1. ASCUNCION V YRIARTE Facts: Petitioners seek to register as a corporation the barrio of San Miguel or Pulo.

The purpose of the incorporation states: "That the object of the corporation is (a) to organize and regulate the management, disposition, administration and control which the barrio of Pulo or San Miguel or its inhabitants or residents have over the common property of said residents or inhabitants or property belonging to the whole barrio as such; and (b) to use the natural products of the said property for institutions, foundations, and charitable works of common utility and advantage to the barrio or its inhabitants." This barrio, having no local government of its own, is governed by the municipality of Pasig. The chief of the division archives of the Executive Bureau refused to file the articles of incorporation on the ground that the object of the proposed corporation is not lawful (the registration of San Miguel Barrio would in effect deprive the municipality of the control over said territory, which is not allowed by law). Hence, a petition for mandamus was filed by petitioners against the chief of the division archives. Issue: W/N proposed articles can be registered? Decision: No, The municipality of Pasig is a municipal corporation organized by law. It has the control of all property of the municipality. The various barrios of the municipality have no right to own or hold property, they not being recognized as legal entities by any law. If there is any public property situated in the barrio of Pulo or San Miguel not belonging to the general government or the province, it belongs to the municipality of Pasig and the sole authority to manage and administer the same resides in that municipality. Until the present laws upon the subject are charged no other entity can be the owner of such property or control or administer it. Otherwise municipalities as now established by law could be deprived of the property which they now own and administer. Each barrio of the municipality would become under the scheme proposed, a separate corporation, would take over the ownership, administration, and control of that portion of the municipal territory within its limits. This would disrupt, in a sense, the municipalities of the Islands by dividing them into a series of smaller municipalities entirely independent of the original municipality. 2. AGUADO V CITY OF MANILA Facts: Ricardo Aguado had claims against the city of manila amounting to P5,621.40 with interest and costs. His complaint springs from an assignment of certain claims from Tomas Luna Munoz who entered into contracts with the Ayuntamiento de Manila for delivery of coal (with a related deposit to guaranty the contract)for use of the Carriedo waterworks but later, despite repeated demands remained unpaid. Further, even after the suspension of the Ayuntamientos functions due to the conquest and occupation of the city of manila and thereafter, no payment was given despite demand to the US Government and the Philippine Islands who succeeded the Ayuntamiento. Eventually, the defendant, the city of Manila, became the acting successor of the above-named entities in the discharge of all of the municipal functions. Likewise all the assets (including the deposit) of the Carriedo waterworks were transferred. After consideration of the facts, the courts ruled in favour of the plaintiff, thus prompting the defendant

to appeal ordering execution against the property of the city of Manila consisting of waterworks and lands pertaining to it and to 94 shares of the Spanish-Filipino Bank Issue: Whether or not the present city of Manila is liable under the contracts referred to in the agreed statement of facts, for the obligations created therein by the old city of Manila (Ayuntamiento de Manila) as its successor, Held: NO, The city of Manila is in no way the successor of the Ayuntamiento de Manila in law.The mere fact that the present authority in these Islands has given to the present city powers like those exercised by the Ayuntamiento de Manila in no way makes the former the successor of the latter. It is an entirely new organization, a new agent of a new principal, and only has such authority, such powers, and such obligations and responsibilities as the new principal has seen fit to grant and impose. Definition of Mun Corp: A municipal corporation is a governmental agent of the state, given authority to govern the people in a limited portion of the state. This power, however, is limited to certain particular governmental functions, which are always expressed in writing in the form of a charter or grant of powers. To ascertain what this power is in each particular case, reference must be made to such grant of powers. Powers not expressly given therein or necessarily implied from such express powers can not be exercised by such governmental agent. It being a doctrine well established then that a municipal corporation is a mere agent of the state, what then is the status of said corporation when the state itself is destroyed? Certainly the general consequences of the death of the principal must follow in its effect upon the authority of the agent. The death of the principal always revokes the agency when there are no vested rights involved. A municipal corporation has not vested right to exist as such. The state may at any time revoke its charter. Of course the state might, by such revocation, incur certain moral obligations, but the performance of these obligations would always rest upon the conscience of the law-making or charter-granting authority of the state. The courts have no equitable or legal authority to compel the state to comply with obligations of this kind in the absence of proper legislation. 3. PROVINCE OF ZBGA DEL NORTE V CITY OF ZBGA Facts: The municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of Zamboanga Province. In 1936, the commonwealth act 39 converted it into a city. Sec 50 provided that properties which the province shall abandon will be acquired and paid by the city of Zamboanga at a price fixed by the Auditor General. The properties consisted of 50 lots and some building. The city paid P47, 000 of the P704,000. However, in 1961m RA 3039 amended sec50 providing for the acquisition of the properties free of charge. Province filed a suit and prayed for RA 3039 to be declared unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff of property without due process of law and just compensation. The CFI declared RA 3039 unconstitutional and held the 50 properties as private properties of the province of Zamboanga. Issue: Whether the 50 properties are public property or private property of the province. Ruling: Public Property.

There are two conflicting applicable laws in the case at bar. Applying the New Civil Code, if the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. Under the said law, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase public works for public service for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category. On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc. Under the aforementioned law, Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites a total of 24 lots since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress. 4. LEAGUE OF CITIES V COMELEC Facts: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. Issue: The petitions raise the following fundamental issues: 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and 2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. Held: The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. 5. SENATOR ALVAREZ V GUINGONA

Facts: In April 1993, HB 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the HOR. In May 1993, a Senate bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate. In January 1994, the HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720). Now Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that the Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97 included the IRA which should not be. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR. 2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGUs income. HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further, the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1st, 2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1st hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well). 2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGUs average annual income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds. To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.

6. MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ V BORJA Facts : The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258 of then Pres. Quirino pursuant toSec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Sinacaban laid claim to several barrios based on the technical description in EO 258. The Municipality of Jimenez asserted jurisdiction based on an agreement with Sinacaban which was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. The Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the earlier resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was void since the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258. Jimenez argued that the power to create municipalities is essentially legislative (as held in Pelaez v Auditor General), then

Sinacaban, which was created thru and EO, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim. Issue: Whether or not Sinacaban has juridical personality. YES Held: Where a municipality created as such by EO is later impliedly recognized and its acts area ccorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In the case of Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, the SC laid the factors to consider in validating the creation of a municipal corporation: 1. The fact that for 30 years, the validity of the corporation has not been challenged; 2. The fact that no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the EO creating themunicipality; and 3. The fact that the municipality was later classified as a 5th class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House. In this case, the following factors are present: 1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was decided in 1965 and yet thevalidity of EO 258 creating it had never been questioned. 2. It was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned. 3. Rule 66, Sec. 16 of the Rules of COurt provides that a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within 5 years from the time the act complanedof was done or committed. 4. The State and even Jimenez recognized Sinacabans corporate existence by entering into an agreement with it regarding the boundary. Ex.: AO 33, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, etc. 5. Sinacaban is constituted as part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of MTCs in the country. Moreover, the LGC of 1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that municipal districts organized pursuant topresidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of Misamis Occidental. II. Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. It is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. It applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. The requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI,Section 3 of the previous Constitution. It cannot be applied to municipal corporations created before, such as Sinacaban. 7. TANO V SOCRATES

Facts: The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of: (1) Ordinance No. 15-92 entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF"; (2) Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending to engage in any business, trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his possession any of the articles for which a permit is required to be had, to obtain first a Mayors and authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto Princesa and, (3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS Petitioners contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of the 1987 Constitution and that the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit. They also claim that it took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as the Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion Public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Government's power under the general welfare clause; they likewise maintained that there was no violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional Held: NO, In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. General Welfare Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied there from, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.

8. MMDA V BEL-AIR FACTS: On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. ISSUE: WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state endowed with police power. HELD: A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic and corporate one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991). Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the sangguniangpanlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the [LGU's corporate powers] provided under the Code. There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a development authority and not a political unit of government since it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. The SangguniangPanlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal. 9. LINA V DIZON PANO Facts : On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the PCSO to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of SanPedro, Laguna, for a mayor's permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquizin a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508 which declared its policy against the operation of lotto within the province. As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. On February 10,

1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508.Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling. It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial government's police power under the General Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. They also maintain that respondent's lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and approval by the local government were sought before it was implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160. Issues: 1. Whether or not Kapasiyahan Blg. 508 and the denial of a mayor's permit based thereon is valid. Ruling: YES. The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue a mayor's permit for the operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private respondent. According to the mayor, he based his decision on an existing ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in the province of Laguna. The ordinance, however, merely states the "objection" of the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto, such resolution isvalid. This is part of the local government's autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government's. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto. The game of lotto is agame of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. 2. Whether or not prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given local government unit. Ruling: NO. The SC held that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around the country. From a careful reading of said provisions, these apply only to national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national government, it is farfetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the LGC.

10. MODAY V CA FACTS: Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Modays land. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is governments right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid. 11. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V CA FACTS: SangguniangPanlalawigan (SP) of Cam Sur passed Res. 129 authorizing the Prov. Gov. To purchase/expropriate property to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-agricultural crops and housing project for the government employees. By virtue of the resolution, Cam Sur filed 2 cases for expropriation against private respondents (San Joaquins). RTC: denied motion to dismiss on the ground of inadequacy of price of San Joaquins. CA: San Joaquins raised issue of a) declaring the resolution null and void, b) complaint for expropriation de dismissed. CA asked Sol Gen to give comment. SolGen: under the LGC, no need for approval by the OP of the exercise of the SP of the right to eminent domin. However, approval of DAR must first be secured (since this involves appropriation of agricultural lands). CA: set aside order of RTC (without however disposing of the issues raised. The SC said that the CA assumed that the resolution is valid and the expropriation is for a public use). Issues: 1) WON the resolution is null and void. Corollary to this issue is WON the expropriation is for a public use. 2) WON the exercise of the power of eminent domain in this case is restricted by the CAR Law?

3) WON the complaint for expropriation may be dismissed on the ground of inadequacy of the compensation offered?

Held/ratio: 1) The expropriation is for a public purpose, hence the resolution is authorized and valid. SC explained that there had been a shift from the old to the new concept of public purpose:. Old concept is that the property must actually be used by the general public. The new concept, on the other hand, means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community. In this case, the proposed pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the CamSur peeps. (How?)invaluable info and tech on agriculture, fishery, and cottage industry, enhance livelihood of farmers and fishermen, etc. 2) No, (citing Ardanavs Reyes, SC here said that the implication of the Ardana case is that) the power of expropriation is superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program. Old LGC does not intimate in the least that LGUs must first secure approval of the Dept of Land Reform for conversion of agri to non-agri use. Likewise, no provision in the CAR Law subjecting expropriation by LGUs to the control of DAR. Moreover, Sec 65 of CAR Law is not in point because it is applicable only to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program. This is limited only to applications for reclassification submitted by land owners or tenant beneficiaries. Statutes conferring power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication. 3) Fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation decalred in the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded. It is unconstitutional to fix just compensation in expropriation cases based on the value given either by the owners or the assessor. Rules for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 ROC, evidence must be submitted to justify what they consider is the just compensation. 12. FARINAS V BARBA Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On March 24,1994, he resigned after going without leave to the United States.To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a recommendation for the appointment of Edward Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the recommendation was made to Mayor Barba. The resolution, containing the recommendation, was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the Local Government Code, disapproved the resolution for the reason that the authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the Governor. Accordingly, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment of petitioner Al Nacino. On June 8, 1994, the Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and swore him in office that same day. On the other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox tothe same position. On June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos

Norte a petition for quo warranto and prohibition. On July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the appointment of respondent Palafox byrespondent Mayor Barba. Issue: Who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure? Ruling: The person who has the power to appoint under such circumstance is the Governor upon the recommendation of the Sangguniang concerned which is the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas where the vacancy occurs. The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding paragraph, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him. 13. SALALIMA V GUINGONA FACTS: This Supreme Court case involves four administrative complaints filed against Albay Governor Salalima and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay. The complaints seek to hold the petitioners liable for a) wanton disregard of law amounting to abuse of authority in OP case 5470; b) grave abuse of authority under Section 60 (e) of the Local Government Code in OP cae 5649; c) oppression and abuse of authority under Section 60 (c) and (e) of the Local Government Code in OP case 5471 and d) abuse of authority and negligence in OP case 5450. Relevant to our discussion on whether or not LGUs can hire private lawyers in cases filed against it is OP case 5469. The Province of Albay imposed real property tax against the National Power Corporation. The latter, claiming that it is tax exempt, refused to pay the said tax liability. Due to its refusal to pay, the Province of Albay took over the properties of NPC and sold them in an auction sale. The Province was the sole bidder. Upon the failure of NPC to redeem the property, the Province sought the issuance of a writ of possession from the Regional Trial Court. The NPC challenged this in a petition filed with the Supreme Court. The Province, through its legal office Atty. Ricaforte, filed its comment on the said petition on May 17, 1989. On June 2, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No. 129-89, authorizing Salalima to engage the services of a Manila-based law firm to handle the case. As such, on August 25, 1989, Atty. Jesus Carnago entered his appearance with the SC as a collaborating counsel. On November 14, 1989, Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes of Cortes and Reyna Law Firm sent a letter to Salalima, informing him that Atty. Carnago had filed a memorandum in the SC. He then proposed that his law firm and that of Atty. Carnago enter into a retainer agreement with the Province in connection with the case. He charged 50, 000 as acceptance fee and a contingency fee of 18%. In response to this, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 01-90 authorizing Salalima to sign a retainer contract with Cortes and Reyna Law Firm.

On June 4, 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Province. The latter then paid the lawyers amounting to around 7 million. However, on May 31, 1993, the Provincial Auditor informed the Province that COA had disallowed the payments for lack of prior written conformity of the Solicitor General and a written concurrence of COA. An administrative complaint was later on filed against the petitioners with the Office of the President. The OP found that the petitioners incurred administrative liability in hiring private lawyers to defend it in the NPC case. ISSUE: WON the petitioners incurred administrative liabilities in hiring private lawyers to represent the Province HELD: In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay, respondents exceeded their authority and violated the abovequoted section of the Local Government Code and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court. The respondents attempted to dispute this finding by presenting the Solicitor Generals conformity dated 15 July 1993. This conformity was, however obtained after the disbursements were already made in 1990 and 1992. What is required by COA Circular No. 86-255 is a prior written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General. What Carnago filed was merely a memorandum. The total attorneys fees of 38 Million is clearly unconscionable. In the case Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok, the Supreme Court ruled that the LGU cannot be represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial legal officer or provincial fiscal who can represent it. A private lawyer has no standing in such a case. Sec. 481 and Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok are applicable in this case. WITH RESPECT TO ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY: Whether or not they incurred liabilities, they can no longer be held to answer for these in view of the fact that they have already been reelected. Their reelection operates as condonation of any misconduct committed in their prior term. In Pascual v. Pascual, the SC ruled that offenses committed or acts done in a previous term are generally held not to furnish a cause for removal in the current term of office. This is because each term is separate from other terms and that the reelection operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefore. Such a rule is founded on the theory that an officials reelection expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was committed during the previous term. Also, sound policy dictates such a rule. A contrary rule would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests between reelected officials and their political enemies who may not stop to hound the former during his new term with administrative cases for acts alleged to have been committed during his previous term. RULING: OP Decision imposing penalties is reversed and set aside. 14. GARCIA V MOJICA

Facts: On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which was to commence on September 1998 upon F.E. Zuelligs first delivery. Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter. Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the other city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this recommendation Issues: 1. Whether Garcia may be held administratively liable. 2. Whether the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of the Local Government Code. Held: 1. No. As previously held, a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds. However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just 4 days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue during the election, and so the electorate could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character. Petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for an act done during his previous term. The agreement between petitioner and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioners prior term. At that moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later. While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, this should not prejudice the filing of any case, other than administrative, against petitioner. The ruling does not mean the total exoneration of petitioners wrongdoing, if any, that might have been committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling is now limited to the question of his administrative liability therefore, and it is our considered view that he may not. 2. No. There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. The decision of the Ombudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if the evidence of guilt is strong. The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman. 15. GARCIA V COMELEC Facts:

Petitioner Enrique Garcia was elected Governor of the Province of Bataan in the May 11, 1992 Elections. In the early evening of July 1, 1993, some mayors, vice mayor, and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the 12 Municipalities of the Province met at the National Power Corp compound in Bagac, Bataan. At about 12:30am of the following day, July 02, 1993, they proceeded to the Bagac town plaza where they constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia, A resolution for the recall of the petitioner Garcia in the ground of loss of confidence was moved and unanimously seconded. 146 names appeared in the Resolution No.1 but only 80 carried the signatures of the members of PRA. Of the 80 signatures, only 74 signatures were found to be genuine. The PRAC of the province had a membership of 144 and its majority is 73. On July 7, 1993, petitioners filed with the respondent COMELEC a petion to deny due course to said Resolution No.1. Petitioners alleged that the PRAC failed to comply with the substantive and procedural requirements laid down in Section 70 of LGCode of 1991. In a per curiam resolution promulgated August 31, 1993, COMELEC dismissed the petition and scheduled the recall elections for the position of Governor of Bataan on October 11, 1993. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of Preliminary injunction to annul the said Resolution of COMELEC on various grounds. They urged that Section 70 of the LGCode allowing recall through the initiative of the PRAC is unconstitutional because (1) the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate recall proceedings and (2) it violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection of law. Issues: 1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings. 2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection of the law. Ruling: 1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a)

to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.

2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities and component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority. Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public place. Needless to state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall which can be given due course by the COMELEC. 16. PIMENTEL V AGUIRRE FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments. HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments. A directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country. It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the

Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. 17. TAVORA V VELOSO Facts: Venustiano T. Tavora, a resident of Marikina, Metro Manila, owns an apartment in Quiapo, Manila which he has leased to JulietaCapati, a resident of Quiapo. On account of alleged violations of the lease agreement by the lessee (unauthorized subleasing and failure to pay rent), the lessor filed an ejectment suit in the City Court of Manila. The defendant filed a motion t/ dismiss on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction for failure of the plaintiff to bring the dispute first to the barangay court for possible amicable settlement under PD 1508. There is no question that there has been no attempt to amicably settle the dispute between Tavora and Capati at the barangay level. After denying the motion to dismiss as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration, the municipal court reversed itself and dismissed the ejectment case.Tavora thus filed a case of certiorari and mandamus praying that the order of dismissal be set aside and that respondent judge be ordered to hear and decide the case. Issue: WON prior confrontation of the parties and conciliation of the lupon is required before the judge can take cognizance of the ejectment case pursuant to PD 1508. Held: Yes. PD 1508 is provides the scope of the Lupon (Barangay Court) as detailed in Sec 2 which discusses the subject matters within the authority/jurisdiction of the Lupon (Barangay Court) which include all parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes, subject to certain exceptions and Sec 3 Venue viz: among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated. However, Sec 3 of the same PD, also included a provisio stating: However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated. Therefore, although venue is generally determined by the residence of the parties, disputes involving real property shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated, notwithstanding that the parties reside elsewhere within the same city/municipality. Thus the case is set aside and the respondent judge is directed to hear and decide the case.

18. GARCES V CA FACTS: Petitioner Garces is owner of an apartment building located in Malate, Manila. On August 14, 1984, he filed with Branch 13 of the MTC of Manila, a complaint for ejectment against respondent Daisy Escalante, the lessee of Room B in that apartment building. Issue: Ruling: In paragraph 1 of both the Complainant and the Amended Complaint filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court, it was alleged that "plaintiff [i.e., petitioner Garces] is a Filipino of legal age, and residing at 2363 Jacobo Street, Singalong, Manila, while defendant [i.e., respondent Escalante] is, likewise, of legal age, Filipino and residing at 1603 Indiana, Malate, Manila, where she may be served with summons and other court processes. 7 A similar allegation appeared in the Petition for Review filed by plaintiff Garces with the Court of Appeals. 8 Furthermore, the record of this case indicates that no Certificate to File Action was issued by the barangay official concerned prior to the initial filing by petitioner Garces of his complaint in court. Clearly, therefore, dismissal of the ejectment suit ordered initially by the Regional Trial Court and later affirmed by the Court of Appeals was not improper, especially considering that, per allegations of complainant himself in his pleadings, both parties were then in fact residents of barangays situated "in the same city or municipality." Petitioner Garces, however, in order to justify non-application in this case of P.D. 1508, would now urge the Court to reverse the dismissal of his complaint on the assertion that the leased apartment unit in Malate "is only the place where (respondent stays) during workdays as respondent Daisy Escalante is working in Manila" i.e., "(respondent's) intention to establish residence is in Cavite where she has her house." 10 The argument is not persuasive. Section 3 of P.D. 1508 specifically provides that the Decree shall be applicable to disputes "between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay" and to disputes "involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality." We think it clear, and so hold, that P.D. 1508 does not refer here to one's legal residence or domicile which, for differing purposes may differ from the actual or physical habitation of a litigant. The policy of the law is evidently to promote dispute settlement through non-litigious, compulsory conciliation procedures and disputes arise where people actually or physically reside. The fact that respondent Escalante stays in the apartment unit in Malate five (5) days a week, every week, is more than adequate proof that, within the meaning of the Decree, respondent "actually resides" in Manila. 19. GEGARE V CA 20. PP V CARUNCHO Facts: In the afternoon of June 16, 1981, which was an election day, Salvador F. Reyes who was a radio reporter for Radio Veritas, addressed certain questions relating the voting procedure to Mayor

Emiliano R. Caruncho, Jr. of Pasig, Metro Manila. The good mayor must have had a trying day because instead of answering the questions, he questioned Reyes for questioning him. What happened next could have been settled easily but for the fact that it was televised nationally Mayor Caruncho and some of his companions manhandled Salvador F. Reyes and the incident was on tape. Understandably, there was an outcry against Caruncho, et all. Understandably also, Reyes sought the assistance of the law and filed a slight physical injuries complaint Issues: Ruling: 21. URBANO V IAC FACTS: ON oct. 23, 1980, Marcelo Javier was hacked by theFilomeno Urbano using a bolo. As a result of which, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm. Upon the intercession of the Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700 for the medical expenses. Hence, On October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Favian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Urbano advanced P400 to Javier at the poluice staion. On November 3, the additional P300 was given to Javier at Urbanos house in the presence of the Barangay Captain. On November 14, 1981, which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. On November 15, 1980, Javier died in the hospital. Issue: Ruling: The evidence found does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus. However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.

It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16). 22. PP V FORTES FACTS: This is about a rape case; the accused Fortes was convicted in the CFI and appealed. Among the issues raised by the accused relevant to this subject was that, the report of the alleged crime committed by him (accused) should have first been reported to the barangay captain pursuant to the provisions of PD 1508 or referral to the Barangay Lupon for purposes of settlement. Further, he contended that the brngy captain was only nearby when the crime allegedly was committed and that the complaint should have been brought to him first and not immediately to the police station. Issue: W/N a complaint for rape should first be brought to the Barangay Lupon?

Decision: No.Court is not persuaded by the appellant's contention that if Merelyn had in fact been raped, then either she or her father should have first informed the barangay captain about the incident. Suffice it to say, reporting the commission of a crime to a barangay captain is not a prerequisite for the formal institution of criminal charges. Even under P.D. No. 1508, the governing law then, rapes was not among the crimes which required referral to the Barangay Lupon for the purpose of seeking an amicable settlement. As a matter of fact, it was among those excepted from such a referral considering that the penalty imposable is more than thirty (30) days imprisonment. 43 If the complainant and her father seemed to have "by-passed" the barangay captain and instead reported the incident directly to the police, it is quite obvious that they wanted immediate action to ensure the appellant's arrest and forestall any possible escape on his part. 23. CENIZA V COMELEC Facts: **Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. ** Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province,

close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection. HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969. The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances. The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voters right of suffrage.

24. NEGROS OCCIDENTAL II ELECTRIC COOP V SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD OF DUMAGUETE Facts: Petitioner Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac were both invited to an investigation to be conducted by the respondents Committee in connection with the operations of public utilities specifically the Negros Orriental Electric Cooperative II. Due their failure to appear at the said investigation, petitioners were reproving for legislative contempt. Issue:

Whether the Sanguniang Panlungsod has the power to mandate the testimony of witnesses and order arrests who fail to observe the subpoena? Ruling: NO. The Constitution and the Local Government Code do not express its provision the granting of power to subpoena and punish contempt for witnesses. Local legislative bodies do not have the contempt power of the legislature since it is sui generis. The said power does not attach to its legislative function but to its character as a distinct and individual power of one of the branches of the government. The same would not be applied to the local legislative bodies which are creations of law. To allow such local legislative bodies to exercise such power without statutory basis would deem be conflict in the doctrine of the separation of power. WHEREFORE, the requiring of attendance and testimony of the petitioners at an investigation should not be punished for legislative contempt for their disobedience of said subpoena, is declared null and void for being ultra vires. 25. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY V COMELEC FACTS: Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which among others, provided for the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone R.A. No. 7227 likewise created petitioner to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses. 2Petitioner was organized with an authorized capital stock of P20 billion which was fully subscribed and fully paid up by the Republic of the Philippines with, among other assets, (a)ll lands embraced, covered and defined in Section 12 hereof, as well as permanent improvements and fixtures upon proper inventory not otherwise alienated, conveyed, or transferred to another government agency. 3 On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippine government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the seaports, airports buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy. The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone. On September 5, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong submitted Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993 to the Office of the President. respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia, Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, herein respondents resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. Respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein a Calendar of Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan, and which indicated, among others, the scheduled Referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday). On June 27, 1996, the Comelec promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.

ISSUE: Whether the Comelec acted properly and juridically in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848. HELD: NO. To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution 11 as reproduced in the footnote below, the word referendum is repeated at least 27 times, initiative is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a Referendum; the counting of votes was entrusted to a Referendum Committee; the documents were called referendum returns; the canvassers, Referendum Board of Canvassers and the ballots themselves bore the description referendum. To repeat, not once was the word initiative used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In enacting the Initiative and Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one term from the other, thus: (a)Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: a.1.Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; a.2.Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and a.3.Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (b)Indirect initiative is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action. (c)Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely: c.1Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and c.2Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. DIFFERENTIATED. There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In enacting the Initiative and Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one term from the other. Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines initiative as the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, he explains that referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law. The foregoing definitions, which are based on Blacks and other leading American authorities, are echoed in the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160). SEC. 120. Local Initiative Defined. Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. SEC. 126.Local Referendum Defined. Local referendum is the legal process whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian. The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Comelec within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.

Prescinding from these definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing. Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local legislative body is given the opportunity to enact the proposal. If it refuses/neglects to do so within thirty (30) days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly-authorized and registered representatives may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. Should the proponents be able to collect the number of signed conformities within the period granted by said statute, the Commission on Elections shall then set a date for the initiative (not referendum) at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned . . .. On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the registered voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted or approved by such law-making authority. Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and direction of the Commission on Elections. In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the lawmaking body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complex than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either Yes or No in the ballot. COMELEC EXERCISES ADMINISTRATION AND SUPERVISION ON THE CONDUCT THEREOF. From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the electorate. This is especially true where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be broken down into several autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be exercised that (n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate, although two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative. It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of R.A. 6735, the Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition. In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it should have done so already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise of these people-power features of our Constitution. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT CANNOT PASS UPON A PROPOSED INITIATIVE UNTIL THE PEOPLE HAVE VOTED FOR IT AND IT HAS BECOME AN APPROVED ORDINANCE OR RESOLUTION. Deliberating on this issue, the Court agrees with private respondent Garcia that indeed, the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. We also note that the Initiative and Referendum Act itself provides that (n)othing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act . . .. So too, the Supreme Court is basically a review court. It passes upon

errors of law (and sometimes of fact, as in the case of mandatory appeals of capital offenses) of lower courts as well as determines whether there had been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any branch or instrumentality or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncement about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COMELEC MAY PASS UPON SUCH PROPOSAL INSOFAR AS TO ITS FORM AND LANGUAGE ARE CONCERNED AND WHETHER THE SAME IS PATENTLY AND CLEARLY OUTSIDE THE CAPACITY OF THE LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODY TO ENACT. Having said that, we are in no wise suggesting that the Comelec itself has no power to pass upon proposed resolutions in an initiative. Quite the contrary, we are ruling that these matters are in fact within the initiatory jurisdiction of the Commission to which then the herein basic questions ought to have been addressed, and by which the same should have been decided in the first instance. In other words, while regular courts may take jurisdiction over approved propositions per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the Comelec in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative powers may adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and language are concerned, as discussed earlier; and it may be added, even as to content, where the proposals or parts thereof are patently and clearly outside the capacity of the local legislative body to enact. Accordingly, the question of whether the subject of this initiative is within the capacity of the Municipal Council of Morong to enact may be ruled upon by the Comelec upon remand and after hearing the parties thereon.