Section Questions, November 20/21, 2013 1.

How has airpower been used against insurgent and guerrilla armies in the post-WWII world? What are the strengths and limitations of airpower against non-state forces? 2. Do the technological changes made since the 1960s, especially in the United States armed forces, represent a new revolution in warfare as some have suggested? Why or why not?

1. Initially, conventional air forces attempted to apply the same doctrine of airpower against other conventional forces to insurgent and guerilla armies. A cursory overview demonstrates this should not be expected to work. Insurgent and guerilla forces do not necessarily have strategic targets or supply lines to attack, nor do they have opposing air forces to contest for air superiority. The initial failure of conventional doctrine compelled conventional air forces to adjust their doctrine. The general pattern that has emerged is that against an insurgent force, the air doctrine must conform to the situation much more tightly. For example, in Vietnam, agent Orange and napalm were used to great effect because the dense foliage was an optimal terrain to use these tools in. In the battle of Tora Bora, coordination between the mujahedeen, ODAs, and US air power allowed close air support to provide effective anti-insurgent measures in the vast openness of Tora Bora. This was so effective to the point that the US was able to drive UBL to a last stand situation in a fortress that had held against the USSR in the 80s. The key element here is there now must be even more coordination with ground forces for the effective use of air power. No longer is it a question whether air power can dominate a war; we now require a coordination between all branches of the military to be effective in any dimension. In the fight against non-state forces, there are some distinct advantages and disadvantages of air power. First off, since non-state forces typically have little capital to construct a competing air force, air superiority is almost guaranteed for the conventional force. However, nonconventional forces are typically masters of using the terrain, which they are usually indigenous to. This means that to employ air power more effectively, the conventional power must adjust doctrine and rely on ground forces as well; this strains resources and is a disadvantage of air power in this situation. 2. Yes, the technological change since the 1960s does represent a new military revolution. This is a revolution of information and communication. The development of multiple methods of safely reconnoitering the enemy and communicating that information to a commander has led to a whole new level of efficiency and coherency within armies. Furthermore, the development of the doctrine and employment of smaller units who are trained with greater capabilities has been fleshed out in this period. For example, the US implemented JSOC after the failure of the Tehran hostage rescue. JSOC allowed for an interservice coordination between these elite units that proved effective in multiple operations since then. Perhaps the biggest change since the 1960s is the more widespread nuclear capabilities in the international sphere. Despite the development of anti-nuclear capabilities that rival that of nuclear capabilities, the widespread nature of nuclear capabilities deter large power from engaging in war. This is something that has

never been seen before; when two large powers are so adverse to igniting a war between them. Ultimately, all these changes constitute a new military revolution since the 1960s.