Du+Id Gtuehet

Revolution in Reverse
200
2
Contents
Revolution in Reverse (or, on the conict between
political ontologies of violence and political
ontologies of the imagination) 3
Part I Be realistic. . . " o
Part II On violence and imaginative displacement 11
Excuisus on tianscendent veisus immanent imagination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Part III On alienation 18
Part IV On Revolution z1
Revolution in Reveise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Revolution in Reverse (or, on
the conict between political
ontologies of violence and political
ontologies of the imagination)
4
All powei to the imagination." Be iealistic, demand the impossible . . . " Any-
one involved in iadical politics has heaid these expiessions a thousand times.
Usually they chaim and excite the hist time one encounteis them, then eventually
become so familiai as to seem hackneyed, oi just disappeai into the ambient
backgiound noise of iadical life. Raiely if evei aie they the object of seiious
theoietical iefection.
lt seems to me that at the cuiient histoiical junctuie, some such iefection
wouldn`t be a bad idea. We aie at a moment, afei all, when ieceived dehnitions
have been thiown into disaiiay. lt is quite possible that we aie heading foi
a ievolutionaiy moment, oi peihaps a seiies of them, but we no longei have
any cleai idea of what that might even mean. Tis essay then is the pioduct of
a sustained enoit to tiy to iethink teims like iealism, imagination, alienation,
buieauciacy, ievolution itself. lt`s boin of some six yeais of involvement with
the alteinative globalization movement and paiticulaily with its most iadical,
anaichist, diiect action-oiiented elements. Considei it a kind of pieliminaiy
theoietical iepoit. l want to ask, among othei things, why is it these teims,
which foi most of us seem iathei to evoke long-since foigouen debates of the
190s, still iesonate in those ciicles` Why is it that the idea of any iadical social
tiansfoimation so ofen seems uniealistic"` What does ievolution mean once one
no longei expects a single, cataclysmic bieak with past stiuctuies of oppiession`
Tese seem dispaiate questions but it seems to me the answeis aie ielated. lf in
many cases l biush past existing bodies of theoiy, this is quite intentional l am
tiying to see if it is possible to build on the expeiience of these movements and
the theoietical cuiients that infoim them to begin to cieate something new.
Heie is the gist of my aigument
1. Right and Lef political peispectives aie founded, above all, on dineient as-
sumptions about the ultimate iealities of powei. Te Right is iooted in a
political ontology of violence, wheie being iealistic means taking into account
the foices of destiuction. ln ieply the Lef has consistently pioposed vaiiations
on a political ontology of the imagination, in which the foices that aie seen
as the ultimate iealities that need to be taken into account aie those foices (of
pioduction, cieativity. . . ) that biing things into being.
2. Te situation is complicated by the fact that systematic inequalities backed
by foice stiuctuial violence always pioduces skewed and fiactuied stiuc-
tuies of the imagination. lt is the expeiience of living inside these fiactuied
stiuctuies that we iefei to as alienation".
3. Oui customaiy conception of ievolution is insuiiectionaiy the idea is to
biush aside existing iealities of violence by oveithiowing the state, then, to
unleash the poweis of populai imagination and cieativity to oveicome the

stiuctuies that cieate alienation. Ovei the twentieth centuiy it eventually

became appaient that the ieal pioblem was how to institutionalize such cie-
ativity without cieating new, ofen even moie violent and alienating stiuctuies.
As a iesult, the insuiiectionaiy model no longei seems completely viable, but
it`s not cleai what will ieplace it.
4. One iesponse has been the ievival of the tiadition of diiect action. ln piactice,
mass actions ieveise the oidinaiy insuiiectionaiy sequence. Rathei than a
diamatic confiontation with state powei leading hist to an outpouiing of
populai festivity, the cieation of new demociatic institutions, and eventually
the ieinvention of eveiyday life, in oiganizing mass mobilizations, activists
diawn piincipally fiom subcultuial gioups cieate new, diiectly demociatic
institutions to oiganize festivals of iesistance" that ultimately lead to con-
fiontations with the state. Tis is just one aspect of a moie geneial movement
of iefoimulation that seems to me to be inspiied in pait by the infuence of
anaichism, but in even laigei pait, by feminism a movement that ultimately
aims to iecieate the enects of those insuiiectionaiy moments on an ongoing
basis
Let me take these one by one.
Part I Be realistic. . . "

liom eaily 2000 to late 2002 l was woiking with the Diiect Action Netwoik in
New Yoik the piincipal gioup iesponsible foi oiganizing mass actions as pait
of the global justice movement in that city at that time. Actually, DAN was not,
technically, a gioup, but a decentialized netwoik, opeiating on piinciples of diiect
demociacy accoiding to an elaboiate, but stiikingly enective, foim of consensus
piocess. lt played a cential iole in ongoing enoits to cieate new oiganizational
foims that l wiote about in an eailiei essay in these pages. DAN existed in
a puiely political space, it had no conciete iesouices, not even a signihcant
tieasuiy, to administei. Ten one day someone gave DAN a cai. lt caused a
minoi, but ongoing, ciisis. We soon discoveied that legally, it is impossible foi
a decentialized netwoik to own a cai. Cais can be owned by individuals, oi
they can be owned by coipoiations, which aie hctive individuals. Tey cannot
be owned by netwoiks. Unless we weie willing to incoipoiate ouiselves as a
nonpioht coipoiation (which would have iequiied a complete ieoiganization and
abandoning most of oui egalitaiian piinciples) the only expedient was to hnd
a volunteei willing to claim to be the ownei foi legal puiposes. But then that
peison was expected to pay all outstanding hnes, insuiance fees, piovide wiiuen
peimission to allow otheis to diive out of state, and, of couise, only he could
ietiieve the cai if it weie impounded. Befoie long the DAN cai had become such
a peiennial pioblem that we simply abandoned it.
lt stiuck me theie was something impoitant heie. Why is it that piojects like
DAN`s piojects of demociatizing society aie so ofen peiceived as idle dieams
that melt away as soon as they encountei anything that seems like haid mateiial
ieality` ln oui case it had nothing to do with inemciency police chiefs acioss
the countiy had called us the best oiganized foice they`d evei had to deal with. lt
seems to me the ieality enect (if one may call it that) comes iathei fiomthe fact that
iadical piojects tend to foundei, oi at least become endlessly dimcult, the moment
they entei into the woild of laige, heavy objects buildings, cais, tiactois, boats,
industiial machineiy. Tis is in tuin is not because these objects aie somehow
intiinsically dimcult to administei demociatically, it`s because, like the DAN cai,
they aie suiiounded by endless goveinment iegulation, and enectively impossible
to hide fiom the goveinment`s aimed iepiesentatives. ln Ameiica, l`ve seen
endless examples. A squat is legalized afei a long stiuggle, suddenly, building
inspectois aiiive to announce it will take ten thousand dollais woith of iepaiis to
biing it up to code, oiganizeis aie foiced spend the next seveial yeais oiganizing
bake sales and soliciting contiibutions. Tis means seuing up bank accounts, and
legal iegulations then specify how a gioup ieceiving funds, oi dealing with the
goveinment, must be oiganized (again, not as an egalitaiian collective). All these
iegulations aie enfoiced by violence. Tiue, in oidinaiy life, police iaiely come in
swinging billy clubs to enfoice building code iegulations, but, as anaichists ofen
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discovei, if one simply pietends they don`t exist, that will, eventually, happen.
Te iaiity with which the nightsticks actually appeai just helps to make the
violence haidei to see. Tis in tuin makes the enects of all these iegulations
iegulations that almost always assume that noimal ielations between individuals
aie mediated by the maiket, and that noimal gioups aie oiganized hieiaichically
seem to emanate not fiom the goveinment`s monopoly of the use of foice, but
fiom the laigeness, solidity, and heaviness of the objects themselves.
When one is asked to be iealistic" then, the ieality one is noimally being
asked to iecognize is not one of natuial, mateiial facts, neithei is it ieally some
supposed ugly tiuth about human natuie. Noimally it`s a iecognition of the
enects of the systematic thieat of violence. lt even thieads oui language. Why,
foi example, is a building iefeiied to as ieal piopeity", oi ieal estate"` Te ieal"
in this usage is not deiived fiom Latin ies, oi thing" it`s fiom the Spanish ieal,
meaning, ioyal", belonging to the king." All land within a soveieign teiiitoiy
ultimately belongs to the soveieign, legally this is still the case. Tis is why the
state has the iight to impose its iegulations. But soveieignty ultimately comes
down to a monopoly of what is euphemistically iefeiied to as foice" that is,
violence. Just as Gioigio Agamben famously aigued that fiom the peispective
of soveieign powei, something is alive because you can kill it, so piopeity is
ieal" because the state can seize oi destioy it. ln the same way, when one takes
a iealist" position in lnteinational Relations, one assumes that states will use
whatevei capacities they have at theii disposal, including foice of aims, to puisue
theii national inteiests. What ieality" is one iecognizing` Ceitainly not mateiial
ieality. Te idea that nations aie human-like entities with puiposes and inteiests
is an entiiely metaphysical notion. Te King of liance had puiposes and inteiests.
liance" does not. What makes it seem iealistic" to suggest it does is simply that
those in contiol of nation-states have the powei to iaise aimies, launch invasions,
bomb cities, and can otheiwise thieaten the use of oiganized violence in the name
of what they desciibe as theii national inteiests" and that it would be foolish
to ignoie that possibility. National inteiests aie ieal because they can kill you.
Te ciitical teim heie is foice", as in the state`s monopoly of the use of
coeicive foice." Whenevei we heai this woid invoked, we hnd ouiselves in the
piesence of a political ontology in which the powei to destioy, to cause otheis
pain oi to thieaten to bieak, damage, oi mangle theii bodies (oi just lock them
in a tiny ioom foi the iest of theii lives) is tieated as the social equivalent of the
veiy eneigy that diives the cosmos. Contemplate, foi instance, the metaphois
and displacements that make it possible to constiuct the following two sentences
Scientists investigate the natuie of physical laws so as to undeistand the foices
that govein the univeise.
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Police aie expeits in the scientihc application of physical foice in oidei to
enfoice the laws that govein society.
Tis is to my mind the essence of Right-wing thought a political ontology
that thiough such subtle means, allows violence to dehne the veiy paiameteis of
social existence and common sense.
Te Lef, on the othei hand, has always been founded on a dineient set of as-
sumptions about what is ultimately ieal, about the veiy giounds of political being.
Obviously Lefists don`t deny the ieality of violence. Many Lefist theoiists have
thought about it quite a lot. But they don`t tend to give it the same foundational
status. lnstead, l would aigue that Lefist thought is founded on what l will call
a political ontology of the imagination" though l could as easily have called
it an ontology of cieativity oi making oi invention. Nowadays, most of us tend
to identify it with the legacy of Maix, with his emphasis on social ievolution
and foices of mateiial pioduction. But ieally Maix`s teims emeiged fiom much
widei aiguments about value, laboi, and cieativity cuiient in iadical ciicles of
his day, whethei in the woikei`s movement, oi foi that mauei vaiious stiains of
Romanticism. Maix himself, foi all his contempt foi the utopian socialists of his
day, nevei ceased to insist that what makes human beings dineient fiom animals
is that aichitects, unlike bees, hist iaise theii stiuctuies in the imagination. lt
was the unique piopeity of humans, foi Maix, that they hist envision things,
then biing them into being. lt was this piocess he iefeiied to as pioduction".
Aiound the same time, utopian socialists like St. Simon weie aiguing that aitists
needed to become the avant gaide oi vanguaid", as he put it, of a new social oidei,
pioviding the giand visions that industiy now had the powei to biing into being.
What at the time might have seemed the fantasy of an eccentiic pamphleteei soon
became the chaitei foi a spoiadic, unceitain, but appaiently peimanent alliance
that enduies to this day. lf aitistic avant gaides and social ievolutionaiies have felt
a peculiai amnity foi one anothei evei since, boiiowing each othei`s languages
and ideas, it appeais to have been insofai as both have iemained commiued to
the idea that the ultimate, hidden tiuth of the woild is that it is something that
we make, and, could just as easily make dineiently. ln this sense, a phiase like
all powei to the imagination" expiesses the veiy quintessence of the Lef.
To this emphasis on foices of cieativity and pioduction of couise the Right
tends to ieply that ievolutionaiies systematically neglect the social and histoiical
impoitance of the means of destiuction" states, aimies, executioneis, baibaiian
invasions, ciiminals, uniuly mobs, and so on. Pietending such things aie not
theie, oi can simply be wished away, they aigue, has the iesult of ensuiing that
lef-wing iegimes will in fact cieate fai moie death and destiuction than those
that have the wisdom to take a moie iealistic" appioach.
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Obviously, this dichotomy is veiy much a simplihcation. One could level end-
less qualihcations. Te bouigeoisie of Maix`s time foi instance had an extiemely
pioductivist philosophy one ieason Maix could see it as a ievolutionaiy foice.
Elements of the Right dabbled with the aitistic ideal, and 20
th
centuiy Maixist
iegimes ofen embiaced essentially iight-wing theoiies of powei, and paid liule
moie than lip seivice to the deteiminant natuie of pioduction. Nonetheless, l
think these aie useful teims because even if one tieats imagination" and vio-
lence" not as the single hidden tiuth of the woild but as immanent piinciples, as
equal constituents of any social ieality, they can ieveal a gieat deal one would not
be able to see otheiwise. loi one thing, eveiywheie, imagination and violence
seem to inteiact in piedictable, and quite signihcant, ways.
Let me stait with a few woids on violence, pioviding a veiy schematic oveiview
of aiguments that l have developed in somewhat gieatei detail elsewheie
Part II On violence and
imaginative displacement
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l`man anthiopologist by piofession and anthiopological discussions of violence
aie almost always piefaced by statements that violent acts aie acts of communica-
tion, that they aie inheiently meaningful, and that this is what is tiuly impoitant
about them. ln othei woids, violence opeiates laigely thiough the imagination.
All of this is tiue. l would haidly want to discount the impoitance of feai
and teiioi in human life. Acts of violence can be indeed ofen aie acts of
communication. But the same could be said of any othei foim of human action,
too. lt stiikes me that what is ieally impoitant about violence is that it is peihaps
the only foim of human action that holds out the possibility of opeiating on otheis
without being communicative. Oi let me put this moie piecisely. Violence may
well be the only way in which it is possible foi one human being to have ielatively
piedictable enects on the actions of anothei without undeistanding anything
about them. Pieuy much any othei way one might tiy to infuence anothei`s
actions, one at least has to have some idea who they think they aie, who they
think you aie, what they might want out of the situation, and a host of similai
consideiations. Hit them ovei the head haid enough, all this becomes iiielevant.
lt`s tiue that the enects one can have by hiuing them aie quite limited. But they
aie ieal enough, and the fact iemains that any alteinative foim of action cannot,
without some soit of appeal to shaied meanings oi undeistandings, have any soit
of enect at all. What`s moie, even auempts to infuence anothei by the thieat
of violence, which cleaily does iequiie some level of shaied undeistandings (at
the veiy least, the othei paity must undeistand they aie being thieatened, and
what is being demanded of them), iequiies much less than any alteinative. Most
human ielations paiticulaily ongoing ones, such as those between longstanding
fiiends oi longstanding enemies aie extiemely complicated, endlessly dense
with expeiience and meaning. Tey iequiie a continual and ofen subtle woik of
inteipietation, eveiyone involved must put constant eneigy into imagining the
othei`s point of view. Tieatening otheis with physical haim on the othei hand
allows the possibility of cuuing thiough all this. lt makes possible ielations of a
fai moie schematic kind i.e., `cioss this line and l will shoot you and otheiwise
l ieally don`t caie who you aie oi what you want`. Tis is, foi instance, why
violence is so ofen the piefeiied weapon of the stupid one could almost say,
the tiump caid of the stupid, since it is the foim of stupidity to which it is most
dimcult to come up with any intelligent iesponse.
Teie is, howevei, one ciucial qualihcation to be made. Te moie evenly
matched two paities aie in theii capacity foi violence, the less all this tends to
be tiue. lf one is involved in a ielatively equal contest of violence, it is indeed
a veiy good idea to undeistand as much as possible about them. A militaiy
commandei will obviously tiy to get inside his opponent`s mind. lt`s ieally only
when one side has an oveiwhelming advantage in theii capacity to cause physical
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haim this is no longei the case. Of couise, when one side has an oveiwhelming
advantage, they iaiely have to actually iesoit to actually shooting, beating, oi
blowing people up. Te thieat will usually sumce. Tis has a cuiious enect. lt
means that the most chaiacteiistic quality of violence its capacity to impose
veiy simple social ielations that involve liule oi no imaginative identihcation
becomes most salient in situations wheie actual, physical violence is likely to be
least piesent.
We can speak heie (as many do) of stiuctuial violence that systematic in-
equalities that aie ultimately backed up by the thieat of foice can be seen as a
foim of violence in themselves. Systems of stiuctuial violence invaiiably seem to
pioduce extieme lopsided stiuctuies of imaginative identihcation. lt`s not that
inteipietive woik isn`t caiiied out. Society, in any iecognizable foim, could not
opeiate without it. Rathei, the oveiwhelming buiden of the laboi is ielegated to
its victims.
Let me stait with the household. A constant staple of 190s situation comedies,
in Ameiica, weie jokes about the impossibility of undeistanding women. Te
jokes of couise weie always told by men. Women`s logic was always being tieated
as alien and incompiehensible. One nevei had the impiession, on the othei hand,
that women had much tiouble undeistanding the men. Tat`s because the women
had no choice but to undeistand men this was the heyday of the Ameiican
patiiaichal family, and women with no access to theii own income oi iesouices
had liule choice but to spend a faii amount of time and eneigy undeistanding
what the ielevant men thought was going on. Actually, this soit of ihetoiic
about the mysteiies of womankind is a peiennial featuie of patiiaichal families
stiuctuies that can, indeed, be consideied foims of stiuctuial violence insofai
as the powei of men ovei women within them is, as geneiations of feminists
have pointed out, ultimately backed up, if ofen in indiiect and hidden ways,
by all soits of coeicive foice. But geneiations of female novelists Viiginia
Woolf comes immediately to mind have also documented the othei side of this
the constant woik women peifoim in managing, maintaining, and adjusting the
egos of appaiently oblivious men involving an endless woik of imaginative
identihcation and what l`ve called inteipietive laboi. Tis caiiies ovei on eveiy
level. Women aie always imagining what things look like fiom a male point of
view. Men almost nevei do the same foi women. Tis is piesumably the ieason
why in so many societies with a pionounced gendeied division of laboi (that is,
most societies), women know a gieat deal about men do eveiy day, and men have
next to no idea about women`s occupations. laced with the piospect of even
tiying to imagine a women`s peispective, many iecoil in hoiioi. ln the US, one
populai tiick among High School cieative wiiting teacheis is to assign students
to wiite an essay imagining that they weie to switch gendeis, and desciibe what
14
it would be like to live foi one day as a membei of the opposite sex. Te iesults
aie almost always exactly the same all the giils in class wiite long and detailed
essays demonstiating that they have spent a gieat deal of time thinking about
such questions, ioughly half the boys iefuse to wiite the essay entiiely. Almost
invaiiably they expiess piofound iesentment about having to imagine what it
might be like to be a woman.
lt should be easy enough to multiply paiallel examples. When something
goes wiong in a iestauiant kitchen, and the boss appeais to size things up, he
is unlikely to pay much auention to a collection of woikeis all sciambling to
explain theii veision of the stoiy. Likely as not he`ll tell them all to shut up and
just aibitiaiily decide what he thinks is likely to have happened you`ie the new
guy, you must have messed up if you do it again, you`ie hied." lt`s those who
do not have the powei to hie aibitiaiily who have to do the woik of hguiing
out what actually happened. What occuis on the most peuy oi intimate level
also occuis on the level of society as a whole. Cuiiously enough it was Adam
Smith, in his Teor, o[ Moro| Sen:ens (wiiuen in 11), who hist made notice
of what`s nowadays labeled compassion fatigue". Human beings, he obseived,
appeai to have a natuial tendency not only to imaginatively identify with theii
fellows, but also, as a iesult, to actually feel one anothei`s joys and pains. Te
pooi, howevei, aie just too consistently miseiable, and as a iesult, obseiveis, foi
theii own self-piotection, tend to simply blot them out. Te iesult is that while
those on the bouom spend a gieat deal of time imagining the peispectives of, and
actually caiing about, those on the top, but it almost nevei happens the othei way
aiound. Tat is my ieal point. Whatevei the mechanisms, something like this
always seems to occui whethei one is dealing with masteis and seivants, men
and women, bosses and woikeis, iich and pooi. Stiuctuial inequality stiuctuial
violence invaiiably cieates the same lopsided stiuctuies of the imagination. And
since, as Smith coiiectly obseived, imagination tends to biing with it sympathy,
the victims of stiuctuial violence tend to caie about its benehciaiies, oi at least,
to caie fai moie about them than those benehciaiies caie about them. ln fact,
this might well be (aside fiom the violence itself) the single most poweiful foice
pieseiving such ielations.
lt is easy to see buieauciatic pioceduies as an extension of this phenomenon.
One might say they aie not so much themselves foims of stupidity and ignoiance
as modes of oiganizing situations alieady maiked by stupidity and ignoiance
owing the existence of stiuctuial violence. Tiue, buieauciatic pioceduie opeiates
as if it weie a foim of stupidity, in that it invaiiably means ignoiing all the sub-
tleties of ieal human existence and ieducing eveiything to simple pie-established
mechanical oi statistical foimulae. Whethei it`s a mauei of foims, iules, statistics,
oi questionnaiies, buieauciacy is always about simplihcation. Ultimately the
1
enect is not so dineient than the boss who walks in to make an aibitiaiy snap
decision as to what went wiong it`s a mauei of applying veiy simple schemas to
complex, ambiguous situations. Te same goes, in fact, foi police, who aie afei
all simply low-level administiatois with guns. Police sociologists have long since
demonstiated that only a tiny fiaction of police woik has anything to do with
ciime. Police aie, iathei, the immediate iepiesentatives of the state`s monopoly
of violence, those who step in to actively simplify situations (foi example, weie
someone to actively challenge some buieauciatic dehnition). Simultaneously,
police they have become, in contempoiaiy industiial demociacies, Ameiica in
paiticulai, the almost obsessive objects of populai imaginative identihcation. ln
fact, the public is constantly invited, in a thousand TV shows and movies, to see
the woild fiom a police omcei`s peispective, even if it is always the peispective
of imaginaiy police omceis, the kind who actually do spend theii time hghting
ciime iathei than conceining themselves with bioken tail lights oi open containei
laws.
Excursus on transcendent versus immanent
imagination
To imaginatively identify with an imaginaiy policeman is of couise not the
same as to imaginatively identify with a ieal one (most Ameiicans in fact avoid a
ieal policeman like the plague). Tis is a ciitical distinction, howevei much an
incieasingly digitalized woild makes it easy to confuse the two.
lt is heie helpful to considei the histoiy of the woid imagination". Te common
Ancient and Medieval conception, what we call the imagination" was consideied
the zone of passage between ieality and ieason. Peiceptions fiom the mateiial
woild had to pass thiough the imagination, becoming emotionally chaiged in
the piocess and mixing with all soits of phantasms, befoie the iational mind
could giasp theii signihcance. lntentions and desiies moved in the opposite
diiection. lt`s only afei Descaites, ieally, that the woid imaginaiy" came to
mean, specihcally, anything that is not ieal imaginaiy cieatuies, imaginaiy
places (Middle Eaith, Nainia, planets in faiaway Galaxies, the Kingdom of Piestei
John. . . ), imaginaiy fiiends. By this dehnition of couise a political ontology of
the imagination" would actually a contiadiction in teims. Te imagination cannot
be the basis of ieality. lt is by dehnition that which we can think, but has no
ieality.
l`ll iefei to this lauei as the tianscendent notion of the imagination" since it
seems to take as its model novels oi othei woiks of hction that cieate imaginaiy
1
woilds that piesumably, iemain the same no mauei how many times one ieads
them. lmaginaiy cieatuies elves oi unicoins oi TV cops aie not anected by
the ieal woild. Tey cannot be, since they don`t exist. ln contiast, the kind of
imagination l have been iefeiiing to heie is much closei to the old, immanent,
conception. Ciitically, it is in no sense static and fiee-foating, but entiiely caught
up in piojects of action that aim to have ieal enects on the mateiial woild, and as
such, always changing and adapting. Tis is equally tiue whethei one is ciafing
a knife oi a piece of jeweliy, oi tiying to make suie one doesn`t huit a fiiend`s
feelings.
One might get a sense of how impoitant this distinction ieally is by ietuining
to the `8 slogan about giving powei to the imagination. lf one takes this to iefei
to the tianscendent imagination piefoimed utopian schemes, foi example
doing so can, we know, have disastious enects. Histoiically, it has ofen meant
imposing them by violence. On the othei hand, in a ievolutionaiy situation, one
might by the same token aigue that not giving full powei to the othei, immanent,
soit of imagination would be equally disastious.
Te ielation of violence and imagination is made much moie complicated
because while in eveiy case, stiuctuial inequalities tend to split society into those
doing imaginative laboi, and those who do not, they do so in veiy dineient ways.
Capitalism heie is a diamatic case in point. Political economy tends to see woik
in capitalist societies as divided between two spheies wage laboi, foi which
the paiadigm is always factoiies, and domestic laboi housewoik, childcaie
ielegated mainly to women. Te hist is seen piimaiily as a mauei of cieating
and maintaining physical objects. Te second is piobably best seen as a mauei of
cieating and maintaining people and social ielations. Te distinction is obviously
a bit of a caiicatuie theie has nevei been a society, not even Engels` Manchestei
oi Victoi Hugo`s Paiis, wheie most men weie factoiy woikeis oi most women
woiked exclusively as housewives. Still, it is a useful staiting point, since it
ieveals an inteiesting diveigence. ln the spheie of industiy, it is geneially those
on top that ielegate to themselves the moie imaginative tasks (i.e., that design
the pioducts and oiganize pioduction), wheieas when inequalities emeige in the
spheie of social pioduction, it`s those on the bouom who end up expected to do
the majoi imaginative woik (foi example, the bulk of what l`ve called the `laboi
of inteipietation` that keeps life iunning).
No doubt all this makes it easiei to see the two as fundamentally dineient
soits of activity, making it haid foi us to iecognize inteipietive laboi, foi example,
oi most of what we usually think of as women`s woik, as laboi at all. To my
mind it would piobably be beuei to iecognize it as the piimaiy foim of laboi.
lnsofai as a cleai distinction can be made heie, it`s the caie, eneigy, and laboi
diiected at human beings that should be consideied fundamental. Te things we
1
caie most about oui loves, passions, iivaliies, obsessions aie always othei
people, and in most societies that aie not capitalist, it`s taken foi gianted that
the manufactuie of mateiial goods is a suboidinate moment in a laigei piocess of
fashioning people. ln fact, l would aigue that one of the most alienating aspects
of capitalism is the fact that it foices us to pietend that it is the othei way aiound,
and that societies exist piimaiily to inciease theii output of things.
Part III On alienation
19
ln the twentieth centuiy, death teiiihes men less than the absence of ieal
life. All these dead, mechanized, specialized actions, stealing a liule bit of
life a thousand times a day until the mind and body aie exhausted, until that
death which is not the end of life but the hnal satuiation with absence.
Raoul Vaneigem, Te Re+o|v:on o[ F+er,Jo, L:[e
Cieativity and desiie what we ofen ieduce, in political economy teims, to
pioduction" and consumption" aie essentially vehicles of the imagination.
Stiuctuies of inequality and domination, stiuctuial violence if you will, tend to
skew the imagination. Tey might cieate situations wheie laboieis aie ielegated
to mind-numbing, boiing, mechanical jobs and only a small elite is allowed to
indulge in imaginative laboi, leading to the feeling, on the pait of the woikeis, that
they aie alienated fiom theii own laboi, that theii veiy deeds belong to someone
else. lt might also cieate social situations wheie kings, politicians, celebiities oi
CEOs piance about oblivious to almost eveiything aiound them while theii wives,
seivants, stan, and handleis spend all theii time engaged in the imaginative woik
of maintaining them in theii fantasies. Most situations of inequality, l suspect,
combine elements of both.
Te subjective expeiience of living inside such lopsided stiuctuies of imagina-
tion is what we aie iefeiiing to when we talk about alienation".
lt stiikes me that if nothing else, this peispective would help explain the lin-
geiing appeal of theoiies of alienation in ievolutionaiy ciicles, even when the
academic Lef has long since abandoned them. lf one enteis an anaichist infoshop,
almost anywheie in the woild, the liench authois one is likely to encountei will
still laigely consist of Situationists like Guy Deboid and Raoul Vaneigem, the
gieat theoiists of alienation (alongside theoiists of the imagination like Coinelius
Castoiiadis). loi a long time l was genuinely puzzled as to how so many subuiban
Ameiican teenageis could be entianced, foi instance, by Raoul Vaneigem`s Te
Re+o|v:on o[ F+er,Jo, L:[e a book, afei all, wiiuen in Paiis almost foity yeais
ago. ln the end l decided it must be because Vaneigem`s book was, in its own way,
the highest theoietical expiession of the feelings of iage, boiedom, and ievulsion
that almost any adolescent at some point feels when confionted with the middle
class existence. Te sense of a life bioken into fiagments, with no ultimate mean-
ing oi integiity, of a cynical maiket system selling its victims commodities and
spectacles that themselves iepiesent tiny false images of the veiy sense of totality
and pleasuie and community the maiket has in fact destioyed, the tendency to
tuin eveiy ielation into a foim of exchange, to saciihce life foi suivival", pleasuie
foi ienunciation, cieativity foi hollow homogenous units of powei oi dead time"
on some level all this cleaily still iings tiue.
20
Te question though is why. Contempoiaiy social theoiy oneis liule explana-
tion. Poststiuctuialism, which emeiged in the immediate afeimath of `8, was
laigely boin of the iejection of this soit of analysis. lt is now simple common
sense among social theoiists that one cannot dehne a society as unnatuial" un-
less one assumes that theie is some natuial way foi society to be, inhuman"
unless theie is some authentic human essence, that one cannot say that the self is
fiagmented" unless it would be possible to have a unihed self, and so on. Since
these positions aie untenable since theie is no natuial condition foi society, no
authentic human essence, no unitaiy self theoiies of alienation have no basis.
Taken puiely as aiguments, these seem dimcult to iefute. But how then do we
account foi the expeiience`
lf one ieally thinks about it, though, the aigument is much less poweiful than
it seems. Afei all, what aie academic theoiists saying` Tey aie saying that the
idea of a unitaiy subject, a whole society, a natuial oidei, aie unieal. Tat all these
things aie simply hgments of oui imagination. Tiue enough. But then what else
could they be` And why is that a pioblem` lf imagination is indeed a constituent
element in the piocess of how we pioduce oui social and mateiial iealities, theie
is eveiy ieason to believe that it pioceeds thiough pioducing images of totality.
Tat`s simply how the imagination woiks. One must be able to imagine oneself
and otheis as integiated subjects in oidei to be able to pioduce beings that aie
in fact endlessly multiple, imagine some soit of coheient, bounded society" in
oidei to pioduce that chaotic open-ended netwoik of social ielations that actually
exists, and so foith. Noimally, people seem able to live with the dispaiity. Te
question, it seems to me, is why in ceitain times and places, the iecognition of it
instead tends to spaik iage and despaii, feelings that the social woild is a hollow
tiavesty oi malicious joke. Tis, l would aigue, is the iesult of that waiping and
shaueiing of the imagination that is the inevitable enect of stiuctuial violence.
Part IV On Revolution
22
Te Situationists, like many `0s iadicals, wished to stiike back thiough a
stiategy of diiect action cieating situations" by cieative acts of subveision that
undeimined the logic of the Spectacle and allowed actois to at least momentaiily
iecaptuie theii imaginative poweis. At the same time, they also felt all this
was inevitably leading up to a gieat insuiiectionaiy moment the" ievolution,
piopeily speaking. lf the events of May `8 showed anything, it was that if one
does not aim to seize state powei, theie can be no such fundamental, one-time
bieak. Te main dineience between the Situationists and theii most avid cuiient
ieadeis is that the millenaiian element has almost completely fallen away. No one
thinks the skies aie about to open any time soon. Teie is a consolation though
that as a iesult, as close as one can come to expeiiencing genuine ievolutionaiy
fieedom, one can begin to expeiience it immediately. Considei the following
statement fiom the Ciimethinc collective, piobably the most inspiiing young
anaichist piopagandists opeiating in the Situationist tiadition today
We must make oui fieedom by cuuing holes in the fabiic of this ieality, by
foiging new iealities which will, in tuin, fashion us. Puuing youiself in new
situations constantly is the only way to ensuie that you make youi decisions
unencumbeied by the ineitia of habit, custom, law, oi piejudice and it is up to
you to cieate these situations
lieedom only exists in the moment of ievolution. And those moments aie not
as iaie as you think. Change, ievolutionaiy change, is going on constantly and
eveiywheie and eveiyone plays a pait in it, consciously oi not."
What is this but an elegant statement of the logic of diiect action the dehant
insistence on acting as if one is alieady fiee` Te obvious question is how it
can contiibute to an oveiall stiategy, one that should lead to a cumulative move-
ment towaids a woild without states and capitalism. Heie, no one is completely
suie. Most assume the piocess could only be one of endless impiovisation. lnsui-
iectionaiy moments theie will ceitainly be. Likely as not, quite a few of them.
But they will most likely be one element in a fai moie complex and multifac-
eted ievolutionaiy piocess whose outlines could haidly, at this point, be fully
anticipated.
ln ietiospect, what seems stiikingly nave is the old assumption that a single
upiising oi successful civil wai could, as it weie, neutialize the entiie appaiatus
of stiuctuial violence, at least within a paiticulai national teiiitoiy that within
that teiiitoiy, iight-wing iealities could be simply swept away, to leave the held
open foi an untiammeled outpouiing of ievolutionaiy cieativity. But if so, the
tiuly puzzling thing is that, at ceitain moments of human histoiy, that appeaied
to be exactly what was happening. lt seems to me that if we aie to have any
chance of giasping the new, emeiging conception of ievolution, we need to begin
by thinking again about the quality of these insuiiectionaiy moments.
23
One of the most iemaikable things about such moments is how they can seem
to buist out of nowheie and then, ofen, dissolve away as quickly. How is it that
the same public" that two months befoie say, the Paiis Commune, oi Spanish
Civil Wai, had voted in a faiily modeiate social demociatic iegime will suddenly
hnd itself willing to iisk theii lives foi the same ultia-iadicals who ieceived a
fiaction of the actual vote` Oi, to ietuin to May `8, how is it that the same
public that seemed to suppoit oi at least feel stiongly sympathetic towaid the
student/woikei upiising could almost immediately afeiwaids ietuin to the polls
and elect a iight-wing goveinment` Te most common histoiical explanations
that the ievolutionaiies didn`t ieally iepiesent the public oi its inteiests, but
that elements of the public peihaps became caught up in some soit of iiiational
eneivescence seem obviously inadequate. liist of all, they assume that `the
public` is an entity with opinions, inteiests, and allegiances that can be tieated
as ielatively consistent ovei time. ln fact what we call the public" is cieated,
pioduced, thiough specihc institutions that allowspecihc foims of action taking
polls, watching television, voting, signing petitions oi wiiting leueis to elected
omcials oi auending public heaiings and not otheis. Tese fiames of action
imply ceitain ways of talking, thinking, aiguing, delibeiating. Te same public"
that may widely indulge in the use of iecieational chemicals may also consistently
vote to make such indulgences illegal, the same collection of citizens aie likely to
come to completely dineient decisions on questions anecting theii communities
if oiganized into a pailiamentaiy system, a system of computeiized plebiscites,
oi a nested seiies of public assemblies. ln fact the entiie anaichist pioject of
ieinventing diiect demociacy is piemised on assuming this is the case.
To illustiate what l mean, considei that in Ameiica, the same collection of
people iefeiied to in one context as the public" can in anothei be iefeiied to as
the woikfoice." Tey become a woikfoice", of couise, when they aie engaged in
dineient soits of activity. Te public" does not woik at least, a sentence like
most of the Ameiican public woiks in the seivice industiy" would nevei appeai
in a magazine oi papei if a jouinalist weie to auempt to wiite such a sentence,
theii editoi would ceitainly change it. lt is especially odd since the public does
appaiently have to go to woik this is why, as lefist ciitics ofen complain, the
media will always talk about how, say, a tianspoit stiike is likely to inconvenience
the public, in theii capacity of commuteis, but it will nevei occui to them that
those stiiking aie themselves pait of the public, oi that whethei if they succeed
in iaising wage levels this will be a public beneht. And ceitainly the public"
does not go out into the stieets. lts iole is as audience to public spectacles, and
consumeis of public seivices. When buying oi using goods and seivices piivately
supplied, the same collection of individuals become something else (consumeis"),
24
just as in othei contexts of action they aie ielabeled a nation", electoiate", oi
population".
All these entities aie the pioduct of institutions and institutional piactices that,
in tuin, dehne ceitain hoiizons of possibility. Hence when voting in pailiamentaiy
elections one might feel obliged to make a iealistic" choice, in an insuiiectionaiy
situation, on the othei hand, suddenly anything seems possible.
A gieat deal of iecent ievolutionaiy thought essentially asks what, then, does
this collection of people become duiing such insuiiectionaiy moments` loi the
last few centuiies the conventional answei has been the people", and all modein
legal iegimes ultimately tiace theii legitimacy to moments of constituent powei",
when the people iise up, usually in aims, to cieate a new constitutional oidei.
Te insuiiectionaiy paiadigm, in fact, is embedded in the veiy idea of the modein
state. A numbei of Euiopean theoiists, undeistanding that the giound has shifed,
have pioposed a new teim, the multitude", an entity that cannot by dehnition
become the basis foi a new national oi buieauciatic state. loi me the pioject is
deeply ambivalent.
ln the teims l`ve been developing, what the public", the woikfoice", con-
sumeis", population" all have in common is that they aie biought into being by
institutionalized fiames of action that aie inheiently buieauciatic, and theiefoie,
piofoundly alienating. Voting booths, television scieens, omce cubicles, hospitals,
the iitual that suiiounds them one might say these aie the veiy machineiy
of alienation. Tey aie the instiuments thiough which the human imagination
is smashed and shaueied. lnsuiiectionaiy moments aie moments when this bu-
ieauciatic appaiatus is neutialized. Doing so always seems to have the enect of
thiowing hoiizons of possibility wide open. Tis only to be expected if one of the
main things that appaiatus noimally does is to enfoice extiemely limited ones.
(Tis is piobably why, as Rebecca Solnit has obseived, people ofen expeiience
something veiy similai duiing natuial disasteis.) Tis would explain why ievolu-
tionaiy moments always seem to be followed by an outpouiing of social, aitistic,
and intellectual cieativity. Noimally unequal stiuctuies of imaginative identi-
hcation aie disiupted, eveiyone is expeiimenting with tiying to see the woild
fiom unfamiliai points of view. Noimally unequal stiuctuies of cieativity aie
disiupted, eveiyone feels not only the iight, but usually the immediate piactical
need to iecieate and ieimagine eveiything aiound them.
Hence the ambivalence of the piocess of ienaming. On the one hand, it is
undeistandable that those who wish to make iadical claims would like to know
in whose name they aie making them. On the othei, if what l`ve been saying is
tiue, the whole pioject of hist invoking a ievolutionaiy multitude", and then to
stait looking foi the dynamic foices that lie behind it, begins to look a lot like the
hist step of that veiy piocess of institutionalization that must eventually kill the
2
veiy thing it celebiates. Subjects (publics, peoples, woikfoices . . . ) aie cieated by
specihc institutional stiuctuies that aie essentially fiamewoiks foi action. Tey
aie what they do. What ievolutionaiies do is to bieak existing fiames to cieate
new hoiizons of possibility, an act that then allows a iadical iestiuctuiing of the
social imagination Tis is peihaps the one foimof action that cannot, by dehnition,
be institutionalized. Tis is why a numbei of ievolutionaiy thinkeis, fiom Ranaele
Laudani in ltaly to the Colectivo Situaciones in Aigentina, have begun to suggest
it might be beuei hei to speak not of constituent" but destituent powei".
Revolution in Reverse
Teie is a stiange paiadox in Maix`s appioach to ievolution. Geneially speak-
ing, when Maix speaks of mateiial cieativity, he speaks of pioduction", and heie
he insists, as l`ve mentioned, that the dehning featuie of humanity is that we
hist imagine things, and then tiy to biing them into being. When he speaks of
social cieativity it is almost always in teims of ievolution, but heie, he insists
that imagining something and then tiying to biing it into being is piecisely what
we should nevei do. Tat would be utopianism, and foi utopianism, he had only
witheiing contempt.
Te most geneious inteipietation, l would suggest, is that Maix on some level
undeistood that the pioduction of people and social ielations woiked on dineient
piinciples, but also knew he did not ieally have a theoiy of what those piinciples
weie. Piobably it was only with the iise of feminist theoiy that l was diawing on
so libeially in my eailiei analysis that it became possible to think systematically
about such issues. l might add that it is a piofound iefection on the enects of
stiuctuial violence on the imagination that feminist theoiy itself was so quickly
sequesteied away into its own subheld wheie it has had almost no impact on the
woik of most male theoiists.
lt seems to me no coincidence, then, that so much of the ieal piactical woik
of developing a new ievolutionaiy paiadigm in iecent yeais has also been the
woik of feminism, oi anyway, that feminist conceins have been the main diiving
foice in theii tiansfoimation. ln Ameiica, the cuiient anaichist obsession with
consensus and othei foims of diiectly demociatic piocess tiaces back diiectly
to oiganizational issues within the feminist movement. What had begun, in the
late `0s and eaily `0s, as small, intimate, ofen anaichist-inspiied collectives
weie thiown into ciisis when they staited giowing iapidly in size. Rathei than
abandon the seaich foi consensus in decision-making, many began tiying to
develop moie foimal veisions on the same piinciples. Tis, in tuin, inspiied some
iadical Qakeis (who had pieviously seen theii own consensus decision-making
2
as piimaiily a ieligious piactice) to begin cieating tiaining collectives. By the
time of the diiect action campaigns against the nucleai powei industiy in the
late `0s, the whole appaiatus of amnity gioups, spokescouncils, consensus and
facilitation had alieady begun to take something like its contempoiaiy foim. Te
iesulting outpouiing of new foims of consensus piocess constitutes the most
impoitant contiibution to ievolutionaiy piactice in decades. lt is laigely the woik
of feminists engaged in piactical oiganizing a majoiity, piobably, tied to the
anaichist tiadition. Tis makes it all the moie iionic that male theoiists who have
not themselves engaged in on-the-giound oiganizing oi taken pait in anaichist
decision-making piocesses, but who hnd themselves diawn to anaichism as a
piinciple, so ofen feel obliged to include in otheiwise sympathetic statements,
that of couise they don`t agiee with this obviously impiactical, pie-in-the-sky,
uniealistic notion of consensus.
Te oiganization of mass actions themselves festivals of iesistance, as they
aie ofen called can be consideied piagmatic expeiiments in whethei it is indeed
possible to institutionalize the expeiience of libeiation, the giddy iealignment
of imaginative poweis, eveiything that is most poweiful in the expeiience of a
successful spontaneous insuiiection. Oi if not to institutionalize it, peihaps, to
pioduce it on call. Te enect foi those involved is as if eveiything weie happening
in ieveise. A ievolutionaiy upiising begins with baules in the stieets, and if
successful, pioceeds to outpouiings of populai eneivescence and festivity. Teie
follows the sobei business of cieating new institutions, councils, decision-making
piocesses, and ultimately the ieinvention of eveiyday life. Such at least is the
ideal, and ceitainly theie have been moments in human histoiy wheie something
like that has begun to happen much though, again, such spontaneous cieations
always seems to end being subsumed within some new foim of violent buieau-
ciacy. Howevei, as l`ve noted, this is moie oi less inevitable since buieauciacy,
howevei much it seives as the immediate oiganizei of situations of powei and
stiuctuial blindness, does not cieate them. Mainly, it simply evolves to manage
them.
Tis is one ieason diiect action pioceeds in the opposite diiection. Piobably
a majoiity of the paiticipants aie diawn fiom subcultuies that aie all about
ieinventing eveiyday life. Even if not, actions begin with the cieation of new
foims of collective decision-making councils, assemblies, the endless auention to
`piocess` and uses those foims to plan the stieet actions and populai festivities.
Te iesult is, usually, a diamatic confiontation with aimed iepiesentatives of
the state. While most oiganizeis would be delighted to see things escalate to a
populai insuiiection, and something like that does occasionally happen, most
would not expect these to maik any kind of peimanent bieaks in ieality. Tey
seive moie as something almost along the lines of momentaiy adveitisements
2
oi beuei, foietastes, expeiiences of visionaiy inspiiation foi a much slowei,
painstaking stiuggle of cieating alteinative institutions.
One of the most impoitant contiibutions of feminism, it seems to me, has been
to constantly iemind eveiyone that situations" do not cieate themselves. Teie is
usually a gieat deal of woik involved. loi much of human histoiy, what has been
taken as politics has consisted essentially of a seiies of diamatic peifoimances
caiiied out upon theatiical stages. One of the gieat gifs of feminism to political
thought has been to continually iemind us of the people is in fact making and
piepaiing and cleaning those stages, and even moie, maintaining the invisible
stiuctuies that make them possible people who have, oveiwhelmingly, been
women. Te noimal piocess of politics of couise is to make such people disappeai.
lndeed one of the chief functions of women`s woik is to make itself disappeai.
One might say that the political ideal within diiect action ciicles has become to
enace the dineience, oi, to put it anothei way, that action is seen as genuinely
ievolutionaiy when the piocess of pioduction of situations is expeiienced as just
as libeiating as the situations themselves. lt is an expeiiment one might say in the
iealignment of imagination, of cieating tiuly non-alienated foims of expeiience.
Conclusion
Obviously it is also auempting to do so in a context in which, fai fiom being
put in tempoiaiy abeyance, state powei (in many paits of the globe at least) so
sunuses eveiy aspect of daily existence that its aimed iepiesentatives inteivene to
iegulate the inteinal oiganizational stiuctuie of gioups allowed to cash checks oi
own and opeiate motoi vehicles. One of the iemaikable things about the cuiient,
neolibeial age is that buieauciacy has come to be so all-encompassing this
peiiod has seen, afei all, the cieation of the hist enective global administiative
system in human histoiy that we don`t even see it any moie. At the same
time, the piessuies of opeiating within a context of endless iegulation, iepiession,
sexism, iacial and class dominance, tend to ensuie many who get diawn into the
politics of diiect action expeiience a constant alteiation of exaltation and buin-
out, moments wheie eveiything seems possible alteinating with moments wheie
nothing does. ln othei paits of the woild, autonomy is much easiei to achieve, but
at the cost of isolation oi almost complete absence of iesouices. How to cieate
alliances between dineient zones of possibility is a fundamental pioblem.
Tese howevei aie questions of stiategy that go well beyond the scope of the
cuiient essay. My puipose heie has been moie modest. Revolutionaiy theoiy, it
seems to me, has in many fionts advanced much less quickly than ievolutionaiy
piactice, my aim in wiiting this has been to see if one could woik back fiom the
28
expeiience of diiect action to begin to cieate some new theoietical tools. Tey
aie haidly meant to be dehnitive. Tey may not even piove useful. But peihaps
they can contiibute to a bioadei pioject of ie-imagining.
Te Anaichist Libiaiy
Anti-Copyiight
May 21, 2012
David Giaebei
Revolution in Reveise
200
Retiieved on May 1
th
, 2009 fiom news.infoshop.org