Special Proceedings

G.R. No. 129242. January 16, 2001.* PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S.
MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO, respondents.
Pleadings and Practice; Estate Proceedings; Probate Courts; It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, shall be controlling; The fact of death of the decedent
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* SECOND DIVISION.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals
and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person
such as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. The petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo.
Same; Same; Same; A party may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of an essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent by raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition; A trial court, sitting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action.It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.
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Same; Same; Same; Motion to Dismiss; A party may not take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify an invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code for the dismissal of a petition for settlement of estate.The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough, to wit: Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035.
Same; Same; Article 222 of the Civil Code applies only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family.The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Besides, an excerpt from the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus: It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than strangers.
Same; Same; Special Proceedings; A petition for issuance of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioner therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. The petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fact of death of
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their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Caneba, Flores, Ranee, Acuesta and Masigla Law Firm for petitioners.
Ricardo E. Aragones for respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda. Manalo, et al., seeking to annul the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the Orders3 of Hie Regional Trial Court and the Resolution4 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts5 are as follows:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.
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1 In CA-G.R. SP No. 39851 promulgated on September 30, 1996, Petition, Annex G, Rollo, pp. 52-59.
2 Galvez, J., ponente, Martinez and Aquino, JJ., concurring; Rollo, pp. 52-59.
3 In SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 respectively dated July 30, 1993 and September 15, 1993, Petition, Annexes D and F, Rollo, pp. 35-44; 51.
4 In CA-G.R. S.P. No. 39851 promulgated on May 6, 1997, Petition, Annex K, Rollo, pp. 70-77.
5 Petition, Annex G, Rollo, pp. 52-59.
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At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalos Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at No. 45 Gen. Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila7 for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order declaring the whole world in default, except the government, and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filing of an Omnibus Motion8 on July 23, 1993 seeking: (1) to set aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time to file opposition; (2) to set for prelimi-
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6 Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 18-25.
7 Branch 35, Presided by Judge Ramon P. Makasiar.
8 Petition, Annex C, Rollo, pp. 27-34.
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nary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9 which resolved, thus:
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof; B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding; C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after their motion for reconsideration of the Order dated July 30, 1993 was denied by the trial court in its Order10 dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for certiorari with the appellate court, they contend that: (1) the venue was improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of nonforum shopping was attached to the petition.
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9 Petition, Annex D, supra.
10 Petition, Annex F, supra.
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Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its Resolution11 promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed.12
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filing of the petition but that the same have failed.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain averments which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:
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Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father, TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the properties of the deceased father, TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. x x x the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage x x x.
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Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners and their coheirs x x x.
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Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring this suit and were forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses of not less than, P250,000.00
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11 Petition, Annex G, supra.
12 Petition, Annex K, supra.
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and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as and for attorneys fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court x x x.13
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to the filing of the petition pursuant to Article 22214 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments15 and the character of the relief sought16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.17 The petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the
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14 Now Article 151 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
15 De Tavera vs. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc., 112 SCRA 243, 248 (1982).
16 Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg Leasing Corporation, 317 SCRA 327, 335 (1999).
17 Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Dumlao, 206 SCRA 40, 46 (1992).
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deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:
(a) That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO for the administration of the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix. (b) That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully determined, that the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed among the legal heirs all in accordance with law. c) That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO MANALO.18
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory
counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees and costs19 in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section l(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis, Article 222 of the Civil Code.
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19 Petition, Annex D, Rollo, pp. 39-43.
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It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction20 and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem.21 So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. Petitioners contend that the term proceeding is so broad that it must necessarily include special proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough, to wit:
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20 Guzman vs. Anog, 37 Phil. 61, 62 (1917); Borja vs. Borja, et al., 101 Phil. 911, 925 (1957) cited in the Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Volume V-A Part I, 1970 Ed. By Vicente J. Francisco.
21 Chico vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33, 36 (1998).
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Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035 (italics supplied).22
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity.23 A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt from the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than strangers.25
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22 Article 151 of the Family Code of the Philippines now reads:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
23 Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed., 1990, citing Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 367, 375, 23 L.Ed. 449; Weston v. Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 464, 7 L.Ed. 481; Syracuse Plaster Co. v. Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corporation, 169 Misc. 564, 7 N.Y. S.2d 897.
24 Rule 1, Section 3(a) of the Rules of Court.
25 Report of the Code Commission, p. 18 cited in the Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, 1995 Ed. By Arturo M. Tolentino, p. 505.
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It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 9263626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.26 The petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests title to the land of the estate in the distributees, and if the decree is erroneous, it should be corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. (Salandanan vs. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 671 [1998])
An heir becomes owner of his hereditary share the moment the decedent dies, thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the heir has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of his share in the estate of the decedent. (Opulencia vs. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 385 [1998]) [Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 135(2001)] G.R. No. 117209. February 9, 1996.* REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
Adoption; Evidence; Factual findings of the lower court, when sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support, are accorded high respect and are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court.It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the lower court, when sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support, are accorded high respect and are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Accordingly, we fully uphold the propriety of that portion of the order of the court below granting the petition for adoption.
Same; Names; While the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register.Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the
adopter a license to change the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
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* SECOND DIVISION.
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Republic vs. Hernandez
Same; Same; Change of Name; Civil Register; The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same.The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall continue to be so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in ones official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its decree recording such change.
Same; Same; Same; Actions; If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change
of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A petition for change of name is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rulesa fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding.A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.The
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Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee, all of which taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.
Actions; Joinder of Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Words and Phrases; By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration.By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites for Joinder of Causes of Action.While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.
Same; Same; Same; While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties.The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as
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many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.
Same; Same; Same; Adoption; Change of Name; Petitions for adoption and change of name have no relation to each other, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common question of fact or lawin short, they do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under the Rules.Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
Same; Same; Same; The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are intimately related and also present interwoven and dependent issues which can be most expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having just one judicial proceeding.It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will make for a complete determination of all matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of adoption and change the name of the adoptee in one petition. As already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in form and substance with respect to the prayer for change of name of the adoptee. The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are intimately related and also present interwoven and dependent issues which can be most expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having just one judicial proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose subject matters or corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken up individually.
Same; Same; Same; Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not
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subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules.The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general, and for change of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents and adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
Same; Same; Same; Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justiceit cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge. It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.
Same; Same; Same; The rules and procedure laid down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public policy which can in no wise be changed or regulated by agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular convenience.The danger wrought by nonobservance of the Rules is that the violation of or failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the proper determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to the merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place, such questions as relate to the form of the
action. The rules and procedure laid down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public policy. They are matters of public order and interest which can in no wise be changed or
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regulated by agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular convenience.
Names; A persons name is a word or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with himit is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a persons name is a word or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
Same; Civil Register; The official name of a person is that given him in the civil register.By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a persons birth must be entered in the civil register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory
restriction is premised on the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.
Same; Same; Actions; Change of Name; The only way that the name of a person can be changed legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register.By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. As earlier
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mentioned, a petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Grounds Warranting a Change of Name.Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Baptism; A name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the communitywhen at variance with that entered in the civil registeris unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by another name, under which he has been known and which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned. For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a change of name. Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using a different name and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. A name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the communitywhen at variance with that entered in the civil registeris unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Adoption; Parent and Child; While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably con-sidered. While the right of a natural parent to name the child is
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recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to rename an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. To
repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.
PETITION for certiorari to review a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br. 158.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
The Law Firm of Pascual Gesmundo and Lim for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Indeed, whats in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose by any other name would smell as sweet?
This could well be the theme of the present appeal by certiorari which challenges, on pure questions of law, the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, dated September 13, 19941 in JDRC Case No. 2964. Said court is faulted for having approved the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition2 to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdic-
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1 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 37-40; per Presiding Judge Jose R. Hernandez.
2 Annex B, id.; ibid., 41-44.
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tional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents residence.3
At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995,4 petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents in this wise:
WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and for all legal intents and purposes shall be known as Aaron Joseph Munson y Andrade, the legally adopted child of Van Munson and Regina Munson effective upon the filing of the petition on March 10, 1994. As soon as the decree of adoption becomes final and executory, it shall be recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule 103, respectively, of the Rules of Court, and shall be annotated in the record of birth of the adopted child, which in this case is in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, where the child was born. Likewise, send a copy of this Order to the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila, for its appropriate action consisten(t) herewith.5
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3 Id., id; ibid,, 44-45.
4 Annex C, id; ibid., 47-50.
5 Annex A, id.; ibid., 40.
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At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has been raised by petitioner regarding the fitness of herein private respondents to be adopting parents nor the validity of the decree of adoption
rendered in their favor. The records show that the latter have commendably established their qualifications under the law to be adopters,6 and have amply complied with the procedural requirements for the petition for adoption,7 with the findings of the trial court being recited thus:
To comply with the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this Court dated March 16, 1994 setting this petition for hearing (Exh. A) was published in the March 31, April 6 and 13, 1994 issues of the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper of general circulation (Exhs. B to E and submarkings). x x x
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Petitioners apart from being financially able, have no criminal nor derogatory record (Exhs. K to V); and are physically fit to be the adoptive parents of the minor child Kevin (Exh. W). Their qualification to become the adoptive parents of Kevin Earl finds support also in the Social Case Study Report prepared by the DSWD through Social Worker Luz Angela Sonido, the pertinent portion of which reads:
Mr. and Mrs. Munson are very religious, responsible, mature and friendly individuals. They are found physically healthy, mentally fit, spiritually and financially capable to adopt Kevin Earl Moran a.k.a. Aaron Joseph.
Mr. and Mrs. Munson have provided AJ with all his needs. They unselfishly share their time, love and attention to him. They are ready and willing to continuously provide him a happy and secure home life.
Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is growing normally under the care of the Munsons. He had comfortably settled in his new environment. His stay with the Munsons during the
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6 See Art. 183 in relation to Art. 185, Family Code.
7 See Art. 188, Family Code; Arts. 32-38, Child and Youth Welfare Code; Secs. 1-5, Rule 99, Rules of Court.
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six months trial custody period has resulted to a close bond with Mr. and Mrs. Munson and vice-versa.
We highly recommend to the Honorable Court that the adoption of Kevin Earl Moran a.k.a. Aaron Joseph by Mr. and Mrs. Van Munson be legalized. 8
It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the lower court, when sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support, are accorded high respect and are binding and conclusive upon this Court.9 Accordingly, we fully uphold the propriety of that portion of the order of the court below granting the petition for adoption.
The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized mainly as follows: (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there was lawful ground for the change of name.
I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he additionally granted the prayer for the change of the given or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs, namely, a decree of adoption and an authority to change the given or proper name of the adoptee, the respective proceedings for each must be instituted separately, and the substantive and procedural requirements therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of
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8 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 37, 38.
9 FNCB Finance vs. Estavillo, G.R. No. 93394, December 20, 1990, 192 SCRA 514; Donato, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 102603, January 18, 1993, 217 SCRA 196; Isabelo, Jr. vs. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 103142, November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 591.
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the Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name, must correspondingly be complied with.10
A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws and rules on adoption have been observed, but not those for a petition for change of name.11 Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of ones legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.12
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition. Further, the conditions for permissive joinder of causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction of the court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met.13
Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding change of name in view of the natural interest of the State in maintaining a system of identification of its citizens and in the orderly administration of justice.14 Private respondents argue otherwise and invoke a liberal construction
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10 Rollo, 18-19.
11 Ibid., 20-23.
12 Ibid., 16.
13 Ibid., 63, 65-66.
14 Ibid., 24-27.
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and application of the Rules, the welfare and interest of the adoptee being the primordial concern that should be addressed in the instant proceeding.15
On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that
Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome to Aaron Joseph should not be treated strictly, it appearing that no rights have been prejudiced by said change of name. The strict and meticulous observation of the requisites set forth by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is indubitably for the purpose of preventing fraud, ensuring that neither State nor any third person should be prejudiced by the grant of the petition for change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of discernment.
The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a year old. Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any contractual obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners on his behalf, be deemed to have any immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said cha(n)ge of name. It stands to reason that there is no way that the state or any person may be so prejudiced by the action for change of Kevin Earls first name. In fact, to obviate any possible doubts on the intent of petitioners, the prayer for change of name was caused to be published together with the petition for adoption.16
Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal effects of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters; (2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and
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15 Ibid., 70-71.
16 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 39.
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(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow
that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same,17 and shall continue to be so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in ones official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its decree recording such change.18
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17 Cruz vs. Republic, L-20927, July 26, 1966, 17 SCRA 693.
18 See Art. 412, Civil Code; Re Ross. 8 Cal 2d 608, 67 P2d 94, 110 ALR 217.
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The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring the name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and place of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court may adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication.19 It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another
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19 Yu Chi Han vs. Republic, L-22040, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 454; Cruz vs. Republic, supra, fn. 17; Republic vs. Taada, etc., et al., L-31563, November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 419; Secan Kok vs. Republic, L27621, August 30, 1973, 52 SCRA 322.
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special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee,20 all of which taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action. Moreover, the reliance by private respondents on the pronouncements in Briz vs. Briz, et al.,21 and Peyer vs. Martinez, et al.22 is misplaced. A restatement of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action would, therefor, appear to be called for.
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration.23 It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.24
As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in the ab-
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20 Rollo, 21-22.
21 43 Phil. 763 (1922).
22 88 Phil. 72 (1951).
23 1 C.J.S., Actions, Sec. 61, 1181.
24 1 Am Jur 2d, Actions, Sec. 81, 776.
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sence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of action arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules be joined.25 Modern statutes and rules governing
joinders are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these ends, they are liberally construed.26
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable,27 with the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of justice.28
The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, al-
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25 Ibid., id., Sec. 85, 778.
26 Ibid., id., Sec. 86, 779.
27 Francisco, V.J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. I, 1973 ed., 186.
28 1 Am Jur 2d, Actions, Sec. 86, 779.
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though the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them.29 While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.30
Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties31 and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented, effectively disallows unlimited joinder.32
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General
A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from each other. Each action is individually governed by particular sets of laws and rules. These two proceedings involve dispa-
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29 Ibid., id., Sec. 89, 781.
30 Francisco, V.J., op. cit., 185-189.
31 Union Glass & Container Corp., et al. vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al., G.R. No. 64013, November 28, 1983, 126 SCRA 31.
32 See Flores vs. Mallare-Phillipps, et al., G.R. No. 66620, September 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 377.
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rate issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the proposed adopters fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee properly (Prasnick vs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is
looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).
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x x x. Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately assessed and determined for neither action is dependent on the other.33
The rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is clear. Joinder may be allowed only if the actions show a commonality of relationship and conform to the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties (Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).
These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out in our Petition (pp. 9-10), an action for adoption and an action for change of name are, in nature and purpose, not related to each other and do not arise out of the same relation between the parties. While what is cogent in an adoption proceeding is the proposed adopters fitness and qualifications to adopt, a petition for change of first name may only prosper upon proof of reasonable and compelling grounds supporting the change requested. Fitness to adopt is not determinative of the sufficiency of reasons justifying a change of name. And similarly, a change of first name cannot be justified in view of a finding that the proposed adopter was found fit to adopt. There is just no way that the two actions can connect and find a common ground, thus the joinder would be improper.
In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly sought in one petition, private respondents rely upon Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4, Comment)
We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both cases, the fact of intimacy and relatedness of the issues is so pronounced. In Peyer, an application to pronounce the husband an absentee is obviously intertwined with the action to transfer the management of conjugal assets to the wife. In Briz, an action for declaration of heirship was deemed a clear condition precedent to an action to recover the land subject of partition and distribution pro-
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33 Rollo, 18-19.
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ceeding. However, the commonality of relationship which stands out in both cases does not characterize the present action for adoption and change of name. Thus the rulings in Peyer and Briz find no place in the case at bar.
Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two actions was, in Briz, declared feasible, the Supreme Court did not indorse an automatic joinder and instead remanded the matter for further proceedings, granting leave to amend the pleadings and implead additional parties-defendants for a complete determination of the controversy (Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, 770). Such cautionary stance all the more emphasizes that although joinders are generally accepted, they are not allowed where the conditions are not satisfactorily met.34
It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will make for a complete determination of all matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of adoption and change the name of the adoptee in one petition. As already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in form and substance with respect to the prayer for change of name of the adoptee. The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are intimately related and also present interwoven and dependent issues which can be most expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having just one judicial proceeding, but not to suits or
actions whose subject matters or corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken up individually.
In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,35 the Court clarified the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action:
The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory rule, as there is no positive provision of law or any rule of jurisprudence which compels a party to join all his causes of action
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34 Ibid., 86-88.
35 G.R. No. 91670, February 7, 1991, 193 SCRA 732; Baldovi vs. Sarte, 36 Phil. 550 (1917). Cf. Hicks vs. Hilario, et al., 40 Phil. 576 (1919) and Insurance Company of North America vs. United Stated Lines Co., et al., L-21839, April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 438.
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and bring them at one and the same time. Under the present rules, the provision is still that the plaintiff may, and not that he must, unite several causes of action although they may be included in one of the classes specified. This, therefore, leaves it to the plaintiffs option whether the causes of action shall be joined in the same action, and no unfavorable inference may be drawn from his failure or refusal to do so. He may always file another action based on the remaining cause or causes of action within the prescriptive period therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)
The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general, and for change of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents and adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice requires correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation.36 It has long been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business.37
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended
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36 Young vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 110736, December 27, 1993, 228 SCRA 718.
37 Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 99357, January 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 537.
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to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge.38
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.39 We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot vs. CA, et al., that:40
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to propose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
xxx
x x x (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
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38 Santos vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92862, July 4, 1991, 198 SCRA 806; Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104437, December 17, 1993, 228 SCRA 565.
39 Vasco vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-46763, February 28, 1978, 81 SCRA 762.
40 L-44642, February 20, 1989, 170 SCRA 367. See also Edra vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 75041, November 13, 1989, 179 SCRA 344.
531
531
x x x. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution. Justice eschews anarchy.
Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy such that rigid application thereof frustrates rather than promotes substantial justice, will technicalities deserve scant consideration from the court. In such situations, the courts are empowered, even obligated, to suspend the operation of the rules.41
We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private respondents by following the reglementary procedure for the change in the proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child. We are hard put to descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to his welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency that would justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State that stands to be prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case, considering its natural interest in the methodical administration of justice and in the efficacious maintenance of a system of identification of its citizens.
The danger wrought by non-observance of the Rules is that the violation of or failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the proper determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to the merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place, such questions as relate to the form of the action. The rules and
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41 Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 (1910); Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 56077, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 165; Yong Chan Kim vs. People, et al., G.R. No. 84719, January 25, 1991, 193 SCRA 344; Bank of America, NT & SA vs. Gerochi, Jr., etc., et al., G.R. 73210, February 10, 1994, 230 SCRA 9; Buan, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101614, August 17, 1994, 235 SCRA 424.
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procedure laid down for the trial court and the adjudiation of cases are matters of public policy.42 They are matters of public order and interest which can in no wise be changed or regulated by agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular convenience.43
In Garcia vs. Republic,44 we are reminded of the definiteness in the application of the Rules and the importance of seeking relief under the appropriate proceeding:
x x x The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not confuse or misapply one procedure for another lest we create confusion in the application of the proper remedy.
Respondent judges unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at achieving stability of procedure is to be deplored. He exceeded his prerogatives by granting the prayer for change of name, his order being unsupported by both statutory and case law. The novel but unwarranted manner in which he adjudicated this case may be characterized as a regrettable abdication of the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law and jurisprudence.
II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition for change of name without citing or proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the only justification advanced for the change of name was the fact of the adoptees baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been known since he came to live with private respondents.45
Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon the grant of adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name given to him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the change of his first name as prayed for in the petition, so they claim, merely
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42 Sanidad vs. Cabotaje, 5 Phil. 204 (1905).
43 Arzadon vs. Arzadon, 15 Phil. 77 (1910).
44 L-16085, November 29, 1961, 3 SCRA 519.
45 Rollo, 28.
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533
confirms the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives. This largely echoes the opinion of the lower court that naming the child Aaron Joseph was symbolic of naming him at birth, and that they, as adoptive parents, have as much right as the natural parents to freely select the first name of their adopted child.46
The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and ruled on this point in this manner:
As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select the first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law. x x x.
xxx
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all intentions of giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon the grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth.47
We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated ruling of respondent judge and must thus set it aside.
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a persons name is a word or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the
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46 Ibid., 67-68.
47 Ibid., 39.
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534
child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.48
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a persons birth must be entered in the civil register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of the law.49 And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.50
By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.51 For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity.52
It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the
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48 Tolentino, A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1993 ed., 672.
49 Chomi vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004 (1956); Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic, L-20306, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 483.
50 Chiu Hap Chiu vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 864.
51 Chomi vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, supra, fn. 49.
52 Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic, supra, fn. 49; Republic vs. Taada, etc., et al., supra, fn. 19; Secan Kok vs. Republic, supra, fn. 19. See Tan vs. Republic, L-16384, April 26, 1962, 4 SCRA 1128.
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sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change.53
Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.54
Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by another name, under which he has been known and which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned.55 For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a change of name.56 Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using a different name and has become known by it constitute
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53 Ong Pen Oan vs. Republic, 102 Phil. 460 (1957); Nacionale vs. Republic, L-18067, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 636; Yu vs. Republic, L-20874, May 25, 1966, 17 SCRA 253; Calderon vs. Republic, L-18127, April 5, 1967, 19 SCRA 721.
54 Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 189, 199 and cases therein cited. See also Republic vs. Avila, etc., et al., L-33131, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 483.
55 Chomi vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, supra, fn. 49.
56 Ong Te vs. Republic, L-15549, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 484.
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proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name.57 A name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the communitywhen at variance with that entered in the civil registeris unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.58
The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such rulings of long accepted wisdom and applicability. The only grounds offered to justify the change of name prayed for was that the adopted child had been baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private respondents and that it was the name by which he had been called and known by his family, relatives and friends from the time he came to live with private respondents.59 Apart from suffusing their pleadings with sanctimonious entreaties for compassion, none of the justified grounds for a change of name has been alleged or established by private respondents. The legal bases chosen by them to bolster their cause have long been struck down as unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the adoptee herein to use his baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the civil register, would be to countenance or permit that which has always been frowned upon.60
The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in his assailed order that
(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely select the first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law. x x x.
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all the intentions of giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon grant
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57 Ong Pen Oan vs. Republic, supra, fn. 53; Grant vs. Republic, L-23609, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 517.
58 Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic, supra, fn. 49.
59 Annex B, Petition; Rollo, 44, 67.
60 Cruz vs. Republic, supra, fn. 17.
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of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth.
and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein enunciated.
The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of the case at bar. In the Wong case, therein petitioner Maximo Wong sought the change of his surname which he acquired by virtue of the decree of adoption granted in favor of spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong. Upon reaching the age of majority, he filed a petition in court to change his surname from Wong to Alcala, which was his surname prior to the adoption. He adduced proof that the use of the surname Wong caused him embarrassment and isolation from friends and relatives in view of a suggested Chinese ancestry when in reality he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, thereby hampering his business and social life, and that his surviving adoptive mother consented to the change of name sought. This Court granted the petition and regarded the change of the surname as a mere incident in, rather than the object of, the adoption.
It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the given name, and the legal consequences thereof in view of the adoption were at issue. That it was sought in a petition duly and precisely filed for that purpose with ample proof of the lawful grounds therefor only serves to reinforce the imperative necessity of seeking relief under and through the legally prescribed procedures.
Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that:
Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein a child is being named for the first time by his natural parent, as against one wherein, a child is previously conferred a first name by his natural parent, and such name is subsequently sought to be disregarded and changed by the adoptive parents. In the first case, there is no dispute that natural parents have the right to freely select and give the childs first name for every person, including juridical persons, must have a name (Tolentino, A., Commentaries and
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538
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. I, 1987 edition, page 721). In the second case, however, as in the case at bar, private respondents, in their capacities as adopters, cannot claim a right to name the minor adoptee after such right to name the child had already been exercised by the natural parent. Adopting parents have not been conferred such right by law, hence, the right asserted by private respondents herein remains but illusory. Renaming the adoptee cannot be claimed as a right. It is merely a privilege necessitating judicial consent upon compelling grounds.61
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of adoption and ensures to the adopted child the rights and privileges arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child,62 should be understood in its proper context. It should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the proper or given name of the child presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such name is registered, regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the purpose of identification, the same constitutes the official name. This effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must remain unaltered save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the socalled right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. To re-
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61 Rollo, 31-32.
62 Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356.
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peat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.
Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is without prejudice to, private respondents privilege to legally change the proper or given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is exercised, this time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the grant thereof is conditioned on strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements and satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced therefor.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent judge is hereby MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law. In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Order affirmed with modification.
Notes.A witness who has two names and adopts the name of his wife is not credible. (People vs. Buendia, 210 SCRA 531 [1992])
A petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent Court is a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so when her former husband gets married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim
laws. (Yasin vs. Judge, Sharia District Court, 241 SCRA 606 *1995+) *Republic vs. Hernandez, 253 SCRA 509(1996)] G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998.* FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY** and HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.
Appeals; Certiorari; Actions; When certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of.Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding. There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.
Actions; Motions; The motion to dismiss may be filed within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint.Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the Rules on Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss filed thereunder would fall under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides that the motion to dismiss may be filed within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint. Clearly, the motion should have been filed on or before the filing of petitioners opposition which is the counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil actions.
Marriages; A void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all.The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.
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* SECOND DIVISION.
** Should read Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay.
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VOL. 300, DECEMBER 29, 1998
761
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
Same; A voidable marriage is considered valid and produces all its civil effects.A voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89. x x x Stated otherwise, the annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the society formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical consequences which the marital union produced during its continuance.
Same; Words and Phrases; The terms annul and null and void have different legal connotations and implications.Indeed, the terms annul and null and void have different legal connotations and implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with whereas null and void is something that does not exist from the beginning. A marriage that is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply declares a status or condition which already exists from the very beginning.
Judgments; It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties; Excepts.Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding statement in the body of the decision or order which may be somewhat confusing, the same is not without a
qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a final decision or order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or constructionwhich usually is the case where the order or decision in question is that of a court not of record which is not constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on which the judgment is based.
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SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Aquino and Ursua for petitioner.
Estelito P. Mendoza and Orlando A. Santiago for private respondent.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Which should prevail between the ratio decidendi and the fallo of a decision is the primary issue in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Federico C. Suntay who opposes respondent
Isabels petition for appointment as administratrix of her grandmothers estate by virtue of her right of representation.
The suit stemmed from the following:
On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel CojuangcoSuntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay filed a criminal case1 against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI)2 a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their children who were living with their mother.3 The suit was docketed as Civil Case Number Q-7180.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
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1 Allegedly for parricide.
2 Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 9, Quezon City.
3 Decision dated October 3, 1967 of the CFI of Rizal penned by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego, p. 3; Annex A of Petition; Rollo, pp. 37-41.
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WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between the parties. It being admitted by the parties and shown by the record that the question of the case and custody of the three children have been the subject of another case between the same parties in another branch of this Court in Special Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot be litigated in this case.
With regard to counterclaim, in view of the manifestation of counsel that the third party defendants are willing to pay P50,000.00 for damages and that defendant is willing to accept the offer instead of her original demand for P130,000.00, the defendant is awarded said sum of P50,000.00 as her counterclaim and to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis supplied)
As basis thereof, the CFI said:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the hospital he continued to be under observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes after (sic) existing at the time of the marriage:
x x x
xxx
xxx
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4 Ibid., pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 39-41.
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(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this very
complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic).5 (Emphasis supplied)
On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina AguinaldoSuntay. The latter is respondent Isabels paternal grandmother. The decedent died on June 4, 1990 without leaving a will.6
Five years later or on October 26, 1995, respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)7 a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay which case was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. In her petition, she alleged among others, that she is one of the legitimate grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she be appointed as administratrix of the estate.8
On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is the surviving spouse of the decedent, that he has been managing the conjugal properties even while the decedent has been alive and is better situated to protect the integrity of the estate than the petitioner, that petitioner and her family have been alienated from the decedent and the Oppositor for more than thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that Letters of Administration be issued instead to him.9
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5 Ibid.
6 Annex I of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 111-119.
7 Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78.
8 Annex I, Petition.
9 Annex J, Petition; Rollo, pp. 116-118.
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On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an opposition, petitioner moved to dismiss the special proceeding case alleging in the main that respondent Isabel should not be appointed as administratrix of the decedents estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under Article 992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives of her father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabels father predeceased his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened succession by representation. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of respondent Isabels parents is null and void, the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmotherthe decedent.10 On October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed order denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss.11 When his motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 9, 1998,12 petitioner, as mentioned above filed this petition.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondent court in denying his motion to dismiss as well as his motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: (a) a motion to dismiss is appropriate in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person; (b) the motion to dismiss was timely filed; (c) the dispositive portion of the decision declaring the marriage of respondent Isabels parents null and void must be upheld; and (d) said decision had long become final and had, in fact, been executed.
On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that petitioners motion to dismiss was late having been filed after the opposition was already filed in court, the counterpart of an answer in an ordinary civil action and that petitioner in his
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10 Motion to Dismiss, Annex A of Petition; Rollo, pp. 31-36.
11 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78; Annex D of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 60-61.
12 Order of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78Annex H of the Petition; Rollo, p. 110.
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opposition likewise failed to specifically deny respondent Isabels allegation that she is a legitimate child of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, the decedents son. She further contends that petitioner proceeds from a miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the body of the decision and its dispositive portion because in an action for annulment of a marriage, the court either sustains the validity of the marriage or nullifies it. It does not, after hearing declare a marriage voidable otherwise, the court will fail to decide and lastly, that the status of marriages under Article 85 of the Civil Code before they are annulled is voidable.
The petition must fail.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding.13 There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.14
A reading of the assailed order, however, shows that the respondent court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder, to wit:
The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively assessed and the pertinent laws applied, the Court finds that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate considering the peculiar nature of this special proceeding as distinguished from an ordinary civil action. At the outset, this proceeding was not adversarial in nature and the petitioner was not called upon to assert a cause of action against a particular defendant. Furthermore, the State has a vital interest in the maintenance of the proceedings, not only be-
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13 Sempio v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 617 (1996).
14 Zarate, Jr. v. Olegario, 263 SCRA 1 (1996).
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cause of the taxes due it, but also because if no heirs qualify, the State shall acquire the estate by escheat.
x x x
xxx
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The court rules, for the purpose of establishing the personality of the petitioner to file and maintain this special proceedings, that in the case at bench, the body of the decision determines the nature of the action which is for annulment, not declaration of nullity.
The oppositors contention that the fallo of the questioned decision (Annex AMotion) prevails over the body thereof is not without any qualification. It holds true only when the dispositive portion of a final decision is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or construction.
Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body of the decision may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment (78 SCRA 541 citing Morelos v. Go Chin Ling; and Heirs of Juan Presto v. Galang). The reason is that the dispositive portion must find support from the decisions ratio decidendi.
Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of Quezon City, marked as Annex A of oppositors motion, the marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on the basis of Art. 85, par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to marriages which are considered voidable. Petitioner being conceived and born of a voidable marriage before the decree of annulment, she is considered legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phils.).15
The trial court correctly ruled that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special proceedings.16 The Rules do not only apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for.
Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the Rules on Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss filed thereunder would fall under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides that the motion to dismiss may be filed
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15 Annex D, Petition; Rollo, pp. 60-61.
16 Rules 1 & 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
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within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint. Clearly, the motion should have been filed on or before the filing of petitioners opposition17 which is the counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil actions.
Not only was petitioners motion to dismiss filed out of time, it was filed almost two years after respondent Isabel was already through with the presentation of her witnesses and evidence and petitioner had presented two witnesses. The filing of the motion to dismiss is not only improper but also dilatory.
The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off course from established jurisprudence on this matter, as petitioner asserts, had in fact faithfully observed the law and legal precedents in this case. In fact, the alleged conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive portion thereof which created the ambiguity or uncertainty in the decision of the CFI of Rizal is reconcilable. The legal basis for setting aside the marriage of respondent Isabels parents is clear under paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI decision has categorically declared that the marriage of respondent Isabels parents is null and void and that the legal effect of such declaration is that the marriage from its inception is void and the children born out of said marriage are illegitimate. Such argument cannot be sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 8318 of the New Civil Code clas-
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17 February 7, 1996.
18 Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and fourteen years by male and female respectively, even with the consent of the parents; (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages; (3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;
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sify what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled.19
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(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83, number 2; (5) Incestuous marriages mentioned in Article 81; (6) Those where one or both contracting parties have been found guilty of killing of the spouse of either of them; (7) Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and other marriages specified in Article 82. (n)
Article 81. Marriage between the following are incestuous and void from their performance, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; (2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood; (3) Between collateral relatives by blood within the fourth degree. (28a)
Article 82. The following marriages shall also be void from the beginning:
(1) Between stepfathers and stepdaughters, and stepmothers and stepsons; (2) Between the adopting father or mother and the adopted, between the latter and the surviving spouse of the former, and between the former and the surviving spouse of the latter; (3) Between the legitimate children of the adopter and the adopted. (28a)
Article 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouses of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. (29a)
Article 84. No marriage license shall be issued to a widow till after three hundred days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime she has given birth to a child. (n)
19 Article 85 of the New Civil Code reads:
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The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 8920 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.
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A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was between the ages of sixteen and twenty years, if male, or between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years, if female, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parent, guardian or person having authority over the party, unless after attaining the ages of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; (2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force; (3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife; (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be; (5) That the consent of either party was obtained by force or intimidation, unless the violence or threat having disappeared, such party, afterwards freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be; (6) That either party was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into the married state, and such incapacity continues, and appears to be incurable.
20 Article 89. Children conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning shall have the same status, rights and
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On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction.21 (Emphasis supplied)
Stated otherwise, the annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the society formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical consequences which the marital union produced during its continuance.22
Indeed, the terms annul and null and void have different legal connotations and implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with23 whereas null and void is something that does not exist from the beginning. A marriage that is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated
through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply declares a status or condition which already exists from the very beginning.
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obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called natural children by legal fiction.
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21 See Tolentino, New Civil Code, Vol. 1, pp. 244-245.
22 Sy Loc Lieng, et al. v. Sy Quia, et al., 16 Phil. 137 (1910).
23 Nuguid v. Nuguid, 123 Phil. 1305 (1966).
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There is likewise no merit in petitioners argument that it is the dispositive portion of the decision which must control as to whether or not the marriage of respondent Isabels parents was void or voidable.
Such argument springs from a miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the body of the decision and its dispositive portion.
Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding statement in the body of the decision or order which may be somewhat confusing,24 the same is not without a qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a final decision or order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or constructionwhich usually is the case where the order or decision in question is that of a court not of record which is not constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on which the judgment is based.25
Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion and the body of the decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole body of the decision in order to give effect to the intention, purpose and judgment of the court. In Republic v. de los Angeles26 the Court said:
Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that *i+n case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This mandate of law, obviously cannot be any less binding upon the courts in relation to its judgments.
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24 Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Calauag, 11 SCRA 333 (1964).
25 Board of Liquidators v. Ricma Trading Corporation, 29 SCRA 397 (1969).
26 41 SCRA 422 (1971).
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x x x The judgment must be read in its entirety, and must be construed as a whole so as to bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation and so as to give effect to every word and part if possible, and to effectuate the intention and purpose of the Court, consistent with the provisions of the organic law. (49 C.J.S., pp. 863-864) *Emphasis supplied+
Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of the CFI of Rizal quoted earlier shows that the marriage is voidable:
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrict (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, he remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
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(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
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There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic).27
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27 Decision, Annex A, Petition; Rollo, pp. 37-41.
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Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage of respondent Isabels parents based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal consequences as to the rights of the children are therefore governed by the first clause of the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary interpretation would be anathema to the rule just abovementioned. Based on said provision the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial court setting aside their marriage on October 3, 1967 are considered
legitimate. For purposes of seeking appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate grandchildren, including respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right of representation in the estate of their grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay after their father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had predeceased their grandmother. This is, however, without prejudice to a determination by the courts of whether the Letters of Administration may be granted to her. Neither does the Court adjudge herein the successional rights of the personalities involved over the decedents estate.
It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point what the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ruiz Castro, emphasized to all magistrates of all levels of the judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of care should be exercised in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the decision becomes final. The adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties, and the dispositions made as well as the directions and instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally leaving absolutely no room for dispute, debate or interpretation.28
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
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28 Padua v. Robles, 66 SCRA 485 (1975).
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SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party thereto can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void. (Apiag vs. Cantero, 268 SCRA 47 [1997])
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 [1997]) [Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760(1998)]

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G.R. No. 129242. January 16, 2001.* PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals

VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001

Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Ricardo E. Aragones for respondents.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

The antecedent facts5 are as follows:

5 Petition, Annex G, Rollo, pp. 52-59.

VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001

Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals

6 Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 18-25.

7 Branch 35, Presided by Judge Ramon P. Makasiar.

8 Petition, Annex C, Rollo, pp. 27-34.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals

9 Petition, Annex D, supra.

10 Petition, Annex F, supra.

VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001

Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals

11 Petition, Annex G, supra.

12 Petition, Annex K, supra.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals

The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

13 Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 21-23.

14 Now Article 151 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001

Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:

18 Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 23-24.

19 Petition, Annex D, Rollo, pp. 39-43.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals

21 Chico vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33, 36 (1998).

VOL. 349, JANUARY 16, 2001

Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals

22 Article 151 of the Family Code of the Philippines now reads:

24 Rule 1, Section 3(a) of the Rules of Court.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals

Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Hernandez

VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 9, 1996

Republic vs. Hernandez

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Hernandez

VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 9, 1996

Republic vs. Hernandez

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Hernandez

VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 9, 1996

Republic vs. Hernandez

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Hernandez

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

1 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 37-40; per Presiding Judge Jose R. Hernandez.