are entailed to their Courts, fro! ,hich they cannot be separated before retire!ent age e cept as a disciplinary action for bad behavior. :nder /ection ", Courts are not entailed to their 'udges, because the po,er of the legislative to establish inferior Courts presupposes the po,er to abolish those Courts. 0f an inferior Court is abolished, the 'udge presiding that Court ,ill necessarily have to lose his position because the abolished Court is not entailed to hi!. c@ The constitutional guarantee of tenure of 'udges applies only as their Courts e ist. As long as those Courts e ist, the 'udges cannot be ousted ,ithout +ust causeG that is the e tent of the constitutional provision relative to security of tenure of 'udges. :pon declaration of the co!pletion of the reorgani&ation as provided for in the Reorgani&ation Act, the affected Courts %shall be dee!ed auto!atically abolished There being no Courts, there are no offices for ,hich tenure of 'udges !ay be clai!ed. By the abolition of those offices, the rights to the! are necessarily e tinguished ?Manalang vs. Cuitoriano, $D Phil. $=5 M"$6DN@. #. 0 a! satisfied that the challenged la, ,as enacted by the Batasang Pa!bansa in response to an urgent and pressing public need and not for the purpose of affecting adversely the security of tenure of all 'udges or legislating the! out to the detri!ent of +udicial independence. 0t should

riot be said of the Batasang Pa!bansa that its po,er of abolition of Courts has been used to disguise an unconstitutional and evil purpose to defeat the security of tenure of 'udges. The 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4" sufficiently co!plies ,ith the bona fi'e rule in the abolition of public office, as clearly e plained in the !ain opinion. Besides, every presu!ption of good faith in its actuations !ust be accorded a coordinate and coe7ual branch of govern!ent, supre!e ,ithin the li!its of its o,n sphere, until that presu!ption is clearly overco!e. There is no sho,ing that the Reorgani&ation Act ,as !otivated for personal or political reasons as to +ustify the interference by the Court ?3arvey vs. 8o,ell, "$$ Mass, D<, 46 N.E. "4#, "#< A./.R. D>4G /tate vs. Eduards, D= Mont. #4<G "=> Pac. >$6, "$ R.C.8. #5>G 8lanto vs. 1i!aporo, "> /CRA 6$$ M"$>>N@. Public interest and public good, as the legislative body vie,s it, !ust be balanced ,ith tenure of 'udges, ,hich is an individual right. Reverting to /ection " and /ection <, supra, the for!er is the ,eightier, because the %'udiciary% is of !ore i!portance to the ,elfare of the country than the tenure of office of an individual 'udge. 0f a 'udge is re!oved ,ithout cause there can be da!age to the public ,elfare to so!e e tent, but !aintenance of a Court that does not !eet the re7uire!ents of progressive 3overn!ent, can cause incalculable pre+udice to the people. 5. Nor does a conflict e ist ,ith the po,er of discipline vested in the /upre!e Court by the present Constitution reading. the /upre!e Court shall have the po,er %to discipline 'udges of inferior Courts, and, by a vote of at least 4 !e!bers, order their dis!issal Absent the Court, it ,ould be futile to spea* of the /upre!e Court9s po,er to discipline. Thus, ,here the legislature has ,illed that the Courts be abolished, the po,er to discipline cannot pose an obstacle to the abolition. The po,er to discipline can co!e into play only ,hen there is re!oval fro! an e isting +udicial office but not ,hen that it office is abolished. The reorgani&ation of the +udicial syste! ,ith the abolition of certain Courts is not an e ercise of the po,er to discipline the 'udges of the abolished Courts. 0t is of significance to note that the po,er to dis!issal vested in the /upre!e Court by the "$<5 Constitution is deli!ited by its po,er to discipline. Absent any need for discipline and the po,er to dis!iss does not e ist. Being circu!scribed in scope, it !ay ,ell be as*ed. does the grant of the po,er of discipline and dis!issal in the /upre!e Court deprive the e ecutive of the po,er of re!ovalH 0s it not !ore in *eeping ,ith the allocation of po,ers in our govern!ent to state that the /upre!e Court shares its po,er to dis!iss ,ith the e ecutive po,er of re!ovalH (or is not the po,er of re!oval basically e ecutive in nature, as an incident to the po,er of appoint!ent, ,hich is the prerogative of the Chief E ecutive alone As in the case of appoint!ents, /ection 6 ?>@, Article K of the Constitution provides that the /upre!e Court shall appoint its officials and e!ployees. Ao,ever, is not this po,er shared ,ith the po,er of appoint!ent of the e ecutive ,ho appoints so!e of the Court officials These 7uestions could lend the!selves to an in-depth study in the proper case. D. The abolition ,ould be no deprivation either of due process of la,. A public office cannot be regarded as the %property % of the incu!bent. A public office is not a contract ?/egovia vs. Noel, D< Phil. 6D5 M"$#6N@. A public office is a public trust ?/ection ", Article K000. "$<5 Constitution@. 0t is a privilege in the gift of the /tate ?Bro,n vs. Russell, ">> Mass. "D, D5 NE "==6, 5# 8RA, #65 cited also in TaJada O Carreon, Political 8a, of the Philippines, Eol. #, p. 65<@. The officers are the servants of the people and not their rulers ?## R.C.8. 5<4-5<$, cited in Martin, Ad!inistrative 8a,, 8a, on Public )fficers and Election 8a,, p. ""#, "$<= ed.@. Besides, it bears stressing that there is no re!oval fro! office but abolition of the office itself. 6. The 7uestioned statute is in *eeping ,ith !a+or refor!s in other depart!ents of govern!ent. %The thrust is on develop!ent.% 0t is %the first !a+or reorgani&ation after four generations.% 0t does not provide for a piece!eal change, ,hich could be ineffective. 0t goes to the roots and does not +ust scratch the surface of our +udicial syste!. 0ts !ain ob+ectives are an i!proved ad!inistration of +ustice, the %attain!ent of !ore efficiency in the disposal of cases, a reallocation of +urisdiction, and a revision of procedures ,hich do not tend to the proper !eting out of +ustice.% These ai!s are policy !atters of necessity in the pursuit of develop!ental goals ,ithin the 'udiciary.

>. The Reorgani&ation Act reorgani&ing the entire +udicial syste! e cluding the /upre!e Court, ,hich is the only constitutional Court, and the /andiganbayan. 0t envisages institutional refor!s in the Philippine +udiciary. 0t does not si!ply change the na!es of the Courts. The facts herein are dissi!ilar fro! those in &rillo vs. Ena#e ?$D Phil. <5# M"$6DN@ ,here the position of 'ustice of the Peace, although ostensibly abolished, ,as !erely changed to Municipal 'udge after the !unicipality of Tacloban ,as converted into a city ,ith its o,n charter. /ignificant a!ong the institutional changes and procedural refor!s are. ,"e 2nterme'iate Appellate Court This Court is no, constituted into ten ?"=@ divisions instead of fifteen ?"6@, five !e!bers co!posing each division, and a !a+ority vote of three !e!bers being needed for a decision. This obviates the cu!berso!e procedure, in case of dissent, of assigning t,o other !e!bers to co!pose a %division of five%. 0t also allo,s fle ibility in that any three !e!bers of a division, arriving at unani!ity, can pro!ulgate a decision. No, provided for is speciali&ation into four ?D@ Civil Cases 1ivisions, t,o ?#@ Cri!inal Cases 1ivisions and four ?D@ /pecial Cases 1ivisions. The speciali&ation is e pected to contribute to the e peditious disposal of cases. The Court has been given original +urisdiction to issue ;rits of !anda!us, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, 7uo ,arranto and au iliary ,rits or processes ,hether or not in aid of its appellate +urisdiction. This ,ould undoubtedly ease the burden of the /upre!e Court ,here nu!erous such cases are filed daily. 0t has e clusive appellate +urisdiction over all final +udg!ents, decisions, resolutions, orders or a,ards of 7uasi-+udicial agencies, instru!entalities, boards or co!!issions, e cept those falling ,ithin the e clusive appellate +urisdiction of the /upre!e Court in accordance ,ith the Constitution. The 0nter!ediate Appellate Court ,ould no, have the po,er to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perfor! any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling ,ithin its original and appellate +urisdiction, including the po,er to grant and conduct ne, trials or further proceedings ?/ec. $@. This does a,ay ,ith the delays attendant to the re!and of cases to the lo,er trial Courts. >e#ional ,rial Courts There are no, thirteen ?"5@ 'udicial Regions, the sa!e as the present ad!inistrative and Batasang Pa!bansa Regions, instead of si teen ?">@ 'udicial 1istricts. A 'udge is appointed to a region, ,hich is his official station. This ensures !obility since a 'udge !ay be assigned any,here ,ithin the Region ,ithout applying the constitutional li!itation of si !onths. Additionally, -it can re!edy te!porary ine7ualities of caseloads in trial Courts. /peciali&ed Courts are integrated into the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, Regional Trial Courts ,ould try all cases ,ithin its +urisdiction unless special cases are assigned to the!, in ,hich case, they re!ain as Branches of Regional Trial Courts. /pecial procedures and technical rules governing special Courts ,ill continue to re!ain applicable in Branches assigned those special cases. etropolitan ,rial Courts There is one Metropolitan Trial Court ,ith several Branches for large urban areas. The appoint!ent of 'udges ,ould be to a Metropolitan Trial Court although a 'udge !ay be assigned by the /upre!e Court to any Branch of the Metropolitan Trial Court as de!anded by the e igencies of the service.

The /upre!e Court !ay designate certain Branches of said Courts to e ercise special +urisdiction over certain cases, unli*e the present set-up ,here special +urisdiction applies only to cases of traffic violations. unicipal ,rial Courts? unicipal Circuit ,rial Courts Municipal Trial Courts !ay no, be designated by the /upre!e Court to e ercise special +urisdiction over certain cases, thereby resulting in overall fle ibility. They can also be circuiti&ed ,ith those in cities not for!ing part of !etropolitan areas. )ne notable change bet,een the old and the ne, set up is that 'udges of these Courts ,ill no, be Presidential appointees unli*e presently ,here the incu!bent 'udges are !erely designated by the /upre!e Court in an Ad!inistrative )rder to sit in e isting Municipal Courts and Municipal Circuit Courts. <. There are innovative features in the Act that co!!end the!selves. a@ The confusing and illogical areas of concurrent +urisdiction bet,een trial Courts have been entirely eli!inated. b@ :nder /ection 5$, there is a unifor! period for appeal of fifteen ?"6@ days counted fro! the notice of the final order, resolution, a,ard, +udg!ent, or decision appealed fro!. A record on appeal is no longer re7uired to ta*e an appeal. The entire original record is no, to be trans!itted. c@ :nder /ection D=, in deciding appealed cases, adoption by reference of findings of fact and conclusions of la, as set forth in the decision, order, or resolution appealed fro!, is also provided for. This ,ill e pedite the rendition of decisions in appealed cases. d@ /ection D# provides for %a !onthly longevity pay e7uivalent to 6P of the !onthly basic pay for 'ustices and 'udges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient, and !eritorious service rendered in the 'udiciary, Provided that, in no case shall the total salary of each 'ustice or 'udge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, e ceed the salary of the 'ustice or 'udge ne t in ran*.% Thus, 'ustices and 'udges ,ho !ay not reach the top, ,here unfortunately there is not enough roo! for all, !ay have the satisfaction of at least appro i!ating the salary scale of those above hi! depending on his length of service, 4. But ,hile the la, itself as ,ritten is constitutional, the !anner in ,hich it ,ill be ad!inistered should not be tainted ,ith unconstitutionality ?Myles /alt Co. vs. Board of Co!!rs., #5$ :/ D<4, >= 8. Ed. 5$#, 5> /ct #=D@. To obviate the possibility of an unconstitutional e ercise of po,er the follo,ing safeguards are reco!!ended and2or e pected to be underta*en. a@ The President can be e pected to indicate a reasonable ti!e fra!e for the co!pletion of the reorgani&ation provided for in the Act and the issuance of the corresponding i!ple!enting )rder. b@ Appoint!ents and their effectivity should be si!ultaneous ,ith, or as close as possible, to the declaration by the President of the co!pletion of the reorgani&ation under /ection DD to avoid any detri!ent to the s!ooth and continuous functioning of the +udicial !achinery. c@ The services of those not separated should be dee!ed uninterrupted, as reco!!ended by the Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation ?Article K0 of its Report@.

$. (or the speedy i!ple!entation of the la,, the /upre!e Court can be e pected to sub!it to the President ,ithin thirty ?5=@ days fro! the date of finality of its 1ecision the staffing pattern for all Courts re7uired by /ection D5. 0 a! constrained to disagree ,ith the suggestion of one of the amici curiae that the staffing pattern be !ade to include the na!es of 'udges. The staffing pattern for 'udges is already clearly and e plicitly provided in the la, itself ,hich enu!erates the various 'udges and 'ustices in their hierarchical order. (urther!ore, to include the superior positions of 'udges ,ould depart fro! the traditional concept of a staffing pattern, ,hich refers !ore to personnel organi&ation and corresponding salaries of inferior e!ployees. 0t is also constitutionally ob+ectionable in that it ,ould interfere ,ith the prerogative of appoint!ent intrinsically e ecutive in nature ?3uevara vs. 0nocentes, "> /CRA 5<$ M"$>>NG 3overn!ent of the Philippines vs. /pringer, 6= Phil. #6$ M"$#<N@. The President !ay not be deprived of, nor be li!ited in, the full use of his discretion in the appoint!ent of persons to any public office. Nothing should so trench upon e ecutive choice as to be, in effect, +udicial designation. "=. A ,ord of e planation. 0f 0 had resolved not to inhibit !yself in this case upon !otion filed by petitioners, it ,as because the Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation, of ,hich 0 ,as privileged to be a !e!ber, confined its ,or* to the reco!!endation of options and guidelines in the tas* of reorgani&ation. The Co!!ittee had no part ,hatsoever in the drafting of the bill nor in the public hearings conducted. 0n fact, so!e of its reco!!endations li*e the circuiti&ation or regionali&ation of the 0nter!ediate Appellate Court, the appellation of !e!bers of the 'udiciary, the confine!ent of the +urisdiction of the 0nter!ediate Appellate Court !erely to appellate +urisdiction, the adoption of the syste! found in the :nited Lingdo! and in Co!!on,ealth countries of having a Court of general +urisdiction ,ith trial and appellate divisions, ,ere not availed of in the final Act. "". 8astly, but by no !eans the least, 0 entertain no doubt that reliance can be placed on the good faith of the President that all the deserving, upon considerations of %efficiency, integrity, length of service and other relevant factors shall be appointed to a strengthened and revitali&ed +udicial syste! in the interest of public serviceG that appoint!ents ,ill not be unduly delayedG and that appointees ,ill be evaluated thoroughly to ensure 7uality and i!partiality in the !en and ,o!en ,ho ,ill *eep vigil over our +udicial ra!parts.

ER(CTA, J., concurring. 0 concur in the vie, that the 'udiciary reorgani&ation la, is not unconstitutional. 0t does not violate the principle of security of tenure of +udges. The Constitution grants to the Batasang Pa!bansa the po,er to create courts inferior to the /upre!e Court ?Article K, /ection "@. All e isting inferior courts ,ere created by la,. No la, is irrepealable. The po,er to create an office includes the po,er to abolish the sa!e. ?:rgelio vs. )s!eJa $ /CRA 5"<G Ma&a vs. )chave, #= /CRA "D#@ /ecurity of tenure cannot be invo*ed ,hen there is no re!oval of a public officer or e!ployee but an abolition of his office. ?Manalang vs. Cuitoriano, $D Phil. $=5G Cru& vs. Pri!icias, #5 /CRA $$4G Baldo& vs. )ffice of the President, <4 /CRA 56D, 5>#@ A distinction should be !ade bet,een re!oval fro! office and abolition of an office. Re!oval i!plies that the office subsists after ouster, ,hile, in abolition, the office no longer e ists thereby ter!inating the right of the incu!bent to e ercise the rights and duties of the office. ?Canonigo vs. Ra!iro, 5" /CRA #<4@ The po,er of the legislative branch of the govern!ent to abolish courts inferior to the /upre!e Court has long been established. ?)ca!po vs. /ecretary of 'ustice, 6" ).3. "D<@. ;hat is only needed is that the abolition passes the test of good faith. it need only be sho,n that said

abolition of the courts is !erely incidental to a bona fide reorgani&ation. ?:rgelio vs. )s!eJa supra.@ 0t is unthin*able to i!pute bad faith to the Presidential Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation co!posed of four ?D@ distinguished !e!bers of the /upre!e Court, the Minister of 'ustice and the 1eputy Minister of 'ustice, and to the !e!bers of the Batasang Pa!bansa ,hose co!bined efforts after a careful study and deliberation resulted to the enact!ent of a bill no, signed into la, as Batasang Pa!bansa Blg. "#$. 0n his sponsorship speech, 'ustice Ricardo C. Puno declared the ob+ectives of the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation 8a, to be the follo,ing. ?"@ the attain!ent of !ore efficiency in the disposal of casesG ?#@ the i!prove!ent in the 7uality of decisions by the courts that ,ill result fro! the easing of court doc*etsG and ?5@ structural changes to !eet the e igencies of present day Philippine /ociety and of the foreseeable future. Ad!ittedly, in the i!ple!entation of the la,, so!e 'udges and 'ustices !ay be adversely affected. But in a conflict bet,een public interest and the individual interest of so!e 'udges and 'ustices, the public ,eal !ust prevail. The ,elfare of the people is the supre!e la,. The i!ple!entation of the la, ,ill entail appoint!ents to the ne, courts. The po,er of appoint!ent is the e clusive prerogative of the President. The i!ple!entation of the la, should be left e clusively to the ,isdo!, patriotis! and states!anship of the President.

PLANA, J., concurring. As the la,!a*ing body has the po,er to create inferior courts and define, prescribe and apportion their +urisdiction, so it has the po,er to abolish or replace the! ,ith other courts as long as the act is done in good faith and not for the purpose of attaining an unconstitutional end. 3ood faith has thus beco!e the crucial issue in the case at bar. :pon an e a!ination of the legislative history of Batas Pa!bansa "#$, as has been done in the !ain opinion, it is !anifest that actual, not !erely presu!ed good faith attended its enact!ent. )n this basis, 0 concur in the opinion penned by the learned Chief 'ustice, 7ualified only by the follo,ing observations. ". E=ecutive consultation 3it" t"e Supreme Court. 1 0 believe the President is under no obligation to consult ,ith the /upre!e CourtG and the /upre!e Court as such is not called upon to give legal advice to the President. 0ndeed, as the /upre!e Court itself has said, it cannot give advisory opinions ?Bacolod Murcia Planters9 Asso., 0nc. vs. Bacolod B Murcia !illing Co., 5= /CRA ><G N;/A vs. Court of 0ndustrial Relations, $= /CRA >#$@ even to the President. 0n the drafting of the present Constitution, there ,as an atte!pt to vest the /upre!e Court ,ith the function of giving advisory opinions. The fra!ers of the Constitution, ho,ever, did not see fit to adopt the proposal. 0f the President should consult the /upre!e Court on the i!ple!entation of Batas Pa!bansa "#$ and the /upre!e Court should give its advice ?leaving aside the 7uestion of procedure@, 0 believe the President ,ould be free to follo, or disregard the adviceG but, in either case, there ,ould be no guarantee that the i!ple!enting action ,ould be upheld in one case or stric*en do,n in the other. #. -n'ue 'ele#ation of le#islative po3ers . B

The petitioners have also assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pa!bansa "#$ on the ground that a provision thereof ?regarding fi ing of co!pensation and allo,ances for !e!bers of the 'udiciary@ constitutes an undue delegation unto the President of legislative po,er. As pointed out in the !ain opinion, the legislature has provided a!ple standards or guidelines for the i!ple!entation of the delegated po,er, ,hich !a*es the delegation inoffensive. 0 ,ould li*e to add ho,ever so!e observations on the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative po,er. :nder the old Constitution, ,hen the abiding rule ,as separation of legislative and e ecutive po,ers, there ,as good reason to !aintain the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative po,er. )ther,ise, the principle of separationof govern!ental po,ers could be negated via unbridled 'ele#ation of legislative po,er. The "$<5 Constitution has ho,ever radically changed the constitutional set-up. There is no, a co!!ingling or fusion of e ecutive and legislative po,ers in the hands of the sa!e group of officials. Cabinet !e!bers play a leading role in the legislative process, and !e!bers of the Batasan actively discharge e ecutive functions. The Pri!e Minister indeed !ust co!e fro! its ran*s. :nder the circu!stances, there is really not !uch sense in rigidly upholding the principle of non-delegation of legislative po,er, at least vis-avis the E ecutive 1epart!ent. 0n a very real sense, the present Constitution has significantly eroded the hoary doctrine of non-delegation of legislative po,er, although it has retained so!e provisions of the old Constitution ,hich ,ere predicated on the principle of non-delegation, this ti!e perhaps not so !uch to authori&e shifting of po,er and thereby correspondingly reduce the incidence of %undue% delegation of legislative po,er, as to avert the abdication thereof. 0n ti!es of ,ar or other national e!ergency, the Batasang Pa!bansa !ay by la, authori&e the President for a li!ited period and sub+ect to such restrictions as it !ay prescribe, to e ercise po,ers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. :nless sooner ,ithdra,n by resolution of the Batasang Pa!bansa, such po,ers shall cease upon its ne t ad+ourn!ent. ?Art. E000, /ec. "6.@ The Batasang Pa!bansa !ay by la, authori&e the President to fi ,ithin specified this and sub+ect to such stations and restrictions as it !ay i!pose, tariff rates, i!port and e port 7uotas, tonnage and ,harfage dues, and other duties or i!posts. M2bi', /ec. "<?#@.N

TEE7AN8EE, J., dissenting. :ndoubtedly, no !ore crucial and transcendental issue of such !agnitude has confronted the Philippine +udiciary than in the present case. The challenged Act, Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$ by its title ,ould reorgani&e all e isting courts ?e cept the nine-!e!ber /andiganbayan 1 and the three- !e!ber Court of Ta Appeals@ and upon declaration by the President of the co!pletion of the reorgani&ation ,ould unprecedentedly dee! all the said courts %auto!atically abolished en !asse and %the incu!bents thereof shall cease to hold office.% 2 The total abolition involves a total of ",>>5 +udicial positions ,ith ","4= incu!bent +udges and D45 vacancies@ as of 'anuary #>, "$4# and the Act ,ould effect an increase of #5= +udicial positions raising the total of +udicial positions to be filled by ne, appoint!ents to ",4$5. Not,ithstanding the great deference due to enact!ents of the Batasan, 0 regretably find !yself unable to +oin the ran*s of !y estee!ed colleagues in the !a+ority ,ho uphold the constitutionality of the Act and have voted to dis!iss the petition, for the follo,ing !ain considerations and reasons. ". 0 go by the ruling of the nu!erical !a+ority of seven 'ustices ?na!ely, Pablo, Cesar Beng&on, Monte!ayor, 'ugo, Bautista, Roberto Concepcion and '.B.8. Reyes, ''.@ in the leading "$66 case of 0campo 3 ,ho fell short by one vote to reach the constitutionally re7uired #25 !a+ority ?at the ti!e 4 out of an ""-!e!ber /upre!e Court@ to declare unconstitutional and invalid section 5

of Republic Act ""4> abolishing the positions of "4 +udges-at-large and "6 cadastral +udges and re!oving or legislating out the incu!bent +udges fro! office as against the contrary vote of a !inority of D 'ustices ?na!ely, then Chief 'ustice Paras and Padilla, Ale Reyes and 8abrador, ''.@ ,ith the parado ical situation that the last three na!ed 'ustices voted for the validity of the Act as a re!edial !easure that abolished said positions ,ithout per!anent station ,hich sub+ected the! to a ri#o'on 'e @ueces ,ithout the consent of the /upre!e Court, ,hich they considered as %repulsive to an independent +udiciary% and violative of an e press prohibitory provision of the "$56 Constitution Q ,hile 'ustice Ale Reyes conceded that other,ise he ,ould go ,ith the !a+ority that %Congress !ay not, as a general rule, abolish a +udicial post ,ithout allo,ing the incu!bent to finish his ter! of office.% #. As then Associate, later Chief 'ustice Cesar Beng&on re!ar*ed in his separate opinion B %?T@he MadverseN outco!e of this litigation Msanctioning the ouster fro! office of the ten petitioners ,ho ,ere presiding different Courts of (irst 0nstance, so!e as +udges-at-large, others as cadastral +udges, upon the enact!ent on 'une "$, "$6D of R.A. ""4> abolishing the positions of +udges-at large and cadastral +udgesN is apt to revive the speculation ,hether ,ittingly or un,ittingly the Constitution has further ,ea*ened the usually ,ea* +udicial depart!ent because of its 9innovative9 re7uire!ent of a #25 !a+ority vote of the /upre!e Court to declare a statute unconstitutional, and 9never in our history has such a nu!ber of +udges of first instance Mtotalling 55 positionsN been ousted through +udicial reorgani&ation. Ais rationale that the e press constitutional guaranty of security of tenure of +udges %during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or beco!e incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office% 3 !ust prevail over the i!plied constitutional authority to abolish courts and to oust the +udges despite their constitutionally-secured tenure bears repeating thus. A careful analysis ,ill perceive that ,hereas petitioners invo*e an e=press guaranty or positivedefinition of their ter! of office, the respondents rely on implie' authority to abolish courts and the positions of the respective +udges. Accurately stated, respondents9 defense rests on a secon'inference deduced fro! such implie' po,er, because they reason out thusly. Congress has e press po,er to establish courtsG t"erefore it has i!plicit po,er to abolish courts and the positions of +udges of such abolished courts ?first inference@G an' t"erefore ?second inference@ Congress li*e,ise has po,er to e+ect the +udges holding such positions. Resulting +uridical situation. The implie' authority invo*ed by respondents collides ,ith the e=pressguaranty of tenure protecting the petitioners. ;hich shall prevail )bviously the e press guaranty !ust override the i!plied authority. %0!plications can never be per!itted to contradict the e pressed intent or to defeat its purpose.%

But the collision !ay he should be avoided, and both sections given validity, if one be considered a proviso or e ception to the other. 0n other ,ords, under the Constitution the Congress !ay abolish e isting courts, provided it does not thereby re!ove the incu!bent +udgesG such abolition to ta*e effect upon ter!ination of their incu!bent The funda!ental provisions on the !atter are thereby coordinated and har!oni&ed9 as 'ustice 8aurel suggested in his concurring opinion in Iandueta v. 1e la Costa. To bring about reconciliations is the great ,or* of +urists. ?Cardo&o, Parado es of 8egal /cience, p. >@ 5

5. This reasoning that the e press guaranty of tenure protecting incu!bent +udges during good behavior unless re!oved fro! office after hearing and due process or upon reaching the co!pulsory retire!ent age of seventy years !ust override the i!plied authority of re!oving by

legislation the +udges has been further strengthened and placed beyond doubt by the ne, provisions of the "$<5 Constitution that transferred the ad!inistrative supervision over all courts and their personnel fro! the Chief E ecutive through the then /ecretary of 'ustice to the /upre!e Court 4 and vested in the /upre!e Court e clusively %the po,er to discipline +udges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight !e!bers, order their dis!issal,% 7 ;hich po,er ,as for!erly lodged by the 'udiciary Act in the Chief E ecutive. As for!er Chief 'ustice Beng&on stressed in his opinion in 0campo, the "$5D Constitutional Convention %fro,ned on re!oval of +udges of first instance through abolition of their offices or reorgani&ation,% citing Professor 'ose Aruego9s observation that the security of +udges9 tenure provision ,as intended to %help secure the independence of the +udiciary% in that %during good behavior, they !ay not be legislated out of office by the la,-!a*ing body nor re!oved by the Chief E ecutive for any reason and under the guise of any pretense ,hatsoeverG they !ay stay in office until they reach the age of seventy years, or beco!e incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. ?Aruego, The (ra!ing of the Philippine Constitution, Eol. "", pp. <"4-<"$@% Ae further cited Aruego9s report that a proposed a!end!ent to the effect that the prohibition against transfers of +udges to another district ,ithout the approval of the /upre!e Court 8 %should not be applicable to a reorgani&ation of tribunals of +ustice or of districts, but the a!end!ent ,as defeated easily ,ithout debate% 9 and logically concluded that %?N@o,, there . before, having vetoed the transfer of +udges thru a re-organi&ation, the Convention evidently could not have per!itted the re!oval of +udges thru re-organi&ation. No,, if the fra!ers of the "$<5 Constitution ,ished to dispel the strong doubts, to say the least in the light of the < to D vote in the 0campo case against re!oval of incu!bent +udges through legislative action by abolition of their courts, then they ,ould have so clearly provided for such for! of re!oval in the "$<5 Constitution, but on the contrary as already stated they ruled out such re!oval or ouster of +udges by legislative action by vesting e clusively in the /upre!e Court the po,er of discipline and re!oval of +udges of all inferior courts. D. This being so, the funda!ental point e!phasi&ed by for!er Chief 'ustice Beng&on that abolition of the 55 +udicial positions in the 0campo case ,as %!erely an indirect !anner of re!oving the petitioners-+udges% ,hile the %positions MthatN ,ere eli!inated . . . ,ere in fact substituted or replaced by other positions of +udges% applies ,ith greater force in the case at bar ,hich involves an unprecedented total %abolition,% thus. %?C@all it reorgani&ation, or legislation or re!oval or abolition, this la, disregards the constitutional assurance that these +udges, once appointed, shall hold office during good behavior ... Munless incapacitated and until retire!entN. The abolition of their offices ,as !erely an indirect !anner of re!oving these petitioners. Re!e!ber that on 'une "$, "$6D, there ,ere "=< +udges of first instance, district +udges, +udges at-large and cadastral +udges ?Rep. Act #$>@. After the passage of Republic Act No. ""4> there ,ere ""D positions of +udges of first instance. There ,as no reduction there ,as increase B in the nu!ber of +udges, nor in the nu!ber of courts. The positions of 'udges-at-8arge and Cadastral 'udges ,ere eli!inatedG but they ,ere in fact substituted or replaced by other positions of +udgesG or if you please, there ,as a !ere change of designation fro! 9Cadastral 'udge or 'udge at large to district +udge Aence it should be ruled that as their positions had not been 9abolished9 de facto, but actually retained ,ith another na!e, these petitioners are entitled to re!ain in the service. ?Brillo v. Enage, 3.R. No. 8-<""6, March 5=, "$6D.@ (or it is not per!issible to effect the re!oval of one +udge thru the e pediency of abolishing his office even as the office ,ith sa!e po,er is created ,ith another na!e. ?Brillo v. Enage, Malone v. ;illia!s, ""4 tenn. 5$", 3ibbe9s Case D A.8.R. p. #""@. 0n this vie, of the picture, ,e believe, Congress could have, and should haveas suggested by /ecretary Tua&on during the hearings in Congress directed in said Republic Act No. ""4> that 9the present +udges-at-large and cadastral +udges shall beco!e district +udges presiding such districts as !ay be fi ed by the President ,ith the consent of the Co!!ission on Appoint!ents or by the /ecretary of 'ustice, as originally proposed by /enator 8aurel in connection ,ith the sa!e bill. /o!ething si!ilar ,as done before, and it ,ould not be ob+ectionable as an encroach!ent on the President9s prerogative of appoint!ent, because such +udges had already been appointed to the +udiciary before the

passage of the act, and the provision !ay be construed in the light of !ere change of official designation plus increase in salary.% 6. Concededly, the 7uestioned Act effects certain changes and procedural refor!s ,ith !ore specific delineation of +urisdiction as !entioned particularly in the !a+ority opinion, but they do not change the basic structure of the e isting courts. The present Municipal Courts, Municipal Circuit Courts and City Courts are restructured and redesignated as Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Metropolitan Trial Courts in the challenged Act. The Courts of (irst 0nstance, Circuit Cri!inal Courts, 'uvenile O 1o!estic Relations Courts and Courts of Agrarian Relations are all restructured and redesignated to be *no,n by the co!!on na!e of Regional Trial Courts ,ith provision for certain branches thereof %to handle e clusively cri!inal cases, +uvenile and do!estic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land refor! cases . . . . and2or such other special cases as the /upre!e Court !ay deter!ine in the interest of a speedy and efficient ad!inistration of +ustice% 15 and the Court of Appeals is restructured and redesignated as the 0nter!ediate Appellate Court ,ith an increase in the nu!ber of Appellate 'ustices fro! the present D6 to 6= but ,ith a reduction of the nu!ber of divisions fro! "6 ?co!posed of 5 'ustices each@ to "= ?co!posed of 6 !e!bers each@ such that it is feared that there is created a bottlenec* at the appellate level in the i!portant tas* discharged by such appellate courts as revie,ers of facts. 0n !y vie,, the %candid ad!ission% by the Chief 'ustice in his opinion for the Court %that he entertained doubts as to ,hether the inter!ediate court of appeals provided for is a ne, tribunal% 15a is e7ually applicable to all the other above !entioned courts provided for in the challenged Act as %ne, courts%. And the best proof of this is the plain and si!ple transitory provision in section DD thereof that upon the President9s declaration of co!pletion of the reorgani&ation ?,hereby the %old courts% shall %be dee!ed auto!atically abolished and the incu!bents thereof shall cease to hold office %?T@he cases pending in the old Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together ,ith the pertinent functions, records, e7uip!ent, property and the necessary personnel together ,ith the %applicable appropriations.% This could not have been possible ,ithout a specification and enu!eration of ,hat specific cases of the %old courts% ,ould be transferred to the particular %ne, courts,% had these %ne, courts% not been !anifestly and substantially the %old courts% ,ith a change of na!e B or as described by 'ustice Barredo to have been his first vie,, no, discarded, in his separate opinion. %+ust a rena!ing, and not a substantial and actual !odification or alteration of the present +udicial structure or syste!% or %a rearrange!ent or re!odeling of the old structure.% 11 >. 0 do not subscribe to the test of good faith or bad faith in the abolition of the courts and conse7uent ouster of the incu!bent +udges fro! office as e pounded by the late e!inent 'ustice 'ose P. 8aurel in his separate concurring opinion in the pre-,ar case of )an'ueta 12 ,herein the Court dis!issed the petition for 7uo ,arranto on the ground of petitioner Iandueta9s estoppel and abandon!ent of office. 13 Realistically vie,ed fro! the basis of the established legal presu!ptions of validity and constitutionality of statutes ?unless set aside by a #25 !a+ority of "= !e!bers of the /upre!e Court@ and of good faith in their enact!ent, one is hard put to con+ure a case ,here the Court could speculate on the good or bad !otives behind the enact!ent of the Act ,ithout appearing to be i!prudent and i!proper and declare that %the legislative po,er of reorgani&ation ?is@ sought to cloa* an unconstitutional and evil purpose.% The good faith in the enact!ent of the challenged Act !ust needs be granted. ;hat !ust be reconciled is the legislative po,er to abolish courts as i!plied fro! the po,er to establish the! ,ith the e press constitutional guaranty of tenure of the +udges ,hich is essential for a free and independent +udiciary. Adherents of the Rule of 8a, are agreed that indispensable for the !aintenance of the Rule of 8a, is a free and independent +udiciary, s,orn to protect and enforce. it ,ithout fear or favor B %free, not only fro! graft, corruption, ineptness and inco!petence but even fro! the tentacles of interference and insiduous influence of the political po,ers that be to 7uote again fro! 'ustice Barredo9s separate concurring opinion. 13 Aence, !y adherence to the <-!e!ber !a+ority opinion of for!er Chief 'ustice Beng&on in the 0campo case, supra, as restated by the Philippine Association of 8a, Professors headed by for!er Chief 'ustice Roberto Concepcion

that %any reorgani&ation should at least sno, the incu!bents of the e isting courts to re!ain in office Mthe appropriate counterpart 9ne, courts9N unless they are re!oved for cause.% <. The %+udges9 broader and stronger guarantees of tenure than ordinary civil servants% as stressed by for!er Chief 'ustice Beng&on in Ms !a+ority opinion in 0campo is based on the +udiciary9s status as a coe7ual and coordinate branch of govern!ent, ,hereas the long line of Philippine cases upholding the legislative po,er to abolish offices refers to officers or e!ployees in the e ecutive branch of govern!ent and %the underlying consideration !ust be borne in !ind that Manalang Mthe aggrieved petitionerN belon#e' to t"e E=ecutive *epartment and because the President approved the la, no 7uestion or encroach!ent by one branch on the other could be apprehended or alleged. 15 This is not a !atter of personal privilege for the incu!bent +udges but as aptly stated by for!er :.P. 8a, 1ean 0rene Corte& in her !e!orandu! as amicus curiae, %for the +udiciary ,hose independence is not only eroded but is in grave danger of being co!pletely destroyed.% 1ean Corte& aptly stressed that %+udicial independence is not a guarantee intended for the /upre!e Court alone, it e tends to the entire court syste! and is even !ore vital to the courts at the lo,est levels because there are !ore of the! and they operate closest to the people,% and %?P@articularly under the present for! of !odified parlia!entary govern!ent ,ith legislative and e ecutive functions overlapping and in certain areas !erging, the +udiciary is left to perfor! the chec*ing function in the perfor!ance of ,hich its independence assu!es an even !ore vital i!portance. % The e tensive !e!oranda filed by 1ean Corte& and other amici curiae such as for!er /enator 'ose ;. 1io*no ,ho strongly urges the Court to stri*e do,n the Act %to prevent further destruction of +udicial independence,% for!er /enator 8oren&o /u!ulong, president of the Philippine Constitution Association ,ho advocates for the Court9s adoption of the B Beng&on !a+ority opinion in the 0campo case so as to abide by %the ele!entary rule in the interpretation of constitutions that effect should be given to all parts of the Constitution% and that the +udges9 security of tenure guaranty should not be rendered !eaningless and inoperative% for!er /olicitor 3eneral Arturo A. Alafri&, president of the Philippine 8a,yers9 Association ,ho sub!its that the total abolition of all courts belo, the /upre!e Court ?e cept the /andiganbayan and the Court of Ta Appeals@ and the re!oval of the incu!bent 'ustices and 'udges %violates the independence of the +udiciary, their security of tenure and right to due process guaranteed the! by the Constitution% and Atty. Raul M. 3on&ales, president of the National Bar Association of the Philippines ,ho invo*es the 1eclaration of 1elhi at the 0C' Conference in "$6$, that %The principles of unre!ovability of the 'udiciary and their /ecurity of Tenure until death or until a retiring age fi ed by statute is reached, is an i!portant safeguard of the Rule of 8a,% have greatly helped in fortifying !y vie,s. 4. 0 had sub!itted in !y !e!o of /epte!ber D, "$4= to the Presidential Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation that %?;@hatever reorgani&ation plans the co!!ittee !ay reco!!end to !eet the ,orld,ide proble! of congested court doc*ets, and to i!prove +udicial services in the public interest, it should be borne in !ind that the !e!bers of the +udiciary as the ,ea*est branch of govern!ent, yet called upon to safeguard the people9s rights and protect the! oppression, official and other,ise, are entitled to security of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even though the lo,er courts !ay be reshuffled or abolished in the process, the !andate and spirit of the Constitution guaranteeing their security of tenure and !aintaining the independence of the +udiciary should be respected, and they should be retained in the ne, courts.% 0n the sa!e vein, 1ean Corte& ,arned of the dire conse7uences of giving the 7uestioned provisions of the Act the %absolutist sense ,hich they appear to have at first blush% thus. %?T@o accept legislative po,er to abolish courts asserted under Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$ ,hich s,eeps through practically the entire +udiciary ,ould be to open the door to future court abolitions in the guise of reorgani&ation. At this stage of our political develop!ent, the process of e!bar*ing upon a !odified parlia!entary syste! !ay ,ell usher in a situation ,here despite guarantees of +udicial tenure, each ruling party in the legislature or any alliance that can co!!and a !a+ority vote !ay periodically underta*e co!plete reorgani&ation and re!ove +udges, thus !a*ing of the +udiciary a veritable stra, in the political ,ind and %?(@urther!ore,

,hat can result in the !odified parlia!entary syste! fro! the close ,or*ing relationship bet,een e ecutive and legislature is !ade !anifest in Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$. 0f the s,eeping reva!p provided ,ere to be carried out the President ,ould appoint all of the +ustices and +udges of the courts affected and the ,hole !e!bership in the +udiciary fro! the highest to the lo,est courts ,ould be his appointees. 0t is relevant to point out that it is precisely a situation li*e this that the Constitution see*s to avoid ,hen it provides staggered ter!s for the chair!an and !e!bers of the constitutional co!!issions ,hich li*e the +udiciary are guaranteed independence.% $. The +udges9 security of tenure ,as rendered nugatory by the Transitory Provisions of the "$<5 Constitution ,hich granted the incu!bent President the unli!ited po,er to re!ove and replace all +udges and officials 14 ?as against the li!ited one-year period for the e ercise of such po,er granted President Cue&on in the "$56 Constitution upon establish!ent of the Philippine Co!!on,ealth :pon the declaration of !artial la, in /epte!ber, "$<#, +ustices and +udges of all courts, e cept the /upre!e Court, had been re7uired to hand in their resignations. There is listed a total of 65 +udges ,ho ,ere replaced or ,hose resignations ,ere accepted by the President during the period fro! /epte!ber, "$<# to April, "$<>. The po,er to replace even the +udges appointed after the effectivity on 'anuary "<, "$<5 of the "$<5 Constitution is yet invo*ed on behalf of the President in the pending case of ,apucar vs. !ama'or 17 not,ithstanding the generally held vie, that such post-"$<5 Constitution appointed +udges are not sub+ect to the Replace!ent Clause of the cited Transitory Provision. ?0n this case, petitioner +udge appointed on 'anuary 5=, "$<> as +udge of the Court of (irst 0nstance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch ", invo*ed his constitutional security of tenure and 7uestioned the appoint!ent e tended on (ebruary #>, "$4= to respondent to replace hi!, although he had not been re!oved or other,ise dis!issed fro! his position nor had be resigned therefro!. The Court per its March #<, "$4= resolution ordered both to refrain fro! discharging the functions of the 7uestioned office And no, co!es this total abolition of ",>>5 +udicial positions ?and thousands of personnel positions@ unprecedented in its s,eep and scope. The urgent need is to strengthen the +udiciary ,ith the restoration of the security of tenure of +udges, ,hich is essential for a free and independent +udiciary as !andated by the Constitution, not to !a*e !ore enfeebled an already feeble +udiciary, possessed neither of the po,er of the s,ord nor the purse, as decried by for!er Chief 'ustice Beng&on in his0campo !a+ority opinion. /hall ,e have +udges of the type of 8ord Co*e )r +udges, ,ho, in his place, ,ould have ans,ered 909ll do ,hat his !a+esty pleases,9 +udges ,ho, afraid of ouster thru a +udiciary reshuffle, ,ould rather serve the interests of the party in po,er or of the political boss, than the interests of +usticeH As it is, the 'udicial 1epart!ent is feeble enough. /hall ,e render it feebler ,ith +udges precariously occupying their official seats 'udges perfor!ing their duties under the s,ord of 1a!ocles of future +udicial reorgani&ations "=. The Chief 'ustice, in his opinion for the Court, e7ually stressed that %,hat is e7ually apparent is that the strongest ties bind the e ecutive and legislative depart!ents. 0t is li*e,ise undeniable that the Batasang Pa!bansa retains its full authority to enact ,hatever legislation !ay be necessary to carry out national policy as usually for!ulated in a caucus of the !a+ority party. 0t is understandable then ,hy in !ortun vs. .aban# 18 it as stressed that ,ith the provision transferring to the /upre!e Court ad!inistrative supervision over the 'udiciary, there is a greater need 9to preserve uni!paired the independence of the +udiciary, especially so at present, ,here to all intends and purposes, there is a fusion bet,een the e ecutive and the legislative branches,9% 19 ,ith the further observation that %!any are the ,ays by ,hich such independence could be eroded.% 0n the cited case of 'udge (ortun ?li*e,ise penned by the Chief 'ustice for the Court@, the Court issued a ,rit of prohibition and certiorari ordering the dis!issal of the cri!inal co!plaint filed ,ith respondent fiscal 8abang by %disgruntled !e!bers of the bar ,ith a record of losing cases% in the +udge9s court and i!posed the penalty of censure on each and everyone of the private respondents-la,yers for the %unsee!ly haste% ,ith ,hich they filed the cri!inal co!plaint, abetted by %the appearance of sheer vindictiveness or oppressive e ercise of state

authority.% The Court !ar*ed the %violation of the cardinal principles of fairness and due process that underlie the Rule of 8a,. Petitioner-'udge ,as not heardG he ,as denied the opportunity to defend hi!self against the accusation. There ,as, on the part of private respondents then, a failure to abide by a Resolution of the 0ntegrated Bar stressing that precisely integration could shield 9the +udiciary ,hich traditionally cannot defend itself e cept ,ithin its o,n foru!, fro! the assaults that politics and self-interest !ay level at it, and assist it to !aintain its integrity, i!partiality and independence,9 % and that such sub+ection of a +udge to public %harass!ent and hu!iliation . . . can di!inish public confidence in the courts.% "". This brings us to the allegedly underlying need for B.P. Blg. "#$ discussed in the course of co!!ittee hearings of Cabinet Bill No. D# and the deliberation on second reading in the Batasang Pa!bansa to rid the +udiciary of inco!petent and corrupt +udges and to restore confidence in the integrity of the courts. The purge has been the constant sub+ect of headlines and editorials, ,ith the Ministry of 'ustice9s 0ntegrity Council reportedly screening and conducting %integrity tests as to ne, applicants and the incu!bent +udges 25 and see*ing %confidential infor!ation on corrupt and inco!petent +udges to help the govern!ent purge the +udiciary.% 21 Pri!e Minister Cesar Eirata ,as 7uoted as saying that %there ,ill be a purge of the corrupt and the !isfits9 ,hen the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act is signed into la, by President Marcos and i!ple!ented in coordination ,ith the /upre!e Court.% 22 The public respondents9 ans,er sidesteps the issue of such purge contravening the rudi!ents of a fair hearing and due process and sub!its that %no ter! of office is sacrosanct ,hen de!anded before the altar of the public good.% The !etropolitan papers reported the %an iety gripping the +udiciary as the Ministry of 'ustice has reportedly been as*ed to collate infor!ation 9on the perfor!ance of the +udges and on the 7ualifications of those slated to ta*e over the positions of the inco!petent, the inefficient or those involved in irregularities. As stated in an editorial, 9/o!eho,, the uncertainty that no, hovers over the +udiciary has unduly sub+ected the +udges to !ental torture since they do not *no, ,hen or ,hether the a e ,ill fall on the!. ;orse, the s,ord of 1a!ocles hanging over their heads could provo*e the! into see*ing the help of people clai!ing to have influence ,ith the po,ers that be.% 23 But 1ean Corte& in her !e!orandu! states that %Ao,ever, no,here on public record is there hard evidence on this. The only figures given in the course of the co!!ittee hearings ,ere to the effect that out of so!e ",<== !e!bers of the +udiciary, bet,een "= to "6 ,ere of the undesirable category, i.e. !isfit, inco!petent or corrupts. ?Barredo, '., before the Co!!ittee on 'ustice, hu!an Rights and 3ood 3overn!ent, 1ece!ber D, "$4=@,% and that %?0@f this be the case, the unprecedented, s,eeping and ,holesale abolition of +udicial offices beco!es an arbitrary act, the effect of ,hich is to assert the po,er to re!ove all the incu!bents guilty or innocent ,ithout due process of la,.% No, ,ould it be of any avail to beg the 7uestion and assert that due process is not available in !ass abolitions of courts. 'ustice Barredo, ho,ever, ,ithout citing any hard evidence, refers in his separate concurrence to t,in ob+ectives of getting rid of % structural inade7uacies of the syste! or of the cu!berso!eness and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force and of %a good nu!ber of those occupying positions in the +udiciary ?,ho9@ !a*e a !oc*ery of +ustice and ta*e advantage of their office for personal ends Ae adds that %it is !y personal assess!ent of the present situation in our +udiciary that its reorgani&ation has to be of necessity t,o-pronged, as 0 have +ust indicated, for the !ost 0deal +udicial syste! ,ith the !ost perfect procedural rules cannot satisfy the people and the interests of +ustice unless the !en ,ho hold positions therein possess the character, co!petence and sense of loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute i!partiality, nay, i!pregnability to all te!ptations of graft and corruption, including the usual i!portunings and the fearso!e albeit i!proper pressures of the po,ers that be,% 23 and invo*es the adage of $#ran'es males, #ran'es reme'ios$ to no, uphold the validity of the Act. (or!er /enator 1io*no in his !e!orandu! anticipates the argu!ent that %great ills de!and drastic cures% thus. %1rastic, yes B but not unfair nor unconstitutional. )ne does not i!prove courts by abolishing the!, any !ore than a doctor cures a patient by *illing hi!. The ills the +udiciary suffers fro! ,ere caused by i!pairing its independenceG they ,ill not be cured by totally

destroying that independence. To adopt such a course ,ould only breed !ore perversity in the ad!inistration of +ustice, +ust as the abuses of !artial rule have bred !ore subversion.% "#. (inally, as stated by the "$-i 6 integrated Bar of the Philippines #nd Aouse of 1elegates, %0t ,ould, indeed, be !ost ironical if 'udges ,ho are called upon to give due process cannot count it on the!selves. )bservance of procedural due process in the separation of !isfits fro! ?he 'udiciary is the right ,ay to attain a laudable ob+ective. 9 As stressed by the Chief 'ustice in the !ortun case, +udges are entitled to the cardinal principles of fairness and due process and the opportunity to be heard and defend the!selves against the accusations !ade against their and not to be sub+ected to harass!ent and hu!iliation, and the Court ,ill repudiate the %oppressive e ercise of legal authority.% More so, are +udges entitled to such due process ,hen ,hat is at sta*e is their constitutionally guaranteed security of tenure and non-i!pair!ent of the independence of the +udiciary and the proper e ercise of the constitutional po,er e clusively vested in the /upre!e Court to discipline and re!ove +udges after fair hearing. 0n su!, 0 see no reason to change the stand sub!itted by !e to the Presidential Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation that B 'udges of inferior courts should not be su!!arily re!oved and branded for life in such reorgani&ation on the basis of confidential adverse reports as to their perfor!ance, co!petence or integrity, save those ,ho !ay voluntarily resign fro! office upon being confronted ,ith such reports against the!. The trouble ,ith such e -parte reports, ,ithout due process or hearing, has been proven fro! our past e perience ,here a nu!ber of honest and co!petent +udges ,ere su!!arily re!oved ,hile others ,ho ,ere generally believed to be bas*et cases have re!ained in the serviceG and The po,er of discipline and dis!issal of +udges of all inferior courts, fro! the Court of Appeals do,n, has been vested by the "$<5 Constitution in the /upre!e Court, and if the +udiciary is to be strengthened, it should be left to clean its o,n house upon co!plaint and ,ith the cooperation of the as grieved parties and after due process and hearing. The constitutional confrontation and conflict !ay ,en be avoided by holding that since the changes and provisions of the challenged Act do not substantially change the nature and functions of the %ne, courts% therein provided as co!pared to the %abolished old courts% but provide for procedural changes, fi ed delineation of +urisdiction and increases in the nu!ber of courts for a !ore effective and efficient disposition of court cases, -the incu!bent +udges guaranteed security of tenure re7uire that they be retained in the corresponding %ne, courts.% !ernan'e%, J., concur.

S!-ara*! O-#%#o%" BARRE O, J., concurring. 0 +oin the !a+ority of !y brethren in voting that the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4=, Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$, is not unconstitutional as a ,hole nor in any of its parts. The issue of unconstitutionality raised by petitioners relates particularly to /ection DD of the Act ,hich reads as follo,s.

/EC. DD. ,ransitory provisions. 1 The provisions of this Act shall be i!!ediately carried out in accordance ,ith an E ecutive )rder to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of (irst 0nstance, the Circuit Cri!inal Courts, the 'uvenile and 1o!estic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently constituted and organi&ed, until the co!pletion of the reorgani&ation provided in this Act as declared by the President. :pon such declaration, the said courts shall be dee!ed auto!atically abolished and the incu!bents thereof shall cease to hold office. The cases pending in the old Courts shall e transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together ,ith the pertinent functions, records, e7uip!ent,. property and the necessary personnel. The applicable appropriations shall li*e,ise be transferred to the appropriate courts constituted pursuant to this Act, to be aug!ented as !ay be necessary fro! the funds for organi&ational changes as provided in Batas Pa!bansa Blg. 4=. /aid funding shall thereafter be included in the annual 3eneral Appropriations Act. 0t is contended by petitioners that the provision in the above section ,hich !andates that %upon the declaration upon the President that the reorgani&ation conte!plated in the Act has been co!pleted@, the said courts ?!eaning the Court of Appeals and all other lo,er courts, e cept the /andiganbayan and the Court of Ta Appeals@ shall be dee!ed abolished and the incu!bents thereof shall cease to hold office% trenches on all the constitutional safeguards and guarantees of the independence of the +udiciary, such as the security of tenure of its !e!bers ?/ection <, Article K of the Philippine Constitution of "$<5@, the prerogatives of the /upre!e Court to ad!inistratively supervise all courts and the personnel thereof ?/ection >, 2'.@ and principally, the po,er of the /upre!e Court %to discipline +udges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Me!bers, order their dis!issal. % ?/ection <, 2'.@ )n the other hand, respondents !aintain that thru the above-7uoted /ection DD. the Batasan did nothing !ore than to e ercise the authority conferred upon it be /ection 0 of the sa!e Article of the Constitution ,hich provides that The 'udicial po,er shall be rested in one /upre!e Court and in suc" inferior courts as may be establis"e' by la3.$ 0n other ,ords, since all inferior courts are, constitutionally spea*ing, !ere creatures of the la, ?of the legislature it follo,s that it is ,ithin the legislature9s po,er to abolish or reorgani&e the! even if in so doing, it !ight result in the cessation fro! office of the incu!bents thereof before the e piration of their respective constitutionally fi ed tenures. Respondents e!phasi&e that the legislative po,er in this respect is broad and indeed plenary. Eie,ing the proble! before :s fro! the above perspectives, it ,ould appear that our tas* is either ?"@ to reconcile, on the one hand, the parlia!ent9s po,er of abolition and reorgani&ation ,ith, on the other, the security of tenure of !e!bers of the +udiciary and the /upre!e Court9s authority to discipline and re!ove +udges or ?#@ to declare that either the po,er of the /upre!e Court or of the Batasan is !ore para!ount than that of the other. 0 believe. ho,ever, that such a !anner of loo*ing at the issue that confronts :s only confuses and co!pounds the tas* ;e are called upon to perfor!. (or ho, can there be a satisfactory and rational reconciliation of the pretended right of a +udge to continue as such, ,hen the position occupied by hi! no longer e istsH To suggest, as so!e do, that the solution is for the court he is sitting in not to be dee!ed abolished or that he should in so!e ,ay be allo,ed to continue to function as +udge until his constitutional tenure e pires is obviously i!practical, if only because ,e ,ould then have the absurd spectacle of a +udiciary ,ith old and ne, courts functioning under distinct set-ups, such as a district court continuing as such in a region ,here the other +udges are regional +udges or of +udges e ercising po,ers not purely +udicial ,hich is offensive to the Constitution. The other suggestion that the incu!bent of the abolished court should be dee!ed appointed to the corresponding ne, court is even ,orse, since it ,ould deprive the appointing authority, the

president, of the po,er to !a*e his o,n choices and ,ould, further!ore, a!ount to an appoint!ent by legislation ,hich is a Constitutional anachronis!. !ore on this point later . 0nas!uch as pursuant to the analysis of the !a+ority of the Me!bers of this Court, in fact and in la,, the structure of +udicial syste! created by Batas Pa!bansa "#$ is substantially different fro! that under the 'udiciary Act of "$D4, as a!ended, hence the courts no, e isting are actually being abolished, ,hy do ;e have to indulge in any reconciliation or feel bound to deter!ine ,hose po,er, that of the Batasang Pa!bansa or that of this Court, should be considered !ore i!periousH 0t being conceded that the po,er to create or establish carries ,ith it the po,er to abolish, and it is a legal a io!, or at least a prag!atic reality that the tenure of the holder of an office !ust of necessity end ,hen his office no longer e ists, as 0 see it, be have no alternative than to hold that petitioners9 invocation of the independence of the +udiciary principle of the Constitution is unavailing ill the cases at bar. 0t is as si!ple as that. 0 !ight hasten to add, in this connection, that to insist that ,hat Batas Pa!bansa "#$ is doing is +ust a rena!ing and not a substantial and actual !odification or alteration of the present +udicial structure or syste! assu!ing a close scrutiny !ight so!eho, support such a conclusion, is pure ,ishful thin*ing, it being e plicitly and une7uivocally provided in the section in 7uestion that said courts are dee!ed abolished% and further, as if to !a*e it !ost un!ista*ably e!phatic, that %the incu!bents thereat shall cease to hold office.% *ura les, se' les. As a !atter of fact, 0 cannot conceive of a !ore e!phatic ,ay of !anifesting and conveying the deter!ined legislative intent about it. No,, ,hy a! 0 yielding to the above reasoning and conclusionH ;hy don9t 0 insist on cha!pioning the cause of the independence of the +udiciary by !aintaining that the constitutional safeguards thereof 0 have already enu!erated earlier !ust be respected in any reorgani&ation ordained by the parlia!ent My ans,er is si!ple. Practically all the Me!bers of the Court concede that ,hat is conte!plated is not only general reorgani&ation but abolition B in other ,ords, not only a rearrange!ent or re!odelling of the old structure but a total de!olition thereof to be follo,ed by the building of a ne, and different one. 0 a! practically alone in conte!plating a different vie,. True, even if 0 should appear as shouting in the ,ilderness, 0 ,ould still !a*e !yself a hero in the eyes of !an +ustices and +udges, !e!bers of the bar and concerned discerning citi&ens, all lovers of the +udicial independence, but understandably, 0 should not be, as 0 a! not, disposed to play such a role virtually at the e pense not only of !y distinguished colleagues but of the Batasang Pa!bansa that fra!ed the la, and, !ost of all, the President ,ho signed and, therefore, sanctioned the Act as it is, unless 0 a! absolutely sure that !y position is for!idable, unassailable and beyond all possible contrary ratiocination, ,hich 0 a! not certain of, as 0 shall de!onstrate anon. To start ,ith, the +urisprudence, here and abroad, touching on the 7uestion no, before :s cannot be said to be clear and consistent, !uch less unsha*eable and indubitably definite either ,ay. None of the local cases 1 relied upon and discussed by the parties and by the Me!bers of the Court during the deliberations, such as Borro!eo, 2)ca!po, 3 Iandueta, 3 Brillo, 5 etc. can, to !y !ind, really serve as reliable pole stars that could lead !e to certainty of correctness. )f course, !y instinct and passion for an independent +udiciary are unco!pro!ising and beyond di!inution. 0ndeed, !y initial reactions, publicly *no,n, about Batas Pa!bansa "#$ e plaining acade!ically its apparent tendency to invade the areas of authority of the /upre!e Court, not to spea* of its dangerously i!pairing the independence of the +udiciary, !ust have, 0 i!agine, created the i!pression that 0 ,ould vote to declare the la, unconstitutional. But, during the deliberations of the Court, the co!bined ,isdo! of !y learned colleagues ,as so!ething 0 could not discount or +ust brush aside. Pondering and thin*ing deeper about all relevant factors, 0 have co!e to the conviction that at least on this day and hour there are +ustifiable grounds to uphold the Act, if only to try ho, it ,ill operate so that thereby the people !ay see that ;e are one ,ith the President and the Batasan in ta*ing ,hat appear to be i!!ediate steps needed to relieve the people fro! a fast spreading cancer in the +udiciary of our country.

Besides, the Philippines has so!eho, not yet returned to co!plete nor!alcy The i!proved national discipline so evident during the earlier days of !artial la,, has declined at a 7uite discernible degree. 1ifferent sectors of society are de!anding urgent refor!s in their respective field And about the !ost vehe!ent and persistent, loud and clear, a!ong their gripes, ,hich as a !atter of fact is co!!on to all of the! is that about the deterioration in the 7uality of perfor!ance of the +udges !anning our courts and the slo, and dragging pace of pending +udicial proceedings. /trictly spea*ing, this is, to be sure, so!ething that !ay not necessarily be related to lac* of independence of the +udiciary. 0t has !ore to do ,ith the ineptness and2or corruption a!ong and corruptibility of the !en sitting in the courts in so!e parts of the country And ,hat is ,orse, ,hile in the co!!unities concerned the !alady is *no,n to factually e ist and is actually graver and ,idespread, very fe,, if any individuals or even associations and organi&ed groups, truly incensed and an ious to be of help, have the courage and possess the re7uisite legal evidence to co!e out and file the corresponding charges ,ith the /upre!e Court, And 0 a! not vet referring to si!ilar situations that are not 7uite openly *no,n but nevertheless +ust as deleterious. )n the other hand, if all these intolerable instances should actually be for!ally brought to the /upre!e Court, it ,ould be hu!anly i!possible for the Court to dispose of the! ,ith desirable dispatch, ,hat ,ith the thousands of other cases it has to attend to and the rather cu!berso!e strict re7uire!ents of procedural due process it has to observe in each and every such ad!inistrative case all of ,hich are ti!e consulting. Eerily, under the foregoing circu!stances, it !ay be said that there is +ustification for the patience of the people about the possibility of early eradication of this disease or evil in our +udiciary pictured above to be nearing the brea*ing point. ;ithal, ,e !ust bear in !ind that +udicial reorgani&ation beco!es urgent and inevitable not alone because of structural inade7uacies of the syste! or of the cu!berso!eness and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force, but also ,hen it beco!es evident that a good nu!ber of those occupying positions in the +udiciary, !a*e a !oc*ery of +ustice and ta*e advantage of their office for selfish personal ends and yet, as already e plained, those in authority cannot e peditiously cope ,ith the situation under e isting la,s and rules. 0t is !y personal assess!ent of the present situation in our +udiciary that its reorgani&ation has to be of necessity t,o-pronged, as 0 have +ust indicated, for the !ost 0deal +udicial syste! ,ith the !ost perfect procedural rules cannot satisfy the people and the interests of +ustice unless the !en ,ho hold positions therein possess the character, co!petence and sense of loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute i!partiality, nay, i!pregnability to an te!ptations of graft and corruption, including the usual i!portunings and the fearso!e albeit i!proper pressures of the po,ers that be. 0 a! certain that the (ilipino people feel happy that Batas Pa!bansa "#$ enco!passes both of these ob+ectives, ,hich indeed are aligned ,ith the foundation of the principle of independence of the +udiciary. The above pre!ises considered, 0 have decided to tac*le our proble! fro! the vie,point of the unusual situation in ,hich our +udiciary is presently perilously situated. Needless to say, to all of us, the Me!bers of the Court, the constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and re!oval only by the /upre!e Court, a!ong others, against i!pair!ent of the independence of the +udiciary, ,hich is one of the bedroc*9s and, therefore, of the essence in any %de!ocracy under a regi!e of +ustice, peace, liberty and e7uality ?Prea!ble of the "$<5 Constitution@, are priceless and should be defended, !ost of all by the /upre!e Court, ,ith all the ,isdo! and courage 3od has individually endo,ed to each of :s. ;ithal, ,e are all conscious of the fact that those safeguards have never been intended to place the person of the +udge in a singular position of privilege and untouchability, but rather, that they are essentially part and parcel of ,hat is re7uired of an independent +udiciary ,here +udges can decide cases and do +ustice to everyone before the! ruat caelum. Ao,ever, ;e find )urselves face to face ,ith a situation, in our +udiciary ,hich is of e!ergency proportions and to insist on rationali&ing ho, those guarantees should be enforced under such a circu!stance see! to be difficult, aside fro! being controversial. And so, in a real sense, ;e have to !a*e a choice bet,een adhering to the strictly legalistic reasoning pursued by petitioners, on the one hand, and the broader and !ore practical approach, ,hich as 0 have said is ,ithin the spirit at least of the Constitution.

My concept of the Constitution is that it is not +ust a cluster of high sounding verbiages spelling purely 0dealis! and nobility in the recognition of hu!an dignity, protection of individual liberties and providing security and pro!otion of the general ,elfare under a govern!ent of la,s. ;ith all e!phasis and vehe!ence, 0 say that the funda!ental la, of the land is a living instru!ent ,hich translates and adapts itself to the de!ands of obtaining circu!stances. 0t is ,ritten for all seasons, e cept for very unusual instances that hu!an ratiocination cannot +ustify to be conte!plated by its language even if read in its broadest sense and in the !ost liberal ,ay. Eerily, it is para!ount and supre!e in peace and in ,ar, but even in peace grave critical situations arise de!anding recourse to e traordinary solutions. Paraphrasing the /panish adage, $(ran'es males, #ran'es reme'ios $, such in ordinary proble!s +ustify e ceptional re!edies. And so, history records that in the face of grave crises and e!ergencies, the !ost constitutionally 0dealistic countries have, at one ti!e or another, under the pressure of prag!atic considerations, adopted corresponding realistic !easures, ,hich perilously tether along the periphery of their Charters, to the e tent of creating i!pressions, of course erroneous, that the sa!e had been transgressed, although in truth their integrity and i!periousness re!ained undi!inished and uni!paired. The Philippines has but recently had its o,n e perience of such constitutional approach. ;hen !artial la, ,as proclai!ed here in "$<#, there ,ere those ,ho vociferously shouted not only that the President had acted arbitrarily and ,ithout the - re7uired factual bases conte!plated in the Co!!ander-in-Chief clause of the "$56 Constitution, but !ore, that he had gone beyond the traditional and universally recogni&ed intent of said clause by utili&ing his !artial la, po,ers not only to !aintain peace and tran7uility and preserve and defend the integrity and security of the state but to establish a Ne, /ociety The critics contended that !artial la, is only for national security, not for the i!position of national discipline under a Ne, /ociety. 1ue to its relevancy to )ur present discussion, it is ,ell for everyone to bear in !ind that in this +urisdiction, this concept of !artial la, has already been upheld several ti!es by this Court. ", for one, accepted such a construction because 0 fir!ly believe that to i!pose !artial la, for the sole end of suppressing an insurrection or rebellion ,ithout coincidentally ta*ing corresponding !easures to eradicate the root causes of the uprising is utter folly, for the country ,ould still continue to lay open to its recurrence. 0 have !ade the foregoing discourse, for it is funda!entally in the fight of this Court9s doctrines about the i!position of !artial la, as 0 have stated that 0 prefer to base this concurrence. To put it differently, if indeed there could be so!e doubt as to the correctness of this Court9s +udg!ent that Batas Pa!bansa "#$ is not unconstitutional, particularly its /ection DD, 0 a! convinced that the critical situation of our +udiciary today calls for solutions that !ay not in the eyes of so!e confor! strictly ,ith the letter of the Constitution but indubitably +ustified by its spirit and intent. As " have earlier indicated, the Charter is not +ust a construction of ,ords to ,hose literal ironclad !eanings ,e !ust feel hidebound ,ithout regard to every Constitution9s desirable inherent nature of ad+ustability and adaptability to prevailing situations so that the spirit and funda!ental intent and ob+ectives of the fra!ers !ay re!ain alive. Batas Pa!bansa "#$ is one such adaptation that co!es handy for the attain!ent of the transcendental ob+ectives it see*s to pursue ;hile, to be sure, it has the effect of factually easing out so!e +ustices and +udges before the end of their respective constitutional tenure sans the usual ad!inistrative investigation, the desirable end is achieved thru !eans that, in the light of the prevailing conditions, is constitutionally per!issible. Before closing, it !ay not be a!iss for !e to point out that Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$, aside fro! ,hat has been discussed about its effect on the guarantees of +udicial independence, also pree!pts, in so!e of its provisions, the pri!ary rule-!a*ing po,er of the /upre!e Court in respect to procedure, practice and evidence. ;ith the pardon of !y colleagues, 0 ,ould +ust li*e to say that the Court should not decry this develop!ent too !uch. After all, the legislature is e pressly e!po,ered by the Charter to do so, ?/ection 6?6@, Article K of the Constitution of "$<5@ so !uch so, that 0 doubt if the Court has any authority to alter or !odify any rule the Batasang Pa!bansa enunciates. Truth to tell, as Chair!an of the Co!!ittee on the Revision of

the Rules of Court, for one reason or another, principally the lac* of a clear consensus as to ,hat so!e of !y colleagues consider very radical proposals voiced by !e or !y co!!ittee, ;e have regrettably procrastinated long enough in !a*ing our procedural rules !ore practical and !ore conducive to speedier disposal and ter!ination of controversies by dealing !ore ,ith substantial +ustice. /o also have ;e, it !ust be confessed, failed to co!e up to e pectations of the fra!ers of the Constitution in our ,ays of disposing of ad!inistrative co!plaints against erring and !isconducting +udges. )f course, ;e can e cuse )urselves ,ith the e planation that not only are ;e overloaded ,ith ,or* beyond hu!an capability of its being perfor!ed e peditiously, but that the strict re7uisites of due process ,hich are ti!e consu!ing have precluded :s fro! being !ore e peditious and speedy. 0 feel 0 !ust say all of these, because if the above-discussed circu!stances have not co!bined to create a very critical situation in our +udiciary that is !a*ing the people lose its faith and confidence in the ad!inistration of +ustice by the e isting courts, perhaps the Court could loo* ,ith !ore sy!pathy at the stand of petitioners. 0 ,ant all the sundry to *no,, ho,ever, that not,ithstanding this decision, the independence of the +udiciary in the Philippines is far fro! being insubstantial, !uch less !eaningless and dead. Batas Pa!bansa "#$ has precisely opened our eyes to ho,, despite doubts and !isgivings, the Constitution can be so construed as to !a*e it possible for those in authority to ans,er the cla!or of the people for an upright +udiciary and overco!e constitutional roadbloc*s !ore apparent than real. To those +ustices, +udges, !e!bers of the bar and concerned citi&ens ,hose eyes !ay be di!!ing ,ith tears of disappoint!ent and disenchant!ent because of the stand 0 have chosen to adopt in these cases, !ay 0 try to assuage the! by +oining their fervent prayers that so!e other day, hopefully in the near future, 1ivine Providence !ay dictate to another constitutional convention to ,rite the guarantees of +udicial independence ,ith in* of deeper hue and ,ords that are definite, clear, una!biguous and une7uivocal, in dra,ing the line of de!arcation bet,een the Parlia!ent and the 'udiciary in the !anner that in Ais 0nfinite ,isdo! ,ould !ost pro!ote genuine and i!partial +ustice for our people, free, not only fro! graft, corruption, ineptness and inco!petence but even fro! the tentacles of interference and insiduous influence of the political po,ers that be. Presently, 0 a! constrained fro! going along ,ith any other vie, than that the Constitution allo,s abolition of e isting courts even if the effect has to be the eli!ination of any incu!bent +udge and the conse7uent cutting of his constitutional tenure of office. 0 cannot close this concurrence ,ithout referring to the apprehensions in so!e 7uarters about the choice that ,ill ulti!ately be !ade of those ,ho ,ill be eased out of the +udiciary in the course of the i!ple!entation of Batas Pa!bansa "#$. By this decision, the Court has in factual effect albeit not in constitutional conception yielded generally to the Batasang Pa!bansa, and !ore specifically to the President, its o,n constitutionally conferred po,er of re!oval of +udges. /ection DD of the Batasan9s Act declares that all of the! shall be dee!ed to have ceased to hold office, leaving it to the President to appoint those ,ho! he !ay see fit to occupy the ne, courts. Thus, those ,ho ,ill not be appointed can be considered as %ceasing to hold their respective offices%, or, as others ,ould say they ,ould be in fact re!oved. Ao, the President ,ill !a*e his choices is beyond )ur po,er to control. But even if so!e !ay be eased out even ,ithout being duly infor!ed of the reason therefor, !uch less being given the opportunity to be heard the past actuations of the President on all !atters of deep public interest shouted serve as sufficient assurance that ,hen lie ulti!ately acts, he ,ill faithfully adhere to his sole!n oath %to do +ustice to every !an hence, lie ,ill e7uip hi!self first ,ith the fullest reliable infor!ation before acts. This is not only !y individual faith founded on !y personal ac7uaintance ,ith the character and sterling 7ualities of President (erdinand E. Marcos. 0 dare say this is the faith of the nation in a !an ,ho has led it successfully through crises and e!ergencies, ,ith +ustice to all, ,ith !alice to,ards none. 0 a! certain, the President ,ill deal ,ith each and every individual to be affected by this reorgani&ation ,ith the best light that 3od ,ill give hi! every !o!ent he acts in each individual case as it co!es for his decision

A6U(NO, J., concurring. 0 concur in the result. The petitioners filed this petition for declaratory relief and prohibition %to declare the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4= ?Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$@ unconstitutional%. The petition should have been dis!issed outright because this Court has no +urisdiction to grant declaratory relief and prohibition is not the proper re!edy to test the constitutionality of the la,. the petition is pre!ature. No +urisdictional 7uestion is involved. There is no +usticiable controversy ,herein the constitutionality of the said la, is in issue. 0t is presu!ed to be constitutional. The la,!a*ing body before enacting it loo*ed into the constitutional angle. /even of the eight petitioners are practising la,yers. They have no personality to assail the constitutionality of the said la, even as ta payers. The eighth petitioner, 3ualberto '. de la 8lana, a city +udge ?,ho in "$<< filed a petition for declaratory relief assailing Presidential 1ecree No. "##$, ,hich called for a referendu!. 1e la 8lana his Co!elec, 4= /CRA 6#6@, has no cause of action for prohibition. Ae is not being re!oved fro! his position. The 'udiciary Reorgani&ation 8a, ,as enacted in ut!ost good faith and not %to cloa* an unconstitutional and evil purpose As ably e pounded by the Chief 'ustice, in enacting the said la,, the la,!a*ing body acted ,ithin the scope of its constitutional po,ers and prerogatives.

GUERRERO, J., concurring. 0 concur ,ith !y distinguished and learned colleagues in upholding the constitutionality of the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4=. (or the record, ho,ever, 0 ,ould li*e to state !y personal convictions and observations on this case, a veritable land!ar* case, for ,hatever they !ay be ,orth. The legal basis of the Court9s opinion rendered by our estee!ed Chief 'ustice having been e haustively discussed and decisively +ustified by hi!, a highly-respected e pert and authority on constitutional la,, it ,ould be an e ercise in duplication to reiterate the sa!e cases and precedents. 0 a! then constrained to approach the proble! 7uite differently, not through the classic !ethods of philosophy, history and tradition, but follo,ing ,hat the ,ell-*no,n +urist, 1ean Pound, said that %the !ost significant advance in the !odern science of la, is the change fro! the analytical to the functional attitude.% 1 And in pursuing this direct ion, 0 !ust also rec*on ,ith and rely on the ruling that %another guide to the !eaning of a statute is found in the evil ,hich it is designed to re!edy, and for this the court properly loo*s at conte!poraneous events, the situation as it e isted, and as it ,as pressed upon the attention of the legislative body.% 2 0 have no doubt in !y !ind that the institutional refor!s and changes envisioned by the la, are clearly conducive to the pro!otion of national interests. The ob+ectives of the legislation na!ely. ?a@ An institutional restructuring by the creation of an 0nter!ediate Appellate Court, thirteen ?0 5@ Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. ?b@ A reappoint!ent of +urisdiction geared to,ards greater efficiency. ?c@ A si!plification of procedures and ?d@ The abolition of the inferior courts created by the 'udiciary Act of "$D4 and

other statutes, as approved by the Congress of the Philippines 3 are undoubtedly intended to i!prove the regi!e of +ustice and thereby enhance public good and order. 0ndeed, the purpose of the Act as further stated in the E planatory Note, ,hich is %to e!body refor!s in the structure, organi&ation and co!position of the 'udiciary, ,ith the ai! of i!proving the ad!inistration of +ustice, of decongesting +udicial doc*ets, and coping ,ith the !ore co!ple proble!s on the present and forseeable future cannot but %pro!ote the ,elfare of society, since that is the final cause of la,. 3 Aence, fro! the standpoint of The general utility and functional value of the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act, there should be no difficulty, doubt or disbelief in its legality and constitutionality. That there are ills and evils plaguing the +udicial syste! is undeniable. The notorious and scandalous congestion of court doc*ets as too ,ell-*no,n to be ignored as are the causes ,hich create and produce such ano!aly. Evident is the need to loo* for devices and !easures that are !ore practical, ,or*able and econo!ical. 5 (ro! the figures alone ?5=",D$< pending cases in "$<>G 56", $D5 in "$<<G D=D, >4> in "$<4G D#>, $"" in "$<$G DD", 55# in "$4=G and D6=, =>5 as of (ebruary 5, "$4#@ 4 the congested character of court doc*ets rising year after year is staggering and enor!ous, loo!ing li*e a legal !onster. But greater than the need to dispense +ustice speedily and pro!ptly is the necessity to have 'ustices and 'udges ,ho are fair and i!partial, honest and incorruptible, co!petent and efficient. The general cla!or that the prestige of the 'udiciary today has deteriorated and degenerated to the lo,est ebb in public esti!ation is not ,ithout factual basis. Records in the /upre!e Court attest to the unfitness and inco!petence, corruption and i!!orality of !any dispensers of +ustice. According to the co!piled data, the total nu!ber of 'ustices and 'udges against ,ho! ad!inistrative charges have been filed for various offenses, !isconduct, venalities and other irregularities reaches 455. )f this total, 6 are 'ustices of the Court of Appeals, ""$ C(0 'udges, 5 Cri!inal Circuit 'udges, 6CAR 'udges, 7 'uvenile O 1o!estic Relations Court 'udge, 46 City 'udges, and 789 Municipal 'udges. The /upre!e Court has found 7:5 of the! guilty and punished the! ,ith either suspension, ad!onition, repri!and or fine. The nu!ber includes 7 CA 'ustice, 4; C(0 'udges, 7 CCC 'udge, 4 CAR 'udges, 7 '1RC 'udge, < City 'udges and ;4 Municipal 'udges. /eventeen ?"<@ 'udges have been ordered dis!issed and separated fro! the service. And these are 4 C(0, 7CAR, 7 City 'udge and 75 Municipal 'udges. 3oing over these ad!inistrative proceedings, it too* an average of t,o-year period fro! the filing of the charge to the dis!issal of the respondent. 0n one case, the proceedings ,ere ter!inated after seven years. Ao, long the pending ad!inistrative cases ,ill be disposed of, only ti!e ,ill tell as an increasing nu!ber of ad!inistrative cases are being filed by victi!s of +udicial !isconduct, abuse and arbitrariness. E cepting those ,ho have been punished and dis!issed fro! the service, there are !any ,ho have been castigated and censured in final +udg!ents of the /upre!e Court upon appeal or revie, of the decisions, orders and other acts of the respondent courts, 'ustices and 'udges. To cite a fe, cases, )ur decisions have categorically pronounced respondents9 actuations, thus. %deplorable, giving no credit to the 'udiciary% 7G applicable rules. The ,hole proceedings loo*ed no !ore than a pre-arranged co!pro!ise bet,een the accused and the 'udge to flaunt the la, and every nor! of propriety and procedure% 8G %there ,as a deliberate failure of respondent 'udge to respect ,hat is so clearly provided in the Rules of Court% 9G %0t is unfortunate that respondent 'udge failed to ac7uaint hi!self ,ith, ="9 !isinterpreted, those controlling provisions and doctrines% 15G %The failure of the respondent Municipal 'udge to yield obedience to authoritative decisions of the /upre!e Court and of respondent Court of (irst 0nstance 'udge and his deplorable insistence on procedural technicalities ,as called do,n in 8-D$4#4, 'uly #6,

"$4". (or pere!ptorily dis!issing the third party co!plaint on the ground that the !otion to dis!iss ,as 9,ell-ta*en9 and respondent 'udge did not elaborate, the Court re!ar*ed. %May his tribe vanish.% 11 0n one case, ;e noted %There is here so so!ething unusual, but far fro! palliating the gravity of the error incurred, it !erely e acerbated it. ... it did render the due process re7uire!ent nugatory, for instead of a fair and i!partial trial, there ,as an 0dle for!, a useless cere!ony.% 12 0t is dishonorable enough to be publicly and officially rebu*ed but to allo, these 'udges and their il* to re!ain and continue to preside in their courtroo!s is a disgrace to the 'udiciary. 0t is to be deplored that the /upre!e Court has not found ti!e to e ercise its po,er and authority in the pre!ises, for no charges or proceedings have been instituted against the!. ;e have a list of these croo*ed 'udges ,hose actuations have been found to be patiently ,rong and !anifestly in-defeasible. There ought to be no ob+ection or co!punction in ,eeding the! out fro! the service. 0f they are not booted out no,, it ,ill ta*e fro! here to eternity to clean this Augean stable. Candidly, one reason for ,riting this concurring opinion is to call attention to these evils, abuses and ,rongs ,hich are surreptitiously but surely destroying the trust and faith of the people in the integrity of the entire 'udiciary. /o!e !e!bers of the Court felt that these revelations ,ould be li*e ,ashing dirty linen in public. But these facts are of public and official record nay court cases, and sooner or later, Truth ,ill co!e out. 0n the light of these *no,n evils and infir!ities of the +udiciary syste!, it ,ould be absurd and unreasonable to clai! that the legislators did not act upon the! in good faith and honesty of purpose and ,ith legiti!ate ends. 0t is presu!ed that official duty has been regularly perfor!ed. 13 The presu!ption of regularity is not confined to the acts of the individual officers but also applies to the acts of boards, such as ad!inistrative board or bodies, and to acts of legislative bodies. 13 3ood faith is al,ays to be presu!ed in the absence of proof to the contrary, of ,hich there is none in the case at bar. 0t could not be other,ise if ;e are to accord as ;e !ust, full faith and credit to the la,!a*ers9 deep sense of public service and the +udicious e ercise of their high office as the duly-elected representatives of the people. 0t is conceded that the abolition of an office is legal if attendant ,ith good faith. 15 The 7uestion of good faith then is the cru of the conflict at bar. 3ood faith in the enact!ent of the la, does not refer to the ,isdo! of the !easure, the propriety of the Act, or to its e pediency. The 7uestions raised by petitioners and amicus curiae for their cause, vi%: ;hy abolish all the courts ;hy legislate out the +udges ;hy not a!end the Rules of Court only 0s abolition of all courts the proper re!edy to ,eed out corrupt and !isfits in our 'udiciaryH B !ay not be in7uired into by :s. %0t is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and *eep it ,ithin the bounds of propriety and co!!on sense. That is pri!arily and e clusively a legislative concern.% 14 The Courts %are not supposed to override legiti!ate policy and ... never in7uire into the ,isdo! of the la,.% 17 Chief 'ustice (ernando ,ho penned the orfe decision, ,rites that ,hile %?i@t is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief 'ustice Concepcion in (on%ales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional po,er or co!petence, not the ,isdo! of the action ta*en, !ay be the basis for declaring a statute invalid,% 18 he adds that it is %useful to recall ,hat ,as so clearly stated by 8aurel that 9the 'udiciary in the deter!ination of actual cases and controversies !ust reflect the ,isdo! and +ustice of the people as e pressed through their representatives in the e ecutive and legislative depart!ents of the govern!ent.9% 19 0n any case, petitioners have not sho,n an iota of proof of bad faith. There is no factual foundation of bad faith on record. And 0 do not consider the state!ent in the sponsorship speech for Cabinet Bill No. D# of Minister of 'ustice Ricardo '. Puno that the Bill ,ould be a !ore efficient vehicle of %eli!inating inco!petent and unfit 'udges as indicative of i!per!issible legislative !otive. 25 0t !ay be true that ,hile the re!edy or solution for!ulated by the legislation ,ill eradicate hopefully or at least !ini!i&e the evils and ills that infect and pester the +udicial body, it ,ill result in the actual re!oval of the 'ustices of the Court of Appeals and 'udges of the lo,er courts. 0t is

also true that ,hether it is ter!ed abolition of office or re!oval fro! office, the end-result is the sa!e B ter!ination of the services of these incu!bents. 0ndeed, the la, !ay be harsh, but that is the la,. *ura le= se' le=. The 'ustices and 'udges directly affected by the la,, being la,yers, should *no, or are e pected to *no, the nature and concept of a public office. 0t is created for the purpose of effecting the ends for ,hich govern!ent has been instituted, ,hich are for the co!!on good, and not the profit, honor or private interest of any one !an, fa!ily or class of !en. 0n our for! of govern!ent, it is funda!ental that public offices are public trust, and that the person to be appointed should be selected solely ,ith a vie, to the public ,elfare. 21 0n the last analysis, a public office is a privilege in the gift of the /tate. 22 There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. E cepting constitutional offices ,hich provide for special i!!unity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. ;hen an office is created by the Constitution, it cannot be abolished by the legislature, but ,hen created by the /tate under the authority of the Constitution, it !ay be abolished by statute and the incu!bent deprived of his office. 23 Acceptance of a +udicial appoint!ent !ust be dee!ed as adherence to the rule that %,hen the court is abolished, any une pired ter! is abolished also. The 'udge of such a court ta*es office ,ith that encu!brance and *no,ledge.% 23 %The 'udge9s right to his full ter! and his full salary are not dependent alone upon his good conduct, but also upon the contingency that the legislature !ay for the public good, in ordaining and establishing the courts, fro! ti!e to ti!e consider his office unnecessary and abolish it.% 25 The re!oval fro! office of the incu!bent then is !erely incidental to the valid act of abolition of the office as de!anded by the superior and para!ount interest of the people. The bad and the croo*ed 'udges !ust be re!oved. The good and the straight, sober 'udges should be reappointed but that is the sole po,er and prerogative of the President ,ho, 0 a! certain, ,ill act according to the best interest of the nation and in accordance ,ith his sole!n oath of office %to preserve and defend its Constitution, e ecute its la,s, do +ustice to everyone ... % There and then the proper balance bet,een the desire to preserve private interest and the desideratu! of pro!oting the public good shall have been struc*. 24 The /upre!e Court has been called the conscience of the Constitution. 0t !ay be the last bul,ar* of constitutional govern!ent. 27 0t Must, ho,ever, be re!e!bered %that legislatures are ulti!ate guardians of the liberties and ,elfare of the people in 7uite as great a degree as courts.% 28 The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislatures as ,ell. 0t adheres, therefore, to the ,ell-settled principle that %all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute% for ,hich reason it ,ill not set aside a la, as violative of the Constitution %e cept in a clear case.% 29 (inally, 0 vie, the controversy presented to :s as a conflict of opinions B on +udicial independence, ,hether i!paired or strengthened by the la,G on reorgani&ation of the courts, ,hether abolition of office or re!oval therefro!, and on delegation of legislative po,er, ,hether authori&ed or unauthori&ed. ;ithout detracting fro! the !erits, the force and brilliance of their advocacies based on logic, history and precedents, 0 choose to stand on the social +ustification and the functional utility of the la, to uphold its constitutionality. 0n the light of conte!poraneous events fro! ,hich the Ne, Republic e!erged and evolved ne, 0deals of national gro,th and develop!ent, particularly in la, and govern!ent, a *ind or for! of +udicial activis!, perhaps si!ilar to it, is necessary to +ustify as the ratio 'eci'en'i of )ur +udg!ent. This is the ti!e and the !o!ent to perfor! a constitutional duty to affi !y i!pri!atur and affir!ance to the la,, hopefully an act of proper +udicial states!anship.

ABA

SANTOS, J., concurring.

0 agree ,ith the learned Chief 'ustice of the Philippines that Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$ is not unconstitutional. :nli*e )scar ;ilde, 0 choose not to yield to te!ptation by e!bellishing !y concurrence lest 0 be accrued of bringing coal to Ne,castle. Accordingly, 0 ,ill si!ply vote to dis!iss the petition Ao,ever, 0 cannot agree ,ith the Chief 'ustice ,hen he says. ... 0n the i!ple!entation of the assailed legislation, therefore it should be in accordance ,ith accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incu!bent +ustices and +udges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its vie, be accorded the fullest consideration. There ,ould be no plausibility then to the allegation that there is an unconstitutional taint to the challenged Act. Moreover, such a construction ,ould be in accordance ,ith the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives bet,een one ,hich ,ould save and another ,hich ,ould invalidate a statute, the for!er is to be preferred. 0t has already been ruled that the statute does not suffer fro! any constitutional infir!ity because the abolition of certain +udicial offices ,as done in good faith. This being the case, 0 believe that the E ecutive is entitled to e ercise its constitutional po,er to fill the ne,ly created +udicial positions ,ithout any obligation to consult ,ith this Court and to accord its vie,s the fullest consideration. To re7uire consultation ,ill constitute an invasion of e ecutive territory ,hich can be resented and even repelled. The i!plicit suggestion that there could be an unconstitutional i!ple!entation of the 7uestioned legislation is not congruent ,ith the basic conclusion that it is not unconstitutional.

E CASTRO, J., concurring. 0 concur in the declaration that the la, is not unconstitutional. May 0, ho,ever, sub!it this separate opinion !ore to avoid being !isunderstood by !y brethren in the +udiciary as not feeling for the! as !uch concern as 0 should for their security of tenure ,hich is raised as the !ain argu!ent against the constitutionality of the la,, than by ,ay of giving added force or support to the !ain opinion so ,ell-,ritten by )ur learned Chief 'ustice in his usual scholarly fashion. 0, therefore, li!it !yself to a discussion that the assailed statue is not unconstitutional ,ithout having to suggest ho, it !ay be i!ple!ented in order that it could stand the !ost rigid test of constitutionality, for in that area, ,hat is involved is purely an e ecutive act of the President in ,hose ,isdo!, patriotis! and sense of +ustice ;e should trust in ho, he ,ould fulfill his s,orn duties to see that the la,s are faithfully e ecuted and to do +ustice to every !an. Moreover, ,hile 0 also concur in the dis!issal of the petition, 0 do so on the additional ground that petitioners have not fulfilled all the re7uisites for the e ercise by this Court of its po,er of +udicial in7uiry B the po,er to declare a la, unconstitutional. 0 The creation and organi&ation of courts inferior to the /upre!e Court is a constitutional prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative is plenary and necessarily i!plies the po,er to reorgani&e said courts, and in the process, abolish the! to give ,ay to ne, or substantially different ones. To contend other,ise ,ould be to forget a basic doctrine of constitutional la, that no irrepealable la,s shall be passed. 1

The po,er to create courts and organi&e the! is necessarily the pri!ary authority fro! ,hich ,ould thereafter arise the security of tenure of those appointed to perfor! the functions of said courts. in the natural order of things, therefore, since the occasion to spea* of security of tenure of +udges arises only after the courts have first been brought into being, the right to security of tenure ta*es a secondary position to the basic and pri!ary po,er of creating the courts to provide for a fair and strong +udicial syste!. 0f the legislature, in the e ercise of its authority, dee!s it ,ise and urgent to provide for a ne, set of courts, and in doing so, it feels the abolition of the old courts ,ould conduce !ore to its ob+ective of i!proving the +udiciary and raising its standard, the !atter involved is one of policy and ,isdo! into ,hich the courts, not even the /upre!e Court, cannot in7uire, !uch less interfere ,ith. By this secondary position it has to the pri!ary po,er of the legislature to create courts, the security of tenure given to the incu!bents should not be a legal i!pedi!ent to the e ercise of that basic po,er of creating the statutory courts ,hich, by necessary i!plication, includes the po,er to abolish the! in order to create ne, ones. This pri!ary legislative po,er is a continuing one, and the resultant right of security of tenure of those appointed to said courts could not bring about the e haustion of that po,er. :n7uestionably, the legislature can repeal its o,n la,s, and that po,er can never be e hausted ,ithout, as a conse7uence, violating a funda!ental precept of constitutional and representative govern!ent that no irrepealable la,s shall be passed. 0f the creation of courts is a legislative prerogative their abolition is, therefore, a !atter of legislative intent. it involves the e ercise of legislative po,er, an act of legislation ,hich generally concerns policy in the for!ation of ,hich the courts have no say 0nitially, ,hen the legislature creates the courts, it suffers fro! no li!itation arising fro! the necessity or respecting the security of tenure of +udges ,ho are not yea there. This inherent character of fullness and plenitude of the po,er to create and abolish courts does not change ,hen that sa!e po,er is once !ore e ercised thereafter, as the need therefor is felt. ;hich only goes to sho, that ,hen done in good faith and !otivated solely by the good and the ,ell-being of the people, the e ercise of the po,er is not !eant to be restricted, curtailed, !uch less e hausted by the socalled +udicial security of tenure. The passage of the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4= is no !ore than the e ercise of the po,er vested by the Constitution on the legislative body of the Republic as described above. That po,er carries ,ith it the duty and responsibility of providing the people ,ith the !ost effective and efficient syste! of ad!inistration of +ustice. This is by far of !ore i!perative and transcedental i!portance than the security of tenure of +udges ,hich, ad!ittedly, is one of the factors that ,ould conduce to independence of the +udiciary B but first of all, a good, efficient and effective +udiciary. A +udiciary ,anting in these basic 7ualities does not deserve the independence that is !eant only for a +udiciary that can serve best the interest and ,elfare of the people ,hich is the !ost pri!ordial and para!ount consideration, not a +udiciary in ,hich the people9s faith has been eroded, a condition ,hich the security of tenure, in so!e instances, !ay even be contributory. 0n enacting the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4=, the legislature is presu!ed to have been !otivated by no other ob+ective than to provide the people the *ind of +udicial !achinery that ,ould best serve their interest and ,elfare, in its belief that the present !achinery is falling short of that !easure of public service. 0t should, li*e,ise, be presu!ed that it has been led to this lo, esti!ate of the utility and effectiveness of the present set-up of the +udiciary after infor!ing itself, ,ith the facilities at its co!!and, such as the po,er of legislative investigation, of the actual condition of the courts, particularly as to ,hether they continue to en+oy the trust, faith and confidence of the public, and ,hat the cause or causes are of their erosion, if not loss, as is the *eenly perceptible feeling of the people in general. Responsibility for this !ore or less e tensive slo,do,n of the delivery of +udicial service can be laid on no other than either of the t,o co!ponents of a court B the procedural la,s or rules that govern the ,or*ings of the courts, or the persons e ecuting or applying the! B or both. ;hen t,o interests conflict as ,hat had given rise to the present controversy the duty of the legislature to provide society ,ith a fair, efficient and effective +udicial syste!, on one hand, and

the right of +udges to security of tenure, on the other, the latter !ust of necessity yield to the for!er. )ne involves public ,elfare and interest !ore directly and on a greater !agnitude than the right of security of tenure of the +udges ,hich is, as is easily discernible, !ore of a personal benefit to +ust a fe,, as indeed only the +udge affected could see* +udicial redress of ,hat he conceives to be its violation. Aerein lies the propriety of the e ercise of %police po,er% of the /tate, if this concept ,hich underlies even the Constitution, has to be invo*ed as a constitutional +ustification of the passage of the Act in 7uestion. That is, if a conflict bet,een the pri!ary po,er of the legislature to create courts, and !ere conse7uential benefit accorded to +udges and +ustices after the creation of the courts is indeed perceivable, ,hich the ,riter fails to see, or, at least, ,ould disappear upon a reconciliation of the t,o apparently conflicting interests ,hich, fro! the above dis7uisition is not hard to find. 0t is, ,ithout doubt, in the essence of the e ercise of police po,er that a right assertable by individuals !ay be infringed in the greater interest of the public good and general ,elfare. This is de!onstrated in ho, the rights and freedo!s enu!erated in the Bill of Rights en+oyable by The entire people, not +ust by a handful in co!parison, are !ade sub+ect to the la,ful e ercise of the police po,er of the /tate. Eie,ed, therefore, fro! the above-!entioned perspective, the general reva!p of the +udiciary involving both its co!ponents B the court as an office or institution, and the +udges and +ustices that !an the! B should not find any legal obstacle in the security of tenure of +udges. This security, after all, is no !ore than as provided for all other officials and e!ployees in the civil service of the govern!ent in /ection 5, Article K00-B of the Constitution ,hich provides. No officer or e!ployees in the civil service shall be suspended or dis!issed e cept for cause as provided by la,. The provision of Article KE00, /ection "= of the Constitution gives to +udicial officials no !ore than a guarantee that their retire!ent age as fi ed in the Constitution shall not be alterable at !ere legislative pleasure. The e7uivalent provision in the "$56 Constitution ,as inserted for the first ti!e because the retire!ent age before then ,as provided !erely by statute not by the Constitution. 0f it co!es to their re!oval or suspension, ,hat gives the! constitutional protection is the afore7uoted provision ,hich does not conte!plate abolition of office ,hen done in good faith, for re!oval i!plies the e istence of the office, not ,hen it is abolished. Ad!ittedly, as has been held, abolition of office for no reason related to public ,elfare or for the good of the service, let alone ,hen done in bad faith, a!ounts to an unla,ful re!oval. 2 The abolition of the courts as declared in the Act as a result of a reorgani&ation of the +udiciary, as the Title of the la, curtly but announces, can by no !eans, fro! any vie,point, be so branded. And ,hether by said reorgani&ation, the present ,ould be dee!ed abolished, as the la, e presses such an un!ista*able intent, the !atter is one for the sole and e clusive deter!ination of the legislature. 0t rests entirely on its discretion ,hether by the nature and e tent of the changes it has introduced, it has done enough to consider the! abolished. To give the /upre!e Court the po,er to deter!ine the e tent or nature of the changes as to their structure, distribution and +urisdiction, before the clear intent to abolish the!, or to declare the! so abolished, is given effect, ,ould be to allo, undue interference in the function of legislation. This ,ould be contrary to the pri!ary duty of courts precisely to give effect to the legislative intent as e pressed in the la, or as !y be discovered therefro!. (ro! the above observation, it ,ould be futile to insist that the present courts ,ould not effectively be abolished by the Act in 7uestion. it !ight be to arrogate po,er for :s to say that the changes the la, brings to the present +udicial syste!, do not suffice for this Court to give effect to the clear intent of the legislative body. ;here ,ould the agrarian courts, the circuit cri!inal courts, the '1RC9s be in the +udicial structure as envisioned by the la,H Are they not abolished by !erger ,ith the regional trial courts, ,hich by such !erger, and by the other changes introduced by the la,, ,ould !a*e said courts different fro! the present Courts of (irst 0nstance ,hich, as a conse7uence, !ay then be considered abolished 0ntegrated as the present

courts are supposed to be, changes so!e,here in the +udicial !achinery ,ould necessarily affect the entire syste!. The fact that the /upre!e Court !ay specially assign courts to function as the special courts +ust !entioned, does not !ean that the changes ,rought are only superficial or %cos!etic% as this ter! has been used so often in the oral argu!ent. ;ithout the ne, la,, these courts ,ill re!ain fi ed and per!anent ,here they are at present. Fet in the course of ti!e, the need for their independent e istence !ay disappear, or that by changed conditions, ,here they are needed at present at a certain place, the need for the! !ay be so!e,here else in later years, if !a i!u! benefit at the least e pense is to be achieved, as al,ays should be a !ost desirable goal and ob+ective of govern!ent. 1e!onstrably then, the abolition of the courts is a !atter of legislative intent into ,hich no +udicial in7uiry is proper, e cept perhaps if they intent is so palpably tainted ,ith constitutional repugnancy, ,hich is not so in the instant case. ;e have, therefore, no occasion, as earlier inti!ated, to spea* of re!oval of +udges ,hen the reorgani&ation of the +udiciary ,ould result in the abolition of the courts other than the /upre!e Court and the Court of Ta Appeals. Aence, the provision of the Constitution giving to the /upre!e Court po,er to dis!iss a +udge by a vote of eight +ustices does not co!e into the vorte of the instant controversy. 0ts possible violation by the assailed statute cannot happen, and !ay, therefore, not constitute an argu!ent against the constitutionality of the la,. (or!er 'ustice Barrera, in a speech before the Philippine Bar Association, 3 i!pliedly indorsed the +udicial reva!p ,hen he enu!erated the 7ualities of a good +udge that the appointing po,er should consider in !a*ing ne, appoint!ents to the +udiciary upon its reorgani&ation pursuant to the 7uestioned Act. The ,ords of the e!inent +urist !ay ,ell reflect the favorable reaction of the public in general to ,hat the Act ai! to achieve in the na!e of good and clean govern!ent. The present +udicial incu!bents, ,ho have not in any ,ay, by their acts and behavior ,hile in office, tarnished the good i!age that the +udiciary should have, therefore, have no cause for apprehension that ,hat they are entitled to under the Constitution by ,ay of security of tenure ,ig be denied the!, considering the publicly *no,n ai! and purpose of the !assive +udicial reva!p, specially as cherished ,ith deep concern by the President ,ho initiated the !ove ,hen he created the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Co!!ittee to reco!!end needed and appropriate +udicial refor!s. 0f the only obstacle to a verdict in favor of constitutionality of the la, is its possible effect of i!pairing the security of tenure of the incu!bents, ;e !ay have the follo,ing facts to consider. ". :nder the "$<5 Constitution all incu!bent +udges and +ustices !ay continue in office until replaced or reappointed by the President. As to those +udicial officials, no security of tenure, in the traditional concept, attaches to their incu!bency ,hich is, in a real sense, only a holdover tenure. Ao, the President has e ercised this i!!ense po,er ,ith ad!irable restraint should serve as the strongest guarantee of ho, +ustice and fairness ,ill be his sole guide in i!ple!enting the la,. #. As to the rest of the incu!bents, they are all appointees of )ur present President, and he should feel concerned !ore than anyone else to protect ,hatever rights they !ay rightfully clai! to !aintain their official standing and integrity. They need have no fear of being ignored for no reason at all, !uch less for !ere spirit of vindictiveness or lac* of nobility of heart. (ro! the foregoing, it ,ould beco!e apparent that only in the i!ple!entation of the la, !ay there possibly be a taint of constitutional repugnancy as ,hen a +udge of ac*no,ledged honesty, industry and co!petence is separated, because an act of arbitrariness ,ould thereby be co!!itted, but the abolition of the courts as decreed by the la, is not by itself or per se unconstitutional.

Conse7uently, the la,, the result of serious and concerned study by a highly co!petent co!!ittee, deserves to be given a chance to prove its ,orth in the ,ay of i!proving the +udiciary. 0f in its i!ple!entation, any one, if at all, feels aggrieved, he can al,ays see* +udicial redress, if he can !a*e out a case of violation of his right of security of tenure ,ith uncontrovertible clarity, as ,hen the separation is very arbitrary in the peculiar circu!stances of his case, for an act of arbitrariness, under any constitution, is unpardonable. This petition should also be dis!issed for being pre!ature, as is the stand of 'ustice A7uino. The petition as*s this Court to e ercise its po,er of +udicial in7uiry, the po,er to declare a la, unconstitutional ,hen it conflicts ,ith the funda!ental la, ?People vs. Eera, >6 Phil. 6>@. This po,er has ,ell-defined li!its, for it can be e ercised only ,hen the follo,ing re7uisites are present, to ,it. ?"@ There !ust be an actual case or controversyG ?#@ The 7uestion of constitutionality !ust be raised by the proper partyG ?5@ Ae should do so at the earliest opportunity, and ?D@ The deter!ination of the constitutionality of the statute !ust be necessary to a final deter!ination of the case. 0 a! of the opinion that the petition does not present an actual controversy nor ,as it filed by the proper parties. The !ain ground for ,hich the constitutionality of the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4= is assailed is that it is violative of the security of tenure of +ustices and +udges. The only persons ,ho could raise the 7uestion of constitutionality of the la, are, therefore, the actual incu!bents of the courts ,ho ,ould be separated fro! the service upon the abolition of the courts affected by the la,, on the theory as advanced by petitioners that their +udicial security of tenure ,ould be violated. )longapo City 'udge de la 8lana, the only +udge a!ong the petitioners, has not been separated fro! the service. Nor is his separation already a certainty, for he !ay be appointed to the court e7uivalent to his present court, or even pro!oted to a higher court. )nly ,hen it has beco!e certain that his tenure has been ter!inated ,ill an actual controversy arise on his allegation of a fact that has beco!e actual, not !erely probable or hypothetical. The present petition !ay neither be allo,ed as a ta payer suit. A ta payer !ay bring an action to raise the 7uestion of constitutionality of a statute only ,hen no one else can !ore appropriately bring the suit to defend a right e clusively belonging to hi!, and. therefore, ,ould locali&e the actual in+ury to his person, and to no other. (or a %proper party% to invo*e the po,er of +udicial in7uiry, as one of the re7uisites in the e ercise of such po,er, does not !ean one having no better right, one !ore personali&ed, than ,hat he has as a !e!ber of the public in general. ;ith the incu!bent +udges undoubtedly being the ones under petitioners9 theory, ,ho ,ould suffer direct and actual in+ury, they should e clude !ere ta payers ,ho cannot be said to suffer as %direct% and %actual% an in+ury as the +udges and +ustices by the enforce!ent of the assailed statute, fro! the right to bring the suit. The validity of the foregoing observation beco!es !ore evident ,hen ;e consider that only after the fate of the present incu!bents is *no,n, ,hether they have been actually separated or not, ,ould the present courts be declared abolished. (or the la, clearly continues their e istence until all the ne, courts have been filled up ,ith ne, appoint!ents, or at least such nu!ber as ,ould be e7ual to the nu!ber of actual incu!bents, and they are the very courts to ,hich they !ay lay clai! to the right to continue therein, so that the status of each and everyone of the! has thereby been !ade certain. )nly then, upon the actual abolition of the courts, !ay there possibly be a violation of the security of tenure, as contented, that ,ould give rise to an %actual controversy% in ,hich the > i!proper party% can be no other than the +udges ,ho feel aggrieved by their non- appoint!ent to the ne, courts. 0t ,ould, therefore, not be proper to declare the la, void at this stage, before it has even been given a chance to prove its ,orth, as the legislature itself and an those ,ho helped by their e haustive and scholarly study, felt it to be an urgent necessity, and before any of the proper parties ,ho could assail its constitutionality ,ould *no, for a fact, certain and actual, not !erely

probable or hypothetical, that they have a right violated by ,hat they could possibly contend to be an unconstitutional enforce!ent of the la,, not by a la, that is unconstitutional unto itself. 0 a!, therefore, for giving the la, a chance to be put into application so as not to douse great popular e pectations for the courts to regain their highest level of efficiency had reputation for probity. 0nevitably, this is to be so since only ,hen the la, is fully i!ple!ented ,ill all the courts affected be declared abolished, undoubtedly to avoid an interregnu! ,hen the country is ,ithout any court, e cept the /upre!e Court, the Court of Ta Appeals and the /andigan. )nly then ,ill it be *no,n ,hether an actual controversy ,ould arise because any of the incu!bents have been left out in the restructured +udiciary. There ,ould then be also a proper party to assail the constitutionality of the la,, confor!ably to the conditions re7uisite for the e ercise of the po,er of +udicial in7uiry ,hich by their stringent character, together ,ith the constitutional prescription of a co!paratively higher vote to declare a la, unconstitutional, reveal a salutary principle of govern!ent that a la, should, by all reasonable intend!ent and feasible !eans, be saved fro! the doo! of unconstitutionality, the rule corollary thereto being that if a la, is susceptible to t,o interpretations, one of ,hich ,ould !a*e it constitutional, that interpretation should be adopted that ,ill not *ill the la,. 0t is to adhere to the above principles that the sub!ission is !ade herein, that ,hile in the i!ple!entation of the la,, constitutional repugnancy !ay not entirely be ruled out, a categorical ruling hereon not being necessary or desirable at the !o!ent, the la, itself is definitely not unconstitutional. 3 Any of the incu!bent +udges ,ho feel in+ured after the la, shall have been i!ple!ented has ade7uate re!edy in la,, ,ith full relief as ,ould be proper. But surely, the benefits envisioned by the la, in the discharge of one of the basic duties of govern!ent to the people B the ad!inistration of +ustice B should not be sacrificed, as it ,ould be, if the la, is, as sought in the present petition, declared void right no,, on the clai! of a fe, of being allegedly denied a right, at best of doubtful character, for the clai! ,ould see! to rest on an unsupportable theory that they have a vested right to a public office. 'ust one !ore point. The la, in 7uestion is not self-e ecuting in the sense that upon its effectivity, certain +udges and +ustices cease to be so by direct action of the la,. This is ,hat distinguishes the Act in 7uestion fro! R.A. No. ""4> involved in the )ca!po case, 5 ,hich by its direct action, no act of i!ple!entation being necessary, all the +udges ,hose positions ,ere abolished, auto!atically ceased as such. The Act in 7uestion, therefore, is not as e posed to the sa!e vulnerability to constitutional attac* as R.A. No. ""4> ,as. Fet by the operation of the Constitution ,ith its ,ise provision on ho, a la, !ay be declared unconstitutional, R.A. No. ""4> stood the test for it to be enforced to the fullness of its intent, ,hich ,as, as in the la, under consideration, 0dentified ,ith public interest and general ,elfare, through a !ore efficient and effective +udicial syste! as the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4= see*s to establish. Aence, the constitutionality of the la, should not be assailed, and the la, itself, stri*en do,n, on the ground that so!e +udges or +ustices !ay be re!oved or separated in violation of their security of tenure. The la, does not directly operate ,ith Chat effect. 0t is in ho, the la, ,ould be i!ple!ented that this feared eventuality !ay or !ay not occur. ;e ,ould then be *illing the la, on a !ere speculation if ;e do so at this stage. This ,ould be an in+udicious act done in rec*less disregard of the safeguards built around a la, to defend it ,hen its constitutionality is attac*edG first the presu!ption that a la, is constitutionalG secon' ,hen a la, is susceptible to t,o interpretations one that ,ould !a*e it constitutional, the other, unconstitutional, the for!er should be adoptedG and t"ir', the Constitution itself ,hich ordains that a la, !ay not be declared unconstitutional e cept on the vote of at least ten ?"=@ !e!bers of the /upre!e Court, !ore than ,hat is re7uired for an ordinary decision of the Court en banc. This is not to !ention the stringent re7uisites for the e ercise of the po,er of +udicial in7uiry as already adverted to, all designed to save the la, fro! the dire fate of unconstitutionality.

To the ,riter, the 7uestion before this Court is a si!ple !atter of choosing bet,een protecting so!e +udges fro! possible separation, as the i!ple!entation of the la, to achieve its pri!ary purpose of i!proving the +udiciary !ay have to result in, or serving the interest of the entire society through an honest, efficient and effective +udiciary. (or, it is unthin*able that ,hat is for the good of the people as a ,hole could have been !eant by the Constitution to be sacrificed for the sa*e of only the fe,. The greatest good for the greatest nu!ber is an un,ritten rule, !ore fir! and enduring than any of the postulates spread in our ,ritten Constitution. This, 0 !ight say, is the !ain the!e of this separate opinion, other,ise e pressed in the ,ell-*no,n and ti!ehonored !a i! %/alus populi establish supre!a le .%

MELENC(O-7ERRERA, J., concurring. There is un7ualified adherence on !y part to the dis!issal of the Petition filed in this case. 0f 0 a! ,riting this separate concurrence, it is !erely to state certain vie,s 0 entertain in regards to the constitutionality of Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$. The controversy in this case involves t,o constitutional provisions. Article K, /ection ", of the )rganic la, provides that the legislative has the po,er to establish inferior Courts by la,. /ection < of the sa!e Article reads. /EC, <. The Me!bers of the /upre!e Court and +udges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or beco!e incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The /upre!e Court shall have the po,er to discipline +udges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Me!bers order their dis!issal. There should be no conflict Bet,een the t,o provisions. Both should be har!oni&ed. ". a@ 0t is a funda!ental proposition that the legislative po,er to create Courts ordinarily includes the po,er to organi&e and to reorgani&e the!, and that the po,er to abolish Courts is generally coe tensive ,ith the po,er to create the!. The po,er to abolish ,as not intended to be 7ualified by the per!anence of tenure ?)pinion of Chief 'ustice Ricardo Paras in )ca!po vs. /ecretary of 'ustice, 6" ).3. "D< M"$66N, citing McCulley vs. /tate, 65 /; "5DG Aalsey vs. 3aines # 8ea 5">@. The right of 'udges to hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of <= years, or beco!e incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, does not deprive Congress of its po,er to abolish, organi&e or reorgani&e inferior Courts ?Brillo vs. Enage, $D Phil. <5#, <56, citing Iandueta vs. de la Costa, >> Phil. >"6G D# A!. 'ur., Pub. )fficer, $=D-6@. 'udges of those Courts ta*e office ,ith that encu!brance and *no,ledge. The legislative po,er to create a court carries ,ith it the po,er to abolish it. ;hen the court is abolished any une pired ter! is abolished also. The +udge of such court ta*es office ,ith that encu!brance and *no,ledge. Perkins v. Corbin, D6 Ala "=5, > A!. Rep. >$4G /tate, e rel. ,"omas v. (unter, "<= Ala. ">6, 6D /o #45, et al.% The i!portance and the i!perative of !aintaining the independence of the 'udiciary is undisputed. At the sa!e ti!e, the po,er of Congress under the Constitution cannot be abridged. (or, in the last analysis, it is not the security of tenure per se that is the only safeguard to the independence of the 'udiciary. 0t is the character and the !ettle of the 'udges ,ho sit on the Bench. Aas not the i!pression been created in the public and that there are those ,ho have abused the prerogatives of their +udicial position *no,ing that they are untouchables by virtue of the per!anence of their tenure

b@ A distinction should be !ade bet,een tenure of 'udges and tenure of Courts. /ection " heretofore !entioned refers to the %'udiciary% as a funda!ental depart!ent of 3overn!ent. /ection < 7uoted above refers to the tenure of office of %individual% 'udges ?inclusive of 'ustices of inferior Courts that is to say, tenure of office is a !atter concerning the individual 'udge. This %individuality% character of /ection < is supported by the clause that the /upre!e Court has the po,er to discipline in'ivi'ual +udges of inferior Courts. A legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to Courts. Courts can be abolished. 0n fact, the entire +udicial syste! can be changed. 0f that syste! can no longer ad!it of change, ,oe to the ,heels of progress and the i!peratives of gro,th in the develop!ent of the 'udiciary. To hold that tenure of 'udges is superior to the legislative po,er to reorgani&e is to render i!potent the e ercise of that po,er. 0t !ay even be stated that, under /ection <, supra, 'udges are entailed to their Courts, fro! ,hich they cannot be separated before retire!ent age e cept as a disciplinary action for bad behavior. :nder /ection ", Courts are not entailed to their 'udges, because the po,er of the legislative to establish inferior Courts presupposes the po,er to abolish those Courts. 0f an inferior Court is abolished, the 'udge presiding that Court ,ill necessarily have to lose his position because the abolished Court is not entailed to hi!. c@ The constitutional guarantee of tenure of 'udges applies only as their Courts e ist. As long as those Courts e ist, the 'udges cannot be ousted ,ithout +ust causeG that is the e tent of the constitutional provision relative to security of tenure of 'udges. :pon declaration of the co!pletion of the reorgani&ation as provided for in the Reorgani&ation Act, the affected Courts %shall be dee!ed auto!atically abolished There being no Courts, there are no offices for ,hich tenure of 'udges !ay be clai!ed. By the abolition of those offices, the rights to the! are necessarily e tinguished ?Manalang vs. Cuitoriano, $D Phil. $=5 M"$6DN@. #. 0 a! satisfied that the challenged la, ,as enacted by the Batasang Pa!bansa in response to an urgent and pressing public need and not for the purpose of affecting adversely the security of tenure of all 'udges or legislating the! out to the detri!ent of +udicial independence. 0t should riot be said of the Batasang Pa!bansa that its po,er of abolition of Courts has been used to disguise an unconstitutional and evil purpose to defeat the security of tenure of 'udges. The 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4" sufficiently co!plies ,ith the bona fi'e rule in the abolition of public office, as clearly e plained in the !ain opinion. Besides, every presu!ption of good faith in its actuations !ust be accorded a coordinate and coe7ual branch of govern!ent, supre!e ,ithin the li!its of its o,n sphere, until that presu!ption is clearly overco!e. There is no sho,ing that the Reorgani&ation Act ,as !otivated for personal or political reasons as to +ustify the interference by the Court ?3arvey vs. 8o,ell, "$$ Mass, D<, 46 N.E. "4#, "#< A./.R. D>4G /tate vs. Eduards, D= Mont. #4<G "=> Pac. >$6, "$ R.C.8. #5>G 8lanto vs. 1i!aporo, "> /CRA 6$$ M"$>>N@. Public interest and public good, as the legislative body vie,s it, !ust be balanced ,ith tenure of 'udges, ,hich is an individual right. Reverting to /ection " and /ection <, supra, the for!er is the ,eightier, because the %'udiciary% is of !ore i!portance to the ,elfare of the country than the tenure of office of an individual 'udge. 0f a 'udge is re!oved ,ithout cause there can be da!age to the public ,elfare to so!e e tent, but !aintenance of a Court that does not !eet the re7uire!ents of progressive 3overn!ent, can cause incalculable pre+udice to the people. 5. Nor does a conflict e ist ,ith the po,er of discipline vested in the /upre!e Court by the present Constitution reading. the /upre!e Court shall have the po,er %to discipline 'udges of inferior Courts, and, by a vote of at least 4 !e!bers, order their dis!issal Absent the Court, it ,ould be futile to spea* of the /upre!e Court9s po,er to discipline. Thus, ,here the legislature has ,illed that the Courts be abolished, the po,er to discipline cannot pose an obstacle to the abolition. The po,er to discipline can co!e into play only ,hen there is re!oval fro! an e isting +udicial office but not ,hen that it office is abolished. The reorgani&ation of the +udicial syste!

,ith the abolition of certain Courts is not an e ercise of the po,er to discipline the 'udges of the abolished Courts. 0t is of significance to note that the po,er to dis!issal vested in the /upre!e Court by the "$<5 Constitution is deli!ited by its po,er to discipline. Absent any need for discipline and the po,er to dis!iss does not e ist. Being circu!scribed in scope, it !ay ,ell be as*ed. does the grant of the po,er of discipline and dis!issal in the /upre!e Court deprive the e ecutive of the po,er of re!ovalH 0s it not !ore in *eeping ,ith the allocation of po,ers in our govern!ent to state that the /upre!e Court shares its po,er to dis!iss ,ith the e ecutive po,er of re!ovalH (or is not the po,er of re!oval basically e ecutive in nature, as an incident to the po,er of appoint!ent, ,hich is the prerogative of the Chief E ecutive alone As in the case of appoint!ents, /ection 6 ?>@, Article K of the Constitution provides that the /upre!e Court shall appoint its officials and e!ployees. Ao,ever, is not this po,er shared ,ith the po,er of appoint!ent of the e ecutive ,ho appoints so!e of the Court officials These 7uestions could lend the!selves to an in-depth study in the proper case. D. The abolition ,ould be no deprivation either of due process of la,. A public office cannot be regarded as the %property % of the incu!bent. A public office is not a contract ?/egovia vs. Noel, D< Phil. 6D5 M"$#6N@. A public office is a public trust ?/ection ", Article K000. "$<5 Constitution@. 0t is a privilege in the gift of the /tate ?Bro,n vs. Russell, ">> Mass. "D, D5 NE "==6, 5# 8RA, #65 cited also in TaJada O Carreon, Political 8a, of the Philippines, Eol. #, p. 65<@. The officers are the servants of the people and not their rulers ?## R.C.8. 5<4-5<$, cited in Martin, Ad!inistrative 8a,, 8a, on Public )fficers and Election 8a,, p. ""#, "$<= ed.@. Besides, it bears stressing that there is no re!oval fro! office but abolition of the office itself. 6. The 7uestioned statute is in *eeping ,ith !a+or refor!s in other depart!ents of govern!ent. %The thrust is on develop!ent.% 0t is %the first !a+or reorgani&ation after four generations.% 0t does not provide for a piece!eal change, ,hich could be ineffective. 0t goes to the roots and does not +ust scratch the surface of our +udicial syste!. 0ts !ain ob+ectives are an i!proved ad!inistration of +ustice, the %attain!ent of !ore efficiency in the disposal of cases, a reallocation of +urisdiction, and a revision of procedures ,hich do not tend to the proper !eting out of +ustice.% These ai!s are policy !atters of necessity in the pursuit of develop!ental goals ,ithin the 'udiciary. >. The Reorgani&ation Act reorgani&ing the entire +udicial syste! e cluding the /upre!e Court, ,hich is the only constitutional Court, and the /andiganbayan. 0t envisages institutional refor!s in the Philippine +udiciary. 0t does not si!ply change the na!es of the Courts. The facts herein are dissi!ilar fro! those in &rillo vs. Ena#e ?$D Phil. <5# M"$6DN@ ,here the position of 'ustice of the Peace, although ostensibly abolished, ,as !erely changed to Municipal 'udge after the !unicipality of Tacloban ,as converted into a city ,ith its o,n charter. /ignificant a!ong the institutional changes and procedural refor!s are. ,"e 2nterme'iate Appellate Court This Court is no, constituted into ten ?"=@ divisions instead of fifteen ?"6@, five !e!bers co!posing each division, and a !a+ority vote of three !e!bers being needed for a decision. This obviates the cu!berso!e procedure, in case of dissent, of assigning t,o other !e!bers to co!pose a %division of five%. 0t also allo,s fle ibility in that any three !e!bers of a division, arriving at unani!ity, can pro!ulgate a decision. No, provided for is speciali&ation into four ?D@ Civil Cases 1ivisions, t,o ?#@ Cri!inal Cases 1ivisions and four ?D@ /pecial Cases 1ivisions. The speciali&ation is e pected to contribute to the e peditious disposal of cases. The Court has been given original +urisdiction to issue ;rits of !anda!us, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, 7uo ,arranto and au iliary ,rits or processes ,hether or not in aid of its appellate +urisdiction. This ,ould undoubtedly ease the burden of the /upre!e Court ,here nu!erous such cases are filed daily.

0t has e clusive appellate +urisdiction over all final +udg!ents, decisions, resolutions, orders or a,ards of 7uasi-+udicial agencies, instru!entalities, boards or co!!issions, e cept those falling ,ithin the e clusive appellate +urisdiction of the /upre!e Court in accordance ,ith the Constitution. The 0nter!ediate Appellate Court ,ould no, have the po,er to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perfor! any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling ,ithin its original and appellate +urisdiction, including the po,er to grant and conduct ne, trials or further proceedings ?/ec. $@. This does a,ay ,ith the delays attendant to the re!and of cases to the lo,er trial Courts. >e#ional ,rial Courts There are no, thirteen ?"5@ 'udicial Regions, the sa!e as the present ad!inistrative and Batasang Pa!bansa Regions, instead of si teen ?">@ 'udicial 1istricts. A 'udge is appointed to a region, ,hich is his official station. This ensures !obility since a 'udge !ay be assigned any,here ,ithin the Region ,ithout applying the constitutional li!itation of si !onths. Additionally, -it can re!edy te!porary ine7ualities of caseloads in trial Courts. /peciali&ed Courts are integrated into the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, Regional Trial Courts ,ould try all cases ,ithin its +urisdiction unless special cases are assigned to the!, in ,hich case, they re!ain as Branches of Regional Trial Courts. /pecial procedures and technical rules governing special Courts ,ill continue to re!ain applicable in Branches assigned those special cases. etropolitan ,rial Courts There is one Metropolitan Trial Court ,ith several Branches for large urban areas. The appoint!ent of 'udges ,ould be to a Metropolitan Trial Court although a 'udge !ay be assigned by the /upre!e Court to any Branch of the Metropolitan Trial Court as de!anded by the e igencies of the service. The /upre!e Court !ay designate certain Branches of said Courts to e ercise special +urisdiction over certain cases, unli*e the present set-up ,here special +urisdiction applies only to cases of traffic violations. unicipal ,rial Courts? unicipal Circuit ,rial Courts Municipal Trial Courts !ay no, be designated by the /upre!e Court to e ercise special +urisdiction over certain cases, thereby resulting in overall fle ibility. They can also be circuiti&ed ,ith those in cities not for!ing part of !etropolitan areas. )ne notable change bet,een the old and the ne, set up is that 'udges of these Courts ,ill no, be Presidential appointees unli*e presently ,here the incu!bent 'udges are !erely designated by the /upre!e Court in an Ad!inistrative )rder to sit in e isting Municipal Courts and Municipal Circuit Courts. <. There are innovative features in the Act that co!!end the!selves. a@ The confusing and illogical areas of concurrent +urisdiction bet,een trial Courts have been entirely eli!inated. b@ :nder /ection 5$, there is a unifor! period for appeal of fifteen ?"6@ days counted fro! the notice of the final order, resolution, a,ard, +udg!ent, or decision appealed fro!.

A record on appeal is no longer re7uired to ta*e an appeal. The entire original record is no, to be trans!itted. c@ :nder /ection D=, in deciding appealed cases, adoption by reference of findings of fact and conclusions of la, as set forth in the decision, order, or resolution appealed fro!, is also provided for. This ,ill e pedite the rendition of decisions in appealed cases. d@ /ection D# provides for %a !onthly longevity pay e7uivalent to 6P of the !onthly basic pay for 'ustices and 'udges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient, and !eritorious service rendered in the 'udiciary, Provided that, in no case shall the total salary of each 'ustice or 'udge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, e ceed the salary of the 'ustice or 'udge ne t in ran*.% Thus, 'ustices and 'udges ,ho !ay not reach the top, ,here unfortunately there is not enough roo! for all, !ay have the satisfaction of at least appro i!ating the salary scale of those above hi! depending on his length of service, 4. But ,hile the la, itself as ,ritten is constitutional, the !anner in ,hich it ,ill be ad!inistered should not be tainted ,ith unconstitutionality ?Myles /alt Co. vs. Board of Co!!rs., #5$ :/ D<4, >= 8. Ed. 5$#, 5> /ct #=D@. To obviate the possibility of an unconstitutional e ercise of po,er the follo,ing safeguards are reco!!ended and2or e pected to be underta*en. a@ The President can be e pected to indicate a reasonable ti!e fra!e for the co!pletion of the reorgani&ation provided for in the Act and the issuance of the corresponding i!ple!enting )rder. b@ Appoint!ents and their effectivity should be si!ultaneous ,ith, or as close as possible, to the declaration by the President of the co!pletion of the reorgani&ation under /ection DD to avoid any detri!ent to the s!ooth and continuous functioning of the +udicial !achinery. c@ The services of those not separated should be dee!ed uninterrupted, as reco!!ended by the Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation ?Article K0 of its Report@. $. (or the speedy i!ple!entation of the la,, the /upre!e Court can be e pected to sub!it to the President ,ithin thirty ?5=@ days fro! the date of finality of its 1ecision the staffing pattern for all Courts re7uired by /ection D5. 0 a! constrained to disagree ,ith the suggestion of one of the amici curiae that the staffing pattern be !ade to include the na!es of 'udges. The staffing pattern for 'udges is already clearly and e plicitly provided in the la, itself ,hich enu!erates the various 'udges and 'ustices in their hierarchical order. (urther!ore, to include the superior positions of 'udges ,ould depart fro! the traditional concept of a staffing pattern, ,hich refers !ore to personnel organi&ation and corresponding salaries of inferior e!ployees. 0t is also constitutionally ob+ectionable in that it ,ould interfere ,ith the prerogative of appoint!ent intrinsically e ecutive in nature ?3uevara vs. 0nocentes, "> /CRA 5<$ M"$>>NG 3overn!ent of the Philippines vs. /pringer, 6= Phil. #6$ M"$#<N@. The President !ay not be deprived of, nor be li!ited in, the full use of his discretion in the appoint!ent of persons to any public office. Nothing should so trench upon e ecutive choice as to be, in effect, +udicial designation. "=. A ,ord of e planation. 0f 0 had resolved not to inhibit !yself in this case upon !otion filed by petitioners, it ,as because the Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation, of ,hich 0 ,as privileged to be a !e!ber, confined its ,or* to the reco!!endation of options and guidelines in the tas* of reorgani&ation. The Co!!ittee had no part ,hatsoever in the drafting of the bill nor in the public hearings conducted. 0n fact, so!e of its reco!!endations li*e the circuiti&ation or regionali&ation of the 0nter!ediate Appellate Court, the appellation of !e!bers of the 'udiciary, the confine!ent of the +urisdiction of the 0nter!ediate Appellate Court !erely to appellate +urisdiction, the

adoption of the syste! found in the :nited Lingdo! and in Co!!on,ealth countries of having a Court of general +urisdiction ,ith trial and appellate divisions, ,ere not availed of in the final Act. "". 8astly, but by no !eans the least, 0 entertain no doubt that reliance can be placed on the good faith of the President that all the deserving, upon considerations of %efficiency, integrity, length of service and other relevant factors shall be appointed to a strengthened and revitali&ed +udicial syste! in the interest of public serviceG that appoint!ents ,ill not be unduly delayedG and that appointees ,ill be evaluated thoroughly to ensure 7uality and i!partiality in the !en and ,o!en ,ho ,ill *eep vigil over our +udicial ra!parts.

ER(CTA, J., concurring. 0 concur in the vie, that the 'udiciary reorgani&ation la, is not unconstitutional. 0t does not violate the principle of security of tenure of +udges. The Constitution grants to the Batasang Pa!bansa the po,er to create courts inferior to the /upre!e Court ?Article K, /ection "@. All e isting inferior courts ,ere created by la,. No la, is irrepealable. The po,er to create an office includes the po,er to abolish the sa!e. ?:rgelio vs. )s!eJa $ /CRA 5"<G Ma&a vs. )chave, #= /CRA "D#@ /ecurity of tenure cannot be invo*ed ,hen there is no re!oval of a public officer or e!ployee but an abolition of his office. ?Manalang vs. Cuitoriano, $D Phil. $=5G Cru& vs. Pri!icias, #5 /CRA $$4G Baldo& vs. )ffice of the President, <4 /CRA 56D, 5>#@ A distinction should be !ade bet,een re!oval fro! office and abolition of an office. Re!oval i!plies that the office subsists after ouster, ,hile, in abolition, the office no longer e ists thereby ter!inating the right of the incu!bent to e ercise the rights and duties of the office. ?Canonigo vs. Ra!iro, 5" /CRA #<4@ The po,er of the legislative branch of the govern!ent to abolish courts inferior to the /upre!e Court has long been established. ?)ca!po vs. /ecretary of 'ustice, 6" ).3. "D<@. ;hat is only needed is that the abolition passes the test of good faith. it need only be sho,n that said abolition of the courts is !erely incidental to a bona fide reorgani&ation. ?:rgelio vs. )s!eJa supra.@ 0t is unthin*able to i!pute bad faith to the Presidential Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation co!posed of four ?D@ distinguished !e!bers of the /upre!e Court, the Minister of 'ustice and the 1eputy Minister of 'ustice, and to the !e!bers of the Batasang Pa!bansa ,hose co!bined efforts after a careful study and deliberation resulted to the enact!ent of a bill no, signed into la, as Batasang Pa!bansa Blg. "#$. 0n his sponsorship speech, 'ustice Ricardo C. Puno declared the ob+ectives of the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation 8a, to be the follo,ing. ?"@ the attain!ent of !ore efficiency in the disposal of casesG ?#@ the i!prove!ent in the 7uality of decisions by the courts that ,ill result fro! the easing of court doc*etsG and ?5@ structural changes to !eet the e igencies of present day Philippine /ociety and of the foreseeable future. Ad!ittedly, in the i!ple!entation of the la,, so!e 'udges and 'ustices !ay be adversely affected. But in a conflict bet,een public interest and the individual interest of so!e 'udges and 'ustices, the public ,eal !ust prevail. The ,elfare of the people is the supre!e la,. The i!ple!entation of the la, ,ill entail appoint!ents to the ne, courts. The po,er of appoint!ent is the e clusive prerogative of the President. The i!ple!entation of the la, should be left e clusively to the ,isdo!, patriotis! and states!anship of the President.

PLANA, J., concurring. As the la,!a*ing body has the po,er to create inferior courts and define, prescribe and apportion their +urisdiction, so it has the po,er to abolish or replace the! ,ith other courts as long as the act is done in good faith and not for the purpose of attaining an unconstitutional end. 3ood faith has thus beco!e the crucial issue in the case at bar. :pon an e a!ination of the legislative history of Batas Pa!bansa "#$, as has been done in the !ain opinion, it is !anifest that actual, not !erely presu!ed good faith attended its enact!ent. )n this basis, 0 concur in the opinion penned by the learned Chief 'ustice, 7ualified only by the follo,ing observations. ". E=ecutive consultation 3it" t"e Supreme Court. 1 0 believe the President is under no obligation to consult ,ith the /upre!e CourtG and the /upre!e Court as such is not called upon to give legal advice to the President. 0ndeed, as the /upre!e Court itself has said, it cannot give advisory opinions ?Bacolod Murcia Planters9 Asso., 0nc. vs. Bacolod B Murcia !illing Co., 5= /CRA ><G N;/A vs. Court of 0ndustrial Relations, $= /CRA >#$@ even to the President. 0n the drafting of the present Constitution, there ,as an atte!pt to vest the /upre!e Court ,ith the function of giving advisory opinions. The fra!ers of the Constitution, ho,ever, did not see fit to adopt the proposal. 0f the President should consult the /upre!e Court on the i!ple!entation of Batas Pa!bansa "#$ and the /upre!e Court should give its advice ?leaving aside the 7uestion of procedure@, 0 believe the President ,ould be free to follo, or disregard the adviceG but, in either case, there ,ould be no guarantee that the i!ple!enting action ,ould be upheld in one case or stric*en do,n in the other. #. -n'ue 'ele#ation of le#islative po3ers . B The petitioners have also assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pa!bansa "#$ on the ground that a provision thereof ?regarding fi ing of co!pensation and allo,ances for !e!bers of the 'udiciary@ constitutes an undue delegation unto the President of legislative po,er. As pointed out in the !ain opinion, the legislature has provided a!ple standards or guidelines for the i!ple!entation of the delegated po,er, ,hich !a*es the delegation inoffensive. 0 ,ould li*e to add ho,ever so!e observations on the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative po,er. :nder the old Constitution, ,hen the abiding rule ,as separation of legislative and e ecutive po,ers, there ,as good reason to !aintain the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative po,er. )ther,ise, the principle of separationof govern!ental po,ers could be negated via unbridled 'ele#ation of legislative po,er. The "$<5 Constitution has ho,ever radically changed the constitutional set-up. There is no, a co!!ingling or fusion of e ecutive and legislative po,ers in the hands of the sa!e group of officials. Cabinet !e!bers play a leading role in the legislative process, and !e!bers of the Batasan actively discharge e ecutive functions. The Pri!e Minister indeed !ust co!e fro! its ran*s. :nder the circu!stances, there is really not !uch sense in rigidly upholding the principle of non-delegation of legislative po,er, at least vis-avis the E ecutive 1epart!ent. 0n a very real sense, the present Constitution has significantly eroded the hoary doctrine of non-delegation of legislative po,er, although it has retained so!e provisions of the old Constitution ,hich ,ere predicated on the principle of non-delegation, this ti!e perhaps not so !uch to authori&e shifting of po,er and thereby correspondingly reduce the incidence of %undue% delegation of legislative po,er, as to avert the abdication thereof. 0n ti!es of ,ar or other national e!ergency, the Batasang Pa!bansa !ay by la, authori&e the President for a li!ited period and sub+ect to such restrictions as it !ay prescribe, to e ercise po,ers necessary and proper to carry out a declared

national policy. :nless sooner ,ithdra,n by resolution of the Batasang Pa!bansa, such po,ers shall cease upon its ne t ad+ourn!ent. ?Art. E000, /ec. "6.@ The Batasang Pa!bansa !ay by la, authori&e the President to fi ,ithin specified this and sub+ect to such stations and restrictions as it !ay i!pose, tariff rates, i!port and e port 7uotas, tonnage and ,harfage dues, and other duties or i!posts. M2bi', /ec. "<?#@.N

TEE7AN8EE, J., dissenting. :ndoubtedly, no !ore crucial and transcendental issue of such !agnitude has confronted the Philippine +udiciary than in the present case. The challenged Act, Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$ by its title ,ould reorgani&e all e isting courts ?e cept the nine-!e!ber /andiganbayan 1 and the three- !e!ber Court of Ta Appeals@ and upon declaration by the President of the co!pletion of the reorgani&ation ,ould unprecedentedly dee! all the said courts %auto!atically abolished en !asse and %the incu!bents thereof shall cease to hold office.% 2 The total abolition involves a total of ",>>5 +udicial positions ,ith ","4= incu!bent +udges and D45 vacancies@ as of 'anuary #>, "$4# and the Act ,ould effect an increase of #5= +udicial positions raising the total of +udicial positions to be filled by ne, appoint!ents to ",4$5. Not,ithstanding the great deference due to enact!ents of the Batasan, 0 regretably find !yself unable to +oin the ran*s of !y estee!ed colleagues in the !a+ority ,ho uphold the constitutionality of the Act and have voted to dis!iss the petition, for the follo,ing !ain considerations and reasons. ". 0 go by the ruling of the nu!erical !a+ority of seven 'ustices ?na!ely, Pablo, Cesar Beng&on, Monte!ayor, 'ugo, Bautista, Roberto Concepcion and '.B.8. Reyes, ''.@ in the leading "$66 case of 0campo 3 ,ho fell short by one vote to reach the constitutionally re7uired #25 !a+ority ?at the ti!e 4 out of an ""-!e!ber /upre!e Court@ to declare unconstitutional and invalid section 5 of Republic Act ""4> abolishing the positions of "4 +udges-at-large and "6 cadastral +udges and re!oving or legislating out the incu!bent +udges fro! office as against the contrary vote of a !inority of D 'ustices ?na!ely, then Chief 'ustice Paras and Padilla, Ale Reyes and 8abrador, ''.@ ,ith the parado ical situation that the last three na!ed 'ustices voted for the validity of the Act as a re!edial !easure that abolished said positions ,ithout per!anent station ,hich sub+ected the! to a ri#o'on 'e @ueces ,ithout the consent of the /upre!e Court, ,hich they considered as %repulsive to an independent +udiciary% and violative of an e press prohibitory provision of the "$56 Constitution Q ,hile 'ustice Ale Reyes conceded that other,ise he ,ould go ,ith the !a+ority that %Congress !ay not, as a general rule, abolish a +udicial post ,ithout allo,ing the incu!bent to finish his ter! of office.% #. As then Associate, later Chief 'ustice Cesar Beng&on re!ar*ed in his separate opinion B %?T@he MadverseN outco!e of this litigation Msanctioning the ouster fro! office of the ten petitioners ,ho ,ere presiding different Courts of (irst 0nstance, so!e as +udges-at-large, others as cadastral +udges, upon the enact!ent on 'une "$, "$6D of R.A. ""4> abolishing the positions of +udges-at large and cadastral +udgesN is apt to revive the speculation ,hether ,ittingly or un,ittingly the Constitution has further ,ea*ened the usually ,ea* +udicial depart!ent because of its 9innovative9 re7uire!ent of a #25 !a+ority vote of the /upre!e Court to declare a statute unconstitutional, and 9never in our history has such a nu!ber of +udges of first instance Mtotalling 55 positionsN been ousted through +udicial reorgani&ation. Ais rationale that the e press constitutional guaranty of security of tenure of +udges %during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or beco!e incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office% 3 !ust prevail over the i!plied constitutional authority to abolish courts and to oust the +udges despite their constitutionally-secured tenure bears repeating thus.

A careful analysis ,ill perceive that ,hereas petitioners invo*e an e=press guaranty or positivedefinition of their ter! of office, the respondents rely on implie' authority to abolish courts and the positions of the respective +udges. Accurately stated, respondents9 defense rests on a secon'inference deduced fro! such implie' po,er, because they reason out thusly. Congress has e press po,er to establish courtsG t"erefore it has i!plicit po,er to abolish courts and the positions of +udges of such abolished courts ?first inference@G an' t"erefore ?second inference@ Congress li*e,ise has po,er to e+ect the +udges holding such positions. Resulting +uridical situation. The implie' authority invo*ed by respondents collides ,ith the e=pressguaranty of tenure protecting the petitioners. ;hich shall prevail )bviously the e press guaranty !ust override the i!plied authority. %0!plications can never be per!itted to contradict the e pressed intent or to defeat its purpose.%

But the collision !ay he should be avoided, and both sections given validity, if one be considered a proviso or e ception to the other. 0n other ,ords, under the Constitution the Congress !ay abolish e isting courts, provided it does not thereby re!ove the incu!bent +udgesG such abolition to ta*e effect upon ter!ination of their incu!bent The funda!ental provisions on the !atter are thereby coordinated and har!oni&ed9 as 'ustice 8aurel suggested in his concurring opinion in Iandueta v. 1e la Costa. To bring about reconciliations is the great ,or* of +urists. ?Cardo&o, Parado es of 8egal /cience, p. >@ 5

5. This reasoning that the e press guaranty of tenure protecting incu!bent +udges during good behavior unless re!oved fro! office after hearing and due process or upon reaching the co!pulsory retire!ent age of seventy years !ust override the i!plied authority of re!oving by legislation the +udges has been further strengthened and placed beyond doubt by the ne, provisions of the "$<5 Constitution that transferred the ad!inistrative supervision over all courts and their personnel fro! the Chief E ecutive through the then /ecretary of 'ustice to the /upre!e Court 4 and vested in the /upre!e Court e clusively %the po,er to discipline +udges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight !e!bers, order their dis!issal,% 7 ;hich po,er ,as for!erly lodged by the 'udiciary Act in the Chief E ecutive. As for!er Chief 'ustice Beng&on stressed in his opinion in 0campo, the "$5D Constitutional Convention %fro,ned on re!oval of +udges of first instance through abolition of their offices or reorgani&ation,% citing Professor 'ose Aruego9s observation that the security of +udges9 tenure provision ,as intended to %help secure the independence of the +udiciary% in that %during good behavior, they !ay not be legislated out of office by the la,-!a*ing body nor re!oved by the Chief E ecutive for any reason and under the guise of any pretense ,hatsoeverG they !ay stay in office until they reach the age of seventy years, or beco!e incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. ?Aruego, The (ra!ing of the Philippine Constitution, Eol. "", pp. <"4-<"$@% Ae further cited Aruego9s report that a proposed a!end!ent to the effect that the prohibition against transfers of +udges to another district ,ithout the approval of the /upre!e Court 8 %should not be applicable to a reorgani&ation of tribunals of +ustice or of districts, but the a!end!ent ,as defeated easily ,ithout debate% 9 and logically concluded that %?N@o,, there . before, having vetoed the transfer of +udges thru a re-organi&ation, the Convention evidently could not have per!itted the re!oval of +udges thru re-organi&ation. No,, if the fra!ers of the "$<5 Constitution ,ished to dispel the strong doubts, to say the least in the light of the < to D vote in the 0campo case against re!oval of incu!bent +udges through legislative action by abolition of their courts, then they ,ould have so clearly provided for such for! of re!oval in the "$<5 Constitution, but on the contrary as already stated they ruled out

such re!oval or ouster of +udges by legislative action by vesting e clusively in the /upre!e Court the po,er of discipline and re!oval of +udges of all inferior courts. D. This being so, the funda!ental point e!phasi&ed by for!er Chief 'ustice Beng&on that abolition of the 55 +udicial positions in the 0campo case ,as %!erely an indirect !anner of re!oving the petitioners-+udges% ,hile the %positions MthatN ,ere eli!inated . . . ,ere in fact substituted or replaced by other positions of +udges% applies ,ith greater force in the case at bar ,hich involves an unprecedented total %abolition,% thus. %?C@all it reorgani&ation, or legislation or re!oval or abolition, this la, disregards the constitutional assurance that these +udges, once appointed, shall hold office during good behavior ... Munless incapacitated and until retire!entN. The abolition of their offices ,as !erely an indirect !anner of re!oving these petitioners. Re!e!ber that on 'une "$, "$6D, there ,ere "=< +udges of first instance, district +udges, +udges at-large and cadastral +udges ?Rep. Act #$>@. After the passage of Republic Act No. ""4> there ,ere ""D positions of +udges of first instance. There ,as no reduction there ,as increase B in the nu!ber of +udges, nor in the nu!ber of courts. The positions of 'udges-at-8arge and Cadastral 'udges ,ere eli!inatedG but they ,ere in fact substituted or replaced by other positions of +udgesG or if you please, there ,as a !ere change of designation fro! 9Cadastral 'udge or 'udge at large to district +udge Aence it should be ruled that as their positions had not been 9abolished9 de facto, but actually retained ,ith another na!e, these petitioners are entitled to re!ain in the service. ?Brillo v. Enage, 3.R. No. 8-<""6, March 5=, "$6D.@ (or it is not per!issible to effect the re!oval of one +udge thru the e pediency of abolishing his office even as the office ,ith sa!e po,er is created ,ith another na!e. ?Brillo v. Enage, Malone v. ;illia!s, ""4 tenn. 5$", 3ibbe9s Case D A.8.R. p. #""@. 0n this vie, of the picture, ,e believe, Congress could have, and should haveas suggested by /ecretary Tua&on during the hearings in Congress directed in said Republic Act No. ""4> that 9the present +udges-at-large and cadastral +udges shall beco!e district +udges presiding such districts as !ay be fi ed by the President ,ith the consent of the Co!!ission on Appoint!ents or by the /ecretary of 'ustice, as originally proposed by /enator 8aurel in connection ,ith the sa!e bill. /o!ething si!ilar ,as done before, and it ,ould not be ob+ectionable as an encroach!ent on the President9s prerogative of appoint!ent, because such +udges had already been appointed to the +udiciary before the passage of the act, and the provision !ay be construed in the light of !ere change of official designation plus increase in salary.% 6. Concededly, the 7uestioned Act effects certain changes and procedural refor!s ,ith !ore specific delineation of +urisdiction as !entioned particularly in the !a+ority opinion, but they do not change the basic structure of the e isting courts. The present Municipal Courts, Municipal Circuit Courts and City Courts are restructured and redesignated as Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Metropolitan Trial Courts in the challenged Act. The Courts of (irst 0nstance, Circuit Cri!inal Courts, 'uvenile O 1o!estic Relations Courts and Courts of Agrarian Relations are all restructured and redesignated to be *no,n by the co!!on na!e of Regional Trial Courts ,ith provision for certain branches thereof %to handle e clusively cri!inal cases, +uvenile and do!estic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land refor! cases . . . . and2or such other special cases as the /upre!e Court !ay deter!ine in the interest of a speedy and efficient ad!inistration of +ustice% 15 and the Court of Appeals is restructured and redesignated as the 0nter!ediate Appellate Court ,ith an increase in the nu!ber of Appellate 'ustices fro! the present D6 to 6= but ,ith a reduction of the nu!ber of divisions fro! "6 ?co!posed of 5 'ustices each@ to "= ?co!posed of 6 !e!bers each@ such that it is feared that there is created a bottlenec* at the appellate level in the i!portant tas* discharged by such appellate courts as revie,ers of facts. 0n !y vie,, the %candid ad!ission% by the Chief 'ustice in his opinion for the Court %that he entertained doubts as to ,hether the inter!ediate court of appeals provided for is a ne, tribunal% 15a is e7ually applicable to all the other above !entioned courts provided for in the challenged Act as %ne, courts%. And the best proof of this is the plain and si!ple transitory provision in section DD thereof that upon the President9s declaration of co!pletion of the reorgani&ation ?,hereby the %old courts% shall %be dee!ed auto!atically abolished and the

incu!bents thereof shall cease to hold office %?T@he cases pending in the old Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together ,ith the pertinent functions, records, e7uip!ent, property and the necessary personnel together ,ith the %applicable appropriations.% This could not have been possible ,ithout a specification and enu!eration of ,hat specific cases of the %old courts% ,ould be transferred to the particular %ne, courts,% had these %ne, courts% not been !anifestly and substantially the %old courts% ,ith a change of na!e B or as described by 'ustice Barredo to have been his first vie,, no, discarded, in his separate opinion. %+ust a rena!ing, and not a substantial and actual !odification or alteration of the present +udicial structure or syste!% or %a rearrange!ent or re!odeling of the old structure.% 11 >. 0 do not subscribe to the test of good faith or bad faith in the abolition of the courts and conse7uent ouster of the incu!bent +udges fro! office as e pounded by the late e!inent 'ustice 'ose P. 8aurel in his separate concurring opinion in the pre-,ar case of )an'ueta 12 ,herein the Court dis!issed the petition for 7uo ,arranto on the ground of petitioner Iandueta9s estoppel and abandon!ent of office. 13 Realistically vie,ed fro! the basis of the established legal presu!ptions of validity and constitutionality of statutes ?unless set aside by a #25 !a+ority of "= !e!bers of the /upre!e Court@ and of good faith in their enact!ent, one is hard put to con+ure a case ,here the Court could speculate on the good or bad !otives behind the enact!ent of the Act ,ithout appearing to be i!prudent and i!proper and declare that %the legislative po,er of reorgani&ation ?is@ sought to cloa* an unconstitutional and evil purpose.% The good faith in the enact!ent of the challenged Act !ust needs be granted. ;hat !ust be reconciled is the legislative po,er to abolish courts as i!plied fro! the po,er to establish the! ,ith the e press constitutional guaranty of tenure of the +udges ,hich is essential for a free and independent +udiciary. Adherents of the Rule of 8a, are agreed that indispensable for the !aintenance of the Rule of 8a, is a free and independent +udiciary, s,orn to protect and enforce. it ,ithout fear or favor B %free, not only fro! graft, corruption, ineptness and inco!petence but even fro! the tentacles of interference and insiduous influence of the political po,ers that be to 7uote again fro! 'ustice Barredo9s separate concurring opinion. 13 Aence, !y adherence to the <-!e!ber !a+ority opinion of for!er Chief 'ustice Beng&on in the 0campo case, supra, as restated by the Philippine Association of 8a, Professors headed by for!er Chief 'ustice Roberto Concepcion that %any reorgani&ation should at least sno, the incu!bents of the e isting courts to re!ain in office Mthe appropriate counterpart 9ne, courts9N unless they are re!oved for cause.% <. The %+udges9 broader and stronger guarantees of tenure than ordinary civil servants% as stressed by for!er Chief 'ustice Beng&on in Ms !a+ority opinion in 0campo is based on the +udiciary9s status as a coe7ual and coordinate branch of govern!ent, ,hereas the long line of Philippine cases upholding the legislative po,er to abolish offices refers to officers or e!ployees in the e ecutive branch of govern!ent and %the underlying consideration !ust be borne in !ind that Manalang Mthe aggrieved petitionerN belon#e' to t"e E=ecutive *epartment and because the President approved the la, no 7uestion or encroach!ent by one branch on the other could be apprehended or alleged. 15 This is not a !atter of personal privilege for the incu!bent +udges but as aptly stated by for!er :.P. 8a, 1ean 0rene Corte& in her !e!orandu! as amicus curiae, %for the +udiciary ,hose independence is not only eroded but is in grave danger of being co!pletely destroyed.% 1ean Corte& aptly stressed that %+udicial independence is not a guarantee intended for the /upre!e Court alone, it e tends to the entire court syste! and is even !ore vital to the courts at the lo,est levels because there are !ore of the! and they operate closest to the people,% and %?P@articularly under the present for! of !odified parlia!entary govern!ent ,ith legislative and e ecutive functions overlapping and in certain areas !erging, the +udiciary is left to perfor! the chec*ing function in the perfor!ance of ,hich its independence assu!es an even !ore vital i!portance. % The e tensive !e!oranda filed by 1ean Corte& and other amici curiae such as for!er /enator 'ose ;. 1io*no ,ho strongly urges the Court to stri*e do,n the Act %to prevent further destruction of +udicial independence,% for!er /enator 8oren&o /u!ulong, president of the Philippine Constitution Association ,ho advocates for the Court9s adoption of the B Beng&on !a+ority opinion in the 0campo case so as to abide by %the ele!entary rule in the interpretation

of constitutions that effect should be given to all parts of the Constitution% and that the +udges9 security of tenure guaranty should not be rendered !eaningless and inoperative% for!er /olicitor 3eneral Arturo A. Alafri&, president of the Philippine 8a,yers9 Association ,ho sub!its that the total abolition of all courts belo, the /upre!e Court ?e cept the /andiganbayan and the Court of Ta Appeals@ and the re!oval of the incu!bent 'ustices and 'udges %violates the independence of the +udiciary, their security of tenure and right to due process guaranteed the! by the Constitution% and Atty. Raul M. 3on&ales, president of the National Bar Association of the Philippines ,ho invo*es the 1eclaration of 1elhi at the 0C' Conference in "$6$, that %The principles of unre!ovability of the 'udiciary and their /ecurity of Tenure until death or until a retiring age fi ed by statute is reached, is an i!portant safeguard of the Rule of 8a,% have greatly helped in fortifying !y vie,s. 4. 0 had sub!itted in !y !e!o of /epte!ber D, "$4= to the Presidential Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation that %?;@hatever reorgani&ation plans the co!!ittee !ay reco!!end to !eet the ,orld,ide proble! of congested court doc*ets, and to i!prove +udicial services in the public interest, it should be borne in !ind that the !e!bers of the +udiciary as the ,ea*est branch of govern!ent, yet called upon to safeguard the people9s rights and protect the! oppression, official and other,ise, are entitled to security of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even though the lo,er courts !ay be reshuffled or abolished in the process, the !andate and spirit of the Constitution guaranteeing their security of tenure and !aintaining the independence of the +udiciary should be respected, and they should be retained in the ne, courts.% 0n the sa!e vein, 1ean Corte& ,arned of the dire conse7uences of giving the 7uestioned provisions of the Act the %absolutist sense ,hich they appear to have at first blush% thus. %?T@o accept legislative po,er to abolish courts asserted under Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$ ,hich s,eeps through practically the entire +udiciary ,ould be to open the door to future court abolitions in the guise of reorgani&ation. At this stage of our political develop!ent, the process of e!bar*ing upon a !odified parlia!entary syste! !ay ,ell usher in a situation ,here despite guarantees of +udicial tenure, each ruling party in the legislature or any alliance that can co!!and a !a+ority vote !ay periodically underta*e co!plete reorgani&ation and re!ove +udges, thus !a*ing of the +udiciary a veritable stra, in the political ,ind and %?(@urther!ore, ,hat can result in the !odified parlia!entary syste! fro! the close ,or*ing relationship bet,een e ecutive and legislature is !ade !anifest in Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$. 0f the s,eeping reva!p provided ,ere to be carried out the President ,ould appoint all of the +ustices and +udges of the courts affected and the ,hole !e!bership in the +udiciary fro! the highest to the lo,est courts ,ould be his appointees. 0t is relevant to point out that it is precisely a situation li*e this that the Constitution see*s to avoid ,hen it provides staggered ter!s for the chair!an and !e!bers of the constitutional co!!issions ,hich li*e the +udiciary are guaranteed independence.% $. The +udges9 security of tenure ,as rendered nugatory by the Transitory Provisions of the "$<5 Constitution ,hich granted the incu!bent President the unli!ited po,er to re!ove and replace all +udges and officials 14 ?as against the li!ited one-year period for the e ercise of such po,er granted President Cue&on in the "$56 Constitution upon establish!ent of the Philippine Co!!on,ealth :pon the declaration of !artial la, in /epte!ber, "$<#, +ustices and +udges of all courts, e cept the /upre!e Court, had been re7uired to hand in their resignations. There is listed a total of 65 +udges ,ho ,ere replaced or ,hose resignations ,ere accepted by the President during the period fro! /epte!ber, "$<# to April, "$<>. The po,er to replace even the +udges appointed after the effectivity on 'anuary "<, "$<5 of the "$<5 Constitution is yet invo*ed on behalf of the President in the pending case of ,apucar vs. !ama'or 17 not,ithstanding the generally held vie, that such post-"$<5 Constitution appointed +udges are not sub+ect to the Replace!ent Clause of the cited Transitory Provision. ?0n this case, petitioner +udge appointed on 'anuary 5=, "$<> as +udge of the Court of (irst 0nstance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch ", invo*ed his constitutional security of tenure and 7uestioned the appoint!ent e tended on (ebruary #>, "$4= to respondent to replace hi!, although he had not been re!oved or other,ise dis!issed fro! his position nor had be resigned therefro!. The Court per its March #<, "$4= resolution ordered both to refrain fro! discharging the functions of the 7uestioned office

And no, co!es this total abolition of ",>>5 +udicial positions ?and thousands of personnel positions@ unprecedented in its s,eep and scope. The urgent need is to strengthen the +udiciary ,ith the restoration of the security of tenure of +udges, ,hich is essential for a free and independent +udiciary as !andated by the Constitution, not to !a*e !ore enfeebled an already feeble +udiciary, possessed neither of the po,er of the s,ord nor the purse, as decried by for!er Chief 'ustice Beng&on in his0campo !a+ority opinion. /hall ,e have +udges of the type of 8ord Co*e )r +udges, ,ho, in his place, ,ould have ans,ered 909ll do ,hat his !a+esty pleases,9 +udges ,ho, afraid of ouster thru a +udiciary reshuffle, ,ould rather serve the interests of the party in po,er or of the political boss, than the interests of +usticeH As it is, the 'udicial 1epart!ent is feeble enough. /hall ,e render it feebler ,ith +udges precariously occupying their official seats 'udges perfor!ing their duties under the s,ord of 1a!ocles of future +udicial reorgani&ations "=. The Chief 'ustice, in his opinion for the Court, e7ually stressed that %,hat is e7ually apparent is that the strongest ties bind the e ecutive and legislative depart!ents. 0t is li*e,ise undeniable that the Batasang Pa!bansa retains its full authority to enact ,hatever legislation !ay be necessary to carry out national policy as usually for!ulated in a caucus of the !a+ority party. 0t is understandable then ,hy in !ortun vs. .aban# 18 it as stressed that ,ith the provision transferring to the /upre!e Court ad!inistrative supervision over the 'udiciary, there is a greater need 9to preserve uni!paired the independence of the +udiciary, especially so at present, ,here to all intends and purposes, there is a fusion bet,een the e ecutive and the legislative branches,9% 19 ,ith the further observation that %!any are the ,ays by ,hich such independence could be eroded.% 0n the cited case of 'udge (ortun ?li*e,ise penned by the Chief 'ustice for the Court@, the Court issued a ,rit of prohibition and certiorari ordering the dis!issal of the cri!inal co!plaint filed ,ith respondent fiscal 8abang by %disgruntled !e!bers of the bar ,ith a record of losing cases% in the +udge9s court and i!posed the penalty of censure on each and everyone of the private respondents-la,yers for the %unsee!ly haste% ,ith ,hich they filed the cri!inal co!plaint, abetted by %the appearance of sheer vindictiveness or oppressive e ercise of state authority.% The Court !ar*ed the %violation of the cardinal principles of fairness and due process that underlie the Rule of 8a,. Petitioner-'udge ,as not heardG he ,as denied the opportunity to defend hi!self against the accusation. There ,as, on the part of private respondents then, a failure to abide by a Resolution of the 0ntegrated Bar stressing that precisely integration could shield 9the +udiciary ,hich traditionally cannot defend itself e cept ,ithin its o,n foru!, fro! the assaults that politics and self-interest !ay level at it, and assist it to !aintain its integrity, i!partiality and independence,9 % and that such sub+ection of a +udge to public %harass!ent and hu!iliation . . . can di!inish public confidence in the courts.% "". This brings us to the allegedly underlying need for B.P. Blg. "#$ discussed in the course of co!!ittee hearings of Cabinet Bill No. D# and the deliberation on second reading in the Batasang Pa!bansa to rid the +udiciary of inco!petent and corrupt +udges and to restore confidence in the integrity of the courts. The purge has been the constant sub+ect of headlines and editorials, ,ith the Ministry of 'ustice9s 0ntegrity Council reportedly screening and conducting %integrity tests as to ne, applicants and the incu!bent +udges 25 and see*ing %confidential infor!ation on corrupt and inco!petent +udges to help the govern!ent purge the +udiciary.% 21 Pri!e Minister Cesar Eirata ,as 7uoted as saying that %there ,ill be a purge of the corrupt and the !isfits9 ,hen the 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act is signed into la, by President Marcos and i!ple!ented in coordination ,ith the /upre!e Court.% 22 The public respondents9 ans,er sidesteps the issue of such purge contravening the rudi!ents of a fair hearing and due process and sub!its that %no ter! of office is sacrosanct ,hen de!anded before the altar of the public good.% The !etropolitan papers reported the %an iety gripping the +udiciary as the Ministry of 'ustice has reportedly been as*ed to collate infor!ation 9on the perfor!ance of the +udges and on the 7ualifications of those slated to ta*e over the positions of the inco!petent, the inefficient or those involved in irregularities. As stated in an editorial, 9/o!eho,, the uncertainty that no, hovers over the +udiciary has unduly sub+ected the +udges to !ental torture since they do not

*no, ,hen or ,hether the a e ,ill fall on the!. ;orse, the s,ord of 1a!ocles hanging over their heads could provo*e the! into see*ing the help of people clai!ing to have influence ,ith the po,ers that be.% 23 But 1ean Corte& in her !e!orandu! states that %Ao,ever, no,here on public record is there hard evidence on this. The only figures given in the course of the co!!ittee hearings ,ere to the effect that out of so!e ",<== !e!bers of the +udiciary, bet,een "= to "6 ,ere of the undesirable category, i.e. !isfit, inco!petent or corrupts. ?Barredo, '., before the Co!!ittee on 'ustice, hu!an Rights and 3ood 3overn!ent, 1ece!ber D, "$4=@,% and that %?0@f this be the case, the unprecedented, s,eeping and ,holesale abolition of +udicial offices beco!es an arbitrary act, the effect of ,hich is to assert the po,er to re!ove all the incu!bents guilty or innocent ,ithout due process of la,.% No, ,ould it be of any avail to beg the 7uestion and assert that due process is not available in !ass abolitions of courts. 'ustice Barredo, ho,ever, ,ithout citing any hard evidence, refers in his separate concurrence to t,in ob+ectives of getting rid of % structural inade7uacies of the syste! or of the cu!berso!eness and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force and of %a good nu!ber of those occupying positions in the +udiciary ?,ho9@ !a*e a !oc*ery of +ustice and ta*e advantage of their office for personal ends Ae adds that %it is !y personal assess!ent of the present situation in our +udiciary that its reorgani&ation has to be of necessity t,o-pronged, as 0 have +ust indicated, for the !ost 0deal +udicial syste! ,ith the !ost perfect procedural rules cannot satisfy the people and the interests of +ustice unless the !en ,ho hold positions therein possess the character, co!petence and sense of loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute i!partiality, nay, i!pregnability to all te!ptations of graft and corruption, including the usual i!portunings and the fearso!e albeit i!proper pressures of the po,ers that be,% 23 and invo*es the adage of $#ran'es males, #ran'es reme'ios$ to no, uphold the validity of the Act. (or!er /enator 1io*no in his !e!orandu! anticipates the argu!ent that %great ills de!and drastic cures% thus. %1rastic, yes B but not unfair nor unconstitutional. )ne does not i!prove courts by abolishing the!, any !ore than a doctor cures a patient by *illing hi!. The ills the +udiciary suffers fro! ,ere caused by i!pairing its independenceG they ,ill not be cured by totally destroying that independence. To adopt such a course ,ould only breed !ore perversity in the ad!inistration of +ustice, +ust as the abuses of !artial rule have bred !ore subversion.% "#. (inally, as stated by the "$-i 6 integrated Bar of the Philippines #nd Aouse of 1elegates, %0t ,ould, indeed, be !ost ironical if 'udges ,ho are called upon to give due process cannot count it on the!selves. )bservance of procedural due process in the separation of !isfits fro! ?he 'udiciary is the right ,ay to attain a laudable ob+ective. 9 As stressed by the Chief 'ustice in the !ortun case, +udges are entitled to the cardinal principles of fairness and due process and the opportunity to be heard and defend the!selves against the accusations !ade against their and not to be sub+ected to harass!ent and hu!iliation, and the Court ,ill repudiate the %oppressive e ercise of legal authority.% More so, are +udges entitled to such due process ,hen ,hat is at sta*e is their constitutionally guaranteed security of tenure and non-i!pair!ent of the independence of the +udiciary and the proper e ercise of the constitutional po,er e clusively vested in the /upre!e Court to discipline and re!ove +udges after fair hearing. 0n su!, 0 see no reason to change the stand sub!itted by !e to the Presidential Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation that B 'udges of inferior courts should not be su!!arily re!oved and branded for life in such reorgani&ation on the basis of confidential adverse reports as to their perfor!ance, co!petence or integrity, save those ,ho !ay voluntarily resign fro! office upon being confronted ,ith such reports against the!. The trouble ,ith such e -parte reports, ,ithout due process or hearing, has been proven fro! our past e perience ,here a nu!ber of honest and co!petent +udges ,ere

su!!arily re!oved ,hile others ,ho ,ere generally believed to be bas*et cases have re!ained in the serviceG and The po,er of discipline and dis!issal of +udges of all inferior courts, fro! the Court of Appeals do,n, has been vested by the "$<5 Constitution in the /upre!e Court, and if the +udiciary is to be strengthened, it should be left to clean its o,n house upon co!plaint and ,ith the cooperation of the as grieved parties and after due process and hearing. The constitutional confrontation and conflict !ay ,en be avoided by holding that since the changes and provisions of the challenged Act do not substantially change the nature and functions of the %ne, courts% therein provided as co!pared to the %abolished old courts% but provide for procedural changes, fi ed delineation of +urisdiction and increases in the nu!ber of courts for a !ore effective and efficient disposition of court cases, the incu!bent +udges guaranteed security of tenure re7uire that they be retained in the corresponding %ne, courts.% !ernan'e%, J., concur. .oo*%o*!" " Article K, /ection ", first sentence of the Constitution reads. The +udicial po,er shall be vested in one /upre!e Court and in such inferior courts as !ay be established by la,.% # Cf. Borro!eo v. Mariano, D" Phil. 5## ?"$#"@ and People v. Eera >6 Phil. 6> ?"$5<@. 5 Article K, /ection < of the Constitution. D 0t !ay be !entioned in passing that petitioners ignored the fact that an action for declaration relief should be filed in a Court of (irst 0nstance and apparently are una,are, that there is no such proceeding *no,n in constitutional la, to declare an act unconstitutional. /o it has been authoritatively ruled even prior to the "$56 Constitution and !uch !ore so after its effectivity and Chat of the present Constitution. That is The concept of +udicial revie, as *no,n in The Philippines, a principle that goes bac* to the epochal decision of Chief 'ustice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, " Cranch "5< ?"4=5@. This Court, then, as do lo,er court has the duty arid The po,er to declare an act unconstitutional but only as in incident to its function of deciding cases. Cf. Angara v. Electoral Co!!ission, >5 Phil. "5$ ?"$5>@G People v. Eera >< Phil. 6> ?"$5<@. 6 3ualberto '. de la 8lana is the Presiding 'udge of Branch 00 of the City Court of )longapo. the other petitioners are all !e!bers of the Philippine bar. > Ae ,as assisted by Assistant /olicitor 3eneral Reynato /. Puno. < The amici curiae ,ho argued ,ere /enator 8oren&o /u!ulong, President, Philippine Constitution AssociationG 1ean 0rene Cortes, for!er 1ean, :.P. College of 8a,G Atty. Bellaflor Angara Castillo, President, :.P. ;o!en 8a,yers CircleG Atty. Pa& Eeto Planas, President, ;o!en 8a,yers AssociationG Atty. Raul Roco, E ecutive Eice-President, 0ntegrated Bar of the PhilippinesG Atty. Enri7ue /y7uia, President, Philippine Bar AssociationG AttyG Rafael 3. /untay, for the Trial 8a,yers AssociationG and /enator 'ose ;. 1io*no sub!itted !e!oranda. Atty. Raul 3on&ales entered his appearance for petitioner and argued by ,ay of rebuttal. Atty. A!broiso Padilla li*e,ise sub!itted a !e!orandu!, ,hich the Court allo,ed to stay in the records.

4 >6 Phil. 6> ?"$5<@. $ 2bi', 4$. "= 8-D===D, 'anuary 5", "$<6, ># /CRA #<6. "" 2bi', 5=4. "# E ecutive )rder No. >"". The ,riter of this opinion ,as designated as Chair!an, and Minister Ricardo C. Puno as Co-Chair!an. T,o !e!bers of the Court, 'ustices Ra!on C. A7uino and A!eurfina A. Melencio-Aerrera, as ,ell as a for!er !e!ber, retired 'ustice (eli C. Antonio, ,ere na!ed to such body. 1eputy Minister of 'ustice 'esus Borro!eo co!pleted the !e!bership. "5 E ecutive )rder No. >"$-A. "D Report of the Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation, 6,>. "6 2bi', <. "> 2bi', citing the President9s fore,ord to The Philippine 1evelop!ent Plan, #. "< 2bi'. "4 2bi', 4. The last sentence of this portion of the Report reads. %That is to achieve the de!ocrati&ation and hu!ani&ation of +ustice in ,hat has been felicitously referred to by the (irst 8ady as a 9co!passionate society.% "$ 2bi', 4-$. #= 2bi', $-"=. #" 2bi', "=. ## 2bi'. #5 Act No. "5>. Cf. Act No. #5D< and D==<. #D Co!!on,ealth Act No. 5. #6 2bi', /ec. 5, :nder Co!!on,ealth Act No. #6$, the !e!bership of the Court of Appeals ,as increased to fifteen, ,ith one Presiding 'ustice and fourteen Associate 'ustices. Three divisions ,ere created, five !e!bers in each division. The Act ,as approved on April <, "$54. 0n "$D6 after the liberation of the Philippines, it ,as abolished by E ecutive )rder No. 5< of President /ergio )s!eJa e ercising his e!ergency po,ers under Co!!on,ealth Act No. ><". 0t ,as established ane, under Republic Act No. 6#, ,hich too* effect on )ctober D, "$D>. #> Republic Act No. #$>. #< /ection 65 of this Act provided. %0n addition to the 1istrict 'udges !entioned in section forty-nine hereof, there shall also be appointed eighteen 'udges-at-large and fifteen Cadastral 'udges ,ho shall not be assigned per!anently to any

+udicial district. and ,ho shall render duty in such district or province as !ay fro! ti!e to ti!e, be designated by the 1epart!ent Aead.% This /ection ,as repealed by Republic Act No. ""4> ?"$6D@. #4 Cf. Republic Act no. 6#= ?"$>4@ and Presidential 1ecree No. #4$ ?"$<5@. #$ Presidential 1ecree No. "D4#. 5= Republic Act No. ""#6 ?"$6D@. 5" Republic Act No. "#><. 0t ,as a!ended by Presidential 1ecree No. $D> ?"$<>@. 5# Republic Act No. "D=D. /ubse7uently, t,o !ore branches ,ere added under Presidential 1ecree No. "D5$ ?"$<4@. 55 Republic Act Nos. D45D and D45>. in "$<4, there ,as a Presidential 1ecree providing for 'uvenile and 1o!estic Relations Courts in thirteen provinces and t,enty-seven other cities. 5D Republic Act No. 6"<$. 56 E planatory Note, 6->. 5> /ponsorship /peech of Minister Puno, Eolu!e (our, Third Regular /ession, "$4=-4", #="5. 5< 2bi'. 54 8-#46<5, 'une l5, "$>4, #5 /CRA $$4. 5$ 2bi', "==5. Prior to such decision, the follo,ing cases had reaffir!ed such a principle. Manalang v. Cuitoriano, $D Phil. $=5 ?"$6D@G Rodrigue& v. Montinola, $D Phil. $>D ?"$6D@G 3acho v. )s!eJa 'r., "=5 Phil. 45< ?"$64@. Briones v. )s!eJa 'r., "=6 Phil. 644 ?"$64@G Cuneta v. Court of Appeals, """ Phil. #D$ ?"$>"@G (acundo v. Aon. Pabalan, ""D Phil. 5=< ?"$>#@G Alipio v. Rodrigue&, ""$ Phil. 6$ ?"$>5@ 8lanto v. 1i!aporo, "#5 Phil. D"5 ?"$>>@G )ca!po v. 1u7ue, "#5 Phil, 4D# ?"$>>@G 3uillergan v. 3an&on, "#5 Phil. ""=# ?"$>>@G Abanilla v. Ticao 8###<", 'uly #>, "$>>, "< /CRA >6#G CariJo v. ACC(A, 8-"$4=4, /ept. #$, "$>>, "4 /CRA "45G 1e la Ma&a v. )chave, 8-##55>, May #5, "$><, #= /CRA "D#G Arao v. 8uspo, 8-#5$4#, 'uly #", "$><, #= /CRA <##. D= 8-#4>"D, 'anuary "<, "$<D, 66 /CRA 5D. D" Enciso v. Re!o, 8-#5><=, /epte!ber 5=, "$>$, #$ /CRA 64=G Ro7ue v. Ericta, 8-5=#DD, /epte!ber #4, "$<5, 65 /CRA "6>. Cf. City of Basilan v. Aechanova, 8-#54D", August 5=, "$<D, 64 /CRA <"". D# >> Phil. >"6 ?"$54@. D5 Co!!on,ealth Act No. "D6. DD 2bi', >#>.

D6 2bi', >#>->#<. D> 0t li*e,ise abolished the Court of 8and Registration ?"$"D@. D< "$5#. D4 >> Phil. >"6, >#>. D$ Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$, /ections 5-"#. 0t !ay be stated that the ,riter of this opinion as the Chair!an of tile Co!!ittee on Reorgani&ation, ,as for the establish!ent either of ?"@ a court of general +urisdiction ,ith an appellate as ,ell as a trial division patterned after that of the syste! of +udicature found in the :nited Lingdo! and in !any Co!!on,ealth countries or, in the alternative, ?#@ of a circuit court of appeals. The Co!!ittee accepted such proposals and incorporated the! in the guidelines. Candor co!pels the ad!ission that he entertained doubts as to ,hether the inter!ediate court of appeals provided for is a ne, tribunal, 0t could be considered though as part of an integrated sche!e for the +udicial reorgani&ation as conte!plated by the Batasang Pa!bansa. 6= 2bi', /ections "5-#D. 6" 2bi', /ection #<. 6# 2bi', /ection #4. 65 2bi', /ection #$. 6D 2bi', /ection 5=. 66 2bi', /ection 5". 6> $D Phil. <5# ?"$6D@. 6< 2bi', <5D-<56. 64 2bi', <56. 6$ According to Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$, /ection #. %The organi&ation herein provided shall include the Court of Appeals, the courts of (irst 0nstance, the Circuit Cri!inal Courts, the 'uvenile and 1o!estic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts.% >= 2bi', /ection DD. 0t last sentence reads. %The cases pending in the old Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together ,ith the pertinent functions, records, e7uip!ent, property and the necessary personnel.% >" Aayden, The Philippines >< ?"$D6@. ># >< Phil. ># ?"$5$@. >5 >5 Phil. "5$.

>D 2bi', "6>. >6 Article E00, /ection " of the "$<5 Constitution. >> /ection "> of Article E00 of the "$<5 Constitution reads as follo,s. %All po,ers vested in the President of the Philippines under the "$56 Constitution and the la,s of the land ,hich are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be dee!ed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pa!bansa provides other,ise.% >< /ection ", Article E00 of the "$56 Constitution. >4 Article E00, /ection " of the constitution, in its original for!. >$ According to Article 0K, /ection " of the "$<5 Constitution prior to its being a!ended last year. %The E ecutive po,er shall be e ercised by the Pri!e Minister ,ith the assistance of the Cabinet. The Cabinet, headed by the Pri!e Minister, shall consist of the heads of !inistries as provided by la,. The Pri!e Minister shall be the head of the 3overn!ent. <= 3.R. No. 64"4D, )ctober 5=, "$4". <" 2bi', D. That characteri&ation is in accordance ,ith the Anglo-A!erican concept of the distinction bet,een presidential and parlia!entary syste!s. in the ,or* of President Marcos entitled, Marcos Notes for the Cancun /u!!it "$4", the Conference appears to have adopted such a distinction. Countries ,ith the presidential syste!s sent their presidents. C. Ben+ie did of AlgeriaG A. /attar of BangladeshG '. B. de )liviera (iguereido of Bra&ilG (. Mitterand of (ranceG A. Cheng of 3uyana A. Boigny of 0vory CoastG 8ope& Portillo of Me icoG A. /. /hagari of Nigeria. (erdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines '. L. Nyerere of Tan&ania R. Reagan of the :nited /tatesG 8. Aerrera Ca!pins of Eene&uelaG /. Lraigher of Fugoslavia. 8i*e,ise, countries under the parlia!entary syste! sent their Pri!e Ministers. P. E. Trudeau of CanadaG Ihao Iiyang of ChinaG M. A. Thatcher of the :nited Lingdo!G 0. 3andhi of 0ndiaG I. /u&u*i of 'apanG N.).T. (alldin of /,eden. ;hile called Chancellors, B. Lreis*y of Austria and A. /ch!idt of 3er!any hold such a position. Cro,n Prince (ahd Bin Abdul A&i& of /audi Arabia does not fall under either category. <# Article 0K, /ection " and 5 of the a!ended Constitution. /ection 5 reads in full. %There shall be an E ecutive Co!!ittee to be designated by the President, co!posed of the Pri!e Minister as Chair!an, and not !ore than fourteen other !e!bers, at least half of ,ho! shall be Me!bers of the Batasang Pa!bansa. The E ecutive Co!!ittee shall assist the President in the e ercise of his po,ers and functions and in the perfor!ance of his duties as he !ay prescribe. <5 8-54545, May #<, "$4", "=D /CRA >=<. <D 2bi', >"6. <6 Article K, /ection >, provides. %The /upre!e Court shall have ad!inistrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. % <> Article K, /ection <.

<< According to /ection >< of the 'udiciary Act of "$D4G as a!ended. %No 1istrict 'udge shall be separated or re!oved fro! office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall e ist, in the +udg!ent of the /upre!e Court, involving serious !isconduct or inefficiency, for the re!oval of said +udge fro! office after the proper proceedings.% Cf. /ection $< as to re!oval of !unicipal +udges also by the President. Cf. People v. 8insangan, ># Phil. >D> ?"$56@G 1e los /antos v. Mallare, 4< Phil. #4$ ?"$6=@G Martine& v. Morfe, 8-5D=##, March #D, "$<#, DD /CRA ##G and Pa!il v. Teleron, 8-5D46D, Nove!ber #=, "$<4, 4> /CRA D"5. <4 Cf. 3insburg, 'udicial Repair of 8egislation, #4 Cleveland /tate 8a, Revie,, 5="-5=D ?"$<$@ <$ 3.R. Nos. 6=64"-6=>"<, 'anuary 5=, "$$#. 4= 2bi', "#. 4" /ection <, Presidential 1ecree No. 65< ?"$<D@. 4# TaJada v. Cuenco, "=5 Phil. "=6" ?"$6<@ lends itself to the vie, that in the interpretation of the funda!ental la,, the literal language is not necessarily controlling, if thereby a constitutional ob+ection could be plausibly raised. 45 The !e!oranda sub!itted by the 0ntegrated Bar of the Philippines, the Philippine Bar Association, the ;o!en 8a,yers Circle, the Philippine ;o!en 8a,yers Association, and the Philippine Trial 8a,yers Association of the Philippines ,ere for dis!issing the petition. A!icus curiae 8oren&o /u!ulong, President of the Philippine Constitution Association, spea*ing on his o,n behalf , ,as on a si!ilar !ind. Amicus curiae 1ean 0rene Cortes, for!er 1ean of the :.P. College of 8a,, ,as for dis!issing the petition, ,hile amicus curiae 'ose ;. 1io*no ,as for granting it. A !e!orandu! allo,ed to stay in the records by for!er /enator A!brosio Padilla ,as for granting it. The court ac*no,ledges the aid it received fro! the !e!oranda sub!itted. 4D >5 Phil. "5$, "6< ?"$5>@. 46 Planas v. 3il, >< Phil >#, <5-<D ?"$5$@. The 7uotation fro! 'ustice Aol!es ca!e fro! /pringer v. 3overn!ent of the Philippine 0slands, #<< :/ "4$, #"" ?"$#4@. Ae and 'ustice Brandeis dissented, upholding the contention of the (ilipino leaders that the President of the /enate and the /pea*er of the Aouse of Representatives of the then Philippine 8egislature could sit in a Board of Control ,ith po,er to vote govern!ent shares in corporations o,ned or controlled by it. The !a+ority sustained the opposite vie,, thus giving the then A!erican 3overnor-general such prerogative. 4> Arnault v. Pecson, 4< Phil. D"4, D#> ?"$6=@. 4< Chapter 0E, /ec. D" of Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$. 44 8-5#=$>, )ctober #D, "$<=, 56 /CRA D5". Cf. Agustin v. Edu, 8=D$""#, (ebruary #, "$<$, 44 /CRA "$6. 4$ 2bi', D$<. $= 3.R. No. 64"4D, )ctober 5=, "$4", "=.

$" 2bi', "". $# 2bi'. $5 Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$, /ection D5. $D 2bi', /ection DD. $6 Article E00, /ection "> of the A!ended Constitution pro- provides %AN po,ers vested in the President of the Philippines under the "$56 Constitution and the la,s of the land ,hich are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be dee!ed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pa!bansa provides other,ise. % Article E00, /ection "=, par. ?"@ of the Constitution reads. %The President shall have control of all the e ecutive depart!ents, bureaus, or offices, e ercise general supervision over all local govern!ents as !ay be provided by la,, and ta*e care that the la,s be faithfully e ecuted.% $> Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$, /ection DD. $< This Court is ready ,ith such a list to be furnished the President. $4 0n the language of par. K0 of the Proposed 3uidelines for 'udicial Reorgani&ation. %The services of those not separated shall be dee!ed uninterrupted. 0n such cases, efficiency, integrity, length of service and other relevant factors shall be considered.% $$ Cf. Roschen v. ;ard, #<$ :/ 55<, 55$ ?"$#$@. "== (ro! the standpoint of the ,riter of this opinion, as earlier noted, the assailed legislation did not go far enough. 0t is certainly !uch !ore, to use the 8ass,ellian phrase of being a %relevant !odification of s!all particulars (or so!e it could be characteri&ed as a close of conservation and a dash or innovation. That is, ho,ever, no argu!ent against its validity ,hich, to repeat, is solely a 7uestion of po,er as far as this Court is concerned. "=" (or!er /enators /alvador A. 8aurel and 'ose ;. 1io*no. "=# (ish, ;illia! Ao,ard Taft and Charles Evan Aughes, "$<6 /upre!e Court Revie, "#5. "=5 2bi'. Cf. Bic*el, Mr. Taft Rehabilitates the Court, <$ Fale 8a, 'ournal " ?"$>$@. "=D Article K000, /ection ", first sentence of the Constitution reads. %Public office is a public trust.% "=6 6< ).3. "D< ?"$66@. "=> 2bi'. "65. The per curia! !inute resolution of the Court reads as follo,s. %0n )ca!po et al. vs. The /ecretary of 'ustice et al., 3.R. No. 8-<$"=, the petition ,as denied, ,ithout costs, due to insufficient votes to invalidate section 5 of Republic Act No. ""4>. Chief 'ustice Paras, and 'ustices Padilla, Reyes ?A@ and 8abrador voted to uphold that particular sectionG 'ustices Pablo, Beng&on, Monte!ayor, 'ugo, Bautista, Concepcion and Reyes, '.B.8., believe it is

unconstitutional.% At "D<. Republic Act No. ""4>, ,hich too* effect on 'une "$, "$6D, abolished the positions of 'udges-at-8arge and Cadastral 'udges. There ,as a vigorous dissent fro! 'ustice Beng&on relying on certain A!erican /tate /upre!e Court decisions notably fro! 0ndiana and Pennsylvania, but as noted in the opinion of 'ustice 8abrador, they could not be considered as applicable in vie, of the difference in constitutional provisions. (ro! 'ustices Monte!ayor and Bautista also ca!e separate opinions as to its unconstitutionality. "=< D" Phil. 5## ?"$#"@. "=4 2bi', 555. "=$ 6< Phil. >== ?"$5#@. ""= 2bi', >=6. The reference should no, be to the Constitution, rather than an )rganic Act of an unincorporated A!erican territory as the Philippines then ,as. BARRE1), '. " And 0 a! not fond of borro,ing 0deas fro! supposed legal acu!en of alien +udicial figures no !atter their recogni&ed reputation. # Borro!eo vs. Mariano, D" Phil. 55=. 5 3.R. No. 8-<$"=, 'anuary "4, "$66, 6" ).3. "D<. D Iandueta vs. 1e la Cuesta, >> Phil. >"6. 6 Brillo vs. Me+ia, $D Phil. <5#. 3:ERRER), '. " /ee Cardo&o, The Nature of the 'udicial Process, p. <5. # Church of The Aoly Trinity vs. :./., "D5 :./. D6<, cited in ;illoughby )n the Constitution of the :nited /tates, #nd ed., Eol. 0, p. >". 5 E planatory vote, Cabinet Bill No. D# ,hich beca!e Batas Pa!bansa Blg. "#$, The 'udiciary Reorgani&ation Act of "$4=. D Cardo&o, The Nature of the 'udicial Process, p. >>. 6 Chief 'ustice Castro, The Bar and the Congested 1oc*ets, p. > /ee Report of the Presidential Co!!ittee on 'udicial Reorgani&ation. Also Report of Court Ad!inistrator. < /ee 8-5<5$$, May #$, "$<D, 6< /CRA "#5, 4 /ee 8-5=566, May 5", "$<4, 45 /CRA D5<, D6=. $ /ee 8-D>6D#, 'uly #", "$<4, 4D /CRA "$4, #=5. "= /ee 8-D$$$6, April 4, "$4".

"" /ee 3.R. No. 6DD6#, 'uly #=, l$4". "# /ee 8-5>">", 1ece!ber "$, "$<5. "5 Rule "5 ", /ection 6?!@, Revised Rules of Court. "D 5" C.'./. 4"=. "6 Cru& vs. Pri!icias, 'r., 8-#46<5, 'une "5, "$>4, #5 /CRA $$4G Bendanillo /r. vs. Provincial 3overnor, 8-#4>"D, 'anuary "<, "$<D, 66 /CRA 5DG Enciso vs. Re!oval 8-#5><=, /ept. 5=, "$>$, #$ /CRA 64= Ro7ue vs. Ericta, 8-5=#DD, /ept. #4, "$<5, 65 /CRA "6>. "> Morfe vs. Mutuc, 8-#=54<, 'an. 5", "$>4, ## /CRA D#D, D6=. "< 2bi'. "4 Chief 'ustice (ernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, p. D4. "$ 2bi', p. D>. #= 'ournal of the Batasan, Third Regular /ession, (eb. 5, "$4", p. "#. #" Bro,n vs. Russel, ">> Mass. "D, cited in 3on&ales, Ad!inistrative 8a,, 8a, on Public )fficers and Election 8a,, #nd ed., p. "D4. ## D# A!. 'ur. 44". #5 2bi'. #D Chero*ee, County vs. /avage, 5# /o. #nd 4=5. #6 McCulley vs. /tate, 65 /.;. "5D. #> Ans,er of /olicitor 3eneral, par. ##, p. #$. #< 8aurel, con., Iandueta vs. de la Cuesta ?"$54@, >> Phil. >"6 #4 Missouri, L. O T. Co. vs. May, "$D :./. #><, #<=G People vs. Crane #"D N.F. "6D, "<5, cited in Cardo&o, The Nature of the 'udicial Process, p. $=. #$ People vs. Eera ?"$5<@, >6 Phil. 6>, /ee Chief 'ustice (ernando, The Po,er of 'udicial Revie,, p. ""=. 1E CA/TR), '. " Constitution of the Philippines by Chief 'ustice Enri7ue M. (ernando, "$<< Edition, p. "<<. # Ro7ue vs. Ericta, 65 /CRA "6>G Abanilla vs. Ticao, "< /CRA >6#G Cru& vs. Pri!icias, 'r., #5 /CRA $$4G )ca!po vs. 1u7ue, "> /CRA $>#G Briones vs. )s!eJa, "=D Phil. 644G :rgelio vs. )s!eJa, 'r., $ /CRA 5"<G 3acho vs. )s!eJa, $D Phil. #=4.

5 1elivered on 8a, 1ay, /epte!ber "$, "$4" before the Philippine Bar Association. D Cf. 3.R. No. 64"4D, (ree Telephone ;or*ers :nion vs. The Aonorable Minister of 8abor and E!ploy!ent, pro!ulgated on )ctober 5=, "$4". 6 )ca!po vs. /ecretary of 'ustice, 6= ).3. "D<. TEEAANLEE, '. " ;ith three vacancies. # /ection DD, B.P. Blg. "#$. 5 )ca!po vs. /ecretary of 'ustice, 3.R. No. 8-"<$=. 'an. "4, "$66G 6" ).3. "D<. D Article K, section <, "$<5 Constitution, as a!ended ?Art. E000, sec. $,"$56 Constitution@. 6 Cited in Chief 'ustice (ernando9s The "$<5 Constitution, page 5<>G e!phasis copied. > Art. K, sec. >, "$<5 Constitution. < 0de!, Art. K, sec. <. 4 Art. E000, sec. <, "$56 Constitution. $ Aruego, (ra!ing of the Phil. Constitution, Eol. ", p. 6"5. "= /ec. #5, B.P. Blg. "#$. "=a At page ">, fn. 6=. "" At page 5 thereof. "# Iandueta vs. 1e la Costa, >> Phil. >"6 ?"$54@. "5 /ee the Chief 'ustice opinion, pages "D-"6. "D At page 4 thereof. "6 Citing Manalang vs. Cuitoriano, 6= ).3. #6"6. "> Art. KE00, sections $ and "=. "< 3.R. No. 65D>< filed on March #<, "$4=. "4 "=D /CRA >=< ?May #<, "$4"@. "$ Main opinion at page #".

#= Phil. 1aily E press issue of Aug. #D, "$4". #" Ti!es 'ournal issue of Aug. ">, "$4". ## Evening Post issue of Aug. "", "$4". #5 Metropolitan papers of Aug. 4, "$4=. Ti!es 'ournal editorial of Aug. 5", "$4=. #D At page 6.